[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 166 (Monday, August 29, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52834-52835]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-18504]


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11842]


Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Administrative Debarment 
Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Involving Ryan 
Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has 
imposed administrative debarment under the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) on Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke.

DATES: Debarment imposed as of August 29, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jae E. Shin, Director, Office of 
Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs, Department of State (202) 632-2107.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 127.7(c)(2) of the ITAR authorizes 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to 
debar any person who has been found pursuant to part 128 of the ITAR to 
have committed a violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or 
when such violation is of such character as to provide a reasonable 
basis for the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to believe that the 
violator cannot be relied upon to comply with the AECA or ITAR in the 
future. Such debarment prohibits the subject from participating 
directly or indirectly in the export of defense articles or defense 
services for which a license or other approval is required by the ITAR.
    Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in 
activity regulated under the ITAR (see, e.g., Sec.  120.1(c) and (d), 
Sec.  126.7, Sec.  127.1(c), and Sec.  127.11(a)). The Department of 
State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for 
approvals that involve any debarred person.
    Between January 2016 and November 2019, Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and 
Daniel Gericke (``Respondents'') were employed by DarkMatter Group 
(DarkMatter), a privately held technology and cyber services company 
headquartered and organized in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that 
furnished cyber services to the UAE government. Prior to working at 
DarkMatter, a foreign corporation registered in the UAE, Respondents 
were employed by CyberPoint International LLC (CyberPoint) a U.S.-based 
company that furnished cyber services to the UAE government pursuant to 
ITAR licenses or other approvals, including technical assistance 
agreements. CyberPoint and DarkMatter were competitors, and in late 
2015 and early 2016, the UAE government transitioned its contracts for 
cyber services from CyberPoint to DarkMatter. During this time period, 
DarkMatter hired certain U.S.-person former managers of CyberPoint, 
including Respondents.
    Respondents possessed computer network exploitation (CNE) expertise 
that included the development, maintenance, deployment, and operation 
of software and hardware designed to obtain unauthorized access to 
electronic devices and accounts. Respondents used their CNE expertise 
to provide and support CNE services to persons and entities in the UAE 
and the UAE government on behalf of DarkMatter.
    Among their other activities, Respondents created certain zero-
click computer hacking and intelligence gathering systems that 
Respondents specially designed, developed, maintained, and operated to 
allow its users access to tens of millions of devices for the UAE 
government's intelligence purposes. The services Respondents performed 
in connection with the relevant systems constituted furnishing defense 
services under U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XI(d) because: (a) 
the relevant systems were electronic systems, equipment, or software 
that were specially designed for intelligence purposes that collect, 
survey, monitor, exploit, analyze, or produce information from the 
electromagnetic spectrum as described in USML Category XI(b); and (b) 
Respondents assisted foreign persons in the use, design, development, 
engineering, production, modification, testing, maintenance, 
processing, or operation of the relevant systems. Respondents did not 
have a license or other approval to furnish such ITAR-controlled 
defense services.
    As a result of these violations, on July 7, 2022 (Adams and Baier) 
and August 5, 2022 (Gericke), the Department of State and Respondents 
entered into Consent Agreements that administratively debarred 
Respondents until July 7, 2025 and August 5, 2025, respectively, and 
pursuant to order of the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military 
Affairs they are administratively debarred. Reinstatement after July 7, 
2025 and August 5, 2025 is not automatic but contingent on full 
compliance with the terms of the July 7, 2022 and August 5, 2022, 
Consent Agreements and evidence that the underlying problems that gave 
rise to the violations have been corrected. At the end of the debarment 
period, Respondents may apply for reinstatement. Until licensing 
privileges are reinstated, Respondents will remain administratively 
debarred.
    This notice is provided to make the public aware that the persons 
listed above are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly 
in any brokering activities and in any export from or temporary import 
into the United States of defense articles, related technical data, or 
defense services in all situations covered by the ITAR.
    Exceptions may be made to this denial policy on a case-by-case 
basis at the discretion of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. 
However, such an exception would be granted only after a full review of 
all circumstances, paying particular attention to the following 
factors: whether an exception is warranted by overriding U.S. foreign 
policy or national security interests; whether an exception would 
further law enforcement concerns that are consistent with foreign 
policy or national security interests of the United States; or whether 
other compelling circumstances exist that are consistent with the 
foreign policy or national security interests of the United States, and 
law enforcement concerns.
    This notice involves a foreign affairs function of the United 
States encompassed within the meaning of the military and foreign 
affairs exclusion of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because the 
exercise of this foreign affairs function is highly discretionary,

[[Page 52835]]

it is excluded from review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Kevin E. Bryant,
Acting Director, Office of Directives Management, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022-18504 Filed 8-26-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-25-P