[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 69 (Monday, April 11, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21052-21056]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-07576]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; Project Identifier MCAI-2021-00840-R]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) 
for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, 
and SA-365N1 helicopters. This proposed AD was prompted by a large 
amount of critical scale particles found on the tail rotor gearbox 
(TGB) chip detector magnetic plug during an unscheduled check of the 
TGB. The particles belonged to the double bearing (pitch control rod 
bearing) installed inside the TGB. This proposed AD would require 
repetitive inspections of the TGB chip detector for particles, 
analyzing any particles collected, performing a double bearing washing, 
repetitive replacements of certain part-numbered

[[Page 21053]]

double bearings, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a 
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is proposed for 
incorporation by reference (IBR). The FAA is proposing this AD to 
address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by May 26, 
2022.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For EASA material that is proposed for IBR in this AD, contact 
EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 
8999 000; email [email protected]; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You 
may find the EASA material on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this material at the FAA, Office of the 
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321, 
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this 
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. The EASA material is also 
available at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating 
Docket No. FAA-2022-0295.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket at https://www.regulations.gov by 
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; or in person at 
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this NPRM, the EASA AD, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andrea Jimenez, Aerospace Engineer, 
COS Program Management Section, Operational Safety Branch, Compliance & 
Airworthiness Division, FAA, 1600 Stewart Ave., Suite 410, Westbury, NY 
11590; telephone (516) 228-7330; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed 
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; Project Identifier 
MCAI-2021-00840-R'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful 
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposal because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you 
provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each 
substantive verbal contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial 
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that 
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to 
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to 
Andrea Jimenez, Aerospace Engineer, COS Program Management Section, 
Operational Safety Branch, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, FAA, 
1600 Stewart Ave., Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone (516) 228-
7330; email [email protected]. Any commentary that the FAA 
receives that is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in 
the public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

    EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the 
European Union, has issued EASA AD 2021-0170, dated July 19, 2021 (EASA 
AD 2021-0170), to correct an unsafe condition for all Airbus 
Helicopters (AH), formerly Eurocopter, Eurocopter France, Aerospatiale, 
Sud Aviation, Model AS 365 N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155 B, EC 155 B1 and SA 
365 N1 helicopters.
    This proposed AD was prompted by a large amount of critical scale 
particles found on the TGB chip detector magnetic plug during an 
unscheduled check of a Model AS 365 N2 helicopter. EASA advises the 
particles belonged to the double bearing (pitch control rod bearing) 
installed inside the TGB and further advises the reported event showed 
a speed of degradation faster than expected. The FAA is proposing this 
AD to prevent bearing degradation and subsequent failure, which could 
result in loss of yaw control. See EASA AD 2021-0170 for additional 
background information.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    EASA AD 2021-0170 requires analyzing any particles collected during 
close monitoring or during any required inspections, repetitive 
inspections of the TGB chip detector for particles, performing a double 
bearing washing, and corrective actions. Corrective actions include 
removing an affected TGB and repairing or replacing that TGB, sending 
affected parts and certain information to the manufacturer, replacing a 
TGB chip detector or TGB electrical magnetic plug, and replacing an 
affected O-ring and double bearing. EASA AD 2021-0170 also requires 
performing a double bearing washing or performing a metallurgical 
analysis based on inspection results.
    EASA AD 2021-0170 also requires for any double bearing part number 
(P/N) 704A33-651-245 or 704A33-651-246, installed on any TGB P/N 
365A33-6005-09, before exceeding 610 flight hours (FH) since first 
installation, or within 110 FH after October 28, 2019 (the effective 
date of EASA AD 2019-0267-E, dated October 25, 2019), whichever occurs 
later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 FH, replacing the 
affected double bearing with a serviceable one. EASA AD 2021-0170 
allows double bearing part number P/N 704A33-651-245 or 704A33-651-246 
to be installed, provided it has never been installed on a helicopter 
and it is inspected as required by EASA AD 2021-0170. Finally, EASA AD 
2021-0170 allows TGB P/N 365A33-6005-09 to be installed, provided it 
has a serviceable double bearing installed that is inspected as 
required by the EASA AD.
    This material is reasonably available because the interested 
parties have access to it through their normal course

[[Page 21054]]

of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Other Related Service Information

    The FAA reviewed Airbus Helicopters Emergency Alert Service 
Bulletin (EASB) No. 01.00.24 for non FAA-type certificated military 
Model AS565MA, MB, MBe, SA, SB, and UB helicopters; EASB No. 01.00.71 
for Model AS365N1, N2, and N3 helicopters, and non FAA-type 
certificated military Model AS365F, Fi, K, and K2 helicopters; EASB No. 
01.31 for non FAA-type certificated military Model SA366GA helicopters; 
and EASB No. 04A016 for Model EC155B and B1 helicopters, each Revision 
3 and dated June 14, 2021 (co-published as one document).
    This service information specifies procedures to inspect the TGB 
chip detector for particles, analyze and define the particles by 
performing a metallurgical analysis, perform a washing of the double 
bearing, replace the double bearing, and send certain information and 
affected parts to the manufacturer.

FAA's Determination

    These helicopters have been approved by EASA and are approved for 
operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral 
agreement with the European Union, EASA has notified the FAA about the 
unsafe condition described in its AD. The FAA is proposing this AD 
after evaluating all known relevant information and determining that 
the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop 
on other helicopters of the same type design.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

    This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified 
in EASA AD 2021-0170, described previously, as incorporated by 
reference, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the 
regulatory text of this proposed AD and except as discussed under 
``Differences Between this Proposed AD and EASA AD 2021-0170.''

Explanation of Required Compliance Information

    In the FAA's ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD 
process, the FAA developed a process to use some civil aviation 
authority (CAA) ADs as the primary source of information for compliance 
with requirements for corresponding FAA ADs. The FAA has been 
coordinating this process with manufacturers and CAAs. As a result, the 
FAA proposes to incorporate EASA AD 2021-0170 by reference in the FAA 
final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with 
EASA AD 2021-0170 in its entirety through that incorporation, except 
for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of 
this proposed AD. Using common terms that are the same as the heading 
of a particular section in EASA AD 2021-0170 does not mean that 
operators need comply only with that section. For example, where the AD 
requirement refers to ``all required actions and compliance times,'' 
compliance with this AD requirement is not limited to the section 
titled ``Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s)'' in EASA AD 2021-
0170. Service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 for 
compliance will be available at https://www.regulations.gov by 
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2022-0295 after the FAA final 
rule is published.

Differences Between This Proposed AD and EASA AD 2021-0170

    Service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies 
sending compliance forms, and certain parts to the manufacturer; this 
proposed AD would not. Service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-
0170 specifies contacting Airbus Helicopters for approved repairs or 
corrective actions if certain discrepancies are found, whereas this 
proposed AD would require accomplishing repairs or corrective actions 
using a method approved by the Manager, General Aviation and Rotorcraft 
Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus 
Helicopters' EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by 
the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.

Interim Action

    The FAA considers this proposed AD would be an interim action. If 
final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further 
rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would 
affect 53 helicopters of U.S. Registry. Labor rates are estimated at 
$85 per work-hour. Based on these numbers, the FAA estimates the 
following costs to comply with this proposed AD.
    Analyzing any particles collected during close monitoring would 
take about 1 work-hour for an estimated cost of $85 per inspection and 
up to $4,505 for the U.S. fleet.
    Replacing a double bearing would take about 16 work-hours and parts 
cost about $1,620 for an estimated cost of 2,980 per replacement and 
$157,940 for the U.S. fleet.
    Inspecting the TGB chip detector for particles would take about 1 
work-hour for an estimated cost of $85 per inspection and $4,505 for 
the U.S. fleet.
    Performing a double bearing washing would take about 8 work-hours 
for an estimated cost of $680 per helicopter.
    The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition replacements that would be required based on the results of 
the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of 
aircraft that might need these on-condition replacements:
    Analyzing collected particles would take about 1 work-hour for an 
estimated cost of $85 per helicopter.
    Replacing a double bearing would take about 16 work-hours and parts 
would cost about $1,620 for an estimated cost of $2,980 per bearing.
    Replacing a TGB chip detector or TGB electrical magnetic plug would 
take about 1 work-hour and parts would cost about $900 for an estimated 
cost of $985 per part replacement.
    Replacing an O-ring would take about 1 work-hour and parts would 
cost about $100 for an estimated cost of $185 per O-ring.
    Replacing a TGB would take about 8 work-hours and parts would cost 
about $155,302 for an estimated cost of $155,982 per replacement.
    The FAA has received no definitive data for the repair cost of a 
TGB.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

[[Page 21055]]

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

Airbus Helicopters: Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; Project Identifier 
MCAI-2021-00840-R.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive 
(AD) by May 26, 2022.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 
N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, and SA-365N1 helicopters, certificated in any 
category.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code 6500, Tail Rotor 
Drive System.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a large amount of critical scale 
particles found on the tail rotor gearbox (TGB) chip detector 
magnetic plug during an unscheduled check of the TGB. The particles 
belonged to the double bearing (pitch control rod bearing) installed 
inside the TGB. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent bearing 
degradation and subsequent failure. The unsafe condition, if not 
addressed, could result in loss of yaw control of the helicopter.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Requirements

    Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all 
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in 
accordance with, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 
2021-0170, dated July 19, 2021 (EASA AD 2021-0170).

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2021-0170

    (1) Where EASA AD 2021-0170 requires compliance in terms of 
flight hours (FH), this AD requires using hours time-in-service 
(TIS).
    (2) Where EASA AD 2021-0170 refers to the effective dates 
specified in paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (iii) of this AD, this AD 
requires using the effective date of this AD.
    (i) October 28, 2019 (the effective date of EASA AD 2019-0267-E, 
dated October 25, 2019).
    (ii) November 19, 2019 (the effective date of EASA AD 2019-
0267R1, dated November 12, 2019 and corrected November 13, 2019).
    (iii) The effective date of EASA AD 2021-0170.
    (3) Where EASA AD 2021-0170 requires actions during each ``after 
last flight (ALF) of the day inspection'' or ``ALF,'' this AD 
requires those actions before the first flight of each day.
    (4) Where paragraph (7) of EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies ``any 
discrepancy,'' for this AD discrepancies include the presence of 
particles and other conditions such as abrasions, particles that 
consist of any scale, chip, flake, splinter, M50 particles, magnetic 
abrasion dust, or other particles other than cotter pin fragments, 
pieces of lock wire, swarf, or miscellaneous non-metallic waste.
    (5) Where paragraph (8) of EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies for Group 
2 helicopters, the first replacement of the affected part must be 
accomplished not later than December 31, 2021, this AD requires, for 
Group 2 helicopters, the first replacement of the affected part as 
defined in EASA AD 2021-0170 must be accomplished within 5 months 
after the effective date of this AD.
    (6) Where any work card referenced in the service information 
referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies ``if there is an anomaly, 
replace the chip detector,'' or ``if there is an anomaly, replace 
the TGB electrical magnetic plug,'' for this AD an anomaly may be 
indicated by the magnetic component of the TGB chip detector or the 
TGB electrical magnetic plug not being magnetized. If there is an 
anomaly, this AD requires before further flight, removing from 
service the TGB chip detector or the TGB electrical magnetic plug as 
applicable to your model helicopter.
    (7) Where any work card referenced in the service information 
referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies ``make sure that the chip 
detector is in good condition,'' or ``make sure that the TGB 
electrical magnetic plug is in good condition,'' as applicable to 
your model helicopter, for this AD ``good condition'' is indicated 
when there are no signs of wear on the locking systems (including 
wear on the bayonets, and slotted tubes). If there are any signs of 
wear on the locking systems, this AD requires before further flight, 
removing from service the TGB chip detector or the TGB magnetic 
electrical magnetic plug as applicable to your model helicopter.
    (8) Where any work card referenced in the service information 
referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies ``if necessary, replace 
the O-rings,'' this AD requires before further flight, removing any 
affected O-ring from service.
    (9) Where the service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-
0170 specifies to return certain parts to the manufacturer, 
including for repair, this AD does not require returning parts to 
the manufacturer, however, this AD does require before further 
flight, repair done in accordance with a method approved by the 
Manager, General Aviation and Rotorcraft Section, International 
Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus Helicopters' EASA Design 
Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval 
must include the DOA-authorized signature.
    (10) Where the service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-
0170 specifies to remove the TGB as per technical documentation, or 
remove the concerned module(s), this AD requires before further 
flight, removing the TGB and replacing it with an airworthy part, or 
repairing the TGB in accordance with a method approved by the 
Manager, General Aviation & Rotorcraft Section, International 
Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus Helicopters' EASA DOA. If 
approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized 
signature.
    (11) Where the service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-
0170 specifies if the collected particles cannot be clearly defined, 
perform a metallurgical analysis and contact Airbus Helicopters, 
before continuing flights, this AD does require before further 
flight, characterization of the particles collected, and performing 
a metallurgical analysis for any particles collected using a method 
in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. However, this AD does 
not require contacting the manufacturer to determine the 
characterization of the particles collected.
    (12) Where the service information or any work card referenced 
in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies to do the actions identified in 
paragraphs (h)(12)(i) through (v) of this AD, this AD does not 
include those requirements.
    (i) Complete Appendix 4.A and 4.B.
    (ii) Comply with paragraph 2.D.
    (iii) Send all collected particles and metallurgical analysis 
report to depot level maintenance facility with the concerned 
module.
    (iv) Inform EST using chip detection tracking sheet.
    (v) Complete the ``Particle Detection'' follow up sheet.
    (13) Where a work card referenced in the service information 
referenced in EASA AD

[[Page 21056]]

2021-0170 specifies ``send all oversized particles for analysis and 
wait for results before continuing flight,'' this AD does not 
require sending particles for analysis, however this AD does require 
before further flight, analyzing the particles using a method in 
accordance with FAA-approved procedures.
    (14) This AD does not mandate compliance with the ``Remarks'' 
section of EASA AD 2021-0170.
    (15) Where paragraph (7) of EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies to 
accomplish the applicable corrective actions ``within the compliance 
time as identified in the applicable ASB,'' this AD requires 
accomplishing corrective actions before further flight.
    (16) Where paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies ``within 
the applicable compliance time as identified in the close monitoring 
and until completion of the close monitoring,'' this AD requires a 
close monitoring compliance time of a total of 25 hours TIS.

(i) No Reporting Requirement

    Although the service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 
specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD 
does not include that requirement.

(j) Special Flight Permit

    Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR 
21.197 and 21.199, provided no passengers are onboard.

(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send 
it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (l)(2) of 
this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(l) Related Information

    (1) For EASA AD 2021-0170, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 
50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email 
[email protected]; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may view this 
material at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest 
Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 
(817) 222-5110. This material may be found in the AD docket at 
https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. 
FAA-2022-0295.
    (2) For more information about this AD, contact Andrea Jimenez, 
Aerospace Engineer, COS Program Management Section, Operational 
Safety Branch, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, FAA, 1600 
Stewart Ave., Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone (516) 228-
7330; email [email protected].

    Issued on March 22, 2022.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification 
Service.

[FR Doc. 2022-07576 Filed 4-8-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P