At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments
- Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR-BOX–2021–12 on the subject line.

Paper Comments
- Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549–1090. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–BOX–2021–12. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–BOX–2021–12, and should be submitted on or before June 24, 2021. For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.37

J. Matthew DeLesDernier, Assistant Secretary.
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations: The Options Clearing Corporation: Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Establish OCC’s Persistent Minimum Skin-In-The-Game

May 27, 2021.

I. Introduction

On February 10, 2021, the Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) the proposed rule change SR–OCC–2021–003. (“Proposed Rule Change”) pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)3 and Rule 19b–4 2 thereunder to establish a persistent minimum level of skin-in-the-game that OCC would contribute to cover default losses or liquidity shortfalls.3 The Proposed Rule Change was published for public comment in the Federal Register on March 2, 2021.4 The Commission has received comments regarding the proposal described in the Proposed Rule Change.5 This Order approves the Proposed Rule Change.

II. Background

“Skin-in-the-game,” as a component of financial risk management, entails a covered clearing agency choosing, upon the occurrence of a default or series of defaults and application of all available assets of the defaulting participant(s), to apply its own capital contribution to the relevant clearing or guaranty fund in full to satisfy any remaining losses prior to the application of any (a) contributions by non-defaulting members to the clearing or guaranty fund, or (b) assessments that the covered clearing agency require non-defaulting participants to contribute following the exhaustion of such participant’s funded contributions to the relevant clearing or guaranty fund.7

OCC’s skin-in-the-game component of its financial risk management regime is described in its current rules, which provide for the use of OCC’s own capital to mitigate losses arising out of a Clearing Member default.8 Specifically, OCC’s rules provide for the offsetting of default losses remaining after the application of a defaulted Clearing Member’s margin deposits and Clearing Fund contributions with OCC’s capital in excess of 110 percent of the Target Capital Requirement at the time of the default.9 OCC’s rules also provide for charging losses remaining after the application of OCC’s excess capital to OCC senior management’s deferred

5 See Notice of Filing infra note 4, 86 FR at 12237.
8 Since the proposal contained in the Proposed Rule Change was also filed as an advance notice, all public comments received on the proposal are considered regardless of whether the comments are submitted on the Proposed Rule Change or the Advance Notice. Comments on the Advance Notice are available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ–2021–801/occc2021081.htm.
9 Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings specified in OCC’s Rules and By-Laws, available at https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp.
compensation as well as non-defaulting Clearing Members. OCC reviewed feedback received in connection with the initial filing of its current rules, relevant papers from industry participants and stakeholders concerning skin-in-the-game, and regulatory regimes in jurisdictions outside the United States. OCC’s current rules do not, however, dedicate OCC’s excess capital for use solely as skin-in-the-game, or guarantee that OCC maintain a minimum amount of skin-in-the-game.

Establishing the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC proposes to establish a persistent minimum level of skin-in-the-game that OCC would contribute to cover default losses or liquidity shortfalls. Such skin-in-the-game would consist of a minimum amount of OCC’s own pre-funded resources that OCC would contribute prior to charging a loss to the Clearing Fund (the “Minimum Corporate Contribution”) and the EDCP Unvested Balance. As proposed, funds comprising the Minimum Corporate Contribution would be excluded from OCC’s liquid net assets funded by equity (“LNAFBE”) for purposes of meeting OCC’s Target Capital Requirement to ensure that OCC may maintain the Minimum Corporate Contribution exclusively for default management.

OCC proposes to define the Minimum Corporate Contribution to mean the minimum level of OCC’s own funds maintained exclusively to cover credit losses or liquidity shortfalls, the level of which OCC’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) shall determine from time to time. To facilitate implementation of OCC’s proposal, the Board approved an initial Minimum Corporate Contribution at such a level that OCC’s total skin-in-the-game (i.e., the sum of the Minimum Corporate Contribution and OCC’s current EDCP Unvested Balance) would equal 25 percent of OCC’s Target Capital Requirement. OCC stated that, in setting the initial Minimum Corporate Contribution, the Board considered factors including, but not limited to, the regulatory requirements in each jurisdiction in which OCC is registered or in which OCC is actively seeking recognition, the amount similarly situated central counterparties commit of their own resources to address participant defaults, the EDCP Unvested Balance, OCC’s LNAFBE greater than 110 percent of its Target Capital Requirement, projected revenue and expenses, and other projected capital needs.

Replenishing the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC proposes that, in the event it were to apply a portion of the Minimum Corporate Contribution to address losses or shortfalls arising out of a Clearing Member default, the size of the Minimum Corporate Contribution would be temporarily reduced, for a period of 270 days, to the amount remaining after its application. Each application of the Minimum Corporate Contribution would trigger a new 270-day period. Under the proposal, OCC would be obligated to notify Clearing Members of any such reduction of the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC believes that 270 calendar days, or approximately nine months, is sufficient time for OCC to accumulate the funds necessary to reestablish the Minimum Corporate Contribution.

OCC proposes change to its Rules, Capital Management Policy, Default Management Policy, Clearing Fund Methodology Policy, and Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plan to effectuate the changes described above.

III. Discussion and Commission Findings

Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act directs the Commission to approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization that such proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organization. After carefully considering the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission finds that the proposal is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to OCC. More specifically, the Commission finds that the proposal is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17Ad–22(e)(2) thereunder.

Before addressing the relevant portions of the Exchange Act and rules and regulations thereunder, however, we address a part of the comment submitted by Susquehanna International Group (“SIG”) not related to Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act or Rule17Ad–22(e)(2) thereunder. SIG argued, as one of its concerns, that OCC’s fees, dues, and other charges would be per se unreasonable, and therefore inconsistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(D) of the Exchange Act because funding the proposal with clearing fees would facilitate a shareholder windfall. We do not address these issues in this order because OCC has not proposed to change any fees, dues, or other charges in the Proposed Rule Change. The

22 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(2).
23 See letter from Richard J. McDonald, SIG, dated March 30, 2021, to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission (“SIG Letter”), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm. In its comment letter, SIG argues that the Proposed Rule Change is inconsistent with Sections 17A(b)(3)(D) and (F) of the Exchange Act. The Commission’s consideration of SIG’s concerns pertaining to Section 17A(b)(3)(F) is addressed in section III.A. below.

25 SIG also (i) expresses concern regarding OCC’s current retention of $325 million in capital; (ii) indicates that OCC should focus on reducing clearing fee rates; and (iii) suggests that the current organization of OCC’s shareholders as for profit entities creates a misalignment of interests. SIG Letter at 2. Because these issues do not bear on the grounds for approval or disapproval applicable to the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission does not address them in this order.

26 Another commenter read SIG’s comment to imply that the inclusion of fees as part of the proposed skin-in-the-game would incentivize OCC to increase their charges for providing clearing services as a method of mitigating the risk of their actual skin-in-the-game. See comment submitted by CJ Zhou (April 8, 2021), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/
resources to manage a Clearing Member default because failure to do so would result in a direct cost to OCC. Incentivizing OCC to maintain an appropriate amount of resources, in turn, could reduce the potential losses charged to the Clearing Fund contributions of non-defaulting Clearing Members in the event of a Clearing Member default, which in turn would help ensure the safeguarding of the Clearing Fund contributions of non-defaulting Clearing Members. In its comment letter, SIG argues that the Proposed Rule Change contravenes the protection of investors and the public interest. SIG states that OCC was established as a monopoly organization in order to serve as a market utility and that it has always been recognized and accepted by concerned parties that monies held as excess OCC capital are excess fees not yet rebated, as opposed to retained earnings. In support of its argument that OCC should not retain earnings generated through clearing fees, SIG states that OCC has not previously had to draw on such funds to address a shortfall.

The Commission is not persuaded by SIG’s arguments with regard to Section 17A(b)(3)(F). As discussed above, the Commission believes that holding a defined Minimum Corporate Contribution would incentivize OCC further to maintain the appropriate amount of resources to manage a Clearing Member default. Aligning OCC’s incentives with risk management considerations, such as default management, supports the public interest because it supports OCC’s role as a utility for clearing and settling U.S. listed options. Further, OCC’s rules do not require OCC to distribute retained earnings in excess of expenses. In addition to providing those services customarily provided by clearing houses of national securities exchanges, OCC is a Covered Clearing Agency registered with the Commission. As a Covered Clearing Agency, OCC is obligated to comply with risk management standards that the Commission adopted under Section 805(a)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Section 17A of the Exchange Act (the “Clearing Agency Rules”).

The Clearing Agency Rules address having policies and procedures regarding, inter alia, the maintenance of assets to address losses attributable to Clearing Member defaults as well as general business risk losses. SIG argues further that OCC’s proposal puts only the public’s skin in the game. SIG states that market participants bear the risk of imprudent decisions by the exchanges in their capacity as the OCC shareholders and of their designee board members because such participants would be denied a rebate of excess fees.

The Commission is not persuaded by this argument either. SIG’s argument assumes that OCC’s Clearing Members have a right to clearing fee revenues not applied to operating costs in a given year, but, as noted above in this section, OCC’s rules, as approved by the Commission, do not require OCC to distribute retained earnings in excess of expenses. SIG’s argument also assumes, without support, that OCC’s five Exchange Directors would not only be willing to make “imprudent decisions to the detriment of OCC’s Clearing Members,” but that the Exchange Directors would be able to enlist sufficient support among OCC’s nine Member Directors to force such “imprudent decisions” through the Board approval process.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission believes that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act.

B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad–22(e)(2) Under the Exchange Act

Rule 17Ad–22(e)(2) under the Exchange Act requires that a covered clearing agency establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to provide for governance arrangements...
that, among other things, are clear and transparent; clearly prioritize the safety and efficiency of the covered clearing agency; and support the public interest requirements of the Exchange Act. In adopting Rule 17Ad–22(e)(2), the Commission discussed comments it received regarding the concept of skin-in-the-game as a potential tool to align the various incentives of a covered clearing agency’s stakeholders, including management and clearing members. And, while the Commission declined to include a specific skin-in-the-game requirement in the rule, it stated its belief that “the proper alignment of incentives is an important element of a covered clearing agency’s risk management practices,” and noted that skin-in-the-game “may play a role in those risk management practices in many instances.” OCC’s current rules require the application management compensation and excess capital as skin-in-the-game, which in turn should help further align the interests of OCC’s stakeholders, including OCC management and Clearing Members.

As described above, OCC’s proposal would not reduce the resources OCC would apply to address default losses or remove the current skin-in-the-game component of OCC’s rules. Rather, OCC proposes to set aside a defined amount of capital for the sole purpose of absorbing losses and shortfalls arising out of a Clearing Member default. OCC has clearly stated the factors that the Board would consider when determining the amount of resources to hold as skin-in-the-game, a portion of which would comprise the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC also proposes to establish a clear process for addressing reductions in the Minimum Corporate Contribution arising out of a Clearing Member’s default. Accordingly, the Commission believes that the proposed changes to establish a persistent minimum level of skin-in-the-game are consistent with Rule 17Ad–22(e)(2) under the Exchange Act.

IV. Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act, and in particular, the requirements of Section 17A of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder. It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, that the Proposed Rule Change be, and hereby is, approved.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.

J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To Amend Equity 4, Rule 4754 Relating to the Limit Up-Limit Down Closing Cross

May 28, 2021.

I. Introduction

On February 11, 2021, The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (“Exchange” or “Nasdaq”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) and Rule 19b–4 thereunder, a proposed rule change to amend Equity 4, Rule (“Rule”) 4754 relating to the Limit Up-Limit Down (“LULD”) closing cross. The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on March 3, 2021. On April 9, 2021, the Exchange filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change, which amended and superseded the proposed rule change as originally filed. On April 15, 2021, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, the Commission designated a longer period within which to approve the proposed rule change. Disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings to determine whether to disapprove the proposed rule change. The Commission has not received any comment letters on the proposed rule change. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on Amendment No. 1 from interested persons, and is approving the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, on an accelerated basis.

II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1

The Nasdaq closing cross is the Exchange’s process for determining the price at which orders will be executed at the close and for executing those orders, and the price determined by the Nasdaq closing cross is the Nasdaq official closing price for securities that participate in the cross. The Nasdaq closing cross begins at 4:00 p.m. and the Exchange applies a price range within which the Nasdaq closing cross must occur. Currently, the Exchange applies a threshold amount that is the greater of $0.50 or 1% of the midpoint of the Nasdaq best bid and offer, and that amount is then added to the Nasdaq best offer and subtracted from the Nasdaq best bid to establish the price range.

The LULD closing cross is the Exchange’s process for executing closing trades in Nasdaq-listed securities when an LULD trading pause pursuant to Rule 4120(a)(12) exists or after 3:50 p.m. and (6) make other clarifying, technical, and conforming changes. Amendment No. 1 is available on the Commission’s website at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2021-009/sr-nasdaq2021009-8670132-2354246.pdf.

6 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 91581, 86 FR 20759 (April 21, 2021). The Commission designated June 1, 2021, as the date by which the Commission shall approve or disapprove, or institute proceedings to determine whether to disapprove, the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1.
7 See Rule 4754(a)(6) and (b)(4). See also Rule 4754(b)(2) (describing the methodology for determining the Nasdaq closing cross price).
8 All times referenced are in Eastern Time.
9 See Rule 4754(b)(2). If the Nasdaq closing cross price established pursuant to Rule 4754(b)(2)(A)–(D) is outside the benchmarks established by the Exchange by a threshold amount, the Nasdaq closing cross will occur at a price within the threshold amounts that best satisfies the conditions of Rule 4754(b)(2)(A)–(D). See Rule 4754(b)(2)(E).
10 See Amendment No. 1, supra note 4, at 6. Nasdaq management may set and modify the benchmarks and thresholds from time to time upon prior notice to market participants. See Rule 4754(b)(2)(B).

17 In Amendment No. 1, the Exchange amended the proposal to: (1) Specify the dissemination of certain imbalance information before the LULD closing cross; (2) clarify the process for calculating the LULD closing cross price and the benchmark prices for the LULD closing cross; (3) specify the treatment of imbalance only orders for purposes of LULD closing cross price selection; (4) provide additional explanation to support the proposal; (5) specify the implementation date for the proposal; (6) make other clarifying, technical, and conforming changes. Amendment No. 1 is available on the Commission’s website at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2021-009/sr-nasdaq2021009-8670132-2354246.pdf.
18 All times referenced are in Eastern Time.
19 See Rule 4754(b)(2). If the Nasdaq closing cross price established pursuant to Rule 4754(b)(2)(A)–(D) is outside the benchmarks established by the Exchange by a threshold amount, the Nasdaq closing cross will occur at a price within the threshold amounts that best satisfies the conditions of Rule 4754(b)(2)(A)–(D). See Rule 4754(b)(2)(E).
20 See Amendment No. 1, supra note 4, at 6. Nasdaq management may set and modify the benchmarks and thresholds from time to time upon prior notice to market participants. See Rule 4754(b)(2)(B).