[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 248 (Monday, December 28, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 84465-84468]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28481]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Docket No. PHMSA-2019-0141]


Pipeline Safety; Information Collection Activities

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this notice announces that the information 
collection request abstracted below is being forwarded to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review and comment. PHMSA will request 
a revision to PHMSA F 7000-1 Accident Report--Hazardous Liquid Pipeline 
Systems identified by OMB control number 2137-0047. A Federal Register 
notice soliciting comments on this information collection was published 
on March 9, 2020, (85 FR 13700). PHMSA received comments which are 
summarized below.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before January 27, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Written comments and recommendations for the proposed 
information collection should be sent within 30 days of publication of 
this notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. You can find this 
information collection by selecting ``Currently under 30-day Review--
Open for Public Comments'' or by using the search function.

Confidential Business Information

    Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial 
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by 
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), 
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to 
this notice contain commercial or financial information that is 
customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and 
that is relevant or responsive to this notice, it is important that you 
clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Pursuant to 49 CFR 
190.343, you may ask PHMSA to give confidential treatment to 
information you give to the agency by taking the following steps: (1) 
Mark each page of the original document submission containing CBI as 
``Confidential''; (2) send PHMSA, along with the original document, a 
second copy of the original document with the CBI deleted; and (3) 
explain why the information you are submitting is CBI. Unless you are 
notified otherwise, PHMSA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this notice. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to 
Angela Hill, DOT, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, PHP-30, Washington, 
DC 20590-0001. Any commentary PHMSA receives that is not specifically 
designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this matter.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information regarding this notice 
contact Angela Hill, Transportation Specialist, by telephone at 202-
366-1246, or by email at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Section 1320.8(d), title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, requires 
PHMSA to provide interested members of the public and affected entities 
an opportunity to comment on information collection and recordkeeping 
requests. This notice identifies proposed changes to an information 
collection that PHMSA will submit to OMB for approval. To streamline 
and improve the data collection processes, PHMSA is revising the form 
and instructions for PHMSA F 7000-1 Accident Report--Hazardous Liquid 
Pipeline Systems for hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipeline 
operators.
    In response to the March 9, 2020, Federal Register notice and 
request for comment (85 FR 13700), PHMSA received comments from the 
Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law 
(Policy Integrity), from the American Petroleum Institute (API), and 
the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL). Comments recommending 
changes, organized by topic area, are summarized and addressed below:
    1. Change Form Name: PHMSA received no comments pertaining to this 
change.
    2. Time Zone and Daylight Savings: PHMSA received no comments 
pertaining to this change.
    3. Operational Status: API/AOPL requested clarification of the 
phrase ``operational status'' and requested that PHMSA undertake a new 
rulemaking to correct an apparent discrepancy between PHMSA's August 
16, 2016, Advisory Bulletin titled, ``Clarification of Terms Relating 
to Pipeline Operational Status'' (81 FR 54512) and recently published 
frequently asked questions concerning PHMSA's October 1, 2019, Final 
Rule titled, ``Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines'' (84 FR 52260). As 
to ``operational status'', PHMSA has included a description of each 
choice for operational status in the instructions for PHMSA F 7000-1 to 
provide clarification. PHMSA routinely updates its data collection 
forms to align with the regulations. If there are any changes to the 
definitions related to operational status of pipelines in the future, 
PHMSA will revise the reports as necessary.
    4. Part A Reorganization and Detailed Questions About Accident 
Response: API/AOPL generally supported reorganizing Part A of the form, 
but recommended PHMSA clarify the term ``identified,'' which is used in 
Part E. API/AOPL opined that responses to questions regarding the 
``identification'' of a pipeline failure are not uniform due to a lack 
of guidance and definition of the term. API/AOPL requested that PHMSA 
align the term with ``confirmed discovery,'' as defined in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, which ``means when it can be reasonably 
determined, based on information available to the operator at the time 
a reportable event has occurred, even if only based on a preliminary 
evaluation.'' PHMSA notes that proposed question A13, ``Local time 
operator identified failure'', has been part of the report for many 
years and has not resulted in confusion. Further, the instructions 
provide guidance for properly determining the date and time identified 
in several scenarios. PHMSA will add date and time of ``confirmed 
discovery'' as a new question A20 since ``confirmed discovery'' occurs 
either concurrent with identifying the failure or later.
    5. Multiple NRC Reports: API/AOPL proposed that PHMSA requires one 
master National Response Center (NRC) report that is linked to multiple 
NRC reports, arising from a single accident. Alternatively, API/AOPL 
proposed that PHMSA collect all the NRC report numbers for one accident 
in Part A6, allowing multiple numbers to be entered in one box, rather 
than create an additional question. API/AOPL also proposed that PHMSA 
provide instructions or guidance informing operators that this question 
includes the initial report and all subsequent reports. PHMSA has 
provided instructions making it clear that the initial NRC report is 
entered as a response to question A21b and all subsequent NRC reports 
are entered in response to question A21c. The response to question A21c 
is submitted via a text field so multiple NRC reports can be entered. 
PHMSA needs the initial NRC report number in a separate data field so 
it can

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be stored as a number and used in analysis.
    6. Flow Control and Valve Closures: API/AOPL commented that the 
``current form provides adequate details on valve closures and shut-in 
response to an accident.'' They opined that each accident is unique and 
response actions to address them may vary widely based on the pipeline 
system, the individual line affected, pipeline ROW versus facility 
release, etc. API/AOPL commented that the additional request for 
information regarding valve closures and shut-in responses on the form 
will likely result in several operators choosing ``other'' as a 
selection, which they say PHMSA is trying to avoid. Further, API/AOPL 
disagreed that adding more questions will allow stakeholders to 
understand the actions taken by the operator to control the flow of 
products while responding to an accident. They commented that 
additional questions may unintentionally cause confusion regarding 
which valve information to report. Finally, API/AOPL comment that PHMSA 
should distinguish between manual and remote-operated valves. PHMSA is 
proposing to collect data about the operator's initial upstream and 
downstream actions to control the flow of product to the failure site. 
There are only two options--valve closure or a text field explaining 
the method of operation control implemented. There is no option for 
``other.'' The form and instructions clearly indicate to report the 
initial method of flow control. When a valve closure is the initial 
method, the operator also identifies the type of valve. PHMSA 
recognizes that valve closure is not always the appropriate method of 
flow control, which is why ``operational control'' was added. Finally, 
the terms ``manual,'' ``automatic,'' and ``remotely controlled'' have 
been in the report for several years without raising any concerns or 
presenting issues in practice. These are commonly used terms familiar 
to the operators. PHMSA also offers a pipeline glossary including types 
of valves.
    7. Area of Accident: API/AOPL commented that clarity is needed 
regarding the term ``underground.'' They commented that PHMSA's 
proposal may not accurately capture operators' current processes. For 
instance, there may be locations on a pipeline that were originally 
buried but have become exposed over time, such as stream and ditch 
crossings, of which the operator is aware and manages as aboveground 
piping. API/AOPL commented that PHMSA should clarify the difference 
between underground and aboveground piping as it relates to an 
unforeseen loss of cover. They noted that the definition of underground 
should refer to the overall condition of the pipeline segment and not 
only the location where the accident occurred. PHMSA notes that the 
instructions provide definitions for both underground and aboveground 
pipe. The additional options under each provide more detail about the 
situations that should be reported for underground and aboveground 
pipe. PHMSA is collecting the data for the failure location, not for 
the overall pipeline segment. PHMSA also notes that this scenario, 
``pipelines that were originally buried but have become exposed over 
time--such as stream and ditch crossings--of which the operator is 
aware and manages as aboveground piping,'' would be reported as 
aboveground and then specifying ``in or spanning an open ditch.'' 
Further, PHMSA notes that the form allows the selection of ``other'' 
after selecting either aboveground or underground to accommodate 
reporting in all possible scenarios.
    8. Date of Water Crossing Evaluation: API/AOPL commented that more 
clarification is needed regarding the term ``evaluation.'' PHMSA 
concurs that the term ``engineering/risk evaluation'' is not well 
defined and is removing it from the form.
    9. Outer Continental Shelf Regions: API/AOPL commented they are 
unclear as to what exactly will be required when reporting outer 
continental shelf (OCS) regions, as this information appears to 
currently be captured in Part B14 of the form. PHMSA currently captures 
OCS Area and Block Number as text fields. In the revision, PHMSA is 
also requiring one of the following to be reported: OCS Alaska, OCS 
Pacific, OCS Gulf of Mexico, or OCS Atlantic. In cases where OCS Area 
or Block Number are not recognized, PHMSA requires that the general 
area of the OCS accident be reported at a minimum.
    10. Item Involved and Age of Failed Item: API/AOPL suggested PHMSA 
retain the selection of ``unknown'' for items of which age cannot be 
ascertained. Regarding ``other'' as a selection for ``item involved,'' 
API/AOPL suggested PHMSA change the option to ``unknown'' or ``data not 
available.'' PHMSA notes that the report has, and continues to, allow 
``unknown'' as an option for both ``date of manufacture'' and ``date of 
installation.'' PHMSA sees no meaningful difference among ``other,'' 
``unknown,'' and ``data not available.'' PHMSA plans to retain 
``other'' as the final option for ``item involved.''
    11. Details About Consequences, Other injuries not requiring in-
patient hospitalization: API/AOPL recommended that PHMSA provide the 
definition of injuries treated on-site or clarify whether operators 
should defer to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's 
(OSHA) definition. Also, API/AOPL asked if the new categories of 
injuries will be classified as ``Impacting People or the Environment'' 
(IPE). PHMSA is requesting information in D10 for ``Estimated number of 
persons with injuries requiring treatment by EMTs at the site of 
accident.'' This terminology is readily understood in the context of a 
pipeline failure. Operators should not use any OSHA definition as they 
apply to work-related injuries only. PHMSA does not plan to consider 
the two new categories of injuries when determining IPE.
    12. Details About Consequences, Volume of product consumed by fire: 
The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law 
supported collecting ``volume of product consumed by fire'' to assess 
the social costs of accidents. API/AOPL argued that operators are 
unable to accurately determine or differentiate between the volume of 
product burned and the volume that evaporated. API/AOPL recommended 
that PHMSA not duplicate oversight with the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and defer to the EPA's jurisdiction under the Clean Air 
Act. PHMSA is requiring operators to estimate the volume of product 
consumed by fire. By gathering this data through accident reports, 
PHMSA enhances its regulatory cost and benefit estimates and improves 
its assessment of regulatory alternatives as required by the Executive 
Order 12866. PHMSA is not duplicating oversight of EPA's jurisdiction, 
rather PHMSA is complying with OMB's Circular A-4, which advises 
agencies to ``monetize quantitative effects whenever possible'' as 
required by Executive Order 12866.
    13. Details About Consequences, Number of building affected by the 
accident: API/AOPL requested that PHMSA use the same classification/
definition of building as prescribed in 49 CFR 192.903. PHMSA notes 
that this code section does not include building classifications. PHMSA 
proposes two categories of buildings--commercial and residential.
    14. Establishing Maximum Pressure: API/AOPL asked that PHMSA 
rephrase the term ``maximum pressure'' to ``maximum operating pressure 
(MOP)'' in accordance with 49 CFR 195.406. Also, API/AOPL requested the 
PHMSA

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revise the form to ask whether the MOP was exceeded. Finally, API/AOPL 
opined that PHMSA should not seek MOP validity in the accident report 
and believes the information would be more appropriate in the National 
Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) or the hazardous liquid and carbon 
dioxide annual report (Form F 7000.1-1). PHMSA has used MOP 
consistently throughout the accident report form and instructions. 
PHMSA's data collection software will determine if MOP was exceeded and 
the degree of exceedance. PHMSA considers the ``limiting factor 
establishing MOP'' as a critical piece of data about the failure 
location.
    15. Length of Segment Isolated: API/AOPL asked for clarification 
regarding the term ``isolated.'' PHMSA's instructions clarify that this 
is only answered when the method of flow control is valve closure both 
upstream and downstream of the failure location. PHMSA will also add 
this clarification to the form.
    16. External Corrosion and Stray Current: API/AOPL do not object to 
additional details regarding stray current, however, they note this 
information is generally not available within the 30-day requirement 
for accident reports. PHMSA notes that operators can submit an original 
accident report without the information in 2a and 2b and submit a 
supplemental report once the information becomes available.
    17. Natural Force Damage Additional Sub-Cause: The API/AOPL do not 
believe that adding tree root damage to the form will significantly 
reduce the number of accidents reported as ``Other Accident Cause.'' 
PHMSA agrees that tree root damage to hazardous liquid pipelines may 
not significantly reduce the number of accidents reported as ``Other 
Accident Cause.'' PHMSA seeks to collect consistent cause codes for all 
pipeline systems for ease of data analysis and realizes that some of 
the detailed cause codes may be more relevant to a specific pipeline 
system type.
    18. Excavation Details For All Excavation Damages: API/AOPL 
commented they are unclear as to what additional information will be 
collected for first- and second-party excavators. In the March 9, 2020 
Notice, PHMSA incorrectly stated that data is collected only when the 
excavator is a third-party. In fact, the current accident report 
already collects data about all excavation damages. PHMSA now proposes 
to only collect data about the excavations in a structure matching the 
current Common Ground Alliance (CGA) Damage Information Reporting Tool 
(DIRT). PHMSA also proposes to add questions about exemptions from 
State damage prevention laws.
    19. State Damage Prevention Law Exemption: API/AOPL recommended 
that PHMSA keep the excavation questions consistent with the 
information collected on the DIRT form. PHMSA's question on State 
Damage Prevention Law Exemption is not part of the CGA-DIRT and is 
applicable only to accidents where a third-party is identified as the 
cause of the accident. Data about exemptions is important to PHMSA and 
its State partners to assess instances where excavators have been 
exempted from notifying operators prior to excavating.
    20. Material Failure Cause Changes: API/AOPL objected to adding a 
question that collects post-construction pressure test values since 
original pressure test information is often missing or unavailable. 
Further, without more information, API/AOPL do not see the value in 
providing this data. PHMSA concurs and will remove the question.
    21. Additional Integrity Inspection Data: API/AOPL asked that PHMSA 
rephrase Part J ``Integrity Inspection'' to ``Successful Integrity 
Inspection'' or ``Completed Integrity Inspection.'' They noted this 
would ensure that operators only provide data on ILI tool runs that 
provided a consistent and complete data set. API/AOPL also asked PHMSA 
to add a list of direct assessment methods available to operators.
    PHMSA has renamed Part J from ``Integrity Inspections'' to 
``Completed Integrity Inspections,'' as suggested. PHMSA understands a 
``completed integrity inspection'' to be when the tool has been 
successfully run and not when the remediation is completed.
    The form currently includes two options for the type of direct 
assessment--``External Corrosion Direct Assessment'' and ``Other.'' The 
selection for ``Other'' would include any ``other technology'' as 
determined by 195.452(j)(5)(iv) or 195.452(c)(1)(i)(D).
    22. Contributing Factors: API/AOPL recommended that PHMSA modify 
Part K by adding an option for ``no contributing factors'' and 
emphasized that contributing factors are often not known until the 
completion of internal company analysis. PHMSA notes that making no 
selection in Part K is equivalent to ``no contributing factors'' and 
has not added the additional option recommended by API/AOPL. PHMSA will 
modify the form and instructions to emphasize that contributing factors 
are often not known until the completion of a root cause analysis. 
Supplemental reports are permitted as operators make determinations 
regarding contributing factors.
    The following information is provided for this information 
collection: (1) Title of the information collection; (2) OMB control 
number; (3) Current expiration date; (4) Type of request; (5) Abstract 
of the information collection activity; (6) Description of affected 
public; (7) Estimate of total annual reporting and recordkeeping 
burden; and (8) Frequency of collection. PHMSA will request a three-
year term of approval for this information collection activity. PHMSA 
requests comments on the following information:
    1. Title: Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline: 
Recordkeeping and Accident Reporting.
    OMB Control Number: 2137-0047.
    Current Expiration Date: 1/31/2023.
    Type of Request: Revision.
    Abstract: This information collection covers recordkeeping and 
accident reporting by hazardous liquid pipeline operators who are 
subject to 49 CFR part 195. Section 195.50 specifies the definition of 
an ``accident'' and the reporting criteria for submitting a Hazardous 
Liquid Accident Report (form PHMSA F7000-1) is detailed in Sec.  
195.54. PHMSA is proposing to revise the form and instructions for 
PHMSA F7000-1 for editorial and clarification purposes and to collect 
additional data. Currently, PHMSA estimates that 406 Hazardous Liquid 
Accident Report forms are submitted each year with operators spending, 
on average, 10 hours to complete each report. Due to the proposed 
changes, PHMSA expects the burden for completing each report to 
increase by 2 hours. This will result in an overall burden increase of 
812 hours for this information collection.
    Affected Public: Hazardous liquid pipeline operators.
    Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden:
    Annual Responses: 1,644.
    Annual Burden Hours: 53,504.
    Comments to Office of Management and Budget are invited on:
    (a) The need for the proposed information, including whether the 
information will have practical utility in helping the agency to 
achieve its pipeline safety goals;
    (b) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the 
proposed collection;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected; and
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden on those who are to respond, 
including the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or 
other technological collection techniques.


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    Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995; 44 U.S.C. 
Chapter 35, as amended; and 49 CFR 1.48.

     Issued in Washington, DC, on December 16, 2020, under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2020-28481 Filed 12-23-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P