[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 18, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26961-26966]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10405]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0105]


NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit 
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC to reduce the required level of 
primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million 
and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial 
protection for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.

DATES: The exemption was issued on May 11, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0105 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0105. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in

[[Page 26962]]

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; telephone: 301-415-0624; email: 
[email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual 
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each 
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first 
time that it is mentioned in this document.
     Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request 
to the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: May 12, 2021.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-331

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Exemption

I. Background

    By letter dated January 18, 2019 Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196, NextEra Energy 
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) that it planned to 
permanently cease power operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Center 
(DAEC) in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and 
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power 
operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power 
operations permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a 
letter dated October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that 
the fuel was permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and 
placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020.
    Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating 
license for DAEC (No. DPR-49) no longer authorizes operation of the 
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The 
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., 
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC 
facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage 
installation (ISFSI).

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated July 16, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20198M584), 
NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite 
primary and secondary liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of 
primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million 
and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial 
protection for DAEC.
    The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to 
have and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450 
million. In addition, the licensee is required to participate in an 
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection) 
that commits each licensee to pay into an insurance pool to be used for 
damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in 
the industry retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to 
deferred premium charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of 
$131,056,000 with respect to any nuclear incident at any operating 
nuclear power plant and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of 
$20,496,000 per incident.
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety 
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or 
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor 
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the 
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent 
cessation of power operations at DAEC and the permanent removal of the 
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible. 
Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages that would 
require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower for such 
plants. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction in primary offsite liability 
insurance and to withdraw from participation in the industry 
retrospective rating plan.

III. Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by 
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has 
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is 
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
    The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power 
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages 
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires 
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical 
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite 
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and 
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to 
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite 
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a 
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor, 
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The 
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance 
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary 
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
    As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and 
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR

[[Page 26963]]

140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity 
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR 
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes 
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the 
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
    Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no 
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of 
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the 
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary 
retrospective insurance pool.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were 
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance, as 
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the 
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost 
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an 
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric 
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation, 
as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and potential 
consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a rated 
capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
    The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions 
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial 
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During 
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML12257A628). The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that, 
upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist after 
permanent cessation of power operations (and the reactor having no 
``rated capacity''), the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to 
reduce the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing 
decommissioning.
    As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently 
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a 
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by 
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly 
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shutdown reactor, 
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire 
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor 
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown 
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in 
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions, and 
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat 
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air 
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large 
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for 
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational and an 
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an 
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to 
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in 
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA 
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for 
such permanently shutdown facilities.
    The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside 
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and 
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor, 
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause 
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the 
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes 
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from 
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then 
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the 
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve 
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the 
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would 
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the 
permanent cessation of reactor operations at DAEC and the permanent 
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer 
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate 
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. 
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the 
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks 
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case 
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted 
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability 
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw 
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for 
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event 
that could cause significant offsite damage has been significantly 
reduced.
    The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents 
for DAEC when permanently defueled as part of SECY-21-0006, ``Request 
by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain 
Emergency Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center,'' 
dated January 15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML20218A875).
    NEDA has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel 
remains in the SFP, the only postulated design-basis accident that 
would remain applicable to DAEC in the permanently defueled condition 
that could contribute a significant dose is a fuel handling accident 
(FHA) in the reactor building, where the SFP is located. For 
completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of other 
design-basis accidents documented in the DAEC Updated Final Safety 
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML19100A055) to 
ensure that these accidents would not have consequences that could 
potentially exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide 
1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design 
Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria 
or approach the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase 
protective action guides (PAGs).
    In the DAEC UFSAR, the licensee has determined that within 19 days 
after shutdown (with open containment), the FHA doses would decrease to 
a level that would not warrant protective actions under the EPA early 
phase PAG framework, notwithstanding meeting the dose limit 
requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria under 
Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC staff notes that the doses from an FHA 
are dominated by the isotope Iodine-131. DAEC permanently ceased power 
operations on August 10, 2020. With 10 months of decay, the thyroid 
dose from an FHA would be negligible. After 10 months of decay, the 
only isotope remaining in significant amounts, among those postulated 
to be released in a design-basis FHA, would be Krypton-85. Since 
Krypton-85 primarily decays by beta emission, the calculated skin dose 
from an FHA analysis would make an insignificant contribution to the 
total effective dose equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in 
the

[[Page 26964]]

determination of the EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. 
The NRC staff concludes that the dose consequence from an FHA for the 
permanently shutdown DAEC would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs. 
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological 
release is highly unlikely and, thus, a significant amount of offsite 
liability insurance coverage is not required.
    The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead 
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and 
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire 
scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that 
involves the loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a 
significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial 
zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a 
zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated 
fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire 
scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time that DAEC has 
been permanently shut down.
    In SECY-93-127 the NRC staff concluded that there was a low 
likelihood and reduced short-term public health consequences of a 
zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent fuel has 
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum, ``Financial 
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during 
Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML003760936), the Commission approved a policy that authorized, through 
the exemption process, withdrawal from participation in the secondary 
insurance layer and a reduction in commercial liability insurance 
coverage to $100 million when a licensee is able to demonstrate that 
the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
    The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar 
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 13, 2020 
(85 FR 1827)). Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor 
licensees that have received exemptions to reduce their primary 
insurance level to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes 
to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown 
Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated 
December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior 
exemptions were based on the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could 
be air-cooled consistent with the technical criterion discussed above.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession 
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff 
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at 
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite 
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable 
of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the 
probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
    The NRC staff evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and presented 
an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe earthquake in 
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling Water 
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365). The 
specific reference plant used for this study is a General Electric (GE) 
Type 4 BWR with a Mark I containment. The analysis postulates a severe 
earthquake and evaluates the potential for the SFP to lose inventory 
and potentially uncover the spent fuel. This evaluation concluded that, 
for the representative BWR, spent fuel stored in a dispersed high-
density configuration would be adequately cooled by natural circulation 
air flow within several months after discharge from a reactor if the 
pool was drained of water during a severe earthquake scenario. 
Specifically, the NUREG-2161 analysis identified that 107 days after 
shutdown, the stored fuel would have decayed sufficiently and be in a 
configuration that allows for air cooling of the fuel during a severe 
earthquake. This would prevent radiological releases without the need 
for additional mitigation actions; therefore, no release as a result of 
a zirconium cladding fire would be expected.
    The NRC staff compared the DAEC facility with the reference plant 
in NUREG-2161 and identified that DAEC is also a GE Type 4 BWR with a 
Mark I containment. The staff also confirmed (see ADAMS Accession No. 
ML21089A207) that DAEC stores the spent fuel following a dispersed 
high-density loading pattern consistent with the dispersed high-density 
configuration assumed in NUREG-2161. Therefore, the NRC staff 
determined that the stored fuel in the DAEC SFP will remain in a 
coolable configuration following a design basis seismic event. Based on 
DAEC's conformance with the analysis in NUREG-2161, the NRC staff finds 
that there is reasonable assurance that the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP 
is air coolable 10 months after the permanent shutdown of the reactor.
    In addition, the licensee performed adiabatic heatup analyses in 
which a complete drainage of the SFP is combined with rearrangement of 
spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP; this 
type of analysis postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent 
fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation would be impeded. NEDA's 
adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that 10 months after the 
permanent cessation of operations, there would be at least 10 hours 
after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water) before 
the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential 
for a significant offsite radiological release could occur.
    In the July 16, 2020, application, NEDA furnished the following 
information: ``Because of the length of time it would take for the 
adiabatic heat up to occur, there is ample time to respond to any 
partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by 
restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the 
likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is 
deemed not credible.''
    In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-21-0006, the NRC 
staff assessed the NEDA accident analyses associated with the 
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and 
defueled DAEC after 10 months of decay. For the highly unlikely beyond 
design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost 
in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel 
are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will be a 
minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the 
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might 
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support 
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, 
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid 
oxidation.
    The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction 
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million and 
the licensee's

[[Page 26965]]

proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool 
for offsite financial protection are consistent with the policy 
established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance considerations 
resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and 
SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in SECY-00-0145 that 
the minimum offsite financial protection requirement may be reduced to 
$100 million and that secondary insurance is not required once it is 
determined that the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer thermal-
hydraulically capable of sustaining a zirconium fire based on a plant-
specific analysis. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar 
exemptions from these insurance requirements have been granted to other 
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors upon satisfactory 
demonstration that the zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel 
stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of 
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in 
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary 
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the 
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140 
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and 
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards 
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the 
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of 
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
    Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff 
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving NEDA from its 
existing primary and secondary insurance obligations have been met. As 
explained above, the NRC staff found that no reasonably conceivable 
design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release 
greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite consequence 
from a design-basis radiological release is highly unlikely and the 
need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage 
is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that, after 10 
months decay, the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP will be capable of being 
adequately cooled by air in the highly unlikely event of pool drainage. 
Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario 
where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a manner that all 
methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available, 
the NRC staff has determined that at least 10 hours would be available 
and is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment, 
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding 
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes 
that the fuel stored in the DEAC SFP will have decayed sufficiently by 
the requested effective date for the exemption of 10 months after 
permanent cessation of power operations to support a reduction in the 
required offsite insurance consistent with SECY-00-0145.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees 
to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly, consistent with 
the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under which 
decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the requirements 
to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to participate 
in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient 
technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested 
exemption is authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established 
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance 
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an 
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not 
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents 
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
    The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100 
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary 
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the 
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in 
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be 
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown 
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at 
operating reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial 
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee 
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that 
could result in an offsite radiological release are minimal, thereby 
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability 
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary 
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
    Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating 
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely 
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to 
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power 
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to 
$131,056,000. However, because DAEC is permanently shut down, it cannot 
produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such a 
liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could 
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and 
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning 
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial 
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the 
radiological risk posed by DAEC when compared to operating reactors.
    The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power 
plants does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full 
operating reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel 
cooling period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The 
licensee's proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level 
of liability insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the 
public. These changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as 
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and exemptions approved for other 
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the 
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in 
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an exemption from participation in the 
secondary insurance pool and a reduction in the primary insurance to 
$100 million, a value more in line with the potential consequences of 
accidents, would be in the public interest in that this ensures that 
there will be adequate funds to address any of those consequences and 
helps to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of the reactor.
    Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10 
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit NEDA to lower the DAEC primary

[[Page 26966]]

insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary retrospective 
premium pool at the requested effective date of 10 months after the 
permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public interest.

C. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the 
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
    As the Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and 
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I 
have determined that approval of the exemption request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because 
reducing the licensee's offsite liability requirements for DAEC does 
not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is 
unrelated to the operation of DAEC or site activities. Accordingly, 
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in 
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational 
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with 
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The 
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential 
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the 
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for, 
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would 
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic 
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the 
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The 
requirement for offsite liability insurance involves surety, insurance, 
or indemnity matters only.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants NEDA an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for DAEC. DAEC 
permanently ceased power operations on August 10, 2020. The exemption 
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits DAEC to reduce the required level of 
primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million and to 
withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial 
protection 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations.
    The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent 
cessation of power operations at DAEC, which is June 10, 2021.

    Dated: May 11, 2021.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Patricia K. Holahan,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2021-10405 Filed 5-17-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P