[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 228 (Wednesday, December 1, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 68203-68212]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-26001]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 1 and 73

[AU Docket No. 21-449; DA 21-1444; FR ID 59514]


Auction of Construction Permits for Full Power Television 
Stations; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 
112

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule; proposed auction procedures.

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SUMMARY: The Office of Economics and Analytics and the Media Bureau 
seek

[[Page 68204]]

comment on the procedures to be used for Auction 112, an auction of 
construction permits for full power television (FPTV) stations. OEA and 
MB expect the bidding for Auction 112 to commence in June 2022.

DATES: Comments are due on or before December 13, 2021, and reply 
comments are due on or before December 23, 2021. Bidding in this 
auction is expected to commence in June 2022.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file comments or reply comments in AU 
Docket No. 21-449. Comments may be filed using the Commission's 
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) All filings in response to the 
Public Notice must refer to AU Docket No. 21-449.
     Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the internet by accessing the ECFS at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
     Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must 
file an original and one copy of each filing.
     Filings in response to the Public Notice can be sent by 
commercial courier or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service 
mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, 
Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
     Commercial deliveries (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Dr., 
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
     U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, or Priority mail 
must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
     Until further notice, the Commission no longer accepts any 
hand or messenger delivered filings. This is a temporary measure taken 
to help protect the health and safety of individuals, and to mitigate 
the transmission of COVID-19.
     Email: Commenters are asked to also submit a copy of their 
comments and reply comments electronically to the following address: 
[email protected].
     People with Disabilities: To request materials in 
accessible formats (braille, large print, electronic files, audio 
format) for people with disabilities, send an email to [email protected] 
or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 
(voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    Auction legal questions: Mary Lovejoy, (202) 418-0660, 
[email protected], Andrew McArdell, (202) 418-0660, 
[email protected].
    General auction questions: Auction Hotline at (717) 338-2868.
    Full power television station service questions: Shaun Maher 
(legal), (202) 418-2324, [email protected], or Kevin Harding 
(technical questions), (202) 418-7077, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Public Notice 
(Auction 112 Comment Public Notice), AU Docket No. 21-449, DA 21-1444, 
released on November 19, 2021. The Auction 112 Comment Public Notice 
includes the following attachments: Attachment A, Construction Permits 
in Auction 112. The complete text of the Auction 112 Comment Public 
Notice, including its attachment, is available on the Commission's 
website at http://www.fcc.gov/auction/112 or by using the search 
function for AU Docket No. 21-449 on the Commission's ECFS web page at 
www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Alternative formats are available to persons with 
disabilities by sending an email to [email protected] or by calling the 
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 
418-0432 (TTY).

I. Introduction

    1. By the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice, the Office of 
Economics and Analytics (OEA) and the Media Bureau (MB) of the Federal 
Communications Commission (Commission) seek comment on the procedures 
to be used for Auction 112, an auction of construction permits for full 
power television (FPTV) stations. OEA and MB expect the bidding for 
Auction 112 to commence in June 2022.

II. Construction Permits To Be Offered in Auction 112

    2. Auction 112 will offer 27 construction permits for FPTV 
stations. The permits that will be available in Auction 112 are listed 
in Attachment A to the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice.
    3. The permits that will be available in Auction 112 are for 
channel allotments contained in the Table of Television Allotments (TV 
Table) and assigned at the indicated communities for which there 
currently is not a licensee. Each permit awarded will be for one of the 
allotted-but-unlicensed channels currently contained in the TV Table.

III. Implementation of Part 1 and Part 73 Competitive Bidding Rules and 
Requirements

    4. Consistent with the provisions of section 309(j)(3)(E)(i) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (the Act), and to ensure that potential 
bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific 
rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, OEA and MB 
seek comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures relating to 
the conduct of Auction 112.
    5. The Commission's part 1 and part 73 competitive bidding rules 
require each applicant seeking to bid to acquire a construction permit 
in a broadcast auction to provide certain information in a short-form 
application (FCC Form 175), including ownership details and numerous 
certifications. The competitive bidding rules in part 1, subpart Q, and 
part 73 also contain a framework for the implementation of a 
competitive bidding design, application and certification procedures, 
reporting requirements, and the prohibition of certain communications.

A. Certification of Notice of Auction 112 Requirements and Procedures

    6. OEA and MB propose to require any party seeking to participate 
in Auction 112 to certify in its short-form application, under penalty 
of perjury, that it has read the public notice adopting procedures for 
the auction and that it has familiarized itself both with the auction 
procedures and with the requirements for obtaining a construction 
permit for an FPTV station. OEA and MB believe that this requirement, 
which was also recently implemented in Auction 110, would help ensure 
that the applicant has reviewed the procedures for participation in the 
auction process and has investigated and evaluated those technical and 
marketplace factors that may have a bearing on its potential use of any 
permits won at auction. Consequently, OEA and MB believe this 
requirement would promote an applicant's successful participation and 
minimize its risk of defaulting on its auction obligations. As with 
other certifications required under 47 CFR 1.2105, an auction 
applicant's failure to make the required certification in its short-
form application by the applicable filing deadline would render its 
application unacceptable for filing, and its application would be 
dismissed with prejudice. OEA and MB seek comment on this proposal. Are 
there alternative procedures that could be implemented that would 
better ensure that an applicant has thoroughly reviewed the auction's 
procedures and considered all relevant factors that may affect its 
participation in the auction and use of any permits for which it is the 
winning bidder?

B. Information Procedures During the Auction Process

    7. OEA and MB propose to limit information available in Auction 112 
to

[[Page 68205]]

discourage unproductive and anti-competitive strategic behavior. 
Accordingly, if this proposal is adopted, OEA and MB will not identify 
bidders placing particular bids until after the bidding has closed. 
While OEA and MB generally make available to the public information 
provided in each applicant's FCC Form 175 following an initial review 
by Commission staff, OEA and MB propose to not make public until after 
bidding has closed: (1) The permits that an applicant selects for 
bidding in its short-form application, (2) the amount of any upfront 
payment made by or on behalf of an applicant, (3) any applicant's 
bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related information that 
might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid. Similarly, this 
nonpublic information may not be communicated from one applicant to 
another. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(1) provides that, subject to specified 
exceptions, all applicants are prohibited from cooperating or 
collaborating with respect to, or communicating with or disclosing to 
each other in any manner, the substance of their own, or each other's, 
or any other applicant's bids or bidding strategies (including post-
auction market structure), or discussing or negotiating settlement 
agreements, until after the deadline for winning bidders to submit down 
payments. ``Applicant'' is defined as including all officers and 
directors of the entity submitting a short form application to 
participate in the auction, all controlling interests of that entity, 
as well as all holders of partnership and other ownership interests and 
any stock interest amounting to 10% or more of the entity, or 
outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting 
a short-form application. A party that submits an application becomes 
an ``applicant'' under the rule at the application filing deadline and 
that status does not change based on later developments.
    8. Under this proposal, OEA and MB would not make public any real-
time information on bidding activity until the close of the auction. 
However, bidders would have access to additional information related to 
their own bidding and bid eligibility before and during the auction via 
the FCC auction bidding system.
    9. Under this proposal, after the close of bidding, bidders' permit 
selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and 
other bidding-related information would be made publicly available.
    10. OEA and MB seek comment on the above details of the proposal 
for implementing limited information procedures, or anonymous bidding, 
in Auction 112. Commenters opposing the use of limited information 
procedures in Auction 112 should explain their reasoning and propose 
alternative information rules.

C. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility

    11. In keeping with the usual practice in spectrum auctions, OEA 
and MB propose that applicants be required to submit upfront payments 
as a prerequisite to becoming qualified to bid. An upfront payment is a 
refundable deposit made by an applicant to establish its eligibility to 
bid on construction permits. Upfront payments that are related to the 
specific construction permits being auctioned protect against frivolous 
or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds 
from which to collect payments owed at the close of bidding.
    12. OEA and MB seek comment on an appropriate upfront payment for 
each construction permit being auctioned, taking into account such 
factors as the efficiency of the auction process and the potential 
value of similar construction permits. With these considerations in 
mind, OEA and MB propose the upfront payments set forth in Attachment A 
to the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice and seek comment on those 
proposed upfront payment amounts.
    13. OEA and MB further propose that the amount of the upfront 
payment submitted by an applicant will determine its initial bidding 
eligibility in bidding units, which are a measure of bidder eligibility 
and bidding activity. OEA and MB propose to assign each construction 
permit a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit 
per one thousand dollars of the upfront payment listed in Attachment A 
to the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice. The number of bidding units 
for a given construction permit is fixed and does not change during the 
auction as prices change. If an applicant is found to be qualified to 
bid on more than one permit being offered in Auction 112, such bidder 
may place bids on multiple construction permits, provided that the 
total number of bidding units associated with those construction 
permits does not exceed that bidder's current eligibility. A bidder 
cannot increase its eligibility during the auction; it can only 
maintain or decrease its eligibility. In calculating its upfront 
payment amount and hence its initial bidding eligibility, an applicant 
must determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish 
to bid (or hold provisionally winning bids) in any single round and 
submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of bidding 
units. OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals.

D. Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices

    14. As part of the pre-bidding process for each auction, OEA and MB 
seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and/or reserve 
price, as mandated by section 309(j) of the Act. OEA and MB propose to 
establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 112. Based on their 
experience in past broadcast auctions, OEA and MB have found that 
setting a minimum opening bid amount judiciously is an effective 
bidding tool for accelerating the competitive bidding process. In the 
most recent television broadcast auctions--for low power television 
(LPTV) construction permits (Auctions 104 and 111)--OEA and MB have 
similarly proposed establishing minimum opening bids but not reserve 
prices; in those auctions, no comments opposed the proposal, and OEA 
and MB adopted it both times. Based on these facts, OEA and MB propose 
establishing minimum opening bids for Auction 112. OEA and MB do not 
propose to establish separate reserve prices for any of the 
construction permits to be offered in Auction 112, nor do OEA and MB 
see any reason to propose an aggregate reserve price for this auction.
    15. For auctions of broadcast permits, OEA and MB generally propose 
minimum opening bid amounts that have been determined by taking into 
account the type of service and class of facility offered, market size, 
population covered by the proposed broadcast facility, and recent 
broadcast transaction data, to the extent such information is 
available. OEA and MB seek comment on the proposed minimum opening bid 
amounts for Auction 112, which are specified in Attachment A to this 
Auction 112 Comment Public Notice.
    16. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts 
will result in unsold construction permits or are not reasonable 
amounts at which to start bidding, they should explain why this is so 
and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters 
should support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested 
amounts or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bid amounts, 
OEA and MB particularly seek comment on factors that could reasonably 
have an impact on bidders' valuation of the broadcast spectrum, 
including the type of service and class

[[Page 68206]]

of facility offered, market size, population covered by the proposed 
broadcast facility and any other relevant factors. Commenters also may 
wish to address the general role of minimum opening bids in managing 
the pace of the auction. For example, commenters could compare using 
minimum opening bids--e.g., by setting higher minimum opening bids to 
reduce the number of rounds it takes for construction permits to reach 
their final prices--to other means of controlling auction pace, such as 
changes to bidding schedules, percentage increments, or activity 
requirements.

E. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    17. For Auction 112, OEA and MB propose that at any time before or 
during the bidding process OEA, in conjunction with MB, may delay, 
suspend, or cancel bidding in the auction in the event of a natural 
disaster, technical obstacle, network interruption, administrative or 
weather necessity, evidence of an auction security breach or unlawful 
bidding activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and 
efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In such a case, OEA would 
notify participants of any such delay, suspension, or cancellation by 
public notice or through the FCC auction bidding system's messages 
function. OEA and MB propose that, if bidding is delayed or suspended, 
OEA may, in its sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting 
from the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or 
cancel the auction in its entirety. OEA and MB propose to exercise this 
authority solely at their discretion, and not as a substitute for 
situations in which bidders may wish to apply activity rule waivers. 
OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals.

F. Interim Withdrawal Payment Percentage

    18. As discussed below, OEA and MB propose not to allow bid 
withdrawals in Auction 112. In the event bid withdrawals are permitted 
in Auction 112, however, OEA and MB propose the interim bid withdrawal 
payment be 20% of the withdrawn bid. A bidder that withdraws a 
provisionally winning bid during an auction is subject to a withdrawal 
payment equal to the difference between the amount of the withdrawn bid 
and the amount of the winning bid in the same or a subsequent auction. 
However, if a construction permit for which a bid has been withdrawn 
does not receive a subsequent higher bid or winning bid in the same 
auction, the Commission cannot calculate the final withdrawal payment 
until that construction permit receives a higher bid or winning bid in 
a subsequent auction. In such cases, when that final withdrawal payment 
cannot yet be calculated, the Commission imposes on the bidder 
responsible for the withdrawn bid an interim bid withdrawal payment, 
which will be applied toward any final bid withdrawal payment that is 
ultimately assessed.
    19. The percentage amount of the interim bid withdrawal payment is 
established in advance of bidding in each auction and may range from 3% 
to 20% of the withdrawn bid amount. The Commission has determined that 
the level of interim withdrawal payment in a particular auction will be 
based on the nature of the service and the inventory of the licenses 
being offered. The Commission noted specifically that a higher interim 
withdrawal payment percentage is warranted to deter the anti-
competitive use of withdrawals when, for example, bidders will not need 
to aggregate the licenses being offered in the auction or when there 
are few synergies to be captured by combining licenses. In light of 
these considerations with respect to the construction permits being 
offered in this auction, OEA and MB propose to use the maximum interim 
bid withdrawal payment percentage permitted by 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1) in 
the event bid withdrawals are allowed in this auction. OEA and MB 
request comment on using 20% for calculating an interim bid withdrawal 
payment amount in Auction 112 in the event that bidders would be 
permitted to withdraw bids. Commenters advocating the use of bid 
withdrawals should also address the percentage of the interim bid 
withdrawal payment.

G. Deficiency Payments and Additional Default Payment Percentage

    20. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of an auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment by 
the specified deadline, fails to make full and timely final payment, 
fails to submit a timely long-form application, or whose long-form 
application is not granted for any reason, or is otherwise 
disqualified) is liable for a default payment under 47 CFR 
1.2104(g)(2). This payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to 
the difference between the amount of the Auction 112 bidder's winning 
bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a construction 
permit covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an 
additional payment equal to a percentage of the defaulter's bid or of 
the subsequent winning bid, whichever is less.
    21. The Commission's rules provide that, in advance of each 
auction, it will establish a percentage between 3% and 20% of the 
applicable winning bid to be assessed as an additional default payment. 
As the Commission has indicated, the level of this additional payment 
in each auction will be based on the nature of the service and the 
construction permits being offered.
    22. For Auction 112, OEA and MB propose to establish an additional 
default payment of 20%, which is consistent with the percentage in 
prior auctions of broadcast construction permits. As the Commission has 
noted, defaults weaken the integrity of the auction process and may 
impede the deployment of service to the public, and an additional 20% 
default payment will be more effective in deterring defaults than the 
3% used in some earlier auctions. In light of these considerations, OEA 
and MB propose for Auction 112 an additional default payment of 20% of 
the relevant bid. OEA and MB seek comment on this proposal.

IV. Proposed Bidding Procedures

A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design

    23. OEA and MB propose to use the Commission's simultaneous 
multiple-round auction format for Auction 112. As described further 
below, this type of auction offers every construction permit for bid at 
the same time and consists of successive bidding rounds in which 
qualified bidders may place bids on individual construction permits. 
Typically, bidding remains open on all construction permits until 
bidding stops on every construction permit. OEA and MB seek comment on 
this proposal.

B. Bidding Rounds

    24. The Commission will conduct Auction 112 over the internet using 
the FCC auction bidding system. A bidder will also have the option of 
placing bids by telephone through a dedicated auction bidder line.
    25. Under this proposal, Auction 112 would consist of sequential 
bidding rounds, each followed by the release of round results. The 
initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be 
released at least one week before the start of bidding. Details on 
viewing round results, including the location and format of 
downloadable round results files, will be included in the same public 
notice.
    26. OEA and MB propose that the initial bidding schedule may be

[[Page 68207]]

adjusted in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances 
speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their 
bidding strategies. Under this proposal, such changes may include the 
amount of time for the bidding rounds, the amount of time between 
rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding 
activity and other factors. OEA and MB seek comment on this proposal. 
Parties commenting on this issue should address the role of the bidding 
schedule in managing the pace of the auction, specifically discussing 
the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by bidding schedule changes, by 
changing the activity requirement(s) or bid amount parameters, or by 
using other means.

C. Stopping Rule

    27. OEA and MB have discretion to establish stopping rules before 
or during multiple-round auctions in order to complete the auction 
within a reasonable time. For Auction 112, OEA and MB propose to employ 
a simultaneous stopping rule approach, which means all construction 
permits remain available for bidding until bidding stops on every 
construction permit. Specifically, bidding will close on all 
construction permits after the first round in which no bidder submits 
any new bid, applies a proactive activity rule waiver, or withdraws any 
provisionally winning bid (if bid withdrawals are permitted in this 
auction). Thus, under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, bidding 
would remain open on all construction permits until bidding stops on 
every construction permit. Consequently, under this approach, it is not 
possible to determine in advance how long the bidding in this auction 
will last.
    28. Further, OEA and MB propose to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following stopping options during Auction 112:

    Option 1. The auction would close for all construction permits 
after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, no bidder 
withdraws a provisionally winning bid (if withdrawals are permitted 
in this auction), or no bidder places any new bid on a construction 
permit for which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Absent 
any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a 
construction permit for which it is the provisionally winning bidder 
would not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule.
    Option 2. The auction would close for all construction permits 
after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, no bidder 
withdraws a provisionally winning bid (if withdrawals are permitted 
in this auction), or no bidder places any new bid on a construction 
permit that already has a provisionally winning bid. Absent any 
other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on an FCC-held 
construction permit (a construction permit that does not already 
have a provisionally winning bid) would not keep the auction open 
under this modified stopping rule.
    Option 3. The auction would close using a modified version of 
the simultaneous stopping rule that combines Option 1 and Option 2 
above.
    Option 4. The auction would close after a specified number of 
additional rounds (special stopping rule) to be announced in advance 
in the FCC auction bidding system. If OEA and MB invoke this special 
stopping rule, they will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s), after which the auction will close.
    Option 5. The auction would remain open even if no bidder places 
any new bid, applies a waiver, or withdraws any provisionally 
winning bid (if withdrawals are permitted in this auction). In this 
event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a 
waiver. The activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder with 
insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a 
waiver.

    29. OEA and MB propose to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding unusually 
slowly or quickly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it 
appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable 
period or will close prematurely. Before exercising these options, OEA 
and MB are likely to attempt to change the pace of the auction. For 
example, OEA and MB may adjust the pace of bidding by changing the 
number of bidding rounds per day or the minimum acceptable bids. Under 
the proposal, OEA would retain the discretion to exercise any of these 
options with or without prior announcement during the auction. OEA and 
MB seek comment on these proposals. Commenters should provide specific 
reasons for supporting or objecting to these proposals.

D. Availability of Bidding Information

    30. OEA and MB propose to make available, after each round closes, 
for each permit its current provisionally winning bid amount, the 
minimum acceptable bid amount for the following round, and the amounts 
of all bids placed on the permit during the round. These reports would 
be publicly accessible. Moreover, after the auction closes, OEA and MB 
propose to make available complete reports of all bids placed during 
each round of the auction, including bidder identities.
    31. OEA and MB also propose to provide bidders with secure access 
to certain non-public bidding information while bidding is ongoing. 
Specifically, after each round ends, and before the next round begins, 
OEA and MB propose to make the following information available to 
individual bidders:
     The bidder's activity, based on all bids in the previous 
round; and
     Summary statistics of the bidder's bidding and other 
bidding-related actions in each round, including the permits on which 
it bid and the price it bid for each of those permits, the result of 
each of its bids, whether it has any provisionally winning bids, and 
remaining activity rule waivers.
    32. OEA and MB believe that limiting the availability of bidding 
information during the auction balances the Commission's interest in 
providing bidders with sufficient information about the status of their 
own bids and the general level of bidding on all permits to allow them 
to bid confidently and effectively, while restricting the availability 
of information that may facilitate identification of bidders placing 
particular bids, which could potentially lead to undesirable strategic 
bidding. OEA and MB seek comment on this view.

E. Activity Rule

    33. To ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period, 
an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively throughout the 
auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before 
participating. For purposes of the activity rule, the FCC auction 
bidding system calculates a bidder's activity in a round as the sum of 
the bidding units associated with any construction permits upon which 
it places bids during the current round and the bidding units 
associated with any construction permits for which it holds 
provisionally winning bids. Bidders are required to be active on a 
specific percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each 
round of the auction. OEA and MB propose a single-stage auction with a 
100% activity requirement. That is, in each bidding round, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required 
to be active on 100% of its bidding eligibility. Under this proposal, 
the activity requirement would be satisfied when a bidder has bidding 
activity on construction permits with bidding units that total 100% of 
its current eligibility in the round. If the activity rule is met, then 
the bidder's eligibility does not change in the next round. Failure to 
maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidder's 
eligibility for the next round of bidding, possibly curtailing or 
eliminating the bidder's

[[Page 68208]]

ability to place additional bids in the auction. A reduction in the 
bidder's eligibility would be to the amount that would bring the bidder 
into compliance with the activity requirement. With a 100% activity 
requirement, a bidder's eligibility would be reduced to equal its 
activity. OEA and MB seek comment on these activity requirements. OEA 
and MB encourage commenters that oppose a 100% activity requirement to 
explain their reasons with specificity and to propose alternative 
approaches.

F. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

    34. For the proposed simultaneous multiple-round auction format, 
OEA and MB propose that when a bidder's activity in the current round 
is below the required minimum level, it may preserve its current level 
of eligibility through an activity rule waiver, if the bidder has any 
available. Consistent with prior Commission auctions of broadcast 
construction permits, OEA and MB propose that each bidder in Auction 
112 be provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used as 
set forth below at the bidder's discretion during the course of the 
auction.
    35. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding, 
not to a particular construction permit. Activity rule waivers can be 
either proactive or automatic. Activity rule waivers are primarily a 
mechanism for a bidder to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in case 
exigent circumstances prevent it from bidding in a particular round.
    36. The FCC auction bidding system will assume that a bidder that 
does not meet the activity requirement would prefer to use an activity 
rule waiver (if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. 
Therefore, the system will automatically apply a waiver at the end of 
any bidding round in which a bidder's activity level is below the 
minimum required unless: (1) The bidder has no activity rule waiver 
remaining; or (2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a 
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the activity 
requirement. If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy 
the required activity level, the bidder's current eligibility will be 
permanently reduced, possibly curtailing or eliminating the ability to 
place additional bids in the auction.
    37. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding round by using the reduce eligibility function in 
the FCC auction bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility 
would be permanently reduced to bring it into compliance with the 
activity rule described above. Reducing eligibility is an irreversible 
action; once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder cannot regain its 
lost bidding eligibility.
    38. Under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, a bidder would 
be permitted to apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a means to 
keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder proactively 
applies an activity rule waiver (using the proactive waiver function in 
the FCC auction bidding system) during a bidding round in which no bid 
is placed or withdrawn (if bid withdrawals are permitted in this 
auction), the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility 
will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC auction 
bidding system in a round in which there is no new bid, no bid 
withdrawal (if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction), or no 
proactive waiver would not keep the auction open. OEA and MB seek 
comment on these proposals.

G. Bid Amounts

    39. OEA and MB propose that, in each round, a qualified bidder will 
be able to place a bid on a given construction permit in any of up to 
nine different amounts: The minimum acceptable bid amount or one of 
eight additional bid amounts. Bidders must have sufficient eligibility 
to place a bid on the particular construction permit.
    40. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts. The first of the acceptable bid 
amounts is called the minimum acceptable bid amount. The minimum 
acceptable bid amount for a construction permit will be equal to its 
minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally winning bid 
for the construction permit. Once there is a provisionally winning bid 
for a construction permit, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that 
construction permit will be equal to the amount of the provisionally 
winning bid plus a specified percentage of that bid amount. The 
percentage used for this calculation, the minimum acceptable bid 
increment percentage, is multiplied by the provisionally winning bid 
amount, and the resulting amount is added to the provisionally winning 
bid amount. If, for example, the minimum acceptable bid increment 
percentage is 10%, then the provisionally winning bid amount is 
multiplied by 10%. The result of that calculation is added to the 
provisionally winning bid amount, and that sum is rounded using the 
Commission's standard rounding procedure for auctions. The result of 
the calculation is subject to a minimum of $100 and results above 
$10,000 are rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but 
above $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; and results below $1,000 
are rounded to the nearest $10. If bid withdrawals are permitted in 
this auction, in the case of a construction permit for which the 
provisionally winning bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable 
bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the 
construction permit.
    41. Additional Bid Amounts. Under this proposal, the Commission 
will calculate the eight additional bid amounts using the minimum 
acceptable bid amount and an additional bid increment percentage. The 
minimum acceptable bid amount is multiplied by the additional bid 
increment percentage, and that result (rounded) is the additional 
increment amount. The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the 
minimum acceptable bid amount plus the additional increment amount. The 
second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable 
bid amount plus two times the additional increment amount; the third 
additional acceptable bid amount is the minimum acceptable bid amount 
plus three times the additional increment amount; etc. If, for example, 
the additional bid increment percentage is 5%, then the calculation of 
the additional increment amount would be (minimum acceptable bid 
amount) * (0.05), rounded. The first additional acceptable bid amount 
equals (minimum acceptable bid amount) + (additional increment amount); 
the second additional acceptable bid amount equals (minimum acceptable 
bid amount) + (2* (additional increment amount)); the third additional 
acceptable bid amount equals (minimum acceptable bid amount) + (3* 
(additional increment amount)); etc.
    42. For Auction 112, OEA and MB propose to use a minimum acceptable 
bid increment percentage of 10%. This means that the minimum acceptable 
bid amount for a construction permit will be approximately 10% greater 
than the provisionally winning bid amount for the construction permit. 
To calculate the additional acceptable bid amounts, OEA and MB propose 
to use a bid increment percentage of 5%. OEA and MB seek comment on 
these proposals.
    43. Bid Amount Changes. OEA and MB propose to retain the discretion 
to change the minimum acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable 
bid percentage, the additional bid increment

[[Page 68209]]

percentage, and the number of acceptable bid amounts during the auction 
if it determines, consistent with past practice, that circumstances so 
dictate. OEA and MB propose to retain the discretion to do so on a 
construction permit-by-construction permit basis. OEA and MB also 
propose to retain the discretion to limit (a) the amount by which a 
minimum acceptable bid for a construction permit may increase compared 
with the corresponding provisionally winning bid, and (b) the amount by 
which an additional bid amount may increase compared with the 
immediately preceding acceptable bid amount. For example a $1,000 limit 
could be set on increases in minimum acceptable bid amounts over 
provisionally winning bids. In this example, if calculating a minimum 
acceptable bid using the minimum acceptable bid increment percentage 
results in a minimum acceptable bid amount that is $1,200 higher than 
the provisionally winning bid on a construction permit, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount would instead be capped at $1,000 above the 
provisionally winning bid. OEA and MB seek comment on the circumstances 
under which such a limit should be employed, factors that should be 
considered when determining the dollar amount of the limit, and the 
tradeoffs in setting such a limit or changing other parameters, such as 
changing the minimum acceptable bid percentage, the bid increment 
percentage, or the number of acceptable bid amounts. If OEA and MB 
exercise this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement in the 
FCC auction bidding system during the auction.
    44. OEA and MB seek comment on these proposals. If commenters 
disagree with the proposal to begin the auction with nine acceptable 
bid amounts per construction permit, they should suggest an alternative 
number of acceptable bid amounts to use. Commenters may wish to address 
the role of the minimum acceptable bids and the number of acceptable 
bid amounts in managing the pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in 
managing auction pace by changing the bidding schedule, activity 
requirement, bid amounts, or by using other means.

H. Provisionally Winning Bids

    45. Under the proposed simultaneous multiple-round auction format, 
the FCC auction bidding system would determine provisionally winning 
bids consistent with practice in past auctions. At the end of a bidding 
round, the bidding system would determine a provisionally winning bid 
for each construction permit based on the highest bid amount received 
for that permit. The FCC auction bidding system would advise bidders of 
the status of their bids when round results are released. A 
provisionally winning bid would remain the provisionally winning bid 
until there is a higher bid on the same construction permit at the 
close of a subsequent round, unless the provisionally winning bid is 
withdrawn (if bid withdrawals are permitted in this auction). 
Provisionally winning bids at the end of the auction would become the 
winning bids. As a reminder, provisionally winning bids count toward 
activity for purposes of the activity rule.
    46. The FCC auction bidding system assigns a pseudo-random number 
generated by an algorithm to each bid when the bid is entered. If 
identical high bid amounts are submitted on a construction permit in 
any given round (i.e., tied bids), the FCC auction bidding system will 
use these pseudo-random generated numbers to select a single 
provisionally winning bid from among the tied bids. The tied bid with 
the highest pseudo-random number wins the tiebreaker and becomes the 
provisionally winning bid. The remaining bidders, as well as the 
provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent 
rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other bids being 
placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the 
provisionally winning bid. If the construction permit receives any bids 
in a subsequent round, the provisionally winning bid again will be 
determined by the highest bid amount received for the construction 
permit.

I. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal

    47. Bid Removal. The FCC auction bidding system allows each bidder 
to remove any of the bids it placed in a round before the close of that 
round. By removing a bid placed within a round, a bidder effectively 
``unsubmits'' the bid. In contrast to the bid withdrawal provisions 
described below, a bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is 
not subject to a withdrawal payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may 
no longer remove a bid. Consistent with the design of the bidding 
system, OEA and MB propose that bidders in Auction 112 would be 
permitted to remove bids placed in a round before the close of that 
round.
    48. Bid Withdrawal. OEA and MB propose not to permit bidders in 
Auction 112 to withdraw bids. When permitted in an auction, bid 
withdrawals provide a bidder with the option of withdrawing bids placed 
in prior rounds that have become provisionally winning bids. A bidder 
would be able to withdraw its provisionally winning bids using the 
withdraw function in the FCC auction bidding system. A bidder that 
withdraws its provisionally winning bid(s), if permitted, is subject to 
the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission's rules.
    49. The Commission has recognized that bid withdrawals may be a 
helpful tool in certain circumstances for bidders seeking to 
efficiently aggregate products or implement backup strategies. The 
Commission has also acknowledged that allowing bid withdrawals may 
encourage insincere bidding or increased opportunities for undesirable 
strategic bidding in certain circumstances. The Commission stated that 
this discretion should be exercised assertively, consider limiting the 
number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent 
bidders from bidding on a particular market if they find a bidder is 
abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures. In managing the 
auction, therefore, OEA and MB have discretion to limit the number of 
withdrawals to prevent bidding abuses.
    50. Based on this guidance and on experience with past auctions of 
broadcast construction permits, OEA and MB propose to prohibit bidders 
from withdrawing any bid after the close of the round in which that bid 
was placed. OEA and MB make this proposal in light of the site-specific 
nature and wide geographic dispersion of the permits available in this 
auction, which suggest that potential applicants for this auction may 
have fewer incentives to aggregate permits through the auction process 
(as compared with bidders in many auctions of wireless licenses). Thus, 
OEA and MB believe that it is unlikely that bidders will have a need to 
withdraw bids in this auction. Further, OEA and MB are mindful that bid 
withdrawals, particularly if they were made late in this auction, could 
result in delays in licensing new broadcast stations and attendant 
delays in the offering of new broadcast service to the public. OEA and 
MB seek comment on the proposal to prohibit bid withdrawals in Auction 
112. Commenters advocating alternative approaches should support their 
arguments by taking into account the construction permits offered, the 
impact of auction dynamics and the pricing mechanism, and the effects 
on the bidding strategies of other bidders.

[[Page 68210]]

V. Tutorial and Additional Information for Applicants

    51. The Commission intends to provide additional information on the 
bidding system and to offer demonstrations and other educational 
opportunities for applicants in Auction 112 to familiarize themselves 
with the FCC auction application system and the auction bidding system. 
For example, OEA and MB intend to release an online tutorial that will 
help applicants understand the procedures to be followed in the filing 
of their auction short-form applications (FCC Form 175) and on the 
bidding procedures for Auction 112.

VI. Procedural Matters

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    52. The Auction 112 Comment Public Notice contains proposed new or 
modified information collection requirements. As part of the 
Commission's continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, OEA and MB 
invite the general public and the Office of Management and Budget to 
comment on the information collection requirements contained in this 
document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). In 
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
OEA and MB seek specific comment on how they might further reduce the 
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer 
than 25 employees.

B. Supplemental Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    53. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 603, the Commission prepared Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analyses (IRFAs) in connection with the Broadcast 
Competitive Bidding Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 62 FR 65392, 
December 12, 1997, and other Commission NPRMs (collectively, 
Competitive Bidding NPRMs) pursuant to which Auction 112 will be 
conducted. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses (FRFAs) likewise were 
prepared in the Broadcast Competitive Bidding Order, 63 FR 48615, 
September 11, 1998, and other Commission rulemaking orders 
(collectively, Competitive Bidding Orders) pursuant to which Auction 
112 will be conducted. OEA and MB have prepared this Supplemental 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental IRFA) of the 
possible significant economic impact on small entities of the policies 
and rules addressed in the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice, to 
supplement the Commission's Initial and Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analyses completed in the Competitive Bidding NPRMs and the Competitive 
Bidding Orders pursuant to which Auction 112 will be conducted. Written 
public comments are requested on this Supplemental IRFA. Comments must 
be identified as responses to the Supplemental IRFA and must be filed 
by the same filing deadlines for comments specified on the first page 
of the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice. The Commission will send a 
copy of the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice, including this 
Supplemental IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration (SBA).
1. Need for, and Objectives of, the Public Notice
    54. The proposed procedures for the conduct of Auction 112, as 
described in the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice, would constitute 
the more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules 
contemplated by parts 1 and 73 of the Commission's rules, adopted by 
the Commission in multiple notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings, 
including the Commission's establishment in the underlying rulemaking 
orders of additional procedures to be used on delegated authority. More 
specifically, the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice seeks comment on 
proposed procedures, terms, and conditions governing Auction 112, as 
well as the minimum opening bid amounts for the specified construction 
permits, and it is fully consistent with the underlying rulemaking 
orders, including the Broadcast Competitive Bidding Order and other 
relevant competitive bidding orders.
    55. The Auction 112 Comment Public Notice provides notice of 
proposed auction procedures and adequate time for Auction 112 
applicants to comment on those proposed procedures. To promote the 
efficient and fair administration of the competitive bidding process 
for all Auction 112 participants, including small businesses, the 
Auction 112 Comment Public Notice seeks comment on the following 
proposed procedures:
     A requirement that any applicant seeking to participate in 
Auction 112 certify in its short-form application, under penalty of 
perjury, that it has read the public notice adopting procedures for 
Auction 112 that will be released in advance of the short-form 
deadline, and that it has familiarized itself with those procedures and 
the requirements for obtaining a construction permit for an FPTV 
station;
     establishment of an interim bid withdrawal percentage of 
20% of the withdrawn bid in the event that OEA and MB allow bid 
withdrawals in Auction 112;
     establishment of an additional default payment of 20% 
under 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2) in the event that a winning bidder defaults 
or is disqualified after the auction;
     use of a simultaneous multiple-round auction format, 
consisting of sequential bidding rounds with a simultaneous stopping 
rule (with discretion to exercise alternative stopping rules under 
certain circumstances);
     retention by OEA, in conjunction with MB, of its 
discretion to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 112 for any 
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of the competitive 
bidding process;
     retention by OEA of its discretion to adjust the bidding 
schedule in order to manage the pace of Auction 112;
     a specific minimum opening bid amount for each 
construction permit available in Auction 112;
     a specific number of bidding units for each construction 
permit;
     a specific upfront payment amount for each construction 
permit;
     establishment of a bidder's initial bidding eligibility in 
bidding units based on that bidder's upfront payment through assignment 
of a specific number of bidding units for each construction permit;
     use of an activity requirement so that bidders must bid 
actively during the auction rather than waiting until late in the 
auction before participating;
     a single stage auction in which a bidder is required to be 
active on 100% of its bidding eligibility in each round of the auction;
     provision of three activity waivers for each qualified 
bidder to allow it to preserve eligibility during the course of the 
auction;
     use of minimum acceptable bid amounts and additional bid 
increments, along with a proposed methodology for calculating such 
amounts, while retaining discretion to change their methodology if 
circumstances dictate;
     bid removal procedures; and
     proposal to allow for bid removals (before the close of a 
bidding round) but not allow bid withdrawals (after the close of a 
bidding round).
2. Legal Basis
    56. The Commission's statutory obligations to small businesses 
participating in a spectrum auction

[[Page 68211]]

under the Act are found in sections 309(j)(3)(B) and 309(j)(4)(D). The 
statutory basis for the Commission's competitive bidding rules is found 
in various provisions of the Act, including 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 301, 
303(e), 303(f), 303(r), 304, 307, and 309(j). The Commission has 
established a framework of competitive bidding rules pursuant to which 
it has conducted auctions since the inception of the auction program in 
1994 and would conduct Auction 112. The Commission has directed that 
OEA and MB, under delegated authority, seek comment on a variety of 
auction-specific procedures prior to the start of bidding in each 
auction.
3. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Proposed Procedures Will Apply
    57. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the proposed procedures, if adopted. The RFA generally 
defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the 
terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small 
government jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has 
the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small 
Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is 
independently owned and operated, (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation, and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the 
SBA.
    58. The specific procedures and minimum opening bid amounts on 
which comment is sought in the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice will 
directly affect all applicants participating in Auction 112. OEA and MB 
expect that the pool of applicants who seek to bid in Auction 112 will 
include firms of all sizes.
    59. Television Broadcasting. This Economic Census category 
comprises establishments primarily engaged in broadcasting images 
together with sound. These establishments operate television broadcast 
studios and facilities for the programming and transmission of programs 
to the public. These establishments also produce or transmit visual 
programming to affiliated broadcast television stations, which in turn 
broadcast the programs to the public on a predetermined schedule. 
Programming may originate in their own studio, from an affiliated 
network, or from external sources. The SBA has created the following 
small business size standard for such businesses: Those having $41.5 
million or less in annual receipts. The 2012 Economic Census reports 
that 751 firms operated that entire year. Of that number, 656 had 
annual receipts of $25,000,000 or less, and 25 had annual receipts 
between $25,000,000 and $49,999,999. Based on this data OEA and MB 
therefore estimates that the majority of commercial television 
broadcasters are small entities under the applicable SBA size standard.
    60. Additionally, the Commission has estimated the number of 
licensed commercial television stations to be 1,374. Of this total, 
1,269 stations (or about 92.5%) had revenues of $41.5 million or less, 
according to Commission staff review of the BIA Kelsey Inc. Media 
Access Pro Television Database (BIA) in April 20, 2021, and therefore 
these stations qualify as small entities under the SBA definition.
    61. In addition, the Commission has estimated the number of 
licensed noncommercial educational (NCE) television stations to be 384. 
These stations are non-profit, and therefore considered to be small 
entities.
    62. There are also 2,371 low power television stations, including 
Class A stations, and 3,306 TV translators. Given the nature of these 
services, OEA and MB presume that all of these entities qualify as 
small entities under the SBA small business size standard.
    63. OEA and MB note, however, that the SBA size standard data do 
not allow for a meaningful estimate of the number of small entities 
that may participate in Auction 112.
    64. In assessing whether a business entity qualifies as small under 
the SBA definition, business control affiliations must be included. The 
estimates above therefore likely overstate the number of small entities 
that might be affected by this auction because the revenue figures on 
which this estimate is based does not include or aggregate revenues 
from affiliated companies. Moreover, the definition of small business 
also requires that an entity not be dominant in its field of operation 
and that the entity be independently owned and operated. The estimate 
of small businesses to which Auction 112 competitive bidding rules may 
apply does not exclude any television station from the definition of a 
small business on these bases and is therefore over-inclusive to that 
extent. Furthermore, OEA and MB are unable at this time to define or 
quantify the criteria that would establish whether a specific 
television station is dominant in its field of operation.
    65. OEA and MB also note that they are unable to accurately develop 
an estimate of how many of the potential Auction 112 applicants might 
prove to be small businesses based on the number of small entities that 
applied to participate in prior broadcast auctions because that 
information is not collected from applicants for broadcast auctions in 
which bidding credits are not based on an applicant's size (as is the 
case in some auctions of licenses for wireless services). OEA and MB 
conclude, however, that the majority of Auction 112 eligible bidders 
will likely meet the SBA's definition of a small business concern.
4. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
    66. The Commission designed the auction application process itself 
to minimize reporting and compliance requirements for all applicants, 
including small business applicants. To participate in this auction, 
parties will file streamlined, short-form applications in which they 
certify under penalty of perjury as to their qualifications. 
Eligibility to participate in bidding is based on an applicant's short-
form application and certifications, as well as its upfront payment. In 
the second phase of the process, there are additional compliance 
requirements for winning bidders. Thus, a small business that fails to 
become a winning bidder does not need to satisfy additional 
requirements of a winning bidder.
    67. OEA and MB do not expect the processes and procedures proposed 
in the Auction 112 Comment Public Notice will require small entities to 
hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, or other professionals to 
participate in Auction 112 and comply with the procedures ultimately 
adopted because of the information, resources, and guidance OEA and MB 
make available to potential and actual participants. For example, OEA 
and MB intend to release an online tutorial that will help applicants 
understand the procedures for filing the auction short-form application 
(FCC Form 175). OEA and MB also intend to make information on the 
bidding system available and to offer demonstrations and other 
educational opportunities for applicants in Auction 112 to familiarize 
themselves with the FCC auction application system and the auction 
bidding system. By providing these resources as well as the resources 
discussed below, OEA and MB expect small business entities who use the 
available resources to experience lower participation and compliance 
costs. Nevertheless, while OEA and MB cannot quantify the cost of 
compliance with the proposed procedures, OEA and MB do not believe that 
the costs of

[[Page 68212]]

compliance will unduly burden small entities that choose to participate 
in the auction because the proposals for Auction 112 are similar in 
many respects to the procedures in recent auctions conducted by the 
Commission.
5. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
    68. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant, 
specifically small business, alternatives that it has considered in 
reaching its proposed approach, which may include the following four 
alternatives (among others): (1) The establishment of differing 
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into 
account the resources available to small entities; (2) the 
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and 
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the 
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption 
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small 
entities.
    69. OEA and MB have taken steps to minimize any economic impact of 
the auction procedures on small businesses through, among other things, 
the many resources provided to potential auction participants. Small 
entities and other auction participants may seek clarification of or 
guidance on complying with competitive bidding rules and procedures, 
reporting requirements, and the FCC's auction bidding system. An FCC 
Auctions Hotline provides access to Commission staff for information 
about the auction process and procedures. The FCC Auctions Technical 
Support Hotline is another resource which provides technical assistance 
to applicants, including small entities, on issues such as access to or 
navigation within the electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the FCC's 
auction bidding system. Small entities may also use the web-based, 
interactive online tutorial produced by Commission staff to familiarize 
themselves with auction procedures, filing requirements, bidding 
procedures, and other matters related to an auction.
    70. The Commission also makes various databases and other sources 
of information, including the Auctions program websites and copies of 
Commission decisions, available to the public without charge, providing 
a low-cost mechanism for small entities to conduct research prior to 
and throughout the auction. Prior to and at the close of Auction 112, 
OEA and MB will post public notices on the Auctions website, which 
articulate the procedures and deadlines for the auction. OEA and MB 
make this information easily accessible and without charge to benefit 
all Auction 112 applicants, including small entities, thereby lowering 
their administrative costs to comply with the Commission's competitive 
bidding rules.
    71. Prior to the start of bidding, eligible bidders will be given 
an opportunity to become familiar with auction procedures and the 
bidding system by participating in a mock auction. Further, OEA and MB 
intend to conduct Auction 112 electronically over the internet using a 
web-based auction system that eliminates the need for bidders to be 
physically present in a specific location. Qualified bidders also have 
the option to place bids by telephone. These mechanisms are made 
available to facilitate participation in Auction 112 by all eligible 
bidders and may result in significant cost savings for small business 
entities that use these alternatives. Moreover, the adoption of bidding 
procedures in advance of the auction, consistent with statutory 
directive, is designed to ensure that the auction will be administered 
predictably and fairly for all participants, including small entities.
6. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rules
    72. None.

C. Deadlines and Filing Procedures

    73. Interested parties may file comments or reply comments on or 
before the dates indicated on the first page of this document in AU 
Docket No. 21-449. Comments may be filed using the Commission's 
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).
    74. Ex Parte Requirements. This proceeding has been designated as a 
``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's 
ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy 
of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral 
presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a 
different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons 
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda 
summarizing the presentations must (1) list all persons attending or 
otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte 
presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and 
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted 
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already 
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda, or other 
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such 
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other 
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where 
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the 
memorandum. Documents shown or given to the Commission staff during ex 
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must 
be filed consistent with 47 CFR 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 
47 CFR 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method 
of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda 
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, 
must be filed through the Electronic Comment Filing System available 
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., 
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding 
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
William W. Huber,
Associate Chief, Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics.
[FR Doc. 2021-26001 Filed 11-30-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P