[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 9, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13452-13521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04894]
[[Page 13451]]
Vol. 87
Wednesday,
No. 46
March 9, 2022
Part III
Department of Transportation
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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New Car Assessment Program; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 /
Notices
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002]
New Car Assessment Program
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Request for comments (RFC).
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SUMMARY: NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) provides comparative
information on the safety performance of new vehicles to assist
consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions and to encourage safety
improvements. In addition to star ratings for crash protection and
rollover resistance, the NCAP program recommends particular advanced
driver assistance systems (ADAS) technologies and identifies the
vehicles in the marketplace that offer the systems that pass NCAP
performance test criteria for those systems. This notice proposes
significant upgrades to NCAP, first, by proposing to add four more ADAS
technologies to those NHTSA currently recommends. The new technologies
are blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane keeping
support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Other plans on
updating NCAP are discussed in the Supplementary Information.
DATES: Comments should be submitted no later than May 9, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to the docket number above and be
submitted by one of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery: 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting
comments, see the Public Participation heading of the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document. Note that all comments received
will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided.
Privacy Act: Anyone can search the electronic form of all
comments received in any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or at https://www.transportation.gov/privacy. For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the street
address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the
dockets.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact
Ms. Jennifer N. Dang, Division Chief, New Car Assessment Program,
Office of Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone: 202-366-1810). For
legal issues, you may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, Office of Chief
Counsel (Telephone: 202-366-2992). You may send mail to either of these
officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice also proposes changes (including
an increase in stringency) to the test procedures and performance
criteria for the four currently recommended ADAS technologies in NCAP
to enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle
models and to harmonize with other consumer information programs.
Second, this notice describes (but does not propose at this time) how
NHTSA could rate vehicles equipped with these ADAS technologies and
requests comment on how best to develop this rating system. Third,
NHTSA seeks (but does not propose at this time) to provide a crash
avoidance rating at the point of sale on a vehicle's window sticker,
consistent with the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act, and discusses ways of implementing the program, including a
potential process for updating such information. Fourth, as part of a
new NHTSA approach to NCAP, NHTSA is proposing a ``roadmap'' of the
Agency's plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years
and presents the roadmap for comment. Fifth, as another first for NCAP,
NHTSA is considering utilizing NCAP to raise consumer awareness of
certain safety technologies that may have the potential to help people
make safe driving choices. This information may be of particular
interest to parents or other caregivers shopping for a vehicle for a
new or inexperienced driver in the household, or parents wanting to
know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/heatstroke. Sixth and
finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several
programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program. The proposal on
ADAS technologies and the aforementioned initiatives pave the way for
the Agency to focus on a much broader safety strategy, including
fulfilling not only the 2015 FAST Act directive but also the recent
mandates included in Section 24213 of the November 2021 Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act, to improve road safety for motor vehicle occupants as well as
other vulnerable road users.
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
A. Lane Keeping Technologies
1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
a. Haptic Alerts
b. False Positive Tests
c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies
1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
b. Test Procedure Harmonization
2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)
D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
c. Current State of AEB Technology
d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
h. Regenerative Braking
3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-to-Collision
b. False Positive Test Scenarios
c. Procedure Clarifications
d. Expand Testing
e. AEB Strikeable Target
IV. ADAS Rating System
A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers
1. Star Rating System
2. Medals Rating System
3. Points-Based Rating System
4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
B. ADAS Rating System Concepts
1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
2. Percentage of Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 1
3. Select Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 2
4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
5. Overall Rating
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V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)
VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
A. Driver Monitoring Systems
B. Driver Distraction
C. Alcohol Detection
D. Seat Belt Interlocks
E. Intelligent Speed Assist
F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist
VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept
B. Baseline Risk Concept
C. Half-Star Ratings
D. Decimal Ratings
E. Rollover Resistance Test
IX. Other Activities
A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data
B. Website Updates
C. Database Changes
X. Economic Analysis
XI. Public Participation
XII. Appendices
I. Executive Summary
NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) supports NHTSA's mission
to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S.
roadways. NCAP, like many other NHTSA programs, has contributed to
significant reductions in motor vehicle fatalities. In the decade prior
to the 1978 start of NCAP, fatalities from motor vehicle crashes
exceeded 50,000 annually. In 2019, 36,096 people still lost their lives
on U.S. roads. Passenger vehicle occupant fatalities decreased from
32,225 in 2000 to 22,215 in 2019.\1\ This reduction is notable,
particularly in light of the fact that the total number of vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) in the U.S. has increased over time. However,
during that same timeframe, pedestrian fatalities increased by 33
percent, from 4,739 in 2000 to 6,205 in 2019.\2\ Furthermore, a
statistical projection of traffic fatalities for the first half of 2021
shows that an estimated 20,160 people died in motor vehicle traffic
crashes--the highest number of fatalities during the first half of the
year since 2006, and the highest half-year percentage increase in the
history of data recorded by the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS).\3\ In addition, the projected 11,225 fatalities during the
second quarter of 2021 represents the highest second quarter fatalities
since 1990, and the highest quarterly percentage change (+23.1 percent)
in FARS data recorded history. Preliminary data reported by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) show that VMT in the first half of 2021
rebounded from a large pandemic-related dip that occurred in the first
half of 2020, increasing by 173.1 billion miles, or about a 13 percent
increase over the comparable period in 2020. The fatality rate for the
first half of 2021 increased to 1.34 fatalities per 100 million VMT, up
from the projected rate of 1.28 fatalities per 100 million VMT in the
first half of 2020. Early evidence suggests that these fatality rates
have increased as a result of increases in risky behaviors like driving
and riding while unbelted, impaired driving, and speeding.\4\ Although
there have been notable gains in automotive safety over the past fifty
years, far more work must be done.
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\1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
\2\ Traffic Safety Facts 2000 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the
General Estimates System.'' U.S. Department of Transportation.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
\3\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2021,
October), Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities for the
First Half (January-June) of 2021. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No.
DOT HS 813 199), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\4\ See https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020-fatality-data-show-increased-traffic-fatalities-during-pandemic.
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This notice discusses how NCAP can support NHTSA's mission through
its multi-faceted initiatives and broad safety strategies to address
vehicle safety involving motor vehicle occupants, other vulnerable road
users, and safe driving choices to further reduce injuries and
fatalities occurring on the nation's roads. As stated in the Department
of Transportation's National Roadway Safety Strategy, proposals to
update NCAP are expected to emphasize safety features that protect
people both inside and outside of the vehicle, and may include
consideration of pedestrian protection systems, better understanding of
impacts to pedestrians (e.g., specific considerations for children),
and automatic emergency braking and lane keeping assistance to benefit
bicyclists and pedestrians. In a first-of-its-kind focus--especially
relevant in light of increases in fatalities caused by risky driving
behaviors--this notice seeks comment on how automakers could encourage
consumers to choose safety technologies that could prevent risky
behaviors from occurring in the first place. This notice also proposes
significant upgrades to NCAP by adding four additional crash avoidance
technologies (also termed ADAS throughout this notice) to the program,
increasing the stringency of the tests for currently recommended ADAS
technologies in NCAP for enhanced evaluation of their current
capabilities, and exploring, for the first time, expanding NCAP to
include safety for road users outside of the vehicle. Finally, this
document presents a roadmap of NHTSA's current plans to upgrade NCAP in
phases over the next several years.
Many of these efforts align with Section 24213 of the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act \5\ and signed on November 15, 2021. First, this RFC, once
finalized, fulfills the requirements of Section 24213(a) of the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because NHTSA intends for the addition of
the four technologies proposed in this RFC to ``finalize the proceeding
for which comments were requested'' on December 16, 2015.\6\
Specifically, the finalization of this RFC will close the December 16,
2015 proceeding and notice. While NHTSA has future plans described in
the roadmap that the Agency discussed in the December 16, 2015 notice,
none are considered an extension of the December 16, 2015 proceeding,
though all information previously collected by NHTSA may be used in the
development of future notices.
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\5\ (Pub. L. 117-58).
\6\ Id. at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015). This
is the notice that will be finalized once the final decision notice
for today's RFC is published.
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Second, this RFC fulfills portions of the requirements in Section
24213(b) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that mandates the Agency
``publish a notice, for the purposes of public comment, to establish a
means for providing consumer information relating to advanced crash-
avoidance technologies'' within one year of enactment that includes:
(1) An appropriate methodology for determining which advanced crash
avoidance technologies should be included in the information, (2)
performance test criteria for use by manufacturers in evaluating those
technologies, (3) a distinct rating system involving each technology,
and (4) updating overall vehicle ratings to include the new rating.
Through this RFC, NHTSA is proposing four additional advanced crash
avoidance technologies \7\ for inclusion in NCAP, proposing the test
criteria for evaluating the advanced crash avoidance technologies, and
seeking comment on the future development of a crash avoidance rating
system. NHTSA described in detail why it chose the four
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technologies that it did and how those technologies meet NHTSA's
established criteria for inclusion in NCAP. Since NHTSA is proposing
the addition of four advanced crash avoidance technologies and test
criteria for evaluating those technologies, NHTSA meets two of the four
requirements for fulfillment of the Advanced Crash Avoidance section of
Sec. 24213(b).
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\7\ This notice refers to the advanced crash avoidance
technologies as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)
technologies.
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Section 24213(b) of the law also requires that the Agency publish a
notice ``to establish a means for providing to consumers information
relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other vulnerable road user safety
technologies'' within one year of enactment. This notice must meet
requirements very similar to the advanced crash avoidance notice
mentioned above. Since NHTSA is today proposing to include pedestrian
automatic emergency braking (PAEB) in the program and is including test
criteria for evaluating PAEB, NHTSA meets two of the four requirements
for fulfillment of the Vulnerable Road User Safety section of Sec.
24213(b). The remaining requirements will be fulfilled once NHTSA
proposes and then finalizes a new rating system for the crash avoidance
technologies in NCAP. The law also requires that NHTSA submit reports
to Congress on its plans for fulfilling the abovementioned
requirements. NHTSA plans to fulfill these reporting requirements in a
timely manner.
Third, this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the requirements of
Section 24213(c) for NHTSA to establish a roadmap for implementation of
NCAP changes that covers a term of ten years, with five year mid-term
and five year long-term components, and with updates to the roadmap at
least once every four years to reflect new Agency interests and public
comments. The first roadmap must be completed within one year of the
law's enactment. Once finalized, the roadmap on future updates to NCAP
proposed in this RFC in its entirety would fulfill the ten-year roadmap
requirement, as some proposed initiatives will be considered in NCAP in
the first five years while others will be proposed in the second half
of the ten-year plan. The details and analysis of this fulfillment are
available in the Roadmap section of this RFC.
Fourth, this RFC, once finalized, will fulfill a provision in
Section 24213(c) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that requires
NHTSA to make the roadmap available for public comment and to consider
the public comments received before finalizing the roadmap. These
provisions are in accordance with the Agency's current practice for
updating NCAP and will be followed to finalize the roadmap. Section
24213(c) of the Law also requires that NHTSA identify opportunities
where NCAP would ``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety
rating programs.'' The Agency is taking steps to harmonize with
existing consumer information rating programs where possible, and when
appropriate, as noted in various sections of this RFC.
Fifth, Section 24213(c) of the Law requires the Agency to engage
with stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints not less than
annually to develop future roadmaps. Again, this provision is in
accordance with the Agency's current practice.
Components of the Notice
There are six main parts to this notice:
1. Proposes to add four new ADAS technologies to NCAP and updates
to current NCAP test procedures,
2. Discusses the Agency's plan to develop a new rating system for
advanced driver assistance technologies,
3. Describes steps to list the crash avoidance rating information
on the vehicle's window sticker (the Monroney label) at the point of
sale,
4. Describes roadmap of the Agency's plans to update NCAP in phases
over the next ten years,
5. Requests comments on expanding NCAP to provide consumer
information on safety technologies that could help people drive safer
by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior, and
6. Discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic
aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
Each of the aforementioned aspects of the notice are described in
greater detail that follows. First, the notice discusses in detail the
Agency's proposed upgrade to add four more ADAS technologies to those
currently recommended by NHTSA through NCAP and that are highlighted on
the NHTSA website. Since 2010, NCAP has recommended four kinds of ADAS
technologies to prospective vehicle purchasers, and has identified to
shoppers the vehicles that have these technologies and that meet NCAP
performance test criteria.\8\ The current technologies are forward
collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent
braking (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS) (with the latter two
collectively referred to as ``automatic emergency braking).\9\ This
notice proposes changes (including an increase in stringency) to the
test procedures and performance criteria for LDW, CIB, DBS, and FCW to
(1) enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle
models, (2) reduce test burden, and (3) harmonize with other consumer
information programs. This notice also describes and proposes four more
ADAS technologies: Blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane
keeping support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking.
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\8\ NCAP only indicates that a vehicle has a recommended
technology when NHTSA has data verifying that the technology meets
the minimum performance requirements set by NHTSA for acceptable
performance. If a vehicle's ADAS is reported to have satisfied the
performance requirements using the test methods specified by the
Agency, then NHTSA uses a checkmark system to indicate on the NHTSA
website that the vehicle is equipped with the technology. Each year,
NHTSA also selects a sample of vehicles from that model year to
verify ADAS system performance by performing its own tests.
\9\ https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies.
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These four new ADAS technologies are candidates for NCAP because
data indicate they satisfy NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in
the program. The prerequisites are: (1) The update to the program
addresses a safety need; (2) there are system designs (countermeasures)
that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) existing or new system
designs have safety benefit potential; and (4) a performance-based
objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance. In
order to address (1), a safety need, the Agency inherently looks first
to address injuries and fatalities stemming from ``high-frequency and
high-risk crash types''--as these crashes command the largest safety
need and thus may also afford the biggest potential benefit. NHTSA does
not calculate relative costs and benefits when considering inclusion in
NCAP as it is a non-regulatory consumer information program. NHTSA
discusses in this notice how each of the proposed ADAS technologies
meets the four prerequisites. As explained in detail in this notice,
the four new ADAS technologies proposed in NCAP are the only
technologies that the Agency believes meet the four prerequisites for
inclusion at this time. Each technology has demonstrated the ability to
successfully mitigate high frequency and high-risk crash types. With
the proposal to include pedestrian automatic emergency braking, NCAP
would be expanded, for the first time, to include safety for people
outside of the vehicle.
Second, this notice discusses the Agency's plan to develop a future
rating system for new vehicles based on the availability and
performance of all the NCAP-recommended crash avoidance technologies.
Currently, NCAP only
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recommends crash avoidance technologies to shoppers, and identifies the
vehicles that offer the recommended technologies that pass NCAP system
performance criteria. Unlike its crashworthiness and rollover
protection programs that offer a combined rating based on vehicle
performance in frontal, side, and rollover tests, the NCAP crash
avoidance program does not currently have a rating system to
differentiate the performance of ADAS technologies. NHTSA seeks to
remedy this by developing a rating system for ADAS technologies to
provide purchasers improved data with which to compare and shop for
vehicles, and to spur improved vehicle performance. Accordingly, this
document seeks public input on how best to develop this rating system.
Third, this notice announces NHTSA's steps to list the crash
avoidance rating information on the vehicle's window sticker (the
Monroney label) at the point of sale, as directed by the FAST Act.\10\
NHTSA requests comment on ideas for the Monroney label information.
Research is underway to maximize the effectiveness of the information
in informing purchasing decisions. A follow-on notice will propose the
crash avoidance rating system and explain how NHTSA would use the
ratings. NHTSA will consider the comments received on this notice in
conjunction with the information gained from the consumer research, to
develop a proposal for a revised label. To help shoppers make more
informed purchasing decisions, NHTSA also plans to provide fuel economy
and greenhouse gas rating information with the NHTSA safety ratings,
not only at the point of sale but also on the NHTSA website.
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\10\ This Act requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to require
vehicle manufacturers to include crash avoidance information next to
the crashworthiness information on vehicle window stickers (Monroney
labels).
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Fourth, as part of a new approach to advancing NCAP, NHTSA has
developed a roadmap of the Agency's current plans to upgrade NCAP in
phases over the next several years. The roadmap sets forth NHTSA's
near-term and longer-term strategies for upgrading NCAP. The roadmap
takes a gradual approach, which contemplates NHTSA's issuing proposed
upgrades in phases, as the technologies mature to readiness for
proposed inclusion in NCAP. Following a proposal will be a final
decision document that responds to comments and provides NHTSA's
decisions for that phase of NCAP updates, including the lead time
provided for the implementation. The roadmap presents an estimated
timeframe of the phased request for comment (RFC) notices.
Fifth, this notice also considers expanding NCAP to provide
consumer information on safety technologies that could help people
drive safer by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior. The
Agency is examining the possibility of expanding NCAP to include
technologies that promote NHTSA's continuing efforts to combat unsafe
driving behaviors, such as distracted and impaired driving, riding in a
vehicle unrestrained, and speeding. NHTSA currently uses many
approaches to reduce dangerous driving behaviors, including high
visibility enforcement and advertising campaigns like ``Click it or
Ticket'' and ``Buzzed Driving is Drunk Driving.'' These campaigns have
succeeded in reducing, but not eliminating, human causes of crashes and
there is some evidence that their success has reached a plateau. NHTSA
is considering how NCAP can promote technologies that would reduce
unsafe driving or riding behavior like distracted and impaired driving,
speeding, or riding in a vehicle unrestrained by targeting the human
behaviors most likely to lead to crashes. This information may be of
particular interest to parents or other caregivers who are shopping for
a vehicle for a new or inexperienced driver in the household, or
caregivers wanting to know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/
heatstroke.
Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating
several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
NHTSA requests comment on the Agency's ideas for revising the 5-star
safety ratings program. This document also discusses ways NHTSA would
like to update the existing ADAS technology program components,
outlines challenges the Agency has encountered relating to manufacturer
self-reported data, and proposes possible solutions to those problems.
Lastly, the RFC discusses (1) updates to the NCAP website to improve
the dissemination of vehicle safety information to consumers and (2)
the development of an NCAP database to modernize the operational
aspects of the program, including a new vehicle information submission
process for vehicle manufacturers.
This RFC includes numbered questions throughout the notice that
highlight specific topics on which NHTSA seeks comments. Although
several questions may be posed un-numbered within the body of certain
sections, these un-numbered questions are reiterated at the conclusion
of the topic discussion and in Appendix B. To help ensure that NHTSA is
able to address all comments received, the Agency requests that
commenters provide corresponding numbering in their responses.
II. Background
NHTSA established its NCAP in 1978 in response to Title II of the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972. When the
program first began providing consumers with vehicle safety information
derived from frontal crashworthiness testing, attention within the
industry to vehicle safety was relatively new. Today's consumers are
much more interested in vehicle safety, and this has become one of the
key factors in vehicle purchasing decisions.\11\ Vehicle manufacturers
have responded to these consumer demands by offering safer vehicles
that incorporate enhanced safety features. This has resulted in
improved vehicle safety performance in NCAP, which has historically
translated into higher NCAP star ratings.
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\11\ See www.regulations.gov, See www.regulations.gov, Docket
No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for a report of ``New Car Assessment Program 5-
Star Quantitative Consumer Research.''
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Over the years, NHTSA began to incorporate ADAS technologies into
NCAP's crash avoidance program. In 2007, NHTSA, for the first time,
issued an RFC exploring the addition of ADAS technologies in NCAP.\12\
Later, based on feedback received from written and oral comments, NHTSA
published a final decision \13\ expanding NCAP to include certain ADAS
technologies and specific performance thresholds that a NHTSA-
recommended ADAS system must meet. Beginning with model year 2011, the
Agency began recommending on its website forward collision warning
(FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), and electronic stability control
(ESC),\14\ and identified to shoppers which vehicles have the
technologies that meet NCAP's performance requirements. NHTSA updated
NCAP further to include crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic
braking support (DBS)
[[Page 13456]]
technologies, beginning with model year 2018 vehicles.
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\12\ 72 FR 3473 (January 25, 2007). The RFC included a request
for comments on a NHTSA report titled, ``The New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP); Suggested Approaches for Future Enhancements.''
\13\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
\14\ ESC was removed from the Agency's list of recommended ADAS
technologies through NCAP beginning in model year 2014 when the
technology became mandated under FMVSS No. 126, ``Electronic
stability control.'' NHTSA also included rear video systems in its
list of recommended technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to
2017 and removed that technology from its list when it became
mandated under FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear Visibility.''
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This RFC continues those efforts. Through several notices and
public meetings, NHTSA has continued discussions with stakeholders
about which technologies should be included in NCAP and the minimum
performance thresholds those technologies should meet. NHTSA has set
forth in Appendix C to this RFC a detailed history of the requests for
comment, public meetings, and other relevant events that underlie this
notice.
The last RFC NHTSA published to discuss potential changes to NCAP
was published in 2015. It was broad in subject matter and sought
comment on NCAP's potential use of enhanced tools and techniques for
evaluating the safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and
stimulating further vehicle safety developments.\15\ On the
crashworthiness front, the RFC sought comment on establishing a new
frontal oblique test and on using more advanced crash test dummies in
all tests. The RFC also sought comment about establishing a new crash
avoidance rating category and including nine advanced crash avoidance
technologies. Additionally, the RFC sought comment on establishing a
new pedestrian protection rating category involving the use of adult
and child head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and adding two
new pedestrian crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on
combining the three categories (crash avoidance, crashworthiness, and
pedestrian protection) into one overall 5-star rating. NHTSA also
received comments at two public hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on
January 14, 2016, and the second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in
Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. The numerous comments received on
the RFC are discussed in a section below.
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\15\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
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In October 2018, NHTSA hosted a third public meeting to re-engage
stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the Agency plan the
future of NCAP.\16\ The Agency has also been working to finalize its
research efforts on pedestrian crash protection, advanced
anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side
impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover
risk curve. As discussed in the roadmap, NHTSA plans to upgrade the
NCAP crashworthiness program in phases over the next several years with
the knowledge it has acquired from the research programs.
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\16\ October 1, 2018.
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III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
ADAS technologies have the potential to increase safety by
preventing crashes or mitigating the severity of crashes that might
otherwise lead to injury and death. NCAP currently conducts performance
verification tests for four ADAS technologies: Forward collision
warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent braking
(CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS). CIB and DBS are collectively
referred to as automatic emergency braking (AEB). Vehicles that are
equipped with one or more of these systems and pass NCAP's performance
test requirements are listed as ``Recommended'' on NHTSA's website.
When the Agency first began recommending FCW and LDW systems for model
year 2011 vehicles, the fitment rate for these systems was less than
0.2 percent (where ``fitment rate'' means the percent of vehicles
equipped with a particular ADAS system). For model year 2018 vehicles,
38.3 percent were equipped with FCW and 30.1 percent were equipped with
LDW.\17\ Providing vehicle safety information through NCAP can be an
effective approach to advance the deployment of safer vehicle designs
and technology in the U.S. market, inform consumer choices, and
encourage adoption of new technologies that have life-saving potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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With this notice, NHTSA is proposing to incorporate four additional
ADAS technologies into NCAP's crash avoidance program: Lane keeping
support (LKS), pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), blind
spot warning (BSW), and blind spot intervention (BSI). Each of these
technologies meets the Agency's established criteria for inclusion in
NCAP: (1) The technology addresses a safety need; (2) system designs
exist that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the technology provides
the potential for safety benefits; and (4) a performance-based
objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance.\18\
Details about how each of the proposed ADAS technologies addresses a
safety need (criterion 1) will be discussed immediately below, while
the remaining criteria will be discussed in the relevant sections under
each technology.
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\18\ 78 FR 20599 (Apr. 5, 2013).
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To gain an understanding of the safety need that current ADAS
technologies may address, NHTSA analyzed crash data for 84 mutually
exclusive pre-crash scenarios.\19\ The pre-crash scenarios used in the
Agency's analysis were devised using a typology \20\ concept \21\
published by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe),
which categorizes crashes into dynamically distinct scenarios based on
pre-crash vehicle movements and critical events. As detailed in the
referenced March 2019 report, NHTSA mapped the pre-crash scenario
typologies to twelve currently available ADAS technologies \22\
believed to potentially address certain pre-crash scenarios by
assisting the driver to avoid or mitigate a crash. These mappings
served to define the corresponding crash populations (i.e., target
crash populations).
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\19\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\20\ A typology is the study or analysis of something, or the
classification of something, based on types or categories.
\21\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios
based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 745),
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
\22\ The twelve ADAS technologies were as follows: FCW, DBS,
CIB, LDW, LKS, lane centering assist (LCA), BSW, BSI, lane change/
merge warning, PAEB, RAB, and rear cross-traffic alert.
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Since several ADAS technologies presently available on passenger
vehicles \23\ are designed to mitigate the same crash scenarios, NHTSA
first grouped the technologies with similar design intent into
categories. The five technology categories that resulted from this
grouping process include: (1) Forward collision prevention, (2) lane
keeping, (3) blind spot detection, (4) forward pedestrian impact, and
(5) backing collision avoidance. As shown in Table A-6, these
categories address the following high-level crash types: (1) Rear-end;
(2) rollover, lane departure, and road departure; (3) lane change/
merge; (4) pedestrian; and (5) backing, respectively. Of the original
84 pre-crash scenarios studied, we mapped 34 relevant pre-crash
scenario typologies to the five resulting technology categories that
represented these crash types.
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\23\ Passenger vehicles were defined as cars, crossovers, sport
utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and vans having a gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
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The forward collision prevention category included three ADAS
technologies: Forward collision warning, crash imminent braking, and
dynamic brake support (FCW, CIB, and
[[Page 13457]]
DBS, respectively). The lane keeping category included lane departure
warning (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS),\24\ and lane centering
assist (LCA). The blind spot detection category included blind spot
warning (BSW),\25\ blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge
warning. The forward pedestrian impact avoidance category included
pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB). Lastly, the backing
collision avoidance category included rear automatic braking (RAB) and
rear cross-traffic alert (RCTA). These ADAS technologies are
characterized as SAE International (SAE) Level 0-1 \26\ driving
automation systems.
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\24\ The study uses the term ``lane keeping assist'' (LKA), but
NCAP terminology differs. NCAP uses the term ``lane keeping
support'' throughout this document instead.
\25\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``blind spot detection''
(BSD) but NCAP uses the term blind spot warning (BSW) throughout
this document instead.
\26\ SAE International (2018), Taxonomy and definitions for
terms related to driving automation systems for on-road motor
vehicles (SAE J3016). Level 0: No Automation--The full-time
performance by the human driver of all aspects of the dynamic
driving task, even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems.
Level 1: Driver Assistance--The driving mode-specific execution by a
driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/
deceleration using information about the driving environment and
with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining
aspects of the dynamic driving task.
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NHTSA derived target crash populations for each of the five
technology categories using 2011 to 2015 Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS) and National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates
System (NASS GES) data sets, which serve as records of police-reported
fatal and non-fatal crashes, respectively, on the nation's roads. For a
given technology category, we compiled data for each of the
corresponding pre-crash scenarios to generate target crash populations
surrounding the number of crashes, fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and
property-damage-only vehicles (PDOVs).\27\ See Table 1 for a breakdown
of target crash populations for each technology category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ PDOVs are vehicles damaged in non-injury-producing crashes
(i.e., crashes in which vehicles only incur property damage and no
occupants incur injury).
\28\ Defined as reverse automatic braking in DOT HS 812 653.
Table 1--Summary of Target Crashes by Technology Group
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety systems Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1-5 injuries PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. FCW/DBS/CIB.............. 1,703,541 (29.4%) 1,275 (3.8%) 883,386 (31.5%) 2,641,884 (36.3%)
2. LDW/LKA/LCA.............. 1,126,397 (19.4%) 14,844 (44.3%) 479,939 (17.1%) 863,213 (11.9%)
3. BSW/BSI/LCM.............. 503,070 (8.7%) 542 (1.6%) 188,304 (6.7%) 860,726 (11.8%)
4. PAEB..................... 111,641 (1.9%) 4,106 (12.3%) 104,066 (3.7%) 6,985 (0.1%)
5. RAB/RvAB \28\ RCTA....... 148,533 (2.6%) 74 (0.2%) 35,268 (1.3%) 231,317 (3.2%)
Combined................ 3,593,18 (62%) 20,841 (62.2%) 1,690,963 (60.3%) 4,604,125 (63.3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to note that target crash populations for the five
technology categories covered 62 percent of all crashes. Crossing path
crashes, which also represented a large crash population and a
significant number of fatalities, were not part of our analysis because
we are not aware of a currently available ADAS technology that can
effectively mitigate this crash type.\29\ However, there are emerging
safety countermeasures that hold potential to address some portion of
these crashes in the future and these technologies will be considered
for NCAP as they mature. These include intersection safety assist (ISA)
systems that use onboard sensors with a wide field of view (e.g.,
cameras, lidar, radar) as well as vehicle communications systems.\30\
\31\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes \32\ also had a
relatively high target population and fatality rate,\33\ but were not
included because, aside from electronic stability control (ESC)
systems, which are mandated,\34\ the Agency is not aware of an ADAS
technology that effectively prevents this crash type and also meets
NHTSA's criteria for inclusion in NCAP at this time.\35\
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\29\ In its 2019 report, Volpe found that of the 5,480,886 light
vehicle crashes occurring from 2011 through 2015, crossing path
crashes, which totaled 1,131,273, represented 21 percent of all
light vehicle crashes and 16 percent (3,972) of all fatalities
(25,350).
\30\ NHTSA recognizes that ISA systems are currently available
on a small number of light vehicles. However, preliminary NHTSA
testing has shown that current-generation ISA systems have only
limited capabilities and therefore would not effectively mitigate
intersection-related crashes at this time--which is one of the
requirements in the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
\31\ Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
technologies have the potential to address crossing path crashes,
but, while NHTSA remains strongly interested in these technologies,
they are not included in the current roadmap. NHTSA is continuing to
consider the various issues that bear upon the deployment path of
V2X, including technological evolution and regulatory changes to the
radio spectrum environment.
\32\ Crash scenarios were categorized by the first sequence of a
crash event. Target crashes for a technology (e.g., lane-keeping
crashes) were a collective of crash scenarios that are relevant to
the technology. The Loss-of-control in single-vehicle scenario was
defined as crashes where the first event was initiated by a
passenger vehicle, and the event was coded as jackknife or traction
loss. This crash scenario is mutually exclusive from those included
in the lane-keeping crashes.
\33\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes are about 1% of
crashes and associated with 3% of fatalities.
\34\ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126.
\35\ In its 2019 report, Volpe categorized 9 percent (470,733)
of all light vehicle crashes (5,480,886) occurring from 2011 through
2015 as control loss crashes. Furthermore, 18 percent (4,456) of all
fatal crashes (25,350) were due to control loss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the pre-crash typologies included in NHTSA's March 2019 study,
rear-end collisions were found to be the most common crash type with an
annual average of 1,703,541 crashes. Rear-end collisions represented
29.4 percent of all annual crashes (5,799,883), followed by lane
keeping typologies (1,126,397 crashes or 19.4 percent), and those
relating to blind spot detection (503,070 crashes or 8.7 percent).
Backing crashes (148,533) represented 2.6 percent of all crashes,
followed by forward pedestrian crashes (111,641) at 1.9 percent.
Rear-end collisions also had the highest number of Maximum
Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) \36\ 1-5 injuries at 883,386, which
represented 31.5 percent of all non-fatal injuries (2,806,260) in Table
A-1. Lane keeping crashes had the second highest number of injuries at
479,939 (17.1 percent), as shown in Table A-2, and blind spot crashes
had the third highest at 188,304 (6.7 percent), as shown in Table A-3.
These typologies were followed by forward pedestrian crashes at 3.7
[[Page 13458]]
percent and backing crashes at 1.3 percent, as shown in Table A-4.\37\
\38\
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\36\ The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification
system for assessing impact injury severity developed and published
by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and is
used for coding single injuries, assessing multiple injuries, or for
assessing cumulative effects on more than one injury. AIS ranks
individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 =
minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 =
maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity,
or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the highest single AIS
for a person with one or more injuries). MAIS 0 means no injury.
\37\ The study uses the term ``impacts'' but for consistency
purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this paragraph.
\38\ The Agency notes that the highest number of serious
injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were recorded for lane keeping
crashes (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed
by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward pedestrian
crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12
percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA found that the lane keeping technology category, represented
by rollover, lane departure, and road departure crashes, included the
highest number of fatalities: 14,844, or 44.3 percent of all fatalities
(33,477), as shown in Table A-2. This was followed by the forward
pedestrian impact category, which included 4,106 pedestrian fatalities
(12.3 percent), as shown in Table A-4. The forward collision prevention
category, made up of rear-end crashes, included 1,275 fatalities (3.8
percent), as shown in Table A-1.\39\ The blind spot detection
technology category, represented by lane change/merge crashes,
accounted for 1.6 percent of all fatalities, as shown in Table A-3.
This was followed by backing crashes at 0.2 percent, as shown in Table
A-5, which defined the backing collision avoidance category. The Agency
notes that forward pedestrian crashes, which comprised the forward
pedestrian impact category, ranked second highest for fatalities, and
were the deadliest based on frequency of fatalities per crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``impacts'' but for
consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this
paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In selecting the ADAS technologies to include in this proposal, the
Agency wanted not only to target the most frequently occurring crash
types, but also prioritize the most fatal and highest risk crashes.
Based on the target crash populations studied, NHTSA believes that
those represented by the forward collision prevention, lane keeping,
blind spot detection, and forward pedestrian impact technology
categories account for the most significant safety need.
The Agency notes that ADAS technologies representing the backing
collision avoidance category (i.e., RAB, RvAB, and RCTA) are not being
proposed for this program update. The backing collision avoidance
category did not appear in the top third for number of crashes, number
of fatalities, or number of MAIS 1-5 injuries. This may be due, in
part, to the fact that a significant part of this crash target
population is addressed by FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear visibility.'' \40\ The
Agency needs additional time to assess all available real-world data
and study the effects of the recent full implementation of FMVSS No.
111 prior to considering adoption of ADAS technologies designed to
prevent backing crashes in NCAP. Furthermore, while the Agency
acknowledges that it previously proposed adding rear automatic braking
(RAB) to NCAP in the December 2015 notice, it is continuing to make
changes to the RAB test procedure published in support of that proposal
to address the comments received. Thus, it is not proposing to add this
technology to NCAP at this time. The Agency may propose adding to NCAP
ADAS technologies that address the backing pre-crash typologies as the
Agency continues to analyze the real-world data and refine test
procedure revisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ 49 CFR 571.111. See 79 FR 19177 (Apr. 07, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Units of measure contained within this notice include meters (m),
kilometers (km), millimeters per second (mm/s), meters per second (m/
s), kilometers per hour (kph), feet (ft.), inches per second (in./s),
feet per second (ft./s), miles per hour (mph), seconds (s), and
kilograms (kg).
A. Lane Keeping Technologies
A study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \41\ from the
National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Study (NMVCCS) \42\ identified
that 42 percent of lane departure crashes (i.e., where the driver left
the lane of travel prior to the crash) resulted in a rollover and 37
percent resulted in an opposite direction crash.
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\41\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., &
Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane
crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to
assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Conference on
the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper
Number 17-0220.
\42\ The National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVVCS)
was a nationwide survey of 5,471 crashes involving light passenger
vehicles, with a focus on factors related to pre-crash events, which
were investigated by the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA
over a 2.5-year period from July 3, 2005, to December 31, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After analyzing NHTSA's 2019 target population study, NHTSA
believes that lane keeping technologies such as lane departure warning
(LDW), lane keeping support (LKS), and lane centering assist (LCA), can
address ten pre-crash scenarios including the prevention or mitigation
of roadway departures and crossing the centerline or median (i.e.,
opposite direction crashes). These pre-crash scenarios represented on
average 1.13 million crashes annually or 19.4 percent of all crashes
that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 14,844 fatalities and
479,939 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-2. This equals 44.3
percent of all fatalities and 17.1 percent of all injuries
recorded.\43\ \44\
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\43\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\44\ When only serious injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were
considered, lane keeping crashes represented the highest number of
non-fatal injuries (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal
injuries), followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent),
forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot
crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02
percent).
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NCAP currently provides information on the performance of LDW, one
of the lane keeping ADAS technologies. LDW was introduced in the
program in 2010 for model year 2011 vehicles.\45\ At the time, the
fitment rate for LDW was less than 0.2 percent. In model year 2018, it
was 30.1 percent.\46\ Although the adoption rate for LDW has increased
over this period, it has not increased as significantly as the fitment
rate for forward collision warning (FCW), which saw an approximate 40
percent increase over the same time period. A possible explanation
regarding the lower fitment rate for LDW will be discussed in the next
section. A second lane keeping ADAS technology that the Agency believes
is appropriate for inclusion in NCAP is LKS. NHTSA believes that LKS
may provide additional safety benefits that LDW cannot and may more
effectively address the number of fatalities and injuries related to
lane departure crashes.
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\45\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
\46\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
Lane departure warning is a NHTSA-recommended technology that is
currently included in NCAP to mitigate lane departure crashes. LDW
systems are used to help prevent crashes that result when a driver
unintentionally allows a vehicle to drift out of its lane of travel.
These systems often use camera-based sensors to detect lane markers,
such as solid lines (including those marked for bike lanes), dashed
lines, or raised reflective indicators such as Botts' Dots, ahead of
the vehicle.\47\ Lane departure alerts are presented to the driver when
the system detects that the vehicle is laterally approaching or
crossing the lane markings. The alert may be visual, audible, and/or
haptic in
[[Page 13459]]
nature. Visual alerts may show which side of the vehicle is departing
the lane, and haptic alerts may be presented as steering wheel or seat
vibrations to alert the driver. It is expected that an LDW alert will
warn the driver of the unintentional lane shift so the driver can steer
the vehicle back into its lane. When a turn signal is activated, the
LDW system acknowledges that the lane change is intentional and does
not alert the driver.
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\47\ Note that performance of LDW systems may be adversely
affected by precipitation or poor roadway conditions due to
construction, unmarked intersections, faded/worn/missing lane
markings, markings covered with water, etc.
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As NHTSA continues its assessment of LDW systems under NCAP, it
plans to use the current NCAP test procedure titled, ``Lane Departure
Warning System Confirmation Test and Lane Keeping Support Performance
Documentation,'' dated February 2013.\48\ This protocol assesses the
system's ability to issue an alert in response to a driving situation
intended to represent an unintended lane departure and to quantify the
test vehicle's position relative to the lane line at the time of the
LDW alert. In NCAP's LDW tests, a test vehicle is accelerated from rest
to a test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) while travelling in a straight
line parallel to a single lane line comprised of one of three marking
types: Continuous white lines, discontinuous (i.e., dashed) yellow
lines, or discontinuous raised pavement markers (i.e., Botts' Dots).
The test vehicle is driven such that the centerline of the vehicle is
approximately 1.8 m (6 ft.) from the lane edge. This path must be
maintained, and the test speed must be achieved, at least 61.0 m (200
ft.) prior to the start gate. Once the driver reaches the start gate,
he or she manually inputs sufficient steering to achieve a lane
departure with a target lateral velocity of 0.5 m/s (1.6 ft./s) with
respect to the lane line. The driver of the vehicle does not activate
the turn signal at any point during the test and does not apply any
sudden inputs to the accelerator pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal.
The test vehicle is driven at constant speed throughout the maneuver.
The test ends when the vehicle crosses at least 0.5 m (1.7 ft.) over
the edge of the lane line marking. The scenario is performed for two
different departure directions, left and right, and for all three lane
marking types, resulting in a total of six test conditions. Five
repeated trials runs are performed per test condition.
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\48\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013,
February). Lane departure warning system confirmation test and lane
keeping support performance documentation. See http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0135.
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LDW performance for each test trial is evaluated by examining the
proximity of the vehicle with respect to the edge of a lane line at the
time of the LDW alert. The LDW alert must not occur when the lateral
position of the vehicle, represented by a two-dimensional polygon,\49\
is greater than 0.8 m (2.5 ft.) from the inboard edge of the lane line
(i.e., the line edge closest to the vehicle when the lane departure
maneuver is initiated), and must occur before the lane departure
exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). To pass the test, the LDW system must satisfy
the pass criteria for three of the first five valid individual trials
\50\ for each combination of departure direction and lane line type (60
percent) and for 20 of the 30 trials overall (66 percent).
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\49\ The two-dimensional polygon is defined by the vehicle's
axles in the X-direction (fore-aft), the outer edge of the vehicle's
tire in the Y-direction (lateral), and the ground in the Z-direction
(vertical).
\50\ Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests
conducted under the same test conditions (including test speed) with
the same subject vehicle.
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NCAP's LDW test conditions represent pre-crash scenarios that
correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed
in real-world lane departure crashes. In its independent review of the
2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe showed that approximately 40
and 30 percent of fatalities in fatal road departure and opposite
direction crashes, respectively, occurred when the posted speed was
72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\51\ Similarly, the data indicated 64 and 63
percent of injuries resulted from road departure and opposite direction
crashes, respectively, that occurred when the posted speed was 72.4 kph
(45 mph) or less.
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\51\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although travel speed was unknown or not reported for a high
percentage of crashes in FARS and GES,\52\ when travel speed was
reported, approximately 6 and 9 percent of fatal road departure and
opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred at travel speeds of
72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Likewise, the data showed 22 and 25 percent
of the police-reported non-fatal road departure and opposite direction
crashes, respectively, occurred at 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Volpe's
data review indicates that speeding is prevalent in lane departure
relevant pre-crash scenarios, but most road departure- and opposite
direction-related fatalities and injuries did not occur on highways.
For instance, 79 percent of road departure-related fatal crashes and 89
percent of road departure-related police-reported injuries occurred on
roads that were not highways. Similarly, for opposite direction-related
crashes, 87 percent of fatalities and 98 percent of injuries did not
occur on highways. Because highway driving speeds are on average much
higher than non-highway speeds, the Volpe data about a high percentage
of crashes occurring at speeds under 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears
accurate. The test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears to address a
large portion of the travel speeds where the crashes are occurring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ For road departure crashes, 63 and 68 percent of the travel
speed data, respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and
GES. For opposite direction crashes, 65 and 67 percent of the data,
respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and GES.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, 62 percent of road departure-related fatalities and 76
percent of road departure-related injuries occurred on straight roads,
thereby aligning with NCAP's test procedure. For opposite direction-
related crashes, 69 percent of fatalities and 67 percent of police-
reported injuries occurred on straight roads.
In its December 2015 notice,\53\ NHTSA expressed concern that the
safety benefits afforded by LDW technology were being diminished due to
false activations. Several studies referenced in that notice had found
that drivers were choosing to disable their vehicle's LDW system
because it was issuing alerts too frequently. The Agency was also
concerned about missed detections resulting from tar lines reflecting
sun light or covered with water and other unforeseen anomalies that
cause unreliable driver warnings. To address these issues and improve
consumer acceptance, NHTSA requested comment in 2015 on whether to
revise certain aspects of NCAP's LDW test procedure. Specifically, the
Agency solicited comment on whether it is feasible to (1) award NCAP
credit to LDW systems that only provide haptic alerts, and (2) develop
additional test scenarios to address false activations and missed
detections. The Agency also proposed to tighten the inboard lane
tolerance for its LDW test procedure from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0
ft.). In doing this, an LDW alert could only occur within a window of
+0.3 to -0.3 m (+1.0 to -1.0 ft.) with respect to the inside edge of
the lane line to pass NCAP's LDW procedure. This proposal effectively
increased the space in which a vehicle could operate within a lane
before triggering of an LDW alert was permitted. Each of these topics
are
[[Page 13460]]
discussed in detail in the sections that follow.
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\53\ 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015).
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a. Haptic Alerts
With respect to haptic warnings, NHTSA mentioned in its December
2015 notice that these alerts may offer greater consumer acceptance
compared to audible alerts, and thus improve the effectiveness of LDW
alerts if the driver does not view the alerts as a nuisance and
disengage the system. In response to the notice, commenters generally
did not support a haptic alert requirement. Some commenters suggested
that requiring a specific feedback type would unnecessarily limit the
manufacturer's flexibility to issue warnings to the driver,
particularly when considering the potential effectiveness of different
feedback types and the need to optimize human-machine interface (HMI)
designs to address a suite of ADAS. Bosch suggested the Agency should
allow all warning options to promote the availability of such systems
in a greater number of vehicles, which should ultimately increase
consumer awareness and encourage vehicle safety improvements. Advocates
stated that the Agency should provide details on the effectiveness of
the different types of sensory feedback (visual, auditory, haptic) to
justify its decision to encourage one warning type over another.
Consumers Union (CU) suggested awarding credit for all LDW feedback
types and awarding additional points or credit for haptic alerts to
encourage this feedback type in the future. The Automotive Safety
Council (ASC) acknowledged that haptic warnings may improve driver
acceptance of LDW systems but suggested that false activations must
also be reduced to realize improved consumer acceptance and additional
safety benefits.
In a large-scale telematics-based study conducted by UMTRI \54\ for
NHTSA on LDW usage, researchers investigated driver behavior in
reaction to alerts. Two types of vehicles were included in the study:
Vehicles with audible-only alerts and vehicles where the driver had the
option to select either an audible or haptic alert. When the latter was
available, the driver selected the haptic warning 90 percent of the
time. Otherwise, the LDW system was turned ``off'' 38 percent of the
time and thus was not providing alerts. For the system that only
provided the audible warning, the LDW was turned ``off'' 71 percent of
the time.
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\54\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the findings from the UMTRI's research, NHTSA concludes
that haptic alerts improve driver acceptance of LDW systems. However,
the Agency is not certain if an increase in driver acceptance will
translate to an improvement in the overall efficacy of the LDW system
in reducing crashes. Furthermore, NHTSA does not want to hinder
optimization of HMI designs given the increasing number of ADAS
technologies available in vehicles today. Therefore, the Agency has
decided not to require a specific alert modality for LDW warnings in
its related NCAP test procedure at this time, but is requesting comment
on whether this decision is appropriate. Although NHTSA has limited
data on the effectiveness of the various alert types, it has some
concern (similar to the one raised for FCW) that certain LDW systems,
such as those that may provide only a visual alert, may be less
effective than other alert options in medium or high urgency
situations.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey,
R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for
connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings
(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. False Positive Tests
In responding to the 2015 RFC, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers
asserted that additional false positive test requirements were not
needed even though they acknowledged NHTSA's concern regarding the
effect of nuisance alerts on consumer acceptance. Specifically, the
Alliance \56\ stated that vehicle manufacturers will optimize their
systems to minimize false positive activations for consumer acceptance
purposes, and thus such tests will not be necessary. Similarly, Honda
stated that vehicle manufacturers must already account for false
positives when considering marketability and HMI. The manufacturer also
indicated that it would be difficult for the Agency to create a valid
false positive test procedure that is robust and repeatable. Mobileye,
Bosch, and MTS Systems Corporation (MTS) also agreed. In fact, Mobileye
explained that it would be hard to reproduce the exact test conditions,
especially with respect to weather, over multiple test locations. Also,
Bosch stated that the specialized tests required to address the
Agency's concern may not be truly representative of all real-world
driving situations that the system encounters. MTS suggested that,
alternatively, a new test could be added to NCAP's LDW test procedure
that would evaluate whether an LDW system can inform the driver that it
is no longer able to issue warnings due to poor environmental
conditions or other reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ After submitting individual comments on the 2015 RFC, the
Alliance and Global Automakers merged to form the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation. This document addresses the individual
comments from the organizations that were then the Alliance and
Global Automakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the concerns expressed regarding repeatability and
reproducibility of test conditions, and the fact that the Agency's data
do not currently support adoption of a false positive assessment for
lane keeping technologies, NHTSA continues to monitor the consumer
complaint data related to false positives to help inform an appropriate
next step.
With respect to the recommendation from MTS, the Agency recognizes
that vehicle manufacturers install LDW telltales on the instrument
panel that illuminate to inform drivers when the system is operational.
The systems are typically operational when the vehicle's travel speed
has reached a preset activation threshold speed and the lane markings
and environmental conditions are appropriate. The telltale will
disappear if those conditions are not met to inform the driver that the
system is no longer operational. In such a state, the system will not
provide an alert if the vehicle departs the travel lane. Given this
feature, NHTSA has decided a test to inform the driver that the system
is no longer issuing warnings is unnecessary at this time.
c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
Support was varied with respect to NHTSA's proposal in the December
2015 notice to modify the LDW test requirements to reduce the leeway
for system activation inside of a lane line from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to
1.0 ft.). Global Automakers stated that the proposed change was
``unduly prescriptive'' and recommended that the Agency retain the
existing lane line tolerance. The organization explained that research
showed 90 percent of drivers needed 1.2 s to react to a warning.\57\
Citing NCAP's LDW test procedure, which requires a steering input
having a target lateral velocity of 0.5 to 0.6 m/s (1.6 to 2 ft./s),
the trade association remarked that this requirement equates to a
necessary warning distance of 0.6 to 0.72 m (1.9 to 2.4 ft.) to ensure
that 90 percent of drivers can react in time to prevent a
[[Page 13461]]
lane departure. Advocates agreed that nuisance notifications are a
concern for driver acceptance, but noted that the Agency provided
little information about the effectiveness of LDW systems meeting the
proposed criteria. Conversely, Delphi, ASC, and MTS commented that some
of the more robust systems that are currently available should be able
to comply with the narrower specification. However, ASC suggested that
the Agency may want to evaluate the impact of the proposed changes
before finalizing the requirements to ensure that narrowing the lane
line tolerances translates to a reduction in false positive alerts, and
thus higher consumer acceptance for LDW systems. Mobileye stated that
the tolerance reduction should increase the required accuracy and
quality of lane keeping systems. MTS remarked that systems meeting the
tighter specification will produce higher driver satisfaction, and, in
turn, system use, compared to those that meet only the current
requirements. Hyundai Motor Company (Hyundai) also supported the
tolerance revision. Consumers Union (CU) agreed with others that the
narrowed lateral tolerance should reduce the issuance of false alerts
on main roadways but cautioned the Agency that this change may not
effectively address false alerts on secondary or curved roads, as
vehicles not only tend to approach within one foot of lane lines, but
also may cross them. The group suggested that false alert conditions be
subject to speed limitations or GPS-based position sensors to avoid
``over activation'' on secondary or curved roads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Tanaka, S., Mochida, T., Aga, M., & Tajima, J. (2012, April
16). Benefit Estimation of a Lane Departure Warning System using
ASSTREET. SAE Int. J. Passeng. Cars--Electron. Electr. Syst.
5(1):133-145, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4271/2012-01-0289.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given NHTSA's goal of reducing nuisance notifications to increase
consumer acceptance of LDW systems and the statements from several
commenters that current LDW systems can meet the proposed reduced test
specification, the Agency believes it is reasonable to propose adopting
the reduced inboard lane tolerance of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.).
In addition to the comments received pertaining to the lane line
tolerance, the Agency also received several suggestions to adopt
additional test scenarios for NCAP's LDW test procedure or make
alternative procedural modifications. Similar to CU's suggestion above
for curved roads, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA add inner and outer
curve scenarios that allow a larger tolerance for the inner lane
boundary than that permitted on a straight road. The company further
recommended that the Agency add road edge detection scenarios,
including curbs and non-structural delimiters such as gravel or dirt,
to reflect real-world conditions and crash scenarios more accurately.
Similarly, Bosch suggested that NHTSA consider introducing road edge
detection requirements in addition to lane markings since not all roads
have lane markings. Additionally, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA alter
the Botts' Dots detail #4 (Botts dots are round, raised markers that
mark lanes) to align with California detail #13, which is more common,
and modify the test procedure to include Botts' Dots on both sides of
the lane or Botts' Dots and a solid line, as these are the most
frequently observed marking pairings.
The Agency appreciates suggestions from commenters and agrees that
there is merit to considering other procedural modifications for NCAP's
lane departure test procedure(s). As will be discussed in the next
section, the Agency is planning to conduct a feasibility study to
determine whether curved roads can be considered for inclusion in NCAP
test procedures to evaluate LKS systems objectively. NHTSA also plans
to perform research to assess how lane keeping system performance on a
test track compares to real-world data for different combinations of
curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing. Additionally, the
Agency recognizes that the European NCAP program (Euro NCAP) has
adopted a road edge detection test that is conducted in a similar
manner to their ``lane keep assist'' tests (described in the next
section), but the road edge detection test does not use lane markings.
Although NHTSA believes the number of vehicles equipped with an ability
to recognize and respond to road edges not defined with a lane line is
presently low, it has identified roadways where this capability could
prevent crashes. Therefore, the Agency is requesting comment on whether
a road edge detection test for either LDW and/or LKS is appropriate for
inclusion in NCAP. In consideration of the lane markings currently
assessed, the Agency proposes to remove the Botts' Dots test scenario
from the current LDW test, as the lane marking type is being removed
from use in California.\58\ At this time, the Agency believes the
traditional dashed and solid lane marking tests would be sufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County
Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although NHTSA has tentatively decided not to adopt additional
false activation requirements for this NCAP upgrade, the Agency is
still concerned about the low effectiveness of LDW and its lack of
consumer acceptance stemming from nuisance alerts and missed
detections.
When NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP program in 2008,\59\
LDW was selected because it met NCAP's four established criteria: (1)
The technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) the system design
of LDW had the potential to mitigate the crash problem; (3) safety
benefits were projected, and (4) test procedures and evaluation
criteria were available to ensure an acceptable performance level. At
the time, the Agency estimated that existing LDW systems were 6 to 11
percent effective in preventing lane departure crashes. Although the
system's effectiveness was relatively low, NHTSA cited the large number
of road departure and opposite direction crashes occurring on the
nation's roadways as well as the resulting AIS 3+ injuries, as reasons
to include LDW in NCAP. Several recent studies have provided varying
results with respect to LDW effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a 2017 study,\60\ the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) concluded that LDW systems were effective in reducing three
types of passenger car crashes (single-vehicle, side-swipes, and head-
on) by 11 percent, which is the same rate NHTSA originally estimated.
Importantly, IIHS also concluded that LDW systems reduce injuries in
those same types of crashes by 21 percent. In its recent study of real-
world effectiveness of crash avoidance technologies in GM vehicles,\61\
UMTRI found that LDW systems showed a 3 percent reduction for
applicable crashes that was determined to be not statistically
significant. Conversely, the active safety technology, LKS (which also
included lane departure warning capability), showed an estimated 30
percent reduction in applicable crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2017, August 23),
Lane departure warning, blind spot detection help drivers avoid
trouble, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/stay-within-the-lines-lane-departure-warning-blind-spot-detection-help-drivers-avoid-trouble.
\61\ Flannagan, C. and Leslie, A., Crash Avoidance Technology
Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle
Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan
Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other studies that examined driver deactivation rates also suggest
that LDW effectiveness may be lower than originally estimated. In a
survey of Honda vehicles brought into Honda
[[Page 13462]]
dealerships for service,\62\ IIHS researchers found that for 184 models
equipped with an LDW system, only a third of the vehicles had the
system activated. Furthermore, in its telematics-based study on LDW
usage,\63\ UMTRI found that, overall, drivers turned off LDW systems 50
percent of the time. However, in Consumer Reports' August 2019 survey
of more than 57,000 CR subscribers, the organization found that 73
percent of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LDW
technology. In fact, 33 percent said that the system had helped them
avoid a crash, and 65 percent said that they trusted the system to work
every time.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, January 28),
Most Honda owners turn off lane departure warning, Status Report,
Vol. 51, No. 1, page 6.
\63\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\64\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure
warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep
drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these findings, the Agency believes that, in addition
to LDW, there is merit to adopting an active lane keeping system, such
as lane keeping support (LKS), in NCAP. As an enhanced active system,
LKS offers the steering and/or braking capability necessary to guide a
vehicle back into its lane without consumer action and should therefore
further enhance safety benefits beyond those that can be realized by
LDW. A detailed discussion pertaining to LKS technology is provided in
the following section.
2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
LDW systems warn a driver that their vehicle is unintentionally
drifting out of their travel lane, while lane keeping support (LKS)
systems are designed to actively guide a drifting vehicle back into the
travel lane by gently counter steering or applying differential
braking. During an unintended lane departure where the driver is not
using the turn signal, LKS systems help to prevent: ``Sideswiping''
where a vehicle strikes another vehicle in an adjacent lane that is
travelling in the same direction; opposite direction crashes where a
vehicle crosses the centerline and strikes another vehicle travelling
in the opposite direction; and road departure crashes where a vehicle
runs off the road resulting in a rollover crash or an impact with a
tree or other object. LKS systems may also help to prevent unintended
lane departures into designated bicycle lanes in situations where the
system's speed threshold is met.
LKS systems typically utilize the same camera(s) used by LDW
systems to monitor the vehicle's position within the lane, and
determine whether a vehicle is about to drift out of its lane of travel
unintentionally. In such instances, LKS automatically intervenes by:
Braking one or more of the vehicle's wheels; steering; or using a
combination of braking and steering so that the vehicle returns to its
intended lane of travel. LKS is one of two active lane keeping
technologies mentioned in the Agency's March 2019 report,\65\ with the
other being lane centering assist (LCA). LKS assists the driver by
providing short-duration steering and/or braking inputs when a lane
departure is imminent or underway, whereas LCA provides continuous
assistance to the driver to keep their vehicle centered within the
lane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in the previous section, UMTRI evaluated the real-
world effectiveness of ADAS technologies, including LDW and LKS.\66\
The results of the LKS study (which also included lane departure
warning functionality) showed an estimated 30 percent reduction in
applicable crashes. Additionally, in its August 2019 survey, 74 percent
of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LKS
technology, and 35 percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash.
Sixty-five percent of owners said that they trusted the system to work
every time.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Carol Flannagan, Andrew Leslie, Crash Avoidance Technology
Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle
Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan
Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
\67\ Consumer Reports. (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure
warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep
drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its December 2015 notice, NHTSA did not propose including LKS
technology as part of the update to NCAP. However, many commenters
recommended that the Agency consider including the technology. For
instance, Bosch and Mobileye stated that LKS systems have the potential
to prevent or mitigate a greater number of collisions involving
injuries and fatalities than LDW systems. The ASC and Delphi
recommended that the Agency adopt LKS in lieu of LDW, with the ASC
adding that Euro NCAP has included LKS in its Lane Support Systems test
protocol since 2016.\68\ \69\ The ASC, Bosch, and Continental noted the
maturity of LKS technology and stated that such systems were already
widely available in vehicles produced at the time. Other proponents of
adopting LKS technology in NCAP include the National Safety Council
(NSC), ZF TRW, and Honda. ZF TRW recommended that the Agency adopt both
active lane keeping (termed LKS in this notice) and lane centering
systems (termed LCA in this notice) due to the high frequency of fatal
road departure crashes. Honda also supports the active safety benefits
of LKS and the system's potential to help prevent crashes. NSC
suggested that the Agency include LKS, as it would complement LDW,
which is already in the program, similar to the way the warning
component of FCW complements the active safety functionality of AEB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ The ASC argued that data from the Highway Loss Data
Institute (HLDI) have shown no statistically significant difference
in collision claim frequencies for vehicles equipped with LDW
compared to those without, and questioned whether LDW systems are
effective in reducing crashes or fatalities.
\69\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2015,
November), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 1.0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As mentioned previously, the Agency agrees with commenters that
there is merit to adopting LKS technology in NCAP. However, NHTSA
believes an LDW system integrated with LKS may be a better approach for
the Agency to consider rather than replacing LDW with LKS. NHTSA
believes, as NSC commented, that an integrated approach (inclusive of
passive and active safety capabilities for lane support systems) would
be similar to what the Agency is proposing for frontal collision
avoidance systems, FCW and AEB, later in this notice.
NHTSA is considering the adoption of certain test methods (e.g.,
those for ``lane keep assist'') contained within the Euro NCAP Test
Protocol--Lane Support Systems (LSS) \70\ to assess technology design
differences for LKS. Since the test speeds and road configurations
specified in this protocol are similar to those stipulated in the
Agency's LDW test procedure, the Agency believes Euro NCAP's test
protocol will sufficiently address the lane keeping crash typology
previously detailed for LDW.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019,
July), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 3.0.2. See
section 7.2.5, Lane Keep Assist tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure includes a series of ``lane keep
assist''
[[Page 13463]]
trials that are performed with iteratively increasing lateral
velocities towards the desired lane line. Each ``lane keep assist''
trial begins with the subject vehicle (SV) (i.e., the vehicle being
evaluated) being driven at 72 kph (44.7 mph) down a straight lane
delineated by a single solid white or dashed white line. Initially, the
SV path is parallel to the lane line, with an offset from the lane line
that depends on the lateral velocity used later in the maneuver. Then,
after a short period of steady-state driving, the direction of travel
of the SV is headed towards the lane line using a path defined by a
1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) radius curve. The lateral velocity of the SV's
approach towards the lane line (from both the left and right
directions) is increased from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) in 0.1
m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments until acceptable LKS performance is no
longer realized. Acceptable LKS performance occurs when the SV does not
cross the inboard leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.3 m (1.0
ft.).
NHTSA conducted a limited assessment of five model year 2017
vehicles equipped with LKS systems. The Agency used a robotic steering
controller to maximize the repeatability and minimize variability
associated with manual steering inputs. For this study, NHTSA also used
a slightly modified and older version of Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure
from what was discussed above. Specifically, the lateral velocity of
the SV's approach towards the lane line was increased from 0.1 m/s to
1.0 m/s in 0.1 m/s increments (0.3 ft./s to 3.3 ft./s in 0.3 ft./s
increments) to assess how LKS systems would perform at higher
velocities. In addition, LKS performance was considered acceptable
(when compared to Euro NCAP's assessment criteria at the time of
NHTSA's testing) for instances where the SV did not cross the inboard
leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.4 m (1.3 ft.).\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ At the time of testing, an older version of Euro NCAP's LSS
test procedure was available. This version stipulated a lane keep
assist assessment criterion of 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) for the maximum
excursion over the inside edge of the lane marking. European New Car
Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). See Assessment Protocol--Safety
Assist, Version 7.0 (2015, November).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A preliminary analysis of the five tested vehicles identified
performance differences between the vehicles depending on the lateral
velocity used during the test. Some vehicles only engaged a steering
response at lower lateral velocities and others continued to provide a
steering input as the lateral velocity was increased.\72\ The maximum
excursion over the lane marking after an LKS activation was also found
to be inconsistent, particularly as lateral velocity increased. These
preliminary findings suggested that there are performance differences
in how vehicle manufacturers are designing their systems for a given
set of operating conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Wiacek, C., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & Shain, K.
(2019), Applying lane keeping support test track performance to
real-world crash data, 26th Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference,
Eindhoven, Netherlands. June 2019, Paper Number 19-0208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The results from these tests, as measured by the maximum excursions
over the lane marking, were compared to the measured shoulder width of
roads where fatal road departure crashes occurred. The analysis
identified roadways where the shoulder width of the roadway was less
than the 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) maximum excursion limit (e.g., certain rural
roadways) used in the Agency's testing. It was observed that only
vehicles displaying robust LKS performance, including at higher lateral
velocities, would likely prevent the vehicle from departing the travel
lane on these roadways. However, most of the roadway departure crashes
were on roads where the shoulder width exceeded 0.4 m (1.3 ft.). On
these roadways, assuming the LKS was engaged, the lane departure could
have been avoided. However, some vehicles did not perform well, with
several exhibiting no system intervention, and others exceeding the
maximum excursion limit as the lateral velocity was increased. To
supplement these initial findings, additional LKS testing has since
been conducted and is undergoing analysis.
Since the analysis showed that most fatal crashes identified in the
study were on roadways having shoulder widths that exceeded the current
Euro NCAP test excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.), NHTSA believes that
adopting the Euro NCAP criterion may provide significant safety
benefits, but is requesting comment on whether an even smaller
excursion limit may be more appropriate. Furthermore, as the study also
identified fatal crashes where lane markers were not present on the
side of the roadway where a departure occurred (such that LKS would not
provide any benefit unless it had the capability to identify the edge
of the roadway), the Agency is also requesting comment (as mentioned
previously) on adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection test to NCAP so
that it may begin to address crashes that occur where lane markings may
not be present.
Based on the findings from NHTSA's LKS testing, which showed
differences in LKS performance at greater lateral velocities, the
Agency is concerned about LKS performance at higher travel speeds when
the vehicle first transitions from a straight to a curved road where
lateral velocity may inherently be high. In its independent analysis of
the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 29 percent of fatal road
departure crashes and 26 percent of fatal opposite direction crashes
occurred at known travel speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph). The
analysis also showed that 55 percent of fatal road departure crashes
and 67 percent of opposite direction crashes occurred on roads with
posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph).\73\ \74\ Furthermore, the
study revealed that speeding was a factor in 31 percent and 13 percent
of fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes,
respectively.\75\ Since NHTSA does not currently have data to show that
LKS system performance at Euro NCAP's current test speed of 72 kph
(44.7 mph) would be indicative of system performance when tested at
higher speeds, NHTSA is requesting comment on whether it would be
beneficial to incorporate additional, higher test speeds to assess the
performance of lane keeping systems in NCAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\74\ For data where the travel speed was known, 63 and 65
percent of the data is unknown or not reported in FARS for road
departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively. For road
departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, 3 and 1
percent of the posted speed data is unknown or not reported in FARS.
\75\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, NHTSA has only performed test track LKS evaluations using
the straight road test configuration specified in the Euro NCAP test
procedure. However, the Agency recognizes that a significant portion of
road departure and opposite direction crashes resulting in fatalities
and injuries occur on curved roads. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data
set \76\ showed that for road departure crashes, 37 percent of
fatalities and 20 percent of injuries occurred on curved roads. For
opposite direction crashes, 30 percent of fatalities and 31 percent of
injuries occurred on curved roads. NHTSA is not certain how LKS
performance observed during straight road trials performed on a test
[[Page 13464]]
track would correlate to real-world system performance on curved roads.
However, NHTSA believes, based on on-road performance testing
experience of newer model year vehicles, that some current system
designs include provisions to address lane departures on curved roads.
The Agency observed that some LKS systems engage by providing limited
operation throughout a curve--which may offer little (if any) safety
benefits. However, other more sophisticated LKS systems maintain
engagement longer and offer more directional authority throughout a
curve. These systems may provide additional safety gains because the
driver has more time to re-engage (i.e., restore effective manual
control of the vehicle).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In NHTSA's study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \77\ from
NMVCCS, crashes that occurred on curved roads \78\ where the driver
departed the travel lane were analyzed. The analysis showed that,
unlike for straight roads where LKS systems may provide smaller
corrective steering inputs to prevent the vehicle from departing the
lane, LKS systems would have to provide sustained lateral correction
(i.e., corrective steering) on a curved road to prevent the vehicle
from departing the lane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., &
Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane
crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to
assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan.
June 2017, Paper Number 17-0220.
\78\ It should be noted that the paper identified crashes where
lane markings were not present on the side of the departure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, in fleet testing of select model year 2012 through
2018 vehicles equipped with LDW and LKS (referenced in the report as
LKA), Transport Canada \79\ found variability in test results and
generally unpredictable system behavior on curved roads. Thus,
Transport Canada stated that it was not possible to gather enough data
to assess the potential safety benefits associated with the technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Meloche, E., Charlebois, D., Anctil, B., Pierre, G., &
Saleh, A. (2019), ADAS testing in Canada: Could partial automation
make our roads safer? 26th International Technical Conference on the
Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Eindhoven, Netherlands, June 2019,
Paper Number 19-0339.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address these unknowns and further understand the potential
effectiveness of LKS systems in the real world, the Agency is
considering additional research to study whether testing on curved
roads should be considered for objective evaluation of LKS systems, and
collect a combination of test track and real-world data to quantify how
LKS systems will operate when exposed to different combinations of
curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing (e.g., at curve onset
or midway through the curve).
With respect to LDW and LKS, NHTSA is seeking comment on the
following:
(1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW
systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type? Why
or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-only
warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when
determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test criteria?
If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert modalities
(such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective at re-
engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If so,
which one(s) and why?
(2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods
from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure,
should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program entirely
and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test procedure
instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW and LKS
capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to conduct the LDW
test if both systems are to be assessed separately. What tolerances
would be appropriate for each test, and why?
(3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to address
lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted).\80\ To help re-
engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must be
provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
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\80\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2016, October), Prevalence of
driver physical factors leading to unintentional lane departure
crashes, Traffic Injury Prevention, 18(5), 481-487, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2016.1247446.
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(4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts'
Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this lane
marking type is being removed from use in California? \81\ If not, why?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County
Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
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(5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.)
over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of
the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be
reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited shoulder
width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance would be
appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for LDW in
addition to LKS? Why or why not?
(6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m
(3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to
establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane line
it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that use of
a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer indication of when
an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the baseline tests
performed without LKS, a process specified by the Euro NCAP LSS
protocol. This is because the small curve radius allows the desired SV
lateral velocity to be more quickly established; requires less initial
lateral offset within the travel lane; and allows for a longer period
of steady state lateral velocity to be realized before an LKS
intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather
than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS
test procedure? Why or why not?
(7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to
evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may
require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency
use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
(8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection
test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane
markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be
added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
(9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro
NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from 0.2
to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system performance, and
that this range is representative of the lateral velocities associated
with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an intended lane change).
However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also specifies a range of
lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 2.0 ft./s) be used to
represent unintended lane departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--
Oncoming vehicle'' and ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle''
tests. To encourage the most robust LKS system performance, should
NHTSA consider a combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure
ranges, lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for
inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
(10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS
performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the
[[Page 13465]]
Agency correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral
velocities on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why
or why not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does
not exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on
straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared to a
vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral
velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the
Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is
negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-engage?
If not, why?
(11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is
redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane departure
when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker on the side
not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a secondary lane
departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion limit established
for the first side. To prevent potential secondary lane departures,
should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP ``lane keep assist''
evaluation criteria to be consistent with language developed for
NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this issue? Why or why not?
NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI intervention shall not cause
the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the inboard edge of the
lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to
the right of it within the validity period. To assess whether this
occurs, a second lane line is required (only one line is specified in
the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a
second lane line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why
not?
(12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes
occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the LKS test
speed be increased, or does the current test speed adequately indicate
performance at higher speeds, especially on straight roads? Why or why
not?
(13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently
contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure
direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test
only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance, should
the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for only one
departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to
assure comparable system performance for the other direction? Or,
should the Agency consider adopting only the most challenging test
conditions? If so, which conditions are most appropriate? For instance,
do the dashed line test conditions provide a greater challenge to
vehicles than the solid line test conditions?
(14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for
each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass
rate for the LKS tests, and why?
(15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS
test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so,
what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?
B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies
NHTSA's 2019 target population study showed that blind spot
detection technologies such as blind spot warning (BSW), blind spot
intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge warning (LCM) (which is
essentially a BSI warning system), can help prevent or mitigate five
pre-crash lane change/merge scenarios. These pre-crash movements
represented, on average, 503,070 crashes annually, or 8.7 percent of
all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 542
fatalities and 188,304 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-3. This
equated to 1.6 percent of all fatalities and 6.7 percent of all
injuries recorded.\82\
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\82\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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Currently, NCAP does not include any ADAS technology that is
designed to address blind spot pre-crash scenarios. NHTSA requested
comment on the inclusion of BSW as part of its upgrade to the program
in its 2015 notice. Although the Agency did not recommend BSI for
inclusion at that time, the Agency is proposing that both BSW and BSI
technologies be adopted as part of this program update.
Although the target population for blind spot detection technology
may not be as large as the populations for AEB or lane keeping
technologies, NHTSA believes there is merit to including blind spot
technologies in NCAP. Consumer Reports found in its 2019 survey that 82
percent of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW technology, 60
percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 68 percent
stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\83\ The Agency
believes the technology's high consumer acceptance rate, in addition to
its potential safety benefits discussed later in this section, supports
its inclusion in the Agency's signature consumer information program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Monticello, M. (2017, June 29), The positive impact of
advanced safety systems for cars: The latest car-safety technologies
have the potential to significantly reduce crashes, Consumer
Reports, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/positive-impact-of-advanced-safety-systems-for-cars/.
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1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
A BSW system is a warning-based driver assistance system designed
to help the driver recognize that another vehicle is approaching, or
being operated within, the blind spot of their vehicle in an adjacent
lane. In these driving situations, and for all production BSW systems
known to NHTSA, the BSW alert is automatically presented to the driver,
and is most relevant to a driver who is contemplating, or who has just
initiated, a lane change. Depending on the system design, additional
BSW features may be activated if the system is presenting an alert and
then the driver operates their turn signal indicator.
BSW systems use camera-, radar-, or ultrasonic-based sensors, or
some combination thereof, as their means of detection. These sensors
are typically located on the sides and/or rear of a vehicle. BSW alerts
may be auditory, visual (most common), or haptic. Visual alerts are
usually presented in the side outboard mirror glass, inside edge of the
mirror housing, or at the base of the front a-pillars inside the
vehicle. When another vehicle enters, or approaches, the driver's blind
spot while operating in an adjacent lane, the BSW visual alert will
typically be continuously illuminated. However, if the driver engages
the turn signal in the direction of the adjacent vehicle while the
visual alert is present, the visual alert may transition to a flashing
state and/or be supplemented with an additional auditory or haptic
alert (e.g., beeping or vibration of the steering wheel or seat,
respectively).
NHTSA requested comment on a draft research blind spot detection
(BSD) test procedure (referred to in this notice as BSW) published on
November 21, 2019 \84\ to assess systems' performance and capabilities
in blind spot related pre-crash scenarios. This test procedure
exercises the BSW system in two different scenarios on the test track:
the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test, and the Straight Lane
Pass-by Test. These two tests assess whether the BSW system displays a
warning when other vehicles, referred to as principal other
[[Page 13466]]
vehicles (POVs), are within the driver's blind spot. The test occurs
without activation of the tested vehicle's, referred to as the subject
vehicle (SV), turn signal. Neither the SV nor POV turn signals are to
be activated at any point during any test trial. A short description of
each test scenario and the requirements for a passing result is
provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test--The POV and SV
are driven parallel to each other at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45
mph) such that the front-most part of the POV is 1.0 m (3.3 ft.) ahead
of the rear-most part of the SV in the outbound lanes of a three-lane
straight road. After 2.5 s of steady-state driving, the POV enters
(i.e., converges into) the SV's blind zone \85\ by making a single lane
change into the lane immediately adjacent to the SV using a lateral
velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). The period of steady-
state driving resumes for at least another 2.5 s and then the POV exits
(i.e., diverges from) the SV's blind zone by returning to its original
travel lane using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5
ft./s). This test is repeated for a POV approach from both the left and
the right side of the SV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ SV blind zones are defined by two rectangular regions that
extend to the side and rear of the SV. Each rectangle is 8.2 ft.
(2.5 m) wide and is represented by lines parallel to the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle but offset 1.6 ft. (0.5 m)
from the outermost edge of the SV's body excluding the side view
mirror(s). The rearward projection begins at the rearmost part of
the SV side mirror housing and ends at a rearward boundary that is
dependent on the relative speed between the SV and POV. The blind
zone is fully described in the test procedure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--To pass a test trial: during the converge lane change, the BSW
alert must be presented by a time no later than 300 ms after any part
of the POV enters the SV blind zone and must remain on while any part
of the POV resides within the SV blind zone; and during the diverge
lane change, the BSW alert may remain active only when the lateral
distance between the SV and POV is greater than 3 m (9.8 ft.) but less
than or equal to 6 m (19.7 ft.). The BSW alert shall not be active once
the lateral distance between the SV and POV exceeds 6 m (19.7 ft.).
Straight Lane Pass-by Test--The POV approaches and then
passes the SV while being driven in an adjacent lane. For each trial,
the SV is traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) whereas
the POV is traveling at one of four constant speeds--80.5, 88.5, 96.6,
or 104.6 kph (50, 55, 60, or 65 mph). The lateral distance between the
two vehicles, defined as the closest lateral distance between adjacent
sides of the polygons used to represent each vehicle, shall nominally
be 1.5 m (4.9 ft.) for the duration of the trial. This test is repeated
for a POV approach towards the SV from an adjacent lane to the left and
to the right of the SV.
--To pass a test trial, the BSW alert must be presented by a time
no later than 300 ms after the front-most part of the POV enters the SV
blind zone and remain on while the front-most part of the POV resides
behind the front-most part of the SV blind zone. The BSW alert shall
not be active once the longitudinal distance between the front-most
part of the SV and the rear-most part of the POV exceeds the BSW
termination distance specified for each POV speed.
For the BSW tests, each scenario is tested using seven repeated
trials for each combination of approach direction (left and right side
of the SV) and test speed. This translates to a total of 14 tests
overall for the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test and 56 tests
overall for the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. NCAP is proposing that to
pass the NCAP system performance requirements, the SV must pass at
least five out of seven trials conducted for each approach direction
and test speed.
The proposed BSW tests represent pre-crash scenarios that
correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed
in real-world lane change crashes. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data
set showed that approximately 28 percent of fatalities and 57 percent
of injuries in lane change crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds
of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\86\ For crashes where the travel speed
was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 14 percent of fatalities
and 24 percent of injuries occurred at speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or
lower.\87\ Furthermore, Volpe found that speeding was a factor in only
18 percent of the fatal lane change crashes and 3 percent of lane
change crashes that resulted in injuries. This suggests that posted
speed corresponds well to travel speed in most lane change
crashes.88 89
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\86\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
\87\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
60 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 68 percent of lane
change crashes that resulted in injuries.
\88\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\89\ It was unknown or not reported whether speeding was a
factor in 3 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 7 percent of
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted earlier, market research conducted by Consumer Reports
(CR) indicated that BSW systems are desirable in consumer interest
surveys of various ADAS technologies. In fact, CR found not only that
an overwhelming majority of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW
technology, but also that 60 percent of them believed BSW technology
had helped them avoid a crash. However, in its study to evaluate the
real-world effectiveness of ADAS technologies in model year 2013-2017
General Motors' (GM) vehicles, UMTRI found that GM's Side Blind Zone
Alert produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane change
crashes. When the Side Blind Zone Alert technology was combined with an
earlier generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the
corresponding effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\90\ UMTRI
attributed this increase to substantially longer vehicle detection
ranges for the Lane Change Alert with Side Blind Zone Alert system
compared to GM's earlier generation Side Blind Zone Alert system.\91\
An Agency study of three BSW-equipped vehicles also showed that that
currently available BSW systems may likely exhibit differences in
detection capabilities and operating conditions such that their
effectiveness estimates could vary significantly.\92\ For instance, one
vehicle's system may simply augment a driver's visual awareness whereas
another may effectively prevent crashes by warning of higher speed lane
change events. In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, Bosch
provided similar insight. The company stated that some BSW systems may
only provide benefit for shorter detection distances, such as 7 m (23.0
ft.) rearward, whereas other systems may provide detection for
distances up to 70 m (229.7 ft.) rearward, which would help the driver
avoid collisions with vehicles approaching from the rear in adjacent
lanes at high speeds. The Agency plans to study these performance
differences in its testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, C.
A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
\91\ For GM's Lane Chane Alert systems, sensors in the vehicle's
rear bumper are utilized to warn the driver of vehicles approaching
from the rear on either the left or right side.
\92\ Forkenbrock, G., Hoover, R.L., Gerdus, E., Van Buskirk,
T.R., & Heitz, M. (2014, July), Blind spot monitoring in light
vehicles--System performance (Report No. DOT HS 812 045),
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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[[Page 13467]]
NHTSA is proposing to conduct BSW tests in NCAP in accordance with
the Agency's BSW test procedure. The Agency believes that the Straight
Lane Pass-by Test scenario, which stipulates incrementally higher test
speeds for the POV, could be used to distinguish between vehicles that
have basic versus advanced BSW capability. For instance, an SV that can
only satisfy the BSW activation criteria when the POV approaches with a
low relative velocity may be considered as having basic BSW capability,
whereas a vehicle that can look further rearward, to sense a passing
vehicle travelling at a much higher speed, may be considered to have
superior BSW capability. NHTSA believes such an assessment is important
because when one vehicle encroaches into the adjacent lane of the
other, the crashes associated with higher speed differentials can be
expected to be more severe than those that occur when the two vehicle
speeds are more similar. Furthermore, the capability of a vehicle to
detect when another vehicle has entered an extended rear zone could be
important for the application of other ADAS technologies such as blind
spot intervention (BSI) or SAE \93\ Level 2 partial driving automation
\94\ systems that incorporate automatic lane change features.
Therefore, the Agency believes that long-range vehicle detection may
not only increase the effectiveness of blind spot technologies such as
BSI, but also enhance capabilities and robustness of other ADAS
applications. For these reasons, NHTSA is proposing (later in this
notice) the incorporation of BSI technology in NCAP to encourage the
proliferation of such systems along with sensing strategies that offer
a greater field of view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ SAE International (2018), SAE J3016_201806: Taxonomy and
definitions for terms related to driving automation systems for on-
road motor vehicles, Warrendale, PA, www.sae.org.
\94\ The sustained driving automation system of both the lateral
and longitudinal vehicle motion control with the expectation that
the driver supervises the driving automation system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters to NHTSA's December 2015 notice overwhelmingly supported
the addition of BSW in NCAP. In fact, many commenters suggested the
Agency expand the testing requirements to encompass additional test
targets, such as motorcycles, and test conditions. Several commenters
also recommended that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test procedure with
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards. Each of
these topics will be discussed below.
a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
Commenters, including the ASC, Continental, Bosch, NSC, and others,
recommended that the Agency expand the BSW testing requirements to
include motorcycle detection. Delphi, MTS, Medical College of Wisconsin
(MCW), and CU suggested that NHTSA evaluate a vehicle's ability to
detect bicycles in addition to motorcycles. Similarly, Subaru suggested
that changes to the Straight Lane Pass-by Test should be made to
address motorcycle detection. MTS and MCW added that motorcycle riders
and bicyclists are more vulnerable to serious and fatal injuries
compared to occupants of motor vehicles. A few commenters were not
supportive of adding a motorcycle detection test in NCAP. Global
Automakers and Hyundai stated that although it was a reasonable goal
for the future, no standardized test devices currently existed at the
time. Similarly, Honda and the Alliance recommended that the Agency
focus on vehicle detection as a first step since no standard test
procedure exists for motorcycle detection. The Alliance added that
since the location of a motorcycle within a lane can vary greatly, test
procedures would need to specify motorcycle behavior and reasonable
detection distances. Furthermore, MTS stated that the position of the
motorcycle POV within the lane (near, center, far) should be specified,
and the radar cross section and projected area of the motorcycle should
be considered as well.
NHTSA agrees that BSW systems capable of detecting motorcycles
would improve safety. A review of the 2011 through 2015 FARS and GES
data sets \95\ showed that there were 106 fatal crashes and nearly
5,100 police-reported crashes annually, on average, for same direction
lane change crashes involving a vehicle and motorcycle. In comparison,
as mentioned earlier, there were 542 fatalities and 503,070 police-
reported crashes annually, on average, for lane change crashes
involving motor vehicles. These data show that more occupants of motor
vehicles die in lane changing crashes than do motorcyclists. However,
the fatality rate for motorcyclists is greater than that for vehicle
occupants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., Yanagisawa, M., & Najm, W. (2018,
September), Pre-Crash Scenario Characteristics of Motorcycle Crashes
for Crash Avoidance Research (Report No. DOT HS 812 902),
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In
Press
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At this time, the Agency has decided to prioritize testing of BSW
systems on motor vehicles for NCAP. NHTSA believes that performing BSW
testing on light vehicles, particularly at higher POV closing speeds,
and for active safety systems (as will be discussed next), should
encourage development of robust sensing systems, which may improve the
detection of other objects such as motorcycles. That being said, the
Agency has planned an upcoming research project designed to address
injuries and fatalities for other vulnerable road users, specifically
motorcyclists. The Agency will continue to observe the development of
BSW technology and is likely to include test procedures for motorcycle
detection in NCAP at a later date if the technology meets the four
prerequisites mentioned above.
Several commenters offered additional suggestions for ways NHTSA
could expand the BSW test procedure. MCW suggested that the Agency
adopt test scenarios that address curved roads and low light
conditions. CU proposed that the Agency should assess whether BSW
systems provide a clear indication to the driver that the system is not
operating since sensors are sometimes rendered inoperable in poor
weather or when blocked.
As with all the ADAS technologies, NHTSA recognizes that there is a
need to understand and assure crash mitigation performance of BSW
systems under all practical situations that the driver and vehicle will
encounter in the real world. However, such comprehensive testing is not
always practical within the scope of the NCAP program. Thus, for
technologies that met the four principles for inclusion in NCAP, the
Agency primarily attempted to address the most frequently occurring,
most fatal, and most injurious pre-crash scenarios when prioritizing
tests to add to the program. When ADAS technologies penetrate the fleet
in sufficient numbers, then the Agency can evaluate how these systems
are performing in the real world and adjust the system performance
criteria accordingly to address additional test conditions, such as
those mentioned by MCW. Regarding CU's suggestion, the Agency believes,
after reviewing vehicle owner's manuals, that most vehicle
manufacturers are including provisions in their system designs to
provide a malfunction indicator to the driver if the system is no
longer operational because the sensors are blocked or due to severe
weather conditions.
NHTSA has also considered Bosch's request to expand the definition
of BSW to encourage adoption of systems that provide longer detection
distances. NHTSA believes, as discussed above,
[[Page 13468]]
that by using higher POV closing speeds to assess BSW system
performance, it may effectively drive enhanced blind spot system
capabilities such as those required for other rearward-looking ADAS
applications, like BSI, or automatic lane change functions.
b. Test Procedure Harmonization
Several commenters suggested that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test
procedure with International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
standard 17387:2008, Intelligent transport systems--Lane change
decision aid systems (LCDAS)--Performance requirements and test
procedures or with various aspects of this standard. Global Automakers
and Hyundai commented that NHTSA should shift the forward edge of the
blind zone rearward from the outside rearview mirrors to the eye point
of a 95th percentile person, as specified in ISO 17387. Hyundai stated
that the ISO procedure is designed such that when the POV is in-line
with the SV driver's eye ellipse, the driver's peripheral vision allows
him/her to see the POV without the assistance of BSW systems. The ASC,
Continental, and Subaru also suggested that the Agency align the
warning zones in the Agency's BSW test procedure with those specified
in ISO 17387.
The Agency does not agree with commenters' suggestion to adopt the
ISO procedure for defining the forward edge of the blind zone as
measured using the eye ellipse from a seated 95th percentile person.
NHTSA believes that the blind zone should be defined not by a specific
seated individual but by the vehicle's characteristics, since a real-
world blind spot for any particular vehicle would differ depending on
the size characteristics of the individual driving the vehicle at the
time. Since people vary in size, they will sit in different seating
positions and have different seating preferences. For instance, a 95th
percentile male will be seated more rearward whereas a 5th percentile
female will be seated more forward. In addition, drivers have personal
preferences for adjusting their side view mirrors that may not be
considered optimal and may not provide a full field of view when
checking the mirrors to make change lanes. For these reasons, the
Agency tentatively concludes that it is more appropriate and better for
the safety of consumers to set the forward plane of the blind zone at
the rearmost part of the side view mirrors, as specified in its BSW
test procedure. This approach should not only best accommodate a wide
variety of driver sizes and seating positions, but also reduce test
complexity when defining the blind zone.
2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
Blind spot intervention (BSI) systems are similar to AEB and LKS
systems in that they provide active intervention to help the driver
avoid a collision with another vehicle. BSW systems alert a driver that
a vehicle is in his/her blind spot, whereas BSI systems activate when
the BSW alert is ignored, and intervene either by automatically
applying the vehicle's brakes or providing a steering input to guide
the vehicle back into the unobstructed lane. With their active
capability, BSI systems can help a driver avoid collisions with other
vehicles that are approaching the vehicle's blind spot, in addition to
preventing crashes with vehicles operating within the vehicle's blind
spot.
Like BSW systems, BSI systems utilize rear-facing sensors to detect
other vehicles that are next to or behind the vehicle in adjacent
lanes. Depending on the design of these systems, BSI activation may or
may not require the driver to operate his/her turn signal indicator
during a lane change. Furthermore, some BSI systems may only operate if
the vehicle's BSW system is also enabled.
As discussed earlier, UMTRI found that GM's BSW system, Side Blind
Zone Alert, produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane
change crashes. However, when Side Blind Zone Alert was combined with a
later generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the corresponding
effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\96\ Given BSI is only now
penetrating the fleet, NHTSA is unaware of any effectiveness studies
for this technology. However, as discussed earlier, the Agency believes
that active safety technologies are more effective than warning
technologies. The UMTRI study concluded that AEB is more effective than
FCW alone and that LKS is more effective than LDW. The Agency believes
the same relationship will likely hold true for blind spot systems, and
that BSI will be more effective than BSW alone. NHTSA also believes, as
mentioned above, that adopting ADAS technologies such as BSI should
also encourage development of enhanced BSW system capabilities (e.g.,
motorcycle and bicycle detection), and may increase the robustness of
other ADAS applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
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NHTSA is proposing to use its published draft test procedure
titled, ``Blind Spot Intervention System Confirmation Test,'' \97\ to
evaluate the performance of vehicles equipped with BSI technology in
NCAP. The Agency's test procedure consists of three scenarios: Subject
Vehicle (SV) Lane Change with Constant Headway, SV Lane Change with
Closing Headway, and SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False
Positive Assessment. In the first two scenarios, an SV initiates or
attempts a lane change into an adjacent lane while a single POV is
residing within the SV's blind zone (Scenario 1), or is approaching it
from the rear (Scenario 2). The third scenario is used to evaluate the
propensity of a BSI system to activate inappropriately in a non-
critical driving scenario that does not present a safety risk to the
occupants in the SV. In each of the tests, the POV is a strikeable
object with the characteristics of a compact passenger car. The system
performance requirements stipulate that the SV may not contact the POV
during the conduct of any test trial. NHTSA is requesting comment on
the number of trials that are appropriate for each test. Each of these
scenarios, along with the proposed evaluation criteria, is detailed
below: \98\
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\97\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
\98\ The Agency notes that these test scenario descriptions
assume the SV is operating in SAE Automation Level 0 or Level 1
operation with only the Automatic Cruise Control (ACC) enabled.
Though the Agency's BSI test procedure has provisions to evaluate
vehicles operating in SAE Automation Levels 2 or 3. Test scenario
descriptions for these evaluations are not discussed herein.
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SV Lane Change with Constant Headway--The POV is driven at
72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane adjacent and to the left of the SV also
traveling at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with a constant longitudinal offset such
that the front-most part of the POV is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-
most part of the SV. After a short period of steady-state driving, the
SV driver engages the left turn signal indicator at least 3 s after all
pre-SV lane change test validity criteria have been satisfied. Within
1.0 0.5 s after the turn signal has been activated, the SV
driver initiates a manual lane change into the POV's travel lane. The
SV driver then releases the steering wheel within 250 ms of the SV
exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius curve during the lane change. To
meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene so as to
prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of the
POV. Additionally, the SV
[[Page 13469]]
BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or
more beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel
lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the validity
period.
SV Lane Change with Closing Headway Scenario--The POV is
driven at a constant speed of 80.5 kph (50 mph) towards the rear of the
SV in an adjacent lane to the left of the SV, which is traveling at a
constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph). During the test, the SV driver
engages the turn signal indicator when the POV is 4.9 0.5
s from a vertical plane defined by the rear of the SV and perpendicular
to the SV travel lane. Within 1.0 0.5 s after the turn
signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a manual lane change
into the POV's travel lane. The SV driver then releases the steering
wheel within 250 ms of the SV exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius
curve. To meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene
to prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of
the POV. Additionally, the SV BSI intervention shall not cause the SV
to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond the inboard edge of the lane
line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to the
right of it within the validity period.
SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False Positive
Assessment Test--The POV is driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane that
is two lanes to the left of the SV's initial travel lane with a
constant longitudinal offset such that the front-most part of the POV
is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of the SV, which is also
travelling at 72.4 kph (45 mph). The SV driver engages the left turn
signal indicator at least 3 s after all pre-SV lane change test
validity criteria have been satisfied. Within 1.0 0.5 s
after the turn signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a
manual lane change into the left adjacent lane (the one between the SV
and POV). For this test, the driver does not release the steering
wheel. Since the lane change will not result in an SV-to-POV impact,
the SV BSI system must not intervene during any valid trials. To
determine whether a BSI intervention occurred, the SV yaw rate data
collected during the individual trials performed in this scenario are
compared to a baseline composite. After being aligned in time to the
baseline, the difference between the data must not exceed 1 degree/
second within the test validity period.
The proposed crash-imminent BSI test scenarios represent pre-crash
scenarios that correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and
injuries observed in real-world lane change crashes. As discussed in
the BSW crash statistics section, Volpe showed that approximately 28
percent of fatalities and 57 percent of injuries in lane change crashes
occurred on roads with posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\99\
Furthermore, approximately 14 percent of fatalities and 24 percent of
injuries were reported for crashes that occurred at known travel speeds
of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\100\
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\99\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
\100\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
65 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 67 percent of lane
change crashes that resulted in injuries.
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NHTSA has conducted a series of tests utilizing its proposed BSI
test procedure. Since BSI systems are not widely available in the
fleet, the Agency selected vehicles in order to cover as many
manufacturers as possible that have implemented this technology. All
vehicles selected for BSW testing also underwent BSI testing. Test
reports related to both test programs can be found in the docket for
this notice. For the purposes of this testing, the Agency used the
Global Vehicle Target (GVT) Revision G to represent the POV, which is
specified in the BSI test procedure as a strikeable object.\101\ When
the BSI technology assessment is incorporated into NCAP, the Agency
plans to use the GVT Revision G as a strikeable target to be consistent
with Euro NCAP's ADAS test procedures that specify a strikeable target.
In the context of testing BSW and BSI technologies in NCAP to address
lane change crashes, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:
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\101\ The GVT is a three-dimensional surrogate that resembles a
white hatchback passenger car. It is currently used by other
consumer organizations, including Euro NCAP, and vehicle
manufacturers in their internal testing of ADAS technologies. See
Section III.D.2. of this notice for an expanded discussion of the
GVT.
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(16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal
indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the
BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal
indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible or
haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a
visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should it
continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from the
blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why not?
(17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane
Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's BSW
capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings when the
POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the blind zone) for
varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?
(18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test
procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why or
why not?
(19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently
contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions (e.g.,
test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side of the
SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios and
test conditions to address the real-world safety problem adequately, or
could it test only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test
burden in NCAP? For instance, should the Agency consider incorporating
only the most challenging test conditions into NCAP, such as the ones
with the greatest speed differential, or choose to perform the test
conditions having the lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency
consider only performing the test conditions where the POV passes by
the SV on the left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data
to assure the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system
performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?
(20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system
performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input on
whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive
assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer
satisfaction? Why or why not?
(21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each
test condition (i.e., test speed and POV approach direction). Is this
an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is the
appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test scenario,
and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each of the two
tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?
(22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction with
activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn signal is
not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated from the
heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention? Should the SV's
LKS system be switched off during conduct of the Agency's BSI
evaluations? Why or why not?
C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)
Another important ADAS technology NHTSA proposes to include in its
upgrade of NCAP is pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB).
[[Page 13470]]
PAEB systems function similar to AEB systems but detect pedestrians
instead of vehicles. PAEB uses information from forward-looking sensors
to issue a warning and actively apply the vehicle's brakes when a
pedestrian, or sometimes a cyclist, is in front of the vehicle and the
driver has not acted to avoid the impending impact. Similar to AEB,
PAEB systems typically use cameras to determine whether a pedestrian is
in imminent danger of being struck by the vehicle, but some systems may
use a combination of cameras, radar, lidar, and/or thermal imaging
sensors.
Many pedestrian crashes occur when a pedestrian is in the forward
path of a driver's vehicle. Four common pedestrian crash scenarios
include when the vehicle is:
1. Heading straight and a pedestrian is crossing the road;
2. Turning right and a pedestrian is crossing the road;
3. Turning left and a pedestrian is crossing the road; and
4. Heading straight and a pedestrian is walking along or against
traffic.
These four crash scenarios are defined as Scenarios S1-S4,
respectively, by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) Crash
Imminent Braking (CIB) Consortium.\102\
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\102\ Carpenter, M.G., Moury, M.T., Skvarce, J.R., Struck, M.
Zwicky, T. D., & Kiger, S.M. (2014, June), Objective tests for
forward looking pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems: Final
report (Report No. DOT HS 812 040), Washington, DC: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
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Two of these scenarios, S1 and S4, are included in NHTSA's draft
research PAEB test procedure, published on November 21, 2019, and
referenced herein as the 2019 PAEB test procedure.\103\ The S1 scenario
represents a pedestrian crossing the road in front of the vehicle,
while the S4 scenario represents a pedestrian moving with or against
traffic along the side of the road in the path of the vehicle. Both
test scenarios are repeated for multiple pedestrian impact locations.
The S1 and S4 crash scenarios were chosen for inclusion in NHTSA's 2019
PAEB test procedure because a review of pedestrian crashes from the
2011 through 2012 GES and FARS data sets \104\ found that, on average,
these two pre-crash scenarios (S1 and S4) accounted for approximately
33,000 (52 percent) of vehicle-pedestrian crashes and 3,000 (90
percent) fatal vehicle-pedestrian crashes with a light-vehicle striking
a pedestrian as the first event. Furthermore, these crashes accounted
for 67 percent of MAIS 2+ and 76 percent of MAIS 3+ injured
pedestrians.\105\ The 2019 PAEB test procedure only considered daylight
test conditions for both the S1 and S4 crash scenarios.
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\103\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
\104\ Yanagisawa, M., Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., & Najm, W.G.
(2017, April), Estimation of potential safety benefits for
pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems (Report No. DOT HS 812
400), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\105\ As explained previously, the Abbreviated Injury Scale
(AIS) is a classification system for assessing impact injury
severity. AIS ranks individual injuries by body region on a scale of
1 to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 =
critical, and 6 = maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum
injury severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the
highest single AIS for a person with one or more injuries).
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The Agency's 2019 PAEB test procedure does not include CAMP
scenario S2 (vehicle turning right and a pedestrian crossing the road),
and CAMP scenario S3 (vehicle turning left and a pedestrian crossing
the road). In response to the December 2015 notice, several commenters
stated that addressing these scenarios with available technology may
generate a significant number of false positive detections. Such false
detections could have the unintended consequences of causing hazardous
situations (e.g., unexpected sudden braking while turning in traffic)
that could lead drivers to disable their PAEB systems, or even lead to
an increase in rear-end collisions. The commenters explained that the
S2 and S3 test scenarios require more sophisticated algorithms as well
as more robust test methodologies than those required for scenarios S1
and S4. However, ZF TRW mentioned that ADAS sensors designed to meet
Euro NCAP's Vulnerable Road Users test procedures would have increased
fields of view (FOV), which should improve their effectiveness in
turning scenarios. Others stated that the articulating mannequins may
not be representative of a real human for all sensing technologies in
turning scenarios. Most commenters indicated that it was more
appropriate to focus on the scenarios affording the most significant
safety benefits first--S1 and S4. Commenters stated that adding the S2
and S3 scenarios would be more practical when the technology matures.
NHTSA will continue to evaluate PAEB systems to assess the feasibility
of expanding the suite of PAEB tests as technological advancements are
made. The Agency will consider adding these test scenarios (S2 and S3)
to NCAP in the future once the Agency has repeatable and reliable test
data to support their inclusion.
In the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the S1 test scenario includes
seven different test conditions--S1a, S1b, S1c, S1d, S1e, S1f, and S1g.
For these tests, the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40
kph (24.9 mph). Additionally, the SV also travels at 16 kph (9.9 mph)
for test conditions S1a, S1b, S1c, and S1d. A pedestrian mannequin
crosses perpendicular to the subject vehicle's line of travel at 5 kph
(3.1 mph) for all test conditions, except for S1e, in which the
mannequin crosses at 8 kph (5.0 mph). In test condition S1a, the SV
encounters a crossing adult pedestrian mannequin walking from the
nearside (i.e., the passenger's side of the vehicle) with 25 percent
overlap of the vehicle.\106\ In test conditions S1b and S1c, the SV
encounters a crossing adult pedestrian walking from the nearside with
50 percent and 75 percent overlap of the vehicle, respectively. In test
condition S1d, the SV encounters a crossing child pedestrian mannequin
running from behind parked vehicles from the nearside with 50 percent
overlap of the vehicle. In test condition S1e, the SV encounters a
crossing adult pedestrian running from the ``offside'' (i.e., the
driver's side of the vehicle) with 50 percent overlap of the vehicle.
In test condition S1f, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian
walking from the nearside that stops short (-25% overlap) of entering
the vehicle's path. In test condition S1g, the SV encounters a crossing
adult pedestrian walking from the nearside that clears the vehicle's
path (125% overlap).
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\106\ Overlap is defined as the percent of the vehicle's width
that the pedestrian would traverse prior to impact if the vehicle's
speed and pedestrian's speed remain constant.
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The S4 test scenario in the 2019 PAEB test procedure includes three
different test conditions--S4a, S4b, and S4c. In this test scenario,
the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40 kph (24.9 mph)
and/or 16 kph (9.9 mph) (for test conditions S4a and S4b) and a
pedestrian mannequin moves parallel to the flow of traffic at 5 kph
(3.1 mph) (for test condition S4c) or is stationary (for test condition
S4a and S4b) in front of the SV. For all S4 test conditions, the SV is
aligned to impact the pedestrian at 25 percent overlap. In test
condition S4a, the SV encounters an adult pedestrian standing in front
of the vehicle on the nearside of the road facing away from the
approaching SV. In test condition S4b, the SV encounters an adult
pedestrian standing in front of the vehicle on the nearside of the road
facing towards the approaching SV. In test condition S4c, the SV
encounters an adult pedestrian walking in front of the vehicle on the
nearside of the road facing away from the approaching SV.
[[Page 13471]]
The Agency is proposing to make several changes to the 2019 PAEB
test procedure for the purpose of adopting it for use in NCAP. These
changes involve the pedestrian mannequins, test speeds and included
test conditions, the specified lighting conditions, and the number of
test trials required to be conducted for each test condition.
The first change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB
test procedure concerns the pedestrian targets. As was recommended by
several commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice, the
Agency proposes to utilize state-of-the-art mannequins with
articulated, moving legs, instead of the posable child and adult
pedestrian test mannequins specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure.
NHTSA believes that the articulating pedestrian targets are more
representative of walking pedestrians and expects that these more
realistic targets will encourage development of PAEB systems that
detect, classify, and respond to pedestrians more accurately and
effectively. In turn, this should allow manufacturers to improve the
effectiveness of current PAEB systems. The Agency also recognizes that
adopting the child and adult articulating targets would harmonize with
other major consumer information-focused entities that use articulating
mannequins, such as Euro NCAP and IIHS. The Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law mandated that NHTSA identify opportunities where NCAP would
``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety rating programs,''
and the Agency believes that the pedestrian mannequins represent one
such opportunity.
The second change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB
test procedure for incorporation into NCAP involves test speeds. The
test speeds specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure correspond to a
relatively small percentage of crashes that result in pedestrian
injuries and fatalities. Volpe's analysis of 2011-2015 FARS and GES
crash data sets showed that 9 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 25
percent of pedestrian injuries resulted from crashes that occurred on
roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 88
percent of fatalities and 43 percent of injuries occurred for crashes
on roadways with posted speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25
mph).107 108 For crashes that occurred on roadways where the
travel speed was known, 6 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 19
percent of pedestrian injuries were reported for travel speeds of 40.2
kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 36 percent of fatalities and 7 percent of
injuries occurred for travel speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25
mph).\109\ NHTSA notes that speeding was a factor in only 5 percent of
the fatal pedestrian crashes, which suggests that the posted speed
could correlate closely with the travel speed of the vehicle prior to
impact with the pedestrian.110 111
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\107\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\108\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
unknown in 4 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 29 percent of
pedestrian crashes that resulted in injuries.
\109\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
59 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 72 percent of pedestrian
crashes that resulted in injuries.
\110\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\111\ In 4 percent of pedestrian crashes, it was unknown or not
reported whether speeding was a factor.
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As Volpe's analysis focused on 2011-2015 FARS and GES crash data
sets, it is likely that most vehicles studied were not equipped with
PAEB systems. Recently, IIHS studied approximately 1,500 police-
reported crashes involving a wide variety of 2017-2020 model year
vehicles from various manufacturers to examine the effects of PAEB
systems on real-world pedestrian crashes.\112\ In this study, the
Institute found that ``pedestrian AEB was associated with a 32 percent
reduction in the odds of a pedestrian crash on roads with speed limits
of 25 mph or less and a 34 percent reduction on roads with 30-35 mph
limits, but no reduction at all on roads with speed limits of 50 mph or
higher. . .''. These findings highlight the limitations of existing
PAEB systems and the importance of adopting higher test speeds for PAEB
testing (where feasible) to encourage additional safety improvement.
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\112\ Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of automatic
emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
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To establish feasible speed thresholds for adoption in its PAEB
test procedure, the Agency conducted a series of tests on a selection
of MY 2020 vehicles from various manufacturers to assess the
operational range and performance of current PAEB systems. Vehicles for
the PAEB characterization tests were selected with the intent of
testing a variety of vehicle makes, types, sizes; global and domestic
products; and forward-facing sensor types (camera only, stereo camera,
fused camera plus radar, etc.) for a given manufacturer and across all
manufacturers.
For the purpose of this study, the Agency used the 2019 PAEB test
procedure, but employed the articulating mannequins in lieu of the
posable mannequins and expanded the test procedure specifications to
include increased vehicle test speeds for the S1b, S1d, S1e, S4a, and
S4c test conditions. For these tests, the SV speed was incrementally
increased to identify when each SV reached its operational limits and
did not respond to the pedestrian target. Before the tests were
initiated, the maximum test speeds for the S1 and S4 scenarios were set
to 60 kph (37.2 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph), respectively.\113\ These
maximum speeds are consistent with Euro NCAP's AEB Vulnerable Road User
test protocol and correspond to up to 74 percent of fatal pedestrian
crashes and 65 percent of injurious pedestrian crashes that occurred on
U.S. roadways, per Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS and GES analysis of posted
speed data.\114\ When no or late intervention occurred for a vehicle
and test condition (i.e., combination of test scenario and speed),
NHTSA repeated the test condition at a test speed that was 5 kph (3.1
mph) lower. This reduced speed defined the system's upper capabilities.
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\113\ These test speeds represent the maximum test speeds
potentially utilized for a given test condition. The actual speeds
used for a given combination of vehicle and test condition depended
on observed PAEB system performance.
\114\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). (2019,
July). TEST PROTOCOL--AEB VRU systems 3.0.2.
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A test matrix of the PAEB characterization study regarding test
speed is provided below.
Full PAEB test series (includes S1 a-g and S4 a-c)
Daytime light conditions, articulating dummies, and additional SV
test speeds in kph (mph) for S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c, as shown in
Table 4.
[[Page 13472]]
Table 4--Complete Matrix of the PAEB Characterization Study
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scenario S1a S1b S1c S1d S1e S1f S1g S4a S4b S4c
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph)........... 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9
40.0/24.9 20.0/12.4 40.0/24.9 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 ......... ......... 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9
......... 30.0/18.6 ......... 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 ......... ......... 50.0/31.1 ......... 50.0/31.1
......... 40.0/24.9 ......... 40.0/24.9 ......... ......... ......... 60.0/37.3 ......... 60.0/37.3
......... 50.0/31.1 ......... 50.0/31.1 ......... ......... ......... 70.0/43.5 ......... 70.0/43.5
......... 60.0/37.3 ......... 60.0/37.3 ......... ......... ......... 80.0/49.7 ......... 80.0/49.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency's characterization testing showed that many MY 2020
vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid impacting the pedestrian
mannequins at higher test speeds than those specified in the 2019 PAEB
test procedure. In fact, several vehicles repeatably achieved full
crash avoidance at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) or higher for the
assessed S1 and S4 test conditions. Test reports related to this
testing can be found in the docket for this notice.
In light of these results, NHTSA is proposing to increase the
maximum SV test speed from the 40 kph (24.9 mph) specified in the 2019
PAEB test procedure to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for all PAEB test conditions
the Agency is proposing to include in NCAP. These include S1a-e and
S4a-c. The Agency notes that it is not proposing to include PAEB false
positive test conditions (i.e., S1f and S1g) in NCAP at this time, but
is requesting comment on whether the omission of these test conditions
is appropriate. NHTSA also notes that 60 kph (37.3 mph) is the maximum
vehicle speed Euro NCAP uses to assess PAEB performance for test
conditions that are similar to, if not identical to, some of those
proposed for use in NCAP, namely S1a, c, d, and e, and S4c. Adopting
this higher test speed will also drive improved PAEB system performance
to address a larger portion of real-world fatalities and injuries.
The Agency is also proposing a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2
mph) for all of the proposed test scenarios. Although this speed is
lower than the minimum test speed used in the 2019 PAEB test procedure
and in its characterization testing (i.e., 16 kph (9.9 mph)), it is the
minimum test speed specified in Euro NCAP's pedestrian tests, with the
exception of Euro NCAP's Car-to-Pedestrian Longitudinal Adult (CPLA)
scenario. The minimum vehicle test speed for the CPLA scenario, which
is similar to the Agency's PAEB S4c test scenario, is 20 kph (12.4
mph).\115\ As stated earlier, in accordance with the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, the Agency is taking steps to harmonize with
existing consumer information rating programs where possible and when
appropriate. NHTSA also believes that reducing the minimum test speed
to 10 kph (6.2 mph) will assure PAEB system functionality for crashes
that may still cause injuries.
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\115\ One difference in the Agency's proposed S4c test condition
and Euro NCAP's CPLA test condition is the amount of pedestrian
overlap with the vehicle at the lower speed (NHTSA uses a 25 percent
overlap while a 50 percent overlap is used in Euro NCAP's CPLA
test). NHTSA believes that for the 25 percent overlap condition in
S4c, a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) is appropriate and
does not see a reason to deviate from the minimum test speed (10 kph
(6.2 mph)) proposed for the other PAEB test conditions.
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In an effort to harmonize with other consumer information programs
on vehicle safety, NHTSA is also proposing to adopt Euro NCAP's
approach to assessing vehicles' PAEB system performance by
incrementally increasing the SV speed from the minimum test speed for a
given scenario to the maximum. The Agency is proposing 10 kph (6.2 mph)
increments for this progression in test speed. In their comments to the
December 2015 notice, Global Automakers and Mobileye encouraged NHTSA
to expand the applicability of the PAEB tests, particularly the S1
scenario, to include a broader range of test speeds because pedestrian
injuries occurred over a wide range of crash speeds, as the Agency has
also indicated. The organizations also mentioned that PAEB system
performance reflects a trade-off between FOV and collision speed/
detection distance. Systems that have a narrow FOV are more effective
at addressing higher speed crashes since they can see further, and
systems that have a wider FOV are more effective at addressing lower
speed impacts.
As its third change to the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the Agency is
proposing to expand PAEB evaluation to include different lighting
conditions. NHTSA's PAEB characterization study included performance
assessments for dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime testing), in
addition to the daylight conditions specified in the 2019 PAEB test
procedure, for the same test vehicles. For each vehicle model tested,
one set of tests was conducted with the pedestrian mannequin
illuminated only by the vehicle's lower beams and a second set of tests
with the pedestrian mannequin illuminated by the upper beams. The area
where the mannequin was located was not provided any additional (i.e.,
external) light source. This repeat testing was conducted because
Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS data set showed that 36 percent of pedestrian
fatalities occurred in the dark with no overhead lights. Test matrices
of the PAEB characterization study with respect to dark lighting
conditions are provided in Tables 5 and 6.
PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c)
Dark conditions with lower beams, articulating dummies, and
additional SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown in Table 5.
Table 5--PAEB Test Series for Dark Conditions With Lower Beams
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scenario S1b S1d S1e S4a S4c
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph). 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9
20.0/12.4 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9
30.0/18.6 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1
40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 .............. 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3
50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 .............. 70.0/43.5 70.0/43.5
60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 .............. 80.0/49.7 80.0/49.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 13473]]
PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c)
Dark conditions with upper beams, articulating dummies, and
additional SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown in Table 6.
Table 6--PAEB Test Series for Dark Conditions With Upper Beams
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scenario S1b S1d S1e S4a S4c
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph). 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9
20.0/12.4 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9
30.0/18.6 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1
40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 .............. 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3
50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 .............. 70.0/43.5 70.0/43.5
60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 .............. 80.0/49.7 80.0/49.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency's characterization testing (Tables 5 and 6) revealed
that PAEB system performance generally degraded in dark conditions
compared to daylight conditions. Additionally, certain test conditions,
such as S1d and S1e, were particularly challenging in dark conditions,
especially when the vehicle's lower beams were used. However, a few
vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid contact with the pedestrian
mannequins at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for certain test
conditions when the vehicles' lower beams provided the only source of
light.
NHTSA's findings for PAEB system performance during testing align
generally well with those from IIHS' recent system effectiveness study
for 2017-2020 model year vehicles. IIHS found that although PAEB
systems were associated with a 32 percent reduction in pedestrian
crashes occurring during daylight, and a 33 percent reduction in
pedestrian crashes for areas with artificial lighting during dawn,
dusk, or at night, there was no evidence that PAEB systems were
effective at nighttime without street lighting.\116\
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\116\ Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of automatic
emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the results of the PAEB characterization study and IIHS'
findings in its recent study, NHTSA is proposing to perform the
proposed test conditions (S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under daylight conditions
and under dark conditions with the vehicle's lower beams. NHTSA notes
that Euro NCAP conducts PAEB testing that is similar to the Agency's
S4c test condition under dark conditions with vehicles' upper beams in
use. Because the Agency cannot be assured that a vehicle's upper beams
are in use during nighttime (i.e., dark lighting conditions) real-world
driving, NHTSA is proposing only to perform nighttime PAEB assessments
using vehicles' lower beams for all test conditions included in NCAP at
this time. However, if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting
systems such as semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or adaptive
driving beam head lighting system, they shall be enabled to
automatically engage during the nighttime PAEB assessment. The Agency
believes this approach covers the two extreme light conditions and as
such, information regarding performance with the upper beams or under
infrastructure lighting can be reasonably inferred.
The Agency recognizes that Euro NCAP performs testing similar to
S1a and S1c at speeds of 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph) in dark
conditions with the SV lower beams in use; however, overhead
streetlights are also used in these tests to provide additional light
source. To study potential performance differences attributable to the
use of overhead lights during dark conditions, NHTSA performed
additional testing for PAEB scenarios S1 b, d, and e and S4 a and c for
a subset of test speeds, 16 kph (9.9 mph) and 40 kph (24.9 mph), for
two of the MY 2020 vehicles used in its initial characterization study.
This study was performed using the vehicles' lower beams under dark
conditions with overhead lights. For this limited testing, the Agency
observed slightly better PAEB performance in dark lighting conditions
with overhead lights than in dark lighting conditions without overhead
lights.
NHTSA believes that testing with the vehicles' lower beams in dark
conditions without overhead lights is appropriate, particularly at
higher test speeds, as it would assure system performance for real-
world situations where visibility is the most limited. Furthermore, as
mentioned previously, dark lighting conditions with no overhead lights
represented 36 percent of pedestrian fatalities and dark lighting
conditions with overhead lights represented 39 percent of pedestrian
fatalities in Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS data set. Additionally, PAEB
systems that meet the performance test specifications under dark
lighting conditions with no overhead lights are likely to meet the
performance specifications under dark lighting conditions with overhead
lights. Thus, the Agency believes assessment of PAEB systems under dark
conditions with no overhead lights and with the vehicle's lower beams
will encourage vehicle manufacturers to make design improvements to
address a significant portion of crashes that currently result in
pedestrian fatalities.
For the PAEB performance criteria, NHTSA is proposing that a
vehicle must achieve complete crash avoidance (i.e., have no contact
with the pedestrian mannequin) in order to pass a test trial conducted
at each specified test speed (i.e., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 kph
(6.2, 12.4, 18.6, 24.9, 31.1, and 37.3 mph)) for each test condition
(S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). NHTSA believes that this
approach, used in conjunction with an incremental increase in SV speed,
should limit damage to the pedestrian mannequin and/or the SV during
testing.
Along these lines, NHTSA is proposing a fourth change to the 2019
PAEB test procedure regarding the number of test trials conducted for
each combination of test condition and test speed. The 2019 PAEB test
procedure specifies seven test trials be conducted for each test speed
under each test condition. The Agency is proposing, however, to not
require that more than one test be conducted per test speed and test
condition combination if certain criteria are met, and is proposing
that the pass rate for a given test speed will be dependent on whether
additional test trials are required to be performed.\117\
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\117\ This is a divergence from assessment of LKS, BSW, and BSI
where a vehicle must meet performance requirements for five out of
seven valid test trials for a particular test condition to pass that
test condition.
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For a given test condition, the test sequence is initiated at the
10 kph (6.2 mph) minimum speed. To achieve a pass result, the test must
be valid (i.e., all test specification and tolerances satisfied), and
the SV must not contact
[[Page 13474]]
the pedestrian mannequin. If the SV does not contact the pedestrian
mannequin during the first valid test, the test speed is incrementally
increased by 10 kph (6.2 mph), and the next test in the sequence is
performed. Unless the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, this
iterative process continues until a maximum test speed of 60 kph (37.3
mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, and the
relative longitudinal velocity between the SV and pedestrian mannequin
is less than or equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, the
Agency will perform four additional (repeated) test trials at the same
speed for which the impact occurred. The vehicle must not contact the
pedestrian mannequin for at least three out of the five test trials
performed at that same speed to pass that specific combination of test
condition and test speed.\118\ If the SV contacts the pedestrian
mannequin during a valid test of a test condition (whether it be the
first test performed for a particular test speed or a subsequent test
trial at that same speed), and the relative impact velocity exceeds 50
percent of the initial speed of the SV, no additional test trials will
be conducted at the given test speed and test condition and the SV is
considered to have failed the test condition at that specific test
speed.
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\118\ The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail criterion (i.e.,
a vehicle must meet performance requirements for three out of five
trials for a particular test condition to pass the test condition)
is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced earlier.
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The Agency is pursuing an assessment approach for PAEB systems that
differs from the evaluation criteria proposed for the other four
proposed ADAS technologies discussed earlier in an attempt to reduce
test burden, but still ensure that passing systems include robust
designs that will afford an enhanced level of safety. NHTSA recognizes
that it is proposing a large number of PAEB test conditions for
inclusion in NCAP--eight total. The Agency also acknowledges that these
test conditions must be repeated for multiple test speeds and lighting
conditions, which inherently imposes additional test burden. Therefore,
the Agency believes that it is reasonable to reduce the number of test
trials that must be conducted at a given test speed for a particular
test condition since the SV's PAEB system will also be assessed at
subsequent test speeds, which would help system robustness. This would
further be supported by the Agency's proposal to require that five test
trials be performed in instances where the SV is unable to meet the no
contact performance requirement in the initial valid trial for that
combination of test condition and speed.
Although NHTSA believes that the assessment approach for PAEB
systems proposed herein is the most reasonable one, the Agency is
requesting comment on whether it should instead pursue an alternative
approach, such as conducting seven trials for each test condition and
speed combination, and requiring that five of the seven trials meet the
no contact performance criterion. Again, this latter approach would be
similar to the one proposed for the other ADAS technologies discussed
earlier.
Previously, NHTSA noted that it did not conduct the S2 and S3 test
scenarios as part of the characterization study and is not proposing
these test scenarios for inclusion in this proposal. The Agency agrees
with the comments mentioned previously that the majority of vehicles in
the U.S. fleet are not currently equipped with sensing systems capable
of detecting pedestrians while a vehicle is turning, as they do not
have the necessary FOV. The American Automobile Association (AAA) \119\
recently conducted PAEB tests, including an S2 scenario where the
vehicle is turning right with an adult pedestrian crossing. The PAEB
systems in four model year 2019 vehicles that were tested did not react
to the test targets during a testing scenario that is similar to
NHTSA's S2 scenario described above, resulting in all test vehicles
colliding with the pedestrian target. These systems performed better in
a scenario that was similar to NHTSA's S1; however, the vehicles
avoided a collision with the pedestrian target 40 percent of the time
at a 32.2 kph (20 mph) test speed and nearly all the time at a 48.3 kph
(30 mph) test speed. Furthermore, in its recent study on PAEB system
effectiveness, IIHS found that while AEB with pedestrian detection was
associated with significant reductions in pedestrian crash risk (~27
percent) and pedestrian injury crash risk (~30 percent), there was no
evidence to suggest that existing systems were effective while the
PAEB-equipped vehicle was turning.\120\ Considering these findings,
NHTSA believes that it is more beneficial at this time to focus our
efforts on performing PAEB testing at higher speeds and with various
lighting conditions using the proposed S1 and S4 test scenarios.
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\119\ American Automobile Association (2019, October), Automatic
emergency braking with pedestrian detection, https://www.aaa.com/AAA/common/aar/files/Research-Report-Pedestrian-Detection.pdf.
\120\ Cicchino, J. B (2022, February), Effects of automatic
emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the context of the NCAP PAEB testing program, NHTSA is seeking
comment on the following:
(23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph
(37.3 mph), to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, most
appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why not?
(24) The Agency has proposed to include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4 a-c
in its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all
test scenarios and test conditions proposed in this RFC notice to
address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test only certain
scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden but still address an
adequate proportion of the safety problem? Why or why not? If it is not
necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios or test
conditions, which scenarios/conditions should be assessed? Although
they are not currently proposed for inclusion, should the Agency also
adopt the false positive test conditions, S1f and S1g? Why or why not?
(25) Given that a large portion of pedestrian fatalities and
injuries occur under dark lighting conditions, the Agency has proposed
to perform testing for the included test conditions (i.e., S1 a-e and
S4 a-c) under dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime) in addition to
daylight test conditions for test speed range 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60
kph (37.3 mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle's lower beams would
provide the source of light during the nighttime assessments. However,
if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting systems such as
semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or adaptive driving beam head
lighting system, they shall be enabled to automatically engage during
the nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing approach appropriate?
Why or why not? Should the Agency conduct PAEB evaluation tests with
only the vehicle's lower beams and disable or not use any other
advanced lighting systems?
(26) Should the Agency consider performing PAEB testing under dark
conditions with a vehicle's upper beams as a light source? If yes,
should this lighting condition be assessed in addition to the proposed
dark test condition, which would utilize only a vehicle's lower beams
along with any advanced lighting system enabled to automatically
engage, or in lieu of the proposed dark testing condition?
[[Page 13475]]
Should the Agency also evaluate PAEB performance in dark lighting
conditions with overhead lights? Why or why not? What test scenarios,
conditions, and speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., dark
lighting conditions) testing in NCAP, and why?
(27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the Agency proposed to perform
one test per test speed until contact occurs, or until the vehicle's
relative impact velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial speed of the
subject vehicle for the given test condition. If contact occurs and if
the vehicle's relative impact velocity is less than or equal to 50
percent of the initial SV speed for the given combination of test speed
and test condition, an additional four test trials will be conducted at
the given test speed and test condition, and the SV must meet the
passing performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least three out
of those five test trials in order to be assessed at the next
incremental test speed. Is this an appropriate approach to assess PAEB
system performance in NCAP, or should a certain number of test trials
be required for each assessed test speed? Why or why not? If a certain
number of repeat tests is more appropriate, how many test trials should
be conducted, and why?
(28) Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for
the proposed PAEB test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively,
should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a maximum
allowable SV-to-mannequin impact speed for any or all of the proposed
test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed combination)? If
yes, why, and for which test conditions? For those test conditions,
what speed reductions would be appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum
allowable impact speed would be appropriate?
(29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin during the initial
trial for a given test condition and test speed combination, NHTSA
proposes to conduct additional test trials only if the relative impact
velocity observed during that trial is less than or equal to 50 percent
of the initial speed of the SV. For a test speed of 60 kph (37.3 mph),
this maximum relative impact velocity is nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph),
and for a test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph), the maximum relative impact
velocity is nominally 5 kph (3.1 mph). Is this an appropriate limit on
the maximum relative impact velocity for the proposed range of test
speeds? If not, why? Note that the tests in Global Technical Regulation
(GTR) No. 9 for pedestrian crashworthiness protection simulates a
pedestrian impact at 40 kph (24.9 mph).
(30) For each lighting condition, the Agency is proposing 6 test
speeds (i.e., those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 mph) in
increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed test
conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results in a
total of 48 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds to
be evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 total combinations for both
light conditions. The Agency mentions later, in the ADAS Ratings System
section, that it plans to use check marks, as is done currently, to
give credit to vehicles that (1) are equipped with the recommended ADAS
technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system performance test
requirements for each ADAS technology included in NCAP until it issues
(1) a final decision notice announcing the new ADAS rating system and
(2) a final rule to amend the safety rating section of the vehicle
window sticker (Monroney label). For the purposes of providing credit
for a technology using check marks, what is an appropriate minimum
overall pass rate for PAEB performance evaluation? For example, should
a vehicle be said to meet the PAEB performance requirements if it
passes two-thirds of the 96 unique combinations of test conditions and
test speeds for the two lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique
combinations of test conditions and test speeds)?
(31) Given previous support from commenters to include S2 and S3
scenarios in the program at some point in the future and the results of
AAA's testing for one of the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks comment on
an appropriate timeframe for including S2 and S3 scenarios into the
Agency's NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from vehicle manufacturers
information on any currently available models designed to address, and
ideally achieve crash avoidance during conduct of, the S2 and S3
scenarios to support Agency evaluation for a future program upgrade.
(32) Should the Agency adopt the articulated mannequins into the
PAEB test procedure as proposed? Why or why not?
(33) In addition to tests performed under daylight conditions, the
Agency is proposing to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems during
nighttime conditions where a large percentage of real-world pedestrian
fatalities occur. Are there other technologies and information
available to the public that the Agency can evaluate under nighttime
conditions?
(34) Are there other safety areas that NHTSA should consider as
part of this or a future upgrade for pedestrian protection?
(35) Are there any aspects of NCAP's proposed PAEB test procedure
that need further refinement or clarification before adoption? If so,
what additional refinement or clarification is necessary, and why?
In addition to the fleet characterization research conducted for
this upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is conducting additional research that
may be used to support future program enhancements. One such research
project is designed to address injuries and fatalities for other
vulnerable road users, specifically cyclists.\121\ While some PAEB
systems may be capable of detecting cyclists and activating to avoid a
crash, NHTSA's current PAEB test procedure does not include a specific
cyclist component. However, since the number of cyclists killed on U.S.
roads continues to rise,\122\ the Agency plans to perform research to
determine the viability of Euro NCAP's AEB cyclist tests. NHTSA will
then compare test data with preliminary crash populations to assess the
adequacy of the test procedure for the U.S. vehicle fleet and roadway
system. The Euro NCAP test includes four test scenarios: One in which
the cyclist crosses in front of the vehicle from the near-side; one in
which the cyclist crosses in front of the vehicle from the near-side
from behind an obstruction; one in which the cyclist crosses in front
of the vehicle from the far-side; and the other in which the cyclist
travels in the same direction as the vehicle. The latter test scenario
is repeated for both 25 percent and 50 percent overlaps, while the
first three scenarios are conducted at 50 percent overlap (i.e., the
vehicle strikes the bicyclist at 50 percent of the vehicle's width). In
all tests, a cyclist target comprised of an articulating dummy, which
replicates the pedaling action of a cyclist, is seated on a bicycle
mounted on a moving platform.
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\121\ NHTSA notes that this research will also include
motorcycles.
\122\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis (2019, June),
Bicyclists and other cyclists: 2017 data (Traffic Safety Facts.
Report No. DOT HS 812 765), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.
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NHTSA believes that detecting cyclists is technically more
challenging for vehicle AEB systems than detecting pedestrians since
cyclists often move at higher speeds. Vehicles must not only be
equipped with sensors that have wider fields of view (similar to that
required for the turning PAEB test scenarios), but must also process
information more quickly as to whether
[[Page 13476]]
to alert the driver and/or automatically brake.
In the context of this additional research testing, NHTSA requests
comment on the following:
(36) Considering not only the increasing number of cyclists killed
on U.S. roads but also the limitations of current AEB systems in
detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on the appropriate
timeframe for adding a cyclist component to NCAP and requests from
vehicle manufacturers information on any currently available models
that have the capability to validate the cyclist target and test
procedures used by Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future NCAP
program upgrade.
(37) In addition to the test procedures used by Euro NCAP, are
there others that NHTSA should consider to address the cyclist crash
population in the U.S. and effectiveness of systems?
D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
As previously mentioned, NHTSA will retain the currently available
ADAS technologies (forward collision warning, crash imminent braking
and dynamic brake support) designed to address forward collisions
(rear-end crashes) in NCAP's crash avoidance program. As discussed in
NHTSA's March 2019 study, these technologies have the potential to
prevent or mitigate eight rear-end pre-crash scenarios, which
represented approximately 1.70 million crashes annually, on average, or
29.4 percent of all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways. As shown in
Table A-1, these crashes resulted in 1,275 fatalities, on average, and
883,386 MAIS 1-5 injuries annually, which represented 3.8 percent of
all fatalities and 31.5 percent of all injuries, respectively.\123\
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\123\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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FCW technology evaluations were introduced into NCAP starting with
model year 2011 vehicles,\124\ while CIB and DBS systems (referred to
collectively as Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)) were added to the
program starting with model year 2018 vehicles.\125\ These technologies
are not being offered as standard equipment on all passenger vehicles,
so it remains important for NCAP to recommend the technologies and
inform shoppers which vehicles have the technologies. Further, NHTSA
observed performance test failures for each of these technologies
during NCAP's model year 2019 vehicle performance verification testing;
\126\ thus, NCAP should continue to inform shoppers as to which systems
perform to NHTSA's benchmark. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the
next few sections, NHTSA believes there are opportunities for updating
the current NCAP performance requirements for these three technologies.
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\124\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
\125\ 80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015).
\126\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket Nos. NHTSA-2010-0093
and NHTSA-2015-0006. (Only one test failure was observed for FCW.)
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1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
An FCW system is an ADAS technology that monitors a vehicle's
speed, the speed of the vehicle in front of it, and the distance
between the two vehicles. If the FCW system determines that the
distance from the driver's vehicle to the vehicle in front of it is too
short, and the closing velocity between the two vehicles is too high,
the system warns the driver of an impending rear-end collision.
Typically, FCW systems are comprised of two components: A sensing
system, which can detect a vehicle in front of the driver's vehicle;
and a warning system, which alerts the driver to a potential crash
threat. The sensing portion of the system may consist of forward-
looking radar, lidar, camera systems, or a combination of these. The
warning system may provide drivers with a visual display, such as a
light on the dash, an audible signal (e.g., buzzer or chime), and/or a
haptic signal that provides tactile feedback to the driver (e.g., rapid
vibrations of the seat pan or steering wheel) to alert the driver of an
impending crash so that they may manually intervene (e.g., apply the
vehicle's brakes or make an evasive steering maneuver) to avoid or
mitigate the crash.
Currently, NCAP's FCW test procedure \127\ consists of three
scenarios that simulate the most frequent types of rear-end crashes.
These include: Lead vehicle stopped (LVS), lead vehicle decelerating
(LVD), and lead vehicle moving (LVM) scenarios. In each scenario, the
vehicle being evaluated is the SV, and the vehicle positioned directly
in front of the SV, a production mid-size passenger car, is the POV.
The time-to-collision (TTC) criteria prescribed for each scenario
represent the time needed for a driver to perceive an impending rear-
end crash, decide the corrective action, and respond with the
appropriate mitigating action. The TTC for each scenario is calculated
by considering the speed of the SV relative to the POV at the time of
the FCW alert. If the FCW system fails to provide an alert within the
required time during testing, the professional test driver brakes or
steers away to avoid a collision. A short description of each test
scenario and the requirements for a passing result based on TTC is
provided below:
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\127\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013,
February). Forward collision warning system confirmation test.
https://www.regulations.gov. Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0134.
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LVS--The SV encounters a stopped POV on a straight road.
The SV is moving at 72.4 kph (45 mph), and the POV is stationary. To
pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least
2.1 s.
LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant
deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV
are both driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with an initial headway of 30.0 m
(98.4 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant
deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. To pass this test, the SV must
issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least 2.4 s.
LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in
front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV are driven at constant
speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. To
pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least
2.0 s.
Each scenario is conducted up to seven times. To pass the NCAP
system performance criteria, the SV must pass at least five out of
seven trials \128\ for each of the three test scenarios.
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\128\ As noted in the Agency's 2015 AEB final decision notice
(80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015)), the Agency believes passing five out
of seven tests successfully discriminates between functional systems
versus non-functional systems. To date, the Agency allows two
failures out of seven attempts to afford some flexibility in
including emerging technologies into the NCAP program. Furthermore,
NHTSA test laboratories have experienced unpredictable vehicle
responses due to the vehicle algorithm designs. Test laboratories
have observed systems that improve their performance with use,
systems degrading and shutting down when they do not see other
vehicles, and systems failing to re-activate if the vehicle is not
cycled through an ignition cycle.
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NCAP's FCW test scenarios are directly related to real-world crash
data. From its analysis of 2011 to 2015 FARS and GES data, the Agency
found that crashes analogous to the LVS test scenario, where a struck
vehicle was stopped at the time of impact, occurred in 65 percent of
the rear-end crashes studied.\129\ The LVD scenario, in which
[[Page 13477]]
the struck vehicle was decelerating at the time of impact, occurred in
22 percent of the rear-end crashes, and the LVM scenario, in which the
struck vehicle was moving at a constant, but slower, speed compared to
the striking vehicle at impact, occurred in 10 percent of the rear-end
crashes. Collectively, these test scenarios represented 97 percent of
rear-end crashes. With respect to test speed, in its independent review
of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe concluded that 28
percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 63 percent of all rear-end
crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 72.4 kph (45
mph) or less.
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\129\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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Currently, NHTSA gives credit on its website by assigning a check
mark to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that send visual, audible,
and/or haptic alerts and meet the TTC requirements. However, the
Agency's research has shown that presenting drivers with an audible
warning in medium or high urgency situations significantly reduced
crash severity relative to visual and tactile (or haptic) warnings,
which did not differ.\130\ This being said, in a large-scale field test
of FCW and LDW systems on model year 2013 Chevrolet and Cadillac
vehicles, the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute
(UMTRI) and GM found that GM's Safety Alert Seat, which provides haptic
seat vibration pulses, increased driver acceptance of both FCW and LDW
systems compared to audible alerts.\131\ The study concluded that the
FCW system was turned off 6 percent of the time when the Safety Alert
Seat was selected (rather than audible alerts), whereas it was turned
off 17 percent of the time when only audible alerts were available. In
light of these findings, the Agency seeks comment on whether to give
credit to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that only provide a
passing audible alert, or whether it should also give credit to those
systems that only provide passing haptic alerts.\132\ If the Agency
elects to give credit to vehicles with haptic alerts, are there certain
haptic alert types that should be excluded from consideration (e.g.,
because they may be such a nuisance to drivers that they may be more
likely to disable the system)? NHTSA also seeks comment on whether it
should no longer give credit to FCW-equipped vehicles that offer only
visual FCW alerts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey,
R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for
connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings
(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
\131\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\132\ The Agency would give credit to FCW systems that have both
passing audible and haptic alerts if both alert types were
available. However, if a vehicle with such a system provided only a
passing haptic alert and the Agency decided only to give credit to
systems that provided passing audible alerts, then the vehicle would
not receive credit as having met the Agency's FCW test requirements.
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NCAP's current FCW test procedure states that if an FCW system
provides a warning timing adjustment setting for the driver, at least
one timing setting must meet the TTC warning criteria specified in the
procedure. Therefore, if a vehicle is equipped with a warning timing
adjustment, only the most conservative (i.e., earliest) warning setting
is tested. Selecting the most conservative setting is beneficial for
track testing where the driver of the SV must steer and/or brake to
avoid a crash with the POV after the FCW alert is issued. However, the
Agency is concerned that many consumers may not adjust the warning
timing setting for FCW alerts. Furthermore, consumers that choose to
adjust the alert timing may be unlikely to select the earliest setting,
as this setting is most likely to result in false positive alerts
(i.e., nuisance alerts) during real-world operation.\133\ The Agency
also recognizes that the earliest FCW setting can be used to pass the
NCAP test--essentially allowing a vehicle to get NCAP credit even
though it may not otherwise earn credit if the later warning settings
are tested. Therefore, by testing the earliest timing adjustment
setting, the Agency's FCW performance assessment may not be indicative
of many drivers' real-world experiences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Nodine, E., Fisher, D., Golembiewski, G., Armstrong, C.,
Lam, A., Jeffers, M.A., Najm, W., Miller, S., Jackson, S., and
Kehoe, N. (2019, May), Indicators of driver adaptation to forward
collision warnings: A naturalistic driving evaluation (Report No.
DOT HS 812 611), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This concern was previously addressed in NHTSA's 2015 AEB final
decision notice, but the Agency has not since made updates to its FCW
test procedure.\134\ In that notice, the Agency stated that because
NCAP is a consumer information program, it should test vehicles as
delivered, using the factory default FCW warning adjustment setting for
FCW and AEB testing, including PAEB. Although the Agency believes there
is still merit to testing the default setting, NHTSA tentatively
believes testing the middle alert setting may be more appropriate.
Selection of the middle or next latest alert setting for testing would
harmonize with Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol, thus
potentially driving costs down for manufacturers and attempting to
ensure that consumers in both the U.S. and European markets benefit
from similar FCW system settings.\135\ Harmonization was a common theme
among commenters responding to NCAP's December 2015 notice, with most
vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, and other industry groups requesting
that NHTSA harmonize test procedures, test targets, and test
requirements with other NCAPs around the world, particularly Euro NCAP.
As mentioned earlier, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also required
that NHTSA consider harmonization with third-party safety rating
programs when possible. In light of these considerations, the Agency is
proposing that it is most appropriate to test the middle (or next
latest) FCW system setting in lieu of the default setting when
performing FCW, CIB, DBS, and PAEB NCAP tests on vehicles that offer
multiple FCW timing adjustment settings.
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\134\ 80 FR 68614 (Nov. 5, 2015).
\135\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019,
July), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.2. See
section 7.4.1.1.
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FCW systems have been recognized as the first generation of ADAS
technologies designed to help drivers avoid an impending rear-end
collision. In 2008, when NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP
program, FCW was selected because the Agency believed (1) this
technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) system designs existed
that could mitigate this safety problem; (3) safety benefit projections
were assessed; and (4) performance tests and procedures were available
to ensure an acceptable performance level.\136\ At the time, the Agency
estimated that FCW systems were 15 percent effective in preventing
rear-end crashes. More recently, in a 2017 study, IIHS \137\ found that
FCW systems may be more effective than NHTSA's initial estimates. IIHS
found that FCW systems reduced rear-end crashes by 27 percent.
Moreover, consumers have shown favorable acceptance of these systems.
For instance, in a 2019 survey of more than 57,000 Consumer Reports
subscribers, 69 percent of vehicle owners reported that they were
satisfied with their
[[Page 13478]]
vehicle's FCW technology, 38 percent of vehicle owners said that it had
helped them avoid a crash, and 54 percent of them remarked that they
trust the system to work every time.\138\ As consumer acceptance has
been positive, and system performance has improved over the years,
fitment rates have also increased. As mentioned previously, less than
0.2 percent of model year 2011 vehicles were equipped with FCW systems
compared to 38.3 percent of model year 2018 vehicles.
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\136\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
\137\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009.
\138\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to forward
collision warning: How FCW helps drivers avoid accidents, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/forward-collision-warning-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One limitation of FCW systems is that they are designed to warn the
driver, but not to provide significant automatic braking of the vehicle
(some FCW systems use haptic brake pulses to alert the driver of a
crash-imminent driving situation, but they are not intended to
effectively slow the vehicle). Since the introduction of FCW systems
into NCAP, active safety systems, such as those with automatic braking
capability (i.e., AEB), have entered the marketplace. In a recent study
sponsored by GM \139\ to evaluate the real-world effectiveness of ADAS
technologies (including FCW and AEB) on 3.8 million model year 2013-
2017 GM vehicles, UMTRI found that, for frontal collisions, camera-
based FCW systems produced an estimated 21 percent reduction in rear-
end striking crashes, while the AEB systems studied (which included a
combination of camera-only, radar-only, and fused camera-radar systems)
produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in the same crash type.\140\
Similarly, in a 2017 study, IIHS found that vehicles equipped with FCW
and AEB showed a 50 percent reduction for the same crash type.\141\
NHTSA is drawing from these research studies, generally, since each has
limitations and deviations from how NHTSA might evaluate fleet-wide
\142\ system effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
Motors LLC. UMTRI-2019-6.
\140\ The Agency notes that the FCW effectiveness rate (21%)
observed by UMTRI is similar to that observed by IIHS in its 2019
study (27%). Differences in data samples and vehicle selection may
contribute to the specific numerical differences. Regardless, the
AEB effectiveness rate observed by UMTRI (46%) was significantly
higher than the corresponding FCW effectiveness rate observed in
either the IIHS or UMTRI study.
\141\ Low-speed AEB showed a 43% reduction.
\142\ The UMTRI study was limited to GM vehicles.
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From a functional perspective, research suggests that active
braking systems, such as AEB, provide greater safety benefits than
corresponding warning systems, such as FCW. However, NHTSA has found
that current AEB systems often integrate the functionalities of FCW and
AEB into one frontal crash prevention system to deliver improved real-
world safety performance and high consumer acceptance. Consequently,
the Agency believes that this system integration may have implications
for NCAP FCW testing because current NCAP FCW requirements were
developed at a time when FCW and AEB functionalities were not always
linked. As will be detailed later in this notice, NHTSA believes that
FCW could now be considered a component of AEB and PAEB such that FCW
operation could be evaluated using NCAP's AEB and PAEB tests.
2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
To address the rear-end crash problem further, in November 2015,
NHTSA published a final decision notice announcing the addition of two
AEB technologies, CIB and DBS, into NCAP effective with model year 2018
vehicles.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). CIB and DBS together are
considered Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike FCW systems, AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS), are designed
to help drivers actively avoid or mitigate the severity of rear-end
crashes. CIB systems provide automatic braking when forward-looking
sensors indicate that a crash is imminent and the driver has not
braked, whereas DBS systems provide supplemental braking when sensors
determine that driver-applied braking is insufficient to avoid an
imminent crash.
In Consumer Reports' 2019 subscriber survey, 81 percent of vehicle
owners reported that they were satisfied with AEB technology, 54
percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 61 percent
stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\144\
Furthermore, IIHS found in its 2017 study that rear-end collisions
decreased by 50 percent for vehicles equipped with AEB and FCW.\145\
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, UMTRI \146\ found that AEB systems
produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in applicable rear-end
crashes when combined with a forward collision alert, which alone
showed only a 21 percent reduction.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ Consumer Reports, (2019, August 5), Guide to automatic
emergency braking: How AEB can put the brakes on car collisions,
https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/automatic-emergency-braking-guide/.
\145\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009.
\146\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
C.A. (2019, September), Analysis of the field effectiveness of
General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting
systems, The University of Michigan Transportation Research
Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
\147\ The AEB systems studied by UMTRI consisted of camera-only,
radar-only, and fused camera-radar AEB systems, the latter two
systems of which also included adaptive cruise control
functionality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent IIHS study \148\ of 2009-2016 crash data from 23 States
suggested that the increasing effectiveness of AEB technology in
certain crash situations is changing the rear-end crash problem. The
Institute's analysis provided insight into the performance of current
AEB systems and future opportunities for improvement. The study
identified the types of rear-end crashes in which striking vehicles
equipped with AEB were over-represented compared to those without
AEB.\149\ For instance, IIHS found that striking vehicles involved in
the following rear-end crashes were more likely to have AEB: (1) Where
the striking vehicle was turning relative to when it was moving
straight; (2) when the struck vehicle was turning or changing lanes
relative to when it was slowing or stopped; (3) when the struck vehicle
was not a passenger vehicle or was a special use vehicle relative to a
passenger car; (4) on snowy or icy roads; or (5) on roads with speed
limits of 112.7 kph (70 mph) relative to those with 64.4 to 72.4 kph
(40 to 45 mph) speed limits. Overall, the study found that 25.3 percent
of crashes where the striking vehicle was equipped with AEB had at
least one of these over-represented characteristics, compared with 15.9
percent of impacts by vehicles that were not equipped with AEB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019,
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118 https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
\149\ In this instance, over-represented means a higher
frequency as a percentage for AEB-equipped vehicles versus non-AEB-
equipped vehicles on a normalized basis.
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These results suggest that the tests used to evaluate the
performance of AEB systems by the Agency's NCAP and other consumer
information programs are influencing the development of countermeasures
capable of minimizing the crash problems that they were intended to
address. However, the results also imply that AEB systems have not yet
provided their full crash reduction potential. While they are effective
at addressing the most common rear-end crashes, they are less effective
at addressing those crashes that
[[Page 13479]]
are more atypical. IIHS found that in 2016, nearly 300,000 (15 percent)
of the police reported two-vehicle rear-end crashes involved one of the
rear-end crashes mentioned above. The Institute suggested that vehicle
manufacturers would be encouraged to improve AEB system designs for
situations where AEB was over-represented if consumer programs
incorporated tests that replicate these rear-end crash events, such as
an angled target vehicle that simulates a struck vehicle changing
lanes. IIHS cautioned (and NHTSA agrees) that new testing protocols
should not drive performance degradation in more typical crash
situations, create unintended safety consequences, or adversely affect
AEB use due to nuisance activations.
While these recent studies suggest that AEB systems (i.e., CIB and
DBS) have collectively been effective in reducing rear-impact crashes,
it is not clear how effective each of these systems are as standalone
systems, and whether their individual effectiveness may change for
certain crash scenarios, environmental conditions, or driver factors
(e.g., poor judgement, distraction, etc.). Furthermore, the Agency is
not aware of any studies of current-generation AEB systems that have
determined the extent to which CIB and DBS individually contributes to
crash reduction.
Prior to considering adopting AEB into NCAP, NHTSA conducted a
review of 2003-2009 National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness
Data System (NASS CDS) data to define the target population for rear-
end crashes.\150\ At the time of the analysis, the Agency concluded
that CIB and DBS target crash populations were mutually exclusive. In
other words, they included crashes in which the driver either did not
brake (CIB) or braked (DBS). The analysis of the crash data showed that
the driver braked in approximately half of the crashes and did not
brake in the other half. However, in its analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS
and GES data sets, Volpe found much more conservative brake rates. The
organization found that the driver braked in just 8 percent of rear-end
crashes involving fatalities and 20 percent of those crashes involving
injuries. The study also showed that the driver made no attempt to
avoid the crash (e.g., no braking, steering, accelerating) for 56
percent of the crashes involving fatalities and for 21 percent of those
involving injuries.\151\ It is possible that the brake rate differed
for the two studies because of the target crash population refinements
made for NHTSA's original analysis and because of difference in data
collection methods between the crash databases. For instance, high-
speed crashes were excluded from NHTSA's target crash population review
because the AEB systems tested at the time had limited speed reduction
capabilities.
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\150\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2012,
June), Forward-looking advanced braking technologies research
report, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0001.
\151\ The Agency notes that for the rear-end pre-crash scenario
group, the driver avoidance maneuver was unknown in 25 percent and
54 percent of the FARS and GES crashes, respectively.
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From the refined target crash population, NHTSA computed
preliminary safety benefits for both CIB and DBS from a limited number
of CIB- and DBS-equipped vehicles subjected to early versions of the
Agency's test procedures based upon speed reduction capabilities.\152\
The Agency recognized that CIB and DBS systems available at the time
had limited capabilities and could not address serious crashes where
fatalities were likely to occur. Nevertheless, the Agency tentatively
found that if a CIB system alone was equipped on all light vehicles, it
could potentially prevent approximately 40,000 minor/moderate injuries
(AIS 1-2), 640 serious-to-critical injuries (AIS 3-5), and save
approximately 40 lives, annually. If a DBS system alone was equipped on
all light vehicles, it could potentially prevent approximately 107,000
minor/moderate injuries (AIS 1-2), 2,100 serious-to-critical injuries
(AIS 3-5), and save approximately 25 lives, annually. These safety
benefits from CIB and DBS were considered incremental to the benefits
stemming from an FCW alert.\153\
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\152\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2014,
August), Automatic emergency braking system (AEB) research report,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0037.
\153\ FCW, CIB, and DBS combined on all light vehicles could
potentially prevent approximately 200,000 minor/moderate injuries
(AIS 1-2), 4,000 (AIS 3-5) serious injuries, and save approximately
100 lives annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's analysis showed there was merit to performing testing to
assess vehicle performance in situations where a driver either does not
brake (CIB) or brakes (DBS). Volpe's recent analysis on braking
behavior/rate further validates the need to assess CIB and DBS
separately. Considering this and the fact that NHTSA cannot currently
differentiate the individual effectiveness of CIB and DBS systems,
NHTSA tentatively believes NCAP should continue to assess CIB and DBS
system performance individually. However, the Agency acknowledges that,
because it believes AEB systems have advanced significantly in recent
years, it is appropriate at this time to consider revising performance
envelopes and dynamic scenarios in NCAP to acknowledge and encourage
such advances.
The following sections discuss in detail CIB and DBS systems, and
more specifically, NCAP's current test procedures and a potential
updated test program for modern AEB systems. The Agency seeks comment
on how NCAP can encourage the maximum safety benefits of AEB and
potentially reduce the number of tests conducted. Comments are also
sought on future suggestions for AEB beyond any near-term upgrade.
a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
In response to an FCW alert or a driver noticing an imminent crash
scenario, a driver may initiate braking to avoid a rear-end crash. In
situations where the driver's braking is insufficient to prevent a
collision, DBS can automatically supplement the driver's braking action
to prevent or mitigate the crash. Similar to FCW and CIB systems, DBS
systems employ forward-looking sensors such as radar, lidar, and/or
vision-based sensors to detect vehicles in the path directly ahead and
monitor a vehicle's operating conditions such as speed or brake
application. However, DBS systems can actively supplement braking to
assist the driver whereas FCW systems serve only to warn the driver of
a potential crash threat, and CIB systems are activated when a rear-end
crash is imminent, but the driver has not manually applied the
vehicle's brakes.\154\
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\154\ DBS systems differ from traditional brake assist systems
used with the vehicle's foundation brakes. Whereas both systems rely
on brake pedal application rate to determine whether supplemental
braking is required, DBS has a lower activation threshold since it
also uses information from the aforementioned sensors to verify that
more braking is needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCAP's current DBS test procedure \155\ consists of the same three
rear-end crash scenarios specified in the FCW system performance test
procedure--LVS, LVD, and LVM, but most of the test speed combinations
specified in the DBS test procedure differ (the single exception is
that the FCW and DBS test procedures both use an LVM test performed
with SV and POV speeds of 72.4 and 32.2 kph (45 and 20 mph),
respectively). In addition,
[[Page 13480]]
the DBS performance assessment includes a Steel Trench Plate (STP)
false positive suppression test, which is conducted at two test speeds.
This fourth test scenario is used to evaluate the propensity of a
vehicle's DBS system to activate inappropriately in a non-critical
driving scenario that would not present a safety risk to the vehicle's
occupants. For the first three test scenarios, where braking is
expected, the SV must provide enough supplemental braking to avoid
contact with the POV to pass a trial run. In the case of the DBS false
positive test scenario, the performance criterion is minimal to no
activation for both test speeds.\156\
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\155\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2015,
October), Dynamic brake support performance evaluation confirmation
test for the New Car Assessment Program, http://www.regulations.gov,
Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0006-0026.
\156\ Minimal activation is defined as a peak SV deceleration
attributable to DBS intervention that is less than or equal to 1.25
times the average of the deceleration recorded for the vehicle's
foundation brake system alone during its approach to the steel
trench plate. The 1.25 multiplier serves to provide some system
flexibility, meaning a mild DBS intervention is acceptable, but one
where the vehicle thinks it must respond to the STP as if it was a
real vehicle is not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in the FCW system performance tests, the vehicle that is
subjected to the DBS test scenarios is the SV. The FCW test procedure
(which uses professional drivers for acceleration, braking, and
steering during test conduct) stipulates that a mid-size passenger car
serve as the POV during testing. The DBS test procedure (which relies
solely on the use of a programmable brake controller and the vehicle's
DBS system for braking), however, utilizes a surrogate (i.e., target
vehicle) to limit the potential for damage to the SV and/or test
equipment in the event of a collision.
The target vehicle presently used as the POV by NCAP for the
Agency's DBS testing is known as the Subject Surrogate Vehicle, or SSV.
The SSV, developed by NHTSA for the purpose of track testing, appears
as a ``real'' vehicle to the camera, radar, and lidar sensors used by
existing AEB systems. The SSV system is comprised of (a) a shell,\157\
which is a visually and dimensionally accurate representation of a
passenger car; (b) a slider and load frame assembly to which the shell
is attached, (c) a two-rail track on which the slider operates, (d) a
road-based lateral restraint track, and (e) a tow vehicle, which pulls
the SSV and its peripherals down the test track during trials where the
POV (i.e., SSV) must be in motion. A brief discussion on the use of the
GVT, discussed earlier in the BSI section, as an alternative to the SSV
for future DBS and CIB testing, is included later in this notice.\158\
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\157\ The shell is constructed from lightweight composite
materials with favorable strength-to-weight characteristics,
including carbon fiber, Kevlar[supreg], phenolic, and Nomex
honeycomb. It is also wrapped with a commercially available vinyl
material to simulate paint on the body panels, rear bumper, and a
tinted glass rear window. A foam bumper having a neoprene cover is
attached to the rear of the SSV to reduce the peak forces realized
immediately after an impact from a test vehicle occurs.
\158\ If the Agency decides to assess FCW in separate tests to
that for DBS and CIB, those FCW tests would also be conducted using
GVT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A short description of each DBS system performance test scenario,
and the requirements for a passing result, is provided below:
Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)--The SV encounters a stopped
POV on a straight road. The SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the
POV is stationary. The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the
SV issues an FCW alert, and the SV brake is applied at a TTC of 1.1 s
(i.e., at a nominal headway of 12.2 m (40 ft.)). To pass this test, the
SV must not contact the POV.
Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)--The SV encounters a POV
slowing with constant deceleration directly in front of it on a
straight road. The SV and POV are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with
an initial headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.). The POV brakes are then
applied at a constant deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. The SV
throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert,
and the SV brakes are applied at a TTC of 1.4 s (i.e., at a nominal
headway of 9.6 m (31.5 ft.)). To pass this test, the SV must not
contact the POV.
Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)--The SV encounters a slower-
moving POV directly in front of it on a straight road. In the first
test, the SV and POV are driven on a straight road at a constant speed
of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second
test, the SV and POV are driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45
mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. In both tests, the SV
throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert,
and the SV brakes are applied at a TTC of 1 s (i.e., at a nominal
headway of 6.7 m (22 ft.) in the first test, and 11.3 m (37 ft.) in the
second test). To pass these tests, the SV must not contact the POV.
Steel Trench Plate (STP) test (to assess false positive
suppression)--The SV is driven over a 2.4 m x 3.7 m x 25.4 mm (8 ft. x
12 ft. x 1 in.) steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 72.4 kph
(45 mph). If no FCW alert is issued by a TTC of 2.1 s, the SV throttle
is released within 500 ms of a TTC of 2.1 s, and the SV brakes are
applied at a TTC of 1.1 s (i.e., at a nominal distance of 12.3 m (40
ft.) from the edge of the STP at 40.2 kph (25 mph), or 22.3 m (73 ft.)
at 72.4 kph (45 mph)). To pass this test, the performance criteria is
non-activation, as defined above.
To pass NCAP's DBS system performance criteria, the SV must
currently pass five out of seven trials for each of the six test
conditions.
As previously mentioned, NCAP's LVS, LVM, and LVD test scenarios
for its DBS evaluations are similar to those for the FCW assessments
and therefore correspond well with real-world crash data and have
similar target crash populations. NHTSA's analysis of the 2011-2015
rear-end crash data from FARS and GES showed target crash populations
of 65 percent for the LVS scenario, 22 percent for the LVD scenario,
and 10 percent for the LVM scenario.\159\ Furthermore, Volpe's
independent review of the 2011-2015 data sets showed that for rear-end
crashes that occurred on roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25
mph) or less, 56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less,
the fatality rate was 2 percent, 11 percent, and 28 percent,
respectively. Additionally, MAIS 1-5 injuries were observed in 6
percent of all rear-end crashes that occurred on roadways with posted
speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, 30 percent with posted speeds of
56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 63 percent with posted speeds of 72.4
kph (45 mph) or less.
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\159\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
If a driver does not take any action to brake when a rear-end crash
is imminent, CIB systems utilize the same types of forward-looking
sensors used in DBS systems to apply the vehicle's brakes automatically
to slow or stop the vehicle. The amount of braking applied varies by
manufacturer, and several systems are designed to achieve maximum
vehicle deceleration just prior to impact. In reviewing model year
2017-2019 NCAP CIB test data, NHTSA observed a deceleration range of
0.31 to 1.27g during test trials that provided speed reductions capable
of satisfying the CIB performance criteria for a given test condition.
Unlike DBS systems, which only provide additional braking to supplement
the driver's brake input, CIB systems activate when the driver has not
applied the brake pedal.
The Agency's current CIB test procedure \160\ is comprised of the
same
[[Page 13481]]
four test scenarios (LVS, LVD, LVM, and the STP false positive
suppression test) and accompanying test speeds as set forth in the DBS
test procedure. However, the performance criteria vary slightly. The
LVM 40.2 kph/16.1 kph (25 mph/10 mph) test condition stipulates that
the SV may not contact the POV. The LVS, LVD, and the LVM 72.4 kph/32.2
kph (45 mph/20 mph) test conditions permit SV-to-POV contact but
require minimum reductions in the SV speed. In the case of the CIB
false positive tests, the performance criterion is little-to-no
activation. Similar to NCAP's DBS tests, the SSV is the POV presently
used in the program's CIB testing. A short description of each test
scenario and the requirements for a passing result is provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2015,
October). Crash imminent brake system performance evaluation for the
New Car Assessment Program. http://www.regulations.gov. Docket No.
NHTSA-2015-0006-0025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LVS--SV encounters a stopped POV on a straight road. The
SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the POV (i.e., the SSV) is
stationary. The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV
issues an FCW alert. To pass this test, the SV speed reduction
attributable to CIB intervention must be >=15.8 kph (9.8 mph).
LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant
deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV
are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with an initial headway of 13.8 m
(45.3 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant
deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV, after which the SV throttle is
released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass this
test, the SV speed reduction attributable to CIB intervention must be
>=16.9 kph (10.5 mph).
LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in
front of it on a straight road. In the first test, the SV and POV are
driven on a straight road at a constant speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and
16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second test, the SV and POV are
driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph),
respectively. In both tests, the SV throttle is released within 500 ms
after the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass the first test, the SV must
not contact the POV. To pass the second test, the SV speed reduction
attributable to CIB intervention must be >=15.8 kph (9.8 mph).
STP test (to assess false positive suppression)--The SV is
driven towards a steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) in one test
and 72.4 kph (45 mph) in the other test. If an FCW alert is issued, the
SV throttle is released within 500 ms of the alert. If no FCW alert is
issued, the throttle is not released until the test's validity period
(the time when all test specifications and tolerances must be
satisfied) has passed. To pass these tests, the SV must not achieve a
peak deceleration equal to or greater than 0.5g at any time during its
approach to the steel trench plate.
To pass NCAP's CIB system performance criteria, the SV must pass
five out of seven trials for each of the six test conditions.
Similar to FCW and DBS, NCAP's CIB test scenarios correlate to the
dynamically distinct rear-end crash data discussed earlier. The
Agency's analysis of the 2011-2015 crash data showed that the LVS, LVD,
and LVM scenarios represented 65 percent, 22 percent, and 10 percent,
respectively, of all rear-end crashes.\161\ With respect to test speed,
in its independent review of 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe
concluded that 2 percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 6 percent of all
rear-end crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 40.2
kph (25 mph) or less. Eleven percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 30
percent of all rear-end crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds of
56.3 kph (35 mph) or less. For posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or
less, these statistics are 28 percent and 63 percent, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Current State of AEB Technology
When NHTSA's CIB test scenarios were developed, relatively few
vehicles were equipped with this technology, and those that were
equipped had systems with limited capabilities. Since then, fitment
rates for CIB systems have increased significantly. The increased
fitment was due in part to an industry voluntary commitment made in
March 2016. At that time, 20 vehicle manufacturers, representing more
than 99 percent of light motor vehicle sales in the U.S., voluntarily
committed to install AEB systems on light motor vehicles.\162\ Pursuant
to this voluntary commitment, the manufacturers would make FCW and CIB
standard on virtually all light-duty vehicles with a gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) of 3,855.5 kg (8,500 pounds) or less beginning no
later than September 1, 2022, and all trucks with a GVWR between
3,856.0 and 4,535.9 kg (8,501 and 10,000 pounds) beginning no later
than September 1, 2025. Conforming vehicles must be equipped with (1)
an AEB system that earns at least an ``advanced'' rating from IIHS in
its front crash prevention track tests and (2) an FCW system that meets
the performance requirements specified in two of NCAP's three FCW test
scenarios.\163\ The manufacturers further pledged to submit annual
progress reports, which IIHS and NHTSA agreed to publish. In 2017, the
first reporting year, approximately 30 percent of the fleet was
equipped with CIB systems (though many of those systems were not
designed to meet the voluntary commitment thresholds), whereas
participating manufacturers equipped 75 percent of their fleet in
2019.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17),
U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to
make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
\163\ To achieve an advanced rating in IIHS' front crash
prevention track tests, a vehicle's AEB system must show a speed
reduction of at least 16.1 kph (10 mph) in either the Institute's
19.3 or 40.2 kph (12 or 25 mph) tests, or a speed reduction of 8.0
kph (5 mph) in both of these tests. https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
\164\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
December 17), NHTSA announces update to historic AEB commitment by
20 automakers, https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aeb-commitment-20-automakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the voluntary commitment worked to increase fitment rates,
the stringency included in the agreement for AEB systems is lower than
that included in NCAP. The voluntary commitment included front crash
prevention track tests that differed in stringency from the NCAP
performance thresholds, and in number. The Agency was aware of those
differences at the time, but considered the voluntary commitment to be
a path toward greater fleet penetration.\165\
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\165\ The Agency also believes that its recommendation of AEB
systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) that meet NCAP performance criteria on
its website since the 2018 model year has further encouraged
adoption of these technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As fitment has increased, the sensor technology for CIB systems has
also advanced significantly. For instance, in 2017, many systems were
not designed to meet the voluntary commitment thresholds, whereas in
2019, most vehicles with FCW and CIB systems were able to pass all
relevant NCAP test scenarios. NHTSA notes that NCAP's CIB test
requirements currently require a speed reduction of at least 15.8 kph
(9.8 mph) in the program's LVS test. These test requirements are more
stringent than those required by the voluntary commitment, which allow
a
[[Page 13482]]
vehicle to comply with the memorandum for a speed reduction of 8.0 kph
(5 mph) in the IIHS 19.3 or 40.2 kph (12 and 25 mph) LVS tests.\166\
For the 2021 model year, the pass rate (as reported by vehicle
manufacturers) for NCAP's FCW and CIB tests for vehicles \167\ equipped
with these technologies and for which manufacturers submitted data was
88.8 percent and 69.5 percent, respectively.\168\ Furthermore, NHTSA
found that 63 percent of model year 2017 vehicles did not contact the
POV in the LVS scenario during the Agency's testing, whereas 100
percent of model year 2021 vehicles did not make contact with the POV
when tested.\169\ As such, the Agency believes current CIB system
performance far exceeds NCAP's current testing requirements, such that
it is feasible to update the program's CIB test conditions to further
safety improvements. Recent NHTSA research supports this assertion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17),
U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to
make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
\167\ In this instance, ``vehicles'' refers to the total number
of vehicles in the 2021 fleet, and not the total number of vehicle
models for that year.
\168\ These values assume a fifty percent take rate for vehicles
having optional equipment.
\169\ No contact was assumed if the test vehicle did not contact
the POV in 5 or more of the 7 required trial runs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
Similar to the fleet testing performed for PAEB, the Agency
conducted a series of CIB characterization tests using a sample of MY
2020 NCAP test vehicles from various manufacturers. The goal of this
testing was to quantify the performance of current CIB systems using
the previously defined LVS and LVD test scenarios, but with an expanded
set of input conditions. Testing was conducted in accordance with the
CIB test procedure prescribed above; however, several scenarios were
then repeated to assess how specific procedural changes (i.e.,
increases in test speed and deceleration magnitude) affected CIB system
performance.
For the additional LVS tests, the Agency incrementally
increased the vehicle speed for the LVS test scenario (from 40.2 to
72.4 kph (25 to 45 mph) in 8.0 kph (5 mph) increments), as shown in
Table 2 below, to identify when/if the vehicle reached its operational
limits and/or did not react to the POV ahead. When insufficient
intervention occurred for a given vehicle, the Agency repeated the test
scenario at a test speed that was 4.0 kph (2.5 mph) lower.\170\ This
reduced speed was used to define the system's upper capabilities for
the LVS scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ Insufficient intervention was defined as a maximum (peak)
deceleration of less than 0.5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the additional LVD tests, the Agency evaluated how
changes made to either the vehicles' speed (72.4 kph versus 56.3 kph
(45 mph versus 35 mph)) or deceleration magnitude (0.5g versus 0.3g)
affected CIB performance, as shown in Table 3 below.
Details of NHTSA's CIB characterization study are provided below
(with speeds given in kph (mph)):
Table 2--Nominal LVS Matrix
------------------------------------------------------------------------
POV speed,
SV speed, (kph/mph) (kph/mph)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
40.2/25................................................. 0/0
48.3/30................................................. 0/0
56.3/35................................................. 0/0
64.4/40................................................. 0/0
72.4/45................................................. 0/0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3--Nominal LVD Matrix
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peak Minimum
SV speed, (kph/mph) POV speed, deceleration distance,
(kph/mph) (g) (mft.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
56.3/35......................................................... 56.3/35 0.3 13.8/45.3
56.3/35......................................................... 56.3/35 0.5 13.8/45.3
72.4/45......................................................... 72.4/45 0.3 13.8/45.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No additional LVM or STP false positive assessments were conducted
as part of the Agency's CIB characterization study. There were several
reasons for this. First, in its review of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES
rear-end crash data sets, NHTSA showed that LVS and LVD rear-end
scenarios resulted in the highest number of crashes and MAIS 1-5
injuries. As shown in Table A-1, there were 1,099,868 LVS, 374,624 LVD,
and 174,217 LVM crashes annually.\171\ Furthermore, there were 561,842
MAIS 1-5 injuries resulting from the LVS crash scenario, 196,731 for
LVD, and 97,402 for LVM. The LVS scenario also had the second highest
number of fatalities. Secondly, it was unclear whether performing a set
of additional STP false positive tests would provide useful data. When
the STP test was initially developed, many AEB systems relied solely on
radar for lead vehicle detection. Today, most vehicles utilize camera-
only or fused systems that rely on both camera and radar. Although the
Agency has observed instances of false positive test failures during
CIB and DBS NCAP evaluations performed with radar-only systems, none
have been observed when camera-only or fused systems were evaluated in
the program. While some radar-only systems have had difficulty
classifying the STP correctly, camera-only and fused (i.e., camera plus
radar) systems have not exhibited this issue.\172\ For these reasons,
the Agency believes it may be appropriate to remove the false positive
STP assessments from NCAP's AEB evaluation matrix in this NCAP update
and is seeking comment in that regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\172\ This is not to suggest that camera systems are superior to
radar systems in all tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency chose to increase the test speeds of the scenarios
included in its CIB characterization study because, in its independent
analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that speeding was
a factor in 42 percent of the fatal rear-end crashes.\173\ A review of
Volpe's analysis also showed that approximately 28 percent of
fatalities and 63 percent of injuries in rear-end crashes occurred when
the posted speed on roadways is 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. When the
travel speed was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 7 percent of
fatal and 34 percent of the police reported real-end crashes resulting
in injuries occurred at
[[Page 13483]]
speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\174\ These data suggested that
there was merit to assessing the capabilities of newer vehicles using
LVS tests performed at higher speeds since this would allow the Agency
to gauge the ability of current-generation CIB systems to address a
greater number of rear-end crashes, particularly those that produce the
most serious and fatal injuries. The Agency also reasoned that it was
most appropriate to increase the test speed in NCAP's LVS scenario, in
particular, since this scenario has the potential to require the
greatest speed reduction authority to realize potential safety
benefits. Historically, it has also been a difficult scenario for
forward-looking sensing systems to address, especially at high vehicle
speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\174\ For this crash mode, 62 and 67 percent of the travel speed
data is not reported in FARS and GES, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although NHTSA acknowledges that the majority of fatal rear-end
crashes (72 percent) occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding
72.4 kph (45 mph), these higher speeds were not assessed as part of the
Agency's characterization testing. Prior to testing, the Agency had
safety concerns with conducting LVS tests at speeds of 80.5 kph (50
mph) or more due to test track length limitations, inherent safety
considerations for laboratory personnel, and potential damage to either
the SV or test equipment. That said, as will be discussed later in this
section, data collected during the Agency's testing showed that higher
test speeds may be feasible, as several vehicles provided complete
crash avoidance at 72.4 kph (45 mph).
NHTSA's intent in evaluating a modified LVD scenario was to
document the performance of current-generation CIB systems using more
demanding LVD-based driving situations. The Agency also planned to use
these test results to determine the feasibility of increasing the
stringency of NCAP's LVD test. Compared to the LVD test conditions
presently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure, the modified LVD
tests, as shown in Table 3, either (1) maintained the existing 13.8 m
(45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway and 0.3g POV deceleration profile, but
increased the travel speed of both the POV and SV from 56.3 to 72.4 kph
(35 to 45 mph), or (2) maintained the existing 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-
POV headway and existing 56.3 kph (35 mph) POV and SV speeds, but
increased the average POV deceleration magnitude to 0.5g.
NHTSA's interest in the first LVD procedural change aligned with
that mentioned for the LVS scenario changes--a significant number of
injuries and fatalities in rear-end crashes occurred at higher speeds.
The second change was made to address situations where the driver of a
lead vehicle brakes aggressively, causing the driver of the following
vehicle to have even less time to avoid or mitigate the crash than had
the lead vehicle braking been at the 0.3g level presently specified.
The Agency reasoned that implementing these changes for the LVD
scenario would introduce a more stringent scenario than that which is
currently prescribed in NHTSA's CIB test procedure, and would thus help
the Agency understand the capabilities of current CIB systems more
comprehensively.
Test reports related to NHTSA's CIB characterization testing can be
found in the docket for this notice.
e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
In general, this study has allowed NHTSA to assess the performance
of current CIB systems and evaluate the technology's future potential
for the new model years' vehicle fleet. The study showed that many
vehicles in today's fleet were able to repeatedly provide complete
crash avoidance at higher test speeds, shorter SV-to-POV headways, and
generally more aggressive conditions than those specified in the
Agency's current NCAP CIB test procedure. This study has also provided
the Agency with new ways to consider differentiating CIB systems'
performance for NCAP ratings purposes in the future. Furthermore, it
has provided the Agency with the underlying support necessary for NCAP
to propose adjustments to the current CIB performance requirements to
address rear-end crashes that are causing a greater number of injuries
and fatalities in the real world. Accordingly, the Agency is proposing
to make several changes to its CIB test procedure for this NCAP
upgrade. These changes are outlined below for each test scenario. For
the LVS scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
Increased SV test speeds and an assessment methodology
that is similar to that which it proposed to assess PAEB system
performance. CIB system performance for the LVS scenario will be
assessed over a range of test speeds. The Agency is proposing a minimum
SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is similar to that currently
specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure--40.2 kph (25 mph), and a
maximum SV test speed of 80.0 kph (49.7 mph). The Agency is proposing
to increase the subject vehicle test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph)
increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed for
the LVS assessment.
The Agency's characterization testing showed that it is feasible to
raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVS test to encourage improved performance
of CIB systems. In fact, several vehicles repeatably afforded full
crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) at speeds up to 72.4 kph (45 mph)
for the LVS test scenario. Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP
performs its Car-to-Car Rear stationary (CCRs) scenario, which is
comparable to the Agency's LVS tests, at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7
mph) for those systems that offer AEB, which also suggests that higher
test speeds are practicable.\175\ As such, NHTSA believes that it is
appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum LVS test speed
of 80 kph (49.7 mph), as this should better address the higher
severity, high-speed crash problem and, in turn, further reduce
fatalities and serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP's protocol
prescribes a minimum SV test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) for the CCRs
scenario for AEB systems that also offer FCW, the Agency does not see a
reason to perform its LVS test at a speed that is less than that which
is specified in its existing test procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)).
Therefore, it is not proposing to harmonize with Euro NCAP with respect
to the minimum required test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
section 8.2.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A revised performance requirement. In lieu of a speed
reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure for
the LVS scenario, the SV must avoid making contact with the POV target
to pass a test trial. Similar to PAEB, this should limit damage to the
SV and POV target during testing and reduce chances that results are
questioned or invalidated.
Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVS
scenario. Currently, NHTSA's CIB test procedure requires that a vehicle
meet the performance criteria (i.e., specified speed reduction) for
five out of seven trials. However, similar to that proposed by NHTSA
for its PAEB assessment, the Agency is proposing that only one test
trial will be conducted per test speed assessed (i.e., 40, 50, 60, 70,
and 80 kph or 24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) if the SV does not
contact the POV target during the first valid trial for each of the
test speeds. For a given test condition, the test sequence is initiated
at the 40 kph (24.9 mph) minimum
[[Page 13484]]
speed. To achieve a passing result, the test must be valid (i.e., all
test specifications and tolerances satisfied), and the SV must not
contact the POV. If the SV does not contact the POV during the first
valid test, the test speed is incrementally increased by 10 kph (6.2
mph), and the next test in the sequence is performed. Unless the SV
contacts the POV, this iterative process continues until a maximum test
speed of 80 kph (31.1 mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the POV,
and the relative longitudinal velocity between the SV and POV is less
than or equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, the Agency
will perform four additional (repeated) test trials at the same speed
for which the impact occurred. The SV must not contact the POV for at
least three out of the five test trials performed at that same speed to
pass that specific combination of test condition and test speed.\176\
If the SV contacts the POV during a valid test of a test condition
(whether it be the first test performed for a particular test speed or
a subsequent test trial at that same speed), and the relative impact
velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, no
additional test trials will be conducted at the given test speed and
test condition and the SV is considered to have failed the test
condition at that specific test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail criterion (i.e.,
a vehicle must meet performance requirements for three out of five
trials for a particular test condition to pass the test condition)
is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency is pursuing an assessment approach for the LVS CIB test
scenario that is similar to that proposed for PAEB systems in order to
reduce test burden, given that additional test speeds are being
proposed. NHTSA believes that this alternative approach will continue
to ensure that passing CIB systems represent robust designs that will
offer a higher level of performance and safety.
For the LVD scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
A reduction in SV and POV test speeds. NHTSA's CIB test
procedure currently prescribes a test speed of 56 kph (34.8 mph) for
the SV and POV in the LVD scenario. Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems
test protocol, Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the Car-to-Car rear
braking (CCRb) specifies an SV speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). For this
upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is proposing to reduce the test speed for
the SV and POV to 50 kph (31.1 mph) to harmonize with Euro NCAP.\177\
Given additional changes proposed for the SV-to-POV headway and
deceleration magnitude (discussed next), NHTSA does not believe the
proposed reduction in test speed will lead to an overall reduction in
test stringency or loss of safety benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
section 8.2.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency is also requesting comment on whether it is appropriate
to incorporate additional SV test speeds for the LVD test scenario,
specifically 60, 70, and 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) or,
alternatively, whether testing at only 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph
(49.7 mph) would be sufficient. As mentioned earlier, Volpe's analysis
of the 2011-2015 FARS data set showed that the majority of crashes
occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph),
suggesting that testing at higher speeds for all CIB test scenarios may
be warranted. The Agency has simply not performed testing at 80 kph
(49.7 mph) to date because of concerns surrounding laboratories'
abilities to safely execute such tests and limited available testing
real estate, as this test scenario requires that both the SV and POV be
travelling at the same speed at the onset of the test validity period.
That being said, NHTSA believes that, (1) given the results from its
characterization study, and in particular, the braking performance
demonstrated in the LVS tests, (2) the fact that tested vehicles may
have higher POV classification confidence for the LVD test compared to
the LVS test since the POV is always in motion during the LVD test, and
(3) the POV will be the GVT, which relies on a robotic platform for
movement, rather than the SSV which must be towed along a monorail
secured to the test track, vehicles in the current fleet will likely
also perform well in higher speed LVD tests. To validate this
assumption, NHTSA will be conducting research next year to assess
vehicle performance at speeds ranging from 50 kph (31.1 mph) to 80 kph
(49.7 mph) for 12 and 40 m (39.4 and 131.2 ft.) headways and POV
deceleration magnitudes of 0.4 and 0.5 g for the LVD CIB test scenario.
Pending the outcome of that research, the Agency may consider adopting
additional higher tests speeds (i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3,
43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the LVD test scenario in NCAP. The Agency
requests comment on what SV-to-POV headway and deceleration
magnitude(s) would be appropriate if the Agency was to adopt any or all
of these additional test speeds. If additional test speeds are adopted,
the Agency would implement an assessment methodology similar to that
proposed for the CIB LVS test scenario, whereby NHTSA would increase
the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the minimum test
speed to the maximum test speed for the LVD assessment.
A reduction in SV-to-POV headway. NHTSA's CIB test
procedure currently specifies a 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway for
the LVD scenario. The Agency is proposing to reduce the prescribed
headway to 12 m (39.4 ft.) to harmonize with Euro NCAP's CCRb scenario.
Given the proposed test speed reduction, the Agency believes it is
appropriate to also reduce the headway to maintain similar stringency
with its current LVD test condition. Whereas Euro NCAP also specifies
an additional SV-to-POV headway of 40 m (131.2 ft.), the Agency is not
proposing to conduct this additional assessment as part of this
proposal. NHTSA does not believe there would be a safety benefit to
adopting 40 m (131.2 ft.) as an additional, and less stringent,
headway. Therefore, it would serve to increase the test burden
unnecessarily.
An increase in deceleration magnitude. The Agency is
proposing to increase the POV deceleration magnitude currently
specified in its CIB test procedure for the LVD scenario from 0.3 g to
0.5 g. In the Agency's CIB characterization study, some vehicles
repeatably afforded full crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) for all
trials when the POV executed a 0.5 g braking maneuver in the LVD
condition with a SV test speed of 35 mph and SV-to-POV headway of 13.8
m (45.3 ft.). Although the test speed used in the Agency's study was
slightly lower than that which the Agency is proposing for the LVD test
condition, and the SV-to-POV headway was slightly longer, NHTSA
believes that it is reasonable to adopt a higher POV deceleration
magnitude for its future LVD testing. The Agency notes that a
deceleration of 0.5 g falls within the range of deceleration magnitudes
prescribed by Euro NCAP in its AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol,
Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the CCRb scenario. In its CCRb
test, Euro NCAP specifies POV deceleration magnitudes of 2 m/s\2\ and 6
m/s\2\ (approximately 0.2 to 0.6 g) for an SV-to-POV headway of 12 m
(39.4 ft.) and SV test speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). As the Agency has
proposed this reduced headway and test speed for its LVD testing, it
reasons that adopting a 0.5 g POV deceleration magnitude is also
practicable. The Agency is not proposing 0.6 g as the POV deceleration
magnitude in its LVD
[[Page 13485]]
test because it has observed instances where the tires on the POV
target developed flat spots during research testing conducted with the
Guided Soft Target (GST) system \178\ to assess Traffic Jam Assist
(TJA) systems. The TJA testing required a braking maneuver for the lead
vehicle decelerates, accelerates, then decelerates (LVDAD) scenario
that is similar to that specified in the Agency's CIB LVD test.\179\
During this testing, NHTSA also found that it was more difficult to
achieve and accurately control deceleration when braking maneuvers
higher than 0.5 g were used.\180\ Extensive tuning efforts related to
the GST brake applications were made in an attempt to rectify the
problems encountered, but these adjustments were unable to consistently
satisfy the test tolerances associated with 0.6 g POV deceleration for
the LVDAD test and a recommendation was made to reduce the maximum
nominal POV deceleration from 0.6 g to 0.5 g for future testing. In its
report findings, the Agency also noted that a deceleration of 0.6 g is
not only very close to the maximum braking capability of the GST's
robotic platform used by the Agency, it is also very close to the
default magnitude used by the LPRV during an emergency stop (maximum
deceleration). As such, the Agency concluded that a decrease in maximum
POV deceleration should also reduce equipment wear, particularly for
the system's tires and braking components, thus improving test
efficiency. This being said, the Agency acknowledges that newer robotic
platforms designed to provide greater capabilities, are now becoming
available, which may resolve the issues observed in the Agency's TJA
testing. As such, the Agency is requesting comment on whether it is
feasible to adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g in lieu of 0.5
g, as proposed.
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\178\ The GST system is comprised of two main parts--a low
profile robotic vehicle (LPRV), and a global vehicle target (GVT),
which is secured to the top of the LPRV.
\179\ Fogle, E.E., Arquette, T.E. (TRC), and Forkenbrock, G.J.
(NHTSA), (2021, May), Traffic Jam Assist Draft Test Procedure
Performability Validation (Report No. DOT HS 812 987), Washington,
DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
\180\ From Section 4.1 of DOT HS 812 987--``POV deceleration
validity check failures occurred during six trials of the eight
LVDAD trials performed. Four of the seven 0.6 g failures were
because the POV was unable to achieve the minimum deceleration
threshold of 0.55 g. The remaining three 0.6 g failures were because
the POV was unable to maintain a minimum average deceleration of at
least 0.55 g.''
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An alternative performance criterion. In lieu of a speed
reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure for
the LVD scenario, the vehicle must avoid making contact with the POV
target to pass a test trial.
Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVD
scenario. NHTSA is adopting an approach to conducting test trials that
is identical to that described above for the CIB LVS scenario,
regardless of the number of test speeds adopted (i.e., one speed, 50
kph (31.1 mph); two speeds, 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph); or
four speeds, 50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)).
If only one or two test speeds are selected for inclusion, the Agency
is seeking comment on whether it is more appropriate to alternatively
require 7 trials for each test speed, and require that 5 out of the 7
trials conducted pass the ``no contact'' performance criterion.
For the LVM scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
Increased SV test speeds. NHTSA is proposing to assess CIB
system performance for the LVM scenario over a range of test speeds,
similar to that proposed for the LVS scenario. The Agency is proposing
a minimum SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is nearly
equivalent to the 40.2 kph (25 mph) test speed currently specified in
NHTSA's CIB test procedure, and a maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7
mph), which is slightly higher than the 72.4 kph (45 mph) specified for
the second LVM test condition in NHTSA's current CIB test procedure.
The Agency is proposing to increase the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2
mph) increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed
for the LVM assessment.
The Agency did not perform additional LVM testing as part of its
CIB characterization study. Nonetheless, NHTSA believes that it is
feasible to raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVM test to encourage improved
performance of CIB systems, as the Agency's current CIB LVM tests
(conducted with an SV speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2
kph (20 mph)) have shown that many vehicles are able to stop without
contacting the POV target for each of the required test trials.
Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP performs its Car-to-Car
Rear moving (CCRm) scenario, which is comparable to the Agency's LVM
tests, at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 mph), which also suggests that
higher SV test speeds are practicable.\181\ As such, NHTSA believes
that it is appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum SV
test speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph) in the Agency's LVM test, as this
should also address high-speed crashes and thus further reduce
fatalities and serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP's protocol
prescribes a minimum SV test speed of 30 kph (18.6 mph) for the CCRm
scenario for vehicles that have AEB systems,\182\ the Agency does not
see a reason to perform its LVM test at a speed that is less than that
which is specified in its existing test procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)).
Therefore, it is not proposing to harmonize with Euro NCAP with respect
to the minimum required test speed.
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\181\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
section 8.2.3.
\182\ The Agency notes that the minimum SV test for vehicles
equipped with only FCW (and no AEB) is 50 kph (31.1 mph).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An alternative POV test speed for all test conditions.
While the Agency's CIB test procedure currently specifies a POV test
speed of 16.1 kph (10 mph) when the SV speed is 40.2 kph (25 mph) and a
POV test speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph) when the SV speed is 72.4 kph (45
mph), the Agency is proposing to use a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4
mph) for every SV test speed that will be assessed for the LVM
scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph), increased in 10.0 kph (6.2
mph) increments. NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP's CCRm protocol
specifies a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph), and this POV speed is
stipulated for similar testing conducted by various other vehicle
safety ratings programs. With this proposed NCAP upgrade, NHTSA sees no
reason to deviate from the other testing organizations with respect to
the POV speed for its LVM test.
A performance criterion of ``no contact''. In lieu of a
speed reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test
procedure for the Agency's higher speed LVM scenario (i.e., POV of 72.4
kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph)), the SV must avoid
making contact with the POV target to pass a test trial for each test
speed assessed for the LVM scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph),
increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments.
Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVM
scenario. NHTSA is adopting an approach to conducting test trials that
is identical to that described above for the CIB LVS scenario. For the
proposed CIB LVM tests, the Agency would require one test trial per SV
speed increment, and four repeat trials in the event of a test failure
for instances where the SV has a relative velocity at impact that is
equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial speed.
NHTSA has chosen to harmonize with Euro NCAP in many respects since
it
[[Page 13486]]
recognizes that the rear-end crash problem, as defined by the most
frequently occurring and dynamically distinct pre-crash scenarios,
could be changing as AEB-equipped vehicles become more prolific in the
fleet. Accordingly, the Agency believes that it is beneficial to
standardize the current CIB test specifications with other consumer
information programs and focus resources on emerging trends.\183\
However, the Agency also notes that it will consider making additional
updates to its CIB test evaluation as the crash problem evolves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019,
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
NHTSA did not conduct any testing, as part of its characterization
study, to evaluate DBS system performance capabilities beyond what is
currently stipulated in NCAP's DBS test procedure. However, the Agency
notes that its CIB and DBS test procedures are currently aligned with
respect to test scenarios, test speeds, headways, etc. Differences
exist only with respect to the use of an SV manual brake application
(i.e., for DBS) and most performance criterion. NHTSA's DBS test
procedure currently specifies ``no contact'' as the performance
criterion for all DBS test conditions, whereas the Agency's CIB test
procedure currently requires a specified speed reduction for each of
the CIB test conditions (with the exception of the lower speed LVM
condition where the POV speed is 16.1 kph (10 mph) and the SV speed is
40.2 kph (25 mph), which requires ``no contact''). Therefore, NHTSA
believes it is reasonable to adopt the CIB test conditions (i.e., test
speeds, headways, etc.) for the comparable DBS test conditions.
However, given the Agency's proposal to embrace the more stringent ``no
contact'' performance criterion for each of the CIB test conditions,
and for the additional reasons mentioned previously, the Agency also
believes, as suggested prior, that there may be merit to removing the
DBS test conditions from NCAP entirely to reduce test burden and the
associated cost.
In its comments to the NCAP's December 2015 notice, the Alliance
\184\ stated that since crash avoidance (i.e., no vehicle contact) is
the desired outcome for all imminent rear-end crash events, if an SV
avoids contact with the POV in all CIB tests, DBS testing should not be
necessary. Although NHTSA agrees with the Alliance's rationale in
principle, the Agency also believes there is merit to ensuring that
both AEB systems perform as designed and help the driver to mitigate or
prevent the crash. The Agency reasons that it is possible for the
driver to apply the brakes, but with a magnitude that does not result
in achieving the vehicle's maximum crash avoidance potential (i.e.,
deceleration). In the past, some manufacturers assumed the driver was
in control when the brake pedal was depressed and would not override
the driver's input when necessary to avoid a crash. Accordingly, NHTSA
hesitates to assume that if CIB systems work effectively during
testing, then DBS systems will automatically do so as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ The Agency notes that the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers (The Alliance) merged with Global Automakers in
January 2020 to create the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto
Innovators). Both automotive industry groups separately submitted
comments to the December 2015 notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these considerations, the Agency is tentatively
proposing to retain both CIB and DBS system performance tests in NCAP,
and to align all test conditions for comparable test scenarios (e.g.,
SV and POV test speeds, headway, etc.) to evaluate whether the DBS
system will provide supplemental braking if the driver brakes but
additional braking is warranted. For this testing, the Agency is
proposing to adopt an assessment approach for DBS that is identical to
that described previously for PAEB and CIB. The Agency would require
one test trial per speed for each test scenario, and four repeated
trials for any specific test condition and speed combination that
results in a test failure and where the SV has a relative velocity at
impact that is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial speed.
Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the
minimum test speed to the maximum test speed. However, the Agency is
also requesting comment on whether removal of the DBS test scenarios
from NCAP would be more appropriate.
As an alternative to retaining all DBS tests in NCAP, or removing
the DBS performance evaluations from NCAP entirely, the Agency believes
it may be more reasonable to conduct only the LVS and LVM tests at the
highest two test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
mph)--to ensure system functionality and that the SV will not suppress
AEB operation when the driver applies the vehicle's foundation brakes.
The Agency would also consider conducting the LVD DBS test at 70 and 80
kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph) if the Agency decides to also adopt these test
speeds for the related CIB test. Comments are requested on this
alternative proposal and whether an alternative assessment method would
be more appropriate if any or all of the DBS test scenarios were
conducted only at the two highest test speeds. For a more limited speed
assessment of the two highest test speeds, 70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
mph), instead of up to four test speeds (50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1,
37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVD, or five test speeds (40, 50, 60,
70, and 80 kph (24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVS and
LVM), should the Agency require one trial per test condition (i.e.,
align with the assessment method outlined for the other AEB test
conditions) or multiple trials? If multiple trials were to be required,
how many would be appropriate, and what would be an acceptable pass
rate?
If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, it also
proposes to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is
initiated. The current DBS test procedure prescribes this shall occur
at specific TTCs per test scenario: 1.1 seconds (LVS), 1.0 seconds
(LVM), and 1.4 second (LVD). The proposed revision would initiate
manual braking at a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW
alert is issued for all DBS test scenario and speed combinations,
regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after the FCW alert but
before initiation of the manual brake application. The Agency reasons
that this change is more representative of real-world use and driving
conditions, and is in basic agreement with the approach specified for
FCW performance evaluations in Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test
protocol.\185\ Alternatively, the Agency requests comment on
appropriate TTCs for the modified test conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
Annex A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
As mentioned earlier, NHTSA is proposing to consolidate its FCW and
CIB tests such that the CIB tests will be used as an indicant of FCW
operation. The Agency is also proposing to similarly assess FCW in the
context of its PAEB tests. NHTSA believes there is merit to assessing
the presence of an FCW alert within the CIB and PAEB test because
operation of FCW and AEB/PAEB systems, in the test scenarios to be used
by NCAP, are complementary
[[Page 13487]]
and fundamentally intertwined. Also, combining the Agency's FCW tests
with those used to assess AEB system performance would reduce test
burden. The Agency proposes that it would evaluate the presence of a
vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV
accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert
is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV
accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the onset
of CIB system braking.\186\ Here, the onset of CIB activation is taken
to be the instant SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g. If no FCW
alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any
braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior
to impact with the POV. The Agency is also proposing to make similar
procedural changes to its PAEB test procedure. NHTSA is seeking comment
as to whether the proposed FCW assessment method is reasonable.
Furthermore, given that most FCW systems are currently able to pass all
relevant NCAP test scenarios, as mentioned earlier, the Agency believes
that, as an alternative to integrating the assessment of FCW into the
Agency's CIB tests, it may be feasible for NCAP to perform one FCW test
that could serve as an indicant of FCW system performance (while still
retaining the previously-stated accelerator pedal release timing to
ensure CIB activation is not unintentionally suppressed). This would
also reduce test burden. If the Agency were to choose one of the
proposed CIB test scenarios to adopt for an FCW test to assess the
performance of FCW systems, which CIB test scenario do commenters
believe would be most appropriate and why?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ Previous NHTSA research indicates that human drivers are
capable of releasing the accelerator pedal within 500 ms after
returning their eyes to a forward-facing viewing position in
response to an FCW alert. Forkenbrock, G., Snyder, A., Hoover, R.,
O'Harra, B., Vasko, S., Smith, L. (2011, July), A Test Track
Protocol for Assessing Forward Collision Warning Driver-Vehicle
Interface Effectiveness (Report No. DOT HS 811 501), Washington, DC:
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency notes that if it maintains any or all of the FCW test
scenarios that are currently included in its FCW test procedure, it
proposes to align the corresponding maximum SV test speeds, POV speeds,
headway, POV deceleration magnitude, etc., as applicable, with the
included CIB tests, similar to that which it has proposed for the DBS
tests. Accordingly, the Agency would adopt the following for the FCW
tests:
LVS--SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph); POV is stationary.
LVD--SV and POV speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph) or up to 80 kph
(49.7 mph), depending on the final test speed adopted for the CIB LVD
scenario; a 12 m (39.4 ft.) SV-to-POV headway; and a POV deceleration
magnitude of 0.5 g.
LVM--SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph); POV speed of 20 kph
(12.4 mph).
If the Agency continues to conduct separate FCW assessments, it
will need to revise the prescribed TTCs currently used to assess FCW
performance to align with the revised test scenario and speed
combinations.\187\ Given the Agency's thoughts about FCW-AEB
integration and the revised test conditions that would be adopted for
any future FCW tests, NHTSA requests comment on what TTC would be
appropriate for each test scenario. Although the Agency is proposing to
adopt an assessment approach for FCW that is identical to that
described previously for PAEB, CIB, and DBS,\188\ it is also requesting
comment on whether an alternative assessment method would be
appropriate in instances where it retains one or more FCW scenarios
that are performed at a single test speed. In such instances, should
the Agency require one trial per test condition (i.e., align with the
assessment method outlined for the other AEB test conditions) or
multiple trials? If multiple trials were to be required, how many would
be appropriate, and what would be an acceptable pass rate?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\ To pass a test trial, the vehicle must issue the FCW alert
on or prior to the prescribed time-to-collision (TTC) specified for
each of the three FCW test scenarios.
\188\ In essence, the Agency would require one test trial per
speed for each test scenario and four repeat trials in the event of
a test failure for instances where the SV has a relative velocity at
impact that is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial
speed. Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from
the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
h. Regenerative Braking
In addition to the FCW alert setting, discussed earlier, there are
additional system settings that the Agency must now consider during its
AEB and PAEB testing. One such setting is that for regenerative
braking. Regenerative braking, which has become more common as electric
vehicles have begun to proliferate the fleet, can slow the vehicle when
the throttle is released. As such, when the throttle is fully released
upon the issuance of the FCW alert in the Agency's AEB and PAEB
testing, vehicle speed can reduce significantly prior to the onset of
braking associated with these technologies, particularly in instances
where the FCW alert is issued early. For vehicles with regenerative
braking that have multiple settings (e.g., nominal, more aggressive,
less aggressive), the Agency is proposing to use the ``off'' setting or
the setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the accelerator
is fully released in its AEB and PAEB tests.\189\ Although NHTSA
reasons that the nominal setting may be the setting most commonly
chosen by a typical driver, it prefers the least aggressive setting, as
it would be more indicative of ``worst case''. Selecting a setting that
affords the lowest deceleration allows the vehicle to travel faster at
the onset of braking associated with AEB and PAEB. This approach would
produce a situation that is more comparable to that for vehicles that
do not have regenerative braking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ The Agency does not plan to make any procedural
modifications for vehicles that have regenerative braking that
cannot be switched off or adjusted, as those vehicles should operate
similarly in the real world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency believes that regenerative braking may also introduce
complications for the Agency's DBS tests (if the DBS tests are retained
in NCAP). NHTSA reasons that some vehicles may offer regenerative
braking that is already so high that there would be only a relatively
small boost in braking from the braking actuator (acting to provide a
combined 0.4 g deceleration). For instance, if the regenerative braking
from simply releasing the accelerator pedal results in 0.3 g braking,
the additional braking required to get to 0.4 g from the actuator would
be a very low force and/or brake pedal displacement. The Agency is
requesting comment on whether regenerative braking may introduce
additional testing issues and on any recommendations for test
procedural changes to rectify possible testing issues related to
regenerative braking.
With respect to FCW, CIB, and DBS testing in NCAP, NHTSA is seeking
comment on the following:
(38) For the Agency's FCW tests:
--If the Agency retains one or more separate tests for FCW, should it
award credit solely to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide
a passing audible alert? Or, should it also consider awarding credit to
vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide passing haptic alerts?
Are there certain haptic alert types that should be excluded from
consideration (if the Agency was to award credit to vehicles with
haptic alerts that pass NCAP tests) because they may be a nuisance to
drivers such that they are more likely to disable the system? Do
commenters
[[Page 13488]]
believe that haptic alerts can be accurately and objectively assessed?
Why or why not? Is it appropriate for the Agency to refrain from
awarding credit to FCW systems that provide only a passing visual
alert? Why or why not? If the Agency assesses the sufficiency of the
FCW alert in the context of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what type of FCW
alert(s) would be acceptable for use in defining the timing of the
release of the SV accelerator pedal, and why?
--Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or next latest) FCW system
setting in lieu of the default setting when performing FCW and AEB
(including PAEB) NCAP tests on vehicles that offer multiple FCW timing
adjustment settings? Why or why not? If not, what use setting would be
most appropriate?
--Should the Agency consider consolidating FCW and CIB testing such
that NCAP's CIB test scenarios would serve as an indicant of FCW
operation? Why or why not? The Agency has proposed that if it combines
the two tests, it would evaluate the presence of a vehicle's FCW system
during its CIB tests by requiring the SV accelerator pedal be fully
released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is issued. If no FCW alert
is issued during a CIB test, the SV accelerator pedal will be fully
released within 500 ms after the onset of CIB system braking (as
defined by the instant SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g). If no
FCW alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any
braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior
to impact with the POV. The Agency notes that it has also proposed
these test procedural changes for its PAEB tests as well. Is this
assessment method for FCW operation reasonable? Why or why not?
--If the Agency continues to assess FCW systems separately from CIB,
how should the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) be amended
if the Agency aligns the corresponding maximum SV test speeds, POV
speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV deceleration magnitude, etc., as
applicable, with the proposed CIB tests, and why? What assessment
method should be used--one trial per scenario, or multiple trials, and
why? If multiple trials should be required, how many would be
appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an acceptable pass rate, and
why?
--Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one FCW test scenario (instead of
the three that are currently included in NCAP's FCW test procedure),
conducted at the corresponding maximum SV test speed, POV speed, SV-to-
POV headway (as applicable), POV deceleration magnitude, etc. of the
proposed CIB test to serve as an indicant of FCW system performance? If
so, which test scenario from NCAP's FCW test procedure is appropriate?
--Are there additional or alternative test scenarios or test conditions
that the Agency should consider incorporating into the FCW test
procedure, such as those at even higher test speeds than those proposed
for the CIB tests, or those having increased complexity? If so, should
the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) and/or test scenario
specifications be amended, and to what extent?
(39) For the Agency's CIB tests:
--Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, deceleration magnitude,
etc. the Agency has proposed for NCAP's CIB tests appropriate? Why or
why not? If not, what speeds, headway(s), deceleration magnitude(s) are
appropriate, and why? Should the Agency adopt a POV deceleration
magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD CIB test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why
or why not?
--Should the Agency consider adopting additional higher tests speeds
(i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the CIB
(and potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why not? If
additional speeds are included, what headway and deceleration magnitude
would be appropriate for each additional test speed, and why?
--Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for the
proposed CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively,
should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a maximum
allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for any or all of the proposed test
conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed combination)? If yes,
why, and for which test conditions? For those test conditions, what
speed reductions would be appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum
allowable impact speed would be appropriate?
(40) For the Agency's DBS tests:
--Should the Agency remove the DBS test scenarios from NCAP? Why or why
not? Alternatively, should the Agency conduct the DBS LVS and LVM tests
at only the highest test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5
and 49.7 mph)? Why or why not? If the Agency also adopted these higher
tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)) for the LVD CIB test,
should it also conduct the LVD DBS test at these same speeds? Why or
why not?
--If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, is it
appropriate to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is
initiated to a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW alert
is issued (regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after the FCW
alert but before initiation of the manual brake application)? If not,
why, and what prescribed TTC values would be appropriate for the
modified DBS test conditions?
(41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has proposed for the CIB and
DBS tests (i.e., one trial per test speed with speed increments of 10
kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and repeat trials only in the
event of POV contact) appropriate? Why or why not? Should an
alternative assessment method such as multiple trials be required
instead? If yes, why? If multiple trials should be required, how many
would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an acceptable pass
rate, and why? If the proposed assessment method is appropriate, it is
acceptable even for the LVD test scenario if only one or two test
speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it more appropriate to
alternatively require 7 trials for each test speed, and require that 5
out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ``no contact'' performance
criterion?
(42) The Agency's proposal to (1) consolidate its FCW and CIB tests
such that the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant of FCW
operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM, and
potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2 for
LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), would result in a total of
20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds to be
evaluated for AEB. If the Agency uses check marks to give credit to
vehicles that (1) are equipped with the recommended ADAS technologies,
and (2) pass the applicable system performance test requirements for
each ADAS technology included in NCAP until such time as a new ADAS
rating system is developed and a final rule to amend the safety rating
section of the Monroney label is published, what is an appropriate
minimum pass rate for AEB performance evaluation? For example, a
vehicle is considered to meet the AEB performance if it passes two-
thirds of the 20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds
(i.e., passes 14 unique combinations of test conditions and test
speeds).
(43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking sensors are becoming
more
[[Page 13489]]
prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not observed any
instances of false positive test failures during any of its CIB or DBS
testing, is it appropriate to remove the false positive STP assessments
from NCAP's AEB (i.e., CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in this NCAP
update? Why or why not?
(44) For vehicles with regenerative braking that have setting
options, the Agency is proposing to choose the ``off'' setting, or the
setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the accelerator is
fully released. As mentioned, this proposal also applies to the
Agency's PAEB tests. Are the proposed settings appropriate? Why or why
not? Will regenerative braking introduce additional complications for
the Agency's AEB and PAEB testing, and how could the Agency best
address them?
(45) Should NCAP adopt any additional AEB tests or alter its
current tests to address the ``changing'' rear-end crash problem? If
so, what tests should be added, or how should current tests be
modified?
(46) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current FCW, CIB, and/or DBS
test procedure(s) that need further refinement or clarification? If so,
what refinements or clarifications are necessary, and why?
3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
NHTSA received several comments in response to the December 2015
notice pertaining to NCAP's DBS and CIB tests. These included comments
on FCW effective time-to-collision (TTC), false positive test
scenarios, procedure clarifications, expanding testing, and the AEB
strikeable target. These will be discussed over the next few sub-
sections.
a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-To-Collision (TTC)
In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, BMW suggested that
the Agency adopt an ``effective TTC'' for NCAP's FCW test that differs
from the ``absolute TTC'' currently stipulated in the associated test
procedure. The manufacturer contended that the deceleration due to an
activated AEB system effectively prolongs the reaction time for the
driver such that ``an FCW warning with AEB intervention at an absolute
TTC of 2.0 seconds is assumed to show an equal or greater effectiveness
in comparison to an FCW warning at 2.4 seconds without AEB
intervention.'' BMW suggested that if AEB functionality is intrinsic to
the frontal crash prevention system, the assessment of the warning TTC
in the FCW performance test should consider the time gained by AEB
deceleration and therefore the Agency should assess the ``effective
TTC,'' not an ``absolute TTC.''
The Agency agrees with BMW that FCW and AEB are interrelated and is
thus proposing to assess the presence of an FCW alert as an integral
component of the CIB test. To assess the adequacy of the FCW alert in
that context, the Agency has proposed to evaluate the presence of a
vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV
accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert
is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV
accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the onset
of CIB system braking. If no FCW alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB
system does not offer any braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal
will not be required prior to impact with the POV. The Agency believes
that this proposal is philosophically aligned with BMW's request, as it
would no longer require the direct assessment of FCW timing relative to
an ``absolute TTC.'' Rather, FCW timing, and how it relates to the
intended onset of CIB activation, would be at the discretion of the
vehicle manufacturer (who will have explicit knowledge of how the
operation of their vehicles' CIB systems affect the ``effective TTC'').
That said, the Agency continues to believe that well-designed FCW
alerts can provide significant safety benefits in crash-imminent rear-
end crash scenarios, and encourages vehicle manufactures to present
them such that the driver may be able to respond with sufficient time
to avoid a crash (i.e., not to solely rely on CIB activation for crash
avoidance). If a vehicle manufacturer chooses to issue an FCW alert in
a way that assumes a CIB intervention will effectively extend the
precrash timeline, but then the AEB system does not activate under
real-world driving conditions, or activates late, drivers may not have
enough time to react to avoid an impending crash.
b. False Positive Test Scenarios
Citing the potential for redundancy with the three active/
supplemental braking scenarios for systems exhibiting lower
deceleration rates, Mobileye suggested that the Agency impose a maximum
speed reduction of 2 kph (1.24 mph) for the CIB and DBS tests, or a
maximum duration of braking over the maximum allowable deceleration
threshold for the false positive tests. The STP test is designed to
provide an indication as to whether a vehicle's AEB system may have a
false activation problem. Some vehicles use haptic braking and/or low-
level braking as part of their FCW alert strategy. These brake
activations are not intended to slow the vehicle significantly; rather,
they attempt to get the driver's attention so that he/she will respond
to the crash-imminent situation. That said, it is quite possible that
FCW-based braking could reduce speed more than the 2 kph (1.24 mph)
threshold suggested by Mobileye.
Recognizing the potential problem for a vehicle to fail the CIB
false positive test as a consequence of how its FCW system was designed
to work, NHTSA built some flexibility into the assessment criteria used
to evaluate how the subject vehicle (SV) responds to the STP. In the
CIB test, activations can produce peak decelerations of up to 0.5g,
which was beyond any FCW-based level at the time. In the DBS test, the
peak deceleration of a given test trial must not exceed 150 percent of
the average peak deceleration calculated for the baseline test series
performed at the same nominal SV speed. These provisions are intended
to tolerate small levels of deceleration, but not the larger magnitudes
indicative of an AEB intervention.
BMW objected to the inclusion of the false positive test scenario
in general for both DBS and CIB systems and raised concerns that such
tests ``can incentivize vehicle manufacturers to focus on one
artificial situation, instead of considering the myriad of potential
real-world traffic situations.'' The manufacturer suggested that if
this test scenario remains for DBS, then the Agency should allow
manufacturers to specify a brake pedal application rate limit beyond
279 mm/s (11 in./s) and up to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) for the false
positive test scenario, to harmonize with Euro NCAP requirements. BMW
further stated that limiting the rate to 279 mm/s (11 in./s) could
increase a DBS system's sensitivity, and thereby increase the
likelihood of additional false activation events in the real world. The
manufacturer mentioned that as more frontal crash prevention systems
combine both FCW and AEB functionalities, speed should reduce for all
pedal application speeds.
Regarding BMW's objection to continuing with the false positive
test scenario for CIB and DBS in NCAP, NHTSA notes that it has
requested comment on whether eliminating the false positive tests would
be appropriate at this time. As discussed previously, the Agency has
not observed false positive test failures in CIB or DBS testing since
these ADAS technologies were added to NCAP.
If NHTSA decides it is appropriate to keep the false positive test
scenario for DBS, BMW requested that
[[Page 13490]]
manufacturers should be permitted to specify a brake pedal application
rate up to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) since this is the upper brake
application rate limit established by Euro NCAP. In its November 2015
final decision notice for AEB, NHTSA addressed a similar request from
the Alliance, which suggested that the Agency harmonize with Euro
NCAP's brake application rate range of 200 to 400 mm/s (8 to 16 in./
s).\190\ At the time, the Agency stated that it would retain its
proposed brake application rate of 254 25.4 mm/s (10
1 in./s) in the DBS system performance test. In justifying
this decision, NHTSA contended that the current application rate value
is well within the range of the Euro NCAP specification. Also, NHTSA
reasoned that the current application rate appears to be a feasible
representation of the activation of DBS systems. DBS systems are
designed to stop rather than slow down, but not too fast like
conventional brake assist systems, which typically address emergency
panic stop situations where the brake application rate exceeds 360 mm/s
(14.2 in./s). For NHTSA to focus on evaluating system performance for
DBS technology (not conventional brake technology), the Agency plans to
retain the current brake pedal application rate of 254
25.4 mm/s (10 1 in./s) for the DBS test.
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\190\ 80 FR 68608 (Nov. 5, 2015).
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c. Procedure Clarifications
In response to the November 2015 final decision notice, Mobileye
asked NHTSA to clarify the process of releasing the accelerator pedal
within 500 ms of the FCW alert prior to braking. The commenter
questioned whether the throttle was gradually released over 500 ms, or
abruptly released over 50 ms. Mobileye also asked that the Agency
clarify how braking is affected if there is no FCW alert, or if the FCW
alert occurs very close to the brake activation.
NHTSA notes that the throttle pedal release rate is not restricted
in NCAP's CIB test procedure. The test procedure requires only that the
SV throttle be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is
issued. As previously mentioned, as part of the Agency's proposed
changes to the CIB tests, it also intends to include test procedure
language stating that if no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the
SV accelerator pedal will be released within 500 ms after the onset of
CIB system braking, and that if no FCW alert is issued and the
vehicle's CIB system does not offer any braking, release of the SV
accelerator pedal will not be required prior to impact with the POV.
With respect to how SV braking is affected, if there is no FCW
alert, or if the alert happens very close to brake activation,
different steps are taken for the crash imminent braking (CIB) and
dynamic brake support (DBS) tests.
In the existing DBS tests, the test procedure states that the
accelerator pedal must be released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is
issued, but prior to the onset of the manual SV brake application by a
robotic brake controller. The Agency recognizes that this can create an
issue if no FCW alert occurs because the throttle may still be
depressed (since no warning was issued) while the SV brakes are applied
by the robot at the prescribed TTC. The Agency has documented this
possibility where the SV throttle and brake pedals are applied at the
same time and provided a recommendation that up to a 250 ms overlap be
allowed.\191\ In other words, once the SV driver detects that the robot
has applied the brakes, the driver will have 250 ms to release the
accelerator fully. The test would not be valid unless this criterion is
met.
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\191\ Forkenbrock, G.J., & Snyder, A.S. (2015, June), NHTSA's
2014 automatic emergency braking test track evaluations (Report No.
DOT HS 812 166), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Agency has proposed to revise when the manual
(robotic) brake application is initiated to a time that corresponds to
1.0 second after the FCW alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB
activation occurs after the FCW alert but before initiation of the
manual brake application) if it continues to perform DBS testing in
NCAP, it has also requested comment on appropriate TTCs for the
modified DBS test conditions as an alternative to this proposal.
Therefore, NHTSA is also requesting comment on the following:
(47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle and brake pedal
application be acceptable in instances where no FCW alert has been
issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW alert
occurs very close to the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is not
acceptable, what overlap would be acceptable?
d. Expand Testing
Magna suggested that NHTSA expand testing to encompass low light
and inclement weather situations. The Agency's proposal for PAEB
systems includes testing under less-than-ideal environmental conditions
(specifically at nighttime). The Agency notes that approximately half
(51 percent) of fatalities caused by rear-end crashes and most MAIS 1-5
injuries (80 percent) occurred under daylight conditions. Furthermore,
nearly all fatalities (92 percent) and injuries (88 percent) stemming
from rear-end collisions occurred in clear weather.\192\ Having said
that, IIHS's review of 2009-2016 rear-end crash data suggested that
AEB-equipped vehicles are over-represented for crashes occurring in
certain weather conditions, such as snow and ice.\193\ Therefore, NHTSA
is requesting comment on the following:
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\192\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\193\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention. 2019,
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(48) Should the Agency pursue research in the future to assess AEB
system performance under less than ideal environmental conditions? If
so, what environmental conditions would be appropriate?
e. AEB Strikeable Target
Numerous commenters recommended that NHTSA harmonize its Strikeable
Surrogate Vehicle (SSV) with the test target used by other testing
organizations such as IIHS and Euro NCAP. The commenters reasoned that
harmonization would further advance the implementation of AEB
technology by reducing the development and testing burden and thereby
result in lower-cost systems. Mercedes recommended that NHTSA recognize
other targets as being equivalent devices to the SSV and requested that
NHTSA allow vehicle manufacturers the option to choose which target is
used for testing.
Currently, NHTSA uses the SSV as the principal other vehicle (POV)
in NCAP testing of DBS and CIB systems. The SSV is a target vehicle
modeled after a small hatchback car and fabricated from light-weight
composite materials including carbon fiber and Kevlar[supreg].\194\
Using this target imposes certain limitations, most importantly the
maximum speed it can be operated at, or be struck by, the SV. Due to
its material properties, the SSV can inflict damage to vehicles that
impact it at higher speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
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Another target, the Global Vehicle Target (GVT), which was
referenced earlier with respect to BSI (blind spot intervention)
testing, resembles a white hatchback passenger car. This three-
[[Page 13491]]
dimensional surrogate is currently used by other consumer
organizations, including Euro NCAP. It is also used by many vehicle
manufacturers in their internal testing to NCAP test specifications,
and by NHTSA to facilitate ADAS research using pre-crash scenarios
beyond those included in the Agency's FCW, CIB, and DBS test
procedures.\195\
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\195\ Currently, manufacturers use test results from their
internal testing and submit them to NHTSA for NCAP's recommendation
of vehicles that pass its performance testing requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GVT consists of 39 vinyl-covered foam pieces (held together
with hook and loop fasteners) that form the structure the outer skins
are attached to. It is secured to the top of a Low-Profile Robotic
Vehicle (LPRV) using hook and loop fasteners, which separate upon an
SV-to-GVT collision. When the GVT is hit at low speed, it is typically
pushed off the LPRV but remains assembled. At higher impact speeds, the
GVT breaks apart as the SV essentially drives through it, and can then
be reassembled on top of the LPRV.
The use of this surrogate vehicle would allow the Agency to perform
tests at higher speeds, thus increasing safety benefits. For this
reason, the Agency used the GVT in its characterization study for CIB
testing at higher speeds. The SSV initially limited the test speeds the
Agency could adopt for CIB and DBS testing because of concerns over
potential damage to the testing equipment and test vehicle. Using the
GVT significantly reduces that possibility for the test speeds
proposed. Also, as future upgrades for NCAP are planned, the GVT can be
used to evaluate more challenging crash scenarios, such as those
required for other ADAS technologies (Intersection Safety Assist and
Opposing Traffic Safety Assist). NHTSA has recently docketed draft
research test procedures for these technologies.\196\ \197\ If, in the
future, the Agency was to consider adopting other test procedures
requiring a strikeable target, incorporating the GVT would allow
harmonization across the program.
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\196\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
September), Intersection safety assist system confirmation test:
Working draft, http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2019-
0102-0006.
\197\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
September), Opposing traffic safety assist system confirmation test:
Working draft. http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2019-
0102-0008.
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NHTSA has conducted vehicle testing to evaluate the FCW alert and
CIB intervention onset timing observed using the GVT Revision E and
compared that with the timing recorded for identical tests performed
with NHTSA's SSV benchmark.\198\ Three light vehicles and three rear-
end crash scenarios were used for this evaluation. A secondary
objective of this study was to assess the characteristics and
durability of the GVT for various test track configurations,
specifically its dynamic stability and in-the-field reconstruction time
after being struck by a test vehicle. GVT stability was evaluated using
straight line and curved path maneuvers at various speeds and lateral
accelerations. Reconstruction times of the GVT after impact were
examined using different impact speeds, directions of impact, and
assembly crew sizes.
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\198\ Snyder, A.C., Forkenbrock, G.J., Davis, I.J., O'Harra,
B.C., & Schnelle, S.C. (2019, July), A test track comparison of the
global vehicle target and NHTSA's strikeable surrogate vehicle
(Report No. DOT HS 812 698), Washington, DC: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
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Overall, the results from the study suggested that the onset timing
of FCW and CIB systems observed during rear-end tests performed with
the GVT was similar to that recorded for the SSV.\199\ The GVT was also
found to be physically stable and remained affixed to the robotic
platform used to facilitate its movement during the high-speed
longitudinal tests as well as those performed at the limit of the
platform's lateral road holding capacity. Although the time between
test trials was longer than that associated with use of the SSV, GVT
reassembly tests demonstrated that the GVT could be reconstructed in a
reasonable time between tests after being struck. However, the physical
reconstruction time is one of three considerations when determining the
time between tests when the GVT is used. After being reassembled and
secured to the top of the robotic platform, the platform must re-
establish its communication with the other equipment needed to perform
the tests, and a ``zero-offset'' check is used. This check not only
ensures the GVT orientation relative to the platform remains consistent
for all tests, but also confirms the distance from the SV to the GVT at
the point of impact is accurately reported as zero when the two first
make contact.
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\199\ Comparable observations were made upon review of test data
from the Agency's CIB characterization testing. Upon review of test
data from the Agency's CIB characterization testing, FCW and CIB
onset timings for identical vehicles were highly comparable
regardless of whether the SSV or GVT Revision G targets were used.
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NHTSA proposes to use the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future NCAP
testing. Similar to that noted earlier regarding the use of the
articulated pedestrian mannequins, the use of the GVT provides another
opportunity for NHTSA to harmonize with other consumer information
safety rating programs as mandated by the Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law. Comments are sought on its adoption regardless of whether
modifications are made to test speeds, deceleration, test scenarios,
combining test procedures, et cetera, as has been discussed.
The Agency also recognizes that there have been ongoing revisions
to the GVT to address its performance in other crash modes that
exercise different ADAS applications. At this time, NHTSA believes the
latest Revision G is appropriate for testing in NCAP. However, for the
purpose of AEB testing only, NHTSA is proposing to accept manufacturer
verification data for AEB tests conducted using GVT Revision F.\200\
\201\ It is the Agency's understanding that Revision G incorporates
changes to the front, side, and oblique aspects of Revision F.\202\
NHTSA believes that modifications implemented for Revision G have not
altered the physical characteristics of the rear of the target such
that a vehicle's performance in the rear-end crash mode would be
impacted. The Agency requests comment on:
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\200\ While the Agency used GVT Revision E in its comparative
testing with the SSV, and it believes that no significant
differences exist between Revision E and Revision F that would
affect AEB test results, the Agency does not believe it is necessary
to accept from vehicle manufacturers AEB test data that was derived
using Revision E because Revision E is no longer in production.
Therefore, the Agency believes that any OEM data that is submitted
should reflect the use of GVT Revision F or Revision G.
\201\ Although the Agency used GVT Revision E in its comparative
testing with the SSV, the Agency does not believe that modifications
made for Revision F would have changed the results of that testing.
It is the Agency's understanding that several modifications were
made to the rear of Revision E, which included adding additional
radar material to the bottom skirt of the target to attenuate
internal reflections, and reducing the slope of the rear top portion
of the hatchback to increase the power of the radar return.
\202\ To improve the real-world characteristics from the front
and side of the target, several changes to the radar treatment were
integrated into the components of the GVT body for Revision G
compared to Revision F, including changes to the skin and wheel
treatment. There were also some minor shape changes to the front of
the GVT body to improve front radar return and to the side to
improve the ability to hold its shape. http://www.dynres.com/2020/02/25/the-new-global-vehicle-target-gvt-has-arrived/.
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(49) The use of the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future AEB NCAP
testing,
(50) whether Revisions F and G should be considered equivalent for
AEB testing, and
(51) whether NHTSA should adopt a revision of the GVT other than
Revision G for use in AEB testing in NCAP.
[[Page 13492]]
With respect to Mercedes' request that NHTSA consider several
targets and allow manufacturers the option to choose which target is
used for testing, the Agency does not believe such an approach is
feasible. The Agency currently accepts and uses, for recommendation
purposes on www.NHTSA.gov, data submitted by vehicle manufacturers for
internal CIB and DBS testing that was conducted using a target other
than the SSV, such as the Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club e.V
(ADAC) target, which was previously used by Euro NCAP and IIHS.\203\
However, during its system performance verification testing, the Agency
has observed several test failures, which may be attributed to
differences in target designs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
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In NHTSA's November 2015 AEB final decision notice,\204\ NHTSA
stated that manufacturers do not need to use the SSV to generate and
submit self-reported test data in support of their AEB systems that
pass NCAP's system performance requirements and are recommended to
consumers on the Agency's website. However, if the vehicle does not
pass NCAP's system performance criteria for AEB systems during the
program's random system performance verification testing, the Agency
would remove the recommendation from its website. To uphold the
credibility of the program and reasonably assure that consumers are
receiving vehicles that meet a specified minimum performance threshold,
NHTSA believes that it is critical to accept self-reported data from
manufacturers that was obtained using tests conducted in accordance
with NHTSA test procedures. As such, NHTSA is proposing not to accept
vehicle manufacturer test data that was derived from an alternative
test target other than that which is specified in NCAP's test
procedures.
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\204\ 80 FR 68607 (Nov. 5, 2015).
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IV. ADAS Rating System
NHTSA is planning to create a rating system based on assessments
related to the performance of ADAS technologies, including, but not
necessarily limited to, the technologies already part of the program
and others proposed above. Currently, NCAP places a check mark by the
relevant ADAS technology on NHTSA's website, www.nhtsa.gov, if two
conditions are met: (1) A vehicle is equipped with the safety
technology recommended by NHTSA; and (2) the system meets NCAP's
performance specifications. Consumers are encouraged to look for
vehicles equipped with ADAS that meet NCAP's performance tests, which
are intended to establish a minimum level of performance on which
consumers can rely and compare among vehicles equipped with similar
technologies.
In the Agency's December 2015 notice, NHTSA discussed a series of
point values for the ADAS technologies at that time. These points would
have been used in a star rating system for these technologies. Vehicles
with ADAS that met the criteria set forth in the Agency's test
procedures would earn full points if offered as standard equipment on a
particular model and half points if offered only as optional equipment
for that model. In response to that proposal, commenters provided mixed
support regarding the feasibility and appropriateness of developing
such an ADAS rating system versus the current process of just
identifying the presence of recommended technologies with check
marks.\205\ Proponents of a rating system were generally supportive of
the broad concept of rating ADAS, but did not propose specific
suggestions for how the Agency could develop such a rating system. Some
commenters responded that ADAS technologies have not yet matured to the
point that a rating system would be appropriate, while others believed
that one could be developed. In the responses for the October 1, 2018
public meeting, support still varied, even when the discussion was more
focused on how the FAST Act mandate to provide crash avoidance
information on the Monroney label might be fulfilled in the context of
an ADAS rating system.
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\205\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119.
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A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers
As mentioned previously, NHTSA's current method of providing ADAS
information to consumers conveys which systems meet NCAP's system
performance requirements, but provides no overall ADAS technology
rating for the vehicle. However, as more emerging ADAS technologies are
available in the market, the Agency believes that a rating mechanism
for these systems would be more beneficial for consumers because it
could better distinguish the technologies, including different levels
of system performance and the technologies' life-saving potential,
rather than simply listing how many technologies a given vehicle is
equipped with that meet NCAP's system performance requirements. As will
be discussed in the sections that follow, ADAS ratings could be
communicated to consumers using stars, medals, points, or other means,
thereby allowing them to make better-informed decisions. Also, the
ratings could be based on the safety benefit potential afforded by
vehicles' ADAS technologies and system performance. In addition, NHTSA
plans to explore several approaches on how to present such rating
information in the Agency's planned consumer research. In this RFC,
NHTSA is soliciting input solely on the creation of an ADAS rating
system, not the visual representation or placement of that rating
system at points of sale. As described in greater detail below, issues
related to the visual representation and placement of the rating system
at points of sale will be a topic covered in future notices and
research.
1. Star Rating System
NCAP currently uses 1 to 5 stars to communicate vehicle
crashworthiness ratings to consumers, with both ratings for the
individual tests and an overall rating. Given the familiarity that
consumers have with NHTSA's current 5-star ratings system, the Agency
could also consider the use of stars for a future ADAS rating system.
However, the Agency has some reservations about pursuing such an
approach.
A future star-based ADAS rating system could produce lower ratings
for technologies than consumers are accustomed to seeing in
crashworthiness and rollover resistance tests, and may cause
unnecessary consumer confusion about the additional safety the
technology on their vehicle provides. For instance, although NHTSA
believes ADAS could potentially add significant safety benefits in
addition to the crashworthiness protection afforded on vehicles, the
Agency questions whether consumers would interpret 1- and 2-star ADAS
ratings as conveying added benefits beyond the crashworthiness
protection offered by a vehicle. In addition, vehicles that do not have
any ADAS ratings could mistakenly be interpreted to have an advantage
(i.e., additional safety benefits) over those that have low ADAS star
ratings. Thus, vehicles that have low ADAS star ratings could
inadvertently discourage consumers from considering ADAS in their
purchasing decisions, when in fact, those vehicles with 1- and 2-stars
may offer significant safety benefits over their unrated peers.
Given these concerns, the Agency could consider reserving star
ratings to convey crashworthiness results only and distinguish ADAS
ratings by using another visualization approach, such as a medals
system or points-based system.
[[Page 13493]]
2. Medals Rating System
Another potential method of presenting ADAS rating information to
consumers could be a three-tiered award system similar in concept to
Olympic medals. Presumably, most consumers are already familiar with
the designations of bronze, silver, and gold as increasingly more
prestigious levels of achievement.
Using an awards system (e.g., medals) rather than stars to
represent NCAP's rating of ADAS technologies would not only distinguish
ADAS grades from crashworthiness ratings, but also visually communicate
that the two ratings are conveying different types of vehicle safety
information. However, it could cause consumer confusion by having two
separate rating systems that consumers would need to consider and, to
the extent there is a divergence between the two systems, potentially
weigh against one another for a given vehicle.
3. Points-Based Rating System
NHTSA could use points to convey ADAS rating information. Points
could be used in lieu of stars or medals or in addition to these
alternative rating communication concepts, and they may serve as the
basis for any of the potential rating system approaches discussed in
the sections that follow. One advantage of a points-based system is
that it can provide improved delineation in ratings, thus benefiting
consumers who may want to compare ratings between several vehicle
models. However, the inherent granularity of a points-based system may
cause consumer confusion if conveyed in addition to another, coarser,
communication rating concept, such as stars or medals. As mentioned
previously, NHTSA plans to conduct consumer research surrounding the
concept of an overall NCAP rating that would combine results from
crashworthiness, rollover resistance, and ADAS technology testing.
4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
Another consideration for the Agency that may add value to an ADAS
rating system is the notion of conveying a vehicle's performance
relative to the baseline (or average) performance observed for today's
vehicle fleet. As detailed later in this notice, this concept is
currently an element of NCAP's crashworthiness rating system. Star
ratings generated in NCAP today are a measure of how much more (or
less) occupant protection (in terms of injury risk) a given vehicle
affords when compared to an ``average'' vehicle. The Agency could
consider incorporating the baseline concept when developing an ADAS
rating system as well. For instance, today's ``average'' vehicle may
achieve 60 out of a possible 100 points (or 3 out of 5 stars) during
NCAP's testing. This score (or rating) may translate to a 30 percent
reduction in the risk of crashes, injuries, deaths, etc. Scores (or
ratings) for future vehicles, which could also potentially be tied to a
percent reduction in crashes, could be compared relative to the
baseline rating of today's fleet, thus affording consumers the
opportunity to compare scores (or ratings) for vehicles spanning
different model years.
B. ADAS Rating System Concepts
Just as there are several ways to communicate ADAS ratings to
consumers, there are also several ways to rate ADAS technologies, a few
of which are discussed below. As each of these rating system concepts
center around vehicle performance in NCAP tests, it was necessary to
consider the primary components of these tests during concept
development.
1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
As discussed extensively in this notice, each ADAS technology and
associated test procedure the Agency is considering for inclusion in
NCAP has the potential to address a real-world safety problem. Each
test procedure is designed to replicate certain injurious and fatal
real-world events (termed ``scenarios'' in this new rating concept)
that can be approximated in a laboratory setting to assess the
capabilities of a given ADAS. Within each scenario, the Agency defines
test conditions to replicate types of real-world incidents. Within each
test condition, one or more test variants (as illustrated in Figures 1
and 2 below) that assess the limitations of each ADAS technology under
that test condition is also defined.\206\ Finally, for each test
variant, the technology would have to pass a certain number of trials
to receive credit for that part of the ADAS rating. Figure 1
illustrates a generic structure for describing a given ADAS test
procedure and its nomenclature in NCAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ In certain test conditions that do not have a multitude of
assessments (e.g., test condition variants), the test condition and
assessment would be one and the same.
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[[Page 13494]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.002
The above methodology and diagram can be illustrated further using
one of the ADAS technologies discussed in this document, PAEB. PAEB is
intended to address a real-world safety issue involving vulnerable road
users, like pedestrians. The current test procedure is designed to
replicate S1 and S4 scenarios (vehicle heading straight with a
pedestrian crossing the road, and a vehicle heading straight with a
pedestrian walking along or against traffic, respectively). Within each
scenario, one or more test conditions are defined. For example, within
the S1b test scenario (as previously discussed), several test condition
variants are defined. In this case, the same test condition would have
to be executed at various speeds (test condition variants). Finally,
NHTSA would prescribe the number of trials for which the system would
have to exhibit conformance to receive credit for these particular test
condition variants and, in turn, scenario. Figure 2 illustrates this
example.
[[Page 13495]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.003
To illustrate further the multitude of assessments simplified in
Figure 1, certain test scenarios only include one test condition and
one test variant. A specific example of this would be the previously
mentioned Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) scenario, evaluated as part of the
Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) test procedure, where the Subject Vehicle
(SV) encounters a stopped Principal Other Vehicle (POV) on a straight
road moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph). This example is illustrated in Figure
3.
[[Page 13496]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.004
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2. Percentage of Test Conditions To Meet--Concept 1
Given the test procedures' structure, an ADAS rating system could
be designed with standards of increasing stringency that must be
achieved to receive higher award levels (as shown in Table 7 below). In
such a system, different ADAS technologies, each with a related test
procedure (e.g., FCW, CIB, LKS), are combined into categories where
each technology addresses a similar crash problem. For instance, ADAS
Category 1 in Table 7 could represent the Forward Collision Prevention
category that would be comprised of the three forward collision
prevention technologies, FCW, CIB, and DBS. Vehicles would have to meet
increasing numbers of test conditions across all test procedures in
that particular ADAS category (i.e., three test procedures for the
example given) to achieve higher ratings (e.g., medals, stars, points).
For the example rating system concept shown in Table 7, 50 percent of
test conditions would have to be met to achieve a bronze award, 75
percent to achieve a silver award, and 100 percent to achieve a gold
award for each ADAS category.\207\ The lowest ADAS rating among the
categories could serve as the overall ADAS award if a summary rating is
established across all included ADAS technologies. Alternatively, an
overall ADAS award could reflect the average ADAS rating amongst the
technology categories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ When `Did not meet' is listed for an ADAS category, the
vehicle failed to pass the requirements for the test condition/
variant when tested. `Did not run' may be used to signify that the
vehicle is not equipped with the technology to pass the related test
procedure(s), and as such, the tests were not conducted.
Table 7--3-Tier ADAS Rating System Concept 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All test procedures & conditions in ADAS category
------------------------------------------------------------
Bronze (50% of Silver (75% of ADAS category
test conditions test conditions Gold (100% of test award
met) met) conditions met)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAS Category 1................. Meets............. Did not meet...... Did not run....... Bronze.
ADAS Category 2................. Meets............. Meets............. Meets............. Gold.
ADAS Category 3................. Meets............. Did not meet...... Did not run....... Bronze.
ADAS Category 4................. Meets............. Meets............. Did not meet...... Silver.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall ADAS Award.......... Bronze
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Select Test Conditions To Meet--Concept 2
Table 8 demonstrates another possible NCAP ADAS rating system
concept. As with Concept 1, ADAS technologies are grouped into
categories that address similar crash problems. Instead of having to
meet a percentage of all test conditions, NCAP could specifically
require certain test conditions to be met for each of three award
levels. These award levels could be based on the following increasingly
challenging delineations:
[[Page 13497]]
(1) Bronze (Basic performers)--test conditions that are achievable
for current systems to meet;
(2) Silver (Advanced performers)--test conditions that are more
difficult for current systems to meet but are more easily achievable
than the current known system limitations; and
(3) Gold (Highest performers)--test conditions that approach the
current limits of system testing feasibility, vehicle operations, and
event extremes.
Depending on a given technology's test procedure, the number of
test conditions, test condition variants, and trial passes necessary to
meet the Agency's requirements could vary. Thus, the ADAS performance
requirements necessary for reaching each subsequent award level could
be based on meeting a single test condition variant or meeting a number
of test conditions. To explain further in the context of Table 8, ADAS
Group 1 could be the Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) technology category,
where technology 1 could be LDW, and technology 2 could be LKS. In this
example, the vehicle's LDW system meets all applicable test conditions
(bronze, silver, gold). However, its LKS system fails to meet the test
conditions required for silver, but meets the test conditions to earn
bronze. Therefore, the highest award this vehicle could achieve for the
LKA category would be bronze, as it is the highest award achieved by
both of the technologies (LDW and LKS) included in the LKA category.
Similar to Concept 1, the lowest or average ADAS rating amongst the
category groups could serve as the overall ADAS award if a summary
rating is established across all included ADAS technologies.
Table 8--3-Tier ADAS Rating System Concept 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bronze test..... Silver test..... Gold test....... ADAS group award
conditions...... conditions...... conditions......
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAS Group 1................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Bronze.
Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... ................ Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... .............
Tech 2................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Did not meet.... Did not run..... .............
ADAS Group 2................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Gold.
Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... .............
Tech 2................... Meets........... ................ ................ Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... .............
ADAS Group 3................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Bronze.
Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Did not meet.... Did not run..... Did not run..... .............
ADAS Group 4................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Silver.
Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Did not meet.... .............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall ADAS Award... Bronze
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
A more detailed example of this ADAS rating system concept, which
uses some of the test conditions and test condition variants discussed
in this document (distinguished by variables such as speed), is shown
below in Table 9. In this example, check marks are used to indicate
that the vehicle's ADAS technology has met the requirements for a given
test procedure's conditions and test condition variants. An ``X''
symbol is used to indicate where vehicles did not meet the test
condition and/or variants, either because the vehicle was not equipped
with the technology and therefore could not be tested, or because the
vehicle's technology was tested, but failed to meet the test procedure
requirements. Units are in kph unless otherwise noted.
To further explain the three-tier rating system illustrated in
Table 9 with context, ADAS Group 3 in the example utilizes Blind Spot
Detection (BSD) to demonstrate multiple test conditions and test
condition variants. BSW (categorized as Technology 1 for the BSD
grouping) has five test condition variants, and BSI (categorized as
Technology 2 for the BSD grouping) includes three test condition
variants. In order for BSD to achieve a bronze award in this example,
the BSW system must meet the three test condition variants included for
this technology under the `Bronze Test Conditions/Variants' heading. No
BSI test conditions, or test condition variants, must be met. In order
for BSD to achieve a silver award, BSW must meet two test conditions
(comprised of five test condition variants) and BSI must meet two test
conditions, both of which are included under the `Silver Test
Conditions/Variants' heading. If the vehicle was also able to meet the
third test condition included in the BSI test procedure, `SV Lane
Change w/Closing Headway 72.4/80.5', which is included under the `Gold
Test Conditions/Variants' heading in Table 9, the vehicle would earn a
gold award. In the Table 9 example, however, BSI does not meet one of
the silver test conditions/variants (`SV Lane Change w/Constant Headway
72.4/72.4'). Consequently, in this example, BSD achieves the next
lowest award--bronze.
[[Page 13498]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.005
[[Page 13499]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.006
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[[Page 13500]]
The approach presented in Tables 8 and 9 would address the Agency's
desire to introduce a dynamic ADAS rating system. As technologies
become more mature, the Agency expects ADAS system performances will
begin to exceed NCAP testing requirements, and as such, systems will
have an easier time meeting the required test conditions across all
test procedures. The Agency could begin providing information on higher
performing systems by periodically increasing the stringency of
requirements to achieve the highest NCAP ratings. Lower award levels
could be reserved for test conditions that are easily achieved by ADAS
in the current vehicle fleet. Higher award levels could be reserved for
test conditions that current ADAS have difficulty achieving, or for new
test scenarios (e.g., PAEB S2 or S3), conditions (e.g., using a
motorcycle or cyclist as the POV), or variants (e.g., increased SV/POV
speeds, decreased headways, additional weather conditions, varying
deceleration rates) that are added to the program over time. This
approach is expected to continue to provide consumers information on
vehicle safety designs that introduce truly exceptional ADAS
performance compared to their peers. It should also incentivize vehicle
manufacturers to improve their ADAS capabilities to meet consumers'
expectations for system performance.
Along these lines, NHTSA could also introduce a slight deviation to
rating system Concept 2. In this deviation, not only would vehicles
have to meet the most demanding requirements across all ADAS test
procedures to receive higher ratings, but also the Agency could set the
performance target for the highest level rating (gold, 5 stars, maximum
points, etc.) for those test conditions that are required for an ADAS
technology that is just emerging in the marketplace, such as
Intersection Safety Assist (ISA), mentioned later in this notice. In
doing so, consumers could be assured that purchasing a vehicle that
earns the highest award level would offer the most advanced ADAS
capabilities available at that time.
4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
The Agency believes it is important to develop an ADAS rating
system that is not only flexible (i.e., one that can adapt or change
over time) to keep pace with advancements in technologies, but also
effective in providing consumer information that encourages the
proliferation of life-saving technology. As such, a third rating system
concept that the Agency could consider would be one which weights the
technology groups based on the target population data and effectiveness
attributable to each technology to derive the overall ADAS award. In
essence, the more critical, more lifesaving, and/or more advanced/
effective technology systems would have more contribution (i.e., be
worth more) in the rating system. Furthermore, for a given technology
group, the Agency could weight the test conditions that approximate
more frequent or injurious real-world events so that they have more
influence in the rating for that group. The selected evaluation method
could be normalized in such a way that the results of each test
condition within a scenario could be appropriately combined and
concisely presented for consumer information or ratings purposes. Such
an approach could also be incorporated for either Concept 1 or Concept
2, discussed above.
Utilizing real-world data to inform the structure of a future ADAS
rating system is challenging for several reasons. For one, there is no
single metric (such as target crash populations, fatalities, or
injuries) that can be used to weight every technology appropriately in
a rating system when both the related real-world safety problem and
meaningful influence are considered. In an effort to correlate rating
system weights directly with potential real-world safety benefits, too
little weight may be assigned to technologies that have lower target
populations (such as those for Blind Spot Detection) compared to
technologies that have much higher target populations (such as those
for Forward Collision Prevention). Thus, the Agency is concerned that
it may be possible for manufacturers to offer one or two ADAS systems
that perform well in the NCAP tests, if those technologies with higher
target populations are apportioned significant weight in a rating
system, while choosing not to include the other, lower-weighted
technologies on their vehicles, or opting to include them even if the
systems perform poorly. Therefore, the Agency believes that it is
critical to find an acceptable balance between weights dictated solely
by real-world data and those that ensure each component provides a
meaningful contribution to the rating system. In essence, each
technology should be apportioned within the rating system such that it
provides a significant contribution while also reflecting the relative
safety improvement that each technology may afford consumers.
Changes in target population data (based on real-world crashes) and
improvements made to ADAS technologies over time pose additional
challenges for the Agency in using real-word data and system
effectiveness estimates to inform appropriate weights or proportions to
assign to the individual test conditions or the corresponding test
condition variants in an ADAS rating system.\208\ As technology systems
improve to meet NCAP test scenarios/conditions, system effectiveness
estimates may increase. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this
notice, the real-world crash data may change as technologies are
designed to address certain crash scenarios, but not others. Ideally,
the Agency would adjust rating system weights to keep pace with these
changes, as this would align with NHTSA's goal of developing a flexible
ADAS rating system that can respond appropriately to improvements or
changes seen for the fleet. Unfortunately, real-world data for system
performance advancements is not always readily available to support
dynamic program upgrades, as the crash data, which takes time to
reflect changes in the vehicle fleet accurately, lags system updates
and deployments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having said that, the Agency sees merit in using available real-
world data, specifically target populations, to determine which ADAS
technologies should be considered for inclusion in the program. The
additional time between technology development and NHTSA's ability to
collect real-world data on target populations has proven in the past to
be sufficient to ensure that the technology is mature prior to
considering it in NCAP. As mentioned previously, the four ADAS
technologies discussed in this proposal focus on the most frequently
occurring and/or most severe crash types, which the Agency believes is
a feasible and prudent approach to use when considering whether an ADAS
technology should be incorporated into NCAP. NHTSA will continue to
leverage all information and safety studies on ADAS technologies, such
as those cited in this notice, to support the Agency's proposal. In
addition, NHTSA plans to leverage all available data to assess real-
world insights into advanced safety technology performance.
5. Overall Rating
As discussed herein, there are many considerations when developing
a potential ADAS rating system. These include: (1) What type of system
to
[[Page 13501]]
adopt; (2) whether to use points, medals, or awards to convey ratings;
and (3) whether to weight system components based on real-world data.
Another consideration is whether to have an overall rating. Although
the concepts discussed thus far have included an overall rating, NHTSA
could also simply list individual ratings for the included ADAS
technologies, but not adopt an overall rating. NHTSA believes that
consumers may have preferences as to which specific ADAS technologies
they would or would not want on their vehicles and may be interested
only in how those individual technologies perform in the Agency's
testing, not in how the vehicle systems perform overall. The Agency
notes that the assignment of ratings for individual technologies could
simply supplement the NCAP program's existing list approach, or
individual technology ratings could be listed concurrently with an
overall rating. Thus, the Agency requests comment on whether an overall
rating system is necessary and, if so, whether it should replace or
simply supplement the existing list approach.
With regard to a future ADAS rating system, the Agency seeks
comments on the following:
(52) The components and development of a full-scale ADAS rating
system,
(53) the aforementioned approaches as well as others deemed
appropriate for the development of a future ADAS rating system in order
to assist the Agency in developing future proposals,
(54) the appropriateness of using target populations and technology
effectiveness estimates to determine weights or proportions to assign
to individual test conditions, corresponding test combinations, or an
overall ADAS award,
(55) the use of a baseline concept to convey ADAS scores/ratings,
(56) how best to translate points/ratings earned during ADAS
testing conducted under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, injuries,
deaths, etc., including which real-world data metric would be most
appropriate,
(57) whether an overall rating system is necessary and, if so,
whether it should replace or simply supplement the existing list
approach, and
(58) effective communication of ADAS ratings, including the
appropriateness of using a points-based ADAS rating system in lieu of,
or in addition to, a star rating system.
In responding to these approaches, or in developing new approaches
for consideration, NHTSA requests that commenters consider a potential
ADAS rating system that would allow flexibilities for continuous
improvements to the program and cross-model year comparisons. In this
notice, the Agency is seeking feedback on the appropriateness of the
test scenarios, test conditions, test condition variants, and number of
trials within each test variant for the four proposed technologies
(PAEB, LKS, BSW, and BSI) discussed in this RFC, in addition to the
four technologies currently included in NCAP. After NHTSA reviews
comments in response to this notice, particularly those in response to
questions raised within each of the ADAS technology sections and the
rating system concepts discussed herein, the Agency anticipates
finalizing the related test procedures and would then develop the
selected ADAS rating system based on the technologies, test scenarios,
test conditions, etc. that have support for incorporation into the
program. Until NHTSA issues (1) a final decision notice announcing the
new ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating
section of the vehicle window sticker (Monroney label), the Agency
plans to continue assigning NCAP credit, using check marks on
www.nhtsa.gov, to vehicles that (1) are equipped with its recommended
ADAS technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system performance test
requirements.
V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)
The third part to this notice relates to the Fixing America's
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which includes a section that
requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to ensure crash avoidance
information is displayed along with crashworthiness information on
window stickers (also known as Monroney labels) placed on motor
vehicles by their manufacturers.\209\ At the time of the FAST Act,
NHTSA was already in the process of developing an RFC notice to present
many proposed updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of several new
ADAS and a corresponding update of the Monroney label.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the
``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA currently requires vehicle manufacturers to include safety
rating information, obtained from NHTSA under its NCAP program, on the
Monroney labels of all new light vehicles manufactured on or after
September 1, 2007 (49 CFR part 575). This requirement was mandated by
Section 10307 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act; A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). The purpose
of the law is to ensure that vehicle manufacturers provide consumers
with relevant vehicle safety ratings information on all new light
vehicles at the point of sale so that they can make informed purchasing
decisions.
Although the safety rating information included on the Monroney
label has provided consumers with valuable information at the point of
sale, there are limitations with the current label for NCAP. For
instance, currently the vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney
label only includes vehicle performance information for the
crashworthiness program in NCAP (known as the 5-star safety ratings),
which is comprised of a full-frontal impact test, a side impact barrier
test, a side impact pole test, a static measurement of the vehicle's
stability factor, and a dynamic assessment of the vehicle's risk to
rollover in a single-vehicle crash. The other consumer information
program in NCAP, which is the ADAS technologies assessment, is not
included in the current vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney
label. This information is only available on www.nhtsa.gov, along with
the 5-star safety ratings information.\210\
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\210\ 49 CFR part 575, Section 302, ``Vehicle labeling of safety
rating information (compliance required for model year 2012 and
later vehicles manufactured on or after January 31, 2012),''
specifies that the safety ratings information landscape should be at
least 4.5 in. wide and 3.5 in. tall or cover at least 8 percent of
the total area of the Monroney label--whichever is larger.
Currently, any change that requires modification of the safety
rating information presented on the Monroney label would require a
notice and comment rulemaking action pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, NHTSA plans to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
in 2023 to include ADAS performance information from NCAP in the
vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney label, as mandated by the
FAST Act. However, NHTSA seeks a flexible means to keep pace with the
technological advancement and the frequent development of new ADAS
technologies while also providing adequate public participation and
transparency. NHTSA would like to develop a way to allow the Agency
both to convey NCAP vehicle safety information in the safety rating
section of the Monroney label and minimize the number of rulemaking
actions needed each time the Agency incorporates a new technology in
NCAP.
At this time, NHTSA believes it may be able to achieve these goals
by adopting all or some combination of the following three main
categories for the
[[Page 13502]]
safety rating section of the Monroney label: (1) Crash protection
information--which would be comprised of a rating (possibly one which
maintains the Agency's 5-star ratings brand) that is tied to a
vehicle's performance in NCAP crashworthiness and rollover testing; (2)
safety technology information--which could be comprised of a rating
(possibly one that uses the Agency's 5-star ratings brand, a three-tier
medal award system, or points) that is tied to a vehicle's ability to
avoid a crash based on its performance in ADAS testing conducted by
NCAP; and (3) overall vehicle safety performance information--which
could give recognition to vehicles that are top performers in both the
crash protection and safety technology information categories for a
given model year.
NHTSA believes that efforts to develop a label that incorporates
these three main overarching categories--crash protection information,
safety technology information, and overall vehicle safety performance
information--should also strive to reduce the need to update the
Monroney label by way of rulemaking when future changes are made to the
NCAP program.
NHTSA intends to develop potential label changes by conducting
consumer research. In the past, NCAP has benefitted from research on
the illustration of NCAP vehicle safety information in the safety
rating section of the Monroney label. NHTSA plans to conduct
qualitative and quantitative consumer market research to: (1) Evaluate
the overall appeal of the safety rating label concept mentioned above
and identify specific likes and dislikes associated with each of the
three main categories on the label; (2) measure the ease of
comprehension for the safety rating label concept and understand which
visual and text features are most effective at conveying vehicle safety
information; (3) assess the distinctiveness of how the information is
displayed and understand how best to make the vehicle safety
information stand out on the Monroney label; and (4) identify
additional areas of improvement related to the three potential main
label categories relating to crash protection information, safety
technology information, and overall vehicle performance
information.\211\ NHTSA plans to use the results of this research to
determine how best to convey safety rating information to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ NHTSA published a notice on April 28, 2020, seeking public
comment on the information collection aspect of the consumer market
research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
The fourth part to this notice discusses, for the first time in
NCAP, a roadmap that sets forth NHTSA's plans for upgrading NCAP over
the next several years. As mentioned at the beginning of this notice,
the Agency's efforts outlined herein include both NHTSA's near- and
long-term strategies for upgrading NCAP.
Fulfillment of the roadmap will involve NHTSA's issuing planned
proposed upgrades in phases as vehicle safety-related systems and
technologies mature and data about their use and efficacy become known.
The systems and technologies would include new vehicle-based
crashworthiness and crash avoidance systems as well as systems-based
improvements, such as occupant restraints and headlamp system
performance upgrades. NHTSA would issue a final decision document
following an RFC that responds to comments and provides appropriate
lead time. This phased process allows stakeholders to provide data and
views on proposed program updates, and allows NHTSA more flexibility to
pursue program updates quicker.
Since 2015, NHTSA has worked to finalize its research on pedestrian
crash protection (head, and upper and lower leg impact tests), advanced
anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side
impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover
risk curve. NHTSA has included these initiatives in the mid-term
component of the 10-year roadmap because the Agency reasonably believes
they would meet the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.\212\
Initiatives in the mid-term component of the 10-year roadmap identify
and prioritize safety opportunities and technologies that are practical
and for which objective tests and criteria, and other consumer data
exist.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ The four requisites are: (1) The technology addresses a
safety need; (2) system designs exist that can mitigate the safety
problem; (3) the technology provides the potential for safety
benefits; and (4) a performance-based objective test procedure
exists that can assess system performance.
\213\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the items in the roadmap discussed below, NHTSA is
taking an unprecedented step to consider expanding NCAP to include
safety technologies that may have the potential to help drivers make
safe driving choices, as discussed in the next section. This aspect of
NCAP would focus on the relationship between technology and behavioral
safety, and would provide comparative information on devices that can
shift driver behavior that contribute to crashes (e.g., speeding, and
drowsy-, impaired- and distracted-driving). Initiatives on these
technologies could be woven into both the first and second half (i.e.,
long-term portion) of the 10-year roadmap, depending on whether the
technologies and objective tests and criteria are sufficiently
developed to meet NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
Initiatives in the long-term component of the roadmap include an
identification of any safety opportunity or technology not included in
the mid-term component for a variety of reasons, and those initiatives
that would most benefit from stakeholder input and comments from the
public. The Agency believes the plans outlined below would fulfill the
requirements set forth in Section 24213 of the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law for the 10-year New Car Assessment Program roadmap
once this RFC is finalized.
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law requires that NHTSA establish a
roadmap for the implementation of NCAP not later than one year after
the law's enactment.\214\ This roadmap must cover a term of ten years,
consisting of a mid-term component and a long-term component.\215\ This
roadmap aligns with relevant Agency priorities, performance plans,
agendas, and any other relevant NHTSA plans.\216\
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\214\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(b).
\215\ Id.
\216\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the contents of the roadmap must include a plan for
any changes for NCAP, which includes descriptions of actions to be
carried out and shall, as applicable, incorporate objective criteria
for evaluating safety technologies and reasonable time periods for
changes to NCAP that include new or updated tests.\217\ NHTSA has long-
established criteria for evaluating safety technologies for inclusion
in NCAP, which is discussed in detail earlier in this notice and in
several previous notices. NHTSA also uses the notice and comment period
to ensure the time periods for changes to NCAP are reasonable, and the
Agency expects this practice to continue. As part of the Agency's
development of next steps for NCAP, NHTSA regularly evaluates other
rating systems within the United States and abroad, including whether
there are safety benefits of consistency with those other rating
[[Page 13503]]
systems.\218\ There are other benefits for being consistent, but safety
is NHTSA's, and thus, NCAP's, top priority.
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\217\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(1)(A).
\218\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, the roadmap shall include key milestones, including the
anticipated start of an action, completion of an action, and effective
date of an update.\219\ While NHTSA can reasonably anticipate when the
start of actions may occur in the mid-term portion of the roadmap, many
technologies in the long-term portion of the roadmap will require
additional research, test procedure development, product development
and maturity, and a number of other factors that prevent the Agency
from providing more detail on the anticipated start of an action. As
such, NHTSA can only provide the estimated start date of 2025-2031.
Completion of action is highly dependent upon the notice and comment
process, and the effective date would be highly dependent on the
completion of an action. Completion dates are dependent on the number
and depth of the comments received in response to an RFC, along with
the technical research necessary to resolve any challenging issues in
the comments. Effective dates are dependent on completion dates. As
such, NHTSA cannot reasonably anticipate those timelines in advance.
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\219\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(1)(B).
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The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also requires that the mid-term
portion of the roadmap identify and prioritize safety opportunities and
technologies that are practical and for which objective rating tests,
evaluation criteria, and other consumer data exist.\220\ In the mid-
term portion of the roadmap, NHTSA has included only those technologies
that are practical and that otherwise meet the requirements in the law.
With respect to the long-term portion of the roadmap, NHTSA must
identify and prioritize safety opportunities and technologies that
exist or are in development.\221\ NHTSA has met both of these
requirements in the following sections, prioritizing safety
opportunities and technologies that are practical and for which
objective rating tests, evaluation criteria, and other consumer data
exist in the mid-term portion, and identifying safety opportunities and
technologies that exist or are in development in the long-term portion.
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\220\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(2)(A).
\221\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(2)(B).
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Any safety opportunity or technology not included in this roadmap
was omitted because NHTSA is not considering inclusion in NCAP at this
time.\222\ In the next five years, addition of other technologies or
opportunities to the roadmap would be subject to NHTSA's four
prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP, the requirements of the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law for inclusion in any part of the roadmap, and the
appropriateness of the technology or opportunity for a consumer
information program.
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\222\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
32310(c)(3).
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Per Sec. 24213(c), NHTSA must request comment on the roadmap and
review and incorporate these comments, as appropriate.\223\ This RFC
requests comments from the public on the roadmap. NHTSA considers the
notice and comment process to be the primary form of stakeholder
engagement, though the Agency reserves the right to conduct other forms
of engagement to ensure that input received represents a diversity of
technical background and viewpoints.\224\ With regard to a roadmap,
NHTSA requests feedback on the following:
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\223\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(e).
\224\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(d).
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(59) Identification of safety opportunities or technologies in
development that could be included in future roadmaps,
(60) opportunities to benefit from collaboration or harmonization
with other rating programs, and
(61) other issues to assist with long-term planning.
2021-2022 Timeframe
As discussed in detail in this notice, NHTSA proposes to
add four new ADAS technologies (LKS, BSD, BSI, and PAEB) in NCAP.
In addition to improving the safety and protection of
motor vehicle occupants, NHTSA continues its efforts and focus to
improve the safety of pedestrians and vulnerable road users. NHTSA
plans to propose a crashworthiness pedestrian protection testing
program in NCAP in 2022. The pedestrian protection program would
incorporate three crashworthiness tests (i.e., head-to-hood, upper leg-
to-hood leading edge, and lower leg-to-bumper) discussed in the
December 2015 RFC.\225\ A crashworthiness pedestrian protection testing
program would measure how well passenger cars, trucks, and sport
utility vehicles protect pedestrians in the event of a crash. The
program would further complement the safety achieved by pedestrian
automatic emergency braking by measuring the safety performance of new
vehicles to pedestrian impacts and encouraging safer vehicle designs
for pedestrians.
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\225\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pp. 78547-78550.
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2022-2023 Timeframe
NHTSA plans to propose using the THOR-50M in NCAP's full
frontal impact tests and the WorldSID-50M in the program's side impact
barrier and side impact pole tests soon after work commences to add the
dummies to 49 CFR part 572 and FMVSSs.\226\ The Agency would inform the
public (in request for comment notices) how these crash test dummies
would be utilized in various NCAP test modes.
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\226\ NHTSA included new rulemakings in the Spring 2020
Regulatory Agenda that would adopt the THOR-50M and WorldSID-50M
into NHTSA's regulation for anthropomorphic test devices, 49 CFR
part 572 (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM20 and https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM22, respectively). NHTSA also included
rulemakings that would adopt use of the THOR-50M and WorldSID-50M at
the manufacturers' option in NHTSA compliance tests for FMVSS No.
208, ``Occupant crash protection,'' (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN
2127-AM21) and FMVSS No. 214, ``Side impact protection,'' (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM23), respectively.
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In the December 2015 notice, NHTSA announced it would like
to include a frontal oblique crash test in NCAP.\227\ In response to
that notice, commenters requested that the Agency provide the public
with additional information on the target population as well as costs
and benefits. They also argued that countermeasure studies have not
been completed and questioned the repeatability and reproducibility of
both the test procedure and the oblique moving deformable barrier.
NHTSA has continued its frontal oblique research and kept the public
informed of its findings.\228\ A cornerstone of the procedure is the
use of THOR-50M dummies in the driver and right front passenger
positions. NHTSA plans to determine in 2022 whether this new crash test
mode is appropriate for inclusion in an FMVSS and/or NCAP. If
[[Page 13504]]
a determination is made to include the test in NCAP, the notice and
comment process would follow soon thereafter.
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\227\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pages 78530 through 78531;
https://one.nhtsa.gov/Research/Crashworthiness/Small%20Overlap%20and%20Oblique%20Testing.
\228\ See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for
document Repeatability and Reproducibility of Oblique Moving
Deformable Barrier Test Procedure (Saunders 2018); Saunders, J. and
Parent, D., ``Repeatability and Reproducibility of Oblique Moving
Deformable Barrier Test Procedure,'' SAE Technical Paper 2018-01-
1055, 2018, doi:10.4271/2018-01-1055; https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/41934 Structural Countermeasure Research Program; https://www.nhtsa.gov/crash-simulation-vehicle-models Vehicle Interior and
Restraint Modeling and Structural Countermeasure Research Program
sections.
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NHTSA will consider incorporating several additional
advanced crash avoidance technologies including lighting systems for
improved nighttime pedestrian visibility into NCAP in the near future,
and will be announcing next steps during this timeframe. These include:
(1) Adaptive driving beam headlights; (2) upgraded lower beam
headlighting; (3) semiautomatic headlamp beam-switching; and (4) rear
automatic braking for pedestrian protection.
2023-2024 Timeframe
A multi-year consumer research effort is underway to
modernize the vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney label. Once
the consumer research is complete, the Agency plans to begin a
rulemaking action in 2023 to update the Monroney label with a new
labeling concept.
Also in 2023, NHTSA plans to commence revising its 5-star
safety ratings system. The Agency has sought comment on several
approaches to provide consumers with vehicle safety ratings that
provide more meaningful safety information and discriminate performance
of vehicles among the fleet. NHTSA discusses this issue in detail in a
section below.
2025-2031 Timeframe
In NHTSA's long-term component of the roadmap, NHTSA includes a
variety of technologies and foci that attempt to overcome many safety
challenges for which the technologies available may not be as mature or
may warrant additional study from NHTSA. NHTSA is seeking stakeholder
input on the appropriateness of each of these technologies for the
program and whether commenters believe that these technologies will
meet the program's four prerequisites within the next 5- or 10-year
time frame.
NHTSA will be further assessing and developing tests for the
following crash avoidance technologies: (1) Intersection safety assist;
(2) opposing traffic safety assist; and (3) automatic emergency braking
for all vulnerable road users (including bicyclists and motorcyclists)
in all major crash scenarios including when the vehicle is turning left
or right. NHTSA will also be assessing the effectiveness of systems
that are or will become available in the fleet. The Agency hopes that
information will be available that would support a proposal in 2025 or
beyond to include these three technologies in NCAP.
Based on comments received from stakeholders, if a technology
development is mature and the available data in the next several years
meet the Agency's four prerequisites, NHTSA would issue a proposal for
inclusion in NCAP during the five-year mid-term timeline.
VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
NCAP has traditionally focused on crashworthiness technologies that
protect the vehicle occupants in the event of a collision. The more
advanced ADAS technologies that are the focus of this notice take the
next step and provide technologies that can assist drivers, or in
certain cases correct drivers' action in ways that can avoid or
mitigate crashes. NHTSA has also begun to consider ways NCAP could be
used to encourage technologies that protect road users other than the
vehicles occupants, such as pedestrians and pedalcyclists.
As beneficial as these technologies may be, NHTSA recognizes that
risky driving behaviors and poor driver choices continue to amplify
crash, injury, and fatality risks on our roadways. Accordingly, NHTSA
is interested in safety technologies that have the ability to address
the prevalent driver behaviors that contribute to roadway fatalities.
For example, there are several available and emerging safety
technologies that have the potential to address speeding and drowsy-,
impaired-, distracted-, and unbelted-driving, thereby reducing the risk
of crashes that lead to injury or death, which are the subjects of
analysis, research, and examination.
NHTSA is exploring opportunities to encourage the development and
deployment of these technologies. While more must be known about the
effectiveness and consumer acceptance of these systems, NHTSA strongly
believes that these technologies will mature and show efficacy. In the
nearer term, then, the Agency sees potential in highlighting vehicles
equipped with these technologies on its website, and possibly
elsewhere, to improve public awareness, and encourage vehicle
manufacturer development and adoption. NHTSA will conduct research to
develop objective test procedures and criteria to evaluate the
performance and effectiveness of these technologies. Initiatives on
these technologies would be woven into both the first and second half
(i.e., long-term portion) of the 10-year roadmap, depending on whether
the technologies and objective tests and criteria are sufficiently
developed to meet NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
A. Driver Monitoring Systems
Driver monitoring systems use a variety of sensors and software to
detect and/or infer driver state based on estimation approaches. For
example, certain types of driver monitoring systems have shown promise
in detecting the state of a driver's drowsiness.\229\ As vehicle
technologies have evolved, driver monitoring systems have been more
commonly introduced and applied to various driver states, particularly
as one of the countermeasures against potential misuse of ADAS.
Currently, there are varied approaches to driver monitoring across
vehicle and equipment manufacturers.
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\229\ Brown, T., Lee, J., Schwarz, C., Fiorentino, D., McDonald,
A., Traube, E., Nadler, E. (2013). Detection of Driver Impairment
from Drowsiness. 23rd Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference, Seoul,
Republic of Korea. May 2013. Paper Number 13-0346.
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NHTSA is considering adding driver monitoring systems as an NCAP
technology to encourage further deployment of effective driver
monitoring systems into vehicles. NHTSA seeks comment on the following
to help the Agency determine whether to implement driver monitoring
systems in NCAP:
(62) What are the capabilities of the various available approaches
to driver monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel sensors, eye
tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer different driver state
measurement or estimations (e.g., visual attention, drowsiness, medical
incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated confidence or reliability in
detecting or inferring such driver states and what supporting data
exist?
(63) Of further interest are the types of system actions taken
based on a driver monitoring system's estimate of a driver's state.
What are the types and modes of associated warnings, interventions, and
other mitigation strategies that are most effective for different
driver states or impairments (e.g., drowsy, medical, distraction)? What
research data exist that substantiate effectiveness of these
interventions?
(64) Are there relevant thresholds and strategies for performance
(e.g., alert versus some degree of intervention) that would warrant
some type of NCAP credit?
(65) Since different driver states (e.g., visual distraction and
intoxication) can result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide
within-lane position variability), comments regarding opportunities and
[[Page 13505]]
tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when the originating cause is not
conclusive are of specific interest.
(66) What types of consumer acceptance information (e.g., consumer
interest or feedback data) are available or are foreseen for
implementation of different types of driver monitoring systems and
associated mitigation strategies for driver impairment, drowsiness, or
visual inattention? Are there privacy concerns? What are the related
privacy protection strategies? Are there use or preference data on a
selectable feature that could be optionally enabled by consumers (e.g.,
for teen drivers by their parents)?
B. Driver Distraction
According to NHTSA's statistics, driver distraction resulted in at
least 3,000 known deaths in 2019.\230\ Often discussions regarding
distracted driving center around cell phone use and texting, but
distracted driving also includes other activities such adjusting the
radio or climate controls or accessing other in-vehicle systems. In-
vehicle devices and Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI) can be strategically
designed to avoid or limit opportunities for driver distraction.\231\
Easy access to manual controls in traditional or expected locations can
minimize the amount of time a driver's eyes are off the road and hands
are off the steering wheel, as well as the time needed for the driver
to activate the control quickly in time-critical traffic conflict
scenarios (e.g., a driver reaches to activate the horn button in a
crash-imminent situation, but finds that the control of horn activation
is not in the expected, typical location).
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\230\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2020,
December). Overview of Motor Vehicle Crashes in 2019. (Traffic
Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 813 060). Washington, DC: National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
\231\ In 2013, NHTSA published ``Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver
Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices.'' These
voluntary guidelines apply to original equipment in-vehicle
electronic devices used by the driver to perform secondary tasks
(communications, entertainment, information gathering, navigation
tasks, etc. are considered secondary tasks) through visual-manual
means. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/04/26/2013-09883/visual-manual-nhtsa-driver-distraction-guidelines-for-in-vehicle-electronic-devices.
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NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
(67) What in-vehicle and HMI design characteristics would be most
helpful to include in an NCAP rating that focuses on ease of use? What
research data exist to support objectively characterizing ease of use
for vehicle controls and displays?
(68) What are specific countermeasures or approaches to mitigate
driver distraction, and what are the associated effectiveness metrics
that may be feasible and appropriate for inclusion in the NCAP program?
Methods may include driver monitoring and action strategies, HMI design
considerations, expanded in-motion secondary task lockouts, phone
application/notification limitations while paired with the vehicle,
etc.
(69) What distraction mitigation measures could be considered for
NCAP credit?
C. Alcohol Detection
Alcohol-impaired driving continues to be a pervasive contributing
factor to roadway fatalities, with over 10,000 deaths in the U.S. in
2019.\232\ NHTSA has explored many ways in which alcohol-impaired
driving risks can be effectively mitigated both through vehicle
technologies and strategic public outreach and enforcement.\233\ In
2020, NHTSA published a Request for Information notice seeking input on
Impaired Driving Technologies in the Federal Register.\234\
Specifically, the notice requested information on available or late
stage technology under development for impaired driving detection and
mitigation. A total of 12 comments were received.\235\ Comments were
submitted about emerging technologies that can directly measure
impairment though blood alcohol concentration at the beginning of a
trip as well as technologies that infer alcohol impairment through a
combination of driver monitoring and other vehicle sensors tracking
during the course of a trip.
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\232\ Ibid.
\233\ NHTSA has researched the Driver Alcohol Detection System
for Safety (DADSS) program.
\234\ 85 FR 71987 (November 12, 2020).
\235\ https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2020-0102-0001/comment.
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NHTSA seeks comment on the following aspects of alcohol detection
systems:
(70) Are there opportunities for including alcohol-impairment
technology in NCAP? What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests could
be considered? Could voluntary deployment or adoption be positively
influenced through NCAP credit?
(71) How can NCAP procedures be described in objective terms that
could be inclusive of various approaches, such as detection systems and
inference systems? Are there particular challenges with any approach
that may need special considerations? What supporting research data
exist that document relevant performance factors such as sensing
accuracy and detection algorithm efficacy?
(72) When a system detects alcohol-impairment during the course of
a trip, what actions could the system take in a safe manner? What are
the safety considerations related to various options that manufacturers
may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, performing a safe stop,
pulling over, or flasher activation)? How should various actions be
considered for NCAP credit?
(73) What is known related to consumer acceptance of alcohol-
impaired driving detection and mitigation functions, and how may that
differ with respect to direct measurement approaches versus estimation
techniques using a driver monitoring system? What consumer interest or
feedback data exist relating to this topic? Are there privacy concerns
or privacy protection strategies with various approaches? What are the
related privacy protection strategies?
D. Seat Belt Interlocks
Seat belt use in passenger vehicles saved an estimated 14,955 lives
in 2017.\236\ The national seat belt use rate in the United States was
90.7 percent in 2019.\237\ Among the 22,215 passenger vehicle occupants
killed in 2019, almost half (47 percent) were unrestrained. For those
passenger vehicle occupants who survived crashes where someone else
died, only 14 percent were unrestrained compared to 47 percent of those
who died.\238\ \239\
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\236\ DOT HS 812 683. Latest agency estimate available.
\237\ DOT HS 812 875.
\238\ DOT HS 813 060.
\239\ Based on known restraint use. Restraint use was unknown
for 8.7 percent of passenger vehicle occupant fatalities in 2019.
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Currently, NHTSA uses an array of countermeasures, including the
Click It or Ticket campaign and State primary enforcement laws, to
encourage seat belt use. The Agency requires seat belt reminders for
the driver's seat.\240\ As of the 2018 model year, about 95 percent of
vehicles voluntarily offer front passenger warnings. NHTSA also informs
consumers searching for vehicle ratings on www.NHTSA.gov as to the
availability of optional front passenger and rear seat belt reminder
systems, which typically provide a visual and auditory warning to the
driver at the onset of a trip and if a passenger unbuckles during a
trip.
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\240\ 49 CFR 571.208.
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Methods for detecting seat belt misuse have advanced in recent
years. A 2018 NHTSA report, ``Performance Assessment of Prototype Seat
Belt Misuse Detection System,'' showed that
[[Page 13506]]
the system correctly identified seat belt misuse in 95 percent of
trials on average across multiple common seat belt misuse
scenarios.\241\ This type of seat belt misuse or non-use detection
could be coupled with various types of seat belt interlock systems to
encourage seat belt use. Although NHTSA is not aware of any such system
being currently in production, various prototype systems have been
developed by manufacturers.\242\ These systems could include
transmission interlock, ignition interlock, and entertainment system
interlock. Such systems could prevent drivers from shifting into gear,
starting their vehicle, or using their vehicle's entertainment system,
respectively, if the driver and/or front passenger is unbelted. Another
potential strategy could be speed limiter interlock systems. Such a
system could first issue a seat belt reminder warning if the driver
begins driving and is unbelted, and then automatically reduce vehicle
speed to a very low speed after a certain warning period if the driver
remains unbelted.
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\241\ DOT HS 812 496.
\242\ ``NHTSA' Research on Seat Belt Interlocks,'' SAE
Government Industry Meeting, January 24-26, 2018.
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NHTSA requests comment on the following related to seat belt
interlock systems:
(74) Should NCAP consider credit for a seat belt reminder system
with a continuous or intermittent audible signal that does not cease
until the seat belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 second
FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? What data are available to support associated
effectiveness? Are certain audible signal characteristics more
effective than others?
(75) Is there an opportunity for including a seat belt interlock
assessment in NCAP?
(76) If the Agency were to encourage seat belt interlock adoption
through NCAP, should all interlock system approaches be considered, or
only certain types? If so, which ones? What metrics could be evaluated
for each? Should differing credit be applied depending upon interlock
system approach?
(77) Should seat belt interlocks be considered for all seating
positions in the vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there be an
opportunity for differentiation in this respect?
(78) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
consumer acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/or persistent
seat belt reminder systems in vehicles? What consumer interest or
feedback data exist on this topic?
(79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity in a selectable feature
that could be optionally engaged such as in the context of a ``teen
mode'' feature?
E. Intelligent Speed Assist
Speeding continues to be one of the critical factors in fatal
crashes on American roadways. Specifically, driving too fast for
conditions and exceeding the posted limit are two prevalent factors
that contribute to traffic crashes. For more than two decades, NHTSA
has identified speed as being a factor in at least nearly one-third of
all motor vehicle related fatalities. For example, in 2019, of the
36,096 traffic-related fatalities occurred on U.S. roadways, 9,478 of
those were positively identified as speeding-related.\243\ These totals
may underreport speeding, potentially to a significant degree, as they
are based on whether any driver in the crash was charged with a
speeding-related offense or if a police officer indicated that racing,
driving too fast for conditions, or exceeding the posted speed limit
was a contributing factor in the crash. As this reporting is based on
aggregated police actions rather than an engineering analysis of
individual crashes, it may tend to underestimate the presence of
speeding, particularly in crashes where the speeding was not clearly
obvious but still a factor in either the occurrence or severity of the
crash.
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\243\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
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Too few drivers view speeding as an immediate risk to their
personal safety or the safety of others, including pedestrians and
vulnerable road users. Yet, the consequences of speeding include:
Greater potential for loss of vehicle control; reduced effectiveness of
occupant protection equipment; increased stopping distance after the
driver perceives a danger; increased degree of crash severity leading
to more severe injuries; economic implications of a speed-related
crash; and increased fuel consumption and cost. The probability of
death, disfigurement, or debilitating injury grows with higher speed at
impact.
NHTSA engages with State and local jurisdictions as well as
national law enforcement partners to provide funding and educational
materials which address speeding. Speed limiter features, which prevent
a vehicle from traveling over a certain speed by limiting engine power,
are available in the U.S. market and widely used in heavy-duty tractor-
trailers and other fleet-based vehicles. In addition, nearly all
vehicles are equipped with a mechanism that limits their top-end speed,
even if that speed is quite high. These systems either prevent a
vehicle from exceeding a preset specific speed regardless of location,
or they use GPS and/or camera data to determine the speed limit of the
current road and apply mitigation measures to reduce speeding. Vehicles
equipped with an intelligent speed assist system can display the
current speed limit to the driver at all times. Should the driver
exceed the speed limit for the road, the system can provide a visual or
auditory alert or actively slow the vehicle to an appropriate speed.
Typically, many existing intelligent speed assist systems can be
temporarily overridden by the driver by depressing the accelerator
pedal firmly.
NHTSA is committed to addressing this important safety issue to
further reduce fatalities and injuries. NHTSA requests comment on the
following aspects of intelligent speed assist systems in passenger
vehicles as well as other approaches that are not discussed in this
notice.
(80) Should NHTSA take into consideration systems, such as
intelligent speed assist systems, which determine current speed limits
and warn the driver or adjust the maximum traveling speed accordingly?
Should there be a differentiation between warning and intervention type
intelligent speed assist systems in this consideration? Should systems
that allow for some small amount of speeding over the limit before
intervening be treated the same or differently than systems that are
specifically keyed to a road's speed limit? What about for systems that
allow driver override versus systems that do not?
(81) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
evaluating speed assist system functionality?
(82) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
consumer acceptance of intelligent speed assist systems? What consumer
interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
(83) Are there other means that the Agency should consider to
prevent excessive speeding?
F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist
Data indicate that since 1998, nearly 900 children (an average of
38 per year) have died in the U.S. of hyperthermia (vehicular
heatstroke) because they were left or became trapped in a hot vehicle.
2018 and 2019 saw a record number of vehicular heatstroke related
deaths at 53
[[Page 13507]]
each year.\244\ Children were in the vehicles due to a variety of
circumstances--some gain entry to a parked vehicle, whereas over 50
percent are forgotten in the vehicle by caregivers.\245\
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\244\ www.noheatstroke.org.
\245\ Id.
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To address these tragedies, many companies have developed
aftermarket devices to remind parents and caregivers that a child may
be left inside the vehicle. NHTSA has assessed several products and
developed a test methodology for evaluating future products.\246\ NHTSA
subsequently opened a public docket inviting all interested parties to
submit information regarding efforts or technological innovations to
help prevent vehicular heatstroke.\247\ Also, NHTSA has media
campaigns, such as ``Where's Baby? Look Before You Lock,'' to raise
awareness to parents and caregivers on the dangers of vehicular
heatstroke.
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\246\ Rudd, R., Prasad, A., Weston, D., & Wietholter, K. (2015,
July). Functional assessment of unattended child reminder systems.
(Report No. DOT HS 812 187). Washington, DC: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
\247\ https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA-2019-0126.
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In recent years, in-vehicle rear seat child reminder technology has
been introduced into a number of vehicle makes and models. Many of
these technological solutions utilize ``door logic'' to determine if
there is potentially a child in the rear seat of the vehicle. The
vehicle door logic checks to see if the rear seat doors were opened and
closed at the start of the trip and then displays a reminder in the
dash board with an audio cue for the driver to check the back seat when
the vehicle is turned off. In September 2019, the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers and the Association of Global Automakers (now
collectively known as the Alliance for Automotive Innovation) announced
that a voluntary agreement had been formed by its member companies to
incorporate rear seat child reminder systems into their vehicles as
standard equipment no later than the 2025 model year.\248\
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\248\ https://www.autosinnovate.org/safety/heatstroke/Automakers%20Commit%20to%20Helping%20Combat%20Child%20Heatstroke.pdf.
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NHTSA requests comment on the following issues related to rear seat
child reminder systems designed to prevent vehicular heatstroke.
(84) If NHTSA considers this technology for inclusion in NCAP, are
door logic solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only consider systems
that detect the presence of a child?
(85) What research data exist to substantiate differences in
effectiveness of these system types?
(86) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
evaluating these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems?
(87) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
consumer acceptance of integrated rear seat child reminder systems in
vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
NHTSA is seeking comment on several approaches to provide consumers
with vehicle safety ratings that provide more meaningful safety
information and provide consumers with more ways to determine relative
performance of vehicles among the fleet. In the current 5-star safety
ratings system, as described in detail in the July 2008 final decision
notice, injury readings recorded from crash test dummies used in NCAP's
frontal impact, side impact barrier, and side impact pole tests are
assessed using injury risk curves designed to predict the chance of a
vehicle's occupant receiving similar injuries.\249\ For each occupant
in each crash test, the risks of injury to each body region assessed
are combined to produce a combined probability of injury to each
occupant. The combined probabilities of injury for each occupant are
divided by a predetermined baseline risk of injury. This baseline risk
of injury approximates the fleet average injury risk for each crash
test. Dividing each combined occupant probability of injury by the
baseline risk of injury results in a relative assessment of that
occupant's combined injury risk versus a known fleet average. These
calculations result in six summary scores for each vehicle representing
the relative risk of injury for the following occupants: (1) The driver
and front seat passenger in the frontal impact test; (2) the driver and
rear seat passenger in the side impact barrier test; (3) the driver in
the side impact pole test; and (4) the relative risk for all occupants
in rollovers with respect to a baseline injury risk. These relative
risks are then converted to star ratings to help consumers make
informed vehicle purchasing decisions.
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\249\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008), http://regulations.gov,
Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0114.
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NHTSA seeks public comment on a few potential concepts it could use
to develop a new 5-star safety ratings system in the future. Some areas
of consideration discussed below could be used in conjunction with one
another, while others could work better as standalone options. Ideally,
any future 5-star safety ratings system should not only fulfill the
program mission, but also be sufficiently flexible to allow for
continuing updates to NCAP to encourage further vehicle safety
improvements.
A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept
NHTSA is seeking comment on the use of a potential points-based
system to calculate future 5-star safety ratings for the
crashworthiness testing program when the Agency decides to update that
program. In this system, star ratings could be assigned directly from
point values related to the results from crash test dummies. The
current system is based on a linear combination of the probability of
injury for multiple body regions, some at different severity levels,
which can result in some body regions being overlooked. A point-based
system, on the other hand, would provide more flexibility to target
injury criteria more representative of real-world injury incidence. The
Agency believes that this potential method would provide more
flexibility in the future when updating the program through a phased
approach. For instance, new testing devices (e.g., crash test dummies),
procedures, injury measurements, or other criteria could be added to
the 5-star-ratings system. Points could be based on critical injury
risk curve values or on criteria, such as reference values from
existing Federal regulations or other Agency data.
This points-based rating system approach would be similar to those
used in other vehicle safety consumer information programs such as IIHS
and Euro NCAP. Upper and lower performance targets would be established
for each test dummy body region assessed in crash tests. Maximum points
would be awarded if Injury Assessment Reference Values (IARVs) meet the
lower target or better. A linearized number of points would be awarded
for injury assessment values that are between the lower and upper
targets. No points would be assigned for those that exceed the upper
target for the respective body region (or perhaps the entire occupant).
Risk curves would no longer be used exclusively to calculate a combined
injury probability from the various body regions and ultimately star
ratings. Critical risk curve values, IARVs, or other accepted injury
limits would be used to establish performance targets and related
points assignments.
[[Page 13508]]
In addition to the injury criteria currently included in the 5-star
safety ratings system, data to support several other injury criteria
are collected for Agency monitoring and consumer information on the
respective NCAP dummies (Hybrid III and ES-2re 50th percentile males,
Hybrid III and SID-IIs 5th percentile females). NHTSA is seeking
comment on whether any additional measurements that are not part of the
existing 5-star ratings system are appropriate for use in a points-
based calculation of the future star ratings.
Currently, if measurements of certain injury criteria that are
included in related FMVSSs exceed standard limits, the Agency would
assign a ``safety concern'' designation on its website and on the
vehicle window sticker (Monroney label).\250\ If measurements of
certain injury criteria that are not part of FMVSSs exceed established
limits, the Agency highlights those on its website (but not on the
Monroney label) with footnotes. In both of these cases, the Agency
seeks to inform consumers of potentially higher injury risks in body
regions that are not captured by the existing 5-star safety ratings
system. The Agency recognizes that consumer confusion may result from
the presentation of a vehicle with high (4- or 5-star) ratings that is
also assigned a safety concern or injury-related footnote. One
potential solution to reduce confusion would be to implement a points-
based system that allows the Agency to include the assessment of all
injuries within the calculation of the star rating, even those that may
not have associated risk curves. Thus, the Agency is seeking comment on
the appropriate method.
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\250\ Id.
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Furthermore, NHTSA is exploring several options regarding the
distribution of points across a potential points-based ratings system.
Real-world data could be used to apportion the total number of
available points to each crash mode, dummy, and/or injury value
according to severity or prevalence in the field. Alternatively, each
dummy or injury value could be allotted the same number of points,
effectively normalizing each dummy or injury.
B. Baseline Risk Concept
Support for adjusting the baseline risk value associated with 5-
star safety ratings has been mixed in the past, with some in favor and
others advising against it.\251\ As mentioned earlier, the Agency is
again seeking comment on whether the baseline risk concept should be
preserved when considering updates to its 5-star safety ratings system
in the future.
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\251\ This is based on comments by participants in the October
1, 2018 public meeting and respondents to the related docket https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA-2018-0055.
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With the July 2008 final decision establishing the existing 5-star
safety ratings system, the concept of a relative star rating system was
introduced for the first time.\252\ As discussed previously, after
injury readings from various body regions are converted to combined
probabilities of injury risks, those combined probabilities are divided
by a baseline (or average) risk of injury that is an approximation of
the vehicle fleet average injury risk. Star ratings generated in NCAP
today are a measure of how much more (or less) occupant protection the
vehicle affords when compared to an ``average'' vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ Prior to the 2010 program enhancements, NCAP star ratings
were based on an absolute, independent scale of combined injury
probability. That is, the combined probability of injury from a
given occupant was converted directly into a star rating with no
intermediate calculation except rounding.
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The intent of the baseline risk as described in the July 2008
notice was to update its value at regular intervals so that, as the
average risk of injury decreased over time, ratings could become more
stringent without changing the underlying criteria. In practice, the
baseline risk has never been adjusted, which results in recent star
ratings being assigned using an older benchmark less representative of
current vehicle safety levels.\253\
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\253\ Park, B., Rockwell, T., Collins, L., Smith, C., Aram, M.
(2015), The enhanced U.S. NCAP: Five years later. 24th Enhanced
Safety of Vehicles Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2015, Paper
Number 15-0314.
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C. Half-Star Ratings
In the December 2015 notice, the Agency sought comments on the
merits of providing ratings to consumers in half-star increments.
Commenters were generally supportive of the notion. In this notice,
NHTSA continues to seek comment on whether the Agency should
disseminate its 5-star safety ratings with half-star increments. This
approach could allow better discrimination of vehicle performance for
consumer information purposes by creating additional levels within the
existing 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-star levels. Though the Agency has not
conducted consumer research on this potential approach, NHTSA believes
that the public is familiar with the general impression of half-star
ratings as it is commonly found in other consumer product rating
schemes.
Future crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings systems most likely
would contain more elements on which vehicles are assessed. Thus, NHTSA
believes that using half-star increments may be necessary in future
rating systems because they allow better discrimination of vehicle
safety performance. The half-star increments, depending on future
Agency decisions, could create anywhere from 9 to 11 levels \254\ of
discrimination for use in rating vehicles.
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\254\ Depending on possible rating scales from 0-5 stars, 0.5-5
stars, or 1-5 stars, the amount of total distinct ratings available
would vary.
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NHTSA could design any half-star rating system to require a vehicle
to reach the minimum threshold for receiving that rating level. Ratings
in a system such as this would be ``rounded down'' to the nearest half-
or whole-star rating and would not be ``rounded up'' to the next half-
or whole-star rating.
D. Decimal Ratings
NHTSA is also seeking comments on whether it should consider
assigning star ratings using a decimal format in addition to or in
place of assigning whole- or half-star ratings. The decimal rating
could be based on a conversion of NCAP test results by using a linear
function approach. For instance, in the current 5-star safety ratings
system, this could be achieved by relating a linear function to the VSS
calculation and its associated ranges. In a potential future 5-star
safety ratings system, like one where the previously discussed points-
based concept is used, a decimal value could also be easily integrated.
Providing NCAP ratings in decimal format could provide consumers with
an additional, high delineation method of discriminating vehicle
performance among the fleet for purchasing reasons.
Considering these ongoing Agency initiatives currently being
pursued for future NCAP upgrades, NHTSA requests comment on the
following:
(88) What approaches are most effective to provide consumers with
vehicle safety ratings that provide meaningful information and
discriminate performance of vehicles among the fleet?
Specifically with regard to a points-based rating system, the
Agency seeks comment on the following:
(89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/body regions that are
not part of the existing 5-star ratings system appropriate for use in a
points-based calculation of future star ratings? Some injury criteria
do not have associated risk curves. Are these regions appropriate to
include, and if so, what is the appropriate method by which to include
them?
Regarding the baseline risk concept and the general concept of
relative
[[Page 13509]]
ratings, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:
(90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings system continue
to measure a vehicle's performance based on a known or expected fleet
average performer, or should it return to an absolute system of rating
vehicles?
(91) Considering the basic structure of the current ratings system
(combined injury risk), the potential overlapping target populations
for crashworthiness and ADAS program elements, as well as other
potential concepts mentioned in this document such as a points-based
system, what would the best method of calculating the vehicle fleet
average performance be?
(92) Should the vehicle fleet average performance be updated at
regular intervals, and if so, how often?
(93) What is the most appropriate way to disseminate these updates
or changes to the public?
Considering a change in approach to how to present star ratings to
the public, NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
(94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5-star ratings with half-
star increments?
(95) Should the Agency assign star ratings using a decimal format
in addition to or in place of whole- or half-stars?
E. Rollover Resistance Testing Program
Currently, there are two rollover resistance tests that the Agency
conducts and are part of the existing 5-star safety ratings system. The
first component of this assessment is the static measurement of the
vehicle's center of gravity height and the track width to determine the
vehicle's static stability factor. The second component of this
assessment is the dynamic rollover test (Fishhook test) that simulates
a driver taking a panic steering action in a loss-of-control situation.
The Agency uses two formulas (no tip-up and tip-up results) for
calculating the risk of rollover and then assigns a rollover rating
based on the risk. NHTSA sought comment on the approach published in
the December 2015 notice to recalculate its current rollover risk curve
given the full implementation of electronic stability control (ESC)
systems as standard equipment in all vehicles manufactured on or after
September 1, 2011. Commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice
were generally supportive of the Agency's desire to update the rollover
risk curve to reflect the role of ESC deployment. However, few specific
comments on the appropriateness of the approach that was described in
the notice were received at the time.
NHTSA is not proposing changes to its two existing rollover
resistance tests at this time. However, when the Agency proposes
changes to the existing 5-star ratings system, it may be feasible to
consider an update to how it assesses the rollover resistance testing
component. Thus, the Agency is seeking comment on whether any future
overall vehicle ratings should continue to include rollover resistance
evaluations. Also, if the Agency updates the rollover risk curve,
suggestions on how to transition that data into a future overall
vehicle rating would be encouraged. The Agency expects that any future
overall vehicle ratings would, at minimum, require reweighting the
contribution of each test mode to that overall rating and thus the need
to determine the most appropriate program area to include the rollover
resistance tests.
(96) Should the Agency continue to include rollover resistance
evaluations in its future overall ratings?
IX. Other Activities
A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data
Since model year 2011, vehicle manufacturers have been reporting to
NHTSA their internal test data that show whether vehicles equipped with
the recommended ADAS technologies pass NCAP's system performance test
requirements in order to receive credit from the Agency. NHTSA assesses
the information provided and then assigns check marks for systems whose
conformance with NCAP's performance test requirements are supported by
the data. As the Agency stated in its July 2008 final decision notice,
commenters were generally supportive of NHTSA's plan to use self-
reported data from the vehicle manufacturers, in conjunction with its
own spot-check verification testing, to determine whether vehicles met
NCAP's system performance test requirements.\255\ The process by which
the Agency has accepted self-reported ADAS technology data for
recommended technologies has been crucial to the successful
administration of the program.
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\255\ 72 FR 3473 (Jan. 25, 2007), Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555.
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However, this process has not been without challenges. Throughout
the administration of the ADAS assessment program in NCAP, NHTSA has
identified inconsistencies in vehicle manufacturers' self-reported data
submissions. The Agency has determined that many of these
inconsistencies stem from unfamiliarity with NCAP's system performance
test procedures, including the use of test targets and other
parameters.
It is critical to maintain program credibility and public trust
when accepting manufacturers' ADAS self-reported data and disseminating
it to the public. One approach to addressing some of the aforementioned
challenges is to encourage all vehicle manufacturers to provide NHTSA
with ADAS self-reported data from an independent test facility that
meets criteria demonstrating competence in NCAP testing protocols. For
instance, NHTSA's rigorous procurement process for awarding contracts
to test laboratories provides that qualified laboratories meet specific
competence requirements.
To address the challenges mentioned above, NHTSA is considering
refusing to accept self-reported data and not posting recommendations
for the vehicle's systems on its website, when:
Manufacturers' self-reported ADAS test data is provided
from a test facility that is not designated as NHTSA's contracted test
laboratory, or
The corresponding ADAS tests are not conducted in
accordance with NCAP's testing protocols (including test devices).
NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
(97) Considering the Agency's goal of maintaining the integrity of
the program, should NHTSA accept self-reported test data that is
generated by test laboratories that are not NHTSA's contracted test
laboratories? If no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most relevant
for evaluating whether a given laboratory can acceptably conduct ADAS
performance tests for NCAP such that the program's credibility is
upheld?
(98) As the ADAS assessment program in NCAP continues to grow in
the future to include new ADAS technologies and more complex test
procedures, what other means would best address the following program
challenges: Methods of data collection, maintaining data integrity and
public trust, and managing test failures, particularly during
verification testing?
B. Website Updates
NHTSA uses its website and the safety rating section of the
Monroney label to convey to consumers vehicle safety information
provided by NCAP. Although the Monroney label is an important tool
NHTSA uses to communicate vehicle safety ratings to consumers at the
point of sale, it has limitations:
[[Page 13510]]
(1) The Agency must undergo a rulemaking action to change any of
its content, including minor and non-substantive changes.\256\
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\256\ The Agency implemented the Monroney label requirement by
regulation (49 CFR 575.302) pursuant to Section 10307 of the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act; A Legacy
for Users (SAFETEA-LU).
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(2) The label is limited to a certain size, only some of which is
dedicated to NCAP information, which only allows for the communication
of limited safety information.
(3) By virtue of being posted on individual vehicles, the label
provides limited utility as a comparative shopping tool unless compared
to labels on vehicles in the same physical location.
Thus, NHTSA uses its website to communicate a wealth of information
about vehicle safety beyond what is displayed on the Monroney label.
NHTSA has structured the information displayed on its website to align
with the structure of the Monroney label. The same crashworthiness and
rollover star ratings are shown on both the label and the website.
However, crash avoidance (ADAS technologies) recommendations are not
included on the Monroney label because they were too new to be included
at the time of the most recent Monroney label update, whereas they are
provided on the website.
In light of the Monroney label limitations, increasingly complex
vehicle ratings and results, and NHTSA's desire to communicate safety
information as timely as possible, NHTSA is considering enhancing the
information on its website. However, some of these enhancements may
necessitate that the information provided on the Monroney label and
website deviate from one another in structure or in content. There are
limitations on the amount of information that can be usefully conveyed
on the Monroney label, so NHTSA is currently considering placing some
information on the website alone. However, while it makes sense to
provide additional information and comparative tools on the website,
NHTSA is concerned that consumers could be confused if the information
in both places is not presented in the same manner. For example, the
Monroney label is currently limited to displaying whole star ratings.
If, as a result of this RFC, NHTSA decides to improve the
differentiation between vehicles by displaying star ratings on its
website using new methods like a decimal equivalent value or half-
stars, such a discrepancy between the Monroney label and the website
may confuse consumers.
During the October 2018 public meeting, Consumers Union suggested
that NHTSA could provide ratings on its website in a ``more granular,
sortable and readily comparable manner.'' Currently, the website's
functionality allows for users to input limited search terms. For
instance, a consumer may search for all vehicles in a given model year,
all vehicles of a specific make, or vehicles with a specific model
name. Consumers may then filter these results by body style, but the
current body style categories are very broad and can encompass hundreds
of models. Consumers are currently limited to viewing ten vehicle
models at a time in search results, meaning that they may need to sift
through many pages of results if they are simply browsing and do not
have a particular make or model in mind. NHTSA plans to address these
issues by improving the organization and versatility of the safety
ratings data presented to the public.
Once a consumer selects a vehicle for further details, they may
choose to compare up to three vehicles, but they must input the year,
make, and model of the vehicles to be compared. NHTSA intends to make
changes to its www.nhtsa.gov user interface to allow for simpler
comparisons between vehicle manufacturers and types. For example, when
a consumer searches for safety rating information for a particular make
and model, similar vehicles could also be shown. These vehicles could
be classified according to body style. The Agency expects to make other
changes to NHTSA.gov to increase the comparability of safety
information.
NHTSA continues to seek comment on the following aspects of vehicle
information provided on its website:
(99) What is the potential for consumer confusion if information on
the Monroney label and on the website differs, and how can this
confusion be lessened?
(100) What types of vehicles do consumers compare during their
search for a new vehicle? Do consumers often consider vehicles with
different body styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large sport
utility)?
(101) When searching for vehicle safety information, do consumers
have a clear understanding for which vehicles they are seeking
information, or do they browse through vehicle ratings to identify
vehicles they may wish to purchase?
(102) When classifying vehicles by body style, what degree of
classification is most appropriate? For example, when purchasing a
passenger vehicle, do consumers consider all passenger vehicles, or are
they inclined to narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset of
passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger vehicle)?
(103) Within the context of the updates considered in this notice,
what is the most important top-level safety-related information that
consumers should be able to compare amongst vehicles? Which of these
pieces of information should consumers be able to use to sort and
filter search results?
C. Database Changes
NHTSA wishes to take this opportunity to inform the public about
other ways the Agency is significantly enhancing the NCAP program. We
have undertaken a considerable developmental effort to modernize the
OEM submission process and our processing of data, so that consumer
information can be provided to consumers quickly and accurately. We are
not requesting comment in this section but are presenting this
information for the benefit of the reader.
Each year NHTSA requests vehicle manufacturers to submit new model
year vehicle information voluntarily on new passenger cars and light
trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or
less. This information is used by NCAP primarily for consumer
information on the Agency's website, presentation on the vehicle window
stickers, and for the selection of new model year vehicles to be tested
under NCAP.
The manner in which NHTSA and vehicle manufacturers communicate
information has changed over the years--from mailed letters and faxes
to spreadsheets and emails. However, NHTSA realized a modernized
process of data submission, collection, analysis, and dissemination is
necessary due to the ever-growing list of data elements needed to
support an evolving test portfolio and diverse vehicle fleet. In the
last model year alone, more than 400 makes and models of passenger
vehicles were sold in the United States, thus requiring vehicle
manufacturers not only to assemble detailed new vehicle data and submit
them to NHTSA, but also NHTSA to collect, sort, and analyze tremendous
amounts of information.
Managing this data has become more complex, utilizing electronic
spreadsheets and email. In addition to processing spreadsheets from
more than 20 organizations, maintaining version control, checking data
for accuracy, clarifying ambiguities, sending ratings letters, and
processing requests have limited the ability of the Agency's current IT
systems in storing and
[[Page 13511]]
analyzing data. These limitations have been exacerbated by the
incorporation of ADAS assessments into NCAP, which accepts self-
reported test data from vehicle manufacturers. Historically, these ADAS
technologies have been available in a mix of vehicles within a
technology package or trim line at the make and model level, which can
cause consumer confusion as to which vehicles have the technologies.
Furthermore, as NCAP is only able to offer consumer information details
at the make and model level, the additional complexity of parsing trim
lines and technology packages has been overly burdensome given NHTSA's
current resources and limitations.
NHTSA is mindful that any expansion in NCAP's ADAS assessment
program will create a long-term need to collect considerably more data
elements from vehicle manufacturers. The current data collection
process of spreadsheets and emails will not suffice to fulfill this
need. To that end, NHTSA has undertaken a multi-year, multi-phase
project to modernize the way in which NCAP communicates with and
receives data from relevant stakeholders. NHTSA is currently developing
a new, secure online web portal and database that will be used to send,
receive, track, store, and process program data elements and
communications.
The first phase of this online portal and database development
focuses on the data submission process from the vehicle manufacturers
to NHTSA. The online web portal would allow designated representatives
from each vehicle manufacturer to submit data and correspondence by
secure and trackable means. Vehicle manufacturers would be able to have
multiple representatives contribute to and approve the data
submissions, and submissions could be done in a more dedicated and
focused manner than is currently feasible with conventional
spreadsheets. The data submission application would include business
rules to help vehicle manufacturers identify invalid data or
typographical errors. The database portion of the project would allow
NHTSA not only to capture and store data more efficiently, but also to
manage program functions more quickly--such as faster posting of NCAP
ratings to the Agency's website. In addition, it would allow NCAP to
determine twin and carryover status in a timelier manner. Furthermore,
the database is significantly more flexible and robust than existing
spreadsheets and would allow more accurate processing of manufacturers'
self-reported data submitted for the ADAS assessment program as well as
the side air bag out-of-position testing program. In addition, this
database would allow NCAP to review vehicle fleet trends and easily
compare and track changes in individual vehicle models from one model
year to the next. This phase of the project has already produced a
prototype, and NHTSA has received preliminary feedback from initial
beta testing.
A second phase of the project will focus on data and correspondence
between NHTSA and its test laboratories. NCAP collects vehicle-specific
test setup information from the vehicle manufacturer and separately
transmits this data to its designated test laboratory. This phase of
the project would streamline the way in which the program communicates
its day-to-day operations that include the review, transmission, and
archive of test data. The result of these upgrades would allow NCAP to
schedule tests, review test data, analyze test anomalies and failures,
respond to manufacturer contests, and publish safety ratings in a
timelier manner.
X. Economic Analysis
The various changes in NCAP discussed in this proposal all enable a
rating system that improves consumer awareness of ADAS safety features,
and encourages manufacturers to accelerate their adoption. This
accelerated adoption of ADAS would drive any economic and societal
impacts that result from these changes, and are thus the focus of this
discussion of economic analysis. Hence, the Agency has considered the
potential economic effects for ADAS technologies proposed for inclusion
in NCAP and the potential benefit of introducing a rating system for
ADAS technologies.
Unlike crashworthiness safety features, where safety improvements
are attributable to improved occupant protection when a crash occurs,
the impact that ADAS technologies have on fatality and injury rates is
a direct function of their effectiveness in preventing crashes or
reducing the severity of the crashes they are designed to mitigate.
This effectiveness is typically measured by using real-world
statistical data, laboratory testing, or Agency expertise.
With respect to vehicle safety, the Agency believes, as discussed
in detail in this notice, the four proposed ADAS technologies have the
potential to reduce vehicle crashes and injury severities further. As
cited in this notice, researchers have conducted preliminary studies to
estimate the effectiveness of ADAS technologies. Although these studies
have been limited to certain models or manufacturers, which may not
represent the entire fleet, they do illustrate how these systems can
provide safety benefits. Thus, although the Agency does not have
sufficient data to determine the monetized safety impacts resulting
from these technologies in a way similar to that frequently done for
mandated technologies--when compared to the future without the proposed
update to NCAP, NHTSA expects that these changes would likely have
substantial positive safety effects by promoting earlier and more
widespread deployment of these technologies.
NCAP also helps address the issue of asymmetric information (i.e.,
when one party in a transaction is in possession of more information
than the other), which can be considered a market failure.\257\
Regarding consumer information, the introduction of a potential new
ADAS rating system is anticipated to provide consumers additional
vehicle safety information (e.g., rating based on ADAS performance and
capability as well as the types of ADAS in vehicles) as opposed to the
information provided in the current program (e.g., check mark based on
ADAS performance as pass/fail) to help them make more informed
purchasing decisions by better presenting the relative safety benefits
of different ADAS technologies. NHTSA believes that the future ADAS
rating would increase consumer awareness and understanding of the
safety benefits in these technologies, and, in turn, incentivize
vehicle manufacturers to offer the ADAS technologies that lead to
higher ratings across a broader selection of their vehicles.
Furthermore, as these ADAS technologies mature and become more reliable
and efficient, a large portion of vehicles equipped with such systems
would achieve higher ADAS ratings, and in turn consumers would have an
increasing number of safer vehicles to choose from. There is an
unquantifiable value to consumers in receiving accurate and comparable
performance information about those technologies among manufacturers,
makes, and models.
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\257\ See.
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According to NHTSA sponsored research,\258\ IIHS/HLDI predicted
that the number of vehicles equipped with ADAS technologies, including
BSW and Lane Keeping Warning, will increase
[[Page 13512]]
substantially from 2020 to 2030 and reach near full market penetration
in 2050. Although the Agency has limited data on costs of ADAS
technologies to consumers, assuming consumer demand for safety remains
high, the future ADAS rating system would likely accelerate the full
adaptation of the four technologies included in this RFC--not to
mention the four existing ones. Nevertheless, the Agency does not have
sufficient data, such as unit cost and information on how soon the full
adaptation will be reached with the ADAS rating, to predict the net
increase in cost to consumers, with a high degree of certainty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ See https://www.iihs.org/media/9517c308-c8d5-42e6-80fd-a69ecd9d2128/3aaYqQ/HLDI%20Research/Bulletins/hldi_bulletin_37-11.pdf. Bulletin Vol. 34, No. 28: September 2017, ``Predicted
availability and fitment of safety features on registered
vehicles,'' Highway Loss Data Institute.
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XI. Public Participation
Interested parties are strongly encouraged to submit thorough and
detailed comments relating to each of the relevant areas discussed in
this notice. Please see Appendix B for a summarized list of specific
questions that have been posed in this notice. Comments submitted will
help the Agency make informed decisions as it strives to advance NCAP
by encouraging continuous safety improvements for new vehicles and
enhancing consumer information.
How do I prepare and submit comments?
To ensure that your comments are filed correctly in the docket,
please include the docket number of this document in your comments.
Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long (49 CFR 553.21).
NHTSA established this limit to encourage you to write your primary
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may attach necessary
additional documents to your comments. There is no limit on the length
of the attachments.
Please submit one copy (two copies if submitting by mail or hand
delivery) of your comments, including the attachments, to the docket
following the instructions given above under ADDRESSES. Please note, if
you are submitting comments electronically as a PDF (Adobe) file, NHTSA
asks that the documents submitted be scanned using an Optical Character
Recognition (OCR) process, thus allowing the Agency to search and copy
certain portions of your submissions.
How do I submit confidential business information?
If you wish to submit any information under a claim of
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential
business information, to the Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the
address given above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition,
you may submit a copy (two copies if submitting by mail or hand
delivery), from which you have deleted the claimed confidential
business information, to the docket by one of the methods given above
under ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed
to be confidential business information, you should include a cover
letter setting forth the information specified in NHTSA's confidential
business information regulation (49 CFR part 512).
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\259\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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Will the Agency consider late comments?
NHTSA will consider all comments received before the close of
business on the comment closing date indicated above under DATES. To
the extent possible, the Agency will also consider comments received
after that date. Please note that even after the comment closing date,
we will continue to file relevant information in the docket as it
becomes available. Accordingly, we recommend that interested people
periodically check the docket for new material. You may read the
comments received at the address given above under ADDRESSES. The hours
of the docket are indicated above in the same location. You may also
see the comments on the internet, identified by the docket number at
the heading of this notice, at www.regulations.gov.
XII. Appendices
Appendix A. Target Population Statistics for Crash Scenarios
259
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\260\ The crash scenarios referenced for the FCW/CIB/DBS target
population are those that comprise the subset of the 84 mutually
exclusive pre-crash scenarios analyzed by VOLPE (Report No. DOT HS
812 745) that were considered relevant for the forward collision
prevention crash category (Report No. DOT HS 812 653). Each of the
84 scenarios is assigned a pre-assigned number and is followed by a
brief description.
Table A-1--Target Population Statistics, FCW/CIB/DBS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAIS 1-5
Crash scenarios \260\ Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle (LV) Stopped........ 1,099,868 474 561,842 1,719,177
2001 Rear-End, LV Slower........................ 174,217 527 97,402 252,341
2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated................... 374,624 155 196,731 587,031
2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher 598 3 273 829
Speed..........................................
2009 Rear-End, Other/Unspecified................ 50,105 70 24,951 77,034
2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle 1,842 37 839 2,510
Stopped........................................
2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle 813 6 486 1,063
Slower.........................................
2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle 1,475 3 860 1,900
Decelerated....................................
---------------------------------------------------------------
Combined Total.............................. 1,703,541 1,275 883,386 2,641,884
---------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Total Crashes.................... 29.4 3.8 31.5 36.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A-2--Target Population for LDW/LKA/LCA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAIS 1-5
Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 1V Rollover 1st Event....................... 4,411 63 3,155 2,104
150 2+V Rollover 1st Event...................... 243 3 337 197
1000 1V, Roadway Departure (RD)................. 966,709 9,751 359,238 679,402
1050 2+V, Roadway Departure..................... 43,957 1,021 32,069 55,856
[[Page 13513]]
1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median................. 8,560 75 2,910 6,214
1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median................ 3,427 106 2,678 4,239
3000 ST Opposite Dir(OD), Head-On............... 32,751 2,761 37,848 23,992
3009 ST OD Forward Impact, Other................ 115 11 69 135
3100 ST OD, Angle Sideswipe..................... 62,214 1,042 38,655 86,054
3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching 4,008 11 2,979 5,019
OD.............................................
---------------------------------------------------------------
Combined Total.............................. 1,126,397 14,844 479,939 863,213
---------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Total Crashes.................... 19.4 44.3 17.1 11.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A-3--Target Population for BSD/BSI/LCM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAIS 1-5
Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8000 LCM in Rear End............................ 48,749 128 26,040 71,977
8001 LCM in ST SD Forward Impact................ 212 4 62 371
8002 LCM in ST SD AS............................ 371,504 332 129,595 651,962
8003 LCM CT VT SD............................... 58,389 40 20,685 99,476
8004 LCM Other.................................. 24,216 38 11,924 36,940
---------------------------------------------------------------
Combined Total.............................. 503,070 542 188,304 860,726
---------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Total Crashes.................... 8.7 1.6 6.7 11.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A-4--Target Population for PAEB
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAIS 1-5
Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
300 1V2Ped RD, Forward Impact................... 60,322 3,264 57,480 1,836
309 1V2Ped, Other............................... 306 26 264 0
350 2+V2Ped..................................... 511 259 452 0
400 1V2Cyc RD, Forward Impact................... 50,094 531 45,529 4,910
409 1V2Cyc, Other/Unspecified................... 175 4 172 0
450 2+V2Cyc..................................... 234 23 169 239
---------------------------------------------------------------
Combined Total.............................. 111,641 4,106 104,066 6,985
---------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Total Crashes.................... 1.9 12.3 3.7 0.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A-5--Target Population for RAB/RvAB/RCTA Technologies
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAIS 1-5
Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
302 1V2Ped, Backup.............................. 2,811 44 2,590 88
402 1V2Cyc, Backup.............................. 439 3 407 48
602 1V2ParkedV, Backup.......................... 41,957 2 5,293 40,389
802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup..................... 1,824 2 217 1,732
6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object............... 101,503 23 26,761 189,059
---------------------------------------------------------------
Combined Total.............................. 148,533 74 35,268 231,317
---------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Total Crashes.................... 2.6 0.2 1.3 3.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A-6--Mapping of Crash Scenarios With Safety Systems
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crash scenarios 1 FCW/CIB/DBS 2 LDW/LKA/LCA 3 BSD/BSI/LCM 4 PAEB 5 RAB/RvAB/RTA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 1V Rollover 1st Event.......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
150 2+V Rollover 1st Event......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
200 1V Jackknife 1st Event......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
250 2+V Jackknife 1st Event........................................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
300 1V2Pedestrian Roadway Departure, Forward Impact................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
302 1V2 Pedestrian, Backup......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
[[Page 13514]]
309 1V2 Pedestrian, Specifics Other/Unknown........................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
350 2+V2 Pedestrian................................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
400 1V2Cyclist Roadway Departure, Forward Impact................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
402 1V2Cyclist, Backup............................................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
409 1V2Cyclist, Specifics Other/Unknown............................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
450 2+V2Cyclist.................................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
500 1V2Animal Roadway Departure, Avoid Animal...................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
502 1V2Animal, Backup.............................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
509 1V2Animal, Specifics Other/Unknown............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
550 2+V2Animal..................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
600 1V2Parked Vehicle Roadway Departure, Forward Impact............ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
602 1V2Parked Vehicle, Backup...................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
609 1V2Parked Vehicle, Specifics Other/Unknown..................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
650 2+V2Parked Vehicle............................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
700 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact.... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
701 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss..... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
702 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Backup.............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
709 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Other............................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
750 2+V2Other Non-Fixed Object..................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
800 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact.............. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
801 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup........................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
809 1V2Fixed Object, Other......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
850 2+V2Fixed Object............................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1000 1V, Roadway Departure......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1001 1V RD, Traction Loss.......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1002 1V RD, Avoid Vehicle/Pedestrian/Animal........................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1003 1V Forward Impact, Ped or Animal.............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1004 1V Forward Impact, End Departure.............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1005 1V Forward Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown.................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1009 1V Other/No Impact............................................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1050 2+V, Roadway Departure........................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median.................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median *................................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle Stopped................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
2001 Rear-End, LV Slower........................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated...................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher Speed.................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
2009 Rear-End, Specifics Other/Unknown............................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
2101 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, Loss Control... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
2102 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Impact, Avoid Vehicle.............................................
2103 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, Avoid Objects.. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
2109 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown...................................
2200 Same Trafficway Same.......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Direction, Angle-Sideswipe.........................................
2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Stopped.............. ............... ............... ............... ...............
2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Slower............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Decelerated.......... ............... ............... ............... ...............
3000 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Head-On................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
3001 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Traction ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Loss..............................................................
3002 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Avoid ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Vehicle...........................................................
3003 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Avoid ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Object............................................................
3009 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Other...... ............... ............... ............... ...............
3100 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Angle Sideswipe........... ............... ............... ............... ...............
3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching Opposite Direction ............... ............... ............... ...............
[[Page 13515]]
4000 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Initial ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Opposite Direction................................................
4001 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Initial ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Same Direction....................................................
4009 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Specifics ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Other/Unknown.....................................................
4100 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Into Same ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Direction.........................................................
4101 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Into ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Opposite Direction................................................
4109 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Specifics ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Other/Unknown.....................................................
5000 Intersect Paths, Straight Across Path......................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
5009 Intersect Paths, Straight Path, Specifics, Specifics Other/ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
Unknown...........................................................
6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object.................................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
7000 1V Negotiating a Curve........................................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
7050 2+V Negotiating a Curve....................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
8000 Lane Change/Merge Before Rear-End............................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
8001 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward ............... ............... ............... ...............
Impact............................................................
8002 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Angle ............... ............... ............... ...............
Sideswipe.........................................................
8003 Lane Change/Merge in Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning Initial ............... ............... ............... ...............
Same Direction....................................................
8004 Lane Change/Merge Other....................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9000 Equipment Failure............................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9020 Loss of Control Due to Tire/Engine/Poor Road.................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9030 2+V, Left/Right Turn, Unspecified............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9040 2+V U-Turn.................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9050 2+V Backing to Moving Vehicle................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9060 2+V No Impact................................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9070 2+V Other..................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
9999 2+V Unknown................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B. Questions Asked Throughout This Notice
III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
(1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW
systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type?
Why or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-
only warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when
determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test
criteria? If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert
modalities (such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective
at re-engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If
so, which one(s) and why?
(2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods
from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure,
should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program
entirely and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test
procedure instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW
and LKS capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to
conduct the LDW test if both systems are to be assessed separately.
What tolerances would be appropriate for each test, and why?
(3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to
address lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted). To help
re-engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must
be provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
(4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts'
Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this
lane marking type is being removed from use in California? If not,
why?
(5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.)
over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of
the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be
reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited
shoulder width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance
would be appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for
LDW in addition to LKS? Why or why not?
(6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m
(3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to
establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane
line it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that
use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer
indication of when an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the
baseline tests performed without LKS, a process specified by the
Euro NCAP LSS protocol. This is because the small curve radius
allows the desired SV lateral velocity to be more quickly
established; requires less initial lateral offset within the travel
lane; and allows for a longer period of steady state lateral
velocity to be realized before an LKS intervention occurs. Is use of
a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.),
acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS test procedure? Why or why
not?
(7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to
evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may
require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency
use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
(8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection
test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane
markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be
added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
(9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro
NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from
0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system
performance, and that this range is representative of the lateral
velocities associated with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an
intended lane change). However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also
specifies a range of lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to
2.0 ft./s) be used to represent unintended lane
[[Page 13516]]
departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Oncoming vehicle'' and
``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle'' tests. To encourage
the most robust LKS system performance, should NHTSA consider a
combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure ranges,
lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for
inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
(10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS
performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the Agency
correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral velocities
on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why or why
not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does not
exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on
straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared
to a vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral
velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the
Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is
negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-
engage? If not, why?
(11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is
redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane
departure when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker
on the side not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a
secondary lane departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion
limit established for the first side. To prevent potential secondary
lane departures, should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP
``lane keep assist'' evaluation criteria to be consistent with
language developed for NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this
issue? Why or why not? NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI
intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more
beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel
lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the
validity period. To assess whether this occurs, a second lane line
is required (only one line is specified in the Euro NCAP LSS
protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a second lane
line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why not?
(12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction
crashes occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the
LKS test speed be increased, or does the current test speed
adequately indicate performance at higher speeds, especially on
straight roads? Why or why not?
(13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently
contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure
direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP
test only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance,
should the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for
only one departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides
test data to assure comparable system performance for the other
direction? Or, should the Agency consider adopting only the most
challenging test conditions? If so, which conditions are most
appropriate? For instance, do the dashed line test conditions
provide a greater challenge to vehicles than the solid line test
conditions?
(14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for
each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass
rate for the LKS tests, and why?
(15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS
test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so,
what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?
(16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal
indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the
BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal
indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible
or haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a
visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should
it continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from
the blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why
not?
(17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane
Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's
BSW capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings
when the POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the
blind zone) for varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?
(18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test
procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why
or why not?
(19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently
contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions
(e.g., test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side
of the SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
scenarios and test conditions to address the real-world safety
problem adequately, or could it test only certain scenarios or
conditions to minimize test burden in NCAP? For instance, should the
Agency consider incorporating only the most challenging test
conditions into NCAP, such as the ones with the greatest speed
differential, or choose to perform the test conditions having the
lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency consider only
performing the test conditions where the POV passes by the SV on the
left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to assure
the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system
performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?
(20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system
performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input
on whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive
assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer
satisfaction? Why or why not?
(21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each
test condition (i.e., test speed and POV approach direction). Is
this an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is
the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test
scenario, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each
of the two tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?
(22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction
with activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn
signal is not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated
from the heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention?
Should the SV's LKS system be switched off during conduct of the
Agency's BSI evaluations? Why or why not?
(23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60
kph (37.3 mph), to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, most
appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why not?
(24) The Agency has proposed to include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4
a-c in its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to
perform all test scenarios and test conditions proposed in this RFC
notice to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test
only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden but
still address an adequate proportion of the safety problem? Why or
why not? If it is not necessary for the Agency to perform all test
scenarios or test conditions, which scenarios/conditions should be
assessed? Although they are not currently proposed for inclusion,
should the Agency also adopt the false positive test conditions, S1f
and S1g? Why or why not?
(25) Given that a large portion of pedestrian fatalities and
injuries occur under dark lighting conditions, the Agency has
proposed to perform testing for the included test conditions (i.e.,
S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime)
in addition to daylight test conditions for test speed range 10 kph
(6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle's
lower beams would provide the source of light during the nighttime
assessments. However, if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting
systems such as semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or
adaptive driving beam head lighting system, they shall be enabled
during the nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing approach
appropriate? Why or why not? Should the Agency conduct PAEB
evaluation tests with only the vehicle's lower beams and disable or
not use any other advanced lighting systems?
(26) Should the Agency consider performing PAEB testing under
dark conditions with a vehicle's upper beams as a light source? If
yes, should this lighting condition be assessed in addition to the
proposed dark test condition, which would utilize only a vehicle's
lower beams along with any advanced lighting system enabled, or in
lieu of the proposed dark testing condition? Should the Agency also
evaluate PAEB performance in dark lighting conditions with overhead
lights? Why or why not? What test scenarios, conditions, and
speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., dark lighting
conditions) testing in NCAP, and why?
(27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the Agency proposed to
perform one test per test speed until contact occurs, or until the
vehicle's relative impact velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial
speed of the subject vehicle for the given test condition. If
contact occurs and if the vehicle's relative impact velocity is less
than or equal to 50 percent
[[Page 13517]]
of the initial SV speed for the given combination of test speed and
test condition, an additional four test trials will be conducted at
the given test speed and test condition, and the SV must meet the
passing performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least three
out of those five test trials in order to be assessed at the next
incremental test speed. Is this an appropriate approach to assess
PAEB system performance in NCAP, or should a certain number of test
trials be required for each assessed test speed? Why or why not? If
a certain number of repeat tests is more appropriate, how many test
trials should be conducted, and why?
(28) Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate
for the proposed PAEB test conditions? Why or why not?
Alternatively, should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or
specify a maximum allowable SV-to-mannequin impact speed for any or
all of the proposed test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test
speed combination)? If yes, why, and for which test conditions? For
those test conditions, what speed reductions would be appropriate?
Alternatively, what maximum allowable impact speed would be
appropriate?
(29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin during the
initial trial for a given test condition and test speed combination,
NHTSA proposes to conduct additional test trials only if the
relative impact velocity observed during that trial is less than or
equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV. For a test speed
of 60 kph (37.3 mph), this maximum relative impact velocity is
nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph), and for a test speed of 10 kph (6.2
mph), the maximum relative impact velocity is nominally 5 kph (3.1
mph). Is this an appropriate limit on the maximum relative impact
velocity for the proposed range of test speeds? If not, why? Note
that the tests in Global Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 9 for
pedestrian crashworthiness protection simulates a pedestrian impact
at 40 kph (24.9 mph).
(30) For each lighting condition, the Agency is proposing 6 test
speeds (i.e., those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 mph) in
increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed test
conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results in
a total of 48 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds
to be evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 total combinations for
both light conditions. The Agency mentions later in the ADAS Ratings
System section, that it plans to use check marks, as is done
currently, to give credit to vehicles that (1) are equipped with the
recommended ADAS technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system
performance test requirements for each ADAS technology included in
NCAP until it issues (1) a final decision notice announcing the new
ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating
section of the vehicle window sticker (Monroney label). For the
purposes of providing credit for a technology using check marks,
what is an appropriate minimum overall pass rate for PAEB
performance evaluation? For example, should a vehicle be said to
meet the PAEB performance requirements if it passes two-thirds of
the 96 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds for
the two lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique combinations of
test conditions and test speeds)?
(31) Given previous support from commenters to include S2 and S3
scenarios in the program at some point in the future and the results
of AAA's testing for one of the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks
comment on an appropriate timeframe for including S2 and S3
scenarios into the Agency's NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from vehicle
manufacturers information on any currently available models designed
to address, and ideally achieve crash avoidance during conduct of
the S2 and S3 scenarios to support Agency evaluation for a future
program upgrade.
(32) Should the Agency adopt the articulated mannequins into the
PAEB test procedure as proposed? Why or why not?
(33) In addition to tests performed under daylight conditions,
the Agency is proposing to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems
during nighttime conditions where a large percentage of real-world
pedestrian fatalities occur. Are there other technologies and
information available to the public that the Agency can evaluate
under nighttime conditions?
(34) Are there other safety areas that NHTSA should consider as
part of this or a future upgrade for pedestrian protection?
(35) Are there any aspects of NCAP's proposed PAEB test
procedure that need further refinement or clarification before
adoption? If so, what additional refinement or clarification is
necessary, and why?
(36) Considering not only the increasing number of cyclists
killed on U.S. roads but also the limitations of current AEB systems
in detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on the appropriate
timeframe for adding a cyclist component to NCAP and requests from
vehicle manufacturers information on any currently available models
that have the capability to validate the cyclist target and test
procedures used by Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future NCAP
program upgrade.
(37) In addition to the test procedures used by Euro NCAP, are
there others that NHTSA should consider to address the cyclist crash
population in the U.S. and effectiveness of systems?
(38) For the Agency's FCW tests:
--If the Agency retains one or more separate tests for FCW, should
it award credit solely to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that
provide a passing audible alert? Or, should it also consider
awarding credit to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide
passing haptic alerts? Are there certain haptic alert types that
should be excluded from consideration (if the Agency was to award
credit to vehicles with haptic alerts that pass NCAP tests) because
they may be a nuisance to drivers such that they are more likely to
disable the system? Do commenters believe that haptic alerts can be
accurately and objectively assessed? Why or why not? Is it
appropriate for the Agency to refrain from awarding credit to FCW
systems that provide only a passing visual alert? Why or why not? If
the Agency assesses the sufficiency of the FCW alert in the context
of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what type of FCW alert(s) would be
acceptable for use in defining the timing of the release of the SV
accelerator pedal, and why?
--Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or next latest) FCW
system setting in lieu of the default setting when performing FCW
and AEB (including PAEB) NCAP tests on vehicles that offer multiple
FCW timing adjustment settings? Why or why not? If not, what use
setting would be most appropriate?
--Should the Agency consider consolidating FCW and CIB testing such
that NCAP's CIB test scenarios would serve as an indicant of FCW
operation? Why or why not? The Agency has proposed that if it
combines the two tests, it would evaluate the presence of a
vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV
accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW
alert is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV
accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the
onset of CIB system braking (as defined by the instant SV
deceleration reaches at least 0.5g). If no FCW alert is issued and
the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any braking, release of the
SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior to impact with the
POV. The Agency notes that it has also proposed these test
procedural changes for its PAEB tests as well. Is this assessment
method for FCW operation reasonable? Why or why not?
--If the Agency continues to assess FCW systems separately from CIB,
how should the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) be
amended if the Agency aligns the corresponding maximum SV test
speeds, POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV deceleration magnitude,
etc., as applicable, with the proposed CIB tests, and why? What
assessment method should be used--one trial per scenario, or
multiple trials, and why? If multiple trials should be required, how
many would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an
acceptable pass rate, and why?
--Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one FCW test scenario (instead
of the three that are currently included in NCAP's FCW test
procedure), conducted at the corresponding maximum SV test speed,
POV speed, SV-to-POV headway (as applicable), POV deceleration
magnitude, etc. of the proposed CIB test to serve as an indicant of
FCW system performance? If so, which test scenario from NCAP's FCW
test procedure is appropriate?
--Are there additional or alternative test scenarios or test
conditions that the Agency should consider incorporating into the
FCW test procedure, such as those at even higher test speeds than
those proposed for the CIB tests, or those having increased
complexity? If so, should the current FCW performance criteria
(i.e., TTCs) and/or test scenario specifications be amended, and to
what extent?
(39) For the Agency's CIB tests:
--Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, deceleration
magnitude, etc. the Agency has proposed for NCAP's CIB tests
[[Page 13518]]
appropriate? Why or why not? If not, what speeds, headway(s),
deceleration magnitude(s) are appropriate, and why? Should the
Agency adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD CIB
test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why or why not?
--Should the Agency consider adopting additional higher tests speeds
(i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the
CIB (and potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why not?
If additional speeds are included, what headway and deceleration
magnitude would be appropriate for each additional test speed, and
why?
--Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for the
proposed CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively,
should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a
maximum allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for any or all of the
proposed test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed
combination)? If yes, why, and for which test conditions? For those
test conditions, what speed reductions would be appropriate?
Alternatively, what maximum allowable impact speed would be
appropriate?
(40) For the Agency's DBS tests:
--Should the Agency remove the DBS test scenarios from NCAP? Why or
why not? Alternatively, should the Agency conduct the DBS LVS and
LVM tests at only the highest test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and
80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)? Why or why not? If the Agency also
adopted these higher tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
mph)) for the LVD CIB test, should it also conduct the LVD DBS test
at these same speeds? Why or why not?
--If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, is it
appropriate to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is
initiated to a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW
alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after
the FCW alert but before initiation of the manual brake
application)? If not, why, and what prescribed TTC values would be
appropriate for the modified DBS test conditions?
(41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has proposed for the CIB and
DBS tests (i.e., one trial per test speed with speed increments of
10 kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and repeat trials only in
the event of POV contact) appropriate? Why or why not? Should an
alternative assessment method such as multiple trials be required
instead? If yes, why? If multiple trials should be required, how
many would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an
acceptable pass rate, and why? If the proposed assessment method is
appropriate, it is acceptable even for the LVD test scenario if only
one or two test speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it more
appropriate to alternatively require 7 trials for each test speed,
and require that 5 out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ``no
contact'' performance criterion?
(42) The Agency's proposal to (1) consolidate its FCW and CIB
tests such that the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant of FCW
operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM,
and potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2
for LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), would result in a
total of 20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds
to be evaluated for AEB. What is an appropriate minimum pass rate
for AEB performance evaluation? For example, a vehicle is considered
to meet the AEB performance if it passes two-thirds of the 20 unique
combinations of test conditions and test speeds (i.e., passes 14
unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds).
(43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking sensors are becoming
more prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not observed
any instances of false positive test failures during any of its CIB
or DBS testing, is it appropriate to remove the false positive STP
assessments from NCAP's AEB (i.e., CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in
this NCAP update? Why or why not?
(44) For vehicles with regenerative braking that have setting
options, the Agency is proposing to choose the ``off'' setting, or
the setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the
accelerator is fully released. As mentioned, this proposal also
applies to the Agency's PAEB tests. Are the proposed settings
appropriate? Why or why not? Will regenerative braking introduce
additional complications for the Agency's AEB and PAEB testing, and
how could the Agency best address them?
(45) Should NCAP adopt any additional AEB tests or alter its
current tests to address the ``changing'' rear-end crash problem? If
so, what tests should be added, or how should current tests be
modified?
(46) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current FCW, CIB, and/or
DBS test procedure(s) that need further refinement or clarification?
If so, what refinements or clarifications are necessary, and why?
(47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle and brake pedal
application be acceptable in instances where no FCW alert has been
issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW alert
occurs very close to the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is
not acceptable, what overlap would be acceptable?
(48) Should the Agency pursue research in the future to assess
AEB system performance under less than ideal environmental
conditions? If so, what environmental conditions would be
appropriate?
(49) The Agency requests comment on the use of the GVT in lieu
of the SSV in future AEB NCAP testing,
(50) The Agency requests comment on whether Revisions F and G
should be considered equivalent for AEB testing.
(51) The Agency requests comment on whether NHTSA should adopt a
revision of the GVT other than Revision G for use in AEB testing in
NCAP.
IV. ADAS Rating System
With regard to a future ADAS rating system, the Agency seeks
comments on the following:
(52) The components and development of a full-scale ADAS rating
system,
(53) the aforementioned approaches as well as others deemed
appropriate for the development of a future ADAS rating system in
order to assist the Agency in developing future proposals,
(54) the appropriateness of using target populations and
technology effectiveness estimates to determine weights or
proportions to assign to individual test conditions, corresponding
test combinations, or an overall ADAS award,
(55) the use of a baseline concept to convey ADAS scores/
ratings,
(56) how best to translate points/ratings earned during ADAS
testing conducted under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, injuries,
deaths, etc., including which real-world data metric would be most
appropriate,
(57) whether an overall rating system is necessary and, if so,
whether it should replace or simply supplement the existing list
approach, and
(58) effective communication of ADAS ratings, including the
appropriateness of using a points-based ADAS rating system in lieu
of, or in addition to, a star rating system.
VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
With regard to a roadmap, NHTSA requests feedback on the
following:
(59) Identification of safety opportunities or technologies in
development that could be included in future roadmaps,
(60) opportunities to benefit from collaboration or
harmonization with other rating programs, and
(61) other issues to assist with long-term planning.
VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
(62) What are the capabilities of the various available
approaches to driver monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel
sensors, eye tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer different
driver state measurement or estimations (e.g., visual attention,
drowsiness, medical incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated
confidence or reliability in detecting or inferring such driver
states and what supporting data exist?
(63) Of further interest are the types of system actions taken
based on a driver monitoring system's estimate of a driver's state.
What are the types and modes of associated warnings, interventions,
and other mitigation strategies that are most effective for
different driver states or impairments (e.g., drowsy, medical,
distraction)? What research data exist that substantiate
effectiveness of these interventions?
(64) Are there relevant thresholds and strategies for
performance (e.g., alert versus some degree of intervention) that
would warrant some type of NCAP credit?
(65) Since different driver states (e.g., visual distraction and
intoxication) can result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide
within-lane position variability), comments regarding opportunities
and tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when the originating cause is
not conclusive are of specific interest.
(66) What types of consumer acceptance information (e.g.,
consumer interest or
[[Page 13519]]
feedback data) are available or are foreseen for implementation of
different types of driver monitoring systems and associated
mitigation strategies for driver impairment, drowsiness, or visual
inattention? Are there privacy concerns? What are the related
privacy protection strategies? Are there use or preference data on a
selectable feature that could be optionally enabled by consumers
(e.g., for teen drivers by their parents)?
(67) What in-vehicle and HMI design characteristics would be
most helpful to include in an NCAP rating that focuses on ease of
use? What research data exist to support objectively characterizing
ease of use for vehicle controls and displays?
(68) What are specific countermeasures or approaches to mitigate
driver distraction, and what are the associated effectiveness
metrics that may be feasible and appropriate for inclusion in the
NCAP program? Methods may include driver monitoring and action
strategies, HMI design considerations, expanded in-motion secondary
task lockouts, phone application/notification limitations while
paired with the vehicle, etc.
(69) What distraction mitigation measures could be considered
for NCAP credit?
(70) Are there opportunities for including alcohol-impairment
technology in NCAP? What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests
could be considered? Could voluntary deployment or adoption be
positively influenced through NCAP credit?
(71) How can NCAP procedures be described in objective terms
that could be inclusive of various approaches, such as detection
systems and inference systems? Are there particular challenges with
any approach that may need special considerations? What supporting
research data exist that document relevant performance factors such
as sensing accuracy and detection algorithm efficacy?
(72) When a system detects alcohol-impairment during the course
of a trip, what actions could the system take in a safe manner? What
are the safety considerations related to various options that
manufacturers may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, performing
a safe stop, pulling over, or flasher activation)? How should
various actions be considered for NCAP credit?
(73) What is known related to consumer acceptance of alcohol-
impaired driving detection and mitigation functions, and how may
that differ with respect to direct measurement approaches versus
estimation techniques using a driver monitoring system? What
consumer interest or feedback data exist relating to this topic? Are
there privacy concerns or privacy protection strategies with various
approaches? What are the related privacy protection strategies?
(74) Should NCAP consider credit for a seat belt reminder system
with a continuous or intermittent audible signal that does not cease
until the seat belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 second
FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? What data are available to support
associated effectiveness? Are certain audible signal characteristics
more effective than others?
(75) Is there an opportunity for including a seat belt interlock
assessment in NCAP?
(76) If the Agency were to encourage seat belt interlock
adoption through NCAP, should all interlock system approaches be
considered, or only certain types? If so, which ones? What metrics
could be evaluated for each? Should differing credit be applied
depending upon interlock system approach?
(77) Should seat belt interlocks be considered for all seating
positions in the vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there be an
opportunity for differentiation in this respect?
(78) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
consumer acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/or persistent
seat belt reminder systems in vehicles? What consumer interest or
feedback data exist on this topic?
(79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity in a selectable feature
that could be optionally engaged such as in the context of a ``teen
mode'' feature?
(80) Should NHTSA take into consideration systems, such as
intelligent speed assist systems, which determine current speed
limits and warn the driver or adjust the maximum traveling speed
accordingly? Should there be a differentiation between warning and
intervention type intelligent speed assist systems in this
consideration? Should systems that allow for some small amount of
speeding over the limit before intervening be treated the same or
differently than systems that are specifically keyed to a road's
speed limit? What about for systems that allow driver override
versus systems that do not?
(81) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
evaluating speed assist system functionality?
(82) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
consumer acceptance of intelligent speed assist systems? What
consumer interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
(83) Are there other means that the Agency should consider to
prevent excessive speeding?
(84) If NHTSA considers this technology for inclusion in NCAP,
are door logic solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only consider
systems that detect the presence of a child?
(85) What research data exist to substantiate differences in
effectiveness of these system types?
(86) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
evaluating these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems?
(87) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
consumer acceptance of integrated rear seat child reminder systems
in vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback data exist on this
topic?
VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
(88) What approaches are most effective to provide consumers
with vehicle safety ratings that provide meaningful information and
discriminate performance of vehicles among the fleet?
(89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/body regions that
are not part of the existing 5-star ratings system appropriate for
use in a points-based calculation of future star ratings? Some
injury criteria do not have associated risk curves. Are these
regions appropriate to include, and if so, what is the appropriate
method by which to include them?
(90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings system
continue to measure a vehicle's performance based on a known or
expected fleet average performer, or should it return to an absolute
system of rating vehicles?
(91) Considering the basic structure of the current ratings
system (combined injury risk), the potential overlapping target
populations for crashworthiness and ADAS program elements, as well
as other potential concepts mentioned in this document such as a
points-based system, what would the best method of calculating the
vehicle fleet average performance be?
(92) Should the vehicle fleet average performance be updated at
regular intervals, and if so, how often?
(93) What is the most appropriate way to disseminate these
updates or changes to the public?
(94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5-star ratings with half-
star increments?
(95) Should the Agency assign star ratings using a decimal
format in addition to or in place of whole- or half-stars?
(96) Should the Agency continue to include rollover resistance
evaluations in its future overall ratings?
IX. Other Activities
(97) Considering the Agency's goal of maintaining the integrity
of the program, should NHTSA accept self-reported test data that is
generated by test laboratories that are not NHTSA's contracted test
laboratories? If no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most
relevant for evaluating whether a given laboratory can acceptably
conduct ADAS performance tests for NCAP such that the program's
credibility is upheld?
(98) As the ADAS assessment program in NCAP continues to grow in
the future to include new ADAS technologies and more complex test
procedures, what other means would best address the following
program challenges: Methods of data collection, maintaining data
integrity and public trust, and managing test failures, particularly
during verification testing?
(99) What is the potential for consumer confusion if information
on the Monroney label and on the website differs, and how can this
confusion be lessened?
(100) What types of vehicles do consumers compare during their
search for a new vehicle? Do consumers often consider vehicles with
different body styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large sport
utility)?
(101) When searching for vehicle safety information, do
consumers have a clear understanding for which vehicles they are
seeking information, or do they browse through vehicle ratings to
identify vehicles they may wish to purchase?
(102) When classifying vehicles by body style, what degree of
classification is most appropriate? For example, when purchasing a
passenger vehicle, do consumers consider all passenger vehicles, or
are they inclined to narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset
[[Page 13520]]
of passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger vehicle)?
(103) Within the context of the updates considered in this
notice, what is the most important top-level safety-related
information that consumers should be able to compare amongst
vehicles? Which of these pieces of information should consumers be
able to use to sort and filter search results?
Appendix C. History of Relevant Events and Documents Pertaining to This
Notice
A. April 5, 2013 Request for Comments
On April 5, 2013, NHTSA published an RFC notice \261\ asking the
public to ``help identify the potential areas of study for
improvement to the program that have the greatest potential for
producing safety benefits.'' Specifically, NHTSA requested comments
on areas in which the Agency believed enhancements to NCAP could be
made either in the short term or over a longer period of time.
Several ADAS applications were discussed for possible future
inclusion in the crash avoidance program in NCAP, including blind
spot warning, lane keeping assistance, crash imminent braking,
dynamic brake support, and pedestrian detection and intervention
systems.
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\261\ 78 FR 20597 (Apr. 5, 2013).
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A total of 68 organizations or individuals submitted comments in
response to the April 2013 notice. The comments received from
stakeholders, though generally supportive of making improvements to
NCAP's crash avoidance program by including assessment of additional
ADAS technologies, exhibited disagreement about how and when a
particular technology should be added to the program. Specifically,
these disagreements included the conditions under which these
technologies should be incorporated into NCAP.
Generally, most commenters supported the assessment of ADAS
technologies, such as CIB, DBS, and rearward pedestrian detection,
in NCAP. There was also support from commenters on the addition of
pedestrian safety assessment in NCAP. However, opinions varied
regarding whether an active and/or passive pedestrian safety program
should be included in NCAP. Moreover, consumer demand for blind spot
warning technology resulted in many commenters recommending the
technology for inclusion in NCAP.
Many commenters encouraged NHTSA to ensure that any program area
considered for inclusion in NCAP should have the necessary
supporting data (e.g., safety benefits) and address a safety need.
Furthermore, many commenters (including both vehicle manufacturers
and safety advocate groups) asked the Agency to also consider a
regulatory, as well as a non-regulatory (NCAP) approach, for any
vehicle safety improvements--especially regarding the introduction
of new advanced crash test dummies. Vehicle manufacturers requested
that the Agency consider providing sufficient lead time for
implementation of any program update. Lastly, many commenters
recommended harmonizing test procedures, test requirements, test
devices, and the like with other government agencies and standards
development organizations, such as the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), SAE International (SAE), and other
consumer information programs worldwide.
B. January 28, 2015 Request for Comment and November 5, 2015 Final
Decision
On January 28, 2015, in response to favorable feedback received
on crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic brake support (DBS)
through the 2013 RFC, NHTSA published an RFC proposing to add these
technologies to NCAP.\262\ On November 5, 2015, NHTSA issued the
final decision to include these technologies, which became effective
for model year 2018 vehicles.\263\
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\262\ 80 FR 4630 (Jan. 28, 2015).
\263\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
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C. December 4, 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act
On December 4, 2015, the President signed the Fixing America's
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which included a section that
requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to ensure crash avoidance
information is displayed along with crashworthiness information on
window stickers placed on motor vehicles by their
manufacturers.\264\ At the time the FAST Act was enacted, NHTSA was
already in the process of developing an RFC notice to present many
proposed updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of several new
ADAS and a corresponding update of the Monroney label.
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\264\ Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the
``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
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D. December 16, 2015 Request for Comments
On December 16, 2015, NHTSA published a broad RFC notice seeking
comment on using enhanced tools and techniques for evaluating the
safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and stimulating further
vehicle safety developments.\265\ On the crashworthiness front, the
RFC sought comment on establishment of a new frontal oblique test
and use of the more advanced crash test dummies in all tests. The
RFC also sought comment on creation of a new crash avoidance rating
category and included nine advanced crash avoidance technologies.
Additionally, the RFC sought comment on creation of a new pedestrian
protection rating category involving the use of adult and child
head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and two new pedestrian
crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on combining
the three categories into one overall 5-star rating.
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\265\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
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In response to the notice, NHTSA received more than 300
comments, more than 200 of which were from individuals supporting
comments made by the League of American Bicyclists. More than 30
individuals filed comments addressing a specific program area or
several topics in the RFC.
The Agency also received responses to the notice at two public
hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on January 14, 2016, and the
second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in Washington, DC, on January
29, 2016. By request, NHTSA also held several meetings with
stakeholders.\266\
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\266\ See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119 for a
full listing of the commenters and the comments they submitted, as
well as records of the public hearings and smaller meetings relating
to the RFC that occurred.
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In response to the notice, commenters raised many issues
involving both supporting data for the proposed changes and
procedural concerns. Commenters stated that the public comment
period was inadequate for purposes of responding because of the
complexity of the program described in the RFC, and claimed that the
technical information supporting the notice was not sufficient to
allow a full understanding of the contemplated changes. According to
the commenters, this hindered their ability to prepare substantive
comments in response to the notice. In addition, most vehicle
manufacturers stated that the significant cost burden associated
with fitment of the proposed new technologies and the inclusion of a
new crash test and new test dummies would increase the price of new
vehicles. Manufacturers also noted that the advanced crash test
dummies described in the RFC were not yet standardized and needed
additional work. Manufacturers, along with safety advocates, further
expressed the need for data demonstrating that each proposed program
change would provide sufficient safety improvement to warrant its
inclusion in NCAP. In addition, several commenters suggested that
NHTSA develop near-term and long-term roadmaps for NCAP and revise
NCAP in a more gradual, ``phased'' approach.\267\
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\267\ For example, one commenter, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, recommended ``that NHTSA revise NCAP in phases to
maintain a data-driven, science-based foundation for the program by,
in part, completing the standardization, federalization, and
docketing of all ATDs and test fixtures to be used in NCAP.''
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E. October 1, 2018 Public Meeting
In response to the issues raised by those who commented on the
December 2015 notice and in light of the FAST Act mandate \268\
NHTSA issued a notice announcing its plan to host a public meeting
to re-engage stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the
Agency plan the future of NCAP. Interested parties were also able to
submit written comments to the docket.\269\
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\268\ Section 24322 ``Passenger Motor Vehicle Information'' of
this Act requires the Secretary of the Department of Transportation
to issue a rule no later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act
``to ensure that crash avoidance information is indicated next to
crashworthiness information on stickers placed on motor vehicles by
their manufacturers.''
\269\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2018-0055.
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Thirty-five parties participated in the public meeting, 32 of
which submitted written comments to the docket. Additional written
comments were submitted by others who did not attend the public
meeting. These commenters included: Automobile manufacturers,
consumer organizations, suppliers, industry associations, academia,
individuals, and other organizations. A large
[[Page 13521]]
number of individuals submitted comments requesting that NCAP
account for pedestrians and bicyclists in its rating system, as
members of the League of American Bicyclists.
Many commenters said an update to NCAP was taking too long. The
prominent theme from the commenters included the request for an NCAP
roadmap that lays out planned changes to the program and details
when those changes are likely to occur. Some commenters pointed to
the roadmaps of Euro NCAP. In addition, many of the comments focused
on ADAS and the need for NCAP to stimulate further the incorporation
of these technologies on vehicles. While supporting an overall
rating, many commenters stated that the individual ratings for the
crashworthiness and ADAS programs should be part of the new ratings
system and be made available to consumers. Automaker commenters
suggested that any changes to NCAP should allow adequate time for
manufacturers to incorporate vehicle design changes in response to
NCAP updates. Some commenters suggested that a vehicle's attributes
and status following a crash (e.g., notifying appropriate
authorities) should be part of NCAP ratings as well.
Several commenters said changes to NCAP should be supported by
sound science and data and address the safety problem with potential
effectiveness of any countermeasure being rated. Some commenters
also suggested that NCAP's promotion of ADAS technologies will lay
the groundwork for automated driving systems (ADS). Several
commenters suggested that there should be as much harmonization as
possible with related global vehicle rating programs to minimize the
cost and testing burden on vehicle manufacturers. Most commenters
supported the idea that NHTSA continue to accept manufacturer-
conducted, self-reported test results as evidence that the vehicles
are equipped with one or more NCAP-recommended technologies (i.e.,
that the Agency does not need to verify that the ADAS meet the NCAP
system performance requirements).
Some commenters noted that NHTSA has yet to implement the
requirement of the 2015 FAST Act to provide crash avoidance
information on the Monroney label. Those who commented on this issue
generally supported moving forward and completing this as soon as
possible. A few additional commenters addressed the issue of
possible new crash test dummies used in NCAP, but indicated that any
new dummies should be ``Federalized'' by adding the dummies into 49
CFR part 572, ``Anthropomorphic test devices,'' before incorporating
them into NCAP.
Regarding the dissemination and promotion of NCAP's vehicle
safety information, some of the commenters urged the expanded use of
new media and other technological approaches to communicating NCAP
vehicle safety information. Others recommended that there should be
traditional public information ``campaigns'' to make the public more
aware of NCAP. Commenters requested a more robust search capability
on NHTSA's website, particularly to facilitate consumer comparisons
of vehicles within a class.
Among those addressing the utility and effectiveness of the 5-
star ratings system, all supported the continued use of star ratings
with some suggesting that the use of half-star increments would be a
way to introduce more differentiation between vehicles and provide
an incentive for manufacturers to improve vehicle safety in
situations where doing so would result in an additional half star.
One commenter suggested a 10-star rating system.
Comments were split on the question of whether new crash tests
should be added to NCAP. Some supported adjusting the baseline
injury risks associated with crashworthiness ratings. One commenter
stated that NCAP should not pursue differentiation just for the sake
of differentiation, instead suggesting that the highest priority
should be to examine the correlation and validity of the current
star rating system with real-world injury data. Several commenters
suggested that there be a silver star rating as part of NCAP that
would highlight safety aspects of vehicles that are of importance to
older drivers. Others who commented on providing vehicle safety
information for specific demographic groups either opposed the idea
of information directed at demographic groups, expressed concerns,
or said additional research is needed.
Issued in Washington, DC, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.95 and 501.5.
Steven S. Cliff,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2022-04894 Filed 3-8-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P