[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 146 (Monday, August 1, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 46892-46903]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16443]


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 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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  Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 146 / Monday, August 1, 2022 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 46892]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 25 and 121

[Docket No.: FAA-2022-0772; Notice No. 22-05]
RIN 2120-AL59


Installation and Operation of Flightdeck Installed Physical 
Secondary Barriers on Transport Category Airplanes in Part 121 Service

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would implement a mandate in the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring that certain airplanes used to 
conduct domestic, flag, or supplemental passenger-carrying operations 
have an installed physical secondary barrier that protects the 
flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck door is 
opened.

DATES: Send comments on or before September 30, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2022-0772 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to www.regulations.gov and 
follow the online instructions for sending your comments 
electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, 
West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
    Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments 
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts 
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the 
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system 
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 
www.dot.gov/privacy.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions for 
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Jacquet, AIR-626, Human-Machine 
Interface Section, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; 
telephone (206) 231-3208; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes 
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation 
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in Subtitle 
VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General Requirements.'' 
Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations and 
minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This 
regulation is within the scope of that authority.
    In addition, section 336, ``Secondary Cockpit Barriers,'' of the 
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Public Law 115-254 (Oct. 5, 2018),\1\ 
directs the Administrator of the FAA to issue an order requiring 
installation of a secondary flightdeck barrier on ``each new aircraft 
that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air carrier in the 
United States operating under the provisions of part 121 of title 14, 
Code of Federal Regulations.''
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    \1\ Referred to as ``the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018'' in 
this rule.
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I. Overview of Proposed Rule

    This proposed rule would implement \2\ Section 336 of the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by proposing to require the installation 
and use of an installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that would be 
deployed (closed and locked) whenever the flightdeck door is opened 
while the airplane is in flight. The purpose of this IPSB would be to 
impede unauthorized access to the flightdeck. The IPSB would be 
required to resist intrusion and meet certain physical standards, but 
still permit line-of-sight visibility between the flightdeck door and 
the cabin.
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    \2\ The FAA determined that an informal rulemaking proceeding 
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act is appropriate 
to prospectively apply these requirements on certain newly-
manufactured airplanes.
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    This proposal would affect operators conducting passenger-carrying 
operations under 14 CFR part 121 with transport category airplanes 
operating in the United States by requiring the operators to use the 
IPSB, when installed, as part of their procedures for opening the 
flightdeck door. This proposed rule would apply to transport category 
airplanes manufactured two years after the effective date of a final 
rule.

II. Background

A. Congressional Mandate

    On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted the FAA Reauthorization Act of 
2018. Section 336 of the Act states:

    (a) SHORT TITLE.--This section may be cited as the ``Saracini 
Aviation Safety Act of 2018.''
    (b) REQUIREMENT.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall issue an order requiring installation of a 
secondary flightdeck barrier on each new aircraft that is 
manufactured for delivery to a passenger air carrier in the United 
States operating under the provisions of part 121.

B. History

    Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA adopted 
standards for

[[Page 46893]]

flightdeck security in January 2002 by adding 14 CFR 25.795 and 
amending Sec.  121.313.\3\ Those amendments were intended to make the 
flightdeck resistant to forcible intrusion and small firearms, and 
prevent unauthorized entry into the flightdeck. These requirements were 
based on International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards,\4\ 
and recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee \5\ 
(ARAC), which were developed by the Design for Security Harmonization 
Working Group. ARAC includes representatives of aircraft owners and 
operators, airmen and flight crewmembers, airports, aircraft 
maintenance providers, aircraft manufacturers, public citizen and 
passenger groups, training providers, and labor organizations.
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    \3\ Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on 
Transport Category Airplanes, 67 FR 2117 (January 15, 2002).
    \4\ Adopted by Amendment 97 to Annex 8 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation on March 12, 1997.
    \5\ See Advisory and Rulemaking Committees--ICAO Amendment 97 to 
Annex 8 and Resistance to Intrusion Complete File (Design for 
Security HWG, TAE), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/342.
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    Even a strong and secure flightdeck door, however, must 
occasionally be opened, in order to provide for necessary events such 
as lavatory breaks and meal service. Between the time of opening and 
closing the flightdeck door (door transition), the open flightdeck has 
some degree of vulnerability to attack. Such an attack could happen 
quickly, and arguably leave insufficient time for the cabin crew to 
react.
    Therefore, in 2007, the FAA promulgated requirements \6\ to address 
the security of the flightdeck when the flightdeck door was opened, 
however briefly. Specifically, the FAA adopted Sec. Sec.  121.584 and 
121.587 to require that the flightdeck door be locked when the airplane 
is in operation, unless it is necessary to open it to permit access by 
authorized persons, and require compliance with FAA-approved procedures 
for opening the door.
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    \6\ Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting 
Systems, 72 FR 45629 (August 15, 2007).
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    As a result of these new requirements, air carriers and type design 
holders developed various methods and designs, including use of 
crewmembers and equipment and, in limited cases, IPSBs,\7\ to help 
secure the flightdeck during the period when the flightdeck door was 
open during flight. To provide guidance and recommendations for these 
different methods and designs, RTCA, Inc.\8\ formed a committee to 
develop recommended procedures and standards for airplane secondary 
barriers. In 2011, RTCA produced DO-329, ``Aircraft Secondary Barriers 
and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures.'' DO-329 describes 
various means of addressing the times when the flightdeck door must be 
opened. In this context, these means can be combinations of people, 
procedures and/or equipment. The document does not recommend one of 
these means over another, but provides advice on the use of each one to 
meet the objective of a secure flightdeck. Subsequently and based on 
the RTCA's report, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-110, 
``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternate Flight Deck Security 
Procedures,'' in 2015. That AC references various means of compliance 
with Sec.  121.584(a)(1), which prohibits the flightdeck door from 
being unlocked during flight unless the operator has an approved 
procedure and visual device to verify that the area outside the 
flightdeck door is secure.
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    \7\ Relatively few such IPSBs were installed, relative to the 
total number of airplanes in scheduled service, and most have since 
been removed. The FAA is not aware of the reasons for removal. In 
addition, the FAA has no data regarding whether those varying 
installations would have met the requirements of this proposal.
    \8\ RTCA was formerly the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics and an Advisory Committee to the FAA.
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C. ARAC Report

    On June 20, 2019, to facilitate the implementation of the mandate 
in Section 336 to require secondary barriers on certain aircraft, the 
FAA tasked ARAC \9\ to recommend standards for IPSB. The ARAC formed 
the Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group, under the Transport 
Airplane and Engine Subcommittee, to carry out the tasks. The Working 
Group included representatives from manufacturers, air carriers, and 
pilot and flight attendant unions. On February 27, 2020, the Working 
Group submitted its ``Recommendation Report to Aviation Rulemaking 
Advisory Committee for Implementation of Section 336 of Public Law 115-
254'' (the Report) \10\ to ARAC. ARAC accepted the Report in March of 
2020 and forwarded it to the FAA.\11\
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    \9\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Tasking Notice (June 20, 
2019), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=3943.
    \10\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barriers Working Group Report, 
available in the docket for this rulemaking and at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=4342.
    \11\ See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Meeting 
(June 18, 2020), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20June%202020%20Meeting%20Packet.pdf.
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    The Report contained 21 recommendations, most of which were by 
consensus. This NPRM incorporates those consensus recommendations.\12\ 
The Report included suggestions on the scope and potential cost of the 
requirement for IPSB, as well as the performance standards that the FAA 
should include in a proposed rule. The FAA carefully considered all 
recommendations and plans to address certain recommendations 
appropriately through guidance. The following summarized 
recommendations are pertinent to this regulatory proposal.
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    \12\ The Report also included three recommendations on which the 
Working Group could not agree, but it provided alternatives. 
Recommendation 19 suggested either a full risk assessment by the FAA 
and air carriers of the secondary barriers currently in use, or the 
continuous evaluation in the future by air carriers of such 
secondary barrier systems under their Safety Management Systems. 
Recommendation 20 suggested either requiring two flight attendants 
onboard every aircraft, or a more particularized assessment of the 
effectiveness of the relevant operational procedures, when only one 
flight attendant is on board. Finally, Recommendation 21 suggested 
implementation times of either 18 or 36 months.
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    The Report recommended that:
--The FAA promulgate a part 25 design standard for IPSB to resist a 
600-pound push load (toward the flightdeck), and a 250-pound pull load 
(away from the flightdeck), applied at certain critical locations.
--The FAA require these load requirements only to be static, rather 
than the more conservative dynamic, because the purpose of the IPSB is 
to delay access to the flightdeck door for only the time necessary for 
the door to be shut and locked.
--The IPSB be able to resist an intrusion attempt for five seconds, so 
as to provide a two-second margin above the expected three-second time 
needed to close and lock the flightdeck door.
--The FAA require the IPSB to be designed such that it would not be 
possible for a 50th percentile male to reach through the IPSB and grab 
an open flightdeck door.
--The IPSB be sufficiently transparent, whether through open space or 
transparent material, to provide situational awareness between the 
vestibule area (outside the flightdeck) and the passenger cabin, and 
that the FAA's design requirements for the IPSB account for human 
needs, that is, providing room for crew changes, meal service, etc.
--That the FAA take any actions needed for the IPSB to be certified to 
existing

[[Page 46894]]

part 25 standards.\13\ Such actions could, according to the Report, 
include excepting a proposed IPSB from conflicting part 25 regulations, 
such as those relating to emergency evacuation and aisle width. Such an 
exception would not, according to the Report, have a meaningful adverse 
impact on safety, due to the limited time during flight that the IPSB 
would be deployed.
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    \13\ Part 25 contains the airworthiness standards (i.e., design 
requirements) for transport category airplanes.
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--That the FAA require part 121 certificate holders to incorporate the 
IPSB's use into their procedures for opening the flightdeck door of 
newly-manufactured airplanes, and impose compliance times of 18 or 36 
months \14\ for when the use of the IPSB would be required as part of 
the certificate holder's operation of newly-manufactured airplanes.
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    \14\ These varying times were based on different estimates of 
the amount of time that would be necessary to develop and certify 
the IPSB. Report, pp. 23-25.

    Lastly, the Report recommended the FAA not impose a similar 
requirement for all-cargo operations or operations conducted under 14 
CFR part 129.\15\ The Report suggested the FAA consider whether the 
operational rule should account for smaller airplanes, because such 
airplanes may only have one cabin crewmember and flights of lesser 
duration, and the flightdeck door may be less likely to be opened.
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    \15\ Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either 
within the United States, or who operate solely outside the United 
States but with airplanes registered in the United States.
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III. Discussion of the Proposal

A. Proposed Part 25 Requirement for IPSB

    The FAA proposes to require installation of an IPSB on certain 
airplanes used by air carriers to conduct passenger-carrying flights 
and for which the applicable operating rules (14 CFR 121.313(f)) 
require a reinforced flightdeck door.\16\ Such IPSBs would be required 
to meet certain new design requirements, which would be set forth in a 
new paragraph (4) to Sec.  25.795(a).
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    \16\ Part 121 of title 14 establishes minimum operating 
standards for part 119 certificate holders who wish to conduct 
domestic, flag, or supplemental operations.
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    Part 25 prescribes airworthiness standards for the issuance of type 
certificates, and changes to those certificates, for transport category 
airplanes.\17\ Each person who applies for such a certificate or change 
for such airplanes must show compliance with the applicable 
requirements in part 25. As such, the proposed part 25 revisions 
establish the IPSB performance standards, but do not specify which 
aircraft need IPSB installed, or that the IPSB must be used when 
showing compliance with Sec.  121.584. This is accomplished by proposed 
changes to part 121.\18\
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    \17\ Transport category airplanes are airplanes for which a type 
certificate is applied for under part 21 in the transport category 
and that meet the transport category airworthiness requirements. 
Multi-engine airplanes with more than 19 seats or a maximum takeoff 
weight greater than 19,000 lbs must be certificated in the transport 
category.
    \18\ The FAA authorizes scheduled air service by issuing a part 
119 certificate for operations under part 121. Air carriers 
authorized to operate under part 121 are generally large, U.S.-based 
airlines, regional air carriers, and certain cargo operators.
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    The IPSB would need to resist intrusion and meet certain strength 
and other standards, as described below.
1. Intrusion Resistance
    The proposed requirement for resisting intrusion into the 
flightdeck must meet three criteria. First, the IPSB must be 
``physical,'' i.e., an object rather than only procedures. Second, the 
IPSB must be a ``barrier,'' in that it must occupy sufficient space 
that it cannot be avoided (i.e., by going over, under, or around it) to 
get access to the flightdeck door. Third, to resist intrusion, the IPSB 
must impede physical force in the event a person tries to overcome the 
IPSB, including by attempting to open or push through it.
2. Proposed Load Requirements
    The IPSB would be required to resist certain intrusion loads 
applied in both the direction of the flightdeck and the direction of 
the passenger cabin,\19\ at the most critical locations on the IPSB. 
Given the variety of IPSB designs and failure modes that are possible, 
this rule would require application of the loads at the most critical 
locations for the particular design. For each load requirement, an 
applicant would have to identify and justify the most critical 
locations to apply these loads for its particular design. The applied 
loads would be considered ultimate loads.\20\
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    \19\ For purposes of this preamble, the terms passenger 
``cabin'' and passenger ``compartment'' refer to the same area of 
the airplane and therefore are used synonymously.
    \20\ Design loads are typically expressed in terms of limit 
loads, which are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5, 
to determine ultimate loads. See 14 CFR 25.301, 25.303, and 25.305. 
In this proposal, the design loads would be expressed as ultimate 
loads, and no additional safety factor would be applied.
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    The FAA proposes the use of static, rather than dynamic, loads \21\ 
for this requirement. Specifically, the FAA proposes a 600-pound static 
load in the direction of the flightdeck. This proposal is consistent 
with Recommendation 1 of the Report, which was derived from Working 
Group discussions regarding the potential means available on board 
(i.e., persons) to exert such loads, coupled with the proprietary 
results of intrusion testing conducted by airframe manufacturers. 
Regarding the need to resist intrusion loads applied in the direction 
of the passenger cabin i.e., by a person pulling on the barrier, the 
IPSB and the flightdeck door are effectively the same. Therefore, an 
acceptable load of 250 pounds in the direction of the passenger cabin 
would correspond to the constant 250-pound tensile load requirement in 
Sec.  25.795(a)(2) for the flightdeck door. This would allow some 
commonality with testing of the flightdeck door.
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    \21\ In this context, ``static'' means a load that is constant 
and the rate of load application is not important; ``dynamic'' means 
a load for which both the magnitude and the rate of load application 
with respect to time are important.
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    The FAA proposes static rather than dynamic loads for these 
performance standards because the purpose of the IPSB is to provide 
resistance to intrusion during the comparatively short time necessary 
for the flightdeck door to be reopened by the flightcrew member and 
then closed and locked. This is in contrast to a barrier such as a 
flightdeck door, which must provide near-continuous security throughout 
the flight. For such barriers, the required dynamic loads of Sec.  
25.795(a)(1) are designed to simulate how the door may have to respond 
in service. For the IPSB, a simpler assessment--of static strength (as 
assessed by its ability to withstand applied loads)--in combination 
with the other proposed requirements, provides an acceptable way to 
determine that the IPSB resists access. Because dynamic load testing is 
generally more conservative than static load testing, an applicant 
could choose to use dynamic testing in order to demonstrate compliance 
with the static load performance requirements.
    The FAA's proposed guidance on methods of testing these static load 
requirements is in proposed AC 25.795-X, which is discussed in the 
``Proposed Guidance'' section of this document.
3. Proposed Delay Requirement
    This proposed rule would require the IPSB be designed to slow the 
time by which a person could reach the flightdeck for at least the time 
required to open and reclose the flightdeck door, but no less than 5 
seconds. This is the time cited in Recommendation 18 of the Report. 
This duration is reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the 
IPSB.

[[Page 46895]]

The proposed requirement that the IPSB need only resist intrusion to 
the flightdeck when the flightdeck door is opened would permit the IPSB 
to be deployed as needed and stowed when not needed.
4. Proposed Visibility Requirement
    The FAA proposes that the IPSB provide enough line-of-sight 
visibility to allow crewmember situational awareness of the area 
between the passenger cabin and the entry to the flightdeck. Due to the 
physical nature of the IPSB, maintaining situational awareness of the 
area between the passenger cabin and the vestibule area when the IPSB 
is deployed is important if crewmembers on either side of the IPSB need 
to act. The proposed design would be evaluated during certification to 
assess whether it meets the above performance standard. For example, 
such visibility could be accomplished via the type of material used to 
construct the IPSB or via open space (e.g., holes, slots, or other 
openings) in the IPSB. This visibility requirement would be codified in 
new Sec.  121.313(l).
5. Proposed Reach-Through Requirement
    Such openings, however, could defeat the purpose of the IPSB if 
they allowed a person to reach through the barrier and grab the open 
flightdeck door. Therefore the FAA proposes to require, in new Sec.  
25.795(a)(4), that the IPSB prevent a person from doing so. The FAA 
would provide compliance guidance in Advisory Circular 25.795-X. This 
guidance would allow an applicant to show compliance using methods that 
include anthropometric reference values of a 50th percentile male, 
coupled with a maximum recommended spacing for any openings in the 
barrier.\22\
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    \22\ As noted above, ARAC recommended the FAA prevent reach-
through by a 50th percentile male, but the FAA proposes that a 
regulation which prevents a ``person'' from reaching through would 
be understandable and consistent with FAA regulatory practice, and 
can be explained in the relevant guidance material.
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6. Proposed Exception From Incompatible Regulations
    The FAA requests comment on its proposed method of certifying IPSB 
installations. The FAA proposes that, during its certification of the 
IPSB installation, the requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.365, 25.803, 
25.813, 25.815, 25.1411, and 25.1447 would not apply to IPSBs in the 
deployed configuration. An IPSB, when deployed to block access to the 
flightdeck, cannot reasonably be expected to meet certain design 
requirements for transport category airplanes, such as those relating 
to rapid decompression, emergency evacuation, aisle width, and 
accessibility to the emergency equipment. Moreover, because this rule 
would not require that the IPSB be deployed during taxi, takeoff, and 
landing, and because the IPSB should be immediately stowed after use, 
the amount of time that the IPSB is deployed should be very brief in 
comparison to the duration of the flight. This configuration-based 
compliance method would be similar to the FAA's longstanding method of 
certification of lavatory doors, in which the FAA considers the 
position of the door when making compliance findings. Depending on the 
proposed design, it may be necessary for an applicant to petition for 
exemption from certain regulations during the certification process.
7. Proposed Human Factors Considerations
    The FAA proposes that the design of the IPSB, whether deployed or 
stowed, must allow for necessary crewmember activities. This would 
include providing adequate space for activities that include crew 
change-outs, restroom breaks, meal service, etc.

B. Proposed Part 121 Requirement to Use Installed Physical Secondary 
Barriers (IPSB)

    The FAA proposes a new paragraph (l) in Sec.  121.313 that would 
require all airplanes that Sec.  121.313(f) requires to have a lockable 
door, and all transport category airplanes that have a door installed 
between the flightdeck and any other occupied compartment, to 
incorporate an IPSB that meets the requirements of proposed Sec.  
25.795(a)(4). This proposed requirement would apply to newly-
manufactured airplanes two years after the effective date of this rule. 
This approach is consistent with the FAA's existing method of 
implementing the requirements for reinforced flightdeck doors and is 
discussed in more detail below. If the operating rules require a 
flightdeck door on the airplane, Sec.  25.795, which currently 
specifies the requirements for the flightdeck door, would add the 
requirements for the IPSB.
    An FAA requirement to simply install an IPSB would not necessarily 
ensure that the IPSB is deployed. Therefore, the FAA also proposes that 
operators incorporate the use of the IPSB into their flightdeck door 
opening procedures required by Sec.  121.584. These procedures contain 
requirements to verify, prior to unlocking or opening a flightdeck 
door, that the area outside the flightdeck door is secure and, if 
someone outside the flightdeck seeks to have the flightdeck door 
opened, then that person is not under duress. New Sec.  121.584(a)(3) 
would require an operator to deploy (close and lock) the IPSB, if one 
was required to be installed on that airplane in accordance with new 
Sec.  121.313(l), before opening the flightdeck door during flight.
    An operational procedure included in the operator's methods of 
compliance with Sec.  121.584 would apply to uses of the IPSB. Some or 
all of the operator's existing procedures could be retained (e.g., the 
procedure for a flight attendant to enter the flightdeck when one of 
the flightcrew leaves, to meet the requirements of Sec.  121.587(b)), 
while others may need to be removed or replaced (e.g., the use of a 
serving cart as an improvised non-installed barrier). Depending on the 
operator's procedures for opening the flightdeck door, an IPSB has the 
potential benefit of requiring only one flight attendant to carry out 
those procedures. One flight attendant could both deploy the secondary 
barrier, and enter the flightdeck when a pilot leaves the flightdeck. 
In contrast, typical current procedures for opening the flightdeck door 
necessitate more than one flight attendant.
    The requirements of Sec.  121.584 are only applicable when the 
flightdeck door is to be unlocked or opened. To comply with Sec.  
121.584 and protect the area just outside the flightdeck door, 
deployment of the IPSB would occur prior to unlocking or opening the 
flightdeck door. The FAA expects that the IPSB would remain deployed 
until after the flightdeck door is closed and locked. Accordingly, the 
IPSB would be in the stowed position during taxi, takeoff, landing, and 
the majority of flight.
    Any training for operation of the IPSB should be tailored to meet 
operational requirements of various designs. Non-prescriptive examples 
of procedures are found in appendix B of the Report.
1. Proposed Two-Year Compliance Time
    The FAA proposes a compliance time of two years, after which any 
transport category airplane manufactured and used in passenger-carrying 
operations under part 121 would be required to have an IPSB meeting the 
requirements of proposed Sec.  25.795(a)(4). The FAA proposes this 2-
year compliance time, rather than the 18 or 36 months recommended in 
the Report, for several reasons. There are very few in-production IPSBs 
currently in existence, so most designs would be new. The means of 
showing compliance with proposed Sec.  25.795(a)(4) have not yet been 
developed nor used previously for

[[Page 46896]]

any of the IPSB that do exist. Consequently, part of the compliance 
time would be needed for both the applicant and the FAA's validation 
and refinement of the methods of compliance for both current and new 
designs. The requirements are complex and there are a large number of 
different airplane models likely to be affected. Many airplanes that 
would be required to have an IPSB will require design modification to 
permit IPSB installation.
2. Date of Manufacture
    For the purposes of this proposal, the FAA considers the date of 
manufacture to be the date on which inspection records show that an 
airplane is in a condition for safe flight. This is not necessarily the 
date on which the airplane is in conformity with the approved type 
design, or the date on which a certificate of airworthiness is issued, 
because some items not relevant to safe flight, such as passenger 
seats, might not be installed at that time. It could be earlier, but 
would be no later, than the date on which the first flight of the 
airplane occurs.\23\
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    \23\ The FAA has used the term ``date of manufacture'' in 
previous rulemakings. See the final rules entitled Improved 
Flammability Standards for Materials Used in the Interiors of 
Transport Category Airplane Cabins (60 FR 6616, 6617, February 2, 
1995), and Improved Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic 
Insulation Materials Used in Transport Category Airplanes (68 FR 
45046, 45055, July 31, 2003).
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3. Not Applicable to Part 129 Operations
    The FAA proposes to apply the requirements of proposed Sec.  
121.313(l) to passenger-carrying, transport category airplanes 
operating under part 121, and not to those airplanes operating under 14 
CFR part 129.
    Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either within the 
United States, or who operate solely outside the United States, but 
with airplanes registered in the United States.\24\ When the FAA 
adopted the reinforced flightdeck door requirements in part 121, the 
agency was concerned that aircraft operations subject to part 129 would 
be more attractive targets for terrorist actions if security was not 
similarly improved. Therefore, in June of 2002 the FAA adopted 14 CFR 
129.28 \25\ to require foreign air carriers to have the same level of 
flightdeck security as domestic air carriers. In this case, the 
requirement for an IPSB would be applicable to newly-manufactured 
airplanes only. The portion of the total fleet made up by airplanes 
that are both newly manufactured, and subject to part 129, is very 
small, so the difference in risk between the domestic fleet and the 
international fleet would not be significant under this proposal.
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    \24\ Currently there are approximately 3,400 airplanes eligible 
for operation in accordance with part 129 that are of the types that 
have a secure flightdeck door. This is approximately 35% of the part 
121/129 fleet. Imposition of the requirement could have the effect 
of reducing the number of airplanes that operators choose make 
available for operation in part 129. Given that, in ten years, less 
than half of the part 121 fleet would have been equipped by IPSBs, 
the relevance to this rule of the number of part 129 airplanes would 
remain marginal.
    \25\ Security Considerations for the Flightdeck on Foreign 
Operated Transport Category Airplanes (67 FR 42449, June 21, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, after September 11, 2001, the need to require reinforced 
flightdeck doors was recognized internationally, and civil aviation 
authorities throughout the world worked together, and with ICAO, to 
establish uniform standards.\26\ The FAA's requirements were mirrored 
by the civil aviation authorities of most other countries. In contrast, 
at this time neither ICAO nor other countries are imposing an IPSB 
requirement. An FAA requirement levied on foreign air carriers for an 
IPSB would therefore be un-harmonized, and as noted above, would not 
significantly change the composition of the international fleet since 
it would only apply to newly-produced airplanes. The FAA anticipates 
that, if there are no changes in fleet composition, by the time full 
adoption of IPSBs among the part 121 fleet occurs, approximately 35% of 
the part 121/129 fleet will lack an IPSB. Should the fleet change, or 
an IPSB requirement become an international standard, the FAA may 
reconsider its current position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ 15 March 2002, Amendment 27 to Annex 6, Part I the 
International Standards and Recommended Practices, International 
Civil Aviation Organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Size and Range
    The FAA invites comments on applying proposed Sec.  121.313(l) to 
all transport category airplanes, as well as to all airplanes with a 
flightdeck door. During a short flight, the flightdeck door may not 
need to be opened. ARAC therefore recognized that, for short flights, 
the IPSB may not provide the intended benefit. However, there is no 
obvious design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross 
weight, which correlates with short flights. Also, the maximum range of 
all of the airplane models that would be covered by this proposed rule 
exceeds the maximum flight time at which opening the flightdeck is 
unlikely. Therefore, this proposal does not consider an airplane's size 
or range, or duration of flight, but invites comment on whether any 
such limitations are appropriate.

C. Proposed Guidance

    The FAA developed proposed AC 25.795-X, ``Installation of Physical 
Secondary Barriers for Transport Category Airplanes.'' This proposed AC 
would provide guidance on acceptable means, but not the only means, of 
showing compliance with proposed Sec.  25.795(a)(4).
    In addition, the FAA has proposed revisions to AC 120-110, 
``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternate Flight Deck Security 
Procedures,'' dated April 14, 2015, to add discussion regarding the 
installation of IPSB and address other operational issues.
    The FAA will post these two proposed ACs to the docket for comment. 
The FAA will also post them to its ``Aviation Safety Draft Documents 
Open for Comment'' web page at www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct 
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon 
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. 
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of 
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act 
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In 
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with 
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's 
analysis of the impacts of the proposed rule. The FAA provides a 
detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis in the docket of this rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this proposed 
rule (1) has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is not an 
economically ``significant

[[Page 46897]]

regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 
12866; (3) would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities; (4) would not create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and (5) would 
not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, 
or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold identified above. 
These analyses are summarized below.

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

1. Benefits
    During many flights, the flightdeck door must be opened for 
lavatory breaks, meal service, rest periods, crew changes, etc. Between 
the time of opening and closing the flightdeck door (door transition), 
the open flightdeck has some degree of vulnerability to attack. This is 
especially the case for transcontinental and international flights. 
During these openings, an attack on the flightdeck could happen 
quickly; this could leave insufficient time for passengers and cabin 
crew to react. However, there have been no breaches of a flightdeck 
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
    The purpose and functional benefit of IPSBs, which Congress 
directed the FAA to require by mandate, is to enhance the flightdeck 
security procedures of 14 CFR 121.584 by slowing the time by which an 
unauthorized person could reach the flightdeck by at least the time 
required to open and reclose the flightdeck door.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Report, pp. 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A Briefing Note \28\ (Stewart and Mueller, 2019) provided to the 
ARAC Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group by one of the members, 
applied an engineering technique--reliability analysis--to the 
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) ``Layers of Security'' 
\29\ to estimate the benefits of secondary barriers in reducing the 
vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet to a 9/11-like terrorist 
attack. This approach requires estimates of ``disruption rates'' for 
the various TSA layers of security and also requires an estimate of the 
probability of a 9/11-like terrorist attack. Estimates of security 
layer disruption rates are very difficult to make and, accordingly, are 
highly uncertain. For example, Stewart and Mueller estimate a 
disruption rate of 15% for the TSA Airport Checkpoint Screening 
security layer, whereas Martonosi and Barrett \30\ estimate the 
disruption rate to be 50%. Estimating the probability of a 9/11-like 
terrorist attack is also difficult since there has been only one such 
event. Consequently, estimating quantified benefits of the proposed 
IPSB requirements is problematic. Accordingly, the FAA does not endorse 
the analysis or conclusions of this Briefing Note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, ``Security Risk and Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,'' Centre for 
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, The University of 
Newcastle, Australia (2019), nova.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/uon:35881.
    \29\ ``Inside Look: TSA Layers of Security,'' www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/08/01/inside-look-tsa-layers-security.
    \30\ Susan E. Martonosi & Arnold Barnett. 2006. ``How Effective 
is Security Screening of Airline passengers?,'' Interfaces 36(6): 
545, 550.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, based on estimates of costs of the 9/11 attacks, we have 
conducted a break-even analysis. An authoritative study \31\ of the 
costs to New York City of the 9/11 attacks provides an estimate of 
$26.6 billion in physical capital and short-term earnings losses,\32\ 
which amounts to $38.86 billion in 2021 dollars.\33\ What remains is to 
estimate the cost of the 2,763 lives lost in the 9/11 attacks. Using 
DOT's $11.8 million dollar estimate of the Value of Statistical Life 
(VSL),\34\ that loss is $32.60 billion, which added to the physical 
capital and earnings losses, makes the total New York City costs to be 
$71.46 billion. We estimate the cost of a single-airplane 9/11-type 
attack (and the value of an averted attack) to be half that at $35.73 
billion. The break-even analysis estimates what the annual probability 
of a single-airplane 9/11-type attack must be in order for the proposed 
rule to break even, i.e., for the benefits of the proposed rule to be 
equal to its costs. Dividing the $236.5 million cost \35\ of the 
proposed rule by the $35.7 billion averted attack value yields the 
break-even annual probability of an attack to be 0.66%. Multiplying 
this calculated break-even probability of attack times the $35.7 
billion averted attack value necessarily returns the $236.5 million 
break-even expected value of averting an attack. Such a break-even 
analysis implicitly assumes that the proposed rule is completely 
effective. Thus, here the proposed rule breaks even under the 
assumptions that the probability of an attempted attack is as high as 
0.66 percent per year and that the proposed rule would be 100% 
effective in thwarting any such attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport. 2002. 
``Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York 
City,'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 8:2 
(November).
    \32\ $21.6 bn in physical capital losses plus the $5 bn average 
of $3.6-$6.4 bn in short-term earnings losses.
    \33\ $26.6 bn inflated by ratio of 2021 and 2002 GDP Price 
Deflators. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ``Table 1.1.4 
Price Indexes for GDP.'' Click ``Modify'' icon and refresh table 
with first and last years of period.
    \34\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Transportation 
Policy. ``Departmental Guidance on the Value of a Statistical 
Life,'' www.dot.gov/policy/transportation-policy/economy. Effective 
Date: March 24, 2022.
    \35\ Assumes 7 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA requests comments on the incremental benefits of this 
proposed rule, including additional information and data to quantify 
benefits.
2. Costs
    The FAA uses the cost estimate of $35,000 provided by the Report 
for the purchase and installation of an IPSB. Costs are estimated in 
two stages since this proposed rule would require IPSBs be installed on 
each new airplane that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air 
carrier operating under part 121. First-stage costs are calculated for 
the 25-year period, 2023-2047, during which the fleet operating under 
part 121 gradually becomes fully equipped with IPSBs. Second-stage 
costs are calculated to include in the analysis a full 25-year airplane 
life cycle (2048-2072) for which the entire part 121 fleet is equipped 
with IPSBs.
(a) Stage One Costs
    In the preliminary analysis of the proposed rule, the FAA estimates 
the rule would begin to apply to new airplanes operating under part 121 
by the end of 2023. The FAA uses its Aerospace Forecast 2020-2040 to 
estimate the annual increase in the passenger fleet operating under 
part 121.\36\ The sum of the forecast increase in the fleet and the 
number of retirements determines the annual increase in new airplanes 
operating under part 121 and therefore the annual number of IPSBs that 
would be installed in airplanes destined for part 121 operations. 
Annual retirements are estimated assuming a retirement rate (3.57%) 
that is consistent with the 2020-2040 forecast of the number of 
airplanes in part 121 operations. A similar analysis is done to 
determine the IPSB training costs of pilots and flight attendants, 
except that training costs

[[Page 46898]]

apply to current as well as future pilots and flight attendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ FAA Forecast FY 2020-2040, Table 21: ``US Mainline Air 
Carriers--Passenger Jet Aircraft,'' & Table 25: ``Regional Air 
Carriers--Passenger Aircraft.'' Since some regional air carriers 
operate under part 135 as well as part 121, the estimate of 
airplanes operating under part 121 is improved by excluding 
airplanes with less than 20 passenger seats. Estimates for the 
period 2040-2047 are made assuming the growth rate (1.74%) implied 
by the FAA part 121 airplane numbers for 2030 and 2040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Stage Two Costs
    As previously noted, second-stage costs are calculated in order to 
include a full 25-year airplane life cycle (2048-2072) for which the 
entire part 121 fleet is equipped with IPSBs. For this second stage, 
the FAA is well beyond the terminal date of the FAA forecast and, 
accordingly, assumes a constant growth rate for the part 121 fleet. The 
constant growth rates for pilots and flight attendants are as before.
(c) Other Potential Costs
    Stewart and Mueller also discuss potential added risks associated 
with IPSBs, including, for example, that crew vigilance and 
responsiveness might be reduced in the presence of an IPSB. The FAA 
notes that it does not find significant downsides to the installation 
of the ISPBs if all other relevant regulations are complied with.
(c) Total Costs of the Rule
    Table 1 summarizes the total costs of the proposed rule by 
combining stage one and stage two costs. At a seven percent discount 
rate, the present value total costs of the proposed rule are $236.5 
million with annualized costs at $20.3 million. At a three percent 
discount rate, the present value total costs of the proposed rule are 
$505.0 million with annualized costs at $ 29.0 million.

                            Table 1--Total Costs of Secondary Barriers Proposed Rule
                                                  [$ millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Present value    Annualized     Present value    Annualized
                                                    costs (7%)      costs (7%)      costs (3%)      costs (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023-2047.......................................          $186.0           $16.0          $296.5           $17.0
2048-2072.......................................            50.4             4.3           208.6            12.0
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
2023-2072.......................................           236.5            20.3           505.0            29.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Present values discounted to 2021 at 7% and 3% discount rates.
2. Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.

3. Discussion of Alternatives
(a) Alternative 1--Extending the Proposed Rule To Include Foreign 
Carriers Operating Under Part 129 \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either 
within the United States, or who operate solely outside the United 
States, but with airplanes registered in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time neither other countries nor ICAO have identified 
secondary barriers as a security priority. Therefore, extending the 
IPSB requirement to foreign air carriers would be un-harmonized. After 
the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA did apply the hardened 
flightdeck door requirement to foreign air carriers, but the need for 
hardened flightdeck doors was recognized internationally and the FAA's 
standards were reflected in the requirements of most other countries. 
The FAA estimates that by the time IPSBs are fully adopted among part 
121 aircraft, 35% of operating commercial passenger aircraft (parts 121 
and 129) will not have an IPSB.
(b) Alternative 2--Exempting the Proposed Rule for Short Duration 
Flights
    ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door may 
not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the 
intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify any airplane 
design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross weight 
that correlates with short flights. Also, the range of all the airplane 
models that would be affected by this proposed rule exceeds the maximum 
flight length at which opening the flightdeck door is unlikely. 
Therefore, this proposal does not address an airplane's size or range, 
or duration of flight, but invites comment on whether any such 
limitations are appropriate.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, Public Law 96-354, 94 
Stat. 1164 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 
857, Mar. 29, 1996) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 
111-240, 124 Stat. 2504, Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal agencies to 
consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and 
other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. 
The term ``small entities'' comprises small businesses and not-for-
profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are 
not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with 
populations of less than 50,000.
    The FAA is publishing this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(IRFA) to aid the public in commenting on the potential impacts to 
small entities from this proposal. The FAA invites interested parties 
to submit data and information regarding the potential economic impact 
that would result from the proposal. The FAA will consider comments 
when making a determination or when completing a Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Assessment.
    Under sections 603(b) and (c) of the RFA, an IRFA must contain the 
following:
    (1) A description of the reasons why the action by the agency is 
being considered;
    (2) A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis for, 
the proposed rule;
    (3) A description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number 
of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply;
    (4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and 
other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an 
estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the 
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for 
preparation of the report or record;
    (5) An identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant 
Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the 
proposed rule; and
    (6) A description of any significant alternatives to the proposed 
rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and 
which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on 
small entities.
1. Reasons the Action Is Being Considered
    Publication of the rule will satisfy the requirements of section 
336 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. This law requires that the 
FAA issue an order for the installation of Secondary Cockpit Barriers 
on each new airplane that is manufactured for delivery to a

[[Page 46899]]

passenger air carrier in the United States operating under title 14 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 121.
2. Objectives and Legal Basis of the Proposed Rule
    The objective of the proposed rule is to require all airplanes in 
part 121 passenger operations to have an Installed Physical Secondary 
Barrier (IPSB). The IPSB would be deployed between the flightdeck and 
passenger compartments before the flightdeck door was opened so as to 
protect the flightdeck during the time that the door was opened and 
closed. This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
Requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing 
regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of 
airplanes that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air 
commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority.
3. All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
    There are no relevant Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or 
conflict with the proposed rule.
4. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities
    The FAA used the definition of small entities in the RFA for this 
analysis. The RFA defines small entities as small businesses, small 
governmental jurisdictions, or small organizations. In 5 U.S.C. 601(3), 
the RFA defines ``small business'' to have the same meaning as ``small 
business concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. The Small 
Business Act authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to 
define ``small business'' by issuing regulations.
    SBA has established size standards for various types of economic 
activities, or industries, under the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).\38\ These size standards generally 
define small businesses based on the number of employees or annual 
receipts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards 
(2019). www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NAICS has classified certificate holders operating under part 121 
in either NAICS 481111, Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation or NAICS 
481211, Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger Air Transportation, or both. 
Since the size standard for either industry is the same at 1500 
employees, it is of no concern in which of the two industries they are 
classified.
    In the regulatory impact analysis for this rulemaking, a total of 
43 operators operating under part 121 were identified in the FAA's 
National Vital Information Subsystem (NVIS) data base. Table 2 lists 23 
of these operators identified in this study as having less than 1500 
employees and therefore potentially subject to consideration under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. Twelve of these operators were identified 
as small based on airline employment data (Table 2, col. 3) from the 
DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics.\39\ The remaining eleven 
operators were identified as having less than 1500 total employees on 
the basis of their numbers of operations and maintenance employees 
(also from the NVIS database). One of the small operators, Piedmont 
Airlines, was excluded from the regulatory flexibility analysis as it 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines. Since the remaining 
22 small operators are more than 50% of the part 21 operator 
population, the FAA estimates that a substantial number of small firms 
are affected by this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Transtats.bts.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

[[Page 46900]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU22.022


[[Page 46901]]


BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    Since the secondary barriers proposed rule would apply to only new 
airplanes entering the fleet, the analysis assumes that each operator's 
current fleet is replaced immediately even though the fleet airplanes 
generally will be replaced only when they are retired. Though airplanes 
could be retired any time over the next 25 years depending on the age 
of the airplane, the analysis assumes immediate replacement to ensure 
that the economic impact is not underestimated. The regulatory impact 
analysis assumes that the average retirement age of transport category 
airplanes is 25 years.
    The economic impact is assessed using 11 of the 22 small operators 
for which revenue data is available from Cirium's (formerly 
FlightGlobal) FlightFleets Analyzer. The analysis uses average revenue 
for the five-year period 2015-2019. Revenue figures for the 11 
operators are available for an average of 3.45 years. For an operator, 
the economic impact is measured as the estimated $35,000 cost of an 
FAA-certified IPSB times number of airplanes, as a percentage of the 
average revenue. The number of airplanes is from the SPAS database as 
of January 9, 2020. The regulatory impact analysis also considers 
training costs for flight attendants and pilots, but these costs are 
not included here as they have a trivial effect on the results.
    As Table 2 shows, the economic impact ranges from .06% and 1.13% of 
sales, which averages to 0.60%. On a 2% criterion that the economic 
impact is significant only if the IPSB cost is at least 2% of a small 
firm's annual revenues, there is no significant economic impact for any 
small firm. On a 1% criterion, the economic impact is barely 
significant for just 2 of the 11 firms which data is available. Bearing 
in mind that these estimates are very conservative, the FAA concludes 
that there is not a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
firms. The FAA requests comments on these estimates and whether or not 
they represent a significant economic impact on the small firms 
affected by this proposed rule.
6. Significant Alternatives Considered that Minimize Economic Impacts 
on Small Entities
    The FAA evaluated alternatives to this rulemaking that could 
minimize impacts on small entities. The FAA identified only alternative 
2 of its regulatory impact analysis as potentially minimizing such 
impacts. Specifically, the FAA considered exempting short duration 
flights from the proposed rule as a means of reducing economic impacts 
on small entities. ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the 
flightdeck door may not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would 
not provide the intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify 
any airplane design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane 
gross weight that sufficiently correlates with short flights. Also, the 
range of all the airplane models that would be affected by the proposed 
rule exceeds the maximum flight length at which opening the flightdeck 
door is unlikely. The FAA requests comments on this and other 
alternatives that would minimize economic impacts of the proposed rule 
on small entities.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and 
has determined that it would have a legitimate domestic objective, in 
that it would increase the safety of the United States from terrorist 
attacks on U.S.-operated airplanes. This proposed rule would not 
operate in a manner as to directly affect foreign trade and, therefore, 
would have little or no effect on foreign trade.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155.0 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that 
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated 
with this proposed rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices that correspond to these proposed regulations.

G. Environmental Analysis

    In accordance with the provisions of regulations issued by the 
Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), FAA Order 
1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded from 
preparation of an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this NPRM action 
qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 5-
6.6(d) because no significant impacts to the environment are expected 
from publication of this NPRM and it involves no extraordinary 
circumstances.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism (64 FR 43255, August 10, 
1999). The agency has determined that this action would not have a 
substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship between 
the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government, and, 
therefore, would not have Federalism implications.

[[Page 46902]]

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (66 FR 28355, May 18, 2001). The agency has 
determined that it would not be a ``significant energy action'' under 
the executive order and would not be likely to have a significant 
adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation (77 FR 26413, May 4, 2012), promotes international 
regulatory cooperation to meet shared challenges involving health, 
safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues and to reduce, 
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory 
requirements. The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the 
policies and agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609, and has 
determined that this proposed rule would have no effect on 
international regulatory cooperation.

VI. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The most 
helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain 
the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To 
ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters 
should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed 
electronically, commenters should submit only one time.
    Except for the confidential business information described in the 
next paragraph, the FAA will file in the docket all comments it 
receives, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public 
contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before 
acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives 
on or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider 
comments filed after the comment period has closed if it is possible to 
do so without incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this 
proposal in light of the comments it receives.
    Confidential Business Information: Confidential Business 
Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both 
customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from 
public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain 
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as 
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or 
responsive to this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the 
submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission 
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked 
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed 
in the public docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be 
sent to Dan Jacquet, AIR-626, Human-Machine Interface Section, 
Technical Innovation Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 
South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198.
    Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not specifically 
designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this 
rulemaking.

B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the 
internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at 
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at 
www.GovInfo.gov.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. 
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this 
rulemaking.
    All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule, 
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from 
the internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item 
(1) above.

C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this 
document may contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER 
INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. To find 
out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, 
Charter flights, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 
44704; Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat 3281 (49 U.S.C. 44903 note).

0
2. In Sec.  25.795, add paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.795   Security considerations.

    (a) * * *
    (4) An installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) must be 
installed to resist intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the 
flightdeck door is opened. In addition, when deployed, the IPSB must:
    (i) Resist a 250 pound (1,113 Newtons) static load in the direction 
of the passenger cabin applied at the most critical locations on the 
IPSB;
    (ii) Resist a 600 pound (2,669 Newtons) static load in the 
direction of the flightdeck applied at the most critical locations on 
the IPSB;
    (iii) Delay a person attempting to access the flightdeck by at 
least the time required for a crewmember to open and reclose the 
flightdeck door, but no less than 5 seconds;
    (iv) Prevent a person from reaching through and touching the flight 
deck door; and
    (v) Allow for necessary crewmember activities.
* * * * *

[[Page 46903]]

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

0
3. The authority citation for part 121 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40119, 
41706, 42301 preceding note added by Pub. L. 112-95, sec. 412, 126 
Stat. 89, 44101, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-
44717, 44722, 44729, 44732; 46105; Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348 
(49 U.S.C. 44701 note); Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat 62 (49 U.S.C. 44732 
note); Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat 3281 (49 U.S.C. 44903 note).

0
4. In Sec.  121.313, add paragraph (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.313   Miscellaneous equipment.

* * * * *
    (l) For airplanes required by paragraph (f) of this section to have 
a door between the passenger and pilot or crew rest compartments, and 
for transport category airplanes that have a door installed between the 
pilot compartment and any other occupied compartment, that were 
manufactured after [DATE TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 
FINAL RULE], an installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that 
provides line-of-sight visibility between the flightdeck door and the 
cabin, and meets the requirements of Sec.  25.795(a)(4) in effect on 
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
0
5. In Sec.  121.584, add paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.584   Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck 
door.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (3) If the airplane is in flight, any installed physical secondary 
barrier required by 121.313(l) has been deployed, and;
* * * * *

    Issued under authority provided by Public Law 115-254 and 49 
U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and 44703 in Washington, DC, on July 27, 
2022.
David W. Hempe,
Deputy Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-16443 Filed 7-29-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P