[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 212 (Friday, November 5, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 61103-61112]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-23811]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 4
[PS Docket Nos. 21-346, 15-80; ET Docket No. 04-35; FCC 21-99; FR ID
55366]
Resilient Networks; Disruptions to Communications; Disruptions to
Communications
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission seeks comment on: potential
improvements to the voluntary Wireless Network Resiliency Cooperative
Framework (Framework), including evaluating what triggers its
activation, its scope of participants, whether existing Framework
elements can be strengthened, any gaps that need to be addressed, and
whether the public would benefit from codifying some or all of the
Framework; ways to enhance the information available to the Commission
through the Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) and Disaster
Information Reporting System (DIRS) during disasters and network
outages to improve situational awareness; and communications resiliency
strategies for power outages, including improved coordination between
communications service providers and power companies and deploying
onsite backup power or other alternative measures to reduce the
frequency, duration, or severity of power-related disruptions to
communications services.
DATES: Submit comments on or before December 6, 2021, and reply
comments on or before January 4, 2022.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by PS Docket Nos. 21-346
and 15-80; ET Docket No. 04-35, by any of the following methods:
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority
mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings.
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020). https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy.
People with disabilities: To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or calling the
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-
418-0432 (TTY).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, contact
Saswat Misra, Attorney-Advisor, Cybersecurity and Communications
Reliability Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202)
418-0944 or via email at [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), in PS Docket Nos. 21-346 and 15-80; ET
Docket No. 04-35; FCC 21-99, adopted on September 30, 2021 and released
on October 1, 2021. The full text of this document is available by
downloading the text from the Commission's website at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-99A1.pdf. When the FCC
Headquarters reopens to the public, the full text of this document will
also be available for public inspection and copying during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington,
DC 20554.
Synopsis
I. Introduction
1. With this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we propose steps
to improve the reliability and resiliency of communications networks
during emergencies. We address these matters against the backdrop of
Hurricane Ida, which hit the United States as a Category 4 hurricane
and caused significant flooding and damage in several states along the
Gulf Coast and the northeastern corridor of the United States.
Hurricane Ida demonstrated that, while service providers' ability to
restore communications in the aftermath of a devastating storm has
improved, more can be done to help ensure that communications networks
are sufficiently survivable to provide some continuity of service
during major emergencies and to enhance the ability of service
providers to restore communications when they fail.
2. Specifically, we consolidate several lines of prior inquiry to
initiate this rulemaking regarding the reliability, resiliency, and
continuity of communications networks. Hurricane Ida is only the most
recent disaster that resulted in failures precisely when Americans most
need to communicate. Recent hurricane and wildfire seasons, earthquakes
in Puerto Rico, and severe winter storms in Texas demonstrate that
America's communications infrastructure remains susceptible to
disruption during disasters. These disruptions can prevent or delay the
transmission of 911 calls, first responder communications, Emergency
Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) messages, and
other potentially life-saving information. They also can have cascading
detrimental effects on the economy and other critical infrastructures
due to
[[Page 61104]]
interdependencies among sectors, including the transportation, medical,
and financial sectors. These disruptions may involve many or all
communications networks--including wireline, wireless, cable,
satellite, or broadcast facilities.
3. Accordingly, in this NPRM, we seek comment on measures to help
ensure that communications services remain operational when disasters
strike. We consider whether elements of the Wireless Network Resiliency
Cooperative Framework (Framework)--a voluntary agreement developed by
the wireless industry in 2016 to provide mutual aid in the event of a
disaster--could be improved to enhance the reliability of communication
networks. 31 FCC Rcd 13745 (2016) (Framework Order). We also ask
whether the public would benefit from codifying some or all of the
Framework into our rules. Next, we seek comment on how the Commission
can better promote situational awareness during disasters through its
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) and Network Outage
Reporting System (NORS). Finally, we explore communications resilience
strategies to address one of the primary reasons for service
disruptions: Electric power outages.
II. Background
4. Resilient communications networks are critical to economic
growth, national security, emergency response, and nearly every facet
of modern life. The Commission has long been concerned with enhancing
the reliability and resiliency of the Nation's communications
infrastructure. In 2004, the Commission adopted rules that require
certain communications providers to supply the Commission with outage
reports to address ``the critical need for rapid, complete, and
accurate information on service disruptions that could affect homeland
security, public health or safety, and the economic well-being of our
Nation, especially in view of the increasing importance of non-wireline
communications in the Nation's communications networks and critical
infrastructure.'' 69 FR 68859 (Nov. 26, 2004) (2004 Part 4 Report and
Order). Under these rules, service providers must submit outage reports
to the Commission through NORS for outages that exceed specified
duration and magnitude thresholds. 47 CFR 4.9. The Commission analyzes
NORS outage reports to, in the short term, assess the magnitude of
major outages, and in the long-term, identify network reliability
trends and determine whether the outages likely could have been
prevented or mitigated had the service providers followed certain
network reliability best practices.
5. In 2007, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Commission
established DIRS as a web-based means for service providers, including
wireless, wireline, broadcast, and cable providers, to voluntarily
report to the Commission their communications infrastructure status,
restoration information, and situational awareness information
specifically during times of crisis. The Commission recently required a
subset of service providers that receive Stage 2 funding from the
Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund or the Connect USVI Fund to report in DIRS
when it is activated in their respective territories. 34 FCC Rcd 9109,
9174, 9176-77, paras. 133, 138-140 (2019) (Puerto Rico & USVI USF Fund
Report and Order). The Commission typically activates DIRS for affected
counties in the event of major emergencies. These announcements often
note that the Commission is suspending its rules on network outage
reporting for DIRS participants during the activation period.
6. DIRS data have provided critical situational awareness during
communications outages, even when information is shared only on an
aggregated or limited basis. The Commission's analysis informs
restoration efforts by federal partners and the agency's own
assessments of communications reliability during disasters. For
example, the Commission prepares and provides aggregated DIRS
information, without company-identifying information, to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), which then distributes the information to a
DHS-led group of federal agencies tasked with coordinating disaster
response efforts, including other units in DHS, during incidents. This
DHS-led group is the Emergency Support Function #2 (ESF-2), which is
composed of other participants including the Department of Agriculture,
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, General Services
Administration, Department of Interior, and the Federal Communications
Commission. Agencies use the analyses for their situational awareness
and for determining restoration priorities for communications services
and infrastructure in affected areas. The Commission also provides
aggregated data, without company-identifying information, to the public
during disasters. Recently, the Commission established a framework to
provide additional federal, state, Tribal, and territorial partners
with access to the critical NORS and DIRS information they need to
ensure the public's safety while preserving the presumptive
confidentiality of the information.
7. Also following Hurricane Katrina in 2007, the Commission adopted
backup power obligations in limited contexts. In 2007, the Commission
adopted a rule requiring Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS)
providers and local exchange carriers to maintain emergency backup
power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside central offices and
eight hours for cell sites, remote switches, and digital loop carrier
system remote terminals. After observing the severe impact on 911
networks across the Midwest caused by the 2012 derecho storm, the
Commission took steps to promote 911 network reliability and resiliency
by requiring covered 911 service providers to take reasonable measures
to provide reliable 911 service, including through providing for
central office backup power. 47 CFR 9.19(a)(4) (defining a ``covered
911 service provider'' as an entity that provides 911, E911, or [Next
Generation 911 (NG911)] capabilities such as call routing, automatic
location information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), or
the functional equivalent of those capabilities, directly to a [Public
Safety Answering Point (PSAP)], statewide default answering point, or
appropriate local emergency authority, or an entity that operates one
or more central offices that directly serve a PSAP). Covered 911
service providers must annually certify to the Commission that they
have taken ``reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service with
respect to 911 circuit diversity, availability of central office backup
power, and diverse network monitoring,'' or they must certify to taking
alternative measures that ``are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the
risk of failure or that one or more certification elements are not
applicable to its network.'' 47 CFR 9.19(b). Covered 911 service
providers must certify their compliance with backup power standards of
24 hours for central offices that provide administrative lines for
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) and 72 hours for central offices
that have a selective router that directs 911 calls. 47 CFR 9.19.
Further, the Commission has adopted rules requiring that providers of
facilities-based, fixed voice service offered as a residential service
provide their subscribers the options to purchase, at the point of
sale, solutions that provide 8 and 24 hours of backup power for the
service. 47 CFR 9.20.
8. In 2013, in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the Commission again
took up
[[Page 61105]]
the issue of communications infrastructure resiliency, particularly
that of wireless resiliency; specifically, the Commission proposed to
require facilities-based Commercial Mobile Radio Service providers to
submit to the Commission for public disclosure, on a daily basis during
and immediately after major disasters, the percentage of cell sites
within their networks that are providing service. On December 14, 2016,
in lieu of adopting this proposal, the Commission adopted an Order
supporting the voluntary Framework, intended to promote resilient
communications and situational awareness during disasters. Framework
Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 13745-46, paras. 1-2. The Framework commits its
participants to five prongs: providing for reasonable roaming
arrangements during disasters when technically feasible; fostering
mutual aid during emergencies; enhancing municipal preparedness and
restoration; increasing consumer readiness and preparation; and
improving public awareness and stakeholder communications on service
and restoration status. An emergency or disaster activates the
Framework where the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
activates ESF-2 and the Commission activates DIRS. ESFs provide the
structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for a Federal
response to an incident. ESF-2 coordinates Federal actions to assist
industry in restoring the public communications infrastructure and to
assist State, tribal, and local governments with emergency
communications and restoration of public safety communications systems
and first responder networks.
9. In 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in
conjunction with its review of federal efforts to improve the
resiliency of wireless networks during natural disasters and other
physical incidents, released a report recommending that the Commission
should improve its monitoring of industry efforts to strengthen
wireless network resiliency. The GAO found that the number of wireless
outages attributed to a physical incident--a natural disaster,
accident, or other manmade event, such as vandalism--increased from 189
in 2009 to 1,079 in 2016. The GAO concluded that more robust measures
and a better plan to monitor the Framework would help the FCC collect
information on the Framework and evaluate its effectiveness, and that
such steps could help the FCC decide if further action is needed. In
light of prolonged outages during several emergency events in 2017 and
2018, and in parallel with the GAO recommendations, the Public Safety
and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) conducted several inquiries and
investigations to better understand and track the output and
effectiveness of the Framework and other voluntary coordination efforts
that promote wireless network resiliency and situational awareness
during and after these hurricanes and other emergencies. In February
2020, following a series of PSHSB staff coordination meetings with
wireless, backhaul and electric service providers to discuss the gaps
identified in the above record, CTIA and the Edison Electric Institute
formed the Cross-Sector Resiliency Forum on February 27, 2020 and
released a 12-step action plan to improving wireless resiliency.
10. In the days leading up to landfall of Hurricane Ida on August
29, 2021, the FCC had begun coordinating response activities with the
State of Louisiana, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and members of the
Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Comm-ISAC) and
to determine potential impacts, challenges, and mutual aid resources.
The Commission had already deployed agents to support the Louisiana
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and to conduct baseline surveys of
communications as well as to provide coordination and spectrum
management support. Communications companies had also begun pre-
positioning mobile communications assets in safe zones just outside the
potential impact areas in order to rapidly deploy much-needed services,
post landfall. Ida had significant physical impacts on both power and
communications infrastructure, which had cascading consequences on
interdependent public safety communications infrastructure and services
such as PSAPs and Louisiana's land mobile radio public safety
communications network.
11. Following Hurricane Ida's departure, the Commission began
supporting recovery work in earnest. The Commission reminded
communications industry of its commitments in the Framework and
encouraged wireless providers, specifically, to activate roaming in
areas where cellular communications were hardest hit. Even after
roaming had been activated in limited areas, communications remained
diminished as communications companies were working to repair, replace,
and restore communications infrastructure. Immediately after the storm,
28.1 percent of cell sites were down across the affected counties.
Louisiana was hardest hit in this respect, with more than 50 percent of
sites down in the affected counties on August 30. At its peak,
Louisiana had three PSAPs offline due to damaged power and
communications infrastructure, and other PSAPs were impacted and
rerouted calls as generators began to fail. Commission personnel
communicated with the Louisiana Association of Broadcasters to
determine unmet fuel, communications, and power needs of state
broadcasters and to facilitate the provision of much needed resources
and services.
12. Commission staff also conducted on-the-ground assessments of
communications infrastructure to provide emergency management officials
intelligence and to assist with the identification of critical
communications infrastructure, including responding to additional
unintentional damage occurring during repairs to the communications and
power infrastructure. The Commission also issued special temporary
authorizations (STAs) and, sua sponte, numerous orders to provide
regulatory relief in support of providers' restoration efforts,
including waivers of deadlines and technical requirements, as well as
providing relief to impacted consumers. This work remains ongoing as
recovery continues.
III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
A. Improving the Wireless Network Resiliency Cooperative Framework
13. The voluntary Framework plays a central role in how wireless
providers prepare for and respond to emergencies. Over the years, the
Commission has examined and re-examined the efficacy of the Framework
for purposes of restoring communications during and following
disasters. These inquiries suggest that providers take a multifaceted
approach to disaster readiness and response, with the aim of improving
the public's safety during natural disasters. Wireless provider efforts
have included investments in network resiliency, reinforcing network
coverage and capacity, conducting site-based preparatory work, and
making plans to mitigate commercial power failures, as well as
utilizing commercial roaming agreements, working with government
partners, and educating consumers on preparedness. These initiatives
have helped to keep more Americans connected and informed even during
major disasters.
14. However, these inquiries also show that there are both gaps in
the
[[Page 61106]]
Framework's coverage and, during some recent disasters, delays in its
implementation, including technical challenges associated with roaming
implementation among signatory companies. Further, as explained below,
there are some disaster situations where the Framework, by its owns
terms, would not go into effect. These findings from our prior
inquiries suggest there may be targeted opportunities to improve the
voluntary Framework and network resiliency--not just of wireless
networks, but of communications networks as a whole. We seek comment on
those opportunities below. We also seek comment on whether the
Commission should revisit the voluntary nature of the Framework.
15. Framework Activation. Currently, the Framework only applies
when both ESF-2 and DIRS are activated. As a result, there may be
circumstances where the Framework is not activated but where mutual aid
or other support obligations are warranted. For example, the Framework
has not been operational during the California power shutoffs and
wildfires because ESF-2 was not activated. To address this gap, should
we work with carriers to revisit the prerequisites, e.g., the types of
emergencies or other declarations (ESF-2 and DIRS activation) that
trigger the Framework or that govern the duration of its obligations?
If so, what should those triggers and durations be?
16. Scope of Framework Participants. We seek comment on whether
expanding the scope of the Framework participants could enhance its
effectiveness. Currently, signatories to the Framework include only
AT&T Mobility, CTIA, GCI, Southern Linc, T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular, and
Verizon Wireless. Additionally, the Competitive Carriers Association
filed a letter supporting the Framework. As the list of signatories
demonstrates, there are a number of wireless providers who are not
signatories to the Framework. Further, the Framework signatories only
include wireless providers. Would greater participation in the
Framework enhance its effectiveness? Are there steps the Commission can
take to encourage voluntary participation beyond the scope of the
existing signatories, such as to include smaller wireless providers, or
entities beyond the mobile-wireless industry, such as facilities-based
backhaul providers, covered 911 service providers, cable, wireline,
broadcast, satellite, or interconnected VoIP providers? Should the
Framework or portions of the Framework be expanded to include any other
stakeholders or organizations?
17. Improving Wireless Roaming. The Framework commits its
signatories to provide reasonable roaming in situations where: ``(i) A
requesting carrier's network has become inoperable and the requesting
carrier has taken all appropriate steps to attempt to restore its own
network, and (ii) the home carrier has determined that roaming is
technically feasible and will not adversely affect service to the home
carrier's own subscribers,'' with such roaming arrangements ``limited
in duration and contingent on the requesting carrier taking all
possible steps to restore service on its own network as quickly as
possible.'' Framework Order, 31 FCC at 13752-53, para 19.
18. Recent events suggest that roaming during disaster contexts can
be improved. As the Hurricane Michael Report found, ``at least some
wireless providers did not take advantage of the types of disaster-
related roaming agreements envisioned in the Framework, allowing their
customers to remain in the dark rather than roam on a competitor's
network.'' FCC, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, October
2018 Hurricane Michael's Impact on Communications: Preparation, Effect,
and Recovery, PS Docket No. 18-339, Report and Recommendations at 6
(PSHSB 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-357387A1.pdf
(Hurricane Michael Report). During Hurricane Ida, there was limited
transparency, and therefore understanding, regarding the status of
roaming, including where it was available and where it was not, and
which network technologies were utilized. We seek comment on how best
to address these issues through the voluntary Framework. Are the
current Framework pre-requisites to triggering disaster roaming too
restrictive, to the detriment of consumers? In particular, we seek
comment on improvements to the Framework to ensure roaming is
operational prior to an event and seamless during emergencies--
addressing both resiliency and restoration--such as annual testing of
roaming capabilities and coordination processes. Are there other
improvements that can be made to ensure that roaming is made available
in a timely manner and for the benefit of the maximum population
possible? For example, should there be minimum timeframes by which a
provider must respond to a disaster roaming request? Are there
conditions or other criteria that could be incorporated into the
Framework to determine that, once met, roaming should be available
automatically in qualifying disaster areas? If a roaming request is
deemed technically infeasible, how should that determination be
conveyed? What criteria should be used to determine whether roaming is
technically feasible? Have there been instances where roaming requests
have been unreasonably denied or responses to such requests have been
unreasonably delayed, or where the roaming-related provisions of the
Framework did not work as intended? During Hurricane Ida, we understand
that initial requests for roaming under the Framework focused on access
to 3G networks. Are there benefits to encouraging roaming access to
newer generations of network technology and, if so, how can the
Commission best support such arrangements? To what extent do capacity
challenges or network configuration issues also hinder effective
roaming, and how should any improvements to the Framework account for
this concern? Should there be any improvement in the standards or their
implementations to ensure the emergency roaming is automatically and
seamlessly accessible to user devices without requiring any action from
the user? Can providers' readiness to execute such disaster-triggered
roaming be verified and tested? What are the public safety benefits and
costs associated with these improvements in wireless roaming?
19. Fostering Mutual Aid. The Framework commits its signatories to
foster mutual aid during disasters. Nevertheless, we observed prolonged
outages during Hurricane Ida. We seek comment on how signatories
fostered mutual aid, such as through sharing physical assets, during
Hurricane Ida and other recent disasters, and how effective this mutual
aid has been in ensuring continuity of communications. Are there
instances in which reasonable requests for mutual aid were denied by
wireless providers? Should the Framework do more to strengthen the
effectiveness of mutual aid? What benefits would accrue if other
segments of the communications industry--such as cable, wireline, and
broadcast--agreed to foster mutual aid during disasters?
20. Enhancing Municipal Preparedness and Restoration. Framework
signatories convened with local government representatives' public
safety subject matter experts and developed best practices to
facilitate coordination before, during, and after emergencies and
disasters in order to maintain and restore wireless service continuity.
Were these best practices
[[Page 61107]]
utilized in Hurricane Ida and other disasters, and how effective were
these best practices in real-world conditions? Should they be updated
in light of lessons learned from these disasters? Are there additional
actions that wireless providers and other stakeholders (e.g., backhaul
service, wireline service providers) can take to ensure appropriate and
effective coordination with local agencies to mitigate the impact of
service disruptions? What are the respective costs and benefits? For
example, should providers establish processes for sharing real-time
restoration efforts? Should the Framework include coordination
obligations and particular coordination activities or best practices?
Are there are other steps that the Commission can take to improve
coordination? The Commission also seeks comment on the recommendations
of the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee's Disaster Response and
Recovery Working Group pertaining to coordination with local
governments and building and maintaining formal relationships across
industry and government stakeholders, and coordination and information
sharing between stakeholders during the disaster planning and recovery
phases.
21. Increasing Local Preparedness and Consumer Readiness. The
Framework commits signatories to increase consumer readiness and
preparation through the development and dissemination with consumer
groups of a Consumer Readiness Checklist. Is there evidence that the
public is aware of this checklist? How is it promoted? Are there other
steps that wireless providers should take to foster local preparedness
and consumer readiness in the face of natural disasters, such as public
service announcements? What are the benefits and costs associated with
those steps? Should the Commission explore additional consumer
awareness and preparedness activities?
22. What measures are in place to ensure that information is
accessible to all Americans? Consumer groups note that the deaf and
hard-of-hearing communities often rely on multiple forms of
communications before and during emergencies, and recommend that
signatories work with these communities to ensure information is
accessible. Should the Framework require signatories to conduct
outreach through multiple forms of communication, such as public
service announcements on television, radio, and social media that is
accessible to both hard-of-hearing and non-English speaking
communities? Verizon suggests providers can maintain a dedicated
website for a specific disaster event. Should the Framework require
signatories to meet with groups representing persons with disabilities
to provide information on emergency planning and resources? Are there
other steps the Commission should take to improve communications with
these and other communities?
23. Improving Public Awareness. Finally, the Framework commits
signatories to improve public awareness and stakeholder communications
on service and restoration status, through sharing DIRS data on cell
site outages on an aggregated, county-by-county basis in the relevant
geographic area. Since the Framework was released, signatories have
agreed to share additional data with the public, including more
granular data on the cause of cell site outages and the number of in-
service cell sites operating on backup power. The Commission has also
requested comment on whether other outage data, e.g., whether the
service disruption extends to 911 service, should be disclosed to the
public. See Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
Disruptions to Communications, et al., Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FCC 21-45, 2021 WL 1603461, at *13-16, paras. 36-46 (Apr.
22, 2021). Would public disclosure of additional information regarding
service disruptions promote public safety? If so, what additional
information should be disclosed? What are the benefits and costs
associated with releasing this information directly to the public? What
mechanisms are in place in communities to impart awareness about
recovery planning and long term-term resiliency, and are those
mechanisms accessible to persons with disabilities? How might those
mechanisms differ across communities or geographic areas, and how can
those differences be accommodated by Framework signatories?
24. Scope of Framework Obligations. We seek comment on the scope of
the Framework's obligations. Should we expand the scope of what is
expected in the event of a disaster? What additional or revised
measures are warranted to address gaps in promoting resiliency and what
are their costs and benefits? For example, should the voluntary
Framework include provisions regarding the placement of back-up
systems, such as Cells on Light Trucks, so that they are ready to
deploy for vulnerable infrastructure to improve service restoration
time? Should the Framework include requirements for restoration or
prioritization of text-to-911 capability in areas where the PSAP is
text-capable, as text-to-911 can be an important communications
solution in emergencies, particularly for individuals with
disabilities? Should the Framework include provisions that address
backhaul redundancy and resiliency? For example, could the Framework
address a limit on the number of cell sites operating on a single
backhaul fiber link? What other steps would promote backhaul resiliency
during disasters?
25. Framework-Related Reporting. We seek comment on whether we
should require wireless providers to submit reports to the Commission
detailing implementation of the voluntary Framework in real time or in
the aftermath of a disaster. What are the benefits and costs associated
with such a reporting requirement? We seek comment on what information
these reports should include, such as specific information related to
the way the provider adhered to any roaming, mutual aid, consumer
outreach, or related provisions of the Framework suggested above. For
example, should the Commission be notified when roaming has been
activated or refused, including information on which generational
technologies it has been activated, and as to which providers are
roaming on which networks? Should the Commission be notified when
resources or services are shared through mutual aid? How soon after
wireless provider action should such notifications be made and how
should they be made?
26. Codifying the Framework. In response to our prior inquiries,
some commenters have urged the Commission to reexamine the voluntary
nature of the Framework. Some of these commenters highlight the
Commission's Hurricane Michael Report to suggest that existing
voluntary coordination efforts, including the Framework, may not be
sufficient to promote wireless network resiliency and situational
awareness during and immediately after emergencies. Accordingly, we
seek comment on whether some or all of the existing or a modified
Framework should be mandatory, and for whom. What are the costs and
benefits of doing so? We also seek comment on our legal authority to
mandate disaster-based obligations in line with the existing or an
expanded Framework. Would the aggregate of these solutions address the
failures highlighted by the Hurricane Michael Report or should
additional measures be considered? Finally, we seek comment on how the
Commission should enforce any mandatory obligations that are not met.
[[Page 61108]]
B. Promoting Situational Awareness During Disasters
27. Over the years, our experience has shown that DIRS and NORS are
vital public safety tools that equip the Commission and its federal and
local partners with actionable situational awareness information for
identifying and resolving threats to 911 and other emergency service
communications. DIRS focuses on infrastructure status information
rather than service outage information, as in NORS. NORS thus draws a
distinction between service outages that affect just 911 and other
types of service outages. Currently, there is limited visibility on how
disasters impact 911 service specifically. Requiring DIRS reporting in
the event of disaster-related outages would help to close this
information gap. Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules
Concerning Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket No. 15-80, Second
Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 6136, 6139, paras. 8, 9 (2021). DIRS
broadly collects infrastructure status information about the nation's
communications networks, but participation is voluntary for the
nation's service providers. While DIRS is voluntary, the Commission
recently required a subset of service providers that choose to accept
Stage 2 funding from the Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund or the Connect USVI
Fund to report in DIRS when it is activated in their respective
territories. Puerto Rico & USVI USF Fund Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd
at 9174, 9176-77, paras. 133, 138-140.
28. The Commission initially grounded its voluntary approach on
observations that a voluntary paradigm worked well during Hurricane
Katrina and that a mandatory reporting process would likely not be
adaptable to unique aspects of each particular crisis. Recommendations
of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, EB Docket No. 06-119 et al., Order, 22 FCC Rcd
10541, 10549, para. 22 (2007). Since that time, the Commission has
observed that, while the nation's large providers typically elect to
voluntarily report in DIRS, smaller providers often do not. This not
only reduces the total number of DIRS filings available to inform the
Commission's analysis of network reliability, but also reduces the
Commission's situational awareness, including awareness of the state of
911 and other emergency services, in locations served by smaller
providers, which are often vulnerable rural or other hard to access
areas. This also creates ambiguity about whether a provider's lack of
DIRS filings means that its network infrastructure actually remains
undamaged, it is choosing not to voluntarily participate in DIRS, or it
is unable to file, e.g., because it cannot access DIRS due to
disruption of its internet access.
29. Meanwhile, NORS participation is mandatory, but it is centered
on disruptions to voice telephony. Under our rules, certain service
providers--wireline, cable, satellite, wireless, interconnected VoIP,
and Signaling System 7 providers--must submit outage reports to NORS
for voice and other outages that exceed specified duration and
magnitude thresholds. 47 CFR 4.9. Service providers are required to
submit a preliminary notification within two hours after determining
that an outage is reportable, followed by an initial outage report
within three calendar days, and a final report no later than 30 days
after discovering the outage. 47 CFR 4.9. These reports are intended to
address ``the critical need for rapid, complete, and accurate
information on service disruptions that could affect homeland security,
public health or safety, and the economic well-being of our Nation . .
. .'' 2004 Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16833, para. 1. The
Bureau analyzes NORS data to assess the magnitude of major outages,
identify trends, and promote network reliability. However, these outage
reporting requirements do not collect information about disruptions
specifically to broadband service. This means the Commission has
limited situational awareness about outages involving broadband
service.
30. We seek comment on steps the Commission can take to address
these issues and encourage better situational awareness through DIRS
and NORS. Starting with DIRS, are there steps the Commission can take
to encourage broader voluntary participation during disasters,
including from smaller providers? Alternatively, should the Commission
consider requiring the nation's service providers, i.e., cable
providers, Direct Broadcast Satellite providers, Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Service, TV and radio broadcasters, Commercial Mobile Radio
Service and other wireless service providers, wireline providers, and
VoIP providers, to report their infrastructure status information in
DIRS when the Commission activates DIRS in geographic areas in which
they broadcast or otherwise provide service? We recognize that a
proposed requirement to file in DIRS must be balanced against
additional burdens on service providers, particularly as DIRS reports
are filed in the midst of disasters and other emergencies. If we were
to explore requiring DIRS filing, we seek comment on our legal
authority to do so, the costs and benefits associated with mandatory
reporting, and how the Commission should enforce any failure to file
DIRS information.
31. With respect to NORS, we seek comment on the public interest
benefits and the costs of reporting of broadband service outages. Would
such reporting likewise improve emergency managers' situational
awareness during disasters? Or do public safety officials and others
currently have access to broadband service outage data through other
means? Could this data be leveraged to help identify broadband outage
trends, and if so, how could this knowledge support first response and
network reliability efforts?
32. We seek comment on suspension of NORS reporting requirements
during disasters. Under our current voluntary DIRS reporting approach,
the Bureau suspends NORS reporting obligations, via public notice, for
providers who elect to report in DIRS for the duration of its
activation period. Formally codifying this practice in our rules may
give providers more clarity on their obligations and streamline and
formalize existing practices. We therefore seek comment on whether to
codify in our part 4 rules the Commission's typical practice of
granting to providers a waiver of their NORS reporting requirements
when they report the outage in DIRS. Are there needs of public safety
officials or others that are not being met by the current reporting
practices? If so, will such gaps remain when our NORS and DIRS
information sharing rules become effective? Amendments to Part 4 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket
No. 15-80, Second Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 6136 (2021).
33. We note that there may be instances in which DIRS is
deactivated but some providers have not yet fully restored service,
resulting in limited continuing outages. In these instances, the
Commission no longer has situational awareness as to the status of
those providers' services, because updates are no longer being filed in
DIRS and the outage was never filed in NORS. We seek comment on how to
best address this gap and ensure that the Commission maintains
situational awareness of outages. Should providers with ongoing outages
at the time of DIRS deactivation be required to report those outages in
NORS?
34. In light of the concerns noted above, we also seek comment on
steps
[[Page 61109]]
the Commission can take to increase its situational awareness of the
state of 911 and other emergency services.
C. Addressing Power Outages
35. The recent devastation wrought by Hurricane Ida, which left
hundreds of thousands of Louisianans without power, water, and other
basic utilities, also extended to the region's communications
infrastructure. Data compiled by the Commission shows that
approximately half of all cellular sites in New Orleans and the
surrounding disaster area remained out of service nearly two days after
the worst effects of Ida had passed, with no clear timetable for the
restoration of these networks. NORS and DIRS data collected by the
Commission in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida and other recent disaster
events reveal that a lack of commercial power at key equipment and
facilities is the single biggest reason why communications networks
transmitting 911 service and related emergency information fail in the
aftermath of disaster events. For example, the Commission's DIRS data
show that the majority of cell site outages in the immediate aftermath
of Hurricane Ida's central disaster region were due to a lack of
commercial power availability. Communications Status Report for Areas
Impacted by Hurricane Ida at 5-6 (August 31, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-375367A1.pdf.
36. More generally, Commission analysis of DIRS data shows that
over 50% of cell site outages that occurred during major 2020
earthquakes, hurricanes, and storms were due to power failures. The
Commission's NORS outage data similarly reveal that the number of
outages caused by power failures has been steadily increasing for the
past several years and that power failures are currently driving a
nationwide trend in the increase of outages. The Commission received
9,158 outage reports in 2020 alone for communications disruptions
caused by power failures, potentially affecting 63,097,389 customers.
Of those customers, 4.3 million potentially experienced service
disruptions on a single day.
37. Without power to support providers' network operations in the
aftermath of disasters, the public is unable to place potentially life-
saving 911 calls, local emergency management officials are unable to
transmit EAS and WEA messages, evacuation orders, and other public
safety-related information, and first responders are unable to
coordinate effectively to save lives and property. Conversely, with
backup power in place, providers are able to bring their networks
online and, if necessary, immediately begin diagnosing and addressing
damage that their networks may have sustained.
38. Hurricane Ida thus continues an unfortunate (though potentially
addressable) trend, demonstrating that the nation's communications
infrastructure remains highly prone to failure due to disruptions to
commercial power in the face of disasters. This reinforces observations
that we have made during recent hurricane and wildfire seasons,
earthquakes in Puerto Rico, and this year's severe winter storms in
Texas. If the current trend continues without corrective action, the
frequency of outages will worsen in coming years as the nation
experiences disaster events of increasing severity, duration, and
impact, including hurricanes, flooding, and wildfires.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP05NO21.037
This figure depicts the number of monthly final outage reports in
NORS with power failure as a reported cause over time. The red dots
represent the numbers of outage reports in 2Q21 months and blue dots
represent months prior to 2Q21. The green line shows the expected
number of outages in each month without taking seasonality effects into
account; as such, it represents the general overall trend in the three-
year window immediately preceding 2Q21 (April 2018 through March 2021).
The shaded gray area indicates a 99% confidence interval for each
month. This confidence interval is defined by the expected number of
outages in each month based on the trend and seasonality effects. These
data do not include outages caused by power failures that were reported
in DIRS. They also do not include outages that are not service
affecting (e.g., outages of transport facilities with diverse routes)
[[Page 61110]]
or special facility outages (outages of single circuits with
Telecommunications Service Priority Level 1 or 2).
39. In view of this context, we now seek to explore communications
resilience strategies for power outages. As part of this review, we
seek to identify actions the Commission, communications providers, and
power companies can cooperatively take to encourage and increase
coordination in the power and communications sectors before, during,
and after an emergency or disaster. We also seek to better understand
how changing circumstances since the Commission's last broad
consideration of backup power (including trends showing increasingly
severe storms, wildfires, and other disasters, and advances in power
technology) may bear on whether and how backup power or alternative
measures may help promote continuity of power, including for PSAPs and
emergency services. We seek comment on this issue.
40. As an initial matter, we seek comment on communications service
provider coordination with power companies before, during, and after
disasters, including efforts of the Cross-Sector Resiliency Forum. Are
existing coordination efforts effective at minimizing communications
service outages that are caused by power outages? Are there
coordination activities that communications service provider and power
companies could potentially take that have not yet been formalized or
operationalized? If so, what steps could the Commission take to
encourage this coordination? For example, should the Commission convene
stakeholders from the electric industry, telecommunications sector, and
public safety agencies to take part in regional coordination events to
encourage greater cross-sector coordination in preparing for and in
response to disasters? Should the Commission coordinate with
gubernatorial offices and state emergency management agencies to
encourage integrating communications providers and power companies into
response planning, execution, and exercises?
41. Next, we seek comment on how backup power or alternative
measures may help promote the continuity of service during or after
disasters. We seek comment on the current state of providers' backup
power implementations. For example, how many hours of backup power do
providers typically maintain, what technologies do they use to meet
their requirements, and how readily deployable are those technologies
when needed? Does the amount or type of backup power solution differ
depending upon the facility or type of infrastructure? What are the
benefits and challenges of maintaining backup power on-site? If not
maintained on-site, how could providers ensure that they can move
backup power resources on-site with minimal delay when disaster
strikes? What steps do providers take to adequately mitigate the risk
that a disaster event that disrupts primary power would also knock out
any on-site backup power resources (e.g., fuel generators)? What types
of backup power solutions are available for the various elements of
infrastructure that may require it?
42. We seek comment on what steps service providers would need to
take with respect to backup power deployment to significantly reduce
the number of communications disruptions caused by power outages. How
many hours of on-site backup power would be appropriate at their
facilities to significantly reduce the frequency of power-related
service disruptions? Are there events or geographic areas in which more
hours of backup power are needed than others? To maximize the
effectiveness of backup power solutions, should backup power be
provisioned at certain critical points in communications
infrastructure, and if so, at which points? In general, how should the
Commission define or otherwise identify facilities and equipment that
are critical to ensuring that emergency communications can be
transmitted in the aftermath of a disaster? Are there differences
across different types of communications networks or geographies where
they are located that are relevant to deployment of backup power
solutions or performance during power outages more generally? Is the
deployment of on-site backup power sufficient to keep networks online
in view of other potentially independent factors that may cause a
network to fail during a disaster, e.g., lack of hardened and resilient
network equipment? If it is not sufficient, what other steps should
service providers take to avoid service disruptions? What are the
associated costs and benefits?
43. As we explore the potential for wider backup power
implementation, we seek comment on service providers' experiences with
any state-specific backup power requirements as well as the potential
cost of implementation.
44. We also seek comment on any alternatives to on-site backup
power that have also proven successful or have the potential to reduce
the frequency, duration, or severity of disruptions to communications
services caused by power outages. Are there other technical solutions
for preventing service disruptions caused by power outages or other
efforts to reduce the number of service disruptions that we have not
raised here?
45. We also seek comment on the Commission's existing requirements
for covered 911 service providers to implement reasonable central-
office backup power measures to ensure 911 reliability. 47 CFR 9.19(b).
The Commission adopted these and other requirements for covered 911
service providers to promote 911 network resiliency. 47 CFR 9.19. As
noted above, Louisiana had three PSAPs offline due to damaged power and
communications infrastructure in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida. Other
PSAPs were also impacted as generators began to fail. Are there steps
the Commission can take, such as revisions to our resiliency rules
(see, e.g., 47 CFR parts 4, 9) or encouraging of voluntary measures, to
make it more likely that PSAPs will have the necessary resources to
continue service during and after disasters? Are there other
considerations pertaining to 911 outages and access to emergency
services in the wake of a disaster?
46. Digital Equity and Inclusion. Finally, the Commission, as part
of its continuing effort to advance digital equity for all, including
people of color, persons with disabilities, persons who live in rural
or Tribal areas, and others who are or have been historically
underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty
or inequality, invites comment on any equity-related considerations and
benefits (if any) that may be associated with the proposals and issues
discussed herein. Specifically, we seek comment on how our proposals
may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility, as well the scope of the Commission's relevant legal
authority.
IV. Procedural Matters
47. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains proposed new
and modified information collection requirements. The Commission, as
part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the
general public and the OMB to comment on the information collection
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44
U.S.C. 3506(c)(4),
[[Page 61111]]
we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the information
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25
employees.
48. Ex Parte Rules--Permit-But-Disclose. This proceeding shall be
treated as ``permit-but-disclose'' proceedings in accordance with the
Commission's ex parte rules. 47 CFR 1.1200-1.1216. Persons making ex
parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must: (1) List
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at
which the ex parte presentation was made; and (2) summarize all data
presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data
or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments,
memoranda, or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may
provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior
comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page
and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in
lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to
Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex
parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).
In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has
made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte
presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations,
and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic
comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed
in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).
Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the
Commission's ex parte rules.
49. Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, as amended (RFA), requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis
be prepared for notice and comment rulemaking proceedings, unless the
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' 5 U.S.C. 605(b). Accordingly, the Commission has prepared
an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning potential
rule and policy changes contained in this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.
V. Legal Basis
50. Authority for the actions proposed in this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking may be found in sections 1, 4(i) through (j), 4(n) through
(o), 201, 202, 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r),
307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332 and 403, of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i) through (j), 154(n) through
(o), 201, 202, 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r),
307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403; sections 2, 3(b), and 6 and 7 of
the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C.
615 note, 615, 615a-1, 615b, section 106 of the Twenty First Century
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, 47 U.S.C. 615c, and
section 506(a) of the Repack Airways Yielding Better Access for Users
of Modern Services Act of 2018 (RAY BAUM's Act).
VI. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
51. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities by the policies and rules
proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this proceeding.
Written public comments are requested on this IRFA, including comments
on any alternatives. Comments must be identified as responses to the
IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments as specified in
the NPRM.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
52. The NPRM proposes steps to safeguard and improve transmission
of life-saving 911, Emergency Alert System (EAS), Wireless Emergency
Alert (WEA) messages and other life-saving information during
emergencies by improving the reliability, resiliency, and continuity of
associated communications networks. More specifically, the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking:
Considers whether elements of the Wireless Network
Resiliency Cooperative Framework (Framework)--a voluntary agreement
developed by the wireless industry in 2016 to provide mutual aid in the
event of a disaster--could be improved to enhance the reliability of
communication networks, including by inquiring into whether the public
would benefit from codifying some or all of the Framework into the
Commission's rules.
Seeks comment on how the Commission can better promote
situational awareness during disasters through its Disaster Information
Reporting System (DIRS) and Network Outage Reporting System (NORS).
(Henceforth, the term ``nation's service providers'' will refer
collectively to this group of entities.).
Explores communications resilience strategies to address
one of the primary reasons for service disruptions: Electric power
outages, including through an exploration of backup power
implementations.
53. These proposals are made against the backdrop of Hurricane Ida,
which hit the United States as a Category 4 hurricane in August 2021
and caused significant flooding and damage in several states along the
southern and northeastern corridors of the United States. Hurricane
Ida, as well as recent hurricane and wildfire seasons, earthquakes in
Puerto Rico, and severe winter storms in Texas demonstrate that
America's communications infrastructure remains susceptible to
disruption during disasters. These disruptions can prevent the
transmission of 911 calls, first responder communications, EAS and WEA
messages, and other potentially life-saving information. They also can
have cascading detrimental effects on the economy and other critical
infrastructures due to interdependencies among sectors, including the
transportation, medical, and financial sectors, among others.
Importantly, these disruptions may involve any or all communications
networks--including wireline, wireless, cable, satellite, or broadcast
facilities.
B. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply
54. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where
feasible, and estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines
the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms
``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A small business concern is one that: (1) Is independently owned
and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3)
satisfies any additional criteria
[[Page 61112]]
established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Below is a list
of such entities.
Interconnected VoIP services;
Wireline Providers;
Wireless Providers--Fixed and Mobile;
Satellite Service Providers; and
Cable Service Providers.
C. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
55. We expect the potential rules in the NPRM will impose new or
additional reporting or recordkeeping and/or other compliance
obligations on service providers in the following ways:
Wireless Resiliency Framework. Any providers that are
required to participate in elements of the Framework who do not already
do so, potentially including smaller wireless providers and entities
beyond the mobile-wireless industry, such as facilities-based backhaul
providers, covered 911 service providers, cable, wireline, broadcast,
satellite, or interconnected VoIP providers would potentially need to
keep records related to roaming agreements, mutual aid agreements,
preparedness and restoration plans, improving consumer readiness and
preparation and improving public awareness and stakeholder
communications on service and restoration status. These providers would
potentially have to submit reports to the Commission detailing
implementation of the Framework in real time or in the aftermath of a
disaster.
NORS and DIRS. Any providers subject to DIRS reporting and
new requirements related to NORS reporting, potentially including cable
providers, Direct Broadcast Satellite providers, Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Service, TV and radio broadcasters, Commercial Mobile Radio
Service and other wireless service providers, wireline providers, VoIP
providers, and broadband service providers, would report their
communications outage information in NORS when their outages exceed
thresholds specified in the Commission's Part 4 rules and
infrastructure status information in DIRS when the Commission activates
DIRS in geographic areas in which they broadcast or otherwise provide
service.
Backup Power. To the extent that the Commission were to
adopt backup power requirements, any Public Safety Answering Points
(PSAPs) or providers subject to them, potentially including cable
providers, Direct Broadcast Satellite providers, Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Service, TV and radio broadcasters, Commercial Mobile Radio
Service and other wireless service providers, wireline providers, and
VoIP providers, could potentially be required to take steps to make
their networks more resilient to power outages, as discussed in the
NPRM.
56. The NPRM seeks comment on a number of aspects of these
proposals, including which providers should be subject to them, the
public safety benefits and costs associated with a provider's
implementation of the Framework, DIRS and NORS reporting, and backup
power resiliency improvements. Given that these elements are currently
unknown pending comment, the Commission is presently unable to quantify
the costs of compliance with rules associated with these proposals, and
whether small entities will need to hire professionals to comply.
However, given that each proposal would make more reliable the
transmission of 911 calls, first responder communications, EAS and WEA
messages, and other potentially life-saving information, we tentatively
conclude that the benefits exceed the costs of implementing any of
these proposals. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion and urge
commenters to provide detailed information in support of their
comments.
D. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
57. None.
Federal Communications Commission.
Katura Jackson,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-23811 Filed 11-4-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P