[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 11 (Tuesday, January 19, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4909-4928]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-01234]



[[Page 4909]]

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

15 CFR Part 7

[Docket No. 210113-0009]
RIN 0605-AA51


Securing the Information and Communications Technology and 
Services Supply Chain

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce is promulgating regulations to 
implement provisions of Executive Order 13873, ``Executive Order on 
Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services 
Supply Chain'' (May 15, 2019). These regulations create the processes 
and procedures that the Secretary of Commerce will use to identify, 
assess, and address certain transactions, including classes of 
transactions, between U.S. persons and foreign persons that involve 
information and communications technology or services designed, 
developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled 
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; 
and pose an undue or unacceptable risk. While this interim final rule 
will become effective on March 22, 2021, the Department of Commerce 
continues to welcome public input and is thus seeking additional public 
comment. Once any additional comments have been evaluated, the 
Department is committed to issuing a final rule.

DATES: Effective March 22, 2021.
    Comments to the interim final rule must be received on or before 
March 22, 2021.

ADDRESSES: All comments must be submitted by one of the following 
methods:
     By the Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov at docket number [DOC-2019-0005].
     By email directly to: [email protected]. Include 
``RIN 0605-AA51'' in the subject line.
     Instructions: Comments sent by any other method, to any 
other address or individual, or received after the end of the comment 
period, may not be considered. For those seeking to submit confidential 
business information (CBI), please clearly mark such submissions as CBI 
and submit by email, mail, or hand delivery as instructed above. Each 
CBI submission must also contain a summary of the CBI, clearly marked 
as public, in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of 
the substance of the information for public consumption. Such summary 
information will be posted on regulations.gov.
     Supporting documents:
    [cir] The Regulatory Impact Analysis is available at http://www.regulations.gov at docket number [DOC-2019-0005];
    [cir] The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
``Significant Cyber Incidents 2020'' is available at https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents;
    [cir] The National Security Strategy of the United States is 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf;
    [cir] ODNI's 2016-2019 Worldwide Threat Assessments of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community are available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/
Testimonies/2018-ATA_-Unclassified-SSCI.pdf (2018), https://
www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR_-SSCI.pdf (2019); and
    [cir] The 2018 National Cyber Strategy of the United States of 
America is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Henry Young, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, telephone: (202) 482-0224. For media inquiries: Meghan 
Burris, Director, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, telephone: (202) 482-4883.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The information and communications technology and services (ICTS) 
supply chain is critical to nearly every aspect of U.S. national 
security. U.S. business and governments at all levels rely heavily on 
ICTS, which: Underpin our economy; support critical infrastructure and 
emergency services; and facilitate the Nation's ability to store, 
process, and transmit vast amounts of data, including sensitive 
information, that is used for personal, commercial, government, and 
national security purposes. The ICTS supply chain must be secure to 
protect our national security, including the economic strength that is 
an essential element of our national security. Ensuring the resilience 
of, and trust in, our ICTS supply chain is an issue that touches upon 
national security, including economic security, and public health and 
safety.
    The purchase, incorporation, and use by U.S. persons of ICTS--such 
as network management or data storage--produced by any person owned by, 
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign 
adversary--can create multiple opportunities for those foreign 
adversaries to exploit potential vulnerabilities in the ICTS. That, in 
turn, could cause direct and indirect harm to both the immediate 
targets of the adverse action and to the United States as a whole. 
While attacks can originate from remote foreign sources, incorporating 
certain software, equipment, and products into U.S. domestic ICTS 
networks, as well as the use of certain cloud, network management, or 
other services, greatly increases the risk that potential 
vulnerabilities may be introduced, or that vulnerabilities may be 
present without being detected. These potential vulnerabilities, if 
exploited, could undermine the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of U.S. person data including personally identifiable 
information or other sensitive personal data.
    Some foreign adversaries are known to exploit the sale of software 
and hardware to introduce vulnerabilities that can allow them to steal 
critical intellectual property, research results (e.g., health data), 
or government or financial information from users of the software or 
hardware. Such vulnerabilities can be introduced in the network, cloud 
service, or individual product data; allow traffic monitoring or 
surveillance; and may be resistant to detection by private purchasers 
or telecommunications carriers. Once detected, such vulnerabilities may 
be extremely costly or impossible to remediate.
    Vulnerabilities to data integrity can be created by including a 
foreign adversary's hardware and software into U.S. networks and 
systems. This incorporated hardware and software poses opportunities to 
add or remove important information, modify files or data streams, slow 
down, or otherwise modify the normal transmission or availability of 
data across U.S. networks. Such capabilities could be exercised in 
areas as diverse as financial market communications, satellite 
communications or control, or sensitive consumer information.
    A foreign adversary could also exploit vulnerabilities provided by 
the incorporation of hardware and software into U.S. environments by 
fully or

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partially closing down critical networks or functions at key times. 
These types of attacks are known as denial of service attacks. Such 
attacks could cause widespread problems, such as if they occur during 
periods of crisis, or they could be used selectively by targeting 
individual corporations or important infrastructure elements or 
functions. They could also be masked to make the source of the 
disruption difficult to attribute and, therefore, difficult to trace 
and stop.
    These risks are not necessarily confined to infrastructure 
environments. They could, for example, be present in the use of cloud 
services, as well as in the widespread use of some consumer devices, 
networked surveillance cameras, drones, or interconnection via the 
internet of computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling 
them to send and receive data. For example, applications (``apps''), 
which may be downloaded from app stores or web browsers by a user to a 
mobile device, may automatically capture vast swaths of sensitive 
personal data from its users, including internet and other network 
activity information such as location data and browsing and search 
histories. This data exfiltration--supported by U.S. web data hosting 
and storage servers--threatens to allow foreign adversaries to exploit 
Americans' personal and proprietary information by allowing a foreign 
adversary to track the locations of Americans, build dossiers of 
sensitive personal data for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage 
from inside the borders of the United States.
    Multiple reported cybersecurity incidents in the United States and 
among major allies in 2020 illustrate the potential risk in permitting 
unrestricted access to U.S. ICTS supply chains, such as:

--In July 2020, two Chinese hackers working with the Chinese Ministry 
of State Security were indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for 
conducting a global computer intrusion campaign targeting U.S. 
intellectual property and confidential business information, including 
COVID-19 vaccine research;
--German officials announced that a Russian hacking group associated 
with the Federal Security Bureau had compromised the networks of 
energy, water, and power companies in Germany by exploiting ICTS supply 
chains; and
--Japan's Defense Ministry announced it was investigating a large-scale 
cyber attack against Mitsubishi Electric that could have compromised 
details of new state-of-the-art missile designs.

See, e.g., Center for Strategic & International Studies, ``Significant 
Cyber Incidents 2020,'' available at https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents.
    Consequently, the President has determined that the unrestricted 
acquisition or use of ICTS that are designed, developed, manufactured, 
or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the 
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary constitutes an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and 
economy of the United States.
    Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, ``Securing the Information 
and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain'' (84 FR 22689) 
(Executive Order), was issued pursuant to the President's authority 
under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and 
section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. IEEPA and the Executive 
Order grant the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) the authority to 
prohibit any acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing 
in, or use of any ICTS (an ``ICTS Transaction'') by any person, or with 
respect to any property, subject to United States jurisdiction, when 
such ICTS Transaction involves any property in which a foreign country 
or national has any interest, and the Secretary, in consultation with 
other agency heads (the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director 
of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the 
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the heads of any 
other executive departments and agencies as the Secretary determines is 
appropriate) determines that the ICTS Transaction: (1) Involves ICTS 
designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, 
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign 
adversary; and (2) poses an undue or unacceptable risk. Executive 
Order, Section 1(a). The Executive Order further provides the Secretary 
with the authority to prohibit such an ICTS Transaction or ``design or 
negotiate measures to mitigate concerns'' about an ICTS Transaction's 
impact on national security. Executive Order, Section 1(b).
    On November 27, 2019, the Department of Commerce (Department) 
published a proposed rule to implement the terms of the Executive 
Order. (84 FR 65316). The proposed rule set forth processes for (1) how 
the Secretary would evaluate and assess transactions involving ICTS to 
determine whether they pose an undue risk of sabotage to or subversion 
of the ICTS supply chain, or an unacceptable risk to the national 
security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. 
persons; (2) how the Secretary would notify parties to transactions 
under review of the Secretary's decision regarding the ICTS 
Transaction, including whether the Secretary would prohibit or mitigate 
the transaction; and (3) how parties to transactions reviewed by the 
Secretary could comment on the Secretary's preliminary decisions. The 
proposed rule also provided that the Secretary could act without 
complying with the proposed procedures where required by national 
security. Finally, the Secretary would establish penalties for 
violations of mitigation agreements, the regulations, or the Executive 
Order.
    In addition to seeking general public comment, the Department 
requested comments from the public on five specific questions: (1) 
Whether the Secretary should consider categorical exclusions or whether 
there are classes of persons whose use of ICTS cannot violate the 
Executive Order; (2) whether there are categories of uses or of risks 
that are always capable of being reliably and adequately mitigated; (3) 
how the Secretary should monitor and enforce any mitigation agreements 
applied to a transaction; (4) how the terms, ``transaction,'' ``dealing 
in,'' and ``use of'' should be clarified in the rule; and (5) whether 
the Department should add record-keeping requirements for information 
related to transactions.
    In response to requests for additional time in which to comment on 
the proposed rule, the Department extended the initial comment period 
from December 27, 2019, until January 10, 2020. (84 FR 70445). As 
reflected herein, the Department has carefully considered and addressed 
the public's comments in promulgating this rule.
    Nonetheless, because several commenters requested that the 
Department provide for an additional round of public comment, and in an 
effort to continue the Department's work to protect the national 
security while reducing the regulatory impact on the public, the 
Department is taking further public comment on the rule. However, 
mindful of the urgent need of the United States to address national 
security concerns related to ICTS Transactions,

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this interim final rule will be effective March 22, 2021. The 
Department is committed to issuing a subsequent final rule in which the 
Department will consider and respond to additional comments received. 
In addition, the Department will implement and publish procedures for a 
licensing process by May 19, 2021.

II. Response to Comments

    During the public comment period on the proposed rule, the 
Department received a number of written submissions reflecting a wide 
range of views. All comments received by the end of the comment period 
are available on the public rulemaking docket at https://www.regulations.gov. Additionally, the Department participated in a 
number of meetings with foreign governments and industry groups to 
discuss the proposed rule prior to the comment period ending. Summaries 
of those meetings are available at https://www.regulations.gov. Below, 
the Department addresses the comments as they pertain to each relevant 
provision of the regulation.

Sec.  7.2 Definitions

Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``appropriate agency heads''
    Numerous comments addressed the extent to which the Department 
interacts with other agencies and department heads throughout the 
process for reviewing ICTS Transactions. Some commenters advocated for 
the rule to require interagency review of all parts of the 
investigations and final determinations, while other commenters noted 
that interagency review should only happen during certain parts of the 
review process. Other commenters requested that the Secretary notify 
the heads of relevant agencies when a review is initiated.
    Requirements regarding interagency review are already contained 
within the Executive Order and, thus, are not subject to change.
    Nevertheless, for clarification, the Department has replaced the 
term ``identified secretaries'' with ``appropriate agency heads,'' to 
address the fact that some of the individuals referenced are not 
Cabinet Secretaries, but rather are heads of agencies. For clarity, the 
term ``appropriate agency heads'' refers to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States 
Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission, and the heads of any other executive 
departments and agencies the Secretary of Commerce determines is 
appropriate. The Executive Order makes clear the Secretary of Commerce 
will confer with other agencies and departments as needed.
Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``Department''
    Although it was not defined in the proposed rule, the Department 
has added a definition of the term ``Department'' to clarify that it 
refers to the United States Department of Commerce, rather than any 
other Cabinet-level agency.
Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``foreign adversary''
    The rule grants the Secretary the authority to block or mitigate 
certain ICTS Transactions involving a foreign adversary. Commenters 
suggested limiting the definition of a ``foreign adversary'' to 
entities already identified in legislation. Some commenters recommended 
changing the concept of ``foreign adversary'' to focus on entities or 
persons instead of nation-states. Other commenters suggested that the 
Department create a list of adversaries and a list of exempt countries 
and distinguish between government and non-governmental entities. 
Commenters also recommended narrowing the scope of the term ``foreign 
adversary'' to situations where a foreign adversary has controlling 
interest in the company executing the covered transaction.
    The rule makes no changes to the definition of ``foreign 
adversary,'' which is consistent with the Executive Order's definition. 
However, as discussed further below, the rule now includes a provision 
titled ``Determination of foreign adversaries'' in section 7.4. This 
provision sets out the list of foreign governments and foreign non-
government persons that the Secretary has determined, solely for the 
purposes of the Executive Order, this rule, and any subsequent rules, 
are ``foreign adversaries.'' It also explains some of the factors that 
the Secretary considered, and will consider, when making any future 
determinations of whether a country is a ``foreign adversary.'' 
Pursuant to the Secretary's discretion, the list of foreign adversaries 
will be revised as determined to be necessary. Because the 
determination of foreign adversaries is subject solely to the 
Secretary's discretion, such revisions will be effective immediately 
upon publication in the Federal Register without prior notice or 
opportunity for public comment.
    The list of ``foreign adversaries'' consists of the following 
foreign governments and non-government persons: The People's Republic 
of China, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(China); the Republic of Cuba (Cuba); the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Iran); the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); the 
Russian Federation (Russia); and Venezuelan politician Nicol[aacute]s 
Maduro (Maduro Regime). The provision clarifies that the Secretary's 
determination is based on multiple sources, including the National 
Security Strategy of the United States, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence's 2016-2019 Worldwide Threat Assessments of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community, and the 2018 National Cyber Strategy of 
the United States of America, as well as other reports and assessments 
from the U.S. Intelligence Community, the U.S. Departments of Justice, 
State and Homeland Security, and other relevant sources. Additionally, 
the provision notes that the Secretary will periodically review this 
list in consultation with appropriate agency heads and may add to, 
subtract from, supplement, or otherwise amend the list.
    It is important to note that the list at section 7.4 identifies 
``foreign adversaries'' solely for the purposes of the Executive Order, 
this rule, and any subsequent rules. It does not reflect a 
determination by the United States about the nature of such foreign 
governments or foreign non-government persons for any other purpose.
Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``ICTS Transaction''
    The proposed rule defined the term ``transaction'' using terms from 
the Executive Order, to mean, ``any acquisition, importation, transfer, 
installation, dealing in, or use of any information and communications 
technology or service.'' It also noted that the term ``transaction'' 
``includes a class of transactions.''
    Some commenters requested the Department refine the definition of 
``transaction'' in various ways. For example, some commenters suggested 
adopting language from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to define 
some of the terms in the definition, such as ``dealing in.'' Others 
urged the Department to further clarify the definition ``transaction'' 
to define the terms ``acquisition,'' or ``use'' in the definition.
    The Department acknowledges that the terms ``transaction,'' 
``acquisition,'' and ``use'' are broad, and retain their commonly-
accepted meanings in the rule. The concerns raised by the

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commenters are addressed by defining the term ``ICTS Transaction'' to 
include (1) ``ongoing activities, such as managed services, data 
transmission, software updates, repairs, or the platforming or data 
hosting of applications for consumer download;'' and (2) ``any other 
transaction, the structure of which is designed or intended to evade or 
circumvent the application of the Executive Order.'' The purpose of 
these additions is to clarify that the Secretary may review ICTS 
Transactions, including the provision of services, that occur on or 
after January 19, 2021, by any person owned by, controlled by, or 
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. 
Providing services, such as software updates, to U.S. persons may 
provide a foreign adversary an opportunity to engage in the types of 
activities that may threaten U.S. national security, as described 
above. Further, the definition of ICTS Transaction clarifies that 
attempting to structure a transaction in order to circumvent 
Secretarial review is nonetheless an ICTS Transaction subject to this 
rule.
Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``party or parties to a transaction''
    Several commenters expressed an interest in the Department further 
clarifying what entities are covered by the rule. Further, in revising 
the proposed rule for finalization, the Department used the term 
``party to a transaction'' in several instances and believes it would 
be beneficial to define that term. Accordingly, the rule adds a 
definition of ``party or parties to a transaction,'' to mean a person 
engaged in an ICTS Transaction, including the person acquiring the ICTS 
and the person from whom the ICTS is acquired. The term ``person'' is 
also defined by the rule and is unchanged from the proposed rule.
    ``Party or parties to a transaction'' include entities designed or 
intended to evade or circumvent application of the Executive Order. For 
purposes of this rule, this definition does not include common carriers 
that transport goods for a fee on behalf of the general public, except 
to the extent that a common carrier knows, or should have known (as the 
term ``knowledge'' is defined in 15 CFR 772.1), it was providing 
transportation services of ICTS to one or more of the parties to a 
transaction that has been prohibited in a final written determination 
made by the Department or permitted subject to mitigation measures.
    This addition narrows the scope of the rule by adding clarity 
regarding which persons are responsible for a reviewable transaction. 
This also affects which parties will be notified by the Department 
regarding any potential review of a transaction.
Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``Person owned by, controlled by, or subject 
to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary''
    In addition to defining ``party or parties to a transaction,'' the 
Department sought to add clarity to the rule by defining the phrase 
``person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or 
direction of a foreign adversary,'' as many commenters expressed 
concern that leaving such terms undefined might create confusion about 
the breadth of the rule's reach. The Department defines ``person owned 
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a 
foreign adversary'' to mean ``any person, wherever located, who acts as 
an agent, representative, or employee, or any person who acts in any 
other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or 
control, of a foreign adversary or of a person whose activities are 
directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or 
subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary; any 
person, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of a nation-
state controlled by a foreign adversary; any corporation, partnership, 
association, or other organization organized under the laws of a 
nation-state controlled by a foreign adversary; and any corporation, 
partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or 
doing business, that is owned or controlled by a foreign adversary.''
Sec.  7.2--Sensitive Personal Data
    Many commenters requested additional clarity about the specific 
ICTS that is subject to this rule. While it is impossible to identify 
all of the ICTS that may present undue or unnecessary risks, the 
Department has defined the term, ``sensitive personal data,'' to 
identify, along with the information identified in section 7.3 of the 
rule, some of types of information or communications that might be 
involved in an ICTS Transaction reviewed under this rule where a party 
or parties to a transaction use, possess, or retain, or are expected to 
use, possess, or retain sensitive personal data.
    The term ``sensitive personal data'' includes: (1) Personally 
Identifiable Information (i.e., data that can identify individuals) 
that is maintained or collected by a U.S. business operating in 
specific areas, and that is maintained or collected on over one million 
people over a 12 month period; and (2) results of individual genetic 
testing.
    The categories of identifiable data of concern to the Department 
are: Financial data that could be used to indicate an individual's 
financial distress or hardship; the set of data included in consumer 
reports; the set of data used for health and certain financial 
insurance applications; data relating to the physical, mental, or 
psychological health condition of an individual; non-public electronic 
communication information, such as personal emails; geolocation data 
used in certain technologies; biometric data; data stored and processed 
for generating Federal, State, Tribal, Territorial, or other government 
identification cards; data concerning U.S. Government personnel 
security clearance status; and data from security clearance or 
employment applications.
    As indicated in section 7.3, Scope, the Department believes that 
ICTS Transactions involving sensitive personal data could create risks 
for the U.S. national security and also believes it is important to 
specifically identify these categories of data to provide the regulated 
community with additional specificity and certainty as to the scope of 
the rule's application.
Sec.  7.2--Definition of ``Undue or unacceptable risk''
    Commenters recommended various alternative uses for and limits on 
this term. For example, some suggested that the Department identify 
certain industries or types of transactions that do not pose a risk to 
national security, and that the Department should exempt certain types 
of transactions from the rule.
    Most of the suggestions could unnecessarily limit the United 
States' ability to determine its national security interests and, thus, 
could limit the ability to protect the Nation. However, the Department 
agrees the term requires definition, and in this rule adopts the 
definition of ``undue or unacceptable risks'' as those risks identified 
in Section 1(a)(ii) of the Executive Order. Section 1(a)(ii) of the 
Executive Order includes the following risks . . . an undue risk of 
sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, 
production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of 
information and communications technology or services in the United 
States; . . . an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or 
resiliency of United States critical infrastructure or the digital 
economy of the United States; or . . . an unacceptable risk to the 
national

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security of the United States or the security and safety of United 
States persons.

Sec.  7.3 Scope of Covered ICTS Transactions

    Many commenters suggested ways the Department could narrow the 
scope of the rule to provide more guidance for the types of 
transactions the Department may review. For example, commenters noted 
the potential impact of the proposed rule on certain types of 
transactions, such as transportation services of ICTS, and argued the 
rule would harm commenters' industries. They also argued that the 
proposed rule was overly broad and that narrowing the scope would bring 
greater economic certainty to ICTS Transactions and the technology 
industry as a whole.
    Other commenters sought to have the Department identify categorical 
exemptions for select industries, such as ICTS Transactions involving 
medical devices or services for air traffic control, while yet others 
sought to exempt transactions involving companies with their business 
headquarters in allied nations, such as Japan. Commenters also 
suggested that, provided appropriate cybersecurity mitigation 
techniques exist, transactions involving otherwise banned equipment 
should be exempted from this rule.
    The Department concludes that categorical exemptions of specific 
industries or geographic locations are unwarranted at this time, 
although the Secretary may consider this possibility in the future. 
Wholesale exemptions of industries and geographic locations would not 
serve the rule's intended purpose of securing the ICTS supply chain 
because such exemptions would contradict the Department's evaluation 
method for ICTS Transactions. Such exemptions would indicate to foreign 
adversaries whole classes of ICTS Transactions outside the scope of 
evaluation under this rule. This would allow foreign adversaries to 
pinpoint certain types of ICTS Transactions that would more easily 
escape Departmental oversight and, therefore, threaten U.S. national 
security. By retaining broad authority across industries, the 
Department will be better able to mitigate identified risks.
    While the rule does not contain categorical exemptions of specific 
industries or geographic locations, the rule now specifies that ICTS 
Transactions that involve certain technologies, hardware, or software 
will be considered to be covered ICTS Transactions. Additionally, the 
rule does make clear that, as further discussed below, the acquisition 
of ICTS items by a United States person as a party to a transaction 
authorized under a U.S. government-industrial security program, is not 
an ICTS Transaction. Additionally, the Department acknowledges that 
ICTS Transactions solely involving personal ICTS hardware devices, such 
as handsets, do not warrant particular scrutiny.
Sec.  7.3--Technology Sectors
    Many commenters requested that the Department identify those 
technologies or products that the Department considers create the 
greatest risks to the national security of the United States. The 
Department understands the desire for additional certainty and broke 
down the scope of technologies included under the scope of this rule 
into six main types of ICTS Transactions involving: (1) ICTS that will 
be used by a party to a transaction in a sector designated as critical 
infrastructure by Presidential Policy Directive 21--Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience, including any subsectors or 
subsequently designated sectors; (2) software, hardware, or any other 
product or service integral to wireless local area networks, mobile 
networks, satellite payloads, satellite operations and control, cable 
access points, wireline access points, core networking systems, or 
long- and short-haul systems; (3) software, hardware, or any other 
product or service integral to data hosting or computing services that 
uses, processes, or retains, or is expected to use, process, or retain, 
sensitive personal data on greater than one million U.S. persons at any 
point over the twelve months preceding an ICTS Transaction; (4) certain 
ICTS products which greater than one million units have been sold to 
U.S. persons at any point over the twelve months prior to an ICTS 
Transaction; (5) software designed primarily for connecting with and 
communicating via the internet that is in use by greater than one 
million U.S. persons at any point over the twelve months preceding an 
ICTS Transaction; (6) ICTS integral to artificial intelligence and 
machine learning, quantum key distribution, quantum computing, drones, 
autonomous systems, or advanced robotics.
Sec.  7.3--Licensing Process for Potential Transactions
    Many commenters requested that the Department establish a process 
for entities to seek pre-approval of their ICTS Transactions, similar 
to the process by which entities may inform the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of investments in U.S. 
businesses, and obtain ``safe harbor'' for those transactions. 
Commenters argued that such a process would help ease business 
uncertainty in specific cases.
    To afford parties greater certainty, within 60 days of the 
publication date of this rule, the Department intends to publish 
procedures to allow a party or parties to a proposed, pending, or 
ongoing ICTS Transaction to seek a license, pursuant to Section 2(b) of 
the Executive Order, in a manner consistent with the national security 
of the United States. Within 120 days of the publication date of this 
rule, the Department intends to implement this licensing process. The 
published procedures will establish criteria by which persons may seek 
a license to enter into a proposed or pending ICTS Transaction or 
engage in an ongoing ICTS Transaction. Persons who may seek a license 
will include any parties to a proposed, pending, or ongoing ICTS 
Transaction as that term is defined in this rule. License application 
reviews will be conducted on a fixed timeline, not to exceed 120 days 
from accepting a license application, to enable qualifying parties to 
conclude permissible transactions without undue delay. If the 
Department does not issue a license decision within 120 days from 
accepting a license application, the application will be deemed 
granted. In no event, however, would the Department issue a license 
decision on an ICTS Transaction that would reveal sensitive information 
to foreign adversaries or others who may seek to undermine U.S. 
national security. Qualifying parties may voluntarily apply for a 
license, and a party's decision not to seek a license will not create a 
negative inference or unfavorable presumption with respect to a 
transaction.
Sec.  7.3--Presidential Policy Directive 21--Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience
    Regarding the Department's assessment of undue and unacceptable 
risk, commenters suggested that the Department create risk criticality 
categories for transactions, such as low, medium, and high, along with 
different assessment approaches. Other commenters advocated using risk 
scores or categories to determine the frequency and rigor of 
monitoring.
    The Department agrees that the scope of the rule could be narrowed 
to indicate more specifically the types of ICTS Transactions that may 
be reviewed. Accordingly, the Department clarifies that ICTS 
Transactions include those that involve, among other aspects, a sector 
designated as critical

[[Page 4914]]

infrastructure by Presidential Policy Directive 21--Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience, including any subsectors or 
subsequently designated sectors. As explained below, the Department has 
also clarified that transactions involving certain sensitive personal 
data, regardless of whether they involve a critical infrastructure 
sector, will be considered ICTS Transactions for the purposes of the 
rule.
Sec.  7.3--Exclusions
    Many commenters sought clarity about the relationship of this rule 
to the rules relating to CFIUS's review of transactions. In response, 
the Department is clarifying that this rule does not apply to an ICTS 
Transaction that CFIUS is actively reviewing, or has reviewed, as a 
covered transaction or covered real estate transaction or as part of 
such a transaction under section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 
1950, as amended, and its implementing regulations. Note, however, that 
a transaction involving ICTS that is separate from, and subsequent to, 
a transaction for which CFIUS has concluded action under section 721 
may be subject to review under this rule, if and to the extent that 
such transactions are separate from the transaction reviewed by CFIUS. 
Parties should therefore be aware that CFIUS review related to a 
particular ICTS, by itself, does not present a safe harbor for future 
transactions involving the same ICTS that may present undue or 
unnecessary risks as determined by the Department.
Sec.  7.3--Exclusions of ICTS Transactions
    Commenters requested categorical exclusions across many sectors, 
industries, functions, and nations. The Secretary recognizes the need 
to be judicious and deliberate in deciding what types of ICTS 
Transactions pose an undue or unacceptable risk. To that end, the rule 
excludes from the scope of the rule those transactions that involve the 
acquisition of ICTS items by a United States person as a party to a 
transaction authorized under a U.S. Government-industrial security 
program, because they are subject to continuous security oversight by, 
and contractual obligations to, other Federal agencies.
Sec.  7.3--Retroactivity of Rule's Applicability
    Some commenters argued that the rule should not apply to 
transactions that took place prior to May 15, 2019, when the Executive 
Order was issued. Other commenters advocated for the complete 
elimination of the proposed rule's retroactivity provisions, and 
proposed the Department only evaluate potential transactions 
prospectively. Other commenters proposed grandfathering some ICTS 
equipment for a predetermined duration, potentially up to 10 years. In 
reviewing these comments and the proposed rule, the Department 
determined that the temporal limits of the rule's application could be 
clarified.
    In response to these comments, the Department has clarified, in 
section 7.3(a)(3), that the rule applies to an ICTS Transactions that 
is initiated, pending, or completed on or after January 19, 2021. 
Further, any act or service with respect to an ICTS Transaction, such 
as execution of any provision of a managed services contract or 
installation of software updates, is an ICTS Transaction on the date 
that the service or update is provided. Thus, if a person that is owned 
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a 
foreign adversary engages in an ICTS Transaction with a person subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States on or after January 19, 2021, 
even if the service was provided pursuant to a contract initially 
entered into prior to January 19, 2021, that transaction is an ICTS 
Transaction that may be reviewed under this rule. The service is a new 
transaction separate from the underlying contract that will be subject 
to review by the Secretary.

Sec.  7.4 Determination of Foreign Adversaries

    As noted above, many commenters requested the Department identify 
those countries that it considers to be ``foreign adversaries.'' Naming 
these countries, the commenters argued, would facilitate global trade 
by allowing U.S. businesses to assess the risks of certain types of 
ICTS Transactions from certain countries. It would also allow companies 
to adjust their supply chains to avoid the risks in such transactions, 
including the risk of an ICTS Transaction being reviewed, and possibly 
prohibited or modified, under this rule. Several commenters also noted 
that defining ``foreign adversaries'' would help determine, and 
possibly reduce, the adverse economic impact the rule may have on 
businesses through better business planning.
    In response to these comments, the Department reconsidered its 
prior determination not to identify specific ``foreign adversaries.'' 
The Department has determined that it is beneficial for the clarity of 
the rule, as well as for persons with ICTS Transactions that may be 
subject to the rule, to identify certain foreign governments and 
foreign non-government persons that are considered, solely for the 
purposes of the Executive Order, this rule, and any subsequent rules, 
to be ``foreign adversaries.'' The list of foreign governments and 
foreign non-government persons this rule identifies as being ``foreign 
adversaries'' are: The People's Republic of China, including the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (China); the Republic of Cuba 
(Cuba); the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran); the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea); the Russian Federation (Russia); and 
Venezuelan politician Nicol[aacute]s Maduro (Maduro Regime). The 
Secretary identified these foreign adversaries because they have 
engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct 
significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or 
security and safety of United States persons, including taking actions 
and enacting policies that are inimical to the interests of the United 
States.
    The determination to identify these ``foreign adversaries'' is 
based on multiple sources, including threat assessments and reports 
from the U.S. Intelligence Community, the U.S. Departments of Justice, 
State, and Homeland Security, and other relevant sources. Additionally, 
the Secretary will periodically review this list in consultation with 
appropriate agency heads and may add to, subtract from, supplement, or 
otherwise amend the list. Accordingly, this list may be revised at any 
time in the future. Any such changes will be announced in the Federal 
Register.
    It is important to note that the list is solely for the purposes of 
the Executive Order, this rule, and any subsequent rules and does not 
reflect a determination by the United States about the nature of such 
foreign governments and foreign non-government persons for any purposes 
other than that ICTS Transactions with persons (as defined in this 
rule) owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or 
direction of an identified foreign adversary may pose an undue or 
unacceptable risk. Further, the rule states that any amendment to this 
list will apply to any ICTS Transaction that is initiated, pending, or 
completed on or after the date that the list is amended.

Sec.  7.5 Effect on Other Laws

    Many commenters suggested that this rule should not apply if 
overlapping and existing U.S. authorities are in force, referencing in 
particular existing national security regulatory regimes. Specifically, 
commenters pointed to CFIUS; authorities under various National Defense 
Authorization Acts;

[[Page 4915]]

the Export Administration Regulations; the Committee for the Assessment 
of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications 
Services Sector (i.e., Team Telecom); and other programs under the 
authority of the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Other commenters recommended exempting equipment provided 
by companies involved in mitigation agreements with the Federal 
Government.
    This rule does not alter or affect any of these existing 
authorities; it is intended to complement, not supplant, these existing 
regimes. However, the Department understands the need for regulatory 
and business certainty, and in the interest of not duplicating efforts 
by other parts of the U.S. Federal government, the rule states that it 
does not apply to ICTS Transactions that CFIUS is actively reviewing, 
or has reviewed, as a covered transaction or covered real estate 
transaction or as part of such a transaction under section 721 of the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and its implementing 
regulations. However, this exclusion in no way precludes a review of a 
subsequent ICTS Transaction if distinct from the previously CFIUS-
reviewed transaction or new information is discovered.
    Other provisions of the rule provide additional means of ensuring 
that any action taken by the Secretary neither conflicts with nor 
frustrates the purposes of other existing laws, regulations or 
processes. Thus, there are two separate points during the review 
process at which the Secretary is expressly required to consult with 
appropriate agency heads: before making an initial determination that 
the transactions is an ICTS Transaction that poses an undue or 
unacceptable risk (section 7.104) and before making a final 
determination (section 7.108). In requiring that the Secretary consult 
with other agency heads, the rule provides for a coordination mechanism 
with other agencies and Departments that have potentially overlapping 
jurisdiction. For example, before making an initial determination 
concerning a transaction, the review of which might potentially overlap 
with a review under CFIUS, the Secretary is required to consult with, 
among others, the Secretary of the Treasury, who serves as the 
Chairperson of CFIUS, thereby helping to ensure coordination and avoid 
redundancy.
    In addition, section 7.100(a) of the rule provides that the 
Secretary may consider all relevant information provided by any U.S. 
Government national security body or other Federal Government agency, 
department or regulatory body in determining what action may be 
necessary to ameliorate a threat posed by an ICTS Transaction.

Subpart B--Review of ICTS Transactions

    Commenters largely recommended the final rule clarify the review 
process, requesting the specific criteria by which the Department will 
use to review transactions. As a whole, Subpart B adds a more detailed 
review process, as requested by commenters.

Sec.  7.100 General

Sec.  7.100(a)--Consideration of Relevant Information
    Many commenters sought clarity as to the type of information on 
which the Secretary could base a determination to commence an 
evaluation of a transaction. In response to these comments, section 
7.100(a) identifies sources or information, factors, and other 
variables related to a transaction that the Secretary may consider when 
reviewing a transaction. This list is non-exclusive and does not 
prevent the Secretary from reviewing any available information; the 
list is intended to provide parties to transactions with greater 
clarity about the types of materials on which the Secretary may rely 
when deciding whether to review (and during that review of) a 
transaction.
    The rule states that the Secretary may consider information 
provided by any U.S. Government national security body or other Federal 
agencies. In addition, the rule clarifies that the Secretary, when 
making determinations about specific transactions, may also consider 
information that includes: (1) Relevant public information; (2) 
confidential business or proprietary information; (3) classified 
national security information; (4) information from State, local, 
tribal, or foreign governments; (5) information from parties to a 
transaction, including records related to such transaction that any 
party keeps or uses, or would be expected to keep or use, in their 
ordinary course of business for such a transaction; (6) information 
obtained through the authority granted under sections 2(a) and (c) of 
the Executive Order and IEEPA; and (7) information provided by any 
other U.S. Government agency, department, or other regulatory body.
    The rule further revises section 7.100(a) to specify that 
information may be obtained through any administrative investigative or 
enforcement action undertaken pursuant to the authority granted under 
sections 2(a) and (c) of the Executive Order and IEEPA. The purpose of 
this clarification is to set out precisely the authorities that grant 
the Secretary the power to access and collect documents related to 
investigations and determinations of potentially prohibited 
transactions.
Sec.  7.100(c)--Determining Foreign Adversary Involvement
    In order to provide industry with more clarity regarding the 
determination of whether an ICTS Transaction involves ICTS designed, 
developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled 
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, 
the Department added guidance about what information it will consider 
when making these decisions. These factors include: (1) Whether the 
party or its component suppliers have headquarters, research, 
development, manufacturing, test, distribution, or service facilities 
or other operations in a foreign country, including one controlled by a 
foreign adversary; (2) personal and professional ties between the 
party--including its officers, directors or similar officials, 
employees, consultants, or contractors--and any foreign adversary; (3) 
laws and regulations of the foreign adversary in which the party is 
headquartered or conducts operations, including research and 
development, manufacturing, packaging, and distribution; and (4) any 
other criteria that the Secretary deems appropriate.
Sec.  7.100(d)--Factors for Determining an Undue or Unacceptable Risk
    Commenters also requested additional information from the 
Department about how it will determine whether an ICTS Transaction 
poses an undue or unacceptable risk. Along with listing factors to help 
determine the relationship between a foreign party to an ICTS 
Transaction and a foreign adversary, the Department has provided 
guidance on some of the information that the Secretary, in consultation 
with the appropriate agency heads, will consider when determining the 
impact of an ICTS Transaction on U.S. national security.
    Specifically, when determining whether an ICTS Transaction poses an 
undue or unacceptable risk, the Secretary and the appropriate agency 
heads will consider factors such as: (1) Threat assessments and reports 
prepared by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 
5(a) of the Executive Order; (2) removal or exclusion orders issued by 
the Secretary

[[Page 4916]]

of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, or the Director of 
National Intelligence (or their designee) pursuant to recommendations 
of the Federal Acquisition Security Council, under 41 U.S.C. 1323; (3) 
relevant provisions of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation and 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and their respective supplements; 
(4) entities, hardware, software, and services that present 
vulnerabilities in the United States as determined by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security pursuant to section 5(b) of the Executive Order, 
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, ``Information and Communications Technology Supply 
Chain Risk Management Task Force: Interim Report,'' September 18, 2019; 
(5) actual and potential threats to execution of a ``National Critical 
Function'' identified by the Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; (6) the nature, 
degree, and likelihood of consequence to the United States public and 
private sectors that could occur if ICTS vulnerabilities were to be 
exploited; and (7) any other source or information that the Secretary 
deems appropriate.
Sec.  7.100(d)--Risk Management
    The Department specifically requested comments on transactions that 
could present an undue or unacceptable risk, but where that risk could 
be reliably and adequately mitigated or prevented. Commenters suggested 
creating national security risk categories for transactions and 
providing assurance that the Secretary would impose the least intrusive 
measures to mitigate transactions in each category. Other commenters 
advocated creating risk categories or bands with different assessment 
approaches. The Department did not adopt these suggestions. ICTS 
Transaction reviews are made on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, 
categorically labeling transactions with pre-determined mitigation 
requirements would effectively counteract that individualized approach 
and may result in ICTS Transactions proceeding that otherwise should 
have been reviewed, and possibly prohibited or mitigated.
    In determining whether an ICTS Transaction poses an undue or 
unacceptable risk, the rule clarifies the risk factors the Secretary, 
in consultation with the appropriate agency heads, may consider. 
Specifically, the Secretary may consider: (1) Threat assessments and 
reports prepared by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to 
section 5(a) of the Executive Order; (2) removal or exclusion orders 
issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, 
or the Director of National Intelligence (or their designee) pursuant 
to recommendations of the Federal Acquisition Security Council, under 
41 U.S.C. 1323; (3) relevant provisions of the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation and the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and 
their respective supplements; (4) entities, hardware, software, and 
services that present vulnerabilities in the United States as 
determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to section 
5(b) of the Executive Order, Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Information and 
Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force: 
Interim Report,'' September 18, 2019; (5) actual and potential threats 
to execution of a ``National Critical Function'' identified by the 
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency; (6) the nature, degree, and likelihood of consequence 
to the United States public and private sectors that could occur if 
ICTS vulnerabilities were to be exploited; and (7) any other source or 
information that the Secretary deems appropriate.

Sec.  7.101 Information To Be Furnished on Demand

    The proposed rule contemplated that individuals might be requested 
to furnish the Secretary with information related to a transaction 
under review. Section 7.101 in this rule clarifies that, under the 
Secretary's authority pursuant to IEEPA, persons may be required to 
furnish under oath complete information relative to any ICTS 
Transaction under review. The Secretary may require that such reports 
include the production of any books, contracts, letters, papers, or 
other hard copy or electronic documents relating to any such act, 
transaction, or property, in the custody or control of the persons 
required to make such reports. Reports may be required either before, 
during, or after an ICTS Transaction under review. Additionally, under 
the authorities provided by IEEPA, the Secretary may, through any 
person or agency, conduct investigations, hold hearings, administer 
oaths, examine witnesses, receive evidence, take depositions, and 
require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the 
production of any books, contracts, letters, papers, and other hard 
copy or electronic documents relating to any matter under 
investigation.

Sec.  7.102 Confidentiality of Information

    The proposed rule requested comments and recommendations from 
stakeholders on additional recordkeeping requirements for information 
related to transactions. Most commenters focused on the confidentiality 
and the public availability of any information received. Commenters 
strongly advocated that the Department protect confidential or 
proprietary business information when making or publishing reports. 
Some commenters advocated for more open publication of these reports, 
and how each threat was mitigated or eliminated.
    To address these concerns and provide additional certainty for 
entities required to produce documents related to transactions, the 
rule clarifies the Department's responsibility to preserve the 
confidentiality of information requested by the Department. 
Specifically, the rule provides that information or documentary 
materials that are not otherwise publicly or commercially available, 
submitted or filed with the Secretary under this part, will not be 
released publicly except to the extent required by law. However, the 
Secretary may disclose information or documentary materials, not 
otherwise publicly or commercially available: (1) Pursuant to any 
administrative or judicial proceeding; (2) pursuant to an act of 
Congress; (3) pursuant to a request from any duly authorized committee 
or subcommittee of Congress; (4) pursuant to a request to any domestic 
governmental entity, or to any foreign governmental entity of a United 
States ally or partner, information or documentary materials, not 
otherwise publicly or commercially available and important to the 
national security analysis or actions of the Secretary, but only to the 
extent necessary for national security purposes, and subject to 
appropriate confidentiality and classification requirements; (5) where 
the parties or a party to a transaction have consented the information 
or documentary materials not otherwise publicly or commercially 
available may be disclosed to third parties; and (6) any other purpose 
authorized by law. These provisions largely incorporate the record 
release requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. 
While the Department will, as always, seek to protect business and 
other confidential information provided by parties, parties providing 
such information in response to this rule must clearly mark those 
documents as business or other confidential.

[[Page 4917]]

Sec.  7.103 Initial Review of ICTS Transactions

    Many commenters addressed the manner in which an ICTS Transaction 
could be identified to the Secretary as a transaction that should be 
reviewed. In particular, many commenters sought clarity on the proposed 
provision that the Secretary could commence evaluations of transactions 
based on information received from private parties ``that the Secretary 
determines to be credible.'' The commenters requested clear guidance on 
what types of information, or parties, the Secretary would deem 
credible. Additionally, several commenters noted that such a provision 
might incentivize parties to engage in anti-competitive behavior that 
would not necessarily lead to identifying transactions posing risks to 
national security. In light of these comments and concerns, the rule 
clarifies that the Secretary may consider any referral for review of a 
transaction (referral): (1) Upon receipt of any information identified 
in section 7.100(a); (2) upon written request of an appropriate agency 
head; or (3) at the Secretary's discretion. Following receipt of a 
referral, the Secretary will assess whether the referral falls within 
the scope of Sec.  7.3(a) and involves ICTS designed, developed, 
manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or 
subject to the jurisdiction of direction of a foreign adversary, and 
determine whether to: (1) Accept the referral and commence an initial 
review of the transaction; (2) request additional information, as 
identified in Sec.  7.100(a), including information from the referring 
entity regarding the referral; or (3) reject the referral.
    Several commenters requested the rule establish clearer procedures 
for how the Secretary will review ICTS Transactions. Commenters also 
advocated for differing determination timeframes, deadlines, or 
milestones based on device nature, threat severity, equipment 
replacement risks, and other potential harms.
    In response to these and other comments, the Department provides 
that, unless the Secretary determines in writing that additional time 
is necessary, the Secretary shall issue the final determination within 
180 days of accepting a referral and commencing the initial review of 
the ICTS Transaction. Regarding the procedures for the Secretary's 
review of ICTS Transactions, the Executive Order provides a careful 
process for the Secretary's decision-making. The rule further sets out 
the factors that the Secretary will consider to assist the decision-
making process. Specifically, the rule provides that the Secretary 
shall assess whether the ICTS Transaction: Falls within the scope of 
Sec.  7.3(a) of the rule; involves ICTS designed, developed, 
manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or 
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; and 
poses an undue or unacceptable risk. The Secretary will evaluate each 
transaction, on a case-by-case basis, based upon the particular facts 
and circumstances, including the identity of the parties involved.
    The rule also further articulates what the Secretary will consider 
when determining whether an ICTS Transactions poses an undue or 
unacceptable risk. The Department has identified ten criteria for such 
determinations. Along with other factors, when determining if an ICTS 
Transaction poses an undue or unacceptable risk, the Secretary will 
consider the nature of the information and communications technology or 
services at issue in the ICTS Transaction, including technical 
capabilities, applications, and market share considerations; the nature 
and degree of the direction or jurisdiction exercised by the foreign 
adversary over the design, development, manufacture, or supply at issue 
in the ICTS Transaction; and the statements and actions of the foreign 
adversary at issue in the ICTS Transaction. Other considerations 
include whether the ICTS Transaction poses a discrete or persistent 
threat and the nature of the vulnerability implicated by the ICTS 
Transaction.

Sec.  7.104 First Interagency Consultation

    The Department has clarified that the Secretary will consult with 
the appropriate agency heads after finding that an ICTS Transaction may 
fall within the scope of the Executive Order.

Sec.  7.105 Initial Determination

    This rule clarifies that if, after review of an ICTS Transaction 
and consultation with the appropriate agency heads, the Secretary 
determines that such ICTS Transaction meets the criteria in section 
7.103(c) of the rule, the Secretary shall then issue an initial written 
determination explaining the finding and whether the Secretary has 
determined to prohibit or propose mitigation measures to the ICTS 
Transaction at issue. The initial determination will contain no 
confidential information, even if such was relied upon to make the 
initial determination. Notice of this initial determination shall be 
served upon the parties to the ICTS Transaction known to the Secretary 
at the time of service. Service may be made by registered U.S. mail, 
facsimile, electronic transmission, or third-party commercial carrier, 
to an addressee's last known address or by personal delivery. Service 
of documents will be considered effective upon the date of postmark, 
facsimile transmission, delivery to third party commercial carrier, 
electronic transmission or upon personal delivery. Notice of the 
initial determination to the parties may also be accomplished by 
publication in the Federal Register where the Secretary determines that 
the initial determination concerns or could impact entities beyond the 
parties to the ICTS Transaction, where one or more of the parties to 
the ICTS Transaction are unknown to the Secretary, or in any other 
circumstance at the Secretary's discretion.

Sec.  7.106 Retention of Records

    The proposed rule requested public comments on whether to require 
parties to undertake additional recordkeeping for information related 
to transactions. Some commenters argued that the Department should not 
impose additional recordkeeping requirements. Additionally, some 
commenters suggested that the recordkeeping requirement begin upon 
receipt of a transaction notice, rather than being an ongoing duty for 
any potentially prohibited ICTS Transaction.
    After reviewing these comments, and consistent with IEEPA, the rule 
provides that, after receiving notification that an ICTS Transaction is 
under review or that an initial determination concerning an ICTS 
Transaction has been made, a notified person must immediately take 
steps to retain any and all records related to such transaction.

Sec.  7.107 Procedures Governing Response and Mitigation

    Commenters requested that the final rule explain how the 
Secretary's determinations may be ``appealed'' and how mitigation 
agreements will be reached and enforced. Commenters also sought more 
robust procedures for waivers, appeals, and mitigation. The proposed 
rule had provided that, within 30 days of a preliminary determination 
by the Secretary that a transaction was an ICTS Transaction that would 
pose an undue or unacceptable risk to the U.S. national security, 
parties to that transaction could submit a response to the decision. 
The proposed rule also allowed the Secretary to require a transaction 
be mitigated to reduce the risks the Secretary identified in the 
preliminary determination.

[[Page 4918]]

    In response to these comments, the Department has added provisions 
to enhance and clarify when and how parties to an ICTS Transaction that 
is the subject of an initial determination may engage with the 
Secretary about the initial determination. The rule establishes a clear 
process for responding to an initial determination concerning an ICTS 
Transaction and provides further guidance on how any identified risks 
may be mitigated so that an identified ICTS Transaction may proceed. 
Similar to the proposed rule, within 30 days of being notified of an 
initial determination, pursuant to section 7.105 of the rule, parties 
to that transaction may respond to the initial determination or assert 
that the circumstances leading to the initial determination no longer 
apply. A party may submit arguments or evidence in support of their 
response and may also propose remedial steps that the party believes 
would negate the basis for the Secretary's initial determination. The 
rule also allows parties to an ICTS Transaction that is subject to an 
initial determination to request a meeting with the Department, which 
may be granted at the Secretary's discretion. Additionally, the rule 
clarifies that if the parties to an ICTS Transaction do not submit a 
response to the Secretary's initial determination within 30 days 
following service of the initial determination, that initial 
determination will become final.
    Other commenters recommended the adoption of an appeals process for 
parties notified of a final determination. The Department has adopted a 
process for reconsidering an initial determination by the Secretary. 
However, an administrative appeals process would hinder the Secretary's 
ability to move swiftly to prevent an undue or unacceptable risk.
    Some commenters also requested that the Department establish a 
maximum life span for imposed mitigations, arguing that such a rule 
would reduce the inhibiting effects that mitigations would have on ICTS 
innovation. The Department disagrees with commenters, finding that such 
a clause would prevent the Department from evaluating the mitigations 
put in place on ICTS Transactions. Failing to reevaluate would 
effectively limit mitigation requirements and potentially reopen 
national security vulnerabilities.

Sec.  7.108 Second Interagency Consultation

    The proposed rule set out the review process that must be followed 
before the Secretary issues a final determination that constitutes a 
final agency action. The process involved response periods, as well as 
possible extensions, given to any party affected by a preliminary 
determination. Commenters addressed communications regarding initial 
and final determinations within the context of this process. Some 
commenters suggested that the Secretary should collaborate with private 
industry when making determinations, similar to the process within the 
Department of Homeland Security's Supply Chain Risk Management Task 
Force. Similar comments were received advocating for the establishment 
of a mechanism for industry to seek guidance on specific work programs 
or participants involved.
    The Department has declined to add specific provisions relating to 
collaborating with industry on ICTS Transaction determinations. 
However, in consideration of these comments there is now a provision 
explaining what factors and sources the Secretary will take into 
consideration during the second consultation. Specifically, the 
Secretary will take into account the views of the appropriate agency 
heads, through the interagency consultation processes. In providing 
their views, the appropriate agency heads may consider the perspective 
of relevant public-private working groups and advisory committees with 
which they convene or engage. For instance, DHS's views could 
incorporate input from the Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force. The 
Department also points out that it maintains a number of advisory 
committees that provide regular opportunities for industry and the 
regulated community to provide feedback to the Department on issues 
impacting their operations. Under the Secure and Trusted Communications 
Networks Act of 2020, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration is also charged with establishing a program to share 
supply chain risk information with telecommunication providers and 
manufacturers.
    Commenters also requested that the Department explain whether and 
how the Secretary's determinations may be appealed or reviewed by 
another authority. This rule adds a provision that, should any 
appropriate agency head oppose the Secretary's proposed final 
determination, the Secretary shall notify the President of the 
Secretary's proposed final determination and such opposition. After 
receiving direction from the President regarding the Secretary's 
proposed final determination and any appropriate agency head's 
opposition thereto, the Secretary shall issue a final determination 
pursuant to Sec.  7.109.
    Additionally, the Department will implement, within 120 days of 
publishing this rule, procedures for how parties to a proposed, 
pending, or ongoing ICTS Transaction may seek a license, pursuant to 
Section 2(b) of the Executive Order, in a manner consistent with the 
national security of the United States.
    As noted above, after reviewing an ICTS Transaction that the 
Secretary believes may pose an undue or unacceptable risk, the 
Secretary will engage in a first interagency consultation with the 
appropriate agency heads to discuss the ICTS Transaction and the 
Secretary's concerns. Following that consultation, the Secretary will 
make an initial determination and, if that decision includes a 
determination to prohibit an ICTS Transaction, will notify the parties 
to the transaction of the Secretary's initial determination. After the 
parties are afforded an opportunity to respond to the initial 
determination and propose mitigation measures, the Secretary will 
engage in a second interagency consultation with the appropriate agency 
heads, to discuss the transaction, the initial determination, and any 
response. This process will help ensure that all information regarding 
ICTS Transactions and the views of the appropriate agency head are 
considered when the Secretary makes a final determination.

Sec.  7.109 Final Determination

    As noted above, the Department appreciates the comments requesting 
additional clarity on the process by which the Secretary will make 
decisions about ICTS Transactions. The rule now provides a specific 
step for issuing final determinations on ICTS Transactions. The outcome 
of a final determination remains unchanged from the proposed rule and 
will provide that an ICTS Transaction is either: (1) Prohibited; (2) 
not prohibited; or (3) permitted pursuant to the adoption of agreed-
upon mitigation measures. Moreover, the rule clarifies that the written 
final determinations will include directions on the timing and manner 
of cessation of a prohibited ICTS Transaction, as applicable, along 
with the penalties, as authorized by IEEPA, for violations of 
applicable mitigation terms or other direction or prohibition issued 
under this rule. The final determination will provide a specific 
description of the prohibited ICTS Transaction and shall be limited in 
force to the circumstances described therein. Moreover, if the 
Secretary determines that an ICTS Transaction is prohibited, the final 
determination shall direct the least

[[Page 4919]]

restrictive means that the Secretary, in the Secretary's discretion, 
determines to be necessary to attenuate or alleviate the undue or 
unacceptable risk posed by the ICTS Transaction.
Sec.  7.109(c)--Notification of Final Determination
    Commenters also provided a number of suggestions on how to further 
ensure the Secretary is held accountable for his or her actions under 
the authority of this rule. Recommendations include limiting the 
Secretary's ability to assign a designee with final decision-making 
authority and deleting the emergency action provision set forth in 
section 7.100(f) of the proposed rule. These suggestions are intended 
to ensure that Congress can hold the executive branch accountable for 
enforcement actions.
    In response to these comments, the final rule enhances transparency 
by requiring final written determinations to be published in the 
Federal Register, where they are readily accessible to both the 
Congress and the public. Moreover, the rule now clarifies that the 
publication shall omit any confidential business information.

Sec.  7.200 Penalties

    Commenters requested the final rule clarify the type and scope of 
penalties for noncompliance with the Secretary's prohibition or 
mitigation of a transaction. We agree with commenters that the type and 
scope of the penalties for noncompliance were unclear, and the section 
has been revised accordingly. The rule now clarifies that any person 
who commits a violation of any final determination, direction, or 
mitigation agreement may be liable to the United States for civil or 
criminal penalties under IEEPA.

Other Comments

    The Department received other comments with which the Department 
disagrees. The Department responds to those comments below.
    First, one commenter requested that the Department expand the 
meaning of the term ``electronic means'' within the definition of ICTS. 
While the Department cannot modify the definition of ICTS contained in 
the Executive Order, the Department clarifies that ``electronic means'' 
includes electromagnetic, magnetic, and photonic means. This change is 
not intended to widen the scope of the rule, but merely to clarify the 
means by which ICTS must function in order for the rule to apply.
    Second, some commenters requested that the Department provide 
technical assistance for parties forced to alter ICTS infrastructure. 
However, the Department is unable to offer technical assistance at this 
time. Accordingly, the Department declines to implement any provision 
for technical assistance in the rule, and the parties to the 
transaction will bear the responsibility and cost of complying with any 
prohibition or mitigation measure.
    Third, one commenter argued that the rule imposes an unfunded 
mandate on the private sector, within the meaning of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Public Law 104-4 (UMRA), contrary to the 
determination made by the Department in the proposed rule. The 
commenter further argued that UMRA requires that before the rule 
becomes final, the Department must include in the rule a written 
statement assessing the costs and benefits of the rule, and estimates 
of future compliance costs, as required by UMRA. The Department 
continues to believe that the rule does not constitute a ``Federal 
private sector mandate'' as defined by UMRA, in that the rule does not 
impose ``an enforceable duty'' upon the private sector. See 2 U.S.C. 
658(7). Rather, the rule sets out the processes and procedures that the 
Secretary of Commerce will use to identify, assess, and address certain 
transactions, including classes of transactions. However, as the 
commenter notes, when a rule does constitute a ``Federal private sector 
mandate,'' UMRA requires the agency prepare a written statement 
containing information about the costs and benefits of the mandate, 
including, where feasible, future compliance costs, 2 U.S.C. 1532, as 
well as that the agency identify and consider regulatory alternatives 
and select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome 
alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule, 2 U.S.C. 1535. 
Thus, even in the event that the rule were considered to constitute a 
federal private sector mandate, the Department has met these 
requirements in full through the preparation of the accompanying 
Regulatory Impact Analysis.

Changes From the Proposed Rule

    Upon consideration of the public comments received, the Department 
makes several changes, as discussed in detail above, from the proposed 
rule in order to increase clarity and certainty for the public. First, 
the rule provides detail on the procedures the Secretary will follow 
when reviewing ICTS Transactions, including identifying the criteria 
and information the Secretary will consider. For example, the rule 
provides clarity as to when the Secretary will consult with the 
appropriate agency heads as part of the review and determination 
process. Second, the rule details the requirements for responding to 
initial determinations. Third, the rule clarifies that parties may 
respond to an initial determination or seek to negotiate a mitigation 
agreement with the Secretary. Fourth, the rule now provides that unless 
the Secretary determines in writing that additional time is necessary, 
the Secretary shall issue a final determination within 180 days of 
accepting a referral and commencing the initial review of an ICTS 
Transaction, eliminating the uncertainty of an open-ended review 
process. Fifth, the rule ensures transparency by specifically requiring 
the Secretary to publish the results of final determinations, absent 
any confidential business information, in the Federal Register. Sixth, 
the rule now specifies that an ICTS Transactions between parties 
outside of a sector designated as critical infrastructure must involve 
a clearly specified technology or service in order to be considered a 
covered ICTS Transactions.
    Additionally, in response to commenters seeking clarity regarding 
the scope of the rule, including numerous requests for the 
identification of ``foreign adversaries,'' the Department defines 
certain terms. The added definitions help to clarify the scope of the 
rule by providing guidance on which entities may be subject to the 
rule, what constitutes an ICTS Transaction, and whether an ICTS 
Transaction involves a foreign adversary. This additional clarity will 
assist entities with making appropriate decisions regarding ICTS 
Transactions that may present risks to the national security, therefore 
helping to protect the United States' ICTS supply chain.

Classification

A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Policies and Procedures)

    Pursuant to the procedures established to implement Executive Order 
12866, the Office of Management and Budget has determined that this 
rule is economically significant.

B. Executive Order 13771 (Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs)

    This rule is not subject to the requirements of Executive Order 
13771 because the benefit-cost analysis demonstrates that the 
regulation is anticipated to improve national security as its primary 
direct benefit.
    ICTS has become integral to the daily operations and functionality 
of U.S. critical infrastructure, as well as much,

[[Page 4920]]

if not most, of U.S. industry. Moreover, ICTS accounts for a large part 
of the U.S. economy. Accordingly, if vulnerabilities in the ICTS supply 
chain--composed of hardware, software, and managed services from third-
party vendors, suppliers, service providers, and contractors--are 
exploited, the consequences can affect all users of that technology or 
service, potentially causing serious harm to critical infrastructure, 
U.S. Government operations, and disrupting the United States and the 
global economy. These harms are already occurring. As noted in 
Executive Order 13873, ``foreign adversaries are increasingly creating 
and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications 
technology and services, which store and communicate vast amounts of 
sensitive information, facilitate the digital economy, and support 
critical infrastructure and vital emergency services.''
    U.S. entities purchasing and incorporating ICTS equipment and using 
ICTS services, such as network management or data storage, provided by 
foreign adversaries can create multiple opportunities for foreign 
adversaries to exploit potential vulnerabilities in the ICTS. That, in 
turn, could cause direct and indirect harm to both the immediate 
targets of the adverse action and to the United States as a whole. 
Incorporation of a foreign adversary's software, equipment, and 
products into domestic ICTS networks, as well as the use of use of 
foreign cloud, network management, or other services, greatly increases 
the risk that potential vulnerabilities may be introduced, or that they 
may be present without being detected. These potential vulnerabilities 
are often categorized under the general concepts of threats to privacy, 
data integrity, and denial of service.
    Some foreign actors are known to exploit the sale or lease of 
software and hardware to introduce vulnerabilities that can allow them 
to steal critical intellectual property, research results (e.g., health 
data), or government or financial information from users of the 
software or hardware. Such vulnerabilities can be introduced at the 
network, cloud service or individual product data, allow traffic 
monitoring or surveillance, and may be resistant to detection by 
private purchasers or telecommunications carriers. Once detected, the 
existence of such vulnerabilities may be extremely costly or impossible 
to remediate.
    Vulnerabilities to data integrity can be created by including an 
adversary's hardware and software into U.S. networks and systems. This 
incorporated hardware and software could then pose opportunities to add 
or remove important information, modify files or data streams, slow 
down, or otherwise modify the normal transmission or availability of 
data across U.S. networks. Such capabilities could be exercised in 
areas as diverse as financial market communications, satellite 
communications or control, or other sensitive consumer information. 
Privileged access to market movement and trends, or other manipulation, 
could disrupt and harm the operation of major exchanges.
    A foreign adversary could also effectively deny access to critical 
services by exploiting vulnerabilities provided by the incorporation of 
hardware and software into U.S. environments, fully or partially 
shutting down critical networks or functions at key times. These types 
of attacks are known as denial of service attacks. Such attacks could 
cause widespread problems, such as if they occur during periods of 
crisis, or they could be used selectively by targeting individual 
corporations, infrastructure elements, or other important 
infrastructure functions. They could also be masked to make the source 
of the disruption difficult to attribute, and therefore be difficult to 
trace and terminate.
    Such risks can be substantially increased by incorporating the 
software and equipment from unreliable adversaries into the U.S. 
telecommunications infrastructure. However, these risks are not 
necessarily confined to infrastructure environments. They could, for 
example, be present in the use of cloud services, as well as in the 
widespread use of some consumer devices, networked surveillance 
cameras, drones, or interconnection via the internet of computing 
devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive 
data.
    The number of attacks by foreign adversaries on the ICTS supply 
chain are known to be increasing. The associated costs are borne by the 
U.S. Government as well as private industry. Given the ubiquity of ICTS 
in the modern economy and especially in critical infrastructure, the 
benefits of preventing significant disruptions or harms to the ICTS 
supply chain that could cause incalculable costs to U.S. firms, 
consumers, and the U.S. Government, would be very high.
    This rule provides a process through which serious disruptions to 
the United States telecommunications infrastructure can be avoided or 
ameliorated. The rule provides the means of bringing to bear the 
information and analytical resources of the U.S. government to address 
ICTS supply chain issues before they arise, and which may be beyond the 
means of individual telecommunications carriers or other U.S. ICTS 
purchasers or users to address on their own. As noted above, the costs 
associated with the potential attacks, loss of service, or disruption 
to the ICTS supply chain are not known at this time, and are in 
actuality unknowable due to the generally clandestine nature of the 
attacks and the fact that they may or may not occur. However, by 
deterring, preventing, or mitigating these attacks, this rule will 
provide the United States with substantial, though unknowable, economic 
benefits as well as benefits to the national security of the United 
States.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Department has examined the economic implications of this final 
rule on small entities as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(RFA). The RFA requires an agency to describe the impact of a rule on 
small entities by providing a regulatory flexibility analysis. The 
Department published an initial regulatory flexibility analysis in the 
proposed rule issued on November 27, 2019 (84 FR 65316) and has posted 
a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) as part of the RIA (see 
ADDRESSES). This final rule is likely to have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. A summary of the FRFA 
follows.
A Statement of the Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments or by 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in 
Response to the IRFA, a Statement of the Assessment of the Agency of 
Such Issues, and a Statement of Any Changes Made in the Proposed Rule 
as a Result of Such Comments
    Many commenters discussed the possibility that this rule could 
present significant economic costs. For example, one commenter stated 
that ``Commerce's proposed rules would result in an extremely broad and 
unprecedented increase in regulatory jurisdiction over private ICT 
transactions. The notice of proposed rulemaking thus marks a watershed 
regulatory moment for companies in or adjacent to the ICT market--which 
is to say, virtually every company in United States--given the 
government's newfound stance that it can determine key terms of what 
ICT companies can buy, sell, or use. As a result, this proceeding and 
the rules that result from it inescapably will impose additional costs 
on ICT companies, such as the increased practical need--even

[[Page 4921]]

absent a legal requirement--to document supply chain risk management 
analysis in the event a transaction is investigated, along with related 
due diligence to consider the as-yet uncertain possibilities for 
government intervention.'' In the RIA, the Department estimated costs 
associated with developing and implementing a plan to conduct due 
diligence on potentially covered transactions, including estimating the 
number of small entities that could be affected by the rule and the 
economic impact on those small entities.
Statement of the Objectives of, and Legal Basis for, the Final Rule
    A description of this final rule, why it is being implemented, the 
legal basis, and the purpose of this final rule are contained in the 
SUMMARY and SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION sections of this preamble, as 
well as in the preamble to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued on 
November 27, 2019 (84 FR 65316), and are not repeated here.
A Description and, Where Feasible, Estimate of the Number of Small 
Entities to Which the Final Rule Applies
    Small Business Administration (SBA) size standards for businesses 
are based on annual receipts and average employment. For the purpose of 
this analysis we define a small business as one employing fewer than 
500 persons. This definition allows us to use 2017 Census data on firm 
employment by NAICS industry to estimate the number of affected small 
entities.
    In the RIA, the Department identified 4,533,000 firms that imported 
significant amounts of goods and services potentially subject to review 
under the Rule. This formed our upper bound estimate for the total 
number of affected entities. By replicating this methodology with firm 
employment data, the Department finds that 4,516,000 of these firms, 
about 99.6 percent, have less than 500 employees. Assuming the lower 
bound estimate of 268,000 affected entities is also made up of 99.6 
percent small businesses, the Department estimates that between 266,995 
and 4,516,000 small businesses will be potentially affected by this 
rule.
Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap or Conflict With the Final 
Rule
    The Department did not identify any Federal rule that duplicates, 
overlaps, or conflicts with this final rule.
Description and Estimate of Economic Effects on Entities, by Entity 
Size and Industry
    In the Costs section of the RIA, the Department estimates that 
costs to all affected entities will range between approximately $235 
million and $20.2 billion, or about $2,800 to $6,300 per entity. The 
Department estimated the costs to small entities using the same 
methodology. All small entity calculations and assumptions can be found 
in Tables 10 through 14. These tables are analogous to Tables 5 through 
9 in the RIA. While most of the assumptions below are identical to 
those found in the previous estimates, there are 3 important 
adjustments to assumptions in the small entity cost estimates:
    1. Entities potentially impacted by the rule reduced by 0.4 percent 
to account for our finding that 99.6 percent of all affected entities 
have less than 500 employees.
    2. Small entities are less likely to have the resources to develop 
and implement a compliance plan. This analysis thus reduces estimates 
of the share of small firms likely to engage in these activities 
accordingly.
    3. Small entities engage in fewer transactions than large entities. 
This analysis reduces the estimates of the number of transactions 
subject to the rule per small firm accordingly.
    As a result of these adjustments, the Department estimates that 
costs to affected small entities will range between approximately $109 
million and $10.9 billion, or about $1,800 and $3,900 per small entity.
Potential Economic Impact of the Rule on Small Entities
    Small businesses, as opposed to larger firms, may not have the same 
ability to deal with the burdens, both direct and indirect, associated 
with the rule. Faced with the various costs associated with compliance, 
firms will have to absorb those costs and/or pass them along to their 
consumers in the form of higher prices. Either action will reduce the 
profits of firms. Due to their lack of market power, and their lower 
profit margins, small firms may find it difficult to pursue either or 
both of those responses while remaining viable.
    A similar situation will hold with respect to the indirect impacts 
of the rule. Small firms downstream of impacted industries are likely 
to face increases in the prices of ICT products they use as inputs and 
either absorb the increase in cost and/or raise their prices. Given 
this situation, it is possible that the rule will have a more 
substantial adverse impact on small firms relative to larger firms.
    However, the changes made from the proposed rule benefit small 
businesses by limiting the scope of transactions subject to the rule. 
Small entities have fewer suppliers and engage in fewer transactions 
than large entities. As a result, by identifying specific foreign 
adversaries and providing guidance on which entities may be subject to 
the rule as well as additional criteria on what constitutes an ICTS 
Transaction, small entities will more readily be able to determine 
whether their transactions are subject to review under the rule--and 
may in some cases, find that none of their transaction are likely to be 
within the scope of the rule. Additionally, by specifically requiring 
the Secretary to publish the results of final determinations in the 
Federal Register, small businesses will be able to assess whether their 
transactions are substantially similar to those that have been 
prohibited. Finally, the rule reduces the potential burdens on small 
entities by emphasizing that (1) the Secretary will choose the least 
burdensome restriction that still allows for protection of the national 
security when deciding whether to prohibit or mitigate an ICTS 
Transaction, and (2) the Secretary shall issue a final determination 
within 180 of commencing an initial review.
A Description of, and an Explanation of the Basis for, Assumptions Used
    SBA size standards for businesses are based on annual receipts and 
average employment. For the purpose of this analysis, the Department 
defines a small business as one employing fewer than 500 persons. This 
definition allows the Department to use 2017 Census data on firm 
employment by NAICS industry to estimate the number of affected small 
entities. The Department does not have access to sufficiently detailed 
data on firm employment and receipts to make use of the full set of SBA 
size standard thresholds.
    The Department notes, however, that 84% of SBA employee thresholds 
are above 500, and 91% of SBA receipt thresholds are above $6 million. 
Census data show that average receipts for firms employing less than 
500 employees are $2.2 million. Thus, using our threshold of 500 
employees we estimate that 99.6% of affected entities are small 
businesses which is likely a slight underestimate.

[[Page 4922]]

Description of Any Significant Alternatives to the Final Rule That 
Accomplish the Stated Objectives of Applicable Statutes and That 
Minimize Any Significant Economic Impact of the Rule on Small Entities
    This rule will allow the Secretary to review ICTS Transactions to 
determine whether they present an undue or unacceptable risk, a 
function which is currently not performed by any other private or 
public entity. As noted above, private industry often lacks the 
incentive, information, or resources to review their ICTS purchases for 
malicious suppliers or other potentially bad actors in the ICTS supply 
chain. The U.S. Government is uniquely situated to determine threats 
and protect the national security, including economic security.
    The Department considered two regulatory alternatives to reduce the 
burden on small entities: (1) Excluding small entities with 5 or fewer 
employees, and (2) excluding certain industries and sectors. However, 
the Department determined that neither of these two alternatives would 
achieve the goal of protecting the national security, nor would they 
eliminate the rule's significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.
    First, the Department considered providing an exemption for small 
entities that have 5 or fewer employees. (``smallest entities''). 
According to Census Bureau's most recent dataset of number of firms by 
employee count, about 61% of all firms have less than 5 employees.
    Second, the Department examined the feasibility of eliminating the 
application of the rule to certain small entities involved in specific 
industries or sectors by excluding: (a) ICTS Transactions that involve 
only the acquisition of commercial items as defined by Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Part 2.101; (b) ICTS Transactions that are used 
solely for the purpose of cybersecurity mitigation or legitimate 
cybersecurity research; and (c) ICTS Transactions under which a United 
States person is subject to a security control agreement, special 
security agreement, or proxy agreement approved by a cognizant security 
agency to offset foreign ownership, control, or influence pursuant to 
the National Industrial Security Program regulations (32 CFR part 
2004).
    Ultimately, the Department decided against adopting either of these 
regulatory alternatives. Exempting certain industries or sectors or 
eliminating the application of the rule to smallest entities could 
inadvertently allow potentially problematic transactions that are 
substantially similar to those conducted by non-exempt entities to 
avoid review, undermining the rule's national security objectives. For 
example, a company that is headquartered in a foreign adversary 
country, regardless of its size or main industry sector, may be 
involved in legitimate cybersecurity research and development 
initiatives performed under the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act, 15 U.S.C. 4301-06, and the foreign company may study 
foreign equipment to gain insights on new innovations or potential 
network security risks. However, that same company may also be 
conducting operations during other ICTS Transactions that could harm 
U.S. national security interests. By promulgating the chosen 
alternative for the rule, the Department sought to remove both the 
possibility for confusion as well as the ability for malicious actors 
to argue that some legitimate cybersecurity research performed by a 
company would exempt all cybersecurity research by a company, 
legitimate or otherwise. Thus, the rule applies to types of ICTS 
Transactions most affecting U.S. national security as opposed to 
exempting entire industries, sectors, or regulated smallest entities 
from review.
    Section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996 states that, for each rule or group of related rules for 
which an agency is required to prepare a FRFA, the agency shall publish 
one or more guides to assist small entities in complying with the rule, 
and shall designate such publications as ``small entity compliance 
guides.'' The agency shall explain the actions a small entity is 
required to take to comply with a rule or group of rules.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA) 
provides that an agency generally cannot conduct or sponsor a 
collection of information, and no person is required to respond to nor 
be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of 
information, unless that collection has obtained Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) approval and displays a currently valid OMB Control 
Number. This rulemaking does not contain a collection of information 
requirement subject to review and approval by OMB under the PRA.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This rule would not produce a Federal mandate (under the regulatory 
provisions of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995) for 
State, local, and tribal governments or the private sector.

F. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    This rule does not contain policies having federalism implications 
requiring preparations of a Federalism Summary Impact Statement.

G. Executive Order 12630 (Governmental Actions and Interference With 
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights)

    This rule does not contain policies that have unconstitutional 
takings implications.

H. Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribes)

    The Department has analyzed this proposed rule under Executive 
Order 13175 and has determined that the action would not have a 
substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, would not 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on Indian tribal 
governments, and would not preempt tribal law.

I. National Environmental Policy Act

    The Department has reviewed this rulemaking action for the purposes 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). It 
has determined that this final rule would not have a significant impact 
on the quality of the human environment.

List of Subjects in 15 CFR Part 7

    Administrative practice and procedure, Business and industry, 
Communications, Computer technology, Critical infrastructure, Executive 
orders, Foreign persons, Investigations, National security, Penalties, 
Technology, Telecommunications.

    This document of the Department of Commerce was signed on January 
13, by Wilbur Ross, Secretary of Commerce. That document with the 
original signature and date is maintained by the Department of 
Commerce. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with 
requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned 
Department of Commerce Federal Register Liaison Officer has been 
authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for 
publication, as an official document of the Department of Commerce. 
This administrative process in no way alters

[[Page 4923]]

the legal effect of this document upon publication in the Federal 
Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on January 13, 2021.
Asha Mathew,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Commerce.


0
For the reasons set out in the preamble, 15 CFR part 7 is added to read 
as follows:

PART 7--SECURING THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND 
SERVICES SUPPLY CHAIN

Subpart A--General
7.1 Purpose.
7.2 Definitions.
7.3 Scope of Covered ICTS Transactions.
7.4 Determination of foreign adversaries.
7.5 Effect on other laws.
7.6 Amendment, modification, or revocation.
7.7 Public disclosure of records.

Subpart B--Review of ICTS Transactions

7.100 General.
7.101 Information to be furnished on demand.
7.102 Confidentiality of information.
7.103 Initial review of ICTS Transactions.
7.104 First interagency consultation.
7.105 Initial determination.
7.106 Recordkeeping requirement.
7.107 Procedures governing response and mitigation.
7.108 Second interagency consultation.
7.109 Final determination.
7.110 Classified national security information.

Subpart C--Enforcement

7.200 Penalties.

    Authority:  50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; E.O. 
13873, 84 FR 22689.

Subpart A--General


Sec.  7.1  Purpose.

    These regulations set forth the procedures by which the Secretary 
may: (a) Determine whether any acquisition, importation, transfer, 
installation, dealing in, or use of any information and communications 
technology or service (ICTS Transaction) that has been designed, 
developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled 
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries 
poses certain undue or unacceptable risks as identified in the 
Executive Order; (b) issue a determination to prohibit an ICTS 
Transaction; (c) direct the timing and manner of the cessation of the 
ICTS Transaction; and (d) consider factors that may mitigate the risks 
posed by the ICTS Transaction. The Secretary will evaluate ICTS 
Transactions under this rule, which include classes of transactions, on 
a case-by-case basis. The Secretary, in consultation with appropriate 
agency heads specified in Executive Order 13873 and other relevant 
governmental bodies, as appropriate, shall make an initial 
determination as to whether to prohibit a given ICTS Transaction or 
propose mitigation measures, by which the ICTS Transaction may be 
permitted. Parties may submit information in response to the initial 
determination, including a response to the initial determination and 
any supporting materials and/or proposed measures to remediate or 
mitigate the risks identified in the initial determination as posed by 
the ICTS Transaction at issue. Upon consideration of the parties' 
submissions, the Secretary will issue a final determination prohibiting 
the transaction, not prohibiting the transaction, or permitting the 
transaction subject to the adoption of measures determined by the 
Secretary to sufficiently mitigate the risks associated with the ICTS 
Transaction. The Secretary shall also engage in coordination and 
information sharing, as appropriate, with international partners on the 
application of these regulations.


Sec.  7.2  Definitions.

    Appropriate agency heads means the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General 
Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and 
the heads of any other executive departments and agencies the Secretary 
determines is appropriate.
    Commercial item has the same meaning given to it in Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR part 2.101).
    Department means the United States Department of Commerce.
    Entity means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, 
corporation, group, subgroup, or other non-U.S. governmental 
organization.
    Executive Order means Executive Order 13873, May 15, 2019, 
``Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services 
Supply Chain''.
    Foreign adversary means any foreign government or foreign non-
government person determined by the Secretary to have engaged in a 
long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse 
to the national security of the United States or security and safety of 
United States persons.
    ICTS Transaction means any acquisition, importation, transfer, 
installation, dealing in, or use of any information and communications 
technology or service, including ongoing activities, such as managed 
services, data transmission, software updates, repairs, or the 
platforming or data hosting of applications for consumer download. An 
ICTS Transaction includes any other transaction, the structure of which 
is designed or intended to evade or circumvent the application of the 
Executive Order. The term ICTS Transaction includes a class of ICTS 
Transactions.
    IEEPA means the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701, et seq.).
    Information and communications technology or services or ICTS means 
any hardware, software, or other product or service, including cloud-
computing services, primarily intended to fulfill or enable the 
function of information or data processing, storage, retrieval, or 
communication by electronic means (including electromagnetic, magnetic, 
and photonic), including through transmission, storage, or display.
    Party or parties to a transaction means a person engaged in an ICTS 
Transaction, including the person acquiring the ICTS and the person 
from whom the ICTS is acquired. Party or parties to a transaction 
include entities designed, or otherwise used with the intention, to 
evade or circumvent application of the Executive Order. For purposes of 
this rule, this definition does not include common carriers, except to 
the extent that a common carrier knew or should have known (as the term 
``knowledge'' is defined in 15 CFR 772.1) that it was providing 
transportation services of ICTS to one or more of the parties to a 
transaction that has been prohibited in a final written determination 
made by the Secretary or, if permitted subject to mitigation measures, 
in violation of such mitigation measures.
    Person means an individual or entity.
    Person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or 
direction of a foreign adversary means any person, wherever located, 
who acts as an agent, representative, or employee, or any person who 
acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the 
direction or control, of a foreign adversary or of a person whose 
activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, 
financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part

[[Page 4924]]

by a foreign adversary; any person, wherever located, who is a citizen 
or resident of a nation-state controlled by a foreign adversary; any 
corporation, partnership, association, or other organization organized 
under the laws of a nation-state controlled by a foreign adversary; and 
any corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, 
wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by a 
foreign adversary.
    Secretary means the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary's 
designee.
    Sensitive personal data means:
    (1) Personally-identifiable information, including:
    (i) Financial data that could be used to analyze or determine an 
individual's financial distress or hardship;
    (ii) The set of data in a consumer report, as defined under 15 
U.S.C. 1681a, unless such data is obtained from a consumer reporting 
agency for one or more purposes identified in 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a);
    (iii) The set of data in an application for health insurance, long-
term care insurance, professional liability insurance, mortgage 
insurance, or life insurance;
    (iv) Data relating to the physical, mental, or psychological health 
condition of an individual;
    (v) Non-public electronic communications, including email, 
messaging, or chat communications, between or among users of a U.S. 
business's products or services if a primary purpose of such product or 
service is to facilitate third-party user communications;
    (vi) Geolocation data collected using positioning systems, cell 
phone towers, or WiFi access points such as via a mobile application, 
vehicle GPS, other onboard mapping tool, or wearable electronic device;
    (vii) Biometric enrollment data including facial, voice, retina/
iris, and palm/fingerprint templates;
    (viii) Data stored and processed for generating a Federal, State, 
Tribal, Territorial, or other government identification card;
    (ix) Data concerning U.S. Government personnel security clearance 
status; or
    (x) The set of data in an application for a U.S. Government 
personnel security clearance or an application for employment in a 
position of public trust; or
    (2) Genetic information, which includes the results of an 
individual's genetic tests, including any related genetic sequencing 
data, whenever such results, in isolation or in combination with 
previously released or publicly available data, constitute identifiable 
data. Such results shall not include data derived from databases 
maintained by the U.S. Government and routinely provided to private 
parties for purposes of research. For purposes of this paragraph, 
``genetic test'' shall have the meaning provided in 42 U.S.C. 300gg-
91(d)(17).
    Undue or unacceptable risk means those risks identified in Section 
1(a)(ii) of the Executive Order.
    United States person means any United States citizen; any permanent 
resident alien; or any entity organized under the laws of the United 
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including such 
entity's foreign branches).


Sec.  7.3  Scope of Covered ICTS Transactions.

    (a) This part applies only to an ICTS Transaction that:
    (1) Is conducted by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States or involves property subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States;
    (2) Involves any property in which any foreign country or a 
national thereof has an interest (including through an interest in a 
contract for the provision of the technology or service);
    (3) Is initiated, pending, or completed on or after January 19, 
2021, regardless of when any contract applicable to the transaction is 
entered into, dated, or signed or when any license, permit, or 
authorization applicable to such transaction was granted. Any act or 
service with respect to an ICTS Transaction, such as execution of any 
provision of a managed services contract, installation of software 
updates, or the conducting of repairs, that occurs on or after January 
19, 2021 may be deemed an ICTS Transaction within the scope of this 
part, even if the contract was initially entered into, or the activity 
commenced, prior to January 19, 2021; and
    (4) Involves one of the following ICTS:
    (i) ICTS that will be used by a party to a transaction in a sector 
designated as critical infrastructure by Presidential Policy Directive 
21--Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, including any 
subsectors or subsequently designated sectors;
    (ii) Software, hardware, or any other product or service integral 
to:
    (A) Wireless local area networks, including:
    (1) Distributed antenna systems; and
    (2) Small-cell or micro-cell base stations;
    (B) Mobile networks, including:
    (1) eNodeB based stations;
    (2) gNodeB or 5G new radio base stations;
    (3) NodeB base stations;
    (4) Home location register databases;
    (5) Home subscriber servers;
    (6) Mobile switching centers;
    (7) Session border controllers; and
    (8) Operation support systems;
    (C) Satellite payloads, including:
    (1) Satellite telecommunications systems;
    (2) Satellite remote sensing systems; and
    (3) Satellite position, navigation, and timing systems;
    (D) Satellite operations and control, including:
    (1) Telemetry, tracking, and control systems;
    (2) Satellite control centers;
    (3) Satellite network operations;
    (4) Multi-terminal ground stations; and
    (5) Satellite uplink centers;
    (E) Cable access points, including:
    (1) Core routers;
    (2) Core networks; and
    (3) Core switches;
    (F) Wireline access points, including:
    (1) Access infrastructure datalinks; and
    (2) Access infrastructure digital loops;
    (G) Core networking systems, including:
    (1) Core infrastructure synchronous optical networks and 
synchronous digital hierarchy systems;
    (2) Core infrastructure dense wavelength division multiplexing or 
optical transport network systems;
    (3) Core infrastructure internet protocol and internet routing 
systems;
    (4) Core infrastructure content delivery network systems;
    (5) Core infrastructure internet protocol and multiprotocol label 
switching systems;
    (6) Data center multiprotocol label switching routers; and
    (7) Metropolitan multiprotocol label switching routers; or
    (H) Long- and short-haul networks, including:
    (1) Fiber optical cables; and
    (2) Repeaters;
    (iii) Software, hardware, or any other product or service integral 
to data hosting or computing services, to include software-defined 
services such as virtual private servers, that uses, processes, or 
retains, or is expected to use, process, or retain, sensitive personal 
data on greater than one million U.S. persons at any point over the 
twelve (12) months preceding an ICTS Transaction, including:
    (A) Internet hosting services;
    (B) Cloud-based or distributed computing and data storage;
    (C) Managed services; and
    (D) Content delivery services;

[[Page 4925]]

    (iv) Any of the following ICTS products, if greater than one 
million units have been sold to U.S. persons at any point over the 
twelve (12) months prior to an ICTS Transaction:
    (A) Internet-enabled sensors, webcams, and any other end-point 
surveillance or monitoring device;
    (B) Routers, modems, and any other home networking device; or
    (C) Drones or any other unmanned aerial system;
    (v) Software designed primarily for connecting with and 
communicating via the internet that is in use by greater than one 
million U.S. persons at any point over the twelve (12) months preceding 
an ICTS Transaction, including:
    (A) Desktop applications;
    (B) Mobile applications;
    (C) Gaming applications; and
    (D) Web-based applications; or
    (vi) ICTS integral to:
    (A) Artificial intelligence and machine learning;
    (B) Quantum key distribution;
    (C) Quantum computing;
    (D) Drones;
    (E) Autonomous systems; or
    (F) Advanced Robotics.
    (b) This part does not apply to an ICTS Transaction that:
    (1) Involves the acquisition of ICTS items by a United States 
person as a party to a transaction authorized under a U.S. government-
industrial security program; or
    (2) The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) is actively reviewing, or has reviewed, as a covered 
transaction or covered real estate transaction or as part of such a 
transaction under section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as 
amended, and its implementing regulations.
    (c) (c) Notwithstanding the exemption in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section, ICTS Transactions conducted by parties to transactions 
reviewed by CFIUS that were not part of the covered transaction or 
covered real estate transaction reviewed by CFIUS remain fully subject 
to this part.


Sec.  7.4  Determination of foreign adversaries.

    (a) The Secretary has determined that the following foreign 
governments or foreign non-government persons have engaged in a long-
term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to 
the national security of the United States or security and safety of 
United States persons and, therefore, constitute foreign adversaries 
solely for the purposes of the Executive Order, this rule, and any 
subsequent rule:
    (1) The People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (China);
    (2) Republic of Cuba (Cuba);
    (3) Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran);
    (4) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea);
    (5) Russian Federation (Russia); and
    (6) Venezuelan politician Nicol[aacute]s Maduro (Maduro Regime).
    (b) The Secretary's determination of foreign adversaries is solely 
for the purposes of the Executive Order, this rule, and any subsequent 
rule promulgated pursuant to the Executive Order. Pursuant to the 
Secretary's discretion, the list of foreign adversaries will be revised 
as determined to be necessary. Such revisions will be effective 
immediately upon publication in the Federal Register without prior 
notice or opportunity for public comment.
    (c) The Secretary's determination is based on multiple sources, 
including:
    (1) National Security Strategy of the United States;
    (2) The Director of National Intelligence's 2016-2019 Worldwide 
Threat Assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community;
    (3) The 2018 National Cyber Strategy of the United States of 
America; and
    (4) Reports and assessments from the U.S. Intelligence Community, 
the U.S. Departments of Justice, State and Homeland Security, and other 
relevant sources.
    (d) (d) The Secretary will periodically review this list in 
consultation with appropriate agency heads and may add to, subtract 
from, supplement, or otherwise amend this list. Any amendment to this 
list will apply to any ICTS Transaction that is initiated, pending, or 
completed on or after the date that the list is amended.


Sec.  7.5  Effect on other laws.

    Nothing in this part shall be construed as altering or affecting 
any other authority, process, regulation, investigation, enforcement 
measure, or review provided by or established under any other provision 
of Federal law, including prohibitions under the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2019, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, or 
IEEPA, or any other authority of the President or the Congress under 
the Constitution of the United States.


Sec.  7.6  Amendment, modification, or revocation.

    Except as otherwise provided by law, any determinations, 
prohibitions, or decisions issued under this part may be amended, 
modified, or revoked, in whole or in part, at any time.


Sec.  7.7  Public disclosure of records.

    Public requests for agency records related to this part will be 
processed in accordance with the Department of Commerce's Freedom of 
Information Act regulations, 15 CFR part 4, or other applicable law and 
regulation.

Subpart B--Review of ICTS Transactions


Sec.  7.100  General.

    In implementing this part, the Secretary of Commerce may:
    (a) Consider any and all relevant information held by, or otherwise 
made available to, the Federal Government that is not otherwise 
restricted by law for use for this purpose, including:
    (1) Publicly available information;
    (2) Confidential business information, as defined in 19 CFR 201.6, 
or proprietary information;
    (3) Classified National Security Information, as defined in 
Executive Order 13526 (December 29, 2009) and its predecessor executive 
orders, and Controlled Unclassified Information, as defined in 
Executive Order 13556 (November 4, 2010);
    (4) Information obtained from state, local, tribal, or foreign 
governments or authorities;
    (5) Information obtained from parties to a transaction, including 
records related to such transaction that any party uses, processes, or 
retains, or would be expected to use, process, or retain, in their 
ordinary course of business for such a transaction;
    (6) Information obtained through the authority granted under 
sections 2(a) and (c) of the Executive Order and IEEPA, as set forth in 
U.S.C. 7.101;
    (7) Information provided by any other U.S. Government national 
security body, in each case only to the extent necessary for national 
security purposes, and subject to applicable confidentiality and 
classification requirements, including the Committee for the Assessment 
of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications 
Services Sector and the Federal Acquisitions Security Council and its 
designated information-sharing bodies; and
    (8) Information provided by any other U.S. Government agency, 
department, or other regulatory body, including the Federal 
Communications Commission, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice;
    (b) Consolidate the review of any ICTS Transactions with other 
transactions already under review where the Secretary determines that 
the transactions raise the same or similar issues, or that are 
otherwise properly consolidated;

[[Page 4926]]

    (c) In consultation with the appropriate agency heads, in 
determining whether an ICTS Transaction involves ICTS designed, 
developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled 
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, 
consider the following:
    (1) Whether the person or its suppliers have headquarters, 
research, development, manufacturing, test, distribution, or service 
facilities, or other operations in a foreign country, including one 
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of, a foreign adversary;
    (2) Ties between the person--including its officers, directors or 
similar officials, employees, consultants, or contractors--and a 
foreign adversary;
    (3) Laws and regulations of any foreign adversary in which the 
person is headquartered or conducts operations, including research and 
development, manufacturing, packaging, and distribution; and
    (4) Any other criteria that the Secretary deems appropriate;
    (d) In consultation with the appropriate agency heads, in 
determining whether an ICTS Transaction poses an undue or unacceptable 
risk, consider the following:
    (1) Threat assessments and reports prepared by the Director of 
National Intelligence pursuant to section 5(a) of the Executive Order;
    (2) Removal or exclusion orders issued by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Secretary of Defense, or the Director of National 
Intelligence (or their designee) pursuant to recommendations of the 
Federal Acquisition Security Council, under 41 U.S.C. 1323;
    (3) Relevant provisions of the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (48 CFR ch. 2) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 
CFR ch. 1), and their respective supplements;
    (4) The written assessment produced pursuant to section 5(b) of the 
Executive Order, as well as the entities, hardware, software, and 
services that present vulnerabilities in the United States as 
determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to that 
section;
    (5) Actual and potential threats to execution of a ``National 
Critical Function'' identified by the Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency;
    (6) The nature, degree, and likelihood of consequence to the United 
States public and private sectors that could occur if ICTS 
vulnerabilities were to be exploited; and
    (7) Any other source or information that the Secretary deems 
appropriate; and
    (e) In the event the Secretary finds that unusual and extraordinary 
harm to the national security of the United States is likely to occur 
if all of the procedures specified herein are followed, the Secretary 
may deviate from these procedures in a manner tailored to protect 
against that harm.


Sec.  7.101  Information to be furnished on demand.

    (a) Pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary under 
sections 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) of the Executive Order and IEEPA, persons 
involved in an ICTS Transaction may be required to furnish under oath, 
in the form of reports or otherwise, at any time as may be required by 
the Secretary, complete information relative to any act or transaction, 
subject to the provisions of this part. The Secretary may require that 
such reports include the production of any books, contracts, letters, 
papers, or other hard copy or electronic documents relating to any such 
act, transaction, or property, in the custody or control of the persons 
required to make such reports. Reports with respect to transactions may 
be required either before, during, or after such transactions. The 
Secretary may, through any person or agency, conduct investigations, 
hold hearings, administer oaths, examine witnesses, receive evidence, 
take depositions, and require by subpoena the attendance and testimony 
of witnesses and the production of any books, contracts, letters, 
papers, and other hard copy or documents relating to any matter under 
investigation, regardless of whether any report has been required or 
filed in connection therewith.
    (b) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the term 
``document'' includes any written, recorded, or graphic matter or other 
means of preserving thought or expression (including in electronic 
format), and all tangible things stored in any medium from which 
information can be processed, transcribed, or obtained directly or 
indirectly, including correspondence, memoranda, notes, messages, 
contemporaneous communications such as text and instant messages, 
letters, emails, spreadsheets, metadata, contracts, bulletins, diaries, 
chronological data, minutes, books, reports, examinations, charts, 
ledgers, books of account, invoices, air waybills, bills of lading, 
worksheets, receipts, printouts, papers, schedules, affidavits, 
presentations, transcripts, surveys, graphic representations of any 
kind, drawings, photographs, graphs, video or sound recordings, and 
motion pictures or other film.
    (c) Persons providing documents to the Secretary pursuant to this 
section must produce documents in a format useable to the Department of 
Commerce, which may be detailed in the request for documents or 
otherwise agreed to by the parties.


Sec.  7.102  Confidentiality of information.

    (a) Information or documentary materials, not otherwise publicly or 
commercially available, submitted or filed with the Secretary under 
this part will not be released publicly except to the extent required 
by law.
    (b) The Secretary may disclose information or documentary materials 
that are not otherwise publicly or commercially available and 
referenced in paragraph (a) in the following circumstances:
    (1) Pursuant to any administrative or judicial proceeding;
    (2) Pursuant to an act of Congress;
    (3) Pursuant to a request from any duly authorized committee or 
subcommittee of Congress;
    (4) Pursuant to any domestic governmental entity, or to any foreign 
governmental entity of a United States ally or partner, information or 
documentary materials, not otherwise publicly or commercially available 
and important to the national security analysis or actions of the 
Secretary, but only to the extent necessary for national security 
purposes, and subject to appropriate confidentiality and classification 
requirements;
    (5) Where the parties or a party to a transaction have consented, 
the information or documentary material that are not otherwise publicly 
or commercially available may be disclosed to third parties; and
    (6) Any other purpose authorized by law.
    (c) This section shall continue to apply with respect to 
information and documentary materials that are not otherwise publicly 
or commercially available and submitted to or obtained by the Secretary 
even after the Secretary issues a final determination pursuant to Sec.  
7.109 of this part.
    (d) The provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1905, relating to fines and 
imprisonment and other penalties, shall apply with respect to the 
disclosure of information or documentary material provided to the 
Secretary under these regulations.

[[Page 4927]]

Sec.  7.103  Initial review of ICTS Transactions.

    (a) Upon receipt of any information identified in Sec.  7.100(a), 
upon written request of an appropriate agency head, or at the 
Secretary's discretion, the Secretary may consider any referral for 
review of a transaction (referral).
    (b) In considering a referral pursuant to paragraph (a), the 
Secretary shall assess whether the referral falls within the scope of 
Sec.  7.3(a) of this part and involves ICTS designed, developed, 
manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or 
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and 
determine whether to:
    (1) Accept the referral and commence an initial review of the 
transaction;
    (2) Request additional information, as identified in Sec.  
7.100(a), from the referring entity regarding the referral; or
    (3) Reject the referral.
    (c) Upon accepting a referral pursuant to paragraph (b) of this 
section, the Secretary shall conduct an initial review of the ICTS 
Transaction and assess whether the ICTS Transaction poses an undue or 
unacceptable risk, which may be determined by evaluating the following 
criteria:
    (1) The nature and characteristics of the information and 
communications technology or services at issue in the ICTS Transaction, 
including technical capabilities, applications, and market share 
considerations;
    (2) The nature and degree of the ownership, control, direction, or 
jurisdiction exercised by the foreign adversary over the design, 
development, manufacture, or supply at issue in the ICTS Transaction;
    (3) The statements and actions of the foreign adversary at issue in 
the ICTS Transaction;
    (4) The statements and actions of the persons involved in the 
design, development, manufacture, or supply at issue in the ICTS 
Transaction;
    (5) The statements and actions of the parties to the ICTS 
Transaction;
    (6) Whether the ICTS Transaction poses a discrete or persistent 
threat;
    (7) The nature of the vulnerability implicated by the ICTS 
Transaction;
    (8) Whether there is an ability to otherwise mitigate the risks 
posed by the ICTS Transaction;
    (9) The severity of the harm posed by the ICTS Transaction on at 
least one of the following:
    (i) Health, safety, and security;
    (ii) Critical infrastructure;
    (iii) Sensitive data;
    (iv) The economy;
    (v) Foreign policy;
    (vi) The natural environment; and
    (vii) National Essential Functions (as defined by Federal 
Continuity Directive-2 (FCD-2)); and
    (10) The likelihood that the ICTS Transaction will in fact cause 
threatened harm.
    (d) If the Secretary finds that an ICTS Transaction does not meet 
the criteria of paragraph (b) of this section:
    (1) The transaction shall no longer be under review; and
    (2) Future review of the transaction shall not be precluded, where 
additional information becomes available to the Secretary.


Sec.  7.104  First interagency consultation.

    Upon finding that an ICTS Transaction likely meets the criteria set 
forth in Sec.  7.103(c) during the initial review under Sec.  7.103, 
the Secretary shall notify the appropriate agency heads and, in 
consultation with them, shall determine whether the ICTS Transaction 
meets the criteria set forth in Sec.  7.103(c).


Sec.  7.105  Initial determination.

    (a) If, after the consultation required by Sec.  7.104, the 
Secretary determines that the ICTS Transaction does not meet the 
criteria set forth in Sec.  7.103(c):
    (1) The transaction shall no longer be under review; and
    (2) Future review of the transaction shall not be precluded, where 
additional information becomes available to the Secretary.
    (b) If, after the consultation required by Sec.  7.104, the 
Secretary determines that the ICTS Transaction meets the criteria set 
forth in Sec.  7.103(c), the Secretary shall:
    (1) Make an initial written determination, which shall be dated and 
signed by the Secretary, that:
    (i) Explains why the ICTS Transaction meets the criteria set forth 
in Sec.  7.103(c); and
    (ii) Sets forth whether the Secretary has initially determined to 
prohibit the ICTS Transaction or to propose mitigation measures, by 
which the ICTS Transaction may be permitted; and
    (2) Notify the parties to the ICTS Transaction either through 
publication in the Federal Register or by serving a copy of the initial 
determination on the parties via registered U.S. mail, facsimile, and 
electronic transmission, or third-party commercial carrier, to an 
addressee's last known address or by personal delivery.
    (c) Notwithstanding the fact that the initial determination to 
prohibit or propose mitigation measures on an ICTS Transaction may, in 
whole or in part, rely upon classified national security information, 
or sensitive but unclassified information, the initial determination 
will contain no classified national security information, nor reference 
thereto, and, at the Secretary's discretion, may not contain sensitive 
but unclassified information.


Sec.  7.106  Recordkeeping requirement.

    Upon notification that an ICTS Transaction is under review or that 
an initial determination concerning an ICTS Transaction has been made, 
a notified person must immediately take steps to retain any and all 
records relating to such transaction.


Sec.  7.107  Procedures governing response and mitigation.

    Within 30 days of service of the Secretary's notification pursuant 
to Sec.  7.105, a party to an ICTS Transaction may respond to the 
Secretary's initial determination or assert that the circumstances 
resulting in the initial determination no longer apply, and thus seek 
to have the initial determination rescinded or mitigated pursuant to 
the following administrative procedures:
    (a) A party may submit arguments or evidence that the party 
believes establishes that insufficient basis exists for the initial 
determination, including any prohibition of the ICTS Transaction;
    (b) A party may propose remedial steps on the party's part, such as 
corporate reorganization, disgorgement of control of the foreign 
adversary, engagement of a compliance monitor, or similar steps, which 
the party believes would negate the basis for the initial 
determination;
    (c) Any submission must be made in writing;
    (d) A party responding to the Secretary's initial determination may 
request a meeting with the Department, and the Department may, at its 
discretion, agree or decline to conduct such meetings prior to making a 
final determination pursuant to Sec.  7.109;
    (e) This rule creates no right in any person to obtain access to 
information in the possession of the U.S. Government that was 
considered in making the initial determination to prohibit the ICTS 
Transaction, to include classified national security information or 
sensitive but unclassified information; and
    (f) (f) If the Department receives no response from the parties 
within 30 days after service of the initial determination to the 
parties, the Secretary may determine to issue a final determination 
without the need to engage in the consultation process provided in 
section 7.108 of this rule.


Sec.  7.108  Second interagency consultation.

    (a) Upon receipt of any submission by a party to an ICTS 
Transaction under Sec.  7.107, the Secretary shall consider

[[Page 4928]]

whether and how any information provided--including proposed mitigation 
measures--affects an initial determination of whether the ICTS 
Transaction meets the criteria set forth in Sec.  7.103(c).
    (b) After considering the effect of any submission by a party to an 
ICTS Transaction under Sec.  7.107 consistent with paragraph (a), the 
Secretary shall consult with and seek the consensus of all appropriate 
agency heads prior to issuing a final determination as to whether the 
ICTS Transaction shall be prohibited, not prohibited, or permitted 
pursuant to the adoption of negotiated mitigation measures.
    (c) If consensus is unable to be reached, the Secretary shall 
notify the President of the Secretary's proposed final determination 
and any appropriate agency head's opposition thereto.
    (d) After receiving direction from the President regarding the 
Secretary's proposed final determination and any appropriate agency 
head's opposition thereto, the Secretary shall issue a final 
determination pursuant to Sec.  7.109.


Sec.  7.109  Final determination.

    (a) For each transaction for which the Secretary issues an initial 
determination that an ICTS Transaction is prohibited, the Secretary 
shall issue a final determination as to whether the ICTS Transaction 
is:
    (1) Prohibited;
    (2) Not prohibited; or
    (3) Permitted, at the Secretary's discretion, pursuant to the 
adoption of negotiated mitigation measures.
    (b) Unless the Secretary determines in writing that additional time 
is necessary, the Secretary shall issue the final determination within 
180 days of accepting a referral and commencing the initial review of 
the ICTS Transaction pursuant to Sec.  7.103.
    (c) If the Secretary determines that an ICTS Transaction is 
prohibited, the Secretary shall have the discretion to direct the least 
restrictive means necessary to tailor the prohibition to address the 
undue or unacceptable risk posed by the ICTS Transaction.
    (d) The final determination shall:
    (1) Be written, signed, and dated;
    (2) Describe the Secretary's determination;
    (3) Be unclassified and contain no reference to classified national 
security information;
    (4) Consider and address any information received from a party to 
the ICTS Transaction;
    (5) Direct, if applicable, the timing and manner of the cessation 
of the ICTS Transaction;
    (6) Explain, if applicable, that a final determination that the 
ICTS Transaction is not prohibited does not preclude the future review 
of transactions related in any way to the ICTS Transaction;
    (7) Include, if applicable, a description of the mitigation 
measures agreed upon by the party or parties to the ICTS Transaction 
and the Secretary; and
    (8) State the penalties a party will face if it fails to comply 
fully with any mitigation agreement or direction, including violations 
of IEEPA, or other violations of law.
    (e) The written, signed, and dated final determination shall be 
sent to:
    (1) The parties to the ICTS Transaction via registered U.S. mail 
and electronic mail; and
    (2) The appropriate agency heads.
    (f) The results of final written determinations to prohibit an ICTS 
Transaction shall be published in the Federal Register. The publication 
shall omit any confidential business information.


Sec.  7.110  Classified national security information.

    In any review of a determination made under this part, if the 
determination was based on classified national security information, 
such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and 
in camera. This section does not confer or imply any right to review in 
any tribunal, judicial or otherwise.

Subpart C--Enforcement


Sec.  7.200  Penalties.

    (a) Maximum penalties.
    (1) Civil penalty. A civil penalty not to exceed the amount set 
forth in Section 206 of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1705, may be imposed on any 
person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or 
causes any knowing violation of any final determination or direction 
issued pursuant to this part, including any violation of a mitigation 
agreement issued or other condition imposed under this part. IEEPA 
provides for a maximum civil penalty not to exceed the greater of 
$250,000, subject to inflationary adjustment, or an amount that is 
twice the amount of the transaction that is the basis of the violation 
with respect to which the penalty is imposed.
    (2) Criminal penalty. A person who willfully commits, willfully 
attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids and abets 
in the commission of a violation of any final determination, direction, 
or mitigation agreement shall, upon conviction of a violation of IEEPA, 
be fined not more than $1,000,000, or if a natural person, may be 
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.
    (3) The Secretary may impose a civil penalty of not more than the 
maximum statutory penalty amount, which, when adjusted for inflation, 
is $307,922, or twice the amount of the transaction that is the basis 
of the violation, per violation on any person who violates any final 
determination, direction, or mitigation agreement issued pursuant to 
this part under IEEPA.
    (i) Notice of the penalty, including a written explanation of the 
penalized conduct specifying the laws and regulations allegedly 
violated and the amount of the proposed penalty, and notifying the 
recipient of a right to make a written petition within 30 days as to 
why a penalty should not be imposed, shall be served on the notified 
party or parties.
    (ii) The Secretary shall review any presentation and issue a final 
administrative decision within 30 days of receipt of the petition.
    (4) Any civil penalties authorized in this section may be recovered 
in a civil action brought by the United States in U.S. district court.
    (b) Adjustments to penalty amounts.
    (1) The civil penalties provided in IEEPA are subject to adjustment 
pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 
1990 (Pub. L. 101-410, as amended, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note).
    (2) The criminal penalties provided in IEEPA are subject to 
adjustment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3571.
    (c) The penalties available under this section are without 
prejudice to other penalties, civil or criminal, available under law. 
Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 1001, which provides that whoever, 
in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency in 
the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or 
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or 
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain 
any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.

[FR Doc. 2021-01234 Filed 1-14-21; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 3510-20-P