[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 71 (Thursday, April 15, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19790-19793]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-05888]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Secretary

31 CFR Part 1

RIN 1505-AC73


Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery Committee--
Systems: SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records; SIGPR .421--Case 
Management System and Investigative Records; and SIGPR .423--Legal 
Records; Privacy Act of 1974; Proposed Implementation

AGENCY: Departmental Offices, Department of the Treasury.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 
1974, as amended, the Department of the Treasury, Departmental Offices 
(DO), gives notice of a proposed exemption for the following new 
systems of records maintained by the Special Inspector General for 
Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) from certain provisions of the Privacy Act:

SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records
SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records
SIGPR .423--Legal Records

    The exemption is intended to comply with the legal prohibitions 
against the disclosure of certain kinds of information and to protect 
certain information maintained in this system of records.

DATES: Written comments must be received by May 17, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on this notice may be submitted 
electronically through the federal government eRulemaking portal at 
http://www.regulations.gov. Electronic submission of comments allows 
the commenter maximum time to prepare and submit a comment, ensures 
timely receipt, and enables the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) 
to make the comments available to the public. Please note that comments 
submitted through https://www.regulations.gov will be public and can be 
viewed by members of the public. Due to COVID-19-related restrictions, 
Treasury has temporarily suspended its ability to receive public 
comments by mail.
    In general, Treasury will post all comments to https://www.regulations.gov without change, including any business or personal 
information provided, such as names, addresses, email addresses, or 
telephone numbers. All comments received, including attachments and 
other supporting material, will be part of the public record and 
subject to public disclosure. You should submit only information that 
you wish to make publicly available.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about this notice and 
privacy issues, contact: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Privacy, 
Transparency, and Records at U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20220; telephone: (202) 622-
5710.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: SIGPR was established by the Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act of 2020. SIGPR has the 
duty to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits, evaluations, and 
investigations of the making, purchase, management, and sale of loans, 
loan guarantees, and other investments made by the Secretary of the 
Treasury under programs established by the Secretary, as authorized by 
Section 4018(c) of the CARES Act, and the management by the Secretary 
of programs, as authorized by Section 4018(c) of the CARES Act. SIGPR's 
duties and responsibilities are set forth in Section 4018 of the CARES 
Act, and in the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3. SIGPR 
plans to create these systems of records to facilitate SIGPR's audits, 
evaluations, investigations, and other operations to (1) promote 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such 
programs; (2) prevent and detect fraud and abuse in the programs and 
operations within its jurisdiction; and (3) keep the head of the 
establishment and the Congress fully informed about problems and 
deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and 
operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action. 
Treasury is publishing separately the notice of the new system of 
records to be maintained by SIGPR.
    Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), the head of a federal agency 
may promulgate rules to exempt a system of

[[Page 19791]]

records from certain provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a if the system of 
records contains investigatory materials compiled for law enforcement 
purposes. Pursuant to these provisions, Treasury proposes to exempt the 
following system of records from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d)(1), 
(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), 
(e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g) of the Privacy Act:

SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records
SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records
SIGPR .423--Legal Records
The following are the reasons the investigatory materials contained in 
the above-referenced systems of records maintained by SIGPR may be 
exempted from various provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2):
    (1) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) (Agency 
Requirements and Rules) because release would give individuals an 
opportunity to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or 
subjects of investigation. As further described in the following 
paragraph, access to such knowledge may impair the ability of the 
Department of the Treasury and SIGPR (the Department/SIGPR) to carry 
out its respective missions, since individuals could:
    (i) Take steps to avoid detection;
    (ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
    (iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
    (iv) Learn whether they are suspects or, instead, have been 
identified as alleged law violators;
    (v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that 
they are not identified in the system of records; or
    (vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
    (2) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) 
and (5) (Access to Records and Agency Requirements and Rules) because 
release might compromise the Department's/SIGPR's ability to provide 
useful tactical and strategic information to law enforcement agencies 
by:
    (i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of 
records such that it might provide information concerning the nature of 
current investigations and enable possible violators to avoid detection 
or apprehension by:
    (A) Allowing the discovery of facts that could form the basis for 
violators' arrests;
    (B) Enabling violators to destroy or alter evidence of alleged 
criminal conduct that could form the basis for arrest; and
    (C) Using knowledge of the status of criminal investigations to 
delay the commission of a crime, or commit a crime at a location that 
might not be under surveillance.
    (ii) Permitting access to either on-going or closed investigative 
files might also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the 
knowledge of which could enable individuals planning crimes to 
structure their operations to avoid detection or apprehension.
    (iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records also 
could disclose the identity of confidential sources and informants and 
the nature of the information supplied, and thereby endanger the 
physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals 
for having provided the information. In addition, confidential sources 
and informants might refuse to provide criminal investigators with 
valuable information if they fear their identities may be revealed 
through disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they 
supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair the 
Department's/SIGPR's ability to carry out its respective mandate.
    (iv) Furthermore, providing access to information contained in the 
systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law 
enforcement officers who compiled information regarding the 
individual's alleged criminal activities and thereby endanger the 
physical safety of those undercover officers or their families by 
exposing them to possible reprisals.
    (v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of 
records for the reasons outlined in paragraph (2), subsections (i) 
through (iv), permitting access in keeping with these provisions would 
discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign and 
domestic, from freely sharing information with the Department/SIGPR and 
thus would restrict the Department's/SIGPR's access to information 
necessary to accomplish its respective mission most effectively.
    (vi) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that the 
Department/SIGPR maintains in the systems of records is restricted by 
law.
    (3) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and 
(f)(4) (Access to Records) because these provisions pertain to 
requesting an amendment or noting a dispute to records that are exempt 
from access for the reasons set forth in paragraph (2) above.
    (4) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) 
because release of the accounting of disclosures of the records in this 
system could impair the ability of law enforcement agencies outside the 
Department/SIGPR from making effective use of information provided by 
the Department/SIGPR. Making accountings of disclosures available to 
the subjects of an investigation could alert them to the fact that 
another agency is conducting an investigation into their alleged 
criminal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the 
other agency's investigation, the nature and purpose of that 
investigation, and the dates on which that investigation was active. 
Individuals possessing such knowledge could take measures to avoid 
detection or apprehension by altering their operations, transferring 
their alleged criminal activities to other geographical areas, or 
destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for arrest. 
In the case of a delinquent account, such release might enable the 
subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before levy.
    (ii) Moreover, providing accountings to the subjects of 
investigations would alert them to the fact that the Department/SIGPR 
has information regarding their alleged criminal activities and could 
inform them of the general nature of that information. Access to such 
information could reveal the operations of the Department/SIGPR's 
information-gathering and analysis systems and permit individuals to 
take steps to avoid detection or apprehension.
    (5) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(4) (Accounting of Disclosures/
Notice of Record Correction or Dispute) because this provision depends 
on an individual's having access to and an opportunity to request 
amendment of records that are exempt from access for the reasons set 
out above, this provision should not apply to the systems of records.
    (6) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements/
Publication of the Categories of Records) because it could compromise 
the Department/SIGPR's ability to provide useful information to law 
enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the information 
could:
    (i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
    (ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informants by the 
subjects of investigations; and
    (iii) Cause informants to refuse to give full information to 
criminal investigators for fear of having their identities as sources 
disclosed.

[[Page 19792]]

    (7) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) (Agency Requirements/
Maintaining Records) because the term ``maintain'' includes ``collect'' 
and ``disseminate,'' and application of this provision to the systems 
of records could impair the Department/SIGPR's ability to collect and 
disseminate valuable law enforcement information in the following ways:
    (i) In many cases, especially in the early stages of an 
investigation, it may be impossible to immediately determine whether 
information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that 
initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further 
evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently, 
prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
    (ii) Not all violations of law discovered by the Department/SIGPR 
fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the Department or SIGPR. 
To promote effective law enforcement, the Department/SIGPR may disclose 
such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including state, 
local and foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction over the offenses to 
which the information relates. Otherwise, the Department/SIGPR might be 
placed in the position of having to ignore information relating to 
violations of law not within the jurisdiction of the Department or 
SIGPR when that information comes to the Department/SIGPR's attention 
during the collation and analysis of information in its respective 
records.
    (8) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) (Agency Requirements/
Collection from an Individual) because it could impair the Department's 
ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate investigative, 
intelligence, and enforcement information. In addition:
    (i) Most information collected about an individual under criminal 
investigation is obtained from third parties, such as witnesses and 
informants. It is usually not feasible to rely upon the subject of the 
investigation as a source for information regarding his or her alleged 
criminal activities.
    (ii) An attempt to obtain information from the subject of a 
criminal investigation will often alert that individual to the 
existence of an investigation, thereby affording the individual an 
opportunity to attempt to conceal his or her alleged criminal 
activities and thus avoid apprehension.
    (iii) In certain instances, the subject of a criminal investigation 
may assert his or her constitutional right to remain silent and refuse 
to supply information to criminal investigators upon request.
    (iv) During criminal investigations, it is often a matter of sound 
investigative procedure to obtain information from a variety of sources 
to verify information already obtained from the subject of a criminal 
investigation or other sources.
    (9) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) (Agency Requirements/
Informing Individuals) because it could impair the Department/SIGPR's 
ability to collect and collate investigative, intelligence, and 
enforcement data. In addition:
    (i) Confidential sources or undercover law enforcement officers 
often obtain information under circumstances in which it is necessary 
to keep the true purpose of their actions secret so as not to let the 
subject of the investigation, or his or her associates, know that a 
criminal investigation is in progress.
    (ii) If it became known that the undercover officer was assisting 
in a criminal investigation, that officer's physical safety could be 
endangered through reprisal, and that officer may not be able to 
continue working on the investigation.
    (iii) Individuals often feel inhibited talking to a person 
representing a criminal law enforcement agency but are willing to talk 
to a confidential source or undercover officer whom they believe is not 
involved in law enforcement activities.
    (iv) Providing a confidential source of information with written 
evidence that he or she was a source, as required by this provision, 
could increase the likelihood that the source of information would be 
subject to retaliation by the subject of the investigation.
    (v) Individuals may be contacted during preliminary information 
gathering, surveys, or compliance projects concerning the 
administration of the internal revenue laws before any individual is 
identified as the subject of an investigation. Informing the individual 
of the matters required by this provision could impede or compromise 
subsequent investigations.
    (10) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) (Agency Requirements/Record 
Maintenance). Because the definition of ``maintain'' includes 
``collect'' and ``disseminate,'' this provision could hinder the 
initial collection of any information that might not be determined or 
determinable, at the moment of collection, to be accurate, relevant, 
timely, and complete. Similarly, application of this provision could 
seriously restrict the Department/SIGPR's ability to disseminate 
information pertaining to a possible violation of law to law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies. In collecting information during a 
criminal investigation, it is often impossible or unfeasible to 
determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to 
collection of the information. In disseminating information to law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies, it is often impossible to 
determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to 
dissemination because the Department/SIGPR may not have the expertise 
with which to make such determinations. Information that may initially 
appear inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete may, when 
collated and analyzed with other available information, become more 
pertinent as an investigation progresses. In addition, application of 
this provision could seriously impede criminal investigators and 
intelligence analysts in the exercise of their judgment in reporting 
results obtained during criminal investigations.
    (11) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) (Agency Requirements/Notice) 
because it could reveal investigative techniques and procedures 
outlined in those records and to prevent revelation of the existence of 
an ongoing investigation where there is need to keep the existence of 
the investigation secret.
    (12) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) (Civil Remedies) because, if 
the civil remedies relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which 
these rules exempt the systems of records, there should be no civil 
remedies for failure to comply with provisions from which the 
Department/SIGPR is exempted. Exemption from this provision will also 
protect the Department/SIGPR from baseless civil court actions that 
might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate 
investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.
    Any information from a system of records for which an exemption is 
claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), which is also 
included in another system of records, retains the same exempt status 
such information has in the system of records for which such exemption 
is claimed.
    This proposed rule is not a ``significant regulatory action'' ' 
under Executive Order 12866.
    Pursuant to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, it is hereby certified that this rulemaking 
will not have significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. The term ``small entity'' is defined to have the same 
meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and 
``small governmental jurisdiction'' as defined in the RFA.

[[Page 19793]]

    The proposed regulation, issued under sections (j)(2) and (k)(2) of 
the Privacy Act, is to exempt certain information maintained by the 
Department/SIGPR in the above-referenced systems of records from 
certain Privacy Act requirements in this system of records by 
individuals who are United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence. In as much as the Privacy Act rights are 
personal and apply only to U.S. citizens or an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence, small entities, as defined in the RFA, are not 
provided rights under the Privacy Act and are outside the scope of this 
regulation.

List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1

    Courts, Freedom of information, Government employees, Privacy.

    Part 1, Subpart C of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations is 
proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 1--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 31 U.S.C. 321. Subpart A also issued 
under 5 U.S.C. 552, as amended. Subpart C also issued under 5 U.S.C. 
552a, as amended.

0
2. In Sec.  1.36, amend the tables in paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and 
(g)(1)(ii) by adding in alphanumeric order the entries for ``SIGPR 
.420--Audit and Evaluations Records'', ``SIGPR .421--Case Management 
System and Investigative Records'' and ``SIGPR .423--Legal Records'' to 
read as follows:


Sec.  1.36  Systems exempt in whole or in part from provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 522a and this part.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Number                             System name
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                               * * * * *
               SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records.
      SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records.
SIGPR .423--Legal Records.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Number                             System name
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                               * * * * *
               SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records.
      SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records.
SIGPR .423--Legal Records.
 
                                * * * * *
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* * * * *

Ryan Law,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Privacy, Transparency, and Records.
[FR Doc. 2021-05888 Filed 4-14-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AK-P