[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 18, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26946-26950]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10406]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0104]
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC to reduce the minimum coverage limit
for onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million
for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.
DATES: The exemption was issued on May 11, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0104 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0104. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of public
[[Page 26947]]
documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request to the PDR
via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-
4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: May 12, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50-331
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Enter
(DAEC) in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power
operations permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a
letter dated October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that
the fuel was permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and
placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating
license for DAEC (No. DPR-49) no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC
facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 16, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20198M579),
NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) concerning onsite
liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit
the licensee to reduce the required level of onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for DAEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident.
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no
longer authorized at DAEC, there are no events that would require the
stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the
risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite
contamination at DAEC is also much lower than the risk of such an event
at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption
from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage insurance
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced risk
of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled DAEC site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2
accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to financially
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident.
The specified $1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed
based on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear reactor operating at
power, resulting in a large fission product release and requiring
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the site.
These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at DAEC
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessel, RCS,
and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related
to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting
systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption
request dated July 16, 2020, the licensee discussed both design-basis
and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the
SFP. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-basis
events at DAEC that could result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way
to demonstrate that any possible radiological releases would be minimal
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g.,
sheltering in place or evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the
radiological consequences associated with various decommissioning
activities and the design-basis accidents at DAEC, in consideration of
the permanently shutdown and defueled condition. The possible design-
basis accident scenarios at DAEC have greatly reduced radiological
consequences. Based on its
[[Page 26948]]
review, the NRC staff concluded that no reasonably conceivable design-
basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than
the EPA PAGs.
The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological
release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium
fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design-basis
accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP
resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in
substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat
of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a
zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time
since DAEC has been permanently shut down.
The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A483), the NRC staff recommended changes to the power reactor
financial protection regulations that would allow licensees to lower
onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel
stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC staff's recommendation
that, among other things, would allow permanently shutdown power
reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance
coverage to $50 million when the licensee was able to demonstrate the
technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP
was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638);
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28, 2018 (83 FR
67365); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on January 14, 2020 (85 FR 2153); and Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 1, published in the Federal Register on March 26,
2021 (86 FR 16241)). These prior exemptions were based on these
licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
In its July 16, 2020, request, the licensee compared the DAEC fuel
storage parameters with those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel
cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment
of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water
Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098). The analysis described in NUREG/CR-
6451 determined that natural air circulation would adequately cool fuel
that has decayed for 7 months after operation in a typical BWR.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite
property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel
stored in the SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be
used to demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is
exceedingly low.
The NRC staff further evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and
presented an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe
earthquake in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling
Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365). The specific reference plant used for this study is a
General Electric (GE) Type 4 BWR with a Mark I containment. The
analysis postulates a severe earthquake and evaluates the potential for
the SFP to lose inventory and potentially uncover the spent fuel. This
evaluation concluded that, for the representative BWR, spent fuel
stored in a dispersed high-density configuration would be adequately
cooled by natural circulation air flow within several months after
discharge from a reactor if the pool was drained of water during a
severe earthquake scenario. Specifically, the NUREG-2161 analysis
identified that 107 days after shutdown, the stored fuel would have
decayed sufficiently and be in a configuration that allows for air
cooling of the fuel during a severe earthquake. This would prevent
radiological releases without the need for additional mitigation
actions; therefore, no release as a result of a zirconium cladding fire
would be expected.
The NRC staff compared the DAEC facility with the reference plant
in NUREG-2161 and identified that DAEC is also a GE Type 4 BWR with a
Mark I containment. The staff also confirmed (see ADAMS Accession No.
ML21089A207) that DAEC stores the spent fuel following a dispersed
high-density loading pattern consistent with the dispersed high-density
configuration assumed in NUREG-2161. Therefore, the NRC staff
determined that the stored fuel in the DAEC SFP will remain in a
coolable configuration following a design basis seismic event.
Based on the evaluation in SECY-96-256, as well as DAEC's
conformance with the analysis in NUREG-2161, the NRC staff determined
$50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property damage insurance
for a decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in the SFP is no
longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. However, the NRC staff has
postulated that there is still a potential for other radiological
incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in significant
onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank
(~450,000 gallons) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater
contamination as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the DAEC site, should such an event occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to
[[Page 26949]]
a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent
insurance considerations resulting from additional zirconium fire risks
as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100, as well as NUREG/CR-6451
and NUREG-2161. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar
exemptions have been granted to other permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors, upon demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium
fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern. The NRC staff concluded that 10 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations on August 10, 2020, sufficient irradiated
fuel decay time will have elapsed at DAEC to decrease the probability
of an onsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire
accident to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with
the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture
of a large liquid radwaste storage tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with Revision 1 of the
DAEC Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated
February 2, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21036A160), all spent fuel will
be removed from the SFP and moved into dry storage at an onsite ISFSI
by April 2022, and the probability of an initiating event that would
threaten SFP integrity occurring before that time is extremely low,
which further supports the conclusion that the zirconium fire risk is
negligible
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow NEDA to
reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage insurance.
As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the exemptions are authorized
by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256.
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 10 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time
will have elapsed at DAEC to decrease the probability of an onsite and
offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident
to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce
onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with the
maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption
is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for
DAEC are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, DAEC permanently shut down on August 10, 2020, and permanently
defueled as of October 12, 2020. The permanently shutdown and defueled
status of the facility results in a significant reduction in the number
and severity of potential accidents and, correspondingly, a significant
reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite property damage.
The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does
not impact the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The
proposed level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at DAEC. Therefore, the NRC
staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not present
an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at DAEC are not
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption
is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological material. Since DAEC permanently
shut down on August 10, 2020, and permanently defueled as of October
12, 2020, it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents or other credible events at DAEC to exceed the
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The licensee has
evaluated the consequences of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis
conditions involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show
that 10 months after the permanent cessation of power operations on
August 10, 2020, the likelihood of such an event leading to a large
radiological release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the
licensee's analyses confirm this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
DAEC site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the
permanently shutdown and defueled DAEC reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an
[[Page 26950]]
undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I
have determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for DAEC does
not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of DAEC or site activities. Accordingly,
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for,
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The
requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety,
insurance, and indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants NEDA an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for DAEC. DAEC permanently ceased
power operations on August 10, 2020. The exemption permits DAEC to
lower the minimum required onsite insurance to $50 million 10 months
after permanent cessation of power operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations at DAEC, which is June 10, 2021.
Dated: May 11, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-10406 Filed 5-17-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P