[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 57 (Friday, March 26, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16241-16245]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-06328]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-289; NRC-2021-0079]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island Nuclear
Station, Unit 1
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
Exelon Generation Company, LLC to reduce the minimum coverage limit for
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1.
DATES: The exemption was issued on March 22, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0079 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0079. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request
to the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Theodore Smith, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6721, email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: March 23, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Bruce A. Watson,
Chief, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-289
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated June 20, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and
[[Page 16242]]
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17171A151), Exelon Generation
Company, LLC (Exelon, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at Three Mile Island Nuclear
Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1) on or about September 30, 2019. On September
20, 2019, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at TMI-1. By
letter dated September 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19269E480),
Exelon certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanenetly removed from
the TMI-1 reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of
September 26, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the TMI-1 renewed
facility operating license no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the TMI-1
facility in the SFP.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated November 25, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19330D862), Exelon requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
concerning onsite liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for
TMI-1.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident.
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no
longer authorized at TMI-1, there are no events that would require the
stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the
risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite
contamination at TMI-1 is also much lower than the risk of such an
event at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the
reduced risk of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled
TMI-1 site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2
accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to financially
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident.
The specified $1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed
based on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear reactor operating at
power resulting in a large fission product release and requiring
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the site.
These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at TMI-1
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessel, RCS,
and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related
to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting
systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption
request dated November 25, 2019, the licensee discussed both design-
basis and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored
in the SFP. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-
basis events at TMI-1 that could result in an offsite radiological
release exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
of 1 roentgen equivalent man at the exclusion area boundary 365 days
after permanent shutdown, as a way to demonstrate that any possible
radiological releases would be minimal and would not require
precautionary protective actions (e.g., sheltering in place or
evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the radiological consequences
associated with various decommissioning activities and the design-basis
accidents at TMI-1, in consideration of a permanently shutdown and
defueled condition. The possible design-basis accident scenarios at
TMI-1 have greatly reduced radiological consequences. Based on its
review, the NRC staff concluded that no reasonably conceivable design-
basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than
the EPA PAGs.
The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological
release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium
fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design-basis
accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP
resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in
substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat
of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a
zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time
since TMI-1 has been permanently shut down.
The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A483), the NRC staff recommended changes to the power reactor
financial protection regulations that would allow licensees to lower
onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel
stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC staff's recommendation
that, among other things, would allow permanently shutdown power
reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance
coverage to $50
[[Page 16243]]
million when the licensee was able to demonstrate the technical
criterion that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was
drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638);
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28, 2018 (83 FR
67365) and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on January 13, 2020 (85 FR 1827)). These prior exemptions were
based on these licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-
cooled, consistent with the technical criterion discussed above.
Exelon's November 25, 2019, exemption request addressed air-cooling
of fuel in a drained SFP. In the attachment to this request, the
licensee compared TMI-1 fuel storage parameters with those used in NRC
generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098). The
analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air
circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for 17 months
after operation in a typical PWR, which is slightly longer than the
zirconium fire period of 488 days that Exelon used for its reqest for
TMI-1. Exelon evaluated the decay heat at TMI-1 and determined that the
average decay heat for the most recently offloaded TMI-1 spent fuel
assembly 488 days after shutdown will be slightly less than the decay
heat for the average fuel assembly at 519 days for the representative
PWR plant in NUREG/CR-6451. This is in part because the power per fuel
assembly at TMI-1 is 16 percent less than that modeled in NUREG/CR-
6451.
The licensee compared the post-shutdown fuel storage conditions
with those assumed for the analysis presented in NUREG/CR-6451. The
licensee found that the TMI-1 fuel storage configuration is
conservative in comparison to the representative configuration used in
the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis with respect to the fuel assembly size (15 x
15 for TMI-1 vs. 17 x 17 for NUREG/CR-6451), the fuel storage pitch
(TMI-1's is smaller, due to a larger gap around fuel assemblies inside
the cells), and the rack orifice size being the same size or larger
than those modeled in NUREG/CR-6451. Thus, the cooling air flow should
be comparable. Differences in the rack material were determined to have
minimal impact, based on Table 3.1 of NUREG/CR-6441, which states that
heat conduction in structures is of low relative importance when
computing cladding temperatures, although racks for both TMI-1 and the
NUREG/CR-6451 model are stainless steel.
Therefore, at 488 days after permanent shutdown (i.e., the
effective date of the requested exemption), the NRC staff has
reasonable assurance that fuel stored in the TMI-1 SFP would be
adequately air-cooled in the highly unlikely event the SFP completely
drained.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC
staff discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for
onsite property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the
spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure
that can be used to demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium
fire is exceedingly low. However, the NRC staff has more recently used
an additional analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP
water, or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of
the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is often referred to as an adiabatic
heatup.
The licensee's adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that there
would be at least 10 hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both
air and/or water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a
temperature where the potential for a significant offsite radiological
release could occur. The licensee states that for this loss of all
cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient time for personnel to respond
with additional resources, equipment, and capability to restore cooling
to the SFPs, even after a non-credible, catastrophic event.
In the analysis provided in the attachment to its November 25,
2019, exemption request, the licensee compared the conditions for the
hottest fuel assembly stored in the SFP to a criterion proposed in
SECY-99-168, ``Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12265A598),
applicable to offsite emergency response for the unit in the
decommissioning process. This criterion considers the time for the
hottest assembly to heat up from 30 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) to 900
[deg]C adiabatically. If the heatup time is greater than 10 hours, then
offsite emergency preplanning involving the plant is not necessary.
Based on the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup
analysis presented in the attachment, at 488 days after permanent
cessation of power operations (i.e., 488 days of decay time), the time
for the hottest fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is greater than 10
hours after the assemblies have been uncovered. As stated in NUREG-
1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an acceptable temperature to
use for assessing onset of fission product release under transient
conditions to establish the critical decay time for determining the
availability of 10 hours for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if
necessary, for offsite agencies to take appropriate action to protect
the health and safety of the public if fuel and cladding oxidation
occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and the
results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical
properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that 488
days after permanent cessation of power operations, more than 10 hours
would be available before a significant offsite release could begin.
The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation provided
an acceptable method for determining the minimum time available for
deployment of mitigation equipment and, if necessary, implementing
measures under a comprehensive general emergency plan.
[[Page 16244]]
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for TMI-1 being permanently defueled as part of SECY-20-0041, ``Request
by Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,''
dated May 5, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19311C762).
Based on the evaluation in SECY-20-0041 and SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff determined $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property
damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in
the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. The NRC staff has
postulated that there is still a potential for other radiological
incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in significant
onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank
(~450,000 gallon) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater
contamination as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the TMI-1 site, should such an event occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million
is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent insurance considerations
resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed in SECY-00-
0145 and SECY-01-0100. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar
exemptions have been granted to other permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors, upon demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium
fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern. As previously stated, the NRC staff concluded that 488 days
after the permanent cessation of power operations on September 20,
2019, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have elapsed at TMI-1
to decrease the probability of an onsite radiological release from a
postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels. In addition,
the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50
million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the
recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radwaste storage tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with the TMI-1 Post-
Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report dated April 2019 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML19095A041), all spent fuel will be removed from the SFP
and moved into dry storage at an onsite independent spent fuel storage
installation by the end of 2022, and the probability of an initiating
event that would threaten SFP integrity occurring before that time is
extremely low, which further supports the conclusion that the zirconium
fire risk is negligible.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow Exelon
to reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage
insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the exemptions
are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256.
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 488 days after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time
will have elapsed at TMI-1 to decrease the probability of an onsite and
offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident
to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce
onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with the
maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption
is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for
TMI-1 are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, TMI-1 permanently shut down on September 20, 2019, and
permanently defueled as of September 26, 2019. The permanently shutdown
and defueled status of the facility results in a significant reduction
in the number and severity of potential accidents and, correspondingly,
a significant reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite
property damage. The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite
insurance coverage does not impact the probability or consequences of
potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance coverage is
commensurate with the reduced consequences of potential nuclear
accidents at TMI-1. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that granting
the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to the health
and safety of the public.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at TMI-1 are not
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption
is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological material. Since TMI-1 permanently
shut down on September 20, 2019, and permanently defueled as of
September 26, 2019, it is no longer possible for the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents or other credible events at TMI-
1 to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
The licensee has evaluated the consequences of highly unlikely, beyond-
design-basis conditions involving a loss of coolant
[[Page 16245]]
from the SFP. The analyses show that 488 days after the permanent
cessation of power operations on September 20, 2019, the likelihood of
such an event leading to a large radiological release is negligible.
The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirm this
conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
TMI-1 site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the
permanently shutdown and defueled TMI-1 reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I
have determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for TMI-1 does
not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of TMI-1 or site activities. Accordingly,
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for,
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The
requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety,
insurance, and indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Exelon an exemption from
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for TMI-1. TMI-1 permanently
ceased power operations on September 20, 2019. The exemption permits
TMI-1 to lower the minimum required onsite insurance to $50 million 488
days after permanent cessation of power operations, which occurred on
January 20, 2021.
The exemption is effective immediately.
Dated: March 22, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-06328 Filed 3-25-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P