[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 119 (Thursday, June 24, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33240-33243]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-13406]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Record of Decision for the Long Range Discrimination Radar 
Operations at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska

AGENCY: Missile Defense Agency, Department of Defense (DoD).

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), as lead agency, and the 
Department of the Air Force (DAF), as a cooperating agency, are issuing 
this joint Record of Decision (ROD) to implement changes in operational 
concept for the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) located at

[[Page 33241]]

Clear Air Force Station (CAFS), Alaska. This decision includes 
modification of the LRDR operational requirements and procedures to 
reflect continuous operations in response to emerging threats. This 
action will enable the MDA to meet its congressional mandate to fully 
support the primary mission of the layered Missile Defense System (MDS) 
to provide continuous and precise tracking and discrimination of long-
range missile threats launched against the United States (U.S.).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the LRDR 
CAFS Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or this ROD, please 
contact Mr. Ryan Keith, MDA Public Affairs, at 256-450-1599 or by email 
at lrdr.info@mda.mil">lrdr.info@mda.mil. Downloadable electronic versions of the Final EIS 
and ROD are available on MDA's website at https://www.mda.mil/system/lrdr.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  This ROD documents the following:
     The decision;
     The alternatives considered in reaching the decision and 
the alternative considered to be environmentally preferable;
     Relevant factors that were considered among the 
alternatives and how those factors entered into the decision; and
     Whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize 
environmental impacts resulting from the selected alternative have been 
adopted, and if not, why they were not.

A. MDA and DAF Decision

    The MDA and the DAF are issuing this ROD, selecting the Proposed 
Action as described in the LRDR CAFS EIS to operate the LRDR on a 
continuous basis. The operational concept would change from the initial 
concept to maintain the LRDR in a readiness posture with limited 
operations and no additional airspace restrictions. The change in LRDR 
operations will create a hazard in areas of the National Airspace 
System where high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) will exceed Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) certification standards for aircraft 
electrical and electronic systems. Therefore, the DAF, on behalf of the 
MDA, requested the FAA to expand the existing restricted airspace at 
CAFS, as described in the LRDR CAFS Final EIS, to address this hazard.

B. FAA Role

    The FAA is a cooperating agency on the LRDR CAFS EIS because it has 
special expertise and jurisdiction by law, pursuant to 49 U.S. Code 
(U.S.C.) Sec.  40101 et seq., for aviation and regulation of air 
commerce in the interests of aviation safety and efficiency. The MDA 
will request the FAA, as a cooperating agency, to consider and adopt, 
in whole or in part, the Final EIS as the required National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation to support FAA decisions 
on the establishment of Restricted Areas. The airspace associated with 
the Proposed Action and alternative lies within the jurisdiction of the 
FAA Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center.
    FAA proposes to establish six new restricted areas and make related 
changes in airspace management. FAA will issue a separate ROD 
addressing its actions related to restricting the flight of aircraft.

C. Background

    Within the DoD, MDA is responsible for developing, testing, and 
fielding an integrated, layered MDS to defend the U.S. and its deployed 
forces, allies, and friends against all ranges of enemy missile threats 
in all phases of flight. The layered MDS is a defensive system 
consisting of land-, sea-, space-, and air-based weapon, sensor, 
communications, and command and control elements that are used to 
detect and defeat incoming missile threats. As part of the layered MDS, 
the LRDR will be the lead sensor in a new class of radars optimized to 
identify threat objects in complex, dense target environments, and to 
enhance efficient deployment of MDS weapons to intercept such threats.
    In response to the congressional mandate to deploy the LRDR, MDA 
completed a siting analysis that selected CAFS out of 50 candidate 
Department of Defense installations in Alaska. In June 2016, MDA and 
DAF prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) to evaluate the potential 
environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of 
the LRDR at CAFS. The 2016 EA resulted in a Finding of No Significant 
Impact (FONSI), and construction of the LRDR began in July 2017. The 
operational concept for the LRDR analyzed in the 2016 EA and FONSI was 
to maintain the LRDR in a readiness posture. Since that time, due to 
emerging threats, MDA identified a need to modify the LRDR operational 
requirements and procedures to reflect continuous operations.

D. NEPA Process

    The LRDR CAFS EIS complies with NEPA, as amended; the Council on 
Environmental Quality Regulations for implementing NEPA; and agency-
specific NEPA-implementing policies and procedures for the MDA, DAF, 
and FAA.\1\
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    \1\ Note: This EIS was ongoing prior to the 14 September 2020 
effective date of the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) 
final rule updating its regulations for implementing the procedural 
provisions of NEPA. Accordingly, the revised CEQ regulations were 
not used for this action pursuant to 40 Code of Federal Regulations 
Sec.  1506.13.
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    The MDA initiated a 45-day formal scoping period by publishing a 
Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register on May 17, 
2019. The MDA held public scoping meetings in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and 
Anderson, Alaska. Forty-two formal comments were received during the 
scoping comment period. The scoping comments focused primarily on 
aviation navigational safety; added flight times and expense; human 
safety; and potential impacts on private airstrips, Clear Airport, and 
the U.S. Air Force Auxiliary Civil Air Patrol Alaska Wing Glider 
Academy (CAP Glider Academy) for youth. These topics were addressed in 
the Draft EIS.
    The Notice of Availability (NOA) for the LRDR CAFS Draft EIS was 
published in the Federal Register on October 28, 2020, announcing a 52-
day comment period beginning October 30, 2020. During this time, public 
comment meetings were held virtually and consisted of an online open 
house and a telephone public meeting. The MDA received comments on the 
Draft EIS from 10 parties, which included individuals, agencies, and 
organizations. Commenters requested changes to the proposed Restricted 
Areas, more information about communication methods if Restricted Areas 
are activated at unscheduled times, and mitigation for climate change 
and air quality impacts. The comments were taken into consideration 
during preparation of the Final EIS. The NOA for the LRDR CAFS Final 
EIS was published in the Federal Register on May 7, 2021 (86 FR 24599-
24600). This ROD is the culmination of the NEPA process.

E. Alternatives Considered

1. Proposed Action--Continuous LRDR Operation and FAA Actions

    The Proposed Action consists of both MDA and FAA actions. Due to 
emerging threats, the MDA proposes to modify the LRDR operational 
requirements and procedures to reflect continuous operations. The 
operational concept would change from the initial concept to maintain 
the LRDR in a readiness posture with limited operations and no 
additional airspace restrictions. Because of the proposed changes to 
LRDR

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operations, airspace restrictions at CAFS are necessary to ensure that 
aircraft would not encounter HIRF resulting from the LRDR operations 
that exceed FAA's HIRF certification standards for aircraft electrical 
and electronic systems. The proposed airspace restrictions include 
expanding the existing Restricted Area (R-2206) at CAFS by adding six 
new Restricted Areas. If necessary, the FAA would implement temporary 
flight restrictions (TFRs) until those Restricted Areas are in effect. 
The FAA also proposes changes to federal airways and instrument flight 
procedures to accommodate the new Restricted Areas.

2. No Action Alternative

    Under the No Action Alternative, the MDA would operate the LRDR in 
a manner that would contain HIRF within the existing R-2206 such that 
the FAA would not need to take new actions to limit aircraft flight.

3. Two-Tier Alternative

    Under the two-tier alternative, the existing R-2206 would be 
expanded with two new Restricted Areas. The two-tier alternative was 
presented during the scoping process but was eliminated from further 
analysis.

F. Environmental Impacts

    The LRDR CAFS EIS analyzed the impacts of the Proposed Action and 
No Action Alternative within 14 environmental categories: Airspace 
management; air quality; biological resources; climate; hazardous 
materials, solid waste, and pollution prevention; historical, 
architectural, archaeological, and cultural resources; land use; 
natural resources and energy supply; noise and compatible land use; 
safety; socioeconomics and environmental justice; subsistence; visual 
effects; and water resources. The potential for cumulative impacts was 
also evaluated in the EIS.
    Under the No Action Alternative, the MDA would operate the LRDR in 
such a way that would contain HIRF within the existing R-2206, except 
during a national security crisis. No new actions would be taken to 
limit use of affected airspace, with the exception of temporary 
measures during a national security crisis. The No Action Alternative 
would not result in any new impacts associated with the environmental 
categories. However, the LRDR would not meet current operational 
requirements for the MDS and would not have the ability to adapt to 
rapidly evolving adversary tactics and technologies.
    MDA's proposed change in LRDR operations would have no impact or 
negligible adverse impacts on all of the environmental categories 
except airspace management, which would have negligible to minor 
adverse impacts. The change to continuous LRDR operations would create 
a hazard in areas of the National Airspace System where the HIRF would 
exceed FAA certification standards for aircraft electrical and 
electronic systems, necessitating the FAA to take actions to restrict 
the flight of aircraft in this airspace.
    The proposed changes related to restricting the flight of aircraft 
would have no impact or negligible adverse impacts on all environmental 
categories except airspace management and socioeconomics, which would 
have minor adverse impacts. Although overall adverse impacts on 
socioeconomics would be negligible to minor, relocation of the CAP 
Glider Academy from Clear Airport to another airport would result in 
moderate adverse impacts, based on currently available information and 
conservative assumptions.
    The following is a brief summary of the Proposed Action's impacts 
on airspace management and socioeconomics.

1. Airspace Management

    The primary impact of MDA's continuous operation of the LRDR would 
be to increase the airspace at CAFS where the HIRF would exceed FAA 
certification standards for aircraft electrical and electronic systems. 
To address this hazard, the FAA would expand the existing Restricted 
Area (R-2206) by adding six new Restricted Areas (R-2206B through R-
2206G) to create a total of seven Restricted Areas at CAFS. Four of the 
Restricted Areas would be active continuously. The remaining three (R-
2206D, R-2206E, and R-2206F) would be active only from 2:00 a.m. to 
4:00 a.m. local Alaska time every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday; at 
other prescheduled times by Notice to Airmen; and as necessary in 
response to national security events.
    Based on current air traffic and accounting for growth of aviation 
activity, the FAA estimates up to five daily (1,825 annual) instrument 
flight rule (IFR) flights would be affected by the proposed Restricted 
Areas. Those five flights are calculated from accumulated daily 
activity across the following: Airway J-125, airway V-436, and direct 
flights that depart Anchorage headed toward Deadhorse, Alaska. Up to an 
estimated 10 daily (3,650 annual) visual flight rule (VFR) flights 
would be affected. If TFRs are necessary before Restricted Areas are in 
effect, the affected IFR flights would be rerouted by air traffic 
control, VFR aircraft would detour to avoid the TFRs, some instrument 
flight procedures would not be available, and air traffic control would 
need to manually direct the affected IFR flights. Once the amended 
procedures and redesigned airways are established, air traffic control 
would cease to manually direct IFR flights through the area. Some 
flight paths would be longer, resulting in slight increases in flight 
times and operation costs as well as slight increases in air emissions 
and fuel use.
    The lowest floor of the proposed Restricted Areas would be 400 feet 
above ground level (AGL) (1,000 feet mean sea level at CAFS). VFR 
aircraft would be able and allowed to fly beneath the proposed 
Restricted Areas, although aircraft are allowed to fly below 500 feet 
AGL only if taking off or landing. The six privately owned airstrips 
beneath the proposed Restricted Areas would remain accessible. Pilots 
would still be able to use Windy Pass for transiting between Interior 
Alaska and Southcentral Alaska. Additionally, except for the periods 
during which R-2206D, R-2206E, and R-2206F would be active, aircraft 
would be able to navigate along Parks Highway, which is used as a 
visual navigation aid, as long as they stay below an altitude of 2,600 
feet AGL (3,200 feet mean sea level) within 0.5 nautical mile of the 
highway.
    Access to Clear Airport would normally be unavailable from the 
north and west during the times when R-2206D, R-2206E, and R-2206F are 
active. While prescheduled restrictions would be unlikely to affect 
users, provisions would be in place to allow emergency aircraft and 
medical evacuation flights, as well as aircraft in emergency 
circumstances, into and out of Clear Airport during these times. The 
MDA is also working with the DoD, FAA, and DAF to identify appropriate 
notification procedures to alert aircraft when Restricted Areas are 
activated outside of prescheduled periods, including methods of rapidly 
notifying pilots of changes in Restricted Area status. Potential 
notification options being considered include a combination of radio 
broadcast on a common traffic advisory frequency and high-intensity 
warning lights. This notification process would be addressed in a 
Letter of Procedure.

2. Socioeconomics

    FAA's actions related to restricting the flight of aircraft would 
result in

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slightly increased flight times, which would result in increased costs 
to aircraft operators both during the interim phase, if necessary, and 
once the redesigned airways are established. These economic impacts 
would be spread across the entire potentially affected aviation 
industry in Alaska. FAA's actions would not affect the provision of 
public services associated with aviation in the study area communities.
    The CAP Glider Academy could no longer conduct its glider 
instruction at Clear Airport due to the proposed Restricted Areas and 
would have to relocate to another airport such as Ladd Army Airfield or 
Fort Greely. The impacts of relocation would be minimized if the Civil 
Air Patrol is able to negotiate a long-term arrangement for operation 
of the Glider Academy that provides participants with no-cost lodging 
or camping options and discounted meal service. Arrangements for 
relocating the CAP Glider Academy have not been completed, and costs 
associated with the new location are not known.

G. Mitigation Measures and Monitoring

    Since development of the initial concept for expanding the 
restricted airspace at CAFS, as described in the LRDR CAFS Final EIS, 
the design of the proposed Restricted Areas has been refined to further 
minimize impacts on the aviation community based on feedback from pilot 
associations, public safety organizations and first responders, and 
airspace user groups. The MDA did not identify any significant 
environmental impacts arising from the Proposed Action and, therefore, 
is not identifying specific mitigation measures. All practicable means 
to mitigate impacts associated with the decision have been considered.

H. Environmentally Preferred Alternative

    Based on the findings of the EIS, the No Action Alternative would 
be the environmentally preferred alternative because the existing 
Restricted Area at CAFS would not need to be expanded. The operations 
at Clear Airport would not be affected, and FAA's proposed 
modifications to federal airways and instrument flight procedures would 
not be necessary. However, the LRDR would not meet current operational 
requirements for the layered MDS and would not have the ability to 
adapt to rapidly evolving adversary tactics and technologies, nor would 
it satisfy the purpose or need for the Proposed Action.

I. Decision

    In accordance with NEPA, we have considered the information 
contained within the LRDR CAFS EIS, comments from the public, input 
from regulatory agencies, LRDR system capabilities, the analysis of the 
missile threat to the U.S., layered MDS performance and operational 
effectiveness, and other relevant factors in deciding whether to 
operate the LRDR continuously at CAFS.
    We have decided to select the Proposed Action over the No Action 
Alternative. Although the No Action Alternative would have fewer 
environmental impacts, it would not fully support the primary mission 
of the layered MDS to provide continuous and precise tracking and 
discrimination of missile threats launched against the U.S. The LRDR 
would not meet current operational requirements for the MDS and would 
not have the ability to adapt to rapidly evolving adversary tactics and 
technologies.

    Dated: June 11, 2021.
Aaron T. Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2021-13406 Filed 6-23-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P