[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 72 (Friday, April 16, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20209-20213]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-07869]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0066]


NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued 
exemptions in response to a request from the licensee regarding certain 
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the 
requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Duane Arnold 
Energy Center, based on the reduced risks of accidents that could 
result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear 
power reactor.

DATES: The exemption was issued on April 13, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0066 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0066. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each 
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first 
time that it is mentioned in this document.
     Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request 
to the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: April 13, 2021.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-331; NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold 
Energy Center; Exemption

I. Background

    By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and

[[Page 20210]]

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NextEra Energy 
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power 
operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Enter (DAEC) in the fourth 
quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and certified to the NRC that 
it planned to permanently cease power operations at DAEC on October 30, 
2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power operations 
permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a letter dated 
October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that the fuel was 
permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and placed in the 
spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020. Based on the docketing of 
these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and 
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified in 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 
50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating license 
(DPR-49) for DAEC no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or 
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is 
still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear 
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC facility in the 
SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation 
(ISFSI).
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety 
analysis reports (USARs) for operating nuclear power reactors involve 
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the 
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would 
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the 
permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC and permanent removal 
of fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible. 
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no 
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the 
spent fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions for 
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, 
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have 
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no 
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a 
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for 
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP 
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning 
status of the facility, NEDA must obtain exemptions from those EP 
regulations. Only then can NEDA modify the DAEC emergency plan to 
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition of DAEC.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated April 2, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated 
October 7, 2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20101M779 and ML20282A595, 
respectively), NEDA requested exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR part 50 for DAEC. Specifically, NEDA requested exemptions 
from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and 
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for nuclear power 
reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require 
establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for 
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix E, Section IV, which establish the elements that comprise 
the content of emergency plans. In the letter dated October 7, 2020, 
NEDA provided supplemental information and responses to the NRC staff's 
requests for additional information concerning the proposed exemptions.
    The information provided by the licensee included justifications 
for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by NEDA would 
eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency 
Management and Assistance,'' Part 350, ``Review and Approval of State 
and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and would 
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at DAEC. The licensee stated 
that the application of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, are not 
needed for adequate emergency response capability, based on the 
substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of 
accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled 
facility, as compared to an operating facility. If offsite protective 
actions were needed for a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident 
that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at DAEC, provisions 
exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a 
comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National 
Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public. A 
CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan, 
is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, 
``Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is 
publicly available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation 
for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It 
promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed 
planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels of 
government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is 
flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and 
property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out 
specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, 
supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions 
will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for 
``all-hazards planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has

[[Page 20211]]

consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological 
release at a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and 
permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly 
lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, 
than at an operating power reactor. However, the EP regulations do not 
recognize that once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the 
risk of a large radiological release from credible emergency accident 
scenarios is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any 
significant offsite radiological release is based on two factors. One 
factor is the elimination of accidents applicable only to an operating 
power reactor, resulting in fewer credible accident scenarios. The 
second factor is the reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory and 
decay heat production due to radioactive decay. Due to the permanently 
defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the 
DAEC SFP and the radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue 
to decay as the spent fuel ages. The spent fuel will produce less heat 
due to radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a 
loss of water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A 
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] 
and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the 
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and 
defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and 
conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is 
significantly less than for an operating nuclear power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for DAEC, 
have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor 
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions was 
based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological 
consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective 
Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the 
exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a 
beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat 
transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to 
initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite 
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP 
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at DAEC, the licensee 
provided analysis demonstrating that 10 months following permanent 
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the 
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite 
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building, 
where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 
the exclusion area boundary.
    With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at DAEC, the licensee 
analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively impede 
any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 10 months 
after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be at least 
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting 
fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 
900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the temperature used to assess the 
potential onset of fission product release. The analysis conservatively 
assumed that the heat up time starts when the SFP has been completely 
drained, although it is likely that site personnel will start to 
respond to an incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does 
not consider the period of time from the initiating event causing loss 
of SFP water inventory until cooling is lost.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and 
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) 
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 10 months after 
DAEC has permanently ceased power operations. An assessment of the 
licensee's EP exemptions is described in SECY-21-0006, ``Request by 
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency 
Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center,'' dated 
January 15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML20218A875). The 
Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the 
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-21-0006, dated 
February 11, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21042A030). Descriptions of 
the specific exemptions requested by the licensee and the NRC staff's 
basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-21-0006. The NRC 
staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the 
specific EP exemptions requested by the licensee are provided in the 
NRC staff's safety evaluation dated April 13, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML21097A141).

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, that would allow the licensee to revise the DAEC Emergency 
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's 
proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the 
exemptions are authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, the licensee provided analyses that show that 
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed 
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans 
required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection 
of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at 
DAEC 10 months after the plant has permanently ceased power operations.
    Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the 
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to 
operating power

[[Page 20212]]

reactors, where typically a large number of different sequences make 
significant contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few months 
after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report 
further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite 
EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because 
even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was 
judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the 
severe earthquake event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences 
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency 
preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in 
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present 
an undue risk to the public health and safety.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by the licensee only involve EP 
requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow the licensee to revise 
the DAEC Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at DAEC 
are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of 
formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the 
reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC will not 
adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site 
or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions 
are consistent with common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and 
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the 
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its 
licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a 
reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section III, because DAEC is permanently 
shut down and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a significant 
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding EPA 
early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, and the risk of a 
significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-basis 
accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating power 
reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at DAEC by 
comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to 
site-specific conditions at DAEC and determined that the risk values in 
NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented for DAEC. As indicated by the 
results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for 
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water 
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), 
while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with 
significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early 
fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements 
were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident 
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic 
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows 
that 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC, 
the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is at least 
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of 
all cooling means.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such 
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent 
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident 
shows that 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations, at 
least 10 hours would be available between the time the fuel is 
initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively 
assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 900 
[deg]C, which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding 
oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. 
This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from 
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all 
cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its 
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in 
granting the requested exemptions to the licensee, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release 
exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In 
the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting 
the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes 
of heat transfer, there will be at least 10 hours available before an 
offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to 
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat 
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to 
occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is 
considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement 
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and 
safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing 
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the 
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously 
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP 
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate 
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently 
shutdown and defueled facilities.
    Additionally, DAEC committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies 
in its letters to the NRC dated April 2 and October 7, 2020. The 
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using 
various existing plant systems for inventory makeup and an internal 
strategy that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps 
(one diesel-driven and one electric motor-driven) that can take

[[Page 20213]]

suction from the Cedar River. These strategies will continue to be 
required as License Condition 2.C.(9), ``Mitigation Strategy License 
Condition,'' of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-49 for DAEC. 
Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents 
affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide multiple methods to 
obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any 
postulated offsite radiological release.
    For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of 
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special 
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the 
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated 
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the DAEC facility 
10 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by 
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness 
at DAEC and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that 
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and 
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the highly unlikely 
event of a radiological emergency at DAEC. Since the underlying purpose 
of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the 
elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal 
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in 
the scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC, the special 
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's 
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published in the Federal Register on March 19, 2021 (86 FR 
14960).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
21-0006, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense 
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants NEDA's exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation dated April 13, 2021. The exemptions are effective as 
of 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC, 
which is June 10, 2021.

    Dated this 13th day of April, 2021.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-07869 Filed 4-15-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P