[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 18, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26961-26966]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10405]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0105]
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC to reduce the required level of
primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million
and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.
DATES: The exemption was issued on May 11, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0105 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0105. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
[[Page 26962]]
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; telephone: 301-415-0624; email:
[email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request
to the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: May 12, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50-331
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019 Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196, NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Center
(DAEC) in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power
operations permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a
letter dated October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that
the fuel was permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and
placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating
license for DAEC (No. DPR-49) no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC
facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 16, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20198M584),
NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite
primary and secondary liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million
and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for DAEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450
million. In addition, the licensee is required to participate in an
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection)
that commits each licensee to pay into an insurance pool to be used for
damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in
the industry retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to
deferred premium charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of
$131,056,000 with respect to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at DAEC and the permanent removal of the
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages that would
require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower for such
plants. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction in primary offsite liability
insurance and to withdraw from participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor,
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
[[Page 26963]]
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary
retrospective insurance pool.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation,
as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a rated
capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that,
upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist after
permanent cessation of power operations (and the reactor having no
``rated capacity''), the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to
reduce the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing
decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shutdown reactor,
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions, and
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational and an
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for
such permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at DAEC and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been significantly
reduced.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for DAEC when permanently defueled as part of SECY-21-0006, ``Request
by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center,''
dated January 15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML20218A875).
NEDA has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel
remains in the SFP, the only postulated design-basis accident that
would remain applicable to DAEC in the permanently defueled condition
that could contribute a significant dose is a fuel handling accident
(FHA) in the reactor building, where the SFP is located. For
completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of other
design-basis accidents documented in the DAEC Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML19100A055) to
ensure that these accidents would not have consequences that could
potentially exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide
1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design
Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria
or approach the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
protective action guides (PAGs).
In the DAEC UFSAR, the licensee has determined that within 19 days
after shutdown (with open containment), the FHA doses would decrease to
a level that would not warrant protective actions under the EPA early
phase PAG framework, notwithstanding meeting the dose limit
requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria under
Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC staff notes that the doses from an FHA
are dominated by the isotope Iodine-131. DAEC permanently ceased power
operations on August 10, 2020. With 10 months of decay, the thyroid
dose from an FHA would be negligible. After 10 months of decay, the
only isotope remaining in significant amounts, among those postulated
to be released in a design-basis FHA, would be Krypton-85. Since
Krypton-85 primarily decays by beta emission, the calculated skin dose
from an FHA analysis would make an insignificant contribution to the
total effective dose equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in
the
[[Page 26964]]
determination of the EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation.
The NRC staff concludes that the dose consequence from an FHA for the
permanently shutdown DAEC would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological
release is highly unlikely and, thus, a significant amount of offsite
liability insurance coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire
scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that
involves the loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a
significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial
zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a
zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire
scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time that DAEC has
been permanently shut down.
In SECY-93-127 the NRC staff concluded that there was a low
likelihood and reduced short-term public health consequences of a
zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent fuel has
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during
Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003760936), the Commission approved a policy that authorized, through
the exemption process, withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance layer and a reduction in commercial liability insurance
coverage to $100 million when a licensee is able to demonstrate that
the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 13, 2020
(85 FR 1827)). Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor
licensees that have received exemptions to reduce their primary
insurance level to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes
to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated
December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior
exemptions were based on the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could
be air-cooled consistent with the technical criterion discussed above.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the
probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
The NRC staff evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and presented
an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe earthquake in
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling Water
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365). The
specific reference plant used for this study is a General Electric (GE)
Type 4 BWR with a Mark I containment. The analysis postulates a severe
earthquake and evaluates the potential for the SFP to lose inventory
and potentially uncover the spent fuel. This evaluation concluded that,
for the representative BWR, spent fuel stored in a dispersed high-
density configuration would be adequately cooled by natural circulation
air flow within several months after discharge from a reactor if the
pool was drained of water during a severe earthquake scenario.
Specifically, the NUREG-2161 analysis identified that 107 days after
shutdown, the stored fuel would have decayed sufficiently and be in a
configuration that allows for air cooling of the fuel during a severe
earthquake. This would prevent radiological releases without the need
for additional mitigation actions; therefore, no release as a result of
a zirconium cladding fire would be expected.
The NRC staff compared the DAEC facility with the reference plant
in NUREG-2161 and identified that DAEC is also a GE Type 4 BWR with a
Mark I containment. The staff also confirmed (see ADAMS Accession No.
ML21089A207) that DAEC stores the spent fuel following a dispersed
high-density loading pattern consistent with the dispersed high-density
configuration assumed in NUREG-2161. Therefore, the NRC staff
determined that the stored fuel in the DAEC SFP will remain in a
coolable configuration following a design basis seismic event. Based on
DAEC's conformance with the analysis in NUREG-2161, the NRC staff finds
that there is reasonable assurance that the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP
is air coolable 10 months after the permanent shutdown of the reactor.
In addition, the licensee performed adiabatic heatup analyses in
which a complete drainage of the SFP is combined with rearrangement of
spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP; this
type of analysis postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent
fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation would be impeded. NEDA's
adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that 10 months after the
permanent cessation of operations, there would be at least 10 hours
after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water) before
the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential
for a significant offsite radiological release could occur.
In the July 16, 2020, application, NEDA furnished the following
information: ``Because of the length of time it would take for the
adiabatic heat up to occur, there is ample time to respond to any
partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by
restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the
likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is
deemed not credible.''
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-21-0006, the NRC
staff assessed the NEDA accident analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and
defueled DAEC after 10 months of decay. For the highly unlikely beyond
design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost
in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel
are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will be a
minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million and
the licensee's
[[Page 26965]]
proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool
for offsite financial protection are consistent with the policy
established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance considerations
resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and
SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in SECY-00-0145 that
the minimum offsite financial protection requirement may be reduced to
$100 million and that secondary insurance is not required once it is
determined that the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer thermal-
hydraulically capable of sustaining a zirconium fire based on a plant-
specific analysis. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar
exemptions from these insurance requirements have been granted to other
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors upon satisfactory
demonstration that the zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel
stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving NEDA from its
existing primary and secondary insurance obligations have been met. As
explained above, the NRC staff found that no reasonably conceivable
design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release
greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite consequence
from a design-basis radiological release is highly unlikely and the
need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage
is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that, after 10
months decay, the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP will be capable of being
adequately cooled by air in the highly unlikely event of pool drainage.
Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario
where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a manner that all
methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available,
the NRC staff has determined that at least 10 hours would be available
and is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment,
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes
that the fuel stored in the DEAC SFP will have decayed sufficiently by
the requested effective date for the exemption of 10 months after
permanent cessation of power operations to support a reduction in the
required offsite insurance consistent with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees
to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly, consistent with
the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under which
decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the requirements
to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to participate
in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient
technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at
operating reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological release are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$131,056,000. However, because DAEC is permanently shut down, it cannot
produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such a
liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by DAEC when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power
plants does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full
operating reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel
cooling period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The
licensee's proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level
of liability insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the
public. These changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and exemptions approved for other
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an exemption from participation in the
secondary insurance pool and a reduction in the primary insurance to
$100 million, a value more in line with the potential consequences of
accidents, would be in the public interest in that this ensures that
there will be adequate funds to address any of those consequences and
helps to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit NEDA to lower the DAEC primary
[[Page 26966]]
insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary retrospective
premium pool at the requested effective date of 10 months after the
permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I
have determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing the licensee's offsite liability requirements for DAEC does
not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of DAEC or site activities. Accordingly,
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for,
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The
requirement for offsite liability insurance involves surety, insurance,
or indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants NEDA an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for DAEC. DAEC
permanently ceased power operations on August 10, 2020. The exemption
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits DAEC to reduce the required level of
primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million and to
withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial
protection 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations at DAEC, which is June 10, 2021.
Dated: May 11, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-10405 Filed 5-17-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P