OIRA has determined that this is a major rule for purposes of Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996 (also known as the Congressional Review Act or CRA) (5 U.S.C. 804(2) et seq.). Under the CRA, a major rule takes effect 60 days after the rule is published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).

Notwithstanding this requirement, the CRA allows agencies to dispense with the requirements of section 801 when the agency for good cause finds that such procedure would be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest and the rule shall take effect at such time as the agency promulgating the rule determines. 5 U.S.C. 808(2). Pursuant to section 808(2), SBA for good cause finds that a 60-day delay to provide public notice is impracticable and contrary to the public interest. Likewise, for the same reasons, SBA for good cause finds that there are grounds to waive the 30-day effective date delay under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3).

As discussed elsewhere in this interim final rule, given the urgent need to provide borrowers with timely relief and the short period of time before certain borrowers will be required to begin making principal and interest payments if they have not yet applied for forgiveness with their lenders, SBA has determined that it is impractical and not in the public interest to provide a delayed effective date. An immediate effective date will allow SBA to expedite loan forgiveness to small businesses and nonprofit organizations and remit forgiveness payments to lenders.

Executive Order 12988

SBA has drafted this rule, to the extent practicable, in accordance with the standards set forth in section 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, to minimize litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden. The rule has no preemptive or retroactive effect.

Executive Order 13132

SBA has determined that this rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various layers of government. Therefore, SBA has determined that this rule has no federalism implications warranting preparation of a federalism assessment.
The FAA issued a second report of an incident involving an SDOS actuator. The SDOS actuator is a telescopic, spring-loaded actuator that assists the mechanic in raising the engine fan cowl. When the actuator is extended (uncompressed), it retains energy in the spring (preloaded). In the incident, after an SDOS actuator with part number BOE–2001–901F was removed, a part separation occurred at the joint between the actuator’s inner tube and its related “back end” bracket. The actuator came apart with spring-propelled force, injuring one of the maintenance personnel. This SDOS actuator was used two roll pins and epoxy at this joint. The FAA has determined that this design, together with spring preload, caused these parts to break.

The FAA received a second report of a hazardous sudden extension of this actuator when, during improper removal of the SDOS actuator from the engine fan cowl while it was retracted, the SDOS actuator rapidly extended, with the potential to cause injury. This was possible because the fastener connecting the SDOS actuator to the fan cowl can be removed by cracking open the fan cowl and reaching under it. After the fastener was removed, the SDOS actuator was still connected to the engine fan case and was held in the retracted position by the “catch” hook, per the design. When the SDOS was rotated upward by hand, the catch hook released, and the SDOS actuator rapidly extended. The FAA has determined that the design of the SDOS actuator with part number BOE–2001–901H obscures the safety marker when the fan cowl is opened. The design of this SDOS actuator was changed during maintenance, resulting in injury to maintenance personnel or damage to the airplane.

The manufacturer of the SDOS actuator, General Aerospace, has changed the design to have a stronger joint between the inner tube and the “back end” bracket that uses blind rivets rather than pins, together with an improved shape of the “catching” bracket. This redesign addressed the aforementioned extension of the SDOS actuator, and the redesigned actuator became part number BOE–2001–901H. General Aerospace then modified part number BOE–2001–901H to include more detailed safety markers in new locations that display the warnings more clearly to maintenance personnel. That redesign addressed the aforementioned extension of the SDOS actuator from release of the catch hook. With the addition of the more detailed safety markers in the new locations, the SDOS actuator part number changed from BOE–2001–901H to BOE–2001–901J. General Aerospace Service Bulletin BOE–2001–901J, dated November 2, 2019, is referenced in Boeing Service Bulletin 737–71–1911, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2019. The FAA issued this AD to address the possible separation of the SDOS actuator, and the visual obstruction of the SDOS actuator safety marker, either of which, during maintenance, could cause injury to maintenance personnel or damage to the airplane.

**Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued**

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that the AD would apply to Boeing model 737–8 and 737–9 airplanes. Since then, the FAA determined that all Boeing model 737 airplanes powered by LEAP–1B engines (737 MAX airplanes), have engine fan cowls on which affected SDOS actuators could be installed. The affected SDOS actuators are rotatable parts, so the future replacement of an SDOS actuator could reintroduce the unsafe condition. The 737 airplane models that are powered by LEAP–1B engines, and therefore that have fan cowls on which affected SDOS actuators could be installed, are currently (g) of the proposed AD to allow use of later-approved revisions of the service information would be contrary to Office of the Federal Register (OFR) regulations regarding incorporation by reference. Specifically, incorporation by reference of a publication is limited to the edition of the publication that is approved by OFR. 1 CFR 51.1(f). To allow operators to use later revisions of the referenced document that are not approved by the OFR and identified in the AD, either the FAA must (1) seek OFR approval to incorporate a later revision of the service document and revise the AD to reference the approved later revision, or (2) operators must request approval to use a later revision as an alternative
method of compliance with this AD under the provisions of paragraph (k) of this AD.

Request for Clarification of the RC Steps in the Service Information

American Airlines requested clarification of paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. The commenter stated that it believes that the RC steps in both Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–71–1911 and Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB can be interpreted to mean that all steps of each Work Package are Required for Compliance. The company also states that the instruction to “Refer to the listed procedures in SB 737–71–1911 Original Issue or later approved revisions as an accepted procedure” found in each Work Package can be interpreted to mean that any part of the Work Package can be deviated from at the discretion of the operator, using the accepted procedures in the service information.

The FAA notes that Boeing’s intention in including the multiple Work Packages, and the FAA’s intention in mandating them, is to provide flexibility to the operator in the sequence of performing the mandated corrective actions. Each Work Package can be implemented one at a time. Each Work Package is defined by a unique combination of Group, Configuration, Engine 1 or Engine 2, and LEFT or RIGHT Fan Cowl descriptors. All of the Work Packages do not apply to every affected airplane.

The FAA further notes that both Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–71–1911 and Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB are consistent in their “RC: Start” and “RC: End” designations, which clearly delineate those Required Actions that are mandated by this AD. The instructions outside of the “RC: Start” and “RC: End” steps can be used to accomplish the required actions, but the AD does not authorize operators to use them as alternatives to the required actions. Where the service information specifies to “refer to” a recommended procedure, and only for those steps, operators may use an accepted alternative procedure.

The FAA has added paragraph (i) to this AD to provide credit for the previous accomplishment of Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, dated November 26, 2019.

Request for Clarification on the Correct Number of Safety Markers

American Airlines asked if the FAA requires a certain number of safety markers on SDOS part number (P/N) BOE–2001–901J units that have been changed from SDOS P/N BOE–2001–901H units. The AD requires that two P/N 12299 safety markers be installed on the SDOS actuator outer tube (cowl door side) if they are not already installed, but the commenter noted that there could be a third safety marker, P/N BOE–2001–713, already installed.

The FAA notes that an operator can comply with this AD by installing either (1) a P/N BOE–2001–901J actuator with its two original safety markers, or (2) a P/N BOE–2001–901H actuator that has been converted to a P/N BOE–2001–901J actuator with two new safety markers, with or without a third marker. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this request.

Request for Clarification on Newly Delivered Airplanes

American Airlines requested clarification on whether the operator would need to request an AMOC for the newly delivered airplanes that already have the SDOS part number BOE–2001–901J. The commenter noted that paragraph (g) of the proposed AD did not include Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020. The FAA notes that AMOCs will not be necessary for airplanes that are newly delivered with the P/N BOE–2001–901J SDOS actuator installed. As previously explained, paragraph (g) of this AD has been updated to include Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020, which includes a revised effectiveness list. No further change to this AD is necessary.

Request for Change to the Airplane Applicability

American Airlines and United Airlines requested that paragraph (c) of the proposed AD be amended to be limited to airplanes identified in the Effectivity section of Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB. As an alternative, American Airlines requested that a subparagraph be added to paragraph (h) of the proposed AD to state that a review of maintenance and delivery records can be used to determine the installed SDOS actuator part number, provided the SDOS part number can be definitively determined from the records check. The FAA notes that paragraph (c) of this AD now includes all Boeing Model 737 airplanes powered by LEAP–1B engines. Paragraph (g) of this AD now mandates Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020. Because all Model 737 airplanes powered by LEAP–1B engines have engine fan cowl that, due to the rotability of the affected parts, are subject to the same SDOS actuator issue, paragraph (j) of this AD now prohibits the installation of SDOS actuators having part numbers BOE–2001–901F and BOE–2001–901H on all Model 737 airplanes powered by LEAP–1B engines.

Request To Allow Use of Alternative Lockwire

American Airlines requested that the FAA allow use of .040 lockwire for the lock wire specified in steps 1(b) and 2(b) of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–71–1911, dated November 26, 2019. American Airlines noted that the .040 lockwire is more common and readily available than .041 lockwire and would provide an equivalent level of safety. American Airlines expressed concern that if the FAA interpreted use of .041 lockwire as an RC step, the .040 lockwire could easily be mistakenly used due to the similarity to the .041 lockwire. The commenter requested that the FAA include an exception regarding this issue if appropriate.

The FAA notes that for the purposes of the SDOS actuator, .040 lockwire will function the same as .041 lockwire. The FAA further notes that Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020, does not specify the use of lockwire in an RC step. Therefore, no change to this AD is necessary as a result of this comment.

Request To Change Description of the Incidents Prompting This AD

Boeing requested an update to the SUMMARY and Discussion sections of the NPRM, and paragraph (e) of the proposed AD, to clarify that there were two different causes and corrective actions.

The FAA agrees and has revised the Summary, Background, and paragraph (e) of this AD to delineate the two corrective actions. The Background section of this final rule describes in detail the two incidents and how each resulted in the actuator’s sudden and hazardous extension. To address the cause of each incident, this AD requires two actions, both of which are unchanged from the NPRM: (1) Replacing each affected SDOS actuator with a new SDOS actuator, and (2) verifying that new safety markers are installed in the proper locations.
Request To Update the Number of Affected U.S. Airplanes

Boeing stated that the number of affected U.S.-registered airplanes identified in the Costs of Compliance section depends on whether the NPRM covers only the SDOS attachment issue (in which case Boeing stated the number is correct), or also covers the safety marker issue (in which case Boeing stated an additional 240 airplanes would be affected).

The FAA notes that since this AD addresses both the SDOS actuator attachment issue and the safety marker issue, both types of affected SDOS actuators must be replaced, resulting in an additional 240 U.S.-registered airplanes that would be affected. The estimated cost for this AD has been updated to reflect a total of 400 U.S.-registered airplanes.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate

Boeing requested that the FAA revise the Costs of Compliance section of the NPRM to correct the labor cost calculation to $425 per airplane.

The FAA agrees that the NPRM provided an incorrect estimate for the number of work-hours to replace the SDOS actuators. The FAA has revised the costs accordingly in this final rule.

Request To Modify the Affected Part Without Removal


The FAA notes that neither General Aerospace Service Bulletin BOE–2001–901–71–01, which is referenced in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–71–1911, nor Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, both dated September 10, 2020, requires removing the SDOS actuator before applying the safety markers. No change to this final rule is necessary as a result of this comment.

Request To Clarify the Need for Ongoing Inspections

Southwest Airlines asked whether the FAA was developing a requirement for ongoing inspections to make sure the safety markers are still present. The commenter stated that Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, dated November 26, 2019, does not mention inspecting for safety markers after the initial compliance.

The FAA notes that proper installation of the safety markers is intended to be permanent; therefore, no repetitive inspections of the safety marker installation are necessary. Because all Model 737 airplanes powered by LEAP–1B engines have engine fan cowlings that, due to parts rotability, are subject to reinstallation of affected SDOS actuators, those airplanes are subject to the requirements of paragraph (j) of this AD, which prohibits the installation of SDOS actuators having part numbers BOE–2001–901F and BOE–2001–901H. The FAA has not changed this AD as a result of the comment.

Request To Include Instructions for Examination of Spare Parts

United Airlines requested clarification of actions required for spare parts. The commenter asserted that spare parts should be handled in the same manner as parts found installed on the aircraft once they are removed and that Paragraph 3.B., Work Instructions, provided in the Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–71–1911, dated November 26, 2019, are intended to be performed at an aircraft level with some exceptions not being applicable.

The FAA disagrees and has not changed the AD with regard to this request. ADs in general do not apply directly to spare parts because under 14 CFR part 39, ADs are legally enforceable rules that apply only to products such as airplanes, and not to parts that are not installed on an airplane. The FAA can, by AD, prohibit or condition the installation of a part on a product. This AD prohibits the installation of SDOS actuators having part numbers BOE–2001–901F and BOE–2001–901H.

However, the FAA notes that Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–71–1911, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020, includes non-mandatory information on how to contact General Aerospace for shipping instructions for SDOS actuator part number BOE–2001–901F, although this AD does not require the return of any parts. Further, the BOE–2001–901H SDOS actuators can be changed to BOE–2001–901J SDOS actuators.

Conclusion

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes:

- Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
- Do not add any additional burden upon the public that was already proposed in the NPRM.

The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final rule.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

The FAA reviewed Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020. This service information describes procedures for replacing each affected SDOS actuator with a new SDOS actuator and verifying that safety markers are installed. This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 400 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

### ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Labor cost</th>
<th>Parts cost</th>
<th>Cost per product</th>
<th>Cost on U.S. operators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Replace SDOS actuator</td>
<td>5 work-hours × $85 per hour = $425 .............</td>
<td>$ *</td>
<td>$425</td>
<td>$170,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The FAA has received no definitive data that would enable the agency to provide parts cost estimates for the actions specified in this proposed AD.
The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. According to the manufacturer, however, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected persons.

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

**Regulatory Findings**

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866.

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**Adoption of the Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**


| 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: |
| Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. |
| §39.13 [Amended] |
| ▪ 2. The FAA amends §39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive: |
| (a) Effective Date |
| This AD is effective September 3, 2021. |
| (b) Affected ADs |
| None. |
| (c) Applicability |
| This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737 airplanes powered by LEAP–1B engines, certified in any category. |
| (d) Subject |
| Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 71, Powerplant. |
| (e) Unsafe Condition |
| This AD was prompted by reports of inadvertent release of the spring energy of certain spring door opening system (SDOS) actuators. The FAA is issuing this AD to address possible separation of the SDOS actuator and visual obstruction of the SDOS actuator safety marker, which, during maintenance, can cause injury to maintenance personnel or damage to the airplane. |
| (f) Compliance |
| Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. |
| (g) Required Actions |
| For airplanes identified in Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020: At the applicable times specified in the “Compliance” paragraph of Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020, except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD, do all applicable actions identified in, and in accordance with, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020. |
| (h) Exception to Service Information Specifications |
| Where Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, Revision 1, dated September 10, 2020, uses the phrase “the original issue date of Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB,” this AD requires using “the effective date of this AD.” |
| (i) Credit for Previous Actions |
| This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using Boeing Special Attention Requirements Bulletin 737–71–1911 RB, dated November 26, 2019. |
| (j) Parts Installation Prohibition |
| As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install on any airplane an SDOS actuator having part number BOE–2001–901F or BOE–2001–901H. |
| (k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) |
| (1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (l) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-AM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. |
| (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. |
| (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD. |
| (l) Related Information |
| For more information about this AD, contact Rose Len, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206–231–3604; email: rose.len@faa.gov. |
| (m) Material Incorporated by Reference |
| (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. |
| (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. |
| (ii) [Reserved] |
| (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&Ds), 2600 Westbrook Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740–5600; telephone 562–797–1717; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. |
| (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195.

(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, email fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ibr-locations.html.

Issued on June 18, 2021.

Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2021–16174 Filed 7–29–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, an update of the hydraulic monitoring system to include additional redundancy. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective September 3, 2021.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 3, 2021.

ADDRESSES: For EASA material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this IBR material on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu. For Airbus SAS service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office—EAL, Rond-Point Emile Dewoitine No: 2, 31700 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; email continued-airworthiness.a350@airbus.com; internet http://www.airbus.com. You may view this IBR material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. It is also available in the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2021–0193.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2021–0193; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kathleen Arrigotti, Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 50318; telephone and fax 206–231–3218; Kathleen.Arrigotti@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion


Airplanes with an original airworthiness certificate or original export certificate of airworthiness issued after September 15, 2020, must comply with the airworthiness limitations specified as part of the approved type design and referenced on the type certificate data sheet; this AD therefore does not include those airplanes in the applicability.

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on March 26, 2021 (86 FR 16117). The NPRM was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. The NPRM proposed to require revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in EASA AD 2020–0268. The NPRM also proposed to require, for certain airplanes, an update of the hydraulic monitoring system to include additional redundancy.

The FAA is issuing this AD to address the overheat failure mode of the hydraulic engine-driven pump (EDP), which may cause a fast temperature rise of the hydraulic fluid, and, if combined with an inoperative fuel tank inerting system, could lead to an uncontrolled overheat of the hydraulic fluid, possibly resulting in ignition of the fuel-air mixture of the affected fuel tank. See the MCAI for additional background information.

Comments

The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The FAA has considered the comment received. The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) stated that it supports the NPRM.

Conclusion

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule as proposed, except for minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

EASA AD 2020–0268 describes new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations related to fuel tank ignition