[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 27 (Thursday, February 11, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 9120-9221]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26546]



[[Page 9119]]

Vol. 86

Thursday,

No. 27

February 11, 2021

Part II





Department of the Treasury





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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency





Federal Reserve System





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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation





12 CFR Parts 50, 249, and 329





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Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards and 
Disclosure Requirements; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 86 , No. 27 / Thursday, February 11, 2021 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 9120]]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 50

[Docket ID OCC-2014-0029]
RIN 1557-AD97

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 249

[Regulation WW; Docket No. R-1537]
RIN 7100-AE 51

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 329

RIN 3064-AE 44


Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards 
and Disclosure Requirements

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Department of the 
Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are 
adopting a final rule that implements a stable funding requirement, 
known as the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), for certain large banking 
organizations. The final rule establishes a quantitative metric, the 
NSFR, to measure the stability of the funding profile of certain large 
banking organizations and requires these banking organizations to 
maintain minimum amounts of stable funding to support their assets, 
commitments, and derivatives exposures over a one-year time horizon. 
The NSFR is designed to reduce the likelihood that disruptions to a 
banking organization's regular sources of funding will compromise its 
liquidity position, promote effective liquidity risk management, and 
support the ability of banking organizations to provide financial 
intermediation to businesses and households across a range of market 
conditions. The NSFR supports financial stability by requiring banking 
organizations to fund their activities with stable sources of funding 
on an ongoing basis, reducing the possibility that funding shocks would 
substantially increase distress at individual banking organizations. 
The final rule applies to certain large U.S. depository institution 
holding companies, depository institutions, and U.S. intermediate 
holding companies of foreign banking organizations, each with total 
consolidated assets of $100 billion or more, together with certain 
depository institution subsidiaries (together, covered companies). 
Under the final rule, the NSFR requirement increases in stringency 
based on risk-based measures of the top-tier covered company. U.S. 
depository institution holding companies and U.S. intermediate holding 
companies subject to the final rule are required to publicly disclose 
their NSFR and certain components of their NSFR every second and fourth 
calendar quarter for each of the two immediately preceding calendar 
quarters. The final rule also amends certain definitions in the 
agencies' liquidity coverage ratio rule that are also applicable to the 
NSFR.

DATES: Effective Date: July 1, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    OCC: Christopher McBride, Director, James Weinberger, Technical 
Expert, or Ang Middleton, Bank Examiner (Risk Specialist), (202) 649-
6360, Treasury & Market Risk Policy; Dave Toxie, Capital Markets Lead 
Expert, (202) 649-6833; Patrick T. Tierney, Assistant Director, Henry 
Barkhausen, Counsel, or Daniel Perez, Counsel, Chief Counsel's Office, 
(202) 649-5490; for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, TTY, (202) 
649-5597; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, 
Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: Juan Climent, Assistant Director, (202) 872-7526, Kathryn 
Ballintine, Manager, (202) 452-2555, J. Kevin Littler, Lead Financial 
Institution Policy Analyst, (202) 475-6677, Michael Ofori-Kuragu, 
Senior Financial Institution Policy Analyst II, (202) 475-6623 or 
Christopher Powell, Senior Financial Institution Policy Analyst II, 
(202) 452-3442, Division of Supervision and Regulation; Benjamin W. 
McDonough, Associate General Counsel, (202) 452-2036, Steve Bowne, 
Senior Counsel, (202) 452-3900, Jason Shafer, Senior Counsel, (202) 
728-5811, Laura Bain, Counsel, (202) 736-5546, or Jeffery Zhang, 
Attorney, (202) 736-1968, Legal Division, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets NW, Washington, DC 20551. 
For the hearing impaired only, Telecommunication Device for the Deaf 
(TDD), (202) 263-4869.
    FDIC: Bobby R. Bean, Associate Director, [email protected]; Brian Cox, 
Chief, Capital Markets Strategies Section, [email protected]; Eric 
Schatten, Senior Policy Analyst, [email protected]; Andrew 
Carayiannis, Senior Policy Analyst, [email protected]; Kyle 
McCormick, Capital Markets Policy Analyst, [email protected]; Capital 
Markets Branch, Division of Risk Management Supervision, (202) 898-
6888; Gregory S. Feder, Counsel, [email protected], Andrew B. Williams, 
II, Counsel, and [email protected], or Suzanne J. Dawley, Counsel, 
[email protected], Supervision, Legislation & Enforcement Branch, Legal 
Division, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20429. For the hearing impaired only, Telecommunication 
Device for the Deaf (TDD), (800) 925-4618.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Background
III. Overview of the Proposed Rule and Proposed Scope of Application
    A. The Proposed Stable Funding Requirement
    B. Revised Scope of Application
IV. Summary of Comments and Overview of Significant Changes to the 
Proposals
V. The Final Rule's Purpose, Design, Scope of Application, and 
Minimum Requirements
    A. Purpose of the Final Rule
    B. Comments on the Need for the NSFR Requirement
    C. The NSFR's Conceptual Framework, Design, and Calibration
    1. Use of an Aggregate Balance Sheet Measure and Weightings
    2. Use of a Simplified and Standardized Point-in-Time Metric
    3. Use of a Time Horizon
    4. Stress Perspectives and Using Elements From the LCR Rule
    5. Analytical Basis of Factor Calibrations and Supervisory 
Considerations
    D. Adjusting Calibration for the U.S. Implementation of the NSFR
    E. NSFR Scope and Minimum Requirement Under the Final Rule--Full 
and Reduced NSFR
    1. Proposed Minimum Requirement and the Tailoring Final Rule
    2. Applicability of the Final Rule to U.S. Intermediate Holding 
Companies and Use of the Risk-Based Indicators
    3. NSFR Minimum Requirements Under the Final Rule: Applicability 
and Calibration
    4. Applicability to Depository Institution Subsidiaries
VI. Definitions
    A. Revisions to Existing Definitions
    1. Revised Definitions for Which the Agencies Received no 
Comments
    2. Revised Definitions for Which the Agencies Received Comments
    3. Other Definitions and Requirements for Which the Agencies 
Received Comments
    4. Other Definitions and Requirements for Which the Agencies Did 
Not Receive Comments
    B. New Definitions

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    1. New Definitions for Which the Agencies Received no Comments
    2. New Definitions for Which the Agencies Received Comments
VII. NSFR Requirement Under the Final Rule
    A. Rules of Construction
    1. Balance-Sheet Values
    2. Netting of Certain Transactions
    3. Treatment of Securities Received in an Asset Exchange by a 
Securities Lender
    B. Determining Maturity
    C. Available Stable Funding
    1. Calculation of the ASF Amount
    2. Characteristics for Assignment of ASF Factors
    3. Categories of ASF Factors
    D. Required Stable Funding
    1. Calculation of the RSF Amount
    2. Characteristics for Assignment of RSF Factors
    3. Categories of RSF Factors for Unencumbered Assets and 
Commitments
    4. Treatment of Rehypothecated Off-Balance Sheet Assets
    E. Derivative Transactions
    1. Scope of Derivatives Transactions Subject to Sec.  __.107 of 
the Final Rule
    2. Current Net Value Component
    3. Initial Margin Received by a Covered Company
    4. Customer Cleared Derivative Transactions
    5. Initial Margin Component
    6. Future Value Component
    7. Comments on the Effect on Capital Markets and Commercial End 
Users
    8. Derivatives RSF Amount Calculation
    9. Derivatives RSF Amount Numerical Example
    F. NSFR Consolidation Limitations
    G. Treatment of Certain Facilities
    H. Interdependent Assets and Liabilities
VIII. Net Stable Funding Ratio Shortfall
IX. Disclosure Requirements
    A. NSFR Public Disclosure Requirements
    B. Quantitative Disclosure Requirements
    1. Disclosure of ASF Components
    2. Disclosure of RSF Components
    C. Qualitative Disclosure Requirements
    D. Frequency and Timing of Disclosure
X. Impact Assessment
    A. Impact on Funding
    B. Costs and Benefits of an RSF Factor for Level 1 HQLA, Both 
Held Outright and as Collateral for Short-Term Lending Transactions
    C. Response to Comments
XI. Effective Dates and Transitions
    A. Effective Dates
    B. Transitions
    1. Initial Transitions for Banking Organizations That Become 
Subject to NSFR Rule After the Effective Date
    2. Transitions for Changes to an NSFR Requirement
    3. Reservation of Authority To Extend Transitions
    4. Cessation of Applicability
XII. Administrative Law Matters
    A. Congressional Review Act
    B. Plain Language
    C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994
    E. Paperwork Reduction Act
    F. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

I. Introduction

    The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are 
adopting in final form the agencies' 2016 proposal to implement a net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR) requirement (the proposed rule), with 
certain adjustments.\1\ The agencies also are finalizing two proposals 
released subsequent to issuance of the proposed rule to revise the 
criteria for determining the scope of application of the NSFR 
requirement (tailoring proposals).\2\ The Board will issue a separate 
proposal for notice and comment to amend its information collection 
under its Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report (FR 2052a) to 
collect information and data related to the requirements of the final 
rule.
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    \1\ See ``Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement 
Standards and Disclosure Requirements,'' 81 FR 35124 (June 1, 2016).
    \2\ See Proposed Changes to Applicability Thresholds for 
Regulatory Capital and Liquidity Requirements, 83 FR 66024 (December 
21, 2018) (domestic tailoring proposal); Changes to Applicability 
Thresholds for Regulatory Capital Requirements for Certain U.S. 
Subsidiaries of Foreign Banking Organizations and Application of 
Liquidity Requirements to Foreign Banking Organizations, Certain 
U.S. Depository Institution Holding Companies, and Certain 
Depository Institution Subsidiaries, 84 FR 24296 (May 24, 2019) (FBO 
tailoring proposal). The agencies indicated that comments regarding 
the NSFR proposed rule would be addressed in the context of a final 
rule to adopt a NSFR requirement for large U.S. banking 
organizations and foreign banking organizations.
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    The final rule establishes a quantitative metric, the NSFR, to 
measure the stability of the funding profile of large U.S. banking 
organizations, U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking 
organizations, and their depository institution subsidiaries with $10 
billion or more in total consolidated assets. The final rule also 
requires these banking organizations to maintain minimum amounts of 
stable funding to support their assets, commitments, and derivatives 
exposures.\3\ By requiring banking organizations to maintain a stable 
funding profile, the final rule reduces liquidity risk in the financial 
sector and provides for a safer and more resilient financial system.
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    \3\ See further discussion of balance sheet funding in section 
V.C below.
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    Sections II and III of this Supplementary Information section 
provide background on the agencies' proposed rule and the tailoring 
proposals (together, the proposals). Section IV provides an overview of 
comments received on the proposals and significant changes to the 
proposals under this final rule. Section V describes the final rule's 
purpose, design, scope of application, and minimum requirements. The 
discussion of the final rule in sections VI through IX describes 
amendments to certain applicable definitions, the calculation of the 
NSFR, requirements imposed on a banking organization that fails to meet 
its minimum NSFR requirement, and the public disclosure requirements 
for U.S. depository institution holding companies and U.S. intermediate 
holding companies subject to the final rule. Sections X through XII 
describe the agencies' impact assessment, the effective date and 
transitions under the final rule, and certain administrative matters.

II. Background

    The 2007-2009 financial crisis revealed significant weaknesses in 
banking organizations' liquidity risk management and liquidity 
positions, including how banking organizations managed their 
liabilities to fund their assets in light of the risks inherent in 
their on-balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet commitments.\4\ The 
2007-2009 financial crisis also revealed an overreliance on short-term, 
less-stable funding, and demonstrated the vulnerability of large and 
internationally active banking organizations to funding shocks. For 
example, weaknesses in funding management at many banking organizations 
made them vulnerable to contractions in funding supply, and they had 
difficulties renewing short-term funding that they had used to support 
longer term or illiquid assets. As access to funding became limited and 
asset prices fell, many banking organizations faced an increased 
possibility of default and failure. To stabilize the global financial 
markets, governments and central banks around the world provided 
significant levels of support to these institutions in the form of 
liquidity facilities and capital injections.
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    \4\ See Senior Supervisors Group, Risk Management Lessons from 
the Global Banking Crisis of 2008, (October 21, 2009), available at 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/banking/2009/SSG_report.pdf.
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    In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) established two international liquidity 
standards. In January 2013, the BCBS established a short-term liquidity 
metric, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), to mitigate the risks 
arising when banking organizations face significantly increased net 
cash outflows in a period

[[Page 9122]]

of stress (Basel LCR standard).\5\ As a complement to the LCR, the BCBS 
in October 2014 established the net stable funding ratio standard 
(Basel NSFR standard) to mitigate the risks presented by banking 
organizations supporting their assets with insufficiently stable 
funding; the Basel NSFR standard requires banking organizations to 
maintain a stable funding profile over a longer, one-year time 
horizon.\6\ The agencies have been, and remain, actively involved in 
the BCBS' international efforts, including the continued development 
and monitoring of the BCBS's framework for liquidity.
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    \5\ See ``Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity 
risk monitoring tools'' at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm.
    \6\ See ``Basel III: the net stable funding ratio'' at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm. The BCBS relatedly published the net 
stable funding ratio disclosure standards published by the BCBS in 
June 2015. See ``Basel III: the net stable funding ratio'' (October 
2014), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf; ``Net 
Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards'' (June 2015), available 
at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d324.pdf.
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    Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the agencies implemented 
several requirements designed to improve the largest and most complex 
banking organizations' liquidity positions and liquidity risk 
management practices. In 2014, the agencies adopted the LCR rule to 
improve the banking sector's resiliency to a short-term liquidity 
stress by requiring large U.S. banking organizations to hold a minimum 
amount of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be 
readily converted into cash to meet projected net cash outflows over a 
prospective 30 calendar-day stress period.\7\ In addition, pursuant to 
section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act \8\ (Dodd-Frank Act) and in consultation with the OCC 
and FDIC, the Board adopted the enhanced prudential standards rule, 
which established general risk management, liquidity risk management, 
and stress testing requirements for certain bank holding companies and 
foreign banking organizations.\9\ These reforms in the post-crisis 
regulatory framework did not include a requirement that directly 
addresses the relationship between a banking organization's funding 
profile and its composition of assets and off-balance commitments.\10\
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    \7\ 12 CFR part 50 (OCC); 12 CFR part 249 (Board); 12 CFR part 
329 (FDIC). See also ``Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk 
Measurement Standards,'' 79 FR 61440 (October 10, 2014).
    \8\ 12 U.S.C. 5365.
    \9\ See 12 CFR part 252. See also ``Enhanced Prudential 
Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking 
Organizations,'' 79 FR 17240 (March 27, 2014). The Economic Growth, 
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, which became law on 
May 24, 2018, subsequently raised the asset thresholds for 
applicability of enhanced prudential standards under section 165 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act. See Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
The Board amended the scope of application of these requirements in 
October 2019. See 84 FR 59032, (November 1, 2019).
    \10\ During the same period, the Board implemented requirements 
designed to enhance the capital positions and loss-absorbing 
capabilities for global systemically important banking organizations 
(GSIBs), which can also have the effect of improving the funding 
profiles of these firms. The Board adopted a risk-based capital 
surcharge for GSIBs in the United States that is calculated based on 
a bank holding company's risk profile, including its reliance on 
short-term wholesale funding (the GSIB capital surcharge rule). See 
12 CFR 217 subpart H. The Board also adopted a total loss-absorbing 
capacity (TLAC) requirement and a long-term debt requirement (LTD) 
requirement (the TLAC/LTD rule) for U.S. GSIBs and the U.S. 
operations of certain foreign GSIBs, which requires these firms and 
operations to have sufficient amounts of equity and eligible long-
term debt to improve their ability to absorb significant losses and 
withstand financial stress and to improve their resolvability in the 
event of failure or material distress. See 12 CFR 252 subparts G and 
P.
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III. Overview of the Proposed Rule and Proposed Scope of Application

A. The Proposed Stable Funding Requirement

    In June 2016, the agencies invited comment on a proposal to 
implement a net stable funding requirement for the U.S. banking 
organizations that were subject to the LCR rule at that time.\11\ The 
proposed rule was generally consistent with the Basel NSFR standard, 
with adjustments to reflect the characteristics of U.S. banking 
organizations, markets, and other U.S. specific considerations.\12\
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    \11\ See ``Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement 
Standards and Disclosure Requirements,'' 81 FR 35124 (June 1, 2016).
    \12\ The BCBS developed the Basel NSFR standard as a longer-term 
balance sheet funding metric to complement the Basel LCR standard's 
short-term liquidity stress metric. In developing the Basel NSFR 
standard, the agencies and their international counterparts in the 
BCBS considered a number of possible funding metrics. For example, 
the BCBS considered the traditional ``cash capital'' measure, which 
compares the amount of a firm's long-term and stable sources of 
funding to the amount of the firm's illiquid assets. The BCBS found 
that this cash capital measure failed to account for material 
funding risks, such as those related to off-balance sheet 
commitments and certain on-balance sheet short-term funding and 
lending mismatches. The Basel NSFR standard incorporates 
consideration of these and other funding risks, as does this final 
rule.
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    The proposed rule would have required a banking organization to 
maintain an amount of available stable funding (ASF) equal to or 
greater than the banking organization's projected minimum funding 
needs, or required stable funding (RSF), over a one-year time 
horizon.\13\ A banking organization's NSFR would have been expressed as 
the ratio of its ASF amount to its RSF amount, with a banking 
organization required to maintain a minimum NSFR of 1.0.\14\
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    \13\ For certain depository institution holding companies with 
$50 billion or more, but less than $250 billion, in total 
consolidated assets and less than $10 billion in on-balance sheet 
foreign exposure, the Board separately proposed a modified NSFR 
requirement.
    \14\ Under the Board's proposed modified NSFR requirement, a 
depository institution holding company subject to a modified NSFR 
would have been required to maintain an NSFR of 1.0 but would have 
calculated such ratio using a lower minimum RSF amount in the 
denominator of the ratio, equivalent to 70 percent of the holding 
company's RSF amount as calculated under the agencies' proposed 
rule.
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    Under the proposed rule, a banking organization's ASF amount would 
have been calculated as the sum of the carrying values of the banking 
organization's liabilities and regulatory capital, each multiplied by a 
standardized weighting (ASF factor) ranging from zero to 100 percent to 
reflect the relative stability of such liabilities and capital over a 
one-year time horizon. Similarly, a banking organization's minimum RSF 
amount would have been calculated as (1) the sum of the carrying values 
of its assets, each multiplied by a standardized weighting (RSF factor) 
ranging from zero to 100 percent to reflect the relative need for 
funding over a one-year time horizon based on the liquidity 
characteristics of the asset, plus (2) RSF amounts based on the banking 
organization's committed facilities and derivative exposures. The 
proposed rule also would have included public disclosure requirements 
for depository institution holding companies subject to the proposed 
rule.

B. Revised Scope of Application

    The proposed rule would have applied to: (1) Bank holding 
companies, savings and loan holding companies without significant 
commercial or insurance operations, and depository institutions that, 
in each case, have $250 billion or more in total consolidated assets or 
$10 billion or more in on-balance sheet foreign exposure; and (2) 
depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated 
assets that are consolidated subsidiaries of such bank holding 
companies and savings and loan holding companies. In addition, the 
Board proposed a modified NSFR requirement that would have applied to 
certain depository institution holding companies with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.\15\
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    \15\ Subsequent to the issuance of the proposed rule, certain 
foreign banking organizations with substantial operations in the 
United States were required to form or designate U.S. intermediate 
holding companies. The scope of application under the proposed rule 
would have included certain U.S. bank holding company subsidiaries 
of foreign banking organizations.

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[[Page 9123]]

    Subsequent to the proposed rule, the agencies published the 
tailoring proposals to modify the application of the LCR rule and the 
proposed rule consistent with considerations and factors set forth 
under section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as amended by the Economic 
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA).\16\ 
As part of the tailoring proposals, the agencies proposed to establish 
four risk-based categories for determining applicability of 
requirements under the LCR rule and the proposed rule. The requirements 
would have increased in stringency based on measures of size, cross-
jurisdictional activity, weighted short-term wholesale funding, nonbank 
assets, and off-balance sheet exposures (risk-based indicators). In 
addition, the tailoring proposals would have removed the Board's 
proposed modified NSFR requirement for certain depository institution 
holding companies.\17\
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    \16\ Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
    \17\ The tailoring proposals also would have removed the LCR 
rule's modified LCR requirement that at the time applied to certain 
depository institution holding companies with total consolidated 
assets of $50 billion or more.
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    In October 2019, the agencies adopted a final rule (tailoring final 
rule) that amended the scope of application of the LCR rule so that it 
applies to certain U.S. banking organizations and U.S. intermediate 
holding companies of foreign banking organizations, each with $100 
billion or more in total consolidated assets, together with certain of 
their depository institution subsidiaries.\18\ The tailoring final rule 
applies LCR requirements on the basis of the four risk-based categories 
determined by the risk profile of the top-tier banking organization, 
including a depository institution that is not a subsidiary of a 
depository institution holding company.\19\ The effective date of the 
revisions to the LCR rule's scope was December 31, 2019.\20\
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    \18\ 84 FR 59230 (November 1, 2019). In a change from the 
tailoring proposals, the tailoring final rule applied LCR 
requirements to a U.S. intermediate holding company of a foreign 
banking organization on the basis of risk-based indicators measured 
for the U.S intermediate holding company and not the foreign banking 
organization's combined U.S. operations.
    \19\ A ``top-tier banking organization'' means the top-tier bank 
holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, savings and loan 
holding company, or depository institution domiciled in the United 
States.
    \20\ The tailoring final rule noted that comments regarding the 
NSFR proposal would be addressed in the context of any final rule to 
adopt a NSFR requirement for large U.S. banking organizations and 
U.S. intermediate holding companies. 84 FR at 59235.
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IV. Summary of Comments and Overview of Significant Changes to the 
Proposals

    The agencies received approximately 30 comments on the proposed 
rule, as well as approximately 20 comments related to the NSFR rule in 
response to the tailoring proposals. Commenters included U.S. and 
foreign banking organizations, trade groups, public interest groups, 
and other interested parties. Agency staff also met with some 
commenters at their request to discuss their comments on the proposed 
rule and the tailoring proposals.\21\ Although many commenters 
supported the goal of improving funding stability, many commenters 
expressed concern regarding the overall proposal and criticized 
specific aspects of the proposed rule.
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    \21\ Summaries of these meetings are available on the agencies' 
public websites. See https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=OCC-2014-0029 (OCC), https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R%2D1537&doc_ver=1 (Board), and https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2016/2016-net_stable-funding-ratio-3064-ae44.html (FDIC).
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    A number of commenters argued that the proposed rule was 
unnecessary because it would target risks already addressed by existing 
regulations, such as the LCR rule. Other commenters expressed concern 
regarding the design and calibration of the proposed rule. These 
commenters requested clarification on the conceptual underpinnings of 
the NSFR, requested additional quantitative support for the proposed 
ASF and RSF factors, and argued that the proposed rule did not satisfy 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements because it provided 
insufficient support for its design and calibration. Some commenters 
criticized the proposed rule as not being appropriately tailored for 
implementation in the United States and argued that the proposed rule 
was more stringent than the Basel NSFR standard such that it could 
disadvantage U.S. banking organizations relative to their foreign 
competitors. Relatedly, certain commenters requested that the agencies 
conform the final rule to the European Union's implementation of the 
Basel NSFR standard (EU NSFR rule) in order to minimize potential 
adverse effects on U.S. banking organizations.\22\
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    \22\ The European Union (EU) implementation of the NSFR 
requirement, effective 2021, includes targeted adjustments from the 
Basel NSFR standard in order to reflect EU specificities generally 
consistent with the EU implementation of the Basel LCR standard. The 
EU's NSFR requirements also include targeted adjustments to support 
sovereign bond markets. See Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European 
Parliament and the Council, May 20, 2019, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R0876 (EU NSFR 
rule).
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    Some commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule could 
result in increased costs to banking organizations and the financial 
system that would exceed the proposed rule's benefits.\23\ 
Specifically, some commenters argued that the proposed rule could 
increase funding and compliance costs, which could cause banking 
organizations to withdraw from or reduce the scale of certain business 
activities with low margins, including certain capital markets-related 
activities. According to the commenters, this could have the effect of 
tightening credit and increasing borrowing costs for households and 
businesses in the United States. Commenters also argued that the 
funding and compliance costs of the proposed rule could increase 
financial stability risk by shifting certain financial intermediation 
activities from the banking sector to less regulated ``shadow banking'' 
channels. Commenters also expressed concern that the proposed rule 
could have pro-cyclical effects, for example, by incentivizing banking 
organizations to restrict lending to improve their NSFRs during periods 
of stress.
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    \23\ The agencies received a number of comments that were not 
specifically responsive to the proposed rule but more generally 
requested that the agencies assess the combined costs of post-crisis 
regulations on the availability of credit and the economy.
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    Additionally, many commenters requested changes to specific 
elements of the proposed rule. For example, commenters recommended the 
agencies assign higher ASF factors for certain liabilities, such as 
certain types of deposits, and lower RSF factors for certain categories 
of assets and committed facilities. Some commenters recommended changes 
to the proposed rule's treatment of derivatives, particularly the 
treatment of variation margin and the treatment of potential valuation 
changes in a derivatives portfolio. In addition, a number of commenters 
requested that the agencies modify the proposed rule to assign zero 
percent RSF and ASF factors to certain assets and liabilities 
commenters viewed as interdependent such that the specific, 
identifiable assets are funded by the specific, identifiable 
liabilities of an equal or similar tenor and, therefore, present little 
or minimal funding risk. Finally, some commenters requested that the 
agencies delay implementation of the NSFR requirement to allow banking 
organizations additional time to build internal reporting systems and 
comply with disclosure requirements.

[[Page 9124]]

    The agencies received a number of comments requesting the agencies 
reconsider the proposed rule's scope of application. Specifically, many 
commenters argued that the proposed thresholds for application were 
arbitrary and insufficiently risk-sensitive and requested the agencies 
further tailor the scope of the proposed rule. The agencies also 
received a number of comments on the appropriateness of the revised 
scope of application in the tailoring proposals.
    As discussed throughout this Supplementary Information section, the 
final rule retains the general design for the NSFR calculation and 
calibrates minimum requirements to the risk profiles of banking 
organizations in a manner consistent with the tailoring final rule. 
However, the final rule includes a number of modifications, including:
     The final rule assigns a zero percent RSF factor to 
unencumbered level 1 liquid asset securities and certain short-term 
secured lending transactions backed by level 1 liquid asset securities 
(see section VII.D of this Supplementary Information section).
     The final rule provides more favorable treatment for 
certain affiliate sweep deposits and non-deposit retail funding (see 
section VII.C of this Supplementary Information section).
     The final rule permits cash variation margin to be 
eligible to offset a covered company's current exposures under its 
derivatives transactions even if it does not meet all of the criteria 
in the agencies' supplementary leverage ratio rule (SLR rule).\24\ In 
addition, variation margin received in the form of rehypothecatable 
level 1 liquid asset securities also would be eligible to offset a 
covered company's current exposures (see section VII.E of this 
Supplementary Information section).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ 12 CFR 3.10(c)(4) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.10(c)(4) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.10(c)(4) (FDIC). In addition, the final rule includes a new 
provision to exclude assets received by a covered company as 
variation margin under derivative transactions from the treatment of 
rehypothecated assets that are off-balance sheet assets in 
accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The final rule reduces the amount of a covered company's 
gross derivatives liabilities that will be assigned a 100 percent RSF 
factor (see section VII.E of this Supplementary Information section).

V. The Final Rule's Purpose, Design, Scope of Application, and Minimum 
Requirements

A. Purpose of the Final Rule

    The NSFR is designed to address risks that are inherent in the 
business of banking. Banking organizations perform maturity and 
liquidity transformation,\25\ which is an important financial 
intermediation process that contributes to efficient resource 
allocation and credit creation. To conduct maturity and liquidity 
transformation and meet the long-term credit needs of businesses and 
households, banking organizations also must address the short-term 
liquidity preferences of funds providers. These transformation 
activities create a certain inherent level of risk to banking 
organizations, the U.S. financial system, and the broader economy 
caused by banking organizations' potential overreliance on unstable 
funding sources relative to the composition of their balance sheets. 
Such overreliance could potentially result in the failure of banking 
organizations, disruptions to asset prices, and reduction in the 
provision of credit to households and businesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ To conduct financial intermediation, banking organizations 
obtain resources that are currently surplus to the needs of certain 
parts of the economy (funds providers) and lend them to other parts 
of the economy that currently need those resources (users of funds). 
Funds providers generally prefer to supply their resources on a 
short-term basis with easy access to their funds (liquid resources); 
for example, household savings. Users of funds often need these 
resources on a long-term basis and in ways that make such resources 
difficult to convert to cash (illiquid resources); for example, 
building factories or capital for business growth. Maturity and 
liquidity transformation refers to the process of bridging the 
competing needs of funds providers and users of funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A banking organization may mitigate these risks by having funding 
sources that are appropriately stable over time. Because short-term 
funding generally tends to be less expensive than longer-term funding, 
banking organizations have incentives to fund their longer-term or 
less-liquid assets with less stable, shorter-term liabilities. While 
this approach may benefit short-term earnings, it may lead to 
imbalances between how a banking organization chooses to fund its 
assets and the funding it may need to maintain the assets over time, as 
well as increases in liquidity and funding risk arising from potential 
customer and counterparty runs and a more interconnected financial 
sector. In turn, this creates a funding risk for banking organizations, 
the financial system, and the broader economy. The final rule requires 
large banking organizations to avoid excessively funding long-term and 
less-liquid assets with short-term or less-reliable funding and thus 
reduces the likelihood that disruptions in a banking organization's 
regular funding sources would compromise its funding stability and 
liquidity position.
    The final rule establishes a minimum NSFR requirement that is 
applicable on a consolidated basis to certain top-tier banking 
organizations with total consolidated assets of $100 billion or more, 
together with certain depository institution subsidiaries (together, 
covered companies). Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule 
requires a covered company to calculate an NSFR based on the ratio of 
its ASF amount to its RSF amount and maintain an NSFR equal to or 
greater than 1.0 on an ongoing basis.\26\ In addition, the final rule, 
like the proposed rule, includes public disclosure requirements for 
U.S. depository institution holding companies and U.S. intermediate 
holding companies of foreign banking organizations that are subject to 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ ASF factors are described in section VII.C, RSF factors are 
described in section VII.D, and the derivatives RSF amount is 
described in section VII.E of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Comments on the Need for the NSFR Requirement

    Banking organizations have improved their liquidity risk management 
practices and liquidity positions since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
including by holding larger liquidity buffers, avoiding excessive 
reliance on very short-term unstable wholesale funding sources, and 
improving their internal controls and governance structures surrounding 
liquidity risk management. The NSFR requirement aims to preserve these 
improvements and help position covered companies to act as resilient 
financial intermediaries through potential future periods of 
instability. The agencies received a number of comments arguing that 
the proposed rule is unnecessary because other elements of the 
agencies' regulatory framework already sufficiently address liquidity 
and funding risk at covered companies.\27\ Some commenters also argued 
that the agencies should not apply an NSFR requirement because many 
covered companies have improved their current funding profiles relative 
to the period leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. By 
contrast, one commenter supported the proposed rule, asserting that it 
would be an important complement to the LCR rule because it would 
address funding stability and

[[Page 9125]]

maturity mismatch more broadly and over a longer time horizon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Commenters provided examples, including the LCR rule; the 
Board's enhanced prudential standards rule; the TLAC/LTD rule; the 
GSIB capital surcharge rule (which includes a measure of weighted 
short-term wholesale funding), SLR rule, and other capital 
requirements; single counterparty credit limits; mandatory clearing 
requirements and margin requirements for non-cleared swaps and non-
cleared security-based swaps; and Board and FDIC supervisory 
guidance relating to liquidity in connection with resolution 
planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule is intended to complement and reinforce other 
elements of the agencies' regulatory framework that strengthen 
financial sector resiliency by addressing risks that are not directly 
addressed by the agencies' other regulatory measures. For example, the 
NSFR rule provides an important complement to the LCR rule, which 
addresses the risk of increased net cash outflows over a 30-calendar 
day period of stress by requiring banking organizations to hold HQLA 
that can be readily converted to cash. While addressing short-term 
cash-flow related risks is a core component of a banking organization's 
liquidity risk management, a banking organization could comply with the 
LCR requirement and still fund its long-term or illiquid assets and 
commitments with short-term liabilities not sufficiently stable to 
preserve these assets over an extended period.\28\ The final rule 
further complements the LCR rule by mitigating the risk of a banking 
organization concentrating funding just outside the LCR's 30-day 
window. The final rule also complements requirements related to firm-
specific measures of funding risk under the Board's enhanced prudential 
standards rule by providing a standardized measure of the stability of 
a banking organization's funding profile, which would promote greater 
comparability of funding structures across banking organizations and 
improve transparency and market discipline through public disclosure 
requirements.\29\ With respect to the other rules and guidance 
commenters cited as sufficiently addressing liquidity and funding risk, 
these elements of the agencies' regulatory framework do not directly 
address balance sheet funding risks for covered companies on a going-
concern basis. \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Cash flow projections, liquidity stress testing, and 
liquidity buffer requirements for certain covered holding companies 
under the Board's enhanced prudential standards rule complement the 
LCR rule by addressing cash flow risks with additional firm-specific 
granularity and across additional time horizons, including a one-
year planning horizon. These requirements do not directly address 
balance sheet funding risks.
    \29\ See 12 CFR 252.35 and 12 CFR 252.157.
    \30\ The final rule reflects that regulatory capital elements 
and long-term debt required under the agencies' regulatory capital 
rule, the Board's GSIB capital surcharge rule, and the TLAC/LTD rule 
provide stable funding by virtue of the long-term or perpetual tenor 
of such regulatory capital elements and long-term debt. The Board's 
GSIB capital surcharge rule and the tailoring final rule include a 
measure of historic funding composition, weighted short-term 
wholesale funding, but this measure does not measure or directly 
address funding risk. The weighted short-term wholesale funding 
measure is based on a banking organization's average use of short-
term funding sources over the prior year but does not reflect a 
banking organization's assets or the banking organization's use of 
longer-term funding sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Reliance on less-stable sources of funding may require a banking 
organization to repay or replace its funding more often and make it 
more exposed to sudden funding market disruptions. Potential loss of 
funding can restrict a banking organization's ability to support its 
assets and commitments over the long term, generating both safety and 
soundness and financial stability risks. The final rule is designed to 
mitigate such risks by directly increasing the funding resilience of 
subject banking organizations. The final rule mitigates risks to U.S. 
financial stability by improving the capacity of banking organizations 
to continue to support their assets and lending activities across a 
range of market conditions. A covered company that sufficiently aligns 
the stability of its funding sources with its funding needs based on 
the liquidity characteristics of its assets and commitments is better 
positioned to avoid asset fire sales and continue to function as a 
financial intermediary in the event of funding or asset market 
disruptions. As a result, a covered company will be better positioned 
to continue to operate and lend, which promotes more stable and 
consistent levels of financial intermediation in the U.S. economy 
across economic and market conditions.
    As a standardized metric, the NSFR also promotes greater 
comparability across covered companies and foreign banks subject to 
substantially similar requirements in other jurisdictions and 
facilitates supervisory assessments of vulnerability. Through public 
disclosure requirements, the NSFR rule also promotes greater market 
discipline through enhanced transparency.\31\ In these ways, a 
standardized long-term funding measure, such as the NSFR, is intended 
to work in tandem with internal models-based measures to provide a more 
robust and complete framework to monitor and manage funding and 
liquidity risks of covered companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Public disclosure requirements are not required for non-
standardized measurements of liquidity risk required under the 
Board's enhanced prudential standards rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. The NSFR's Conceptual Framework, Design, and Calibration

    A number of commenters questioned the conceptual framework and 
design of the proposed rule, as well as its overall analytical basis 
and the calibrations of specific components. In particular, commenters 
argued that the agencies did not provide sufficient justification or 
data analysis to support the proposed calibration of the NSFR rule's 
relevant factors. Some commenters questioned whether the calibrations 
in the proposed rule reflected a one-year period of stress or whether 
the calibration was intended to reflect different ``business-as-usual'' 
conditions.\32\ A number of commenters also argued that if the proposed 
rule was not calibrated based on the same stress assumptions as the LCR 
rule, the proposed rule should not incorporate elements and definitions 
from the LCR rule. Some commenters also requested that the agencies 
reconsider elements of the proposed rule that they believed to be more 
conservative than the LCR rule. In addition, several commenters argued 
that the proposed rule was focused on commercial banking and was 
therefore not sensitive enough to the different business models of 
covered companies, such as custody banks and banking organizations 
significantly involved in capital markets. Another commenter stated 
that the NSFR is a static measure and does not take into account 
actions a firm may take in the future to address funding risk. As 
addressed in sections VII.C and VII.D of this Supplementary Information 
section, the agencies also received a number of comments on the 
proposed values of ASF factors and RSF factors where the commenter's 
concern was predicated on the design of the NSFR. For example, 
commenters described the value of certain ASF factors as conservative 
based on the assumption that the values represented cash-flow amounts 
and commenters therefore made direct comparison to factors used in the 
LCR rule. In light of these comments, the agencies are clarifying in 
this Supplementary Information section the conceptual basis for the 
NSFR design under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Certain commenters also expressed concerns about the 
descriptions by the BCBS of the Basel NSFR standard between 2009 and 
2014 and the opportunities to comment on certain elements of the 
international standard. Commenters argued that the agencies should 
remove elements of the proposed rule or re-open the comment period 
because, in these commenters' view, the public was unable to comment 
on the inclusion of certain elements in the Basel NSFR standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Use of an Aggregate Balance Sheet Measure and Weightings
    The NSFR's conceptual design builds on commonly used assessments of 
balance sheet funding.\33\ The NSFR is a standardized measure of a 
banking organization's funding relative to its assets and commitments. 
Consistent with the Basel NSFR standard, the final

[[Page 9126]]

rule conceptually draws on supervisory and industry-developed funding 
risk management measures, with modifications to account for material 
funding risks and policy considerations.\34\ Supervisors and industry 
stakeholders such as credit rating agencies and equity analysts 
routinely assess the funding profiles of banking organizations through 
comparisons of the compositions of the banking organization's assets 
and liabilities.\35\ The NSFR's design as a ratio of weighted 
liabilities and regulatory capital to weighted assets and commitments 
is consistent with these approaches. Using a ratio measure is 
appropriate for measuring and addressing funding risks because it 
provides a holistic assessment of a banking organization's funding 
profile based on the aggregate composition of the banking 
organization's balance sheet and commitments rather than on individual 
assets or liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See supra note 12.
    \34\ For example, the final rule takes into account policy 
considerations such as externalities associated with an unstable 
funding structure that can affect the safety and soundness of other 
banking organizations and U.S. financial stability and an interest 
in maintaining financial intermediation of covered companies across 
economic and market conditions.
    \35\ For example, supervisors and industry analysts compare 
compositions of assets and liabilities though the use of a loans-to-
deposits ratio or by defining a measure of ``noncore'' funding 
dependency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule takes into account the differing risk 
characteristics of a covered company's various assets, liabilities, and 
certain off-balance sheet commitments and applies different weightings 
(ASF and RSF factors) to reflect these risk characteristics. Under the 
final rule, ASF and RSF factors are used to determine the numerator and 
denominator of the NSFR and reflect, respectively, the stability of 
funding, and the need for assets and commitments to be supported by 
such funding over a range of market conditions, each as assessed under 
the final rule. As described in sections VII.C and VII.D of this 
Supplementary Information section, the final rule uses broad categories 
of liabilities and assets to assess relative stability and funding 
needs, respectively. These weightings make the NSFR assessment risk 
sensitive by differentiating between types of assets and types of 
liabilities.
    While the NSFR is a simplified and standardized metric, meeting the 
NSFR minimum requirement of 1.0 provides evidence that a covered 
company has, in aggregate, a sufficient amount of stable liabilities 
and regulatory capital to support over a one-year time horizon its 
aggregate assets and commitments based on the liquidity characteristics 
of such aggregate assets and commitments.\36\ Given the size, 
complexity, scope of activities, and interconnectedness of covered 
companies, a covered company with an NSFR of less than 1.0 may face an 
increased likelihood of liquidity stress or of having to dispose of 
illiquid assets, and may be less well positioned to maintain its level 
of financial intermediation over various market conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ As described in section V.E.3 of this Supplementary 
Information section, the final rule applies an adjustment factor to 
the denominator of the ratio to reflect the risk profile of a 
covered company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters expressed concerns that application of RSF factors to 
specific assets has the effect of imposing a requirement on covered 
companies to issue additional long-dated liabilities to fund such 
assets. The final rule does not prescribe the method by which a covered 
company must meet its minimum requirement. Under the final rule, the 
NSFR requirement reflects the aggregate balance sheet of a covered 
company, and the final rule does not apply separate minimum funding 
requirements to individual assets, legal entities, or business lines 
represented on the balance sheet. For example, a covered company that 
has an NSFR of 1.0 and increases its holding of certain long-dated 
assets is not required to issue additional long-dated liabilities under 
the final rule but, rather, has discretion on how to continue to meet 
its minimum requirement, including by changing its overall asset 
composition.
2. Use of a Simplified and Standardized Point-in-Time Metric
    Many commenters expressed concerns or suggestions that related to 
the level of granularity in the NSFR's conceptual design or that the 
NSFR was a point-in-time measure. For example, commenters suggested the 
NSFR include additional RSF and ASF factors tailored to specific 
products and activities.\37\ Commenters similarly expressed concerns 
about the number of residual maturity categories used in the NSFR. A 
number of commenters criticized the design of the NSFR as a static 
metric arguing that the measurement of the funding risk of a covered 
company's aggregate balance sheet should consider actions that banking 
organizations may undertake in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See sections VII.C, VII.D and VII.E of this Supplementary 
Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to these concerns, the agencies note that a broad 
comparison of the stability of a covered company's funding relative to 
the liquidity characteristics of its assets achieves the final rule's 
funding risk-mitigation objectives. To limit the burden on covered 
companies and to maximize the comparability of the metric between each 
covered company and other international banking organizations, the NSFR 
is designed as a simplified metric that uses a small number of 
categories of assets, exposures, liabilities, counterparty types, and 
residual maturity buckets to achieve its objective. While the balance 
sheets of large banking organizations reflect a complex variety of 
transactions and business activities, additional granularity could be 
burdensome to covered companies relative to the goals of the NSFR 
requirement. The NSFR was designed holistically and introducing 
additional granularity could require recalibration of certain other 
elements. For example, the incorporation of additional RSF factors may 
require other RSF factors to be adjusted upward, as they currently 
reflect an aggregate view of the level of stable funding required for 
the entire set of assets or off-balance sheet commitments in a given 
category. Additionally, to the extent possible, the metric utilizes the 
carrying values of assets and liabilities on a covered company's 
balance sheet under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) and limits the need for additional valuations.
    In response to comments that the NSFR is not sensitive to the 
different business models of covered companies, the agencies note that 
the NSFR is designed to allow comparison across covered companies and 
other international firms, and to minimize differences in how liquidity 
characteristics of liabilities and assets are evaluated by covered 
companies. As a standardized metric, the final rule is constructed to 
ensure a sufficient amount of stable funding across all covered 
companies, regardless of their business models. The NSFR generally does 
not differentiate by a banking organization's business model, its lines 
of business, or the purpose for which individual assets or liabilities 
are held on its balance sheet. For example, the NSFR treats securities 
held on a covered company's balance sheet based on the securities' 
credit risk and market characteristics regardless of whether such 
securities are held as long-term investments, as hedging instruments, 
or as market making inventory. While the composition of banking 
organizations' balance sheets varies based on business models and the 
services provided to customers, the NSFR is not focused on

[[Page 9127]]

any particular business model (for example, commercial banking), as 
suggested by commenters.
    Like most prudential requirements, the NSFR is a measure of a 
covered company's condition at a point in time and by design does not 
consider the broad variety of actions that management may take in the 
future. As a general principle, the agencies do not speculate about 
future transactions, contingencies, or potential managerial remediation 
steps that the covered company may take.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ As noted above, the point-in-time NSFR complements forward-
looking assessments of risk, such as a covered company's internal 
liquidity stress testing practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Use of a Time Horizon
    Certain commenters questioned the NSFR's design in respect to its 
time horizon. While the NSFR measures a banking organization's balance 
sheet and commitments at a point in time, the assessment of adequate 
funding considers the stability of, and the need for, funding with 
reference to a general one-year time horizon and a range of market 
conditions. The measurement incorporates contractual maturities but 
generally does not reflect expectations about the year following the 
calculation date.\39\ Rather, consistent with the Basel NSFR standard, 
the NSFR calibrations seek to reflect resilient credit intermediation 
to the real economy and general behaviors by banking organizations and 
their counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ As described below, calculation date means any date on 
which a covered company calculates its NSFR. See section VI.A.1 of 
this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of a time horizon for the assessment of funding imbalances 
is appropriate because the residual maturities of liabilities and 
assets of a covered company at the calculation date are, among other 
characteristics, indicative of the liabilities' stability and the 
assets' need for funding, respectively. For example, liabilities that 
are due to mature in the short term will generally provide less 
stability to a banking organization's balance sheet than longer-term 
liabilities. Similarly, certain short-dated assets maturing in less 
than one year should require a smaller portion of funding to be 
maintained over a one-year time horizon because banking organizations 
may allow such assets to mature without replacing them. The choice of a 
one-year time horizon is also consistent with traditional accounting 
and supervisory measures of short-term and long-term financial 
instruments and exposures.
4. Stress Perspectives and Using Elements From the LCR Rule
    A number of commenters requested clarification on the extent to 
which the NSFR calibrations incorporated stress assumptions. Consistent 
with the complementary designs of the Basel LCR and NSFR standards, the 
final rule is designed differently from, and to be complementary to, 
the LCR rule. Unlike the LCR, which compares immediately available 
sources of cash to potential stressed cash outflows over a 30-calendar 
day period, the NSFR is not a cash-flow coverage metric, and ASF and 
RSF amounts are not cash-flow amounts. While ASF factors take into 
account the characteristics of liabilities that influence relative 
funding stability across a range of market conditions, the values of 
ASF factors do not represent liability outflow rates. Similarly, while 
RSF factors take into account the liquidity characteristics of assets 
that generally influence their need for funding over a one-year 
horizon, the values of RSF factors do not reflect the monetization 
value of assets. In response to comments that the values of factors 
used in the LCR rule imply that ASF or RSF factors were incorrectly 
calibrated, it is important to note that comparisons of the values of 
ASF or RSF factors under the final rule to the values of outflow and 
inflow rates used in the LCR rule are not indicative of the relative 
conservatism of the requirements under both rules.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See sections VII.C and VII.D of this Supplementary 
Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the final rule is not designed to function as a one-year 
liquidity stress test, and therefore its ASF and RSF factors are not 
assigned based on, or intended to directly translate to, assumed cash 
inflows and outflows over a one-year period of stress. Rather, the 
final rule is intended to serve as a balance-sheet metric, and ASF and 
RSF factors reflect, respectively, the relative stability of funding 
and the need for funding based on the liquidity characteristics of 
assets and commitments, each across a range of economic and financial 
conditions.\41\ Funding and liquidity characteristics of liabilities 
and assets under stress conditions are therefore relevant to, but not 
determinative of, ASF and RSF factors. As a result, ASF and RSF factor 
calibrations take into account potential effects of stress on the 
stability of funding and liquidity characteristics of assets and 
commitments, but are not calibrated to require a covered company to 
retain a buffer against a stress period of one year, as discussed in 
sections VII.C and VII.D of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The LCR rule compares cash-generating resources (i.e., the 
HQLA amount) to cash needs (total net cash outflows) in a 30-day 
stress. The final rule compares sources of stable funding (ASF 
amount) to the need for stable funding (RSF amount), each calibrated 
over a 12-month horizon and across a range of market conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the NSFR generally is not calibrated to the stress 
assumptions of the LCR rule, it nevertheless shares certain common 
elements and definitions with the complementary LCR where such 
consistency is helpful. The alignment of the final rule with the 
structure and design of the LCR rule, where appropriate, aims to 
improve efficiency and limit compliance costs to covered companies by 
allowing them more efficiently to implement the two requirements. In 
response to commenters' concerns that sharing definitions and elements 
with the LCR rule inappropriately incorporates stress assumptions into 
the NSFR requirement, the agencies note that many shared elements and 
defined terms are independent of stress assumptions.\42\ Moreover, to 
the extent that the final rule incorporates definitions of the LCR 
rule, their usage in the final rule generally reflects assumptions that 
are specific to the final rule.\43\ Finally, while the final rule is 
not calibrated based on a one-year stress, some considerations of 
conservatism are still relevant. For example, as discussed in section 
VII.B of this Supplementary Information section, the final rule 
generally applies the same assumptions for determining maturity as the 
LCR rule because conservative assumptions regarding the maturity of 
funding relative to the duration of asset holdings are appropriate for 
assessing the risks presented by mismatches in balance sheet funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ For example, the definitions of ``general obligation,'' 
``affiliate,'' and ``company'' do not incorporate an assumption of 
stress.
    \43\ For example, the final rule applies the same ASF factor to 
certain forms of funding from a financial sector entity that mature 
in six months or less, regardless of whether such funding is in the 
form of a secured funding transaction or unsecured wholesale 
funding, whereas the LCR rule generally treats these categories of 
funding separately for purposes of determining applicable outflow 
amounts. See 12 CFR 50.32(h) and (j) (OCC); 12 CFR 249.32(h) and (j) 
(Board); 12 CFR 329.32(h) and (j) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Analytical Basis of Factor Calibrations and Supervisory 
Considerations
    Several commenters argued that the agencies did not sufficiently 
rely on empirical analysis to inform various portions of the proposed 
rule. Other commenters argued that the agencies

[[Page 9128]]

did not sufficiently disclose the quantitative data and analyses on 
which the agencies relied.
    As explained in detail in sections VII.C and VII.D of this 
Supplementary Information section, the liabilities within an ASF factor 
category generally exhibit similar levels of funding stability and the 
assets within an RSF factor category generally exhibit similar 
liquidity characteristics. In addition, there is a sufficient number of 
ASF factor and RSF factor categories in the final rule to differentiate 
among the funding risks presented by the assets, commitments, and 
liabilities covered by the NSFR. The ASF and RSF factors as calibrated 
for these categories of liabilities and assets, and as applied under 
the Basel NSFR standard to similar categorizations, are generally 
appropriate for U.S. implementation.\44\ However, as discussed below, 
the final rule departs from the Basel NSFR standard where doing so 
would support important domestic policy objectives. The agencies 
regularly review their regulatory framework, including liquidity 
requirements, to ensure it is functioning as intended and will continue 
to assess the NSFR's calibration under the final rule. A more specific 
discussion of the agencies' analysis is provided in sections VII.C and 
VII.D of this Supplementary Information section, which discuss the 
comments received on the calibration of ASF and RSF factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Supervisory experience is informed in part through 
confidential data obtained through the FR 2052a report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the proposed rule and as noted above, certain ASF 
and RSF factor assignments in the final rule take into account policy 
considerations relating to the safety and soundness of covered 
companies and U.S. financial stability.\45\ For example, the assignment 
of a zero percent ASF factor to wholesale funding from financial sector 
entities that matures within six months generally reflects supervisory 
concerns related to the financial stability risks related to 
overreliance on this source of funding by large interconnected banking 
organizations. In calibrating the factors, the agencies also considered 
behavioral and operational factors that can affect funding stability or 
asset liquidity, such as reputational incentives that could cause a 
covered company to maintain lending to certain counterparties.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See sections VII.C and VII.D of this Supplementary 
Information section.
    \46\ See section VII of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters' assertion that the agencies failed to 
disclose quantitative data and analyses used to support the proposed 
rule, the agencies note that they disclosed in the proposed rule 
material that was available and reliable. In the instances in which the 
agencies cited data in support of the proposed rule, the agencies 
identified that data, acknowledged the shortcomings of the available 
data, and invited input from the public. In developing the final rule, 
the agencies have considered the comments received.

D. Adjusting Calibration for the U.S. Implementation of the NSFR

    As noted above, the final rule is based on the general framework of 
the Basel NSFR standard. Some commenters argued that the agencies 
should not adopt the proposed rule, or should modify certain elements 
of the proposed rule, because the Basel NSFR standard is an 
internationally negotiated standard that was not properly tailored to 
reflect U.S. financial, legal, and market conditions. By contrast, a 
number of commenters argued that the final rule should be more 
consistent with the Basel NSFR standard, particularly with respect to 
elements that would be more stringent under the proposed rule than the 
Basel NSFR standard.
    In developing the proposed and final rules, the agencies considered 
the Basel NSFR standard as well as financial, legal, market, and other 
considerations specific to the United States. Basing the final rule on 
the general framework of the Basel NSFR standard helps promote 
competitive equity with respect to covered companies and other large, 
internationally active banking organizations in other jurisdictions, 
facilitate regulatory consistency across jurisdictions, and ensure a 
minimum level of resiliency across the global financial system. Where 
appropriate, the final rule differs from the Basel NSFR standard to 
reflect specific characteristics of U.S. markets, practices of U.S. 
banking organizations and domestic policy objectives.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Notable divergences in the final rule from the Basel NSFR 
standard include the treatment of level 1 liquid asset securities, 
certain short-term secured lending transactions backed by level 1 
liquid assets, variation margin in derivatives transactions, and 
non-deposit retail funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. NSFR Scope and Minimum Requirement Under the Final Rule--Full and 
Reduced NSFR

1. Proposed Minimum Requirement and the Tailoring Final Rule
    In the tailoring proposals, the agencies re-proposed the scope of 
application of the NSFR proposed rule. The tailoring proposals would 
have established four categories of requirements--Category I, II, III, 
and IV--that would have been used to tailor the application of the NSFR 
requirement based on the risk profile of a top-tier banking 
organization as measured by the risk-based indicators.\48\ Covered 
companies subject to Category I and II requirements would have been 
subject to the full requirements of the proposed rule (full NSFR). 
Under Category III or Category IV, however, covered companies would 
have been subject to further tailored NSFR requirements based on the 
top-tier banking organization's level of weighted short-term wholesale 
funding. Specifically, a covered company that meets the criteria for 
Category III with $75 billion or more in average weighted short-term 
wholesale funding would have been subject to the full NSFR requirement. 
By contrast, banking organizations in Category III with less than $75 
billion in average weighted short-term wholesale funding, or in 
Category IV with $50 billion or more in average weighted short-term 
wholesale funding, would have been required to comply with a reduced 
NSFR (reduced NSFR) requirement, calibrated at a level equivalent to 
between 85 and 70 percent of the full NSFR requirement.\49\ Banking 
organizations in Category IV with less than $50 billion in weighted 
short-term wholesale funding would not have been subject to an NSFR 
requirement. In addition, a depository institution subsidiary of a 
covered company meeting the criteria of Category I, II, or III would 
have been required to comply with the NSFR requirement to which its 
parent covered company was subject if the depository institution 
subsidiary's total consolidated assets were $10 billion or greater. 
Depository institution subsidiaries with less than $10 billion in total 
consolidated assets, as well as depository institution subsidiaries of 
covered companies meeting the criteria of Category IV, would not have 
been required to comply with an NSFR requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See section III.B of this Supplementary Information 
section. In the tailoring proposals, the proposed scope of 
application for the NSFR was the same as that proposed for the LCR 
rule.
    \49\ As noted above, the tailoring proposals would have removed 
the Board's modified LCR and modified NSFR requirement because the 
reduced LCR and reduced NSFR would be better designed for assessing 
liquidity and funding risks for banking organizations in Categories 
III and IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The tailoring final rule adopted these categories, with certain 
changes, for purposes of the LCR rule and the agencies' capital rule. 
Under the tailoring final rule, Category I requirements apply to U.S. 
global systemically important banks (GSIBs)

[[Page 9129]]

and any of their depository institution subsidiaries with $10 billion 
or more in consolidated assets. Category II requirements apply to top-
tier banking organizations,\50\ other than U.S. GSIBs, with $700 
billion or more in consolidated assets or $75 billion or more in 
average cross-jurisdictional activity, and to their depository 
institution subsidiaries with $10 billion or more in consolidated 
assets. Category III requirements apply to top-tier banking 
organizations that have $250 billion or more in consolidated assets, or 
that have $100 billion or more in consolidated assets and also have $75 
billion or more in (1) average nonbank assets, (2) average weighted 
short-term wholesale funding, or (3) average off-balance sheet 
exposure, that are not subject to Category I or II requirements. 
Category III requirements also apply to depository institution 
subsidiaries of these top-tier banking organizations, each with $10 
billion or more in consolidated assets. Category IV requirements apply 
to top-tier depository institution holding companies or U.S. 
intermediate holding companies that in each case have $100 billion or 
more in consolidated assets and $50 billion or more in average weighted 
short-term wholesale funding that are not subject to Category I, II or 
III requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See supra note 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the tailoring final rule, covered companies in Category I and 
II, or in Category III with $75 billion or more in average weighted 
short-term wholesale funding are subject to the full requirements of 
the LCR rule. All other covered companies in Category III and covered 
companies in Category IV with $50 billion or more in average weighted 
short-term wholesale funding are subject to a reduced LCR requirement 
calibrated at 85 percent and 70 percent, respectively. The calibration 
approaches outlined in the tailoring proposals and tailoring final rule 
were designed to better align the regulatory requirements of banking 
organizations with their risk profiles, taking into account their size 
and complexity, as well as their potential impact on systemic risk.
    The final rule adopts the risk-based category approach used in the 
tailoring final rule for purposes of applying the NSFR. The application 
of the NSFR requirements to specific entities based on their tailoring 
category is discussed further below.
2. Applicability of the Final Rule to U.S. Intermediate Holding 
Companies and Use of the Risk-Based Indicators
    The tailoring proposals would have applied liquidity requirements 
to foreign banking organizations based on the risk profile of their 
combined U.S. operations. Specifically, the proposed NSFR requirements 
would have applied to a foreign banking organization based on the 
combined risk profile of its U.S. intermediate holding company and any 
U.S. branches or agencies, as measured by the risk-based 
indicators.\51\
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    \51\ The tailoring proposals also sought comment on whether 
standardized liquidity requirements, such as the LCR and NSFR, 
should apply to the U.S. branches and agencies of a foreign banking 
organization to complement the internal liquidity stress testing 
standards that currently apply to these entities. As described in 
the tailoring final rule, the Board continues to consider whether to 
develop and propose for implementation a standardized liquidity 
requirement with respect to the U.S. branches and agencies of 
foreign banking organizations. See 84 FR at 59257. Any such 
requirement would be subject to notice and comment as part of a 
separate rulemaking process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Most commenters argued that the NSFR requirement should apply 
directly to a U.S. intermediate holding company of a foreign banking 
organization based on the U.S. intermediate holding company's risk 
profile. Some commenters further asserted that no NSFR requirement 
should be imposed on U.S. intermediate holding companies in view of the 
application of the NSFR under home country standards to the top-tier 
foreign parent. These commenters argued that the application of an NSFR 
requirement to U.S. intermediate holding companies is inconsistent with 
the principles of national treatment and equality of competitive 
opportunity because mid-tier U.S. bank holding companies of a similar 
size and risk profile would not be subject to an NSFR requirement but 
rather would be reflected in the NSFR applied at the top-tier 
consolidated U.S. parent. Other commenters argued that the liquidity 
requirements that apply to foreign banking organizations' U.S. 
operations, such as internal liquidity stress testing and liquidity 
risk management standards, and total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) 
instruments issued by U.S. intermediate holding companies make the 
application of the NSFR rule unnecessary for such companies. In 
addition, some commenters argued that U.S. intermediate holding 
companies should not be subject to the NSFR rule until after the 
agencies have conducted an impact analysis. By contrast, other 
commenters supported the proposed application of an NSFR requirement to 
a U.S. intermediate holding company based on the risk profile of the 
combined U.S. operations of the foreign banking organization.
    A U.S. intermediate holding company poses risks in the United 
States similar to domestic banking organizations of a similar size and 
risk profile, even if the parent foreign banking organization is 
subject to an NSFR requirement in its home jurisdiction. The LCR rule, 
the Board's enhanced prudential standards rule, and the final rule 
apply to applicable U.S. banking organizations on a global consolidated 
basis and incorporate certain liquidity risks posed by mid-tier holding 
companies and their subsidiaries.\52\ For this reason, such 
requirements do not apply directly to mid-tier holding companies on a 
standalone basis. Consistent with the LCR rule and the Board's enhanced 
prudential standards rule, the final rule applies to a U.S. 
intermediate holding company of a foreign banking organization because 
of the risks it presents to the U.S. financial system on a consolidated 
basis. However, the final rule does not apply liquidity or funding 
requirements to a subsidiary holding company of a U.S. intermediate 
holding company of a foreign banking organization. Further, for the 
reasons described in section V.A of this Supplementary Information 
section, the NSFR requirement is a complement to the LCR rule and other 
regulatory requirements for banking organizations that can present 
material risks to the U.S. financial system. In light of these 
concerns, the agencies are applying an NSFR requirement to U.S. 
intermediate holding companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ The consolidated risks posed by U.S. banking organizations 
to the U.S. financial system also include risks derived from 
foreign-based branches and subsidiaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, consistent with the scope of application of the LCR 
rule, the final rule applies the NSFR requirement to a U.S. 
intermediate holding company based on the risk profile of the U.S. 
intermediate holding company, rather than on the combined U.S. 
operations of the foreign banking organization.\53\ Specifically, the 
final rule applies a full NSFR or reduced NSFR requirement to a U.S. 
intermediate holding company under the risk-based categories based on 
measures of the U.S. intermediate holding company's risk-based 
indicators. This approach helps to enhance the efficiency of NSFR 
requirements relative to the proposal, because stable funding 
requirements that apply to a U.S. intermediate holding company are 
based on the U.S.

[[Page 9130]]

intermediate holding company's risk profile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See supra note 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. NSFR Minimum Requirements Under the Final Rule: Applicability and 
Calibration
    A number of commenters argued that the re-proposed scope of 
applicability of the NSFR requirement was too stringent. Some 
commenters argued that smaller regional banking organizations should 
not be subject to the NSFR rule and that NSFR requirements for Category 
IV banking organizations should be eliminated. By contrast, other 
commenters argued that the tailoring proposals would tailor NSFR 
requirements in a way that would weaken the safety and soundness of 
large banking organizations and increase risks to U.S. financial 
stability. Some commenters argued that full NSFR requirements should 
apply to all covered companies until after the final rule has been 
effective for a sufficiently long period of time for the agencies to 
evaluate its efficacy. Other commenters advocated for further tailoring 
of the NSFR requirements.
    For the reasons discussed below, the final rule generally retains 
the NSFR requirements described under the tailoring proposals. The 
final rule adopts a reduced NSFR requirement calibrated to 85 percent 
of the full NSFR requirement for Category III banking organizations 
with less than $75 billion in weighted short-term wholesale funding, 
and to 70 percent of the full NSFR requirement for Category IV banking 
organizations with $50 billion or more in weighted short-term wholesale 
funding.\54\ Consistent with the tailoring proposals, depository 
institution subsidiaries with less than $10 billion in total 
consolidated assets would not be subject to an NSFR requirement. 
Moreover, no NSFR requirement applies at the subsidiary depository 
institution-level under Category IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Under the final rule, a banking organization applies the 
appropriate adjustment factor to its calculated RSF amount (required 
stable funding adjustment percentage), by multiplying its RSF amount 
by its required stable funding adjustment percentage. Banking 
organizations subject to the full NSFR requirement apply a 100 
percent required stable funding adjustment percentage. Banking 
organizations subject to a reduced NSFR requirement apply an 85 or 
70 percent required stable funding adjustment percentage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a) NSFR Requirements Under Category I
    Consistent with the scope of application of the LCR rule, the 
tailoring proposals would have applied full NSFR requirements to 
covered companies that meet the criteria for Category I. The agencies 
did not receive comments on the application of the NSFR requirement 
under Category I and are finalizing this aspect as proposed.
b) NSFR Requirements Under Category II
    The tailoring proposals would have applied the full NSFR 
requirement to covered companies that meet the criteria for Category 
II. Some commenters argued that Category II should include a reduced 
NSFR requirement to reflect the lower risk profile of Category II 
banking organizations relative to those in Category I. Specifically, 
these commenters argued certain banking organizations in Category II 
present relatively lower stable funding risks than Category I banking 
organizations due to such banking organizations' concentration in 
custody activities and use of operational deposits.
    Similar to U.S. GSIBs and their large depository institution 
subsidiaries, banking organizations that meet the criteria for Category 
II provide material levels of financial intermediation within the 
United States or internationally, and the NSFR helps to ensure that 
such banking organizations have appropriate funding to be in a position 
to sustain the necessary intermediation activities over a range of 
conditions. Additionally, the failure or distress of banking 
organizations that meet the criteria for Category II could impose 
significant costs on the U.S. financial system and economy. For 
example, any very large or global banking organization, including one 
that has a significant custody business, that is subject to asset fire 
sales resulting from funding disruptions is likely to transmit distress 
on a broader scale because of the greater volume of assets it may sell 
and the number of its counterparties across multiple jurisdictions. 
Similarly, a banking organization with significant international 
activity is more exposed to the risk of ring-fencing of funding 
resources by one or more jurisdictions. Ring-fencing may hamper the 
movement of funding, regardless of the level of custody business. More 
generally, the overall size of a banking organization's operations, 
material transactions in foreign jurisdictions, and the use of overseas 
funding sources add complexity to the management of the banking 
organization's funding profile. For these reasons, the agencies are 
adopting the proposal to apply the full NSFR requirement to Category II 
banking organizations.
c) NSFR Requirements Under Category III
    As described above, the tailoring proposals would have 
differentiated NSFR requirements in Category III based on whether the 
level of average weighted short-term wholesale funding of a banking 
organization was at least $75 billion and sought comment on the 
calibration of the reduced NSFR requirement.
    Some commenters argued that Category III banking organizations with 
less than $75 billion in average weighted short-term wholesale funding 
should not be subject to a reduced NSFR requirement. By contrast, many 
commenters expressed support for a reduced NSFR requirement under 
Category III, and generally recommended that such requirement be 
calibrated to 70 percent of the full NSFR requirement, consistent with 
the calibration of the Board's previously proposed modified NSFR 
requirement. In addition, several of these commenters argued that the 
reduced NSFR requirement should apply only to holding companies.
    To improve the calibration of a banking organization's minimum ASF 
amount relative to its funding profile and its potential risk to U.S. 
financial stability, the final rule differentiates between banking 
organizations based on their category and their reliance on short-term 
wholesale funding. As discussed in the tailoring final rule, ongoing 
reliance on short-term, wholesale funding can make a banking 
organization more vulnerable to safety and soundness and financial 
stability risks. Accordingly, under the final rule, a banking 
organization subject to Category III standards with average weighted 
short-term wholesale funding of $75 billion or more is subject to the 
full NSFR requirement.
    A banking organization subject to Category III standards with 
average weighted short-term wholesale funding of less than $75 billion 
is subject to a reduced NSFR requirement calibrated at 85 percent of 
the full NSFR requirement. An 85 percent calibration is appropriate for 
these banking organizations because they are less likely to contribute 
to a systemic event relative to similarly sized banking organizations 
that have a greater reliance on short-term wholesale funding and 
therefore, are more complex, and whose distress or failure is more 
likely to have greater systemic impact.
    As a general matter, the alignment of the reduced NSFR with the 
Board's initially proposed modified NSFR

[[Page 9131]]

would not be appropriate because each of these requirements was 
designed to address different risk profiles. The Board designed the 
modified NSFR for smaller U.S. holding companies with less complex 
business models and more limited potential impact on U.S. financial 
stability compared to banking organizations that would be subject to 
the reduced NSFR requirement.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ The Board's initially proposed modified NSFR applied to 
depository holding companies with between $50 billion and less than 
$250 billion in total assets whereas the tailoring proposal would 
have applied Category III requirements to banking organizations that 
either have $250 billion or more in total assets or have $100 
billion or more in total assets as well as heightened levels of off-
balance sheet exposure, nonbank assets, or weighted short-term 
wholesale funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d) NSFR Requirements Under Category IV
    Under the tailoring proposals, a Category IV banking organization 
with average weighted short-term wholesale funding of $50 billion or 
more would have been required to comply with a reduced NSFR requirement 
of between 70 and 85 percent. However, the reduced NSFR requirement 
under Category IV would not have applied to standalone depository 
institutions or at the level of a subsidiary depository institution.
    Some commenters argued that all banking organizations subject to 
Category IV should be subject to an NSFR requirement and that the 
requirement could be further modified or simplified for these 
organizations, as appropriate. In contrast, other commenters argued for 
the removal of any NSFR requirement for all banking organizations 
subject to Category IV.
    For a banking organization with total consolidated assets of at 
least $100 billion and less than $250 billion, average weighted short-
term wholesale funding of $50 billion or more demonstrates a material 
reliance on short-term, generally uninsured funding from more 
sophisticated counterparties, which can make a banking organization 
more vulnerable to large-scale funding runs, generating both safety and 
soundness and financial stability risks. Accordingly, such a banking 
organization is relatively more vulnerable to the funding stability 
risks addressed by the reduced NSFR requirement relative to similarly 
sized banking organizations that rely more heavily on stable funding 
such as retail deposits and have traditional balance sheet structures. 
The application of the NSFR requirement, albeit at a reduced level, is 
therefore appropriate for these banking organizations given their lower 
potential impact on systemic risk.
    The final rule calibrates the minimum reduced NSFR requirement 
under Category IV at a level equivalent to 70 percent of the minimum 
level required under Category I and II. The difference between the 85 
percent reduced NSFR calibration in Category III and the reduced 70 
percent LCR calibration in Category IV reflects the differences in risk 
profiles of banking organizations subject to each respective 
requirement. The 70 percent calibration recognizes that these banking 
organizations are less complex and smaller than other banking 
organizations subject to more stringent requirements under the final 
rule and would likely have more modest systemic impact than larger, 
more complex banking organizations if they experienced funding 
disruptions. Banking organizations that are not subject to Category I, 
II or III requirements and that have average weighted short-term 
wholesale funding of less than $50 billion are not subject to an NSFR 
requirement under the final rule. Depository institution subsidiaries 
of banking organizations subject to Category IV requirements are not 
subject to an NSFR requirement.
4. Applicability to Depository Institution Subsidiaries
    As described above, the tailoring proposals would have applied the 
same NSFR requirement to top-tier banking organizations subject to 
Category I, II, or III standards and to their subsidiary depository 
institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets.
    Although a number of commenters generally supported the application 
of consistent requirements for U.S. depository institutions holding 
companies and their depository institution subsidiaries, many 
commenters requested that the agencies eliminate the application of the 
NSFR requirement to depository institutions that are consolidated 
subsidiaries of covered companies. These commenters stated that the 
NSFR rule should recognize that the holding company structure in the 
United States allows for banking organizations to manage liquidity 
across the broader corporate group and provides firms with flexibility 
regarding where liquidity is held within the corporate structure. These 
commenters also argued that an NSFR requirement for a consolidated 
depository institution is unnecessary in view of the supervisory 
monitoring and prudential limits applicable to the depository 
institution's funding structure, as well as the source of strength 
requirements that obligate the parent to remediate any funding 
deficiencies at a subsidiary depository institution. Alternatively, 
these commenters suggested that the agencies should rely on their 
supervisory authority to ensure stable funding for depository 
institutions. The commenters also requested that, if the agencies apply 
the NSFR requirement to depository institutions, an exemption should 
apply to depository institutions that comprise 85 percent or more of 
the assets of the consolidated organization. Commenters supporting such 
an approach stated that the costs of separately applying an NSFR at the 
subsidiary depository institution-level would outweigh any benefits.
    The proposed treatment would have aligned with the agencies' 
longstanding policy of applying similar standards to holding companies 
and their depository institution subsidiaries. Large depository 
institution subsidiaries play a significant role in a banking 
organization's funding structure, and in the operation of the payments 
system. Such entities should have sufficient amounts of stable funding 
to meet their funding needs rather than be overly reliant on their 
parents or affiliates. In addition, these large subsidiaries generally 
have access to deposit insurance coverage and, as a result, application 
of standardized funding requirements would help to reduce the potential 
for losses to the FDIC's deposit insurance fund. Accordingly, the final 
rule maintains the application of an NSFR requirement to covered 
depository institution subsidiaries as proposed.

VI. Definitions

    The proposed rule would have shared definitions with the LCR rule 
and would have been codified in the same part of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as the LCR rule for each of the agencies.\56\ The proposed 
rule also would have revised certain of the existing definitions under 
the LCR rule and adopted new definitions for purposes of both the LCR 
and NSFR rules. The agencies received a number of comments regarding 
the proposed definitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ 12 CFR part 50 (OCC); 12 CFR part 249 (Board); 12 CFR part 
329 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that certain of the LCR rule's definitions are 
flawed and should not be used for purposes of the NSFR rule because 
they are the result of an internationally negotiated standard that was 
not properly calibrated to reflect U.S. market conditions or U.S. 
banking organizations' practices. As discussed in section V.C of this 
Supplementary Information section, to the extent that the final rule 
incorporates definitions

[[Page 9132]]

also used in the LCR rule, their usage in the final rule generally 
reflects assumptions specific to the final rule. The agencies also note 
that these common definitions include defined terms that are not 
included in the Basel LCR standard, but are specific to U.S. markets 
and banking organizations. For example, the definitions for certain 
types of brokered deposits and collateralized deposits are not included 
in the Basel LCR standard or the Basel NSFR standard. In addition, the 
final rule has tailored certain definitions, such as the definition of 
``operational deposit,'' for the U.S. market. The use of common 
definitions across the regulatory framework, as appropriate, helps to 
minimize compliance costs, facilitate comparability across banking 
organizations, and reduce regulatory burden. Comments regarding 
specific defined terms are discussed below. For ease of convenience, 
the following discussion refers to Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule, even 
though the definitions found in Sec.  __.3 will apply to both the LCR 
rule and final rule.

A. Revisions to Existing Definitions

    The proposed rule would have amended the following definitions that 
were included in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule: ``calculation date,'' 
``collateralized deposits,'' ``committed,'' ``covered nonbank 
company,'' ``operational deposit,'' ``secured funding transaction,'' 
``secured lending transaction,'' and ``unsecured wholesale funding.''
1. Revised Definitions for Which the Agencies Received no Comments
    The proposed rule would have amended the existing definition of 
``calculation date,'' ``committed,'' and ``covered nonbank company'' in 
Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule. The agencies received no comments on the 
changes to these definitions and are adopting these revised definitions 
as proposed.
    Calculation date. The final rule amends to the definition of 
``calculation date'' in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule to include any date 
on which a covered company calculates its NSFR for purposes of Sec.  
__.100 of the final rule.
    Committed. The definition of ``committed'' in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR 
rule provides the criteria under which a credit facility or liquidity 
facility is considered committed for purposes of the LCR rule. To more 
clearly reflect the intended meaning of ``committed,'' the final rule, 
consistent with the proposed rule, amends the definition to state that 
a credit or liquidity facility is committed if it is not 
unconditionally cancelable under the terms of the facility. Consistent 
with the agencies' risk-based capital rule, the final rule defines 
``unconditionally cancelable'' to mean that a covered company may 
refuse to extend credit under the facility at any time, including 
without cause (to the extent permitted under applicable law).\57\ For 
example, a credit or liquidity facility that permits a covered company 
to refuse to extend credit only upon the occurrence of a specified 
event (such as a material adverse change) would not be considered 
unconditionally cancelable, and therefore the facility would be 
considered ``committed'' under the final rule. Conversely, a credit or 
liquidity facility that the covered company may cancel without cause 
would be considered unconditionally cancelable because the covered 
company may refuse to extend credit under the facility at any time, and 
therefore the facility would not be considered ``committed.'' For 
example, credit card lines that are cancelable without cause (to the 
extent permitted under applicable law), as is generally the case, are 
not considered committed under the amendment to the definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ See 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 324.2 
(FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Covered nonbank company. Consistent with the proposed rule, the 
final rule revises the definition of ``covered nonbank company'' to 
clarify that if the Board requires a company designated by the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for Board supervision to 
comply with the LCR rule or the final rule, it will do so through a 
rulemaking that is separate from the LCR rule and the final rule or by 
issuing an order.
2. Revised Definitions for Which the Agencies Received Comments
    The agencies received comments on the following proposed amendments 
to existing definitions that are included in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR 
rule: ``collateralized deposit,'' ``operational deposit,'' ``secured 
funding transaction,'' ``secured lending transaction,'' and ``unsecured 
wholesale funding.''
    Collateralized Deposit. The proposed rule would have amended the 
definition of ``collateralized deposit'' to include those deposits of a 
fiduciary account collateralized as required under state law, as 
applicable to state member and nonmember banks and state savings 
associations. In addition, the proposed rule would have amended the 
definition to include those deposits of a fiduciary account held at a 
covered company for which a depository institution affiliate of the 
covered company is a fiduciary and that the covered company has opted 
to collateralize pursuant to 12 CFR 9.10(c) (for national banks) or 12 
CFR 150.310 (for federal savings associations).
    The agencies received two comments regarding the definition of 
``collateralized deposit.'' One commenter supported the proposed 
amendment to include fiduciary deposits collateralized as required 
under state law, as applicable to state member banks, state nonmember 
banks, and state savings associations. The other commenter requested 
that the agencies revise the definition to include secured sweep 
repurchase arrangements, which the commenter described as arrangements 
that allow a customer's balances to be temporarily ``swept'' out of a 
deposit account and into a secured non-deposit funding arrangement with 
the covered company. The commenter argued that secured sweep repurchase 
arrangements are distinct from other secured funding transactions, 
including wholesale funding offered by a broker-dealer, because they 
are typically tied to operational accounts and involve an automated 
sweep of corporate client funds into a secured sweep repurchase 
account, thus posing, in the commenter's view, less liquidity risk. The 
commenter argued that secured sweep repurchase arrangements are similar 
to secured deposit funding because the arrangements are offered as part 
of a broader business relationship between a covered company and a 
customer and, therefore, should not be subject to the unwind provisions 
in Sec.  __.21 of the LCR rule.
    The final rule adopts the amended definition of ``collateralized 
deposit'' as proposed with an adjustment to expressly include deposits 
of a fiduciary account collateralized pursuant to state law 
requirements for which a covered company's depository institution 
affiliate is a fiduciary. The agencies defined ``collateralized 
deposit'' to identify a narrow set of secured funding transactions that 
should not be subject to the unwind provision in the LCR rule for a 
covered company when determining its HQLA amount.\58\ The agencies 
excluded such deposits from the unwind provision based on their unique 
characteristics, including, among other things, that such deposits 
``are required to be collateralized under applicable law'' and that 
``the banking relationship associated with collateralized deposit can 
be different in nature from shorter-term repurchase and

[[Page 9133]]

reverse repurchase agreements.'' \59\ The revised definition includes 
deposits of a fiduciary account collateralized pursuant to state law 
requirements or at the covered company's discretion pursuant to 12 CFR 
9.10(c) (for national banks) or 12 CFR 150.310 (for federal savings 
associations) in order to provide consistent treatment to deposits that 
are subject to collateralization requirements or have been 
collateralized. Additionally, temporary secured sweep repurchase 
arrangements, including those offered part of a broader business 
relationship, that will mature in 30 calendar days or less of an LCR 
calculation date may affect a covered company's excess HQLA amount 
similar to other wholesale secured funding transactions conducted by a 
broker-dealer and do not qualify for the treatment afforded to 
collateralized deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See Sec.  __.21 of the LCR rule. Certain secured funding 
transactions other than collateralized deposits are used in 
calculating adjusted liquid asset amounts for determining the 
adjusted excess HQLA amount under the LCR rule.
    \59\ 79 FR at 61473.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Operational Deposit. The proposed rule would have amended the 
definition of ``operational deposit'' to include both deposits received 
by the covered company in connection with operational services provided 
by the covered company and deposits placed by the covered company in 
connection with operational services received by the covered company. 
The proposed rule also would have amended this definition to clarify 
that only deposits can qualify. Further, because operational deposits 
are limited to accounts that facilitate short-term transactional cash 
flows associated with operational services, operational deposits also 
should only have short-term maturities, falling within the proposed 
rule's less-than-six-month maturity category and generally within the 
LCR rule's 30-calendar-day period. Further, because operational 
deposits are limited to accounts that facilitate short-term 
transactional cash flows associated with operational services, 
operational deposits also should only have short-term maturities, 
falling within the proposed rule's less-than-six-month maturity 
category and generally within the LCR rule's 30-calendar-day period. 
Notwithstanding the proposed revisions to this definition, the 
treatment of operational deposits under Sec. Sec.  __.32 and __.33 of 
the LCR rule would have remained the same.
    The agencies received a number of comments regarding the proposed 
definition of ``operational deposit.'' Some commenters requested 
removal of the limitation that operational deposits cannot be provided 
by non-regulated funds. These commenters argued that a deposit placed 
at a covered company by a non-regulated fund for the provision of 
operational services would have similar liquidity risks as a deposit 
placed by a regulated fund for the same operational purposes.\60\ One 
commenter argued that the exclusion of deposits placed by a non-
regulated fund lacks a clear policy rationale and is unduly strict 
towards the custody bank business model. The commenter also argued that 
this exclusion is more stringent than the treatment of operational 
deposits in the Basel LCR standard. The commenter expressed concern 
that retaining this exclusion could undermine the current trend among 
non-regulated funds of separating the safekeeping and administration of 
their investment assets from their trading and financing activities. A 
commenter also asserted this exclusion is unnecessary because the risk 
associated with operational deposits from non-regulated funds is 
addressed sufficiently by the exclusion of deposits provided in 
connection with a covered company's provision of prime brokerage 
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See Sec.  __.4(b)(6) of the LCR rule; 79 FR at 61501. This 
section provides that operational deposits do not include deposits 
that are provided in connection with the covered company's provision 
of prime brokerage services, which include operational services 
provided to a non-regulated fund. Section __.3 of the LCR rule 
defines a ``non-regulated fund'' as any hedge fund or private equity 
fund whose investment adviser is required to file SEC Form PF 
(Reporting Form for Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain 
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors), other than 
a small business investment company as defined in section 102 of the 
Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that the definition of ``operational deposit'' 
should not be limited to deposits. The commenter suggested instead that 
the definition should be revised to include non-deposit unsecured 
wholesale funding that matures within the LCR rule's 30-day time 
horizon, in order to include arrangements that allow an operational 
customer's balances to be temporarily swept out of a deposit account 
into non-deposit products until such time as the funds are needed to 
meet operational demands. The commenter argued that excluding such 
arrangements from the definition of ``operational deposit'' could 
underrepresent the amount of a covered company's funding that is 
associated with the provision of operational services over the LCR 
rule's 30-day time horizon.
    Operational deposit are deposits necessary for the covered company 
to provide operational services, as that term is defined in Sec.  __.3 
of the LCR rule, to the wholesale customer or counterparty providing 
the deposit.\61\ Among other things, the definition requires compliance 
with certain operational requirements of Sec.  __.4 of the LCR rule in 
order for a deposit to be recognized as an operational deposit 
(operational requirements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See 79 FR at 61498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The exclusion of deposits provided by non-regulated funds is 
appropriate because, in general, non-regulated funds tend to be 
sophisticated and are more likely than many other types of 
counterparties to engage in higher-risk trading strategies involving 
leverage, which may result in higher cash needs due to collateral calls 
and less stable deposit balances during certain market conditions. In 
comparison to non-financial wholesale counterparties or regulated 
financial sector entities, it is also more likely that operational 
activities at a non-regulated fund would be impacted by the performance 
of the fund's investment or trading activity that relies upon prime 
brokerage services, and thus it would be more difficult to separate its 
deposit balances that are necessary to maintain operational activities 
from its balances that support trading and investment activities that 
rely on prime brokerage services (even if these services are provided 
by different entities of a covered company). As a result, deposits from 
non-regulated funds may present heightened funding risk relative to 
deposits from other counterparties.
    In addition, operational deposit balances swept out of a deposit 
account and into non-deposit products will not be eligible to be 
considered ``operational deposits''. The LCR rule provides that in 
order to be recognized as an operational deposit, any excess amount not 
linked to operational services must be excluded.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See Sec.  __.4(b)(5) of the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the preamble to the LCR rule noted, operational deposits are 
assigned a lower outflow rate under the LCR rule compared to other 
short-term wholesale funding due to the perceived stability arising 
from the relationship between a covered company and a depositor, the 
necessity of the deposit for the provision of operational services, and 
the switching costs associated with moving such deposits.\63\ In 
contrast, excess funds, including funds that are swept into non-deposit 
products until funds are needed to meet operational demands, are not 
necessary for the provision of operational services and therefore do 
not exhibit these

[[Page 9134]]

characteristics.\64\ Furthermore, the LCR rule excludes from 
operational deposits those deposits held in an account that is designed 
to incentivize customers to maintain excess funds in the account 
through increased revenue, reduction in fees, or other economic 
incentives.\65\ Because the sweep arrangements described by the 
commenter are typically used to increase returns on deposits, the 
continued exclusion of these sweep arrangements from the definition of 
``operational deposit'' is consistent with this treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See 79 FR at 61497-502.
    \64\ See 79 FR at 61500.
    \65\ See Sec.  __.4(b)(4) of the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, the final rule adopts the amended definition of 
``operational deposits'' as proposed.
    Secured Funding Transaction and Secured Lending Transaction. The 
proposed rule would have revised the definitions of ``secured funding 
transaction'' and ``secured lending transaction'' to clarify that (i) 
the transactions must be secured by a lien on securities or loans, 
rather than secured by a lien on other assets; (ii) the definitions 
include only transactions with wholesale customers or counterparties, 
and (iii) securities issued or owned by a covered company do not 
constitute secured funding or lending transactions.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ As noted in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule and the proposed 
rule, the definition of ``secured funding transaction'' also 
includes repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions, 
and the definition of ``secured lending transaction'' also includes 
reverse repurchase agreements and securities borrowing transactions, 
as these transactions result in the equivalent of a lien, securing 
the cash leg of the transaction, that gives the asset borrower 
priority over the asset in the event the covered company or the 
counterparty, as applicable, enters into receivership, bankruptcy, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter recommended amending the definitions of ``secured 
funding transaction'' and ``secured lending transaction'' by replacing 
``securities'' with ``financial assets'' in order to broaden the forms 
of collateral that may be used in transactions that meet the 
definitions. Specifically, the commenter argued that short-term debt, 
commercial paper, gold, and certain other assets should be permitted 
forms of collateral because they effectively reduce the risk associated 
with secured transactions. The same commenter also requested that the 
definition of ``secured lending transaction'' be expanded to include 
certain transactions with retail customers, and, in particular, open-
maturity loans to retail customers collateralized by customer 
securities, such as a margin loan. The commenter asserted that a 
securities-based loan to a retail counterparty has similar 
characteristics to an open-maturity reverse repurchase agreement with a 
wholesale counterparty, including that the transaction is fully secured 
by the borrower's collateral, the lender has a legal right and 
operational ability to close out the loan upon default by the 
counterparty and sell the collateral to offset the lender's credit 
exposure, and the maturity of the loan extends each day that a notice 
of termination is not provided.
    Under the LCR rule, the cash flows associated with secured funding 
and secured lending transactions take into account the relative 
liquidity of the cash and marketable collateral that will be exchanged 
at the maturity of the transaction and recognize that collateral in the 
form of HQLA securities tends to be the most liquid. By contrast, 
collateral that is not generally traded in liquid markets, including 
property, plant, and equipment, may provide limited liquidity value, 
particularly relative to the LCR rule's time horizon. While collateral 
that is not in the form of securities or loans may serve to mitigate 
credit risk, in the agencies' experience, the cash flows on lending 
secured by such collateral, including the likelihood of renewing the 
lending at maturity, depend to a greater degree on the characteristics 
of the counterparty rather than the collateral, thus making the 
liquidity risk associated with such arrangements more akin to that of 
unsecured lending. Accordingly, such lending transactions should not 
necessarily receive a 100 percent inflow rate under the LCR rule; 
rather, the inflow rate should depend on the characteristics of the 
borrower, which more accurately reflect the likelihood that a covered 
company will be able to realize inflows from or roll over some or all 
of the loan during a period of significant stress. In contrast to their 
contributions to total net cash outflows under the LCR rule, the 
contributions of secured loan assets and secured funding liabilities to 
the funding risk of a covered company's aggregate balance sheet 
generally depend on their maturities and counterparty characteristics 
and the final rule generally treats secured and unsecured wholesale 
transactions similarly.
    In addition, while there is no defined term ``securities'' in the 
LCR rule, the agencies are clarifying that a funding transaction that 
is not a security, is conducted with a wholesale customer or 
counterparty, and is secured under applicable law by a lien on third-
party short-term debt or commercial paper provided by a covered company 
would qualify as a secured funding transaction. Similarly, a lending 
transaction that is not a security, is conducted with a wholesale 
customer or counterparty, and is secured under applicable law by a lien 
on third-party short-term debt or commercial paper provided by the 
wholesale customer or counterparty would qualify as a secured lending 
transaction. However, secured funding and lending transactions where 
the collateral is in the form of gold or other commodities would not 
meet the definition of a secured funding transaction or secured lending 
transaction. These assets exhibit an increased volatility in market 
value and there are logistical factors associated with holding and 
liquidating these assets as compared to loans and securities.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ The LCR rule for similar reasons does not include gold 
bullion as a level 1 liquid asset. See 79 FR at 61456.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule adopts the amended definitions of ``secured funding 
transaction'' and ``secured lending transaction'' as proposed. Under 
the final rule, the definitions of ``secured funding transaction'' and 
``secured lending transaction'' include only transactions with 
wholesale customers or counterparties. Secured lending transactions do 
not include secured lending to a retail customer or counterparty, such 
as a retail margin loan. For purposes of the LCR rule generally, 
secured lending transactions categorize certain lending to a wholesale 
customer or counterparty where the expectation is that the transaction 
may mature in the near term with the covered company receiving cash 
from the counterparty and being required to return collateral to the 
counterparty.\68\ In contrast, the treatment of retail exposures 
generally reflects the agencies' expectation that a covered company 
will need to maintain a portion of retail lending even during stress, 
regardless of collateralization.\69\ As noted above, RSF factors 
assigned to unencumbered loans to retail and wholesale customers and 
counterparties under the final rule reflect their maturity and 
counterparty, rather than collateralization, and the RSF factors 
assigned to secured retail lending are the same as for secured lending 
to non-financial sector wholesale counterparties. As a result, the 
final rule, like the proposed rule, categorizes secured lending to a 
retail customer or counterparty separately from secured lending 
transactions with wholesale customers or counterparties for

[[Page 9135]]

purposes of assigning RSF factors under the NSFR requirement.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See 79 FR at 61513.
    \69\ See 79 FR at 61512.
    \70\ See section VII.D of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, under the final rule securities issued or owned by a 
covered company do not constitute secured funding or lending 
transactions. For example, asset-backed securities issued by a special 
purpose entity that a covered company consolidates on its balance sheet 
are not secured funding transactions. Similarly, securities owned by a 
covered company where contractual payments to the covered company are 
collateralized are not secured lending transactions.
    Unsecured wholesale funding. The proposed rule would have amended 
the definition of ``unsecured wholesale funding'' to mean a liability 
or general obligation of a covered company to a wholesale customer or 
counterparty that is not a secured funding transaction. The agencies 
received one comment regarding this proposed definition. The commenter 
asserted that, although ``asset exchange'' is separately defined in the 
LCR rule, an asset exchange could nonetheless fall under the definition 
of ``unsecured wholesale funding'' because it could be viewed as a 
liability or general obligation that is not a secured funding 
transaction if entered into with a wholesale customer or counterparty.
    The final rule adopts the amended definition of ``unsecured 
wholesale funding'' as proposed with an adjustment to expressly exclude 
asset exchanges. Under the final rule, secured funding with a wholesale 
counterparty that does not meet the revised definition of ``secured 
funding transaction'' generally meets the definition of ``unsecured 
wholesale funding.'' However, consistent with the agencies' intent to 
provide a special framework for asset exchanges, the definitions of 
``unsecured wholesale funding'' and ``unsecured wholesale lending'' in 
the final rule have been revised to exclude asset exchanges.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ In addition to the unique treatment of asset exchanges in 
Sec.  __.102(c) of the final rule, asset exchanges are also subject 
to special treatment pursuant to Sec.  __.106(d). These treatments 
are discussed further in section VII.D.4 of this Supplementary 
Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Other Definitions and Requirements for Which the Agencies Received 
Comments
    Given that the definitions in the LCR rule would apply to the final 
rule, the proposed rule also requested comment as to whether any other 
existing definitions or terms should be amended. The agencies received 
several comments requesting revisions and clarifications to other 
definitions in the LCR rule that the agencies did not propose to amend.
    Credit and liquidity facility. One commenter requested that the 
agencies provide examples of a lending commitment that would qualify as 
a ``credit facility'' or ``liquidity facility'' under the rules. 
Section __.3 of the LCR rule defines ``credit facility'' to mean a 
legally binding agreement to extend funds if requested at a future 
date, including a general working capital facility such as a revolving 
credit facility for general corporate or working capital purposes.\72\ 
Other examples of credit facilities may include a letter of credit, 
home equity line of credit, or any other legally binding agreement to 
extend funds if requested at a future date that is not included in the 
definition of ``liquidity facility.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ A credit facility does not include a legally binding 
written agreement to extend funds at a future date to a counterparty 
made for the purpose of refinancing the debt of the counterparty 
when it is unable to obtain a primary or anticipated source of 
funding, which is included in the definition of ``liquidity 
facility.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section __.3 of the LCR rule defines ``liquidity facility'' to mean 
a legally binding written agreement to extend funds at a future date to 
a counterparty that is made for the purpose of refinancing the debt of 
the counterparty when it is unable to obtain a primary or anticipated 
source of funding. The definition of ``liquidity facility'' further 
clarifies that it includes an agreement to provide liquidity support to 
asset-backed commercial paper by lending to, or purchasing assets from, 
any structure, program, or conduit in the event that funds are required 
to repay maturing asset-backed commercial paper.\73\ Other examples of 
liquidity facilities include agreements related to non-asset backed 
commercial paper programs, secured financing transactions, securities 
investment vehicles, and conduits that, in each case, meet the 
requirements of the liquidity facility definition in Sec.  __.3 of the 
LCR rule. The LCR rule requires a facility that has characteristics of 
both credit and liquidity facilities to be classified as a liquidity 
facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ A liquidity facility excludes facilities that are 
established solely for the purpose of general working capital, such 
as revolving credit facilities for general corporate or working 
capital purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a commenter asked the agencies to clarify the 
treatment of (1) commercial paper backstop facilities where the 
customer has no commercial paper currently outstanding and (2) 
facilities that are expected to be cancelled without funding, such as 
an unfunded bridge lending facility in connection with a capital 
markets issuance. A commercial paper backstop facility may meet the 
definition of a liquidity facility because the purpose of the facility 
is to provide liquidity support in the future, if needed, regardless of 
whether the customer currently has any commercial paper outstanding or 
not. The determination of whether such a facility is ``committed'' 
likewise would not be impacted by the fact that the customer has no 
amount of commercial paper outstanding, but would depend on whether it 
was ``unconditionally cancelable'' as described above.\74\ With respect 
to an unfunded bridge lending facility in connection with a capital 
markets issuance, the facility may be considered a credit facility if 
its sole purpose is to provide working capital to the issuer prior to 
the capital markets issuance. If, however, the unfunded bridge lending 
facility's purpose at least partially includes providing funds in the 
event that the issuer cannot otherwise refinance its outstanding 
liabilities prior to the capital market issuance, then the facility 
would likely meet the definition of a liquidity facility. Whether a 
facility meets the definition of a credit or liquidity facility at a 
calculation date is not influenced by expectations regarding its future 
cancellation. In addition, the determination of whether such a facility 
is ``committed'' at a calculation date depends on whether it was 
``unconditionally cancelable,'' and would not be impacted by the 
likelihood of its cancellation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ The undrawn amount of the facility would be determined 
under Sec.  __.32(e)(2) of the LCR rule and Sec.  __.106(a)(2) of 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Retail customer or counterparty. Section __.3 of the LCR rule 
defines ``retail customer or counterparty'' to include a living or 
testamentary trust that: (i) Is solely for the benefit of natural 
persons; (ii) does not have a corporate trustee; and (iii) terminates 
within 21 years and 10 months after the death of grantors or 
beneficiaries of the trust living on the effective date of the trust or 
within 25 years, if applicable under state law. One commenter suggested 
changing the definition of ``retail customer or counterparty'' to 
account for certain trusts, such as common trust arrangements with 
corporate trustees that the commenter viewed as akin to a natural 
person. The commenter suggested that a natural person's direct or 
indirect power to control a trust's investment is a better measure for 
assessing whether a trust should be treated for purposes of the LCR and 
NSFR rule as a retail customer or counterparty. The commenter suggested 
that a natural person's direct

[[Page 9136]]

or indirect power to control a trust's investment is a better measure 
for assessing whether a trust should be treated for purposes of the LCR 
and NSFR rules as a retail customer or counterparty.
    The agencies expect that, as a class, living and testamentary 
trusts with corporate trustees are more likely to exhibit behavioral 
traits and sophistication comparable to those of a wholesale rather 
than retail customer or counterparty, even if a natural person has 
indirect authority over the trustee or complementary power to direct 
the trust's investment activity.\75\ For example, despite the authority 
of a natural person to direct the trustee's investment, a corporate 
trustee would be more likely to act for the trust in the manner of a 
financial counterparty. The final rule does not include any change to 
the definition of ``retail customer or counterparty.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Subsequent to the proposal, the agencies issued in October 
2017 frequently asked questions related to the LCR rule, including 
discussion of corporate trustees. See https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/liquidity-coverage-ratio-faqs.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Liquid and readily-marketable. Under the LCR rule, certain assets 
must be liquid and readily-marketable in order to be included as HQLA 
by a covered company. This requirement is intended to ensure that 
assets included as HQLA exhibit a level of liquidity that would allow a 
covered company to convert them into cash during times of stress in 
order to meet its obligations when other sources of liquidity may be 
reduced or unavailable. Under the LCR rule, an asset is liquid and 
readily-marketable if it is traded in an active secondary market with 
more than two committed market makers, a large number of committed non-
market maker participants on both the buying and selling sides of 
transactions, timely and observable market prices, and a high trading 
volume.
    The agencies received several comments and requests for 
clarification on this definition. Several commenters suggested that the 
liquid and readily-marketable criteria are unduly difficult to satisfy. 
One commenter stated that banking organizations have had difficulty 
collecting the data necessary to demonstrate that securities meet these 
criteria, and that the cost of collecting data for certain securities 
that are widely accepted as being liquid and readily-marketable 
outweighs the benefits. Several commenters requested additional 
clarification concerning what is required by each of the elements of 
the liquid and readily-marketable standard. For example, commenters 
requested clarification for how to determine that a market maker is 
``committed,'' that there is a ``large'' number of market participants, 
and that the trading volume for a security is ``high.'' Commenters 
expressed concern that relatively new types of securities and 
securities that are preferred by investors utilizing a ``buy and hold'' 
strategy, including securities of the highest credit quality that have 
strong demand at primary issuance, may not meet the criteria. 
Commenters also expressed concern that there appears to be no widely 
accepted or straightforward method for assessing these criteria.
    Commenters also provided alternative methods to establish that a 
security is liquid and readily-marketable. Several commenters suggested 
that certain asset classes should be presumed to be liquid and readily-
marketable without further analysis if they meet certain criteria. For 
example, commenters suggested that certain securities should be 
presumed to be liquid and readily-marketable, including (i) securities 
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, including 
agency securities, (ii) debt issues of foreign sovereigns that meet 
certain risk weight and other criteria, and (iii) U.S. equities 
included in the Russell 1000 index. These commenters also suggested 
that securities presumed to be liquid and readily-marketable could be 
assessed annually or more frequently to ensure that they are liquid and 
readily-marketable. Another commenter suggested that a security should 
be deemed liquid and readily-marketable if a firm can demonstrate that 
the 30-day trading volume for the security exceeds the firm's holdings 
of that security, or that there has been a purchase in the market for 
each offer to sell the security. One commenter suggested that 
securities should be considered liquid and readily-marketable if other 
securities issued by the same issuer or guaranteed by the same credit 
protection provider have already been deemed liquid and readily-
marketable.
    The LCR rule's definition of ``liquid and readily-marketable'' is 
intended to complement other restrictions on the assets that can 
potentially be included in HQLA. Within the universe of possible HQLA, 
the criteria in the definition are not overly prescriptive given the 
divergence of trading frequency and practices. Suggestions to more 
narrowly define these criteria would be difficult to apply because of 
the different market structures for different asset classes. In 
response to commenters' requests for clarification, this Supplementary 
Information section describes the agencies' general expectations 
regarding how assets may satisfy the definition's criteria.
    The agencies do not expect covered companies to conduct the liquid 
and readily-marketable analysis on a daily basis. However, the agencies 
expect that covered companies monitor the securities included as HQLA 
and conduct the analysis periodically, especially following a change in 
market conditions. Covered companies should be able to demonstrate that 
they have an appropriate process to regularly review that each security 
meets the liquid and readily-marketable requirements and that they do 
in fact perform this analysis.
    The LCR rule defines ``liquid and readily-marketable'' to mean that 
a given security is traded in an active secondary market that satisfies 
four conditions. The first condition is that the active secondary 
market must have more than two committed market makers. The presence of 
committed market makers is an important characteristic of liquid 
securities markets, to ensure that trades within the market will be 
fulfilled on an ongoing basis. A covered company generally may treat a 
market maker as committed if the market maker has a history of trading 
the security in a substantial volume, particularly during times of 
stress. As with the other criteria necessary for a security to be 
liquid and readily-marketable, once the covered company makes an 
initial determination that a security has more than two committed 
market makers, a periodic review is adequate to confirm the continued 
presence of committed market makers. The second condition is that the 
active secondary market must have a large number of non-market maker 
participants acting as buyers and sellers of the security. The agencies 
generally will consider a security to satisfy this requirement if the 
majority of the trading volume for the security involves non-market 
maker participants. It also may be possible to satisfy this requirement 
for securities traded in secondary markets where most trades are 
between market makers if there are a large number of non-market maker 
participants. The third condition is that the active secondary market 
must have timely and observable market prices. The agencies generally 
expect that securities that trade regularly and at prices that are 
quoted daily can be considered to meet this requirement. The fourth 
condition is that the active secondary market must have a high trading 
volume. The analysis should take into account the depth of the market 
across a range of time periods.

[[Page 9137]]

    Operational Requirements for HQLA. One commenter suggested that the 
agencies eliminate the operational requirement that firms periodically 
monetize a sample of their HQLA held as eligible HQLA through an 
outright sale or pursuant to a repurchase (LCR monetization 
requirement). The commenter argued that if a security already satisfies 
the agencies' liquid and readily-marketable standard, then it is 
unnecessary to also sell the security to demonstrate its liquidity to 
determine that it is eligible HQLA. The commenter also suggested that 
the agencies accept proof that a security has been used to secure a 
loan from a Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) to satisfy the LCR 
monetization requirement. The LCR rule has separate definitions for 
``High-quality liquid assets'' and ``Eligible HQLA'' for distinct 
purposes under the LCR rule. The agencies are retaining the LCR 
monetization requirement in order to ensure a covered company's 
continued access to funds providers and the effectiveness of its 
processes for monetization. While satisfaction of the liquid and 
readily-marketable criteria indicates that a covered company should be 
able to monetize a security, actual monetization confirms the 
security's marketability and confirms that the covered company 
maintains adequate processes for monetizing the security.
3. Other Definitions and Requirements for Which the Agencies Did Not 
Receive Comments
    As noted above in section VI.A.3 of this Supplementary Information 
section, the proposed rule also requested comment as to whether any 
other existing definitions or terms in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule 
should be amended. Although the agencies did not receive specific 
requests to change the definition of ``brokered deposit,'' several 
commenters expressed concern that the FDIC's interpretation of 
``brokered deposit'' is overly broad. The final rule amends certain of 
the definitions related to brokered deposits in Sec.  __.3 to improve 
clarity and consistency with the FDIC's brokered deposit framework.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ The FDIC separately published a proposal in February 2020 
to modernize its brokered deposit regulations, which would establish 
a new framework for analyzing whether deposits placed through 
deposit placement arrangements qualify as brokered deposits (FDIC 
brokered deposit proposal). Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices: 
Brokered Deposits Restrictions, 85 FR 7453 (February 10, 2020). In 
addition, in 2019 the FDIC published a final rule amending its 
brokered deposit regulations to conform with changes to section 29 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) made by section 202 
of EGRRCPA related to reciprocal deposits. See Limited Exception for 
a Capped Amount of Reciprocal Deposits From Treatment as Brokered 
Deposits, 84 FR 1346, 1349 (February 4, 2019), technical amendment 
at 84 FR 15095 (April 15, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section __.3 previously defined a brokered deposit to mean any 
deposit held at the covered company that is obtained, directly or 
indirectly, from or through the mediation or assistance of a deposit 
broker as that term is defined in section 29 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831f(g)) (FDI Act) and includes a reciprocal 
brokered deposit and a brokered sweep deposit. The final rule amends 
this definition by adding a reference to the FDIC's regulations and 
eliminating the reference to reciprocal brokered deposits and brokered 
sweep deposits because not all reciprocal and sweep deposits are 
brokered deposits under section 29 of FDI Act and the FDIC's 
implementing regulations.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ In 2019, the FDIC published a final rule implementing 
section 202 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296-1368 (2018), 
codified at 12 U.S.C. 1831f. 84 FR 1346 (February. 4, 2019). Section 
202 amends section 29 of the FDI Act to except a capped amount of 
reciprocal deposits from treatment as brokered deposits for certain 
insured depository institutions. Additionally, a third party whose 
primary purpose is not the placement of funds with depository 
institutions is not a deposit broker, meaning deposits placed or 
facilitated by such a person are not brokered deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For this reason, the final rule also renames ``brokered sweep 
deposit'' to ``sweep deposit'' and ``reciprocal brokered deposit'' to 
``brokered reciprocal deposit'' wherever these terms appear. These 
clarifications are important in light of ongoing FDIC efforts to update 
the classification of brokered deposits. Under the final rule, the term 
``sweep deposit'' includes deposits that are brokered deposits as well 
as deposits that are not brokered deposits. The term ``reciprocal 
brokered deposits'' only includes deposits that are classified as 
brokered deposits.
    Pursuant to section 553(b)(B) of the APA, general notice and the 
opportunity for public comment are not required with respect to a 
rulemaking when an ``agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the 
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) 
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' The changes to these 
definitions are only intended to clarify the scope of the definitions, 
not substantively alter the definitions or changes the applicable 
outflow or inflow amounts in the LCR rule. Because these changes are 
technical in nature and merely improve the clarity of these definitions 
in the LCR and NSFR rules, the agencies have determined that it is 
unnecessary to provide notice or the opportunity to comment prior to 
adopting these changes to these definitions related to brokered 
deposits.

B. New Definitions

    The proposed rule would have added several new definitions: 
``carrying value,'' ``encumbered,'' ``NSFR regulatory capital 
element,'' ``NSFR liability,'' and ``QMNA netting set,'' and 
``unsecured wholesale lending.''
1. New Definitions for Which the Agencies Received no Comments
    The agencies received no comments on the proposed definitions of 
``carrying value,'' ``encumbered,'' ``NSFR regulatory capital 
element,'' ``NSFR liability,'' and ``QMNA netting set,'' and the final 
rule adopts these definitions as proposed.
    The final rule defines ``carrying value'' to mean the value on a 
covered company's balance sheet of an asset, NSFR regulatory capital 
element, or NSFR liability, as determined in accordance with GAAP. The 
final rule includes this definition because RSF and ASF factors 
generally are applied to the carrying value of a covered company's 
assets, NSFR regulatory capital elements, and NSFR liabilities. By 
relying on values based on GAAP, the final rule aims to ensure 
consistency in the application of the NSFR requirement across covered 
companies and limit operational compliance costs because covered 
companies already prepare financial reports in accordance with GAAP. 
This definition is consistent with the definition used in the agencies' 
regulatory capital rules.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ See 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 324.2 
(FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule's definition of ``encumbered'' uses the criteria for 
an ``unencumbered'' asset found in Sec.  __.22(b) of the LCR rule. The 
definition does not include any substantive changes to the concept of 
encumbrance included in the LCR rule. The final rule uses this 
definition in place of the criteria enumerated in Sec.  __.22(b) of the 
LCR rule. The addition of this definition is necessary to apply the 
concept of encumbrance in Sec. Sec.  __.106(c) and (d) of the final 
rule, which are discussed in sections VII.D of this Supplementary 
Information section.
    Additionally, the final rule defines ``NSFR regulatory capital 
element'' to mean any capital element included in a covered company's 
common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1 capital, and tier 2 
capital, as those terms are defined

[[Page 9138]]

in the agencies' risk-based capital rule, prior to the application of 
capital adjustments or deductions set forth in the agencies' risk-based 
capital rule.\79\ This definition excludes any debt or equity 
instrument that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or 
tier 2 capital instruments in Sec.  __.22 of the agencies' risk-based 
capital rule or that is being phased out of tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
pursuant to subpart G of the agencies' risk-based capital rule.\80\ The 
term ``NSFR regulatory capital element'' includes both equity and 
liabilities under GAAP that meet the requirements of the definition. 
This definition of ``NSFR regulatory capital element'' generally aligns 
with the definition of regulatory capital in the agencies' risk-based 
capital rule, but does not include capital deductions and 
adjustments.\81\ As a result, the final rule requires assets that are 
capital deductions (such as goodwill) to be included in the 
determination of required stable funding, as discussed in section VII.D 
of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR 
part 324 (FDIC).
    \80\ Tier 2 capital instruments that have a remaining maturity 
of less than one year are not included in regulatory capital. See 12 
CFR 3.20(d)(1)(iv) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.20(d)(1)(iv) (Board); 12 CFR 
324.20(d)(1)(iv) (FDIC); see also 12 CFR 3.300 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.300 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.300 (FDIC).
    \81\ The definition of ``NSFR regulatory capital element'' 
includes allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL) to the same 
extent as under the risk-based capital rule. See 12 CFR 3.20(d)(3) 
(OCC); 12 CFR 217.20(d)(3) (Board); 12 CFR 324.20(d)(3) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the final rule defines ``NSFR liability'' to mean any 
liability or equity reported on a covered company's balance sheet that 
is not an ``NSFR regulatory capital element.'' The term ``NSFR 
liability'' primarily refers to balance sheet liabilities but may 
include equity because some equity may not qualify as an ``NSFR 
regulatory capital element.'' The definitions of ``NSFR liability'' and 
``NSFR regulatory capital element,'' taken together, should cover the 
entirety of the liability and equity side of a covered company's 
balance sheet.
    Finally, the final rule defines ``QMNA netting set'' to refer to a 
group of derivative transactions with a single counterparty that is 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement (QMNA),\82\ and is 
netted under the QMNA.\83\ QMNA netting sets include, in addition to 
non-cleared derivative transactions, a group of cleared derivative 
transactions (that is, a group of derivative transactions that have 
been entered into with, or accepted by, a central counterparty (CCP)) 
if the applicable governing rules for the group of cleared derivative 
transactions meet the definition of a QMNA. The term ``QMNA netting 
set'' is used in the calculation of a covered company's stable funding 
requirement attributable to its derivative transactions, as discussed 
in section VII.E of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Each QMNA netting set must meet each of the conditions 
specified in the definition of ``qualifying master netting 
agreement'' under Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule and the operational 
requirements under Sec.  __.4(a) of the LCR rule.
    \83\ A QMNA may identify a single QMNA netting set (for which 
the agreement creates a single net payment obligation and for which 
collection and posting of margin applies on an aggregate net basis) 
or it may establish multiple QMNA netting sets, each of which would 
be separate from and exclusive of any other QMNA netting set or 
derivative transaction covered by the QMNA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. New Definitions for Which the Agencies Received Comments
    Unsecured wholesale lending. The proposed rule would have added a 
definition of ``unsecured wholesale lending'' to mean a liability or 
general obligation of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the 
covered company that is not a secured lending transaction. Similar to 
the comment received regarding the revised definition of ``unsecured 
wholesale funding,'' a commenter noted that an asset exchange could be 
viewed as a liability or general obligation that is not a secured 
lending transaction if entered into with a wholesale customer and 
treated as unsecured wholesale lending under the LCR and NSFR rules. 
For the reasons discussed above in respect to the definition of 
``unsecured wholesale funding,'' the agencies are revising the 
definition of ``unsecured wholesale lending'' to exclude asset 
exchanges.\84\ The final rule otherwise adopts the definition of 
``unsecured wholesale lending'' as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ Under the LCR rule, a covered company should continue to 
look to Sec.  __.33(f) for the appropriate methodology for 
determining inflows with respect to asset exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. NSFR Requirement Under the Final Rule

A. Rules of Construction

    The proposed rule would have included rules of construction in 
Sec.  __.102 relating to how items recorded on a covered company's 
balance sheet would be reflected in the covered company's ASF and RSF 
amounts.
1. Balance-Sheet Values
    As noted above, a covered company generally would have determined 
its ASF and RSF amounts based on the carrying values of its on-balance 
sheet assets, NSFR regulatory capital elements, and NSFR liabilities as 
determined under GAAP. For off-balance sheet assets, the proposed rule 
would have included a rule of construction in Sec.  __.102(a) 
specifying that, unless otherwise provided, a transaction or exposure 
that is not recorded on the balance sheet of a covered company would 
not be assigned an ASF or RSF factor and, conversely, a transaction or 
exposure that is recorded on the balance sheet of the covered company 
would be assigned an ASF or RSF factor. While the proposed rule 
generally would have relied on balance sheet carrying values, it would 
have provided a separate treatment for derivative transactions and the 
undrawn amount of commitments. The proposed rule also would have 
included adjustments to account for certain rehypothecated off-balance 
sheet assets.
    The agencies received several comments regarding the treatment of 
securitization exposures. Two commenters requested that all or certain 
securitization exposures that are included on a covered company's 
balance sheet pursuant to GAAP be excluded from a covered company's 
NSFR.\85\ The commenters argued that the assets and liabilities of the 
securitization vehicle are not owned or owed, respectively, by the 
covered company or that the securitization vehicle normally has no 
legal obligation to make payments when the cash flow from the assets 
underlying the securitization is insufficient. As an alternative to 
this exclusion, one of the commenters suggested that the assets 
collateralizing the securitization should be assigned an RSF factor to 
match the ASF factor assigned to the securities issued. This commenter 
also argued that where the covered company provides a liquidity 
facility to support an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduit, 
the NSFR rule should treat the ABCP conduit as a third-party 
securitization and assign a 5 percent RSF factor to the committed 
liquidity facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ For example, commenters requested the exclusion of 
securitizations that are ``traditional securitizations'' under the 
agencies' regulatory capital rules and meet the operational 
requirements of risk transfer under those rules, or certain asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, a number of banking 
organizations provided funding support for securitization exposures, 
even if the banking organization did not include the exposures on its 
balance sheet. In response to these events, changes were made to GAAP 
that now require firms to include certain securitization

[[Page 9139]]

exposures on their balance sheets.\86\ GAAP's requirements for 
including securitization exposures on a firm's balance sheet are based, 
in part, on whether the firm exercises control of those exposures. As 
discussed in section V.C of this Supplementary Information section, the 
NSFR is designed to assess the consolidated balance sheet of a covered 
company and using GAAP both promotes consistency in the application of 
the NSFR across covered companies and limits operational costs 
associated with compliance. In addition, if a covered company meets the 
requirements under GAAP for including securitization exposures on-
balance sheet, it may be exposed to funding obligations generated by 
those exposures. Therefore, it is appropriate to require stable funding 
for securitization exposures that are reflected on-balance sheet in 
accordance with GAAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ For example, GAAP may require consolidation where a covered 
company retains a controlling financial interest in the 
securitization structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the request of one commenter that the rule not 
assign RSF factors to assets of an on-balance sheet securitization that 
meets (1) the definition of ``traditional securitization'' under the 
agencies' regulatory capital rules and (2) the operational requirements 
of risk transfer under those rules, the agencies note that the 
operational requirements include the requirement that the exposures are 
not reported on the firm's consolidated balance sheet under GAAP.\87\ 
As a result, the commenter's requested treatment would not result in 
the exclusion of any on-balance sheet securitizations from a covered 
company's NSFR. Regardless of the accounting treatment of particular 
securitization transactions, all securitizations carry liquidity risks, 
including unexpected funding needs. Covered companies may experience 
reputational pressure to support securitization transactions that they 
are associated with. The final rule accordingly does not include the 
commenter's requested exclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See 12 CFR 41(a)(1) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.41(a)(1) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.41(a)(1) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Netting of Certain Transactions
    The proposed rule would have included a rule of construction in 
Sec.  __.102(b) that describes the treatment of receivables and 
payables that are associated with secured funding transactions, secured 
lending transactions, and asset exchanges with the same counterparty 
that the covered company has netted against each other. The agencies 
did not receive any comments regarding these netting criteria and are 
finalizing these netting criteria as proposed.
    For purposes of determining the carrying value of these 
transactions, GAAP permits a covered company, when the relevant 
accounting criteria are met, to offset the gross value of receivables 
due from a counterparty under secured lending transactions by the 
amount of payments due to the same counterparty under secured funding 
transactions (GAAP offset treatment). The final rule requires a covered 
company to satisfy these GAAP accounting criteria and the criteria 
applied in Sec.  __.102(b) before it can treat the applicable 
receivables and payables on a net basis for the purposes of the NSFR 
requirement.
    Section __.102(b) of the final rule applies the same netting 
criteria specified in the agencies' SLR rule.\88\ These criteria 
require, first, that the offsetting transactions have the same explicit 
final settlement date under their governing agreements. Second, the 
criteria require that the right to offset the amount owed to the 
counterparty with the amount owed by the counterparty is legally 
enforceable in the normal course of business and in the event of 
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding. Third, 
the criteria require that under the governing agreements the 
counterparties intended to settle net, settle simultaneously, or settle 
according to a process that is the functional equivalent of net 
settlement (that is, the cash flows of the transactions are equivalent, 
in effect, to a single net amount on the settlement date), where the 
transactions are settled through the same settlement system, the 
settlement arrangements are supported by cash or intraday credit 
facilities intended to ensure that settlement of the transactions will 
occur by the end of the business day, and the settlement of the 
underlying securities does not interfere with the net cash settlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 12 CFR 3.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) (OCC); 12 CFR 
217.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) (Board); 12 CFR 
324.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Treatment of Securities Received in an Asset Exchange by a 
Securities Lender
    The proposed rule would have included a rule of construction in 
Sec.  __.102(c) specifying that when a covered company, acting as a 
securities lender, receives a security in an asset exchange, includes 
the value of the security on its balance sheet, and has not 
rehypothecated the security received, the covered company is not 
required to assign an RSF factor to the security it has received and is 
not permitted to assign an ASF factor to any liability to return the 
security.
    The agencies received two comments relating to this section of the 
proposed rule. One commenter asserted that Sec.  __.102(c), together 
with Sec.  __.106(d),\89\ of the proposed rule would be inconsistent 
with the Basel NSFR standard by assigning RSF factors to assets not 
included on the balance sheet of a covered company under GAAP. In 
response to the comment, the agencies note that Sec.  __.102(c) of the 
proposed rule, would not have applied to assets excluded from a covered 
company's balance sheet under GAAP; it would have applied only to the 
carrying value of assets received in an asset exchange that the covered 
company includes on its balance sheet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ Section __.106(d) of the proposed rule would have addressed 
certain assets received by a covered company in an asset exchange 
and not included on the covered company's balance sheet, as well as 
certain other off-balance sheet assets rehypothecated by a covered 
company. Comments regarding that provision are discussed in section 
VII.D.4 of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The other commenter argued that the proposed rule should apply a 
different treatment for asset exchanges more generally because, 
according to the commenter, the proposed rule did not sufficiently 
recognize the funding value of assets received in an asset exchange. In 
particular, this commenter argued that the rule should assign an ASF 
factor to the value of the asset received in an asset exchange, based 
on the type of asset and the remaining maturity of the asset exchange. 
The commenter asserted that such treatment would also better align with 
the LCR rule, which under certain circumstances allows a covered 
company to include in its HQLA amount an asset received in an asset 
exchange and may take into account both the assets received and 
provided for purposes of assigning inflow or outflow rates. The 
commenter further argued that the proposed rule's treatment of asset 
exchanges would incentivize covered companies to rehypothecate assets 
received in an asset exchange, which the commenter argued would 
increase systemic risk.
    The NSFR assesses the adequacy of a covered company's funding 
stability based on the covered company's balance sheet at a point in 
time. A covered company, acting as a securities lender, retains the 
security on its balance sheet. Since the covered company is the owner 
of the provided security, it is appropriate for the covered company to 
retain stable funding for that security, even in cases where the 
liquidity characteristics of the asset that the

[[Page 9140]]

covered company provides are less favorable relative to the asset it 
receives in the asset exchange. Unlike the LCR, the NSFR is not a cash 
flow coverage metric and, where the asset received has not been 
rehypothecated, the availability of the received asset as a source of 
liquidity is not considered in the design of the NSFR, even in cases 
where the received asset is recorded on a covered company's balance 
sheet.
    The final rule adopts the proposed treatment for securities 
received in an asset exchange by a covered company acting as a 
securities lender. This provision is intended to neutralize differences 
across accounting frameworks and maintain consistency across covered 
companies, and is consistent with the treatment of security-for-
security transactions under the SLR rule.\90\ Because the final rule 
does not require stable funding for the securities received, it does 
not treat the covered company's obligation to return these securities 
as stable funding and does not permit a covered company to assign an 
ASF factor to this obligation. If, however, the covered company, acting 
as the securities lender, sells or rehypothecates the securities 
received, the final rule requires the covered company to assign the 
appropriate RSF factor or factors under Sec.  __.106 to the proceeds of 
the sale or, in the case of a pledge or rehypothecation, to the 
securities themselves if such securities remain on the covered 
company's balance sheet.\91\ Similarly, the covered company must assign 
a corresponding ASF factor to the NSFR liability associated with the 
asset exchange, for example, with an obligation to return the security 
received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ 12 CFR 3.10(c)(4)(ii)(A) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.10(c)(4)(ii)(A) 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(A) (FDIC).
    \91\ If the assets received by the securities lender have been 
rehypothecated but remain on the covered company's balance sheet, 
these collateral securities would have been assigned an RSF factor 
under Sec.  __.106(c) to reflect their encumbrance. For the 
treatment of rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets, see section 
VII.D.4 of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Determining Maturity

    The proposed rule would have assigned ASF and RSF factors to a 
covered company's NSFR liabilities and assets based in part on the 
maturity of each NSFR liability or asset. Section __.101 of the 
proposed rule would have incorporated the maturity assumptions in 
Sec. Sec.  __.31(a)(1) and (2) of the LCR rule to determine the 
maturities of a covered company's NSFR liabilities and assets. For 
example, the proposed rule would require a covered company to apply the 
earliest possible maturity date to an NSFR liability (which would be 
assigned an ASF factor) and the latest possible maturity date to an 
asset (which would be assigned an RSF factor), taking into account any 
notice periods or options that may modify the maturity date.
    A commenter argued that the proposed rule's maturity assumptions 
provide a less risk-sensitive approach than the Basel NSFR standard, 
stating that the Basel NSFR standard does not require the assumption 
that a liability matures according to its earliest possible maturity 
date, but provides supervisors with discretion regarding assumptions 
about the exercise of certain options based on reputational factors and 
market expectations. Another commenter posited that the NSFR rule 
should not assume that a covered company would exercise a ``clean-up'' 
call option with respect to a securitization at the earliest possible 
date.\92\ Instead, the commenter argued that the NSFR rule should 
require a covered company to identify the securitizations that are 
likely to have a clean-up call option maturing over the next year and 
to reasonably evaluate whether the covered company intends to exercise 
that option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ The commenter's discussion referred to contractual 
provisions whereby an originating banking organization or servicer 
has the option to exercise a ``clean-up'' call by repurchasing the 
remaining securitization exposures once the amount of the underlying 
asset exposures or outstanding securitization exposures falls below 
a specified amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule incorporates the maturity assumptions of the LCR 
rule as proposed. The final rule requires a covered company to identify 
the maturity date of its NSFR liabilities and assets in a conservative 
manner by applying the earliest possible maturity date to an NSFR 
liability and the latest possible maturity date to an asset. The final 
rule generally also requires a covered company to take a conservative 
approach when determining maturity with respect to any notice periods 
and with respect to any options, either explicit or embedded, that may 
modify maturity dates. For example, a covered company is required to 
treat an option to reduce the maturity of an NSFR liability or an 
option to extend the maturity of an asset as if it will be exercised on 
the earliest possible date.
    The final rule treats an NSFR liability that has an ``open'' 
maturity (i.e., the NSFR liability has no maturity date under Sec.  
__.101 and may be closed out on demand) as maturing on the day after 
the calculation date. For example, an ``open'' repurchase transaction 
or a demand deposit placed at a covered company is treated as maturing 
on the day after the calculation date. To ensure consistent use of 
terms in the final rule and LCR rule and to avoid ambiguity between 
perpetual instruments and transactions (i.e., the instrument or 
transaction has no contractual maturity date and may not be closed out 
on demand) and open maturity instruments and transactions, the final 
rule amends Sec.  __.31 of the LCR rule to use the term ``open'' 
instead of using the phrase ``has no maturity date.'' This change has 
no substantive impact on the LCR rule. The final rule treats a 
perpetual NSFR liability (such as perpetual securities issued by a 
covered company) as maturing one year or more after the calculation 
date.
    The final rule treats each principal amount due under a 
transaction, such as separate principal payments due under an 
amortizing loan, as a separate transaction for which the covered 
company would be required to identify the date on which the payment is 
contractually due and apply the appropriate ASF or RSF factor based on 
that maturity date. This treatment ensures that a covered company's ASF 
and RSF amounts reflect the timing of the contractual maturities of a 
covered company's liabilities and assets, rather than treating the full 
principal amount as though it were due on one date (such as the last 
contractual principal payment date). For example, if funding provided 
by a counterparty to a covered company requires two contractual 
principal repayments, the first due less than six months from the 
calculation date and the second due one year or more from the 
calculation date, only the principal amount that is due one year or 
more from the calculation date is assigned a 100 percent ASF factor, 
which is the factor assigned to liabilities that have a maturity of one 
year or more from the calculation date. The liability for the 
contractual principal repayment due within six months represents a less 
stable source of funding and is therefore assigned a lower ASF factor.
    For deferred tax liabilities that have no maturity date, the 
maturity date under the final rule is the first calendar day after the 
date on which the deferred tax liability could be realized.
    Because the maturity assumptions in Sec.  __.101 of the final rule 
apply only to NSFR liabilities and assets, the final rule does not 
apply the LCR rule's maturity assumptions to a covered company's NSFR 
regulatory capital elements. Unlike NSFR liabilities, which have 
varying maturities, NSFR regulatory capital elements are longer-term by 
definition, and as such, the proposed rule would have assigned a

[[Page 9141]]

100 percent ASF factor to all NSFR regulatory capital elements.
    The final rule's incorporation of the above maturity assumptions 
provides for consistent determination of maturities across covered 
companies, which improves comparability and standardization of the 
NSFR. In addition, these assumptions reflect an appropriate degree of 
conservatism regarding the timing of when an asset or NSFR liability 
will mature, which helps to support a covered company's funding 
resiliency across a range of economic and financial conditions. This 
approach is also consistent with a provision in the Basel NSFR standard 
that one commenter argued would be more risk-sensitive. This standard 
provides that for funding with options exercisable at the discretion of 
a firm subject to a jurisdiction's NSFR requirement, national 
supervisors should take into account reputational factors that may 
pressure a firm not to exercise the option. Given the possibility and 
variability of reputational considerations with respect to many forms 
of funding, in addition to the considerations discussed above, the 
final rule incorporates the LCR rule maturity assumptions as proposed.
    With respect to the treatment of securitization clean-up call 
options, these options are generally features of securitizations with 
terms greater than one year and are generally exercisable near the end 
of the term. Instead of providing for firm specific evaluations of the 
likelihood of exercising a clean-up call option as commenters 
suggested, the final rule employs standardized assumptions to all firms 
to facilitate comparability across firms. The maturity assumptions of 
the LCR rule and final rule, however, do not require all clean-up call 
options to be exercised at the earliest possible date. Section 
__.31(a)(1)(iii)(A) of the LCR rule, applicable to the NSFR through 
Sec.  __.101 of the final rule, provides that a covered company must 
treat an option to reduce the maturity of an obligation as though it 
will be exercised at the earliest possible date, except where the 
original maturity of the obligation is greater than one year and the 
option does not go into effect for a period of 180 days following the 
issuance of the instrument. If that condition is met, then the maturity 
of the obligation will be the original maturity date at issuance under 
both the LCR rule and the final rule.

C. Available Stable Funding

1. Calculation of the ASF Amount
    Section __.103 of the proposed rule would have established the 
requirements for a covered company to calculate its ASF amount, which 
would have equaled the sum of the carrying values of the covered 
company's NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities, each 
multiplied by an ASF factor assigned in Sec.  __.104 or Sec.  
__.107(c).\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ ASF factors would have been assigned to NSFR regulatory 
capital elements and NSFR liabilities under Sec.  __.104, except for 
NSFR liabilities relating to derivatives. As discussed in section 
VII.E of this Supplementary Information section, certain NSFR 
liabilities relating to derivative transactions would not have been 
considered stable funding for purposes of a covered company's NSFR 
calculation and would have been assigned a zero percent ASF factor 
under Sec.  __.107(c) of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the proposed rule, ASF factors would have been assigned based on 
the relative stability of each category of NSFR regulatory capital 
element or NSFR liability relative to the NSFR's one-year time horizon. 
In addition, Sec.  __.108 of the proposed rule would have provided that 
a covered company may include in its ASF amount the ASF of a 
consolidated subsidiary only to the extent that the funding of the 
subsidiary supports the RSF amount of the subsidiary or is readily 
available to support RSF amounts of the covered company outside the 
consolidated subsidiary.\94\ The agencies received no comments on the 
calculation of the ASF amount and are adopting such calculation as 
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See section VII.F of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comments regarding the proposed assignment of ASF factors and 
specific contractual and funding-related features of a number of NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities are described below.
2. Characteristics for Assignment of ASF Factors
    For the purpose of assigning ASF factors, the proposed rule would 
have categorized NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities 
into five broad categories based on their tenor, the type of funding, 
and the type of funding counterparty. The proposed rule would have 
applied the same ASF factor in each category to reflect the relative 
stability of a covered company's NSFR regulatory capital elements and 
NSFR liabilities over a one-year time horizon. ASF factors would have 
been scaled from zero to 100 percent, with a zero percent weighting 
representing the lowest relative stability and a 100 percent weighting 
representing the highest relative stability.
    For operational simplicity, the proposed rule would have grouped 
NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities into one of four 
maturity categories: One year or more, less than one year, six months 
or more but less than one year, and less than six months (ASF maturity 
categories). One commenter expressed concern that the ASF maturity 
categories are arbitrary and may lead a covered company to 
unnecessarily adjust its funding profile to align with the ASF maturity 
categories rather than its actual funding needs. This commenter 
recommended that the ASF factor framework provide more granular 
maturity categories (e.g., monthly residual maturity categories), which 
would be more risk-sensitive.
    The agencies did not receive general comments on the proposed 
approach to differentiate ASF factors based on different funding types 
and counterparties, although some comments were received on the 
proposed categories of ASF and are discussed below. However, some 
commenters suggested that, for purposes of measuring the stand-alone 
NSFR of a covered company that is a depository institution subsidiary 
of another covered company, ASF factors should be higher or subject to 
a floor where the counterparty providing the funding is an affiliated 
insured depository institution. For example, one commenter suggested 
that the ASF factor for funding provided by an affiliated depository 
institution should be no less than 95 percent, particularly where the 
affiliated depository institution has an ASF amount in excess of its 
RSF amount when measured on a stand-alone basis. These commenters 
argued that a higher ASF factor would be appropriate because funding 
provided by an affiliated depository institution is more stable than 
funding from non-affiliated sources. These commenters also asserted 
that special treatment for funding transactions between affiliated 
insured depository institutions in the final rule would be consistent 
with the treatment of affiliates in the U.S. bank regulatory framework, 
such as the treatment of affiliates in sections 23A and 23B of the 
Federal Reserve Act,\95\ the Board's Regulation W,\96\ and cross-
guarantee liability provisions in the FDI Act.\97\ Commenters also 
suggested that special treatment could be limited to institutions that 
would qualify for the

[[Page 9142]]

``sister bank exemption'' in section 223.41(b) of Regulation W.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ 12 U.S.C. 371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1.
    \96\ 12 CFR part 223.
    \97\ 12 U.S.C. 1815(e).
    \98\ 12 CFR 223.41(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule generally adopts the proposed rule's approach to 
assigning ASF factors subject to certain modifications and 
clarifications that are discussed below in this Supplementary 
Information section. The final rule treats funding to be relatively 
less stable if there is a greater likelihood that a covered company 
would need to replace or repay it over a one-year time horizon. As in 
the proposed rule, the final rule assigns an ASF factor to NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities based on three 
characteristics relating to the stability of the funding: (1) Funding 
tenor, (2) funding type, and (3) counterparty type. As discussed below, 
certain ASF factor assignments under the final rule reflect additional 
policy considerations.
a) Funding Tenor
    For purposes of assigning ASF factors, the final rule assigns a 
higher ASF factor to funding that has a longer remaining maturity (or 
tenor) than shorter-term funding because, funding that by its terms has 
a longer tenor is more stable relative to a one-year horizon and should 
be less susceptible to short-term rollover risk. Specifically, the 
assignment of a higher ASF factor reflects the relatively decreased 
likelihood that a firm in the near term would need to replace funding 
that has a longer tenor, or if necessary, monetize assets at a loss to 
repay the funding in comparison to funding of a shorter tenor. The need 
to replace funding or monetize assets could adversely impact a firm's 
liquidity position or generate negative externalities for other market 
participants. Longer-term funding, therefore, generally would provide 
greater stability across all market conditions. For operational 
simplicity, and consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule 
groups the tenor of NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR 
liabilities into one of the four ASF maturity categories: One year or 
more, less than one year, six months or more but less than one year, 
and less than six months. These ASF maturity categories are consistent 
with the design principles described in section V of this Supplementary 
Information section and the Basel NSFR standard. They are also 
generally consistent to other approaches used for reflecting the role 
of residual maturities in other agencies' regulations and supervisory 
approaches.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ For example, the Board's GSIB capital surcharge rule 
includes generally similar categories for the maturities of average 
wholesale funding, including short-term wholesale funding, with 
remaining maturities of one year or more and six months or more but 
less than one year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The purpose of the ASF maturity categories is to categorize NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities in a simple manner 
based on the relative stability of such funding. Although the 
categories may result in some greater cliff effects between groups than 
more granular categories (e.g., one-month maturity categories), 
including more granular categories would increase complexity and result 
in a metric that is more difficult to monitor and supervise.\100\ The 
final rule generally treats funding with a remaining maturity of one 
year or more as the most stable and short-term funding as less stable. 
In this manner, the final rule incentivizes a covered company to 
maintain a stable funding profile by utilizing funding, such as equity 
and long-term debt, that matures beyond the NSFR's one-year time 
horizon. The final rule generally treats funding that matures in six 
months or more but less than one year as less stable than regulatory 
capital and long-term debt because a covered company would need to 
replace or repay such funding before the end of the NSFR's one-year 
time horizon. Funding with a remaining maturity of less than six months 
or an open maturity is generally treated as less stable because a 
covered company may need to replace or repay it in the near term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ The agencies note that adoption of the final rule does not 
preclude covered companies from using other metrics to manage 
funding risks and conduct internal stress testing over various time 
horizons that may include, among other things, more granular 
maturity categories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b) Funding Type
    The final rule recognizes that certain types of funding, such as 
certain types of deposits, tend to be more stable than other types of 
funding, independent of their tenor. For example, as described below in 
this Supplementary Information section, the final rule assigns a higher 
ASF factor to stable retail deposits relative to other retail deposits, 
due in large part to the presence of full deposit insurance coverage 
and other stabilizing features, such as another established 
relationship with the depository institution,\101\ that increase the 
likelihood of a counterparty continuing the funding across a broad 
range of market conditions. Similarly, the final rule assigns a higher 
ASF factor to operational deposits provided to a covered company than 
to certain other forms of short-term wholesale deposits, as discussed 
below in this Supplementary Information section. In a manner consistent 
with the proposed rule, the final rule takes into account the 
characteristics of funding type on funding stability when assigning ASF 
factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ For example, another deposit account, a loan, bill payment 
services, or any similar service or product provided to the 
depositor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c) Counterparty Type
    The final rule assigns ASF factors by taking into account the type 
of counterparty that provides the funding, using the same counterparty 
type classifications as the LCR rule: (1) Retail customers or 
counterparties, (2) wholesale customers or counterparties that are not 
financial sector entities, and (3) financial sector entities.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ Under Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule, the term ``retail 
customer or counterparty'' includes individuals, certain small 
businesses, and certain living or testamentary trusts. The term 
``wholesale customer or counterparty'' refers to any customer or 
counterparty that is not a retail customer or counterparty. The term 
``financial sector entity'' refers to a regulated financial company, 
identified company, investment advisor, investment company, pension 
fund, or non-regulated fund, as such terms are defined in Sec.  __.3 
of the LCR rule. The final rule incorporates these definitions. For 
purposes of determining ASF and RSF factors assigned to liabilities, 
assets, and commitments where counterparty type is relevant, the 
final rule treats an unconsolidated affiliate of a covered company 
as a financial sector entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule considers the 
differences in funding provided by retail and wholesale customers or 
counterparties when assigning ASF factors. Retail customers or 
counterparties (including small businesses) typically maintain long-
term relationships with covered companies and their deposits may 
consist of larger numbers of accounts with smaller balances relative to 
wholesale depositors. Retail customers or counterparties are generally 
less likely to move deposits over a one-year time horizon than 
wholesale depositors. In contrast, wholesale depositors are more likely 
to move deposits over a one-year time horizon for business or 
investment reasons. Therefore, the final rule treats most types of 
deposit funding provided by retail customers or counterparties as more 
stable than deposit funding provided by wholesale customers or 
counterparties.
    In addition, wholesale customers and counterparties that are not 
financial sector entities typically maintain balances with covered 
companies to support their non-financial activities, such as production 
and physical investment, which tend to be less correlated to short-term 
financial market fluctuations than activities of financial sector 
entities. Therefore, non-financial wholesale customers or 
counterparties are more likely than financial sector

[[Page 9143]]

entities to continue to provide funding to a covered company over a 
one-year horizon.
    Further, differences in business models and liability structures 
tend to make short-term funding provided by financial sector entities 
less stable than similar funding provided by non-financial wholesale 
customers or counterparties. Financial sector entities are typically 
less reliable funding providers than non-financial wholesale customers 
or counterparties due, in part, to their financial intermediation 
activities. Financial sector entities tend to be more sensitive to 
market fluctuations that could cause them to reduce their general level 
of funding provided to a covered company. Furthermore, the increased 
interconnectedness between financial sector entities means that there 
is a higher correlation of risks across the financial sector that may 
adversely impact the stability of short-term funding provided by a 
financial sector entity. Therefore, the final rule treats most short-
term funding that is provided by financial sector entities as less 
stable than similar types of funding provided by non-financial 
wholesale customers or counterparties.
    Further, as a general matter, an affiliation would not necessarily 
improve the funding stability of the covered company. Banking 
organizations that generally rely on funding from financial sector 
affiliates may have similar balance sheet funding risks to those that 
generally rely on funding of the same tenor from non-affiliates. An 
affiliated depository institution that is providing funding to a 
covered company may have a business model, liability structure, 
sensitivity to market fluctuations, degree of financial sector 
interconnectedness, or other characteristics that are similar to 
unaffiliated financial sector entities. While funding relationships 
with affiliates may provide a banking organization with additional 
flexibility in the normal course of business, ongoing reliance on 
contractually short-term funding from affiliates may present risks that 
are similar to funding from non-affiliate sources, particularly during 
stress. Therefore, the final rule's treatment of funding from 
affiliated sources consistent with non-affiliate funding provides a 
more appropriate measure of balance sheet funding risk.
    The agencies also are not convinced that the ASF factors applicable 
to funding provided by an affiliated insured depository institution 
should be higher in cases where the affiliated funds provider has an 
ASF amount in excess of its RSF amount when calculated on a standalone 
basis. The comparison of ASF to RSF amounts is informative of the 
overall funding position of a banking organization, taking into account 
its entire balance sheet, lending commitments, and derivative 
exposures. However, the balance sheet funding position of an affiliated 
insured depository institution at a calculation date does not 
necessarily imply that the institution is generally more likely to 
continue to provide funds to a covered company than an unaffiliated 
funding provider. The agencies note that the specific legal provisions 
cited by commenters (e.g., sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve 
Act, the Board's Regulation W, and the FDI Act) address different 
policy considerations than the NSFR and do not suggest that funding 
from affiliates is more stable than funding received from non-
affiliates.
    While comprehensive data on the funding of covered companies by 
counterparty type is limited, the agencies' analysis of available data 
confirmed the agencies' expectation of funding stability differences 
across counterparty types.\103\ Prior to issuing the proposed rule, the 
agencies reviewed information collected on the Consolidated Reports of 
Condition and Income (Call Report), Report of Assets and Liabilities of 
U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC 002), and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Financial and Operational 
Combined Uniform Single Report (FOCUS Report) over the period beginning 
December 31, 2007, and ending December 31, 2008, in combination with 
more recent FR 2052a report data, and supervisory information collected 
in connection with the LCR rule. In addition, the agencies reviewed 
supervisory information collected from depository institutions for 
which the FDIC was appointed as receiver in 2008 and 2009. Although the 
NSFR requirement is designed to measure the stability of a covered 
company's funding profile across all market conditions and would not be 
specifically based on a particular market stress environment, the 
agencies considered a period of stress for purposes of evaluating the 
relative effects of counterparty type on funding stability. Because a 
covered company under normal conditions may adjust funding across 
counterparty types for any number of reasons, focusing on periods of 
stress allowed the agencies to evaluate general differences in 
stability by counterparty type.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ Prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, covered companies 
did not consistently report or disclose detailed liquidity 
information. On November 17, 2015, the Board adopted the revised FR 
2052a to collect quantitative information on selected assets, 
liabilities, funding activities, and contingent liabilities from 
certain large banking organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies' analysis of available public and supervisory 
information shows that, during 2008, funding from financial sector 
entities exhibited less stability than funding provided by non-
financial wholesale counterparties, which in turn exhibited less 
stability than insured retail deposits. For example, Call Report data 
on insured deposits, deposit data from the FFIEC 002, and broker-dealer 
liability data reported on the FOCUS Report showed higher withdrawals 
in wholesale funding than retail deposits over this period. The 
agencies' analysis of supervisory data from a sample of large 
depository institutions for which the FDIC was appointed as receiver in 
2008 and 2009 also indicated that, during the periods leading up to 
receivership, funding provided by wholesale counterparties was 
significantly less stable, showing higher average total withdrawals, 
than funding provided by retail customers and counterparties.
3. Categories of ASF Factors
    Based on the tenor, funding type and counterparty type 
characteristics described above, the agencies categorized NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities into five broad 
categories and assigned a single ASF factor in each category, as shown 
in Table 1 below. The types of funding grouped together in each 
category generally displays relatively similar stability as compared to 
funding in a different category. The value of the ASF factor is 
calibrated to reflect the relative distinctions between categories and 
the general composition of balance sheet liabilities, and is generally 
consistent with the Basel NSFR standard to promote comparability across 
jurisdictions and the supervisory assessment of the aggregate funding 
position of covered companies.

[[Page 9144]]



   Table 1--Categories of NSFR Regulatory Capital Elements and Liabilities Based on Their Characteristics and
                                              Resulting ASF Factors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         NSFR regulatory capital    ASF factor
             Tenor               Counter-party type     Funding type         and liabilities          percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One year or more...............  All...............  All...............  NSFR regulatory capital             100
                                                                          elements and long-term
                                                                          NSFR liabilities.
Any tenor......................  Retail............  Fully insured.....  Stable retail deposits               95
                                                                          and.
                                                                         certain affiliate sweep
                                                                          deposits.
                                                     Not fully insured.  Other non-brokered                   90
                                                                          retail deposits and
                                                                          certain affiliate
                                                                          sweep deposits.
                                 Retail brokered...  Fully insured.....  Brokered reciprocal      ..............
                                                                          deposits.
One year or more...............  ..................  All...............  Other brokered deposits
                                                                          not held in a
                                                                          transactional account.
Less than one year.............  Wholesale.........  Non-operational *.  Unsecured funding                    50
                                                                          provided by, and
                                                                          secured funding
                                                                          transactions with, a
                                                                          counterparty that is
                                                                          not a financial sector
                                                                          entity or central bank.
Six months but less than one     Financial or        Non-operational...  Unsecured wholesale      ..............
 year.                            central bank.                           funding provided by,
                                                                          and secured funding
                                                                          transactions with, a
                                                                          financial sector
                                                                          entity or central bank.
                                 All...............  Securities........  Securities issued by a   ..............
                                                                          covered company.
                                 Retail brokered...  All...............  Retail brokered          ..............
                                                                          deposits other than
                                                                          brokered reciprocal
                                                                          deposits, sweep
                                                                          deposits, or
                                                                          transactional deposits.
Any tenor......................  ..................  ..................  Transactional retail     ..............
                                                                          brokered deposits.
                                                     Not fully insured.  Brokered reciprocal      ..............
                                                                          deposits.
                                 Retail............  All...............  Non-affiliate sweep
                                                                          deposits.
                                                                         Retail funding that is
                                                                          not a deposit or
                                                                          security.
                                 Wholesale.........  Operational.......  Operational deposits...  ..............
Less than six months...........  Retail brokered...  Any...............  Certain short-term                    0
                                                                          retail brokered
                                                                          deposits.
                                 Financial or        Non-operational...  Short-term funding from  ..............
                                  central bank.                           a financial sector
                                                                          entity or central bank.
                                 All...............  Securities........  Securities issued by a   ..............
                                                                          covered company.
                                                     Other.............  Trade date payables....  ..............
Any tenor **...................  All...............  Derivative........  NSFR derivatives         ..............
                                                                          liability amount.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* That is, not an operational deposit.
** The derivative treatment nets derivative transactions with various maturities.

a) 100 Percent ASF Factor
    Section __.104(a) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 100 
percent ASF factor to NSFR regulatory capital elements, as defined in 
Sec.  __.3 of the proposed rule, and described in section VI.B of this 
Supplementary Information section. The proposed rule also would have 
assigned a 100 percent ASF factor to NSFR liabilities that have a 
remaining maturity of one year or more from the calculation date, other 
than funding typically provided by retail customers or counterparties. 
This category would have included debt or equity securities issued by a 
covered company that have a remaining maturity of one year or more.
    In the proposed rule, the agencies requested comment on whether 
long-term debt securities issued by a covered company where the company 
is the primary market maker of such securities should be assigned an 
ASF factor other than 100 percent (for example, between 95 and 99 
percent) to recognize the risk that a covered company may buy back 
these debt securities. One commenter supported the proposed assignment 
of a 100 percent ASF factor to such securities on the basis that a 
lower ASF is unnecessary because the NSFR is not a stress metric. The 
agencies did not receive other comments regarding treatment of the NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities that mature one year 
or more from the calculation date not provided by retail customers or 
counterparties.
    The final rule assigns a 100 percent ASF factor to NSFR regulatory 
capital elements and NSFR liabilities that mature one year or more from 
the calculation date as proposed. NSFR regulatory capital elements and 
non-retail long-term liabilities that do not mature during the NSFR's 
one-year time horizon represent the most stable form of funding under 
the final rule because they are not susceptible to rollover risk during 
the NSFR's timeframe. Similarly, and as noted by the commenter, there 
is reduced risk, absent stress conditions, that a covered company will 
face pressure to buy back its long-term debt securities in significant 
quantities during the NSFR's one-year time horizon as compared to other 
liabilities on its balance sheet.
    The agencies received comments requesting assignment of a 100 
percent ASF factor to certain other NSFR liabilities, which are 
discussed in more detail below.
b) 95 Percent ASF Factor
    Section __.104(b) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 95 
percent ASF factor to stable retail deposits held at a covered 
company.\104\ The assignment of a 95 percent ASF factor would have 
reflected that such deposits generally provide a highly stable source 
of funding for covered companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ Section __.3 of the LCR rule defines a ``stable retail 
deposit'' as a retail deposit that is entirely covered by deposit 
insurance and either (1) is held by the depositor in a transactional 
account or (2) the depositor that holds the account has another 
established relationship with the covered company such as another 
deposit account, a loan, bill payment services, or any similar 
service or product provided to the depositor that the covered 
company demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the appropriate Federal 
banking agency, would make the withdrawal of the deposit highly 
unlikely during a liquidity stress event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters requested that the final rule assign a 95 or 100 
percent ASF factor to certain retail deposits that do not meet the 
definition of ``stable retail deposits,'' but are subject to 
contractual restrictions that make it less likely the deposits would be 
redeemed earlier than their contractual term. For example, some 
commenters suggested that the NSFR rule assign a 100 percent ASF factor 
to a retail deposit, such as a certificate of deposit, with a remaining 
maturity greater than one year if the covered company or its 
consolidated depository institution does not maintain a secondary 
market for the deposit, or if the contract contained provisions 
restricting redemption only to certain specified events, such as death 
or

[[Page 9145]]

determination of mental incapacity of the depositor.
    The final rule assigns a 95 percent ASF factor to deposits that 
meet the definition of ``stable retail deposit'' as proposed. Relative 
to liabilities in the 100 percent ASF category, stable retail deposits 
either have no contractual restriction on withdrawal within a one-year 
period or there is some likelihood that covered companies may permit 
withdrawals despite contractual restrictions within the one-year 
horizon. Although some evidence suggests that these deposits are highly 
stable, they are not as stable as funding for which there is greater 
certainty of maturity outside the NSFR one-year horizon. Therefore, an 
ASF factor that is only slightly lower than that assigned to NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and long-term NSFR liabilities is 
appropriate because stable retail deposits are nearly as stable over 
the NSFR's one-year time horizon as NSFR regulatory capital elements 
and long-term NSFR liabilities under Sec.  __.104(a) of the final rule.
    The remaining maturity of stable retail deposits does not affect 
the assignment of an ASF factor under the final rule because the 
stability of retail deposits is more closely linked to counterparty and 
funding type characteristics. As noted in the preamble to the proposed 
rule, the combination of full deposit insurance coverage, the 
depositor's relationship with the covered company, and the costs of 
moving transactional or multiple accounts to another institution 
substantially reduce the likelihood that retail depositors will 
withdraw stable retail deposits in significant amounts over a one-year 
time horizon.\105\ Maturity or other contractual provisions restricting 
redemption are less relevant, for example, because a covered company 
may permit withdrawal of a retail term deposit for business and 
reputational reasons in the event of a depositor's early withdrawal 
request despite the absence of a contractual requirement to permit such 
a withdrawal within the NSFR's one-year time horizon. Generally, other 
categories of funding that do not have the features of stable retail 
deposits are not as stable and therefore assigned to a lower ASF factor 
category in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See section VII.C.2.b of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, affiliated brokered sweep deposits deposited in 
accordance with a contract with a retail customer or counterparty and 
where the entire amount of the deposit is covered by deposit insurance 
would have been assigned a 90 percent ASF factor.\106\ Commenters 
requested that similar types of deposits be assigned a higher ASF 
factor, claiming that these deposits have historically evidenced 
stability across a range of market conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Under Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule, a ``brokered sweep 
deposit'' previously was defined to mean a deposit held at a covered 
company by a customer or counterparty through a contractual feature 
that automatically transfers to the covered company from another 
regulated financial company at the close of each business day 
amounts identified under the agreement governing the account from 
which the amount is being transferred. As discussed in section 
VI.A.4 of this Supplementary Information section, the final rule 
amends Sec.  __.3 to replace ``brokered sweep deposit'' with the 
term ``sweep deposit'' because not all sweep deposits are brokered, 
for example, if they meet the terms of the primary purpose exception 
under section 29 of the FDI Act and the FDIC's brokered deposit 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a change from the proposal, the final rule also assigns a 95 
percent ASF factor to affiliate sweep deposits where the entire amount 
of the sweep deposit is covered by deposit insurance and where a 
covered company has demonstrated to the satisfaction of its appropriate 
Federal banking agency that withdrawal of the deposit is highly 
unlikely to occur during a liquidity stress event. A sweep deposit 
arrangement places deposits at one or more banking organizations, with 
each banking organization receiving the maximum amount that is covered 
by deposit insurance, according to a priority ``waterfall.'' Within the 
waterfall structure, affiliates tend to be the first to receive 
deposits and the last from which deposits are withdrawn. Because of 
this priority relationship with an affiliate, a covered company is more 
likely to receive and maintain a steady stream of sweep deposits 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty across a range of market 
conditions. The priority relationship with an affiliate results in a 
deposit relationship that is reflective of an overall relationship with 
the underlying retail customer or counterparty where these deposits 
generally exhibit a stability profile associated with deposits directly 
from retail customers. This affiliate relationship combined with the 
presence of full deposit insurance coverage reduces the likelihood that 
retail depositors will withdraw these deposits in significant amounts 
over a one-year time horizon. Given these stabilizing characteristics, 
some affiliate sweep deposits from retail customers may provide similar 
funding stability across a range of market conditions as stable retail 
deposits, particularly if there are contractual features or costs that 
substantially reduce the likelihood that an affiliate sweep deposit 
will be withdrawn over a one-year time horizon. In light of this 
possibility, the final rule assigns a 95 percent ASF factor to any 
fully insured affiliate sweep deposit from a retail customer or 
counterparty that the covered company demonstrates is highly unlikely 
to be withdrawn during a liquidity stress event. For the same reasons 
as the agencies described in connection with this final rule, the 
agencies are considering making similar changes to the treatment of 
affiliate sweep deposits in the LCR in a separate rulemaking.
c) 90 Percent ASF Factor
    While stable retail deposits and certain fully-insured retail 
affiliate sweep deposits, regardless of tenor, have the highest 
stability characteristics for deposits under the final rule, other non-
brokered retail deposits and certain retail brokered deposits have a 
combination of deposit insurance, counterparty relationship, and tenor 
characteristics that provide relatively less stability than stable 
retail deposits and are assigned a slightly lower ASF factor of 90 
percent.
(i) Other Non-Brokered Retail Deposits
    Section __.104(c) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 90 
percent ASF factor to retail deposits that are neither stable retail 
deposits nor retail brokered deposits. This category would have 
included retail deposits that are not fully insured by the FDIC or are 
insured under non-FDIC deposit insurance systems. The agencies did not 
receive comments on this aspect of the proposed rule, and the final 
rule assigns a 90 percent ASF factor to these other retail deposits as 
proposed.
    As discussed above in section VII.C.2 of this Supplementary 
Information section, retail customers and counterparties tend to 
provide deposits that are more stable than funding provided by other 
types of counterparties. However, deposits provided by retail customers 
and counterparties that are not fully covered by FDIC deposit insurance 
are assigned a lower ASF factor than the ASF factor assigned to stable 
retail deposits because of the elevated risk that depositors will 
withdraw funds if they become concerned about the condition of the 
bank, in part, because the depositor will have no guarantee that 
uninsured funds will promptly be made available through established and 
timely intervention and resolution protocols. In addition, deposits 
that are neither held in a transactional account nor from a customer 
that has another relationship with a covered company tend to be less 
stable than stable retail deposits because

[[Page 9146]]

the depositor is less reliant on the services of the covered company. 
Therefore, the assigned ASF factor reflects the somewhat greater 
likelihood of withdrawal for those deposits that are not stable retail 
deposits. Similar to stable retail deposits and for the same reasons, 
the remaining maturity of these retail deposits does not affect the 
assignment of an ASF factor under the final rule.
(ii) Affiliate Sweep Deposits, Fully Insured Brokered Reciprocal 
Deposits, and Certain Longer-Term Retail Brokered Deposits
    Section __.104(c) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 90 
percent ASF factor to the following three categories of brokered 
deposits \107\ provided by retail customers or counterparties: (1) A 
reciprocal brokered deposit where the entire amount is covered by 
deposit insurance,\108\ (2) an affiliated brokered sweep deposit where 
the entire amount of the deposit is covered by deposit insurance,\109\ 
and (3) a brokered deposit that is not a reciprocal brokered deposit or 
brokered sweep deposit, is not held in a transactional account, and has 
a remaining maturity of one year or more.\110\ Other types of brokered 
deposits would have been assigned lower ASF factors under the proposed 
rule.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ A ``brokered deposit'' previously was defined in Sec.  
__.3 of the LCR rule as a deposit held at the covered company that 
is obtained, directly or indirectly, from or through the mediation 
or assistance of a deposit broker, as that term is defined in 
section 29(g) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831f(g)), and includes 
reciprocal brokered deposits and brokered sweep deposits. In the 
final rule, the agencies have amended the definition to mean a 
deposit held at the covered company that is obtained, directly or 
indirectly, from or through the mediation or assistance of a deposit 
broker, as that term is defined in section 29(g) of the FDI Act (12 
U.S.C. 1831f(g)) and the FDIC's regulations. See section VI.A.4 of 
this Supplementary Information section.
    The agencies note that the ASF factors assigned to retail 
brokered deposits are based solely on the stable funding 
characteristics of these deposits over a one-year time horizon. The 
assignment of ASF factors is not intended to reflect other impacts 
of these deposits on a covered company, such as their effect on a 
company's probability of failure or loss given default, franchise 
value, or asset growth rate or lending practices.
    \108\ A ``reciprocal brokered deposit'' previously was defined 
in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule as a brokered deposit that the covered 
company receives through a deposit placement network on a reciprocal 
basis, such that: (1) For any deposit received, the covered company 
(as agent for the depositors) places the same amount with other 
depository institutions through the network and (2) each member of 
the network sets the interest rate to be paid on the entire amount 
of funds it places with other network members. The final rule 
renames the term ``reciprocal brokered deposit'' to ``brokered 
reciprocal deposit'' to avoid confusion and use terminology 
consistent with other regulations. See 12 CFR 327.8(q).
    \109\ See supra note 106. Typically, these transactions involve 
securities firms or investment companies that transfer (``sweep'') 
idle customer funds into deposit accounts at one or more banks. An 
affiliate sweep deposit is deposited in accordance with a contract 
between the retail customer or counterparty and the covered company, 
a controlled subsidiary of the covered company, or a company that is 
a controlled subsidiary of the same top-tier company of which the 
covered company is a controlled subsidiary.
    \110\ Under the final rule, the agencies removed from the 
definition of ``brokered deposit'' references to deposits defined as 
either a ``reciprocal brokered deposit'' or ``brokered sweep 
deposit'' in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule. This revision reflects 
modifications made to these terms under the final rule, as discussed 
in section VI.A.4 of this Supplementary Information section. See 
supra note 107.
    \111\ These other types of brokered deposits are discussed in 
sections VII.C.3.d and VII.C.3.e of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter argued that brokered deposits are not inherently 
unstable and should receive similar treatment as non-brokered retail 
deposits. Several commenters suggested that retail brokered deposits 
with a remaining maturity of one year or more be assigned a 100 percent 
ASF factor. Commenters argued that assigning these long-term retail 
brokered deposits an ASF factor of 100 percent would align with the 
Basel standard and recognize the more significant role of this funding 
source in the U.S. financial system relative to other jurisdictions. 
The commenters further argued that covered companies can expect to rely 
on these deposits for funding over the NSFR's one-year time horizon 
given their maturity and because depositors are generally not permitted 
to withdraw such deposits except under narrow circumstances and usually 
not without a significant penalty. The commenters also argued that 
depositors are less likely to accelerate the maturity of their brokered 
deposits outside of a stress scenario. Commenters also expressed 
concern that the FDIC's interpretation of ``brokered deposit'' is 
overly broad and reflects policy concerns, such as rapid deposit 
expansion and improper deposit management that are not relevant for 
purposes of determining the appropriate treatment of such products for 
regulatory liquidity and stable funding requirements.
    Except in the cases described below where brokered deposits have 
certain stabilizing features, the typical characteristics of brokered 
deposits support assigning a lower ASF factor for retail brokered 
deposits than the ASF factor assigned to stable or other retail 
deposits. Specifically, deposits that are placed by a deposit broker 
are typically at higher risk of being withdrawn over a one-year period 
as compared to a retail deposit placed directly by a retail customer or 
counterparty. As noted, the FDIC has issued a proposal revising its 
brokered deposits framework \112\ and expects the finalization of this 
proposal will address some concerns that the FDIC's existing 
interpretations are overly broad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ 85 FR 7453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, statutory restrictions on certain brokered deposits 
can make this form of funding less stable than other deposit types 
across a range of market environments. Specifically, a covered company 
that becomes less than ``well capitalized'' \113\ is subject to 
restrictions on renewing or rolling over funds obtained directly or 
indirectly through a deposit broker.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ As defined in section 38 of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1831o.
    \114\ See 12 U.S.C. 1831f.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, the final rule generally assigns a lower ASF 
factor to retail brokered deposits to reflect their reduced stability 
in comparison to other forms of retail deposits. However, consistent 
with the proposal, the final rule applies a 90 percent ASF factor to 
the following retail brokered deposits that have certain stabilizing 
characteristics: (1) A brokered reciprocal deposit provided by a retail 
customer or counterparty, where the entire amount of the deposit is 
covered by deposit insurance; and (2) a brokered deposit provided by a 
retail customer or counterparty that is not a brokered reciprocal 
deposit or sweep deposit, is not held in a transactional account, and 
has a remaining maturity of one year or more. In a change from the 
proposal, the final rule assigns a 90 percent ASF factor to any 
affiliate sweep deposit that does not meet all of the requirements for 
affiliate sweep deposits to be assigned a 95 percent ASF factor, which 
includes affiliate sweep deposits that are not fully covered by deposit 
insurance.\115\ Each of these types of deposits is discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ Section __.104(d)(7) of the proposed rule would have 
assigned a 50 percent ASF factor to a brokered affiliate sweep 
deposit where less than the entire amount of the deposit is covered 
by deposit insurance and without regard to whether a covered company 
could demonstrate to the satisfaction of its appropriate Federal 
banking agency that a withdrawal of such deposit is highly unlikely 
to occur during a liquidity stress event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Brokered reciprocal deposits. The reciprocal nature of a brokered 
reciprocal deposit provided by a retail customer or counterparty means 
that a deposit placement network contractually provides a covered 
company with the same amount of deposits that it places with other 
depository institutions. As a result, and because the deposit is fully 
insured, the retail customers or counterparties providing the deposit 
tend to be less

[[Page 9147]]

likely to withdraw it than other types of deposits that are assigned a 
lower ASF factor.
    Affiliate sweep deposits. As described above in section VII.C.3.b 
of this Supplementary Information section, within the waterfall 
structure of sweep deposit arrangements, affiliates tend to be the 
first to receive deposits and the last from which deposits are 
withdrawn. With this priority relationship with an affiliate, a covered 
company is more likely to receive and maintain a steady stream of sweep 
deposits across a range of market conditions. Based on the reliability 
of this stream of sweep deposits the final rule treats sweep deposits 
received from affiliates as more stable than sweep deposits received 
from non-affiliates and more similar to other types of retail deposits. 
The final rule takes into account that the priority relationship with 
an affiliate results in a deposit relationship that is reflective of an 
overall relationship with the underlying retail customer where these 
deposits generally exhibit a stability profile associated with deposits 
directly from retail customers or counterparties, even if the deposits 
are not fully covered by deposit insurance.
    Certain longer-term brokered deposits. For a brokered deposit 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty that is not a brokered 
reciprocal deposit or sweep deposit, which is not held in a 
transactional account and that has a remaining maturity of one year or 
more, the contractual term makes it a more stable source of funding 
than other types of deposits that are assigned a lower ASF factor. 
However, these brokered deposits are not assigned an ASF factor higher 
than 90 percent, as requested by certain commenters, because a covered 
company may be more likely to permit withdrawal of retail brokered 
deposits in the event of an early withdrawal request by the depositor, 
for reputational or franchise reasons, despite the absence of 
contractual requirements to permit withdrawal within the NSFR's one-
year time horizon.
d) 50 Percent ASF Factor
    The final rule assigns an ASF factor of 50 percent to most forms of 
wholesale funding with residual maturities of less than one year, 
certain retail brokered deposits that do not have the stabilizing 
characteristics described above, and non-deposit retail funding. For 
wholesale funding, the 50 percent ASF factor recognizes that funding 
that contractually matures in less than one year is less stable than 
longer term wholesale funding relative to the NSFR time horizon. The 
likelihood that maturing wholesale funding will be renewed generally 
depends on counterparty relationship characteristics, with financial 
sector entities being less likely than non-financial sector entities to 
renew their provision of funding. In addition, the final rule assigns 
the 50 percent ASF factor to all wholesale operational deposits, 
regardless of contractual maturity or counterparty, reflecting the 
provision of operational services. The 50 percent ASF factor applied to 
certain retail brokered deposits and to retail funding that is not a 
deposit or security reflect the counterparty relationship 
characteristics and the extent to which the retail funding has other 
stabilizing characteristics.
Unsecured Wholesale Funding Provided by, and Secured Funding 
Transactions With, a Counterparty That is Not a Financial Sector Entity 
or Central Bank and With Remaining Maturity of Less Than One Year
    Sections __.104(d)(1) and (2) of the proposed rule would have 
assigned a 50 percent ASF factor to a secured funding transaction or 
unsecured wholesale funding (including a wholesale deposit) that, in 
each case, matures less than one year from the calculation date and is 
provided by a wholesale customer or counterparty that is not a central 
bank or a financial sector entity (or a consolidated subsidiary 
thereof). The proposed rule would have assigned this ASF factor because 
covered companies generally will need to roll over or replace funding 
with these characteristics during the NSFR's one-year time horizon.
    Several commenters also requested that the NSFR assign a higher ASF 
factor to public sector entity deposits, including public deposits that 
must be collateralized and collateralized corporate trust deposits. 
These commenters argued that these public sector entity collateralized 
deposits are more stable than most other wholesale deposits because, 
among other things, the deposit relationship is connected to longer-
term relationships between a covered company and the public sector 
entity, the relationship is often acquired through prescribed bidding 
processes, and the deposits frequently are secured by HQLA. These 
commenters also argued that assigning a higher ASF factor to 
collateralized deposits would be consistent with the LCR rule, which 
assigns a lower outflow rate to such deposits compared to other forms 
of wholesale funding. The commenters recommended that the agencies 
revise the ASF factor for such deposits to one minus the RSF factor 
applicable to the underlying collateral. One commenter advocated 
assigning a 95 percent ASF factor (or an alternative factor slightly 
lower than 95 percent) to public sector entity deposits in excess of 
FDIC deposit insurance limits if the deposit is privately insured or 
fully collateralized by an FHLB letter of credit. The commenter argued 
that such features would lower the likelihood of withdrawal for these 
types of funds, including during times of stress.
    Other commenters requested a higher ASF factor for FHLB advances 
because, in their view, FHLB advances are stable, reliable and fully 
secured, and the FHLBs have a proven track record of providing 
liquidity. For example, one commenter recommended assigning an ASF 
factor of 80 percent to FHLB advances with maturities of six months or 
more but less than one year.
    The treatment of wholesale deposits in the final rule includes 
consideration of counterparty relationships. As compared to retail 
customers or counterparties, wholesale customers or counterparties may 
be motivated to a greater degree by return and risk of an investment, 
tend to be more sophisticated and responsive to changing market 
conditions, and often employ personnel who specialize in the financial 
management of the counterparty. As a result, wholesale customers or 
counterparties are more likely to withdraw their funding than a retail 
customer or counterparty. Further, FDIC deposit insurance coverage does 
not mitigate these motivations and sophistication characteristics to 
increase the stability of funding provided by a wholesale customer or 
counterparty sufficient to warrant an ASF factor higher than 50 
percent.
    The NSFR's application to a covered company's aggregate balance 
sheet generally does not involve differentiation between secured and 
unsecured liabilities and, by design, the NSFR treats the liquidity 
characteristics of collateral differently from the LCR rule. Although 
collateralization may reduce credit risk in the event of default, 
funding stability is influenced more by tenor, funding type and 
counterparty relationship characteristics. The fact that certain 
deposits placed by public sector entities are required to be 
collateralized for their contractual term does not mitigate the risk 
that a public sector entity may not renew such funding upon maturity. 
The final rule treats the collateralization of FHLB advances in the 
same fashion. Additionally, ASF and RSF factor values are not intended 
to be values of, respectively, cash outflow amounts as in the LCR rule 
or market haircuts of assets

[[Page 9148]]

used as collateral. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate for the 
type of collateral, nor the RSF factor assigned to such assets, to 
determine the ASF factor assigned to a collateralized deposit, as 
suggested by commenters.\116\
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    \116\ Additionally, as discussed in section VII.D of this 
Supplementary Information section, the final rule applies lower RSF 
factors to HQLA on a covered company's balance sheet relative to 
certain less liquid assets, including HQLA used for, or available 
for, the collateralization of public sector entity deposits, 
consistent with the treatment of encumbered assets described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule also treats the maturity characteristics of FHLB 
advances consistent with other wholesale funding. Although the FHLBs 
served as a source of liquidity during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
covered companies generally may need to renew maturing funding from 
these entities across a range of market conditions. The FHLB system 
also conduct maturity transformation in obtaining the system's funding 
from investors. Similar to other wholesale counterparties, the FHLB 
system responds to events and market conditions in different ways than 
retail counterparties and could be sensitive to fluctuations in market 
conditions, which make funding already obtained from FHLBs less stable 
than retail deposits and other forms of funding that are assigned 
higher ASF factors. As a result, distinguishing FHLB advances from 
other types of wholesale funding would be at odds with the goal of the 
NSFR, which is to provide a standardized measure to ensure appropriate 
stable funding of covered companies relative to their assets and 
commitments.
    For the reasons discussed above, the final rule assigns an ASF 
factor of 50 percent for a secured funding transaction or unsecured 
wholesale funding (including a wholesale deposit) that, in each case, 
matures less than one year from the calculation date and is provided by 
a wholesale customer or counterparty that is not a central bank or a 
financial sector entity (or a consolidated subsidiary thereof), as 
proposed. Funding from FHLBs and public sector entity deposits that 
have a residual maturity of less than one year from the calculation 
date are included in this category.
Unsecured Wholesale Funding Provided by, and Secured Funding 
Transactions With, a Financial Sector Entity or Central Bank With 
Remaining Maturity of Six Months or More, but Less Than One Year
    Sections __.104(d)(3) and (4) of the proposed rule would have 
assigned a 50 percent ASF factor to a secured funding transaction or 
unsecured wholesale funding that matures six months or more but less 
than one year from the calculation date and is provided by a financial 
sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary thereof, or a central 
bank.\117\ The proposed rule would therefore have treated funding from 
central banks consistently with funding from financial sector entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See supra note 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies did not receive comments on this aspect of the 
proposed rule, and the final rule adopts this provision as proposed. In 
assigning a 50 percent ASF factor, the final rule treats secured 
funding transactions and unsecured funding that each have a remaining 
maturity of six months or more but less than one year, and are 
conducted with financial sector counterparties and central banks, the 
same as similar types of funding from other wholesale customers and 
counterparties.
Securities Issued by a Covered Company With Remaining Maturity of Six 
Months or More, but Less Than One Year
    Section __.104(d)(5) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 50 
percent ASF factor to securities issued by a covered company that 
mature in six months or more, but less than one year, from the 
calculation date.
    The agencies received no comments on this provision of the proposed 
rule. Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule assigns a 50 
percent ASF factor to securities issued by a covered company that 
mature in six months or more, but less than one year, from the 
calculation date. This treatment is appropriate because funds providers 
that are investors in securities issued by covered companies include, 
among others, financial sector entities and the relationship of the 
funds provider to a covered company generally will have characteristics 
that make such funding less stable than other types of funding received 
from retail customers or counterparties.\118\ Further, due to the 
operation of secondary markets, a covered company may not be aware of 
the nature of the current investor in a security issued by a covered 
company and requiring a covered company to apply an ASF factor based on 
counterparty type would be operationally complex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ Securities issued by a covered company that have a 
remaining maturity of one year or more receive an ASF factor of 100 
percent. See section VII.C.3.a of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Operational Deposits
    Section __.104(d)(6) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 50 
percent ASF factor to operational deposit funding, including 
operational deposits from financial sector entities. Operational 
deposits would include both (i) unsecured wholesale funding in the form 
of deposits and (ii) collateralized deposits that, in each case, are 
necessary for the provision of operational services, such as clearing, 
custody, or cash management services.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ The agencies note that the methodology that a covered 
company would have used to determine whether and to what extent a 
deposit is operational for the purposes of the proposed rule must be 
consistent with the methodology used for the purposes of the LCR 
rule. See Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule for the full list of services 
that qualify as operational services and Sec.  __.4(b) of the LCR 
rule for additional requirements for operational deposits. 
Consistent with the proposed rule, the methodology for determining 
an operational deposit under the final rule is the same as the 
methodology used for the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters requested that the final rule assign operational 
deposits a higher ASF factor (e.g., one commenter recommended an ASF 
factor of between 60 and 75 percent) because moving operational 
deposits to a different institution is expensive, time consuming, and 
risky. \120\ In support of this request, a commenter stated that 
changing custody service providers can take between six and twelve 
months and can significantly disrupt a company's essential payment, 
clearing, and settlement functions. Another commenter argued that 
depositors are unlikely to move their operational deposits from a 
covered company because of other relationships the depositor has with 
the covered company, particularly when the covered company is a 
regional banking institution. By contrast, one commenter noted that 
operational deposits can be withdrawn from a covered company by a 
customer within the NSFR's one-year time horizon and therefore do not 
warrant a higher ASF factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ Comments about the definition of operational deposits are 
discussed in section VI.A of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also asserted that the proposed rule's treatment of 
operational deposits was inconsistent with the treatment of operational 
deposits under the LCR rule, and argued that this type of funding is 
more stable than suggested by the treatment in the LCR rule or the 
proposed rule based on historical experience, evidenced in the 
empirical data, and the results of internal stress testing. These 
commenters contended that the proposed treatment of operational 
deposits would compound the already punitive treatment of operational 
deposits under the LCR rule. A commenter also argued that the proposed 
treatment of operational

[[Page 9149]]

deposits could penalize the business of custody banks.
    The final rule applies an ASF factor of 50 percent to operational 
deposits as proposed. By definition, operational deposits are essential 
for the ongoing provision of operational services by a covered company 
to a wholesale depositor. The final rule therefore applies the ASF 
factor for operational deposits based on the operational relationship 
with the depositor rather than the contractual tenor of the funding or 
the type of wholesale counterparty. The level of operational deposits 
from a given funds provider may vary over time based on the customer's 
needs and, consistent with other wholesale funding that matures within 
one year that is assigned a 50 percent ASF factor, is not contractually 
guaranteed for the NSFR's one-year horizon. Further a counterparty 
could successfully restructure how it obtains various operational 
services and could place some or all of its operational deposits with 
another financial institution over a one-year time horizon. The 50 
percent ASF factor also recognizes that the stability of short-term 
operational and non-operational deposits from financial counterparties 
are not identical because switching operational service providers may 
be difficult and have associated costs that are not present with non-
operational deposits.
    As discussed in section V.C of this Supplementary Information 
section, ASF factors are not directly comparable to outflow rates 
assigned in the LCR rule or other cash flow risk assessments, such as 
internal liquidity stress testing. While there are some barriers to 
withdrawing operational deposits, such as switching costs, operational 
deposits are not as stable as those forms of funding that are assigned 
a higher ASF factor in the final rule.
    In response to commenters' concern that the proposed treatment of 
operational deposits is especially impactful to the custody banks 
business model, which place greater reliance on operational deposits 
than other business models, the agencies note the NSFR rule is meant to 
apply a single minimum standard to all covered companies regardless of 
business model, in order to improve resiliency and comparability of 
funding profiles for all covered companies. Accordingly, the NSFR 
assigns ASF factors and RSF factors to categories of liabilities and 
assets based on the characteristics of those liabilities and assets 
rather than their prevalence in certain business models.
Other Retail Brokered Deposits
    Section __.104(d)(7) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 50 
percent ASF factor to most categories of brokered deposits provided by 
retail customers or counterparties that do not include the additional 
stabilizing features described under Sec.  __.104(c) and summarized 
above. Specifically, retail brokered deposits to which the proposed 
rule would have assigned a 50 percent ASF factor included: (1) A 
brokered deposit that is not a reciprocal brokered deposit or brokered 
sweep deposit and that is held in a transactional account; (2) a 
brokered deposit that is not a reciprocal brokered deposit or brokered 
sweep deposit, is not held in a transactional account, and matures in 
six months or more, but less than one year, from the calculation date; 
(3) a reciprocal brokered deposit or brokered affiliate sweep deposit 
where less than the entire amount of the deposit is covered by deposit 
insurance; and (4) a brokered non-affiliate sweep deposit, regardless 
of deposit insurance coverage.
    Commenters argued that one or more of the above types of retail 
brokered deposits should be assigned a higher ASF factor. Commenters 
asserted the proposed rule's treatment of brokered deposits was too 
conservative, arguing that brokered deposits have historically been 
stable sources of funding, including during times of stress, and their 
use has not been correlated with the growth of risky assets.
    Commenters recommended that specific brokered deposits be assigned 
a 90 percent ASF factor. For example, some commenters suggested that 
non-affiliate sweep deposits with contractual agreements that provide a 
depository institution with priority over other participants in a 
brokered sweep deposit program waterfall receive the same 90 percent 
ASF factor assigned to affiliated brokered sweep deposits. Another 
commenter requested that the 90 percent ASF factor be applied to all 
non-affiliate brokered retail sweep deposits that are fully insured and 
with remaining terms of greater than one year. Similarly, one commenter 
suggested that retail brokered deposits categorized as money market 
deposit accounts that are subject to a commitment to leave the balances 
on deposit with the bank for a pre-determined period of time and 
subject to an early withdrawal penalty should be assigned a 90 percent 
ASF factor. The commenter argued that the agreements, which require 
that the funds not be withdrawn for a minimum period without incurring 
a significant interest penalty, make the funds sufficiently stable to 
warrant a higher ASF factor.
    One commenter argued that many brokered deposits held in 
transactional accounts behave substantially similarly to retail 
deposits and should therefore receive an ASF factor that is higher than 
the proposed 50 percent factor. In particular, this commenter noted 
that, due to the types of deposits that may be considered ``brokered 
deposits'' under the FDIC's brokered deposit guidance,\121\ many 
transactional account products that act as a stable source of retail 
funding could be classified as ``brokered'' due to a referral from a 
third party. This, the commenter noted, would make them subject to a 50 
percent ASF factor under the NSFR rule.\122\ Another commenter argued 
that retail brokered deposits are more stable due to the large number 
and variety of providers of such deposits. Accordingly, the commenter 
asserted that a covered company could easily find a substitute 
counterparty for a company that withdraws its brokered deposits from 
the covered company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, ``Frequently 
Asked Questions on Identifying, Accepting and Reporting Brokered 
Deposits,'' updated June 30, 2016, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16042b.pdf.
    \122\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, commenters requested that the agencies increase the ASF 
factors applied to retail brokered deposits to align the ASF factors 
with the outflow rates assigned in the LCR rule. For example, one 
commenter argued that it would be inconsistent for brokered deposits 
that receive a 25 percent outflow rate under the LCR rule to receive a 
50 percent ASF factor under NSFR rule. The commenter argued that the 
ASF factor and LCR outflow rate should be complements, and, if not, the 
ASF factor should be more favorable because a covered company would 
have a full year to make adjustments to its balance sheet to replace a 
withdrawal of retail brokered deposits, whereas the LCR outflow rate is 
assumed to occur over a 30 calendar-day stress period. The same 
commenter argued that the perceived disparate treatment of these 
brokered deposits between the NSFR rule and LCR rule could incentivize 
covered companies to meet funding needs with shorter, rather than long-
term brokered deposits.
    The retail brokered deposits to which a 50 percent ASF factor would 
have been assigned are less stable sources of funding than the retail 
brokered deposits that are assigned a 90 percent ASF factor, other 
deposits that are assigned a 90 percent ASF factor, and

[[Page 9150]]

stable retail deposits, which are assigned a 95 percent ASF factor. 
Although the considerations identified by commenters may cause certain 
brokered deposits to have increased relative stability, these brokered 
deposits do not have the same combination of stabilizing features that 
warrant assignment of a higher ASF factor. Specifically, they lack a 
combination of being fully covered by deposit insurance, being received 
from an affiliate, or having a longer-term maturity.
    In response to commenters' request to treat certain non-affiliate 
sweep deposits in a similar manner to affiliate sweep deposits, the 
agencies note that an affiliate sweep deposit relationship is 
reflective of an overall relationship with the underlying retail 
customer or counterparty and these deposits generally exhibit a 
stability profile associated with deposits directly from retail 
customers, which warrants assignment of a higher ASF factor. As a 
result, the final rule assigns a 50 percent ASF factor to non-affiliate 
sweep deposits and a higher ASF factor to affiliate sweep deposits, as 
discussed above. The agencies will continue to review the treatment of 
sweep deposits, including non-affiliate sweep deposits, under the LCR 
and NSFR rules.\123\ In response to the comments regarding treatment 
under the LCR rule, as discussed above in section V.C of this 
Supplementary Information section, the agencies note that the ASF 
factors are not intended to align with the outflow rates assigned in 
the LCR rule in all cases due to the different purposes of the two 
rules. With the exception of affiliate sweep deposits where less than 
the entire amount of the deposit is covered by deposit insurance, which 
the final rule assigns a 90 percent ASF factor,\124\ the agencies are 
adopting the 50 percent ASF factor for these deposits as proposed for 
the reasons discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ As part of this effort, the agencies intend to revise the 
regulatory reporting (e.g. Call Report) to obtain data that may help 
evaluate funding stability of sweep deposits over time to determine 
their appropriate treatment under liquidity regulations.
    \124\ See section VII.C.3.c.ii. of this Supplementary 
Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Funding From a Retail Customer or Counterparty not in the Form of a 
Deposit or Security
    The proposed rule would have assigned a zero percent ASF factor to 
retail funding that is not in the form of a deposit or security issued 
by the covered company. In the proposed rule, the agencies noted that 
non-deposit retail liabilities are not regular sources of funding or 
commonly utilized funding arrangements for covered companies.\125\ The 
proposed rule also, however, solicited comment as to whether the final 
rule should assign an ASF factor greater than zero to any non-deposit 
retail liabilities.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ As noted above, a security issued by the covered company 
that is held by a retail customer or counterparty would not take 
into account counterparty type and therefore would not fall within 
this category.
    \126\ See 81 FR at 35140.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters expressed concern that the proposed treatment of 
non-deposit retail liabilities was overly conservative and would 
unfairly penalize business models that focus on securities trading, 
such as retail-oriented securities brokerage firms that utilize retail 
brokerage payables as a source of funding.\127\ For example, a 
commenter expressed concern that an organization with a depository 
institution and a broker-dealer subsidiary of equal size could face a 
funding shortfall under the proposed rule because the funding of the 
broker-dealer subsidiary would not be assigned sufficiently high ASF 
factors and the stable funding of the depository institution may not be 
treated under the NSFR rule as available to support the nonbank funding 
needs of the consolidated entity's broker-dealer subsidiary.\128\ Some 
commenters noted that retail brokerage payables have been historically 
stable across both normal and stressed economic periods--for example, 
one commenter asserted that its amount of retail brokerage payables 
increased at the height of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and from 
2009 to 2016. Commenters further indicated that retail brokerage 
payables have counterparty credit risks similar to uninsured deposits, 
in part because they arise in a transactional context and as part of a 
client's larger brokerage relationship. One commenter argued that 
because the risk-based capital surcharge for GSIBs in the United States 
(GSIB capital surcharge rule) excludes non-deposit retail customer 
funding entirely from its Method 2 calculation methodology,\129\ this 
implicitly suggests that other Board rules consider such funding to be 
stable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ The term ``retail brokerage payables'' generally refers to 
(1) cash awaiting investment in retail clients' brokerage accounts, 
or ``free credit balances,'' and (2) cash balances in a securities 
firm's bank account related to a retail client's pending securities 
purchase and sale transactions and pending deposits to and 
distributions from clients' brokerage accounts, or ``float.''
    \128\ See also section VII.F of this Supplementary Information 
section.
    \129\ 12 CFR 217.405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters suggested more favorable treatment for specific 
types of non-deposit retail liabilities. Specifically, commenters 
argued that some liabilities owed to retail counterparties in 
connection with non-deposit products, such as prepaid cards, travelers 
checks, and customer rewards programs, should be recognized as a stable 
source of funding given historical experience of low volatility in 
balances and redemptions over time. In addition, these commenters 
argued that certain features may be offered in connection with certain 
prepaid products that would increase their stability, such as pass-
through insurance provided by some prepaid card products and state law 
requirements that money transmitters hold and invest funds equal to 
outstanding prepaid liabilities in high grade, low-risk assets.
    Several commenters argued that the agencies should apply an ASF 
factor higher than zero percent to non-deposit retail liabilities to 
align with the treatment of similar liabilities under the LCR 
rule.\130\ Some commenters recommended assigning an ASF factor of 60 
percent to non-deposit retail liabilities. Other commenters recommended 
assigning a 50 percent ASF factor to non-deposit retail funding or 
assigning a 50 percent ASF factor to the unsecured liabilities of a 
broker-dealer subsidiary of a covered company that are owed to a retail 
customer or counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ Section __.32(a)(5) of the LCR rule assigns a 40 percent 
outflow rate to non-deposit retail funding. As discussed in section 
V of this Supplementary Information section, the treatment of 
liabilities under the NSFR rule is not intended to align directly 
with that of the LCR rule due to the different purposes of the two 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a general matter, the final rule considers the relationship 
characteristics of retail customers or counterparties at least as 
favorably as wholesale counterparties that are not financial sector 
entities, and takes into account whether funding is obtained in 
connection with a transactional account or as part of another 
relationship with the covered company. However, not all forms of retail 
funding are equally stable. Although the GSIB capital surcharge rule 
excludes certain forms of non-deposit retail funding from the Method 2 
calculation methodology, exclusion of a funding source is not 
dispositive of its stability because the GSIB score measures a banking 
organization's systemic importance and does not measure the stability 
of each type of funding. Accordingly, the final rule does not calibrate 
ASF factors to non-deposit retail liabilities based on whether those 
liabilities are included in the Method 2 calculation under the GSIB 
capital surcharge rule.

[[Page 9151]]

    As noted by commenters, many of the liabilities that would have 
been included in the non-deposit retail funding category have 
demonstrated a relative degree of stability during normal and adverse 
economic periods, similar to types of funding that receive a 50 percent 
ASF factor. As non-deposits, however, the types of retail funding 
described above do not have the same stabilizing characteristics as the 
categories of deposits assigned a 90 percent or 95 percent ASF factor 
under the final rule. Although certain non-deposit retail funding may 
have transactional and other counterparty relationship characteristics 
similar to retail deposits and retail brokered deposits, they may also 
reflect counterparty sophistication characteristics similar to certain 
wholesale counterparties. For these reasons, the final rule assigns a 
50 percent ASF factor to funding from a retail customer that is not a 
deposit or a security, including retail brokerage payables.
All Other NSFR Liabilities With Remaining Maturity of Six Months or 
More, but Less Than One Year
    Section __.104(d)(8) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 50 
percent ASF factor to all other NSFR liabilities that have a remaining 
maturity of six months or more, but less than one year. As discussed in 
section VII.C.2 of this Supplementary Information section, a covered 
company would not need to roll over a liability of this maturity in the 
shorter-term, but may need to roll it over before the end of the NSFR's 
one-year time horizon.
    The agencies received no comments on this provision of the proposed 
rule. For the reasons discussed in the proposed rule, the final rule 
assigns a 50 percent ASF factor to all other NSFR liabilities that have 
a remaining maturity of six months or more, but less than one year as 
proposed.
e) Zero Percent ASF Factor
    The final rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor to NSFR 
liabilities that demonstrate the least stable funding characteristics, 
including trade date payables, certain short-term retail brokered 
deposits, certain short-term funding from financial sector entities or 
central banks, and any other NSFR liability that matures in less than 
six months and is not described above. In the absence of a remaining 
tenor of at least six months, funding on a covered company's balance 
sheet of these types are considered unreliable sources of funding 
relative to the need to support assets and commitments over the NSFR's 
time horizon.
Trade Date Payables
    Section __.104(e)(1) of the proposed rule would have assigned an 
ASF factor of zero percent to trade date payables that result from 
purchases by a covered company of financial instruments, foreign 
currencies, and commodities that are required to settle within the 
lesser of the market standard settlement period for the particular 
transactions and five business days from the date of the sale. Trade 
date payables are established when a covered company buys financial 
instruments, foreign currencies, and commodities, but the transactions 
have not yet settled. Trade date payables are recorded on the covered 
company's balance sheet as a liability. These payables should result in 
a payment from a covered company at the settlement date, which varies 
depending on the specific market. Accordingly, trade date payables are 
not a source of stable funding.
    The agencies did not receive comments on this provision. As 
proposed, the final rule assigns an ASF factor of zero percent to trade 
date payables because trade date payables should result in a payment 
from a covered company at the settlement date, meaning the liability 
does not represent a stable source of funding.
Certain Short-Term Retail Brokered Deposits
    Section __.104(e)(2) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
zero percent ASF factor to a brokered deposit provided by a retail 
customer or counterparty that is not a reciprocal brokered deposit or 
brokered sweep deposit, is not held in a transactional account, and 
matures less than six months from the calculation date.
    Commenters argued that non-maturity brokered deposits that are held 
in a savings account are similar in stability to non-brokered retail 
deposits held in a retail savings account, and therefore should be 
assigned a higher ASF factor. The commenters argued that assignment of 
a zero percent ASF factor would overstate the funding risks of brokered 
savings accounts, which these commenters argued include stabilizing 
deposit features such as the availability of full or partial FDIC 
deposit insurance and that the account holder can use other services 
provided by the banking organization.
    Retail brokered deposits that are not brokered reciprocal deposits 
or sweep deposits, are not held in transactional accounts, and mature 
in less than six months tend to be less stable than other types of 
brokered deposits because they do not have the stabilizing features of 
brokered deposits that are assigned a higher ASF factor. Although non-
maturity brokered deposits held in savings accounts may be fully or not 
fully insured and may provide similar access to services as a non-
brokered deposit in a retail savings account, deposit brokers can, in 
some cases, decide whether to move this funding to a different banking 
organization at low cost and with little notice to the covered company. 
Additionally, even if the deposit is fully insured, because the funds 
are held in non-transactional accounts they are less stable due to the 
ease with which the deposits can be withdrawn. Finally, under the 
maturity categories of the final rule, the term of these deposits would 
fall into the shortest-term and thus represent the least stable form of 
funding.
    For these reasons, the final rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor 
to a brokered deposit provided by a retail customer or counterparty 
that is not a brokered reciprocal deposit or sweep deposit, is not held 
in a transactional account, and matures less than six months from the 
calculation date as proposed.
Securities Issued by a Covered Company With Remaining Maturity of Less 
Than Six Months
    Section __.104(e)(4) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
zero percent ASF factor to securities that are issued by a covered 
company and that have a remaining maturity of less than six months. As 
discussed above in section VII.C.2 of this Supplementary Information 
section, the proposed rule generally would have treated as less stable 
funding that has to be paid within the NSFR's one-year time horizon.
    The agencies received no comments on this provision of the proposed 
rule. The final rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor to securities 
that are issued by a covered company and that have a remaining maturity 
of less than six months because such funding does not represent a 
source of stable funding over the NSFR's one-year time horizon.
Short-Term Funding From a Financial Sector Entity
    Section __.104(e)(5) of the proposed rule would have applied a zero 
percent ASF factor to funding (other than operational deposits) for 
which the counterparty is a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof and the transaction matures less than six

[[Page 9152]]

months from the calculation date.\131\ In general, financial sector 
entities and their consolidated subsidiaries are more likely than other 
types of counterparties to withdraw funding from a covered company, 
regardless of whether the funding is secured or the type of collateral 
securing the funding, as described in section VII.C.2 of this 
Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See supra note 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters raised concerns that the proposed assignment of a 
zero percent ASF factor to short-term funding from a financial sector 
entity would impair an important funding source for covered companies 
and could adversely affect the functioning of credit markets by 
increasing borrowing and transaction costs for end-users. Specifically, 
commenters objected that the proposed rule would assign a zero percent 
ASF factor to secured funding transactions while also assigning a 10 to 
15 percent RSF factor to secured lending transactions.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ As discussed in section VII.D.3.a of this Supplementary 
Information section, the agencies are decreasing the effect on the 
market for short-term secured lending transactions by adopting a 
zero percent RSF factor for certain secured lending transactions 
that are secured by rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also raised domestic and international regulatory 
concerns around the proposed framework for repurchase agreements. 
Commenters stated that rulemakings such as the GSIB capital surcharge 
rule and the SLR rule have increased the costs of transacting in 
matched-book repurchase agreements by adding higher capital 
requirements and that the NSFR would further exacerbate these costs. 
Commenters also questioned the assumption underlying the ASF and RSF 
factors for repurchase agreement and reverse repurchase agreement 
transactions--namely, that a covered company would be more likely to 
roll over short-term loans to financial sector entities than such 
entities would be likely to roll over short-term funding to a covered 
company. Since commenters primarily raised these concerns with regards 
to the assignment of RSF factors to short-term secured funding 
transactions, these issues are addressed more fully in section VII.D of 
this Supplementary Information section.
    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule assigns a zero 
percent ASF factor to funding (other than operational deposits) for 
which the counterparty is a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof and the transaction matures less than six months 
from the calculation date because financial sector counterparties are 
more likely to withdraw short term funding within a one-year time 
horizon, regardless of whether the transaction is secured or unsecured. 
As discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information section, 
one of the goals of the final rule is to ensure that covered companies 
have sufficient levels of long-term stable funding and do not 
excessively rely on short-term borrowings from financial sector 
entities. Moreover, these types of short-term borrowings with financial 
sector counterparties can carry elevated risks to the funding needs of 
covered companies when combined with concentrations that can increase 
systemic risk and interconnectedness.
    The agencies do not anticipate that the treatment of these short-
term secured funding transactions will have a significant impact on the 
markets identified by commenters, such as fixed income markets, 
commercial mortgage-backed securities, lending markets, or money 
markets, especially in light of the adjustments made in the treatment 
of short-term secured lending transactions as discussed in VII.D.3 of 
this Supplementary Information section. However, the agencies monitor 
these market segments on an ongoing basis to evaluate the impact of 
agency rulemakings on financial intermediation. At the same time, the 
agencies will continue to examine collateral markets for any warning 
signals, including the costs of short- and long-term funding, 
participation rates, and collateral flows between covered companies and 
financial sector entities.
Short-Term Funding From a Central Bank
    Section __.104(e)(5) of the proposed rule also would have assigned 
a zero percent ASF factor to short-term funding from central banks to 
recognize the short-term nature of such funding from central banks, 
consistent with the proposed rule's focus on stable funding from market 
sources. For example, funding obtained from the discount window would 
have been assigned a zero percent ASF factor, consistent with the terms 
of discount window advances.
    The agencies received no comments on this provision of the proposed 
rule. The final rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor to short-term 
funding from central banks as proposed.
All Other NSFR Liabilities With Remaining Maturity of Less Than Six 
Months or an Open Maturity
    Section __.104(e)(6) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
zero percent ASF factor to all other NSFR liabilities, including those 
that mature less than six months from the calculation date and those 
that have an open maturity. NSFR liabilities that do not fall into one 
of the categories that are assigned an ASF factor generally would not 
represent a regular or reliable source of funding and, therefore, the 
proposed rule would not have treated any portion as stable funding.
    Commenters requested that the NSFR rule assign a non-zero ASF 
factor to the unused borrowing capacity with FHLBs because the FHLB 
system is an important source of liquidity for U.S. banking 
organizations. The commenters pointed to FHLB lending activity during 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, which demonstrated that FHLBs increased 
their lending by 50 percent between 2007 and 2008. Commenters argued 
that recognizing this source of funding was appropriate since the NSFR 
requirement, unlike the LCR rule, is intended to be a structural metric 
that reflects the stable funding required across all market conditions 
over a longer one-year time horizon. One commenter suggested that the 
agencies conduct a study on the potential impact of the final rule on 
the FHLB system and its role in providing liquidity to banks.
    As discussed in section V.C of this Supplementary Information 
section, the NSFR is determined based on a covered company's balance 
sheet at a point in time. In order for a funding source to be 
considered relevant stable funding under the NSFR, a covered company 
must have obtained the funding for its balance sheet at that point in 
time. Establishing reliable sources of contingent funding in advance of 
potential funding needs is an essential part of sound liquidity risk 
management for banking organizations. For the purposes of assessing the 
risks presented by a banking organization's balance sheet, however, the 
NSFR does not treat undrawn lines of credit available to a covered 
company as stable funding, regardless of whether they are 
collateralized or whether they are provided by the FHLB system, the 
Federal Reserve System, or any other third parties.
    The final rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor to all other NSFR 
liabilities, including those that mature less than six months from the 
calculation date and those that have an open maturity.

D. Required Stable Funding

1. Calculation of the RSF Amount
    Consistent with the proposed rule, under the final rule a covered 
company's RSF amount reflects a covered company's funding requirement 
based on the liquidity characteristics of

[[Page 9153]]

its assets, commitments, and derivative exposures. Under Sec.  __.105 
of the proposed rule, a covered company's RSF amount would have equaled 
the sum of two components: (i) The carrying values of a covered 
company's assets (other than assets included in the calculation of the 
covered company's derivatives RSF amount) and the undrawn amounts of 
its committed credit and liquidity facilities, each multiplied by an 
RSF factor assigned under Sec.  __.106 (discussed in section VII.D.3 of 
this Supplementary Information section), and (ii) the covered company's 
derivatives RSF amount, as calculated under Sec.  __.107 (discussed in 
section VII.E of this Supplementary Information section). The agencies 
received no comments on the calculation of the RSF amount and are 
adopting it as proposed.
2. Characteristics for Assignment of RSF Factors
    The proposed rule would have grouped NSFR assets, derivative 
exposures and commitments into broad categories and assigned RSF 
factors to determine the overall amount of stable funding a covered 
company must maintain. RSF factors would have been scaled from zero to 
100 percent based on the tenor and other liquidity characteristics of 
an asset, derivative exposure, or committed facility. The agencies did 
not receive comments on this general approach to using the 
characteristics of assets and commitments, and the final rule adopts 
the characteristics for assigning RSF factors as proposed. As in the 
proposed rule, the final rule categorizes assets, derivative exposures, 
and committed facilities into categories and assigns RSF factors based 
on the following liquidity characteristics: (1) Tenor; (2) encumbrance; 
(3) type of counterparty; (4) credit quality, and (5) market 
characteristics. As discussed below and in the relevant sections of 
this Supplementary Information section, the final rule assigns RSF 
factors using these characteristics as proposed with certain 
modifications that simplify the framework to seven categories for the 
assignment of RSF factors.
a) Tenor
    In general, the final rule requires a covered company to maintain 
more stable funding to support assets that have longer tenors because 
of the greater time the asset will remain on the balance sheet and 
before the covered company is contractually scheduled to realize 
inflows at the maturity of the asset. In addition, if assets with a 
longer tenor are not held to maturity, such assets may liquidate at a 
discount because of the increased market and credit risks associated 
with cash flows occurring further in the future. Assets with a shorter 
tenor, in contrast, generally require a smaller amount of stable 
funding under the final rule because a covered company would not need 
to fund such assets after the maturity date unless the assets are 
extended or rolled over and the covered company would therefore have 
access to the inflows from these maturing assets sooner. The final rule 
divides maturities for purposes of a covered company's RSF amount 
calculation into the same four maturity categories consistent with the 
ASF maturity categories: One year or more, less than one year, six 
months or more but less than one year, and less than six months (RSF 
maturity categories).
b) Encumbrance
    As described in section VII.D.3.h of this Supplementary Information 
section, whether an asset is encumbered and the extent of the 
encumbrance dictates the amount of stable funding required to support 
the particular asset. Similar to assets with longer contractual tenors, 
assets that are encumbered at a calculation date may be required to be 
held for the duration of the encumbrance and these assets often cannot 
be monetized while encumbered. In general, the longer an asset is 
encumbered, the more stable funding is required under the final rule.
c) Counterparty Type
    A covered company may face pressure to renew some portion of its 
assets at contractual maturity in order to maintain its franchise value 
with customers and because a failure to roll over such assets could be 
perceived by market participants as an indicator of financial distress 
at the covered company. Typically, these pressures are influenced by 
the type of counterparty to the maturing asset. For example, covered 
companies often consider their lending relationships with a wholesale, 
non-financial borrower to be important to maintain current business and 
generate additional business in the future. By contrast, the agencies 
expect these concerns are less likely to be a factor with respect to 
financial sector counterparties because financial counterparties 
typically have a wider range of alternate funding sources already in 
place, face lower transaction costs associated with arranging alternate 
funding, and have less expectation of stable lending relationships with 
any single provider of credit. In light of these business and 
reputational considerations, the final rule generally requires a 
covered company to maintain more aggregate stable funding to support 
certain lending to non-financial counterparties than for lending to 
financial counterparties.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ See supra note 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d) Credit Quality
    Credit quality is a factor in an asset's general funding 
requirements because market participants tend to be more willing to 
purchase assets with higher credit quality on a consistent basis and 
the prices of these assets are generally less volatile across a range 
of market and economic conditions. The demand for higher credit quality 
assets, therefore, is more likely to persist, and such assets are more 
likely to have resilient values, allowing a covered company to dispose 
of them more easily across a range of market conditions. Assets of 
lower credit quality, in contrast, are less likely to retain their 
value over time across market conditions. The final rule, like the 
proposed rule, generally requires greater aggregate stable funding with 
respect to assets of lower credit quality, to reduce the risk that in 
the event of having to dispose of such an asset prior to maturity a 
covered company may have to monetize it at a discount.
e) Market Characteristics
    Assets that are traded in transparent, standardized markets with 
large numbers of participants and dedicated intermediaries tend to 
exhibit a higher degree of reliable liquidity. The final rule, 
therefore, generally requires less aggregate stable funding for 
holdings of such assets relative to those traded in markets 
characterized by information asymmetry and relatively few participants.
f) Comments Proposing Other Liquidity Characteristics
    The agencies invited comment on whether other characteristics 
should be considered for purposes of assigning RSF factors. Several 
commenters suggested that RSF factors should be assigned based on 
criteria related to existing regulations and other market and 
operational factors.\134\ Another commenter argued that RSF factors 
should more closely align with market haircuts used in secured funding 
markets. One commenter recommended

[[Page 9154]]

the agencies assign RSF factors based on the intent for which a 
security is held and apply a lower RSF factor to short-term securities 
held for market-making purposes than for securities held for investment 
purposes, arguing that the proposal would negatively impact market-
making activities. Other commenters argued that the assignment of RSF 
factors should take into account eligibility of assets as collateral 
for FHLB advances.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ For example, a commenter recommended incorporating the 
impact of existing regulations on a given asset or the counterparty 
to the asset, and an asset's external credit rating. The commenter 
recommended other market and operational factors, including the 
seniority, hedging, clearing characteristics of the asset and the 
size of the market for the asset.
    \135\ As discussed in section VII.C.3 of this Supplementary 
Information section, some commenters also recommended assigning a 
non-zero ASF factor to unused borrowing capacity from FHLBs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section V.B of this Supplementary Information 
section, the final rule addresses funding stability risks not directly 
addressed in other parts of the agencies' regulatory framework. 
Although the agencies recognize that other regulations may require or 
incentivize covered companies to hold, or refrain from holding, certain 
assets, those regulations do not directly address the stability of a 
banking organization's funding profile in relation to the composition 
of its assets and commitments. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate 
to assign RSF factors to assets based on their treatment in other 
regulations or the impact of regulations on the counterparty to an 
asset. The liquidity characteristics described above tend to be 
generally reflected in market haircuts, but RSF factor values are not 
directly representative of asset haircuts and closer alignment of RSF 
factors with haircuts used in secured funding markets would be 
inappropriate for calibrating aggregate funding requirements of covered 
companies. As also discussed in section V.C, the final rule's 
simplified and standardized measure of funding risk does not 
differentiate between business activities or the intent for which a 
covered company holds a given asset. Accordingly, the final rule takes 
into account an asset's contractual residual maturity at a point in 
time and does not speculate on a covered company's intended purpose and 
timeframe for holding an asset in the future. Further, an asset's 
eligibility as collateral for FHLB advances is not an appropriate 
additional basis for determining RSF factors. The liquidity 
characteristics described above, including credit quality, are likely 
factors also considered by FHLBs when assessing collateral eligibility. 
Generally, assets currently held by a covered company contribute to its 
balance sheet funding risk regardless of the covered company's 
operational ability to obtain FHLB advances in the future.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ In respect to FHLB advances, many FHLB advances may have 
long maturities that may be reflected in the assignment of ASF 
factors described in section VII.C.3 of this Supplementary 
Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Categories of RSF Factors for Unencumbered Assets and Commitments
    Based on the tenor, encumbrance, counterparty type, credit quality, 
and market characteristics described above, the final rule assigns RSF 
factors to unencumbered assets and commitments in the categories shown 
in Table 2. The treatment of encumbered assets is described below and 
shown in Table 3. The assignment of RSF factors for derivative 
exposures is described in section VII.E of this Supplementary 
Information section.

  Table 2--Categories of Unencumbered Assets and Commitments Based on Their Characteristsics and Resulting RSF
                                                     Factors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Credit quality or
Unencumbered and with tenor of:  Counterparty types        market             NSFR assets or        RSF factor
                                                       characteristics         commitments            percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perpetual......................  Central bank......  Other.............  Currency and coin......               0
Any tenor......................  Non-financial.....  HQLA..............  Level 1 liquid assets    ..............
                                                                          held on balance sheet.
Less than six months...........  All...............  Other.............  Cash items in the        ..............
                                                                          process of collection
                                                                          and certain trade date
                                                                          receivables.
                                 Central bank......  HQLA..............  Reserve Bank balances    ..............
                                                                          and claims on foreign
                                                                          central banks.
                                 Financial.........  Non-operational...  Secured lending          ..............
                                                                          transactions secured
                                                                          by rehypothecatable
                                                                          level 1 liquid assets.
Committed......................  All...............  Other.............  Committed credit and                  5
                                                                          liquidity facilities.
Any tenor......................  Non-financial.....  HQLA..............  Level 2A liquid assets               15
                                                                          held on balance sheet.
Less than six months...........  Financial.........  Non-operational...  Secured lending          ..............
                                                                          transactions secured
                                                                          by assets other than
                                                                          rehypothecatable level
                                                                          1 liquid assets and
                                                                          unsecured lending.
Any tenor......................  Non-financial.....  HQLA..............  Level 2B liquid assets               50
                                                                          held on balance sheet.
Six months or more, but less     Financial.........  Non-operational...  Secured lending          ..............
 than one year.                                                           transactions and
                                                                          unsecured wholesale
                                                                          lending.
Any tenor......................  Financial.........  Operational.......  Operational deposit      ..............
                                                                          placements.
Less than one year.............  Non-financial.....  Non-operational...  Secured lending          ..............
                                                                          transactions and
                                                                          unsecured lending.
                                 Retail............  Any...............  Retail lending.........  ..............
                                 Any...............  Any...............  All other assets.......  ..............
One year or more...............  Retail............  Risk weight <=50    Retail mortgages.......              65
                                                      percent.
                                 Retail and non-     Risk weight <=20    Secured lending          ..............
                                  financial.          percent.            transactions,
                                                                          unsecured wholesale
                                                                          lending, and retail
                                                                          lending.
                                 Retail............  Risk weight >50     Retail mortgages.......              85
                                                      percent.
                                 Retail and non-     Risk weight >20     Secured lending          ..............
                                  financial.          percent.            transactions,
                                                                          unsecured wholesale
                                                                          lending, and retail
                                                                          lending.
                                 All...............  Non-HQLA..........  Securities other than    ..............
                                                                          common equity shares
                                                                          that are not HQLA.
Any tenor......................  ..................  ..................  Publicly traded common   ..............
                                                                          equity shares that are
                                                                          not HQLA.
                                                     Derivative          Commodities............  ..............
                                                      transactions are
                                                      traded on U.S. or
                                                      non-U.S.
                                                      exchanges.
One year or more...............  Financial.........  Any...............  Secured lending                     100
                                                                          transactions and
                                                                          unsecured lending to a
                                                                          financial sector
                                                                          entity.
Any tenor......................  All...............  >90 days past due   Nonperforming assets...  ..............
                                                      or nonaccrual.
                                                     Any...............  All other assets.......  ..............

[[Page 9155]]

 
Any tenor *....................  All...............  Derivative........  NSFR derivatives asset   ..............
                                                                          amount.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The derivative treatment nets derivative transactions with various maturities.

a) Zero Percent RSF Factor
    Certain assets held by banking organizations have unique 
characteristics such that they do not contribute risk to a banking 
organization's funding profile. Assets such as currency, coin, cash 
items in the process of collection and short-term central bank reserves 
on a covered company's balance sheet at the NSFR calculation date 
generally can be used in the immediate term to meet obligations and 
eliminate short-term liabilities. In the normal course of business, 
trade date receivables also constitute assets of this type, even though 
they are subject to certain operational frictions.
    Certain other assets in this category, such as level 1 liquid asset 
securities on a covered company's balance sheet and certain short-term 
secured lending transactions backed by rehypothecatable level 1 liquid 
assets conducted with financial sector entities make minimal 
contribution to a covered company's aggregate funding risk and are 
important to the efficient operation of key short-term funding markets.
    These unique characteristics make it appropriate to assign an RSF 
factor of zero percent, the lowest RSF factor assigned to assets.
(i) Asset Classes for Which the Agencies Received No Comments
    The proposal would have applied a zero percent RSF factor to 
currency, coin, cash items in the process of collection, Reserve Bank 
balances and other central bank reserves with a maturity of less than 
six months. The agencies received no comments on these asset classes 
and are finalizing them as proposed.
Currency and Coin
    Section __.106(a)(1)(i) of the final rule assigns a zero percent 
RSF factor to currency and coin because these assets can be directly 
used to meet financial obligations. Currency and coin include U.S. and 
foreign currency and coin owned and held in all offices of a covered 
company; currency and coin in transit to a Federal Reserve Bank or to 
any other depository institution for which the covered company's 
subsidiaries have not yet received credit; and currency and coin in 
transit from a Federal Reserve Bank or from any other depository 
institution for which the accounts of the subsidiaries of the covered 
company have already been charged.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ This description of currency and coin is consistent with 
the treatment of currency and coin in Federal Reserve form FR Y-9C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cash Items in the Process of Collection
    Section __.106(a)(1)(ii) of the final rule assigns a zero percent 
RSF factor to cash items in the process of collection because these 
assets will not persist on a covered company's balance sheet, but 
rather will be converted to assets that can be directly used to meet 
financial obligations in the immediate term. These items would include: 
(1) Checks or drafts in process of collection that are drawn on another 
depository institution (or a Federal Reserve Bank) and that are payable 
immediately upon presentation in the country where the covered 
company's office that is clearing or collecting the check or draft is 
located, including checks or drafts drawn on other institutions that 
have already been forwarded for collection, but for which the covered 
company has not yet been given credit (known as cash letters), and 
checks or drafts on hand that will be presented for payment or 
forwarded for collection on the following business day; (2) U.S. 
government checks drawn on the Treasury of the United States or any 
other U.S. government agency that are payable immediately upon 
presentation and that are in process of collection; and (3) such other 
items in process of collection that are payable immediately upon 
presentation and that are customarily cleared or collected as cash 
items by depository institutions in the country where the covered 
company's office that is clearing or collecting the item is 
located.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ This description of cash items in the process of 
collection is consistent with the treatment of cash items in process 
of collection in Federal Reserve form FR Y-9C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reserve Bank Balances and Other Claims on a Reserve Bank That Mature in 
Less Than Six Months
    Section __.106(a)(1)(iii) of the final rule assigns a zero percent 
RSF factor to a Reserve Bank balance or to another claim on a Reserve 
Bank that matures in less than six months from the calculation date. 
The term ``Reserve Bank balances'' is defined in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR 
rule and includes required reserve balances and excess reserves, but 
not other balances that a covered company maintains on behalf of 
another institution.\139\ Reserve Bank balances can be directly used to 
meet financial obligations through the Federal Reserve's payment 
system. Although other claims on Reserve Banks that mature in less than 
six months cannot be directly used to meet financial obligations, a 
covered company faces little risk of harm to its franchise value if it 
does not roll over the lending to a Reserve Bank at maturity. The 
covered company, therefore, may realize cash flows associated with the 
asset in the near term and not retain the asset on its balance sheet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ For example, the term ``Reserve Bank balance'' does not 
include balances maintained by a covered company on behalf of a 
respondent for which it acts as a pass-through correspondent. See 12 
CFR 204.5(a)(1)(ii). The definition also does not include balances 
maintained on behalf of an excess balance account participant. See 
12 CFR 204.10(d). The Board reduced reserve requirement ratios to 
zero percent effective March 26, 2020. This action eliminated 
reserve requirements for all depository institutions. See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm The Board could 
revise required reserve requirements in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Claims on a Foreign Central Bank That Matures in Less Than Six Months
    Section __.106(a)(1)(iv) of the final rule assigns a zero percent 
RSF factor to claims on a foreign central bank that mature in less than 
six months. Similar to claims on a Reserve Bank, claims on a foreign 
central bank in this category may generally either be directly used to 
meet financial obligations or will be available for such use in the 
near term, and a covered company faces little risk of harm to its 
franchise value if it does not roll over the lending.
(ii) Asset Classes for Which the Agencies Received Comments
    The proposed rule would have applied a zero percent RSF factor to 
trade date receivables that met certain criteria. The proposed rule 
also would have assigned RSF factors higher than zero to (1) certain 
level 1 liquid assets and (2) secured lending transactions with a 
maturity of less than six months

[[Page 9156]]

conducted with financial sector entities (or their subsidiaries) and 
secured by rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets. The agencies 
received a number of comments on the proposed treatment of these 
assets.
Trade Date Receivables
    Section __.106(a)(1)(v) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
zero percent RSF factor to a trade date receivable due to a covered 
company that results from the sale of a financial instrument, foreign 
currency, or commodity that (1) is contractually required to settle 
within the lesser of the market standard settlement period for the 
relevant type of transaction, without extension of the standard 
settlement period, and five business days from the date of the sale; 
and (2) has not failed to settle within the required settlement period. 
By contrast, Sec.  __.106(a)(8) of the proposed rule would have 
assigned a 100 percent RSF factor to a trade date receivable that (1) 
is contractually required to settle within the lesser of the market 
standard settlement period and five business days, but (2) fails to 
settle within this period.\140\ Several commenters expressed concerns 
that the proposed treatment was overly conservative and would result in 
assignment of a 100 percent RSF to trade date receivables that would 
likely still settle. Some commenters requested a zero percent RSF 
factor for trade date receivables that have failed to settle within the 
standard settlement period or five days, but still are expected to 
settle. These commenters noted that such treatment would align with the 
treatment in the Basel NSFR standard. One commenter contended that 
certain instruments have standard market settlement periods longer than 
five days and requested a zero percent RSF factor for receivables that 
settle within the greater of the standard market settlement period and 
five days. Another commenter requested a zero percent RSF factor for 
trade date receivables that failed to settle but are not more than five 
days past the standard settlement date, arguing that a covered company 
would expect the majority of its trade date receivables to have settled 
by that date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ In addition, consistent with the definition of 
``derivative transaction'' under Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule, a trade 
date receivable that has a contractual settlement or delivery lag 
longer than the lesser of the market standard for the particular 
instrument or five days would have been treated as a derivative 
transaction under Sec.  __.107 of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule expands the types of trade date receivables that are 
assigned a zero percent RSF factor to include trade date receivables 
due to a covered company that result from the sale of a financial 
instrument, foreign currency, or commodity that is required to settle 
no later than the market standard for the particular transaction, and 
that has yet to settle but is not more than five business days past the 
scheduled settlement date. This change from the proposal will more 
accurately measure the amount of receivables that are expected to 
settle and result in inflows in the near future because such trade date 
receivables are still reasonably expected to settle imminently. As 
discussed in section VII.D.3.g of this Supplementary Information, trade 
date receivables that do not qualify for a zero percent RSF factor are 
assigned a 100 percent RSF factor.
Unencumbered Level 1 Liquid Assets Held on Balance Sheet
    Section __.106(a)(2)(i) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
5 percent RSF factor to unencumbered level 1 liquid assets that would 
not have been assigned a zero percent RSF factor. The proposed rule 
would have incorporated the definition of ``level 1 liquid assets'' set 
forth in Sec.  __.20(a) of the LCR rule but would not have taken into 
consideration the operational requirements described in Sec.  __.22 of 
the LCR rule. As a result, the proposed rule would have assigned a 5 
percent RSF factor to the following level 1 liquid assets: (1) 
Securities issued or unconditionally guaranteed as to the timely 
payment of principal and interest by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury; (2) liquid and readily-marketable securities,\141\ as defined 
in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule, issued or unconditionally guaranteed as 
to the timely payment of principal and interest by any other U.S. 
government agency (provided that its obligations are fully and 
explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government); (3) certain liquid and readily-marketable securities that 
are claims on, or claims guaranteed by, a sovereign entity, a central 
bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and European Community, or a 
multilateral development bank; and (4) certain liquid and readily-
marketable debt securities issued by sovereign entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ As discussed in section VI of this Supplementary 
Information section, the final rule incorporates the LCR rule's 
definition of ``liquid and readily-marketable,'' which means, with 
respect to a security that the security is traded in an active 
secondary market with: (1) More than two committed market makers; 
(2) a large number of non-market maker participants on both the 
buying and selling sides of transactions; (3) timely and observable 
market prices; and (4) a high trading volume. See Sec.  __.3 of the 
LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argued that the NSFR rule should assign a zero 
percent RSF factor for all HQLA. These commenters argued that the 
proposed non-zero RSF factors for these assets would unduly penalize 
low-risk sources of funding, increase banking organizations' costs for 
holding HQLA and engaging in securities financing transactions 
involving HQLA, and undermine the ability of banking organizations to 
act as market makers. Other commenters believed a zero percent RSF 
factor would provide for a more level playing field by aligning with 
other jurisdictions' implementation of the NSFR.
    A number of commenters requested a zero percent RSF factor be 
assigned to all level 1 liquid assets, which include certain government 
securities that commenters argued have liquidity characteristics 
similar to assets that would have been assigned a zero percent RSF 
factor under the proposed rule.\142\ Many commenters argued that U.S. 
Treasury securities, in particular, should be assigned a zero percent 
RSF factor because they are among the most liquid and readily 
marketable securities a covered company may hold and benefit from 
flight to quality during times of stress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ These commenters also argued that the proposed treatment 
would be more conservative than the treatment of level 1 liquid 
assets under the LCR rule, which allows a banking organization to 
include the full fair value of level 1 liquid assets in its HQLA 
amount. The value of RSF factors are not representative of market 
haircuts to asset values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, assets that a covered company can directly use 
to meet financial obligations or can reasonably expect to obtain the 
cash inflows at the maturity of these assets in the near future are 
assigned a zero percent RSF factor under the final rule. Such assets 
generally do not present risks to a covered company or the financial 
sector in the event of funding disruptions. Similarly, given their 
liquidity characteristics, level 1 liquid asset securities present 
minimal risks resulting from a covered company's funding of these 
assets as assessed over a one-year time horizon. Across a broad range 
of market conditions, a covered company generally may be less likely to 
have to fund these securities for one year compared to other 
securities. Although U.S. Treasury securities and other level 1 liquid 
asset securities generally must be monetized before they can be used to 
settle obligations and face modest transaction costs in doing so, these 
assets, regardless of their

[[Page 9157]]

contractual maturity, serve as reliable sources of liquidity across 
market conditions, based on their high credit quality and the favorable 
characteristics of the markets for these assets. Further, level 1 
liquid asset securities generally retain their value in the event of 
market disruptions relative to most other assets. In addition, these 
level 1 liquid asset securities serve a critically important role in 
supporting the smooth functioning of the funding markets, and, as 
further discussed in section X of this Supplementary Information 
section, a non-zero RSF factor on level 1 liquid assets could 
discourage intermediation in the U.S. Treasury market. For these 
reasons, the final rule applies a zero percent RSF factor to 
unencumbered level 1 liquid assets. Responses to comments requesting 
the final rule assign a zero percent RSF factor to all other HQLA are 
included below.
Secured Lending Transactions With a Financial Sector Entity or a 
Subsidiary Thereof That Mature Within Six Months and Are Secured by 
Rehypothecatable Level 1 Liquid Assets
    Section __.106(a)(3) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 10 
percent RSF factor to a secured lending transaction \143\ with a 
financial sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary thereof that 
matures within six months of the calculation date and is secured by 
level 1 liquid assets that are rehypothecatable for the duration of the 
transaction.\144\ The proposal explained that a relatively lower amount 
of stable funding is needed to support all forms of short-term lending 
to financial sector entities because the financial nature of the 
counterparty presents relatively lower reputational risk to a covered 
company if it chooses not to roll over the transaction when it matures. 
As a general matter, the proposed rule would have treated secured 
lending transactions and unsecured lending transactions with financial 
sector counterparties the same. However, the proposed rule would have 
assigned a lower RSF factor to such short-term lending transactions 
that are secured by rehypothecatable level 1 assets, relative to most 
other lending, because of a covered company's ability to monetize the 
level 1 liquid asset for the duration of the transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See section VI of this Supplementary Information section 
for a description of the definition of ``secured lending 
transaction'' in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule.
    \144\ The proposal would have assigned a 15 percent RSF factor 
to all other secured lending transactions to a financial sector 
counterparty with a remaining maturity of less than six months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters requested that the agencies reduce or remove 
the proposed RSF factors for all short-term secured lending 
transactions to financial sector entities. These commenters argued that 
the RSF factor should match the zero percent ASF factor assigned to 
short-term secured funding transactions with financial sector entities, 
noting that the proposed asymmetrical treatment would prevent a covered 
company from using such short-term funding transactions wholly to fund 
its short-term lending transactions. Commenters asserted that this 
asymmetry would be overly punitive, impair a covered company's ability 
to conduct prudent short-term liquidity risk management, not accurately 
reflect collateral quality, and increase costs. Such increased costs, 
commenters contended, would cause covered companies to reduce such 
lending, resulting in a further contraction of the repo market, 
increased market volatility for the securities typically used as 
collateral, and have a negative impact on financial institutions that 
rely on the short-term funding market. Commenters also argued that the 
proposed RSF factors for short-term secured lending transactions to 
financial sector entities are unnecessary and overly burdensome because 
other regulatory measures sufficiently address the risks posed by these 
transactions. Several commenters argued that the proposed RSF treatment 
would reduce the competitiveness of covered companies relative to other 
market participants. Other commenters requested that the agencies 
reduce the RSF factors to align with other jurisdictions' 
implementation of the NSFR.
    The agencies also received comments requesting a zero percent RSF 
factor be assigned to short-term secured lending transactions with 
financial sector entities secured by rehypothecatable level 1 liquid 
assets. One commenter argued that these transactions present few risks 
of disorderly or destabilizing unwinds due to the quality of the 
underlying collateral. Another commenter expressed concern that the 
proposed 10 percent RSF factor would incentivize a covered company to 
purchase on balance sheet level 1 liquid assets rather than borrow such 
assets through secured lending transactions to obtain more favorable 
RSF treatment, which would increase liquidity and interest rate risk as 
a result of holding the assets on balance sheet.
    Covered companies may use short-term secured funding and lending 
transactions, such as repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase 
agreements, for collateral management and funding purposes as well as 
other business and risk management purposes. Short-term secured funding 
and lending transactions, however, can give rise to certain funding 
risks. For example, a covered company is exposed to risk of borrower 
default and fluctuation in the price of the underlying collateral. At 
the same time, a covered company may be incentivized to continue 
funding a certain portion of its lending under these transactions even 
as it loses access to its short term funding transactions. Although the 
agencies recognize that other regulations reduce certain risks 
associated with short-term secured lending transactions, the NSFR 
requirement is designed to directly measure and ensure the stability of 
covered companies' aggregate funding profile over a one-year horizon.
    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule generally treats 
secured lending transactions with financial sector counterparties the 
same as unsecured lending to these counterparties based on their tenor 
and counterparty characteristics, described below. However, the 
agencies have revised the proposed rule by adding Sec.  
__.106(a)(1)(vii) to the final rule, which assigns an RSF factor of 
zero percent, rather than 10 percent, for short-term lending 
transactions with a financial sector entity secured by rehypothecatable 
level 1 liquid assets, as such short-term secured lending transactions 
present minimal risk to the covered company. Moreover, as further 
discussed in section X of this Supplementary Information section, a 
non-zero RSF factor on secured lending transactions secured with 
rehypothecateble level 1 liquid assets could also discourage 
intermediation in certain short-term secured lending markets. The 
calibration would also align the RSF factor for these loan receivables 
with the RSF factor for level 1 liquid assets that are held on the 
covered company's balance sheet.
b) 5 Percent RSF Factor
Committed Credit and Liquidity Facilities--RSF Factor and Undrawn 
Amount
    Section __.106(a)(2)(ii) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
5 percent RSF factor to the undrawn amount of committed credit and 
liquidity facilities that a covered company provides to its customers 
and counterparties.\145\ The proposed rule

[[Page 9158]]

clarified that the ``undrawn amount'' for purposes of the NSFR rule 
would be the amount that could be drawn within one year of the 
calculation date, but would not have included amounts that could only 
be drawn contingent upon contractual milestones or events that cannot 
reasonably be expected to occur within one year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ The terms ``credit facility,'' ``liquidity facility,'' and 
``committed'' are defined terms under Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule. As 
discussed in section VI.A of this Supplementary Information section, 
the final rule modifies the definition of ``committed.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies did not receive any comments on the proposed 5 percent 
RSF factor assigned to the undrawn amount of committed credit and 
liquidity facilities. However, several commenters requested the 
agencies modify the proposed rule to permit a covered company to reduce 
the undrawn commitments by the value of collateral that it receives to 
secure its committed facility, particularly collateral in the form of 
HQLA, for purposes of determining the applicable RSF amount. Commenters 
noted that the LCR rule permits covered companies to net, for purposes 
of calculating outflow amounts, level 1 and level 2A liquid assets that 
secure a committed credit or liquidity facility against the undrawn 
amount of the facility, and requested similar treatment under the NSFR 
rule.
    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule does not permit a 
covered company to net collateral against undrawn amounts of 
commitments.\146\ As described in section V.C of this Supplementary 
Information section, unlike the LCR rule, which addresses the risk of 
cash outflows and permits a covered company to net certain high-quality 
collateral against the undrawn amount of a committed credit or 
liquidity facility because such collateral may be used to meet its 
short-term obligations,\147\ the NSFR measures the funding profile of a 
covered company's balance sheet and any draw upon a committed facility 
would become an asset (i.e., a loan) on a covered company's balance 
sheet that generally would increase the covered company's stable 
funding needs. Similarly, collateral obtained pursuant to a default of 
a draw on a secured facility would add to a covered company's balance 
sheet and require stable funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ The NSFR requirement generally does not take into account 
prospective inflows arising from the receipt of collateral. As 
explained further below in section VII.E of this Supplementary 
Information section, the NSFR requirement's treatment of derivative 
transactions permits the receipt of certain eligible collateral to 
be netted against the derivatives asset amount. Recognition in the 
NSFR requirement of the funding value of collateral for derivatives 
transactions is appropriate notwithstanding the rule's general 
prohibition against netting collateral because of the special role 
of derivatives margin and because the rule sets forth a number of 
restrictions and contractual netting criteria for certain collateral 
to be netted against the derivatives asset amount.
    \147\ See Sec.  __.32(e)(3) of the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter requested clarification of the term ``undrawn 
amount'' and the treatment of funded commitments that result in 
contractually offsetting collateral inflows. The commenter also asked 
what level of support would be required to demonstrate an amount is 
excludable from the undrawn amount because it is contingent upon events 
not reasonably expected to occur within the NSFR's time horizon. The 
agencies are clarifying that the undrawn amount is the maximum amount 
that could be drawn under the agreement within the NSFR requirement's 
one-year time horizon under all reasonably possible circumstances.\148\ 
The undrawn amount does not include amounts that are contingent on the 
occurrence of a contractual milestone or other events that cannot 
reasonably be expected to be reached or occur within the one-year time 
horizon. For example, if a construction company can draw a certain 
amount from a credit facility only upon meeting a construction 
milestone that cannot reasonably be expected to be reached within one 
year, such as entering the final stage of a multi-year project that has 
just begun, then the undrawn amount would not include the amount that 
would become available only upon entering the final stage of the 
project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ For example, if the governing agreement provides that (1) 
the counterparty must liquidate collateral securing the facility 
before drawing on the facility and (2) the covered company must 
provide the amount available under the facility less the proceeds of 
the collateral sale, the undrawn amount would be the full value of 
the amount available under the facility (i.e., not reduced by the 
proceeds of the collateral sale). This reflects the contractual 
possibility that the covered company may still be required to 
provide the counterparty the full value allowed under the facility, 
even though under many circumstances the covered company's exposure 
would be reduced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, a letter of credit that meets the definition of credit 
or liquidity facility may entitle a seller to obtain funds from a 
covered company if a buyer fails to pay the seller. If the seller is 
legally entitled to obtain the funds available under the letter of 
credit as of the calculation date (because the buyer has defaulted) or 
if the buyer should reasonably be expected to default within the NSFR's 
one-year time horizon, then the funds available under the letter of 
credit are undrawn amounts. However, if, under the terms of the letter 
of credit, the seller is not legally entitled to obtain funds from the 
covered company as of the calculation date because the buyer has not 
failed to perform under the agreement with the seller, and the covered 
company does not reasonably expect nonperformance within the NSFR's 
one-year time horizon, then the funds potentially available under the 
letter of credit are not undrawn amounts.
    The agencies expect that a covered company would conduct an 
analysis of the likelihood of contingent contractual milestones or 
other events to be reached or occur, which may include reliance on 
historical experience, including consideration of both internal and 
industry-wide data. The agencies also expect a covered company to be 
able to provide sufficient supporting documentation that justifies its 
assessment that a contractual milestone or other event cannot 
reasonably be expected to be reached or occur within the one-year time 
horizon. The sufficiency and appropriateness of that documentation 
would be reviewed by supervisory staff.
    The agencies are finalizing the assigned 5 percent RSF factor to 
the undrawn amount of committed credit and liquidity facilities that a 
covered company provides to its customers and counterparties as 
proposed. The final rule requires a covered company to recognize 
committed facilities in its aggregate stable funding requirement to a 
limited extent, even though they are generally not included on a 
covered company's balance sheet. The 5 percent RSF factor is the lowest 
non-zero RSF factor and is applied uniquely to off-balance sheet 
commitments.
c) 15 Percent RSF Factor
    The final rule applies a 15 percent RSF factor to unencumbered 
level 2A liquid assets held on a covered company's balance sheet and 
lending to financial counterparties that matures in less than six 
months, other than secured lending transactions backed by 
rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets. Based on their liquidity 
characteristics, including their high credit quality, these assets may 
also not need to be funded for the entirety of the NSFR's one-year time 
horizon, and covered companies may have the ability to recognize 
inflows from such assets within one year across a range of market 
conditions.
Unencumbered Level 2A Liquid Assets
    Section __.106(a)(4)(i) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
15 percent RSF factor to level 2A liquid assets, as defined in Sec.  
__.20(b) of the LCR rule, but would not have taken into consideration 
the operational requirements described in Sec.  __.22 or the level 2 
cap in Sec.  __.21. As set forth in the LCR rule, level 2A liquid 
assets

[[Page 9159]]

include certain obligations issued or guaranteed by a Government 
Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) and certain obligations issued or guaranteed 
by a sovereign entity or a multilateral development bank. The LCR rule 
requires these securities to be liquid and readily-marketable, as 
defined in Sec.  __.3, to qualify as level 2A liquid assets.
    Commenters requested more favorable treatment for certain GSE 
securities under the NSFR rule. Several commenters recommended that 
mortgage-backed securities issued by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) should receive the same 5 percent RSF factor proposed for 
level 1 liquid assets, as long as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain 
under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
One commenter argued these securities exhibit favorable liquidity 
characteristics and are low risk, and expressed concern that the 
proposed 15 percent RSF factor would discourage banks from purchasing 
these mortgage-backed securities, which would result in increased 
mortgage interest rates for homeowners. Another commenter noted that 
the European Union allows covered bonds with similar liquidity 
characteristics to qualify as level 1 liquid assets. Another commenter 
recommended that FHLB consolidated debt obligations should receive a 5 
percent RSF factor based on the historical performance of these 
obligations during financial stress and their strong market attributes, 
including narrow bid-ask spreads, numerous active and diverse market 
makers, timely market prices, and high trading volumes.
    Similar to other HQLA, level 2A liquid assets held by covered 
companies on their balance sheets have a broad range of residual 
maturities and are held for a variety of purposes. For example, covered 
companies hold such securities as long-term investments, as instruments 
to maintain medium-term hedges or as part of the covered company's 
eligible HQLA under the LCR rule. Holdings of unencumbered level 2A 
liquid assets on a covered company's balance sheet present only modest 
risks to the covered company or financial system in the event of 
funding disruptions. A 15 percent RSF factor is appropriate for GSE-
issued or GSE-guaranteed obligations because they have high credit 
quality and are traded in deep, liquid markets. For example, mortgage-
backed securities issued by GSEs have a higher credit quality, higher 
average daily trading volume, and lower bid-ask spreads relative to 
corporate debt securities, which are assigned a higher RSF factor. 
However, these securities have different liquidity characteristics than 
U.S. Treasury securities and other level 1 liquid assets. For instance, 
GSE obligations are not subject to the same unconditional sovereign 
guarantee as certain securities that are level 1 liquid assets, which 
are assigned a zero percent RSF factor. Moreover, while certain GSEs 
are currently operating under the conservatorship of the FHFA, GSE 
obligations are not explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit 
of the United States, and they should not receive the same treatment as 
obligations that have such an explicit guarantee. This treatment is 
consistent with the agencies' risk-based capital rule, which 
differentiates between obligations and guarantees of U.S. GSEs, 
including those operating under conservatorship of FHFA and securities 
explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United 
States.\149\ With respect to covered bonds, the agencies have 
determined that covered bonds do not meet the liquid and readily-
marketable standard in the United States and thus do not meet the 
liquidity characteristics to qualify as a level 1 or level 2A liquid 
asset. The final rule adopts a 15 percent RSF factor for level 2A 
liquid assets as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ 12 CFR 3.32 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.32 (Board); 12 CFR 324.32 
(FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secured Lending Transactions Secured by All Other Collateral and 
Unsecured Wholesale Lending With a Financial Sector Entity or a 
Subsidiary Thereof That Mature Within Six Months
    Section __.106(a)(4)(ii) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
15 percent RSF factor to a secured lending transaction with a financial 
sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary thereof that is secured by 
assets other than rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets and that 
matures within six months of the calculation date. The proposal also 
would have assigned a 15 percent RSF factor to unsecured wholesale 
lending to a financial sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary 
thereof that matures within six months of the calculation date.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ See supra note 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The comments received by the agencies regarding the treatment of 
secured lending transactions generally, as well as the agencies' 
response to the comments, are summarized above in section VII.D.3.a of 
this Supplementary Information section. The agencies did not receive 
any comments specific to the proposed treatment of unsecured wholesale 
lending to a financial sector entity or a subsidiary thereof that 
matures within six months.
    The final rule adopts the proposed treatment for these transactions 
without any modification. A 15 percent RSF factor reflects that these 
transactions contribute less to a covered company's aggregate funding 
requirement because of their shorter tenors relative to loans with a 
longer remaining maturity, when considering cash inflows upon maturity 
of the loan. In addition, these loans also generally present lower 
reputational risk if a covered company chooses not to roll over the 
transaction because of the financial nature of the counterparty. For 
these reasons, a 15 percent RSF factor for these assets is lower than 
the RSF factor assigned to longer-term secured transactions to similar 
counterparties or to similar-term loans to non-financial 
counterparties. However, the assignment of a higher RSF factor to these 
assets compared to similar short-term secured lending transactions to 
financial counterparties that are secured by rehypothecatable level 1 
liquid assets reflects the covered company's more limited ability to 
monetize assets that are not level 1 liquid assets for the duration of 
the transaction.
d) 50 Percent RSF Factor
    Based on the NSFR's one-year time horizon, the final rule applies 
the median RSF factor of 50 percent to unencumbered level 2B liquid 
assets of all maturities. Covered companies may not need to fund these 
securities for the entirety of the NSFR's one-year time horizon, and 
covered companies may have the ability to recognize inflows from such 
assets within one year, each across a range of market conditions.
    The final rule also applies a 50 percent RSF factor to most loans 
with remaining maturities of less than one year and to operational 
deposit placements. Lending that matures in less than one year is less 
likely to require funding for a full year relative to loans that have 
residual maturities of one year or more, which generally receive a 
higher RSF factor under the final rule. While certain loans that mature 
in less than one year may be renewed, covered companies are generally 
more likely to receive cash inflows when these loans mature compared to 
longer maturities. With respect to operational deposit placements, the 
50 percent RSF factor reflects that covered companies as recipients of 
operational services likely would face limitations to making 
significant changes to their operational activities during the NSFR's 
one-year

[[Page 9160]]

time horizon across a range of market conditions.
Unencumbered Level 2B Liquid Assets
    Section __.106(a)(5)(i) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
50 percent RSF factor to level 2B liquid assets, as defined in Sec.  
__.20(c) of the LCR rule, but without taking into consideration the 
operational requirements described in Sec.  __.22 or the level 2 caps 
in Sec.  __.21. At the time of proposal, level 2B liquid assets 
included certain publicly traded corporate debt securities and publicly 
traded common equity shares that are liquid and readily-marketable. To 
qualify as a level 2B liquid asset, the asset must meet certain 
criteria under Sec.  __.20 of the LCR rule. For example, among other 
criteria, equity securities must be part of a major index and both 
corporate debt securities and municipal obligations must be 
``investment grade'' under 12 CFR part 1.
    Subsequent to the issuance of the proposed rule, EGRRCPA was 
enacted, which requires the agencies to treat certain municipal 
obligations as a level 2B liquid asset for purposes of the LCR rule and 
any other regulation that incorporates a definition of the term ``high-
quality liquid asset'' or substantially similar term.\151\ Consistent 
with EGRRCPA, the agencies amended the LCR rule to treat municipal 
obligations that are investment grade and liquid and readily-marketable 
as level 2B liquid assets.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296-1368 (May 24, 2018).
    \152\ See 84 FR 25975 (June 5, 2019). As a result, the agencies 
are not also finalizing proposed Sec.  __.106(a)(5)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed RSF factor 
for level 2B liquid assets was too high and argued that these 
securities should be considered more liquid over the NSFR's one-year 
horizon. For example, one commenter requested a 15 percent RSF factor 
for equity securities that are included in major market indices, such 
as exchange-traded funds that track a major market index. Some 
commenters recommended revised RSF treatment for level 2B liquid asset 
eligible corporate debt securities. For example, some commenters 
requested that the RSF factor for corporate debt securities be more 
granular and calibrated based on the tenor of the securities, the 
issuer's creditworthiness, or the desired tenor of funding used to 
purchase the securities. One commenter requested eliminating the 
requirement that a corporate debt security be investment grade.\153\ 
Another commenter recommended the agencies adopt the RSF factors 
assigned to various types of corporate debt in the Basel NSFR standard. 
One commenter recommended that the agencies more closely align the RSF 
factor for these assets to the market haircuts in secured funding 
markets. Another commenter expressed concern that the proposed RSF 
treatment would make it more expensive for banking organizations to 
hold debt and equity securities intended for trading, which would 
result in decreased willingness to hold inventories and negatively 
impact capital markets. The commenter asserted that, given the 
importance of capital markets in the United States, the proposed RSF 
factor would place the United States at a competitive disadvantage to 
other jurisdictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ Pursuant to the LCR rule, corporate debt securities must 
be investment grade in order to qualify as a level 2B liquid asset. 
12 CFR 249.20(c)(1)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule maintains as proposed the 50 percent RSF factor for 
level 2B liquid assets, which include certain investment grade publicly 
traded corporate debt securities and municipal obligations \154\ and 
certain publicly traded common equity shares included on the Russell 
1000 or an index that a foreign supervisor recognizes for purposes of 
including equity shares in level 2B liquid assets under applicable 
regulatory policy of a foreign jurisdiction. As described in section 
V.C of this Supplementary Information section, the final rule uses 
definitions common to the LCR rule to increase the efficiency of the 
rule. The agencies did not propose and the final rule does not adopt 
any changes to the definition of level 2B liquid assets. The agencies, 
therefore, are not changing the requirements for corporate debt 
securities to qualify as a level 2B liquid asset. Such changes would be 
outside the scope of this rulemaking. Assets that meet the definition 
of level 2B liquid assets have distinctive liquidity characteristics as 
described in the LCR rule, which include either relatively higher 
credit risk, lower trading volumes, or elevated price volatility across 
market conditions when compared to level 1 and level 2A liquid assets. 
These securities also have relatively greater liquidity relative to 
assets that are not HQLA under the LCR rule. For these reasons, the RSF 
factor assigned to level 2B liquid assets is materially higher than the 
RSF factor of 15 percent applied to level 2A liquid assets, but lower 
than the RSF factor applied to securities that do not qualify as HQLA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Section __.106(a)(5)(iv) of the proposed rule, which would 
have assigned a 50 percent RSF factor to general obligation 
securities of a public sector entity, is removed because such 
securities now are encompassed by the definition of municipal 
obligations in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule. Consistent with section 
403 of EGRRCPA, Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule defines a ``municipal 
obligation'' as ``an obligation of (1) a state or any political 
subdivision thereof, or (2) any agency or instrumentality of a state 
or any political subdivision thereof.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Covered companies may be holding level 2B liquid assets on balance 
sheet at a calculation date that have a wide range of residual 
maturities and for a range of purposes, each of which may require 
various contractual or anticipated holding periods. While some portion 
of level 2B liquid assets may mature or be contractually scheduled to 
be sold within one year, a covered company may need to fund certain of 
these securities over a one-year time horizon. Similar to level 2A 
liquid assets, covered companies may hold these securities for 
investment purposes or as part of a covered company's HQLA amount. Over 
a range of market conditions, a covered company may be generally less 
likely to have to fund these securities for one year compared to 
securities that do not qualify as HQLA. For the reasons above, it is 
appropriate for the RSF factor applied to level 2B liquid assets to be 
materially higher than the RSF factor of 15 percent applied to level 2A 
liquid assets but lower than that applied to securities that do not 
qualify as HQLA.
    In response to commenters' requests for additional granularity, the 
agencies note that the purpose of the NSFR is to provide a broad, 
standardized measure of funding stability that can be compared across 
covered companies. As discussed in section V.C, to achieve this 
purpose, the final rule uses a small number of standardized maturity 
buckets rather than using granular maturity buckets of debt instruments 
or the funding used to purchase such assets. In addition, the final 
rule does not differentiate between assets based on other difficult to 
monitor criteria, such as a covered company's intent for holding or 
funding the asset or the characteristics of the issuer, because to do 
so would require the agencies to make determinations about each covered 
company's intent or the credit risk of each issuer. Such individualized 
determinations would be contrary to the NSFR's purpose as a 
standardized measure. In addition, contrary to commenters' concerns, 
the agencies expect that the final rule will strengthen the U.S. 
financial system, including capital markets, by ensuring banking 
organizations maintain sufficiently stable funding on an ongoing basis.

[[Page 9161]]

Secured Lending Transactions and Unsecured Wholesale Lending to a 
Financial Sector Entity or a Subsidiary Thereof or a Central Bank That 
Mature in Six Months or More, But Less Than One Year
    Section __.106(a)(5)(ii) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
50 percent RSF factor to a secured lending transaction or unsecured 
wholesale lending transaction that matures in six months or more, but 
less than one year from the calculation date, where the counterparty is 
a financial sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary thereof or the 
counterparty is a central bank.\155\ As discussed above, a covered 
company faces lower reputational risk if it chooses not to roll over 
secured or unsecured loans to financial counterparties or claims on a 
central bank than it would with loans to non-financial counterparties. 
Even though loans in this category have terms greater than six months 
(and liquidity from principal repayments will not be available in the 
near term) these loans mature within the NSFR's one-year time horizon 
so the proposed rule would not have required them to be fully supported 
by stable funding. For the reasons discussed in the proposal, the 
agencies are finalizing a 50 percent RSF factor for these transactions 
as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ Section __.106(a)(5)(ii) of the final rule does not apply 
to an operational deposit placed at a financial sector entity or 
consolidated subsidiary thereof. The treatment of such an 
operational deposit is covered by Sec.  __.106(a)(4)(iii) of the 
final rule.
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Operational Deposits Held at Financial Sector Entities
    Section __.106(a)(5)(iii) of the proposed rule would have assigned 
a 50 percent RSF factor to an operational deposit, as defined in Sec.  
__.3 of the LCR rule, placed by the covered company at a financial 
sector entity. Consistent with the reasoning for the ASF factor 
assigned to operational deposits placed at a covered company, described 
in section VII.C.3.d of this Supplementary Information section, such 
operational deposits placed by a covered company are less readily 
monetizable by the covered company compared to non-operational 
placements. These deposits are placed for operational purposes, and 
covered companies likely would face legal or operational limitations to 
making significant withdrawals during the NSFR's one-year time horizon. 
While the agencies received comments addressing the ASF factor assigned 
to operational deposits received by a covered company, as discussed 
above at section VII.C.3.d, the agencies did not receive any comments 
addressing the RSF factor assigned to operational deposits placed by a 
covered company at an unaffiliated financial sector entity. For the 
reasons discussed in the proposed rule, the final rule adopts the 50 
percent RSF factor for operational deposits placed by a covered company 
at another financial sector entity as proposed.
Secured Lending Transactions and Unsecured Wholesale Lending to 
Counterparties That Are Not Financial Sector Entities and Are Not 
Central Banks and That Mature in Less Than One Year
    Section __.106(a)(5)(v) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
50 percent RSF factor to lending to a wholesale customer or 
counterparty that is not a financial sector entity or central bank, 
including a non-financial corporate, sovereign, or public sector 
entity, that matures in less than one year from the calculation date. 
Unlike with lending to financial sector entities and central banks, the 
proposed rule would have assigned the same RSF factor to lending to 
these entities with a remaining maturity of less than six months as it 
would have assigned to lending with a remaining maturity of six months 
or more, but less than one year. The proposed rule would not have 
required this lending to be fully supported by stable funding based on 
its maturity within the NSFR's one-year time horizon and the assumption 
that a covered company may be able to reduce its lending to some degree 
over the NSFR's one-year time horizon. However, the proposed rule's 
assignment of a 50 percent RSF factor reflected the stronger incentives 
that a covered company is likely to have to continue to lend to these 
wholesale counterparties due to reputational risk and a covered 
company's need to maintain its franchise value, even when the lending 
is scheduled to mature in the nearer term, as discussed in section 
VII.D.2.c of this Supplementary Information section. The agencies did 
not receive any comments addressing the proposed RSF factor assigned to 
this category. For the reasons discussed in the proposal, the agencies 
are adopting this provision as proposed.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ This provision is adopted at Sec.  __.106(a)(4)(iv)(A) of 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lending to Retail Customers and Counterparties That Matures in Less 
Than One Year
    Section __.106(a)(5)(v) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
50 percent RSF factor to lending to retail customers or counterparties 
(including certain small businesses), as defined in Sec.  __.3 of the 
LCR rule, that matures less than one year from the calculation date for 
the same reputational and franchise value maintenance reasons for which 
it would have assigned a 50 percent RSF factor to lending to wholesale 
customers and counterparties that are not financial sector entities or 
central banks. The agencies did not receive any comments specific to 
the RSF factor assigned to this asset category. For the reasons 
described in the proposed rule, the agencies are adopting this 
provision as proposed.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ This provision is adopted at Sec.  __.106(a)(4)(iv)(B) of 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

All Other Assets That Mature in Less Than One Year
    Section __.106(a)(5)(v) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
50 percent RSF factor to all other assets that mature within one year 
of the calculation date but are not described in the categories above. 
The shorter maturity of an asset in this category reduces a covered 
company's funding needs, since the asset may not need to be retained on 
the covered company's balance sheet past maturity and provides for cash 
inflows upon maturity during the NSFR's one-year time horizon. However, 
a covered company generally may be less able to monetize these assets 
due to their lower credit quality and their relevant market 
characteristics as compared to the enumerated asset classes that are 
assigned lower RSF factors.
    One commenter expressed concern that this category would capture 
asset-backed commercial paper that is fully supported by a credit or 
liquidity facility provided by another bank and has a maturity of six 
months or less, while unencumbered loans to banks with maturities of 
less than six months are assigned a 15 percent RSF factor. The 
commenter argued that a covered company's risk exposure for purchasing 
asset-backed commercial paper that is fully supported by a facility 
provided by a bank is equivalent to its risk exposure for a loan to 
another bank. Accordingly, the commenter argued that such asset-backed 
commercial paper should receive the same 15 percent RSF factor as a 
short-term loan to a financial sector entity. Another commenter argued 
that the RSF factor assigned to commercial

[[Page 9162]]

paper should be based on the creditworthiness of the issuing company.
    In response, the agencies note that the final rule generally 
assigns RSF factors to exposures as of a point in time. For holdings of 
asset-backed commercial paper that are supported by a credit or 
liquidity facility provided by a bank, a covered company would not have 
an exposure to a financial sector entity unless the facility has been 
drawn upon; therefore, such asset-backed commercial paper is not 
treated as a loan to a financial sector entity under the final rule. 
Although the contractual features of an individual asset or the credit 
worthiness of its issuer can affect the funding needs related to 
holding that particular asset, the final rule is intended to provide a 
standardized measure of funding stability that can be compared across 
covered companies. Differentiating between holdings of commercial paper 
based on contractual features or the issuer's credit worthiness would 
require the agencies to make determinations based on each contractual 
arrangement and the credit risk of each issuer. Such individualized 
determinations would be contrary to the NSFR's purpose as a 
standardized measure.
    For the reasons discussed in the proposed rule, the agencies are 
finalizing this provision as proposed.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ This provision is adopted at Sec.  __106(a)(4)(iv) of the 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e) 65 Percent RSF Factor
    Under the final rule, loans that mature in one year or more (other 
than operational deposit placements) are assigned higher RSF factors 
than loans that mature in less than one year. The final rule assigns a 
65 percent RSF factor to retail mortgages that mature in one year or 
more and are assigned a risk weight of no greater than 50 percent under 
the agencies' risk-based capital rule and loans to retail and non-
financial wholesale counterparties that mature in one year or more and 
are assigned a risk weight of no greater than 20 percent.
Retail Mortgages That Mature in One Year or More and Are Assigned a 
Risk Weight of No Greater Than 50 Percent
    Section __.106(a)(6)(i) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
65 percent RSF factor to retail mortgages that mature one year or more 
from the calculation date and are assigned a risk weight of no greater 
than 50 percent under subpart D of the agencies' risk-based capital 
rule. Under the agencies' risk-based capital rule, residential mortgage 
exposures secured by a first lien on a one-to-four family property that 
are prudently underwritten, are not 90 days or more past due or carried 
in nonaccrual status, and that are neither restructured nor modified 
generally receive a 50 percent risk weight.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See 12 CFR 3.32(g) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.32(g) (Board); 12 CFR 
324.32(g) (FDIC). The final rule is consistent with the Basel NSFR 
standard, which assigns a 65 percent RSF factor to residential 
mortgages that receive a 35 percent risk weight under the Basel II 
standardized approach for credit risk, because the agencies' risk-
based capital rule assigns a 50 percent risk weight to residential 
mortgage exposures that meet the same criteria as those that receive 
a 35 percent risk weight under the Basel II standardized approach 
for credit risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argued that the proposed rule's treatment for 
mortgage loans would be overly conservative in comparison to the 15 
percent RSF factor assigned to certain GSE-issued or GSE-guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities. One commenter noted that prudently 
underwritten mortgages can be pooled into GSE or private label 
mortgage-backed securities and argued that, as a result, they should 
receive an RSF factor no higher than 50 percent. Similarly, another 
commenter noted that single family mortgage loans should not receive an 
RSF factor above 50 percent because such loans can be used as 
collateral for FHLB loans. One commenter suggested that the proposed 
RSF factor for mortgage loans under the NSFR could encourage banks to 
originate and sell loans rather than hold them in portfolio.
    Mortgage lending to households is an important form of financial 
intermediation conducted by banking organizations, including during 
times of funding disruptions. To support financial intermediation, and 
based on the residual maturity and other liquidity characteristics of 
mortgage loans, the final rule requires individual mortgages that meet 
certain criteria to be supported by a greater amount of stable funding 
than assets assigned a 50 percent RSF factor. Individual mortgage loans 
have substantially different credit and liquidity characteristics than 
mortgage-backed securities eligible for a lower RSF factor. In 
particular, GSE-issued and GSE-guaranteed securities have a much higher 
trading volume than individual mortgage loans. Mortgage loans also do 
not have the same liquidity characteristics as assets that are assigned 
a 50 percent RSF factor, such as assets that are either securities that 
satisfy certain benchmark market thresholds or assets with relatively 
short maturity. In contrast, mortgage loans in the 65 percent RSF 
category mature in more than one year from the calculation date, and 
typically have many years until they mature. Prior to maturity, it may 
be difficult to monetize an individual mortgage loan in a timely 
fashion or without incurring a relatively higher haircut in a secured 
funding transaction compared to HQLA.
    In addition, the agencies acknowledge that covered companies will 
take into account the final rule's assignment of a 65 percent RSF 
factor when deciding whether to sell mortgage loans or retain them in 
portfolio. However, covered companies may choose to retain or sell 
mortgage loan originations for a variety of reasons including earnings, 
liquidity, and capital management. Accordingly, the 65 percent RSF 
factor for mortgage loans would not significantly impact a covered 
company's decision to retain a mortgage loan in portfolio. The primary 
purpose of the final rule is to ensure that a banking organization's 
assets are adequately funded. For the reasons described above, the 
final rule assigns a 65 percent RSF factor to mortgage loans that meet 
certain criteria as proposed.
Secured Lending Transactions, Unsecured Wholesale Lending, and Lending 
to Retail Customers and Counterparties That Mature in One Year or More 
and Are Assigned a Risk Weight of No Greater Than 20 Percent
    Section __.106(a)(6)(ii) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 
65 percent RSF factor to secured lending transactions, unsecured 
wholesale lending, and lending to retail customers and counterparties 
that are not otherwise assigned an RSF factor, that mature one year or 
more from the calculation date, that are assigned a risk weight of no 
greater than 20 percent under subpart D of the agencies' risk-based 
capital rule, and where the borrower is not a financial sector entity 
or a consolidated subsidiary thereof.\160\ As discussed in the proposed 
rule, these loans generally have more favorable liquidity 
characteristics because of their lower credit risk than loans that have 
a risk weight greater than 20 percent under the agencies' risk-based 
capital rule. However, these loans require more stable funding than 
loans that mature and provide liquidity within the NSFR's one-year time 
horizon. The agencies did not receive any comments on this provision. 
For the reasons discussed in

[[Page 9163]]

the proposed rule, the agencies are adopting this provision as 
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ See 12 CFR 3.32(g) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.32(g) (Board); 12 CFR 
324.32(g) (FDIC). This aspect of the proposed rule would have been 
consistent with the Basel NSFR standard, which assigns a 65 percent 
RSF factor to loans that receive a 35 percent or lower risk weight 
under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk, because 
the standardized approach in the agencies' risk-based capital rule 
does not assign a risk weight that is between 20 and 35 percent to 
such loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

f) 85 Percent RSF Factor
    The final rule assigns an 85 percent RSF factor to all other retail 
mortgages not assigned an RSF factor above, all other loans to non-
financial sector counterparties, publicly traded common equity shares 
that are not HQLA, other non-HQLA securities that mature in one year or 
more, and certain commodities.
Retail Mortgages That Mature in One Year or More and Are Assigned a 
Risk Weight of Greater Than 50 Percent
    Section __.106(a)(7)(i) of the proposed rule would have assigned an 
85 percent RSF factor to retail mortgages that mature one year or more 
from the calculation date and are assigned a risk weight of greater 
than 50 percent under subpart D of the agencies' risk-based capital 
rule. As noted above, under the agencies' risk-based capital rule, a 
retail mortgage is assigned a 50 percent risk weight if it is secured 
by a first lien on a one-to-four family property, prudently 
underwritten, not 90 days or more past due or carried in nonaccrual 
status, and has not been restructured or modified.\161\ Mortgages that 
do not meet these criteria are assigned a risk weight of greater than 
50 percent.\162\ The proposed rule would have treated these mortgages 
as generally riskier than mortgages that receive a risk weight of 50 
percent or less and would have required them to be supported by more 
stable funding because of the possibility that they would be more 
difficult to monetize.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ See supra note 159.
    \162\ Under the agencies' risk-based capital rule, the risk 
weight on mortgages may be reduced to less than 50 percent if 
certain conditions are satisfied. In these cases, the final rule 
assigns an RSF factor of 65 percent, which is the RSF factor 
assigned to retail mortgages that mature in one year or more and are 
assigned a risk weight of no greater than 50 percent. See 12 CFR 
3.36 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.36 (Board); 12 CFR 324.36 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons discussed in the proposed rule, the final rule 
assigns an 85 percent RSF factor to these mortgage exposures as 
proposed.
Secured Lending Transactions, Unsecured Wholesale Lending, and Lending 
to Retail Customers and Counterparties That Mature in One Year or More 
and Are Assigned a Risk Weight of Greater Than 20 Percent
    Section __.106(a)(7)(ii) of the proposed rule would have assigned 
an 85 percent RSF factor to secured lending transactions, unsecured 
wholesale lending, and lending to retail customers and counterparties 
that are not otherwise assigned an RSF factor (such as retail 
mortgages), that mature one year or more from the calculation date, 
that are assigned a risk weight greater than 20 percent under subpart D 
of the agencies' risk-based capital rule, and for which the borrower is 
not a financial sector entity or consolidated subsidiary thereof.
    Several commenters requested lower RSF factors for certain lending 
transactions. For example, a few commenters argued that commercial real 
estate mortgages should be assigned an RSF factor lower than 85 percent 
because commercial real estate loans are low risk, and covered 
companies already are subject to regulatory requirements related to 
their real estate portfolios, which renders an RSF requirement 
unnecessary. Another commenter requested the agencies reduce the RSF 
factor for credit card exposures to customers who pay their entire 
account balances each month. This commenter argued that credit card 
exposures to these customers are analogous to short-term loans that 
receive a 50 percent RSF factor.
    The final rule retains the 85 percent RSF factor for this category 
of lending. These loans mature in one year or more and have less 
favorable liquidity and market characteristics, including greater 
credit risk associated with higher risk weights under the agencies' 
risk-based capital rule. Commercial real estate loans generally present 
a higher risk profile, heightened vulnerability to changing market 
conditions, and greater monetization difficulty than loans that are 
assigned a lower RSF factor. Although commercial real estate lending is 
subject to other regulations designed to promote safe and sound lending 
practices, these regulations do not specifically address the funding 
risks presented by these loans. Accordingly, the agencies consider the 
85 percent RSF factor appropriate for these loans in order to ensure 
covered companies maintain sufficient funding to support these assets.
    In addition, the agencies decline to adopt a commenter's suggestion 
to apply a lower RSF factor to credit card exposures to customers who 
repay their entire account balances each month. Although some credit 
card customers fully and regularly repay account balances, assigning 
different RSF factors to credit card exposures based on a covered 
company's assumptions of a credit card customer's future repayment 
behavior would be inconsistent with the NSFR's purpose as a 
standardized measure of funding stability. Accordingly, the final rule 
assigns an 85 percent RSF factor to all credit card exposures that 
mature in one year or more and have a risk weight of greater than 20 
percent under the agencies' risk-based capital rule as proposed. The 
agencies are clarifying, however, that contractual minimum payment 
amounts due on credit card exposures would generally be considered to 
be a loan to a retail customer maturing in less than one year and would 
be subject to the 50 percent RSF factor.
Publicly Traded Common Equity Shares That Are Not HQLA and Other 
Securities That Mature in One Year or More That Are Not HQLA
    Sections __.106(a)(7)(iii) and (iv) of the proposed rule would have 
assigned an 85 percent RSF factor to publicly traded common equity 
shares that are not HQLA and other non-HQLA securities that mature one 
year or more from the calculation date. For example, these assets would 
have included equity shares not listed on a recognized exchange, low 
rated corporate debt securities and municipal obligations, private-
label mortgage-backed securities, and other types of asset-backed 
securities.
    As described above, commenters generally expressed concern that the 
proposed rule's assignment of RSF factors to equity shares was overly 
conservative and not reflective of market haircuts for such securities. 
Commenters, however, also expressed specific concerns related to the 85 
percent RSF factor assigned to non-HQLA publicly traded common equity 
shares and other securities that mature in one year or more. One 
commenter expressed concern that higher RSF factors for non-HQLA 
securities would be procyclical and incentivize covered companies to 
sell non-HQLA securities in favor of HQLA securities in a crisis. Other 
commenters argued that even though equity and debt securities issued by 
a financial sector entity are precluded from qualifying as HQLA, these 
assets should receive a lower RSF factor because there is no empirical 
basis for assigning a higher RSF factor to securities issued by a 
financial sector entity than to securities issued by a non-financial 
sector entity. These commenters also asserted that the 85 percent RSF 
factor would adversely impact capital flows to financial sector 
entities, which would impair their ability to provide market-making and 
other services. Another commenter argued that the 85 percent RSF factor 
is overly conservative because it fails to take into account a bank's 
ability to mitigate its exposure risk with liquid options, swaps, or 
future instruments.
    Several commenters also requested that lower RSF factors be 
assigned to

[[Page 9164]]

specific types of equities and securities. For example, one commenter 
recommended a 50 percent RSF factor for equities traded on an exchange 
that are included in certain global stock indexes. Other commenters 
requested lower RSF factors for certain private-label residential 
mortgage-backed securities, commercial mortgage backed securities, and 
certain asset-backed securities. Commenters argued that the 85 percent 
RSF factor was overly punitive and would discourage covered companies 
from holding these securities, which would impair the markets served by 
these securities. Some of these commenters argued that residential 
mortgage-backed securities, in particular, should receive the same RSF 
treatment as level 2 liquid assets consistent with the Basel NSFR 
standard and the EU NSFR rule. Other commenters requested lower RSF 
factors for certain traditional securitizations, which commenters 
asserted are safer assets as a result of certain changes to regulatory 
requirements and rating agency protocols. One commenter recommended the 
agencies examine recent initiatives by the BCBS and International 
Organizations of Securities Commission to identify specific securities 
that warrant lower RSF factors.
    The final rule retains the 85 percent RSF factor for publicly 
traded securities that are not HQLA and mature in one year or more. 
Non-HQLA securities, including securities issued by financial sector 
entities, historically have demonstrated greater price volatility and 
lower marketability across market conditions than securities that 
qualify as HQLA. Given this historical experience, it is appropriate to 
assign a higher RSF factor to these securities than HQLA securities. 
Although a banking organization may have some ability to mitigate its 
risk exposure to these assets, the final rule is designed as a 
standardized measure of the stability of a covered company's funding 
profile and therefore does not take into account the company's 
idiosyncratic risk management practices. With respect to the concern 
that the 85 percent RSF factor would incentivize covered companies to 
liquidate non-HQLA during a stress period, the 85 percent RSF factor 
will reduce this risk because covered companies would be holding large 
amounts of stable funding to support these assets, decreasing the need 
to immediately monetize these assets.
    For the reasons described above, the agencies decline to reduce the 
RSF factor for certain types of securities which are not eligible as 
HQLA, as requested by commenters. As previously explained, equities 
that are not HQLA generally exhibit less favorable liquidity 
characteristics relative to equities that qualify as HQLA, regardless 
of the country location of the index or exchange on which that equity 
is traded. Although specific issuances of private-label residential 
mortgage-backed securities, commercial mortgage backed securities, or 
asset-backed securities may exhibit liquidity characteristics similar 
to HQLA, the final rule assigns RSF factors based on asset class to 
ensure standardization and ease of comparability of the measure. These 
securities can exhibit high price volatility, depending on the 
performance of their underlying assets and specific contractual 
features. In addition, the bespoke characteristics of securitization 
structures may be tailored to a limited range of investors, which can 
limit a banking organization's ability to monetize a given 
securitization issuance. Although changes in regulatory requirements 
and rating agency protocols regulations may have reduced certain risks 
associated with certain securitizations, many of these assets do not 
have a proven history of liquidity. As a result, the final rule assigns 
an 85 percent RSF factor as proposed.
Commodities
    Section __.106(a)(7)(v) of the proposed rule would have assigned an 
85 percent RSF factor to commodities held by a covered company for 
which a liquid market exists, as indicated by whether derivative 
transactions for the commodity are traded on a U.S. board of trade or 
trading facility designated as a contract market (DCM) under sections 5 
and 6 of the Commodity Exchange Act \163\ or on a U.S. swap execution 
facility (SEF) registered under section 5h of the Commodity Exchange 
Act.\164\ The proposed rule would have assigned a 100 percent RSF 
factor to all other commodities held by a covered company. The proposed 
rule would have required a covered company to support its commodities 
positions with a substantial amount of stable funding because, in 
general, commodities as an asset class have historical material price 
volatility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ 7 U.S.C. 7 and 7 U.S.C. 8.
    \164\ 7 U.S.C. 7b-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would have assigned an 85 percent RSF factor, 
rather than a 100 percent RSF factor, to commodities for which 
derivative transactions are traded on a U.S. DCM or U.S. SEF because 
the exchange trading of derivatives on a commodity tends to indicate a 
greater degree of standardization, fungibility, and liquidity in the 
market for the commodity.\165\ As noted in the Supplementary 
Information section to the proposed rule, a market for a commodity for 
which a derivative transaction is traded on a U.S. DCM or U.S. SEF is 
more likely to have established standards (for example, with respect to 
different grades of commodities) that are relied upon in determining 
the commodities that can be provided to effect physical settlement 
under a derivative transaction. In addition, the exchange-traded market 
for a commodity derivative transaction generally increases price 
transparency for the underlying commodity. A covered company could 
therefore more easily monetize a commodity that meets this requirement 
than a commodity that does not, either through the spot market or 
through derivative transactions based on the commodity. The proposed 
rule accordingly would have required less stable funding to support 
holdings of commodities for which derivative transactions are traded on 
a U.S. DCM or U.S. SEF than it would have required for other 
commodities, which a covered company may not be able to monetize as 
easily.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ Examples of commodities that currently meet this 
requirement are gold, oil, natural gas, and various agricultural 
products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that the stated rationale for assigning an 85 
percent RSF factor to commodities traded on U.S. exchanges should apply 
equally to commodities traded on non-U.S. exchanges. The commenter 
requested that rather than assigning a 100 percent RSF factor to 
commodities traded on non-U.S. exchanges, the final rule assign an 85 
percent RSF factor to commodities that are traded on non-U.S. exchanges 
that are registered in non-U.S. jurisdictions in order to provide 
consistent treatment with commodities traded on a U.S. exchange. These 
commodities, the commenter argued, have similar liquidity 
characteristics to commodities traded on U.S. exchanges.
    As noted by the commenter, commodities for which derivative 
transactions are traded on exchanges registered outside the United 
States may have a similar degree of liquidity as commodities for which 
derivative transactions are traded on a U.S. DCM or U.S. SEF. To 
provide consistent treatment of commodities traded on U.S. and non-U.S. 
exchanges, the final rule assigns an 85 percent RSF factor to any 
commodity held by a covered company for which derivative transactions 
are

[[Page 9165]]

authorized to be traded on an U.S. DCM, U.S. SEF, or any other 
exchange, whether located in the United States or in a jurisdiction 
outside of the United States.\166\ The agencies note that covered 
companies are limited in the types of physical commodities activities 
in which they are able to engage. For example, the Board has approved 
requests from certain financial holding companies to engage in certain 
physical commodities trading activities for which derivative contracts 
are approved for trading on a U.S. futures exchange by the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (unless specifically 
excluded by the Board) or other commodities that have been specifically 
authorized by the Board under section 4(k)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956.\167\ The legal restrictions applicable to bank 
holding companies and financial holding companies under the BHC Act (as 
well as restrictions applicable to national banks and state-chartered 
banks under the National Bank Act and the FDI Act, respectively) 
continue to apply, and the final rule does not grant a covered company 
the authority to engage in any commodities activities not otherwise 
permitted by applicable law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ As with all derivatives, commodity derivatives are subject 
to Sec.  __.107 of the final rule.
    \167\ 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(1)(B). The types of commodities 
permitted by the Board for financial holding companies generally are 
assigned an 85 percent RSF factor under the final rule. For example, 
under Board precedent, commodity trading activities involving any 
type of coal would be permissible for a financial holding company, 
even though the CFTC has authorized only Central Appalachian coal. 
Therefore, under the final rule, the carrying value of any type of 
coal would be assigned an 85 percent RSF factor. Any derivative 
transaction based on coal, though, would be subject to Sec.  __.107 
of the final rule. With respect to commodities for which a 
derivative is traded on a non-U.S. exchange, the agencies note that 
such non-U.S. exchanges will be supervised by a prudential regulator 
in the relevant jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g) 100 Percent RSF Factor
All Other Assets Not Described Above
    Section __.106(a)(8) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 100 
percent RSF factor to all other performing assets not otherwise 
assigned an RSF factor under Sec.  __.106 or Sec.  __.107. These assets 
include, but are not limited to, loans to financial institutions 
(including to an unconsolidated affiliate) that mature in one year or 
more; assets deducted from regulatory capital; \168\ common equity 
shares that are not traded on a public exchange; unposted debits; and 
trade date receivables that have failed to settle within the lesser of 
the market standard settlement period for the relevant type of 
transaction, without extension of the standard settlement period, and 
five business days from the date of the sale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ Assets deducted from regulatory capital include, but are 
not limited to, goodwill, certain deferred tax assets, certain 
mortgage servicing assets, and certain defined benefit pension fund 
net assets. See 12 CFR 3.22 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22 (Board); 12 CFR 
324.22 (FDIC). These assets, as a class, tend to be difficult for a 
covered company to readily monetize.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies received a number of comments suggesting that certain 
trade date receivables receiving a 100 percent RSF factor under the 
proposed rule should receive a lower RSF factor. As described above, 
several commenters opposed the proposal's assignment of a 100 percent 
RSF factor to trade date receivables that fail to settle within the 
lesser of five business days and the standard settlement period but are 
still expected to settle. Another commenter argued that, in the case of 
trade date receivables generated by primary offerings, settlement 
delays reflect unique timing needs rather than increased funding risk. 
Accordingly, the commenter recommended that the agencies assign a zero 
percent RSF factor to trade date receivables generated by primary 
offering settlements for the duration of the primary offering.
    As described above, the agencies are amending the final rule to 
assign a zero percent RSF factor to trade date receivables due to a 
covered company that result from the sale of a financial instrument, 
foreign currency, or commodity that are required to settle no later 
than the market standard for the particular instrument, and have yet to 
settle but are not more than five business days past the scheduled 
settlement date. The final rule otherwise retains the assignment of a 
100 percent RSF factor as proposed. Assets in this category do not 
consistently exhibit liquidity characteristics that would suggest a 
covered company should support them with anything less than full stable 
funding.
Nonperforming Assets RSF Factor
    Section __.106(b) of the proposed rule would have assigned a 100 
percent RSF factor to any asset on a covered company's balance sheet 
that is past due by more than 90 days or that has nonaccrual status. 
Because these assets have an elevated risk of non-payment, these assets 
tend to be illiquid regardless of their tenor. The agencies did not 
receive any comments on this aspect of the proposal. Consistent with 
the proposed rule, the final rule requires a covered company to assign 
a 100 percent RSF factor to nonperforming assets.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ The final rule's description of nonperforming assets in 
Sec.  __.106(b), like the proposed rule's description, is consistent 
with the definition of ``nonperforming exposure'' in Sec.  __.3 of 
the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

h) RSF Factors for Encumbered Balance Sheet Assets
    Consistent with the criteria used for assigning RSF factors 
described above, the RSF factor that the proposed rule would have 
assigned to an asset would have depended on whether or not the asset is 
encumbered and the length of any encumbrance. As discussed in section 
VI of this Supplementary Information section, the proposed rule would 
have defined ``encumbered'' (a new defined term under Sec.  __.3), as 
the converse of the term ``unencumbered'' currently used in the LCR 
rule. Encumbered assets must generally be retained for the period of 
encumbrance and generally cannot be monetized during this period. Thus, 
Sec.  __.106(c) of the proposed rule would have assigned the RSF factor 
to encumbered assets based on the tenor of the encumbrance.
    The agencies received one comment regarding the potential impact of 
the proposed rule's treatment of assets pledged for six months or 
longer by a covered company to an FHLB under a blanket, but not asset-
specific, lien to secure an extension of credit to the covered company.
    As is the case for an asset pledged to any other counterparty to 
secure or provide credit enhancement to a transaction, a covered 
company generally must retain or replace an asset pledged to an FHLB 
during the period in which it is encumbered and cannot monetize the 
asset while encumbered.\170\ However, where an asset of a covered 
company is subject to a blanket, rather than asset-specific lien, in 
favor of an FHLB, such asset would not be considered ``encumbered'' if 
credit secured by the asset is not currently extended to the covered 
company or its consolidated subsidiaries. Where credit has been 
extended and is secured by a blanket

[[Page 9166]]

lien, a covered company may identify which specific assets covered by 
the blanket lien secure the amount of extended credit, consistent with 
the requirements of the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ As discussed in section VI.B of this Supplementary 
Information section, the final rule's definition of ``encumbered'' 
does not consider an asset to be encumbered solely because the asset 
is pledged to a central bank or GSE to secure a transaction if (i) 
potential credit secured by the asset is not currently extended to 
the covered company or its consolidated subsidiaries and (ii) the 
pledged asset is not required to support access to the payment 
services of a central bank. The final rule's definition of 
``encumbered'' does not include any substantive changes to the 
concept of encumbrance included in the LCR rule. See 79 FR at 61469.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule retains the treatment of encumbered assets as 
proposed. Under the final rule, an asset that is encumbered for less 
than six months from the calculation date is assigned the same RSF 
factor as would be assigned to the asset if it were not encumbered 
because the covered company will not need to retain the asset beyond 
six months. For an asset that is encumbered for a period of six months 
or more, but less than one year, the final rule assigns an RSF factor 
equal to the greater of 50 percent and the RSF factor that would be 
assigned if the asset were not encumbered. This treatment ensures that 
a covered company's RSF amount reflects the effect of the encumbrance 
on an asset that would be assigned a lower RSF factor if unencumbered 
based on its tenor and other liquidity characteristics. Additionally, 
the final rule assigns a 100 percent RSF factor to an asset that is 
encumbered for a remaining period of one year or more because the asset 
would be retained and unavailable to the covered company for the 
entirety of the NSFR's one-year time horizon. Finally, in cases where 
the duration of an asset's encumbrance exceeds the maturity of that 
asset, the final rule assigns an RSF factor to the asset based on its 
encumbrance period. For example, if a covered company provides a level 
1 liquid asset security that matures in three months as collateral in a 
one-year repurchase agreement, the covered company would need to 
replace that security upon its maturity with another asset that meets 
the requirements of the repurchase agreement. Thus, even though the 
maturity of the asset currently provided as collateral is short-dated, 
a covered company must fully support an asset with stable funding for 
the duration of the one-year repurchase agreement. As a result, the RSF 
factor determined by on the one-year encumbrance period.
    Table 3 sets forth the RSF factors for assets that are encumbered.

                                   Table 3--RSF Factors for Encumbered Assets
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          RSF factors for encumbered assets *
                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Asset encumbered <6      Asset encumbered >=6     Asset encumbered >=1
                                                months               months <1 year                year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If RSF factor for unencumbered asset   RSF factor for the       50 percent.............  100 percent.
 is <=50 percent:.                      asset as if it were
                                        unencumbered.
If RSF factor for unencumbered asset   RSF factor for the       RSF factor for the       100 percent.
 is >50 percent:.                       asset as if it were      asset as if it were
                                        unencumbered.            unencumbered.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* If the remaining encumbrance period exceeds the effective maturity of the asset, the final rule assigns an RSF
  factor to the asset based on its encumbrance period.

i) Assets Held in Certain Customer Protection Segregated Accounts
    Section __.106(c)(3) of the proposed rule would have specified that 
an asset held in a segregated account maintained pursuant to statutory 
or regulatory requirements for the protection of customer assets would 
not have been considered to be encumbered solely because it is held in 
such a segregated account.\171\ Instead, the proposed rule would have 
assigned an asset held in such a segregated account the RSF factor that 
would be assigned to the asset under Sec.  __.106 if it were not held 
in a segregated account. For example, a covered company must segregate 
customer free credits, which are customer funds held prior to their 
investment, until the customer decides to invest or withdraw the funds. 
The proposed rule would have treated the funds that a covered company 
places on deposit with a third-party depository institution in 
accordance with segregation requirements as a short-term loan to a 
financial sector entity, which would have been assigned a 15 percent 
RSF factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ For example, the proposed rule would not consider an asset 
held pursuant to the SEC's Rule 15c3-3 (17 CFR 240.15c3-3) or the 
CFTC's Rule 1.20 or Part 22 (17 CFR 1.20; 17 CFR part 22) to be 
encumbered solely because it is held in a segregated account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters argued that segregated client assets should have 
no stable funding requirement because, among other reasons, they 
already are funded by liabilities to the client and pose limited 
funding risks to covered companies. Some commenters noted that SEC and 
CFTC rules require client assets to be segregated and accounted for 
separately from the covered company's assets, protected from the 
bankruptcy of the covered company, and held in cash or other limited 
investments. Commenters also argued that segregated client assets 
should be treated analogously to currency and coin, which are assigned 
a 0 percent RSF factor. One commenter argued that the proposed 
treatment for segregated client assets would conflict with the 
treatment of such assets under the LCR rule, which recognizes some 
inflows from anticipated changes in the value of segregated client 
accounts and 100 percent outflows for non-operational deposits placed 
by financial institution counterparties.
    Several commenters claimed that requiring stable funding for 
segregated client assets would inappropriately incentivize covered 
companies to maintain such balances in non-cash form (e.g., U.S. 
Treasury securities) rather than hold them in a deposit account at a 
third-party bank in order to reduce the RSF factor. Other commenters 
expressed concern that covered companies may pass the cost of 
maintaining stable funding for segregated client assets on to the 
client or stop providing services that require segregated accounts.
    The agencies are finalizing the treatment of customer segregated 
account assets as proposed.\172\ As discussed in section V.C of this 
Supplementary Information section, the NSFR applies to a covered 
company's entire balance sheet, does not differentiate between assets 
based on business line or the reason for which they are held, and is 
not designed to mirror the treatment of assets under the LCR rule. 
Regulatory or contractual requirements to segregate certain assets for 
the benefit of customers do not necessarily reduce a covered company's 
funding risks relative to holding the same assets absent segregation, 
based on the covered company's funding stability relative to the tenor 
and other liquidity characteristics of its assets. The NSFR measure 
generally utilizes the carrying value of assets where possible and,

[[Page 9167]]

consistent with GAAP, does not distinguish segregated balance sheet 
assets from other assets, except to the extent the final rule does not 
consider assets to be encumbered solely as a result of segregation. 
Additionally, regulatory requirements to hold specified amounts of 
assets for clients, in the form of cash, limited investments, or other 
assets, may result in a covered company holding additional assets 
relative to the absence of such regulatory requirements and the need to 
fund such assets is treated consistently in the final rule relative to 
assets of the same type. For example, the covered company may hold, and 
need to fund, identical level 1 liquid asset securities for the purpose 
of customer protection and as a hedging instrument to provide 
protection to the covered company; therefore, the final rule would 
assign the RSF factor corresponding to the level 1 liquid asset 
securities. Further, the NSFR applies to an aggregate balance sheet and 
generally does not associate specific assets with specific 
funding.\173\ For example, the NSFR does not associate aggregate 
deposit placements for the protection of clients collectively that may 
be funded with individual liabilities due to certain clients, as 
described by commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ Comments requesting treatment as interdependent assets and 
liabilities are discussed in section VII.H of this Supplementary 
Information section.
    \173\ The final rule does include certain netting of specific 
assets against certain liabilities as described in sections VII.A.2 
and VII.E.2 of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the final rule assigns a zero percent RSF 
factor to unencumbered level 1 liquid assets and generally assigns a 15 
percent RSF factor to a deposit placed at a third-party financial 
institution with a remaining maturity of less than six months, based on 
the tenor and other liquidity characteristics of these assets. A 
covered company's requirement to comply with certain customer 
protection segregation requirements that result in a deposit at a 
third-party financial institution does not, by itself, adjust the tenor 
of such a placement or serve to improve the covered company's ability 
to withdraw the funds or otherwise monetize the asset in comparison to 
other deposits placed with a third-party banking organization. For 
example, unlike coin and currency, a covered company cannot directly 
use customer segregated account assets to satisfy its own 
obligations.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See section VII.D.3.a of this Supplementary Information 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, it would not be appropriate to assign a zero 
percent RSF factor to assets based on their segregated status and an 
asset held in this type of segregated account is assigned the RSF 
factor that would be assigned to the asset under Sec.  __.106 as if it 
was not held in a segregated account.
4. Treatment of Rehypothecated Off-Balance Sheet Assets
    As discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information 
section, the NSFR calculation is based on the carrying value of assets 
on a covered company's balance sheet consistent with GAAP. However, 
certain assets that can affect a covered company's aggregate funding 
risks may not be included on a covered company's balance sheet under 
GAAP. The proposed rule, therefore, would have included provisions to 
address the funding risks associated with certain off-balance sheet 
assets that a covered company may obtain through lending transactions, 
asset exchanges, or other transactions. These assets can affect a 
covered company's balance sheet risk profile where they are 
rehypothecated and used to obtain funding. For example, a covered 
company may use off-balance sheet assets to generate funding. The 
assignment of an ASF factor to this liability without recognizing the 
encumbrance placed on a covered company's balance sheet would distort 
the NSFR assessment of a covered company's overall balance sheet risks. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that such reuse of off-balance sheet 
assets should be associated with an appropriate contribution to a 
covered company's RSF amount regardless of the source of the assets. 
This is especially the case if the off-balance sheet asset is 
encumbered to generate funding that has a longer tenor than the 
transaction through which the off-balance sheet asset was sourced. In 
that case, a covered company may need to roll over the transaction 
through which it obtained the off-balance sheet asset before the 
encumbrance of the asset terminates. Alternatively, the covered company 
may need to obtain a replacement asset to close out the sourcing 
transaction under which it obtained the asset before the encumbrance 
expires. Under either approach, the covered company must fund an asset 
for the duration of the encumbrance.
    Section __.106(d) of the proposed rule specified how a covered 
company would have assigned an RSF factor to a transaction involving an 
off-balance sheet asset that secures an NSFR liability or the sale of 
an off-balance sheet asset that results in an NSFR liability (for 
instance, in the case of a short sale). The proposed rule would have 
assigned an RSF factor to a receivable of a lending transaction, a 
security provided in an asset exchange, or to the off-balance sheet 
asset itself depending on the transaction through which the covered 
company obtained the off-balance sheet asset. Specifically, for an off-
balance sheet asset obtained under a lending transaction, Sec.  
__.106(d)(1) of the proposed rule would have assigned an RSF factor to 
the receivable of the lending transaction as if it were encumbered for 
the longer of (1) the remaining maturity of the NSFR liability secured 
by or resulting from the sale of the off-balance sheet asset and (2) 
any other encumbrance period already applicable to the lending 
transaction. For an off-balance sheet asset obtained through an asset 
exchange, Sec.  __.106(d)(2) of the proposed rule would have assigned 
an RSF factor to the asset provided by the covered company in the asset 
exchange as if it were encumbered for the longer of (1) the remaining 
maturity of the NSFR liability secured by or resulting from the sale of 
the off-balance sheet asset and (2) any other encumbrance period 
applicable to the provided asset. For an off-balance sheet asset not 
obtained under either a lending transaction or asset exchange, Sec.  
.106(d)(3) of the proposed rule would have assigned an RSF factor to 
the off-balance sheet asset as if it were encumbered for the longer of 
(1) the remaining maturity of the NSFR liability secured by or 
resulting from the sale of the off-balance sheet asset and (2) any 
other encumbrance period applicable to the off-balance sheet asset.
    The agencies received several comments on the proposed treatment of 
rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets under Sec.  __.106(d) of the 
proposed rule. Commenters argued that the proposed treatment would be 
inconsistent with the concept of the NSFR as a balance-sheet metric 
because it would assign RSF factors based on assets not included on the 
covered company's balance sheet under GAAP. Some commenters also argued 
that the agencies should not adopt the proposed treatment because it 
would result in stable funding requirements that would be greater than 
specified under the Basel NSFR standard. Commenters also argued that 
the proposed rule lacked a clear empirical foundation for the treatment 
of rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets. One commenter argued that 
the proposed treatment would result in the assignment of ASF and RSF 
factors that do not accurately reflect the funding risk of the 
underlying transactions. One commenter objected to the proposed 
treatment for rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets received in an 
asset exchange, asserting

[[Page 9168]]

that the final rule should assign an ASF factor to the value of the 
asset received in an asset exchange, based on the type of asset and the 
remaining maturity of the asset exchange. Another commenter asserted 
that asset exchanges enable a covered company to manage its collateral 
at reduced funding costs and lower funding risks, so the proposed 
treatment of rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets received in an 
asset exchange is unnecessary to achieve the agencies' stated goal of 
ensuring that off-balance sheet assets are not used to generate ASF 
while not reducing the covered company's overall funding risk.
    Commenters requested additional clarification as to the scope of 
activities intended to be covered by Sec.  __.106(d) of the proposed 
rule, in particular by proposed Sec.  __.106(d)(3), which would have 
addressed off-balance sheet assets that are sourced through all other 
types of transactions. One of these commenters stated that proposed 
Sec.  __.106(d)(3) is extremely punitive and could lead to unintended 
consequences.
    Another commenter asserted that it would be operationally difficult 
to comply with Sec.  __.106(d) of the proposed rule if a covered 
company is required to link each source and use of off-balance sheet 
assets to on-balance sheet assets and liabilities. This commenter also 
suggested that the final rule should recognize the benefits to a 
covered company of collateral substitution rights, for example, where a 
covered company has provided two assets to a single counterparty or a 
single tri-party repurchase agreement intermediary to secure two 
separate NSFR liabilities, and the covered company has the operational 
and legal capability to determine the allocation of the assets to each 
NSFR liability.
    To address the funding risks presented when a covered company has 
an NSFR liability that is secured by, or results from the sale of, an 
off-balance sheet asset and to prevent distortion of the NSFR metric, 
the agencies are finalizing the treatment of rehypothecated off-balance 
sheet assets under Sec.  __.106(d) generally as proposed, but are 
narrowing the scope of the section such that Sec.  __.106(d) does not 
apply to off-balance sheet assets received as variation margin under a 
derivative transaction. The agencies also are modifying Sec.  
__.106(d)(3), as explained in this Supplementary Information section. 
As noted by commenters, the NSFR is a balance-sheet metric, and the 
treatment for rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets under the final 
rule assigns RSF factors to assets recorded on a covered company's 
balance sheet, rather than to off-balance sheet assets. The agencies 
also note that the BCBS clarified the treatment of certain off-balance 
sheet assets under the Basel NSFR standard as a result of 
rehypothecation, which is generally consistent with the treatment under 
the final rule.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ BCBS, ``Basel III--The Net Stable Funding Ratio: 
frequently asked questions,'' February 2017, available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d396.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a) Off-Balance Sheet Assets Obtained in Lending Transactions
    Where a covered company obtains an off-balance sheet asset through 
a lending transaction,\176\ the lending transaction will be included as 
a receivable asset on the covered company's balance sheet. Under Sec.  
__.106(d)(1) of the final rule, if a covered company obtained an off-
balance sheet asset through a lending transaction (e.g., a reverse 
repurchase agreement), the final rule treats the balance sheet 
receivable associated with the lending transaction as encumbered for 
the longer of: (1) The remaining maturity of the NSFR liability secured 
by the off-balance sheet asset (e.g., a repurchase agreement) or 
resulting from the sale of the off-balance sheet asset (e.g., a short 
sale), as the case may be, and (2) any other encumbrance period already 
applicable to the lending transaction. The remaining maturity of the 
liability secured by the off-balance sheet asset, or resulting from the 
sale of the off-balance sheet asset, restricts the ability of a covered 
company to monetize the lending transaction receivable and the lending 
receivable is therefore treated as encumbered.\177\ For example, Sec.  
__.106(d)(1) applies if a covered company obtains a level 2A liquid 
asset as collateral under an overnight reverse repurchase agreement 
with a financial counterparty and subsequently pledges the level 2A 
liquid asset as collateral in a repurchase transaction with a maturity 
of one year or more but, consistent with GAAP, does not include the 
level 2A liquid asset on its balance sheet. In this case, the final 
rule treats the covered company's balance-sheet receivable associated 
with the reverse repurchase agreement as encumbered for a period of one 
year or more, since the remaining maturity of the repurchase agreement 
secured by the rehypothecated level 2A liquid asset is one year or 
more. Accordingly, the final rule assigns the reverse repurchase 
agreement receivable an RSF factor of 100 percent (under Sec.  
__.106(c)(1)(iii)) instead of 15 percent (under Sec.  __.106(a)(3)(i)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ As described in section VI.A.2 of this Supplementary 
Information section, the final rule defines the term ``secured 
lending transaction'' to mean any lending transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the covered 
company that is secured under applicable law by a lien on securities 
or loans provided by the wholesale customer or counterparty, which 
gives the covered company, as holder of the lien, priority over the 
securities or loans. Section .__106(d)(1) applies to an off-balance 
sheet asset obtained under any lending transaction, regardless of 
the nature of the counterparty or the off-balance sheet asset. For 
the purposes of this section of this Supplementary Information 
section, a lending transaction is not an asset exchange or a 
derivative transaction.
    \177\ As described in section VI.B of this Supplementary 
Information section, the final rule includes a new definition of 
``Encumbered'' based on any legal, regulatory, contractual or other 
restrictions on the ability of a covered company to monetize an 
asset. See Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter asserted that this type of position poses less funding 
risk, because the on-balance sheet receivable has a shorter maturity 
than the liability and the off-balance sheet asset is highly liquid. 
However, the asset funding need for this type of transaction is driven 
by the obligation to continue to collateralize the liability for a 
period of one year or more relative to the short-term sourcing 
transaction rather than the liquidity characteristics of the asset 
pledged. Therefore, the effective funding need of the receivable 
associated with the asset pledged must take into account the one-year 
period of encumbrance, consistent with a 100 percent RSF factor.
b) Off-Balance Sheet Assets Obtained in an Asset Exchange
    Where a covered company provides a security in an asset exchange, 
the security provided remains on the covered company's balance sheet 
under GAAP. However, the security received by the covered company in 
the asset exchange may be an off-balance sheet asset under GAAP (for 
example, because the covered company acted as a securities borrower in 
the asset exchange). Under Sec.  __.106(d)(2) of the final rule, if a 
covered company obtains an off-balance sheet asset under an asset 
exchange and has an NSFR liability secured by, or resulting from the 
sale of, the off-balance sheet asset, the final rule treats the on-
balance sheet asset provided by the covered company in the asset 
exchange as encumbered for the longer of: (1) The remaining maturity of 
the NSFR liability secured by the off-balance sheet asset or resulting 
from the sale of the off-balance asset, as the case may be, and (2) any 
encumbrance period already applicable to the provided asset. For 
example, assume a covered company, acting as a securities borrower, 
provides a level 2A liquid asset as collateral and obtains a level 1 
liquid asset security under an asset

[[Page 9169]]

exchange with counterparty A and with a remaining maturity of six 
months, and subsequently provides the level 1 liquid asset security as 
collateral to secure a repurchase agreement with counterparty B and 
that matures in one year or more. In such a case, the covered company 
typically would not include the level 1 liquid asset security on its 
balance sheet.\178\ Under Sec.  __.106(d)(2) of the final rule, the 
level 2A liquid asset provided by the covered company (which remains on 
the covered company's balance sheet) is treated as encumbered for a 
period of one year or more (equal to the remaining maturity of the 
repurchase agreement secured by the rehypothecated level 1 liquid asset 
security) instead of six months (equal to the remaining maturity of the 
asset exchange) and the carrying value of the level 2A liquid asset 
provided is assigned an RSF factor of 100 percent (in accordance with 
Sec.  __.106(c)(1)(iii)) instead of 50 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ Under GAAP, where a covered company acting as a securities 
borrower engages in an asset exchange, the asset provided by the 
covered company typically remains on the covered company's balance 
sheet while the received asset, if not rehypothecated, would not be 
on the covered company's balance sheet. To the extent a covered 
company includes on its balance sheet an asset received in an asset 
exchange and the covered company subsequently uses the on-balance 
sheet asset as collateral to secure a separate NSFR liability, Sec.  
__.106(d) of the final rule does not apply. For example, if a 
covered company acts as a securities lender in an asset exchange and 
recognizes the collateral securities received on its balance sheet, 
the covered company should treat those collateral securities 
received as encumbered if the covered company sells or 
rehypothecates the collateral securities received, taking into 
account the remaining maturity of the transaction in which they have 
been rehypothecated. While the covered company should treat the 
securities it provided in the asset exchange as encumbered, the 
covered company would not be required to treat the securities it 
provided in the original asset exchange as encumbered for a period 
other than the remaining maturity of the asset exchange. The on-
balance sheet asset used as collateral to secure the NSFR liability 
is assigned an RSF factor in the same manner as other assets on the 
covered company's balance sheet (including by taking into account 
the asset's encumbrance) pursuant to Sec. Sec.  __.106(a) through 
(c) or Sec.  __.107 of the final rule, as applicable. See section 
VII.A.3 of this Supplementary Information section for assets 
received that remain unencumbered and section VII.D.3.h of this 
Supplementary Information section for any balance sheet assets that 
are encumbered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to comments that the final rule should recognize the 
funding value of the off-balance sheet asset received in an asset 
exchange (in the example above where the covered company acts a 
securities borrower, the level 1 liquid asset) and for the reasons 
described in section VII.A.3 of this Supplementary Information section, 
the final rule provides that a covered company must assign an RSF 
factor to the on-balance sheet asset provided (in the example above, 
the level 2A liquid asset) rather than the off-balance sheet asset 
received because the on-balance sheet asset is a component of the 
covered company's aggregate funding need at the calculation date. 
Unlike the LCR rule, where an off-balance sheet asset received in an 
asset exchange can potentially qualify as eligible HQLA available to 
satisfy short-term cash-flow needs, the NSFR is a measure of the 
stability of a covered company's funding profile relative to its 
assets. As discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information 
section, the final rule generally does not consider the future 
availability of an asset as a source of liquidity and assigns RSF 
factors to assets rather than ASF factors as suggested by commenters.
c) Off-Balance Sheet Assets Obtained Through Other Transactions
    Where a covered company obtains an off-balance sheet asset through 
a transaction that is not a lending transaction or an asset exchange 
(source transaction), there is the potential that the covered company 
might not record the source transaction on its balance sheet. At the 
same time, the covered company may rehypothecate the off-balance sheet 
asset obtained in the source transaction to obtain funding and generate 
an NSFR liability. This funding could increase the covered company's 
ASF amount, depending on the maturity and other characteristics of the 
NSFR liability, without the source transaction or the off-balance sheet 
asset itself being reflected in its RSF amount. However, due to the 
rehypothecation of the off-balance sheet asset, a covered company may 
record a liability to return the asset to the counterparty of the 
source transaction or a liability secured by the off-balance sheet 
asset.\179\ Further, the covered company may need to roll over the 
source transaction if this transaction matures before the encumbrance 
of the rehypothecated asset terminates. Alternatively, the covered 
company may need to obtain a replacement asset to close out the source 
transaction before the encumbrance expires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ If the NSFR liability is a short sale that is booked on an 
open basis or otherwise has a remaining maturity of less than six 
months, the asset resulting from the NSFR liability would be treated 
as unencumbered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address this risk and prevent potential distortions of the NSFR, 
under Sec.  __.106(d)(3) of the final rule, if a covered company has an 
off-balance sheet asset that it did not obtain under either a lending 
transaction or an asset exchange, the covered company is required to 
treat any associated on-balance sheet asset resulting from the 
rehypothecation transaction as encumbered for a period equal to the 
greater of the remaining maturity of the NSFR liability or the 
encumbrance of the source transaction. This provision would apply to 
any proceeds that appeared on a covered company's balance sheet as a 
result of a rehypothecation transaction. For example, if a covered 
company rehypothecates an off-balance sheet asset for a period of one 
year more and receives cash as proceeds of the rehypothecation, the 
covered company would be required to treat the cash received as 
encumbered and assigned a 100 percent RSF factor. Covered companies are 
not required to treat the off-balance sheet asset as if the off-balance 
sheet asset was included on a company's balance sheet. Even if a 
covered company reuses the proceeds of the rehypothecated transaction, 
the covered company should still apply an RSF factor, based on the 
encumbrance, to the on-balance sheet asset that was the direct result 
of the transaction. Without this treatment, a covered company's RSF 
amount would not reflect the funding risk that the covered company must 
maintain the asset, or a similar asset, or the fact that the covered 
company has limited its ability to monetize or recognize inflows from 
the source transaction for the duration of the rehypothecation.
    Additionally, Sec.  __.106(d)(3) of the proposed rule would have 
applied in the case of an NSFR liability secured by, or resulting from 
the sale of, an off-balance sheet asset that a covered company had 
received in the form of variation margin under a derivative 
transaction. The final rule modifies the proposal by not subjecting 
assets received as variation margin under a derivative transaction to 
the requirements of Sec.  __.106(d).\180\ Excluding such variation 
margin from Sec.  __.106(d) of the final rule is appropriate because 
the final rule accounts for variation margin within the derivatives RSF 
amount calculation specified in Sec.  __.107.\181\ Section __.106(d)(3) 
of the final rule therefore

[[Page 9170]]

applies where a covered company has rehypothecated an off-balance sheet 
asset not received under a lending transaction or asset exchange or as 
variation margin under a derivative transaction. For example, the 
agencies note that Sec.  __.106(d)(3) of the final rule applies if a 
covered company obtains an asset as initial margin under a derivative 
transaction or borrows an asset for a fee without providing collateral 
and uses the asset to generate an NSFR liability without including the 
asset on its balance sheet under GAAP.
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    \180\ This treatment applies to both assets received as 
variation margin necessary to cover the current exposure of a 
derivative or derivative netting set and variation margin received 
in excess of such an amount.
    \181\ Section __.107 of the final rule provides for netting of 
certain rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets received as variation 
margin by the covered company against the value of the underlying 
derivative asset for purposes of a covered company's derivatives RSF 
amount. See section VII.E.2 of this Supplementary Information 
section. The final rule's modifications to Sec.  __.106(d)(3) of the 
proposed rule are consistent with Sec.  __.107 of the final rule.

             Table 4--Treatment of Off-Balance Sheet Assets
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transaction through which a covered      RSF factor is applied to the
 company obtains an off-balance sheet     following on-balance sheet
 asset (source transaction) and whether   asset, taking into account the
 the asset is subsequently used in a      remaining maturity of the NSFR
 transaction to generate a NSFR           liability and the encumbrance
 liability.                               period of the source
                                          transaction.
Off-balance sheet asset received in any  No RSF factor applied.
 source transaction and is not
 rehypothecated.
Off-balance sheet asset received in a    RSF factor is applied to on-
 lending transaction and subsequently     balance sheet lending
 used to generate a NSFR liability.       transaction receivable under
                                          Sec.   __.106(d)(1).
Off-balance sheet asset received in an   RSF factor is applied to the on-
 asset exchange (e.g., where a covered    balance sheet asset provided
 company acts as securities borrower)     in the asset exchange under
 subsequently used to generate a NSFR     Sec.   __.106(d)(2).
 liability *.
Off-balance sheet asset received as      See derivative treatment under
 variation margin under a derivative      Sec.   __.107 of the final
 transaction.                             rule.
Off-balance sheet asset received in a    RSF factor is applied to the on-
 source transaction other than a          balance sheet asset resulting
 lending transaction, or asset            from the NSFR liability under
 exchange, and the asset is not           Sec.   __.106(d)(3).
 received as variation margin under a
 derivative transaction, and
 subsequently used to generate a NSFR
 liability.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For assets received in an asset exchange recorded on balance sheet
  (e.g., when a covered company acts as a securities lender) see
  sections VII.A.3 and VII.D.3.h of this Supplementary Information
  section.

    Consistent with the proposed rule, Sec.  __.106(d) of the final 
rule does not apply in cases where a covered company has an NSFR 
liability secured by, or resulting from the sale of, an on-balance 
sheet asset.
d) Technical and Operational Clarifications
(i) Amounts of Rehypothecated Off-Balance Sheet Assets Relative to 
Transactions Through Which the Assets Are Obtained
    If the value of rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets obtained in 
lending transactions or asset exchanges is less than the carrying value 
of the on-balance sheet receivables for the lending transactions or 
assets provided under the asset exchanges, respectively, the covered 
company should treat the value of the receivables or assets provided as 
encumbered in an amount equivalent to the value of the rehypothecated 
off-balance sheet assets, for purposes of Sec. Sec.  __.106(d)(1) and 
(2).\182\ This treatment recognizes that when a covered company 
rehypothecates only a portion of the value of off-balance sheet assets 
obtained in a lending transaction or an asset exchange, it would be 
overly conservative to apply an RSF factor based on such encumbrance to 
the entire value of the lending transaction receivable, or to the full 
value of assets provided in the asset exchange, as applicable. 
Accordingly, the covered company need not treat the entire value of the 
receivables or assets provided as encumbered.
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    \182\ A covered company would assign appropriate RSF factors to 
the value of the lending transaction receivables, or assets provided 
in the asset exchanges, equivalent to the value of the 
rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets based on the appropriate 
encumbrance periods and categories of RSF factors under Sec.  __.106 
of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Conversely, the value of rehypothecated off-balance sheet assets 
received by a covered company in a lending transaction, asset exchange, 
or other transaction might exceed the value of the on-balance sheet 
receivable for the lending transaction, the assets provided under the 
asset exchange, or the asset resulting from the NSFR liability, 
respectively. In such cases, a covered company potentially could 
rehypothecate an amount of off-balance sheet assets to produce an NSFR 
liability that exceeds the value of the on-balance sheet lending 
transaction receivable or assets provided (excess rehypothecated 
assets). Under the final rule, on-balance sheet assets resulting from 
the rehypothecation of the off-balance sheet assets are assigned the 
appropriate RSF factor consistent with other on-balance sheet assets. 
Covered companies should use appropriate and justifiable assumptions in 
identifying and attributing the sources and uses of off-balance sheet 
assets, including excess rehypothecated assets, consistent with the 
operational clarifications below.
(ii) Operational Clarifications
    With regard to a commenter's concerns about the operational burden 
associated with linking assets and liabilities for purposes of Sec.  
__.106(d), if a covered company provides an asset as collateral, and 
the covered company operationally could have provided either an off-
balance sheet asset or the same security in the form of on-balance 
sheet asset, the final rule permits the covered company to identify 
either the off-balance sheet asset or the on-balance sheet asset as the 
provided collateral for purposes of determining encumbrance treatment 
under Sec. Sec.  __.106(c) and (d). Similarly, if a covered company 
operationally could have provided either of two equivalent off-balance 
sheet assets, one received under a lending transaction and the other 
under an asset exchange, the final rule does not restrict the covered 
company's ability to identify either asset as the provided collateral 
for purposes of determining encumbrance treatment under Sec.  
__.106(d). In either case, the covered company's identification for 
purposes of Sec. Sec.  __.106(c) and __.106(d) must be consistent with 
contractual and other applicable requirements on the relevant 
calculation date. The same treatment would apply for a covered 
company's use of a security as collateral and the covered company's 
ability to identify whether the security is already owned by the 
covered company or is an identical security received from a lending 
transaction, asset exchange, or other transaction.
    For example, if a covered company receives a security in a reverse 
repurchase agreement that is identical to a security the covered 
company already owns, and the covered company provides one of these 
securities as collateral to secure a repurchase

[[Page 9171]]

agreement, the final rule permits the covered company to identify, for 
purposes of determining encumbrance treatment under Sec. Sec.  
__.106(c) and (d), either the owned security or the security received 
in the reverse repurchase agreement as the encumbered collateral for 
the repurchase agreement, provided that the covered company had the 
operational and legal capability to provide either one of the 
securities as of the calculation date. If the covered company chooses 
to treat the off-balance sheet security received in connection with the 
reverse repurchase agreement as the collateral securing the repurchase 
agreement at the calculation date, Sec.  __.106(d)(1) would apply and 
the covered company would treat the reverse repurchase agreement as 
encumbered for purposes of assigning an RSF factor. If the covered 
company instead chooses to treat the owned security as the collateral 
encumbered by the repurchase agreement, the covered company would apply 
the appropriate RSF factor (reflecting the encumbrance) to the owned 
security under Sec.  __.106(c) and no additional adjustment would need 
to be made to the encumbrance of the reverse repurchase agreement under 
Sec.  __.106(d).
    The agencies anticipate that a covered company would be able to 
comply with this section based on aggregate information (because much 
of the data is currently collected and monitored for other purposes, 
including the FR 2052a and compliance with the LCR rule) rather than 
through transaction-by-transaction tracking. For example, a covered 
company may determine its requirements under Sec. Sec.  __.106(c) and 
__.106(d) based on the aggregate value of an asset class pledged at 
each of the NSFR rule's encumbrance periods (less than six months, six 
months or more but less than one year, or one year or more); the 
aggregate value of the asset class on the covered company's balance 
sheet; and the values and maturity categories of balance sheet 
receivables or assets provided by the covered company under 
transactions sourcing each type of borrowed asset.\183\ The agencies 
expect this approach to substantially limit any incremental operational 
costs of compliance for covered companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ In the case of securities, this approach would involve a 
covered company identifying its aggregate encumbrances by each 
security identifier (e.g., CUSIP or ISIN) for each of the NSFR's 
encumbrance periods; the aggregate value held in a covered company's 
inventory by each security identifier; and the aggregate value of 
on-balance sheet receivables or assets associated with transactions 
sourcing each security identifier. Since the NSFR generally applies 
the same funding requirement to all transaction types that have 
similar counterparty, collateral and maturity characteristics (e.g., 
a margin loan to a financial sector entity maturing in six months 
and a reverse repo to a financial sector entity maturing in six 
months would have the same funding requirement), a covered company 
may consider transactions that are treated equivalently by the NSFR 
in aggregate when calculating the receivable amounts that are 
subject to Sec.  __.106(d) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, when the covered company has provided two assets to a 
single counterparty to secure two different NSFR liabilities, and the 
covered company had the sole legal right and operational capability to 
determine the allocation of the collateral provided to each of the NSFR 
liabilities at the calculation date, the final rule permits the covered 
company to identify which asset secures which NSFR liability for 
purposes of determining encumbrance treatment under Sec. Sec.  
__.106(c) and __.106(d). As an example, assume that a covered company 
enters into two secured funding transactions with a single counterparty 
(or with a single tri-party repo intermediary), one with an overnight 
maturity and one with a maturity of one year, and provides level 2A 
liquid assets as collateral for one secured funding transaction and 
level 2B liquid assets as collateral for the second secured funding 
transaction. If the covered company had the legal right and operational 
capability to allocate the provided level 2A and level 2B liquid assets 
between the two secured funding transactions, the final rule permits 
the covered company to identify which of the securities are encumbered 
for a period of one year and which are encumbered overnight for 
purposes of Sec. Sec.  __.106(c) and __.106(d). As described above, the 
covered company's determinations for purposes of these sections must be 
consistent with contractual and other applicable requirements, 
including accounting treatment.\184\ Similar considerations apply where 
a covered company has borrowed an asset of one type from a counterparty 
pursuant to an asset borrowing transaction and the covered company has 
the legal right and operational capability to substitute another type 
of asset to return.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ Covered companies may allocate collateral encumbered at 
the calculation date between transactions secured by such collateral 
based on the eligibility of the currently encumbered pool of 
collateral using justifiable and consistent assumptions. For the 
purposes of Sec.  __.106 of the final rule, a covered company should 
not make assumptions regarding the potential future substitution of 
encumbered collateral with other assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Derivative Transactions

    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to maintain 
stable funding to support its on-balance sheet derivative activities. 
Under the proposed rule, a covered company would have calculated its 
required stable funding amount relating to its derivative transactions 
\185\ (derivatives RSF amount) separately from its other assets, 
commitments, and liabilities due to the variable nature and generally 
more complex features of derivative transactions relative to other on-
balance sheet assets and liabilities of covered companies.\186\ For 
similar reasons, the proposed rule would not have separately treated 
derivative liabilities in excess of derivative assets as available 
stable funding to support non-derivative assets and commitments, as 
described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ As defined in Sec.  __.3 of the LCR rule, ``derivative 
transaction'' means a financial contract whose value is derived from 
the values of one or more underlying assets, reference rates, or 
indices of asset values or reference rates. Derivative contracts 
include interest rate derivative contracts, exchange rate derivative 
contracts, equity derivative contracts, commodity derivative 
contracts, credit derivative contracts, forward contracts, and any 
other instrument that poses similar counterparty credit risks. 
Derivative contracts also include unsettled securities, commodities, 
and foreign currency exchange transactions with a contractual 
settlement or delivery lag that is longer than the lesser of the 
market standard for the particular instrument or five business days. 
A derivative does not include any identified banking product, as 
that term is defined in section 402(b) of the Legal Certainty for 
Bank Products Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. 27(b)), that is subject to 
section 403(a) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 27a(a)).
    \186\ The proposed rule would have included mortgage commitments 
that are derivative transactions in the general derivative 
transactions treatment, in contrast to the LCR rule, which excludes 
those transactions and applies a separate, self-contained mortgage 
commitment treatment. See Sec. Sec.  __.32(c) and (d) of the LCR 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rule, a covered company's derivatives RSF amount 
would have consisted of three general components, each described 
further below: (1) A component reflecting the current net value of a 
covered company's derivative assets and liabilities, taking into 
account variation margin provided by and received by the covered 
company (current net value component); (2) a component to account for 
initial margin provided by a covered company for its derivative 
transactions and assets contributed by a covered company to a CCP's 
mutualized loss-sharing arrangement in connection with cleared 
derivative transactions (initial margin component); and (3) a component 
to account for potential future derivatives valuation changes (future 
value component). For the current net value component, a covered 
company would have netted its derivatives transactions and certain 
variation margin amounts to identify whether the current net value of 
its

[[Page 9172]]

derivatives positions was either an NSFR derivatives asset amount or an 
NSFR derivatives liability amount (described below) and assigned a 100 
percent RSF factor or zero percent ASF factor, respectively. For the 
initial margin component, the proposed rule would have assigned an 85 
percent RSF factor to CCP contributions and a minimum 85 percent RSF 
factor to initial margin provided by a covered company. The proposed 
rule also would have assigned a 100 percent RSF factor to the future 
value component, which would have equaled 20 percent of the sum of a 
covered company's gross derivative liabilities. The final rule makes 
certain adjustments to the current net value component's treatment of 
variation margin received by covered companies and the calibration of 
the future value component.
1. Scope of Derivatives Transactions Subject to Sec.  __.107 of the 
Final Rule
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to measure 
its derivatives exposures in its calculation of the NSFR, regardless of 
the counterparty. A few commenters suggested that all derivative 
transactions with commercial end-users--specifically, entities that are 
not subject to the clearing requirement under the Commodity Exchange 
Act \187\ or the margin requirements for non-cleared swaps under the 
agencies' swap margin rule (swap margin rule)--should be excluded from 
the NSFR rule.\188\ These commenters argued that derivative activities 
of commercial end-users do not pose a threat to financial stability and 
that applying funding requirements for such activities would be 
inconsistent with Congress's intent in the Dodd-Frank Act that the 
regulation of derivative trading not impose costs on commercial end-
users.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \187\ Although the term ``commercial end-user'' is not defined 
in the Dodd-Frank Act, it is used in this Supplementary Information 
section to mean a company that is eligible for the exception to the 
mandatory clearing requirement for swaps under section 2(h)(7)(A) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act and section 3C(g)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, respectively. This exception is generally available to 
a person that (1) is not a financial entity, (2) is using the swap 
to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and (3) has notified the CFTC 
or SEC how it generally meets its financial obligations with respect 
to non-cleared swaps or security-based swaps. See 7 U.S.C. 
2(h)(7)(A) and 15 U.S.C. 78c-3(g)(1).
    \188\ See 12 CFR part 45 (OCC); 12 CFR part 237 (Board); 12 CFR 
part 349 (FDIC); see also Final Rule, Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 FR 74840 (November 30, 
2015).
    \189\ These commenters cited to 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7), 6s(e)(4) as 
examples within the Dodd-Frank Act. One commenter noted that certain 
regulatory requirements relating to derivative transactions in 
jurisdictions outside the United States also exempt certain 
derivative transactions with non-financial sector entities, which 
the commenter argued provided support for an exemption from the 
NSFR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule does not distinguish between derivative transactions 
with commercial end-users and other counterparty types. Unlike the 
clearing and margin requirements cited by commenters, which apply 
specifically to derivative transactions and include statutory 
exemptions for certain transactions with non-financial sector 
counterparties, the final rule seeks to measure and address funding 
risks of a covered company's aggregate balance sheet. The final rule 
therefore includes derivative transactions as one of many types of 
exposures that contribute to a covered company's aggregate funding 
risk.\190\ Derivative transactions are subject to a range of funding 
risks driven by the underlying economic exposures and contractual 
features, such as their variable nature and the regular need to 
exchange collateral. These funding risks are not primarily determined 
by the derivative transaction's counterparty, and therefore 
transactions with commercial end-user counterparties could contribute 
to funding risk in a manner similar to derivative transactions with 
financial sector entity counterparties. In addition, although the 
agencies' regulatory capital rule differentiates the capital 
requirements for derivative transactions with commercial end-user and 
financial sector counterparties in certain cases, such distinction is 
based largely on the potential for the transactions with commercial 
end-users to be primarily used to hedge or mitigate commercial risks, 
which can be a material consideration in determining the counterparty 
credit risk for an exposure.\191\ By contrast, the NSFR is not designed 
to measure the risks associated with counterparty defaults, but instead 
presumes a covered company would continue to intermediate and fund its 
derivatives portfolio over a one-year horizon. Accordingly, the final 
rule does not provide an exclusion for derivative transactions with 
commercial end-user counterparties and requires a covered company to 
include all its balance sheet derivatives exposures in its calculation 
of the NSFR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ As discussed further below, the final rule, like the 
proposed rule, also applies a stable funding requirement based on a 
covered company's derivative transactions in the aggregate, using a 
standardized measure rather than a more granular approach that would 
consider in greater detail specific features of individual 
transactions, such as counterparty type.
    \191\ For example, the standardized approach for calculating the 
exposure amount of derivative contracts under the agencies' 
regulatory capital rule removes the alpha factor from the exposure 
amount formula for derivative contracts with commercial end-user 
counterparties, resulting in lower requirements in comparison to 
similar derivative contracts with a counterparty that is not a 
commercial end-user.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Current Net Value Component
    Under the proposed rule, the stable funding requirement for the 
current net value component of a covered company's derivative assets 
and liabilities would have been based on the value (as of the 
calculation date) of each of its derivative transactions (not subject 
to a QMNA) and each QMNA netting set and the variation margin provided 
by and received by the covered company. For the current net value 
component, the proposed rule would have measured a covered company's 
aggregate derivative activities on a net basis by: (i) Reducing 
exposures with each counterparty by taking into account QMNA netting 
sets; (ii) determining the value of each derivative asset, liability or 
QMNA netting set after netting certain variation margin amounts; and 
(iii) offsetting a covered company's overall total derivatives asset 
amount with its total derivatives liability amount, each as described 
below (i.e., the proposed rule's NSFR derivatives asset or liability 
amount). Through these netting calculations, a covered company would 
have determined whether the current net value of its derivatives 
positions was either an NSFR derivatives asset amount or an NSFR 
derivatives liability amount. The proposed rule would have assigned a 
100 percent RSF factor to a covered company's NSFR derivatives asset 
amount or a zero percent ASF factor to a covered company's NSFR 
derivatives liability amount. By netting across assets and liabilities 
in addition to counterparties and transactions, the current net value 
component would have reflected the current stable funding needs 
associated with the covered company's overall derivatives activities.
    The agencies received a number of comments regarding this 
component, including comments on the calculation of the NSFR derivative 
asset or liability amount, the proposed RSF and ASF factors for these 
amounts, and how the proposed calculation would have accounted for 
variation margin received and provided by a covered company. The final 
rule modifies the calculation of the current net value component with 
certain adjustments to the types of variation margin that are eligible 
for netting in such component, but otherwise adopts the treatment as 
proposed. Due to the variable nature of derivative transactions, the 
interdependencies within the derivative

[[Page 9173]]

portfolios of covered companies, and the connection to assets and 
liabilities related to margin provided and received by a covered 
company, the final rule, like the proposed rule, assesses the funding 
risks of derivatives activities on a net basis. Under the final rule, 
the NSFR point-in-time measure generally reflects the funding provided 
by derivative transactions and associated variation margin in 
supporting a covered company's funding needs for its derivative 
portfolio. Under the final rule, the current net value component is 
calculated as follows:
Step 1: Calculation of Derivative and QMNA Netting set Asset and 
Liability Values
    First, a covered company determines the asset or liability value of 
each derivative transaction (not subject to a QMNA) and each QMNA 
netting set. Each derivative transaction or QMNA netting set has either 
a derivatives asset value or derivatives liability value, depending on 
(1) the derivative transaction's or QMNA netting set's asset or 
liability valuation and (2) the value of variation margin provided or 
received under the derivative transaction or QMNA netting set that is 
eligible for netting under the final rule.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ See Sec.  __.107(f) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A derivatives asset value of a derivative transaction or QMNA 
netting set is the asset value after netting variation margin received 
in the form of cash or rehypothecatable level 1 liquid asset securities 
by the covered company that meets the eligibility conditions described 
in Sec.  __.107(f)(1) of the final rule and discussed in section 
VII.E.2.b of this Supplementary Information section.
    A derivatives liability value of a derivative transaction or QMNA 
netting set is the liability value after netting any variation margin 
provided by the covered company, regardless of the type of variation 
margin. The final rule also specifies that a covered company may not 
reduce its derivatives asset or liability values by initial margin 
provided to or received from counterparties.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Initial margin includes payments provided and received by 
a covered company to provide credit protection relative to a 
derivative exposure, including independent amounts. Such payments 
should be considered as initial margin under the final rule except 
in instances where a payment, such as the return of part or all of 
an independent amount, has occurred due to the change in the value 
of a derivative exposure and the payment has been netted against the 
covered company's exposure, in which case the payment should be 
treated as variation margin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Step 2: Calculation of Total Derivatives Asset Amounts and Total 
Derivatives Liability Amounts
    Second, a covered company sums its derivatives asset values, as 
calculated in step 1, to determine its total derivatives asset amount, 
and separately sums its derivatives liability values, as calculated in 
step 1, to determine its total derivatives liability amount.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ See Sec.  __.107(e) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Step 3: Calculation of NSFR Derivatives Asset Amount or NSFR 
Derivatives Liability Amount
    Third, a covered company calculates its overall NSFR derivatives 
asset amount or NSFR derivatives liability amount by calculating the 
difference between its total derivatives asset amount and its total 
derivatives liability amount, each as calculated in step 2.\195\ If a 
covered company's total derivatives asset amount exceeds its total 
derivatives liability amount, the covered company would have an NSFR 
derivatives asset amount. Conversely, if a covered company's total 
derivatives liability amount exceeds the total derivatives asset 
amount, the covered company would have an NSFR derivatives liability 
amount. The NSFR derivatives asset or NSFR derivatives liability amount 
represents a covered company's overall derivatives activities on a net 
basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See Sec.  __.107(d) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Step 4: Application of RSF or ASF Factors to the NSFR Derivatives Asset 
Amount or NSFR Derivatives Liability Amount
    Fourth, and finally, the final rule assigns a 100 percent RSF 
factor to a covered company's NSFR derivatives asset amount or a zero 
percent ASF factor to a covered company's NSFR derivatives liability 
amount. \196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ See Sec. Sec.  __.107(b) and (c) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a) Comments Regarding NSFR Derivatives Asset Amount and NSFR 
Derivatives Liability Amount
    A number of commenters recommended that the approach for 
calculating the NSFR derivatives asset amount or NSFR derivatives 
liability amount should be based on the remaining maturity of a covered 
company's derivative transactions or netting sets, which commenters 
asserted would be more consistent with the proposed rule's 
consideration of tenor for assigning an RSF factor for certain other 
assets. Moreover, commenters asserted that short-dated derivatives do 
not require as much long-term funding as long-dated derivatives because 
a covered company could generally expect to allow its short-dated 
derivative transactions to mature within the NSFR's one-year horizon, 
there are generally no market or client expectations that firms would 
roll over derivative transactions, and the agencies did not provide 
empirical evidence suggesting otherwise. For example, commenters 
suggested reducing the RSF factor for assets based on individual 
derivative transactions with a remaining maturity of less than one 
year, with a further reduction for asset values based on individual 
derivative transactions with a remaining maturity of six months or 
less. Some commenters suggested that the agencies should rely on other 
regulatory measures to determine the remaining maturity of derivative 
netting sets, such as the calculation of maturity for derivative 
netting sets under the internal models methodology for counterparty 
credit risk under the agencies' advanced approaches risk-based capital 
rule.\197\ As an alternative to incorporating tenor considerations to 
determine a covered company's derivatives asset amount, one commenter 
suggested that the final rule assign reduced RSF factors for an asset 
purchased by a covered company as a hedge to a derivative transaction 
based on the remaining maturity of the derivative it is meant to hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See 12 CFR 3.132(d)(4) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.132(d)(4) 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.132(d)(4) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies are not adopting in the final rule a more granular 
approach to the calculation of the NSFR derivatives asset amount and 
are instead adopting the approach under the proposed rule. The current 
net value component is an operationally simple measure of the funding 
needs associated with a covered company's aggregate derivatives 
portfolio. Relative to other approaches, such as the more granular 
approaches suggested by commenters that would take into account the 
remaining maturity of certain derivative transactions or hedging 
transactions, the final rule's approach allows for a consistent and 
comparable measure of net derivative exposures across covered 
companies. Further, while a more complex approach based on a covered 
company's internal models methodology as suggested by commenters may be 
appropriate in other contexts, such an approach would be contrary to 
the NSFR's standardized calculation of a relatively simple measure of 
the risks raised by a covered company's derivative positions. Although 
this simplified approach may overstate the funding risk of certain 
short-maturity derivative assets, it may

[[Page 9174]]

also understate the funding risk of certain short-maturity derivative 
liabilities. As described above, the current net value component is 
arrived at through a series of netting procedures to determine the NSFR 
derivatives asset amount. Derivative asset exposures to a counterparty 
with varying maturities may be offset by derivative liabilities within 
a netting set. Additionally, total derivative assets are netted with 
total derivative liabilities. Given the inclusion of many different 
transactions in the calculation, the remaining maturity of the 
resulting NSFR derivatives asset amount or NSFR derivatives liability 
amount to which the RSF or ASF factor is applied would not be intuitive 
or meaningful for the NSFR's one-year time horizon and estimating its 
effective maturity would require complex calculations. Under the final 
rule's approach, a covered company's current net value component can be 
reduced by the value of derivative liabilities of any maturity, 
including short-dated positions. This simplified approach should serve 
as a reasonable and balanced approximation of the current stable 
funding needs associated with a covered company's overall derivatives 
activities.
    In response to comments requesting the assignment of reduced RSF 
factors to assets that hedge derivative transactions, the agencies 
similarly note that the current net value component of the final rule 
is designed as a simplified approach that nets all derivative 
liabilities against derivative assets. An alternative approach that 
permits a covered company to match particular derivative assets or 
liabilities to specific hedging positions (whether derivative 
transactions or otherwise) to determine the assignment of RSF factors 
for the current net value component would introduce significant 
complexity, reduce standardization, and, depending on the approach, 
introduce an additional operational burden or increased reliance on 
covered companies' internal models. In addition, although derivative 
assets or liabilities may reduce certain risks of the specific 
positions for which they are hedging, they would still require stable 
funding to enable the covered company to continue to intermediate and 
fund its derivatives portfolio and hedging positions over a one-year 
time horizon. The final rule therefore adopts the same calculation 
structure as the proposed rule for the current net value component, 
with modifications discussed below with respect to consideration of 
variation margin received by a covered company.
    The agencies are adopting the proposed rule's assignment of a 100 
percent RSF factor to an NSFR derivatives asset amount and a zero 
percent ASF factor to an NSFR derivatives liability amount. The 
calculation of a covered company's NSFR derivatives asset amount 
already recognizes the contribution made by variation margin and 
derivative liabilities to the funding for derivative asset positions, 
based on their treatment under the final rule. As a result, the NSFR 
derivatives asset amount represents overall derivatives activities that 
are not fully margined, based on the eligibility of variation margin 
for netting under the rule. Derivative transactions are complex 
financial instruments that can significantly and quickly fluctuate in 
value. Given these risks, the final rule, like the proposed rule, would 
require full stable funding for these net residual exposures. Moreover, 
while the final rule's current net value component recognizes the 
contribution made by derivative liabilities to the funding for 
derivative asset positions, the agencies do not consider a covered 
company's NSFR derivatives liability amount, if any, to be available 
stable funding to support assets outside of the covered company's 
derivative portfolio.
b) Variation Margin Received and Provided
    Under the proposed rule's calculation of a covered company's 
current net value component, a covered company would have been 
permitted to offset derivative assets only by variation margin received 
that was in the form of cash that met criteria at Sec.  
__.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1) through (7) of the SLR rule (SLR netting 
criteria).\198\ Additionally, under the proposed rule, all variation 
margin provided by the covered company would have been taken into 
account in determining derivatives liability values. The proposed rule 
also would have assigned RSF factors to on-balance sheet assets that 
the covered company has provided or received as variation margin under 
a derivative transaction (not subject to a QMNA netting set) or QMNA 
netting set, and an ASF factor to any liability that arises from an 
obligation to return variation margin.
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    \198\ See 12 CFR 3.10(c)(4)(ii)(C) (OCC); 12 CFR 
217.10(c)(4)(ii)(C) (Board); 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C) (FDIC). 
Specifically, under the proposed rule, these conditions were: (1) 
Cash collateral received is not segregated; (2) variation margin is 
calculated and transferred on a daily basis based on mark-to-fair 
value of the derivative contract; (3) variation margin transferred 
is the full amount necessary to fully extinguish the net current 
credit exposure to the counterparty, subject to the applicable 
threshold and minimum transfer amounts; (4) variation margin is cash 
in the same currency as the settlement currency in the contract; (5) 
the derivative contract and the variation margin are governed by a 
QMNA between the counterparties to the contract, which stipulates 
that the counterparties agree to settle any payment obligations on a 
net basis, taking into account any variation margin received or 
provided; (6) variation margin is used to reduce the current credit 
exposure of the derivative contract and not the PFE (as that term is 
defined in the SLR rule); and (7) variation margin may not reduce 
net or gross credit exposure for purposes of calculating the Net-to-
gross Ratio (as that term is defined in the SLR rule).
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(i) Criteria for Netting of Variation Margin Received or Provided 
Against Derivative Assets or Liabilities, Respectively
    The agencies received comments regarding the proposed rule's 
criteria for variation margin received to be eligible for netting 
against derivatives asset values. Commenters argued that the proposed 
rule lacked a rationale for recognizing all forms of variation margin 
provided by a covered company against derivatives liability values, 
while only permitting derivatives asset values to be netted by 
variation margin received by a covered company if the variation margin 
met the SLR netting criteria. These commenters argued that the proposed 
treatment for netting variation margin received was overly conservative 
and would increase costs to covered companies. Commenters requested 
that the agencies allow additional forms of variation margin received 
to be netted against derivatives assets.
Operational and Contractual Criteria for Netting Variation Margin 
Received
    Many commenters requested that the final rule permit netting of 
additional variation margin received against the covered company's 
derivative assets because the amounts received would represent a 
funding benefit to the covered company. Commenters argued that, unlike 
the SLR rule, the NSFR rule is designed to measure the funding risk of 
a covered company's balance sheet and, therefore, should recognize the 
value of collateral received when the receipt of collateral represents 
a source of liquidity or facilitates the monetization of the underlying 
derivative asset. These commenters asserted that the final rule should 
recognize netting for any cash collateral that is received by a covered 
company, specifically criticizing the proposed criteria that variation 
margin be calculated and transferred on a daily basis or provide for 
the full extinguishment of a net current credit exposure, as the 
amounts of cash collateral received would represent a funding benefit 
to the covered company. Commenters noted that, under the proposed rule, 
a small shortfall of variation margin would result in a

[[Page 9175]]

derivative asset being considered as entirely un-margined, which could 
lead to volatility in the amounts allowed for netting due to periodic 
shortfalls. Certain commenters requested that, at a minimum, this 
requirement be revised so that margin disputes or operational 
shortfalls would not have an impact on the netting amount. Commenters 
also argued that, if the SLR netting criteria are retained in the final 
rule, the criteria should be changed to align with proposed changes to 
the Basel Leverage Ratio Framework to avoid the final rule being more 
be more stringent than the Basel NSFR standard, which incorporates the 
Basel Leverage Ratio Framework netting criteria by reference.\199\
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    \199\ See BCBS, Consultative Document: Revisions to the Basel 
Leverage Ratio Framework (April 2016), p. 7, Annex ] 24(iv).
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    Commenters also specifically recommended that the final rule not 
include the proposed criterion that cash variation margin received must 
be in the same currency as the settlement currency in the contract. 
These commenters noted that the LCR rule treats HQLA denominated in a 
foreign currency as a source of liquidity that can be used to meet 
near-term outflows denominated in a different currency and the swap 
margin rule permits the receipt of cash collateral denominated in a 
currency different from the settlement currency of the derivative 
transaction if the currency falls within swap margin rule's definition 
of ``major currency'' or, if the cash variation margin is not in a 
``major currency,'' subject to an 8 percent haircut under that 
rule.\200\ Commenters expressed concern that the proposed criterion 
would discourage covered companies from accepting variation margin in 
certain currencies. These commenters argued the proposed criterion 
would make transactions more expensive if covered companies passed 
along any increased costs to counterparties by requiring them to 
provide variation margin in certain currencies.
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    \200\ See 12 CFR 45.6 (OCC); 12 CFR 237.6. (Board); 12 CFR 349.6 
(FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering these comments, the agencies have revised the 
proposal by: (1) Removing the requirement that variation margin be 
received in the full amount necessary to extinguish the net current 
credit exposure to a counterparty in order to be recognized for netting 
purposes; and (2) modifying the currency requirement. In the final 
rule, to be recognized for netting purposes, the variation margin (1) 
must not be segregated; (2) must be received in connection with a 
derivative transaction that is governed by a QMNA or other contract 
between the counterparties to the derivative transaction, which 
stipulates that the counterparties agree to settle any payment 
obligations on a net basis, taking into account any variation margin 
received or provided; (3) must be calculated and transferred on a daily 
basis on mark-to-fair value of the derivative contract; and (4) must be 
in a currency specified as an acceptable currency to settle payment 
obligations in the relevant governing contract.
    In response to commenters, the final rule does not include the 
requirement that variation margin be received in the full amount 
necessary to extinguish the net current credit exposure to a 
counterparty in order to be recognized for netting purposes. This 
change will avoid unduly penalizing a covered company if variation 
margin the covered company has received does not fully extinguish the 
underlying derivative exposure due to short-term margin disputes or 
operational reasons and would avoid volatility in a covered company's 
funding requirement due to periodic, short-term shortfalls in variation 
margin received.\201\
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    \201\ Because the final rule does not include the proposed 
criterion regarding full extinguishment, the agencies note that 
comparisons of this criterion to the Basel Leverage Ratio Framework 
are accordingly no longer relevant.
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    The final rule includes a modified version of the proposed netting 
criterion for currency. Specifically, the final rule requires that in 
order to qualify for netting treatment, variation margin received by a 
covered company must be in a currency specified as an acceptable 
currency to settle the obligation in the relevant governing contract. 
Non-cash variation margin must be denominated in a currency specified 
as an acceptable currency. The final rule does not adopt certain 
commenters' suggestions to permit netting of variation margin only if 
it is denominated in certain major currencies, or to apply discount 
rates to account for costs of currency conversion, because such 
requirements would have significantly increased the complexity of the 
final rule. Allowing variation margin, whether cash or non-cash, that 
is not in a currency specified as an acceptable currency would also 
entail currency conversion risks and decrease the certainty about 
whether the variation margin truly netted out a derivatives exposure.
    The final rule retains the requirement that variation margin is 
calculated on a daily basis based on the fair value of the derivative 
contract. To satisfy this criterion, derivative positions must be 
valued daily, and margin must be transferred daily when the threshold 
and daily minimum transfer amounts are satisfied according to the terms 
of the derivative contract. While variation margin exchanged less 
frequently may reduce the funding risk associated with a derivative 
position, the requirement that margin be exchanged daily makes the 
funding flows associated with derivative positions more predictable and 
manageable. Derivative positions with less frequent or episodic 
transfers of variation margin present more significant funding concerns 
than derivative positions subject to daily margin exchanges.
Netting Variation Margin Received in the Form of Non-Cash Collateral
    With respect to non-cash variation margin received by a covered 
company, commenters recommended that the final rule recognize variation 
margin received in the form of rehypothecatable securities. In 
particular, commenters argued that variation margin received in the 
form of rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets represents stable 
funding to a covered company with respect to derivative assets. The 
commenters cited the treatment of level 1 liquid assets under the LCR 
rule as evidence that such securities have limited liquidity and market 
risk.
    Other commenters recommended that all classes of rehypothecatable 
HQLA, not only rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets, should be 
recognized for netting under Sec.  __.107 of the final rule. Some 
commenters urged the agencies to permit netting of variation margin 
received in the form of rehypothecatable HQLA, subject to haircuts 
equivalent to the applicable RSF factors for such assets. One commenter 
also suggested applying the haircuts used by the Board for collateral 
accepted at the discount window to determine the amount by which such 
collateral received as variation margin would offset a derivatives 
asset. Other commenters asserted that market practices--such as 
haircuts and daily exchange of collateral--ensure that non-cash 
variation margin received would provide a sufficiently stable source of 
funding for purposes of netting against a covered company's derivative 
assets.
    Commenters also asserted that permitting netting of non-cash 
variation margin received would better align with the treatment of 
collateral under the swap margin rule, which allows certain non-cash 
collateral to be used to meet variation margin requirements.\202\

[[Page 9176]]

Commenters further argued that recognition of non-cash variation margin 
received would be consistent with the proposed rule's treatment of 
variation margin provided as well as other parts of the proposed rule 
that would have assigned lower RSF factors to an asset based on receipt 
of collateral.\203\
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    \202\ See 12 CFR 45.6 (OCC); 12 CFR 237.6. (Board); 12 CFR 349.6 
(FDIC).
    \203\ Commenters noted that short-term secured lending 
transactions with a financial sector entity secured by 
rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets would have received a lower 
RSF factor than other secured and unsecured lending transactions 
under the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters argued that the proposed treatment of non-cash variation 
margin received would have a disproportionately adverse impact on 
certain counterparties, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies, which generally provide securities as variation 
margin due to their business models. Commenters stated that, in order 
to be able to provide cash variation margin to a covered company, these 
counterparties would have to engage in securities lending or repurchase 
agreements, which could increase interconnectedness and systemic risks 
within the financial system, adversely affect the liquidity of such 
securities, and reduce returns to these counterparties.\204\ Another 
commenter argued that the NSFR rule would create a substantial new 
funding requirement across all covered companies if it did not allow 
netting of non-cash variation margin received in the form of HQLA.
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    \204\ The commenters also noted that a covered company may then 
have an incentive to invest the cash variation margin received in 
securities for business and risk management reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a change from the proposed rule, for purposes of determining 
derivatives asset values under the final rule, a covered company may 
take into account variation margin received in the form of 
rehypothecatable level 1 liquid asset securities. Level 1 liquid asset 
securities tend to have very stable value and reliable liquidity across 
market conditions. However, other types of non-cash collateral (i.e., 
non-level 1 liquid asset securities) are less likely to hold their 
value across market conditions, are more likely to be difficult to 
monetize, and may fluctuate in value to a greater degree. Therefore, 
the final rule does not permit a covered company to net against a 
derivatives asset variation margin received in the form of non-level 1 
liquid asset securities or other non-cash assets. Moreover, the 
contractual ability to rehypothecate the level 1 liquid asset 
securities ensures that the covered company is able to monetize the 
collateral without a triggering event, such as a default by the 
counterparty, across market conditions. Therefore, in order to be 
recognized for netting under the final rule, level 1 liquid asset 
securities received as variation margin must be rehypothecatable, in 
addition to meeting the other netting criteria that are required for 
recognition of cash variation margin.\205\
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    \205\ As noted above, for purposes of the netting criterion for 
currency, rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets received as 
variation margin must be denominated in a currency that is specified 
as an acceptable currency to settle the obligation in the relevant 
governing contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule's allowance of rehypothecatable level 1 liquid 
assets to be netted against derivatives assets will further align the 
final rule and the agencies' swap margin rule. Although the swap margin 
rule permits certain non-level l liquid assets to be used as variation 
margin for certain swap transactions, limiting the final rule's 
permissible netting to variation margin received in the form of cash 
and rehypothecatable level 1 liquid asset securities is appropriate 
because permitting a covered company to reduce its derivative assets by 
other types of non-cash collateral could increase the funding risk 
associated with its derivative portfolio and reduce its ability to 
continue to intermediate and fund its derivatives portfolio over a one-
year horizon. The agencies also recognize that, when measured by total 
volume, a significant majority of variation margin exchanged by swap 
dealers continues to be comprised of cash, with the majority of the 
remaining variation margin comprised of government securities.\206\ As 
a result, the agencies do not expect that the final rule's allowance of 
rehypothecatable level 1 liquid assets for the purposes of netting will 
materially alter counterparties' behaviors regarding variation margin 
or result in substantial new funding requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ The swap margin rule requires variation margin exchanged 
between swap entities to be cash, which represents a significant 
portion of the swaps market. See 12 CFR 45.6(a) (OCC); 12 CFR 
237.6(a) (Board); 12 CFR 349.6(a) (FDIC). According to the ISDA's 
Margin Survey for 2019, the 20 counterparties with the largest 
outstanding notional amounts of derivative transactions reported 
that their regulatory and discretionary variation margin delivered 
is comprised of approximately 84.6 percent cash, and 13.2 percent 
government securities, and regulatory and discretionary variation 
margin received is approximately 76.5 percent cash and 14.2 percent 
government securities. See ISDA Margin Survey 2019 (September 2019), 
available at https://www.isda.org/a/1F7TE/ISDA-Margin-Survey-Year-end-2019.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, Sec.  __.107(f)(1)(ii) of the final rule provides that 
a covered company must calculate the derivatives asset value of the 
underlying derivative transaction or QMNA netting set by subtracting 
the value of variation margin received that is in the form of 
rehypothecatable level 1 liquid asset securities from the asset value 
of the derivative transaction or QMNA netting set.\207\
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    \207\ To the extent a covered company receives variation margin 
in excess of the asset value of the derivative transaction or QMNA 
netting set, the derivative asset value may not be reduced below 
zero, treated as a derivative liability value, or netted against 
other derivative asset values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) RSF and ASF Factors Assigned to Assets Provided or Received as 
Variation Margin and Associated Liabilities
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to include 
in its RSF amount on-balance sheet assets that the covered company has 
provided (that remain on a covered company's balance sheet) and 
received as variation margin in connection with its derivative 
transactions.
On-Balance Sheet Variation Margin Provided by a Covered Company
    The proposed rule would have assigned an RSF factor to on-balance 
sheet variation margin \208\ provided by a covered company based on 
whether the variation margin reduces the covered company's derivatives 
liability value or whether it is excess variation margin. The agencies 
did not receive any comments regarding this proposed treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ For example, if a covered company uses securities from its 
trading inventory to satisfy a requirement to provide variation 
margin in respect to a derivative liability, these securities would 
remain on its balance sheet under GAAP. For cash variation margin 
provided in respect to a similar derivative transaction, a covered 
company's cash balance would already have been reduced, and the 
covered company would have recorded a receivable. The receivable 
amount may reflect amounts of cash variation margin previously 
provided in excess of a covered company's liability and owed by a 
counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, under the final rule, the liability value of a 
derivative transaction or QMNA netting set, as applicable, takes into 
account any variation margin provided by a covered company. A covered 
company may have provided variation margin in an amount that reduces 
its liability to a counterparty or variation margin in excess of this 
amount. For example, the amount of a receivable or of securities 
recorded on a covered company's balance sheet may represent both an 
amount of variation margin provided that reduces a covered company's 
derivative liability, as calculated under the final rule, and excess 
variation margin provided. Consistent with the

[[Page 9177]]

proposed rule, if the variation margin provided by a covered company 
reduces the derivatives liability value of a derivative transaction or 
QMNA netting set, the final rule assigns a zero percent RSF factor to 
the carrying value of such variation margin. This variation margin 
already reduces the covered company's derivatives liabilities, 
resulting in a lower total derivatives liability amount that, in turn, 
offsets the covered company's total derivatives asset amount when 
calculating its NSFR derivatives asset amount. As a result, the funding 
needs for this variation margin provided is already reflected in a 
covered company's RSF amount through the current net value component.
    To the extent a covered company provides excess variation margin--
that is, an amount of variation margin that does not reduce the 
liability value of a derivative transaction or QMNA netting set--and 
includes the excess variation margin asset on its balance sheet, the 
final rule assigns such excess variation margin an RSF factor under 
Sec.  __.106, based on the characteristics of the asset or balance 
sheet receivable associated with the asset, as applicable. Since excess 
variation margin does not reduce a covered company's derivatives 
liabilities values, the covered company's current net value component 
does not reflect these on-balance sheet assets. The final rule assigns 
RSF factors to excess variation margin on a covered company's balance 
sheet to reflect the need for stable funding for such assets as part of 
the covered company's aggregate balance sheet. The RSF factor applied 
to excess variation margin provided depends on the asset provided. If a 
covered company has provided different types of variation margin (for 
example, both cash and securities), the covered company can determine 
which variation margin should be treated as excess and apply the 
appropriate RSF factor.
On-Balance Sheet Assets for Variation Margin Received by a Covered 
Company
    The proposed rule would have assigned an RSF factor to all 
variation margin received by a covered company that is on the balance 
sheet of the covered company,\209\ according to the characteristics of 
each asset received. The agencies received no comments on this aspect 
of the proposal.
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    \209\ Under the final rule, RSF factors are assigned to 
variation margin received that are recorded as on-balance sheet 
assets of a covered company regardless of whether the variation 
margin received has reduced the covered company's derivative asset 
value under the rule. GAAP's treatment of variation margin assets 
received by a covered company depends on whether the variation 
margin was received in the form of cash or securities. Variation 
margin received that is eligible for netting under GAAP reduces the 
value of derivative assets under GAAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies are adopting the requirement for variation margin 
received by a covered company that is on the covered company's balance 
sheet as proposed. As described above, under the final rule, the 
derivatives asset value of a derivative transaction or QMNA netting 
set, as applicable, takes into account certain variation margin 
received by a covered company. This variation margin received reduces 
the covered company's derivative assets, resulting in a lower total 
derivatives asset amount. As a result, the funding needs for this 
variation margin received is not reflected in the current net value 
component. Therefore, regardless of whether on-balance sheet variation 
margin received is eligible for netting under the current net value 
component calculation, assignment of an RSF factor to these on-balance 
sheet assets under Sec.  __.106 is necessary to capture the funding 
risk associated with these assets.
ASF Assignment for Balance Sheet Liabilities Representing the Return of 
Variation Margin Received by a Covered Company
    The proposed rule would have assigned a zero percent ASF factor to 
any liability that arises from an obligation to return \210\ variation 
margin received by a covered company related to its derivative 
transactions. One commenter suggested that the final rule assign an ASF 
factor of greater than zero to the liability to return variation margin 
received by a covered company. The commenter argued that this change 
would be consistent with the BCBS and the International Organization of 
Securities Commission guidelines for acceptable classes of derivatives 
collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ A covered company generally will record a liability on its 
balance sheet representing its obligation to return a value of 
variation margin received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the proposed rule, given that these liabilities can 
change based on the underlying derivative transactions and remain on 
balance sheet, at most, only for the duration of the associated 
derivative transactions, they do not represent stable funding for a 
covered company. Additionally, the contribution of variation margin 
received to the covered company's funding risk is appropriately 
recognized through the final rule's calculation of the NSFR derivatives 
asset amount described above and an additional contribution to a 
covered company's ASF amount in respect to an accounting liability to 
return such assets would be duplicative. For these reasons, the final 
rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor to liabilities representing an 
obligation to return variation margin received by a covered company.
3. Initial Margin Received by a Covered Company
    For initial margin received by the covered company that is recorded 
as an asset on its balance sheet, the proposed rule would not have 
treated the asset received as initial margin differently from other 
balance sheet assets and would have assigned an RSF factor according to 
the characteristics of each asset received. Additionally, the proposed 
rule would have assigned a zero percent ASF factor to any liability 
that arises from an obligation to return initial margin received by a 
covered company related to its derivative transactions.\211\
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    \211\ Similar to variation margin received, a covered company 
will record a liability for its obligation to return initial margin 
and independent amounts received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argued that the final rule should recognize the 
receipt of initial margin by a covered company as a potential source of 
stable funding, especially if the covered company has the contractual 
and operational ability to re-use the collateral assets in the future, 
which commenters asserted is common market practice in the over-the-
counter derivatives market. Commenters requested that the final rule 
more closely align the ASF treatment of liabilities for initial margin 
received with the RSF treatment of initial margin assets provided by a 
covered company, in particular with respect to initial margin received 
from a counterparty that is a commercial end-user. Some commenters 
requested that the final rule apply an ASF factor of at least 50 
percent to liabilities for initial margin received by a covered company 
and permit initial margin received to reduce the RSF amount for initial 
margin provided by a covered company in the initial margin component. 
As another approach, commenters requested that the NSFR rule permit 
initial margin assets received by a covered company that can be 
rehypothecated in the future to offset the current RSF amount derived 
from the related derivative asset, subject to haircuts on the initial 
margin assets, because such initial margin is contractually linked to 
the covered company's rights and obligations under the derivative 
transaction and is

[[Page 9178]]

available to the covered company for the duration of the derivative 
contract.
    The agencies are adopting the treatment of initial margin received 
as proposed. As discussed in section V of this Supplementary 
Information section, the general design of the final rule requires a 
covered company to assess of the amount of its stable funding based on 
NSFR regulatory capital and liabilities at a point in time, and the 
adequacy of such funding based on the characteristics of assets and 
commitments. The NSFR generally does not determine current stable 
funding based on the potential future reuse of assets. Consistent with 
this approach, the derivative framework under the final rule does not 
recognize as stable funding the potential reuse at a future date of 
assets received as initial margin. Additionally, the amount of initial 
margin received by a covered company, and the liability to return such 
margin, can change based on the aggregate underlying derivative 
transactions and customer preferences, such as counterparties' demand 
for derivatives exposure, which may fluctuate over time. Moreover, the 
extent to which the initial margin assets received are available to a 
covered company may also fluctuate. Initial margin received by a 
covered company, including initial margin subject to the swap margin 
rule, often is subject to segregation requirements that arise from 
regulatory or contractual requirements, which limits the ability of the 
covered company to re-use initial margin assets. Even absent a 
segregation requirement, a covered company may voluntarily agree to 
segregate the initial margin received at the request of its 
counterparties or novate the position from the covered company to 
another counterparty at some point in the future in order to preserve 
franchise value and avoid negative signaling to market participants, 
making unsegregated initial margin also an unstable source of funding. 
This is true also in those cases where a covered company currently has 
the ability to re-use the initial margin assets that it receives, as 
the initial margin is only available to the covered company at most for 
the duration of the derivative transaction. Consistent with the general 
treatment of balance sheet assets, the final rule applies an RSF factor 
to a covered company's on-balance sheet assets received as initial 
margin. These assets result from the current level of activity with 
derivative counterparties and likely will be held on balance sheet for 
the duration of the associated derivative transactions or counterparty 
relationships. It is therefore appropriate to assign RSF factors to 
these assets based on their liquidity characteristics.
    With respect to the liability to return initial margin received, 
this liability is subject to change based on a covered company's 
counterparties and their derivative positions and remains, at most, 
only for the duration of the associated derivative transactions, such 
that it does not represent stable funding for a covered company. In 
response to commenters' request that initial margin received be 
permitted to reduce the RSF amount for initial margin provided, the 
agencies note that unlike variation margin that is exchanged to account 
for changes in the current valuations of a derivative transaction or 
QMNA netting set, initial margin received from counterparties is 
intended to cover a covered company's potential losses in connection 
with a counterparty's default (e.g., the cost to close out or replace 
the transaction with a defaulted counterparty) and therefore would not 
factor into the measure of the current value of a covered company's 
derivatives portfolio.
    For these reasons, the final rule assigns a zero percent ASF factor 
to any liability representing an obligation to return initial margin 
received and assigns an RSF factor under Sec.  __.106 to an asset 
received as initial margin that is on the covered company's balance 
sheet based on the characteristics of the asset.
4. Customer Cleared Derivative Transactions
    Under the proposed rule, the treatment of a covered company's 
cleared derivative transaction would have depended on whether the 
covered company was acting as an agent or as a principal. A covered 
company's NSFR derivatives asset amount or NSFR derivatives liability 
amount would have taken into account the asset or liability values of 
derivative transactions between a CCP and a covered company, acting as 
principal, where the covered company has entered into an offsetting 
transaction (commonly known as a ``back-to-back'' transaction) with a 
customer. Because a covered company would have obligations as a 
principal under both derivative transactions comprising the back-to-
back transaction, any asset or liability values arising from these 
transactions, or any variation margin provided or received in 
connection with these transactions, would have been taken into account 
in the covered company's calculations of its NSFR derivatives asset or 
liability amount.
    If a covered company was a clearing member of a CCP, it would not 
have included in its NSFR derivatives asset amount or NSFR derivatives 
liability amount the value of a cleared derivative transaction that the 
covered company, acting as agent, has submitted to the CCP on behalf of 
a customer, including when the covered company has provided a guarantee 
to the CCP for the performance of the customer. As the proposed rule 
explained, these cleared derivative transactions are assets or 
liabilities of a covered company's customer and not the covered 
company. Similarly, a covered company would not have included in its 
calculations under Sec.  __.107 of the proposed rule variation margin 
provided or received in connection with customer cleared derivative 
transactions.
    To the extent a covered company includes on its balance sheet under 
GAAP a derivative asset or liability value (as opposed to a separate 
receivable or payable in connection with a derivative transaction) 
associated with a customer cleared derivative transaction, the 
derivative transaction would have constituted a derivative transaction 
of the covered company under the proposed rule.\212\ If a covered 
company includes on its balance sheet an asset associated with a 
guarantee of a customer's performance on a cleared derivative 
transaction and that balance sheet entry is substantially equivalent to 
a derivative contract, the asset should be treated as a derivative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ The proposed rule requested comment regarding whether the 
value of a cleared derivative transaction that a covered company, 
acting as agent, has submitted to a CCP on behalf of a customer of 
the covered company would be included on the covered company's 
balance sheet under any circumstances other than in connection with 
a default by the customer. Commenters did not identify any such 
circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent a covered company has an asset or liability on its 
balance sheet associated with a customer derivative transaction that is 
not a derivative asset or liability--for example, if a covered company 
has extended credit on behalf of a customer to cover a variation margin 
payment or a covered company holds customer funds relating to 
derivative transactions in a customer protection segregated account--
such asset or liability of the covered company would have been assigned 
an RSF or ASF factor under Sec. Sec.  __.106 or __.104 of the proposed 
rule, respectively. Accordingly, to the extent a covered company's 
balance sheet includes a receivable asset owed by a CCP or payable 
liability owed to a CCP in connection with customer receipts and 
payments under derivative

[[Page 9179]]

transactions, this asset or liability would not have constituted a 
derivative asset or liability of the covered company and would not have 
been included in the covered company's calculations under Sec.  __.107 
of the proposed rule.
    Commenters supported the proposed exclusion from a covered 
company's NSFR for a cleared derivative transaction that the covered 
company, acting as agent, has submitted to a CCP on behalf of a 
customer, stating that this treatment appropriately reflected the 
limited funding risks of these activities. Some commenters suggested 
that certain back-to-back derivative transactions with a customer and a 
CCP also should be excluded from a covered company's NSFR derivatives 
asset or liability amount because they present minimal funding risks 
that are similar to cleared derivative transactions where the covered 
company is acting as an agent. Specifically, commenters highlighted as 
low risk a derivative transaction where the covered company is not 
contractually required to make a payment to the customer unless and 
until the covered company has received a corresponding payment from the 
CCP. These commenters noted that in both a back-to-back arrangement and 
a cleared derivative transaction submitted by a covered company as 
agent with a guarantee of the customer's performance, the covered 
company faces the same risk upon customer default of being required to 
make payments to the CCP without receiving a corresponding payment from 
the customer.
    One commenter asked how the proposed rule would treat initial 
margin that a covered company receives from customers in excess of 
amounts provided to the CCP in connection with a cleared derivative 
transaction. The commenter asked how the proposed rule would treat a 
customer's initial margin that a covered company maintains in 
segregated accounts and invests in accordance with applicable rules, 
regulations and agreements with the customer. The commenter also 
asserted that the customer's initial margin functions as funding for 
the resulting assets.
    Under the final rule, and consistent with the proposal, a covered 
company's NSFR derivatives asset amount or NSFR derivatives liability 
amount does not include the value of a cleared derivative transaction 
that the covered company, acting as agent, has submitted to a CCP on 
behalf of a customer. This includes instances when the covered company, 
acting as agent, has provided a guarantee to the CCP for the 
performance of the customer, as long as the cleared derivative 
transaction does not appear on a covered company's balance sheet. 
Additionally, consistent with GAAP, the final rule requires a covered 
company to include in its NSFR the derivative asset or liability 
amounts related to back-to-back derivative transactions that the 
covered company has executed with a CCP and a customer of the covered 
company as proposed.
    As discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information 
section, the NSFR rule is a standardized metric that generally relies 
on the assets and liabilities on a covered company's balance sheet. The 
treatments of submitted agency transactions and executed back-to-back 
derivative transactions are consistent with the final rule's reliance 
of on-balance sheet items. Since exposures due to back-to-back 
derivative transactions are recorded on the balance sheet of a covered 
company, the final rule's treatment for these exposures will ease 
administration of the rule by aligning with the balance sheet 
treatment, consistent with the design of the NSFR. The agencies note 
that in the case of back-to-back derivative transactions executed with 
a customer and a CCP where the covered company maintains equal 
exposures to each counterparty (which reflects the amount of variation 
margin posted and collected), the covered company's derivative asset 
and liability positions facing the customer and CCP should generally 
offset within the covered company's NSFR derivatives asset or liability 
amount, reflecting a neutral stable funding requirement. However, by 
taking this approach, the final rule reflects the incremental funding 
risk that is present when these exposures are not fully offset, such as 
in the case where there are differences in the amount of eligible 
variation margin received and collected. In addition, these net 
exposures are not excluded from the final rule as certain funding risks 
may still be present. For example, as commenters noted, a covered 
company in a back-to-back arrangement may be required to make payments 
to the CCP even if the covered company's customer has failed to make a 
corresponding payment to the covered company. Initial margin received 
by a covered company from customers in excess of amounts provided to a 
CCP in connection with a cleared derivative transaction, including 
initial margin maintained in segregated accounts and other permitted 
assets, is treated the same as other initial margin received by a 
covered company, as described in section VII.E.3 of this Supplementary 
Information section. Additional RSF amounts could also result from 
initial margin provided by a covered company to the CCP and the 
derivatives future value component, each as described below.
5. Initial Margin Component
    The proposed derivative framework included an initial margin 
component that would address the treatment of assets contributed to a 
CCP's mutualized loss-sharing arrangement and initial margin provided 
by a covered company in respect to its derivative transactions. Under 
the proposed rule, a covered company's contribution to a CCP's 
mutualized loss-sharing arrangement would have been assigned an RSF 
factor of 85 percent. Similarly, under the proposed rule, initial 
margin provided by a covered company for derivative transactions 
(except where the covered company acts as an agent for a customer's 
cleared derivative transaction, as described below) would have been 
assigned an RSF factor equal to the higher of 85 percent or the RSF 
factor applicable under Sec.  __.106 to each asset comprising the 
initial margin provided. The proposed rule would have assigned an 85 
percent RSF factor to the fair value of a covered company's 
contributions to a CCP's mutualized loss-sharing arrangement or initial 
margin provided by a covered company regardless of whether the 
contribution or initial margin is included on the covered company's 
balance sheet. This treatment reflects the fact that a covered company 
would have faced the same funding needs and risks as a result of having 
to provide these assets, regardless of their balance sheet treatment 
under GAAP. Under the proposed rule, to the extent a covered company 
included on its balance sheet a receivable for its contributions to a 
CCP's mutualized loss-sharing arrangement or for initial margin 
provided for derivative transactions, the covered company would have 
assigned an RSF factor to the fair value of the asset, but not the 
receivable, in order to avoid double-counting.
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company would not have assigned 
an RSF factor to initial margin provided by the covered company when it 
is acting as an agent for a customer's cleared derivative transaction 
and the covered company does not guarantee return of the initial margin 
to the customer. The preamble to the proposal noted that a covered 
company would have had limited liquidity risk for such initial margin 
because, following certain timing delays, the customer would have been 
obligated to fund the initial margin for the duration of the 
transaction.

[[Page 9180]]

However, to the extent a covered company would have included such 
initial margin on its balance sheet, the proposed rule would have 
required the covered company to assign an RSF factor to the resulting 
initial margin asset under Sec.  __.106 of the proposed rule and an ASF 
factor to the corresponding liability under Sec.  __.104 of the 
proposed rule, similar to the treatment of other on-balance sheet 
items.
    One commenter asserted that the agencies should not adopt the 85 
percent RSF factor because the process by which this percentage was 
developed for the Basel NSFR standard did not include public input or 
publication of supporting evidence by the BCBS. Commenters also 
requested that a lower RSF factor be assigned to a covered company's 
contributions to a CCP's mutualized loss-sharing arrangement (e.g., one 
commenter requested an RSF factor of 50 percent, other commenters 
recommended assigning the RSF factor that applies to operational 
deposits held at a financial sector entity). To support a lower RSF 
factor, one commenter asserted that the amount of such contributions 
tend to exhibit low variability over time and are typically redeemable 
within a three-month time horizon. The commenter also asserted that 
there is a low probability of a CCP drawing on the funds available in 
the mutualized loss-sharing account, which are used in very rare cases 
of a clearing member default and only after exhaustion of the defaulter 
clearing member's resources and the CCP's first loss contributions to 
the mutualized loss-sharing resources. Finally, the commenter argued 
that a lower RSF amount could be more appropriately set by assigning 
RSF factors directly to the underlying assets contributed to a CCP's 
mutualized loss-sharing arrangement, given the low probability that the 
assets will be used by a CCP.
    With respect to the treatment of initial margin provided by a 
covered company for derivative transactions, the agencies received 
several comments recommending that such initial margin should be 
assigned an RSF factor of less than 85 percent and also that the RSF 
factor should be assigned based on the remaining contractual maturity 
of the relevant derivative transaction or QMNA netting set. Commenters 
argued that such treatment is warranted because a covered company may 
choose to not re-enter into a short-dated derivative transaction 
following its maturity if the covered company has liquidity needs at 
that point and a covered company will be able to liquidate the initial 
margin provided for the transaction in a short period of time after the 
contract matures.
    One commenter argued that initial margin provided to a CCP for 
cleared derivative transactions should be assigned a lower RSF factor 
than initial margin provided for non-cleared derivative transactions 
because cleared derivatives tend to be more standardized and liquid, 
and turn over more frequently, than non-cleared derivatives. The 
commenter asserted that a covered company could choose to reduce its 
cleared derivative activities with a CCP in the future and realize the 
return of initial margin provided to a CCP within a six-month time 
horizon. Therefore, the commenter argued, the final rule should assign 
an RSF factor of 50 percent to initial margin provided for cleared 
derivative transactions, similar to the RSF factor assigned to secured 
lending transactions with a financial sector entity that matures in six 
months or more but less than one year. The commenter also argued that 
providing favorable treatment for initial margin provided for cleared 
derivative transactions would be consistent with the CFTC's margin 
requirements for derivatives clearing organizations, which assume short 
liquidation periods,\213\ and the agencies' swap margin rule.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ See 17 CFR 39.13(g).
    \214\ See supra note 188.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter supported the proposed rule's treatment of initial 
margin provided by a covered company when the covered company is acting 
as an agent for the client and does not guarantee the performance of 
the CCP to the client. This commenter stated that the proposed rule 
appropriately reflects the central clearing market structure and noted 
that the majority of initial margin that a covered company receives 
from a client for the client's cleared derivative transactions is 
passed through to the CCP.
    After reviewing these comments, the agencies are adopting the 
treatment of assets provided to a CCP's mutualized loss sharing 
arrangement and initial margin provided by a covered company for 
derivative transactions as proposed.
    The final rule assesses a covered company's funding profile for its 
derivative activities on an aggregate net basis based on its current 
contractual positions. In addition, the final rule generally does not 
consider the range of potential activities that covered companies or 
counterparties may take in the future.\215\ For example, the 
standardized initial margin component is applied consistently to all 
covered companies and does not take into account an individual covered 
company's ability to adjust its level of cleared derivative activities 
or the probability of individual CCP's usage of a covered company's 
contributions to a default fund upon a member default. Additionally, an 
individual covered company may face challenges in meaningfully reducing 
its derivative exposures and initial margin requirements without 
impacting its customer relationships and intermediation. Moreover, 
during periods of market volatility, initial margin requirements may 
increase, which would increase a covered company's funding needs 
related to initial margin assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ See section V of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule does not incorporate more granular assignments of 
RSF factors to initial margin provided by a covered company based on 
the maturity of the underlying derivative transactions. As discussed 
above, the final rule's treatment of initial margin provided is 
consistent with the overall approach taken in the rule to utilize an 
aggregate portfolio framework with respect to derivative transactions 
that does not take into account the scheduled maturity of individual 
transactions. For the reasons discussed, while there may be some 
benefits to a more granular approach, the agencies have determined that 
a change from the proposal is not justified because such an approach 
would unnecessarily increase the complexity of the measure and require 
reliance on covered companies' internal modeling, which is contrary to 
the NSFR's design as a standardized measure.
    Specifically, the final rule assigns an RSF factor of 85 percent to 
the fair value of assets provided to a CCP's mutualized loss sharing 
arrangement and an RSF factor of at least 85 percent to the fair value 
of initial margin provided for derivatives transactions. The 
application of these RSF factors is based on the assumption that a 
covered company generally must maintain most of its CCP mutualized loss 
sharing arrangement contributions or initial margin provided in order 
to continue to support its customers and intermediate in derivative 
markets. For similar reasons, the treatment applies regardless of 
whether the contribution or initial margin is included on the covered 
company's balance sheet. The final rule's assignment of an 85 percent 
RSF factor reflects a standardized assumption across all derivative 
transactions based on an assumption of derivatives activities at an 
aggregate level. In addition, the standardized

[[Page 9181]]

minimum 85 percent RSF factor reflects the difficulty for covered 
companies generally to significantly reduce the aggregate level of 
derivative activity (both principal and client-driven behavior) without 
damaging their customer relationships or reputations as intermediaries.
    Another commenter asked that the agencies clarify whether initial 
margin provided by a covered company in connection with cleared 
derivative transactions of a customer that have a remaining maturity of 
one year or more would be assigned an RSF factor of 100 percent, 
similar to the proposed treatment of assets encumbered for a period of 
one year or longer.
    Like the proposed rule, Sec.  __.107 of the final rule does not 
assign an RSF factor to initial margin provided by a covered company 
acting as agent for a customer's cleared derivative transactions where 
the covered company does not guarantee the return of the initial margin 
to the customer. To the extent a covered company includes on its 
balance sheet any such initial margin provided, this initial margin 
would instead be assigned an RSF factor pursuant to Sec.  __.106 of the 
final rule and any corresponding liability would be assigned an ASF 
factor pursuant to Sec.  __.104.
6. Future Value Component
    In addition to the current net value component, which requires a 
covered company to maintain stable funding relative to its net current 
derivatives position as of the calculation date, the proposed rule 
would have required a covered company to maintain stable funding to 
support potential changes in the valuation of its derivative 
transactions over the NSFR's one-year horizon (future value component). 
Specifically, this future value component would have addressed the risk 
that the covered company may need to provide or return margin or make 
settlement payments to its counterparties as the net value of its 
derivatives portfolio fluctuates.
    Under the proposed rule, the future value component would have 
equaled 20 percent of the sum of a covered company's gross derivative 
values that are liabilities (i.e., liabilities related to each of its 
derivative transactions not subject to a QMNA and each of its QMNA 
netting sets that are liabilities prior to consideration of margin, 
hereinafter gross derivative liabilities), multiplied by an RSF factor 
of 100 percent. Gross derivative liabilities in this context would have 
referred to derivative liabilities calculated without recognition of 
variation margin or settlement payments provided or received based on 
changes in the value of the covered company's derivative transactions. 
For example, if the value of a covered company's derivative transaction 
moves from $0 to a liability position of -$10, the covered company's 
gross derivative liability value would be $10, even if the covered 
company has provided $10 of variation margin to cover the change in 
value.
    While some commenters supported addressing funding risk associated 
with changes in the value of derivative transactions in the final rule, 
other commenters asserted that this component should not be included in 
the final rule because the NSFR, as a business-as-usual and point-in-
time funding metric, should not take into account funding needs that 
could result from potential future market changes. One commenter argued 
that the future value component was unnecessary because the LCR rule 
already adequately addresses the risks associated with potential 
valuation changes in a covered company's derivatives portfolio.
    The agencies also received a number of comments on the specific 
design and calibration of the proposed future value component. Many of 
these commenters asserted that the proposed calibration was overly 
conservative and was not sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. 
Commenters also argued that gross derivative liabilities are a poor 
indicator of a covered company's potential contingent funding 
obligation. The value of a covered company's derivatives portfolio may 
fluctuate over time (e.g., due to a covered company having to provide 
or return margin to its counterparties) in a way that results in a 
material increase to its funding requirements over the one-year time 
horizon. It is necessary to address the contingent funding risk 
associated with derivatives in the final rule in order to adequately 
ensure the resilience of a covered company's funding profile and to 
address a funding need not picked up by the current net value 
component. Covered companies require sufficient stable funding to 
support margin flows in a range of market conditions, including a 
stress event.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ For example, during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, some 
covered companies experienced volatility in their derivatives 
portfolios, which led to margin payments that were a significant 
drain on liquidity and contributed to systemic instability. Since 
the 2007-2009 crisis, banking organizations continue to experience 
funding needs in their net margin flows over time, with the size and 
impact of the funding needs varying across covered companies 
depending on the size and composition of their derivatives 
portfolios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current net value component relies on a uniform netting 
treatment that assumes payment inflows and outflows related to 
derivatives assets and liabilities would be perfectly offsetting across 
QMNAs, counterparties, derivative types, and maturities. On its own, 
this assumption generally benefits covered companies by resulting in a 
lower funding requirement under the NSFR than might occur in practice. 
In addition, even if a covered company's payment inflows and outflows 
under its derivatives are matched, as the first component assumes, the 
covered company's margin inflows and outflows may not be. For example, 
even where a covered company has entered into offsetting positions in 
terms of market risk, its margin rights and obligations (based on 
changes in the value of its derivatives, contractual triggers such as 
changes in the covered company's financial condition, or business 
considerations such as customer requests) may differ. This could occur 
if it faces different types of counterparties, such as a commercial 
end-user on one side and a dealer on the other side, for each 
offsetting position. For covered companies with substantial derivatives 
activities, margin flows can be a significant source of liquidity risk.
    The final rule generally retains the proposed rule's treatment of 
derivative portfolio potential valuation changes but reduces the 
weighting of this component from 20 percent to 5 percent of gross 
derivative liabilities. This revision should reduce the potentially 
pro-cyclical effects raised by commenters in response to the proposed 
rule's calibration at 20 percent. To the extent the proposed rule's 
requirement could have disincentivized covered companies from 
maintaining longer-dated derivative transactions used by clients for 
hedging purposes, this change also should reduce such effects. This 
calibration also ensures covered companies maintain at least a minimum 
amount of stable funding for funding risks associated with potential 
valuation changes in derivatives portfolios. In addition, the agencies 
expect the final rule's reduction of the calibration from 20 percent to 
5 percent should lessen the incentive for a covered company to reduce 
its NSFR funding requirement without meaningfully changing its risk 
profile by closing out derivative transactions with large gross 
derivative liabilities and re-entering into equivalent transactions 
with zero liability exposure. The agencies will monitor this risk 
through supervisory processes and evaluate the appropriateness of the 5 
percent calibration as more data, reflective of a

[[Page 9182]]

wider variety of economic conditions, become available.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ Any change to the 5 percent calibration would be subject 
to the agencies' notice and comment rulemaking process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule relies on gross derivative liabilities as the basis 
for measuring a covered company's funding risks associated with 
derivatives portfolio potential valuation changes. Gross derivative 
liabilities tend to positively correlate with cumulative losses 
realized over the life of outstanding contracts. Thus, large amounts of 
gross derivative liabilities are likely to be positively correlated 
with derivatives portfolios characterized by higher average volatility 
and collateral and settlement flows. In addition, although gross 
derivative liabilities may include transactions that are not currently 
subject to the exchange of variation margin, the agencies note that 
these transactions may become subject to margin calls or early 
repayment due to contractual triggers or client requests, for example 
in response to a change in the covered company's financial condition.
    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule requires a 
covered company to treat settlement payments based on changes in the 
fair value of derivative transactions equivalently to variation margin 
for purposes of calculating the covered company's gross derivative 
liabilities. While these settlement payments fully extinguish a covered 
company's current derivative exposure from an accounting perspective, 
they do not reduce a derivative transaction's funding risk related to 
potential valuation changes. Under both the collateralized-to-market 
and settled-to-market approaches, a covered company may be required to 
fund equivalent flows of margin or settlement payments based on changes 
in the value of its derivative transactions. Permitting settlement 
payments to reduce the gross derivatives liability measure could 
inappropriately incentivize covered companies to re-characterize 
variation margin as settlement payments in order to evade the stable 
funding requirement for potential derivative valuation changes. 
Therefore, derivative liabilities that have been extinguished from the 
balance sheet by such settlement payments must still be included in the 
covered company's calculation of gross derivative liabilities for the 
purposes of this component. This requirement also should reduce 
opportunities for evasion.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ As noted above, some commenters argued that the agencies 
should not include the proposed treatment of variation margin 
exchanged characterized as settlement payments because the 
commenters believed such an approach would be more stringent than 
the Basel NSFR standard. While it is possible that covered companies 
could be subject to a more stringent requirement with respect to 
this component of the final rule than banking organizations in 
foreign jurisdictions that adopt a different approach, the final 
rule's treatment of settlement payments is necessary to prevent 
evasion of the final rule's requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies also considered a range of alternative approaches for 
addressing funding risks associated with derivatives portfolio 
potential valuation changes, including alternative approaches suggested 
by commenters. The agencies, however, have determined to adopt this 
component as proposed because the benefits of a simpler measure with 
less operational costs outweighs its shortcomings. Although many of the 
alternatives could have increased this component's risk sensitivity, 
they also would have introduced increased complexity and pro-
cyclicality. In addition, the suggested alternative of applying the 20 
percent calculation as a floor to the overall NSFR derivatives RSF 
amount would not reflect the funding risks arising from the other 
components of the NSFR derivatives treatment.
7. Comments on the Effect on Capital Markets and Commercial End Users
    The agencies received a number of comments arguing that the 
proposed rule would increase the cost to covered companies of engaging 
in derivative transactions, which commenters argued would harm capital 
markets and the economy. Some of these commenters asserted that covered 
companies would pass on increased costs to derivatives end-users, 
making it more expensive for commercial firms to hedge business risks.
    The final rule promotes stable funding by a covered company of 
derivatives activities and restricts a covered company's ability to 
fund such activities with unstable liabilities in a manner that could 
generate undue risks to the safety and soundness of the covered company 
or impose costs on U.S. businesses, consumers, and taxpayers in the 
event of a disruption to the U.S. financial system. In addition, in 
comparison to the proposed rule, certain modifications included in the 
final rule will reduce the RSF amount in connection with derivative 
transactions, thereby also reducing any incremental funding cost 
increases for covered companies that would have resulted from the 
proposed requirement. Section X of this Supplementary Information 
section further discusses the expected impacts of the rule, including 
potential benefits and costs for covered companies and other market 
participants.
8. Derivatives RSF Amount Calculation
    Under the final rule, a covered company must sum the required 
stable funding amounts calculated under Sec.  __.107 to determine the 
covered company's derivatives RSF amount. A covered company's 
derivatives RSF amount includes the following components:
    (1) The RSF amount for the current net value component, which is 
equal to the covered company's NSFR derivatives asset amount, 
multiplied by an RSF of 100 percent, as described in section VII.E.2 of 
this Supplementary Information section;
    (2) The RSF amount for non-excess variation margin provided by the 
covered company, which, as described in section VII.E.2 of this 
Supplementary Information section, equals the carrying value of 
variation margin provided by the covered company that reduces the 
covered company's derivatives liability value of the relevant QMNA 
netting set or derivative transaction not subject to a QMNA netting 
set, multiplied by an RSF factor of zero percent;
    (3) The RSF amount for excess variation margin provided by the 
covered company, which as described in section VII.E.2 of this 
Supplementary Information section, equals the sum of the carrying 
values of each excess variation margin asset provided by the covered 
company, multiplied by the RSF factor assigned to the asset pursuant to 
Sec.  __.106;
    (4) The RSF amount for variation margin received, which comprises 
the total of the carrying value of variation margin received by the 
covered company, multiplied by the RSF factor assigned to each asset 
comprising the variation margin pursuant to Sec.  __.106, as described 
in section VII.E.2 of this Supplementary Information section; and
    (5) The RSF amount for potential future valuation changes of the 
covered company's derivatives portfolio, which, as described in section 
VII.E.6 of this Supplementary Information section, equals 5 percent of 
the sum of the covered company's gross derivatives liabilities, 
calculated as if no variation margin had been exchanged and no 
settlement payments had been made based on changes in the values of the 
derivative transactions, multiplied by an RSF factor of 100 percent;
    (6) The fair value of a covered company's contributions to CCP 
mutualized loss sharing arrangements, multiplied by an RSF factor of 85 
percent, as described in section VII.E.5

[[Page 9183]]

of this Supplementary Information section.
    (7) The fair value of initial margin provided by the covered 
company, multiplied by the higher of an RSF factor of 85 percent and 
the RSF factor assigned to the initial margin asset pursuant to Sec.  
__.106, as described in section VII.E.5 of this Supplementary 
Information section.
9. Derivatives RSF Amount Numerical Example
    The following is a numerical example illustrating the calculation 
of a covered company's derivatives RSF amount under the final rule. 
Table 5 sets forth the facts of the example, which assumes that: (1) 
Each transaction is covered by a QMNA between the covered company and 
each counterparty; (2) any cash and U.S. Treasury securities received 
as variation margin by the covered company meet the conditions 
specified in Sec.  __.107(f)(1); (3) variation margin provided by the 
covered company is not included on the covered company's balance sheet; 
(4) the covered company has provided U.S. Treasuries as initial margin 
to its counterparties; and (5) the derivative transactions are not 
cleared through a CCP.

                                Table 5--Derivatives RSF Amount Numerical Example
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Derivatives RSF amount numerical example
                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Asset (liability)
                                               value for the      Variation margin provided      Initial margin
                                              covered company,    (received) by the covered     provided by the
                                              prior to netting             company              covered company
                                              variation margin
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Counterparty A:
    Derivative 1A..........................                 10  (1) cash.....................                  2
    Derivative 2A..........................                (2)  (1) U.S. Treasury securities.
 Counterparty B:
    Derivative 1B..........................               (10)  3 cash.......................                  1
    Derivative 2B..........................                  5
 Counterparty C:
    Derivative 1C..........................                (2)  0............................                  0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Calculation of derivatives assets and liabilities.
    (1) The derivatives asset value for counterparty A = (10-2)-2 = 6.
    (2) The derivatives liability value for counterparty B = (10-5)-3 = 
2.
    (3) The derivatives liability value for counterparty C = 2.
    Calculation of total derivatives asset and liability amounts.
    (1) The covered company's total derivatives asset amount = 6.
    (2) The covered company's total derivatives liability amount = 2 + 
2 = 4.
    Calculation of NSFR derivatives asset or liability amount.
    (1) The covered company's NSFR derivatives asset amount = max (0, 
6-4) = 2.
    (2) The covered company's NSFR derivatives liability amount = max 
(0, 4-6) = 0.
    Required stable funding relating to derivative transactions.
    The covered company's derivatives RSF amount is equal to the sum of 
the following:
    (1) NSFR derivatives asset amount x 100% = 2 x 1.0 = 2;
    (2) Non-excess variation margin provided x 0% = 3 x 0.0 = 0;
    (3) Excess variation provided x applicable RSF factor(s) = 0;
    (4) Variation margin received x applicable RSF factor(s) = 2 x 0.0 
= 0;
    (5) Gross derivatives liabilities x 5% x 100% = (5+2) x 0.05 x 1.0 
= 0.35;
    (6) Contributions to CCP mutualized loss-sharing arrangements x 85% 
= 0 x 0.85 = 0; and
    (7) Initial margin provided x higher of 85% or applicable RSF 
factor(s) = (2+1) x max (0.85, 0.0) = 2.55.
    The covered company's derivatives RSF amount = 2 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0.35 
+ 0 + 2.55 = 4.90.

F. NSFR Consolidation Limitations

    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to 
calculate its NSFR on a consolidated basis. When calculating its 
consolidated ASF amount, the proposed rule would have required a 
covered company to take into account restrictions on the availability 
of stable funding at a consolidated subsidiary to support assets, 
derivative exposures, and commitments of the covered company held at 
entities other than the subsidiary.
    To determine a consolidated ASF amount, a covered company would 
have calculated the contribution to its consolidated ASF and RSF 
amounts, respectively, associated with each consolidated subsidiary, 
each as calculated by the covered company for purposes of the covered 
company's consolidated NSFR (subsidiary ASF contribution and subsidiary 
RSF contribution). Where a subsidiary's ASF contribution is greater 
that the subsidiary's RSF contribution, the amounts above the 
subsidiary RSF contribution would have been considered an ``excess'' 
ASF amount of the subsidiary, as calculated for the purpose of the 
consolidated firm (excess ASF amount). The proposed rule would have 
permitted the covered company to include in its consolidated ASF amount 
each subsidiary ASF contribution: (1) Up to the subsidiary RSF 
contribution, as calculated from the covered company's perspective, 
plus (2) any excess ASF amount above the subsidiary's RSF contribution, 
only to the extent the consolidated subsidiary could transfer assets to 
the top-tier entity of the covered company, taking into account 
statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory restrictions. This 
approach to calculating a covered company's consolidated ASF amount 
would have been similar to the approach taken in the LCR rule to 
calculate a covered company's HQLA amount.
    ASF amounts associated with a consolidated subsidiary, in this 
context, refer to those amounts that would be calculated from the 
perspective of the covered company. That is, in calculating the ASF 
amount of a consolidated subsidiary that can be included in the covered 
company's consolidated ASF amount, the covered company would not 
include certain transactions between consolidated subsidiaries that are 
netted under GAAP. For this reason, an ASF amount of a consolidated 
subsidiary that is included in a covered company's consolidated NSFR 
calculation may not always be equal to the ASF amount of

[[Page 9184]]

the consolidated subsidiary when calculated on a standalone basis if 
the consolidated subsidiary is itself a covered company.
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company that 
includes a consolidated subsidiary's excess ASF amount in its 
consolidated NSFR to implement and maintain written procedures to 
identify and monitor restrictions on transferring assets from its 
consolidated subsidiaries. The covered company would have been required 
to document the types of transactions, such as loans or dividends, a 
covered company's consolidated subsidiary could use to transfer assets 
and how the transactions would comply with applicable restrictions. The 
proposed rule would have required the covered company to be able to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the appropriate agency that assets 
may be transferred freely in compliance with statutory, regulatory, 
contractual, or supervisory restrictions that may apply in any relevant 
jurisdiction. A covered company that did not include any excess ASF 
amount from its consolidated subsidiaries in its NSFR would not have 
been be required to have such procedures in place. The proposal also 
requested alternative approaches that the agencies should consider 
regarding the treatment of excess ASF amounts.
    Two commenters requested that the agencies clarify how the proposed 
consolidation provisions would apply to inter-affiliate transactions, 
including those that qualify as regulatory capital of a covered 
company's consolidated subsidiary. One commenter supported the proposed 
rule's treatment of certain inter-affiliate transactions for purposes 
of determining the subsidiary ASF and RSF contributions because 
ignoring such inter-affiliate transactions is consistent with the GAAP 
accounting treatment of such transactions. Another commenter argued 
that the ASF and RSF contribution amounts of a consolidated subsidiary 
should reflect the calculation of ASF and RSF from the subsidiary's 
perspective on a standalone basis. For example, under this approach, 
the funding raised by a covered company that is downstreamed to a 
consolidated subsidiary and included as capital at that subsidiary 
(downstream funding) would be counted as ASF of the subsidiary and part 
of the subsidiary ASF contribution. In addition, one commenter 
requested that the agencies clarify whether the consolidation 
provisions would apply to securitization vehicles that must be 
consolidated on the covered company's balance sheet in accordance with 
GAAP.
    The agencies also received comments on the calculation of the 
consolidated NSFR for covered companies that are subject to a reduced 
NSFR requirement. Several commenters requested that covered companies 
subject to a reduced NSFR requirement be allowed to automatically 
include in their consolidated NSFR a subsidiary's ASF contribution up 
to 100 percent of the subsidiary's RSF contribution, rather than 
limiting the automatically included amount based on a reduced 
requirement at the subsidiary. These commenters asserted that the 
subsidiary's ASF contribution would be available to meet its full RSF 
contribution without regards to a reduced consolidated requirement and 
that this approach would be consistent with the Board's originally 
proposed modified NSFR treatment.
    The final rule includes the consolidation provisions as proposed. 
Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule permits a covered 
company to include in its consolidated ASF amount any portion of the 
subsidiary ASF contribution of a consolidated subsidiary that is less 
than or equal to the subsidiary RSF contribution because the 
subsidiary's NSFR liabilities and NSFR regulatory capital elements 
generating that ASF amount are available as stable funding for the 
subsidiary's assets, derivative exposures, and commitments. The final 
rule limits the automatic inclusion of excess ASF amounts, however, 
because the stable funding at one consolidated subsidiary of the 
covered company may not always be available to support assets, 
derivative exposures, and commitments at another consolidated 
subsidiary.
    For example, if a covered company calculates a subsidiary RSF 
contribution of $90 based on the assets, derivative exposures, and 
commitments of a consolidated subsidiary and a subsidiary ASF 
contribution of $100 based on the NSFR regulatory capital elements and 
NSFR liabilities of the consolidated subsidiary, the consolidated 
subsidiary would have an excess ASF amount of $10 for purposes of the 
consolidation provision in the final rule. The covered company may only 
include an amount of this $10 excess ASF amount in its consolidated ASF 
amount to the extent the consolidated subsidiary may transfer assets to 
the top-tier entity of the covered company (for example, through a 
dividend or loan from the subsidiary to the top-tier covered company), 
taking into account any statutory, regulatory, contractual, or 
supervisory restrictions. Examples of restrictions on transfers of 
assets that a covered company must take into account in calculating its 
NSFR include sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 
371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1); the Board's Regulation W (12 CFR part 223); 
any restrictions on a consolidated subsidiary by state or Federal law, 
such as restrictions imposed by a state banking or insurance 
supervisor; and any restrictions on a consolidated subsidiary or 
branches of a U.S. entity domiciled outside the United States by a 
foreign regulatory authority, such as a foreign banking supervisor. 
This limitation on the excess ASF amount of a consolidated subsidiary 
includable in a covered company's consolidated NSFR applies to both 
U.S. and non-U.S. consolidated subsidiaries.
    The agencies are not modifying the consolidation provisions, as 
suggested by one commenter, to require a covered company to determine 
the excess ASF amount of a consolidated subsidiary based on ASF and RSF 
amounts of the subsidiary as calculated from the subsidiary's 
perspective on a standalone basis. The final rule aligns with the 
netting of exposures under GAAP at the consolidated level, and the 
final rule's consolidation provisions would not require a covered 
company to take into account, in the calculation of the subsidiary ASF 
contribution, ASF and RSF amounts resulting from transactions between 
consolidated subsidiaries that are netted under GAAP.
    As described in section V of this Supplementary Information 
section, the NSFR uses carrying value on a covered company's balance 
sheet where appropriate. The calculation of subsidiary ASF contribution 
does not include certain inter-affiliate transactions that are 
eliminated when a covered company constructs its consolidated balance 
sheet under GAAP. For example, if consolidated subsidiary ``A'' makes a 
loan to consolidated subsidiary ``B'', the loan asset of subsidiary A 
and the liability of subsidiary B generally would be eliminated when a 
covered company constructs a consolidated balance sheet in accordance 
with GAAP. Therefore, in this example, subsidiary B's liability is not 
included in the calculation of subsidiary B's subsidiary ASF 
contribution.
    The scope of the inter-affiliate transactions that are excluded 
from the calculation of a subsidiary's excess ASF amount includes 
transactions between a covered company and its consolidated subsidiary, 
including where the covered company downstreams funding that is 
recognized as capital at the consolidated subsidiary. For example, if a

[[Page 9185]]

subsidiary's ASF contribution equals $110, consisting of $10 of capital 
placed by the parent and $100 of retail deposits, only the retail 
deposits would be subject to the excess ASF calculation. If the 
subsidiary's RSF contribution was $90 (calculated from the perspective 
of the parent covered company, after excluding inter-affiliate 
transactions), then there would be $10 of excess ASF.
    To the extent a large depository institution subsidiary of a 
covered company is subject to a stand-alone NSFR requirement under the 
final rule, the subsidiary's compliance with its stand-alone NSFR 
requirement could potentially constitute a restriction on the 
subsidiary's ability to transfer assets to the covered company, 
depending on the circumstances. Such a restriction would limit the 
parent covered company's ability to include portions of the depository 
institution's excess ASF amount (calculated from the perspective of the 
consolidated parent covered company), but would not change the 
calculation of the ASF amount of the subsidiary, as calculated on a 
standalone basis for purposes of its NSFR requirement. Likewise, 
regulatory capital requirements applicable to a consolidated subsidiary 
of a covered company could limit the extent to which the covered 
company may count the excess ASF amount of the subsidiary towards the 
covered company's consolidated ASF amount, but would not change the 
calculation of the subsidiary's ASF amount.
    Similar to other balance sheet items, the assets and liabilities of 
securitization vehicles that are consolidated onto a covered company's 
balance sheet under GAAP are included in the calculation of the 
consolidated vehicle's ASF contributions and RSF contributions. For 
example, securities issued by a securitization vehicle that are 
liabilities on a consolidated covered company's balance sheet, and 
assets of a securitization vehicle that are included on a covered 
company's balance sheet are included in the calculation of the ASF 
contributions and RSF contributions.
    In cases where a covered company is subject to a reduced NSFR 
requirement, the covered company must calculate the subsidiary ASF 
contribution and subsidiary RSF contribution amount of each 
consolidated subsidiary from the perspective of the covered company for 
purposes of its consolidated reduced NSFR requirement. Specifically, a 
covered company must apply the appropriate adjustment factor to its 
consolidated subsidiary's RSF contribution amount when determining the 
amount of the subsidiary RSF contribution for purposes of determining 
the amount of the consolidated subsidiary's ASF that can automatically 
be included in the covered company's consolidated ASF amount. Any 
amount of the consolidated subsidiary's ASF in excess of its adjusted 
RSF contribution amount, as calculated by the covered company, may only 
be included in the covered company's consolidated NSFR to the extent 
the consolidated subsidiary can transfer assets to the covered company, 
taking into account statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory 
restrictions. It is important that covered companies consider funding 
needs across the consolidated entity for the NSFR calculation as 
required. Accordingly, covered companies must consider the extent to 
which assets held at a consolidated subsidiary are transferable across 
the organization and ensure that a minimum level of ASF is positioned 
or freely available to transfer to meet funding needs at the subsidiary 
where they are expected to occur. Although ASF contribution amounts at 
a consolidated subsidiary in excess of its adjusted RSF contribution 
amount may be available to support that subsidiary during the NSFR's 
one-year time horizon, permitting the automatic inclusion of such ASF 
contribution amounts up to 100 percent of the subsidiary's standalone 
RSF contribution amounts, as requested by commenters, without 
appropriate consideration of transfer restrictions, may make the 
consolidated NSFR requirement less effective.

G. Treatment of Certain Facilities

    In light of recent disruptions in economic conditions caused by the 
outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 and the stress in U.S. 
financial markets, the Board, with the approval of the U.S. Secretary 
of the Treasury, established certain liquidity facilities pursuant to 
section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.\219\
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    \219\ 12 U.S.C. 343(3).
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    In order to prevent disruptions in the money markets from 
destabilizing the financial system, the Board authorized the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston to establish the Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (MMLF). Under the MMLF, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston may extend non-recourse loans to eligible borrowers to purchase 
assets from money market mutual funds. Assets purchased from money 
market mutual funds are posted as collateral to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston. MMLF collateral generally comprises securities and 
other assets with the same maturity date as the MMLF non-recourse 
loan.\220\
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    \220\ The maturity date of a MMLF advance equals the earlier of 
the maturity date of the eligible collateral pledged to secure the 
advance and 12 months from the date of the advance.
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    In order to provide liquidity to small business lenders and the 
broader credit markets, and to help stabilize the financial system, the 
Board authorized each of the Federal Reserve Banks to extend credit 
under the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF).\221\ 
Under the PPPLF, each of the Federal Reserve Banks may extend non-
recourse loans to institutions that are eligible to make Paycheck 
Protection Program (PPP) covered loans as defined in section 7(a)(36) 
of the Small Business Act.\222\ Under the PPPLF, only PPP covered loans 
that are guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA) with 
respect to both principal and accrued interest and that are originated 
by an eligible institution may be pledged as collateral to the Federal 
Reserve Banks. The maturity date of the extension of credit under the 
PPPLF equals the maturity date of the PPP covered loans pledged to 
secure the extension of credit.\223\
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    \221\ The Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility was 
previously known as the Paycheck Protection Program Lending 
Facility.
    \222\ 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(36). Congress created the PPP as part of 
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act and in 
recognition of the exigent circumstances faced by small businesses. 
PPP covered loans are fully guaranteed as to principal and accrued 
interest by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and also afford 
borrower forgiveness up to the principal amount and accrued interest 
of the PPP covered loan, if the proceeds of the PPP covered loan are 
used for certain expenses. Under the PPP, eligible borrowers 
generally include businesses with fewer than 500 employees or that 
are otherwise considered to be small by the SBA. The SBA reimburses 
PPP lenders for any amount of a PPP covered loan that is forgiven. 
In general, PPP lenders are not held liable for any representations 
made by PPP borrowers in connection with a borrower's request for 
PPP covered loan forgiveness. For more information on the Paycheck 
Protection Program, see https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans/coronavirus-relief-options/paycheck-protection-program-ppp.
    \223\ The maturity date of the loan made under the PPPLF will be 
accelerated if the underlying PPP covered loan goes into default and 
the eligible borrower sells the PPP covered loan to the SBA to 
realize the SBA guarantee. The maturity date of the loan made under 
the PPPLF also will be accelerated to the extent of any PPP covered 
loan forgiveness reimbursement received by the eligible borrower 
from the SBA.
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    Eligible borrowers under the MMLF and PPPLF include certain banking 
organizations that are currently subject to the LCR rule and that will 
be subject to the final rule upon its effective date. Advances from the 
MMLF and PPPLF facilities are non-recourse, and the maturity of the 
advance generally aligns with the maturity of the collateral. 
Accordingly, a covered company is not

[[Page 9186]]

exposed to credit or market risk from the collateral securing the MMLF 
or PPPLF advance that could otherwise affect the banking organization's 
ability to settle the loan and generally can use the value of cash 
received from the collateral to repay the advances at maturity.
    To facilitate the use of the MMLF and the PPPLF, on May 6, 2020, 
the agencies published in the Federal Register an interim final rule to 
require a banking organization subject to the LCR rule to neutralize 
the effect on its LCR of participation in the MMLF and PPPLF (LCR 
interim final rule).\224\ The LCR interim final rule requires a covered 
company to neutralize the LCR effects of the advances made by the MMLF 
and PPPLF together with the assets securing these advances. 
Specifically, the LCR interim final rule added a new definition to the 
LCR rule for ``Covered Federal Reserve Facility Funding'' to identify 
MMLF and PPPLF advances separately from other secured funding 
transactions under the LCR rule. The LCR interim final rule requires 
outflow amounts associated with Covered Federal Reserve Facility 
Funding and inflow amounts associated with the assets securing this 
funding to be excluded from a covered company's total net cash outflow 
amount under the LCR rule.\225\ The treatment under the LCR interim 
final rule better aligns the treatment of these advances and collateral 
under the LCR rule with the liquidity risk associated with funding 
exposures through these facilities, and to ensure consistent and 
predictable treatment of covered companies' participation in the 
facilities under the LCR rule. The agencies received one comment 
letter, from a trade association, on the LCR interim final rule. The 
commenter supported the requirements under the LCR interim final rule, 
arguing that the requirements encourage participation in the 
facilities, which ultimately provides benefits to small businesses, 
households, and investors.
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    \224\ 85 FR 26835 (May 6, 2020). The agencies also adopted 
interim final rules to address the capital treatment of 
participation in the MMLF (85 FR 16232 (Mar. 23, 2020)) and capital 
treatment of participation in the PPPLF (85 FR 20387 (Apr. 13, 
2020)). These interim final rules were adopted as final on September 
29, 2020.
    \225\ See 12 CFR 50.34 (OCC); 12 CFR 249.34 (Board); 12 CFR 
329.34 (FDIC). Section __.34 does not apply to the extent the 
covered company secures Covered Federal Reserve Facility Funding 
with securities, debt obligations, or other instruments issued by 
the covered company or its consolidated entity.
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    For the same reasons that the agencies issued the LCR interim final 
rule, the agencies are adopting, as final, provisions to better align 
the treatment of these advances and collateral under the NSFR rule with 
the liquidity risk associated with funding exposures through these 
facilities, and to ensure consistent and predictable treatment of 
covered companies' participation in the facilities under the NSFR 
rule.\226\ Specifically, the final rule adds a new Sec.  __.108 that 
requires liability and asset amounts associated with Covered Federal 
Reserve Facility Funding to be excluded from a covered company's NSFR. 
Consistent with the LCR rule, this new Sec.  __.108 does not apply to 
the extent the covered company secures Covered Federal Reserve Facility 
Funding with securities, debt obligations, or other instruments issued 
by the covered company or its consolidated entity. This arrangement 
presents liquidity risk due to the asymmetric cash flows of the covered 
company because the covered company would not have an inflow to offset 
its cash outflows.
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    \226\ The new definition of ``Covered Federal Reserve Facility 
Funding'' was added into the common definitions section of the LCR 
and NSFR rules. Consistent with the LCR interim final rule, the 
final rule does not amend the agencies' definitions of average 
weighted short-term wholesale funding in the common definitions 
section of the LCR and NSFR rules and the Board is not amending the 
calculation of weighted short-term wholesale funding on reporting 
form FR Y-15 related to Sec.  __.108 of the final rule. Weighted 
short-term wholesale funding measures a banking organization's 
typical dependency on certain types of funding and generally does 
not measure funding risks related to the composition of a banking 
organization's assets and commitments.
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    Pursuant to section 553(b)(B) of the APA, general notice and the 
opportunity for public comment are not required with respect to a 
rulemaking when an ``agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the 
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) 
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' The agencies have 
determined that it is in the public interest to finalize these changes 
without notice and comment. The MMLF and PPPLF were established in 
response to urgent and severe economic disruptions, and these changes 
will provide certainty to covered companies regarding the NSFR 
treatment of transactions under the facilities, thereby facilitating 
the continued operation of, and covered companies' participation in the 
facilities. In addition, the agencies note that it may be unnecessary 
to provide notice or the opportunity to comment prior to adopting these 
changes because the public recently had an opportunity to comment on 
substantively similar changes to the LCR rule, and no adverse comments 
were submitted to the agencies in connection with those changes.

H. Interdependent Assets and Liabilities

    The Basel NSFR standard provides that, subject to strict conditions 
and in limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for an asset and a 
liability to be considered interdependent and assigned a zero percent 
RSF factor and a zero percent ASF factor, respectively.\227\ The 
proposed rule did not include a framework for interdependent assets and 
liabilities because, as stated in the proposal, the agencies did not 
identify transactions conducted by U.S. banking organizations that 
would meet the conditions in the Basel NSFR standard.
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    \227\ See supra note 6 at para 45.
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    As the proposed rule noted, in order for an asset and liability to 
be considered interdependent, the Basel NSFR standard would require all 
of the following conditions to be met: (1) The interdependence of the 
asset and liability must be established on the basis of contractual 
arrangements, (2) the liability cannot fall due while the asset remains 
on the balance sheet, (3) the principal payment flows from the asset 
cannot be used for purposes other than repaying the liability, (4) the 
liability cannot be used to fund other assets, (5) the individual 
interdependent asset and liability must be clearly identifiable, (6) 
the maturity and principal amount of both the interdependent liability 
and asset must be the same, (7) the bank must be acting solely as a 
pass-through unit to channel the funding received from the liability 
into the corresponding interdependent asset, and (8) the counterparties 
for each pair of interdependent liabilities and assets must not be the 
same.
    The Basel NSFR standard's conditions for establishing 
interdependence are intended to ensure that the specific liability 
will, on the basis of contractual terms and under all circumstances, 
remain for the life of the asset and all cash flows during the life of 
the asset and at maturity are perfectly matched with cash flows of the 
liability. Under such conditions, a covered company would face no 
funding risk or benefit arising from the interdependent asset and 
liability. For example, the proposed rule noted that if a sovereign 
entity establishes a program where it provides funding through 
financial institutions that act as pass-through entities to make loans 
to third parties, and all the conditions set forth in the Basel NSFR 
standard are met, the liquidity profile of a financial institution 
would not be

[[Page 9187]]

affected by its participation in the program. As such, the assets of 
the financial institution created through such a program could be 
considered interdependent with the liabilities that would also be 
created through the program, and the assets and liabilities could be 
assigned a zero percent RSF factor and a zero percent ASF factor, 
respectively. The proposed rule noted that no such programs at that 
time existed in the United States. Therefore, the proposed rule did not 
include a provision for assigning zero percent RSF and ASF factors to 
assets and liabilities that are ``interdependent.'' However, the 
proposed rule requested comment as to whether any assets and 
liabilities of covered companies should receive such treatment under 
the NSFR rule.
    Commenters requested that the final rule recognize as 
interdependent various assets and liabilities. Specifically, commenters 
requested interdependent treatment in connection with securities 
borrowing and lending transactions to facilitate client short 
positions; securities borrowing transactions and covered company short 
positions; certain client segregated assets and liabilities for client 
claims on those assets; assets and liabilities arising from derivatives 
clearing activities on behalf of clients; initial margin received by a 
covered company under client-facing derivative transactions and used to 
fund hedge positions for the derivative transactions, and assets and 
liabilities related to mortgage servicing activities. Commenters 
asserted that these transactions present no funding risk to covered 
companies. Discussions below address comments on the treatment of 
assets and liabilities as interdependent.
    As discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information 
section, the NSFR is a broad measure of the funding profile of the 
whole balance sheet of a covered company at a point in time and the 
final rule generally does not apply separate requirements to individual 
lines of business or to subsets of assets and liabilities of a covered 
company. The treatment of specific assets and liabilities as 
interdependent would effectively remove these items from the assessment 
of the covered company's stable funding profile overall. As discussed 
in sections VII.C.2.a and VII.D.2.a of this Supplementary Information 
section, the final rule uses the remaining maturity of assets and 
liabilities to assess a covered company's funding risks. As a general 
principle, it would be inconsistent with the purposes and design of the 
NSFR to provide interdependent treatment to a specific asset and 
liability where the specified asset can contractually persist on the 
balance sheet of the covered company after the extinguishment of the 
specified liability. Additionally, the final rule generally does not 
consider the range of actions that a covered company may take in the 
future that would adjust the maturity of an asset in response to the 
maturity of a liability. Consistent with the purposes and design of the 
NSFR, as discussed above, the agencies have concluded that it would be 
inappropriate to recognize any assets and liabilities as 
interdependent. Additionally, including in the final rule the criteria 
under which certain transactions could qualify as interdependent would 
add considerable complexity and undermine the NSFR's design as a simple 
and standardized measure. In the discussion below, the agencies discuss 
concerns about why particular transactions suggested by commenters will 
not qualify as interdependent.
Short Sales
    Commenters requested that the agencies reconsider interdependent 
treatment for transactions conducted by a covered company that 
facilitate the covered company or its customers entering into short 
positions. Commenters provided examples of certain secured funding 
transactions, such as firm shorts or loans of collateral to customers, 
that they asserted directly fund certain secured lending transactions, 
such as a reverse repurchase agreement or a securities borrowing 
transaction. These commenters asserted that the short sale of a 
security by a covered company represents a liability on its balance 
sheet. In a similar manner, a client short sale may result in a covered 
company receiving the cash proceeds as collateral for the security 
provided to cover the client's short position, increasing the covered 
company's balance sheet liability to its clients. In each case, the 
covered company may use the proceeds from its short sale or the cash 
collateral from the client's short sale to collateralize a secured 
lending transaction to source the security sold short. The secured 
lending transaction is recorded as an asset on the covered company's 
balance sheet.
    At the time of terminating its short exposure, the covered company 
extinguishes its short position liability. Similarly, at the unwind of 
the client short transaction, the client may return the security to the 
covered company in return for the cash proceeds of the initial short 
sale, closing out the covered company's liability to the client. In 
either case, to close out the asset the covered company may return the 
security to the securities lender or reverse repurchase agreement 
counterparty and receive back the cash collateral. Commenters asserted 
that when either type of short position is unwound, the associated 
balance sheet liabilities and assets would roll off simultaneously. 
These commenters argued that such transactions are substantially 
similar to transactions in which a covered company acts as riskless 
principal; that the transactions are linked by regulation, internal 
procedures, and business practices; that the principal amounts of the 
asset and liability generated by a customer short position are 
generally the same; and that such treatment would be consistent with 
the Basel NSFR standard that provides special treatment for securities 
borrowing transactions. As a result, commenters requested that the 
agencies assign no funding requirement to the secured lending 
transaction that sources the security, which is the covered company's 
balance-sheet asset.
    Commenters also noted that certain securities borrowing 
transactions conducted by a covered company are subject to the Board's 
Regulation T and requested that the agencies recognize that conducting 
a stock borrow for a permitted purpose under Regulation T creates a 
clear link between the liability to the client and the secured lending 
transaction. One commenter speculated that covered companies would need 
to raise additional long-term funding to support the stable funding 
requirement for activities that facilitate short positions and that the 
cash raised through such issuance may increase a covered company's 
balance sheet leverage, which in turn may cause the covered company to 
reduce other financial intermediation activities. One commenter argued 
that failing to reduce the funding requirement for facilitating short-
sale activities would impede market liquidity and cited a report by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York concerning the short-sale ban in the 
United States from September 18, 2018, to October 8, 2018, as evidence 
that impeding the short-sale market would damage equities markets.
    The agencies have concluded that because there is a risk that the 
maturities of the assets and liabilities for these transactions may not 
match, it would be inappropriate to treat these assets and liabilities 
as interdependent. It is unclear whether the consequence of the 
maturity of all short sales liabilities on related assets would be the 
same in practice. For example, the related assets may potentially 
persist beyond the maturity of the liability. In addition,

[[Page 9188]]

although there are regulatory requirements that could require broker-
dealers to take a capital charge if they do not return securities to a 
securities lender, these regulations may not subject all potential 
transactions to capital charges and a covered company could still 
technically retain a security if it is was willing to incur such 
capital charges.
    Secured funding and lending transactions conducted by a covered 
company that facilitate the covered company, or its customers, entering 
into a short exposure contribute to the funding profile of the covered 
company similar to secured funding and lending transactions conducted 
for other purposes, such as matched book repurchase and reverse 
repurchase agreements. Providing interconnected treatment for assets 
and liabilities related to short positions could incent covered 
companies to engage in regulatory arbitrage by transforming some 
matched book repurchase agreements into customer shorts covered by 
sourcing an asset from a third party. Further, covered companies 
frequently conduct short-facilitation transactions on an open basis, or 
with significant embedded optionality, and with highly sophisticated 
financial counterparties. A covered company may have limited control 
over the maturity of either the related asset or liability and may be 
exposed to the asymmetric timing of the maturities or the termination 
amounts. The decision to terminate the funding received from a short 
sale may be influenced by a range of factors outside the control of the 
covered company, such as market volatility or the investment priorities 
of a covered company's client. In the case of a short exposure covered 
by a security borrow from a third party, the decision to terminate the 
secured lending transaction by the covered company may be influenced by 
the presence of alternative eligible uses for the security borrowed. 
The secured lending transaction maturity is also dependent upon the 
capacity of the securities lender to terminate the transaction by 
returning cash collateral on demand. Conversely, the securities lender 
may disrupt the symmetry of the transactions by terminating the secured 
lending transaction prior to the termination of the short. The covered 
company may not be able to source the securities elsewhere or may not 
be able to demand additional collateral from the customer but may have 
to continue facilitating the customer short. As discussed in section 
VII.D.3.c of this Supplementary Information section, the relatively low 
RSF factor applied to short-term secured lending transactions with 
financial counterparties is designed to address uncertainty as to 
whether assets may persist on the balance sheet. For these reasons, the 
agencies are not applying interdependent treatment to transactions 
facilitating short positions.
Assets Held in Certain Customer Protection Segregated Accounts and 
Associated Liabilities
    In another example, commenters requested that the agencies 
recognize as interdependent assets that are required to be segregated 
according to regulations and the associated liabilities for client 
claims on these assets. In particular, a covered company may be 
required to hold a certain amount of segregated assets in order to 
comply with regulations applicable to customer funds of a broker-dealer 
or futures commission merchant. Under the proposed rule, segregated 
assets that are included on a covered company's balance sheet under 
GAAP would be assigned RSF factors in the same manner as other assets 
of the covered company. Commenters asserted that this treatment would 
overstate the funding requirement associated with these assets since 
the assets are held for the benefit of clients, covered companies have 
limited reinvestment rights over the assets, and the assets are funded 
by associated liabilities to customers. Commenters also argued that the 
proposed treatment would incentivize covered companies to hold 
segregated client assets in non-cash form rather than deposit cash with 
third parties.\228\
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    \228\ See section VII.D.3.i of this Supplementary Information 
section, which discusses the assignment of RSF factors to assets 
held in certain customer protection segregated accounts.
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    Covered companies face funding risk with respect to such segregated 
accounts due to potential asymmetry between the relevant assets and 
liabilities. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to treat such 
assets and the corresponding liabilities as interdependent. Covered 
companies have the ability to exercise control over client assets held 
in segregated accounts, and covered companies may be able to earn a 
return on those assets depending on reinvestment choices. Additionally, 
the amount and maturity of segregated assets may not be directly 
connected to the amount and maturity of liabilities to customers. In 
cases where a covered company is required to segregate an amount of 
assets, the determination of the aggregate value segregated may be 
dependent on many different activities and liabilities to customers, 
each subject to optionality exercisable at the discretion of the 
customer. For example, the amount of assets to be segregated for client 
protection under the SEC's Rule 15c3-3 may be based on a substantial 
volume of individual customer free credit balances, margin loans 
extended to customers, and short positions.
Clearing Activities
    Commenters requested that the agencies treat clearing activities 
conducted on behalf of clients as interdependent transactions. Under 
these transactions, covered companies would guarantee the performance 
of a client to the CCP and would collect any necessary margin 
requirements from the client and post them to the CCP on behalf of the 
client. Commenters argued that these client clearing activities should 
be considered as interdependent transactions, as the covered company 
would be acting solely on behalf of the client.
    As discussed in section VII.E.4 of this Supplementary Information 
section, if a covered company is engaged in clearing activities as an 
agent for a client, it may be that the covered company would record no 
balance sheet entries associated with such activities. Accordingly, 
there would be no RSF factor assigned to such activities. Under these 
circumstances, interdependent treatment would be unnecessary. To the 
extent that a covered company guarantees the performance of its client 
or otherwise engages in activities that cause these transactions to be 
recorded on its balance sheet, it would be inappropriate to de-
recognize them for purposes of the NSFR. In some situations, a covered 
company may continue to face funding risk as the intermediary between 
its client and the CCP.
Hedges of Derivative Transactions Financed With Initial Margin
    Commenters stated that a covered company in certain circumstances 
can use initial margin that is provided by a client to purchase a 
security that can then be used to hedge the market risk of a client-
facing derivative transaction. In these cases, commenters asserted that 
a covered company's liability to return initial margin may be viewed as 
directly funding the hedge security on the covered company's balance 
sheet. Commenters argued that interdependent treatment is warranted for 
the assets and liabilities generated by such activity because the 
covered company acts as an intermediary when using client funds to 
hedge the risk created by the client-

[[Page 9189]]

facing derivative. Additionally, the covered company generally sells 
the hedge asset when the client's derivative position is unwound, 
regardless of the remaining maturity of the hedge asset. The commenters 
alternatively recommended that the agencies could limit interdependent 
treatment in these cases to circumstances where the sale of the hedge 
asset and the unwind of the derivative (together with the associated 
liability to return the initial margin) occur simultaneously pursuant 
to a contract or internal procedures. One commenter argued that 
contractual provisions and auditable internal policies and procedures 
create links between assets and liabilities that are sufficiently 
formal and enforceable such that interdependent treatment is warranted. 
For example, in the case of initial margin provided by a client and 
used by a covered company to purchase a security to hedge the customer-
facing derivative exposure, one commenter argued that force majeure 
clauses relieve a covered company from returning initial margin to a 
client when the company is unable to sell the hedge security asset. In 
this case, the commenter argued that the hedge asset and initial margin 
liability are linked because the firm will not be required to return 
the initial margin until it is able to sell the hedge security.
    In these cases, commenters requested that the agencies either 
assign a non-zero ASF factor for rehypothecatable initial margin 
received by a covered company or reduce the RSF factor assigned to the 
hedge asset purchased using initial margin provided by a client. 
Commenters asserted that the proposed rule should provide greater 
funding value to initial margin received by a covered company from 
clients and used by the covered company to hedge its derivative 
position with the client because this source of funding is more closely 
related to the covered company's derivatives activities than other 
sources of funding that receive higher ASF factors, like retail 
deposits. The commenters also expressed the view that failure to give 
interdependent treatment to initial margin liabilities and related 
hedge assets under these circumstances effectively punishes covered 
companies for financing corporate entities, which would adversely 
impact corporate financing.
    While a covered company may be unlikely in practice to continue to 
hold a hedge asset without a corresponding liability to its client, 
there is generally no absolute contractual bar against this. A covered 
company generally could continue to hold an asset formally used as a 
hedge despite a change in or elimination of a particular client's 
derivative position. A covered company could, for example, return a 
client's initial margin but continue to hold the asset purchased as a 
hedge, if only for a short time. It is not the case that the asset and 
liability necessarily fall due at the same time. Accordingly, it would 
not be appropriate to treat these assets and liabilities as 
interdependent.
Mortgage Servicing
    A commenter also suggested that mortgage servicing rights and 
deposits related to mortgage servicing be granted interdependent 
treatment. The commenter argued that the asset (mortgage servicing 
rights) and liability (mortgage borrower deposits consisting of the 
principal, interest, tax, and insurance payments collected from the 
borrowers to be remitted to investors, insurers, and state and local 
governments) are linked and treated as self-funding by the industry. 
The commenter also argued that deposits arising from mortgage servicing 
should be considered stable because they have predictable inflow and 
outflow patterns.
    It would be inconsistent with the NSFR's aggregated balance sheet 
approach to remove from the ratio calculation, through interdependent 
treatment, an asset and a liability that are not each clearly 
identifiable or where the maturities and amounts of the asset and the 
liability do not align. While certain assets and liabilities may be 
closely linked (such as mortgage servicing rights and borrower 
liabilities), there is not enough certainty that the size and maturity 
of these assets and liabilities would always align.
Other Comments on Interdependent Assets and Liabilities
    Commenters also submitted several general comments applicable to 
many types of transactions that they argued should receive 
interdependent treatment. Commenters suggested that the agencies could 
impose data reporting requirements to verify that internal policies and 
procedures are maintaining a link between the various parts of the 
transactions they believe should be granted interdependent treatment. 
Another commenter argued that, if covered companies engage in the 
transactions outlined above in accordance with the BCBS haircut floors 
for non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions,\229\ then 
the transactions should be treated as interdependent. Several 
commenters also warned that failure to provide interdependent treatment 
for the positions described above would significantly reduce liquidity 
in the relevant markets.
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    \229\ Basel Committee, Haircut floors for non-centrally cleared 
securities financing transactions (November 2015), available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d340.htm.
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    A discussed in section V of this Supplementary Information section, 
the NSFR is a broad measure of the funding profile of the whole balance 
sheet of a covered company and the final rule does not apply separate 
requirements to individual lines of business or to subsets of assets 
and liabilities of a covered company. The treatment of specific assets 
and liabilities as interconnected would effectively remove these items 
from the assessment of the covered company's stable funding profile 
overall. As a general principle, it would be inconsistent with the 
purposes and design of the NSFR to provide interdependent treatment to 
a specific asset and liability where the specified asset can 
contractually persist on the balance sheet of the covered company after 
the extinguishment of the specified liability. While internal processes 
and procedures may increase the probability of such assets and 
liabilities aligning, it would be impractical to expand the final rule 
to create or regulate such processes in a manner that would ensure 
alignment.

VIII. Net Stable Funding Ratio Shortfall

    As noted above, the proposed rule would have required a covered 
company to maintain an NSFR of at least 1.0 on an ongoing basis. The 
agencies expect circumstances where a covered company has an NSFR below 
1.0 to arise rarely. However, given the range of reasons, both 
idiosyncratic and systemic, a covered company could have an NSFR below 
1.0 (for example, a covered company's NSFR might temporarily fall below 
1.0 during a period of extreme liquidity stress), the proposed rule 
would not have prescribed a particular supervisory response to address 
a violation of the NSFR requirement. Instead, the proposed rule would 
have provided flexibility for the appropriate Federal banking agency to 
respond based on the circumstances of a particular case. Potential 
supervisory responses could include, for example, an informal 
supervisory action, a cease-and-desist order, or a civil money penalty.
    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to notify 
the appropriate Federal banking agency of an NSFR shortfall or 
potential shortfall. Specifically, the proposed rule would have 
required a covered company to notify its appropriate Federal banking 
agency no later than 10 business days, or such other period as

[[Page 9190]]

the appropriate Federal banking agency may otherwise require by written 
notice, following the date that any event has occurred that has caused 
or would cause the covered company's NSFR to fall below the minimum 
requirement.
    In addition, a covered company would have been required to develop 
a plan for remediation in the event of an NSFR shortfall. As set forth 
in the proposed rule, such a plan would have been required to include 
an assessment of the covered company's liquidity profile, the actions 
the covered company has taken and will take to achieve full compliance 
with the proposed rule (including a plan for adjusting the covered 
company's liquidity profile to comply with the proposed rule's NSFR 
requirement and a plan for fixing any operational or management issues 
that may have contributed to the covered company's noncompliance), and 
an estimated time frame for achieving compliance. The proposed rule 
would have required a covered company to submit its remediation plan to 
its appropriate Federal banking agency no later than 10 business days, 
or such other period as the appropriate Federal banking agency may 
otherwise require by written notice, after: (1) The covered company's 
NSFR falls below, or is likely to fall below, the minimum requirement 
and the covered company has or should have notified the appropriate 
Federal banking agency, as required under the proposed rule; (2) the 
covered company's required NSFR disclosures or other regulatory reports 
or disclosures indicate that its NSFR is below the minimum requirement; 
or (3) the appropriate Federal banking agency notifies the covered 
company that it must submit a plan for NSFR remediation and the agency 
provides a reason for requiring such a plan.
    Finally, the covered company would have been required to report to 
the appropriate Federal banking agency no less than monthly (or other 
frequency, as required by the agency) on its progress towards achieving 
full compliance with the proposed rule. These reports would have been 
mandatory until the firm's NSFR was equal to or greater than 1.0.
    The agencies would have retained the authority to take supervisory 
action against a covered company that fails to comply with the NSFR 
requirement.\230\ Any action taken would have depended on the 
circumstances surrounding the funding shortfall, including, but not 
limited to, operational issues at a covered company, the frequency or 
magnitude of the noncompliance, the nature of the event that caused a 
shortfall, and whether such an event was temporary or unusual.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ See Sec.  __.2(c) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies received one comment requesting clarification of how 
frequently a covered company must calculate its NSFR to meet the 
proposed rule's requirement to maintain an NSFR of 1.0 on an ``ongoing 
basis.'' The commenter suggested that the final rule should require a 
covered company to calculate its NSFR in the same manner as it 
calculates its regulatory capital levels. The commenter argued that, 
because the NSFR is a long-term funding metric calculated primarily by 
reference to a covered company's balance sheet, it would not be 
possible to calculate a firm's NSFR more frequently than monthly.
    The agencies also received two comments related to the proposed 
rule's shortfall provisions. One commenter asserted that the proposed 
rule did not have a mechanism similar to the LCR permitting a covered 
company's NSFR to fall below 1.0. Another commenter responded to the 
agencies' request for comment as to whether the proposed shortfall 
framework should include a de minimis exception, such that a covered 
company would not be required to report a shortfall if its NSFR 
returned to the required minimum within a short grace period. This 
commenter requested a de minimis exception when the cause of an NSFR 
shortfall is beyond a covered company's control and the shortfall would 
not be expected to increase systemic risk because of an expected short 
duration and minimal amount. This commenter also requested that the 
final rule include a cure period where a shortfall is caused by a 
merger or acquisition by a covered company. Another commenter requested 
that the requirement to submit a formal remediation plan should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis by the covered company's appropriate 
Federal banking agency. The commenter also requested that the 
requirement to respond to an NSFR shortfall be calibrated to the 
materiality and likely persistence of the shortfall.
    Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule requires a 
covered company to maintain an NSFR of at least 1.0 on an ongoing 
basis. The NSFR is designed to ensure that covered companies have the 
ability to serve households and businesses in both normal and adverse 
economic situations. The agencies would generally support a covered 
company that chooses to reduce its NSFR during a liquidity stress 
period in order to continue to lend and undertake other actions to 
support the broader economy in a safe and sound manner.
    While the final rule requires a covered company that is a U.S. 
depository institution holding company or U.S. intermediate holding 
company to disclose its NSFR for each quarter on a semi-annual 
basis,\231\ a covered company needs to monitor its funding profile on 
an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the NSFR requirement. If a 
covered company's funding profile materially changes intra-quarter, the 
agencies expect the company to be able to calculate its NSFR to 
determine whether it remains compliant with the NSFR requirement, 
consistent with the notification requirements of Sec.  __.110 of the 
final rule.\232\ The agencies are adopting the shortfall provisions of 
the final rule as proposed. Consistent with the shortfall framework in 
the LCR rule, the final rule's shortfall framework provides supervisory 
flexibility for the appropriate agency to respond to an NSFR shortfall 
based on the particular circumstances of the shortfall. Depending on 
the circumstances, an NSFR shortfall would not necessarily result in 
supervisory action, but, at a minimum, would result in a notification 
to the appropriate agency and heightened supervisory monitoring through 
a remediation plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ See section IX of this Supplementary Information section.
    \232\ The ability for a covered company to calculate its NSFR at 
any point in which its funding profile materially changes intra-
quarter is similar to the application of minimum capital 
requirements under the agencies regulatory capital rule. For 
example, Prompt Corrective Action requires an insured depository 
institution to provide written notice to its primary supervisor that 
an adjustment to its capital category may have occurred no later 
than 15 calendar days following the date that any material event has 
occurred that would cause the insured depository institution to be 
placed in a lower capital category. See 12 CFR 6.3 (OCC); 12 CFR 
208.42 (Board); 12 CFR 324.402 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies have determined not to include a cure period or de 
minimis exception to the shortfall notification requirement in the 
final rule. The shortfall notification procedures are intended to help 
the agencies identify a covered company that has a heightened liquidity 
risk profile, and identify and evaluate shortfall patterns over time 
and across covered companies. Timely notification of a shortfall allows 
the appropriate Federal banking agency to make an informed 
determination as to the appropriate supervisory response. As a result, 
the agencies are finalizing the requirement that a covered company must 
provide such notification no later than 10 business days, or such other 
period as the appropriate agency may otherwise require by written 
notice, following the date that any shortfall event has occurred. 
Similarly, timely submission of a remediation plan

[[Page 9191]]

facilitates evaluation of shortfalls and the efforts undertaken by 
covered companies to address them, which assists the agencies in 
determining the appropriate supervisory response. Such supervisory 
monitoring and response could be hindered if notice were to occur or 
remediation plans were only submitted after a shortfall persisted in 
duration or increased in amount.

IX. Disclosure Requirements

A. NSFR Public Disclosure Requirements

    The disclosure requirements of the proposed rule would have applied 
to certain bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies. The tailoring proposals would have amended the scope of 
application of the proposed disclosure requirements to apply to 
domestic top-tier depository institution holding companies and U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations subject 
to the proposed NSFR rule.\233\ The disclosure requirements of the 
proposed rule would not have applied to depository institutions.\234\ 
The proposed rule would have required public disclosure of a company's 
NSFR and components, as well as discussion of certain qualitative 
features to facilitate an understanding of the company's calculation 
and results. The final rule adopts the public disclosure requirements 
for domestic top-tier depository institution holding companies and U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations that 
are subject to the final rule (covered holding companies).
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    \233\ The FBO tailoring proposal would have applied NSFR public 
disclosure requirements to a U.S. intermediate holding company of a 
foreign banking organization subject to Category II or III liquidity 
standards, or subject to Category IV liquidity standards with $50 
billion or more in weighted short-term wholesale funding. 84 FR at 
24320.
    \234\ The Board noted in the Supplementary Information section 
of the proposed rule that it may develop a different or modified 
reporting form that would be required for both depository 
institutions and depository institution holding companies subject to 
the proposed rule. The Board stated that it anticipated that it 
would solicit public comment on any such new reporting form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Quantitative Disclosure Requirements

    The proposals would have required a company subject to the proposed 
disclosure requirements to publicly disclose the company's NSFR and its 
components. The proposed NSFR disclosure template would have included 
components of a company's ASF and RSF calculations (ASF components and 
RSF components, respectively), as well as the company's ASF amount, RSF 
amount, and NSFR. For most ASF and RSF components, the proposed rule 
would have required disclosure of both ``unweighted'' and ``weighted'' 
amounts.\235\ For certain line items in the proposed NSFR disclosure 
template relating to derivative transactions that include components of 
multi-step calculations before an ASF or RSF factor is applied, a 
company would only have been required to disclose a single amount for 
the component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ The ``unweighted'' amount generally refers to values of 
ASF or RSF components prior to applying the assigned ASF or RSF 
factors, whereas the ``weighted'' amount generally refers to the 
amounts resulting after applying the assigned ASF or RSF factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters argued that the proposed NSFR disclosure template 
should not include certain information that is more granular than, or 
in addition to, the information specified in the BCBS common template, 
such as the requirement for additional detail regarding a company's 
HQLA and certain other assets. One of these commenters asserted that 
the proposed level of detail of required disclosures could constrain a 
company's ability to execute its funding and related business 
strategies because a firm subject to the disclosure requirements would 
be wary of adjusting its funding structure in a way that would appear 
to market participants to diverge from the funding structures of peer 
firms. The commenter also argued this anticipation of a market response 
would inappropriately force firms with different business models and 
funding needs to maintain similar funding structures. The commenter 
acknowledged that these concerns could be mitigated if firms explain 
the difference between their funding structures and those of other 
firms in the qualitative portion of the public disclosure, but argued 
that market participants are likely to pay more attention to the 
quantitative portion of a firm's disclosure. To address these concerns, 
the commenter argued that reducing the required granularity of the 
proposed disclosures would provide the market with sufficient 
information about a company's liquidity profile without resulting in 
what the commenter argued would be negative effects of overly detailed 
disclosures.
    Other commenters suggested that the final rule require a company to 
disclose its average NSFR over the relevant reporting period, rather 
than the company's NSFR at the end of the quarter. The commenters 
argued that liquidity positions, and consequently a company's NSFR, can 
be volatile. Accordingly, disclosing a company's NSFR for the day 
ending a reporting period could suggest that the company's liquidity 
position is more volatile than an average of the company's NSFR over 
the entire reporting period would suggest. One commenter also argued 
that using an average value would be consistent with the disclosure 
requirements for the LCR. The final rule retains the quantitative 
disclosure requirements largely as proposed.\236\ However, in a change 
from the proposal, the final rule requires covered holding companies to 
use simple daily averages rather than quarter end data in its public 
disclosures. This change from the proposal will reduce the possibility 
of ``window dressing'' by covered holding companies and will benefit 
the public by more accurately reflecting the long term funding profile 
of the reporting covered holding companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ As described in section V.E.3 of this Supplementary 
Information section, the final rule includes reduced NSFR 
requirements for certain covered companies. The final rule makes 
certain adjustments to the NSFR disclosure template in Sec.  __.131 
of the final rule to incorporate the reduced requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the final rule requires disclosure of certain liquidity 
data, it does not require a covered holding company to disclose 
specific asset-, liability-, or transaction-level details. This should 
limit the risk that public disclosures will prevent a covered holding 
company from executing its risk management and business strategies. The 
disclosure requirements in the final rule are generally consistent with 
the items specified in the BCBS common template, with some relatively 
small differences, as described below. By using a standardized tabular 
format that is generally similar to the BCBS common template, the final 
rule's NSFR disclosure template enables market participants to compare 
funding characteristics of covered holding companies in the United 
States and other banking organizations subject to similar requirements 
in other jurisdictions.
    For most ASF or RSF components, the final rule's NSFR disclosure 
template, like the proposed NSFR disclosure template, requires 
separation of the unweighted amount based on maturity categories 
relevant to the NSFR requirement: Open maturity; less than six months 
after the calculation date; six months or more, but less than one year 
after the calculation date; one year or more after the calculation 
date; and perpetual. While the BCBS common template does not 
distinguish between the ``open'' and ``perpetual'' maturity categories 
(grouping them together under the heading ``no maturity''), the final 
rule requires a company to disclose

[[Page 9192]]

amounts in the ``open'' and ``perpetual'' maturity categories 
separately because the categories are on opposite ends of the maturity 
spectrum for purposes of the final rule. The ``open'' maturity category 
is meant to identify instruments that do not have a stated contractual 
maturity and may be closed out on demand, such as demand deposits. The 
``perpetual'' category is intended to identify instruments that 
contractually may never mature and may not be closed out on demand, 
such as equity securities. The final rule's NSFR disclosure template 
separates these two categories into different columns to improve the 
transparency and quality of the disclosure without undermining the 
ability to compare the NSFR component disclosures of banking 
organizations in other jurisdictions that utilize the BCBS common 
template because these two columns can be summed for comparison 
purposes. For certain ASF and RSF components that represent 
calculations that do not depend on maturities, such as the NSFR 
derivatives asset or liability amount, the final rule's NSFR disclosure 
template, like the proposed NSFR disclosure template, does not require 
a covered holding company to separate its disclosed amount by maturity 
category.
    As described further below, the final rule, like the proposed rule, 
identifies the ASF and RSF components that a covered holding company 
must include in each row of the NSFR disclosure template, including 
cross-references to the relevant sections of the final rule. In some 
cases, the final rule's NSFR disclosure template requires instruments 
that are assigned identical ASF or RSF factors to be disclosed in 
different rows or columns, and some rows and columns combine disclosure 
of instruments that are assigned different ASF or RSF factors.
    For consistency, the final rule's NSFR disclosure template requires 
a covered holding company to clearly indicate the as-of date for 
disclosed amounts and report all amounts on a consolidated basis and 
expressed in millions of U.S. dollars or as a percentage, as 
applicable.
1. Disclosure of ASF Components
    The proposed rule would have required a company subject to the 
proposed requirement to disclose its ASF components, separated into the 
following categories: (1) Capital and securities, which includes NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and other capital elements and securities; 
(2) retail funding, which includes stable retail deposits, less stable 
retail deposits, retail brokered deposits, and other retail funding; 
(3) wholesale funding, which includes operational deposits and other 
wholesale funding; and (4) other liabilities, which include the 
company's NSFR derivatives liability amount and any other liabilities 
not included in other categories. The Board is adopting the ASF 
component disclosure categories as proposed.
    The final rule's NSFR disclosure template differs from the BCBS 
common template by including some additional ASF categories that are 
not separately broken out under the Basel NSFR, such as retail brokered 
deposits. The final rule's NSFR disclosure template also includes 
additional information regarding a covered holding company's total 
derivatives amount. These differences from the BCBS common template 
provide greater transparency by requiring disclosure of additional 
information relevant for understanding a covered holding company's 
liquidity profile. These differences would not impact comparability 
across jurisdictions, as the more specific line items can be added 
together to produce a comparable total amount.
2. Disclosure of RSF Components
    The proposed disclosure requirements would have required a company 
to disclose its RSF components, separated into the following 
categories: (1) Total HQLA and each of its component asset categories 
(i.e., level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid assets); (2) assets other 
than HQLA that are assigned a zero percent RSF factor; (3) operational 
deposits; (4) loans and securities, separated into categories including 
retail mortgages and securities that are not HQLA; (5) other assets, 
which include commodities, certain components of the company's 
derivatives RSF amount, and all other assets not included in another 
category (including nonperforming assets); \237\ and (6) undrawn 
amounts of committed credit and liquidity facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ A company would have been required to disclose 
nonperforming assets as part of the line item for other assets and 
nonperforming assets, rather than as part of a line item based on 
the type of asset that has become nonperforming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section VII.D.3.h of this Supplementary Information 
section, the proposed rule would have assigned RSF factors to 
encumbered assets under Sec. Sec.  __.106(c) and (d). A company subject 
to the proposed disclosure requirements would have been required to 
include encumbered assets in a cell of the NSFR disclosure template 
based on the asset category and asset maturity rather than based on the 
encumbrance period. Similar treatment would have applied for an asset 
provided or received by a company as variation margin to which an RSF 
factor is assigned under Sec.  __.107.
    The final rule includes the RSF component disclosure categories as 
proposed with adjustments to incorporate the reduced requirements under 
the final rule. The final rule's NSFR disclosure template differs in 
some respects from the BCBS common template to provide more granular 
information regarding RSF components without undermining comparability 
across jurisdictions. For example, the final rule requires disclosure 
of a covered holding company's level 1, level 2A, and level 2B liquid 
assets by maturity category, which is not required under the BCBS 
common template, to assist market participants and other parties in 
assessing the composition of a covered holding company's HQLA 
portfolio.\238\ Additionally, because some assets that are assigned a 
zero percent RSF factor under the final rule are not HQLA under the LCR 
rule, such as currency and coin and certain trade date receivables, the 
template includes a distinct category for zero percent RSF assets that 
are not level 1 liquid assets. The NSFR disclosure template also 
differs from the BCBS common template in its presentation of the 
components of a covered holding company's NSFR derivatives asset 
amount, generally to improve the clarity of disclosure by separating 
components into distinct rows and by including the total derivatives 
asset amount so that market participants and other parties can better 
understand a covered holding company's NSFR derivatives asset 
calculation.
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    \238\ The Board notes that the information to be disclosed 
relating to HQLA is consistent with the design and purpose of the 
NSFR and is different from disclosures under the LCR rule. The 
carrying values of the various types of liquid assets at the 
reporting date, together with their maturity profile, provide 
additional clarity regarding the structure of the reporting 
company's balance sheet. In contrast, the LCR rule focuses on the 
ability to monetize assets in a period of stress and the LCR 
disclosure template contains averages of market values of eligible 
HQLA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Qualitative Disclosure Requirements

    A company subject to the proposed disclosure requirements would 
have been required to provide a qualitative discussion of the company's 
NSFR and its components sufficient to facilitate an understanding of 
the calculation and results. The proposed rule would not have 
prescribed the content or format of a company's qualitative 
disclosures; rather, it would have allowed flexibility for discussion 
based on each company's particular circumstances. The proposed rule 
would, however, have provided guidance through examples of topics

[[Page 9193]]

that a company may discuss, to the extent they would be significant to 
the company's NSFR. These examples would have included: (1) The main 
drivers of the company's NSFR; (2) changes in the company's NSFR over 
time and the causes of such changes (for example, changes in strategies 
or circumstances); (3) concentrations of funding sources and changes in 
funding structure; (4) concentrations of available and required stable 
funding within a company's corporate structure (for example, across 
legal entities); and (5) other sources of funding or other factors in 
the NSFR calculation that the company considers to be relevant to 
facilitate an understanding of its liquidity profile.
    One commenter requested that under the final rule a company only be 
required to provide a qualitative discussion of items that are 
``material'' rather than ``significant'' to the company's NSFR, which 
the commenter argued would be consistent with disclosure requirements 
applicable under U.S. federal securities laws and facilitate more 
effective compliance.
    The final rule, like the proposed rule, uses the term 
``significant'' to describe the examples of items affecting a covered 
holding company's NSFR about which a covered holding company should 
provide a qualitative discussion. However, a covered holding company 
may determine the relevant qualitative disclosures based on a 
materiality concept. Information is regarded as material for purposes 
of the disclosure requirements in the final rule if the information's 
omission or misstatement could change or influence the assessment or 
decision of a user relying on that information for the purpose of 
making investment decisions. This approach is consistent with the 
disclosure requirements under the Board's regulatory capital rules and 
the LCR public disclosure requirement.\239\
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    \239\ See 12 CFR 217.62, 217.172 and ``Regulatory Capital Rules: 
Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, 
Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized 
Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure 
Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and 
Market Risk Capital Rule,'' 78 FR 62018, 62129 (October 11, 2013); 
12 CFR 249.91(d) and ``Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Public Disclosure 
Requirements; Extension of Compliance Period for Certain Companies 
to Meet the Liquidity Coverage Ratio Requirements,'' 81 FR 94922, 
94926 (December 27, 2016).
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    As noted above, the proposed rule would have required a company to 
provide a qualitative discussion of its NSFR and included an 
illustrative list of potentially relevant items that a company could 
discuss, to the extent relevant to its NSFR. Among the illustrative 
list of potentially relevant items was an item titled ``Other sources 
of funding or other factors in the net stable funding ratio calculation 
that the covered depository institution holding company considers to be 
relevant to facilitate an understanding of its liquidity profile.'' The 
Board has determined that this item would have been redundant given the 
proposed rule's general requirement that a covered holding company must 
provide a qualitative discussion of its NSFR. For this reason, the 
final rule eliminates this example.
    Disclosure requirements under the LCR rule also include a 
qualitative disclosure section.\240\ Given that the proposed rule and 
the LCR rule would be complementary quantitative liquidity 
requirements, a company subject to both disclosure requirements would 
have been permitted to combine the two qualitative disclosures, as long 
as the specific qualitative disclosure requirements of each are 
satisfied. In response to a comment that the Board received on the 
proposed rule for the LCR public disclosure requirements suggesting 
that required qualitative disclosures include an exemption for certain 
confidential or proprietary information, the final LCR public 
disclosure rule clarified that a firm subject to that rule is not 
required to include in its qualitative disclosures any information that 
is proprietary or confidential.\241\ Instead, the covered holding 
company is only required to disclose general information about those 
subjects and provide a reason why the specific information has not been 
disclosed. To maintain consistency between the qualitative disclosure 
requirements of the LCR and final rules, the final rule does not 
require a covered holding company to include in the qualitative 
disclosure for its NSFR any information that is proprietary or 
confidential so long as the company discloses general information about 
the non-disclosed subject and provides a specific reason why the 
information is not being disclosed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ 81 FR 94922.
    \241\ 81 FR at 94926.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Frequency and Timing of Disclosure

    The proposed rule would have required a company to provide timely 
public disclosures after each calendar quarter. One commenter argued 
that the frequency of the required disclosure should be increased to 
daily because market participants need more timely information to 
adequately adjust their risk management and business activities based 
on the liquidity risk of companies. The commenter also argued that 
quarterly NSFR disclosures could increase market instability relative 
to more frequent disclosures, because, the commenter argued, large 
changes in a company's NSFR between quarters would be more disruptive 
to the market compared to more frequent disclosures that revealed 
smaller incremental changes to a company's NSFR. Finally, the commenter 
argued that more frequent disclosure would make it more difficult for a 
company to engage in ``window dressing'' its NSFR to create the 
appearance that its liquidity profile is more stable than the company 
normally maintains.
    Like the proposed rule, the final rule requires public disclosures 
for each calendar quarter. However, in a change from the proposal, the 
quarterly NSFR disclosures are required to be reported on a semiannual 
basis for every second and fourth calendar quarter. For example, 
following the end of the second quarter of 2023, covered holding 
companies are required to publicly disclose their NSFRs and ASF and RSF 
components for the first quarter of 2023 and the second quarter of 
2023. This approach balances the benefits of quarterly disclosures, 
which includes allowing market participants and other parties to assess 
the funding risk profiles of covered holding companies, with the 
concerns that more frequent disclosure could result in unintended 
consequences. The Board will continue to assess the potential effects 
that public disclosures have on the ability of banking organizations to 
engage in banking activities that support the economy, especially in 
times of stress. The Board will work with international groups, such as 
the BCBS, as part of its continuing evaluation of the efficacy of 
timely public disclosures.
    For supervisory purposes, the Board will continue to monitor on a 
more frequent basis any changes to a covered holding company's 
liquidity profile through the information submitted on the FR 2052a 
report.\242\
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    \242\ The Board will issue a separate proposal for notice and 
comment to amend its information collection under its FR 2052a to 
collect information and data related to the requirements of the 
final rule.
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    As noted above, the proposed rule would have required a company 
subject to the proposed requirements to publicly disclose, in a direct 
and prominent manner, the required information on its public internet 
site or in its public financial or other public regulatory reports. The 
Board requires that the disclosures be readily accessible to the 
general public for a period of at least five years after the disclosure 
date.

[[Page 9194]]

The Board received no comments on this aspect of the proposed rule and 
are including it in the final rule without modification.
    Under the proposed rule, the first reporting period for which a 
company would have been required to disclose its NSFR and its 
components would have been the calendar quarter that begins on the date 
the company becomes subject to the proposed NSFR requirement. Several 
commenters suggested that companies be given additional time to comply 
with disclosure and reporting requirements after becoming subject to 
the final rule. In addition, one commenter suggested that the 
disclosure requirements not be effective until at least two years after 
a final NSFR rule is adopted. Some argued that companies need 
additional time to build and implement the data collection systems 
necessary to meet the NSFR disclosure requirements. Other commenters 
argued that companies need additional time to align their existing 
liquidity data reporting processes under the FR 2052a and the LCR 
public disclosure requirements with those required for the NSFR rule. 
Another commenter also argued that additional time is necessary to 
allow the Board to clarify, through interpretation, the definitions of 
various terms used in the LCR rule and the proposed NSFR, and to allow 
companies to modify their compliance systems consistent with such 
interpretations.
    To allow covered holding companies sufficient time to modify their 
reporting and compliance systems, the final rule does not require 
covered holding companies to provide public NSFR disclosures until the 
first calendar quarter that includes the date that is 18 months after 
the covered holding company becomes subject to the NSFR 
requirement.\243\ This means that covered holding companies that are 
subject to the final rule beginning on the effective date of July 1, 
2021, are required to make public disclosures for the first and second 
quarters of 2023 approximately 45 days after the end of the second 
quarter of 2023.
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    \243\ The LCR rule similarly does not require covered holding 
companies to provide public LCR disclosures until the first calendar 
quarter that includes the date that is 18 months after the covered 
holding company becomes subject to the LCR rule. 12 CFR 249.90(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the Supplementary Information section of the 
proposed rule, the timing of disclosures required under the Federal 
banking laws may not always coincide with the timing of disclosures 
required under other Federal laws, including disclosures required under 
the Federal securities laws. For calendar quarters that do not 
correspond to a company's fiscal year or quarter end, under the 
proposals the Board would have considered those disclosures that are 
made within 45 days of the end of the calendar quarter (or within 60 
days for the limited purpose of the company's first reporting period in 
which it is subject to the proposed rule's disclosure requirements) as 
timely. In general, where a company's fiscal year end coincides with 
the end of a calendar quarter, the Board would have considered 
disclosures to be timely if they are made no later than the applicable 
SEC disclosure deadline for the corresponding Form 10-K annual report. 
In cases where a company's fiscal year end does not coincide with the 
end of a calendar quarter, the Board would have considered the 
timeliness of disclosures on a case-by-case basis.
    This approach to timely disclosures is consistent with the approach 
to public disclosures that the Board has taken in the context of other 
regulatory reporting and disclosure requirements. For example, the 
Board has used the same indicia of timeliness with respect to the 
public disclosures required under its regulatory capital rules and the 
LCR public disclosure requirements.\244\ The Board did not receive any 
comments regarding this aspect of the proposed rule, and the final rule 
includes it as proposed.
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    \244\ See 78 FR 62018, 62129 (capital); 12 CFR 249.94 (LCR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

X. Impact Assessment

A. Impact on Funding

    The agencies analyzed the potential impact of the final rule on the 
funding structure of covered companies and estimated the potential 
increase in funding costs for covered companies. In addition, the 
impact analysis considered the potential costs and benefits of an 
alternative policy of incorporating a small RSF requirement for level 1 
liquid assets and certain short-term secured lending transactions with 
financial sector counterparties secured by level 1 liquid assets. 
Finally, this section presents responses to impact-related comments 
received on the NSFR proposed rule.
    The agencies used bank funding data from the second quarter of 2020 
to obtain the latest available view of the impact of the final rule. 
While the second quarter of 2020 represents a period of macroeconomic 
stress as a result of economic disruptions related to the COVID-19 
pandemic, the banking system was healthy and bank funding markets 
remained open and functioning, partly due to the establishment of 
facilities by the Board that supported market functioning and provision 
of credit to households and businesses.\245\ The impact of the final 
rule could vary through the economic and credit cycle based on the 
liquidity profile of a covered company's assets and appetite for 
funding risk. However, the agencies expect the impact of the final rule 
to be broadly similar if estimated using assets, commitments, and 
liabilities data from periods immediately preceding the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ Short-term funding markets experienced a period of 
significant stress in March 2020 that was alleviated by financial 
and economic policy interventions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies approximated ASF and RSF amounts at the consolidated 
level for covered companies that would be subject to the full or 
reduced NSFR requirement, as applicable, to estimate stable funding 
shortfalls and excesses. These estimates were based on confidential 
supervisory data collected on the FR 2052a report and publicly 
available data from the FR Y-9C. As the available regulatory reports do 
not correspond perfectly to the final rule's categories of assets, 
commitments, and liabilities to which RSF and ASF factors are assigned, 
the estimation entailed the use of staff judgment, which may introduce 
some measurement error and hence, uncertainty into the estimates.
    The scope of application for the final rule includes 20 banking 
organizations, 11 of which would be Category III banking organizations 
subject to a reduced NSFR requirement.\246\ Additionally, 27 depository 
institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets that 
are consolidated subsidiaries of the 20 banking organizations described 
above are also covered by the final rule. The initial proposal would 
have included a broader set of covered companies, but the agencies 
subsequently established a modified scope as part of their recent 
efforts to tailor regulations for domestic and foreign banks to more 
closely match their risk profiles.\247\ The final rule

[[Page 9195]]

aligns its scope of application with the LCR rule.
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    \246\ Eleven banking organizations that would be subject to 
Category III standards that have less than $75 billion in average 
weighted short-term wholesale funding and would be subject to a 
reduced NSFR requirement calibrated at 85 percent.
    \247\ As described above in Supplementary Information section 
III, the tailoring proposals would have modified the scope of 
application of the LCR rule and the proposed NSFR rule to apply to 
certain U.S. banking organizations and U.S. intermediate holding 
companies of foreign banking organizations, each with $100 billion 
or more in total consolidated assets, together with certain of their 
depository institution subsidiaries. In 2019, the agencies adopted a 
tailoring final rule that amended the scope of the LCR rule. See 
``Changes to Applicability Thresholds for Regulatory Capital and 
Liquidity Requirements,'' 84 FR 59230.
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    Using the approach described above, and assuming uncertainty of 5 
percent in the NSFR due to measurement errors and management buffers, 
the agencies estimate that nearly all of these covered companies would 
be in compliance with the applicable NSFR requirement in the second 
quarter of 2020. The agencies estimate that a small number of GSIBs 
subject to the full NSFR could face an expected NSFR shortfall. The 
total shortfall is estimated to be $10 to $31 billion of stable 
funding. The agencies' estimates of shortfalls at these individual 
covered companies range from a negligible amount to 8 percent of the 
company's current level of ASF of their estimated NSFR. Beyond this 
small number of companies with shortfalls, the additional change in 
stable funding necessary to comply with the final rule at other covered 
companies, including all depository institution subsidiaries, is zero. 
Considering all banking organizations that would be subject to the 
final rule, the agencies estimate that there is a total ASF of $8.5 
trillion, a $1.3 trillion surplus over the total RSF.
    As the final rule has differential effects on the use of funding of 
different tenors, the agencies studied the effect of the final rule on 
overall bank funding costs. The agencies do not expect most covered 
companies to incur an increase in funding costs to comply with the NSFR 
requirements. Across the companies with possible NSFR shortfalls, the 
agencies estimate that the annual funding costs of raising additional 
stable funding ranges from $80 to $250 million. For the individual 
companies, estimates of the funding costs range from a negligible 
amount to about 3 percent of net income from the third quarter of 2019 
to the second quarter of 2020. The cost estimate assumes companies with 
a shortfall would elect to eliminate it by replacing liabilities that 
are assigned a lower ASF factor with longer maturity liabilities that 
are assigned a higher ASF factor. This cost is based on an estimated 
difference in relative interest expense between 90 day AA-rated 
commercial paper (assigned a zero percent ASF factor) and unsecured 
debt that matures in one year (assigned a 100 percent ASF factor). The 
estimated difference is approximately 80 basis points, based on the 
average cost difference between these two sources of funding from 
January 2002 to February 2020.
    Covered companies have multiple avenues by which to adjust their 
funding sources to increase their NSFRs, such as raising more retail 
deposits, raising capital, or lengthening funding terms. In general, 
covered companies would be expected to adjust to changes in regulation 
in a manner that provides the most favorable tradeoff between revenues 
and the cost of compliance. For this analysis, the agencies assumed 
that covered companies would resolve any NSFR shortfall by increasing 
their use of 12-month term funding, which is the shortest term that 
qualifies for a 100 percent ASF factor, and thus is a good proxy for 
the lowest cost way of resolving an NSFR shortfall through additional 
funding.
    Instead of changing their funding mix to increase available stable 
funding, covered companies with a stable funding shortfall could 
instead change their asset mix to reduce their required stable funding. 
Covered companies may do so if the forgone revenues from such assets 
are smaller than the cost of raising additional stable funding. In this 
scenario, the costs incurred by covered companies would be even smaller 
than the agencies' estimates. Due to the depth and competitiveness of 
U.S. financial markets, such portfolio changes, if they were to occur, 
would likely have little knock-on effects on households and businesses.
    Maintaining stable funding requirements may reduce the risk of 
covered company failure and the vulnerability of the financial system 
more broadly. To assess this, the agencies examined measures of stable 
funding for financial institutions leading up to and during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. The agencies found that, during the crisis, 
financial institutions that held low amounts of stable funding were 
significantly more likely to fail, be resolved, or receive liquidity 
and funding assistance from federal programs such as the FDIC's 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. This analysis indicates that the 
final rule is likely to increase the overall resilience of the banking 
system.
    To assess changes since the financial crisis, the agencies examined 
broad measures of funding stability, including the loans-to-deposits 
ratio and an approximation of the NSFR that, unlike the more precise 
measure used to estimate the shortfall, can be calculated back to the 
mid-2000's. These measures show clear improvement since the mid-2000's. 
Much of this improvement appeared soon after the financial crisis, 
potentially reflecting the combined effects of the post-crisis 
regulatory reforms as well as the release of the BCBS's draft NSFR 
standard in 2010. These broader improvements in funding stability 
suggest that the total adjustments that banking organizations have made 
in response to the NSFR standard and proposed rule may be greater than 
the stable funding shortfalls suggested by the most recent data.
    To assess changes in stable funding since the NSFR notice of 
proposed rulemaking, the agencies compared the stable funding shortfall 
under the proposed rule, estimated at the time of the proposed rule 
(December 2015), and the stable funding shortfall under the final rule. 
Under the proposed rule, the agencies estimated an aggregate stable 
funding shortfall of $39 billion as of December 2015. The agencies 
estimate that, as of June 2020 under the final rule, the shortfall is 
between $10 and $31 billion, or a difference of $8 to $29 billion from 
the proposed rule in December 2015.\248\ This difference is similar to 
the difference in stable funding requirements caused by the changes in 
the RSF factors in the final rule for level 1 high quality liquid 
assets and gross derivative liabilities from the proposal. The agencies 
estimate that the aggregate required stable funding needed by banking 
organizations to comply with the NSFR would have been $28 to $65 
billion had these changes not been implemented. The comparable figures 
suggest that the change in the shortfall from the proposal to the final 
rule is comparable to the isolated impact of the changes implemented in 
the final rule. More broadly, the historical perspective suggests that 
the final rule will help lock in the gains in funding stability made 
since the financial crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ The agencies have explored the methodological differences 
between the proposal and final rule estimates and concluded these 
differences likely would not substantially affect the estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Costs and Benefits of an RSF Factor for Level 1 HQLA, Both Held 
Outright and as Collateral for Short-Term Lending Transactions

    The final rule establishes a zero percent RSF factor for level 1 
liquid assets held outright and short-term secured lending transactions 
with financial sector counterparties that are secured by level 1 high 
quality liquid assets. The agencies analyzed the costs and benefits of 
an alternate policy of a 5 percent RSF factor for such assets. As 
discussed above, the agencies estimated that the marginal cost of 
additional stable funding is about 80 basis points.\249\ Based on this 
estimate, the

[[Page 9196]]

agencies predict that covered companies with an NSFR shortfall would 
have to incur an annual cost of about four basis points for each dollar 
of level 1 liquid assets needed to comply with a 5 percent stable 
funding requirement.\250\ For such a covered company, the increase in 
funding costs due to a 5 percent RSF factor on level 1 liquid assets 
would offset about 3 percent of interest revenues on U.S. Treasury and 
Agency securities and about 2 percent of interest revenues on reverse 
repurchase agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ The agencies also analyzed the costs and benefits of a 10 
percent RSF factor for short-term secured lending transactions to 
financial sector counterparties, and came to the same conclusion as 
with the 5 percent RSF factor. This reflects the fact that a higher 
RSF factor on these assets increases both the associated costs and 
benefits,
    \250\ A stable funding requirement of 5 percent multiplied by an 
80 basis points stable funding annual premium equals an annual cost 
of four basis points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By reducing the profitability of holding these assets, the funding 
cost of a non-zero RSF factor on level 1 liquid assets could discourage 
intermediation in U.S. Treasury and repo markets by covered companies 
that have an NSFR close to or below 100 percent or are concerned that 
they could have an NSFR below 100 percent under stress. To the extent 
that higher costs discourage private sector intermediation in these 
markets, these costs could reduce intermediation activity. Robust 
intermediation activity is seen as beneficial to the smooth functioning 
of these key components of the financial system. During past periods of 
significant market stress or impaired liquidity, the Federal Reserve 
has taken actions to support the smooth functioning of the markets for 
Treasury securities and short-term U.S. dollar funding markets. These 
actions have been taken to prevent strains in the Treasury market from 
impeding the flow of credit in the economy or to mitigate the risk that 
money market pressures could adversely affect monetary policy 
implementation.
    In addition, a non-zero RSF factor for level 1 liquid assets would 
make it more costly for covered companies to hold level 1 liquid assets 
than to hold central bank reserves, which have a zero percent RSF 
factor. The differential treatment of these assets, which count equally 
towards HQLA requirements under the LCR rule, may increase demand for 
central bank reserves relative to other level 1 liquid assets. Having a 
range of high-quality assets that can serve as near substitutes for 
each other allows more flexibility in monetary policy implementation 
and supports banking organizations' ability to manage liquidity risks 
efficiently as the supply of these different asset types varies over 
time, further supporting smooth market functioning.
    The agencies identified two benefits of a small RSF requirement on 
level 1 liquid assets. The first benefit is that the stable funding 
requirement would help insulate covered companies against sharp price 
declines of level 1 liquid assets. Such price declines might put 
liquidity pressure on covered companies by triggering collateral and 
margin calls, and, in more severe cases, fire sales. Although level 1 
liquid assets are less volatile and more liquid than other securities, 
selling large quantities of them in a short period can depress their 
price further. In particular, using BrokerTec data, the agencies 
estimated that the price impact of selling $100 million of on-the-run 
U.S. Treasury securities ranges from 2 to 13 basis points during 
financial market stress. A small RSF requirement on level 1 liquid 
assets would ensure that covered companies fund a small portion of 
these securities from stable sources, which could ease the liquidity 
pressure caused by price declines and thus potentially reduce the need 
for Federal Reserve liquidity support in times of stress.
    The second benefit of a small RSF requirement is that it would 
insulate covered companies against the systemic risk associated with 
the interconnectedness of short-term financing positions secured by 
level 1 liquid assets. In particular, covered companies may want to 
provide short-term financing to counterparties during financial market 
stress to preserve client relationships, thus maintaining a set of 
interconnected positions. In the event of counterparty default, covered 
companies might be forced to sell the level 1 liquid asset collateral 
securing these positions to be able to perform on their short-term 
obligations. However, unwinding such interconnected positions could 
potentially put further liquidity stress on both covered companies and 
short-term financing markets, especially during periods of stress. 
Importantly, the agencies found that, over the last 15 years, there 
were several episodes where the typical 1 to 2 percent haircuts used in 
U.S. Treasury repurchase agreements did not provide sufficient 
protection against day-to-day losses on U.S. Treasury securities. A 
small RSF requirement would incentivize covered companies to fund level 
1 liquid assets with more stable funding, which would reduce the risks 
associated with interconnected short-term financing positions.
    After considering the above costs and benefits, importantly 
including the concern that a small RSF requirement could interfere with 
the functioning of U.S. Treasury and repo markets by disincentivizing 
covered companies from acting as intermediaries, the agencies are 
adopting as part of the final rule a zero percent RSF factor for level 
1 liquid assets held as securities and for short-term secured lending 
transactions secured by level 1 liquid assets.

C. Response to Comments

    The agencies received many comments concerning the potential impact 
of the proposal, most of which argued that the cost of the proposal 
would have been greater than predicted by the agencies. Commenters 
argued the impact of the NSFR alone and together with other more 
recently finalized regulations would have adverse impacts on banking 
activities, markets, and the real economy. For example, one commenter 
argued that the NSFR would further reduce the ability of covered 
companies to act as financial intermediaries, extend credit, promote 
price discovery, and conduct segregation and custody of client assets, 
which the commenters argued has already been reduced by recent 
regulation, including the SLR rule and the GSIB capital surcharge rule. 
This commenter also argued that the NSFR would reduce liquidity in the 
markets for securities, raise costs for derivatives end-users, make 
pricing less efficient, and result in a sunk cost to covered companies 
in the form of a liquidity buffer. The commenter further argued that 
the increase in costs to covered companies stemming from the NSFR could 
be passed on to a covered company's clients. The commenters noted that 
the predicted cost of the Basel NSFR standard has been cited by other 
jurisdictions as justification to change the standard, and that the 
agencies should consider changes to reduce the costs of the proposal.
    In regard to commenters' concerns that the proposal would decrease 
financial intermediation, reduce market liquidity, and increase costs 
to customers, the estimates from the analysis demonstrated that nearly 
all covered companies are already in compliance with their NSFR 
requirements, and there is a substantial surplus of ASF in excess of 
RSF across covered companies at an aggregate level. The agencies also 
studied the effect of the final rule on overall bank funding costs and 
do not expect most covered companies to incur an increase in funding 
costs to comply with the final NSFR requirements. As such, the final 
rule would not require further changes by most covered companies to 
comply with the rule, limiting adverse effects on financial 
intermediation or market liquidity.

[[Page 9197]]

    In developing the final rule, the agencies considered commenters' 
concerns regarding potential costs of specific aspects of the NSFR, and 
in some cases have made certain targeted changes that reduce potential 
negative impacts on covered companies. For example, the proposal set 
the RSF factors for level 1 liquid asset securities held outright and 
short-term reverse repos secured by level 1 liquid assets to 5 percent 
and 10 percent, respectively. The final rule establishes a zero percent 
RSF factor for both level 1 liquid asset securities held outright and 
short-term reverse repos secured by level 1 liquid assets, in part to 
avoid disincentivizing covered companies from U.S. Treasury and repo 
market intermediation. The proposal also required a 20 percent RSF add-
on factor for gross derivatives liabilities. Many commenters expressed 
concerns that this treatment would reduce the willingness of covered 
companies to act as derivatives counterparties and could thus aggravate 
financial market liquidity stress. The final rule establishes a 5 
percent RSF add-on factor for gross derivatives liabilities to take 
these concerns into account. The change in the RSF factor from 20 
percent to 5 percent reduces estimated aggregate RSF by $77 billion, or 
1 percent of the estimated total RSF.
    Commenters also asserted that the agencies had insufficient data to 
estimate the impact of the NSFR on covered companies. The agencies note 
that the impact analysis for the final rule used publicly available FR 
Y-9C report data and confidential data from the FR 2052a report data 
from the second quarter of 2020, which is the most up-to-date and 
comprehensive information on covered companies.\251\ Although the 
confidential supervisory and publicly available data in the analysis 
does not perfectly correspond to the categories of assets, commitments, 
and liabilities used in the final rule, the data is sufficient to 
construct informative estimates in the impact analysis.
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    \251\ The impact analysis reported in the proposal used a 
different data collection that was less comprehensive in its 
coverage of banking companies covered by the NSFR, and less detailed 
in its description of balance sheet items.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies also received comments suggesting that a point-in-time 
estimate of the amount of ASF relative to RSF, as provided above, is an 
inadequate measure of the economic effect of the NSFR. In particular, 
the commenters argued that the NSFR fluctuates over the business cycle 
because categories with high RSF factors, such as nonperforming assets 
and gross derivatives liabilities, tend to increase during economic 
downturns. The commenters expressed concerns that, as a result, the 
NSFR requirement could have pro-cyclical effects. The agencies partly 
address this concern by reducing the RSF factor for gross derivative 
liabilities from 20 percent to 5 percent. In addition, the agencies 
note that the NSFR of nearly all covered companies increased over the 
first half of 2020, while nonperforming assets and gross derivative 
liabilities increased for most covered companies. Notably, this 
increase in the NSFR was partly driven by the inflow of retail deposits 
at covered companies, which was similar to the inflow of retail 
deposits during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Therefore, 
the available empirical evidence currently available suggests that 
retail deposit inflows can partially counteract the potential pro-
cyclicality of the NSFR requirement on covered companies during 
economic downturns.
    One commenter agreed with the agencies' statement in the 
Supplementary Information section to the proposal that even a slight 
reduction in the probability of another financial crisis would far 
outweigh the additional costs of the proposal. This commenter cites a 
study showing that the estimated cost of the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
was greater than $20 trillion.\252\ The BCBS finds banking crises 
typically have smaller but still very large cumulative discounted costs 
of 20 to 60 percent of GDP, which translates to a total cost of $4 to 
$12 trillion.\253\ The final rule promotes safety and soundness by 
protecting covered companies against an extended period of liquidity 
and market stress by mandating a minimum amount of stable funding 
commensurate to the liquidity risks of their assets and certain 
contingent exposures.
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    \252\ Better Markets, The Cost of the Crisis: $20 Trillion and 
Counting (2015).
    \253\ The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an Assessment 
of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity 
Requirements (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters questioned whether the impact assessment in the 
proposal adequately accounts for costs to the intermediate holding 
companies of foreign banking organizations, noting that the impact 
assessment was developed prior to the finalization of the requirement 
that certain foreign banking organizations form an intermediate holding 
company in the United States under the Board's enhanced prudential 
standards rule. The commenters asserted that this timing likely 
resulted in the impact assessment in the proposal not including or 
underestimating the impact to intermediate holding companies. The 
impact analysis in the final rule considered all covered companies, 
including intermediate holding companies, using data from the second 
quarter of 2020.

XI. Effective Dates and Transitions

A. Effective Dates

    Under the proposed rule, the NSFR requirement would have been 
effective as of January 1, 2018. At the time the proposal was issued in 
April 2016, the agencies set this effective date to provide covered 
companies with sufficient time to adjust to the requirements of the 
proposal, including to make any changes to ensure their assets, 
derivative exposures, and commitments are stably funded and to adjust 
information systems to calculate and monitor their NSFR ratios. The 
NSFR is a balance-sheet metric and its calculations would generally be 
based on the carrying value, as determined under GAAP, of a covered 
company's assets, liabilities, and equity. As a result, covered 
companies should generally be able to leverage current financial 
reporting systems to comply with the NSFR requirement.
    Under the proposed rule, the updated definitions were set to become 
effective for purposes of the LCR rule at the beginning of the calendar 
quarter after finalization of the proposed NSFR rule, instead of on 
January 1, 2018. The agencies proposed that revisions to definitions in 
the LCR rule become effective sooner than the proposed NSFR effective 
date because they would enhance the clarity of certain definitions used 
in the LCR rule. Several commenters requested additional time to adjust 
the revised LCR definitions into their liquidity compliance systems. 
One commenter requested at least 180 days after the final rule is 
published for the revised LCR definitions to be effective. Another 
commenter requested that the Board issue additional guidance on how the 
revised definitions should be incorporated into FR 2052a reporting 
requirements prior to implementation of the final rule, particularly 
the definitions of ``secured funding'' and ``secured lending.''
    Many commenters requested that the January 1, 2018 effective date 
be delayed to provide covered companies additional time to achieve 
compliance with the NSFR requirement. For example, one commenter 
requested that the effective date be delayed to at least January 2020. 
One commenter argued that the agencies should take additional time to 
better understand the multiple new regulatory initiatives, including

[[Page 9198]]

proposed and potential total loss absorbing capacity requirements, 
before introducing a new NSFR requirement. Commenters argued that 
covered companies should be given additional time to build and update 
internal reporting systems and comply with public disclosure 
requirements given their ongoing work to implement existing 
requirements under the LCR rule and the Board's FR 2052a reporting 
form.\254\ These commenters asserted that covered companies required 
additional time beyond 2018 to develop necessary staffing, management, 
compliance, and information technology resources. Some commenters also 
noted that certain covered companies would likely require additional 
time to make structural adjustments to their balance sheets to be in 
compliance with the NSFR requirement and other pending rulemakings. One 
commenter suggested that the final rule should be implemented in three 
transitional phrases consisting of a study of the cumulative impacts of 
existing post-crisis regulatory reforms on the economy, finalizing the 
NSFR with an initial ratio of ASF to RSF of 0.70, and adjusting the 
NSFR requirement to 1.0 only for certain of the largest banking 
organizations.\255\ The commenter also suggested that the agencies 
should not implement beyond the first phase if they find that economic 
impacts are not minimal or the rule is found to be ineffective. Another 
commenter suggested that the treatment for derivatives should be 
instituted through a phased-in transition to better align with the 
agencies' margin requirements for non-cleared swaps.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ On November 17, 2015, the Board adopted the revised FR 
2052a report to collect quantitative information on selected assets, 
liabilities, funding activities, and contingent liabilities from 
certain large banking organizations.
    \255\ https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/large-institution-supervision.htm.
    \256\ See 12 CFR 45.1(e) (OCC); 12 CFR 237.1(e) (Board); 12 CFR 
349.1(e) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters' concerns and in light of the revised 
date on which the agencies are finalizing the NSFR rule, the agencies 
are revising the final rule to require covered companies to maintain an 
NSFR of 1.0 beginning on July 1, 2021. This effective date provides 
sufficient time for covered companies to take into account the new 
requirement and, as necessary, to make infrastructure and operational 
adjustments that may be required to comply with the final rule. To the 
extent a covered company is required to change its funding profile to 
comply with the final rule, the effective date should be sufficient to 
allow the firm to assess the prevailing market conditions to achieve 
optimal results.
    The final rule also adopts an effective date of July 1, 2021 for 
revisions to definitions currently used in the LCR rule. The effective 
date for revisions to the definitions in the LCR rule is appropriate, 
as the revisions will provide additional clarity on the meaning of such 
terms. In addition, covered companies will be able to modify their 
compliance systems to incorporate the revised definitions by the 
effective date, especially since the revisions will likely require 
covered companies to make adjustments to their existing systems and not 
require covered companies to develop entirely new systems.

B. Transitions

1. Initial Transitions for Banking Organizations That Become Subject to 
NSFR Rule After the Effective Date
    Under the tailoring proposals, a banking organization that would 
have become subject to the LCR rule or proposed rule after the 
effective date of the final rule would have been required to comply 
with the LCR rule or proposed rule on the first day of the second 
quarter after the banking organization became subject to it (newly 
covered banking organizations), consistent with the amount of time 
previously provided under the LCR rule or proposed rule.
    Some commenters requested additional time to comply with the LCR 
rule, and the tailoring final rule provided an additional quarter to 
comply for newly covered banking organizations to comply with the LCR 
rule. Consistent with the LCR rule, the final rule provides an 
additional quarter to comply with the final rule, such that a newly 
covered company will be required to comply with these requirements on 
the first day of the third quarter after becoming subject to these 
requirements. A covered company becomes subject to the NSFR based on 
its category of applicable standards. A covered company's category is 
determined based on risk-based indicators as reported on its Call 
Report, FR Y-9LP or FR Y-15, or on averages of such reported items.
2. Transitions for Changes to an NSFR Requirement
    Under the tailoring proposals, a banking organization subject to 
the LCR rule or proposed rule that becomes subject to a higher outflow 
or required stable funding adjustment percentage would have been able 
to continue using a lower calibration for one quarter. A banking 
organization that becomes subject to a lower outflow or required stable 
funding adjustment percentage at a quarter end would have been able to 
use the lower percentage immediately, as of the first day of the 
subsequent quarter. Some commenters requested longer transitions before 
a banking organization is required to meet an increased LCR 
requirement.
    The tailoring final rule provided an additional quarter in the LCR 
rule to continue to use a lower outflow adjustment percentage after a 
banking organization becomes subject to a higher outflow adjustment 
percentage, but retained the one quarter transition period for a 
banking organization that transitions to a lower outflow adjustment 
percentage. Consistent with the LCR rule, the final rule allows a 
covered company an additional quarter to continue using a lower 
required stable funding adjustment percentage after becoming subject to 
a higher required stable funding adjustment percentage.\257\ The 
agencies are finalizing the transition period for a banking 
organization that transitions to a lower required stable funding 
adjustment percentage as proposed. A depository institution subsidiary 
with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets must begin 
complying on the same dates as its top-tier banking organization.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ Section __.105 of the final rule assigns required stable 
funding adjustment percentages to banking organizations based on 
their category of standards and amount of average weighted short-
term wholesale funding. A banking organization's category and 
average weighted short-term wholesale funding are deemed to change 
during the quarter in which the banking organization files the 
reporting form demonstrating it meets the definition of a new 
category or its level of average weighted short-term wholesale 
funding triggers an increased or decreased required stable funding 
adjustment percentage under section __.105 of the final rule. 
Accordingly, the banking organization is deemed to be subject to a 
new required stable funding adjustment percentage in the quarter 
during which the relevant information (used to determine category 
eligibility or level of average weighted short-term wholesale 
funding) is reported. For example, if a banking organization subject 
to Category III standards and an 85 percent required stable funding 
adjustment percentage subsequently files an FR Y-15 during the 
fourth quarter of a calendar year (representing a September 30 as-of 
reporting date) that reports an amount of weighted short-term 
wholesale funding such that the banking organization's average 
weighted short-term wholesale funding is $75 billion or more, the 
banking organization would be deemed to be subject to the higher 
required stable funding adjustment percentage (100 percent) as of 
the fourth quarter of that calendar year. Such a banking 
organization would have a two-quarter transition period and be 
required to comply with the higher adjustment percentage by the 
first day of the third calendar quarter of the next calendar year 
(July 1st).
    \258\ See supra note 19.

[[Page 9199]]



        Table 6--Example Dates for Changes to an NSFR Requirement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Continue to apply
                                  prior required     Apply new required
                                  stable funding       stable funding
                                    adjustment     adjustment percentage
                                    percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example 1:
    Banking organization that   1st and 2nd        Beginning July 1,
     becomes subject to a        quarter of 2024.   2024.
     higher required stable
     funding adjustment
     percentage as of December
     31, 2023,\259\ as a
     result of having an
     average weighted-short-
     term wholesale funding
     level of greater than $75
     billion based on the four
     prior calendar quarters.
Example 2:
    Covered subsidiary          No prior           Comply with required
     depository institution of   requirement.       stable funding
     banking organization that                      adjustment
     moves from Category IV to                      percentage
     another category as of                         applicable to new
     December 31, 2023.                             category beginning
                                                    July 1, 2024.
Example 3:
    Banking organization that   1st quarter of     Beginning April 1,
     becomes subject to a        2024.              2024.
     lower required stable
     funding adjustment
     percentage as of December
     31, 2023, as a result of
     having an average
     weighted-short-term
     wholesale funding level
     of less than $75 billion
     based on the four prior
     calendar quarters.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Reservation of Authority To Extend Transitions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ That is, the banking organization filed reports in the 4th 
quarter of 2023 (as of September 30 report date) demonstrating that 
it had an average weighted-short-term wholesale funding level of 
greater than $75 billion during the four prior calendar quarters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule includes a reservation of authority that provides 
the agencies with the flexibility to extend transitions for banking 
organizations where warranted by events and circumstances. There may be 
limited circumstances where a banking organization needs a longer 
transition period. For example, an extension may be appropriate when 
unusual or unforeseen circumstances, such as a merger with another 
entity, cause a banking organization to become subject to an NSFR 
requirement for the first time. However, the agencies expect that this 
authority would be exercised in limited situations, consistent with 
prior practice.
4. Cessation of Applicability
    Under the tailoring proposals, once a banking organization became 
subject to an LCR or proposed NSFR requirement, it would have remained 
subject to the rule until the appropriate agency determined that 
application of the rule would not be appropriate in light of the 
banking organization's asset size, level of complexity, risk profile, 
or scope of operations. The tailoring final rule repealed this 
provision in the LCR rule because the revised scope of application 
framework made this cessation provision unnecessary. Consistent with 
the LCR rule, the agencies are repealing this provision in the final 
rule. A banking organization that no longer meets the relevant criteria 
for being subject to the final rule will not be required to comply with 
the final rule.

XII. Administrative Law Matters

A. Congressional Review Act

    For purposes of the Congressional Review Act, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) makes a determination as to whether a final 
rule constitutes a ``major'' rule.\260\ If a rule is deemed a ``major 
rule'' by the OMB, the Congressional Review Act generally provides that 
the rule may not take effect until at least 60 days following its 
publication.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
    \261\ 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Congressional Review Act defines a ``major rule'' as any rule 
that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs of the OMB finds has resulted in or is likely to result in (A) 
an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; (B) a major 
increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, 
Federal, State, or local government agencies or geographic regions; or 
(C) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, 
productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based 
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and 
export markets.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As required by the Congressional Review Act, the agencies will 
submit the final rule and other appropriate reports to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office for review.

B. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,\263\ requires the 
Federal banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and 
final rules published after January 1, 2000. The agencies sought to 
present the final rule in a simple and straightforward manner and did 
not receive any comments on the use of plain language in the proposed 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ Public Law 106-102, sec. 722, 113 Stat. 1338, 1471 (1999), 
12 U.S.C. 4809.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act \264\ (RFA) generally requires an 
agency to either provide a regulatory flexibility analysis with a final 
rule or to certify that the final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The U.S. 
Small Business Administration (SBA) establishes size standards that 
define which entities are small businesses for purposes of the 
RFA.\265\ Except as otherwise specified below, the size standard to be 
considered a small business for banking entities subject to the final 
rule is $600 million or less in consolidated assets.\266\ In accordance 
with section 3(a) of the RFA, the Board is publishing a regulatory 
flexibility analysis with respect to the final rule. The OCC and FDIC 
are certifying that

[[Page 9200]]

the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \265\ U.S. SBA, Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched 
to North American Industry Classification System Codes, available at 
https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards.
    \266\ See id. Pursuant to SBA regulations, the asset size of a 
concern includes the assets of the concern whose size is at issue 
and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates. 13 CFR 121.103(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Board
    Based on its analysis and for the reasons stated below, the Board 
believes that the final rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    The final rule is intended to implement a quantitative liquidity 
requirement applicable for certain bank holding companies, savings and 
loan holding companies, and state member banks.
    Under regulations issued by the Small Business Administration, a 
``small entity'' includes firms within the ``Finance and Insurance'' 
sector with total assets of $600 million or less.\267\ The Board 
believes that the Finance and Insurance sector constitutes a reasonable 
universe of firms for these purposes because such firms generally 
engage in activities that are financial in nature. Consequently, bank 
holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, and state member 
banks with asset sizes of $600 million or less are small entities for 
purposes of the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ 13 CFR 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section V.E of this Supplementary Information 
section, the final rule will generally apply to certain Board-regulated 
institutions with $100 billion or more total consolidated assets, and 
certain of their depository institution subsidiaries with $10 billion 
or more in total assets.
    Companies that are subject to the final rule therefore 
substantially exceed the $600 million asset threshold at which a 
banking entity is considered a ``small entity'' under SBA regulations. 
Because the final rule does not apply to any company with assets of 
$600 million or less, the final rule is not expected to apply to any 
small entity for purposes of the RFA. As discussed in the Supplementary 
Information section, including section V of the Supplementary 
Information section, the Board does not believe that the final rule 
duplicates, overlaps, or conflicts with any other Federal rules. In 
light of the foregoing, the Board does not believe that the final rule 
will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.
OCC
    The OCC considered whether the final rule is likely to have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
pursuant to the RFA. The OCC currently supervises approximately 745 
small entities. Because the final rule will only apply to OCC-regulated 
entities that have $10 billion or more in assets, the OCC concludes the 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small OCC-regulated entities.
FDIC
    The RFA generally requires an agency, in connection with a final 
rule, to prepare and make available for public comment a final 
regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the impact of a final 
rule on small entities.\268\ However, a regulatory flexibility analysis 
is not required if the agency certifies that the rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The SBA has defined ``small entities'' to include banking organizations 
with total assets of less than or equal to $600 million that are 
independently owned and operated or owned by a holding company with 
less than $600 million in total assets.\269\ Generally, the FDIC 
considers a significant effect to be a quantified effect in excess of 5 
percent of total annual salaries and benefits per institution, or 2.5 
percent of total noninterest expenses. The FDIC believes that effects 
in excess of these thresholds typically represent significant effects 
for FDIC-supervised institutions. For the reasons described below and 
under section 605(b) of the RFA, the FDIC certifies that the final rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \269\ The SBA defines a small banking organization as having 
$600 million or less in assets, where ``a financial institution's 
assets are determined by averaging the assets reported on its four 
quarterly financial statements for the preceding year.'' See 13 CFR 
121.201 (as amended, effective August 19, 2019). ``SBA counts the 
receipts, employees, or other measure of size of the concern whose 
size is at issue and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates.'' 
See 13 CFR 121.103. Following these regulations, the FDIC uses a 
covered entity's affiliated and acquired assets, averaged over the 
preceding four quarters, to determine whether the covered entity is 
``small'' for the purposes of RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FDIC supervises 3,270 institutions,\270\ of which 2,492 are 
considered small entities for the purposes of the RFA.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ FDIC-supervised institutions are set forth in 12 U.S.C. 
1813(q)(2).
    \271\ Call Report data, June 30, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule applies the full NSFR requirement to companies that 
are subject to the Category I and Category II liquidity standards. 
Companies subject to the Category III liquidity standards with $75 
billion or more in average weighted short-term wholesale funding are 
also subject to the full NSFR requirement. All other companies subject 
to the Category III standards, and companies subject to the Category IV 
standards with $50 billion or more in average weighted short-term 
wholesale funding, are subject to a reduced NSFR requirement calibrated 
at 85 percent and 70 percent, respectively. Depository institution 
subsidiaries of companies subject to the Category I, II, or III 
liquidity standards are subject to the same NSFR requirement as their 
top tier holding company if the depository institution subsidiary has 
total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more. Depository 
institution subsidiaries of companies subject to Category IV liquidity 
standards are not subject to the NSFR.
    As of June 30, 2020, the FDIC supervises four depository 
institutions that would be subject to an NSFR requirement calibrated at 
85 percent.\272\ No depository institutions that are subject to the 
NSFR requirements would be considered small entities for the purposes 
of the RFA because the NSFR requirements apply only to depository 
institutions with at least $10 billion in total consolidated assets, 
and whose parent company is subject to the Category I, II, or III 
liquidity standards and, therefore, has least $100 billion in total 
consolidated assets.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ Call Report data, June 30, 2020.
    \273\ No companies with less than $100 billion in total 
consolidated assets would be subject to the capital and liquidity 
standards set forth in the agencies' tailoring rule. See 84 FR 
59230, 59235 (November 1, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because this rule does not apply to any FDIC-supervised 
institutions that would be considered small entities for the purposes 
of the RFA, the FDIC certifies that this final rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

    Section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994 (RCDRIA) \274\ requires that each Federal 
banking agency, in determining the effective date and administrative 
compliance requirements for new regulations that impose additional 
reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on insured depository 
institutions, consider, consistent with principles of safety and 
soundness and the public interest, any administrative burdens that such 
regulations would place on depository institutions, including small 
depository institutions, and customers of depository institutions, as 
well as the benefits of

[[Page 9201]]

such regulations. The agencies have considered comments on these 
matters in other sections of this Supplementary Information section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, under section 302(b) of the RCDRIA, new regulations 
that impose additional reporting, disclosures, or other new 
requirements on insured depository institutions generally must take 
effect on the first day of a calendar quarter that begins on or after 
the date on which the regulations are published in final form.\275\ 
Therefore, the final rule will be effective on July 1, 2021, the first 
day of the third calendar quarter of 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the final rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The 
OMB control numbers are 1557-0323 for the OCC, 7100-0367 for the Board, 
and 3064-0197 for the FDIC. These information collections will be 
extended for three years, with revision. The information collection 
requirements contained in this final rule have been submitted by the 
OCC and FDIC to OMB for review and approval under section 3507(d) of 
the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of the OMB's 
implementing regulations (5 CFR part 1320). The Board reviewed the 
final rule under the authority delegated to the Board by OMB. The 
agencies did not receive any specific public comments on the PRA 
analysis.
    The agencies have a continuing interest in the public's opinions of 
information collections. At any time, commenters may submit comments 
regarding the burden estimate, or any other aspect of this collection 
of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the 
addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section. All comments will become a 
matter of public record. A copy of the comments may also be submitted 
to the OMB desk officer for the agencies: By mail to U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW, #10235, Washington, DC 
20503; by facsimile to (202) 395-5806; or by email to: 
[email protected], Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk 
Officer.
Proposed Revision, With Extension, of the Following Information 
Collections
    Title of information collection and OMB control number: Reporting 
and Recordkeeping Requirements Associated with Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring (1557-0323 
for the OCC); Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Disclosure Requirements 
Associated with Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (7100-0367 for the 
Board); and Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards, and Monitoring (LCR) (3064-0197 for the FDIC).
    Frequency of Response: Biannually, quarterly, monthly, and event 
generated.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents:
    OCC: National banks and federal savings associations.
    Board: Insured state member banks, bank holding companies, and 
savings and loan holding companies, and U.S intermediate holding 
companies of foreign banking organizations.
    FDIC: State nonmember banks and state savings associations.
    Current actions: The reporting requirements in the final rule are 
found in section __.110, the recordkeeping requirements are found in 
sections __.108(b) and __.110(b), and the disclosure requirements are 
found in sections __.130 and __.131. The disclosure requirements are 
only for Board supervised entities. Since the burden estimates for the 
NSFR revisions were inadvertently included in the November 1, 2019, 
tailoring final rule (84 FR 59230), the burden estimates will not 
change for this submission with the exception of the FDIC's burden 
estimates which have been updated to reflect the addition of two 
additional supervised institutions.
    Section __.110 requires a covered company to take certain actions 
following any NSFR shortfall. A covered company would be required to 
notify its appropriate Federal banking agency of the shortfall no later 
than 10 business days (or such other period as the appropriate Federal 
banking agency may otherwise require by written notice) following the 
date that any event has occurred that would cause or has caused the 
covered company's NSFR to be less than 1.0. It must also submit to its 
appropriate Federal banking agency its plan for remediation of its NSFR 
to at least 1.0, and submit at least monthly reports on its progress to 
achieve compliance.
    Section __.108(b) provides that if an institution includes an ASF 
amount in excess of the RSF amount of the consolidated subsidiary, it 
must implement and maintain written procedures to identify and monitor 
applicable statutory, regulatory, contractual, supervisory, or other 
restrictions on transferring assets from the consolidated subsidiaries. 
These procedures must document which types of transactions the 
institution could use to transfer assets from a consolidated subsidiary 
to the institution and how these types of transactions comply with 
applicable statutory, regulatory, contractual, supervisory, or other 
restrictions. Section __.110(b) requires preparation of a plan for 
remediation to achieve an NSFR of at least equal to 1.0, as required 
under Sec.  __.100.
    Section __.130 requires that a depository institution holding 
company subject to the NSFR publicly disclose on a biannual basis its 
NSFR calculated for each of the two immediately preceding calendar 
quarters, in a direct and prominent manner on its public internet site 
or in its public financial or other public regulatory reports. These 
disclosures must remain publicly available for at least five years 
after the date of disclosure. Section __.131 specifies the quantitative 
and qualitative disclosures required and provides the disclosure 
template to be used.
    Estimated average hour per response:
    Reporting
    Sections __.40(a) and __.110(a) (filed monthly)--0.5 hours.
    Sections __.40(b) and __.110(b)--0.5 hours.
    Sections __.40(b)(3)(iv) and __.110(b) (filed quarterly)--0.5 
hours.
    Recordkeeping
    Sections __.22(a)(2), __.22(a)(5), and __.108(b)--40 hours.
    Sections __.40(b) and __.110(b)--200 hours.
    Disclosure (Board only)
    Sections 249.90, 249.91, 249.130, and 249.131 (filed biannually)--
24 hours.
    OCC:
    OMB control number: 1557-0323.
    Number of Respondents: 13.
    Total Estimated Annual Burden: 4,722 hours.
    Board:
    OMB control number: 7100-0367.
    Number of Respondents: 19 for Recordkeeping Sections 249.22(a)(2), 
249.22(a)(5), and 249.108(b) and Disclosure Sections 249.90, 249.91, 
249.130, and 249.131; 1 for all other rows.
    Total Estimated Annual Burden: 2,793 hours.
    FDIC:
    OMB control number: 3064-0197.
    Number of Respondents: 4.
    Total Estimated Annual Burden: 994 hours.

[[Page 9202]]

F. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires that an agency prepare a 
budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule that includes a 
Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by state, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more, adjusted for inflation (currently $157 million), in 
any one year. The OCC interprets ``expenditure'' to mean assessment of 
costs (i.e., this part of our UMRA analysis assesses the costs of a 
rule on OCC-supervised entities, rather than the overall impact). The 
OCC's estimate of banks' operational costs to comply with mandates is 
approximately $26 million in the first year. In addition to these 
operational expenditures, the OCC anticipates that in order to comply 
with the final rule, banks may have to substitute lower RSF-factor 
assets for higher yielding assets that have higher RSF factors. The OCC 
estimates the impact of this substitution may cost two affiliated banks 
approximately $240 million per year. The total UMRA cost is 
approximately $266 million ($26 million in compliance related 
expenditures + $240 million in shortfall funding). Therefore, 
consistent with the UMRA, the OCC has concluded that the final rule 
will result in private sector costs that exceed the threshold for a 
significant regulatory action. When the final rule is published in the 
Federal Register, the OCC's UMRA written statement will be available 
at: http://www.regulations.gov, Docket ID OCC-2014-0029.

Text of Common Rule

0
(All agencies)

PART [ ]--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS, AND MONITORING

Subpart K--Net Stable Funding Ratio
Sec.
__.100 Net stable funding ratio.
__.101 Determining maturity.
__.102 Rules of construction.
__.103 Calculation of available stable funding amount.
__.104 ASF factors.
__.105 Calculation of required stable funding amount.
__.106 RSF factors.
__.107 Calculation of NSFR derivatives amounts.
__.108 Funding related to Covered Federal Reserve Facility Funding.
__.109 Rules for consolidation.

Subpart L--Net Stable Funding Shortfall


Sec.  __.110  NSFR shortfall: supervisory framework.

Subpart K--Net Stable Funding Ratio


Sec.  __.100   Net stable funding ratio.

    (a) Minimum net stable funding ratio requirement. A [BANK] must 
maintain a net stable funding ratio that is equal to or greater than 
1.0 on an ongoing basis in accordance with this subpart.
    (b) Calculation of the net stable funding ratio. For purposes of 
this part, a [BANK]'s net stable funding ratio equals:
    (1) The [BANK]'s available stable funding (ASF) amount, calculated 
pursuant to Sec.  __.103, as of the calculation date; divided by
    (2) The [BANK]'s required stable funding (RSF) amount, calculated 
pursuant to Sec.  __.105, as of the calculation date.


Sec.  __.101   Determining maturity.

    For purposes of calculating its net stable funding ratio, including 
its ASF amount and RSF amount, under subparts K through N, a [BANK] 
shall assume each of the following:
    (a) With respect to any NSFR liability, the NSFR liability matures 
according to Sec.  __.31(a)(1) of this part without regard to whether 
the NSFR liability is subject to Sec.  __.32;
    (b) With respect to an asset, the asset matures according to Sec.  
__.31(a)(2) of this part without regard to whether the asset is subject 
to Sec.  __.33 of this part;
    (c) With respect to an NSFR liability or asset that is perpetual, 
the NSFR liability or asset matures one year or more after the 
calculation date;
    (d) With respect to an NSFR liability or asset that has an open 
maturity, the NSFR liability or asset matures on the first calendar day 
after the calculation date, except that in the case of a deferred tax 
liability, the NSFR liability matures on the first calendar day after 
the calculation date on which the deferred tax liability could be 
realized; and
    (e) With respect to any principal payment of an NSFR liability or 
asset, such as an amortizing loan, that is due prior to the maturity of 
the NSFR liability or asset, the payment matures on the date on which 
it is contractually due.


Sec.  __.102   Rules of construction.

    (a) Balance-sheet metric. Unless otherwise provided in this 
subpart, an NSFR regulatory capital element, NSFR liability, or asset 
that is not included on a [BANK]'s balance sheet is not assigned an RSF 
factor or ASF factor, as applicable; and an NSFR regulatory capital 
element, NSFR liability, or asset that is included on a [BANK]'s 
balance sheet is assigned an RSF factor or ASF factor, as applicable.
    (b) Netting of certain transactions. Where a [BANK] has secured 
lending transactions, secured funding transactions, or asset exchanges 
with the same counterparty and has offset the gross value of 
receivables due from the counterparty under the transactions by the 
gross value of payables under the transactions due to the counterparty, 
the receivables or payables associated with the offsetting transactions 
that are not included on the [BANK]'s balance sheet are treated as if 
they were included on the [BANK]'s balance sheet with carrying values, 
unless the criteria in [Sec.  __.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) of the 
AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY LEVERAGE RATIO RULE] are met.
    (c) Treatment of Securities Received in an Asset Exchange by a 
Securities Lender. Where a [BANK] receives a security in an asset 
exchange, acts as a securities lender, includes the carrying value of 
the received security on its balance sheet, and has not rehypothecated 
the security received:
    (1) The security received by the [BANK] is not assigned an RSF 
factor; and
    (2) The obligation to return the security received by the [BANK] is 
not assigned an ASF factor.


Sec.  __.103   Calculation of available stable funding amount.

    A [BANK]'s ASF amount equals the sum of the carrying values of the 
[BANK]'s NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities, in each 
case multiplied by the ASF factor applicable in Sec.  __.104 or Sec.  
__.107(c) and consolidated in accordance with Sec.  __.109.


Sec.  __.104  ASF factors.

    (a) NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities assigned 
a 100 percent ASF factor. An NSFR regulatory capital element or NSFR 
liability of a [BANK] is assigned a 100 percent ASF factor if it is one 
of the following:
    (1) An NSFR regulatory capital element; or
    (2) An NSFR liability that has a maturity of one year or more from 
the calculation date, is not described in paragraph (d)(9) of this 
section, and is not a retail deposit or brokered deposit provided by a 
retail customer or counterparty.
    (b) NSFR liabilities assigned a 95 percent ASF factor. An NSFR 
liability of a [BANK] is assigned a 95 percent ASF factor if it is one 
of the following:

[[Page 9203]]

    (1) A stable retail deposit (regardless of maturity or 
collateralization) held at the [BANK]; or
    (2) A sweep deposit that:
    (i) Is deposited in accordance with a contract between the retail 
customer or counterparty and the [BANK], a controlled subsidiary of the 
[BANK], or a company that is a controlled subsidiary of the same top-
tier company of which the [BANK] is a controlled subsidiary;
    (ii) Is entirely covered by deposit insurance; and
    (iii) The [BANK] demonstrates to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY] 
that a withdrawal of such deposit is highly unlikely to occur during a 
liquidity stress event.
    (c) NSFR liabilities assigned a 90 percent ASF factor. An NSFR 
liability of a [BANK] is assigned a 90 percent ASF factor if it is 
funding provided by a retail customer or counterparty that is:
    (1) A retail deposit (regardless of maturity or collateralization) 
other than a stable retail deposit or brokered deposit;
    (2) A brokered reciprocal deposit where the entire amount is 
covered by deposit insurance;
    (3) A sweep deposit that is deposited in accordance with a contract 
between the retail customer or counterparty and the [BANK], a 
controlled subsidiary of the [BANK], or a company that is a controlled 
subsidiary of the same top-tier company of which the [BANK] is a 
controlled subsidiary, where the sweep deposit does not meet the 
requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section; or
    (4) A brokered deposit that is not a brokered reciprocal deposit or 
a sweep deposit, that is not held in a transactional account, and that 
matures one year or more from the calculation date.
    (d) NSFR liabilities assigned a 50 percent ASF factor. An NSFR 
liability of a [BANK] is assigned a 50 percent ASF factor if it is one 
of the following:
    (1) Unsecured wholesale funding that:
    (i) Is not provided by a financial sector entity, a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity, or a central bank;
    (ii) Matures less than one year from the calculation date; and
    (iii) Is not a security issued by the [BANK] or an operational 
deposit placed at the [BANK];
    (2) A secured funding transaction with the following 
characteristics:
    (i) The counterparty is not a financial sector entity, a 
consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity, or a central 
bank;
    (ii) The secured funding transaction matures less than one year 
from the calculation date; and
    (iii) The secured funding transaction is not a collateralized 
deposit that is an operational deposit placed at the [BANK];
    (3) Unsecured wholesale funding that:
    (i) Is provided by a financial sector entity, a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity, or a central bank;
    (ii) Matures six months or more, but less than one year, from the 
calculation date; and
    (iii) Is not a security issued by the [BANK] or an operational 
deposit;
    (4) A secured funding transaction with the following 
characteristics:
    (i) The counterparty is a financial sector entity, a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity, or a central bank;
    (ii) The secured funding transaction matures six months or more, 
but less than one year, from the calculation date; and
    (iii) The secured funding transaction is not a collateralized 
deposit that is an operational deposit;
    (5) A security issued by the [BANK] that matures six months or 
more, but less than one year, from the calculation date;
    (6) An operational deposit placed at the [BANK];
    (7) A brokered deposit provided by a retail customer or 
counterparty that is not described in paragraphs (c) or (e)(2) of this 
section;
    (8) A sweep deposit provided by a retail customer or counterparty 
that is not described in paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section;
    (9) An NSFR liability owed to a retail customer or counterparty 
that is not a deposit and is not a security issued by the [BANK]; or
    (10) Any other NSFR liability that matures six months or more, but 
less than one year, from the calculation date and is not described in 
paragraphs (a) through (c) or (d)(1) through (d)(9) of this section.
    (e) NSFR liabilities assigned a zero percent ASF factor. An NSFR 
liability of a [BANK] is assigned a zero percent ASF factor if it is 
one of the following:
    (1) A trade date payable that results from a purchase by the [BANK] 
of a financial instrument, foreign currency, or commodity that is 
contractually required to settle within the lesser of the market 
standard settlement period for the particular transaction and five 
business days from the date of the sale;
    (2) A brokered deposit provided by a retail customer or 
counterparty that is not a brokered reciprocal deposit or sweep 
deposit, is not held in a transactional account, and matures less than 
six months from the calculation date;
    (3) A security issued by the [BANK] that matures less than six 
months from the calculation date;
    (4) An NSFR liability with the following characteristics:
    (i) The counterparty is a financial sector entity, a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity, or a central bank;
    (ii) The NSFR liability matures less than six months from the 
calculation date or has an open maturity; and
    (iii) The NSFR liability is not a security issued by the [BANK] or 
an operational deposit placed at the [BANK]; or
    (5) Any other NSFR liability that matures less than six months from 
the calculation date and is not described in paragraphs (a) through (d) 
or (e)(1) through (4) of this section.


Sec.  __.105   Calculation of required stable funding amount.

    (a) Required stable funding amount. A [BANK]'s RSF amount equals 
the [BANK's] required stable funding adjustment percentage as 
determined under paragraph (b) of this section multiplied by the sum 
of:
    (1) The carrying values of a [BANK]'s assets (other than amounts 
included in the calculation of the derivatives RSF amount pursuant to 
Sec.  __.107(b)) and the undrawn amounts of a [BANK]'s credit and 
liquidity facilities, in each case multiplied by the RSF factors 
applicable in Sec.  __.106; and
    (2) The [BANK]'s derivatives RSF amount calculated pursuant to 
Sec.  __.107(b).
    (b) Required stable funding adjustment percentage. A [BANK's] 
required stable funding adjustment percentage is determined pursuant to 
Table 1 to this paragraph (b).

Table 1 to Paragraph (b)--Required Stable Funding Adjustment Percentages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Required stable funding adjustment percentage           Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global systemically important BHC or GSIB depository                 100
 institution............................................
Category II [BANK]......................................             100

[[Page 9204]]

 
Category III [BANK] with $75 billion or more in average              100
 weighted short-term wholesale funding and Category III
 [BANK] that is a consolidated subsidiary of such a
 [BANK].................................................
Category III [BANK] with less than $75 billion in                     85
 average weighted short-term wholesale funding and any
 Category III [BANK] that is a consolidated subsidiary
 of such a Category III [BANK]..........................
Category IV [BANK] with $50 billion or more in average                70
 weighted short-term wholesale funding..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (c) Transition into a different required stable funding 
adjustment percentage. (1) A [BANK] whose required stable funding 
adjustment percentage increases from a lower to a higher required 
stable funding adjustment percentage may continue to use its 
previous lower required stable funding adjustment percentage until 
the first day of the third calendar quarter after the required 
stable funding adjustment percentage increases.
    (2) A [BANK] whose required stable funding adjustment percentage 
decreases from a higher to a lower required stable funding 
adjustment percentage must continue to use its previous higher 
required stable funding adjustment percentage until the first day of 
the first calendar quarter after the required stable funding 
adjustment percentage decreases.


Sec.  __.106   RSF factors.

    (a) Unencumbered assets and commitments. All assets and undrawn 
amounts under credit and liquidity facilities, unless otherwise 
provided in Sec.  __.107(b) relating to derivative transactions or 
paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section, are assigned RSF factors as 
follows:
    (1) Unencumbered assets assigned a zero percent RSF factor. An 
asset of a [BANK] is assigned a zero percent RSF factor if it is one of 
the following:
    (i) Currency and coin;
    (ii) A cash item in the process of collection;
    (iii) A Reserve Bank balance or other claim on a Reserve Bank that 
matures less than six months from the calculation date;
    (iv) A claim on a foreign central bank that matures less than six 
months from the calculation date;
    (v) A trade date receivable due to the [BANK] resulting from the 
[BANK]'s sale of a financial instrument, foreign currency, or commodity 
that is required to settle no later than the market standard, without 
extension, for the particular transaction, and that has yet to settle 
but is not more than five business days past the scheduled settlement 
date;
    (vi) Any other level 1 liquid asset not described in paragraphs 
(a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(v) of this section; or
    (vii) A secured lending transaction with the following 
characteristics:
    (A) The secured lending transaction matures less than six months 
from the calculation date;
    (B) The secured lending transaction is secured by level 1 liquid 
assets;
    (C) The borrower is a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof; and
    (D) The [BANK] retains the right to rehypothecate the collateral 
provided by the counterparty for the duration of the secured lending 
transaction.
    (2) Unencumbered assets and commitments assigned a 5 percent RSF 
factor. An undrawn amount of a committed credit facility or committed 
liquidity facility extended by a [BANK] is assigned a 5 percent RSF 
factor. For the purposes of this paragraph (a)(2), the undrawn amount 
of a committed credit facility or committed liquidity facility is the 
entire unused amount of the facility that could be drawn upon within 
one year of the calculation date under the governing agreement.
    (3) Unencumbered assets assigned a 15 percent RSF factor. An asset 
of a [BANK] is assigned a 15 percent RSF factor if it is one of the 
following:
    (i) A level 2A liquid asset; or
    (ii) A secured lending transaction or unsecured wholesale lending 
with the following characteristics:
    (A) The asset matures less than six months from the calculation 
date;
    (B) The borrower is a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof; and
    (C) The asset is not described in paragraph (a)(1)(vii) of this 
section and is not an operational deposit described in paragraph 
(a)(4)(iii) of this section.
    (4) Unencumbered assets assigned a 50 percent RSF factor. An asset 
of a [BANK] is assigned a 50 percent RSF factor if it is one of the 
following:
    (i) A level 2B liquid asset;
    (ii) A secured lending transaction or unsecured wholesale lending 
with the following characteristics:
    (A) The asset matures six months or more, but less than one year, 
from the calculation date;
    (B) The borrower is a financial sector entity, a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof, or a central bank; and
    (C) The asset is not an operational deposit described in paragraph 
(a)(4)(iii) of this section;
    (iii) An operational deposit placed by the [BANK] at a financial 
sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary thereof; or
    (iv) An asset that is not described in paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(a)(3) or (a)(4)(i) through (a)(4)(iii) of this section that matures 
less than one year from the calculation date, including:
    (A) A secured lending transaction or unsecured wholesale lending 
where the borrower is a wholesale customer or counterparty that is not 
a financial sector entity, a consolidated subsidiary thereof, or a 
central bank; or
    (B) Lending to a retail customer or counterparty.
    (5) Unencumbered assets assigned a 65 percent RSF factor. An asset 
of a [BANK] is assigned a 65 percent RSF factor if it is one of the 
following:
    (i) A retail mortgage that matures one year or more from the 
calculation date and is assigned a risk weight of no greater than 50 
percent under subpart D of [AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]; or
    (ii) A secured lending transaction, unsecured wholesale lending, or 
lending to a retail customer or counterparty with the following 
characteristics:
    (A) The asset is not described in paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(a)(5)(i) of this section;
    (B) The borrower is not a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof;
    (C) The asset matures one year or more from the calculation date; 
and
    (D) The asset is assigned a risk weight of no greater than 20 
percent under subpart D of [AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION].
    (6) Unencumbered assets assigned an 85 percent RSF factor. An asset 
of a [BANK] is assigned an 85 percent RSF factor if it is one of the 
following:
    (i) A retail mortgage that matures one year or more from the 
calculation date and is assigned a risk weight of greater than 50 
percent under subpart D of [AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION];
    (ii) A secured lending transaction, unsecured wholesale lending, or 
lending to a retail customer or counterparty with the following 
characteristics:

[[Page 9205]]

    (A) The asset is not described in paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(a)(6)(i) of this section;
    (B) The borrower is not a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary thereof;
    (C) The asset matures one year or more from the calculation date; 
and
    (D) The asset is assigned a risk weight of greater than 20 percent 
under subpart D of [AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION];
    (iii) A publicly traded common equity share that is not HQLA;
    (iv) A security, other than a publicly traded common equity share, 
that matures one year or more from the calculation date and is not 
HQLA; or
    (v) A commodity for which derivative transactions are traded on a 
U.S. board of trade or trading facility designated as a contract market 
under sections 5 and 6 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7 and 8) 
or on a U.S. swap execution facility registered under section 5h of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7b-3) or on another exchange, whether 
located in the United States or in a jurisdiction outside of the United 
States.
    (7) Unencumbered assets assigned a 100 percent RSF factor. An asset 
of a [BANK] is assigned a 100 percent RSF factor if it is not described 
in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) of this section, including a 
secured lending transaction or unsecured wholesale lending where the 
borrower is a financial sector entity or a consolidated subsidiary 
thereof and that matures one year or more from the calculation date.
    (b) Nonperforming assets. An RSF factor of 100 percent is assigned 
to any asset that is past due by more than 90 days or nonaccrual.
    (c) Encumbered assets. An encumbered asset, unless otherwise 
provided in Sec.  __.107(b) relating to derivative transactions, is 
assigned an RSF factor as follows:
    (1)(i) Encumbered assets with less than six months remaining in the 
encumbrance period. For an encumbered asset with less than six months 
remaining in the encumbrance period, the same RSF factor is assigned to 
the asset as would be assigned if the asset were not encumbered.
    (ii) Encumbered assets with six months or more, but less than one 
year, remaining in the encumbrance period. For an encumbered asset with 
six months or more, but less than one year, remaining in the 
encumbrance period:
    (A) If the asset would be assigned an RSF factor of 50 percent or 
less under paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section if the 
asset were not encumbered, an RSF factor of 50 percent is assigned to 
the asset.
    (B) If the asset would be assigned an RSF factor of greater than 50 
percent under paragraphs (a)(5) through (a)(7) of this section if the 
asset were not encumbered, the same RSF factor is assigned to the asset 
as would be assigned if it were not encumbered.
    (iii) Encumbered assets with one year or more remaining in the 
encumbrance period. For an encumbered asset with one year or more 
remaining in the encumbrance period, an RSF factor of 100 percent is 
assigned to the asset.
    (2) Assets encumbered for period longer than remaining maturity. If 
an asset is encumbered for an encumbrance period longer than the 
asset's maturity, the asset is assigned an RSF factor under paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section based on the length of the encumbrance period.
    (3) Segregated account assets. An asset held in a segregated 
account maintained pursuant to statutory or regulatory requirements for 
the protection of customer assets is not considered encumbered for 
purposes of this paragraph solely because such asset is held in the 
segregated account.
    (d) Off-balance sheet rehypothecated assets. When an NSFR liability 
of a [BANK] is secured by an off-balance sheet asset or results from 
the [BANK] selling an off-balance sheet asset (for instance, in the 
case of a short sale), other than an off-balance sheet asset received 
by the [BANK] as variation margin under a derivative transaction:
    (1) If the [BANK] received the off-balance sheet asset under a 
lending transaction, an RSF factor is assigned to the lending 
transaction as if it were encumbered for the longer of:
    (i) The remaining maturity of the NSFR liability; and
    (ii) Any other encumbrance period applicable to the lending 
transaction;
    (2) If the [BANK] received the off-balance sheet asset under an 
asset exchange, an RSF factor is assigned to the asset provided by the 
[BANK] in the asset exchange as if the provided asset were encumbered 
for the longer of:
    (i) The remaining maturity of the NSFR liability; and
    (ii) Any other encumbrance period applicable to the provided asset; 
or
    (3) If the [BANK] did not receive the off-balance sheet asset under 
a lending transaction or asset exchange, an RSF factor is assigned to 
the on-balance sheet asset resulting from the rehypothecation of the 
off-balance sheet asset as if the on-balance sheet asset were 
encumbered for the longer of:
    (i) The remaining maturity of the NSFR liability; and
    (ii) Any other encumbrance period applicable to the transaction 
through which the off-balance sheet asset was received.


Sec.  __.107   Calculation of NSFR derivatives amounts.

    (a) General requirement. A [BANK] must calculate its derivatives 
RSF amount and certain components of its ASF amount relating to the 
[BANK]'s derivative transactions (which includes cleared derivative 
transactions of a customer with respect to which the [BANK] is acting 
as agent for the customer that are included on the [BANK]'s balance 
sheet under GAAP) in accordance with this section.
    (b) Calculation of required stable funding amount relating to 
derivative transactions. A [BANK]'s derivatives RSF amount equals the 
sum of:
    (1) Current derivative transaction values. The [BANK]'s NSFR 
derivatives asset amount, as calculated under paragraph (d)(1) of this 
section, multiplied by an RSF factor of 100 percent;
    (2) Variation margin provided. The carrying value of variation 
margin provided by the [BANK] under each derivative transaction not 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement and each QMNA netting 
set, to the extent the variation margin reduces the [BANK]'s 
derivatives liability value under the derivative transaction or QMNA 
netting set, as calculated under paragraph (f)(2) of this section, 
multiplied by an RSF factor of zero percent;
    (3) Excess variation margin provided. The carrying value of 
variation margin provided by the [BANK] under each derivative 
transaction not subject to a qualifying master netting agreement and 
each QMNA netting set in excess of the amount described in paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section for each derivative transaction or QMNA netting 
set, multiplied by the RSF factor assigned to each asset comprising the 
variation margin pursuant to Sec.  __.106;
    (4) Variation margin received. The carrying value of variation 
margin received by the [BANK], multiplied by the RSF factor assigned to 
each asset comprising the variation margin pursuant to Sec.  __.106;
    (5) Potential valuation changes. (i) An amount equal to 5 percent 
of the sum of the gross derivative values of the [BANK] that are 
liabilities, as calculated under paragraph (b)(5)(ii) of this section, 
for each of the [BANK]'s derivative transactions not subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement and each of its QMNA netting sets, 
multiplied by an RSF factor of 100 percent;

[[Page 9206]]

    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (5)(i) of this section, the gross 
derivative value of a derivative transaction not subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement or of a QMNA netting set is equal 
to the value to the [BANK], calculated as if no variation margin had 
been exchanged and no settlement payments had been made based on 
changes in the value of the derivative transaction or QMNA netting set.
    (6) Contributions to central counterparty mutualized loss sharing 
arrangements. The fair value of a [BANK]'s contribution to a central 
counterparty's mutualized loss sharing arrangement (regardless of 
whether the contribution is included on the [BANK]'s balance sheet), 
multiplied by an RSF factor of 85 percent; and
    (7) Initial margin provided. The fair value of initial margin 
provided by the [BANK] for derivative transactions (regardless of 
whether the initial margin is included on the [BANK]'s balance sheet), 
which does not include initial margin provided by the [BANK] for 
cleared derivative transactions with respect to which the [BANK] is 
acting as agent for a customer and the [BANK] does not guarantee the 
obligations of the customer's counterparty to the customer under the 
derivative transaction (such initial margin would be assigned an RSF 
factor pursuant to Sec.  __.106 to the extent the initial margin is 
included on the [BANK]'s balance sheet), multiplied by an RSF factor 
equal to the higher of 85 percent or the RSF factor assigned to each 
asset comprising the initial margin pursuant to Sec.  __.106.
    (c) Calculation of available stable funding amount relating to 
derivative transactions. The following amounts of a [BANK] are assigned 
a zero percent ASF factor:
    (1) The [BANK]'s NSFR derivatives liability amount, as calculated 
under paragraph (d)(2) of this section; and
    (2) The carrying value of NSFR liabilities in the form of an 
obligation to return initial margin or variation margin received by the 
[BANK].
    (d) Calculation of NSFR derivatives asset or liability amount.
    (1) A [BANK]'s NSFR derivatives asset amount is the greater of:
    (i) Zero; and
    (ii) The [BANK]'s total derivatives asset amount, as calculated 
under paragraph (e)(1) of this section, less the [BANK]'s total 
derivatives liability amount, as calculated under paragraph (e)(2) of 
this section.
    (2) A [BANK]'s NSFR derivatives liability amount is the greater of:
    (i) Zero; and
    (ii) The [BANK]'s total derivatives liability amount, as calculated 
under paragraph (e)(2) of this section, less the [BANK]'s total 
derivatives asset amount, as calculated under paragraph (e)(1) of this 
section.
    (e) Calculation of total derivatives asset and liability amounts.
    (1) A [BANK]'s total derivatives asset amount is the sum of the 
[BANK]'s derivatives asset values, as calculated under paragraph (f)(1) 
of this section, for each derivative transaction not subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement and each QMNA netting set.
    (2) A [BANK]'s total derivatives liability amount is the sum of the 
[BANK]'s derivatives liability values, as calculated under paragraph 
(f)(2) of this section, for each derivative transaction not subject to 
a qualifying master netting agreement and each QMNA netting set.
    (f) Calculation of derivatives asset and liability values. For each 
derivative transaction not subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement and each QMNA netting set:
    (1) The derivatives asset value is equal to the asset value to the 
[BANK], after taking into account:
    (i) Any variation margin received by the [BANK] that is in the form 
of cash and meets the following conditions:
    (A) The variation margin is not segregated;
    (B) The variation margin is received in connection with a 
derivative transaction that is governed by a QMNA or other contract 
between the counterparties to the derivative transaction, which 
stipulates that the counterparties agree to settle any payment 
obligations on a net basis, taking into account any variation margin 
received or provided;
    (C) The variation margin is calculated and transferred on a daily 
basis based on mark-to-fair value of the derivative contract; and
    (D) The variation margin is in a currency specified as an 
acceptable currency to settle obligations in the relevant governing 
contract; and
    (ii) Any variation margin received by the [BANK] that is in the 
form of level 1 liquid assets and meets the conditions of paragraph 
(f)(1)(i) of this section provided the [BANK] retains the right to 
rehypothecate the asset for the duration of time that the asset is 
posted as variation margin to the [BANK]; or
    (2) The derivatives liability value is equal to the liability value 
of the [BANK], after taking into account any variation margin provided 
by the [BANK].


Sec.  __.108   Funding related to Covered Federal Reserve Facility 
Funding.

    (a) Treatment of Covered Federal Reserve Facility Funding. 
Notwithstanding any other section of this part and except as provided 
in paragraph (b) of this section, available stable funding amounts and 
required stable funding amounts related to Covered Federal Reserve 
Facility Funding and the assets securing Covered Federal Reserve 
Facility Funding are excluded from the calculation of a [BANK]'s net 
stable funding ratio calculated under Sec.  __.100(b).
    (b) Exception. To the extent the Covered Federal Reserve Facility 
Funding is secured by securities, debt obligations, or other 
instruments issued by the [BANK] or one of its consolidated 
subsidiaries, the Covered Federal Reserve Facility Funding and assets 
securing the Covered Federal Reserve Facility Funding are not subject 
to paragraph (a) of this section and the available stable funding 
amount and required stable funding amount must be included in the 
[BANK]'s net stable funding ratio calculated under Sec.  __.100(b).


Sec.  __.109   Rules for consolidation.

    (a) Consolidated subsidiary available stable funding amount. For 
available stable funding of a legal entity that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a [BANK], including a consolidated subsidiary organized 
under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, the [BANK] may include the 
available stable funding of the consolidated subsidiary in its ASF 
amount up to:
    (1) The RSF amount of the consolidated subsidiary, as calculated by 
the [BANK] for the [BANK]'s net stable funding ratio under this part; 
plus
    (2) Any amount in excess of the RSF amount of the consolidated 
subsidiary, as calculated by the [BANK] for the [BANK]'s net stable 
funding ratio under this part, to the extent the consolidated 
subsidiary may transfer assets to the top-tier [BANK], taking into 
account statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supervisory 
restrictions, such as sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act 
(12 U.S.C. 371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1) and Regulation W (12 CFR part 
223).
    (b) Required consolidation procedures. To the extent a [BANK] 
includes an ASF amount in excess of the RSF amount of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the [BANK] must implement and maintain written procedures 
to identify and monitor applicable statutory, regulatory, contractual, 
supervisory, or other restrictions on transferring assets from any of 
its consolidated subsidiaries. These procedures must document which 
types of transactions the [BANK] could use to

[[Page 9207]]

transfer assets from a consolidated subsidiary to the [BANK] and how 
these types of transactions comply with applicable statutory, 
regulatory, contractual, supervisory, or other restrictions.

Subpart L--Net Stable Funding Shortfall


Sec.  __.110   NSFR shortfall: Supervisory framework.

    (a) Notification requirements. A [BANK] must notify the [AGENCY] no 
later than 10 business days, or such other period as the [AGENCY] may 
otherwise require by written notice, following the date that any event 
has occurred that would cause or has caused the [BANK]'s net stable 
funding ratio to be less than 1.0 as required under Sec.  __.100.
    (b) Liquidity Plan. (1) A [BANK] must within 10 business days, or 
such other period as the [AGENCY] may otherwise require by written 
notice, provide to the [AGENCY] a plan for achieving a net stable 
funding ratio equal to or greater than 1.0 as required under Sec.  
__.100 if:
    (i) The [BANK] has or should have provided notice, pursuant to 
Sec.  __.110(a), that the [BANK]'s net stable funding ratio is, or will 
become, less than 1.0 as required under Sec.  __.100;
    (ii) The [BANK]'s reports or disclosures to the [AGENCY] indicate 
that the [BANK]'s net stable funding ratio is less than 1.0 as required 
under Sec.  __.100; or
    (iii) The [AGENCY] notifies the [BANK] in writing that a plan is 
required and provides a reason for requiring such a plan.
    (2) The plan must include, as applicable:
    (i) An assessment of the [BANK]'s liquidity profile;
    (ii) The actions the [BANK] has taken and will take to achieve a 
net stable funding ratio equal to or greater than 1.0 as required under 
Sec.  __.100, including:
    (A) A plan for adjusting the [BANK]'s liquidity profile;
    (B) A plan for remediating any operational or management issues 
that contributed to noncompliance with subpart K of this part; and
    (iii) An estimated time frame for achieving full compliance with 
Sec.  __.100.
    (3) The [BANK] must report to the [AGENCY] at least monthly, or 
such other frequency as required by the [AGENCY], on progress to 
achieve full compliance with Sec.  __.100.
    (c) Supervisory and enforcement actions. The [AGENCY] may, at its 
discretion, take additional supervisory or enforcement actions to 
address noncompliance with the minimum net stable funding ratio and 
other requirements of subparts K through N of this part (see also Sec.  
__.2(c)).
[End of Proposed Common Rule Text]

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 50

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Liquidity, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations.

12 CFR Part 249

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Federal 
Reserve System, Holding companies, Liquidity, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

12 CFR Part 329

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC, Liquidity, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations.

Adoption of the Common Rule Text

    The proposed adoption of the common rules by the agencies, as 
modified by agency-specific text, is set forth below:

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Chapter I

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, part 50 of 
chapter I of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as 
follows:

PART 50--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 93a, 481, 1818, 1828, and 1462 
et seq.


0
2. Amend Sec.  50.1 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) introductory 
text to read as follows:


Sec.  50.1  Purpose and applicability.

    (a) Purpose. This part establishes a minimum liquidity standard and 
a minimum stable funding standard for certain national banks and 
Federal savings associations on a consolidated basis, as set forth 
herein.
    (b) Applicability. (1) A national bank or Federal savings 
association is subject to the minimum liquidity standard, minimum 
stable funding standard, and other requirements of this part if:
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  50.2 by redesignating paragraph (b) as paragraph (c), 
adding new paragraph (b), and revising newly redesignated paragraph (c) 
to read as follows:


Sec.  50.2  Reservation of authority.

* * * * *
    (b) The OCC may require a national bank or Federal savings 
association to maintain an amount of available stable funding greater 
than otherwise required under this part, or to take any other measure 
to improve the national bank's or Federal savings association's stable 
funding, if the OCC determines that the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's stable funding requirements as calculated under 
this part are not commensurate with the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's funding risks. In making determinations under 
this section, the OCC will apply notice and response procedures as set 
forth in 12 CFR 3.404.
    (c) Nothing in this part limits the authority of the OCC under any 
other provision of law or regulation to take supervisory or enforcement 
action, including action to address unsafe or unsound practices or 
conditions, deficient liquidity levels, deficient stable funding 
levels, or violations of law.

0
4. Amend Sec.  50.3 by:
0
a. Removing the definition for ``Brokered sweep deposit'', ``Covered 
nonbank company'', and ``Reciprocal brokered deposit'';
0
b. Adding definitions for ``Brokered reciprocal deposit'', ``Carrying 
value'', ``Encumbered'', ``NSFR liability'', ``NSFR regulatory capital 
element'', ``QMNA netting set'', ``Sweep deposit'', ``Unconditionally 
cancelable'', and ``Unsecured wholesale lending''; and
0
c. Revising definitions for ``Brokered deposit'', ``Calculation date'', 
``Collateralized deposit'', ``Committed'', ``Operational deposit'', 
``Secured funding transaction'', ``Secured lending transaction'', and 
``Unsecured wholesale funding.''
    The additions and revisions, in alphabetical order, read as 
follows:


Sec.  50.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Brokered deposit means any deposit held at the national bank or 
Federal savings association that is obtained, directly or indirectly, 
from or through the mediation or assistance of a deposit broker as that 
term is defined in section 29 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act

[[Page 9208]]

(12 U.S.C. 1831f(g)) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's 
regulations.
    Brokered reciprocal deposit means a brokered deposit that a 
national bank or Federal savings association receives through a deposit 
placement network on a reciprocal basis, such that:
    (1) For any deposit received, the national bank or Federal savings 
association (as agent for the depositors) places the same amount with 
other depository institutions through the network; and
    (2) Each member of the network sets the interest rate to be paid on 
the entire amount of funds it places with other network members.
    Calculation date means, for subparts B through J of this part, any 
date on which a national bank or Federal savings association calculates 
its liquidity coverage ratio under Sec.  50.10, and for subparts K 
through M of this part, any date on which a national bank or Federal 
savings association calculates its net stable funding ratio under Sec.  
50.100.
* * * * *
    Carrying value means, with respect to an asset, NSFR regulatory 
capital element, or NSFR liability, the value on the balance sheet of 
the national bank or Federal savings association, each as determined in 
accordance with GAAP.
* * * * *
    Collateralized deposit means:
    (1) A deposit of a public sector entity held at the national bank 
or Federal savings association that is required to be secured under 
applicable law by a lien on assets owned by the national bank or 
Federal savings association and that gives the depositor, as holder of 
the lien, priority over the assets in the event the national bank or 
Federal savings association enters into receivership, bankruptcy, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
    (2) A deposit of a fiduciary account awaiting investment or 
distribution held at the national bank or Federal savings association 
for which the national bank or Federal savings association is a 
fiduciary and is required under 12 CFR 9.10(b) (national banks) or 12 
CFR 150.300 through 150.320 (Federal savings associations) to set aside 
assets owned by the national bank or Federal savings association as 
security, which gives the depositor priority over the assets in the 
event the national bank or Federal savings association enters into 
receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or 
similar proceeding; or
    (3) A deposit of a fiduciary account awaiting investment or 
distribution held at the national bank or Federal savings association 
for which the national bank's or Federal savings association's 
affiliated insured depository institution is a fiduciary and where the 
national bank or Federal savings association under 12 CFR 9.10(c) 
(national banks), 12 CFR 150.310 (Federal savings associations), or 
applicable state law (state member and nonmember banks, and state 
savings associations) has set aside assets owned by the national bank 
or Federal savings association as security, which gives the depositor 
priority over the assets in the event the national bank or Federal 
savings association enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding.
    Committed means, with respect to a credit or liquidity facility, 
that under the terms of the facility, it is not unconditionally 
cancelable.
* * * * *
    Encumbered means, with respect to an asset, that the asset:
    (1) Is subject to legal, regulatory, contractual, or other 
restriction on the ability of the national bank or Federal savings 
association to monetize the asset; or
    (2) Is pledged, explicitly or implicitly, to secure or to provide 
credit enhancement to any transaction, not including when the asset is 
pledged to a central bank or a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise 
where:
    (i) Potential credit secured by the asset is not currently extended 
to the national bank or Federal savings association or its consolidated 
subsidiaries; and
    (ii) The pledged asset is not required to support access to the 
payment services of a central bank.
* * * * *
    NSFR liability means any liability or equity reported on a national 
bank's or Federal savings association's balance sheet that is not an 
NSFR regulatory capital element.
    NSFR regulatory capital element means any capital element included 
in a national bank's or Federal savings association's common equity 
tier 1 capital, additional tier 1 capital, and tier 2 capital, in each 
case as defined in 12 CFR 3.20, prior to application of capital 
adjustments or deductions as set forth in 12 CFR 3.22, excluding any 
debt or equity instrument that does not meet the criteria for 
additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital instruments in 12 CFR 3.22 and is 
being phased out of tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital pursuant to 
subpart G of 12 CFR part 3.
    Operational deposit means short-term unsecured wholesale funding 
that is a deposit, unsecured wholesale lending that is a deposit, or a 
collateralized deposit, in each case that meets the requirements of 
Sec.  50.4(b) with respect to that deposit and is necessary for the 
provision of operational services as an independent third-party 
intermediary, agent, or administrator to the wholesale customer or 
counterparty providing the deposit.
* * * * *
    QMNA netting set means a group of derivative transactions with a 
single counterparty that is subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement and is netted under the qualifying master netting agreement.
* * * * *
    Secured funding transaction means any funding transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of the national bank or Federal savings association to a 
wholesale customer or counterparty that is secured under applicable law 
by a lien on securities or loans provided by the national bank or 
Federal savings association, which gives the wholesale customer or 
counterparty, as holder of the lien, priority over the securities or 
loans in the event the national bank or Federal savings association 
enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding. Secured funding transactions include 
repurchase transactions, securities lending transactions, other secured 
loans, and borrowings from a Federal Reserve Bank. Secured funding 
transactions do not include securities.
    Secured lending transaction means any lending transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the national bank 
or Federal savings association that is secured under applicable law by 
a lien on securities or loans provided by the wholesale customer or 
counterparty, which gives the national bank or Federal savings 
association, as holder of the lien, priority over the securities or 
loans in the event the counterparty enters into receivership, 
bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding. 
Secured lending transactions include reverse repurchase transactions 
and securities borrowing transactions. Secured lending transactions do 
not include securities.
* * * * *
    Sweep deposit means a deposit held at the national bank or Federal 
savings association by a customer or counterparty through a contractual 
feature that automatically transfers to the national bank or Federal 
savings

[[Page 9209]]

association from another regulated financial company at the close of 
each business day amounts identified under the agreement governing the 
account from which the amount is being transferred.
* * * * *
    Unconditionally cancelable means, with respect to a credit or 
liquidity facility, that a national bank or Federal savings association 
may, at any time, with or without cause, refuse to extend credit under 
the facility (to the extent permitted under applicable law).
    Unsecured wholesale funding means a liability or general obligation 
of the national bank or Federal savings association to a wholesale 
customer or counterparty that is not a secured funding transaction. 
Unsecured wholesale funding includes wholesale deposits. Unsecured 
wholesale funding does not include asset exchanges.
    Unsecured wholesale lending means a liability or general obligation 
of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the national bank or Federal 
savings association that is not a secured lending transaction or a 
security. Unsecured wholesale lending does not include asset exchanges.
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  50.22 by revising paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  50.22  Requirements for eligible high-quality liquid assets.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) The assets are not encumbered.
* * * * *

0
6. In Sec.  50.30, amend paragraph (b)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  50.30  Total net cash outflow amount.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Other than the transactions identified in Sec.  50.32(h)(2), 
(h)(5), or (j) or Sec.  50.33(d) or (f), the maturity of which is 
determined under Sec.  50.31(a), transactions that have an open 
maturity are not included in the calculation of the maturity mismatch 
add-on.
* * * * *

0
7. In Sec.  50.31, amend paragraphs (a)(1) introductory text, (a)(2) 
introductory text, and (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  50.31  Determining maturity.

    (a) * * *
    (1) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
50.32, on the earliest possible contractual maturity date or the 
earliest possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account 
any option that could accelerate the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction, except that when considering the earliest possible 
contractual maturity date or the earliest possible date the transaction 
could occur, the national bank or Federal savings association should 
exclude any contingent options that are triggered only by regulatory 
actions or changes in law or regulation, as follows:
* * * * *
    (2) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
50.33, on the latest possible contractual maturity date or the latest 
possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account any 
option that could extend the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction, except that when considering the latest possible 
contractual maturity date or the latest possible date the transaction 
could occur, the national bank or Federal savings association may 
exclude any contingent options that are triggered only by regulatory 
actions or changes in law or regulation, as follows:
* * * * *
    (4) With respect to a transaction that has an open maturity, is not 
an operational deposit, and is subject to the provisions of Sec.  
50.32(h)(2), (h)(5), (j), or (k) or Sec.  50.33(d) or (f), the maturity 
date is the first calendar day after the calculation date. Any other 
transaction that has an open maturity and is subject to the provisions 
of Sec.  50.32 shall be considered to mature within 30 calendar days of 
the calculation date.
* * * * * *


Sec.  50.32  [Amended]

0
8. Amend Sec.  50.32 by:
0
a. Removing the phrase ``reciprocal brokered deposits'' and adding the 
phrase ``brokered reciprocal deposits'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing the phrase ``brokered sweep deposits'' and adding the 
phrase ``sweep deposits'' in its place wherever it appears.
* * * * *

Subpart G through J [Added and Reserved]

0
9. Add and reserve subparts G through J to part 50.

Subparts K and L [Added]

0
10. Amend part 50 by adding subparts K and L as set forth at the end of 
the common preamble.

Subparts K and L [Amended]

0
11. Amend subparts K and L of part 50 by:
0
a. Removing ``[AGENCY]'' and adding ``OCC'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing ``[AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]'' and adding ``12 CFR part 
3'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
c. Removing ``[Sec.  __.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) of the AGENCY 
SUPPLEMENTARY LEVERAGE RATIO RULE]'' and adding ``12 CFR 
3.10(c)(2)(v)(A) through (C)'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
d. Removing ``[BANK]'s'' and adding ``national bank's or Federal 
savings association's'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
e. Removing ``[BANK]'' and adding ``national bank or Federal savings 
association'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
f. Amending Sec.  50.105 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  50.105  Calculation of required stable funding amount.

* * * * *
    (b) Required stable funding adjustment percentage. A national 
bank's or Federal savings association's required stable funding 
adjustment percentage is determined pursuant to Table 1 to this 
paragraph (b).

Table 1 to Paragraph (b)--Required Stable Funding Adjustment Percentages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSIB depository institution that is a national bank or               100
 Federal savings association............................
Category II national bank or Federal savings association             100
Category III national bank or Federal savings                        100
 association that:......................................
(1) Is a consolidated subsidiary of (a) a covered
 depository institution holding company or U.S.
 intermediate holding company identified as a Category
 III banking organization pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12
 CFR 238.10 or (b) a depository institution that meets
 the criteria set forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B)
 of the definition of Category III national bank or
 Federal savings association in this part, in each case
 with $75 billion or more in average weighted short-term
 wholesale funding; or

[[Page 9210]]

 
(2) Has $75 billion or more in average weighted short-
 term wholesale funding and is not a consolidated
 subsidiary of (a) a covered depository institution
 holding company or U.S. intermediate holding company
 identified as a Category III banking organization
 pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12 CFR 238.10 or (b) a
 depository institution that meets the criteria set
 forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the
 definition of Category III national bank or Federal
 savings association in this part.
Category III national bank or Federal savings                         85
 association that:......................................
(1) Is a consolidated subsidiary of (a) a covered
 depository institution holding company or U.S.
 intermediate holding company identified as a Category
 III banking organization pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12
 CFR 238.10 or (b) a depository institution that meets
 the criteria set forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B)
 of the definition of Category III national bank or
 Federal savings association in this part, in each case
 with less than $75 billion in average weighted short-
 term wholesale funding; or
(2) Has less than $75 billion in average weighted short-
 term wholesale funding and is not a consolidated
 subsidiary of (a) a covered depository institution
 holding company or U.S. intermediate holding company
 identified as a Category III banking organization
 pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12 CFR 238.10 or (b) a
 depository institution that meets the criteria set
 forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the
 definition of Category III national bank or Federal
 savings association in this part.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


0
12. Amend part 50 by adding subpart M to read as follows:

Subpart M--Transitions


Sec.  50.120  Transitions.

    (a) Initial application. (1) A national bank or Federal savings 
association that initially becomes subject to the minimum net stable 
funding requirement under Sec.  50.1(b)(1)(i) after July 1, 2021, must 
comply with the requirements of subparts K through M of this part 
beginning on the first day of the third calendar quarter after which 
the national bank or Federal savings association becomes subject to 
this part.
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association that becomes 
subject to the minimum net stable funding requirement under Sec.  
50.1(b)(1)(ii) must comply with the requirements of subparts K through 
M of this part subject to a transition period specified by the OCC.
    (b) Transition to a different required stable funding adjustment 
percentage.
    (1) A national bank or Federal savings association whose required 
stable funding adjustment percentage changes is subject to the 
transition periods as set forth in Sec.  50.105(c).
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association institution that 
is no longer subject to the minimum stable funding requirement of this 
part pursuant to Sec.  50.1(b)(1)(i) based on the size of total 
consolidated assets, cross-jurisdictional activity, total nonbank 
assets, weighted short-term wholesale funding, or off-balance sheet 
exposure calculated in accordance with the Call Report, or instructions 
to the FR Y-9LP, the FR Y-15, or equivalent reporting form, as 
applicable, for each of the four most recent calendar quarters may 
cease compliance with the requirements of subparts K through M of this 
part as of the first day of the first calendar quarter after it is no 
longer subject to Sec.  50.1(b).
    (c) Reservation of authority. The OCC may extend or accelerate any 
compliance date of this part if the OCC determines such extension or 
acceleration is appropriate. In determining whether an extension or 
acceleration is appropriate, the OCC will consider the effect of the 
modification on financial stability, the period of time for which the 
modification would be necessary to facilitate compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through M of this part, and the actions the 
national bank or Federal savings association is taking to come into 
compliance with the requirements of subparts K through M of this part.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

12 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, part 249 of 
chapter II of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as 
follows:

PART 249--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS, AND MONITORING 
(REGULATION WW)

0
13. The authority citation for part 249 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1467a(g)(1), 
1818, 1828, 1831p-1, 1831o-1, 1844(b), 5365, 5366, 5368.


0
14. Revise the heading for part 249 as set forth above.

0
15. Revise Sec.  249.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  249.1  Purpose and applicability.

    (a) Purpose. This part establishes a minimum liquidity standard and 
a minimum stable funding standard for certain Board-regulated 
institutions on a consolidated basis, as set forth herein.
    (b) Applicability. (1) A Board-regulated institution is subject to 
the minimum liquidity standard and a minimum stable funding standard, 
and other requirements of this part if:
    (i) It is a:
    (A) Global systemically important BHC;
    (B) GSIB depository institution;
    (C) Category II Board-regulated institution;
    (D) Category III Board-regulated institution; or
    (E) Category IV Board-regulated institution with $50 billion or 
more in average weighted short-term wholesale funding;
    (ii) It is a covered nonbank company; or
    (iii) The Board has determined that application of this part is 
appropriate in light of the Board-regulated institution's asset size, 
level of complexity, risk profile, scope of operations, affiliation 
with foreign or domestic covered entities, or risk to the financial 
system.
    (2) This part does not apply to:
    (i) A bridge financial company as defined in 12 U.S.C. 5381(a)(3), 
or a subsidiary of a bridge financial company; or
    (ii) A new depository institution or a bridge depository 
institution, as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1813(i).
    (3) In making a determination under paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this 
section, the Board will apply, as appropriate, notice and response 
procedures in the same manner and to the same extent as the notice and 
response procedures set forth in 12 CFR 263.202.
    (c) Covered nonbank companies. The Board will establish a minimum 
liquidity standard and minimum stable funding standard and other 
requirements for a designated company under this part by rule or order. 
In establishing such standards, the Board will consider the factors set 
forth in sections 165(a)(2) and (b)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act and may 
tailor the application of the requirements of this part to the 
designated company based on the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, mix of the activities of the 
designated company, or any other risk-related factor that the Board 
determines is appropriate.

[[Page 9211]]


0
16. Amend Sec.  249.2, by revising paragraph (b) and adding paragraph 
(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  249.2  Reservation of authority.

* * * * *
    (b) The Board may require a Board-regulated institution to maintain 
an amount of available stable funding greater than otherwise required 
under this part, or to take any other measure to improve the Board-
regulated institution's stable funding, if the Board determines that 
the Board-regulated institution's stable funding requirements as 
calculated under this part are not commensurate with the Board-
regulated institution's funding risks. In making determinations under 
this section, the Board will apply notice and response procedures as 
set forth in 12 CFR 263.202.
    (c) Nothing in this part limits the authority of the Board under 
any other provision of law or regulation to take supervisory or 
enforcement action, including action to address unsafe or unsound 
practices or conditions, deficient liquidity levels, deficient stable 
funding levels, or violations of law.

0
17. Amend Sec.  249.3 by:
0
a. Adding the definitions for ``Brokered reciprocal deposit'', 
``Carrying value'', ``Encumbered'', ``NSFR liability'', ``NSFR 
regulatory capital element'', ``QMNA netting set'', ``Sweep deposit'', 
``Unconditionally cancelable'', and ``Unsecured wholesale lending''.
0
b. Revising the definitions for ``Brokered deposit'', ``Calculation 
date'', ``Collateralized deposit'', ``Committed'', ``Covered nonbank 
company'', ``Operational deposit'', ``Secured funding transaction'', 
``Secured lending transaction'', and ``Unsecured wholesale funding''.
0
c. Removing the definitions for ``Reciprocal brokered deposit'' and 
``Brokered sweep deposit''.
    The additions and revisions, in alphabetical order, read as 
follows:


Sec.  249.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Brokered deposit means any deposit held at the Board-regulated 
institution that is obtained, directly or indirectly, from or through 
the mediation or assistance of a deposit broker as that term is defined 
in section 29 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831f(g)) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's regulations.
    Brokered reciprocal deposit means a brokered deposit that a Board-
regulated institution receives through a deposit placement network on a 
reciprocal basis, such that:
    (1) For any deposit received, the Board-regulated institution (as 
agent for the depositors) places the same amount with other depository 
institutions through the network; and
    (2) Each member of the network sets the interest rate to be paid on 
the entire amount of funds it places with other network members.
    Calculation date means, for subparts B through J of this part, any 
date on which a Board-regulated institution calculates its liquidity 
coverage ratio under Sec.  249.10, and for subparts K through N of this 
part, any date on which a Board-regulated institution calculates its 
net stable funding ratio under Sec.  249.100.
* * * * *
    Carrying value means, with respect to an asset, NSFR regulatory 
capital element, or NSFR liability, the value on the balance sheet of 
the Board-regulated institution, each as determined in accordance with 
GAAP.
* * * * *
    Collateralized deposit means:
    (1) A deposit of a public sector entity held at the Board-regulated 
institution that is required to be secured under applicable law by a 
lien on assets owned by the Board-regulated institution and that gives 
the depositor, as holder of the lien, priority over the assets in the 
event the Board-regulated institution enters into receivership, 
bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
    (2) A deposit of a fiduciary account awaiting investment or 
distribution held at the Board-regulated institution for which the 
Board-regulated institution is a fiduciary and is required under 12 CFR 
9.10(b) (national banks), 12 CFR 150.300 through 150.320 (Federal 
savings associations), or applicable state law (state member and 
nonmember banks, and state savings associations) to set aside assets 
owned by the Board-regulated institution as security, which gives the 
depositor priority over the assets in the event the Board-regulated 
institution enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding; or
    (3) A deposit of a fiduciary account awaiting investment or 
distribution held at the Board-regulated institution for which the 
Board-regulated institution's affiliated insured depository institution 
is a fiduciary and where the Board-regulated institution under 12 CFR 
9.10(c) (national banks), 12 CFR 150.310 (Federal savings 
associations), or applicable state law (state member and nonmember 
banks, state savings associations) has set aside assets owned by the 
Board-regulated institution as security, which gives the depositor 
priority over the assets in the event the Board-regulated institution 
enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding.
    Committed means, with respect to a credit or liquidity facility, 
that under the terms of the facility, it is not unconditionally 
cancelable.
* * * * *
    Covered nonbank company means a designated company that the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has required by separate 
rule or order to comply with the requirements of 12 CFR part 249.
* * * * *
    Encumbered means, with respect to an asset, that the asset:
    (1) Is subject to legal, regulatory, contractual, or other 
restriction on the ability of the Board-regulated institution to 
monetize the asset; or
    (2) Is pledged, explicitly or implicitly, to secure or to provide 
credit enhancement to any transaction, not including when the asset is 
pledged to a central bank or a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise 
where:
    (i) Potential credit secured by the asset is not currently extended 
to the Board-regulated institution or its consolidated subsidiaries; 
and
    (ii) The pledged asset is not required to support access to the 
payment services of a central bank.
* * * * *
    NSFR liability means any liability or equity reported on a Board-
regulated institution's balance sheet that is not an NSFR regulatory 
capital element.
    NSFR regulatory capital element means any capital element included 
in a Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital, 
additional tier 1 capital, and tier 2 capital, in each case as defined 
in Sec.  217.20 of Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217), prior to application 
of capital adjustments or deductions as set forth in Sec.  217.22 of 
Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217), excluding any debt or equity instrument 
that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments in Sec.  217.22 of Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217) and is 
being phased out of tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital pursuant to 
subpart G of Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217).
    Operational deposit means short-term unsecured wholesale funding 
that is a deposit, unsecured wholesale lending that is a deposit, or a 
collateralized deposit, in each case that meets the requirements of 
Sec.  249.4(b) with respect to that deposit and is necessary for the

[[Page 9212]]

provision of operational services as an independent third-party 
intermediary, agent, or administrator to the wholesale customer or 
counterparty providing the deposit.
* * * * *
    QMNA netting set means a group of derivative transactions with a 
single counterparty that is subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement and is netted under the qualifying master netting agreement.
* * * * *
    Secured funding transaction means any funding transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of the Board-regulated institution to a wholesale customer 
or counterparty that is secured under applicable law by a lien on 
securities or loans provided by the Board-regulated institution, which 
gives the wholesale customer or counterparty, as holder of the lien, 
priority over the securities or loans in the event the Board-regulated 
institution enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding. Secured funding 
transactions include repurchase transactions, securities lending 
transactions, other secured loans, and borrowings from a Federal 
Reserve Bank. Secured funding transactions do not include securities.
    Secured lending transaction means any lending transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the Board-
regulated institution that is secured under applicable law by a lien on 
securities or loans provided by the wholesale customer or counterparty, 
which gives the Board-regulated institution, as holder of the lien, 
priority over the securities or loans in the event the counterparty 
enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding. Secured lending transactions include 
reverse repurchase transactions and securities borrowing transactions. 
Secured lending transactions do not include securities.
* * * * *
    Sweep deposit means a deposit held at the Board-regulated 
institution by a customer or counterparty through a contractual feature 
that automatically transfers to the Board-regulated institution from 
another regulated financial company at the close of each business day 
amounts identified under the agreement governing the account from which 
the amount is being transferred.
* * * * *
    Unconditionally cancelable means, with respect to a credit or 
liquidity facility, that a Board-regulated institution may, at any 
time, with or without cause, refuse to extend credit under the facility 
(to the extent permitted under applicable law).
    Unsecured wholesale funding means a liability or general obligation 
of the Board-regulated institution to a wholesale customer or 
counterparty that is not a secured funding transaction. Unsecured 
wholesale funding includes wholesale deposits. Unsecured wholesale 
funding does not include asset exchanges.
    Unsecured wholesale lending means a liability or general obligation 
of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the Board-regulated 
institution that is not a secured lending transaction or a security. 
Unsecured wholesale lending does not include asset exchanges.
* * * * *

0
18. Amend Sec.  249.22 by revising paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  249.22  Requirements for eligible high-quality liquid assets.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) The assets are not encumbered.
* * * * *

0
19. In Sec.  249.30, revise paragraph (b)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  249.30  Total net cash outflow amount.

    (b) * * *
    (3) Other than the transactions identified in Sec.  249.32(h)(2), 
(h)(5), or (j) or Sec.  249.33(d) or (f), the maturity of which is 
determined under Sec.  249.31(a), transactions that have an open 
maturity are not included in the calculation of the maturity mismatch 
add-on.
* * * * *

0
20. In Sec.  249.31, revise paragraphs (a)(1) introductory text, (a)(2) 
introductory text, and (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  249.31  Determining maturity.

    (a) * * *
    (1) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
249.32, on the earliest possible contractual maturity date or the 
earliest possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account 
any option that could accelerate the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction, except that when considering the earliest possible 
contractual maturity date or the earliest possible date the transaction 
could occur, the Board-regulated institution should exclude any 
contingent options that are triggered only by regulatory actions or 
changes in law or regulation, as follows:
* * * * *
    (2) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
249.33, on the latest possible contractual maturity date or the latest 
possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account any 
option that could extend the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction, except that when considering the latest possible 
contractual maturity date or the latest possible date the transaction 
could occur, the Board-regulated institution may exclude any contingent 
options that are triggered only by regulatory actions or changes in law 
or regulation, as follows:
* * * * *
    (4) With respect to a transaction that has an open maturity, is not 
an operational deposit, and is subject to the provisions of Sec.  
249.32(h)(2), (h)(5), (j), or (k) or Sec.  249.33(d) or (f), the 
maturity date is the first calendar day after the calculation date. Any 
other transaction that has an open maturity and is subject to the 
provisions of Sec.  249.32 shall be considered to mature within 30 
calendar days of the calculation date.
* * * * *


Sec.  249.32  [Amended]

0
21. Amend Sec.  249.32 by:
0
a. Removing the phrase ``reciprocal brokered deposits'' and adding the 
phrase ``brokered reciprocal deposits'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing the phrase ``brokered sweep deposits'' and adding the 
phrase ``sweep deposits'' in its place wherever it appears.

Subparts K and L [Added]

0
22. Amend part 249 by adding subparts K and L as set forth at the end 
of the common preamble.

Subparts K and L [Amended]

0
23. Amend subparts K and L of part 249 by:
0
a. Removing ``[AGENCY]'' and adding ``Board'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing ``[AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]'' and adding ``Regulation Q 
(12 CFR part 217)'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
c. Removing ``[Sec.  __.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) of the AGENCY 
SUPPLEMENTARY LEVERAGE RATIO RULE]'' and adding ``12 CFR 
217.10(c)(2)(v)(A) through (C)'' in its place wherever it appears.

[[Page 9213]]

0
d. Removing ``[BANK]'' and adding ``Board-regulated institution'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
e. Removing ``[BANK]'s'' and adding ``Board-regulated institution's'' 
in its place wherever it appears.

0
24. Amend part 249 by adding subparts M and N to read as follows:

Subpart M--Transitions.


Sec.  249.120  Transitions.

    (a) Initial application. (1) A Board-regulated institution that 
initially becomes subject to the minimum net stable funding requirement 
under Sec.  249.1(b)(1)(i) or (ii) after July 1, 2021, must comply with 
the requirements of subparts K through N of this part beginning on the 
first day of the third calendar quarter after which the Board-regulated 
institution becomes subject to this part.
    (2) A Board-regulated institution that becomes subject to the 
minimum net stable funding requirement under Sec.  249.1(b)(1)(iii) 
must comply with the requirements of subparts K through N of this part 
subject to a transition period specified by the Board.
    (b) Transition to a different required stable funding adjustment 
percentage. (1) A Board-regulated institution whose required stable 
funding adjustment percentage changes is subject to the transition 
periods as set forth in Sec.  249.105(c).
    (2) A Board-regulated institution that is no longer subject to the 
minimum stable funding requirement of this part pursuant to Sec.  
249.1(b)(1)(i) or (ii) based on the size of total consolidated assets, 
cross-jurisdictional activity, total nonbank assets, weighted short-
term wholesale funding, or off-balance sheet exposure calculated in 
accordance with the Call Report, or instructions to the FR Y-9LP, the 
FR Y-15, or equivalent reporting form, as applicable, for each of the 
four most recent calendar quarters may cease compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through N of this part as of the first day 
of the first calendar quarter after it is no longer subject to Sec.  
249.1(b).
    (c) Reservation of authority. The Board may extend or accelerate 
any compliance date of this part if the Board determines such extension 
or acceleration is appropriate. In determining whether an extension or 
acceleration is appropriate, the Board will consider the effect of the 
modification on financial stability, the period of time for which the 
modification would be necessary to facilitate compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through N of this part, and the actions the 
Board-regulated institution is taking to come into compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through N of this part.

Subpart N--NSFR Public Disclosure


Sec.  249.130  Timing, method, and retention of disclosures.

    (a) Applicability. A covered depository institution holding 
company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company 
that is subject to the minimum stable funding requirement in Sec.  
249.100 of this part must publicly disclose the information required 
under this subpart.
    (b) Timing of disclosure. (1) A covered depository institution 
holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank 
company that is subject to the minimum stable funding requirement in 
Sec.  249.100 of this part must provide timely public disclosures every 
second and fourth calendar quarter of all of the information required 
under this subpart for each of the two immediately preceding calendar 
quarters.
    (2) A covered depository institution holding company, U.S. 
intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank holding company that 
is subject to this subpart must provide the disclosures required by 
this subpart beginning with the first calendar quarter that includes 
the date that is 18 months after the covered depository institution 
holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank 
company first became subject to the minimum stable funding requirement 
in Sec.  249.100 of this part.
    (c) Disclosure method. A covered depository institution holding 
company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company 
must publicly disclose, in a direct and prominent manner, the 
information required under this subpart on its public internet site or 
in its public financial or other public regulatory reports.
    (d) Availability. The disclosures provided under this subpart must 
remain publicly available for at least five years after the initial 
disclosure date.


Sec.  249.131  Disclosure requirements.

    (a) General. A covered depository institution holding company, U.S. 
intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company must publicly 
disclose the information required by this subpart in the format 
provided in Table 1 to this paragraph:
BILLING CODE P

[[Page 9214]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11FE21.000


[[Page 9215]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11FE21.001


[[Page 9216]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11FE21.002

BILLING CODE C
    (b) Calculation of disclosed average amounts--(1) General. (i) A 
covered depository institution holding company, U.S. intermediate 
holding company, or covered nonbank company must calculate its 
disclosed amounts:
    (A) On a consolidated basis and presented in millions of U.S. 
dollars or as a percentage, as applicable; and
    (B) As simple averages of daily amounts for each calendar quarter.
    (ii) A covered depository institution holding company, U.S. 
intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company must disclose 
the beginning date and end date for each calendar quarter.
    (2) Calculation of unweighted amounts. (i) For each component of a 
covered depository institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate 
holding company's, or covered nonbank company's ASF amount calculation, 
other than the NSFR derivatives liability amount and total derivatives 
liability amount, the ``unweighted amount'' means the sum of the 
carrying values of the covered depository institution holding 
company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or covered nonbank 
company's NSFR regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities, as 
applicable, determined before applying the appropriate ASF factors, and 
subdivided into the following maturity categories, as applicable: Open 
maturity; less than six months after the calculation date; six months 
or more, but less than one year, after the calculation date; one year 
or more after the calculation date; and perpetual.
    (ii) For each component of a covered depository institution holding 
company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or covered nonbank 
company's RSF amount calculation, other than amounts included in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(xvi) through (xix) of this section, the ``unweighted 
amount'' means the sum of the carrying values of the covered depository 
institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or 
covered nonbank company's assets and undrawn amounts of committed 
credit facilities and committed liquidity facilities extended by the 
covered depository institution holding company, or U.S. intermediate 
holding company, or covered nonbank company, as applicable, determined 
before applying the appropriate RSF factors, and subdivided by maturity 
into the following maturity categories, as applicable: Open maturity; 
less than six months after the calculation date; six months or more, 
but less than one year,

[[Page 9217]]

after the calculation date; one year or more after the calculation 
date; and perpetual.
    (3) Calculation of weighted amounts. (i) For each component of a 
covered depository institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate 
holding company's, or covered nonbank company's ASF amount calculation, 
other than the NSFR derivatives liability amount and total derivatives 
liability amount, the ``weighted amount'' means the sum of the carrying 
values of the covered depository institution holding company's, U.S. 
intermediate holding company's, or covered nonbank company's NSFR 
regulatory capital elements and NSFR liabilities, as applicable, 
multiplied by the appropriate ASF factors.
    (ii) For each component of a covered depository institution holding 
company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or covered nonbank 
company's RSF amount calculation, other than amounts included in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(xvi) through (xix) of this section, the ``weighted 
amount'' means the sum of the carrying values of the covered depository 
institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or 
covered nonbank company's assets and undrawn amounts of committed 
credit facilities and committed liquidity facilities extended by the 
covered depository institution holding company, U.S. intermediate 
holding company, or covered nonbank company, multiplied by the 
appropriate RSF factors.
    (c) Quantitative disclosures. A covered depository institution 
holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank 
company must disclose all of the information required under Table 1 to 
paragraph (a) of this section including:
    (1) Disclosures of ASF amount calculations:
    (i) The sum of the average weighted amounts and, for each 
applicable maturity category, the sum of the average unweighted amounts 
of paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (iii) of this section (row 1);
    (ii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of NSFR regulatory capital 
elements described in Sec.  249.104(a)(1) (row 2);
    (iii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of securities described in 
Sec. Sec.  249.104(a)(2), 249.104(d)(5), and 249.104(e)(3) (row 3);
    (iv) The sum of the average weighted amounts and, for each 
applicable maturity category, the sum of the average unweighted amounts 
of paragraphs (c)(1)(v) through (viii) of this section (row 4);
    (v) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of stable retail deposits and 
sweep deposits held at the covered depository institution holding 
company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company 
described in Sec.  249.104(b) (row 5);
    (vi) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of retail deposits other than 
stable retail deposits or brokered deposits, described in Sec.  
249.104(c)(1) (row 6);
    (vii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of sweep deposits, brokered 
reciprocal deposits, and brokered deposits provided by a retail 
customer or counterparty described in Sec. Sec.  249.104(c)(2), 
249.104(c)(3), 249.104(c)(4), 249.104(d)(7), 249.104(d)(8) and 
249.104(e)(2) (row 7);
    (viii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable 
maturity category, the average unweighted amount of other funding 
provided by a retail customer or counterparty described in Sec.  
249.104(d)(9) (row 8);
    (ix) The sum of the average weighted amounts and, for each 
applicable maturity category, the sum of the average unweighted amounts 
of paragraphs (c)(1)(x) and (xi) of this section (row 9);
    (x) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of operational deposits placed 
at the covered depository institution holding company, U.S. 
intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company described in 
Sec.  249.104(d)(6) (row 10);
    (xi) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of other wholesale funding 
described in Sec. Sec.  249.104(a)(2), 249.104(d)(1), 249.104(d)(2), 
249.104(d)(3), 249.104(d)(4), 249.104(d)(10), and 249.104(e)(4) (row 
11);
    (xii) In the ``unweighted'' cell, the average amount of the NSFR 
derivatives liability amount described in Sec.  249.107(d)(2) (row 12);
    (xiii) In the ``unweighted'' cell, the average amount of the total 
derivatives liability amount described in Sec.  249.107(e)(2) (row 13);
    (xiv) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of all other liabilities not 
included in amounts disclosed under paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (xiii) 
of this section (row 14);
    (xv) The average amount of the ASF amount described in Sec.  
249.103 (row 15);
    (2) Disclosures of RSF amount calculations, including to reflect 
any encumbrances under Sec. Sec.  249.106(c) and 249.106(d):
    (i) The sum of the average weighted amounts and the sum of the 
average unweighted amounts of paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) through (iv) of 
this section (row 16);
    (ii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of level 1 liquid assets 
described in Sec. Sec.  249.106(a)(1) (row 17);
    (iii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of level 2A liquid assets 
described in Sec.  249.106(a)(3)(i) (row 18);
    (iv) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of level 2B liquid assets 
described in Sec.  249.106(a)(4)(i) (row 19);
    (v) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of assets described in Sec.  
249.106(a)(1), other than level 1 liquid assets included in amounts 
disclosed under paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section or secured lending 
transactions included in amounts disclosed under paragraph (c)(2)(viii) 
of this section (row 20);
    (vi) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of operational deposits placed 
at financial sector entities or consolidated subsidiaries thereof 
described in Sec.  249.106(a)(4)(iii) (row 21);
    (vii) The sum of the average weighted amounts and, for each 
applicable maturity category, the sum of the average unweighted amounts 
of paragraphs (c)(2)(viii), (ix), (x), (xii), and (xiv) of this section 
(row 22);
    (viii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable 
maturity category, the average unweighted amount of secured lending 
transactions where the borrower is a financial sector entity or a 
consolidated subsidiary of a financial sector entity and the secured 
lending transaction is secured by level 1 liquid assets, described in 
Sec. Sec.  249.106(a)(1)(vii), 249.106(a)(3)(ii), 249.106(a)(4)(ii), 
and 249.106(a)(7) (row 23);
    (ix) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted

[[Page 9218]]

amount of secured lending transactions that are secured by assets other 
than level 1 liquid assets and unsecured wholesale lending, in each 
case where the borrower is a financial sector entity or a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity, described in Sec. Sec.  
249.106(a)(3)(ii), 249.106(a)(4)(ii), and 249.106(a)(7) (row 24);
    (x) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of secured lending transactions 
and unsecured wholesale lending to wholesale customers or 
counterparties that are not financial sector entities or consolidated 
subsidiaries thereof, and lending to retail customers and 
counterparties other than retail mortgages, described in Sec. Sec.  
249.106(a)(4)(iv), 249.106(a)(5)(ii), and 249.106(a)(6)(ii) (row 25);
    (xi) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of secured lending 
transactions, unsecured wholesale lending, and lending to retail 
customers or counterparties that are assigned a risk weight of no 
greater than 20 percent under subpart D of Regulation Q (12 CFR part 
217) described in Sec. Sec.  249.106(a)(4)(ii), 249.106(a)(4)(iv), and 
249.106(a)(5)(ii) (row 26);
    (xii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of retail mortgages described 
in Sec. Sec.  249.106(a)(4)(iv), 249.106(a)(5)(i), and 249.106(a)(6)(i) 
(row 27);
    (xiii) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable 
maturity category, the average unweighted amount of retail mortgages 
assigned a risk weight of no greater than 50 percent under subpart D of 
Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217) described in Sec. Sec.  
249.106(a)(4)(iv) and 249.106(a)(5)(i) (row 28);
    (xiv) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of publicly traded common 
equity shares and other securities that are not HQLA and are not 
nonperforming assets described in Sec. Sec.  249.106(a)(6)(iii), and 
249.106(a)(6)(iv) (row 29);
    (xv) The average weighted amount and average unweighted amount of 
commodities described in Sec. Sec.  249.106(a)(6)(v) and 249.106(a)(7) 
(row 30);
    (xvi) The average unweighted amount and average weighted amount of 
the sum of (A) assets contributed by the covered depository institution 
holding company to a central counterparty's mutualized loss-sharing 
arrangement described in Sec.  249.107(b)(6) (in which case the 
``unweighted amount'' shall equal the fair value and the ``weighted 
amount'' shall equal the unweighted amount multiplied by 85 percent) 
and (B) assets provided as initial margin by the covered depository 
institution holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or 
covered nonbank company for derivative transactions described in Sec.  
249.107(b)(7) (in which case the ``unweighted amount'' shall equal the 
fair value and the ``weighted amount'' shall equal the unweighted 
amount multiplied by the higher of 85 percent or the RSF factor 
assigned to the asset pursuant to Sec.  249.106) (row 31);
    (xvii) In the ``unweighted'' cell, the covered depository 
institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or 
covered nonbank company's average amount of the NSFR derivatives asset 
amount under Sec.  249.107(d)(1) and in the ``weighted'' cell, the 
covered depository institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate 
holding company's, or covered nonbank company's average amount of the 
NSFR derivatives asset amount under Sec.  249.107(d)(1) multiplied by 
100 percent (row 32);
    (xviii) In the ``unweighted'' cell, the covered depository 
institution holding company's, U.S. intermediate holding company's, or 
covered nonbank company's average amount of the total derivatives asset 
amount described in Sec.  249.107(e)(1) (row 33);
    (xix) (A) In the ``unweighted'' cell, the average amount of the sum 
of the gross derivative liability values of the covered depository 
institution holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or 
covered nonbank company that are liabilities for each of its derivative 
transactions not subject to a qualifying master netting agreement and 
each of its QMNA netting sets, described in Sec.  249.107(b)(5), and 
(B) in the ``weighted'' cell, such sum multiplied by 5 percent, as 
described in Sec.  249.107(b)(5) (row 34);
    (xx) The average weighted amount and, for each applicable maturity 
category, the average unweighted amount of all other asset amounts not 
included in amounts disclosed under paragraphs (c)(2)(i) through (xix) 
of this section, including nonperforming assets (row 35);
    (xxi) The average weighted and unweighted amount of undrawn credit 
and liquidity facilities described in Sec.  249.106(a)(2) (row 36);
    (xxii) The average amount of the RSF amount as calculated in Sec.  
249.105(a) prior to the application of the applicable required stable 
funding adjustment percentage in Sec.  249.105(b) (row 37);
    (xxiii) The applicable required stable funding adjustment 
percentage described in Table 1 to Sec.  249.105(b) (row 38);
    (xxiv) The average amount of the RSF amount as calculated under 
Sec.  249.105 (row 39);
    (3) The average of the net stable funding ratios as calculated 
under Sec.  249.100(b) (row 40);
    (d) Qualitative disclosures. (1) A covered depository institution 
holding company, U.S. intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank 
company must provide a qualitative discussion of the factors that have 
a significant effect on its net stable funding ratio, which may include 
the following:
    (i) The main drivers of the net stable funding ratio;
    (ii) Changes in the net stable funding ratio results over time and 
the causes of such changes (for example, changes in strategies and 
circumstances);
    (iii) Concentrations of funding sources and changes in funding 
structure; or
    (iv) Concentrations of available and required stable funding within 
a covered company's corporate structure (for example, across legal 
entities).
    (2) If a covered depository institution holding company, U.S. 
intermediate holding company, or covered nonbank company subject to 
this subpart believes that the qualitative discussion required in 
paragraph (d)(1) of this section would prejudice seriously its position 
by resulting in public disclosure of specific commercial or financial 
information that is either proprietary or confidential in nature, the 
covered depository institution holding company, U.S. intermediate 
holding company, or covered nonbank company is not required to include 
those specific items in its qualitative discussion, but must provide 
more general information about the items that had a significant effect 
on its net stable funding ratio, together with the fact that, and the 
reason why, more specific information was not discussed.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Chapter III

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, part 329 of 
chapter III of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended 
as follows:

PART 329--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS

0
25. The authority citation for part 329 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1815, 1816, 1818, 1819, 1828, 1831p-1, 
5412.


[[Page 9219]]



0
26. Amend Sec.  329.1 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) 
introductory text to read as follows:


Sec.  329.1   Purpose and applicability.

    (a) Purpose. This part establishes a minimum liquidity standard and 
a minimum stable funding standard for certain FDIC-supervised 
institutions on a consolidated basis, as set forth herein.
    (b) * * *
    (1) An FDIC-supervised institution is subject to the minimum 
liquidity standard, minimum stable funding standard, and other 
requirements of this part if:
* * * * *

0
27. Amend Sec.  329.2 by revising paragraph (b) and adding paragraph 
(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  329.2  Reservation of authority.

* * * * *
    (b) The FDIC may require an FDIC-supervised institution to maintain 
an amount of available stable funding greater than otherwise required 
under this part, or to take any other measure to improve the FDIC-
supervised institution's stable funding, if the FDIC determines that 
the FDIC-supervised institution's stable funding requirements as 
calculated under this part are not commensurate with the FDIC-
supervised institution's funding risks. In making determinations under 
this section, the FDIC will apply notice and response procedures as set 
forth in 12 CFR 324.5.
    (c) Nothing in this part limits the authority of the FDIC under any 
other provision of law or regulation to take supervisory or enforcement 
action, including action to address unsafe or unsound practices or 
conditions, deficient liquidity levels, deficient stable funding 
levels, or violations of law.

0
28. Amend Sec.  329.3 by:
0
a. Removing the definitions for ``Brokered sweep deposit'', ``Covered 
nonbank company'', and ``Reciprocal brokered deposit'';
0
b. Adding definitions for ``Brokered reciprocal deposit'', ``Carrying 
value'', ``Encumbered'', ``NSFR liability'', ``NSFR regulatory capital 
element'', ``QMNA netting set'', ``Sweep deposit'', ``Unconditionally 
cancelable'', and ``Unsecured wholesale lending''; and
0
c. Revising definitions for ``Brokered deposit'', ``Calculation date'', 
``Collateralized deposit'', ``Committed'', ``Operational deposit'', 
``Secured funding transaction'', ``Secured lending transaction'', and 
``Unsecured wholesale funding.''
    The additions and revisions, in alphabetical order, read as 
follows:


Sec.  329.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Brokered deposit means any deposit held at the FDIC-supervised 
institution that is obtained, directly or indirectly, from or through 
the mediation or assistance of a deposit broker as that term is defined 
in section 29 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831f(g)) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's regulations.
    Brokered reciprocal deposit means a brokered deposit that an FDIC-
supervised institution receives through a deposit placement network on 
a reciprocal basis, such that:
    (1) For any deposit received, the FDIC-supervised institution (as 
agent for the depositors) places the same amount with other depository 
institutions through the network; and
    (2) Each member of the network sets the interest rate to be paid on 
the entire amount of funds it places with other network members.
    Calculation date means, for subparts B through J of this part, any 
date on which an FDIC-supervised institution calculates its liquidity 
coverage ratio under Sec.  329.10, and for subparts K through M of this 
part, any date on which an FDIC-supervised institution calculates its 
net stable funding ratio under Sec.  329.100.
* * * * *
    Carrying value means, with respect to an asset, NSFR regulatory 
capital element, or NSFR liability, the value on the balance sheet of 
the FDIC-supervised institution, each as determined in accordance with 
GAAP.
* * * * *
    Collateralized deposit means:
    (1) A deposit of a public sector entity held at the FDIC-supervised 
institution that is required to be secured under applicable law by a 
lien on assets owned by the FDIC-supervised institution and that gives 
the depositor, as holder of the lien, priority over the assets in the 
event the FDIC-supervised institution enters into receivership, 
bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
    (2) A deposit of a fiduciary account awaiting investment or 
distribution held at the FDIC-supervised institution for which the 
FDIC-supervised institution is a fiduciary and is required under 
applicable state law to set aside assets owned by the FDIC-supervised 
institution as security, which gives the depositor priority over the 
assets in the event the FDIC-supervised institution enters into 
receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or 
similar proceeding; or
    (3) A deposit of a fiduciary account awaiting investment or 
distribution held at the FDIC-supervised institution for which the 
FDIC-supervised institution's affiliated insured depository institution 
is a fiduciary and where the FDIC-supervised institution under 12 CFR 
9.10(c) (national banks), 12 CFR 150.310 (Federal savings 
associations), or applicable state law (state member and nonmember 
banks, and state savings associations) has set aside assets owned by 
the FDIC-supervised institution as security, which gives the depositor 
priority over the assets in the event the FDIC-supervised institution 
enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding.
    Committed means, with respect to a credit or liquidity facility, 
that under the terms of the facility, it is not unconditionally 
cancelable.
* * * * *
    Encumbered means, with respect to an asset, that the asset:
    (1) Is subject to legal, regulatory, contractual, or other 
restriction on the ability of the FDIC-supervised institution to 
monetize the asset; or
    (2) Is pledged, explicitly or implicitly, to secure or to provide 
credit enhancement to any transaction, not including when the asset is 
pledged to a central bank or a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise 
where:
    (i) Potential credit secured by the asset is not currently extended 
to the FDIC-supervised institution or its consolidated subsidiaries; 
and
    (ii) The pledged asset is not required to support access to the 
payment services of a central bank.
* * * * *
    NSFR liability means any liability or equity reported on an FDIC-
supervised institution's balance sheet that is not an NSFR regulatory 
capital element.
    NSFR regulatory capital element means any capital element included 
in an FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital, 
additional tier 1 capital, and tier 2 capital, in each case as defined 
in 12 CFR 324.20, prior to application of capital adjustments or 
deductions as set forth in 12 CFR 324.22, excluding any debt or equity 
instrument that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or 
tier 2 capital instruments in 12 CFR 324.22 and is being phased out of 
tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital pursuant to subpart G of 12 CFR part 
324.
    Operational deposit means short-term unsecured wholesale funding 
that is a deposit, unsecured wholesale lending that is a deposit, or a 
collateralized deposit, in each case that meets the requirements of 
Sec.  329.4(b) with respect to that deposit and is necessary for the

[[Page 9220]]

provision of operational services as an independent third-party 
intermediary, agent, or administrator to the wholesale customer or 
counterparty providing the deposit.
* * * * *
    QMNA netting set means a group of derivative transactions with a 
single counterparty that is subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement and is netted under the qualifying master netting agreement.
* * * * *
    Secured funding transaction means any funding transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of the FDIC-supervised institution to a wholesale customer 
or counterparty that is secured under applicable law by a lien on 
securities or loans provided by the FDIC-supervised institution, which 
gives the wholesale customer or counterparty, as holder of the lien, 
priority over the securities or loans in the event the FDIC-supervised 
institution enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding. Secured funding 
transactions include repurchase transactions, securities lending 
transactions, other secured loans, and borrowings from a Federal 
Reserve Bank. Secured funding transactions do not include securities.
    Secured lending transaction means any lending transaction that is 
subject to a legally binding agreement that gives rise to a cash 
obligation of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the FDIC-
supervised institution that is secured under applicable law by a lien 
on securities or loans provided by the wholesale customer or 
counterparty, which gives the FDIC-supervised institution, as holder of 
the lien, priority over the securities or loans in the event the 
counterparty enters into receivership, bankruptcy, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding. Secured lending 
transactions include reverse repurchase transactions and securities 
borrowing transactions. Secured lending transactions do not include 
securities.
* * * * *
    Sweep deposit means a deposit held at the FDIC-supervised 
institution by a customer or counterparty through a contractual feature 
that automatically transfers to the FDIC-supervised institution from 
another regulated financial company at the close of each business day 
amounts identified under the agreement governing the account from which 
the amount is being transferred.
* * * * *
    Unconditionally cancelable means, with respect to a credit or 
liquidity facility, that an FDIC-supervised institution may, at any 
time, with or without cause, refuse to extend credit under the facility 
(to the extent permitted under applicable law).
    Unsecured wholesale funding means a liability or general obligation 
of the FDIC-supervised institution to a wholesale customer or 
counterparty that is not a secured funding transaction. Unsecured 
wholesale funding includes wholesale deposits. Unsecured wholesale 
funding does not include asset exchanges.
    Unsecured wholesale lending means a liability or general obligation 
of a wholesale customer or counterparty to the FDIC-supervised 
institution that is not a secured lending transaction or a security. 
Unsecured wholesale lending does not include asset exchanges.
* * * * *

0
29. Amend Sec.  329.22, by revising paragraph (b)(1) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  329.22  Requirements for eligible high-quality liquid assets.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) The assets are not encumbered.
* * * * *

0
30. Amend Sec.  329.30, by revising paragraph (b)(3) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  329.30  Total net cash outflow amount.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Other than the transactions identified in Sec.  329.32(h)(2), 
(h)(5), or (j) or Sec.  329.33(d) or (f), the maturity of which is 
determined under Sec.  329.31(a), transactions that have an open 
maturity are not included in the calculation of the maturity mismatch 
add-on.
* * * * *

0
31. Amend Sec.  329.31, by revising paragraphs (a)(1) introductory 
text, (a)(2) introductory text, and (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  329.31  Determining maturity.

    (a) * * *
    (1) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
329.32, on the earliest possible contractual maturity date or the 
earliest possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account 
any option that could accelerate the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction, except that when considering the earliest possible 
contractual maturity date or the earliest possible date the transaction 
could occur, the FDIC-supervised institution should exclude any 
contingent options that are triggered only by regulatory actions or 
changes in law or regulation, as follows:
* * * * *
    (2) With respect to an instrument or transaction subject to Sec.  
329.33, on the latest possible contractual maturity date or the latest 
possible date the transaction could occur, taking into account any 
option that could extend the maturity date or the date of the 
transaction, except that when considering the latest possible 
contractual maturity date or the latest possible date the transaction 
could occur, the FDIC-supervised institution may exclude any contingent 
options that are triggered only by regulatory actions or changes in law 
or regulation, as follows:
* * * * *
    (4) With respect to a transaction that has an open maturity, is not 
an operational deposit, and is subject to the provisions of Sec.  
329.32(h)(2), (h)(5), (j), or (k) or Sec.  329.33(d) or (f), the 
maturity date is the first calendar day after the calculation date. Any 
other transaction that has an open maturity and is subject to the 
provisions of Sec.  329.32 shall be considered to mature within 30 
calendar days of the calculation date.
* * * * *


Sec.  329.32  [Amended]

0
32. Amend Sec.  329.32 by:
0
a. Removing the phrase ``reciprocal brokered deposits'' and adding the 
phrase ``brokered reciprocal deposits'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing the phrase ``brokered sweep deposits'' and adding the 
phrase ``sweep deposits'' in its place wherever it appears.

Subparts G through J [Added and Reserved]

0
33. Add and reserve subparts G through J to part 329.

Subparts K and L [Added]

0
34. Amend part 329 by adding subparts K and L as set forth at the end 
of the common preamble.

Subparts K and L [Amended]

0
35. Subparts K and L to part 329 are amended by:
0
a. Removing ``[AGENCY]'' and adding ``FDIC'' in its place wherever it 
appears.
0
b. Removing ``[AGENCY CAPITAL REGULATION]'' and adding ``12 CFR part 
324'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
c. Removing ``A [BANK]'' and adding ``An FDIC-supervised institution'' 
in its place wherever it appears.

[[Page 9221]]

0
d. Removing ``a [BANK]'' and add ``an FDIC-supervised institution'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
e. Removing ``[BANK]'' and adding ``FDIC-supervised institution'' in 
its place wherever it appears.
0
f. Removing ``[Sec.  __.10(c)(4)(ii)(E)(1) through (3) of the AGENCY 
SUPPLEMENTARY LEVERAGE RATIO RULE]'' and adding ``12 CFR 
324.10(c)(2)(v)(A) through (C)'' in its place wherever it appears.
0
g. Amending Sec.  329.105, by revising paragraph (b) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  329.105  Calculation of required stable funding amount.

* * * * *
    (b) Required stable funding adjustment percentage. An FDIC-
supervised institution's required stable funding adjustment percentage 
is determined pursuant to Table 1 to this paragraph (b).

Table 1 to Paragraph (b)--Required Stable Funding Adjustment Percentages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSIB depository institution supervised by the FDIC......             100
Category II FDIC-supervised institution.................             100
Category III FDIC-supervised institution that:..........             100
(1) Is a consolidated subsidiary of (a) a covered
 depository institution holding company or U.S.
 intermediate holding company identified as a Category
 III banking organization pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12
 CFR 238.10 or (b) a depository institution that meets
 the criteria set forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B)
 of the definition of Category III FDIC-supervised
 institution in this part, in each case with $75 billion
 or more in average weighted short-term wholesale
 funding; or
(2) Has $75 billion or more in average weighted short-
 term wholesale funding and is not a consolidated
 subsidiary of (a) a covered depository institution
 holding company or U.S. intermediate holding company
 identified as a Category III banking organization
 pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12 CFR 238.10 or (b) a
 depository institution that meets the criteria set
 forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the
 definition of Category III FDIC-supervised institution
 in this part.
Category III FDIC-supervised institution that:..........              85
(1) Is a consolidated subsidiary of (a) a covered
 depository institution holding company or U.S.
 intermediate holding company identified as a Category
 III banking organization pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12
 CFR 238.10 or (b) a depository institution that meets
 the criteria set forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B)
 of the definition of Category III FDIC-supervised
 institution in this part, in each case with less than
 $75 billion in average weighted short-term wholesale
 funding; or
(2) Has less than $75 billion in average weighted short-
 term wholesale funding and is not a consolidated
 subsidiary of (a) a covered depository institution
 holding company or U.S. intermediate holding company
 identified as a Category III banking organization
 pursuant to 12 CFR 252.5 or 12 CFR 238.10 or (b) a
 depository institution that meets the criteria set
 forth in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the
 definition of Category III FDIC-supervised institution
 in this part.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


0
36. Amend part 329 by adding subpart M to read as follows:

Subpart M--Transitions


Sec.  329.120  Transitions.

    (a) Initial application. (1) An FDIC-supervised institution that 
initially becomes subject to the minimum net stable funding requirement 
under Sec.  329.1(b)(1)(i) after July 1, 2021, must comply with the 
requirements of subparts K through M of this part beginning on the 
first day of the third calendar quarter after which the FDIC-supervised 
institution becomes subject to this part.
    (2) An FDIC-supervised institution that becomes subject to the 
minimum net stable funding requirement under Sec.  329.1(b)(1)(ii) must 
comply with the requirements of subparts K through M of this part 
subject to a transition period specified by the FDIC.
    (b) Transition to a different required stable funding adjustment 
percentage.
    (1) An FDIC-supervised institution whose required stable funding 
adjustment percentage changes is subject to the transition periods as 
set forth in Sec.  329.105(c).
    (2) An FDIC-supervised institution that is no longer subject to the 
minimum stable funding requirement of this part pursuant to Sec.  
329.1(b)(1)(i) based on the size of total consolidated assets, cross-
jurisdictional activity, total nonbank assets, weighted short-term 
wholesale funding, or off-balance sheet exposure calculated in 
accordance with the Call Report, or instructions to the FR Y-9LP, the 
FR Y-15, or equivalent reporting form, as applicable, for each of the 
four most recent calendar quarters may cease compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through M of this part as of the first day 
of the first calendar quarter after it is no longer subject to Sec.  
329.1(b).
    (c) Reservation of authority. The FDIC may extend or accelerate any 
compliance date of this part if the FDIC determines such extension or 
acceleration is appropriate. In determining whether an extension or 
acceleration is appropriate, the FDIC will consider the effect of the 
modification on financial stability, the period of time for which the 
modification would be necessary to facilitate compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through M of this part, and the actions the 
FDIC-supervised institution is taking to come into compliance with the 
requirements of subparts K through M of this part.

Brian P. Brooks,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.

    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.

Ann Misback,
Secretary of the Board,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

    Dated at Washington, DC, on October 20, 2020.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-26546 Filed 2-4-21; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE P