[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 98 (Friday, May 20, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30976-30988]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-10923]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

[CIS No. 2709-21; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2022-0004]
RIN 1615-ZB94


Designation of Afghanistan for Temporary Protected Status

AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS).

ACTION: Notice of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation.

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SUMMARY: Through this notice, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
announces that the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is 
designating Afghanistan for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 18 
months, effective May 20, 2022, through November 20, 2023. This 
designation allows eligible Afghan nationals (and individuals having no 
nationality who last habitually resided in Afghanistan) who have 
continuously resided in the United States since March 15, 2022, and who 
have been continuously physically present in the United States since 
May 20, 2022 to apply for TPS.

DATES: 
    Designation of Afghanistan for TPS: The 18-month designation of 
Afghanistan for TPS is effective on May 20, 2022 and will remain in 
effect for 18 months, through November 20, 2023.
    Registration: The registration period for eligible individuals to 
submit TPS applications begins May 20, 2022 and will remain in effect 
through November 20, 2023.

ADDRESSES: For further information on TPS, including guidance on the 
registration process and additional information on eligibility, please 
visit the USCIS TPS web page at uscis.gov/tps. You can find specific 
information about Afghanistan's TPS designation by selecting 
``Afghanistan'' from the menu on the left side of the TPS web page.
    If you have additional questions about TPS, please visit uscis.gov/tools. Our online virtual assistant, Emma, can answer many of your 
questions and point you to additional information on our website. If 
you are unable to find your answers there, you may also call our USCIS 
Contact Center at 800-375-5283 (TTY 800-767-1833).
    Applicants seeking information about the status of their individual 
cases may check Case Status Online, available on the USCIS website at 
uscis.gov, or visit the USCIS Contact Center at uscis.gov/contactcenter.
    Further information will also be available at local USCIS offices 
upon publication of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: You may contact Ren[aacute] Cutlip-
Mason, Chief, Humanitarian Affairs Division, Office of Policy and 
Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of 
Homeland Security, by mail at 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, 
MD 20746, or by phone at 800-375-5283.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Abbreviations

BIA--Board of Immigration Appeals
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
DHS--U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOS--U.S. Department of State
EAD--Employment Authorization Document
FNC--Final Nonconfirmation
Form I-765--Application for Employment Authorization
Form I-797--Notice of Action (Approval Notice)
Form I-821--Application for Temporary Protected Status
Form I-9--Employment Eligibility Verification
Form I-912--Request for Fee Waiver
Form I-94--Arrival/Departure Record
FR--Federal Register
Government--U.S. Government
IER--U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Immigrant 
and Employee Rights Section

[[Page 30977]]

IJ--Immigration Judge
INA--Immigration and Nationality Act
SAVE--USCIS Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program
Secretary--Secretary of Homeland Security
TNC--Tentative Nonconfirmation
TPS--Temporary Protected Status
TTY--Text Telephone
USCIS--U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
U.S.C.--United States Code

Purpose of This Action (TPS)

    Through this notice, DHS sets forth procedures necessary for 
eligible nationals of Afghanistan (or individuals having no nationality 
who last habitually resided in Afghanistan) to submit an initial 
registration application under the designation of Afghanistan for TPS 
and apply for an employment authorization document (EAD). Under the 
designation, individuals must submit an initial Afghanistan TPS 
application (Form I-821) and they may also submit an Application for 
Employment Authorization (Form I-765), during the 18-month initial 
registration period that runs from May 20, 2022, through November 20, 
2023.\1\ In addition to demonstrating continuous residence in the 
United States since March 15, 2022,\2\ and meeting other eligibility 
criteria, initial applicants for TPS under this designation must 
demonstrate that they have been continuously physically present in the 
United States since May 20, 2022, the effective date of this 
designation of Afghanistan, before USCIS may grant them TPS. DHS 
estimates that approximately 72,500 individuals are eligible to file 
applications for TPS under the designation of Afghanistan.
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    \1\ In general, individuals must be given an initial 
registration period of no less than 180 days to register for TPS, 
but the Secretary has discretion to provide for a longer 
registration period. See 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iv). In keeping 
with the humanitarian purpose of TPS and advancing the goal of 
ensuring ``the Federal Government eliminates . . . barriers that 
prevent immigrants from accessing government services available to 
them'' under Executive Order 14012, Restoring Faith in Our Legal 
Immigration Systems and Strengthening Integration and Inclusion 
Efforts for New Americans, 86 FR 8277 (Feb. 5, 2021), the Secretary 
has recently exercised his discretion to provide for TPS initial 
registration periods that coincide with the full period of a TPS 
country's initial designation or redesignation. See, e.g., 87 FR 
23211 (Apr. 19, 2022) (providing 18-mos. registration period under 
the new TPS designation of Ukraine); 87 FR 23202 (Apr. 19, 2022) 
(providing 18-mos. registration period under the new TPS designation 
of Sudan); 86 FR 38744 (July 22, 2021) (providing 18-mos. 
registration period under the TPS redesignation of Somalia). For the 
same reasons, the Secretary is similarly exercising his discretion 
to provide applicants under this TPS designation of Afghanistan with 
an 18-month initial registration period.
    \2\ The ``continuous physical presence date'' (CPP) is the 
effective date of the most recent TPS designation of the country, 
which is either the publication date of the designation announcement 
in the Federal Register or such later date as the Secretary may 
establish. The ``continuous residence date'' (CR) is any date 
established by the Secretary when a country is designated (or 
sometimes redesignated) for TPS. See INA section 244(b)(2)(A) 
(effective date of designation); 244(c)(1)(A)(i-ii) (discussing CR 
and CPP date requirements).
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What is Temporary Protected Status (TPS)?

     TPS is a temporary immigration status granted to eligible 
nationals of a foreign state designated for TPS under the INA, or to 
eligible individuals without nationality who last habitually resided in 
the designated foreign state, regardless of their country of birth.
     During the TPS designation period, TPS beneficiaries are 
eligible to remain in the United States, may not be removed, and are 
authorized to work so long as they continue to meet the requirements of 
TPS. They may apply for and receive EADs as evidence of employment 
authorization.
     TPS beneficiaries may also apply for and be granted travel 
authorization as a matter of discretion.
     To qualify for TPS, beneficiaries must meet the 
eligibility standards at INA section 244(c)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. 
1254a(c)(1)-(2).
     When the Secretary terminates a foreign state's TPS 
designation, beneficiaries return to one of the following:
    [cir] The same immigration status or category that they maintained 
before TPS, if any (unless that status or category has since expired or 
terminated); or
    [cir] Any other lawfully obtained immigration status or category 
they received while registered for TPS, as long as it is still valid 
beyond the date TPS terminates.

Why was Afghanistan designated for TPS?

    DHS has reviewed conditions in Afghanistan. Based on this review, 
and after consulting with the Department of State (DOS), the Secretary 
has determined that an 18-month designation is warranted because of 
ongoing armed conflict and the extraordinary and temporary conditions 
described below.

Overview

    In August 2021, the Taliban took over Kabul after waging a 20-year 
insurgency against the government of Afghanistan and U.S. and NATO 
forces. Armed conflict and insurgency continue throughout the country 
of Afghanistan.\3\ The Taliban is seen as both ill-equipped and 
unwilling to meet the country's numerous challenges including the 
current security situation, economic collapse, a crumbling healthcare 
system, severe food insecurity, and respect for human rights.\4\ 
Afghanistan is undergoing a humanitarian disaster. The United Nations 
has called the current situation ``unparalleled, with more than 24.4 
million people requiring humanitarian assistance to survive.'' \5\ 
``Half the population [is] facing acute hunger, including 9 million 
people in emergency food insecurity--the highest number globally [with] 
[m]alnutrition on the rise, and livelihoods [that] have been 
destroyed.'' \6\
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    \3\ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens `Risk of 
Extremism,' UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 
18, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2022).
    \4\ Nilofar Sakhi, The humanitarian and human security crises in 
Afghanistan, Middle East Institute (MEI), Oct. 12, 2021, available 
at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/humanitarian-and-human-security-crises-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \5\ Afghanistan Conference 2022, UN Web TV, Mar. 31, 2022, 
available at: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1p/k1puubpv5u (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2022).
    \6\ Afghanistan Conference 2022, UN Web TV, Mar. 31, 2022, 
available at: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1p/k1puubpv5u (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2022).
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Armed Conflict and Security Situation

    The Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, 
invoking Sharia law to remove women from public life, enforce strict 
moral codes, and exact draconian punishments for transgressions 
including dismemberment and public executions.\7\ In response to the 
Taliban harboring al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001,\8\ U.S. forces began airstrikes and a ground 
invasion that, by mid-November 2001, in concert with actions by 
remaining Mujahideen fighters under the Northern Alliance, drove the 
Taliban from most of Afghanistan. Following a transition of security 
responsibility from the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
(ANDSF),\9\ the Taliban expanded its presence across larger parts of 
the country \10\ and by

[[Page 30978]]

2017, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIS-
K) emerged, adding ``a new, dangerous dimension'' to the situation.\11\
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    \7\ Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan, pp. 43 
(Oxford University Press, 2021).
    \8\ Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan, pp. 53-67 
(Oxford University Press, 2021).
    \9\ Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, NATO, updated Nov. 17, 
2020, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_87183.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \10\ Afghanistan: Growing Challenges, International Crisis 
Group, Apr. 30, 2017, available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-growing-challenges (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \11\ Special report on the strategic review of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Report of the Secretary-
General, A/72/312-S/2017/696, UN Security Council, p. 3, Aug. 10, 
2017, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_report_on_the_strategic_review_of_the_united_nations_assistance_mission_in_afghanistan.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    Beginning in 2019, the United States engaged with the Taliban to 
establish an agreement to withdraw troops, with various efforts over 
the next two years seeking assurances that the Taliban would meet 
counter-terrorism pledges and participate in intra-Afghan peace 
talks.\12\ In April 2021, President Biden announced a complete U.S. 
military withdrawal by September 11, 2021, and in early July 2021, U.S. 
troops began withdrawal operations, including from their largest base 
at Bagram.\13\ The Taliban began rapidly taking territory including 
regional urban centers, and beginning August 6, provincial 
capitals.\14\ The Taliban took over Kabul on August 15, and on August 
30, 2021, the last U.S. forces departed Afghanistan.\15\
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    \12\ The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999-2021, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2021, available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
    \13\ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.S. Leaves Its Last Afghan Base, 
Effectively Ending Operations, N.Y. Times, Jul. 4, 2021, available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/world/asia/afghanistan-bagram-us-withdrawal.html (last visited Apr. 8. 2022).
    \14\ The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999-2021, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2021, available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan (last visited on Apr. 12, 2022).
    \15\ The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999-2021, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2021, available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
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    Before the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, armed conflict had 
taken a high toll on Afghan civilians. The U.N. Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 116,076 civilian deaths and injuries due 
to armed conflict from 2009 until June 2021 with record numbers of 
girls and women killed and injured, as well as record numbers of 
overall child casualties.\16\
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    \16\ Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict--
Annual Report 2020, U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Feb. 
2021, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict--Midyear Update: 1 January to 30 June 2021, U.N. 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Jul. 2021, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2021_26_july.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
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    Civilians face continuing risk of harm due to ground engagements 
between the Taliban and ISIS-K, as well as direct punitive targeting by 
Taliban fighters reportedly taking retaliatory action against people 
associated with the Ashraf Ghani administration \17\ and sectarian 
attacks on the Shiite minority by ISIS-K.\18\ It is reported that 
``attacks on civilians made up 36 percent of all disorder events, 
indicating that civilians will continue to remain at heightened risk of 
violence under'' the Taliban.\19\
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    \17\ ``No Forgiveness for People Like You'' Executions and 
Enforced Disappearances in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Human 
Rights Watch, Nov. 30, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
    \18\ See Afghanistan Security situation update, Country of 
Origin Information Report, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
Sept. 9, 2021, available at: https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \19\ 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022, High risk of violence 
targeting civilians under Taliban rule, The Armed Conflict Location 
& Event Data Project (ACLED), Jan. 2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/afghanistan/ (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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i. Taliban
    Following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops and collapse of 
the Afghan military, armed conflict continues in Afghanistan as the 
Taliban attempts to impose their rule across the country.\20\ Taliban 
forces have clashed with remaining resistance fighters in Panjshir 
Province \21\ and unknown and little-known groups, including 
``Anonymous Fighters'' and ``Turkistan Freedom Tigers,'' have targeted 
Taliban forces, notably in Jowzjan and Takhar provinces.\22\
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    \20\ See Afghanistan Security situation update, Country of 
Origin Information Report, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
Sept. 9, 2021, available at: https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \21\ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 5-11 March 
2022, ACLED, Mar. 2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/2022/03/16/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-5-11-march-2022 
(last visited Apr. 8. 2022); Regional Overview: South Asia and 
Afghanistan 19-25 February, ACLED, Feb. 2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/2022/03/03/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-19-25-february-2022/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \22\ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 26 February 
to 4 March 2022, ACLED, Mar. 2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/2022/03/10/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-26-february-4-march-2022/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); 
Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 5-11 February 2022, 
ACLED, Feb. 2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/2022/02/17/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-5-11-february-2022/ 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    Despite their pledge not to do so, reports indicate that the 
Taliban are targeting old adversaries including former Afghan police 
and military personnel, increasing the potential for escalating armed 
conflict.\23\ General instability in the country, including instability 
caused by an economic crisis, increases the difficulty of establishing 
security and thwarting the rise of further extremism.\24\
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    \23\ Radio Azadi, Michael Scollon, Taliban Takes Revenge On 
Former Afghan Security Forces, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 
12, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-revenge-afghan-security-forces/31505696.html (last visited Apr. 8. 
2022).
    \24\ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens `Risk of 
Extremism,' UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 
18, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2022).
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    The Taliban appear committed to maintaining its methods of warfare 
that have taken a heavy toll on civilians, including retaining a 
contingent of trained suicide bombers, as central to its combat and 
political strategy.\25\ Though the Taliban pledged to not allow al-
Qaida to ``threaten the security of the United States and its allies'' 
from Afghan soil, veteran Taliban leaders with deep relationships with 
al-Qaida organizers have returned to positions of power, raising 
concern that the Taliban will once again create a safe space for global 
jihadists.\26\ The Taliban have announced the appointment to positions 
of power members of the Haqqani family, known for operating a brutal 
terrorist network during the Taliban insurgency,\27\ and veteran 
Taliban leaders with ties to al-Qaida.\28\
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    \25\ Abubakar Siddique, As Taliban Attempts to Transform from 
Insurgency to Government, Suicide Bombers Remain Key to Its 
Strategy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 4, 2021, 
available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-suicide-bombings-afghanistan/31546216.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \26\ Abubakar Siddique & Abdul Hai Kakar, Al-Qaeda Could 
Flourish With New Strategy Under Taliban Rule, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, Sept. 30, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-al-qaeda-taliban/31486256.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Driss El-Bay, Afghanistan: The pledge 
binding al-Qaeda to the Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available 
at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58473574 (last visited Apr. 
8, 2022).
    \27\ Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government, BBC 
News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \28\ Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government, BBC 
News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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ii. Islamic State-Khorasan
    The threat of ISIS-K is growing, with increasing risk to civilians. 
The Department of State designated ISIS-K as a ``foreign terrorist 
organization'' in

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January 2016, and U.S. forces engaged in significant operations to 
reduce its numbers and to reclaim the small swaths of territory that it 
held.\29\ The Taliban have long engaged in efforts to eradicate the 
organization, and they continue to fight a renewed ISIS-K insurgency, 
frequently resulting in civilian casualties.\30\ ISIS-K claimed 
responsibility for the August 26, 2021, suicide attack outside Kabul 
airport, and has been behind some of the deadliest operations against 
Afghan civilians.\31\ A feature of ISIS-K's attacks is large-scale IED 
and suicide bombings of Hazara Shia mosques and gatherings, which are 
dramatically increasing sectarian violence in Afghanistan.\32\
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    \29\ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-
Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Aug. 27, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \30\ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-
Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Aug. 27, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \31\ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-
Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Aug. 27, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \32\ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-
Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Aug. 27, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    United Nations Special Representative for Afghanistan, Deborah 
Lyons, indicated that the Taliban have been unable to stem the 
expansion of ISIS-K, and that it now appears to be present in nearly 
all provinces.\33\ As of November 17, 2021, she stated that the number 
of attacks attributed to ISIS-K has increased significantly from 60 
last year to 334 this year.\34\ The Armed Conflict Location & Event 
Data Project (ACLED), a non-profit data collection, analysis, and 
crisis mapping project, reports multiple recent attacks by ISIS-K 
during the months of October and November 2021, including engagements 
with the Taliban and targeting of civilians.\35\
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    \33\ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens `Risk Of 
Extremism,' UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 
18, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2022).
    \34\ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens `Risk Of 
Extremism,' UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 
18, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2022).
    \35\ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 30 October to 
5 November 2021, ACLED, Nov. 2021, available at: https://acleddata.com/2021/11/11/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-30-october-5-november-2021/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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iii. Destruction of Infrastructure
    Afghanistan faces significant challenges due to the destruction of 
vital infrastructure during armed conflict. There are numerous reports 
that the Taliban targeted power stations and distribution equipment, 
dug up roads and destroyed bridges, destroyed cell towers and 
communications infrastructure, and damaged schools, medical facilities, 
and government buildings during their insurgency.\36\ The education 
system is also at risk of complete collapse due to the economic 
crisis.\37\
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    \36\ Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnappings, 
and Destruction of Vital Infrastructure, US Embassy in Afghanistan, 
Jan. 31, 2021, available at: https://af.usembassy.gov/statement-on-continuation-of-assassinations-kidnappings-and-destruction-of-vital-infrastructure/ (last visited May 3, 2022); Secretary-General's 
press encounter on Afghanistan, U.N. Secretary-General, Aug. 13, 
2021, available at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-press-encounter-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022); Sayed Salahuddin, 10 killed in twin Kabul blasts, power 
supply disrupted across Afghanistan, Arab News, Jun. 2, 2021, 
available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/1869436/world (last 
visited May 3, 2022); Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged 
Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLOnews, Jul. 15, 2021, 
available at: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173540 (last visited 
May 3, 2022); Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan 
Security Situation Update, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
Sep. 2021, available at: https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf 
(last visited May 3, 2022).
    \37\ Four Ways to Support Girls' Access to Education in 
Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 20, 2022, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/20/four-ways-support-girls-access-education-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    During the Taliban insurgency in the first half of 2021, the ``39 
electricity pylons that bring imported power into Afghanistan [were] 
damaged.'' \38\ Power supply subsequently became ``extremely erratic 
even in the capital Kabul,'' with notable disruptions to Kunduz, 
Baghlan, Kabul, Nangarhar and Parwan provinces.\39\ ``Millions of 
Afghans have become intimately familiar with regular power cuts and 
being forced to navigate daily tasks and chores with just a few hours 
of electricity supply.'' \40\
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    \38\ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, 
IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \39\ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, 
IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \40\ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, 
IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Blasts cut power to millions in 
Afghanistan before Eid holiday, Al Jazeera, Apr. 30, 2022, available 
at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/30/blasts-cut-power-to-millions-in-afghanistan-ahead-of-eid (last visited May 4, 2022).
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    In July 2021, the Taliban reportedly frequently attacked power and 
communications infrastructure in their advance, blowing up fiber optics 
systems and destroying telecommunications antennas across the country, 
seriously affecting digital and mobile communication.\41\ The Taliban 
reportedly either torched or destroyed 260 government buildings and 
assets in 116 districts,\42\ leaving more than 13 million people 
without access to public services and halting ``hundreds of development 
projects such as the reconstruction of water supply networks, roads, 
retaining walls, the construction of schools, bridges, hospitals, 
stadiums, cold storage facilities, [and] drilling wells.'' \43\ The 
armed conflict left the Afghan countryside ``littered with abandoned 
and decaying power plants, prisons, schools, factories, office 
buildings and military bases.'' \44\
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    \41\ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, 
IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \42\ Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged Infrastructure in 
116 Districts: IARCS, TOLO News, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: 
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173540 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \43\ Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged Infrastructure in 
116 Districts: IARCS, TOLO News, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: 
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173540 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \44\ Daniel Nasaw, U.S. Left Afghanistan Littered With Decaying 
Factories, Schools, Offices, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6, 2021, 
available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-left-afghanistan-littered-with-decaying-factories-schools-offices-11630933200 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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iv. Danger From Explosive Remnants of War Including Landmines
    Explosive remnants of war (ERW) which failed to detonate, including 
landmines, pose a significant risk to civilians in Afghanistan, killing 
or injuring tens of thousands during the past three decades.\45\ These 
munitions ``from more recent armed clashes caused over 98 percent of 
the [ERW] casualties recorded in 2021,'' of which more than 79 percent 
were children.\46\ And ``[d]ue to evolving conflict dynamics, 
Afghanistan's humanitarian mine action needs are now as great as they 
have ever

[[Page 30980]]

been.'' \47\ The Taliban have reportedly agreed to permit the HALO 
Trust (Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization), a British-American 
charity in Afghanistan that has been clearing land mines for decades, 
to continue its work,\48\ yet in June 2021 ISIS-K militants attacked 
HALO staff members, killing 10, suggesting that they continue to face 
substantial risk.\49\ In addition, the organization reports that new 
mines and explosive devices were laid and left behind in the battles 
leading up to the Taliban's takeover of Kabul.\50\
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    \45\ Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan (last visited May 4, 2022).
    \46\ Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan (last visited May 4, 2022).
    \47\ Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan (last visited May 4, 2022).
    \48\ Clearing Afghanistan's Landmines One Careful Step a Time, 
Voice of America (VOA) News, Nov. 21, 2021, available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/clearing-afghanistan-s-landmines-one-careful-step-a-time/6318080.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
    \49\ Najim Rahim & Mike Ives, Attack in Afghanistan Kills 10 
From Charity That Clears Land Mines, N.Y. Times, Jun. 9, 2021, 
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/world/asia/afghanistan-land-mines-halo-trust.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \50\ Clearing Afghanistan's Landmines One Careful Step a Time, 
Voice of America (VOA) News, Nov. 21, 2021, available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/clearing-afghanistan-s-landmines-one-careful-step-a-time/6318080.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
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v. Rising Internal Displacement
    Rising internal displacement emanates from the ongoing armed 
conflict and the unstable security situation in Afghanistan. Land 
pressures and related disputes have also been a challenge in 
Afghanistan, fueling displacements, and complicating the security and 
relocation options for internally displaced persons (IDPs).\51\ As of 
March 15, 2022, UNHCR reported there were approximately 3.4 million 
conflict-induced IDPs in Afghanistan--with 736,889 of those added in 
2021.\52\ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted that these IDPs are from 33 out of 
the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, and 79 percent of those added in 2021 
are women and children.\53\ UNOCHA further stated, ``[i]nadequate 
shelter, food insecurity, insufficient access to sanitation and health 
facilities, as well as a lack of protection, often result in precarious 
living conditions that jeopardizes the well-being and dignity of 
affected families.'' \54\ Reports reflect that the Taliban exacerbated 
the IDP problem by forcing thousands of people from their homes, 
including Hazaras as well as former government officials, and 
redistributing their property to Taliban supporters.\55\
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    \51\ See Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002-2012, 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Feb. 2013, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5136fbc72.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022); Gulamaiz Sharifi, Abubakar Siddique, Afghan 
Hazaras Fear The Worst After Forced Taliban Evictions, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 6, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-hazaras-taliban/31496224.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \52\ Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation #15, U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Mar. 15, 2022, available at: 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91524 (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2022).
    \53\ Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, U.N. Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Nov. 21, 
2021, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \54\ Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, U.N. Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Nov. 21, 
2021, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \55\ Emma Graham-Harrison, Taliban `forcibly evicting' Hazaras 
and opponents in Afghanistan, The Guardian, Oct. 23, 2021, available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/taliban-forcibly-evicting-hazaras-and-opponents-in-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
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Economic Collapse and Health Concerns

i. Economic Impacts of Taliban Takeover
    Economic ramifications of the Taliban takeover in August 2021 
include ``millions of dollars in lost income, spiking prices, a 
liquidity crisis, and shortages of cash.'' \56\ The cessation of 
purchasing power of the Afghan population as a result of the 
termination of international assistance once used to pay salaries has 
caused an ``enormous number of Afghan households [to] immediately 
los[e] their primary sources of income. According to a World Food 
Program survey released in February 2022, four out of five households 
reported no income or significantly reduced incomes in January 2022.'' 
\57\ In October 2021, the World Bank noted that ``the sudden loss of 
public sector activity will have impacts throughout the economy, 
especially in the service and construction sectors (which account for 
58 percent of GDP).'' \58\
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    \56\ Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, US Should Adjust 
Sanctions, Economic Policies, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, 
available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistan-facing-famine (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \57\ Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis, 
Questions and Answers on Human Costs of Sanctions, Banking 
Restrictions, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistan-economic-roots-humanitarian-crisis?gclid=Cj0KCQjw5-WRBhCKARIsAAId9Fnpi5weaKquaERnky8T0Ry0t9FSOsR2mWY_nGA5NmEA3iRz1L8BjF4aAkmGEALw_wcB#_Why_did_the (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \58\ The World Bank in Afghanistan Overview, The World Bank, 
Oct. 8, 2021, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview#1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    In November 2021, the Taliban banned the use of foreign currency, 
which may ``further disrupt an economy on the brink of collapse.'' \59\ 
Banking officials note that ``most Afghan banks cannot cover 
withdrawals by private actors and aid organizations'' and ``[e]ven when 
funds are transmitted electronically into banks, the lack of cash means 
that money is not physically available and therefore cannot flow into 
the country's economy.'' \60\ When compared to the Taliban's previous 
peak in the 1990s, ``poverty this time can only be predicted to be 
worse and more keenly felt.'' \61\ As of February 2022, the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) could not access its funds in the 
Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) for program implementation because 
the Taliban-run AIB cannot convert it to Afghani currency.\62\ Of the 
$4 billion worth of afghanis, in the economy, only $500 million worth 
was in circulation, ``hindering humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, 
where more than half the country's 39 million people suffer extreme 
hunger and the economy, education and social services face collapse.'' 
\63\
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    \59\ Taliban bans foreign currencies in Afghanistan, BBC News, 
Nov. 3, 2021, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-59129470 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \60\ Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, US Should Adjust 
Sanctions, Economic Policies, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, 
available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistan-facing-famine (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \61\ Kate Clark, Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg: 
Afghanistan's economic distress post-15 August, Afghanistan Analysts 
Network, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/killing-the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg-afghanistans-economic-distress-post-15-august/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \62\ Michelle Nichols, U.N. has millions in Afghanistan bank, 
but cannot use it, Reuters, Feb. 3, 2022, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-has-millions-afghanistan-bank-cannot-use-it-2022-02-03/ (last visited May 4, 2022).
    \63\ Michelle Nichols, U.N. has millions in Afghanistan bank, 
but cannot use it, Reuters, Feb. 3, 2022, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-has-millions-afghanistan-bank-cannot-use-it-2022-02-03/ (last visited May 4, 2022).
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ii. Access to Food, Potable Water, and Healthcare
    Rising prices, increasing unemployment, and a drop in the value of 
the local currency exacerbate food insecurity trends.\64\ The Executive 
Director of the World Food Programme

[[Page 30981]]

(WFP) described the likelihood of widespread famine in Afghanistan as 
``the worst humanitarian crisis on Earth.'' \65\ One in three Afghan 
nationals are acutely food insecure.\66\ For the first time, urban and 
rural areas now experience similar rates of food insecurity.\67\ 
According to recent WFP surveys, ``only five percent of households in 
Afghanistan have enough to eat every day'' and ``half reported they had 
run out of food altogether at least once, in the past two weeks.'' \68\ 
As a result of current circumstances, some families are selling their 
children, especially girls, to obtain food.\69\
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    \64\ In the grip of hunger: Only 5 percent of Afghan families 
have enough to eat, World Food Programme, Sept. 23, 2021, available 
at: https://www.wfp.org/stories/grip-hunger-only-5-percent-afghan-families-have-enough-eat (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \65\ John Simpson, Afghans facing `hell on earth' as winter 
looms, BBC News, Nov. 8, 2021, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59202880 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \66\ Federica Marsi, Medics overwhelmed as Afghanistan 
healthcare crumbles, Al Jazeera, Sept. 28, 2021, available at: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/9/28/medics-in-afghanistan-face-tough-choices-as-healthcare-crumbles (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \67\ Afghanistan's healthcare system on brink of collapse, as 
hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN News, Sept. 22, 2021, 
available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \68\ Afghanistan's healthcare system on brink of collapse, as 
hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN News, Sept. 22, 2021, 
available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \69\ Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, US Should Adjust 
Sanctions, Economic Policies, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, 
available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistan-facing-famine (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    The Afghan government officially declared a drought on June 22, 
2021.\70\ Considered ``one of the worst droughts of the last two 
decades,'' the resulting conditions ``are particularly severe in the 
south, western, and northwestern parts of the country.'' \71\ Severe 
drought has impacted 7.3 million people across 25 out of 34 
provinces.\72\ The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports that ``drought conditions are likely to 
persist and even worsen into 2022, further deteriorating food security 
among Afghans.'' \73\ The current drought also ``inhibits hydroelectric 
production in Afghanistan,'' exacerbating the country's reliance on 
electricity imports that it can no longer afford.\74\ In 2021, 
``reduced winter snowfall'' and ``below average spring rainfall in the 
west'' contributed to ``low river flows and insufficient water in 
existing reservoirs and dams.'' \75\ Some drinking water wells in Kabul 
went dry due to decreasing groundwater levels, and ``...the groundwater 
table (meaning the level of the water naturally stored underground) in 
Kabul city has dropped by 12 meters in 2021 alone.'' \76\
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    \70\ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR--
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 
2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \71\ Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger, and thirst 
expected to worsen, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, 
available at: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/global-warming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-and-thirst-expected-to-worsen/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \72\ `Shah Meer Baloch, `The challenge for us now is drought, 
not war': Livelihoods of millions of Afghans at risk, The Guardian, 
Sept. 21, 2021, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/sep/21/drought-war-livelihoods-afghan-farmers-risk-taliban-security-forces-kandahar (last visited on Apr. 8, 2022).
    \73\ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR--
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 
2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \74\ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR--
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 
2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \75\ Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger, and thirst 
expected to worsen, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, 
available at: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/global-warming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-and-thirst-expected-to-worsen/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \76\ Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger, and thirst 
expected to worsen, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, 
available at: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/global-warming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-and-thirst-expected-to-worsen/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
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    An insufficiently staffed healthcare system predated the Taliban 
takeover of Kabul.\77\ In 2018, Afghanistan ``had a nationwide average 
of only 4.6 medical doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 people, 
far below the WHO threshold of 23 per 10,000 people,'' indicating a 
critical shortage that was more pronounced in rural areas.\78\ By 
September 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO) asserted that the 
healthcare system was on the brink of collapse.\79\ The World Bank and 
other organizations froze approximately $600 million in health care 
aid, leaving at risk the effective deployment of a variety of 
treatments, surgeries, immunizations, and procedures.\80\ While there 
have been recent dispersals of international aid, ``including $308 
million in relief authorized by the United States, they have not been 
enough to cover 1,200 health facilities and 11,000 health workers.'' 
\81\
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    \77\ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR--
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, p. 139, 
Oct. 30, 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \78\ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR--
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, p. 139, 
Oct. 30, 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \79\ Afghanistan's healthcare system on brink of collapse, as 
hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN News, Sept. 22, 2021, 
available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \80\ Apoorva Mandavilli, Health Care in Afghanistan Is 
Crumbling, Aid Groups Warn, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2021, available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/health/afghanistan-health-taliban.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \81\ Afghanistan's Health Care System Is Collapsing Under 
Stress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 06, 2022, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/06/world/asia/afghanistans-health-care-system.html (last visited May 3, 2022).
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    Declining staffing levels is a factor during the recent conflict as 
doctors, nurses, and midwives have ``stopped working or fled the 
country'' \82\ and there have been reported incidents of insurgent 
groups targeting healthcare workers with threats, intimidation, 
abduction, and killings.\83\ Additionally, Taliban restrictions 
requiring that women be escorted to health appointments by male family 
members and bans on male healthcare professionals treating women are 
further compromising women's access to health care.\84\ The 
International Rescue Committee has predicted that 90 percent of health 
clinics in Afghanistan will likely close in the near future as a result 
of the Taliban takeover and the freezing of international funding.\85\
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    \82\ Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Medical 
treatment and healthcare, UK Home Office, p. 10, Oct. 2021, 
available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2062549/AFG_CPIN_Medical_and_healthcare.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) 
(citing Giving birth under the Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 20, 2021, 
available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58585323).
    \83\ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and guidance 
note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 65, Nov. 2021. 
available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \84\ Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis, 
Questions and Answers on Human Costs of Sanctions, Banking 
Restrictions, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistan-economic-roots-humanitarian-crisis?gclid=Cj0KCQjw5-WRBhCKARIsAAId9Fnpi5weaKquaERnky8T0Ry0t9FSOsR2mWY_nGA5NmEA3iRz1L8BjF4aAkmGEALw_wcB#_Why_did_the (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \85\ Crisis in Afghanistan: Unprecedented hunger after the 
conflict, International Rescue Committee, Jan. 7, 2022, available 
at: https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-afghanistan-unprecedented-hunger-after-conflict (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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Human Rights Abuses and Repression

    The Taliban exclude women, as well as non-Pashtuns with only a few 
exceptions,\86\ and have been described

[[Page 30982]]

as highly totalitarian.\87\ The Taliban's takeover presents significant 
concerns about the stability of human rights and safety for segments of 
the population.
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    \86\ Alissa J. Rubin, Taliban Complete Interim Government, Still 
Without Women, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/world/asia/taliban-women-government.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \87\ Nilofar Sakhi, The Humanitarian and Human Security Crises 
in Afghanistan, Middle East Institute (MEI), Oct. 12, 2021, 
available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/humanitarian-and-human-security-crises-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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i. Women and Girls
    Despite substantial improvements in the social, political, and 
economic conditions for women and girls since 2001, violence targeting 
women and girls remained pervasive in Afghanistan before the Taliban 
takeover.\88\ Even before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, 
``discrimination, harassment, and violence against women'' were 
``endemic in government-controlled areas and in government 
ministries.'' \89\ Studies cited by the former Ministry of Women's 
Affairs showed that greater than half of Afghan women reported physical 
abuse, and 17 percent reported sexual violence, with rampant 
underreporting.\90\ Since August 2021, the status of women and girls 
has become ``increasingly precarious,'' with reports of new 
restrictions placed on women.\91\ In September 2021, the Taliban 
announced the revival of the so-called Ministry for the Propagation of 
Virtue and Prevention of Vice,\92\ which when it previously existed, 
``became a notorious symbol of abuse, particularly against women and 
girls.'' \93\ These developments exist within a broader context of 
``traditional, restrictive views of gender roles and rights, including 
some views consistent with the Taliban's former practices . . . 
especially in rural areas and among younger men.'' \94\
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    \88\ Country Guidance: Afghanistan--Common analysis and guidance 
note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 78, Nov. 2021, 
available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \89\ Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, 
Congressional Research Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, 
available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11646 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \90\ Alissa J. Rubin, Threats and Fear Cause Afghan Women's 
Protections to Vanish Overnight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2021, updated 
October 7, 2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/04/world/middleeast/afghanistan-women-shelter-taliban.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \91\ Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, 
Congressional Research Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, 
available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11646 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \92\ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, 
Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 
29, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022); Haq Nawaz Khan, Ellen Francis, and Adam Taylor, The Taliban 
is bringing back its feared ministry of `vice' and `virtue', The 
Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2021, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/08/afghan-vice-virtue-ministry/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2022); Kathy Gannon, Taliban replace ministry 
for women with `virtue' authorities, AP News, Sept. 18, 2021, 
available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/08/afghan-vice-virtue-ministry/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
    \93\ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, 
Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 
29, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 
2022).
    \94\ Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, 
Congressional Research Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, 
available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11646 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    Since August 2021, specialized courts and prosecution units, 
``responsible for enforcing the 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women, have been discontinued.'' \95\ Many legal professionals 
involved with women's protections from sexual, domestic, and other 
violence went into hiding or fled the country, and most domestic 
violence shelters have closed.\96\ As shelters closed some survivors 
were reportedly sent to detention centers while individuals convicted 
of gender-based violence were released by the Taliban. \97\
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    \95\ Experts decry measures to `steadily erase' Afghan women and 
girls from public life, United Nations News, Jan. 17, 2022, 
available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109902 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \96\ Fereshta Abbasi, Afghan Women Fleeing Violence Lose Vital 
Protection, For Survivors of Abuse, Shelters Offered Lifeline, Human 
Rights Watch, Sept. 24, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/24/afghan-women-fleeing-violence-lose-vital-protection 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \97\ Freedom of the World 2022, Afghanistan, Freedom House, Feb. 
28, 2022, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/afghanistan/freedom-world/2022 (last visited Apr. 8. 2022).
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    Afghan women are becoming ``socially invisible'' in public 
life.\98\ The By-Law of the Commission for Preaching and Guidance, 
Recruitment and Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a 
manual used by the Taliban in a number of provinces since August 2021, 
and now across the country, place ``tough restrictions on the conduct 
of women and girls.'' \99\ These authorities provide instruction on 
which family members qualify to be a mahram, or chaperone, for women 
and older girls, and commands women to wear a veil when in the presence 
of non-mahrams.\100\ In some parts of the country, women have been 
barred from leaving their home without a mahram \101\ and have been 
attacked or blocked from receiving social services such as healthcare 
when leaving their home without a mahram.\102\ The manual also requires 
women to wear a hijab and veil in public.\103\ As punishments for non-
conformity, the Taliban has carried out lashings and executions.\104\
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    \98\ Marie McAuliffe, Struggling to Survive: Gender, 
Displacement, and Migration in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Feb. 23, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggling-survive-gender-displacement-and-migration-taliban-controlled-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \99\ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, 
Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 
29, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 
2022).
    \100\ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, 
Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 
29, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 
2022).
    \101\ Country of Origin Information (COI) Brief Report, 
Afghanistan: Recent developments in the security situation, impact 
on civilians and targeted individuals, Ministry of Immigration and 
Integration, The Danish Immigration Service, p. 1, Sept. 2021, 
available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060188/Afghanistan_Targetedindiv_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \102\ Heather Barr, Afghan Women Watching the Walls Close In, 
Taliban Crushes Women's Freedom of Movement and Other Rights, Human 
Rights Watch, Mar. 2, 2022, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/02/afghan-women-watching-walls-close (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \103\ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, 
Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 
29, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 
2022).
    \104\ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and 
guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 78, Nov. 
2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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    Reports indicate that women were forced to marry Taliban fighters 
prior to the takeover of Kabul in 2021.\105\ Although the Taliban has 
denied the occurrence of forced marriage, local activists report the 
practice occurs, stating that women are being married as ``sexual 
slaves.'' \106\ A statement shared

[[Page 30983]]

on social media featuring Taliban insignia instructed religious leaders 
in Takhar and Badakhshan ``to refer girls older than 15 and widows 
younger than 45'' to the ``Mujahideen Cultural Commission'' for 
marriage to Taliban fighters.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Country of Origin Information (COI) Brief Report, 
Afghanistan: Recent developments in the security situation, impact 
on civilians and targeted individuals, Ministry of Immigration and 
Integration, The Danish Immigration Service, p. 1, Sept. 2021, 
available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060188/Afghanistan_Targetedindiv_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) 
(citing Lynne O'Donnell, As Taliban Expand Control, Concerns About 
Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise, Foreign Policy, Jul. 23, 2021, 
available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/23/afghanistan-taliban-women-gender/; and Frud Bezhan & Mustafa Sarwar, Return To 
The `Dark Days': Taliban Reimposes Repressive Laws On Women In Newly 
Captured Areas in Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Jul. 
14, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-repression-afghan-women/31358597.html).
    \106\ Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of 
the Taliban [Version 1.0], UK Home Office, p. 33-34, Oct. 2021, 
available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2061589/AFG_CPIN_Fear_of_the_Taliban.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing 
Taliban trying to force Afghan girls as young as 13 into marriage, 
The National, Aug. 3, 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2021/08/03/taliban-trying-to-force-afghan-girls-as-young-as-13-into-marriage/).
    \107\ Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of 
the Taliban [Version 1.0], UK Home Office, p. 33-34, Oct. 2021, 
available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2061589/AFG_CPIN_Fear_of_the_Taliban.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing 
Taliban trying to force Afghan girls as young as 13 into marriage, 
The National, August 3, 2021, available at: https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2021/08/03/taliban-trying-to-force-afghan-girls-as-young-as-13-into-marriage/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Taliban have banned girls from attending secondary school past 
the sixth grade,\108\ although the Taliban permitted women to attend 
universities in February 2022.\109\ Rules segregating teachers and 
classes according to gender ``exacerbated a severe teacher shortage and 
threaten to eliminate higher education opportunities for girls.'' \110\
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    \108\ Fereshta Abbasi, Afghan Girls' Education: `I Don't Think I 
Have a Future,' Closing Secondary Schools to Girls Causing Lasting 
Harm, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 31, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/31/afghan-girls-education-i-dont-think-i-have-future (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \109\ Ayaz Gul, All Public Universities in Afghanistan Open to 
Male, Female Students, Voice of America (VOA), Feb. 26, 2022, 
available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/all-public-universities-in-afghanistan-open-to-male-female-students/6461202.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2022); The Taliban closes Afghan girls' schools hours after 
reopening, Al Jazeera, Mar. 23, 2022, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/23/taliban-orders-girls-schools-shut-hours-after-reopening (last visited May 3, 2022).
    \110\ Christina Goldbaum, Taliban Allow Girls to Return to Some 
High Schools, but With Big Caveats, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2021, 
updated Nov. 3, 2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/27/world/asia/afghan-girls-school-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Afghan women are unable to hold positions of authority in almost 
all spheres of public life.\111\ They have been ``barred from paid 
employment, except as teachers for girls and health-care workers.'' 
\112\ Women aid employees are allowed to work unconditionally in just 
three out of 34 provinces.\113\ In the remaining provinces, ``women aid 
workers face severe restrictions, such as requirements for a male 
family member to escort them while they do their jobs, making it 
difficult or impossible for them to do their job effectively.'' \114\ 
In the legal field, female lawyers and judges ``have left the courts 
under Taliban pressure'' and ``live in a state of perpetual fear that 
they or their loved ones could be tracked down and killed.'' \115\ 
Although Taliban representatives claim that female lawyers and judges 
are protected by a general amnesty for all former government workers, 
these women fear retribution for their work.\116\
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    \111\ Marie McAuliffe, Struggling to Survive: Gender, 
Displacement, and Migration in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Feb. 23, 2022, 
available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggling-survive-gender-displacement-and-migration-taliban-controlled-afghanistan 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \112\ HRW Says Donors Should Link Afghan Aid to Taliban's 
Observing Rights for Girls, Women, Gandahara Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, Mar. 21, 2022, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/hrw-donors-afghan-aid-taliban-womens-rights/31762920.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \113\ Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid Workers, Human 
Rights Watch, Nov. 4, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \114\ Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid Workers, Human 
Rights Watch, Nov. 4, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022.
    \115\ David Zucchino, Afghan Women Who Once Presided Over Abuse 
Cases Now Fear for Their Lives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2021, updated 
Oct. 22, 2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/world/asia/afghan-judges-women-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=5 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \116\ David Zucchino, Afghan Women Who Once Presided Over Abuse 
Cases Now Fear for Their Lives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2021, updated 
Oct. 22, 2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/world/asia/afghan-judges-women-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=5 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Women activists and former members of public life have been 
targeted with severe violence since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. 
Protests by women ``outraged by the . . . hard-line'' nature of the 
Taliban's so-called ``caretaker government'' have been met by violence 
from the Taliban fighters.\117\ According to ACLED, during the week of 
October 30 to November 5, 2021, ``the bodies of four women civil 
society activists were recovered in Balkh province, including a well-
known women's rights defender . . . [allegedly] killed by an organized 
network targeting civil society activists, who introduced themselves as 
representatives of a human rights organization.'' \118\
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    \117\ Yaroslav Trofimov, Afghan Women Protest Hard-Line Taliban 
Government, Face Violent Crackdown, The Wall Street Journal, Sep. 8, 
2021, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-women-protest-talibans-all-male-government-face-violent-crackdown-11631105098 (last visited May 3, 2022), cited by: Taliban Government 
in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, p. 20, Nov. 2, 2021, available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46955 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \118\ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 30 October 
to 5 November 2021, ACLED, Nov. 2021, available at: https://acleddata.com/2021/11/11/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-30-october-5-november-2021/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
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ii. Targeted Killings and Evictions of Hazaras
    Hazaras have been ``historic victims of prejudice on religious and 
ethnic grounds.'' \119\ Though they made progress in achieving parity 
with other ethnic groups over the last two decades, Hazaras were 
particular targets of harm by the Taliban during the Taliban's period 
of rule from 1996-2001. Recently, Taliban fighters massacred nine 
ethnic Hazara men after taking control of Ghazni province in July 
2021.\120\ Hazaras, an ethnic Shia minority, are also enduring a 
pattern of increasing sectarian attacks from ISIS-K, which over the 
last several years ``has been blamed for dozens of bombings and gun 
attacks on mosques, shrines, schools . . . [as] the group views Shiites 
as apostates.'' \121\
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    \119\ Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political 
History, p.26, (Princeton University Press, 2010).
    \120\ Afghanistan: Taliban responsible for brutal massacre of 
Hazara men--new investigation, Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2021, 
available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/afghanistan-taliban-responsible-for-brutal-massacre-of-hazara-men-new-investigation/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \121\ Pamela Constable, After Kabul school attack, Afghans fear 
a return to violence, The Washington Post, Apr. 20, 2022, available 
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/afghanistan-school-attack-isis-hazara/ (last visited May 3, 2022).
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    Human Rights Watch and other sources have reported that the Taliban 
has begun forcibly evicting Hazaras from their homes, including 700 
from the central province of Daikundi in late September 2021,\122\ 
hundreds of families from the southern Helmand province and northern 
Balkh province,\123\ and others from Daikundi, Uruzgan, and Kandahar 
provinces.\124\ Human Rights Watch stated that ISIS-K ``has repeatedly 
carried out devastating attacks that appear designed to spread terror 
and inflict maximum suffering particularly on Afghanistan's Hazara

[[Page 30984]]

community.'' \125\ Reuters reported that ``[w]ith more than 400 Shi'ite 
mosques in Kabul alone, total security is impossible and no one knows 
where the next attack will come.'' \126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ Gulamaiz Sharifi, Abubakar Siddique, Afghan Hazaras Fear 
The Worst After Forced Taliban Evictions, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, Oct. 6, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-hazaras-taliban/31496224.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \123\ Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 
Hazaras, Former Civil Servants Targets of Collective Punishment, 
Land-Grabbing, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \124\ Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 
Hazaras, Former Civil Servants Targets of Collective Punishment, 
Land-Grabbing, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \125\ Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on Shia, ISIS 
Affiliate's Targeted Killings Amount to Crimes Against Humanity, 
Human Rights Watch, Oct. 25, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/25/afghanistan-surge-islamic-state-attacks-shia (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \126\ Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, For Afghan Hazaras, where to pray 
can be life and death choice, Reuters, Oct. 21, 2021, available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-hazaras-where-pray-can-be-life-death-choice-2021-10-21/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
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iii. Restrictions and Risks in Cases of Nonconformity
    Optimism that the current Taliban may be more moderate than the 
Taliban was from 1996-2001 has faded, as they are reportedly targeting 
journalists,\127\ artists and musicians,\128\ barbers and those working 
in fashion,\129\ civil society participants and protestors.\130\ 
According to Amnesty International, these actions have created a 
climate of fear and intimidation that has caused many Afghan nationals 
to engage in self-censoring, adopting conservative attire, and 
abandoning former employment and public life.\131\ For example, 
according to the chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission, those formerly employed as ``[l]awyers, judges and 
prosecutors are mostly in hiding.'' \132\ The Taliban have announced 
that they will once again carry out executions and amputations of hands 
for criminal offenses, and have begun doing so.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Afghanistan: Journalists tell of beatings by Taliban, BBC 
News, Sept. 9, 2021, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58500579 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \128\ Javier C. Hern[aacute]ndez, Musicians Flee Afghanistan, 
Fearing Taliban Rule, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2021, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/arts/music/afghanistan-musicians-flee.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Afghanistan: Gunmen attack 
wedding to stop music being played, BBC News, Oct. 31, 2021, 
available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59107046 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \129\ The Taliban Order Barbers Not To Shave Beards In Afghan 
Province Of Helmand, NPR, Sept. 27, 2021, available at: https://www.npr.org/2021/09/27/1041025238/the-taliban-order-barbers-not-to-shave-beards-in-afghan-province-of-helmand (last visited Apr. 8, 
2022).
    \130\ Matthieu Aikins et al., As Taliban Crush Dissent, New 
Leaders Face Cascading Challenges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2021, 
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/08/world/asia/taliban-protests-pakistan.html?referringSource=articleShare (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2022).
    \131\ Afghanistan: Taliban wasting no time in stamping out human 
rights says new briefing, Amnesty International, Sept. 21, 2021, 
available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/afghanistan-taliban-wasting-no-time-in-stamping-out-human-rights-says-new-briefing/ (last visited May 4, 2022).
    \132\ Public Displays of Corpses Signal Return of Hard-Line 
Afghan Taliban, Voice of America (VOA) News, Sept. 27, 2021, 
available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/public-displays-of-corpses-signal-return-of-hard-line-afghan-taliban-/6248297.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \133\ Taliban Official Says Strict Punishment And Executions 
Will Return, NPR, Sept. 24, 2021, available at: https://www.npr.org/2021/09/24/1040339286/taliban-official-says-strict-punishment-and-executions-will-return (last Apr. 8, 2022); The Taliban's Sharia is 
the Most Brutal of All, Foreign Policy, Oct.13, 2021, available at 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/13/the-talibans-sharia-is-the-most-brutal-of-all/ (last visited May 4, 2022).
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iv. Challenges for Individuals With Disabilities
    At least one in five households in Afghanistan includes an adult or 
child with a serious sensory, psychosocial, intellectual, or physical 
disability, making Afghanistan one of the largest per capita 
populations of individuals with disabilities in the world.\134\ Unlike 
many other marginalized populations, merely the removal of 
discrimination does not automatically enable equal participation in 
society; rather there are often necessary accommodations or 
remediations that must happen in physical, communications, or other 
infrastructures.\135\ Access to physical rehabilitation services is ``. 
. . complicated by poverty, poor quality roads, and danger along the 
way due to armed conflict.'' \136\ After the Taliban takeover in 2021, 
any strides that Afghanistan had made in protecting the rights of the 
disabled through the signing and ratifying of conventions under the 
administrations of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani ``have been virtually 
abandoned'' as the withdrawal of foreign aid has ``reduced both the 
funds to implement these programs and international commitments[,] and 
the Afghan leadership's interest in carrying them out.'' \137\ The 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) confirms the stigmatization of 
individuals with physical and mental disabilities, with ``women, 
displaced persons and returned migrants with mental health issues'' 
being particularly vulnerable.\138\ EASO also notes the ``lack of 
appropriate infrastructure and specialist care that covers the needs of 
people with disabilities.'' \139\
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    \134\ ``Disability Is Not Weakness,'' Discrimination and 
Barriers Facing Women and Girls with Disabilities in Afghanistan, 
Human Rights Watch, p. 1, Apr. 2020, available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0420_web_0.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \135\ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, The 
United Nations Human Rights Office (OHCHR), Dec. 13, 2006, available 
at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities (last visited May 4, 2022).
    \136\ ``Disability Is Not Weakness,'' Discrimination and 
Barriers Facing Women and Girls with Disabilities in Afghanistan, 
Human Rights Watch, p. 17, Apr. 2020, available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0420_web_0.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \137\ Chris Fitzgerald, Humanitarian Crisis And Neglect In 
Afghanistan Puts People With Disabilities At Risk, The Organization 
for World Peace, Jan. 19, 2022, available at: https://theowp.org/reports/humanitarian-crisis-and-neglect-in-afghanistan-puts-people-with-disabilities-at-risk/ (last visited May 3, 2022).
    \138\ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and 
guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 88, Nov. 
2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
    \139\ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and 
guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 88, Nov. 
2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

What authority does the Secretary have to designate Afghanistan for 
TPS?

    Section 244(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1), authorizes the 
Secretary, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the U.S. 
Government, to designate a foreign state (or part thereof) for TPS if 
the Secretary determines that certain country conditions exist.\140\ 
The decision to designate any foreign state (or part thereof) is a 
discretionary decision, and there is no judicial review of any 
determination with respect to the designation, termination, or 
extension of a designation. See INA section 244(b)(5)(A); 8 U.S.C. 
1254a(b)(5)(A).\141\ The Secretary, in his or her discretion, may then 
grant TPS to eligible nationals of that foreign state (or individuals 
having no nationality who last habitually resided in the designated 
foreign state). See INA section 244(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(a)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ INA section 244(b)(1) ascribes this power to the Attorney 
General. Congress transferred this authority from the Attorney 
General to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. The Secretary may 
designate a country (or part of a country) for TPS on the basis of 
ongoing armed conflict such that returning would pose a serious 
threat to the personal safety of the country's nationals and 
habitual residents, environmental disaster (including an epidemic), 
or extraordinary and temporary conditions in the country that 
prevent the safe return of the country's nationals. For 
environmental disaster-based designations, certain other statutory 
requirements must be met, including that the foreign government must 
request TPS. A designation based on extraordinary and temporary 
conditions cannot be made if the Secretary finds that allowing the 
country's nationals to remain temporarily in the United States is 
contrary to the U.S. national interest. Id., at section 244(b)(1).
    \141\ This issue of judicial review is the subject of 
litigation. See, e.g., Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020), 
petition for en banc rehearing filed Nov. 30, 2020 (No. 18-16981); 
Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
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    At least 60 days before the expiration of a foreign state's TPS 
designation or extension, the Secretary, after consultation with 
appropriate U.S.

[[Page 30985]]

Government agencies, must review the conditions in the foreign state 
designated for TPS to determine whether they continue to meet the 
conditions for the TPS designation. See INA section 244(b)(3)(A), 8 
U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A). If the Secretary determines that the foreign 
state continues to meet the conditions for TPS designation, the 
designation will be extended for an additional period of 6 months or, 
in the Secretary's discretion, 12 or 18 months. See INA section 
244(b)(3)(A), (C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A), (C). If the Secretary 
determines that the foreign state no longer meets the conditions for 
TPS designation, the Secretary must terminate the designation. See INA 
section 244(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B).

Notice of the Designation of Afghanistan for TPS

    By the authority vested in me as Secretary under INA section 244, 8 
U.S.C. 1254a, I have determined, after consultation with the 
appropriate U.S. Government agencies, the statutory conditions 
supporting Afghanistan's designation for TPS on the basis of ongoing 
armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions are met. See 
INA section 244(b)(1)(A) and (C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(A) and (C). I 
estimate up to approximately 72,500 individuals may be eligible for TPS 
under the designation of Afghanistan. On the basis of this 
determination, I am designating Afghanistan for TPS for 18 months, from 
May 20, 2022 through November 20, 2023. See INA section 244(b)(1)(C) 
and (b)(2); 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C), and (b)(2).

Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Eligibility and Employment Authorization for TPS

Required Application Forms and Application Fees To Register for TPS

    To register for TPS based on the designation of Afghanistan, you 
must submit a Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, 
and pay the filing fee or request a fee waiver, which you may submit on 
Form I-912, Request for Fee Waiver. You may be required to pay the 
biometric services fee. If you can demonstrate an inability to pay the 
biometric services fee, you may request to have the fee waived. Please 
see additional information under the ``Biometric Services Fee'' section 
of this notice.
    TPS beneficiaries are authorized to work in the United States. You 
are not required to submit Form I-765 or have an EAD but see below for 
more information if you want to work in the United States.
    For more information on the application forms and fees for TPS, 
please visit the USCIS TPS web page at uscis.gov/tps. Fees for the Form 
I-821, the Form I-765, and biometric services are also described in 8 
CFR 103.7(b)(1)(i).

How can TPS beneficiaries obtain an Employment Authorization Document 
(EAD)?

    Everyone must provide their employer with documentation showing 
that they have the legal right to work in the United States. TPS 
beneficiaries are eligible to obtain an EAD, which proves their legal 
right to work. TPS applicants who want to obtain an EAD must file the 
Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, and pay the fee 
or request a fee waiver, by submitting Form I-912, Request for Fee 
Waiver. TPS applicants may file this form along with their TPS 
application, or at a later date, provided their TPS application is 
still pending or has been approved.

Refiling an Initial TPS Registration Application After Receiving a 
Denial of a Fee Waiver Request

    If you receive a denial of a fee waiver request, you must refile 
your Form I-821 for TPS along with the required fees during the 
registration period, which extends until November 20, 2023. You may 
also file for your EAD on Form I-765 with payment of the fee along with 
your TPS application or at any later date you decide you want to 
request an EAD during the registration period.

Filing Information

    USCIS offers the option to applicants for TPS under Afghanistan's 
designation to file Form I-821 and related requests for EADs online or 
by mail. When filing a TPS application, applicants can also request an 
EAD by submitting a completed Form I-765, Application for Employment 
Authorization, with their Form I-821.
    Online filing: Form I-821 and Form I-765 are available for 
concurrent filing online.\142\ To file these forms online, you must 
first create a USCIS online account.\143\
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    \142\ Find information about online filing at ``Forms Available 
to File Online,'' https://www.uscis.gov/file-online/forms-available-to-file-online.
    \143\ https://myaccount.uscis.gov/users/sign_up.
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    Mail filing: Mail your application for TPS to the proper address in 
Table 1.

Table 1--Mailing Addresses

    Mail your completed Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected 
Status, Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, and Form 
I-912, Request for Fee Waiver, if applicable, and supporting 
documentation to the proper address in Table 1.

                       Table 1--Mailing Addresses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  If . . .                          Mail to . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
You are using the U.S. Postal Service        USCIS, Attn: TPS
 (USPS) and you live in Alaska, Arizona,      Afghanistan, P.O. Box
 California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,         20300, Phoenix, AZ 85036-
 Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New       0300.
 Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
 South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington,
 Wyoming.
You are using FedEx, UPS, or DHL and you     USCIS, Attn: TPS
 live in Alaska, Arizona, California,         Afghanistan (Box 20300),
 Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,    1820 E. Skyharbor Circle
 Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North          S, Suite 100, Phoenix, AZ
 Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,      85034-4850.
 Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
You are using the U.S. Postal Service        USCIS, Attn: TPS
 (USPS) and live in Alabama, Arkansas,        Afghanistan, P.O. Box
 Connecticut, Delaware, District of           805282, Chicago, IL 60680-
 Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,        5285.
 Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
 Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
 Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New
 Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
 Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
 Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
 Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
 Wisconsin.

[[Page 30986]]

 
You are using FedEx, UPS, or DHL and live    USCIS, Attn: TPS
 in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,           Afghanistan, (Box 805282),
 Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,     131 South Dearborn--3rd
 Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,            Floor, Chicago, IL 60603-
 Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,        5517.
 Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
 Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
 Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
 Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
 West Virginia, Wisconsin.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If you were granted TPS by an immigration judge (IJ) or the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and you wish to request an EAD, please 
mail your Form I-765 application to the appropriate mailing address in 
Table 1. When you are requesting an EAD based on an IJ/BIA grant of 
TPS, please include a copy of the IJ or BIA order granting you TPS with 
your application. This will help us verify your grant of TPS and 
process your application.

Supporting Documents

    The filing instructions on the Form I-821 list all the documents 
needed to establish eligibility for TPS. You may also find information 
on the acceptable documentation and other requirements for applying 
(i.e., registering) for TPS on the USCIS website at uscis.gov/tps under 
``Afghanistan.''

Travel

    TPS beneficiaries may also apply for and be granted travel 
authorization as a matter of discretion. You must file for travel 
authorization if you wish to travel outside of the United States. If 
granted, travel authorization gives you permission to leave the United 
States and return during a specific period. To request travel 
authorization, you must file Form I-131, Application for Travel 
Document, available at www.uscis.gov/i-131. You may file Form I-131 
together with your Form I-821 or separately. When filing the Form I-
131, you must:
     Select Item Number 1.d. in Part 2 on the Form I-131; and
     Submit the fee for the Form I-131, or request a fee 
waiver, which you may submit on Form I-912, Request for Fee Waiver.
    If you are filing Form I-131 together with Form I-821, send your 
forms to the address listed in Table 1. If you are filing Form I-131 
separately based on a pending or approved Form I-821, send your form to 
the address listed in Table 2 and include a copy of Form I-797 for the 
approved or pending Form I-821.

                       Table 2--Mailing Addresses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              If you are . . .                      Mail to . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Filing Form I-131 together with a Form I-    The address provided in
 821, Application for Temporary Protected     Table 1.
 Status.
Filing Form I-131 based on a pending or      USCIS, Attn: I-131 TPS,
 approved Form I-821, and you are using the   P.O. Box 660167, Dallas,
 U.S. Postal Service (USPS): You must         TX 75266-0867.
 include a copy of the receipt notice (Form
 I-797C) showing we accepted or approved
 your Form I-821.
Filing Form I-131 based on a pending or      USCIS, Attn: I-131 TPS,
 approved Form I-821, and you are using       2501 S. State Hwy. 121
 FedEx, UPS, or DHL: You must include a       Business, Ste. 400,
 copy of the receipt notice (Form I-797C)     Lewisville, TX 75067.
 showing we accepted or approved your Form
 I-821.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Biometric Services Fee for TPS

    Biometrics (such as fingerprints) are required for all applicants 
14 years of age and older. Those applicants must submit a biometric 
services fee. As previously stated, if you are unable to pay the 
biometric services fee, you may request a fee waiver, which you may 
submit on Form I-912, Request for Fee Waiver. For more information on 
the application forms and fees for TPS, please visit the USCIS TPS web 
page at uscis.gov/tps. If necessary, you may be required to visit an 
Application Support Center to have your biometrics captured. For 
additional information on the USCIS biometric screening process, please 
see the USCIS Customer Profile Management Service Privacy Impact 
Assessment, available at dhs.gov/privacy.

General Employment-Related Information for TPS Applicants and Their 
Employers

How can I obtain information on the status of my TPS application and 
EAD request?

    To get case status information about your TPS application, as well 
as the status of your TPS-based EAD request, you can check Case Status 
Online at uscis.gov, or visit the USCIS Contact Center at uscis.gov/contactcenter. If your Form I-765 has been pending for more than 90 
days, and you still need assistance, you may ask a question about your 
case online at egov.uscis.gov/e-request/Intro.do or call the USCIS 
Contact Center at 800-375-5283 (TTY 800-767-1833).

When hired, what documentation may I show to my employer as evidence of 
identity and employment authorization when completing Form I-9?

    You can find the Lists of Acceptable Documents on the last page of 
Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, as well as the 
Acceptable Documents web page at uscis.gov/i-9-central/acceptable-documents. Employers must complete Form I-9 to verify the identity and 
employment authorization of all new employees. Within three days of 
hire, employees must present acceptable documents to their employers as 
evidence of identity and employment authorization to satisfy Form I-9 
requirements.
    You may present any document from List A (which provides evidence 
of both identity and employment authorization) or one document from 
List B (which provides evidence of your identity) together with one 
document from List C (which provides evidence of employment 
authorization), or you may present an acceptable receipt as described 
in the Form I-9 Instructions. Employers may not reject a document based 
on a future expiration date. You can find additional information about 
Form I-9 on the I-9 Central web page

[[Page 30987]]

at uscis.gov/I-9Central. An EAD is an acceptable document under List A.

If I have an EAD based on another immigration status, can I obtain a 
new TPS-based EAD?

    Yes, if you are eligible for TPS, you can obtain a new TPS-based 
EAD, regardless of whether you have an EAD or work authorization based 
on another immigration status. If you want to obtain a new TPS-based 
EAD valid through November 20, 2023, then you must file Form I-765, 
Application for Employment Authorization, and pay the associated fee 
(unless USCIS grants your fee waiver request).

Can my employer require that I provide any other documentation such as 
evidence of my status or proof of my Afghan citizenship or a Form I-
797C showing that I registered for TPS for Form I-9 completion?

    No. When completing Form I-9, employers must accept any 
documentation you choose to present from the Form I-9 Lists of 
Acceptable Documents that reasonably appears to be genuine and that 
relates to you, or an acceptable List A, List B, or List C receipt. 
Employers need not reverify List B identity documents. Employers may 
not request proof of Afghan citizenship or proof of registration for 
TPS when completing Form I-9 for new hires or reverifying the 
employment authorization of current employees. Refer to the ``Note to 
Employees'' section of this Federal Register notice for important 
information about your rights if your employer rejects lawful 
documentation, requires additional documentation, or otherwise 
discriminates against you based on your citizenship or immigration 
status, or your national origin.

Note to All Employers

    Employers are reminded that the laws requiring proper employment 
eligibility verification and prohibiting unfair immigration-related 
employment practices remain in full force. This Federal Register notice 
does not supersede or in any way limit applicable employment 
verification rules and policy guidance, including those rules setting 
forth reverification requirements. For general questions about the 
employment eligibility verification process, employers may call USCIS 
at 888-464-4218 (TTY 877-875-6028) or email USCIS at [email protected]. USCIS accepts calls and emails in English and 
many other languages. For questions about avoiding discrimination 
during the employment eligibility verification process (Form I-9 and E-
Verify), employers may call the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil 
Rights Division, Immigrant and Employee Rights Section (IER) Employer 
Hotline at 800-255-8155 (TTY 800-237-2515). IER offers language 
interpretation in numerous languages. Employers may also email IER at 
[email protected].

Note to Employees

    For general questions about the employment eligibility verification 
process, employees may call USCIS at 888-897-7781 (TTY 877-875-6028) or 
email USCIS at [email protected]. USCIS accepts calls in 
English, Spanish and many other languages. Employees or job applicants 
may also call the IER Worker Hotline at 800-255-7688 (TTY 800-237-2515) 
for information regarding employment discrimination based on 
citizenship, immigration status, or national origin, including 
discrimination related to Form I-9 and E-Verify. The IER Worker Hotline 
provides language interpretation in numerous languages.
    To comply with the law, employers must accept any document or 
combination of documents from the Lists of Acceptable Documents if the 
documentation reasonably appears to be genuine and to relate to the 
employee, or an acceptable List A, List B, or List C receipt as 
described in the Form I-9 Instructions. Employers may not require extra 
or additional documentation beyond what is required for Form I-9 
completion. Further, employers participating in E-Verify who receive an 
E-Verify case result of ``Tentative Nonconfirmation'' (TNC) must 
promptly inform employees of the TNC and give such employees an 
opportunity to contest the TNC. A TNC case result means that the 
information entered into E-Verify from Form I-9 differs from records 
available to DHS.
    Employers may not terminate, suspend, delay training, withhold or 
lower pay, or take any adverse action against an employee because of a 
TNC while the case is still pending with E-Verify. A Final 
Nonconfirmation (FNC) case result is received when E-Verify cannot 
confirm an employee's employment eligibility. An employer may terminate 
employment based on a case result of FNC. Work-authorized employees who 
receive an FNC may call USCIS for assistance at 888-897-7781 (TTY 877-
875-6028). For more information about E-Verify-related discrimination 
or to report an employer for discrimination in the E-Verify process 
based on citizenship, immigration status, or national origin, contact 
IER's Worker Hotline at 800-255-7688 (TTY 800-237-2515). Additional 
information about proper nondiscriminatory Form I-9 and E-Verify 
procedures is available on the IER website at justice.gov/ier and the 
USCIS and E-Verify websites at uscis.gov/i-9-central and e-verify.gov.

Note Regarding Federal, State, and Local Government Agencies (Such as 
Departments of Motor Vehicles)

    For Federal purposes, individuals approved for TPS may show their 
Form I-797, Notice of Action, indicating approval of their Form I-821 
application, or their A12 or C19 EAD to prove that they have TPS or a 
pending TPS application. However, while Federal Government agencies 
must follow the guidelines laid out by the Federal Government, state 
and local government agencies establish their own rules and guidelines 
when granting certain benefits. Each state may have different laws, 
requirements, and determinations about what documents you need to 
provide to prove eligibility for certain benefits. Whether you are 
applying for a Federal, state, or local government benefit, you may 
need to provide the government agency with documents that show you are 
covered under TPS or show you are authorized to work based on TPS. 
Examples of such documents are:
     Your new EAD with a category code of A12 or C19 for TPS, 
regardless of your country of birth;
     A copy of your Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record; or
     Form I-797, the notice of approval, for your Form I-821, 
Application for Temporary Protected Status, if you received one from 
USCIS.
    Check with the government agency regarding which document(s) the 
agency will accept.
    Some benefit-granting agencies use the SAVE program to confirm the 
current immigration status of applicants for public benefits. SAVE can 
verify when an individual has TPS based on the documents above. In most 
cases, SAVE provides an automated electronic response to benefit-
granting agencies within seconds, but occasionally verification can be 
delayed. You can check the status of your SAVE verification by using 
CaseCheck at uscis.gov/save/save-casecheck, then by clicking the 
``Check Your Case'' button. CaseCheck is a free service that lets you 
follow the progress of your SAVE verification using your date of birth 
and SAVE verification case number or an immigration identifier number 
that you provided to the benefit-granting agency. If an agency has 
denied your application based solely or in part on a SAVE response, the 
agency must offer you the

[[Page 30988]]

opportunity to appeal the decision in accordance with the agency's 
procedures. If the agency has received and acted on or will act on a 
SAVE verification and you do not believe the final SAVE response is 
correct, please see the SAVE Records: Fast Facts For Benefit Applicants 
sheet under SAVE Resources at https://www.uscis.gov/save/save-resources 
for information about how to correct or update your immigration record.

[FR Doc. 2022-10923 Filed 5-19-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-97-P