[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 93 (Monday, May 17, 2021)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 26633-26647]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10460]
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 86 , No. 93 / Monday, May 17, 2021 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 26633]]
Executive Order 14028 of May 12, 2021
Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. The United States faces persistent
and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber
campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private
sector, and ultimately the American people's security
and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its
efforts to identify, deter, protect against, detect,
and respond to these actions and actors. The Federal
Government must also carefully examine what occurred
during any major cyber incident and apply lessons
learned. But cybersecurity requires more than
government action. Protecting our Nation from malicious
cyber actors requires the Federal Government to partner
with the private sector. The private sector must adapt
to the continuously changing threat environment, ensure
its products are built and operate securely, and
partner with the Federal Government to foster a more
secure cyberspace. In the end, the trust we place in
our digital infrastructure should be proportional to
how trustworthy and transparent that infrastructure is,
and to the consequences we will incur if that trust is
misplaced.
Incremental improvements will not give us the security
we need; instead, the Federal Government needs to make
bold changes and significant investments in order to
defend the vital institutions that underpin the
American way of life. The Federal Government must bring
to bear the full scope of its authorities and resources
to protect and secure its computer systems, whether
they are cloud-based, on-premises, or hybrid. The scope
of protection and security must include systems that
process data (information technology (IT)) and those
that run the vital machinery that ensures our safety
(operational technology (OT)).
It is the policy of my Administration that the
prevention, detection, assessment, and remediation of
cyber incidents is a top priority and essential to
national and economic security. The Federal Government
must lead by example. All Federal Information Systems
should meet or exceed the standards and requirements
for cybersecurity set forth in and issued pursuant to
this order.
Sec. 2. Removing Barriers to Sharing Threat
Information. (a) The Federal Government contracts with
IT and OT service providers to conduct an array of day-
to-day functions on Federal Information Systems. These
service providers, including cloud service providers,
have unique access to and insight into cyber threat and
incident information on Federal Information Systems. At
the same time, current contract terms or restrictions
may limit the sharing of such threat or incident
information with executive departments and agencies
(agencies) that are responsible for investigating or
remediating cyber incidents, such as the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other elements of
the Intelligence Community (IC). Removing these
contractual barriers and increasing the sharing of
information about such threats, incidents, and risks
are necessary steps to accelerating incident
deterrence, prevention, and response efforts and to
enabling more effective defense of agencies' systems
and of information collected, processed, and maintained
by or for the Federal Government.
[[Page 26634]]
(b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of National Intelligence, shall review
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
contract requirements and language for contracting with
IT and OT service providers and recommend updates to
such requirements and language to the FAR Council and
other appropriate agencies. The recommendations shall
include descriptions of contractors to be covered by
the proposed contract language.
(c) The recommended contract language and
requirements described in subsection (b) of this
section shall be designed to ensure that:
(i) service providers collect and preserve data, information, and reporting
relevant to cybersecurity event prevention, detection, response, and
investigation on all information systems over which they have control,
including systems operated on behalf of agencies, consistent with agencies'
requirements;
(ii) service providers share such data, information, and reporting, as they
relate to cyber incidents or potential incidents relevant to any agency
with which they have contracted, directly with such agency and any other
agency that the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of National Intelligence, deems appropriate, consistent with
applicable privacy laws, regulations, and policies;
(iii) service providers collaborate with Federal cybersecurity or
investigative agencies in their investigations of and responses to
incidents or potential incidents on Federal Information Systems, including
by implementing technical capabilities, such as monitoring networks for
threats in collaboration with agencies they support, as needed; and
(iv) service providers share cyber threat and incident information with
agencies, doing so, where possible, in industry-recognized formats for
incident response and remediation.
(d) Within 90 days of receipt of the
recommendations described in subsection (b) of this
section, the FAR Council shall review the proposed
contract language and conditions and, as appropriate,
shall publish for public comment proposed updates to
the FAR.
(e) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB
shall take appropriate steps to ensure to the greatest
extent possible that service providers share data with
agencies, CISA, and the FBI as may be necessary for the
Federal Government to respond to cyber threats,
incidents, and risks.
(f) It is the policy of the Federal Government
that:
(i) information and communications technology (ICT) service providers
entering into contracts with agencies must promptly report to such agencies
when they discover a cyber incident involving a software product or service
provided to such agencies or involving a support system for a software
product or service provided to such agencies;
(ii) ICT service providers must also directly report to CISA whenever they
report under subsection (f)(i) of this section to Federal Civilian
Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies, and CISA must centrally collect and
manage such information; and
(iii) reports pertaining to National Security Systems, as defined in
section 10(h) of this order, must be received and managed by the
appropriate agency as to be determined under subsection (g)(i)(E) of this
section.
(g) To implement the policy set forth in subsection
(f) of this section:
(i) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense acting through the
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Attorney General,
[[Page 26635]]
and the Director of OMB, shall recommend to the FAR Council contract
language that identifies:
(A) the nature of cyber incidents that require reporting;
(B) the types of information regarding cyber incidents that require
reporting to facilitate effective cyber incident response and remediation;
(C) appropriate and effective protections for privacy and civil
liberties;
(D) the time periods within which contractors must report cyber incidents
based on a graduated scale of severity, with reporting on the most severe
cyber incidents not to exceed 3 days after initial detection;
(E) National Security Systems reporting requirements; and
(F) the type of contractors and associated service providers to be
covered by the proposed contract language.
(ii) Within 90 days of receipt of the recommendations described in
subsection (g)(i) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the
recommendations and publish for public comment proposed updates to the FAR.
(iii) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense
acting through the Director of the NSA, the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence shall
jointly develop procedures for ensuring that cyber incident reports are
promptly and appropriately shared among agencies.
(h) Current cybersecurity requirements for
unclassified system contracts are largely implemented
through agency-specific policies and regulations,
including cloud-service cybersecurity requirements.
Standardizing common cybersecurity contractual
requirements across agencies will streamline and
improve compliance for vendors and the Federal
Government.
(i) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense acting through the Director of the NSA, the
Director of OMB, and the Administrator of General
Services, shall review agency-specific cybersecurity
requirements that currently exist as a matter of law,
policy, or contract and recommend to the FAR Council
standardized contract language for appropriate
cybersecurity requirements. Such recommendations shall
include consideration of the scope of contractors and
associated service providers to be covered by the
proposed contract language.
(j) Within 60 days of receiving the recommended
contract language developed pursuant to subsection (i)
of this section, the FAR Council shall review the
recommended contract language and publish for public
comment proposed updates to the FAR.
(k) Following any updates to the FAR made by the
FAR Council after the public comment period described
in subsection (j) of this section, agencies shall
update their agency-specific cybersecurity requirements
to remove any requirements that are duplicative of such
FAR updates.
(l) The Director of OMB shall incorporate into the
annual budget process a cost analysis of all
recommendations developed under this section.
Sec. 3. Modernizing Federal Government Cybersecurity.
(a) To keep pace with today's dynamic and increasingly
sophisticated cyber threat environment, the Federal
Government must take decisive steps to modernize its
approach to cybersecurity, including by increasing the
Federal Government's visibility into threats, while
protecting privacy and civil liberties. The Federal
Government must adopt security best practices; advance
toward Zero Trust Architecture; accelerate movement to
secure cloud services, including Software as a Service
(SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and
Platform as a Service (PaaS); centralize and streamline
access to cybersecurity data to drive analytics for
identifying and managing cybersecurity risks; and
invest in both technology and personnel to match these
modernization goals.
(b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
head of each agency shall:
[[Page 26636]]
(i) update existing agency plans to prioritize resources for the adoption
and use of cloud technology as outlined in relevant OMB guidance;
(ii) develop a plan to implement Zero Trust Architecture, which shall
incorporate, as appropriate, the migration steps that the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of
Commerce has outlined in standards and guidance, describe any such steps
that have already been completed, identify activities that will have the
most immediate security impact, and include a schedule to implement them;
and
(iii) provide a report to the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the
President and National Security Advisor (APNSA) discussing the plans
required pursuant to subsection (b)(i) and (ii) of this section.
(c) As agencies continue to use cloud technology,
they shall do so in a coordinated, deliberate way that
allows the Federal Government to prevent, detect,
assess, and remediate cyber incidents. To facilitate
this approach, the migration to cloud technology shall
adopt Zero Trust Architecture, as practicable. The CISA
shall modernize its current cybersecurity programs,
services, and capabilities to be fully functional with
cloud-computing environments with Zero Trust
Architecture. The Secretary of Homeland Security acting
through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the
Administrator of General Services acting through the
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
(FedRAMP) within the General Services Administration,
shall develop security principles governing Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) for incorporation into agency
modernization efforts. To facilitate this work:
(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA, and the Administrator of General Services acting through
FedRAMP, shall develop a Federal cloud-security strategy and provide
guidance to agencies accordingly. Such guidance shall seek to ensure that
risks to the FCEB from using cloud-based services are broadly understood
and effectively addressed, and that FCEB Agencies move closer to Zero Trust
Architecture.
(ii) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security acting through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the
Director of OMB and the Administrator of General Services acting through
FedRAMP, shall develop and issue, for the FCEB, cloud-security technical
reference architecture documentation that illustrates recommended
approaches to cloud migration and data protection for agency data
collection and reporting.
(iii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security acting through the Director of CISA shall develop and issue, for
FCEB Agencies, a cloud-service governance framework. That framework shall
identify a range of services and protections available to agencies based on
incident severity. That framework shall also identify data and processing
activities associated with those services and protections.
(iv) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the heads of FCEB Agencies,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA, shall evaluate the types and sensitivity of their
respective agency's unclassified data, and shall provide to the Secretary
of Homeland Security through the Director of CISA and to the Director of
OMB a report based on such evaluation. The evaluation shall prioritize
identification of the unclassified data considered by the agency to be the
most sensitive and under the greatest threat, and appropriate processing
and storage solutions for those data.
(d) Within 180 days of the date of this order,
agencies shall adopt multi-factor authentication and
encryption for data at rest and in transit, to the
maximum extent consistent with Federal records laws and
other applicable laws. To that end:
(i) Heads of FCEB Agencies shall provide reports to the Secretary of
Homeland Security through the Director of CISA, the Director of OMB,
[[Page 26637]]
and the APNSA on their respective agency's progress in adopting multifactor
authentication and encryption of data at rest and in transit. Such agencies
shall provide such reports every 60 days after the date of this order until
the agency has fully adopted, agency-wide, multi-factor authentication and
data encryption.
(ii) Based on identified gaps in agency implementation, CISA shall take all
appropriate steps to maximize adoption by FCEB Agencies of technologies and
processes to implement multifactor authentication and encryption for data
at rest and in transit.
(iii) Heads of FCEB Agencies that are unable to fully adopt multi-factor
authentication and data encryption within 180 days of the date of this
order shall, at the end of the 180-day period, provide a written rationale
to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Director of CISA, the
Director of OMB, and the APNSA.
(e) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA, in consultation with the Attorney
General, the Director of the FBI, and the Administrator
of General Services acting through the Director of
FedRAMP, shall establish a framework to collaborate on
cybersecurity and incident response activities related
to FCEB cloud technology, in order to ensure effective
information sharing among agencies and between agencies
and CSPs.
(f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Administrator of General Services, in consultation with
the Director of OMB and the heads of other agencies as
the Administrator of General Services deems
appropriate, shall begin modernizing FedRAMP by:
(i) establishing a training program to ensure agencies are effectively
trained and equipped to manage FedRAMP requests, and providing access to
training materials, including videos-on-demand;
(ii) improving communication with CSPs through automation and
standardization of messages at each stage of authorization. These
communications may include status updates, requirements to complete a
vendor's current stage, next steps, and points of contact for questions;
(iii) incorporating automation throughout the lifecycle of FedRAMP,
including assessment, authorization, continuous monitoring, and compliance;
(iv) digitizing and streamlining documentation that vendors are required to
complete, including through online accessibility and pre-populated forms;
and
(v) identifying relevant compliance frameworks, mapping those frameworks
onto requirements in the FedRAMP authorization process, and allowing those
frameworks to be used as a substitute for the relevant portion of the
authorization process, as appropriate.
Sec. 4. Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security. (a)
The security of software used by the Federal Government
is vital to the Federal Government's ability to perform
its critical functions. The development of commercial
software often lacks transparency, sufficient focus on
the ability of the software to resist attack, and
adequate controls to prevent tampering by malicious
actors. There is a pressing need to implement more
rigorous and predictable mechanisms for ensuring that
products function securely, and as intended. The
security and integrity of ``critical software''--
software that performs functions critical to trust
(such as affording or requiring elevated system
privileges or direct access to networking and computing
resources)--is a particular concern. Accordingly, the
Federal Government must take action to rapidly improve
the security and integrity of the software supply
chain, with a priority on addressing critical software.
(b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of
NIST shall solicit input from the Federal Government,
private sector, academia, and other appropriate actors
to identify existing or develop new standards, tools,
and best practices for complying with the standards,
procedures, or criteria in subsection (e) of this
section.
[[Page 26638]]
The guidelines shall include criteria that can be used
to evaluate software security, include criteria to
evaluate the security practices of the developers and
suppliers themselves, and identify innovative tools or
methods to demonstrate conformance with secure
practices.
(c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the
Director of NIST shall publish preliminary guidelines,
based on the consultations described in subsection (b)
of this section and drawing on existing documents as
practicable, for enhancing software supply chain
security and meeting the requirements of this section.
(d) Within 360 days of the date of this order, the
Director of NIST shall publish additional guidelines
that include procedures for periodic review and
updating of the guidelines described in subsection (c)
of this section.
(e) Within 90 days of publication of the
preliminary guidelines pursuant to subsection (c) of
this section, the Secretary of Commerce acting through
the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of
such agencies as the Director of NIST deems
appropriate, shall issue guidance identifying practices
that enhance the security of the software supply chain.
Such guidance may incorporate the guidelines published
pursuant to subsections (c) and (i) of this section.
Such guidance shall include standards, procedures, or
criteria regarding:
(i) secure software development environments, including such actions as:
(A) using administratively separate build environments;
(B) auditing trust relationships;
(C) establishing multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional
access across the enterprise;
(D) documenting and minimizing dependencies on enterprise products that
are part of the environments used to develop, build, and edit software;
(E) employing encryption for data; and
(F) monitoring operations and alerts and responding to attempted and
actual cyber incidents;
(ii) generating and, when requested by a purchaser, providing artifacts
that demonstrate conformance to the processes set forth in subsection
(e)(i) of this section;
(iii) employing automated tools, or comparable processes, to maintain
trusted source code supply chains, thereby ensuring the integrity of the
code;
(iv) employing automated tools, or comparable processes, that check for
known and potential vulnerabilities and remediate them, which shall operate
regularly, or at a minimum prior to product, version, or update release;
(v) providing, when requested by a purchaser, artifacts of the execution of
the tools and processes described in subsection (e)(iii) and (iv) of this
section, and making publicly available summary information on completion of
these actions, to include a summary description of the risks assessed and
mitigated;
(vi) maintaining accurate and up-to-date data, provenance (i.e., origin) of
software code or components, and controls on internal and third-party
software components, tools, and services present in software development
processes, and performing audits and enforcement of these controls on a
recurring basis;
(vii) providing a purchaser a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for each
product directly or by publishing it on a public website;
(viii) participating in a vulnerability disclosure program that includes a
reporting and disclosure process;
(ix) attesting to conformity with secure software development practices;
and
[[Page 26639]]
(x) ensuring and attesting, to the extent practicable, to the integrity and
provenance of open source software used within any portion of a product.
(f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information
and the Administrator of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration,
shall publish minimum elements for an SBOM.
(g) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of
NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
acting through the Director of the NSA, the Secretary
of Homeland Security acting through the Director of
CISA, the Director of OMB, and the Director of National
Intelligence, shall publish a definition of the term
``critical software'' for inclusion in the guidance
issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section. That
definition shall reflect the level of privilege or
access required to function, integration and
dependencies with other software, direct access to
networking and computing resources, performance of a
function critical to trust, and potential for harm if
compromised.
(h) Within 30 days of the publication of the
definition required by subsection (g) of this section,
the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, shall
identify and make available to agencies a list of
categories of software and software products in use or
in the acquisition process meeting the definition of
critical software issued pursuant to subsection (g) of
this section.
(i) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of
NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security acting through the Director of CISA and with
the Director of OMB, shall publish guidance outlining
security measures for critical software as defined in
subsection (g) of this section, including applying
practices of least privilege, network segmentation, and
proper configuration.
(j) Within 30 days of the issuance of the guidance
described in subsection (i) of this section, the
Director of OMB acting through the Administrator of the
Office of Electronic Government within OMB shall take
appropriate steps to require that agencies comply with
such guidance.
(k) Within 30 days of issuance of the guidance
described in subsection (e) of this section, the
Director of OMB acting through the Administrator of the
Office of Electronic Government within OMB shall take
appropriate steps to require that agencies comply with
such guidelines with respect to software procured after
the date of this order.
(l) Agencies may request an extension for complying
with any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k)
of this section. Any such request shall be considered
by the Director of OMB on a case-by-case basis, and
only if accompanied by a plan for meeting the
underlying requirements. The Director of OMB shall on a
quarterly basis provide a report to the APNSA
identifying and explaining all extensions granted.
(m) Agencies may request a waiver as to any
requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this
section. Waivers shall be considered by the Director of
OMB, in consultation with the APNSA, on a case-by-case
basis, and shall be granted only in exceptional
circumstances and for limited duration, and only if
there is an accompanying plan for mitigating any
potential risks.
(n) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the
Director of OMB, and the Administrator of the Office of
Electronic Government within OMB, shall recommend to
the FAR Council contract language requiring suppliers
of software available for purchase by agencies to
comply with, and attest to complying with, any
requirements issued pursuant to subsections (g) through
(k) of this section.
[[Page 26640]]
(o) After receiving the recommendations described
in subsection (n) of this section, the FAR Council
shall review the recommendations and, as appropriate
and consistent with applicable law, amend the FAR.
(p) Following the issuance of any final rule
amending the FAR as described in subsection (o) of this
section, agencies shall, as appropriate and consistent
with applicable law, remove software products that do
not meet the requirements of the amended FAR from all
indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contracts;
Federal Supply Schedules; Federal Government-wide
Acquisition Contracts; Blanket Purchase Agreements; and
Multiple Award Contracts.
(q) The Director of OMB, acting through the
Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government
within OMB, shall require agencies employing software
developed and procured prior to the date of this order
(legacy software) either to comply with any
requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this
section or to provide a plan outlining actions to
remediate or meet those requirements, and shall further
require agencies seeking renewals of software
contracts, including legacy software, to comply with
any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of
this section, unless an extension or waiver is granted
in accordance with subsection (l) or (m) of this
section.
(r) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of
NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
acting through the Director of the NSA, shall publish
guidelines recommending minimum standards for vendors'
testing of their software source code, including
identifying recommended types of manual or automated
testing (such as code review tools, static and dynamic
analysis, software composition tools, and penetration
testing).
(s) The Secretary of Commerce acting through the
Director of NIST, in coordination with representatives
of other agencies as the Director of NIST deems
appropriate, shall initiate pilot programs informed by
existing consumer product labeling programs to educate
the public on the security capabilities of internet-of-
Things (IoT) devices and software development
practices, and shall consider ways to incentivize
manufacturers and developers to participate in these
programs.
(t) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of
NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and representatives of other
agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate,
shall identify IoT cybersecurity criteria for a
consumer labeling program, and shall consider whether
such a consumer labeling program may be operated in
conjunction with or modeled after any similar existing
government programs consistent with applicable law. The
criteria shall reflect increasingly comprehensive
levels of testing and assessment that a product may
have undergone, and shall use or be compatible with
existing labeling schemes that manufacturers use to
inform consumers about the security of their products.
The Director of NIST shall examine all relevant
information, labeling, and incentive programs and
employ best practices. This review shall focus on ease
of use for consumers and a determination of what
measures can be taken to maximize manufacturer
participation.
(u) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of
NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the FTC and
representatives from other agencies as the Director of
NIST deems appropriate, shall identify secure software
development practices or criteria for a consumer
software labeling program, and shall consider whether
such a consumer software labeling program may be
operated in conjunction with or modeled after any
similar existing government programs, consistent with
applicable law. The criteria shall reflect a baseline
level of secure practices, and if practicable, shall
reflect increasingly comprehensive levels of testing
and assessment that a product may have undergone. The
Director
[[Page 26641]]
of NIST shall examine all relevant information,
labeling, and incentive programs, employ best
practices, and identify, modify, or develop a
recommended label or, if practicable, a tiered software
security rating system. This review shall focus on ease
of use for consumers and a determination of what
measures can be taken to maximize participation.
(v) These pilot programs shall be conducted in a
manner consistent with OMB Circular A-119 and NIST
Special Publication 2000-02 (Conformity Assessment
Considerations for Federal Agencies).
(w) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the
Director of NIST shall conduct a review of the pilot
programs, consult with the private sector and relevant
agencies to assess the effectiveness of the programs,
determine what improvements can be made going forward,
and submit a summary report to the APNSA.
(x) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads
of other agencies as the Secretary of Commerce deems
appropriate, shall provide to the President, through
the APNSA, a report that reviews the progress made
under this section and outlines additional steps needed
to secure the software supply chain.
Sec. 5. Establishing a Cyber Safety Review Board. (a)
The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall establish the Cyber
Safety Review Board (Board), pursuant to section 871 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451).
(b) The Board shall review and assess, with respect
to significant cyber incidents (as defined under
Presidential Policy Directive 41 of July 26, 2016
(United States Cyber Incident Coordination) (PPD-41))
affecting FCEB Information Systems or non-Federal
systems, threat activity, vulnerabilities, mitigation
activities, and agency responses.
(c) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
convene the Board following a significant cyber
incident triggering the establishment of a Cyber
Unified Coordination Group (UCG) as provided by section
V(B)(2) of PPD-41; at any time as directed by the
President acting through the APNSA; or at any time the
Secretary of Homeland Security deems necessary.
(d) The Board's initial review shall relate to the
cyber activities that prompted the establishment of a
UCG in December 2020, and the Board shall, within 90
days of the Board's establishment, provide
recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security
for improving cybersecurity and incident response
practices, as outlined in subsection (i) of this
section.
(e) The Board's membership shall include Federal
officials and representatives from private-sector
entities. The Board shall comprise representatives of
the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice,
CISA, the NSA, and the FBI, as well as representatives
from appropriate private-sector cybersecurity or
software suppliers as determined by the Secretary of
Homeland Security. A representative from OMB shall
participate in Board activities when an incident under
review involves FCEB Information Systems, as determined
by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary of
Homeland Security may invite the participation of
others on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature
of the incident under review.
(f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
biennially designate a Chair and Deputy Chair of the
Board from among the members of the Board, to include
one Federal and one private-sector member.
(g) The Board shall protect sensitive law
enforcement, operational, business, and other
confidential information that has been shared with it,
consistent with applicable law.
(h) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
provide to the President through the APNSA any advice,
information, or recommendations of the Board for
improving cybersecurity and incident response practices
and policy upon completion of its review of an
applicable incident.
[[Page 26642]]
(i) Within 30 days of completion of the initial
review described in subsection (d) of this section, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide to the
President through the APNSA the recommendations of the
Board based on the initial review. These
recommendations shall describe:
(i) identified gaps in, and options for, the Board's composition or
authorities;
(ii) the Board's proposed mission, scope, and responsibilities;
(iii) membership eligibility criteria for private-sector representatives;
(iv) Board governance structure including interaction with the executive
branch and the Executive Office of the President;
(v) thresholds and criteria for the types of cyber incidents to be
evaluated;
(vi) sources of information that should be made available to the Board,
consistent with applicable law and policy;
(vii) an approach for protecting the information provided to the Board and
securing the cooperation of affected United States individuals and entities
for the purpose of the Board's review of incidents; and
(viii) administrative and budgetary considerations required for operation
of the Board.
(j) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Attorney General and the APNSA,
shall review the recommendations provided to the
President through the APNSA pursuant to subsection (i)
of this section and take steps to implement them as
appropriate.
(k) Unless otherwise directed by the President, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall extend the life of
the Board every 2 years as the Secretary of Homeland
Security deems appropriate, pursuant to section 871 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Sec. 6. Standardizing the Federal Government's
Playbook for Responding to Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities and Incidents. (a) The cybersecurity
vulnerability and incident response procedures
currently used to identify, remediate, and recover from
vulnerabilities and incidents affecting their systems
vary across agencies, hindering the ability of lead
agencies to analyze vulnerabilities and incidents more
comprehensively across agencies. Standardized response
processes ensure a more coordinated and centralized
cataloging of incidents and tracking of agencies'
progress toward successful responses.
(b) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA, in consultation with the Director of
OMB, the Federal Chief Information Officers Council,
and the Federal Chief Information Security Council, and
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense acting
through the Director of the NSA, the Attorney General,
and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
develop a standard set of operational procedures
(playbook) to be used in planning and conducting a
cybersecurity vulnerability and incident response
activity respecting FCEB Information Systems. The
playbook shall:
(i) incorporate all appropriate NIST standards;
(ii) be used by FCEB Agencies; and
(iii) articulate progress and completion through all phases of an incident
response, while allowing flexibility so it may be used in support of
various response activities.
(c) The Director of OMB shall issue guidance on
agency use of the playbook.
(d) Agencies with cybersecurity vulnerability or
incident response procedures that deviate from the
playbook may use such procedures only after consulting
with the Director of OMB and the APNSA and
demonstrating that these procedures meet or exceed the
standards proposed in the playbook.
[[Page 26643]]
(e) The Director of CISA, in consultation with the
Director of the NSA, shall review and update the
playbook annually, and provide information to the
Director of OMB for incorporation in guidance updates.
(f) To ensure comprehensiveness of incident
response activities and build confidence that
unauthorized cyber actors no longer have access to FCEB
Information Systems, the playbook shall establish,
consistent with applicable law, a requirement that the
Director of CISA review and validate FCEB Agencies'
incident response and remediation results upon an
agency's completion of its incident response. The
Director of CISA may recommend use of another agency or
a third-party incident response team as appropriate.
(g) To ensure a common understanding of cyber
incidents and the cybersecurity status of an agency,
the playbook shall define key terms and use such terms
consistently with any statutory definitions of those
terms, to the extent practicable, thereby providing a
shared lexicon among agencies using the playbook.
Sec. 7. Improving Detection of Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities and Incidents on Federal Government
Networks. (a) The Federal Government shall employ all
appropriate resources and authorities to maximize the
early detection of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
incidents on its networks. This approach shall include
increasing the Federal Government's visibility into and
detection of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats
to agency networks in order to bolster the Federal
Government's cybersecurity efforts.
(b) FCEB Agencies shall deploy an Endpoint
Detection and Response (EDR) initiative to support
proactive detection of cybersecurity incidents within
Federal Government infrastructure, active cyber
hunting, containment and remediation, and incident
response.
(c) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the
Director of CISA shall provide to the Director of OMB
recommendations on options for implementing an EDR
initiative, centrally located to support host-level
visibility, attribution, and response regarding FCEB
Information Systems.
(d) Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations
described in subsection (c) of this section, the
Director of OMB, in consultation with Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall issue requirements for FCEB
Agencies to adopt Federal Government-wide EDR
approaches. Those requirements shall support a
capability of the Secretary of Homeland Secretary,
acting through the Director of CISA, to engage in cyber
hunt, detection, and response activities.
(e) The Director of OMB shall work with the
Secretary of Homeland Security and agency heads to
ensure that agencies have adequate resources to comply
with the requirements issued pursuant to subsection (d)
of this section.
(f) Defending FCEB Information Systems requires
that the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through
the Director of CISA have access to agency data that
are relevant to a threat and vulnerability analysis, as
well as for assessment and threat-hunting purposes.
Within 75 days of the date of this order, agencies
shall establish or update Memoranda of Agreement (MOA)
with CISA for the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation
Program to ensure object level data, as defined in the
MOA, are available and accessible to CISA, consistent
with applicable law.
(g) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the
Director of the NSA as the National Manager for
National Security Systems (National Manager) shall
recommend to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Committee on National
Security Systems (CNSS) appropriate actions for
improving detection of cyber incidents affecting
National Security Systems, to the extent permitted by
applicable law, including recommendations concerning
EDR approaches and whether such measures should be
operated by agencies or through a centralized service
of common concern provided by the National Manager.
[[Page 26644]]
(h) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the CNSS shall review the
recommendations submitted under subsection (g) of this
section and, as appropriate, establish policies that
effectuate those recommendations, consistent with
applicable law.
(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the
Director of CISA shall provide to the Director of OMB
and the APNSA a report describing how authorities
granted under section 1705 of Public Law 116-283, to
conduct threat-hunting activities on FCEB networks
without prior authorization from agencies, are being
implemented. This report shall also recommend
procedures to ensure that mission-critical systems are
not disrupted, procedures for notifying system owners
of vulnerable government systems, and the range of
techniques that can be used during testing of FCEB
Information Systems. The Director of CISA shall provide
quarterly reports to the APNSA and the Director of OMB
regarding actions taken under section 1705 of Public
Law 116-283.
(j) To ensure alignment between Department of
Defense Information Network (DODIN) directives and FCEB
Information Systems directives, the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of OMB, shall:
(i) within 60 days of the date of this order, establish procedures for the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to
immediately share with each other Department of Defense Incident Response
Orders or Department of Homeland Security Emergency Directives and Binding
Operational Directives applying to their respective information networks;
(ii) evaluate whether to adopt any guidance contained in an Order or
Directive issued by the other Department, consistent with regulations
concerning sharing of classified information; and
(iii) within 7 days of receiving notice of an Order or Directive issued
pursuant to the procedures established under subsection (j)(i) of this
section, notify the APNSA and Administrator of the Office of Electronic
Government within OMB of the evaluation described in subsection (j)(ii) of
this section, including a determination whether to adopt guidance issued by
the other Department, the rationale for that determination, and a timeline
for application of the directive, if applicable.
Sec. 8. Improving the Federal Government's
Investigative and Remediation Capabilities. (a)
Information from network and system logs on Federal
Information Systems (for both on-premises systems and
connections hosted by third parties, such as CSPs) is
invaluable for both investigation and remediation
purposes. It is essential that agencies and their IT
service providers collect and maintain such data and,
when necessary to address a cyber incident on FCEB
Information Systems, provide them upon request to the
Secretary of Homeland Security through the Director of
CISA and to the FBI, consistent with applicable law.
(b) Within 14 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Attorney General and the Administrator of the
Office of Electronic Government within OMB, shall
provide to the Director of OMB recommendations on
requirements for logging events and retaining other
relevant data within an agency's systems and networks.
Such recommendations shall include the types of logs to
be maintained, the time periods to retain the logs and
other relevant data, the time periods for agencies to
enable recommended logging and security requirements,
and how to protect logs. Logs shall be protected by
cryptographic methods to ensure integrity once
collected and periodically verified against the hashes
throughout their retention. Data shall be retained in a
manner consistent with all applicable privacy laws and
regulations. Such recommendations shall also be
considered by the FAR Council when promulgating rules
pursuant to section 2 of this order.
[[Page 26645]]
(c) Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations
described in subsection (b) of this section, the
Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
formulate policies for agencies to establish
requirements for logging, log retention, and log
management, which shall ensure centralized access and
visibility for the highest level security operations
center of each agency.
(d) The Director of OMB shall work with agency
heads to ensure that agencies have adequate resources
to comply with the requirements identified in
subsection (c) of this section.
(e) To address cyber risks or incidents, including
potential cyber risks or incidents, the proposed
recommendations issued pursuant to subsection (b) of
this section shall include requirements to ensure that,
upon request, agencies provide logs to the Secretary of
Homeland Security through the Director of CISA and to
the FBI, consistent with applicable law. These
requirements should be designed to permit agencies to
share log information, as needed and appropriate, with
other Federal agencies for cyber risks or incidents.
Sec. 9. National Security Systems. (a) Within 60 days
of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense
acting through the National Manager, in coordination
with the Director of National Intelligence and the
CNSS, and in consultation with the APNSA, shall adopt
National Security Systems requirements that are
equivalent to or exceed the cybersecurity requirements
set forth in this order that are otherwise not
applicable to National Security Systems. Such
requirements may provide for exceptions in
circumstances necessitated by unique mission needs.
Such requirements shall be codified in a National
Security Memorandum (NSM). Until such time as that NSM
is issued, programs, standards, or requirements
established pursuant to this order shall not apply with
respect to National Security Systems.
(b) Nothing in this order shall alter the authority
of the National Manager with respect to National
Security Systems as defined in National Security
Directive 42 of July 5, 1990 (National Policy for the
Security of National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems) (NSD-42). The FCEB network shall
continue to be within the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA.
Sec. 10. Definitions. For purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``agency'' has the meaning ascribed to
it under 44 U.S.C. 3502.
(b) the term ``auditing trust relationship'' means
an agreed-upon relationship between two or more system
elements that is governed by criteria for secure
interaction, behavior, and outcomes relative to the
protection of assets.
(c) the term ``cyber incident'' has the meaning
ascribed to an ``incident'' under 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(2).
(d) the term ``Federal Civilian Executive Branch
Agencies'' or ``FCEB Agencies'' includes all agencies
except for the Department of Defense and agencies in
the Intelligence Community.
(e) the term ``Federal Civilian Executive Branch
Information Systems'' or ``FCEB Information Systems''
means those information systems operated by Federal
Civilian Executive Branch Agencies, but excludes
National Security Systems.
(f) the term ``Federal Information Systems'' means
an information system used or operated by an agency or
by a contractor of an agency or by another organization
on behalf of an agency, including FCEB Information
Systems and National Security Systems.
(g) the term ``Intelligence Community'' or ``IC''
has the meaning ascribed to it under 50 U.S.C. 3003(4).
(h) the term ``National Security Systems'' means
information systems as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6),
3553(e)(2), and 3553(e)(3).
[[Page 26646]]
(i) the term ``logs'' means records of the events
occurring within an organization's systems and
networks. Logs are composed of log entries, and each
entry contains information related to a specific event
that has occurred within a system or network.
(j) the term ``Software Bill of Materials'' or
``SBOM'' means a formal record containing the details
and supply chain relationships of various components
used in building software. Software developers and
vendors often create products by assembling existing
open source and commercial software components. The
SBOM enumerates these components in a product. It is
analogous to a list of ingredients on food packaging.
An SBOM is useful to those who develop or manufacture
software, those who select or purchase software, and
those who operate software. Developers often use
available open source and third-party software
components to create a product; an SBOM allows the
builder to make sure those components are up to date
and to respond quickly to new vulnerabilities. Buyers
can use an SBOM to perform vulnerability or license
analysis, both of which can be used to evaluate risk in
a product. Those who operate software can use SBOMs to
quickly and easily determine whether they are at
potential risk of a newly discovered vulnerability. A
widely used, machine-readable SBOM format allows for
greater benefits through automation and tool
integration. The SBOMs gain greater value when
collectively stored in a repository that can be easily
queried by other applications and systems.
Understanding the supply chain of software, obtaining
an SBOM, and using it to analyze known vulnerabilities
are crucial in managing risk.
(k) the term ``Zero Trust Architecture'' means a
security model, a set of system design principles, and
a coordinated cybersecurity and system management
strategy based on an acknowledgement that threats exist
both inside and outside traditional network boundaries.
The Zero Trust security model eliminates implicit trust
in any one element, node, or service and instead
requires continuous verification of the operational
picture via real-time information from multiple sources
to determine access and other system responses. In
essence, a Zero Trust Architecture allows users full
access but only to the bare minimum they need to
perform their jobs. If a device is compromised, zero
trust can ensure that the damage is contained. The Zero
Trust Architecture security model assumes that a breach
is inevitable or has likely already occurred, so it
constantly limits access to only what is needed and
looks for anomalous or malicious activity. Zero Trust
Architecture embeds comprehensive security monitoring;
granular risk-based access controls; and system
security automation in a coordinated manner throughout
all aspects of the infrastructure in order to focus on
protecting data in real-time within a dynamic threat
environment. This data-centric security model allows
the concept of least-privileged access to be applied
for every access decision, where the answers to the
questions of who, what, when, where, and how are
critical for appropriately allowing or denying access
to resources based on the combination of sever.
Sec. 11. General Provisions. (a) Upon the appointment
of the National Cyber Director (NCD) and the
establishment of the related Office within the
Executive Office of the President, pursuant to section
1752 of Public Law 116-283, portions of this order may
be modified to enable the NCD to fully execute its
duties and responsibilities.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or
the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(c) This order shall be implemented in a manner
consistent with applicable law and subject to the
availability of appropriations.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any
[[Page 26647]]
party against the United States, its departments,
agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or
agents, or any other person.
(e) Nothing in this order confers authority to
interfere with or to direct a criminal or national
security investigation, arrest, search, seizure, or
disruption operation or to alter a legal restriction
that requires an agency to protect information learned
in the course of a criminal or national security
investigation.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 12, 2021.
[FR Doc. 2021-10460
Filed 5-14-21; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3295-F1-P