[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 42 (Thursday, March 3, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 11986-11990]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04052]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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  Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 42 / Thursday, March 3, 2022 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 11986]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-112; NRC-2015-0213]


Determining Which Structures, Systems, Components and Functions 
Are Important to Safety

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a 
petition for rulemaking (PRM), dated July 20, 2015, and supplemented on 
August 31, 2015, submitted by Kurt T. Schaefer (the petitioner). The 
petition was docketed by the NRC on September 4, 2015, and was assigned 
Docket No. PRM-50-112. The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its 
regulations to define the term ``important to safety'' and provide a 
set of specific criteria for determining which structures, systems, 
components and functions are ``important to safety.'' The NRC is 
denying the petition because the issue raised does not involve a 
significant safety or security concern, and the existing NRC 
regulations, guidance, and procedures adequately address the issue 
raised in the PRM. A prescriptive approach that defines criteria for 
structures, systems, components and functions ``important to safety'' 
would likely have unintended consequences for the licensing bases of 
the current operating fleet and could reduce operational flexibility 
without providing a clear safety benefit. The NRC's current regulations 
continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of 
public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and 
protect the environment.

DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking PRM-50-112 is closed 
on March 3, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0213 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may 
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of 
the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0213. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Dawn Forder; telephone: 301-415-3407; 
email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the 
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, 
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are 
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make 
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (ET), Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stacy Joseph, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301-415-3256, email: 
[email protected], U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. The Petition

    Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking--requirements for filing,'' provides an 
opportunity for any person to petition the Commission to issue, amend, 
or rescind any regulation. On July 20, 2015, the NRC received a PRM 
from Mr. Kurt T. Schaefer (the petitioner), which was supplemented on 
August 31, 2015. The NRC assigned this PRM the docket number of PRM-50-
112. On January 6, 2016 (81 FR 410), the NRC published a notice of 
docketing and request for comment in the Federal Register. The 
petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations in Sec.  50.2, 
``Definitions,'' of 10 CFR part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production 
and Utilization Facilities,'' to include a definition with specific 
criteria for determining what structures, systems, components (SSCs) 
and functions are ``important to safety.'' The petitioner stated that 
``[t]he nuclear industry is on its third generation of engineers and 
regulators with no clear definition of what is `important to safety' '' 
and that ``there is no excuse for not having a concise set of 
functional criteria defining such a used term.''
    The petitioner noted that the ``NRC staff's current position is 
that SSCs `important to safety' consists of two subcategories, `safety-
related' and `non-safety-related.' '' The petitioner stated that while 
safety-related SSCs are defined in Sec.  50.2, ``the regulations do not 
provide an equivalent set of criteria for determining which non-safety-
related SSCs are `important to safety.' '' The petitioner noted that 
there is very little agreement about what ``non-safety-related 
structures, systems and components (SSCs) should be categorized as 
`important to safety.' '' Furthermore, the petitioner stated that 
``there is only a general description of what is `important to safety' 
in 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, [`General Design Criteria for Nuclear 
Power Plants,'] and the regulations do not provide a specific set of 
criteria for determining which SSCs are `important to safety.' '' The 
petitioner stated that ``NRC Generic Letter (GL) 84-01, ``NRC use of 
the terms, `Important to Safety' and `Safety-Related','' and its 
attachments, clarified the NRC staff's use of these terms, but did not 
``provide a specific set of criteria for determining which non-safety-
related SSCs are to be categorized as `important to safety.' '' The 
petitioner stated that, ``there are regulations, regulatory guidance 
and routinely generated regulatory evaluations, based on SSCs with no 
specific criteria that determines what are the applicable SSCs.'' In 
the petition, the petitioner recommended text and specific criteria for 
the definition of ``important to safety.''

[[Page 11987]]

II. Public Comments on the Petition

    On January 6, 2016, the NRC requested comments from the public on 
the petition. As part of the request for public comments, the NRC also 
requested (1) any new information and analysis that could provide the 
basis for changes to the NRC's regulations, (2) specific examples where 
the lack of a formal NRC definition of the terms ``safety related'' and 
``important to safety'' directly resulted in adverse consequences to 
external stakeholders, (3) the regulations that would require revision 
to reflect the new definition and the nature (objective) of the 
revision for each provision of the regulation that must be revised, and 
(4) any guidance needed to implement the new definition, including what 
the scope should be, level of detail, and content of the guidance.
    The comment period closed on March 21, 2016, and the NRC received 
12 comment submissions containing a total of 102 individual comments. A 
comment submission is a communication or document submitted to the NRC 
by an individual or entity with one or more individual comments 
addressing a subject or issue. Seven of the public comment submissions 
opposed the petition, three supported the petition, and two were 
responses from the petitioner to other comment submissions. Three of 
the public comment submissions were received after the end of the 
comment period, but the NRC considered them in the comment analysis. 
All of the comment submissions received on this petition are available 
as indicated in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this 
document and on https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2015-
0213.
    The NRC addressed the comments in a separate document, ``NRC 
Response to Public Comments for PRM-50-112,'' as listed in the 
``Availability of Documents'' section of this document. A brief summary 
of these comments and the NRC's responses is included here.
    Several comment submissions opposing the petition indicate that 
nuclear power plant applicants and licensees have an existing 
understanding of the safety classification terms as applied to their 
nuclear power plants and do not see the need for a specific definition 
of ``important to safety'' for SSCs at all nuclear power plants in 
Sec.  50.2. Several comment submissions opposing the petition also 
assert that the specification of a definition of ``important to 
safety'' in Sec.  50.2 might result in confusion among nuclear power 
plant applicants and licensees over the classification of the SSCs at 
their nuclear power plants. Several comment submissions opposing the 
petition also indicate that significant costs might be involved with 
the development and implementation of a definition of ``important to 
safety'' for SSCs at all nuclear power plants that would outweigh the 
benefits of such an effort.
    Several comment submissions supporting the petition suggest that a 
specific definition for ``important to safety'' in Sec.  50.2 for SSCs 
at all nuclear power plants would resolve uncertainty regarding the 
scope of SSCs classified as ``important to safety'' and help improve 
safety at nuclear power plants. Comment submissions supporting the 
petition also stated that a specific definition of ``important to 
safety'' in the NRC regulations would help reduce cost for nuclear 
power plant applicants and licensees by providing regulatory certainty. 
Several comment submissions supporting the petition recommend that a 
definition of ``important to safety'' should be consistent or 
compatible with the safety classification methods developed, or under 
development, by other organizations.

III. Reasons for Denial

    The NRC is denying the petition because the issue raised in the 
petition does not involve a significant safety or security concern and 
because the existing NRC regulations, guidance, and procedures 
adequately address the issue raised in the petition. More specifically, 
the NRC is denying the petition because the proposed rulemaking effort 
to define ``important to safety'' in Sec.  50.2 for SSCs and their 
functions at all nuclear power plants does not have a safety benefit 
for nuclear power plants under 10 CFR part 50 and part 52, ``Licenses, 
Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.'' The NRC 
maintains that a strong regulatory framework including a clear 
understanding of regulatory terminology is important to provide 
adequate protection of public health and safety. The NRC's current 
regulatory framework is supported by the well-established understanding 
of terminology such as ``important to safety,'' as documented in 
regulatory guidance, policy, and licensee and applicant documentation.
    The NRC agrees with the petitioner that a specific definition of 
``important to safety'' for SSCs and their functions at all nuclear 
power plants is not provided in Sec.  50.2. As noted by the petitioner, 
the history of the terms ``important to safety'' and ``safety-related'' 
has not been straightforward. However, a rulemaking effort to define 
``important to safety'' in Sec.  50.2 for SSCs and their functions at 
all nuclear power plants does not present a safety benefit for nuclear 
power plants under 10 CFR parts 50 and 52 and the existing regulatory 
framework provides adequate protection.

Historic Guidance and Rulemaking Activity on Defining ``Important to 
Safety''

    The evolution of the different uses of safety classification terms 
at the NRC has a lengthy, complicated regulatory history. For example, 
the meaning of ``important to safety'' and ``safety-related'' was a 
topic of discussion following the accident at the Three Mile Island, 
Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant in 1979 and during the subsequent 
litigation. Specifically, in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal 
Board Decision in the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Company, et al. 
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1) dated May 26, 1983 
(ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983)), the Appeal Board confirmed the 
distinction between the use of the terms ``important to safety'' and 
``safety-related'' during the litigation of the restart of the TMI-1 
nuclear power plant.
    After the TMI-2 accident evaluation, numerous NRC documents 
addressed the distinction between the ``important to safety'' and 
``safety-related'' classifications of SSCs at nuclear power plants. For 
example, the NRC documented its position on the meaning of ``important 
to safety'' in a staff memorandum dated November 20, 1981, from Harold 
R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), to all 
NRR personnel. This memorandum specifies the proper use of ``important 
to safety'' and ``safety-related'' by the NRC staff. Specifically, the 
1981 Denton memorandum states that `` `important to safety' encompasses 
the broad class of plant features, covered (not necessarily explicitly) 
in the General Design Criteria, that contribute in [an] important way 
to safe operation and protection of the public in all phases and 
aspects of facility operation (i.e., normal operation and transient 
control as well as accident mitigation).'' The 1981 Denton memorandum 
further states that ``important to safety'' includes ``safety-related'' 
as a subset. Subsequently, in December 1983, Harold R. Denton wrote a 
letter to the Utility Safety Classification Group restating the 
position taken in the 1981 memorandum and explaining the historical 
acceptance of the distinction between these terms. The 1983 Denton 
letter also stated that ``NRC regulatory

[[Page 11988]]

jurisdiction involving a safety matter is not controlled by the use of 
terms such as `safety related' or `important to safety.' '' Generic 
Letter 84-01 reiterated this distinction in terminology to nuclear 
power plant applicants and licensees and included the 1983 Denton 
letter as an enclosure.
    Relatedly, in NUREG-0660, Volume 1, ``NRC Action Plan Developed as 
a Result of the TMI-2 Accident,'' dated May 1980, the NRC staff 
proposed numerous TMI-2 Action Plan items to provide assurance of 
nuclear power plant safety, including Item I.F, ``Quality Assurance,'' 
to improve the quality assurance (QA) program for design, construction, 
and operations to provide greater assurance that plant design, 
construction, and operational activities are conducted in a manner 
commensurate with their importance to safety. In Item I.F.1, ``Expand 
QA list,'' the NRC staff proposed the development of guidance for 
licensees to expand their QA lists to cover equipment ``important to 
safety'' and rank the equipment in order of its importance to safety. 
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,'' dated 
November 1980, provided the list of TMI-2 Action Plan items that were 
subsequently approved by the Commission for implementation (which did 
not include Item I.F.1). As noted in NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of 
Generic Safety Issues,'' Section 1, ``TMI Action Plan Items,'' Item 
I.F.1 was considered resolved, with any further guidance to be 
addressed through the normal processes. Therefore, the list and ranking 
of ``important to safety'' equipment proposed in Item I.F.1 was not 
created because the NRC determined it was not needed at the time.
    In Memorandum and Order (CLI-84-9), ``In the Matter of Long Island 
Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),'' June 5, 
1984, the Commission recognized that ``the history of the use of the 
terms `important to safety' and `safety-related' is tortuous and 
somewhat inconsistent.'' The Commission directed the NRC staff to 
proceed with rulemaking on the use of the terms ``important to safety'' 
and ``safety-related.'' In SECY-85-119, ``Issuance of Proposed Rule on 
the Important to Safety Issue,'' dated April 5, 1985, the NRC staff 
provided to the Commission a proposed rule to define ``important to 
safety'' for SSCs at nuclear power plants. In the staff requirements 
memorandum (SRM) for SECY-85-119, ``Issuance of Proposed Rule on the 
Important-to-Safety Issue,'' dated December 31, 1985, the Commission 
disapproved SECY-85-119 and provided direction to NRC staff for 
redrafting a proposed definition of ``important to safety.'' In SECY-
86-164, ``Proposed Rule on the Important to Safety Issue,'' dated May 
29, 1986, the NRC staff provided a revised version of a proposed 
definition of ``important to safety'' for Commission consideration, and 
also reviewed the existing use of this term in the NRC's regulations. 
By June 1987, three of four Commissioners voted 2-1 to disapprove the 
proposed rule, but no further action was taken. As documented in a 
memorandum dated June 24, 1991, from Samuel J. Chilk, SECY closed SECY-
86-164 on the basis that informal discussions between the staff in the 
NRC Office of the Executive Director for Operations (OEDO) and Office 
of the Secretary indicated that there may no longer be any need for the 
Commission to address the issues in SECY-18-164. Since that time, the 
NRC staff has not engaged in further rulemaking action to define 
``important to safety.''

Use of ``Important to Safety'' in NRC Regulations

    The term ``important to safety'' first appeared in appendix A to 10 
CFR part 50, published as a final rule in the Federal Register on 
February 20, 1971 (36 FR 03255). However, when appendix A and appendix 
B, ``Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel 
Reprocessing Plants,'' to 10 CFR part 50 were developed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the NRC focused its regulatory activities on a 
deterministic approach for safety-related SSCs, and allowed licensees 
to address much of the design and treatment of other SSCs in licensee 
documents. For example, final safety analysis reports (FSARs) for 
nuclear power plants typically have described some SSCs that are 
``important to safety'' but are not classified as ``safety-related'' 
and that have a reduced amount of NRC regulatory treatment compared 
with ``safety-related'' SSCs. Over time, the NRC developed regulations 
that address SSCs beyond those classified as ``safety-related.'' For 
example, the NRC specifies requirements for a wide range of SSCs, 
including SSCs that are important to safety but not classified as 
``safety-related,'' in Sec.  50.49, ``Environmental qualification of 
electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants''; 
Sec.  50.62, ``Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated 
transients without scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear 
power plants''; Sec.  50.63, ``Loss of all alternating current power''; 
and Sec.  50.65, ``Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of 
maintenance at nuclear power plants.''
    In addition, the term ``important to safety'' appears in several 
reactor fire protection regulations. The NRC regulations in Sec.  
50.48, ``Fire protection,'' require that each operating nuclear power 
plant have a fire protection plan that satisfies General Design 
Criterion (GDC) 3, ``Fire protection,'' of appendix A to 10 CFR part 
50. GDC 3 requires that SSCs that are ``important to safety'' be 
designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety 
requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. 
Section II.A of appendix R, ``Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power 
Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' to 10 CFR part 50 in 
states that the fire protection program shall extend the concept of 
defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas that are ``important 
to safety,'' with the objectives of dealing with prevention, detection, 
and protection.
    For conformance with fire protection requirements, Sec.  50.48(c) 
permits operating plants to voluntarily transition their deterministic 
fire protection program to one based on risk-informed and performance-
based requirements using National Fire Protection Association Standard 
(NFPA) 805, ``Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light 
Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,'' 2001 Edition. Section 
50.48(c) also establishes an alternative regulatory structure for fire 
protection and permits licensees to voluntarily adopt NFPA 805, which 
would allow licensees the option to use a risk-informed, performance-
based approach to change the deterministic fire protection 
configurations and procedures of their operating reactors. Licensees 
adopting a risk informed approach for conformance with fire protection 
programs did not change the safety classification of their equipment--
rather, they maintained fire protection areas that are considered 
``important to safety'' under a deterministic approach within the scope 
of the program. Almost all nuclear power plants that transitioned to 
the Sec.  50.48(c) regulatory structure performed plant modifications 
that resulted in a decrease in the plant core damage frequency. If the 
modifications required installation of non-safety-related equipment, 
the additional modifications were considered ``important to safety,'' 
as the equipment was required to safely shutdown the plant following a 
fire event but not required to mitigate the consequences of an 
accident.
    More recently, the NRC regulations in Sec.  50.69, ``Risk-informed 
categorization and treatment of structures, systems and components for 
nuclear power

[[Page 11989]]

reactors,'' allow nuclear power plant licensees to request, in a 
license amendment, the implementation of risk-informed categorization 
and treatment of SSCs at their nuclear power plants. The scope of Sec.  
50.69 extends beyond safety-related SSCs and addresses the wider range 
of SSCs, i.e., SSCs that would be considered ``important to safety'' at 
the specific nuclear power plant. Further, the NRC requires in Sec.  
50.55a(b)(3)(iii)(D) that certain licensees assess the operational 
readiness of pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints within the scope of 
the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) that are not 
classified as safety-related, but provide defense-in-depth for new 
reactors with passive cooling systems (such as the AP1000 reactor 
design) (see 82 FR 32934; July 18, 2017). The RTNSS components in new 
reactors with passive cooling systems would be considered ``important 
to safety'' at those specific nuclear power plants.
    In sum, these issues provide additional examples of the consistent 
understanding and treatment of ``important to safety'' in the existing 
regulatory framework, and illustrate how licensees and applicants may 
identify the safety characterization of SSCs in their documentation 
without a set of prescriptive criteria for determining which SSCs are 
important to safety. As illustrated in the previous discussion, the NRC 
has over time addressed SSCs classified as ``important to safety'' in 
different ways in its requirements, and in doing so, has established a 
framework that uses this safety classification terminology without the 
need for a prescriptive definition in Sec.  50.2.

Basis for Denial

    Based on many years of experience with the current safety 
classification terminology, nuclear power plant applicants and 
licensees under 10 CFR part 50 and part 52 have an established 
understanding of the importance to safety for all SSCs in nuclear power 
plants as documented in their specific licensing basis documentation 
(e.g., Final Safety Analysis Reports or Design Control Documents). In 
addition, the NRC and licensees have a common understanding of the 
foundation of what constitutes ``important to safety'' as demonstrated 
in the guidance documents and generic communications discussed 
previously (e.g., the 1981 memorandum from Harold R. Denton to the NRR 
staff, 1983 letter from Harold R. Denton to the Utility Safety 
Classification Group, and Generic Letter 84-01). Moreover, the NRC 
reviews safety classification information in applications on a case-by-
case basis. The petitioner has not provided, and NRC staff has not 
identified, a safety reason to create criteria, either prescriptive or 
performance based, defining ``important to safety'' in Sec.  50.2.
    As a result, a rulemaking effort to add a definition for 
``important to safety'' for SSCs and their functions in Sec.  50.2 does 
not have a safety benefit for nuclear power plants under 10 CFR parts 
50 and 52. Further, the NRC's current regulatory framework is supported 
by the well-established understanding and application of terminology 
such as ``important to safety,'' as documented in regulatory guidance, 
policy, and licensee and applicant documentation.

IV. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Document                              ADAMS accession No./Federal Register citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generic Letter 1984-01, ``NRC Use of the Terms,          ML031150515.
 `Important to Safety' and Safety Related','' dated
 January 5, 1984.
Letter dated December 19, 1983, from Harold R. Denton,   ML17150A235.
 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to
 T.S. Ellis, III, Esq., on behalf of the Utility Safety
 Classification Group.
NUREG-0660, Volume 1, ``NRC Action Plan Developed as a   ML072470526.
 Result of the TMI-2 Accident,'' dated May 1980.
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan           ML051400209.
 Requirements,'' dated November 1980.
NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety Issues,''     https://www.nrc.gov/sr0933/.
 Section 1, ``TMI Action Plan Items''.
Staff memorandum dated November 20, 1981, from Harold    ML111230453.
 R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
 Regulation, to all NRR Personnel.
SECY-85-119, ``Issuance of Proposed Rule on the          ML15322A002.
 Important-To-Safety Issue,'' dated April 5, 1985.
SRM-SECY-85-119, ``Issuance of Proposed Rule on the      ML15322A003.
 Important-To-Safety Issue,'' dated December 31, 1985.
SECY-86-164, ``Proposed Rule on the Important-To-Safety  ML15322A005.
 Issue,'' dated May 29, 1986.
Memo from the Secretary of the Commission dated June     ML15322A006.
 24, 1991, withdrawing the proposed rulemaking in SECY-
 86-164.
Federal Register Notice: PRM-50-112, Determining Which   ML15266A002.
 Structures, Systems, Components and Functions are
 Important to Safety, Petition for Rulemaking; Notice
 of Docketing and Request for Comment.
PRM-50-112 Petition from Kurt Schaefer Determining       ML15278A208.
 Which Structures, Systems, Components and Functions
 are Important to Safety.
PRM-50-112 Supplement to Petition from Kurt Schaefer     ML15278A211.
 Determining Which Structures, Systems, Components and
 Functions are Important to Safety.
Memorandum and Order (CLI-84-9), ``In the Matter of      ML20091K598.
 Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power
 Station, Unit 1),'' June 5, 1984.
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1) dated     ML16357A784.
 May 26, 1983 (ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983)).
National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA)-    https://www.nfpa.org/.
 805, ``Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection
 for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,''
 2001 Edition.
Incorporation by Reference of American Society of        82 FR 32934.
 Mechanical Engineers Codes and Code Cases (July 18,
 2017).
NRC Responses to Public Comments for PRM-50-112........  ML21123A223.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NRC may post materials related to this document, including 
public comments, on the Federal rulemaking website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2015-0213.

V. Conclusion

    For the reasons cited in this document, the NRC is denying PRM-50-
112. The petition did not present

[[Page 11990]]

any significant new information or arguments that would warrant the 
requested amendment. Current requirements continue to provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and 
safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the 
environment.

    Dated: February 22, 2022.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2022-04052 Filed 3-2-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P