[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 208 (Monday, November 1, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 60189-60194]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-23698]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 64

[CG Docket No. 12-129; PS Docket No. 21-343; FCC 21-108; FRS 53657]


Enhancing Security of Public Safety Answering Point 
Communications

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission seeks to gather updated 
information and propose how best to fulfill Congress' goal of 
protecting Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) from disruptive 
robocalls in a manner that avoids the potential security risks of 
making registered PSAP numbers available to those claiming to be 
autodialer operators. Specifically, the Commission proposes that voice 
service providers be required to block autodialed calls made to PSAP 
telephone numbers on the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry. The Commission 
takes this action to satisfy its statutory obligations under the Middle 
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (Tax Relief Act).

DATES: Comments are due on or before December 1, 2021, and reply 
comments are due on or before December 16, 2021.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by CG Docket No. 12-129 
and PS Docket No. 21-343, by any of the following methods:
     Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
     Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must 
file an original and one copy of each filing. If more than one docket 
or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, filers 
must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or 
rulemaking number.
    Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be 
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 
Federal Communications Commission.
     Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, 
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
     U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority 
mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
     Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the 
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings. 
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety 
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC 
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard D. Smith of the Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (717) 338-2797 or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), in CG Docket No. 12-129 
and PS Docket No. 21-343, FCC 21-108, adopted on September 30, 2021 and 
released on October 1, 2021. The full text of the document is available 
for public inspection and copying via the Commission's Electronic 
Comment Filing System (ECFS). To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic 
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or call the 
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice).
    This matter shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' 
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. 47 CFR 
1.1200 through 1.1216. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are 
reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain 
summaries of the substances of the presentations and not merely a 
listing of the subjects discussed. More than a one or two sentence 
description of the views and arguments presented is generally required. 
See 47 CFR 1.1206(b). Other rules pertaining to oral and written ex 
parte presentations in permit-but-disclose proceedings are set forth in 
Sec.  1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.1206(b).

Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

    The FNPRM seeks comment on proposed rule amendments that may result 
in modified information collection requirements. If the Commission 
adopts any modified information collection requirements, the Commission 
will publish a notice in the Federal Register inviting the public to 
comment on the requirements, as required by the Paperwork Reduction 
Act. Public Law 104-13; 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520. In addition, pursuant to 
the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, the Commission seeks 
comment on how it might further reduce the information collection 
burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. Public 
Law 107-198; 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).

Synopsis

A. Extent of the Problem

    1. In this FNPRM, the Commission seeks updated information since 
the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry was adopted in 2012 about the magnitude 
of the problem that the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry is intended to 
address--i.e., the frequency of autodialer-initiated calls to PSAPs' 
telephone lines and the extent of the disruption and other harms that 
these calls cause. See Implementation of the Middle Class Tax Relief 
and Job Creation Act of 2012, Establishment of a Public Safety 
Answering Point Do-Not-Call Registry, CG Docket No. 12-129, Report and 
Order, 27 FCC Rcd 13615 (2012). In adopting the registry rules, the 
Commission noted that autodialers can tie up public safety lines, 
divert critical responder resources from emergency services, and impede 
the public's access to emergency lines.
    2. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which autodialed 
calls continue to be a problem for PSAPs. Has the number of such 
unwanted calls changed in any significant way since 2012? For example, 
have technological changes resulted in more unwanted autodialed calls 
being made to PSAPs or have any new technological or regulatory 
solutions, such as blocking technologies, arisen that allow PSAPs to 
better protect themselves from unwanted calls? Does the extent of this 
problem vary depending on whether the autodialed calls are voice calls 
or texts? Are there situations in which entities that intended to 
disrupt PSAP operations used autodialers or similar technologies in 
denial-of-service attacks to disrupt the provision of emergency 
services? How do those incidents shed light on the risk and potential 
harms that might result from the misuse of registered PSAP numbers? 
Have such incidents increased since 2012, as technology has changed? 
Are there new or evolving robocall threats to PSAPs

[[Page 60190]]

that the registry is not designed for or otherwise cannot address? If 
so, are there ways to adapt the registry to such threats?
    3. To what extent does the recent Supreme Court decision addressing 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act's (TCPA's) definition of 
``automatic telephone dialing system'' impact the efficacy of the PSAP 
Do-Not-Call registry? See Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.Ct. 1163, 
1168-73 (2021). For example, does the Supreme Court's decision 
potentially narrow the types of equipment that fall within that 
definition, and thus limit the number of callers subject to the 
prohibition on autodialing registered PSAP numbers? If fewer callers 
are deemed ``autodialers'' under the ruling than previously, does that 
have implications for the Commission's assessment of the security risk 
by potentially reducing the number of callers that will need to access 
the registry? Correspondingly, does it change the protections afforded 
to PSAPs by narrowing the types of callers that are prohibited from 
calling registered telephone numbers?

B. Call Blocking Proposal

    4. In light of potential security concerns involved with granting 
access to the registered PSAP numbers to a broad range of autodialer 
operators as the means to facilitate compliance with the PSAP Do-Not-
Call registry as contemplated in 2012, the Commission proposes that 
voice service providers block autodialed calls made to registered PSAP 
telephone numbers on the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry. As the means to 
identify the calls to be blocked, the Commission's rules already 
require autodialer operators seeking access to the registry to provide 
certain information including ``all outbound telephone numbers used to 
place autodialed calls, including both actual originating numbers and 
numbers that are displayed on caller identification services.'' See 47 
CFR 64.1202(d). The Commission proposes that such registered 
``outbound'' telephone numbers used to make autodialed calls be 
provided to voice service providers as the means to identify those 
autodialed calls that should be blocked when made to registered PSAP 
numbers.
    5. The Commission proposes to give voice service providers access 
to the PSAP telephone numbers and outbound autodialer telephone numbers 
registered on the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry. The Commission further 
proposes to require voice service providers to block any calls that 
originate from a registered autodialer number when made to a registered 
PSAP telephone number. Under this approach, access to the registered 
PSAP telephone numbers is restricted to more easily verified voice 
service providers that can ensure compliance by blocking calls made to 
the PSAP telephone numbers rather than entrusting compliance to an 
unknown number of robocallers whose identity and intentions in seeking 
access to the database may be difficult to confirm. Specifically, the 
Commission seeks comment on whether such an approach would alleviate 
the security risks associated with allowing access to a centralized 
database of PSAP numbers to all autodialer users who register. Does 
granting voice service providers access to registered PSAP telephone 
numbers create any new security issues? If so, how should the 
Commission minimize those concerns? How can the Commission ensure the 
security of the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry database from malicious 
actors?
    6. Responsible Voice Service Providers. The Commission seeks 
comment on which voice service providers should be subject to the 
blocking requirement. Should one voice service provider in the call 
path be responsible for blocking calls from registered autodialer 
telephone numbers to registered PSAP telephone numbers? Are certain 
voice service providers, such as those originating or terminating calls 
or those voice service providers that are also covered 911 service 
providers, better suited to carry out this obligation?
    7. Emergency Autodialed Calls. The Commission seeks comment on 
whether to limit its blocking requirement only to non-emergency 
autodialed calls. The current rules prohibit operators of robocalling 
equipment from using such equipment to contact registered PSAP numbers 
``other than for an emergency purpose.'' See 47 CFR 64.1202(c). Should 
the Commission retain this distinction or instruct voice service 
providers to block any calls from a registered autodialer number to a 
registered PSAP number? Are there situations when autodialer users may 
use autodialing equipment to make an emergency call? If so, how should 
the Commission account for such a possibility? Should the Commission 
grant access to the registry only to those autodialer numbers that are 
used solely for non-emergency purposes? Should the Commission adopt 
rules that establish a presumption that all calls from registered 
autodialer telephone numbers are non-emergency calls, and if so, what 
steps should the Commission take to ensure emergency calls to PSAPs are 
not inadvertently blocked? Are there any other barriers, costs, or 
considerations that should be taken into account in adopting rules that 
require voice service providers to block non-emergency calls from 
registered autodialer telephone numbers to registered PSAP numbers?
    8. Preventing Unauthorized Disclosure of Registered Numbers. The 
Commission proposes and seeks comment on extending the existing 
restrictions on disclosure and dissemination of registered numbers to 
voice service providers that might be granted access to the registry 
under our proposed approach. See 47 CFR 64.1202(f); 47 U.S.C. 
1473(c)(1). Are the current restrictions sufficient or should the 
Commission adopt new or different restrictions to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure of registered numbers?
    9. Erroneous Blocking. Is requiring the blocking of autodialed 
calls technically feasible for voice service providers? If so, can 
those programs ensure that calls PSAPs wish to receive are not blocked? 
Should the Commission consider a safe harbor from liability for good 
faith blocking of phone calls to PSAPs from originating numbers that 
are erroneously entered into the registry? Should autodialer operators 
be afforded a safe harbor from liability when they have submitted an 
outbound telephone number to the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry, but the 
call is not blocked through the fault of the voice service provider or 
registry administrator?
    10. Verifying and Updating the Registry. Are there other safeguards 
the Commission should adopt to ensure that emergency phone calls are 
not affected by the call blocking proposal to avoid inadvertently 
blocking legitimate emergency calls? The current rules require that all 
contact information provided by an autodialer operator to gain access 
to the registry, including the outbound telephone numbers used to place 
autodialed calls, be updated within 30 days of any change to this 
information. See 47 CFR 64.1202(d). Is this requirement sufficient to 
ensure that the database of telephone numbers used to identify those 
autodialed calls to be blocked remains updated to remove telephone 
numbers that are no longer used to make autodialed calls and add new 
telephone numbers that are used to make autodialed calls? Or should the 
Commission consider any new or different requirements to ensure that 
the database of registered telephone numbers used to make autodialed 
calls remains accurate over time? Are there alternative methods and 
sources that should be employed by the voice service provider or 
registry administrator to ensure that only non-emergency calls

[[Page 60191]]

are blocked to registered PSAP telephone numbers? Is there a cost-
effective means for voice service providers to track the use of such 
telephone numbers to determine if they have been recently ported to 
non-autodialer users? Should voice service providers be required to 
report to the Commission the number of blocked autodialer calls to 
PSAPs in order to help the Commission assess how frequently such calls 
occur and whether the registry is effective?
    11. Security Risks. Would a call blocking requirement raise the 
risk that a malicious actor could reverse-engineer a list of PSAP 
numbers by determining what calls have been blocked? Would that create 
any additional security risk for PSAPs? If there is such a risk, would 
this allow bad-actor callers to spoof the PSAP number and avoid all 
blocking under our existing rule limiting blocking emergency calls from 
PSAPs? If so, what could the Commission do to address this concern? 
Should the Commission's transparency and redress requirements for 
blocked calls apply to blocking done pursuant to a PSAP Do-Not-Call 
registry? See 47 CFR 64.1200(k)(8). Are there other factual, legal, or 
policy factors that the Commission should consider before allowing 
voice service providers to block calls to PSAP numbers that are used 
for emergency purposes? Alternatively, would such a requirement raise 
the risk that a malicious actor may purposely register non-autodialing 
outgoing numbers into the registry in order to prevent legitimate 
emergency callers from contacting PSAPs? If so, how can the Commission 
address such a concern? Are there any other potential security concerns 
the Commission may need to address?
    12. Costs and Impact on Small Business. The Commission seeks 
comment on the impact of its proposal on small businesses and any 
potential alternatives that may reduce the impact of autodialed calls 
on PSAPs without imposing burdens on such small businesses. The 
Commission tentatively concludes that the benefits associated with its 
proposal exceed the costs and seeks comment on this tentative 
conclusion. The Commission seeks comment on any specific cost concerns 
associated with its proposal. Are there ways to mitigate any costs or 
burdens on smaller voice providers associated with implementing a call 
blocking approach to satisfy the statutory obligation to create a PSAP 
Do-Not-Call registry?
    13. Statutory Authority. The Commission believes that the proposed 
approach satisfies its statutory obligation to ``create a specialized 
Do-Not-Call registry'' for PSAPs. See 47 U.S.C. 1473. In addition, the 
Commission believes that this approach satisfies its statutory 
requirement to ``provide a process for granting and tracking access to 
the registry by the operators of automatic dialing equipment.'' See 47 
U.S.C. 1473(b)(3). The Commission seeks comment on this analysis of the 
statutory requirements contained in section 6507(b) as applied to the 
call blocking proposal in the FNPRM, including the extent to which the 
Commission's current rules must be amended to implement this proposal.

C. Do-Not-Call Registry 2012 Security Concerns

    14. The Commission seeks comment on its assessment of the 
seriousness of the security risks associated with housing registered 
PSAP telephone numbers in a centralized database and granting access to 
those numbers to callers purporting to need them to comply with the 
rules as contemplated in 2012. The Commission is particularly 
interested in comments from PSAPs, law enforcement agencies, and 
national security agencies on these risks. To what extent, if any, 
would granting access to a list of PSAP numbers enhance the ability of 
bad actors to initiate a denial-of-service attack on a PSAP? Are there 
other comprehensive sources of PSAP telephone numbers already 
available, such that incremental risks added by the registry would be 
minimal? Even if some individual PSAP numbers are obtainable from 
alternative sources, to what extent would access to a single 
centralized database of such numbers increase the security risks of 
misuse of such numbers? On balance, do these security concerns outweigh 
the potential protections a registry affords from unwanted autodialed 
calls? How might the Commission best address the security concerns 
posed by a centralized database of PSAP telephone numbers that would 
allow the Commission to move forward with the creation of a PSAP Do-
Not-Call registry, as contemplated in 2012, in a manner that does not 
jeopardize PSAPs and emergency callers that rely on PSAPs?
    15. To what extent do the significant potential monetary penalties 
for PSAP Do-Not-Call violations and for unauthorized dissemination or 
distribution of the registered PSAP numbers impact the Commission's 
analysis of the risks of potential abuse? To what extent is the 
effectiveness of such monetary penalties undermined when dealing with 
individuals or entities who seek to intentionally disrupt the provision 
of emergency services and make efforts to conceal their identity, or 
who are foreign actors against whom it may be difficult or impossible 
to enforce such penalties? Does the implementation of STIR/SHAKEN 
caller ID authentication technology, or the efforts of the registered 
traceback consortium to trace calls back to their source, make it less 
likely that callers initiate denial-of-service attacks on PSAPs by 
making it easier to determine the source of a call?

D. Alternative Solutions to the Do-Not-Call Registry Security Issues

    16. Enhanced Caller Vetting. If the call blocking proposal to 
protect PSAPs from unwanted autodialed calls proves unworkable, are 
there other mechanisms or safeguards that the Commission could 
implement to effectively vet the identity of users who seek access to 
registered PSAP numbers to reduce the likelihood of providing access to 
those telephone numbers to bad actors that might misuse these numbers, 
and if so, what are they? The Commission's rules already require that 
entities seeking access to the registry provide certain contact 
information including, for example, the names under which the 
registrant operates, a business address, a telephone number, an email 
address, and a contact person. See 47 CFR 64.1202(d). Is this 
information sufficient to confirm the identity and intent of the party 
seeking access to the registry or should the Commission impose 
additional or different requirements? How could the Commission prevent 
parties that seek access to the registry for malicious purposes from 
submitting false information to circumvent its review and gain access 
to the registry under false pretenses? Would any such measures be 
consistent with section 6507(b)(3), which directs the Commission to 
``provide a process for granting and tracking access to the registry by 
the operators of automatic dialing equipment?'' For instance, does the 
Commission have discretion under that provision to limit access only to 
certain operators? Is such discretion in that regard supported by the 
fact that section 6507(b)(4) directs the Commission to ``protect the 
list of registered numbers from disclosure or dissemination by parties 
granted access to the registry?'' Is there any level of cost-effective 
vetting the Commission could do that would sufficiently guard against 
improper use of the registry? The Commission asks commenters to provide 
cost information on any suggested mechanisms or safeguards.
    17. Improved Data Security Requirements. Even with sufficient 
vetting of registry users, would there remain significant risks that 
PSAP

[[Page 60192]]

telephone numbers could be disseminated, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, as part of that process (e.g., through carelessness or 
malicious hacking)? What security measures should the Commission 
consider to ensure that parties that obtain such sensitive data 
institute appropriate measures to prevent data breaches? What types of 
data security requirements might be appropriate? Should any such 
mechanisms relied upon to protect PSAP telephone numbers from 
unauthorized access or disclosure be adaptable to address data security 
issues? If so, would they need to be adaptable in real time or near-
real time? How would such adaptation be effectuated as a practical 
matter?
    18. Consistent with section 6507(b)(1), the Commission's rules 
``permit,'' but do not require, PSAPs to register ``any PSAP telephone 
numbers associated with the provision of emergency services or 
communications with other public safety agencies.'' See 47 CFR 
64.1202(b). Does the discretion afforded to PSAPs to decide which, if 
any, of their telephone numbers that they wish to place on the registry 
allow PSAPs to decide for themselves whether the benefits outweigh the 
risks of submitting numbers to the registry? How should this impact the 
Commission's review of the security risks of a PSAP Do-Not-Call 
registry? Can PSAPs, for example, decide to register only those numbers 
for which they determine that the protections from unwanted calls 
outweigh the potential harms from denial-of-service attacks? Do PSAPs 
have sufficient information to understand the protections and risks 
afforded by the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry, including an understanding 
of the types of dialing equipment that would be prohibited from calling 
those numbers under the TCPA's definition of an ``autodialer?'' Should 
the Commission conduct outreach to ensure that PSAPs are aware of the 
potential benefits and risks of submitting their numbers for inclusion 
on the registry? Conversely, if PSAPs decline to register their numbers 
due to the security risk, would that undermine the effectiveness of the 
PSAP Do-Not-Call registry? What security protections, if any, would be 
necessary to reassure PSAPs that the benefits of participating in the 
registry outweigh the risks? The Commission invites commenters to 
provide information on the costs and benefits of any proposed security 
protections.

E. Alternative Technical and Regulatory Solutions

    19. Other Technological Solutions. Are there other technological 
solutions beyond the Commission's call blocking proposal that may have 
emerged in the near decade since section 6507 became law that the 
Commission might explore to protect PSAPs from unwanted calls while 
fulfilling the statute's requirements? For example, could the 
Commission require callers to filter their autodialed calls through a 
hardware or software platform that would house an encrypted list of 
registered PSAP numbers and would be able to block autodialing 
equipment from making calls to these numbers? Do such technologies 
exist, and would it be cost effective and technologically feasible to 
implement such a solution? If such a technological solution does not 
currently exist, what steps would be needed to develop such technology 
and what entity or entities might be best suited to do so? What costs 
would be involved in terms of time and money to develop such a 
technological fix?
    20. How long might it take to identify, develop, and implement any 
such alternative solution to a PSAP Do-Not-Call registry? What would it 
cost to create such a solution? Who would maintain the list of 
telephone numbers housed in such a technological solution, and how 
often would the technology be updated or would callers be required to 
install updates? Are there risks that legitimate emergency calls might 
be blocked if such a system were implemented? Are there other viable 
alternative technological options that the Commission should consider 
that satisfy the specific statutory requirements and objectives of 
section 6507? Alternatively, should the Commission consider certain 
options--even if they do not satisfy section 6507 in and of 
themselves--that the Commission could adopt in addition to measures 
that do satisfy section 6507?
    21. Security solutions exist today that can block calls to PSAPs 
that are determined to be fraudulent. These solutions become more 
effective when used in combination with STIR/SHAKEN. Is call blocking 
at the PSAP a more effective solution? Can PSAPs deploy the same 
blocking solutions that are used for consumers, or are more specialized 
solutions required? If blocking is to be based, at least in part, on 
information produced by STIR/SHAKEN, what information should the 
terminating provider disseminate to the PSAP to make this 
determination? If more specialized solutions are required, how do these 
tools differ from consumer blocking tools? Would the need for PSAPs to 
deploy this solution place additional technical complexity and/or 
additional financial burden on PSAPs, and if so, how could this be 
mitigated? Which type of solutions can be deployed on a wide scale?
    22. Apart from provider blocking, do PSAPs themselves have an 
ability to effectively block unwanted calls? If not, how long would it 
take and how much would it cost to implement such a blocking solution? 
Would requiring every autodialed call to identify itself as an 
automated call using the caller ID information allow PSAPs to block 
these calls more effectively? Are there any ``best practices'' that 
PSAPs might implement to protect themselves from robocalls? For 
example, the Hospital Robocall Protection Group has issued a report 
outlining best practices that hospitals can use to protect hospitals 
against robocalls. Should the Commission consider outlining similar 
best practices for PSAPs? If so, what is the best method for doing so? 
For instance, should the Commission seek input from an existing or new 
advisory committee?
    23. National Do-Not-Call Registry. Could the Commission utilize the 
existing National Do-Not-Call Registry, working in conjunction with the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to protect PSAPs from unwanted calls? 
The National Do-Not-Call Registry is administered by the FTC and has 
been operational for almost two decades and currently protects over 240 
million telephone numbers from telemarketing sales calls, or telephone 
solicitations. Would allowing PSAPs to register their telephone numbers 
on the National Do-Not-Call Registry afford them a more timely, cost-
effective, and secure solution to stop many unwanted calls while 
shielding the identity of the relatively small number of PSAP numbers 
by including them among the hundreds of millions of other telephone 
numbers already contained in that registry? Could this approach, in 
conjunction with the TCPA's existing protection from autodialed calls 
to ``emergency telephone lines,'' satisfy the goals of section 6507 
while providing reasonable security safeguards that preclude parties 
from identifying those telephone numbers associated with PSAPs and 
using them for malicious purposes? See 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A). Could 
the Commission work with the FTC to ensure this solution could be 
implemented in a timely manner?
    24. Would this approach require Congress to revisit the statutory 
language associated with the Tax Relief Act and the TCPA to permit the 
Commission to implement this solution? This might include authorizing 
the inclusion of PSAP telephone numbers on a registry currently 
reserved for ``residential telephone subscribers,'' and

[[Page 60193]]

used by callers making telephone solicitations rather than callers 
making autodialed calls. See 47 U.S.C. 227(c). It might also include 
harmonizing the statutory monetary penalties associated with calling 
PSAP telephone numbers with those for violations of the TCPA. 
Alternatively, could the Commission work in conjunction with public 
safety organizations or their representatives to utilize any existing 
or planned databases of public safety numbers, rather than creating a 
new registry, to satisfy our obligations under the statute? If it is 
deemed not possible to implement section 6507 without creating 
significant new security risks to PSAPs, what should be done at that 
point?
    25. Expanded Use of the Reassigned Numbers Database. Could the 
Commission expand use of the Commission's Reassigned Numbers Database 
(RND) as a means to prevent unwanted calls to PSAPs? The RND is 
designed to prevent a consumer from getting unwanted calls intended for 
someone who previously held their telephone number. Callers wishing to 
avail themselves of certain TCPA liability safe harbor provisions can 
query the database to determine whether a telephone number may have 
been reassigned since the most recent date of consent so they can avoid 
calling consumers who do not want to receive the calls. See 47 CFR 
64.1200(m). To achieve its goal of avoiding robocalls to registered 
PSAP numbers, should the Commission expand the RND to include 
registered PSAP telephone numbers as well as reassigned telephone 
numbers, and require autodialer operators to query the RND before 
placing calls? Would the inclusion of PSAP numbers, coupled with a 
requirement for autodialers to query the RND, effectively prevent 
unwanted calls to PSAPs? Would this alternative adequately protect the 
security of the sensitive PSAP telephone numbers while fulfilling the 
statutory obligation to create a PSAP Do-Not-Call registry? The 
Commission notes that the cost to operate the RND is recovered through 
usage charges collected from callers that choose to use the database. 
Does such a fee-based database align with Congress' intent in 
instructing the Commission to create the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry?
    26. The Commission seeks comment on these and any other potential 
solutions that allow the Commission to protect registered PSAP numbers 
from unauthorized dissemination in a timely and cost-effective manner, 
while fulfilling Congress' goal of stopping unwanted calls to PSAPs, 
including the costs and benefits of each approach.

F. Other Security Threats to PSAPs

    27. Cybersecurity events continue to affect the ability of PSAPs to 
respond to 911 calls, locate 911 callers, and dispatch assistance. How 
can the Commission aid in securing PSAPs against these types of 
attacks? As 911 services evolve, the ability to reach PSAPs by text, 
video, and data transmissions create additional vulnerabilities that 
may be exploited. As states and local jurisdictions have deployed text-
to-911 capabilities, have PSAPs experienced attacks using text 
messaging as an attack vector? Have PSAPs transitioning to Next 
Generation 911 (NG911) systems experienced an increase in such 
incidents? If so, are those risks specific to NG911's technical 
implementation? Can the proposed Do-Not-Call registry for PSAPs 
mitigate risks associated with NG911 services? Can solutions used to 
prevent cyberattacks through the PSAP's administrative broadband 
connections also prevent attacks through NG911? What is needed to 
ensure NG911 communications with PSAPs are legitimate traffic?
    28. In 2020, the Communications Security, Reliability, and 
Interoperability Council (CSRIC) submitted a report to the Commission 
regarding security risks and best practices for mitigation in 911 
systems. See Communications Security, Reliability, And Interoperability 
Council VII, Report on Security Risks and Best Practices for Mitigation 
in 9-1-1 in Legacy, Transitional, and NG 9-1-1 Implementations 
(September 16, 2020). Is the report complete in its identification of 
security risks and best practices? What challenges, in addition to 
those discussed in the report, do PSAPs face in securing their 
operations? Are there additional best practices that PSAPs should 
consider adopting? What steps should the Commission take to aid in 
implementing best practices for PSAPs or otherwise promote 
cybersecurity in the PSAP environment?
    29. Should the Commission consider caller ID authentication methods 
such as STIR/SHAKEN as a means to enhance the security of PSAP 
operations or promote greater trust for calls to PSAPs and those 
associated with 911? Providers using STIR/SHAKEN assign calls an 
``attestation level'' that signifies what they know about the calling 
party and its right to use the number shown in the caller ID. Does 
STIR/SHAKEN sufficiently mitigate the robocall threat to PSAPs by 
allowing service providers to screen illegitimate 911 calls, including 
911 calls to PSAPs from callers seeking to disguise their phone number 
or location information, more effectively? Can PSAPs use existing 
analytics, such as caller ID authentication, to help evaluate the 
trustworthiness of a call and caller? Do such analytics help PSAPs 
combat robocalling attacks better than a centralized database of PSAP 
numbers? If not, could additional STIR/SHAKEN standards, such as a 
unique attestation level, help distinguish between legitimate 911 calls 
and illegitimate calls from bad actors? Should the Commission encourage 
standards bodies to define such standards to be deployed by providers? 
Should such an attestation framework distinguish 911 calls originated 
by non-service initialized devices, which bypass the typical 
authorization conducted by originating providers, from service-
initialized 911 calls? Can STIR/SHAKEN standards account for this issue 
and ensure that PSAPs using caller ID authentication do not negatively 
impact legitimate calls? Are there other technology developments or 
regulatory changes that would be required to facilitate the use of 
caller ID authentication technologies to support PSAP operations?
    30. Digital Equity and Inclusion. The Commission, as part of its 
continuing effort to advance digital equity for all, including people 
of color, persons with disabilities, persons who live in rural or 
Tribal areas, and others who are or have been historically underserved, 
marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty or 
inequality, invites comment on any equity-related considerations and 
benefits (if any) that may be associated with the proposals and issues 
discussed herein. See 47 U.S.C. 151; Executive Order No. 13985, 
published at 86 FR 7009, Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and 
Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government 
(January 20, 2021). Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on how 
its proposals may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, 
inclusion, and accessibility, as well as the scope of the Commission's 
relevant legal authority.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    31. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared the Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities by the policies and rules 
proposed in the FNPRM. Written public comments are requested on the 
IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and

[[Page 60194]]

must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the FNPRM provided.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

    32. Section 6507 of the Tax Relief Act required the Commission to 
``initiate a proceeding to create a specialized Do-Not-Call registry'' 
for PSAPs to protect them from unwanted or illegal robocalls and to 
issue associated regulations after providing the public with notice and 
an opportunity to comment. To fulfill this mandate, in 2012 the 
Commission adopted rules to establish a Do-Not-Call registry for 
telephone numbers used by PSAPs and to prohibit the use of ``automatic 
dialing equipment'' to contact those registered numbers for non-
emergency purposes.

B. Legal Basis

    33. The proposed rules are authorized under sections 4(i), 4(j), 
and 227 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 
154(i), 154(j), 227, and section 6507 of the Middle Class Tax Relief 
and Job Creation Act of 2012, Public Law 112-96, 47 U.S.C. 1473, 47 
U.S.C. 6507.

C. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements

    34. The FNPRM proposes that registered PSAP telephone numbers be 
made available to voice service providers that will be required to 
block autodialed calls made to those numbers. Under this proposal, 
PSAPs will be permitted to register their telephone numbers on the PSAP 
Do-Not-Call registry. This will necessitate some administrative 
functions for those PSAPs, such as designating a representative to 
review, update, and upload their current telephone numbers to the 
registry. Such PSAPs will need to develop a process to verify on an 
annual basis that the registered numbers should continue to appear on 
the registry.
    35. In addition, the Commission's rules already require autodialer 
operators seeking access to the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry to provide 
certain information, including all outbound telephone numbers used to 
place autodialed calls. The FNPRM proposes that autodialer operators 
continue to upload such numbers into the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry and 
update them regularly.
    36. The FNPRM proposes that voice service providers will be 
provided with the registered PSAP and autodialer telephone numbers 
contained on the PSAP Do-Not-Call registry and will be required to 
block any calls that originate from a registered autodialer number when 
made to a registered PSAP telephone number. This will require voice 
service providers to develop, if they have not already done so, call 
blocking programs to ensure that any autodialed calls to PSAP numbers 
are blocked.

D. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    37. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, 
which may include the following four alternatives (among others): (1) 
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities.
    38. The FNPRM considers alternatives to requiring voice service 
providers to block autodialed calls and, for each alternative, the 
Commission requested comment on the costs and time frames required to 
implement the solutions discussed, including how to mitigate the impact 
on small businesses. Specifically, the FNPRM seeks comment on whether 
PSAPs themselves can deploy call blocking solutions and effectively 
block unwanted autodialed calls. It also considers whether requiring 
every autodialed caller to identify itself as an automated call using 
the Caller-ID information would allow PSAPs to block these calls more 
effectively.
    39. In addition, the FNPRM considers allowing operators of 
autodialed calls to continue to access registered PSAP numbers. In that 
case, however, the Commission considers adopting more robust mechanisms 
or safeguards to effectively vet the identity of users who seek access 
to registered PSAP numbers to reduce the likelihood of providing access 
to those telephone numbers to bad actors that might misuse the numbers. 
The FNPRM also considers requiring callers to filter their autodialed 
calls through an app or software platform that would block autodialer 
equipment from making calls to registered PSAP numbers.
    40. Further, the FNPRM proposes as an alternative solution the use 
of the existing National Do-Not-Call Registry to protect PSAPs from 
unwanted calls. The FNPRM seeks comment on whether allowing PSAPs to 
register their telephone numbers on the National Do-Not-Call Registry 
would afford them a more timely, cost-effective, and secure solution to 
stop many unwanted calls while shielding the identity of the relatively 
small number of PSAP numbers by including them among the hundreds of 
millions of other telephone numbers already contained in that registry. 
Finally, the FNPRM seeks comment on whether the Commission should 
expand the Reassigned Numbers Database (RND) to include registered PSAP 
telephone numbers as well as reassigned telephone numbers, and require 
autodialer operators to query the RND before placing calls.
    41. The Commission expects to consider the economic impact of these 
proposals on small entities, as identified in comments filed in 
response to the FNPRM and the IRFA, in reaching its final conclusions 
and taking action in this proceeding.

E. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rules

    42. None.

Federal Communications Commission.
Katura Jackson,
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2021-23698 Filed 10-29-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P