[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 76 (Thursday, April 22, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21309-21312]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-08482]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Ensuring the Continued 
Security of the United States Critical Electric Infrastructure

AGENCY: Office of Electricity, Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Request for information.

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SUMMARY: The United States Government recognizes the immediate 
imperative to secure our electric infrastructure. The electric power 
system is vital to the Nation's energy security, supporting national 
defense, emergency services, critical infrastructure, and the economy. 
Preventing exploitation and attacks by foreign threats to the U.S. 
supply chain is the focus of this Request for Information (RFI). On 
January 20, 2021, Executive Order, Protecting Public Health and the 
Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 
suspended Executive Order, Securing the United States Bulk-Power 
System, for 90 days and directed the Secretary of Energy and the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to consider 
whether to recommend that a replacement order be issued. In the process 
of developing such recommendations, the Department of Energy (DOE or 
the Department) identified opportunities to institutionalize change, 
increase awareness, and strengthen protections against high-risk 
electric equipment transactions by foreign adversaries, while providing 
additional certainty to the utility industry and the public. As the 
United States Government considers whether to recommend a replacement 
Executive Order that appropriately balances national security, 
economic, and administrability considerations, the Department is 
seeking information from electric utilities, academia, research 
laboratories, government agencies, and other stakeholders on various 
aspects of the electric infrastructure.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 7, 2021. If you 
anticipate difficulty in submitting comments within that period, 
contact the person listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT as soon as 
possible.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are encouraged to submit written comments 
to [email protected]. All comments will be posted and 
available to the public www.energy.gov/oe/securing-critical-electric-infrastructure. Written comments may also be delivered by conventional 
mail to Michael Coe, Director, Energy Resilience Division of the Office 
of Electricity, U.S. Department of Energy, Mailstop OE-20, Room 8H-033, 
1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585. In light of the 
national emergency concerning the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic and personnel limitations, commenters are encouraged to submit 
comments electronically. Commenters are further cautioned that all 
conventional mail to the Department is subject to an automatic security 
screening process that may take several weeks and sometimes renders 
mailed material illegible.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Coe, Director, Energy 
Resilience Division of the Office of Electricity, U.S. Department of 
Energy, Mailstop OE-20, Room 8G-042, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 
Washington, DC 20585; (202) 287-5166; or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Background
II. Request for Information
    A. Development of a Long-Term Strategy
    B. Prohibition Authority
III. Submission of Comments

I. Introduction

A. Background

    The Nation's energy infrastructure is fundamental to national 
security, the continuity of our economy, and our way of life. 
Adversarial nation-state actors are targeting our critical 
infrastructure, with increasing focus on the energy

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sector. The Federal Government and industry stakeholders have endorsed 
the need to strengthen supply chain risk management with respect to the 
electric power system and recognize the threat our foreign adversaries 
pose to our critical infrastructure.
    The Administration is addressing critical infrastructure security 
through various actions and considers the protection and resilience of 
energy infrastructure to be a part of that comprehensive strategy. To 
strengthen the resilience of America's critical infrastructure, the 
Administration recently issued Executive Order 14017, America's Supply 
Chains,\1\ which, among other things, directs the Secretary of Energy, 
in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, to, within 100 
days, identify and make recommendations to address risks in the supply 
chain for high-capacity batteries and, within one year, review and make 
recommendations to improve supply chains for the energy sector 
industrial base. The electricity subsector industrial control systems 
cybersecurity initiative ``100-day sprint'' announced by the Department 
is intended to enhance the integrity and security of priority sites' 
control systems by installing technologies and systems to provide 
visibility and detection of threats and abnormalities in industrial 
control and operational technology systems.
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    \1\ Executive Order 14017, America's Supply Chains, 86 FR 11849 
(Mar. 1, 2021).
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    To further secure the Nation's electric grid, the Department is 
developing recommendations to strengthen requirements and capabilities 
for supply chain risk management practices by the Nation's electric 
utilities. These recommendations are intended to enable an approach 
that builds on, clarifies, and, where appropriate, modifies prior 
executive and agency actions.
    E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,\2\ issued 
on May 1, 2020, authorized the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to work 
with Federal partners and the energy industry to take actions to secure 
the Nation's bulk-power system (BPS). Most significantly, E.O. 13920 
authorized the Secretary to prohibit the acquisition, transfer, or 
installation of certain BPS electric equipment sourced from foreign 
adversary countries.\3\ Informed by a July 8, 2020 request for 
information on implementation of E.O. 13920,\4\ on December 17, 2020, 
the Secretary issued a Prohibition Order invoking the authority of E.O. 
13920 (December 2020 Prohibition Order).\5\ Pursuant to the December 
2020 Prohibition Order, a limited number of utilities \6\ were 
prohibited from acquiring, importing, transferring, or installing 
certain BPS electric equipment.\7\ That order targeted select equipment 
manufactured or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject 
to the jurisdiction or direction of the People's Republic of China.\8\
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    \2\ Executive Order 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power 
System, 85 FR 26595 (May 4, 2020).
    \3\ Id. at 26595-26596.
    \4\ Securing the United States Bulk-Power System: Request for 
Information, 85 FR 41023 (July 8, 2020).
    \5\ Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities, 86 
FR 533 (Jan. 6, 2021).
    \6\ The December 2020 Prohibition Order defined ``Responsible 
Utility'' as ``an electric utility that owns or operates Defense 
Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI), as defined by section 
215A(a)(4) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), that actively serves a 
CDF, as designated by the Secretary under section 215A(c) of the 
FPA.'' Id. at 534.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Id.
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    On January 20, 2021, Executive Order 13990, Protecting Public 
Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate 
Crisis, was issued, which suspended E.O. 13920 for 90 days.\9\ As the 
December 2020 Prohibition Order is predicated on the authorities 
delegated to DOE by E.O. 13920, the Prohibition Order was also 
suspended during this same time period. The E.O. 13920 suspension has 
expired and effective April 20, 2021, the Secretary revoked the 
December 2020 Prohibition Order to allow for the Department to conduct 
this Request for Information to develop a strengthened approach to 
address the supply chain security of the U.S. electricity subsector.
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    \9\ Executive Order 13990, Protecting Public Health and the 
Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 86 
FR 7037, 7042 (Jan. 25, 2021).
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    E.O. 13990 also directed the Secretary and the OMB Director to 
``jointly consider whether to recommend that a replacement order be 
issued.'' \10\ In the process of developing such recommendations, the 
Department identified opportunities to strengthen protections against 
high-risk electric equipment transactions, while providing additional 
certainty to the utility industry and the public.
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    \10\ Id.
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    To ensure that the Department's considerations for a replacement 
Executive Order appropriately balance national security, economic, and 
administrability considerations, the Department is seeking information 
from electric utilities, academia, research laboratories, government 
agencies, and other stakeholders.
    Adversarial nation-state actors are targeting our critical 
infrastructure, with increasing focus on the energy sector. For 
example, the government of People's Republic of China is equipped and 
actively planning to undermine the electric power system in the United 
States. The growing prevalence of essential electric system equipment 
being sourced from China presents a significant threat, as Chinese law 
provides opportunities for China to identify and exploit 
vulnerabilities in Chinese-manufactured or supplied equipment that are 
used in U.S. critical infrastructure that rely on these sources. 
Accordingly, the Department expects that, during the period of time in 
which further recommendations are being developed, utilities will seek 
to act in a way that minimizes the risk of installing electric 
equipment and programmable components that are subject to foreign 
adversaries' ownership, control, or influence.

II. Request for Information

    Based on the Department's experience implementing E.O. 13920 and 
feedback from stakeholders, the Department seeks additional public 
input on several issues set forth below. Please carefully read Section 
III of this RFI regarding the public nature of submissions. As 
explained in detail, any information that you do not want to be 
publicly viewable should not be included in your comment, nor in any 
document attached to your comment. Instructions regarding how to 
provide Confidential Business Information are also provided. To the 
extent possible, please reference the question being addressed in your 
response. Respondents are not required to address all questions.

A. Development of a Long-Term Strategy

    While immediate security concerns associated with foreign ownership 
and control may be addressed through time-limited emergency 
authorities, addressing pervasive and ongoing grid security risks 
requires a comprehensive long-term strategy. The Department is 
interested in recommendations for how to best exercise its role as the 
Sector Risk Management Agency to inform and coordinate with the utility 
industry and appropriate regulators at all levels of government, 
including state Public Utility Commissions and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), to ensure their procurement practices and 
requirements evolve to match changes in the threat landscape and best 
protect critical infrastructure. The Department is also interested in 
how to enable better testing of critical grid equipment, encourage 
better procurement and risk management practices, and develop a strong 
domestic

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manufacturing base with high levels of security and resilience. 
Attention is also needed to the challenge of how to mitigate the risks 
associated with potentially compromised grid equipment that is already 
installed on the system, along with the potential costs and benefits of 
addressing such equipment. The Department also recognizes innovative 
approaches will be needed to thwart continually evolving threats.
    1. What technical assistance would States, Indian Tribes, or units 
of local government need to enhance their security efforts relative to 
the electric system?
    2. What specific additional actions could be taken by regulators to 
address the security of critical electric infrastructure and the 
incorporation of criteria for evaluating foreign ownership, control, 
and influence into supply chain risk management, and how can the 
Department of Energy best inform those actions?
    3. What actions can the Department take to facilitate responsible 
and effective procurement practices by the private sector? What are the 
potential costs and benefits of those actions?
    4. Are there particular criteria the Department could issue to 
inform utility procurement policies, state requirements, or FERC 
mandatory reliability standards to mitigate foreign ownership, control, 
and influence risks?

B. Prohibition Authority

    Immediate threats to the Nation's electric grid must be addressed. 
By declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act in E.O. 13920, the President authorized the 
Secretary to prohibit the acquisition, transfer, or installation of 
certain bulk-power system equipment sourced from foreign adversary 
countries. The December 2020 Prohibition Order applied to utilities 
that own or operate Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI), as 
defined by section 215A(a)(4) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), that 
actively serves a ``critical defense facility (CDF)'', as designated by 
the Secretary under section 215A(c) of the FPA, at a service voltage of 
69 kilovolts and above, from the point of electrical interconnection 
with the CDF up to and including the next ``upstream'' transmission 
substation (Responsible Utilities).\11\
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    \11\ See December 2020 Prohibition Order, supra note 4.
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    Due to the interconnected nature of the U.S. transmission and 
distribution networks across the U.S., the Department is requesting 
comment on the advisability and feasibility of an expanded approach 
that would cover distribution facilities that serve CDFs.
    Additionally, while threats to electric equipment serving CDFs pose 
a unique national security risk, the electric system serves numerous 
types of critical infrastructure and enable the national critical 
functions.\12\ Prohibition of the installation of at-risk electric 
equipment that serves any critical infrastructure facility may further 
enhance the Nation's national and economic security.
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    \12\ `` 'National Critical Functions' means the functions of 
government and the private sector so vital to the United States that 
their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a 
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.'' 
Executive Order 13865, Coordinating National Resilience to 
Electromagnetic Pulses, 84 FR 12041 (Mar. 29, 2019).
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    1. To ensure the national security, should the Secretary seek to 
issue a Prohibition Order or other action that applies to equipment 
installed on parts of the electric distribution system, i.e., 
distribution equipment and facilities?
    2. In addition to DCEI, should the Secretary seek to issue a 
Prohibition Order or other action that covers electric infrastructure 
serving other critical infrastructure sectors including communications, 
emergency services, healthcare and public health, information 
technology, and transportation systems?
    3. In addition to critical infrastructure, should the Secretary 
seek to issue a Prohibition Order or other action that covers electric 
infrastructure enabling the national critical functions?
    4. Are utilities sufficiently able to identify critical 
infrastructure within their service territory that would enable 
compliance with such requirements?

III. Submission of Comments

    DOE invites all interested parties to submit in writing by June 7, 
2021, comments and information on matters addressed in this RFI.
    Submitting comments via email or postal mail. If you do not want 
your personal contact information to be publicly viewable, do not 
include it in your comment or any accompanying documents. Instead, 
provide your contact information on a cover letter. Include your first 
and last names, email address, telephone number, and optional mailing 
address. The cover letter will not be publicly viewable as long as it 
does not include any comments.
    Include contact information each time you submit comments, data, 
documents, and other information to DOE.
    Comments, data, and other information submitted to DOE 
electronically should be provided in PDF (preferred), Microsoft Word or 
Excel, WordPerfect, or text (ASCII) file format. Provide documents that 
are not secured, are written in English, and are free of any defects or 
viruses. Documents should not contain special characters or any form of 
encryption and, if possible, they should carry the electronic signature 
of the author.
    Campaign form letters. Please submit campaign form letters by the 
originating organization in batches of between 50 to 500 form letters 
per PDF or as one form letter with a list of supporters' names compiled 
into one or more PDFs. This reduces comment processing and posting 
time.
    Confidential Business Information. According to 10 CFR 1004.11, any 
person submitting information that he or she believes to be 
confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should submit via 
email two well-marked copies: One copy of the document marked 
confidential including all the information believed to be confidential, 
and one copy of the document marked ``non-confidential'' with the 
information believed to be confidential deleted. Submit these documents 
via email. DOE will make its own determination about the confidential 
status of the information and treat it according to its determination.
    It is DOE's policy that all comments may be included in the public 
docket, without change and as received, including any personal 
information provided in the comments (except information deemed to be 
exempt from public disclosure).

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on April 19, 
2021, by Patricia A. Hoffman, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of 
Electricity, pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of 
Energy. That document with the original signature and date is 
maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance 
with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the 
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to 
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as 
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative 
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document on 
publication in the Federal Register.


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    Signed in Washington, DC, on April 20, 2021.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2021-08482 Filed 4-21-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P