[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 72 (Friday, April 16, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20209-20213]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-07869]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0066]
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued
exemptions in response to a request from the licensee regarding certain
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the
requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Duane Arnold
Energy Center, based on the reduced risks of accidents that could
result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on April 13, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0066 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0066. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request
to the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: April 13, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50-331; NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold
Energy Center; Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and
[[Page 20210]]
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Enter (DAEC) in the fourth
quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and certified to the NRC that
it planned to permanently cease power operations at DAEC on October 30,
2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power operations
permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a letter dated
October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that the fuel was
permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and placed in the
spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020. Based on the docketing of
these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified in
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating license
(DPR-49) for DAEC no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is
still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC facility in the
SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation
(ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating nuclear power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC and permanent removal
of fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the
spent fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions for
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor,
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning
status of the facility, NEDA must obtain exemptions from those EP
regulations. Only then can NEDA modify the DAEC emergency plan to
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of DAEC.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated April 2, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated
October 7, 2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20101M779 and ML20282A595,
respectively), NEDA requested exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR part 50 for DAEC. Specifically, NEDA requested exemptions
from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for nuclear power
reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require
establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, which establish the elements that comprise
the content of emergency plans. In the letter dated October 7, 2020,
NEDA provided supplemental information and responses to the NRC staff's
requests for additional information concerning the proposed exemptions.
The information provided by the licensee included justifications
for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by NEDA would
eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency
Management and Assistance,'' Part 350, ``Review and Approval of State
and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and would
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at DAEC. The licensee stated
that the application of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, are not
needed for adequate emergency response capability, based on the
substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of
accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled
facility, as compared to an operating facility. If offsite protective
actions were needed for a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident
that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at DAEC, provisions
exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a
comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National
Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public. A
CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan,
is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101,
``Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is
publicly available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation
for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It
promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed
planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels of
government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is
flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and
property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out
specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities,
supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions
will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for
``all-hazards planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has
[[Page 20211]]
consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological
release at a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and
permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly
lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer,
than at an operating power reactor. However, the EP regulations do not
recognize that once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the
risk of a large radiological release from credible emergency accident
scenarios is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any
significant offsite radiological release is based on two factors. One
factor is the elimination of accidents applicable only to an operating
power reactor, resulting in fewer credible accident scenarios. The
second factor is the reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory and
decay heat production due to radioactive decay. Due to the permanently
defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the
DAEC SFP and the radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue
to decay as the spent fuel ages. The spent fuel will produce less heat
due to radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a
loss of water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and
conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is
significantly less than for an operating nuclear power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for DAEC,
have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions was
based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective
Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the
exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a
beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat
transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at DAEC, the licensee
provided analysis demonstrating that 10 months following permanent
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building,
where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary.
With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at DAEC, the licensee
analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively impede
any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 10 months
after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be at least
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting
fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches
900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the temperature used to assess the
potential onset of fission product release. The analysis conservatively
assumed that the heat up time starts when the SFP has been completely
drained, although it is likely that site personnel will start to
respond to an incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does
not consider the period of time from the initiating event causing loss
of SFP water inventory until cooling is lost.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 10 months after
DAEC has permanently ceased power operations. An assessment of the
licensee's EP exemptions is described in SECY-21-0006, ``Request by
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center,'' dated
January 15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML20218A875). The
Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-21-0006, dated
February 11, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21042A030). Descriptions of
the specific exemptions requested by the licensee and the NRC staff's
basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-21-0006. The NRC
staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the
specific EP exemptions requested by the licensee are provided in the
NRC staff's safety evaluation dated April 13, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML21097A141).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, that would allow the licensee to revise the DAEC Emergency
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the
exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, the licensee provided analyses that show that
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans
required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection
of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at
DAEC 10 months after the plant has permanently ceased power operations.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events.
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to
operating power
[[Page 20212]]
reactors, where typically a large number of different sequences make
significant contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738,
relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few months
after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report
further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite
EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because
even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was
judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the
severe earthquake event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by the licensee only involve EP
requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow the licensee to revise
the DAEC Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at DAEC
are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of
formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the
reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC will not
adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site
or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions
are consistent with common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its
licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a
reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because DAEC is permanently
shut down and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a significant
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding EPA
early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, and the risk of a
significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-basis
accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating power
reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at DAEC by
comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to
site-specific conditions at DAEC and determined that the risk values in
NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented for DAEC. As indicated by the
results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365),
while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with
significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early
fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements
were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows
that 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC,
the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is at least
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of
all cooling means.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident
shows that 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations, at
least 10 hours would be available between the time the fuel is
initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively
assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 900
[deg]C, which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding
oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release.
This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all
cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in
granting the requested exemptions to the licensee, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In
the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting
the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes
of heat transfer, there will be at least 10 hours available before an
offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to
occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is
considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and
safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, DAEC committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies
in its letters to the NRC dated April 2 and October 7, 2020. The
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using
various existing plant systems for inventory makeup and an internal
strategy that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps
(one diesel-driven and one electric motor-driven) that can take
[[Page 20213]]
suction from the Cedar River. These strategies will continue to be
required as License Condition 2.C.(9), ``Mitigation Strategy License
Condition,'' of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-49 for DAEC.
Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents
affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide multiple methods to
obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any
postulated offsite radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the DAEC facility
10 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness
at DAEC and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the highly unlikely
event of a radiological emergency at DAEC. Since the underlying purpose
of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the
elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in
the scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC, the special
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental
Assessment published in the Federal Register on March 19, 2021 (86 FR
14960).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
21-0006, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants NEDA's exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated April 13, 2021. The exemptions are effective as
of 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC,
which is June 10, 2021.
Dated this 13th day of April, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-07869 Filed 4-15-21; 8:45 am]
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