[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 7 (Tuesday, January 12, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 2299-2311]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28498]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
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 

  Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 7 / Tuesday, January 12, 2021 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 2299]]



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 53

[Docket ID OCC-2020-0038]
RIN 1557-AF02

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 225

[Docket No. R-1736]
RIN 7100-AG06

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 304

RIN 3064-AF59


Computer-Security Incident Notification Requirements for Banking 
Organizations and Their Bank Service Providers

AGENCY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Treasury; 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The OCC, Board, and FDIC (together, the agencies) invite 
comment on a notice of proposed rulemaking (proposed rule or proposal) 
that would require a banking organization to provide its primary 
federal regulator with prompt notification of any ``computer-security 
incident'' that rises to the level of a ``notification incident.'' The 
proposed rule would require such notification upon the occurrence of a 
notification incident as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours 
after the banking organization believes in good faith that the incident 
occurred. This notification requirement is intended to serve as an 
early alert to a banking organization's primary federal regulator and 
is not intended to provide an assessment of the incident. Moreover, a 
bank service provider would be required to notify at least two 
individuals at affected banking organization customers immediately 
after the bank service provider experiences a computer-security 
incident that it believes in good faith could disrupt, degrade, or 
impair services provided for four or more hours.

DATES: Comments must be received by April 12, 2021.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by RIN (1557-AF02 (OCC), 
7100-AF (Board), 3064-AF59 (FDIC)), by any of the following methods:
    OCC:
    Commenters are encouraged to submit comments through the Federal 
eRulemaking Portal, if possible. Please use the title ``Computer-
Security Incident Notification Requirements for Banking Organizations 
and Their Bank Service Providers'' to facilitate the organization and 
distribution of the comments. You may submit comments by any of the 
following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal--Regulations.gov Classic or 
Regulations.gov Beta:
    [cir] Regulations.gov Classic: Go to https://www.regulations.gov/. 
Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2020-0038'' in the Search Box and click 
``Search.'' Click on ``Comment Now'' to submit public comments. For 
help with submitting effective comments please click on ``View 
Commenter's Checklist.'' Click on the ``Help'' tab on the 
Regulations.gov home page to get information on using Regulations.gov, 
including instructions for submitting public comments.
    [cir] Regulations.gov Beta: Go to https://beta.regulations.gov/ or 
click ``Visit New Regulations.gov Site'' from the Regulations.gov 
Classic homepage. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2020-0038'' in the Search Box 
and click ``Search.'' Public comments can be submitted via the 
``Comment'' box below the displayed document information or by clicking 
on the document title and then clicking the ``Comment'' box on the top-
left side of the screen. For help with submitting effective comments 
please click on ``Commenter's Checklist.'' For assistance with the 
Regulations.gov Beta site, please call (877) 378-5457 (toll free) or 
(703) 454-9859 Monday-Friday, 9 a.m.-5 p.m. ET or email 
[email protected].
     Mail: Chief Counsel's Office, Attention: Comment 
Processing, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street 
SW, Suite 3E-218, Washington, DC 20219.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th Street SW, Suite 3E-218, 
Washington, DC 20219.
    Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and 
``Docket ID OCC-2020-0038'' in your comment. In general, the OCC will 
enter all comments received into the docket and publish the comments on 
the Regulations.gov website without change, including any business or 
personal information provided such as name and address information, 
email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received, including 
attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the public 
record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any information 
in your comment or supporting materials that you consider confidential 
or inappropriate for public disclosure.
    Public Inspection: You may review comments and other related 
materials that pertain to this rulemaking action by any of the 
following methods:
     Viewing Comments Electronically--Regulations.gov Classic 
or Regulations.gov Beta:
    [cir] Regulations.gov Classic: Go to https://www.regulations.gov/. 
Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2020-0038'' in the Search box and click 
``Search.'' Click on ``Open Docket Folder'' on the right side of the 
screen. Comments and supporting materials can be viewed and filtered by 
clicking on ``View all documents and comments in this docket'' and then 
using the filtering tools on the left side of the screen. Click on the 
``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page to get information on 
using Regulations.gov. The docket may be viewed after the close of the 
comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
    [cir] Regulations.gov Beta: Go to https://beta.regulations.gov/ or 
click ``Visit New Regulations.gov Site'' from the Regulations.gov 
Classic homepage. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2020-0038'' in the Search Box 
and click ``Search.'' Click on the ``Comments'' tab. Comments can be 
viewed and filtered by clicking on the ``Sort By'' drop-down on the 
right side of the screen or the ``Refine Results'' options on the left 
side of the screen. Supporting materials can

[[Page 2300]]

be viewed by clicking on the ``Documents'' tab and filtered by clicking 
on the ``Sort By'' drop-down on the right side of the screen or the 
``Refine Results'' options on the left side of the screen.'' For 
assistance with the Regulations.gov Beta site, please call (877) 378-
5457 (toll free) or (703) 454-9859 Monday-Friday, 9 a.m.-5 p.m. ET or 
email [email protected]. The docket may be viewed 
after the close of the comment period in the same manner as during the 
comment period.
    Board:
    When submitting comments, please consider submitting your comments 
by email or fax because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at 
the Board may be subject to delay. You may submit comments, identified 
by Docket No. R-1736 RIN 7100-AG06, by any of the following methods:
     Agency Website: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/RevisedRegs.cfm.
     Email: [email protected]. Include docket 
and RIN numbers in the subject line of the message.
     FAX: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
     Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, 
Washington, DC 20551.
    All public comments will be made available on the Board's website 
at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/RevisedRegs.cfm as 
submitted, unless modified for technical reasons or to remove 
personally identifiable information at the commenter's request. 
Accordingly, comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or 
contact information. Public comments also may be viewed electronically 
or in paper in 146, 1709 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006, 
between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays.
    FDIC:
     Agency Website: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments on the Agency 
website.
     Email: [email protected]. Include RIN 3064-AF59 in the 
subject line of the message.
     Mail: James P. Sheesley, Assistant Executive Secretary, 
Attention: Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th 
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Comments may be hand delivered to 
the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street NW, building 
(located on F Street) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
    Public Inspection: All comments received will be posted without 
change to https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/--including any 
personal information provided--for public inspection. Paper copies of 
public comments may be ordered from the FDIC Public Information Center, 
3501 North Fairfax Drive, Room E-1002, Arlington, VA 22226 or by 
telephone at (877) 275-3342 or (703) 562-2200.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    OCC: Patrick Kelly, Director, Critical Infrastructure Policy, (202) 
649-5519, Jennifer Slagle Peck, Counsel, (202) 649-5490, or Priscilla 
Benner, Senior Attorney, Chief Counsel's Office, (202) 649-5490, or 
persons who are hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: Nida Davis, Associate Director, (202) 872-4981, Julia 
Philipp, Lead Financial Institution Cybersecurity Policy Analyst, (202) 
452-3940, Don Peterson, Supervisory Cybersecurity Analyst, (202) 973-
5059, Systems and Operational Resiliency Policy, of the Supervision and 
Regulation Division; Jay Schwarz, Special Counsel, (202) 452-2970, 
Claudia Von Pervieux, Senior Counsel (202) 452-2552, Legal Division, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets 
NW, Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only, 
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD) users may contact (202) 
263-4869.
    FDIC: Robert C. Drozdowski, Special Assistant to the Deputy 
Director (202) 898-3971, [email protected], and Martin D. Henning, 
Deputy Director (202) 898-3699, [email protected], Division of Risk 
Management Supervision; Graham N. Rehrig, Senior Attorney (703) 314-
3401, [email protected], and John Dorsey, Acting Supervisory Counsel 
(202) 898-3807, [email protected], Legal Division, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    Cyberattacks reported to federal law enforcement have increased in 
frequency and severity in recent years.\1\ These types of attacks may 
use destructive malware or other malicious software to target 
weaknesses in the computers or networks of banking organizations 
supervised by the agencies.\2\ Some cyberattacks have the potential to 
alter, delete, or otherwise render a banking organization's data and 
systems unusable. Depending on the scope of an incident, a banking 
organization's data and system backups may also be affected, which can 
severely affect the ability of the banking organization to recover 
operations. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are 
issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (the proposal or proposed rule) 
that would require a banking organization to notify its primary federal 
regulator when the banking organization believes in good faith that a 
significant ``computer-security incident'' has occurred.\3\ This 
notification requirement is intended to serve as an early alert to a 
banking organization's primary federal regulator and is not intended to 
include an assessment of the incident.
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    \1\ See Federal Bureau of Investigation, internet Crime 
Complaint Center, 2019 internet Crime Report at 5 (last accessed 
Sept. 4, 2020), available at https://pdf.ic3.gov/2019_IC3Report.pdf.
    \2\ See Cybercriminals and Fraudsters: How Bad Actors Are 
Exploiting the Financial System During the COVID-19 Pandemic: 
Virtual Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
International Development and Monetary Policy of the U.S. House 
Committee on Financial Services 116th Congress (2020) (written 
statement of Tom Kellerman, Head of Cybersecurity Strategy, VMware, 
Inc.), available at https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba10-wstate-kellermannt-20200616.pdf.
    \3\ As defined by the proposed rule, a computer-security 
incident is an occurrence that results in actual or potential harm 
to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information 
system or the information that the system processes, stores, or 
transmits; or constitutes a violation or imminent threat of 
violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable 
use policies. To promote uniformity of terms, the agencies have 
sought to align this term to the fullest extent possible with an 
existing definition from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). See NIST, Computer Security Resource Center, 
Glossary (last accessed Sept. 20, 2020), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Dictionary.
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    The agencies also recognize that a computer-security incident may 
be the result of non-malicious failure of hardware, software errors, 
actions of staff managing these computer resources, or potentially 
criminal in nature. Banking organizations that experience a computer-
security incident that may be criminal in nature are expected to 
contact relevant law enforcement or security agencies, as appropriate, 
after the incident occurs.\4\
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    \4\ For example, a local FBI field office. See FBI, Contact Us, 
Field Offices, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices (last 
accessed Dec. 9, 2020).
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    Moreover, banking organizations have become increasingly reliant on 
bank

[[Page 2301]]

service providers to provide essential technology-related products and 
services. Service providers that provide services described in the Bank 
Service Company Act (BSCA) \5\ to banking organizations (bank service 
providers) \6\ also are vulnerable to cyber threats, which have the 
potential to disrupt, degrade, or impair the provision of banking 
services to their banking organization customers. Therefore, the 
proposed rule would require a bank service provider to notify affected 
banking organization customers immediately after the bank service 
provider experiences a computer-security incident that it believes in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair the provision of services 
subject to the BSCA. Given the rule's purposes of ensuring that banking 
organizations provide timely notice of significant computer-security 
incident disruptions to the agencies, the agencies believe that bank 
service providers should contact at least two individuals at affected 
banking organizations to help ensure that notice has been received.
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    \5\ 12 U.S.C. 1861-67.
    \6\ Bank service providers would include both bank service 
companies and third-party providers under the BSCA.
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    The agencies believe that it is important that the primary federal 
regulator of a banking organization be notified as soon as possible of 
a significant computer-security incident that could jeopardize the 
viability of the operations of an individual banking organization, 
result in customers being unable to access their deposit and other 
accounts, or impact the stability of the financial sector.\7\ The 
proposed rule refers to these significant computer-security incidents 
as ``notification incidents.'' Knowing about and responding to 
notification incidents affecting banking organizations is important to 
the agencies' missions for a variety of reasons, including the 
following:
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    \7\ These computer-security incidents may include major 
computer-system failures, cyber-related interruptions, such as 
coordinated denial of service and ransomware attacks, or other types 
of significant operational interruptions.
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     The receipt of notification-incident information may give 
the agencies earlier awareness of emerging threats to individual 
banking organizations and, potentially, to the broader financial 
system;
     An incident may so severely impact a banking organization 
that it can no longer support its customers, and the incident could 
impact the safety and soundness of the banking organization, leading to 
its failure. In these cases, the sooner the agencies know of the event, 
the better they can assess the extent of the threat and take 
appropriate action;
     Based on the agencies' broad supervisory experiences, they 
may be able to provide information to a banking organization that may 
not have previously faced a particular type of notification incident;
     The agencies would be better able to conduct analyses 
across supervised banking organizations to improve guidance, adjust 
supervisory programs, and provide information to the industry to help 
banking organizations protect themselves; and
     Receiving notice would enable the primary federal 
regulator to facilitate and approve requests from banking organizations 
for assistance through the U.S. Treasury Office of Cybersecurity and 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (OCCIP).\8\
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    \8\ OCCIP coordinates with U.S. Government agencies to provide 
agreed-upon assistance to banking and other financial services 
sector organizations on computer-incident response and recovery 
efforts. These activities may include providing remote or in-person 
technical support to an organization experiencing a significant 
cyber event to protect assets, mitigate vulnerabilities, recover and 
restore services, identify other entities at risk, and assess 
potential risk to the broader community. The Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council's Cybersecurity Resource Guide for 
Financial Institutions (Oct. 2018) identifies additional information 
available to banking organizations. Available at https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pdf/FFIEC%20Cybersecurity%20Resource%20Guide%20for%20Financial%20Institutions.pdf (last accessed Nov. 29, 2020).
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    As discussed below, current reporting requirements related to cyber 
incidents are neither designed nor intended to provide timely 
information to regulators regarding such incidents.

II. Review of Existing Regulations and Guidance

    The agencies considered whether the information that would be 
provided under the proposed rule could be obtained through existing 
reporting standards. Currently, banking organizations may be required 
to report certain instances of disruptive cyber-events and cyber-crimes 
through the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), and they are 
generally expected to notify their primary federal regulator ``as soon 
as possible'' when they become ``aware of an incident involving 
unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information.'' \9\ 
These reporting standards provide the agencies with valuable insight 
regarding cyber-related events and information-security compromises; 
however, these existing requirements do not provide the agencies with 
sufficiently timely information about every notification incident that 
would be captured by the proposed rule.
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    \9\ See 12 CFR part 30, appendix B, supp. A (OCC); 12 CFR part 
208, appendix D-2, supp. A, 12 CFR 211.5(l), 12 CFR part 225, 
appendix F, supp. A (Board); 12 CFR part 364, appendix B, supp. A 
(FDIC) (italics omitted).
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    Under the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and 
its implementing regulations, certain banking organizations are 
required to file SARs when they detect a known or suspected criminal 
violation of federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a 
money-laundering activity.\10\ While the agencies monitor SARs 
regularly, SARs serve a different purpose from this proposed incident 
notification requirement and do not require reporting of every incident 
captured by the proposed definition of a notification incident. 
Moreover, the 30-calendar-day reporting requirement under the BSA 
framework (with an additional 30 calendar days provided in certain 
circumstances) does not provide the agencies with sufficiently timely 
notice of reported incidents.
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    \10\ See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.; 31 CFR subtitle B, 
chapter X.
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    Additionally, the Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for 
Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, which 
interprets section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and the 
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 
generally sets forth the supervisory expectation that a banking 
organization notify its primary federal regulator ``as soon as 
possible'' if the organization becomes aware of an incident involving 
unauthorized access to, or use of, sensitive customer information.\11\ 
While this may provide the agencies with notice of certain computer-
security incidents, this standard is too narrow in scope to address all 
relevant computer-security incidents that would be covered by the 
proposed rule. In particular, the GLBA notification standard focuses on 
incidents that result in the compromise of sensitive customer 
information and, therefore, does not include the reporting of incidents 
that disrupt operations but do not compromise sensitive customer 
information.
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    \11\ See 15 U.S.C. 6801; 12 CFR part 30, appendix B, supp. A 
(OCC); 12 CFR part 208, appendix D-2, supp. A, 12 CFR 211.5(l), 12 
CFR part 225, appendix F, supp. A (Board); 12 CFR part 364, appendix 
B, supp. A (FDIC).
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    Finally, the BSCA requires a banking organization to notify the 
appropriate Federal banking agency of the existence of service 
relationships within 30 days after the making of such service contracts 
or the performance of the

[[Page 2302]]

service, whichever occurs first.\12\ However, the BSCA has no 
notification requirements if the service is disrupted.
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    \12\ 12 U.S.C. 1867(c)(2).
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III. The Proposal

    The proposed rule would establish two primary requirements, which 
would promote the safety and soundness of banking organizations and be 
consistent with the agencies' authorities to supervise these 
entities.\13\ First, the proposed rule would require a banking 
organization to notify the agencies of a notification incident. In 
particular, a banking organization would be required to notify its 
primary federal regulator of any computer-security incident that rises 
to the level of a notification incident as soon as possible and no 
later than 36 hours after the banking organization believes in good 
faith that a notification incident has occurred. The agencies do not 
expect that a banking organization would typically be able to determine 
that a notification incident has occurred immediately upon becoming 
aware of a computer-security incident. Rather, the agencies anticipate 
that a banking organization would take a reasonable amount of time to 
determine that it has experienced a notification incident. In this 
context, the agencies recognize banking organizations may not come to a 
good faith belief that a notification incident has occurred outside of 
normal business hours. Only once the banking organization has made such 
a determination would the requirement to report within 36 hours begin.
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    \13\ See 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 161, 481, 1463, 1464, 1861-1867, and 
3102 (OCC); 12 U.S.C. 321-338a, 1467a(g), 1818(b), 1844(b), 1861-
1867, 3101 et seq., and 5365 (Board); 12 U.S.C. 1463, 1811, 1813, 
1817, 1819, and 1861-1867 (FDIC).
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    The proposed rule would define a computer-security incident as an 
occurrence that (i) results in actual or potential harm to the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or 
the information the system processes, stores, or transmits; or (ii) 
constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security 
policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. The proposed 
rule would define a notification incident as a computer-security 
incident that a banking organization believes in good faith could 
materially disrupt, degrade, or impair--

the ability of the banking organization to carry out banking 
operations, activities, or processes, or deliver banking products 
and services to a material portion of its customer base, in the 
ordinary course of business;

any business line of a banking organization, including associated 
operations, services, functions and support, and would result in a 
material loss of revenue, profit, or franchise value; or

those operations of a banking organization, including associated 
services, functions and support, as applicable, the failure or 
discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the financial 
stability of the United States.

    Second, the proposed rule would require a bank service provider of 
a service described under the BSCA to notify at least two individuals 
at affected banking organization customers immediately after 
experiencing a computer-security incident that it believes in good 
faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair services provided subject to 
the BSCA for four or more hours. As technological developments have 
increased in pace, banks have become increasingly reliant on bank 
service providers to provide essential technology-related products and 
services. The impact of computer-security incidents at bank service 
providers can flow through to their banking organization customers. 
Therefore, in order for a banking organization to be able to provide 
relevant notifications to its primary federal regulator in a timely 
manner, it needs to receive prompt notification of computer-security 
incidents from its service providers.
    Bank services that are subject to the BSCA include ``check and 
deposit sorting and posting, computation and posting of interest and 
other credits and charges, preparation and mailing of checks, 
statements, notices, and similar items, or any other clerical, 
bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or similar functions performed 
for a depository institution,'' as well as components that underlie 
these activities.\14\ Other services that are subject to the BSCA 
include data processing, back office services, and activities related 
to credit extensions, as well as components that underlie these 
activities.\15\
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    \14\ See 12 U.S.C. 1863-64.
    \15\ See 12 U.S.C. 1864(f). Under the BSCA, such services must 
be permissible for bank holding companies under section 4(c)(8) of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, and Sec.  225.28 
of the Board's Regulation Y. 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.; 12 CFR 225.28. 
Activities permissible under Sec.  225.28 are: (1) Extending credit 
and servicing loans; (2) activities related to extending credit; (3) 
leasing personal or real property; (4) operating nonbank depository 
institutions; (5) trust company functions; (6) financial and 
investment advisory activities; (7) agency transactional services 
for customer investments; (8) investment transactions as principal; 
(9) management consulting and counseling activities; (10) support 
services; (11) insurance agency and underwriting; (12) community 
development activities; (13) money orders, savings bonds, and 
traveler's checks; and (14) data processing. 12 CFR 225.28.
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    The proposed rule would apply to the following banking 
organizations:

    For the OCC, ``banking organizations'' would include national 
banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches and 
agencies.
    For the Board, ``banking organizations'' would include all U.S. 
bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies; state 
member banks; the U.S. operations of foreign banking organizations; 
Edge and agreement corporations.
    For the FDIC, ``banking organizations'' would include all 
insured state nonmember banks, insured state-licensed branches of 
foreign banks, and state savings associations.

    To clarify, not all ``computer-security incidents'' require a 
banking organization to notify its primary federal regulator; only 
those that rise to the level of ``notification incidents'' require 
notification. Other computer-security incidents, such as a limited 
distributed denial of service attack that is promptly and successfully 
managed by a banking organization, would not require notice to the 
appropriate agency.
    The following is a non-exhaustive list of events that would be 
considered ``notification incidents'' under the proposed rule:
    1. Large-scale distributed denial of service attacks that disrupt 
customer account access for an extended period of time (e.g., more than 
4 hours);
    2. A bank service provider that is used by a banking organization 
for its core banking platform to operate business applications is 
experiencing widespread system outages and recovery time is 
undeterminable;
    3. A failed system upgrade or change that results in widespread 
user outages for customers and bank employees;
    4. An unrecoverable system failure that results in activation of a 
banking organization's business continuity or disaster recovery plan;
    5. A computer hacking incident that disables banking operations for 
an extended period of time;
    6. Malware propagating on a banking organization's network that 
requires the banking organization to disengage all internet-based 
network connections; and
    7. A ransom malware attack that encrypts a core banking system or 
backup data.

The agencies expect that banking organizations would consider whether 
other significant computer-security incidents they experience, beyond 
those listed above, constitute notification incidents for purposes of 
notifying the appropriate agency.

    The definition of ``notification incident'' includes language that 
is consistent with the ``core business line''

[[Page 2303]]

and ``critical operation'' definitions included in the resolution-
planning rule issued by the Board and FDIC under section 165(d) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.\16\ In particular, the second prong of the notification 
incident definition identifies incidents that would impact core 
business lines, and the third prong identifies incidents that would 
impact critical operations. Banking organizations subject to the 
Resolution Planning Rule can use the core business lines and critical 
operations identified in their resolution plans \17\ to identify 
incidents that should be reported under the second and third prongs of 
the proposed rule.
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    \16\ Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act and the resolution-
plan rule, 12 CFR parts 363 and 381 (the Resolution Planning Rule), 
require certain financial companies to report periodically to the 
FDIC and the Board their plans for rapid and orderly resolution in 
the event of material financial distress or failure. On November 1, 
2019, the FDIC and the Board published in the Federal Register 
amendments to the Resolution Planning Rule. See 84 FR 59194.
    \17\ Elements of both the ``core business lines'' and ``critical 
operations'' definitions from the Resolution Planning Rule are 
incorporated in the proposed ``notification incident'' definition. 
Under the Resolution Planning Rule, ``core business lines'' means 
those business lines of the covered company, including associated 
operations, services, functions and support, that, in the view of 
the covered company, upon failure would result in a material loss of 
revenue, profit, or franchise value, and ``critical operations'' 
means those operations of the covered company, including associated 
services, functions, and support, the failure or discontinuance of 
which would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United 
States. See 12 CFR 363.2, 381.2.
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    The agencies do not expect banking organizations that are not 
subject to the Resolution Planning Rule to identify ``core business 
lines'' or ``critical operations,'' or to develop procedures to 
determine whether they engage in any operations, the failure or 
discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the financial stability 
of the United States. However, the agencies do expect all banking 
organizations to have a sufficient understanding of their lines of 
business to be able to notify the appropriate agency of notification 
incidents that could result in a material loss of revenue, profit, or 
franchise value to the banking organization.
    If a banking organization is a subsidiary of another banking 
organization that is also subject to the notification requirements of 
this proposed rule, the agencies expect the subsidiary banking 
organization to alert its parent banking organization as soon as 
possible of the notification incident, in addition to notifying its 
primary federal regulator. The parent banking organization would need 
to make a separate assessment of whether it, too, has suffered a 
notification incident about which it must notify its primary federal 
regulator. An entity that is not itself a banking organization, but 
that is a subsidiary of a banking organization, would not have its own 
separate notification requirement under this proposed rule. Instead, if 
a computer-security incident were to occur at a non-bank subsidiary of 
a banking organization, the parent banking organization would be 
expected to assess whether the incident was a notification incident, 
and if so, it would be required to notify its primary federal 
regulator.
    The proposed notification requirement is intended to serve as an 
early alert to a banking organization's primary federal regulator about 
a notification incident and is not intended to include an assessment of 
the incident. As such, no specific information is required for the 
notice, and the proposed rule does not include any prescribed reporting 
forms or templates to minimize reporting burden. The agencies believe 
that in most cases banking organizations would eventually notify their 
primary regulator when an event occurs that meets the high threshold of 
a notification incident and that this proposed rule is formalizing a 
process that the agencies' experience suggest already exists. The 
agencies recognize that a banking organization may be working 
expeditiously to resolve the notification incident--either directly or 
through a bank service provider--at the time it would be expected to 
notify its primary federal regulator. The agencies believe, however, 
that 36 hours is a reasonable amount of time after a banking 
organization believes in good faith that a notification incident has 
occurred to notify its primary federal regulator, particularly because 
the notice would not need to include an assessment of the incident. The 
agencies expect only that banking organizations share general 
information about what is known at the time. Moreover, the notice could 
be provided through any form of written or oral communication, 
including through any technological means (e.g., email or telephone), 
to a designated point of contact identified by the banking 
organization's primary federal regulator (e.g., an examiner-in-charge, 
local supervisory office, or a cyber-incident operations center). The 
notification, and any information provided by a banking organization 
related to the incident, would be subject to the agencies' 
confidentiality rules.
    Under the proposed rule, a bank service provider would be required 
to notify at least two individuals at affected banking organization 
customers immediately after it experiences a computer-security incident 
that it believes in good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair 
services provided subject to the BSCA for four or more hours. A bank 
service provider would not be expected to assess whether the incident 
rises to the level of a notification incident for a banking 
organization customer. The banking organization would be responsible 
for making that determination because a bank service provider may not 
know if the services provided are critical to the banking 
organization's operations. If, after receiving such notice from a bank 
service provider, the banking organization determines that a 
notification incident has occurred, the banking organization would be 
required to notify its primary federal regulator in accordance with 
this proposed rule. Typically, existing bank service provider 
agreements that support operations that are critical to a banking 
organization customer require notification to the customer as soon as 
possible in the event of a material incident during the normal course 
of business, and the agencies believe that the procedures in place to 
do so will generally include some redundancy to ensure that 
notification occurs.
    Under the proposal, the agencies would expect bank service 
providers to continue to provide a banking organization customer with 
prompt notification of these material incidents. The agencies believe 
that it is practical for a bank service provider to immediately notify 
at least two individuals at their affected banking organization 
customers after experiencing a computer-security incident of the 
severity described in the proposed rule because the notice would not 
need to include an assessment of the incident, and the agencies observe 
that there are effective automated systems for doing so currently. The 
agencies expect only that bank service providers would make a best 
effort to share general information about what is known at the time. 
Regulators would enforce the bank service provider notification 
requirement directly against bank service providers and would not cite 
a banking organization because a service provider fails to comply with 
the service provider notification requirement.
    This proposal is not expected to add significant burden on banking 
organizations. Banking organizations should already have internal 
policies for responding to computer-security incidents, which the 
agencies believe generally already include processes for notifying 
their primary federal regulator and other stakeholders of incidents

[[Page 2304]]

within the scope of the proposal. However, these processes are not 
uniform or consistent between institutions and have not always resulted 
in timely notification being provided to the applicable regulator, 
which is why the agencies are issuing this proposal. This proposal also 
is not expected to add significant burden on bank service providers. 
The agencies' experiences with conducting bank service provider 
contract reviews during examinations indicates that most of these 
contracts include incident-reporting provisions. As a result, this 
proposal is not expected to add significant burden on a material number 
of bank service providers.
    Each agency may provide additional clarification and guidance to 
its supervised banking organizations on how best to communicate with 
the agencies to implement the notification requirements of the rule.

IV. Impact Analysis

    Covered banking organizations under the proposed rule would include 
all depository institutions, holding companies, and certain other 
financial entities that are supervised by one of the agencies. 
According to recent Call Report and other data, the agencies supervise 
approximately 5,000 depository institutions along with a number of 
holding companies and other financial services entities that would be 
covered under the proposed rule.\18\
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    \18\ September 30, 2020 Call Report Data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposed rule would require bank service providers 
as described in the BSCA to notify at least two individuals at affected 
banking organization customers immediately after the bank service 
providers experience a computer-security incident that they believe in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair services they provide 
subject to the BSCA for four or more hours. This requirement would 
enable a banking organization to promptly respond to an incident, 
determine whether it must notify its primary federal regulator that a 
notification incident has occurred, and take other appropriate measures 
related to the incident. The agencies do not have data on the number of 
bank service providers that would be affected by this requirement. 
However, several known bank service providers have self-selected the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry 
``Computer System Design and Related Services'' (NAICS industry code 
5415) as their primary business activity. As a conservative estimate of 
the population of covered bank service providers for this analysis, the 
agencies assume that all firms in this industry are bank service 
providers.\19\ According to Census counts, there were 120,220 firms in 
the United States under NAICS code 5415 in 2017, the most recent year 
for which such data is available.\20\
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    \19\ NAICS code 5415 most likely contains many firms that are 
not bank service providers, so the agencies believe using the 
population of firms in this industry is an overestimate. However, 
there may be some bank service providers that do not self-identify 
under NAICS code 5415.
    \20\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 SUSB Annual Data Tables by 
Establishment Industry (Mar. 2020), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html.
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Benefits

    The agencies believe that prompt notification of these incidents 
would provide the following benefits to banking organizations and the 
financial industry as a whole.
    Notification may assist the relevant agencies in determining 
whether the incident is isolated or is one of many simultaneous 
identical or similar incidents at multiple banking organizations. If 
the notification incident is isolated to a single banking organization, 
the primary federal regulator may be able to facilitate requests for 
assistance to the affected organization, arranged by the U.S. Treasury 
OCCIP, to minimize the impact of the incident. This benefit may be 
greatest for small banking organizations with more limited computer 
security resources. If the notification incident is one of many 
simultaneous identical or similar incidents at multiple banking 
organizations, the agencies may also alert other banking organizations 
of the threat, as appropriate, while protecting confidential 
supervisory information, recommend preventative measures in order to 
better manage or prevent reoccurrence of similar incidents, or 
otherwise help coordinate the response and mitigation efforts. 
Receiving notification incident information from multiple banking 
organizations would also allow regulators to conduct analyses across 
entities to improve guidance, to adjust supervisory programs to limit 
the reoccurrence of such incidents in the future, and to provide 
information to the industry to help banking organizations protect 
themselves against future computer-security incidents.
    The proposal may help reduce losses in the event a notification 
incident is so significant that it jeopardizes a banking organization's 
viability, as the proposal will provide additional time for the 
agencies to prepare to handle a potential failure as cost-effectively 
and non-disruptively as possible.
    The agencies do not have the information to quantify the potential 
benefits of the proposed rule because the benefits depend on the 
breadth and severity of future notification incidents, the specifics of 
those incidents, and the value of the assistance approved by the 
agencies, among other things. In addition, the agencies believe that 
the proposed rule would formalize a process that already exists, based 
on the agencies' experiences. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, 
banking organizations face a heightened risk of disruptive and 
destructive attacks that have increased in frequency and severity in 
recent years; therefore, the agencies believe that the benefits of the 
proposed rule would exceed the costs--detailed below.

Costs

    The proposed rule would require banking organizations to notify 
their primary federal regulator as soon as possible and no later than 
36 hours after a banking organization has determined that a 
notification incident has occurred. The agencies reviewed available 
supervisory data and SARs involving cyber events against banking 
organizations to develop an estimate of the number of notification 
incidents expected to be reported annually. This review focused on 
descriptive criteria (e.g., ransomware, trojan, zero day, etc.) that 
may be indicative of the type of material computer-security incident 
that would meet the notification incident reporting criteria. Based on 
this review, the agencies estimate that approximately 150 notification 
incidents may occur on an annual basis.\21\ The agencies specifically 
invite comment on the estimated number of incidents.
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    \21\ The agencies used conservative judgment when assessing 
whether a cyber-event might have risen to the level of a 
notification incident, so the approach may overestimate the number. 
However, the approach may also underestimate the number of 
notification incidents since supervisory and SAR data may not 
capture all such incidents.
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    The agencies estimate that, upon occurrence of a notification 
incident, the affected banking organization may incur up to three hours 
of staff time to coordinate internal communications, consult with its 
bank service provider, if appropriate, and notify the banking 
organization's primary federal regulator. This may include discussion 
of the incident among staff of the banking organization, such as the 
Chief Information Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, a senior 
legal or compliance officer, and staff of a bank service provider, as 
appropriate, and liaison with senior management of the

[[Page 2305]]

banking organization. The agencies believe that the regulatory burden 
associated with the notice requirement would be de minimis, because the 
communications that led to the determination of the notification 
incident would occur regardless of the proposed rule.\22\
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    \22\ Even at an elevated labor compensation rate of $200 per 
hour, the proposed rule would only impose additional compliance 
costs of $600 per notification.
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    The proposed rule also requires a bank service provider, as defined 
herein and in accordance with the BSCA, to notify at least two 
individuals at affected banking organization customers immediately 
after it experiences a computer-security incident that it believes in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair services provided subject 
to the BSCA for four or more hours. The agencies do not have data on 
the frequency of incidents that would require bank service providers to 
notify their customers who are banking organizations. For purposes of 
this proposed rule, the agencies assume that 2,404 bank service 
providers, or approximately 2 percent \23\ of the 120,220 firms under 
NAICS code 5415, could experience a computer-security incident each 
year that would require notification to affected banking organization 
customers. The agencies specifically invite comment on the estimated 
number of incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ This is informed by the estimate of the percentage of 
banking organizations that have notification incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies believe that bank service providers would have 
automated systems allowing them to identify banking organization 
customers when a computer-security incident that meets the criteria for 
notification has occurred and for contacting at least two individuals 
at affected banking organization customers. Furthermore, the agencies 
anticipate that such firms would need approximately one hour to 
determine that a computer-security incident meets the notification 
criteria and two hours to identify the customers affected by the 
service disruption and provide notification that an incident has 
occurred. These activities would total 7,212 hours per year for the 
population of bank service providers described above.\24\ The agencies 
believe that the additional compliance costs would be de minimis for 
each affected bank service provider.\25\ Post-notification activities 
such as providing technical support to affected bank organization 
customers that would be provided during the normal course of business 
when managing and resolving a computer security incident are beyond the 
scope of the notification requirement.
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    \24\ 7,212 hours = 2,404 per year frequency of incidents * 3 
hours per incident.
    \25\ Even at an elevated labor compensation rate of $200 per 
hour, the proposed rule would only impose additional compliance 
costs of $600 per notification.
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    The agencies invite comments on these expected benefits and costs.

V. Alternatives Considered

    The agencies considered several alternatives to the proposal. The 
agencies considered leaving the current regulations unchanged. The 
agencies rejected this alternative because of the significant risks 
that notification incidents pose to banking organizations and to the 
financial sector.
    The agencies considered limiting the definition of notification 
incidents to those covered by the SAR-filing requirements. In this 
alternative, submission of a SAR would have served as notification of 
such an incident. This approach would have eliminated the additional 
compliance burden but would have delayed the notification and decreased 
the benefits provided by the proposed rule. In the proposal, however, 
the agencies determined that, to minimize regulatory burden, the notice 
requirement would not include the level of detail required of a SAR 
(which could otherwise have created a significant burden to complete as 
a banking organization manages a notification incident).
    The agencies considered expanding the definition of notification 
incident to include any incident that might disrupt a banking 
organization's systems or any unauthorized access to the banking 
organization's sensitive customer data. However, the agencies 
ultimately sought to strike a balance that would minimize compliance 
burden by focusing only on events that are likely to cause significant 
harm to banking organizations.

VI. Request for Comments

    The agencies seek comment on all aspects of their proposal and more 
specifically on the following:
    1. How should the definition of ``computer-security incident'' be 
modified, if at all? For example, should it include only occurrences 
that result in actual harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of an information system or the information the system 
processes, stores, or transmits? Should it include only occurrences 
that constitute an actual violation of security policies, security 
procedures, or acceptable use policies?
    2. How should the definition of ``notification incident'' be 
modified, if at all? For example, instead of ``computer-security 
incident,'' should the definition of ``notification incident'' refer to 
other NIST terms and definitions, or another recognized source of terms 
and definitions? Should the standard for materially disrupt, degrade, 
or impair be altered to reduce potential redundancy between the terms 
or to consider different types of impact on the banking organization? 
Should the definition not include language that is consistent with the 
``core business line'' and ``critical operation'' definitions included 
in the resolution-planning rule? Should those elements of the 
definition only apply to banking organizations that have resolution 
planning requirements?
    3. How should the 36 hour timeframe for notification be modified, 
if at all, and why? Should it be made shorter or longer? Should it 
start at a different time? Should the timeframe be modified for certain 
types of notification incidents or banking organizations (for example, 
should banks with total assets of less than $10 billion have a 
different timeframe)?
    4. Is the proposed requirement that banking organizations and bank 
service providers notify the appropriate party when they ``believe in 
good faith'' that they are experiencing or have experienced a 
notification incident or computer-security incident, as applicable, 
sufficiently clear such that banking organizations and bank service 
providers understand when they should provide notice? How should the 
``believes in good faith'' standard be modified, if at all? For 
example, should the standard be ``reasonably believes'' for either 
banking organizations or bank service providers?
    5. How should notification by banking organizations under the 
proposed rule be provided to the agencies? Should the agencies adopt a 
process for joint notification to the agencies in cases where multiple 
affiliates of a banking organization have notification requirements to 
different agencies? If so, how should joint notification be done and 
why? Should the agencies adopt centralized points of contact to receive 
notifications or should notifications be provided to regional offices 
(such as Federal Reserve Banks) or banking organization-specific 
supervisory teams?
    6. The proposed rule's definition of ``banking organizations'' and 
``bank service providers'' would include the financial market utilities 
(FMUs) that are chartered as a State member bank or Edge corporation, 
or perform services subject to regulation and examination under the 
BSCA. Are there unique factors that the agencies should consider in 
determining how notification requirements should apply to these

[[Page 2306]]

FMUs? For designated FMUs for which the Board is the Supervisory Agency 
under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, would notification requirements 
best be conveyed through this proposed rule or through amendments to 
the Board's Regulation HH?
    7. What other types of entities regulated by the agencies should be 
added to the rule as ``banking organizations'' that would be subject to 
the rule? Why?
    8. Which entities proposed in the rule as ``banking organizations'' 
should be removed from the rule? Why?
    9. Do existing contracts between banking organizations and bank 
service providers already have provisions that would allow banking 
organizations to meet the proposed notification incident requirements?
    10. Does the definition of ``bank service provider'' in the 
proposed rule appropriately capture the services about which banking 
organizations should be informed in the event of disruptions? Should 
all the services included in the Bank Service Company Act be included 
for purposes of banking organizations receiving notice of disruptions 
from their bank service providers? If not, which services should 
require a bank service provider to notify its affected banking 
organization customers when those services are disrupted, and why? 
Should the requirement only attach to a subset of services provided to 
banking organizations under the BSCA or should it only attach to 
certain bank service providers, such as those that are examined by the 
federal banking agencies?
    11. Should the proposed rule for bank service providers require 
bank service providers to notify all banking organization customers or 
only those affected by a computer-security incident under the proposed 
rule?
    12. Within what timeframe should bank service providers provide 
notification to banking organizations? Is immediate notification after 
experiencing a disruption in services provided to affected banking 
organization customers and to report to those organizations reasonable? 
If not, what is the appropriate amount of time for a bank service 
provider to determine it has experienced a material disruption in 
service that impacts its banking organization customers, and why?
    13. The agencies understand that many existing contracts between 
banking organizations and bank service providers contain notification 
provisions regarding material incidents and that, generally, bank 
service providers use automated systems to notify banking organizations 
of service disruptions. The agencies are seeking information on how 
bank service providers currently notify banking organizations of 
service disruptions under existing contracts between bank service 
providers and banking organizations. Do those contracts contemplate the 
provision of notice to at least two individuals at an affected banking 
organization? Is the method of notice specified in existing contracts 
(for example, email, telephone, etc.) sufficient to allow bank service 
providers to provide notice of computer-security incidents to at least 
two individuals at affected banking organizations? If not, how best 
could the requirement for bank service providers to notify at least two 
individuals at affected banking organizations be achieved most 
efficiently and cost effectively for both parties?
    14. Describe circumstances in which a bank service provider would 
become aware of a material disruption that could be a notification 
incident for banking organization customers but the banking 
organization customers would not be aware of the incident. Would it be 
overly burdensome to certain bank service providers, such as smaller 
bank service providers, to provide notice of material disruptions, 
degradations, or impairments to their affected banking organization 
customers and, if so, why?
    15. The agencies invite comments on specific examples of computer-
security incidents that should, or should not, constitute notification 
incidents.
    16. The agencies invite comments on the methodology used to 
estimate the number of notification incidents per year that would need 
to be reported under the proposed rule.

Written comments must be received by the agencies no later than April 
12, 2021.

VII. Regulatory Analysis and Procedure

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number. The agencies will request new control 
numbers for this information collection. The information collection 
requirements contained in this joint notice of proposed rulemaking have 
been submitted to OMB for review and approval by the OCC and FDIC under 
section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of 
OMB's implementing regulations (5 CFR part 1320). The Board reviewed 
the proposed rule under the authority delegated to the Board by OMB.
    The proposed rule contains a reporting requirement that is subject 
to the PRA. The reporting requirement is found in Sec. Sec.  53.3 
(OCC), 225.302 (Board), and 304.23 (FDIC) of the proposed rule, which 
require a banking organization to notify its primary federal bank 
regulatory agency of the occurrence of a ``notification incident'' at 
the banking organization.
    The proposed rule also contains a disclosure requirement that is 
subject to the PRA. The disclosure requirement is found in Sec. Sec.  
53.4 (OCC), 225.303 (Board), and 304.24 (FDIC) of the proposed rule, 
which require a bank service provider to notify at least two 
individuals at affected banking organization customers immediately 
after it experiences a computer-security incident that it believes in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair services provided subject 
to the BSCA for four or more hours.
    Comments are invited on:
    (a) Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the agencies' functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    (b) the accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information 
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
used;
    (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    (d) ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    (e) estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information. All 
comments will become a matter of public record.
    Comments on aspects of this document that may affect reporting 
requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the addresses 
listed in the ADDRESSES section of this Supplementary Information. A 
copy of the comments may also be submitted to the OMB desk officer for 
the Agencies: By mail to U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th 
Street NW, #10235, Washington, DC 20503 or by facsimile to (202) 395-
5806, Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk Officer.

[[Page 2307]]

Proposed Information Collection

    Title of Information Collection: Computer-Security Incident 
Notification.
    Frequency of Response: On occasion; event-generated.\26\
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    \26\ For purposes of these calculations, the agencies assume 
that the frequency is 1 response per respondent.
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    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents:

    OCC: National banks, federal savings associations, federal 
branches and agencies, and bank service providers.
    FDIC: All insured state nonmember banks, insured state-licensed 
branches of foreign banks, State savings associations, and bank 
service providers.
    Board: All state member banks (as defined in 12 CFR 208.2(g)), 
bank holding companies (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1841), savings and 
loan holding companies (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1467a), foreign 
banking organizations (as defined in 12 CFR 211.21(o)), foreign 
banks that do not operate an insured branch, state branch or state 
agency of a foreign bank (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 3101(b)(11) and 
(12)), Edge or agreement corporations (as defined in 12 CFR 
211.1(c)(2) and (3)), and bank service providers.

    Number of Respondents: \27\
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    \27\ The number of respondents for the reporting requirement is 
based on allocating the estimated 150 notification incidents among 
the agencies based on the percentage of entities supervised by each 
agency. The FDIC represents the majority of the banking 
organizations (64 percent), while the Board supervises approximately 
21 percent of the banking organizations, with the OCC supervising 
the remaining 15 percent of banking organizations. The number of 
respondents for the disclosure requirement is based on an assumption 
of an approximately 2 percent per year frequency of incidents from 
120,220 firms, which is divided equally among the OCC, FDIC, and 
Board.
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    OCC: Reporting--22; Disclosure--801.
    FDIC: Reporting--96; Disclosure--802.
    Board: Reporting--32; Disclosure--801.

    Estimated Hours per Response:

    Reporting--Sections 53.3 (OCC), 225.302 (Board), and 304.23 
(FDIC): 3 hours.
    Disclosure--Sections 53.4 (OCC), 225.303 (Board), and 304.24 
(FDIC): 3 hours.

    Estimated Total Annual Burden:

    OCC: Reporting -66 hours; Disclosure--2,403 hours.
    FDIC: Reporting -288 hours; Disclosure--2,406 hours.
    Board: Reporting -96 hours; Disclosure--2,403 hours.

    Abstract: The proposed rule would establish notification 
requirements for banking organizations upon the occurrence of a 
``computer-security incident'' that rises to the level of a 
``notification incident.''
    A ``notification incident'' is defined as a ``computer-security 
incident'' that a banking organization believes in good faith could 
materially disrupt, degrade, or impair:
     The ability of the banking organization to carry out 
banking operations, activities, or processes, or deliver banking 
products and services to a material portion of its customer base, in 
the ordinary course of business;
     Any business line of a banking organization, including 
associated operations, services, functions and support, and would 
result in a material loss of revenue, profit, or franchise value; or
     Those operations of a banking organization, including 
associated services, functions and support, as applicable, the failure 
or discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the financial 
stability of the United States.
    A ``computer-security incident'' is defined as an occurrence that 
results in actual or potential harm to the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of an information system or the information that the 
system processes, stores, or transmits; or constitutes a violation or 
imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, 
or acceptable use policies.
    The proposed rule would require a banking organization to notify 
its primary federal banking regulator upon the occurrence of a 
``notification incident'' at the banking organization. The agencies 
recognize that the proposed rule would impose a limited amount of 
burden, beyond what is usual and customary, on banking organizations in 
the event of a computer-security incident even if it does not rise to 
the level of a notification incident, as banking organizations will 
need to engage in an analysis to determine whether the relevant 
thresholds for notification are met. Therefore, the agencies' estimated 
burden per notification incident takes into account the burden 
associated with such computer-security incidents.
    The proposed rule also would require a bank service provider, as 
defined herein and in accordance with the BSCA, to notify at least two 
individuals at affected banking organization customers immediately 
after it experiences a computer-security incident that it believes in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair services provided subject 
to the BSCA for four or more hours.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    OCC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare an 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the impact of the 
rule on small entities (defined by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) for purposes of the RFA to include commercial banks and savings 
institutions with total assets of $600 million or less and trust 
companies with total assets of $41.5 million or less) or to certify 
that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities. The OCC currently supervises 
approximately 745 small entities.
    Because the proposed rule impacts all OCC-supervised institutions, 
as well as all bank service providers, it would impact a substantial 
number of small entities. However, the expected costs of the proposal 
would be de minimis. Many banks already have internal policies for 
responding to security incidents, which include processes for notifying 
their primary regulator and other stakeholders of incidents within the 
scope of the proposal. Additionally, while the OCC believes bank 
service provider contracts may already include these provisions, if 
current contracts do not include these provisions, then the OCC does 
not expect the implementation of these provisions to impose a material 
burden on bank service providers. Therefore, the OCC certifies that the 
proposed rule, if implemented, would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    Board: The Board has considered the potential impact of the 
proposed rule on small entities in accordance with section 603 of the 
RFA.\28\ Based on the Board's analysis, and for the reasons stated 
below, the Board believes that this proposed rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial of number of small 
entities.
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    \28\ 5 U.S.C. 603.
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    As discussed in the Supplementary Information, the agencies are 
proposing to require a banking organization to notify its primary 
federal regulator as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours after 
the banking organization believes in good faith that a notification 
incident has occurred. The proposed rule would establish a significant 
computer-security incident notification requirement, which would 
support the safety and soundness of entities supervised by the 
agencies. The proposed rule also would require a bank service provider, 
as defined herein and in accordance with the BSCA, to notify at least 
two individuals at affected banking organization customers immediately 
after it experiences a computer-security incident that it believes in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair the provision of services 
subject to the BSCA for four or more hours.

[[Page 2308]]

    The Board's rule applies to state-chartered banks that are members 
of the Federal Reserve System, bank holding companies, savings and loan 
holding companies, U.S. operations of foreign banking organizations, 
Edge and agreement corporations (collectively, ``Board-regulated 
entities''). As described in the Impact Analysis section, requirements 
under the proposed rule would apply to all Board-regulated entities. 
Under regulations issued by the Small Business Administration, a small 
entity includes a depository institution, bank holding company, or 
savings and loan holding company with total assets of $600 million or 
less and trust companies with total receipts of $41.5 million or 
less.\29\ According to Call Reports and other Board reports, there were 
approximately 472 state member banks, 2,925 bank holding companies, 132 
savings and loan holding companies, and 16 Edge and agreement 
corporations that are small entities.\30\ In addition, the proposed 
rule affects all bank service providers that provide services subject 
to the BSCA.\31\ The Board is unable to estimate the number of bank 
service providers that are small due to the varying types of banking 
organizations that may enter into outsourcing arrangements with bank 
service providers.
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    \29\ See 13 CFR 121.201; 84 FR 34261 (July 18, 2019).
    \30\ State member bank data is derived from March 31, 2020 Call 
Reports. Data for bank holding companies and savings and loan 
holding companies are derived from the June 30, 2020, FR Y-9C and FR 
Y-9SP. Data for Edge and agreement corporations are derived from the 
December 31, 2019 and March 31, 2020, FR-2086b.
    \31\ Discussed in detail in the Impact Analysis section.
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    The proposed rule would require all banking organizations to notify 
their primary federal regulator as soon as possible and no later than 
36 hours after the banking organization believes in good faith that a 
notification incident has occurred. The agencies estimate that, upon 
occurrence of a notification incident, an affected banking organization 
may incur compliance costs of up to three hours of staff time to 
coordinate internal communications, consult with its bank service 
provider, if appropriate, and notify the banking organization's primary 
federal regulator. As described in the Impact Analysis section above, 
this requirement is estimated to affect a relatively small number of 
Board-regulated entities. The agencies believe that any compliance 
costs associated with the notice requirement would be de minimis, 
because the communications that led to the determination of the 
notification incident would have occurred regardless of the proposed 
rule.
    The proposed rule also would require a bank service provider, as 
defined herein and in accordance with the BSCA, to notify at least two 
individuals at affected banking organization customers immediately 
after it experiences a computer-security incident that it believes in 
good faith could disrupt, degrade, or impair the provision of services 
subject to the BSCA for four or more hours. As described in the Impact 
Analysis section above, the agencies believe that any compliance costs 
associated with the implementation of this requirement would be de 
minimis for each affected bank service provider. There are no other 
recordkeeping, reporting or compliance requirements associated with the 
proposed rule.
    The Board has not identified any federal statutes or regulations 
that would duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed revisions, 
and the Board is not aware of any significant alternatives to the final 
rule that would reduce the economic impact on Board-regulated small 
entities. For the reasons stated above, the Board believes that this 
proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The Board welcomes comment on all 
aspects of its analysis. In particular, the Board requests that 
commenters describe the nature of any impact on small entities and 
provide empirical data to illustrate and support the extent of the 
impact.
    FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an 
agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare and make 
available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis 
that describes the impact of a proposed rule on small entities.\32\ 
However, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required if the 
agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Small Business 
Administration (SBA) has defined ``small entities'' to include banking 
organizations with total assets of less than or equal to $600 
million.\33\ Generally, the FDIC considers a significant effect to be a 
quantified effect in excess of 5 percent of total annual salaries and 
benefits per institution, or 2.5 percent of total noninterest expenses. 
The FDIC believes that effects in excess of these thresholds typically 
represent significant effects for FDIC-supervised institutions. For the 
reasons described below, the FDIC certifies that the proposed rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
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    \32\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \33\ The SBA defines a small banking organization as having $600 
million or less in assets, where an organization's assets are 
determined by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly 
financial statements for the preceding year. See 13 CFR 121.201 (as 
amended by 84 FR 34261, effective August 19, 2019). In its 
determination, the SBA counts the receipts, employees, or other 
measure of size of the concern whose size is at issue and all of its 
domestic and foreign affiliates. See 13 CFR 121.103. Following these 
regulations, the FDIC uses a banking organization's affiliated and 
acquired assets, averaged over the preceding four quarters, to 
determine whether the banking organization is ``small'' for the 
purposes of RFA.
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    As described in the Impact Analysis section, the proposed rule is 
expected to affect all institutions supervised by the FDIC. According 
to recent Call Reports, the FDIC supervises 3,270 insured depository 
institutions (FDIC-supervised IDIs).\34\ Of these, approximately 2,492 
FDIC-supervised IDIs would be considered small entities for the 
purposes of RFA.\35\ These small entities hold approximately $540 
billion in assets, accounting for 14 percent of total assets held by 
FDIC-supervised institutions. In addition, the rule affects all bank 
service providers that provide services subject to the BSCA.\36\ The 
FDIC is unable to estimate the number of affected bank service 
providers that are small. For purposes of this certification, the FDIC 
assumes, as an upper limit, that all affected bank service providers 
are small.
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    \34\ FDIC Call Reports, June 30, 2020.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Discussed in detail in the Impact Analysis section.
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    The proposed rule would require a banking organization to notify 
its primary federal regulator as soon as possible and no later than 36 
hours after the banking organization believes in good faith that a 
notification incident has occurred. As described in the Impact Analysis 
section above, this requirement is estimated to affect a relatively 
small number of FDIC-supervised institutions and impose a compliance 
cost of up to three hours per incident. The agencies believe that the 
regulatory burden of such a requirement would be de minimis in nature, 
since the internal communications that led to the determination of the 
notification incident would have occurred regardless of the proposed 
rule.\37\
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    \37\ Even at an elevated labor compensation rate of $200 per 
hour, the proposed rule would impose a cost burden of less than $600 
per incident.
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    In addition, the proposed rule would require a bank service 
provider, as defined herein and in accordance with the BSCA, to notify 
at least two individuals at affected banking

[[Page 2309]]

organization customers immediately after it experiences a computer-
security incident that it believes in good faith could disrupt, 
degrade, or impair the provision of services subject to the BSCA for 
four or more hours. As described in the Impact Analysis section above, 
the agencies believe that any additional compliance costs would be de 
minimis for each affected bank service provider.
    Given that the costs of the proposed rule would be de minimis, the 
FDIC certifies that the proposed rule would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The FDIC 
invites comments on all aspects of the supporting information provided 
in this RFA section. In particular, would this proposed rule have any 
significant effects on small entities that the FDIC has not identified?

Plain Language

    Section 722 of the GLBA \38\ requires the agencies to use plain 
language in all proposed and final rules published after January 1, 
2000. The agencies have sought to present the proposed rule in a simple 
and straightforward manner and invite comment on the use of plain 
language. For example:
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    \38\ Codified at 12 U.S.C. 4809.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. How could the agencies organize the material to better suit 
your needs? How could they present the proposed rule more clearly?
    2. How could the requirements in the proposed rule be more 
clearly stated?
    3. Do the regulations contain technical language or jargon that 
is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
    4. Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, use 
of headings, paragraphing) make the regulation easier to understand? 
If so, what changes would achieve that?
    5. Would more, but shorter, sections be better? If so, which 
sections should be changed?
    6. What other changes can the agencies incorporate to make the 
regulation easier to understand?

OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The OCC analyzed the proposed rule under the factors set forth in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under 
this analysis, the OCC considered whether the proposed rule includes a 
federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and 
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year, adjusted for inflation (currently $157 
million). As noted in the OCC's Regulatory Flexibility analysis, the 
OCC expects that the costs associated with the proposal, if any, would 
be de minimis and, thus, has determined that this proposed rule would 
not result in expenditures by State, local, and Tribal governments, or 
the private sector, of $157 million or more in any one year. 
Accordingly, the OCC has not prepared a written statement to accompany 
this proposal.

Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

    The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994 (RCDRIA) \39\ requires that each federal banking agency, in 
determining the effective date and administrative compliance 
requirements for new regulations that impose additional reporting, 
disclosure, or other requirements on insured depository institutions, 
consider, consistent with principles of safety and soundness and the 
public interest, any administrative burdens that such regulations would 
place on depository institutions, including small depository 
institutions, and customers of depository institutions, as well as the 
benefits of such regulations. In addition, new regulations and 
amendments to regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosure, 
or other new requirements on insured depository institutions generally 
must take effect on the first day of a calendar quarter that begins on 
or after the date on which the regulations are published in final 
form.\40\ The agencies invite comments that further will inform their 
consideration of the RCDRIA.
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    \39\ Public Law 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160.
    \40\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(b)(1).
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List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 53

    Administrative practice and procedure, Federal Savings 
Associations, National Banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Safety and soundness.

12 CFR Part 225

    Administrative practice and procedure, Bank holding companies, 
banking, Edge and agreement corporations, Foreign banking 
organizations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety and 
soundness, Savings and loan holding companies, State member banks.

12 CFR Part 304

    Administrative practice and procedure, Bank deposit insurance, 
Banks, banking, Freedom of information, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Safety and soundness.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the Common Preamble and under the 
authority of 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 161, 481, 1463, 1464, 1861-1867, and 
3102, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency proposes to amend 
chapter I of Title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

0
1. Part 53 is added to read as follows:

PART 53--COMPUTER-SECURITY INCIDENT NOTIFICATION

Sec.
53.1 Authority, purpose, and scope.
53.2 Definitions.
53.3 Notification.
53.4 Bank service provider notification.

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 161, 481, 1463, 1464, 1861-1867, 
and 3102.


Sec.  53.1  Authority, purpose, and scope.

    (a) Authority. This part is issued under the authority of 12 U.S.C. 
1, 93a, 161, 481, 1463, 1464, 1861-1867, and 3102.
    (b) Purpose. This part promotes the timely notification of 
significant computer-security incidents that affect OCC-supervised 
institutions and their service providers.
    (c) Scope. This part applies to all national banks, Federal savings 
associations, and Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. This 
part also applies to bank service providers, as defined in Sec.  
53.2(b)(2).


Sec.  53.2  Definitions.

    (a) Except as modified in this part, or unless the context 
otherwise requires, the terms used in this part have the same meanings 
as set forth in 12 U.S.C. 1813.
    (b) For purposes of this part, the following definitions apply--
    (1) Banking organization means a national bank, Federal savings 
association, or Federal branch or agency of a foreign bank.
    (2) Bank service provider means a bank service company or other 
person providing services to a banking organization that is subject to 
the Bank Service Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1861-1867).
    (3) Business line means products or services offered by a banking 
organization to serve its customers or support other business needs.
    (4) Computer-security incident is an occurrence that--
    (i) Results in actual or potential harm to the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information 
that the system processes, stores, or transmits; or
    (ii) Constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of 
security

[[Page 2310]]

policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.
    (5) Notification incident is a computer-security incident that a 
banking organization believes in good faith could materially disrupt, 
degrade, or impair--

    (i) The ability of the banking organization to carry out banking 
operations, activities, or processes, or deliver banking products 
and services to a material portion of its customer base, in the 
ordinary course of business;
    (ii) Any business line of a banking organization, including 
associated operations, services, functions and support, and would 
result in a material loss of revenue, profit, or franchise value; or
    (iii) Those operations of a banking organization, including 
associated services, functions and support, as applicable, the 
failure or discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the 
financial stability of the United States.

    (6) Person has the same meaning as set forth at 12 U.S.C. 
1817(j)(8)(A).


Sec.  53.3  Notification.

    A banking organization must notify the OCC of a notification 
incident through any form of written or oral communication, including 
through any technological means, to a designated point of contact 
identified by the OCC. The OCC must receive this notification from the 
banking organization as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours 
after the banking organization believes in good faith that a 
notification incident has occurred.


Sec.  53.4  Bank service provider notification.

    A bank service provider is required to notify at least two 
individuals at each affected banking organization customer immediately 
after the bank service provider experiences a computer-security 
incident that it believes in good faith could disrupt, degrade, or 
impair services provided subject to the Bank Service Company Act (12 
U.S.C. 1861-1867) for four or more hours.

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the Common Preamble and under the 
authority of 12 U.S.C. 321-338a, 1467a(g), 1818(b), 1844(b), 1861-1867, 
3101 et seq., and 5365 the Board proposes to amend chapter II of Title 
12, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 225--BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND CHANGE IN BANK CONTROL 
(REGULATION Y)

0
2. The authority citation for part 225 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(13), 1818, 1828(o), 1831i, 1831p-
1, 1843(c)(8), 1844(b), 1972(1), 3106, 3108, 3310, 3331-3351, 3906, 
3907, and 3909; 15 U.S.C. 1681s, 1681w, 6801 and 6805.

0
3. Subpart N is added to read as follows:
Subpart N--Computer-Security Incident Notification
Sec.
225.300 Authority, purpose, and scope.
225.301 Definitions.
225.302 Notification.
225.303 Bank service provider notification.

Subpart N--Computer-Security Incident Notification


Sec.  225.300  Authority, purpose, and scope.

    (a) Authority. This subpart is issued under the authority of 12 
U.S.C. 1, 321-338a, 1467a(g), 1818(b), 1844(b), 1861-1867, 3101 et 
seq., and 5365.
    (b) Purpose. This subpart promotes the timely notification of 
significant computer-security incidents that affect Board-supervised 
entities and their service providers.
    (c) Scope. This subpart applies to all U.S. bank holding companies 
and savings and loan holding companies; state member banks; the U.S. 
operations of foreign banking organizations; and, Edge and agreement 
corporations. This subpart also applies to bank service providers, as 
defined in Sec.  225.301(a)(2).


Sec.  225.301  Definitions.

    (a) For purposes of this subpart, the following definitions apply--
    Banking organization means a U.S. bank holding company; U.S. 
savings and loan holding company; state member bank; the U.S. 
operations of foreign banking organizations; and an Edge and agreement 
corporation.
    Bank service provider means a bank service company or other person 
providing services to a banking organization that is subject to the 
Bank Service Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1861-1867).
    Business line means products or services offered by a banking 
organization to serve its customers or support other business needs.
    Computer-security incident is an occurrence that:
    (1) Results in actual or potential harm to the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information 
that the system processes, stores, or transmits; or
    (2) Constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of 
security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.
    Notification incident is a computer-security incident that a 
banking organization believes in good faith could materially disrupt, 
degrade, or impair--
    (1) The ability of the banking organization to carry out banking 
operations, activities, or processes, or deliver banking products and 
services to a material portion of its customer base, in the ordinary 
course of business;
    (2) Any business line of a banking organization, including 
associated operations, services, functions and support, and would 
result in a material loss of revenue, profit, or franchise value; or
    (3) Those operations of a Banking organization, including 
associated services, functions and support, as applicable, the failure 
or discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the financial 
stability of the United States.
    (b) [Reserved]


Sec.  225.302  Notification.

    A banking organization must notify the Board of a notification 
incident through any form of written or oral communication, including 
through any technological means (e.g., email, telephone, text, etc.), 
to a designated point of contact identified by the Board (e.g., an 
examiner-in-charge, local supervisory office, or a cyber-incident 
operations center). The Board must receive this notification from a 
banking organization as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours 
after the banking organization believes in good faith that a 
notification incident has occurred.


Sec.  225.303  Bank service provider notification.

    A bank service provider is required to notify at least two 
individuals at each affected banking organization customer immediately 
after the bank service provider experiences a computer-security 
incident that it believes in good faith could disrupt, degrade, or 
impair services provided, subject to the Bank Service Company Act (12 
U.S.C. 1861-1867), for four or more hours.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the Common Preamble, and under the 
authority of 12 U.S.C. 1463, 1811, 1813, 1817, 1819, and 1861-1867, the 
FDIC proposes to amend 12 CFR part 304 as follows:

PART 304--FORMS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND REPORTS

0
4. Revise the authority citation for part 304 to read as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552; 12 U.S.C. 1463, 1464, 1813, 1817, 1819, 
1831, and 1861-1867.

[[Page 2311]]

0
5. Revise Sec.  304.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  304.1  Purpose.

    This subpart informs the public where it may obtain forms and 
instructions for reports, applications, and other submittals used by 
the FDIC, and describes certain forms that are not described elsewhere 
in FDIC regulations.


Sec.  Sec.  304.15-304.20  [Reserved]

0
6. Reserve Sec. Sec.  304.15 through 304.20.
0
7. Add subpart C to read as follows:
Subpart C--Computer-Security Incident Notification
Sec.
304.21 Authority, purpose, and scope.
304.22 Definitions.
304.23 Notification.
304.24 Bank service provider notification.

Subpart C--Computer-Security Incident Notification


Sec.  304.21  Authority, purpose, and scope.

    (a) Authority. This subpart is issued under the authority of 12 
U.S.C. 1463, 1811, 1813, 1817, 1819, and 1861-1867.
    (b) Purpose. This subpart promotes the timely notification of 
significant computer-security incidents that affect FDIC-supervised 
institutions and their service providers.
    (c) Scope. This subpart applies to all insured state nonmember 
banks, insured state licensed branches of foreign banks, and State 
savings associations. This subpart also applies to bank service 
providers, as defined in Sec.  304.22(b)(2).


Sec.  304.22  Definitions.

    (a) Except as modified in this subpart, or unless the context 
otherwise requires, the terms used in this subpart have the same 
meanings as set forth in 12 U.S.C. 1813.
    (b) For purposes of this subpart, the following definitions apply:
    (1) Banking organization means an FDIC-supervised insured 
depository institution, including all insured state nonmember banks, 
insured state-licensed branches of foreign banks, and State savings 
associations.
    (2) Bank service provider means a bank service company or other 
person providing services to a banking organization that is subject to 
the Bank Service Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1861-1867).
    (3) Business line means products or services offered by a banking 
organization to serve its customers or support other business needs.
    (4) Computer-security incident is an occurrence that:
    (i) Results in actual or potential harm to the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information 
that the system processes, stores, or transmits; or
    (ii) Constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of 
security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.
    (5) Notification incident is a computer-security incident that a 
banking organization believes in good faith could materially disrupt, 
degrade, or impair--
    (i) The ability of the banking organization to carry out banking 
operations, activities, or processes, or deliver banking products and 
services to a material portion of its customer base, in the ordinary 
course of business;
    (ii) Any business line of a banking organization, including 
associated operations, services, functions and support, and would 
result in a material loss of revenue, profit, or franchise value; or
    (iii) Those operations of a banking organization, including 
associated services, functions and support, as applicable, the failure 
or discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the financial 
stability of the United States.
    (6) Person has the same meaning as set forth at 12 U.S.C. 
1817(j)(8)(A).


Sec.  304.23  Notification.

    A banking organization must notify the FDIC of a notification 
incident through any form of written or oral communication, including 
through any technological means, to a designated point of contact 
identified by the FDIC. The FDIC must receive this notification from 
the banking organization as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours 
after the banking organization believes in good faith that a 
notification incident has occurred.


Sec.  304.24  Bank service provider notification.

    A bank service provider is required to notify at least two 
individuals at each affected banking organization customer immediately 
after the bank service provider experiences a computer-security 
incident that it believes in good faith could disrupt, degrade, or 
impair services provided subject to the Bank Service Company Act (12 
U.S.C. 1861-1867) for four or more hours.


Sec.  Sec.  304.25-304.30  [Reserved]

0
8. Reserve Sec. Sec.  304.25 through 304.30.

Brian P. Brooks,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.

    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
Ann Misback,
Secretary of the Board.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

    Dated at Washington, DC, on or about December 15, 2020.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-28498 Filed 1-11-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-33-P; 6210-01-P; 6714-01-P