[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 247 (Wednesday, December 23, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 83840-83862]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28437]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

31 CFR Parts 1010, 1020, and 1022

RIN 1506-AB47


Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible 
Virtual Currency or Digital Assets

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (``FinCEN''), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking to seek 
public comments on a proposal to require banks and money service 
businesses (``MSBs'') to submit reports, keep records, and verify the 
identity of customers in relation to transactions involving convertible 
virtual currency

[[Page 83841]]

(``CVC'') or digital assets with legal tender status (``legal tender 
digital assets'' or ``LTDA'') held in unhosted wallets (as defined 
below), or held in wallets hosted in a jurisdiction identified by 
FinCEN. FinCEN is proposing to adopt these requirements pursuant to the 
Bank Secrecy Act (``BSA''). To effectuate certain of these proposed 
requirements, FinCEN proposes to prescribe by regulation that CVC and 
LTDA are ``monetary instruments'' for purposes of the BSA. However, 
FinCEN is not proposing to modify the regulatory definition of 
``monetary instruments'' or otherwise alter existing BSA regulatory 
requirements applicable to ``monetary instruments'' in FinCEN's 
regulations, including the existing currency transaction reporting 
(``CTR'') requirement and the existing transportation of currency or 
monetary instruments reporting requirement.

DATES: Written comments on this proposed rule may be submitted on or 
before January 4, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Federal E-rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Refer to Docket Number 
FINCEN-2020-0020 and the specific RIN number 1506-AB47 the comment 
applies to.
     Mail: Policy Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-
2020-0020 and the specific RIN number.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Regulatory Support Section 
at 1-800-767-2825 or electronically at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    Through this proposed rule, FinCEN is seeking to address the 
illicit finance threat created by one segment of the CVC market and the 
anticipated growth in LTDAs based on similar technological principles. 
FinCEN proposes to address this threat by establishing a new reporting 
requirement with respect to certain transactions in CVC or LTDA, that 
is similar to the existing currency transaction reporting requirement, 
and by establishing a new recordkeeping requirement for certain CVC/
LTDA transactions, that is similar to the recordkeeping and travel rule 
regulations pertaining to funds transfers and transmittals of funds.
    FinCEN is providing a 15-day period for public comments with 
respect to this proposed rule. FinCEN has determined that such a 
comment period is appropriate for several reasons.\1\
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    \1\ Although the formal comment period concludes 15 days after 
filing at the Federal Register, FinCEN will endeavor to consider any 
material comments received after the deadline as well.
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    First, FinCEN assesses that there are significant national security 
imperatives that necessitate an efficient process for proposal and 
implementation of this rule. As explained further below, U.S. 
authorities have found that malign actors are increasingly using CVC to 
facilitate international terrorist financing, weapons proliferation, 
sanctions evasion, and transnational money laundering, as well as to 
buy and sell controlled substances, stolen and fraudulent 
identification documents and access devices, counterfeit goods, malware 
and other computer hacking tools, firearms, and toxic chemicals.\2\ In 
addition, ransomware attacks and associated demands for payment, which 
are almost exclusively denominated in CVC, are increasing in 
severity,\3\ and the G7 has specifically noted concern regarding 
ransomware attacks ``in light of malicious actors targeting critical 
sectors amid the COVID-19 pandemic.'' \4\
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    \2\ See, e.g., United States. v. Cazes, No. 1:17CR-00144, 
Indictment ] 2 (E.D. Ca. filed June 1, 2017) (alleging that 
``AlphaBay [was] a dark-web marketplace designed to enable users to 
buy and sell illegal goods, including controlled substances, stolen 
and fraudulent identification documents and access devices, 
counterfeit goods, malware and other computer hacking tools, 
firearms, and toxic chemicals . . . AlphaBay required its users to 
transact in digital currencies, including Bitcoin, Monero, and 
Ethereum.''); Dep't of the Treasury Press Release--Remarks of Sigal 
Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
(May 13, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm687; 
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, ``Two Chinese Nationals Charged 
with Laundering Over $100 Million in Cryptocurrency from Exchange 
Hack'' at pp. 1 (Mar. 2, 2020) (``North Korea continues to attack 
the growing worldwide ecosystem of virtual currency as a means to 
bypass the sanctions imposed on it by the United States and the 
United Nations Security Council.''), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-nationals-charged-laundering-over-100-million-cryptocurrency-exchange-hack. For vulnerabilities of digital assets 
to securities fraud, see SEC--Investor Alert: Ponzi Schemes Using 
Virtual Currencies, SEC Pub. No. 153 (7/13), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf (accessed June 23, 2020); 
CFTC--Investor Alert: Watch Out for Fraudulent Digital Asset and 
``Crypto'' Trading websites, https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/watch_out_for_digital_fraud.html (accessed 
Aug. 28, 2020); U.S. Dep't of Justice, ``Report of the Attorney 
General's Cyber-Digital Task Force, Cryptocurrency: An Enforcement 
Framework,'' (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1326061/download.
    \3\ In 2019, ransomware demands reached $25 billion globally, 
and FinCEN observed an increase in the average amount involved in 
ransomware incidents of $280,000 from 2018 to 2019. See Emsisoft, 
``Report: The Cost of Ransomware in 2020. A Country-by-Country 
Analysis'' (Feb. 2020), https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/35583/report-the-cost-of-ransomware-in-2020-a-country-by-country-analysis/ 
(accessed Dec. 1, 2020); FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2020-A006, ``Advisory 
on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate 
Ransom Payments'' (Oct. 2020), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2020-10-01/Advisory%20Ransomware%20FINAL%20508.pdf. 
See also G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Statement 
on Digital Payments, Ransomware Annex to G7 Statement (Oct. 13, 
2020) (``[Ransomware] [a]ttacks have intensified in the last two 
years[.]''), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7-Ransomware-Annex-10132020_Final.pdf.
    \4\ G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Statement 
on Digital Payments (Oct. 13, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1152. In ransomware attacks, victims are often 
compelled to obtain and send CVC to an account or address designated 
by the perpetrator of the attack. This activity can occur through 
regulated financial institutions. For example, across 2017 and 2018, 
FinCEN observed at least seventeen separate transactions over 
$10,000 conducted between U.S. financial institutions and unhosted 
wallets affiliated with the Lazarus Group, a malign actor engaged in 
efforts to steal and extort CVC as a means of generating and 
laundering large amounts of revenue for the North Korean regime. 
Generally, FinCEN has observed that, following initial receipt of 
the funds, the perpetrator may then engage in multiple transactions 
between unhosted wallets before exchanging the CVC for fiat 
currency. See also Joe Tidy, ``How hackers extorted $1.14m from 
University of California, San Francisco,'' (June 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53214783 (detailing ransomware attack 
against COVID-19 researchers); Dep't of the Treasury Press Release--
Remarks of Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence (May 13, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm687.
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    Second, the new requirements FinCEN is proposing to adopt represent 
a targeted expansion of BSA reporting and recordkeeping obligations, 
and FinCEN has engaged with the cryptocurrency industry on multiple 
occasions on the AML risks presented in the cryptocurrency space and 
carefully considered information and feedback received from industry 
participants. These engagements have included a FinCEN Exchange event 
in May 2019, visits to cryptocurrency businesses in California in 
February 2020, an industry roundtable with the Secretary of the 
Treasury in March 2020, and a FinCEN Exchange event on cryptocurrency 
and ransomware in November 2020. FinCEN also has received outreach on 
unhosted wallets in response to anticipated FinCEN regulatory action, 
including letters from CoinCenter, the Blockchain Association, 
Blockchain.com, Global Digital Asset & Cryptocurrency Association, 
Circle, and the Association for Digital Asset Markets.
    Third, although FinCEN is publishing this proposal in the Federal 
Record and invites public comment, FinCEN has noted that notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements are inapplicable because this proposal 
involves a foreign affairs function of the

[[Page 83842]]

United States and because ``notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' \5\ 
The proposal seeks to establish appropriate controls to protect United 
States national security from a variety of threats from foreign nations 
and foreign actors, including state-sponsored ransomware and 
cybersecurity attacks, sanctions evasion, and financing of global 
terrorism, among others. Furthermore, undue delay in the implementation 
of the proposed rule would encourage movement of unreported or 
unrecorded assets implicated in illicit finance from hosted wallets at 
financial institutions to unhosted or otherwise covered wallets, such 
as by moving CVC to exchanges that do not comply with AML/CFT 
requirements.
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    \5\ 5 U.S.C. 533.
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    This section provides an overview of the relevant technology and 
the requirements of the proposed rule.

A. Technology Overview

    CVC is a medium of exchange, such as a cryptocurrency, that either 
has an equivalent value as currency, or acts as a substitute for 
currency, but lacks legal tender status.\6\ Blockchain-based types of 
CVC (e.g., Bitcoin) are peer-to-peer systems that allow any two parties 
to transfer value directly with each other without the need for a 
centralized intermediary (e.g., a bank or MSB). As a technical matter, 
blockchain-based CVC generally consist of computers operating the 
network software (nodes) that enable, validate, and store transaction 
records on a distributed digital ledger (a blockchain). To transfer an 
asset on a blockchain, a person enters an alphanumeric code known only 
to the transferor (a private key) into a cryptographic hash function 
enabled by the network software, which allows the transferor to request 
that the network software validate a new entry on the ledger showing 
that control of an asset has been assigned to the recipient.\7\ Once 
the network software has validated this transfer, the ledger is altered 
and the recipient may transfer the asset to another recipient using 
their own private key.\8\ Ledger entries are cryptographically secured, 
and accounts are identified on a blockchain by alphanumeric ``public 
keys''--not by the owner's name.
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    \6\ CVC is therefore a type of ``value that substitutes for 
currency.'' See 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A). This definition is 
consistent with the recent joint notice of proposed rulemaking 
issued by FinCEN and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
in relation to the collection, recordkeeping, and transmission 
requirements applicable to funds transfers and transmittals of 
funds. See ``Threshold for the Requirement To Collect, Retain, and 
Transmit Information on Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds 
That Begin or End Outside the United States, and Clarification of 
the Requirement To Collect, Retain, and Transmit Information on 
Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies and Digital 
Assets With Legal Tender Status,'' 85 FR 68005, 68011 (Oct. 27, 
2020) (``Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM'').
    \7\ See Satoshi Nakamoto, ``Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic 
Cash System'' (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf; Chamber of 
Digital Commerce, ``Legislator's Toolkit for Blockchain Technology'' 
(Dec. 2018), https://digitalchamber.s3.amazonaws.com/State-Working-Group-Toolkit_Final_12.4.1.pdf.
    \8\ Id.
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    Some persons use the services of a financial institution to acquire 
or transact in CVC. For example, certain financial institutions provide 
custody services for their customers' CVC in so-called ``hosted 
wallets.'' In such arrangements, a financial institution may execute 
transactions on a blockchain on behalf of a customer using a private 
key controlled by the financial institution. Other persons do not use 
the services of a financial institution, in which case they use the 
private key controlling the CVC to transact directly on a blockchain. 
Such persons may store the private key in a software program or written 
record, often referred to as an ``unhosted wallet.'' Importantly, as 
described below, financial institutions are subject to certain BSA 
regulatory obligations when providing CVC-related services, including 
services involving hosted wallets.\9\ A person conducting a transaction 
through an unhosted wallet to purchase goods or services on their own 
behalf is not a money transmitter.\10\
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    \9\ Financial institutions that use unhosted wallets but that 
still conduct money transmission activities on behalf of third 
parties, such as peer-to-peer exchangers, are money transmitters. 
FinCEN Guidance--Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Certain 
Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies at pp. 14-
15 (May 9, 2019) (``FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance'').
    \10\ Id. at 16.
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    Blockchain-based CVC networks present opportunities as well as 
risks. The G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors recently 
noted that ``[t]he widespread adoption of digital payments [such as 
CVC] has the potential to address frictions in existing payment systems 
by improving access to financial services, reducing inefficiencies, and 
lowering costs.'' \11\ At the same time, however, CVCs are used in 
illicit financial activity that presents substantial national security 
concerns. Depending on the features of the particular CVC and its 
network, a CVC's global reach can enable the rapid transfer of 
significant value with only anonymized or pseudonymized information 
about the transaction recorded, making it easier for malign actors to 
engage in illicit financial activity without detection or 
traceability.\12\ Specifically, illicit finance risks involving CVC are 
enhanced by the capacity of users to engage with the CVC through 
unhosted wallets or wallets hosted by a foreign financial institution 
not subject to effective anti-money laundering regulation (an 
``otherwise covered wallet''). In such cases, there may be gaps in the 
recordkeeping and reporting regime with respect to financial 
transactions, which malign actors may seek to exploit.
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    \11\ G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Statement 
on Digital Payments (Oct. 13, 2020).
    \12\ U.S. Dep't of Justice, ``Report of the Attorney General's 
Cyber-Digital Task Force, Cryptocurrency: An Enforcement 
Framework,'' (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1326061/download.
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    Determining the true amount of illicit activity that is conducted 
in cryptocurrency is challenging. One industry estimate is that 
approximately 1% of overall market transaction volume, or $10 billion, 
in CVC activity conducted globally in 2019 was illicit.\13\ This 
figure, however, may underestimate such illicit activity. Despite 
significant underreporting due to compliance challenges in parts of the 
CVC sector, in 2019, FinCEN received approximately $119 billion in 
suspicious activity reporting associated with CVC activity taking place 
wholly or in substantial part in the United States.\14\ By industry 
measures, this would equate to approximately 11.9% of total CVC market 
activity being relevant to a possible violation of law or 
regulation.\15\ U.S. authorities have found that malign actors have 
used CVC to facilitate international terrorist financing, weapons 
proliferation, sanctions evasion, and transnational money laundering, 
as well as to buy and sell controlled substances, stolen and fraudulent 
identification documents and access devices, counterfeit goods, malware 
and other computer hacking tools, firearms, and toxic chemicals.\16\ In

[[Page 83843]]

addition, ransomware attacks and associated demands for payment, which 
are almost exclusively denominated in CVC, have increased in 
severity,\17\ and the G7 has specifically noted concern regarding 
ransomware attacks ``in light of malicious actors targeting critical 
sectors amid the COVID-19 pandemic.'' \18\
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    \13\ See Chainalysis, ``2020 Crypto Crime Report,'' (Jan. 2020), 
https://go.chainalysis.com/2020-Crypto-Crime-Report.html.
    \14\ A significant majority of this $119 billion related to 
suspicious activity that took place before 2019 based on subsequent 
lookbacks. FinCEN anticipates that in the future it will receive 
additional suspicious activity reporting for activity that took 
place in 2019 but that has not yet been recognized as suspicious.
    \15\ FinCEN emphasizes that suspicious activity is not a clear 
indication of a crime but is activity that is potentially illicit. 
See 31 CFR 1020.320, 1022.320 (laying out the standards for 
suspicious activity).
    \16\ See, e.g., United States. v. Cazes, No. 1:17CR-00144, 
Indictment ] 2 (E.D. Ca. filed June 1, 2017) (alleging that 
``AlphaBay [was] a dark-web marketplace designed to enable users to 
buy and sell illegal goods, including controlled substances, stolen 
and fraudulent identification documents and access devices, 
counterfeit goods, malware and other computer hacking tools, 
firearms, and toxic chemicals . . . AlphaBay required its users to 
transact in digital currencies, including Bitcoin, Monero, and 
Ethereum.''); Dep't of the Treasury Press Release--Remarks of Sigal 
Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
(May 13, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm687; 
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, ``Two Chinese Nationals Charged 
with Laundering Over $100 Million in Cryptocurrency from Exchange 
Hack'' at pp. 1 (Mar. 2, 2020) (``North Korea continues to attack 
the growing worldwide ecosystem of virtual currency as a means to 
bypass the sanctions imposed on it by the United States and the 
United Nations Security Council.''), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-nationals-charged-laundering-over-100-million-cryptocurrency-exchange-hack. For vulnerabilities of digital assets 
to securities fraud, see SEC--Investor Alert: Ponzi Schemes Using 
Virtual Currencies, SEC Pub. No. 153 (7/13), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf (accessed June 23, 2020); 
CFTC--Investor Alert: Watch Out for Fraudulent Digital Asset and 
``Crypto'' Trading websites, https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/watch_out_for_digital_fraud.html (accessed 
Aug. 28, 2020).
    \17\ In 2019, ransomware demands reached $25 billion globally, 
and FinCEN observed an increase in the average amount involved in 
ransomware incidents of $280,000 from 2018 to 2019. See Emsisoft, 
``Report: The Cost of Ransomware in 2020. A Country-by-Country 
Analysis'' (Feb. 2020), https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/35583/report-the-cost-of-ransomware-in-2020-a-country-by-country-analysis/ 
(accessed Dec. 1, 2020); FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2020-A006, ``Advisory 
on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate 
Ransom Payments'' (Oct. 2020), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2020-10-01/Advisory%20Ransomware%20FINAL%20508.pdf. 
See also G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Statement 
on Digital Payments, Ransomware Annex to G7 Statement (Oct. 13, 
2020) (``[Ransomware] [a]ttacks have intensified in the last two 
years[.]''), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7-Ransomware-Annex-10132020_Final.pdf.
    \18\ G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Statement 
on Digital Payments (Oct. 13, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1152. In ransomware attacks, victims are often 
compelled to obtain and send CVC to an account or address designated 
by the perpetrator of the attack. This activity can occur through 
regulated financial institutions. For example, across 2017 and 2018, 
FinCEN observed at least seventeen separate transactions over 
$10,000 conducted between U.S. financial institutions and unhosted 
wallets affiliated with the Lazarus Group, a malign actor engaged in 
efforts to steal and extort CVC as a means of generating and 
laundering large amounts of revenue for the North Korean regime. 
Generally, FinCEN has observed that, following initial receipt of 
the funds, the perpetrator may then engage in multiple transactions 
between unhosted wallets before exchanging the CVC for fiat 
currency. See also Joe Tidy, ``How hackers extorted $1.14m from 
University of California, San Francisco,'' (June 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53214783 (detailing ransomware attack 
against COVID-19 researchers); Dep't of the Treasury Press Release--
Remarks of Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence (May 13, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm687.;
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    Some types of CVC pose particularly severe illicit finance 
challenges. Anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrency (``AEC'') protocols have 
the effect of limiting the ability of investigators or other parties to 
follow transaction flows on their distributed public ledgers, unlike 
other types of CVC that allow a bank or MSB to identify the full 
transaction history of the CVC or LTDA value involved in the 
transaction (i.e. the entire transaction history of the value from the 
transaction block it was mined). Though relatively small in comparison 
to more established CVC networks, AECs have a well-documented 
connection to illicit activity. For example, AECs were used to launder 
Bitcoins paid to the wallet used in the Wannacry ransomware attack. 
AECs are accepted on various darknet marketplaces and the largest 
cryptocurrency mining malware networks continue to mine Monero, a type 
of AEC. Other innovations in distributed ledger technology designed to 
address transaction scalability, such as so-called Layer 2 solutions, 
together with AEC protocols represent an overall trend towards less 
transparency. These technology features are readily transferable to 
existing systems through protocol upgrades or system forks, i.e. the 
development of a new blockchain from an existing blockchain.\19\
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    \19\ Cf. Financial Action Task Force, ``12-Month Review of the 
Revised FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service 
Providers'' (June 2020) (``The ML/TF [Money Laundering/Terror 
Finance] risks of virtual assets are more difficult to address and 
mitigate once the products are launched. Their cross-border nature 
can present difficulties for enforcement if AML/CFT is not 
considered from the start. Hence, it is very important for 
jurisdictions to analyse and address risk in a forward-looking 
manner and ensure that they have all the necessary tools and 
authorities in place before they are needed.''), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/12-Month-Review-Revised-FATF-Standards-Virtual-Assets-VASPS.pdf.
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B. Rule Overview

    This proposed rule would adopt recordkeeping, verification, and 
reporting requirements for certain deposits, withdrawals, exchanges, or 
other payments or transfers of CVC or LTDA by, through, or to a bank or 
MSB \20\ that involve an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet. FinCEN 
is proposing to define otherwise covered wallets as those wallets that 
are held at a financial institution that is not subject to the BSA and 
is located in a foreign jurisdiction identified by FinCEN on a List of 
Foreign Jurisdictions Subject to 31 CFR 1010.316 Reporting and 31 CFR 
1010.410(g) Recordkeeping (the ``Foreign Jurisdictions List''). 
Initially, FinCEN is proposing that the Foreign Jurisdictions List be 
comprised of jurisdictions designated by FinCEN as jurisdictions of 
primary money laundering concern (i.e. Burma, Iran, and North Korea).
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    \20\ FinCEN requests comment on whether to expand the 
requirements of the proposed rule to other types of financial 
institutions, such as broker-dealers.
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    First, this proposed rule would require banks and MSBs to file a 
report with FinCEN containing certain information related to a 
customer's CVC or LTDA transaction and counterparty (including name and 
physical address), and to verify the identity of their customer, if a 
counterparty to the transaction is using an unhosted or otherwise 
covered wallet and the transaction is greater than $10,000 (or the 
transaction is one of multiple CVC transactions involving such 
counterparty wallets and the customer flowing through the bank or MSB 
within a 24-hour period that aggregate to value in or value out of 
greater than $10,000). Second, this proposed rule would require banks 
and MSBs to keep records of a customer's CVC or LTDA transaction and 
counterparty, including verifying the identity of their customer, if a 
counterparty is using an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet and the 
transaction is greater than $3,000.

II. Background

A. Risks of Unhosted and Otherwise Covered Wallets Versus Hosted 
Wallets

    CVC wallets are interfaces for storing and transferring CVC.\21\ 
There are two wallet types: ``hosted wallets'' and ``unhosted 
wallets.'' The ability to transact in CVC using unhosted or otherwise 
covered wallets, and the possibility that there will be a similar 
ability to transact in LTDA using unhosted or otherwise wallets, 
increases risks related to AML and combatting the financing of 
terrorism (``CFT'').
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    \21\ FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance at pp. 15-16.
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    Hosted wallets are provided by account-based money transmitters 
that receive, store, and transmit CVC on behalf of their 
accountholders. Such entities generally interact with their customers 
through websites or mobile applications. In this business model, the 
money transmitter (i.e., the hosted wallet provider) is the host, the 
account is the wallet, and the accountholder is the wallet owner. Banks 
can also be

[[Page 83844]]

hosted wallet providers.\22\ Money transmitters doing business in whole 
or substantial part in the United States, as well as banks within the 
United States, that are hosted wallet providers are subject to the BSA 
and must comply with AML/CFT program requirements, including by 
conducting customer due diligence with respect to accountholders and 
reporting suspicious activity.
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    \22\ Since the FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance, certain BSA-regulated 
banks have obtained authorization to custody CVC through hosted 
wallets. For example, on July 22, 2020, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (``OCC'') concluded that a national bank 
or federal savings association may provide cryptocurrency custody 
services on behalf of customers (the ``OCC Custody Guidance''). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter #1170 
at pp. 1, 9 (July 22, 2020), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2020/int1170.pdf. The OCC 
Custody Guidance notes that demand for cryptocurrency custody 
services has grown for several reasons, including that (i) access to 
cryptocurrency value is lost when an owner loses its cryptographic 
private key; (ii) banks may offer more secure storage than other 
existing options; and (iii) some investors may wish to manage 
cryptocurrency on behalf of customers and use national banks as 
custodians for the managed assets. Id. at pp. 4-5. The OCC Custody 
Guidance notes that as part of the custody services they provide, 
national banks and federal savings associations may include services 
such as facilitating the customer's cryptocurrency and fiat currency 
exchange transactions, transaction settlement, trade execution, 
recording keeping, valuation, tax services, reporting, or other 
appropriate services. Id. at pp. 8 n.39, 9. Similarly, some state-
chartered banks are also authorized to custody CVC in hosted 
wallets. For example, in 2019 Wyoming created a new class of 
financial institutions, Special Purpose Depository Institutions, or 
SPDIs. See H.B. 74, 65th Wyo. Leg., 1st Sess. (as amended) (2019). 
The SPDI bank charter permits an SPDI to engage in a range of 
services, including custodial services and trade execution related 
to digital assets.
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    By contrast, the term unhosted wallet describes when a financial 
institution is not required to conduct transactions from the wallet 
(for example, when an owner has the private key controlling the 
cryptocurrency wallet and uses it to execute transactions involving the 
wallet on the owner's own behalf). Users of unhosted wallets interact 
with a virtual currency system directly and have independent control 
over the transmission of the value. When such a person conducts a 
transaction to purchase goods or services on the person's own behalf, 
they are not a money transmitter and are not subject to BSA 
requirements applicable to financial institutions.\23\ Additionally, 
because such transactions do not necessarily involve a regulated 
financial intermediary on at least one side of the transaction, they 
may never be scrutinized pursuant to any AML/CFT program.
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    \23\ FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance at pp. 16.
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    The Treasury Department has previously noted that ``[a]nonymity in 
transactions and funds transfers is the main risk that facilitates 
money laundering.'' \24\ The Financial Action Task Force (``FATF'') 
\25\ has similarly observed that the extent to which anonymous peer-to-
peer permit transactions via unhosted wallets, without involvement of a 
virtual asset service provider or a financial institution, is a key 
potential AML/CFT risk in some CVC systems.\26\ FATF members have 
specifically observed that unregulated peer-to-peer transactions 
``could present a leak in tracing illicit flows of virtual assets,'' 
particularly if one or more blockchain-based CVC networks were to reach 
global scale.\27\ Importantly, as explained below, while data contained 
on some blockchains are open to public inspection and can be used by 
authorities to attempt to trace illicit activity, FinCEN believes that 
this data does not sufficiently mitigate the risks of unhosted and 
otherwise covered wallets.\28\
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    \24\ Dep't of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk 
Assessment at pp. 4 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2018NMLRA_12-18.pdf.
    \25\ The FATF is an international, inter-governmental task force 
whose purpose is the development and promotion of international 
standards and the effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and 
operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist 
financing, the financing of proliferation, and other related threats 
to the integrity of the international financial system.
    \26\ FATF Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors on So-Called Stablecoins at pp. 15 (June 2020), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Virtual-Assets-FATF-Report-G20-So-Called-Stablecoins.pdf.
    \27\ 12-Month Review of the Revised FATF Standards on Virtual 
Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers at pp. 15 (June 2020), 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/12-Month-Review-Revised-FATF-Standards-Virtual-Assets-VASPS.pdf. The 
FATF has also encouraged government authorities to address potential 
risks posed by disintermediated (i.e., peer-to-peer) transactions in 
a proactive manner, as they deem appropriate. Id. at pp. 7. The FATF 
noted that jurisdictions have a range of national-level tools to 
mitigate, to some extent, the risks posed by anonymous peer-to-peer 
transactions if national authorities consider the ML/TF risk to be 
unacceptably high. This includes banning or denying licensing of 
platforms if they allow unhosted wallet transfers, introducing 
transactional or volume limits on peer-to-peer transactions, or 
mandating that transactions occur with the use of a VASP or 
financial institutions. Id. at pp. 15.
    \28\ The risk profile of wallets hosted by foreign financial 
institutions located in certain jurisdictions that do not have an 
effective AML regime resembles the risk profile of unhosted wallets. 
The reason transactions involving hosted wallets present lower 
illicit finance risk in jurisdictions with an effective AML regime 
is because of the role that intermediaries in such jurisdictions 
play in preventing money laundering by applying a variety of 
controls, such as due diligence, transaction monitoring, and 
suspicious activity reporting. Financial institutions subject to 
effective regulation are also obligated to cooperate with lawful 
investigations. In jurisdictions in which financial institutions are 
allowed to turn a blind eye to, or even purposefully facilitate, 
money laundering, there is no basis to conclude that intermediation 
reduces illicit finance risk. The reporting, recordkeeping, and 
verification requirements of this proposed rule would apply to 
transactions with wallets hosted in jurisdictions listed on the 
Foreign Jurisdictions List.
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B. Limitations of Current Tools To Mitigate the AML/CFT Risks of CVC

    In certain circumstances, investigators may be able to analyze 
blockchain data to identify illicit activity.\29\ While such analytic 
techniques can be used to combat illicit finance, they are not a 
panacea. Blockchain analysis can be rendered less effective by a number 
of factors, including the scale of a blockchain network, the extent of 
peer-to-peer activity (i.e., transactions between unhosted wallets), 
the use of anonymizing technologies to obscure transaction information, 
and a lack of information concerning the identity of transferors and 
recipients in particular transactions. Additionally, several types of 
AEC (e.g., Monero, Zcash, Dash, Komodo, and Beam) are increasing in 
popularity and employ various technologies that inhibit investigators' 
ability both to identify transaction activity using blockchain data and 
to attribute this activity to illicit activity conducted by natural 
persons.\30\
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    \29\ D.Y. Huang et al., ``Tracking Ransomware End-to-end,'' 2018 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Francisco, CA, 
2018, pp. 618-631, doi: 10.1109/SP.2018.00047.
    \30\ See ``What is Monero (XMR)?'' https://web.getmonero.org/get-started/what-is-monero/ (accessed Dec. 1, 2020).
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    Regulations under the BSA already require filing CTRs for 
transactions involving or aggregating to more than $10,000 in currency 
or monetary instruments as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(dd). Such CTRs 
provide valuable information that helps investigators identify bulk 
cash smuggling, structuring, and other large-scale money laundering 
efforts, among other activity, even when the customer is not complicit 
in the overall money laundering scheme.\31\ This proposed rule would 
similarly provide greater insight into transacting parties with a nexus 
to one or more potentially illicit transactions:
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    \31\ Other types of reports required under the BSA, including 
suspicious activity reports, are also critical to law enforcement. 
The reporting requirements of this proposed rule are a virtual 
currency analogue to the CTR reporting requirement.
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     First, the proposed rule would require that banks and MSBs 
identify and verify hosted wallet customers who engage in transactions 
with unhosted or otherwise covered wallet counterparties when those 
customers conduct transactions above the equivalent of $3,000 in CVC or 
LTDA with an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet

[[Page 83845]]

counterparty (with reporting required for transactions over $10,000), 
and that banks and MSBs collect certain information (i.e. name and 
physical address) concerning the customer's counterparties.\32\
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    \32\ FinCEN recognizes that persons engaged in illicit finance 
will likely attempt to use falsified credentials and other types of 
schemes to evade the requirement to report their true identities. 
However, banks and MSBs develop solutions to try to ferret out such 
abuse, not only for AML purposes but also to avoid being defrauded 
by illicit actors themselves. Furthermore, such efforts can generate 
valuable leads through suspicious activity reports.
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     Second, the proposed rule would cause banks and MSBs to 
generate reports containing the transaction hash and identity of 
persons holding wallets engaging with unhosted or otherwise covered 
wallets engaging in transactions across multiple financial 
institutions.
     Third, the proposed rule would create a new prohibition on 
structuring--i.e., engaging in transactions in a manner to avoid 
reporting requirement--applicable to virtual currency transactions. 
Structuring is a method used by some malign actors to avoid detection 
by law enforcement of their illicit activities.
    In this notice, FinCEN is seeking comment on the potential effects 
of this proposed rule on activity through financial intermediaries that 
are subject to the BSA or to AML/CFT regulations in a foreign 
jurisdiction.

C. Legal Framework

1. The Bank Secrecy Act
    The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, as 
amended by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (``USA PATRIOT Act'') (Pub. L. 107-56) and other legislation, is 
the legislative framework commonly referred to as the BSA. The 
Secretary of the Treasury (``Secretary'') has delegated to the Director 
of FinCEN (``Director'') the authority to implement, administer, and 
enforce compliance with the BSA and associated regulations.\33\
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    \33\ Treasury Order 180-01 (Jan. 14, 2020).
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    Pursuant to this authority, FinCEN may require financial 
institutions to keep records and file reports that the Director 
determines have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or 
regulatory investigations or proceedings, or in intelligence or 
counterintelligence matters to protect against international 
terrorism.\34\ Regulations implementing Title II of the BSA appear at 
31 CFR chapter X.\35\
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    \34\ 31 U.S.C. 5311.
    \35\ Treasury Order 180-01 (Jan. 14, 2020).
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    Specifically, under 12 U.S.C. 1829b(b)(1), where the Secretary 
determines that the maintenance of appropriate types of records and 
other evidence by insured depository institutions has a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings, the Secretary has the authority to prescribe regulations 
to carry out the purposes of this section. Similarly, under 12 U.S.C. 
1953, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate recordkeeping 
requirements for uninsured banks and uninsured financial institutions, 
to include MSBs.
    Under 31 U.S.C. 5313, the Secretary is authorized to require 
financial institutions to report currency transactions, or transactions 
involving other monetary instruments as the Secretary prescribes. These 
reports may be required on transactions in an amount, denomination, or 
amount and denomination, or under circumstances the Secretary 
prescribes by regulation. Reports must be filed at the time and in the 
way the Secretary prescribes. The BSA defines the term ``monetary 
instruments'' to include, among other things, ``United States coins and 
currency . . . [and] as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation, 
coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers' checks, bearer 
negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer 
securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar 
material. . . .'' \36\ The term ``monetary instruments'' is also 
defined for the purposes of FinCEN's regulations in 31 CFR chapter X at 
31 CFR 1010.100(dd).\37\
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    \36\ 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3).
    \37\ This proposed rule would not modify the regulatory 
definition of ``monetary instruments'' at 31 CFR 1010.100(dd), 
although it would prescribe that CVC and LTDA are ``monetary 
instruments'' pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5313 for the purposes of the 
issuance of the proposed reporting requirement added at 31 CFR 
1010.316.
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    Under 31 U.S.C. 5318(a)(2), the general powers of the Secretary 
pursuant to the BSA include the ability to require a class of domestic 
financial institutions to ``maintain appropriate procedures to ensure 
compliance with [subchapter 53 of title 31 of the U.S. Code] and 
regulations prescribed under [such] subchapter or to guard against 
money laundering.'' \38\
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    \38\ The proposed rule relies on authority under 31 U.S.C. 5313 
and 5318(a)(2) to extend several existing requirements that apply to 
the current requirement to file currency transaction reports to the 
new requirement to file transaction reports related to transactions 
in CVC or LTDA. It also relies on the authority of 31 U.S.C. 
5318(a)(2) for the promulgation of the recordkeeping requirements on 
wallets held by foreign financial institutions in jurisdictions 
identified by FinCEN.
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2. Implementation of the BSA With Respect to Persons Dealing in CVC
    Under FinCEN's regulations found at 31 CFR chapter X, banks and 
MSBs are subject to a number of requirements under the BSA, including 
requirements to maintain an AML/CFT program and to report suspicious 
activity to FinCEN.\39\ Specifically, banks and MSBs are required to 
have an AML/CFT program that includes, at a minimum, (1) internal 
controls to assure ongoing compliance; (2) independent testing for 
compliance to be conducted by internal personnel or by an outside 
party; (3) designation of an individual or individuals responsible for 
coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance; and (4) training and 
education for appropriate personnel.\40\ Banks are also required to 
maintain appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting customer due 
diligence and a customer identification program (``CIP'') as part of 
their AML/CFT program.\41\ The BSA and its implementing regulations 
also require banks and MSBs to file CTRs and suspicious activity 
reports (``SARs''). Financial institutions are required to file SARs to 
report any transaction that the financial institution ``knows, 
suspects, or has reason to suspect'' is suspicious, if the transaction 
is conducted or attempted by, at, or through the institution, and the 
transaction involves or aggregates to at least $5,000 in funds or other 
assets in the case of banks, and at least $2,000 in funds or other 
assets in the case of MSBs.\42\
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    \39\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.210, 1020.320, 1022.210, 1022.320.
    \40\ 31 CFR 1020.210, 1022.210.
    \41\ 31 CFR 1020.210(b)(5), 1020.220, 1022.210(d)(1).
    \42\ 31 CFR 1020.320, 1022.320.
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    Many of the BSA requirements that apply to banks and MSBs are 
applicable to their transactions in CVC or LTDA.\43\ For instance, 
financial institutions are required to address the risks of such 
transactions as part of their AML/CFT programs, file CTRs where 
appropriate (such as where a person uses a reportable amount of 
currency to purchase CVC or LTDA), and report suspicious activity 
related to such transactions to FinCEN.
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    \43\ FinCEN guidance makes clear that CVC is a type of ``value 
that substitutes for currency.'' See, e.g., FinCEN Guidance--
Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies at pp. 3-5 (Mar. 18, 2013) 
(``FinCEN 2013 CVC Guidance''); FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance at pp. 7. 
While LTDA does, by definition, have legal tender status, it does 
not meet the definition of currency in 31 CFR 1010.100 as it is not 
coin or paper money. Thus, like CVC, LTDA is also value that 
substitutes for currency.

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[[Page 83846]]

    FinCEN's guidance also states that financial institutions are 
subject to the collection, recordkeeping, and transmittal requirements 
applicable to transmittals of funds with respect to transactions in CVC 
or LTDA.\44\ A notice of proposed rulemaking recently published by 
FinCEN and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
proposes regulatory amendments to these same rules to clarify that they 
apply to transactions in CVC or LTDA, and also to lower the monetary 
threshold triggering the rules for certain transactions (the ``Funds 
Transfer/Funds Travel Rule NPRM'').\45\ Under the collection and 
recordkeeping aspect of these rules, banks and nonbank financial 
institutions are required to collect and retain information related to 
transmittals of funds in amounts of $3,000 or more.\46\ Furthermore, 
the transmittal aspect of these rules requires financial institutions 
to transmit certain information required to be collected by the funds 
recordkeeping rule to other banks or nonbank financial institutions 
participating in the transmittal.\47\
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    \44\ See FinCEN 2019 CVC Guidance at pp. 11-12.
    \45\ Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM at pp. 68005-06.
    \46\ See 31 CFR 1010.410(e) (non-bank financial institutions); 
31 CFR 1020.410(a) (banks). Among the information that must be 
collected and retained is (a) name and address of the transmittor; 
(b) the amount of the transmittal order; (c) the execution date of 
the transmittal order; (d) any payment instructions received from 
the transmittor with the transmittal order; and (e) the identity of 
recipient's financial institution.
    \47\ See 31 CFR 1010.410(f).
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3. CTR Reporting Obligations
    The existing regulations that implement the CTR reporting 
requirement are found at several sections of 31 CFR chapter X. The 
basic reporting requirement is found at 31 CFR 1010.311, and applies 
generally to all financial institutions as defined by FinCEN's 
regulations. Individual regulatory parts also refer back to 31 CFR 
1010.311, such as in the regulatory parts that apply to banks and 
MSBs.\48\ Timing, procedural, and recordkeeping requirements related to 
the CTR reporting requirement are found at 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1)-(3) 
and (d)-(e). Identification verification and recordkeeping requirements 
applicable to transactions requiring a CTR are found at 31 CFR 1010.312 
and are referenced in other regulatory parts.\49\ Aggregation 
requirements that require financial institutions to aggregate across 
multiple branches and transactions for the purposes of determining 
whether the CTR reporting requirement's monetary threshold is satisfied 
are found at 31 CFR 1010.313 and are referenced in other regulatory 
parts.\50\ Anti-structuring rules that apply to transactions in 
currency reporting requirements are found at 31 CFR 1010.314 and are 
referenced in other regulatory parts.\51\ An exemption that applies to 
non-bank financial institutions obligations under the CTR reporting 
requirement is found at 31 CFR 1010.315 and is also referenced in other 
regulatory parts.\52\ Finally, banks are subject to specific statutory 
exemptions from the CTR reporting requirement as incorporated into 
FinCEN's regulations at 31 CFR 1020.315; the mandatory and 
discretionary statutory exemptions these regulations implement are 
found at 31 U.S.C. 5313(d) and (e), respectively.
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    \48\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.311, 1022.311.
    \49\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.312, 1022.312.
    \50\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.313, 1022.313.
    \51\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.314, 1022.314.
    \52\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1022.315.
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III. Proposed Reporting Requirement for Transactions Involving CVC or 
LTDA

A. Expansion of the BSA Definition of ``Monetary Instruments''

    This proposed rule would add a determination at 31 CFR 1010.316(a), 
a new section this proposed rule would add, that CVC and LTDA are 
``monetary instruments'' for the purposes of 31 U.S.C. 5313. Section 
5313 authorizes the Secretary to issue reporting requirements in 
relation to ``transactions for the payment, receipt, or transfer of 
United States coins or currency (or other monetary instruments the 
Secretary of the Treasury prescribes)'' (emphasis added). The BSA 
defines ``monetary instruments'' to include, among other things, 
``United States coins and currency'' and ``as the Secretary may 
prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, 
travelers' checks, bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment 
securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on 
delivery, and similar material[.]'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CVC and LTDA are ``similar material'' to ``coins and currency of a 
foreign country, travelers' checks, bearer negotiable instruments, 
bearer investment securities, bearer securities, [and] stock on which 
title is passed on delivery . . . .'' \54\ The six specific instruments 
included in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3)(B) each represent material that can 
serve as a substitute for U.S. coins and currency, or in other words, 
function as money. Like currency itself, negotiable instruments and 
instruments in bearer form are commodified so that they can serve 
monetary functions, such as by acting as a medium of exchange, a store 
of value, or a unit of account. CVC similarly functions as a 
commodified unit of exchange and a substitute for coins and currency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of the BSA, a salient characteristic shared by the six 
specific instruments included in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3)(B) is not the 
right to an underlying asset, but rather that title to the asset passes 
upon delivery, that is, whoever possess the instrument is considered 
its owner.\55\ With respect to CVC and LTDA, the holder of the private 
key related to any such CVC or LTDA has control over that CVC or LTDA. 
That private key grants the holder the ability and blockchain-based 
authority to transfer the CVC or LTDA.\56\ In essence, ownership of CVC 
and LTDA passes upon delivery similar to the instruments described in 
31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Some CVCs, such as stablecoins, may be redeemable for an 
underlying asset.
    \56\ See, e.g., Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
Electronic Cash System, available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 
(``Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a 
hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next 
owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify 
the signatures to verify the chain of ownership.'') (accessed 
December 5, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the note to the proposed determination at 31 CFR 1010.316(a) 
makes clear, however, that proposed determination is not intended to 
affect the regulatory definition of ``monetary instruments'' at 31 CFR 
1010.100(dd), or the use of that regulatory definition elsewhere in 
FinCEN's regulations, including in relation to the CTR reporting 
requirement at 31 CFR 1010.311 and the transportation of currency or 
monetary instruments reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1010.340.\57\
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    \57\ Nor is this proposed regulatory determination intended to 
have any impact on the definition of ``currency'' in 31 CFR 
1010.100(m). Furthermore, nothing in this proposal is intended to 
constitute a determination that any CVC or LTDA that is within the 
regulatory definition of ``monetary instruments'' at 31 U.S.C. 
5312(a)(3) is currency for the purposes of the federal securities 
laws, 15 U.S.C. 78c(47), or the federal derivatives laws, 7 U.S.C. 
1-26, and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Scope of the Reporting Requirement

    The proposed reporting requirement would apply to transactions 
involving CVC or LTDA between a bank's or MSB's hosted wallet customer 
and an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet. This proposed rule would 
apply an aggregation requirement, similar to the CTR aggregation 
requirement, to the proposed reporting requirement for transactions 
involving CVC or LTDA.

[[Page 83847]]

However, only CVC or LTDA transactions would need to be aggregated 
together for the purposes of the proposed reporting requirement; a 
report would not be required when the total value of a person's CVC or 
LTDA transactions plus the person's currency transactions in a 24-hour 
period is greater than $10,000 in value, as determined by the financial 
institution based on the value at the time of each transaction, but the 
total value of the person's CVC or LTDA transactions alone is not 
greater than $10,000 in value, as determined by the financial 
institution based on the value at the time of each transaction.\58\
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    \58\ As noted previously, the changes this proposed rule would 
make are not intended to modify the CTR reporting requirement. 
Consistent with this intention, the proposed rule would make no 
change to the CTR aggregation requirements; the value of a person's 
CVC or LTDA transactions is not relevant to the determination of 
whether the person's currency transactions in aggregate require the 
filing of a CTR.
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    FinCEN is proposing an exemption to the reporting requirement that 
would make this requirement inapplicable to transactions between hosted 
wallets held at financial institutions subject to the BSA. FinCEN is 
also proposing to extend this exemption to CVC or LTDA transactions 
where the counterparty wallet is hosted by a foreign financial 
institution, except for a foreign financial institution in a 
jurisdiction listed on the Foreign Jurisdictions List, which FinCEN is 
proposing to establish. Initially, the Foreign Jurisdictions List would 
be comprised of jurisdictions designated by FinCEN as jurisdictions of 
primary money laundering concern (i.e. Burma, Iran, and North Korea), 
but could in the future be expanded to include jurisdictions that are 
identified to have significant deficiencies in their regulation of CVC 
or LTDA such that the application of this proposed rule's recordkeeping 
and reporting requirements would be appropriate.

C. Comparison to the CTR Reporting Requirements and Consideration of 
Extension of Current CTR Exemptions to the Proposed CVC/LTDA 
Transaction Reporting Requirement

    Similar to the CTR reporting requirement, this proposed rule would 
require reporting of transactions in CVC or LTDA that aggregate to 
greater than $10,000 in one day. Substantive exemptions to the CTR 
reporting requirement can be found at 31 CFR 1010.315 and 1020.315. The 
exemption at 31 CFR 1010.315 exempts a non-bank financial institution 
(including an MSB) from the obligation to file a report otherwise 
required by 31 CFR 1010.311 with respect to a transaction in currency 
between the institution and a commercial bank. This proposed rule would 
not extend this exemption to the reporting requirement proposed to be 
added at 31 CFR 1010.316(b) related to CVC/LTDA transactions between a 
bank's or MSB's hosted wallet customer and an unhosted or otherwise 
covered wallet. FinCEN is not proposing extending this exemption 
because unhosted and otherwise covered wallets would generally not 
involve a U.S. commercial bank. FinCEN has requested comment, however, 
on whether these exemptions should be extended with respect to the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement.
    The current exemptions to the CTR reporting requirement for banks 
at 31 CFR 1020.315 are based in the mandatory and discretionary 
statutory exemptions to reporting requirements imposed on banks 
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5313(d) and (e), respectively. The two sections 
below consider those exemptions in turn.
1. Application of Mandatory Exemptions to 31 U.S.C. 5313 Reporting 
Requirements to the Proposed CVC/LTDA Transaction Reporting Requirement
    31 U.S.C. 5313(d) mandates that the Secretary exempt ``depository 
institutions''--which include the banks on which the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement would be imposed--from reporting 
requirements imposed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5313(a) with respect to 
transactions between the depository institution and: (a) Another 
depository institution; (b) a department or agency of the United 
States, any State, or any political subdivision of any State; (c) any 
entity established under the laws of the United States, any State, or 
any political subdivision of any State, or under an interstate compact 
between two or more States, which exercises governmental authority on 
behalf of the United States or any such State or political subdivision; 
or (d) any business or category of business the reports on which have 
little or no value for law enforcement purposes.
    FinCEN believes these mandatory statutory exemptions are likely to 
be of limited practical relevance with respect to the proposed 
reporting requirement because of the limited likelihood that the types 
of institutions covered by these mandatory statutory exemptions would 
maintain unhosted or otherwise covered wallets. Nevertheless, FinCEN is 
proposing to apply the mandatory statutory exemptions to the proposed 
CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement. At this time, however, 
FinCEN is not proposing to determine that there is any business or 
category of business for which the reports on CVC or LTDA would have 
little or no value for law enforcement purposes.\59\
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    \59\ FinCEN is therefore not extending the exemptions at 31 CFR 
1020.315(b)(4)-(5) to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirement. 31 CFR 1020.315(b)(4)-(5) were promulgated to implement 
the mandatory reporting exemptions of 31 U.S.C. 5313(d) with respect 
to transactions in currency. ``Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act 
Regulations--Exemptions From the Requirement To Report Transactions 
in Currency'' 62 FR 47141, 47142 (Sept. 8, 1997).
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2. Consideration of Applying the Discretionary Exemptions to 31 U.S.C. 
5313 Reporting Requirements to the Proposed CVC/LTDA Transaction 
Reporting Requirement
    31 U.S.C. 5313(e) states that the Secretary may exempt a depository 
institution from the reporting requirements of subsection (a) with 
respect to transactions between the depository institution and a 
qualified business customer of the institution on the basis of 
information submitted to the Secretary by the institution in accordance 
with procedures which the Secretary shall establish. FinCEN's 
regulations incorporate this provision by including as ``exempt 
persons'' two categories of entities that are not within the mandatory 
exemptions of 31 U.S.C. 5313(d),\60\ and then requiring that banks file 
a notice to FinCEN with respect to such persons prior to applying the 
exemption to discontinue the filing of CTRs.\61\
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    \60\ See 31 CFR 1020.315(b)(6)-(7).
    \61\ See 31 CFR 1020.315(c)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The discretionary exemptions that FinCEN has adopted relate to U.S. 
businesses with transaction accounts that frequently engage in 
transactions greater than $10,000, and certain payroll account 
customers.\62\ Neither of these discretionary categories appear likely 
to be counterparties to transactions between banks' hosted wallet 
customers and unhosted or otherwise covered wallets. Therefore, FinCEN 
is not proposing to extend these provisions to the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement. FinCEN has requested comment on the 
exemptions it should apply.
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    \62\ See 31 CFR 1020.315(b)(6)-(7).

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[[Page 83848]]

IV. Proposed Recordkeeping, Verification, and Other Procedural 
Requirements on Transactions Involving CVC or LTDA

A. Recordkeeping, Verification, and Other Procedural Requirements 
Related to the Proposed CVC/LTDA Transaction Reporting Requirement

    As noted above in Section II.C.3, the basic CTR reporting 
requirement at 31 CFR 1010.311 is complemented by identification 
verification, recordkeeping, and procedural requirements, and other 
provisions found in other sections of 31 CFR chapter X. In particular, 
with respect to transactions for which a CTR must be filed, financial 
institutions must comply with the following related requirements:
     Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.312, financial institutions must 
verify and record the identity of the individual presenting the 
transaction, as well as record the identity, account number, and the 
social security or taxpayer identification number, if any, of any 
person or entity on whose behalf such transaction is to be effected. 
The regulation also lays out specific requirements for verification.
     Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1), a CTR must be filed 
within 15 days following the date of the reportable transaction.
     Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(2), a CTR must be retained 
for five years from the date of the report.
     Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(3), a CTR must be filed 
with FinCEN, unless otherwise specified.
     Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.306(d), a CTR must be filed on a 
form prescribed by the Secretary. Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.306(e), the 
CTR form may be obtained from the BSA E-Filing System.
     Pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.314, structuring transactions to 
evade the CTR reporting requirement is prohibited.
    This proposed rule would amend these requirements. Specifically, 
the procedural and anti-structuring rules are proposed to be amended in 
a straightforward manner by adding to their scope the proposed 
reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1010.316. The identity verification and 
recordkeeping requirements are proposed to be amended to apply a new 
verification requirement to a financial institution's hosted wallet 
customer, and to require the collection of the name and physical 
address of the customer's counterparty, when engaging in a transaction 
reportable pursuant to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirement.

B. Recordkeeping and Verification Requirements Distinct From the 
Proposed CVC/LTDA Transaction Reporting Requirement

    This proposed rule would add a new recordkeeping requirement at 31 
CFR 1010.410(g) requiring banks and MSBs to keep records and verify the 
identity of their hosted wallet customers, when those customers engage 
in transactions with unhosted or otherwise covered wallets with a value 
of more than $3,000. With respect to the verification requirement for 
recordkeeping, the proposed rule would allow for methods analogous to 
those permitted for verification of hosted wallet customers in relation 
to transactions subject to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirement. The proposed recordkeeping requirement would not apply to 
transactions between hosted wallets (except for otherwise covered 
wallets).
    FinCEN is proposing to establish this recordkeeping and 
verification requirement pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1829b(b)(1) and 12 
U.S.C. 1953, which authorize the Secretary to adopt recordkeeping 
requirements for banks and MSBs that have a high degree of usefulness 
in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, as well 
as 31 U.S.C. 5318(a), which authorizes the Secretary to require 
domestic banks and MSBs to maintain appropriate procedures to ensure 
compliance with subchapter 53 of title 31 of the U.S. Code and 
regulations prescribed thereunder or to guard against money laundering. 
As a result, the statutory exemptions of 31 U.S.C. 5313 covering 
transactions between depository institutions and certain other entities 
do not apply to these proposed requirements.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

A. Expansion of the Definition of ``Monetary Instruments''

    As described in Section III.B, the proposed rule would add a new 
provision at 31 CFR 1010.316(a) that includes a determination that CVC 
and LTDA are ``monetary instruments'' for the purposes of 31 U.S.C. 
5313. This determination provides a basis for the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement proposed to be added at 31 CFR 
1010.316(b).\63\
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    \63\ 31 CFR 1010.316(c) provides definitions for CVC and LTDA. 
As noted previously, CVC is defined consistently with the proposed 
definition in FinCEN and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Board's recent Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM. See 85 FR 
68005, 68011 (Oct. 27, 2020). LTDA is defined for the first time to 
be any type of digital asset issued by the United States or any 
other country that is designated as legal tender by the issuing 
country and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of 
issuance.
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    This proposed determination is not intended to impact the 
regulatory definition of ``monetary instruments'' at 31 CFR 
1010.100(dd), nor that regulatory definition's use elsewhere in 
FinCEN's regulations, including in relation to the currency transaction 
reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1010.311, and the transportation of 
currency or monetary instruments reporting requirement at 31 CFR 
1010.340.

B. Reporting Requirements on CVC and LTDA Transactions With Unhosted or 
Otherwise Covered Wallets

    This notice proposes a new reporting requirement at 31 CFR 
1010.316(b). This would require banks and MSBs to file a report similar 
to the CTR for transactions between their customers' CVC or LTDA hosted 
wallets and unhosted or otherwise covered wallets, either as senders or 
recipients. This reporting requirement would apply even if the user of 
the unhosted or otherwise covered wallet is the customer for which the 
financial institution holds a hosted wallet.
    To maintain consistency with the CTR form, this proposed rule would 
require CVC and LTDA transaction reporting at a threshold of $10,000 in 
value, as determined by the financial institution based on the 
prevailing exchange rate at the time of the transaction.\64\ FinCEN 
plans to issue a reporting form similar to but distinct from the CTR 
reporting form that will require the reporting of information on the 
filer, transaction, hosted wallet customer, and each counterparty.
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    \64\ The term ``prevailing exchange rate'' means a rate 
reasonably reflective of a fair market rate of exchange available to 
the public for the CVC/LTDA at the time of the transaction. 
Financial institutions would be required to document their method 
for determining the prevailing exchange rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would add aggregation requirements similar to 
those that apply to the requirement to file CTRs. Specifically, the 
proposed aggregation provision at 31 CFR 1010.313(c) would require that 
banks and MSBs, in calculating whether the $10,000 threshold has been 
met, treat multiple CVC and LTDA transactions as a single transaction 
if the bank or MSB has knowledge that they are by or on behalf of any 
person and result in value in or value out of CVC or LTDA above the 
threshold of $10,000 during a 24-hour period. This 24-hour period 
begins from the first unreported transaction.\65\

[[Page 83849]]

The aggregation provisions would not require that CVC/LTDA transactions 
be aggregated with currency transactions for the purposes of either the 
CTR reporting requirement threshold or the CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement threshold.
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    \65\ For example, if three $6,000 transactions with unhosted 
wallets are initiated by a MSB's hosted wallet customer at 7:00 a.m. 
on Tuesday, 7:00 p.m. on Tuesday, and 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, then 
the first two transactions would be reported, consistent with the 
aggregation requirement, but not the third transaction. However, the 
third transaction would be subsequently reported, consistent with 
the aggregation requirement, if there were additional transactions 
with unhosted or otherwise covered wallets before 8:00 a.m. on 
Thursday totaling more than $4,000 in value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because a bank or MSB may provide CVC or LTDA hosting through 
distinct corporate structures and from different physical locations 
than it provides traditional financial services, proposed 31 CFR 
1010.313(c) makes clear that, for purposes of aggregation with respect 
to the CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement, a bank or MSB must 
include all of its offices and records, wherever they may be located. 
Additionally, under this proposed rule, foreign-located MSBs must 
comply with the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement, 
and this related aggregation requirement, with respect to their 
activities in the United States.\66\
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    \66\ Cf. FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2012-A001, ``Foreign-Located Money 
Services Businesses'' (Feb. 2012), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/FIN-2012-A001.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to counterparty information that would be required to 
be reported pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.316(b), the proposed rule would 
require the reporting of certain identifying information including, at 
a minimum, the name and physical address of each counterparty. 
Consistent with their AML/CFT programs, under the proposed rule, banks 
and MSBs would continue to follow risk-based procedures to determine 
whether to obtain additional information about their customer's 
counterparties or take steps to confirm the accuracy of counterparty 
information.
    The proposed 31 CFR 1010.316 would exempt from required reporting 
those transactions that are between a filer's hosted wallet customer 
and a counterparty hosted wallet at a financial institution that is 
either regulated under the BSA or located in a foreign jurisdiction 
that is not on the Foreign Jurisdictions List. As proposed, prior to 
applying the exemption at 31 CFR 1010.316(d), banks and MSBs would need 
to have a reasonable basis to determine that a counterparty wallet is a 
hosted wallet at either a BSA-regulated financial institution or a 
foreign financial institution in a jurisdiction that is not on the 
Foreign Jurisdictions List. For example, in analyzing whether a 
counterparty's wallet is hosted by a BSA-regulated MSB, financial 
institutions would need to ensure that the MSB is registered with 
FinCEN. In making a determination of the applicability of the exemption 
to a wallet hosted by a foreign financial institution, banks and MSBs 
would need to confirm that the foreign financial institution is not 
located in a jurisdiction on the Foreign Jurisdictions List, and would 
need to apply reasonable, risk-based, documented procedures to confirm 
that the foreign financial institution is complying with registration 
or similar requirements that apply to financial institutions in the 
foreign jurisdiction.
    As discussed in Section III.D, FinCEN also proposes amending 31 CFR 
1020.315 to apply the mandatory statutory exemptions to the reporting 
requirements imposed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5313(a) to the proposed CVC/
LTDA transaction reporting requirement to be added at 31 CFR 
1010.316(b). However, as discussed in Section III.D, FinCEN is not 
proposing to conclude that there is any business or category of 
business the reports on which have little or no value for law 
enforcement purposes under the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirement. Therefore, FinCEN is not proposing to extend the 
regulatory exceptions related to public companies and their 
subsidiaries that have been applied to such entities with respect to 
currency transactions pursuant to 31 CFR 1020.315(b)(4)-(5). Further, 
FinCEN is not proposing applying the discretionary statutory exemptions 
to further limit the scope of the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement. FinCEN is continuing to consider these issues 
and has sought comments on whether it should apply these exemptions 
differently.
    Because FinCEN has only proposed extending the exemption under 31 
CFR 1020.315 to entities subject to the mandatory statutory exemption 
listed in 31 CFR 1020.315(b)(1)-(3), FinCEN is not proposing to require 
a bank to file FinCEN Form 110 or a similar form in relation to such 
exempt persons in order to take advantage of the exemption. This is 
consistent with the existing special rule at 31 CFR 1020.315(c)(2)(B) 
for transactions in currency.
    In some instances, CVC/LTDA transactions may involve multiple 
senders and recipients. As reflected in the proposed exemption language 
at 31 CFR 1010.316(d), a transaction where any one participating wallet 
is unhosted or otherwise covered would be subject to the proposed CVC/
LTDA transaction reporting requirement. Therefore, banks and MSBs would 
be required to report, keep records, and engage in verification with 
respect to such transactions, if the aggregate amount of CVC/LTDA 
transactions involving unhosted or otherwise covered wallets, either 
sent or received from their customer's account, exceeds $10,000 in 
value within a 24-hour period.

C. Recordkeeping and Verification Requirements Related to the 
Transaction Reporting Requirement for CVC and LTDA Transactions With 
Unhosted or Otherwise Covered Wallets

    As described in Section IV, the proposed rule would also extend to 
the new CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement provisions analogous 
to the identity verification, recordkeeping, and procedural 
requirements, and the anti-structuring rule, that apply to the CTR 
reporting requirement.
1. Identity Verification and Recordkeeping Requirements
    The identity verification and recordkeeping requirements applicable 
to transactions that require the filing of a CTR are found at 31 CFR 
1010.312. The proposed rule would amend this provision by adding a 
requirement at 31 CFR 1010.312(b) that banks and MSBs verify and keep 
records of their hosted wallet customers who engage in a transaction 
with unhosted or otherwise covered wallet counterparties. Specifically, 
banks and MSBs would be required to verify and record the identity of 
their customer engaged in a reportable transaction.\67\ Under the 
proposed rule, in the case of a transaction in which the bank's or 
MSB's customer is the sender and the bank or MSB is aware at the time 
of the transaction that reporting is required pursuant to 31 CFR 
1010.316 or 1010.313(c) (where the reporting requirement applies based 
on aggregation), the bank or MSB should not complete the transmission 
of funds until such recordkeeping and verification is complete. 
Similarly, in the case of a transaction in which the bank's or MSB's 
customer is the recipient, the bank or MSB would need to obtain the 
required recordkeeping and verification information as soon as 
practicable. In addition, under the proposed rule, banks and MSBs would 
be expected to incorporate policies tailored to their respective 
business models should the bank or MSB be

[[Page 83850]]

unable to obtain the required information, such as by terminating its 
customer's account in appropriate circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Pursuant to the note to 31 CFR 1010.312(b), this includes 
verifying the identity of the person accessing the customer's 
account, which may be someone conducting a transaction on the 
customer's behalf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN recognizes that verification of identity in the CTR context 
generally involves transactions in currency that are physically 
presented, in contrast to the CVC and LTDA transactions that are 
subject to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement, for 
which this is often not the case. Accordingly, under the proposed rule, 
consistent with the bank's or MSB's AML/CFT program, the bank or MSB 
would need to establish risk-based procedures for verifying their 
hosted wallet customer's identity that are sufficient to enable the 
bank or MSB to form a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity 
of its customer. These procedures would be based on the bank's or MSB's 
assessment of the relevant risks, including those presented by the 
nature of their relationship with their hosted wallet customer, the 
transaction activity, and other activity associated with each 
counterparty and the CVC or LTDA assets. In the case of a bank, which 
is subject to very similar requirements pursuant to its obligations to 
obtain CIP information and engage in ongoing customer due diligence 
(``CDD''), the bank may be able to leverage information it has 
previously collected and is already obligated to collect.\68\ The same 
may be true for MSBs which must maintain internal controls as part of 
an effective money laundering program that is reasonably designed to 
prevent the money services business from being used to facilitate money 
laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.\69\
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    \68\ See 31 CFR 1020.210(b)(5); 31 CFR 1020.220(a).
    \69\ See 31 CFR 1022.210(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Procedural Requirements and the Anti-Structuring Rule
a. Procedural Requirements
    The proposed rule would amend several procedural requirements that 
apply to the CTR reporting requirement to ensure their application to 
the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement as well. These 
include the requirements of 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1), which applies a 15-
day deadline from the date of a reportable transaction for the filing 
of the new report; (a)(2), which requires the retention of a copy of 
each filed report for five years from the date of the report; (a)(3), 
which requires reports to be filed with FinCEN unless otherwise 
specified); (d), which requires reports to be filed on form prescribed 
by the Secretary; and (e), which states that forms used to make reports 
may be obtained on FinCEN's BSA E-Filing System.
    The proposed rule would also make several clerical edits. It would 
amend 31 CFR 1010.310, which previously provided an overview of the CTR 
requirement, so that it describes both the CTR requirement and the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement. The proposed rule 
would also conform the relevant cross-references in Parts 1020 and 1022 
to the new requirements,\70\ and would add cross-references to the new 
reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1020.316 and 31 CFR 1022.316.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ Specifically, the proposed rule would make relevant 
conforming changes to 31 CFR 1020.310, 1020.312, 1020.313, 1022.310, 
1022.312, and 1022.313.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Anti-Structuring Rule
    The proposed rule would amend the definition of structuring at 31 
CFR 1010.100(xx) to refer to the new reporting requirement at 31 CFR 
1010.316 and would also modify the prohibition on structuring at 31 CFR 
1010.314 to refer to the proposed reporting requirement. In order to 
make the proposed reporting requirement effective, it is necessary to 
ensure that parties engaged in structuring to avoid the new reporting 
requirement are subject to penalties. Because the proposed reporting 
requirement at 31 CFR 1010.316 would be imposed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 
5313(a), the proposed amended structuring prohibition at 31 CFR 
1010.314 is consistent with 31 U.S.C. 5324.

D. Recordkeeping and Verification Requirements for Transactions Greater 
than $3,000

    Under the proposed recordkeeping provision, to be added at 31 CFR 
1010.410(g), banks and MSBs would be required to keep records and 
verify the identity of their customers engaging in transactions 
involving the withdrawal, exchange or other payment or transfer, by, 
through, or to such financial institution of CVC or LTDA, as those 
terms are defined in Sec.  1010.316(c), with a value of more than 
$3,000, as determined by the bank or MSB based on the prevailing 
exchange rate at the time of the transaction.
    With respect to counterparty information for which banks and MSBs 
would be required to collect records pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.410(g), 
the proposed rule would require that banks and MSBs collect, at a 
minimum, the name and physical address of each counterparty, and other 
information the Secretary may prescribe on the reporting form 
implementing the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement. 
Banks and MSBs would, under the proposed rule, continue to follow risk-
based procedures, consistent with their AML/CFT program, to determine 
whether to obtain additional information about their customer's 
counterparties or take steps to confirm the accuracy of counterparty 
information.
    Transactions with a value of greater than $10,000 would be subject 
to both the reporting requirement of 31 CFR 1010.316(b) and the 
recordkeeping and verification requirements of 31 CFR 1010.410(g). 
However, FinCEN expects that banks and MSBs would be able to employ a 
single set of information collection and verification procedures to 
satisfy both requirements, and has made the verification requirements 
consistent.\71\ Furthermore, FinCEN has proposed to apply to these 
recordkeeping and verification requirements the exemption for 
transactions between hosted wallets (except for otherwise covered 
wallets).\72\ The same considerations, discussed in Section V.B, that 
govern the application of the exemption to the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement, such as the need for banks or MSBs 
to have a documented basis for applying an exemption, would also govern 
the application of this exemption. In addition, no aggregation would be 
required for the purpose of the recordkeeping requirement at 31 CFR 
1010.410(g).
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    \71\ Cf., e.g., 31 CFR 1010.410(g)(2), with 31 CFR 1010.312(b) 
(verification is only required under either provision for hosted 
wallet customers transacting through unhosted or otherwise covered 
wallets).
    \72\ Cf. 31 CFR 1010.410(g)(4), with 31 CFR 1010.316(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, banks and MSBs would be subject to similar 
programmatic requirements under the recordkeeping requirement at 31 CFR 
1010.410(g) as they would be under the verification requirement for the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement. Specifically, in 
the case of a transaction in which the bank's or MSB's customer is the 
sender and recordkeeping and verification is required pursuant to 31 
CFR 1010.410(g), the bank or MSB should not complete the transmission 
of funds until such recordkeeping and verification is complete. 
Similarly, in the case of a transaction in which the bank's or MSB's 
customer is the recipient, the bank or MSB should obtain the required 
recordkeeping and verification information as soon as

[[Page 83851]]

practicable. In addition, banks and MSBs would be expected to 
incorporate policies tailored to their respective business models 
should the bank or MSB be unable to obtain the required information, 
such as by terminating its customer's account in appropriate 
circumstances.
    For transactions subject to the proposed recordkeeping requirement 
at 31 CFR 1010.410(g), a bank or MSB would be required to obtain and 
retain an electronic record of information about its customer, the 
amount and execution date of the transaction, and the counterparty. 
Unlike other recordkeeping requirements, such as 31 CFR 1010.410(e) and 
1020.410(a), the recordkeeping requirement in the proposed rule would 
require the electronic retention of information. FinCEN is proposing to 
require electronic recordkeeping based on the fact that such 
recordkeeping is the practical way in which businesses engaged in CVC 
or LTDA transactions are likely to track their data and the most 
efficient form in which data can be provided to law enforcement and 
national security authorities.
    Furthermore, under 31 CFR 1010.410(g)(3) as proposed, the 
information that a financial institution would be required to retain 
under paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of that section must be retrievable 
by the bank or MSB by reference to the name or account number of its 
customer, or the name of its customer's counterparty. This information 
would not need not be retained in any particular manner, so long as the 
bank or MSB is able to retrieve the information. FinCEN is proposing 
these requirements to ensure that the information retained by banks and 
MSBs is efficiently searchable in response to lawful information 
requests.

VI. Request for Comment

    FinCEN welcomes comment on all aspects of this proposed rule. 
FinCEN encourages all interested parties to provide their views.
    With respect to the effect of expanding the scope on the definition 
of ``monetary instruments'' in the BSA, FinCEN in particular requests 
comment on the following question from financial institutions and 
members of the public:
    (1) Has FinCEN been sufficiently clear that the impact of the 
definitional change to ``monetary instruments'' would be limited to the 
reporting, recordkeeping, verification, and other requirements of this 
proposed rule, and not to preexisting regulatory obligations such as 
the CTR reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1010.311?
    With respect to the reporting requirements in proposed 31 CFR 
1010.316, FinCEN in particular requests comment on the following 
questions from law enforcement, financial institutions, and members of 
the public:
    (2) Describe the costs from complying with the proposed reporting 
requirement.
    (3) Describe the benefits to law enforcement from the data obtained 
from the proposed reporting requirement.
    (4) Has FinCEN struck a reasonable balance between financial 
inclusion and consumer privacy and the importance of preventing 
terrorism financing, money laundering, and other illicit financial 
activity? If not, what would be a more appropriate way to balance these 
objectives?
    (5) Describe how the costs of complying with the proposed reporting 
requirement, or the benefits to law enforcement from the data obtained 
from the proposed reporting requirement, would vary were FinCEN to 
adopt a higher or lower threshold than $10,000.
    (6) Describe how the costs of complying with the proposed reporting 
requirement, or the benefits to law enforcement from the data obtained 
from the proposed reporting requirement, would vary were FinCEN to 
apply the reporting requirement to all CVC/LTDA transactions by hosted 
wallets, including those with hosted wallet counterparties.
    (7) Should FinCEN add additional jurisdictions to the Foreign 
Jurisdictions List or remove jurisdictions currently on that list? Are 
there any particular considerations FinCEN should take into account 
when adding or removing jurisdictions?
    (8) Has FinCEN provided sufficient clarity to financial 
institutions on the scope of the aggregation requirements that apply to 
the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement?
    (9) Discuss the costs and benefits of modifying the aggregation 
requirement to require aggregation for the purposes of the proposed 
CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement across both fiat and CVC/
LTDA transactions.
    (10) Has FinCEN properly considered the extension of the mandatory 
and discretionary statutory exemptions at 31 U.S.C. 5313(d)-(e) that 
are currently applicable to the CTR reporting requirement to the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement? Has FinCEN 
extended exemptions either too broadly or too narrowly? Was FinCEN 
correct to not extend the exemption from the CTR reporting requirement 
at 31 CFR 1010.315 related to transactions between a non-bank financial 
institution and a commercial bank to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement?
    (11) Should FinCEN extend the obligation to file reports under the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement to financial 
institutions other than banks and MSBs (e.g., brokers-dealers, futures 
commission merchants, mutual funds, etc.)? What would be the cost and 
benefits of extending the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirements to other financial institutions?
    With respect to the proposed recordkeeping, verification, and other 
requirements in connection with CVC/LTDA transactions, FinCEN in 
particular requests comment on the following questions from law 
enforcement, financial institutions, and members of the public:
    (12) Describe the costs from complying with the proposed 
recordkeeping and verification requirements.
    (13) Describe the benefits to law enforcement from being able to 
access data verified and obtained based on the proposed recordkeeping 
and verification requirements.
    (14) Could the verification requirements be adjusted to enhance the 
benefits to law enforcement without a significant change to the costs 
to banks and MSBs, or to reduce the costs to banks and MSBs without a 
significant change in the benefit to law enforcement?
    (15) Describe the potential changes to the costs and benefits that 
would be available to law enforcement were FinCEN to maintain the 
reporting requirement of 31 CFR 1010.316 but also require that banks 
and MSBs verify the identity of the counterparties of their hosted 
wallet customers.
    (16) Is it necessary for the anti-structuring prohibition to be 
extended to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement?
    With respect to the proposed recordkeeping requirements in 31 CFR 
1010.410(g), FinCEN in particular requests comment on the following 
questions from law enforcement, financial institutions, and members of 
the public:
    (17) Would it be appropriate for FinCEN to require additional data 
be retained pursuant to 31 CFR 1010.410(g)?
    (18) Describe the costs from complying with the proposed 
recordkeeping and verification requirements.

[[Page 83852]]

    (19) Describe the benefits to law enforcement from being able to 
access data verified and obtained based on the proposed recordkeeping 
and verification requirements.
    (20) Could the verification requirements be adjusted to enhance the 
benefits to law enforcement without a significant change to the costs 
to banks and MSBs, or to reduce the costs to banks and MSBs without a 
significant change in the benefit to law enforcement?
    (21) Describe the potential changes to the costs and benefits that 
would be available to law enforcement were FinCEN to maintain the 
recordkeeping requirement of 31 CFR 1010.410(g) but also require that 
banks and MSBs verify the identity of the counterparties of their 
hosted wallet customers.
    (22) Is it reasonable to require that records be retained in 
electronic form? Are the retrievability criteria reasonable?
    (23) Should FinCEN extend the obligation to keep records under the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement to financial 
institutions other than banks and MSBs (e.g., broker-dealers, futures 
commission merchants, mutual funds, etc.)?
    (24) Describe technical challenges to implementation to could 
impact reasonable ability to implement these requirements.

VII. Administrative Procedure Act

    The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally requires an agency 
to provide notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and an 
opportunity for interested persons to participate in the rulemaking by 
submitting comments on the proposal.\73\ No minimum period for comment 
is prescribed, although agencies must provide the public with a 
``meaningful opportunity'' to comment on a proposal.\74\ The APA also 
requires publication of the final version of a rule at least thirty 
days before the rule's effective date.
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    \73\ See generally 5 U.S.C. 553.
    \74\ See N. Carolina Growers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United Farm 
Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 770 (4th Cir. 2012); Rural Cellular Ass'n v. 
FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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    These requirements do not apply, however, to rules involving a 
``foreign affairs function'' or where ``good cause'' is shown for rules 
with respect to which ``notice and public procedure'' is 
``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' 
\75\ As described below, the proposed rule is not subject to notice-
and-comment requirements because it falls within each of these 
exceptions. Nevertheless, FinCEN is publishing its proposed rule in the 
Federal Register and inviting comments, and will consider any comments 
received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1), (b)(3)(B), (d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN has determined that a longer period of public comment is not 
necessary and would frustrate the objectives of the rule by unduly 
delaying implementation of measures to curb illicit finance and threats 
to United States national interests. FinCEN notes that in addition to 
the comment period being provided, the agency has directly engaged with 
the cryptocurrency industry on multiple occasions and in a variety of 
formats over the past year on the AML risks arising in connection with 
cryptocurrency and carefully considered information and feedback 
received from industry participants. These engagements have included a 
FinCEN Exchange event in May 2019 on virtual currency with 
representatives from virtual currency money transmitters, third-party 
service providers, federal government agencies, a federal task force, 
and depository institutions that included discussion of methods to 
identify vulnerabilities, disrupt terrorist and proliferation 
financing, and guard against other financial crimes; \76\ visits to 
cryptocurrency businesses in California in February 2020; a working 
session in March 2020 with cryptocurrency industry leaders, compliance 
experts, and senior Treasury Department and FinCEN officials that 
included discussion of supervisory and regulatory challenges facing 
digital assets, including cryptocurrency; \77\ and a FinCEN Exchange 
event on cryptocurrency and ransomware in November 2020 that included 
discussion of emerging trends and typologies, and recovery of victims' 
funds.\78\ Recently, FinCEN also has received outreach from industry 
specifically addressing potential regulatory requirements for unhosted 
wallets, including letters from CoinCenter, the Blockchain Association, 
Blockchain.com, the Global Digital Asset & Cryptocurrency Association, 
Circle, and the Association for Digital Asset Markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See Press Release, FinCEN, May 3, 2019, available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/financial-crime-enforcement-network-exchange (last accessed Dec. 18, 2020).
    \77\ See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Mar. 2, 
2019, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm926 (last accessed Dec. 18, 2020).
    \78\ See Press Release, FinCEN, Nov. 12, 2020, available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-holds-virtual-fincen-exchange-ransomware (last accessed Dec. 18, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule is a vital part of FinCEN's efforts to curb 
illicit finance, and, subject to feedback received during the comment 
period, FinCEN believes rapid implementation is critical to the 
successful accomplishment of the proposed rule's objectives. Undue 
delay in implementing this rule would encourage movement of unreported 
or unrecorded assets implicated in illicit finance from hosted wallets 
at financial institutions to unhosted or otherwise covered wallets, 
such as by moving CVC to exchanges that do not comply with AML/CFT 
requirements. Such delay presents an opportunity to illicit actors who 
have substantial proceeds in regulated financial institutions and who 
want to be able to move those funds without detection into the darker, 
unregulated corners of the CVC ecosystems: Withdraw the funds quickly 
with no required reporting to federal authorities, or withdraw the 
funds after the rule takes effect with detailed mandatory reporting to 
federal authorities. Conversely, participants with funds at regulated 
financial institutions who wish to transact with illicit actors 
operating outside that regulated environment are similarly enabled to 
proceed with those transactions immediately without detailed mandatory 
reporting to federal authorities, but face significant reporting 
obligations if they wait until after a period of delayed 
implementation. FinCEN has concluded that the incentives that would be 
created by an undue implementation delay could seriously undermine the 
interests the rule is designed to advance. In addition, the substantial 
concerns about national security, terrorism, ransomware, money 
laundering, and other illicit financial activities discussed above, and 
the need for an effective response in a rapidly changing area of major 
national concern, support making the amendments in the proposed rule 
effective as quickly as is feasible.
    The considerations are reinforced by the inapplicability of the 
APA's notice-and-comment requirements to the proposed rule. As noted, 
the APA provides an exemption from notice-and-comment requirements 
where ``there is involved . . . a foreign affairs function of the 
United States,'' and while this exemption is not to be ``interpreted 
loosely'' to reach any function having an impact beyond U.S. 
borders,\79\ it is applicable wherever a foreign affairs

[[Page 83853]]

function is ``involved.'' This exemption is distinct from the APA's 
good cause exception,\80\ and reaches matters affecting relations with 
other governments to a substantial extent, such as where adherence to 
the APA's requirements would ``provoke definitely undesirable 
international consequences.'' \81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1581 
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 79-1980, at 23 (1946), 
H.R.Rep. No. 79-1980, at pp. 23 (1946)).
    \80\ See Mast, 596 F. Supp. at pp. 1581.
    \81\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule advances foreign policy and national security 
interests of the United States, using a statute that was designed in 
part for that purpose. As the Supreme Court has explained, one of 
Congress's core aims in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act was to respond to 
threats associated with international financial transactions.\82\ Those 
concerns are plainly implicated where a foreign financial institution 
is not subject to adequate AML/CFT regulation, or where individuals 
outside the United States transact without using a financial 
institution at all. With the increasingly geographically dispersed 
operating models of CVC systems and financial institutions, both in 
their organizational and operational structures as well as in their 
services to customers in many jurisdictions, most CVC and LTDA activity 
involves cross-border value transfer or cross-border operations. For 
example, the Bitcoin network operates across nodes around the world. 
Only approximately 17% of the nodes on the Bitcoin network operate in 
the United States.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27-28 
(1974).
    \83\ ``Global Bitcoin Nodes Distribution,'' Bitnodes, https://bitnodes.io/ (accessed Dec. 2, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirements of the proposed rule directly involve one or more 
foreign affairs functions of the United States. The illicit financing 
targeted by these requirements involves substantial international 
dimensions. Among the objectives of these requirements is the 
application of appropriate controls to curb malign actions of hostile 
foreign states facilitated by means of CVC/LTDA, to prevent evasion of 
United States sanctions regimes, to combat the financing of global 
terrorism, and to address other threats originating in whole or in 
substantial part outside the United States, including the proliferation 
of ransomware attacks, transnational money laundering, and 
international trafficking in controlled substances, stolen and 
fraudulent identification documents and access devices, counterfeit 
goods, malware and other computer hacking tools, firearms, and toxic 
chemicals. Unduly delaying the implementation of the proposed rule 
would hinder the efforts of the United States government to perform 
important national security and foreign affairs functions.\84\ In 
addition, as explained in the discussion of the good cause exception, 
FinCEN expects that malign actors may exploit such a delay by moving 
assets to unhosted wallets and away from regulated financial 
institutions to escape financial transparency.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(reasoning that notice-and-comment process can be ``slow and 
cumbersome,'' thereby impairing national interests).
    \85\ See Am. Ass'n of Exporters & Importers-Textile & Apparel 
Grp. v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting 
incentive to engage in activities to manipulate trade levels that 
prior announcement of restricted quotas would create).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, and consistent with the policy interests underlying 
this rule, FinCEN notes that the requirements being imposed represent 
an important part of the leadership role of the United States in the 
development of international standards applicable to global financial 
networks, both in general and with respect to CVC/LTDA in 
particular.\86\ In addition to the foreign affairs functions involved 
in efforts to combat illicit financing, the measures being adopted 
directly concern the movement of currency and its equivalents (i.e., 
value that substitutes for currency) across national borders, which has 
long been viewed as a critical aspect of foreign policy, international 
relations, and global economic standing.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to 
United Nations, 618 F.3d 172, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2010). As commentators 
have noted, the United States has played a leading role in the 
development of international AML/CFT measures, including through 
unilateral action establishing templates for global standards. See 
Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and 
United States, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 303, 381 (2006).
    \87\ See Schultz, 416 U.S. at pp. 27-28. Numerous provisions of 
the BSA single out transactions with foreign elements for special 
treatment. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5314 (reports on transactions with 
foreign financial agencies), 5316 (importation and exportation of 
monetary instruments); see also 31 U.S.C. 5315(a)(1), (3) (declaring 
congressional findings that, inter alia, ``moving mobile capital can 
have a significant impact on the proper functioning of the 
international monetary system'' and that authority should be 
provided to collect information on capital flows to beyond 
authorities under the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Bretton 
Woods Agreement Act).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the foreign affairs exemption, the APA permits an 
agency to forgo otherwise applicable notice-and-comment procedures 
where the agency ``for good cause finds . . . that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.'' \88\ It has long been recognized that the APA's 
notice-and-comment requirements may run counter to the public interest 
``when the very announcement of a proposed rule itself can be expected 
to precipitate activity by affected parties that would harm the public 
welfare.'' \89\ This is especially so in connection with financial 
regulation where the ``announcement of a proposed rule would enable the 
sort of financial manipulation the rule sought to prevent.'' \90\ In 
such circumstances ``notice and comment could be dispensed with in 
order to prevent the amended rule from being evaded.'' \91\ As noted 
above, FinCEN is concerned about the consequences of undue delay in the 
implementation of the proposed rule, and in particular that such delay 
could accelerate or cause the movement of assets implicated in illicit 
finance from hosted wallets at financial institutions to unhosted or 
otherwise covered wallets, such as by moving CVC to exchanges that do 
not comply with AML/CFT requirements. These concerns squarely implicate 
the APA's good cause exception. Good cause may also be supported where 
delay in implementation ``could result in serious harm.'' \92\ For 
example, agency good cause findings have been sustained in connection 
with anti-terrorism measures, such as rules adopted to prevent airplane 
hijacking.\93\ While serious harm most commonly involves threats to 
physical health and safety, agency good cause findings based on other 
concerns, such as the prevention of substantial financial fraud, have 
also survived challenge.\94\ FinCEN has determined that the substantial 
concerns about national security, terrorism, ransomware, money 
laundering, and other illicit financial activities discussed above, and 
the need for an effective response in a rapidly changing area of major 
national concern, support making the amendments in the proposed rule 
effective as quickly as is feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B).
    \89\ Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dept of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 1492 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983).
    \90\ See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act at pp. 31, quoted in Utility Solid 
Waste Activities Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 236 F.3d 
749, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    \91\ Mack Trucks, Inc. v. E.P.A., 682 F.3d 87, 95 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    \92\ Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
    \93\ See id.; see also Airport Operators Council Intern. v. 
Shaffer, 354 F. Supp. 79 (D.D.C. 1973).
    \94\ See Disabled in Action of Metro. New York, Inc. v. 
Brezenoff, 506 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Northern 
Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741, 751 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding 
good cause based on need to preserve wildlife in light of impending 
hunting season).

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[[Page 83854]]

VIII. Regulatory Analysis

A. Executive Orders 13563, 12866, and 13771

    Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 direct agencies to assess costs 
and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is 
necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, and public health and 
safety effects; distributive impacts; and equity). Executive Order 
13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, 
of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility. 
Although the review requirements of Executive Order 12866 do not apply 
to this proposed rule because it involves a foreign affairs function, 
in the interest of maximizing transparency, FinCEN has analyzed the 
economic effects of this proposed rule consistent with the principles 
of the Order.
    FinCEN believes the primary cost of complying with the proposed 
rule is captured in its Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) 
(``PRA'') burden estimates described in detail below, which amount to 
1,284,349 hours. FinCEN estimated in its recent OMB control number 
renewal for SAR requirements that the average labor cost of storing 
SARs and supporting documentation, weighed against the relevant labor 
required, was $24 per hour.\95\ FinCEN assesses that this is a 
reasonable estimate for the labor cost of the requirements that would 
be imposed by this rule. Therefore a reasonable minimum estimate for 
the burden of administering this rule is approximately $30.8 million 
annually (1,284,349 hours multiplied by $24 per hour). However, the PRA 
burden does not include certain costs, such as information technology 
implementation costs solely resulting from the proposed rule. FinCEN 
specifically requests comment regarding the costs associated with 
implementing these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ 85 FR 31598, 31604 and 31607 (May 26, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN notes that although institutions that provide CVC or LTDA 
wallet hosting services are, ipso facto, likely to be capable of 
handling the implementation of the proposed reporting requirement, the 
initial costs of implementation may be non-trivial. For instance, 
institutions may incur costs in the initial stages if they set up a 
process for fitting existing data they maintain into XML format.
    The benefits from the proposed rule are expected to include 
enhanced law enforcement ability to investigate, prosecute and disrupt 
the financing of international terrorism and other priority 
transnational security threats, as well as other types of financial 
crime, by obtaining improved visibility into financial flows into 
unhosted wallets and improved attribution of CVC transactions involving 
unhosted and otherwise covered wallets.\96\ FinCEN believes that the 
collection of CVC and LTDA indicators will significantly enhance law 
enforcement's and regulators' ability to leverage blockchain analytics 
to obtain attribution and move investigations forward in an expeditious 
manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ At the moment, only a limited number of transactions occur 
involving LTDA, although many countries are developing LTDA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cost of terrorist attacks can be immense. For instance, one 
public report estimated the cost of terrorism globally at $33 billion 
in 2018, though this cost was primarily borne outside the United 
States.\97\ The cost of a major terrorist attack, such as the September 
11 attacks, can reach tens of billions of dollars.\98\ Of course, it is 
difficult to quantify the contribution of a particular rule to a 
reduction in the risk of a terrorist attack. However, even if the 
proposed rule produces very small reductions in the probability of a 
major terrorist attack, the benefits would exceed the costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ See Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism 
Index, 2019 (Nov. 2019), https://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf.
    \98\ For example, the New York Comptroller estimated in 2002 
that the direct physical and human cost of the September 11 attacks 
on New York was over $30.5 billion. See City of New York 
Comptroller, ``One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of 9/11 on New York 
City'' (Sept. 4, 2002), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/impact-9-11-year-later.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would contribute to the ability of law 
enforcement to investigate a wide array of priority transnational 
threats and financial crimes, including terrorism, proliferation 
financing, sanctions evasion, money laundering, human trafficking, and 
child exploitation.
    FinCEN considered several alternatives to the proposed rule. First, 
FinCEN considered imposing a reporting requirement on all CVC/LTDA 
transactions. However, FinCEN determined that existing AML requirements 
typically were sufficient to mitigate enough of the risks of illicit 
finance involving transactions between hosted wallets at BSA-regulated 
institutions that it did not appear justified to impose an additional 
transaction reporting requirement that all banks and MSBs report all 
such transactions. If FinCEN reevaluates this conclusion in light of 
comments to the proposed rule, FinCEN would likely extend the 
discretionary reporting requirement exemptions similar to the rules 
that apply to banks under 31 CFR 1020.315 such that filers could submit 
a FinCEN Form 110 or similar form to exempt certain customers that 
engage in consistent patterns of legal transactions.
    Second, FinCEN considered only applying the exemption at 31 CFR 
1010.316(d) to counterparty hosted wallets at BSA-regulated financial 
institutions and not extending it to hosted wallets at foreign 
financial institutions in jurisdictions not on the Foreign 
Jurisdictions List. However, FinCEN determined that given the 
inherently international nature of CVC and LTDA transactions, and the 
fact that certain other jurisdictions apply an AML regime to financial 
institutions hosting CVC or LTDA wallets, it would be appropriate to 
initially not impose additional requirements with respect to wallets 
hosted by financial institutions in jurisdictions not on the Foreign 
Jurisdictions List. However, FinCEN will carefully analyze comments to 
determine whether additional jurisdictions should be added to the 
Foreign Jurisdictions List.
    Third, FinCEN considered applying a lower threshold for the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transactions than the $10,000 threshold. While 
imposing a lower threshold for CVC/LTDA transactions would enhance the 
ability of law enforcement and national security authorities to obtain 
attribution on a larger number of wallets, FinCEN determined that it 
would be beneficial for the reporting requirement included in the 
proposed rule to have a threshold consistent with the CTR reporting 
requirement for fiat transactions. FinCEN will carefully consider 
comments as to whether a lower or higher reporting threshold would be 
appropriate for the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirement.
    Fourth, FinCEN considered extending the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement to different types of financial 
institutions besides banks and MSBs. Based on the current market 
structure, FinCEN determined that it would be appropriate to limit the 
proposed rule's application to banks and MSBs. FinCEN will carefully 
evaluate comments as to whether the CVC/LTDA custody market in its 
current form, or as a result of how it is expected to develop in the 
future, justifies extending the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting 
requirement to other types of financial institutions such as those in 
the securities and commodities industries.

[[Page 83855]]

    Fifth, FinCEN considered imposing the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1010.316(b), as well as the proposed 
recordkeeping requirement at 31 CFR 1010.410(g), without associated 
verification requirements. However, FinCEN determined that it is 
reasonable to require verification at the time a hosted wallet customer 
engages in CVC/LTDA transactions that transfer significant value 
involving unhosted or otherwise covered wallets. The proposed 
verification requirement would enhance the ability of financial 
institutions to provide accurate information in their CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting, as well as to identify suspicious activity. 
FinCEN also considered proposing verification requirements that 
required gathering specific documentation consistent with the 
verification requirements applicable to CTR reporting, but determined 
that it would be more appropriate to allow banks and MSBs to rely on 
risk-based verification procedures.
    Executive Order 13771 requires an agency to identify at least two 
existing regulations to be repealed whenever it publicly proposes for 
notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation. The 
reporting, recordkeeping, and verification requirements proposed in 
this notice involve a national security function. Therefore, Executive 
Order 13771 does not apply.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
requires an agency either to provide an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis with a proposed rule or certify that the proposed rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. This proposed regulation applies to all banks and MSBs and 
likely would affect a substantial number of small entities. FinCEN has 
therefore prepared an initial regulatory flexibility analysis pursuant 
to the RFA. FinCEN welcomes comments on all aspects of the initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis. A final regulatory flexibility 
analysis will be conducted after consideration of comments received 
during the comment period.
1. Statement of the Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed 
Regulation
    This proposed rule would adopt recordkeeping, verification, and 
reporting requirements for certain deposits, withdrawals, exchanges, or 
other payments or transfers of CVC or LTDA by, through, or to a bank or 
MSB that involve an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet. FinCEN is 
proposing to define otherwise covered wallets as those wallets that are 
held at a financial institution that is not subject to the BSA and is 
located in a foreign jurisdiction identified by FinCEN on a Foreign 
Jurisdictions List.
    First, this proposed rule would require banks and MSBs to file a 
report with FinCEN containing certain information related to a 
customer's CVC or LTDA transaction and counterparty (including name and 
physical address), and to verify the identity of their customer, if a 
counterparty to the transaction is using an unhosted or otherwise 
covered wallet and the transaction is greater than $10,000 (or the 
transaction is one of multiple CVC transactions involving such 
counterparty wallets and the customer flowing through the bank or MSB 
within a 24-hour period that aggregate to value in or value out of 
greater than $10,000). Second, this proposed rule would require banks 
and MSBs to keep records of a customer's CVC or LTDA transaction and 
counterparty, including verifying the identity of their customer, if a 
counterparty is using an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet and the 
transaction is greater than $3,000.
    Although analytic techniques can be used to combat illicit finance 
through CVC or LTDA, they are not a panacea. Blockchain analysis can be 
rendered less effective by a number of factors, including the scale of 
a blockchain network, the extent of peer-to-peer activity (i.e., 
transactions between unhosted wallets), the use of anonymizing 
technologies to obscure transaction information, and a lack of 
information concerning the identity of transferors and recipients in 
particular transactions. Additionally, several types of AEC are 
increasing in popularity and employ various technologies that inhibit 
investigators' ability both to identify transaction activity using 
blockchain data and to attribute this activity to illicit activity 
conducted by natural persons.
    The requirements FinCEN is proposing would therefore provide 
greater insight into transacting parties with a nexus to one or more 
potentially illicit transactions in several respects. These include 
directly as a result of the information collected, maintained, and 
reported in relation to transactions above the recordkeeping or 
reporting thresholds and also through information identified in 
relation to structured transactions given the new structuring 
prohibition that would be imposed. This greater insight will contribute 
to the ability of law enforcement to investigate a wide array of 
priority transnational threats and financial crimes, including 
terrorism, proliferation financing, sanctions evasion, money 
laundering, human trafficking, and child exploitation. The proposed 
rule's reporting requirements are similar to the reporting requirements 
applicable to cash transactions imposed by the CTR reporting 
requirement. Furthermore the recordkeeping requirements resemble the 
recordkeeping requirements applicable to transmittals of funds between 
financial institutions.
2. Small Entities Affected by the Proposed Regulation
    This proposed regulation applies to all banks and MSBs and likely 
would affect a substantial number of small entities. As described in 
the PRA section that follows, based upon current data there are 5,306 
banks, 5,236 credit unions, and 365 MSBs that would be impacted by the 
proposed rule changes. Based upon current data, for the purposes of the 
RFA, there are at least 3,817 small Federally-regulated banks and 4,681 
small credit unions.\99\ FinCEN believes that most money transmitters 
are small entities.\100\ Because the proposed rule would apply to all 
of these small financial institutions, FinCEN concludes that this 
proposed rule would apply to a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ The Small Business Administration (``SBA'') defines a 
depository institution (including a credit union) as a small 
business if it has assets of $600 million or less. The information 
on small banks is published by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (``FDIC'') and was current as of March 31, 2020.
    \100\ The SBA defines an entity engaged in ``Financial 
Transactions Processing, Reserve, and Clearinghouse Activities'' to 
be small if it has assets of $41.5 million or less. FinCEN assesses 
that money transmitters most closely align with this SBA category of 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN anticipates that for most small banks and credit unions the 
impact of the proposed changes will be minor. While FinCEN is aware 
that such institutions, in light of developments such as the OCC 
Custody Guidance and the creation of the SPDI charter in Wyoming, are 
likely to engage in a growing amount of CVC transactions, that trend is 
still in the early stages. FinCEN anticipates the burden on banks will 
become more comparable to that on MSBs over time, as banks engage in 
more custody transactions involving CVC or LTDA. Likewise, FinCEN does 
not believe that any banks or MSBs currently facilitate a significant 
number of transactions involving sovereign digital currencies.
    Based on the conclusions just mentioned, the primary impact of the

[[Page 83856]]

proposed rules on small businesses will be on small businesses acting 
as money transmitters. FinCEN notes that although institutions that 
provide CVC or LTDA wallet hosting services are, ipso facto, likely to 
be capable of handling the implementation of the proposed reporting 
requirement, the initial costs of implementation may be non-trivial. 
For instance, institutions may incur costs in the initial stages if 
they set up a process for fitting existing data they maintain into XML 
format.
3. Compliance Requirements
    Compliance costs for entities that would be affected by these 
regulations are generally, reporting, recordkeeping, and information 
technology implementation and maintenance costs. Data are not readily 
available to determine the costs specific to small entities and FinCEN 
invites comments about compliance costs, especially those affecting 
small entities.
    This proposed rule would adopt recordkeeping, verification, and 
reporting requirements for certain deposits, withdrawals, exchanges, or 
other payments or transfers of CVC or LTDA by, through, or to a bank or 
MSB that involve an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet. First, this 
proposed rule would require banks and MSBs to file a report with FinCEN 
containing certain information related to a customer's CVC or LTDA 
transaction and counterparty (including name and physical address), and 
to verify the identity of their customer, if a counterparty to the 
transaction is using an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet and the 
transaction is greater than $10,000 (or the transaction is one of 
multiple CVC transactions involving such counterparty wallets and the 
customer flowing through the bank or MSB within a 24-hour period that 
aggregate to value in or value out of greater than $10,000). Second, 
this proposed rule would require banks and MSBs to keep records of a 
customer's CVC or LTDA transaction and counterparty, including 
verifying the identity of their customer, if a counterparty is using an 
unhosted or otherwise covered wallet and the transaction is greater 
than $3,000.
4. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
    FinCEN is unware of any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap with, 
or conflict with the changes to the BSA regulation proposed herein. 
These rules are meant to be analogues to the recordkeeping requirements 
applicable to transmittals of funds between financial institutions and 
the CTR reporting requirements applicable to transactions in currency.
5. Significant Alternatives to the Proposed Regulations
    FinCEN considered several alternatives to the proposed regulatory 
changes. First, FinCEN considered imposing a reporting requirement on 
all CVC/LTDA transactions. However, FinCEN determined that existing AML 
requirements typically were sufficient to mitigate enough of the risks 
of illicit finance involving transactions between hosted wallets at 
BSA-regulated institutions that it did not appear justified to impose 
an additional transaction reporting requirement that all banks and MSBs 
report all such transactions.
    Second, FinCEN considered only applying the exemption at 31 CFR 
1010.316(d) to counterparty hosted wallets at BSA-regulated financial 
institutions and not extending it to hosted wallets at foreign 
financial institutions in jurisdictions not on the Foreign 
Jurisdictions List. However, FinCEN determined that it would be 
appropriate to initially not impose additional requirements with 
respect to wallets hosted by financial institutions in jurisdictions 
not on the Foreign Jurisdictions List.
    Third, FinCEN considered applying a lower threshold for the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transactions than the $10,000 threshold. FinCEN 
determined that it would be beneficial for the reporting requirement 
included in the proposed rule to have a threshold consistent with the 
CTR reporting requirement for fiat transactions.
    Fourth, FinCEN considered extending the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement to different types of financial 
institutions besides banks and MSBs. Based on the current market 
structure, FinCEN determined that it would be appropriate to limit the 
proposed rule's application to banks and MSBs.
    Fifth, FinCEN considered imposing the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement at 31 CFR 1010.316(b), as well as the proposed 
recordkeeping requirement at 31 CFR 1010.410(g), without associated 
verification requirements. However, FinCEN determined that it is 
reasonable to require verification at the time a hosted wallet customer 
engages in CVC/LTDA transactions that transfer significant value 
involving unhosted or otherwise covered wallets. FinCEN also considered 
proposing verification requirements that required gathering specific 
documentation consistent with the verification requirements applicable 
to CTR reporting, but determined that it would be more appropriate to 
allow banks and MSBs to rely on risk-based verification procedures.
    FinCEN welcomes comment on the overall regulatory flexibility 
analysis, especially information about compliance costs and 
alternatives.

C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (``Unfunded 
Mandates Act''), Public Law 104-4 (March 22, 1995), requires that an 
agency prepare a budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule 
that may result in expenditure by the state, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year. If a budgetary impact statement is 
required, section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Act also requires an 
agency to identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory 
alternatives before promulgating a rule. See section VIII.A for a 
discussion of the economic impact of this proposed rule and regulatory 
alternatives.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The reporting and recordkeeping requirements contained in this 
proposed rule have been submitted by FinCEN to OMB for review in 
accordance with the PRA. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, an agency 
may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, 
a collection of information unless it displays a valid control number 
assigned by OMB. Written comments and recommendations for the 
information collection can be submitted by visiting www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. Find this particular notice by selecting ``Currently 
under Review--Open for Public Comments'' or by using the search 
function. Comments are welcome and must be received by January 7, 2021. 
In accordance with requirements of the PRA and its implementing 
regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, the following information concerning the 
collections of information are presented to assist those persons 
wishing to comment on the information collections.
1. Change in the Definition of ``Monetary Instruments''
    The change proposed in this notice to the definition of monetary 
instruments would impose no direct burden on the public.

[[Page 83857]]

2. Reporting Requirement Related to CVC and LTDA: [31 CFR 
1010.306(a)(1)-(3), (d)-(e), 1010.313, 1010.316, 1020.313, 1020.315, 
1020.316, 1022.313, 1022.316]
    The proposed rule would require banks and MSBs to report 
information related to CVC and LTDA transactions above $10,000 between 
their hosted wallet clients and unhosted or otherwise covered wallets. 
The proposed aggregation rules that would apply to CVC and LTDA 
transactions are broadly similar to those that apply to the CTR 
reporting requirement; aggregation is not required, however, between a 
person's CVC/LTDA and currency transactions. The mandatory exemptions 
of 31 U.S.C. 5313(d) apply to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement, as incorporated in 31 CFR 1020.315.
    Description of Recordkeepers: Banks and MSBs that conduct CVC or 
LTDA transactions on behalf of hosted wallet clients as senders or 
recipients in an amount above $10,000.
    Estimated Number of Recordkeepers: 10,907 financial institutions. 
FinCEN estimates that there are approximately 5,306 federally regulated 
banks and 5,236 federally regulated credit unions.\101\ FinCEN, for 
purposes of these estimates, will assume that all of these banks and 
credit unions engage nominally in transactions involving CVC. FinCEN 
estimates that, as of November 2020, 365 MSBs engage in CVC 
transactions.\102\ The FinCEN MSB registration form does not require 
that companies disclose whether they engage in CVC transactions. This 
estimate is therefore based on adding the number of MSBs that indicated 
they engage in CVC transactions in an optional field on the MSB 
registration form, and the number that did not so indicate but which, 
based on FinCEN's research, FinCEN believes engage in CVC transactions. 
(5,306 + 5,236 + 365 = 10,907).
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    \101\ According to the FDIC there were 5,103 FDIC-insured banks 
as of March 31, 2020. According to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, there were 203 other entities supervised by 
the Board or other Federal regulators, as of June 16, 2020, that 
fall within the definition of bank. (20 Edge Act institutions, 15 
agreement corporations, and 168 foreign banking organizations). 
According to the National Credit Union Administration, there were 
5,236 federally regulated credit unions as of December 31, 2019.
    \102\ In the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM, FinCEN estimated 
that there were 530 MSB filers. Certain of these, however, are 
filers that were previously registered with FinCEN and that 
subsequently allowed their expirations to lapse. As a result of 
their expirations lapsing, FinCEN has removed those filers from the 
burden calculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated Average Annual Burden Hours Per Recordkeeper: FinCEN 
notes that in the recent Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM, FinCEN 
estimated that the burden hours per bank was nominally one hour. FinCEN 
is retaining the same estimate for this rule. While FinCEN is aware 
that banks, in light of developments such as the OCC Custody Guidance 
and the creation of the SPDI charter in Wyoming, are likely to engage 
in a growing amount of CVC transactions, that trend is still in the 
early stages. FinCEN anticipates the burden on banks will become more 
comparable to that on MSBs over time, as banks engage in more custody 
transactions involving CVC or LTDA.
    In the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM PRA analysis, FinCEN 
estimated that the burden per MSB to comply with the collection and 
recordkeeping requirement at the transactional threshold of $3,000 was 
240 hours per institution, and that the burden per MSB to comply with 
the transmission requirement at the transactional threshold of $3,000 
was 180 hours per institution. The burden analysis below assumes that 
the transmittal requirement burden in the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule 
NPRM context is analogous to the reporting requirement burden under the 
proposed CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement.\103\ However, the 
burden must be adjusted for four factors: (i) The fact that the $10,000 
threshold under the CVC/LTDA transaction reporting requirement is 
greater than the $3,000 threshold in the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule 
NPRM; (ii) the fact that the burden analyzed in the Funds Transfer/
Travel Rule NPRM relates to transactions between hosted wallets and not 
transactions from hosted to unhosted wallets, and there may be more or 
fewer hosted-to-unhosted transactions at any level; (iii) the fact that 
some transactions below the transaction reporting threshold may be 
subject to reporting due to aggregation requirements; and (iv) the fact 
that the reporting burden under the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement may be more complex than the transmission 
requirement under the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ As discussed in the next section, FinCEN assumes that the 
recordkeeping requirement burden in the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule 
NPRM context is analogous to the recordkeeping/verification burden 
related to CVC/LTDA transaction reporting.
    \104\ FinCEN anticipates that the number of transactions subject 
to reporting and recordkeeping related to otherwise covered wallets 
hosted by foreign financial institutions located in jurisdictions on 
the Foreign Jurisdictions List will be modest and does not calculate 
additional burden in relation to this aspect of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As FinCEN noted in the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM PRA 
analysis, the estimated average burden hours would vary depending on 
the number of transactions conducted by a financial institution's 
customers with unhosted or otherwise covered wallets. In a recent 
publication commenting on the recent Funds Transfer/Funds Travel NPRM, 
the blockchain analytics firm CipherTrace estimated that the proposed 
decrease in the applicable threshold for international transactions 
from $3,000 to $250 would increase the number of reportable 
transactions per month from approximately 27,300 to approximately 
79,000.\105\ Applying a constant elasticity model,\106\ FinCEN 
estimates that approximately 60% as many transactions would occur above 
the $10,000 threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ CipherTrace, ``FinCEN's Proposed Rule Change for Travel 
Rule Threshold Would More Than Double Compliance Events at US 
VASPs'' (Nov. 13, 2020), https://ciphertrace.com/fincens-proposed-rule-change-for-travel-rule-would-trigger-more-than-double-the-compliance-events-at-us-vasps/ (accessed Dec. 1, 2020).
    \106\ Specifically, FinCEN fit an equation of the model Y = 
CX[alpha] to the data from CipherTrace, where Y equals the number of 
transactions above a given threshold, X equals the threshold, C is a 
constant, and [alpha] is the percent change in Y per one-percent 
change in X. FinCEN used the calibrated values of C and [alpha] to 
extrapolate to the number of transactions above the $10,000 
threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to estimate the ratio of unhosted-to-hosted transactions 
to hosted-to-hosted transactions, FinCEN analyzed blockchain data 
related to all identifiable transactions by each of two major exchanges 
in September 2020 using blockchain analytic tools. FinCEN found that 
the ratio of unhosted-to-hosted to hosted-to-hosted transactions were 
approximately 1.52 and 2.39 in the $3,000 to $10,000 transaction range 
for the two exchanges, respectively. In the greater than $10,000 range 
the ratios were 1.40 and 1.64, respectively. In the analysis below, 
FinCEN uses the larger ratios, 2.39 and 1.64. Thus FinCEN will assume 
that 164% as many transactions would be covered by the reporting 
requirements at the $10,000 threshold under the proposed rule than the 
transmission requirements at the same threshold in the Funds Transfer/
Travel Rule NPRM. Similarly, in the $3,000 to $10,000 range, FinCEN 
will assume 239% as many transactions would be covered by the proposed 
rule's recordkeeping and verification requirements described in the 
next section in comparison to the recordkeeping requirements in the 
Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM.
    Thus, at the $10,000 threshold, we assume that only 60% as many 
transactions are occurring as at the $3,000 level, but that the number 
of such transactions which are unhosted-to-hosted are 164% of the 
amount of such transactions that are hosted-to-

[[Page 83858]]

hosted, for a combined total scaling factor of 98.4%. To account for 
the fact that some transactions less than $10,000 will need to be 
aggregated due to aggregation requirements, we will assume that the 
total scaling factor is 148% (98.4% * 1.5).
    In contrast to the PRA analysis used for the Funds Transfer/Travel 
Rule NPRM, the reporting burden will possibly be more complicated than 
the requirement to transmit information in the Funds Transfer/Travel 
Rule NPRM given the variety of information required by the reporting 
form. For purposes of calculations, FinCEN assumes that the reporting 
burden will be twice as complex.\107\ Therefore the total scaling 
factor applied to the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM PRA burden 
estimate for transmission burden is 2.96 (2.96 = 2 x 1.48). As a 
result, the estimated burden per MSB is 533 hours (180 hours (from 
Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM PRA analysis) x 2.94).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ The burden of collecting counterparty information that 
must be reported on the reporting form is considered in the next 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated Total Additional Annual Burden Hours: 10,542 hours 
(10,542 banks x 1 hour/bank) + 194,545 hours (365 MSBs x 533 hours/MSB) 
= 205,087 hours.
3. Recordkeeping and Verification Requirements Related to CVC and LTDA: 
[31 CFR 1010.312, 1010.410(g), 1022.312, 1022.312]
    The proposed rule would require banks and MSBs to keep records of, 
and verify the identity of their hosted wallet customers who 
participate in, transactions subject to the CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirements, i.e. CVC/LTDA transactions involving hosted 
wallet customers and unhosted or otherwise covered wallets related with 
a value aggregating to $10,000 or more. The proposed recordkeeping 
requirement at 31 CFR 1010.410(g) likewise would require banks and MSBs 
to keep records of, and verify the identity of their hosted wallet 
customers who engage in, transactions with a value of more than $3,000. 
Furthermore, under the proposed rule, for transactions that are greater 
than $3,000, or that aggregate to more than $10,000, the name and 
physical address of each counterparty must be collected and, in the 
case of reportable transactions, reported.
    Description of Recordkeepers: Banks and MSBs that conduct CVC or 
LTDA transactions on behalf of hosted wallet clients as senders or 
recipients in an amount above $3,000, or that aggregate to an amount 
above $10,000.
    Estimated Number of Recordkeepers: 10,907 financial institutions. 
FinCEN estimates that there are approximately 5,306 federally regulated 
banks and 5,236 federally regulated credit unions. FinCEN assesses that 
all of these banks and credit unions nominally engage in transactions 
involving CVC. FinCEN estimates that there are 365 MSBs that engage in 
CVC transactions.
    Estimated Average Annual Burden Hours per Recordkeeper: As noted in 
the previous section, FinCEN believes that the burden estimate for 
recordkeeping in the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM (240 hours per 
MSB) is analogous to the burden estimate for recordkeeping and 
verification requirements pursuant to the proposed CVC/LTDA transaction 
reporting requirement.
    All transactions subject to reporting would also subject to 
recordkeeping and verification requirements. Therefore, the estimate 
that 148% as many transactions will be subject to the proposed 
reporting requirement as compared to the transactions subject to 
transmission requirements proposed by the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule 
NPRM, also applies to the recordkeeping and verification requirements 
of the proposed rule. However, this increase needs to be supplemented 
with the increase in transactions that would be subject to 
recordkeeping and verification under 31 CFR 1010.410(g), as proposed, 
which are between $3,000 and $10,000. Using the constant elasticity 
model described in the previous section, the number of hosted-to-hosted 
transactions between $3,000 and $10,000 is approximately 40% of the 
estimated number of transactions about $10,000. Applying the 239% scale 
factor used in the previous section to calculate the proportionate 
number of hosted-to-unhosted transactions, and making no adjustment for 
the fact that some transactions in this $3,000 to $10,000 range would 
contribute to aggregation for the purposes of the proposed CVC/LTDA 
transaction reporting requirement and already be subject to 
verification, the total number of transactions subject to verification 
and recordkeeping due to 31 CFR 1010.410(g) would increase by an 
additional 96% (0.4 * 2.39 = 0.956), for a total scaling factor of 244% 
(2.44 = 1.48 + 0.96).
    However, FinCEN notes that the recordkeeping and verification 
requirement in the proposed rule is likely to be more burdensome than 
the collection and recordkeeping requirements of the Funds Transfer/
Travel Rule NPRM. In particular, the requirements dealt with in the 
Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM do not require verification in most 
cases. In contrast, this proposed rule would require verifying the 
hosted wallet customer in each transaction subject to the reporting or 
recordkeeping requirements, as well as collecting each counterparty's 
name and physical address. As a result of this greater burden, FinCEN 
assumes, for the purpose of this burden estimate, that the 
recordkeeping and verification burden is five times greater per 
transaction, under the proposed rule, than the burden imposed under the 
recordkeeping requirements of the Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM. 
Therefore the total scaling factor applied to the Funds Transfer/Travel 
Rule NPRM PRA burden estimate for transmission burden is 12.2 (12.2 = 5 
x 2.44). As a result, the estimated burden per MSB is 2,928 hours (240 
hours (from Funds Transfer/Travel Rule NPRM PRA analysis) x 12.2).
    Estimated Total Additional Annual Burden Hours: 10,542 hours 
(10,542 banks x 1 hour/bank) + 1,068,720 hours (365 MSBs x 2,928 hours/
MSB) = 1,079,262 hours.
4. Total Annual Burden Hours Estimate Under the Proposed Rule
    205,087 (reporting requirements) + 1,079,262 hours (recordkeeping 
and verification requirements) = 1,284,349 hours.
5. Questions for Comment
    In addition to the questions listed above, FinCEN specifically 
invites comment on: (a) The accuracy of the estimated burden associated 
with the collection of information; (b) how the quality, utility, and 
clarity of the information to be collected may be enhanced; and (c) how 
the burden of complying with the collection of information may be 
minimized, including through the application of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology.

List of Subjects in 31 CFR Parts 1010, 1020, and 1022

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Currency, 
Foreign banking, Foreign currencies, Investigations, Penalties, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Terrorism.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, Parts 1010, 1020, and 
1022 of chapter X of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations are 
proposed to be amended as follows:

[[Page 83859]]

PART 1010--GENERAL PROVISIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 1010 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314 
and 5316-5332; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307; 
sec. 701, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 599.

0
2. Amend Sec.  1010.100 by revising paragraph (xx) to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.100  General definitions.

* * * * *
    (xx) Structure (structuring). For purposes of Sec.  1010.314, a 
person structures a transaction if that person, acting alone, or in 
conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, conducts or attempts 
to conduct one or more transactions in currency, or, as defined in 
Sec.  1010.316(c), convertible virtual currency, and digital assets 
with legal tender status, in any amount, at one or more financial 
institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for the purpose of 
evading the reporting requirements under Sec. Sec.  1010.311, 1010.313, 
1020.315, 1010.316, 1021.311 and 1021.313 of this chapter. ``In any 
manner'' includes, but is not limited to, the breaking down of a single 
sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at 
or below $10,000, or the conduct of a transaction, or series of 
currency transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction or 
transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting threshold at any 
single financial institution on any single day in order to constitute 
structuring within the meaning of this definition.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec.  1010.306, by revising the text of paragraphs (a), (d), 
and (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.306  Filing of reports.

    (a)(1) A report required by Sec.  1010.311, Sec.  1010.316, or 
Sec.  1021.311 of this chapter, shall be filed by the financial 
institution within 15 days following the day on which the reportable 
transaction occurred.
    (2) A copy of each report filed pursuant to Sec. Sec.  1010.311, 
1010.313, 1010.316, 1020.315, 1021.311 and 1021.313 of this chapter, 
shall be retained by the financial institution for a period of five 
years from the date of the report.
    (3) All reports required to be filed by Sec. Sec.  1010.311, 
1010.313, 1010.316, 1020.315, 1021.311 and 1021.313 of this chapter, 
shall be filed with FinCEN, unless otherwise specified.
* * * * *
    (d) Reports required by Sec.  1010.311, 1010.313, 1010.316, 
1010.340, Sec.  1010.350, 1020.315, 1021.311 or 1021.313 of this 
chapter shall be filed on forms prescribed by the Secretary. All 
information called for in such forms shall be furnished.
    (e) Forms to be used in making the reports required by Sec.  
1010.311, 1010.313, 1010.316, 1010.350, 1020.315, 1021.311 or 1021.313 
of this chapter may be obtained from BSA E-Filing System. Forms to be 
used in making the reports required by Sec.  1010.340 may be obtained 
from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection or FinCEN.
0
4. Revise Sec.  1010.310 to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.310  Reports of transactions in currency.

    Sections 1010.310 through 1010.314 and 1010.316 set forth the rules 
for the reporting by financial institutions of transactions in 
currency, convertible virtual currency, and digital assets with legal 
tender status. Unless otherwise indicated, the transactions in currency 
reporting requirements in Sec. Sec.  1010.310 through 1010.314 apply to 
all financial institutions. The transactions in convertible virtual 
currency and digital assets with legal tender status requirements apply 
to banks and money services businesses. Each financial institution 
should refer to subpart C of its chapter X part for any additional 
transactions in currency reporting requirements.
0
5. Revise Sec.  1010.312 to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.312  Identification required.

    (a) Transactions in Currency: Before concluding any transaction 
with respect to which a report is required under Sec.  1010.311, 
1010.313(b), 1020.315, 1021.311, or 1021.313 of this chapter, a 
financial institution shall verify and record the name and address of 
the individual presenting a transaction, as well as record the 
identity, account number, and the social security or taxpayer 
identification number, if any, of any person or entity on whose behalf 
such transaction is to be effected. Verification of the identity of an 
individual who indicates that he or she is an alien or is not a 
resident of the United States must be made by passport, alien 
identification card, or other official document evidencing nationality 
or residence (e.g., a Provincial driver's license with indication of 
home address). Verification of identity in any other case shall be made 
by examination of a document, other than a bank signature card, that is 
normally acceptable within the banking community as a means of 
identification when cashing checks for nondepositors (e.g., a driver's 
license or credit card). A bank signature card may be relied upon only 
if it was issued after documents establishing the identity of the 
individual were examined and notation of the specific information was 
made on the signature card. In each instance, the specific identifying 
information (i.e., the account number of the credit card, the driver's 
license number, etc.) used in verifying the identity of the customer 
shall be recorded on the report, and the mere notation of ``known 
customer'' or ``bank signature card on file'' on the report is 
prohibited.
    (b) Transactions in Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets 
with Legal Tender Status: Before concluding any transaction with 
respect to which a report is required under Sec.  1010.313(c) or Sec.  
1010.316 of this chapter, a bank or money services business shall 
verify and record the identity of its customer engaging in the 
transaction. Consistent with the bank's or money service business's 
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism 
program, the bank or money services business should establish risk-
based procedures for verifying the identity of its customer. The 
procedures must enable the bank or money services business to form a 
reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of its customer 
engaging in a transaction. These procedures must be based on the bank 
or money services business's assessment of the relevant risks, 
including those presented by the nature of their relationship with its 
customer, the transaction activity, and other activity associated with 
the convertible virtual currency or digital assets with legal tender 
status involved in the transaction.
    Note to paragraph (b): If a bank or money services business has 
knowledge that a person has accessed the bank's or money services 
business's customer's wallet to conduct a reportable transaction who is 
not the bank's or money services business's customer, the bank or money 
services business should treat that person as a customer for the 
purposes of this paragraph, and verify both the person who accessed the 
account and the customer.
0
6. Revise Sec.  1010.313 to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.313  Aggregation.

    (a) Multiple branches. A financial institution includes all of its 
domestic branch offices, and any recordkeeping facility, wherever 
located, that contains records relating to the transactions of the 
institution's domestic offices, for

[[Page 83860]]

purposes of the transactions in currency reporting requirements in this 
chapter.
    (b) Multiple transactions in currency. In the case of financial 
institutions other than casinos, for purposes of the transactions in 
currency reporting requirements in this chapter, multiple currency 
transactions shall be treated as a single transaction if the financial 
institution has knowledge that they are by or on behalf of any person 
and result in either cash in or cash out totaling more than $10,000 
during any one business day (or in the case of the U.S. Postal Service, 
any one day). Deposits made at night or over a weekend or holiday shall 
be treated as if received on the next business day following the 
deposit.
    (c) Multiple transactions in convertible virtual currency or 
digital assets with legal tender status. In the case of banks and money 
services businesses, for purposes of the transactions in convertible 
virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender status reporting 
requirements in this chapter, multiple convertible virtual currency and 
digital assets with legal tender status transactions shall be treated 
as a single transaction if the bank or money services business has 
knowledge that they are by or on behalf of any person and result in 
value in or value out of convertible virtual currency or digital assets 
with legal tender status with a value of more than $10,000 during a 24-
hour period. A bank or money services business includes all of its 
offices and records, wherever they may be located, for purposes of 
reporting requirements in this chapter for their transactions in 
convertible virtual currency or digital assets with legal tender 
status.
0
7. Amend Sec.  1010.314 by revising the introductory text and 
paragraphs (a) and (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.314  Structured transactions.

    No person shall for the purpose of evading the transactions in 
currency or transactions in convertible virtual currency or digital 
assets with legal tender status reporting requirements of this chapter 
with respect to such transaction:
    (a) Cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to 
fail to file a report required under the transactions in currency or 
transactions in convertible virtual currency or digital assets with 
legal tender status reporting requirements of this chapter;
    (b) Cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to 
file a report required under the transactions in currency or 
transactions in convertible virtual currency or digital assets with 
legal tender status reporting requirements of this chapter that 
contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or
* * * * *
0
8. Add Sec.  1010.316 to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.316  Filing obligations for reports of transactions in 
convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status.

    (a) For purposes of this section only, FinCEN has determined that 
``monetary instruments'' as defined by 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3) includes 
convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status.
    Note to paragraph (a): The determination in paragraph (a) 
authorizes the promulgation of reporting requirements for transactions 
in convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5313(a). However, the determination in 
paragraph (a) is intended to have no impact on the definition of the 
term ``monetary instruments'' at Sec.  1010.100(dd) or as used 
elsewhere in this chapter, including in relation to the currency 
transaction reporting requirement at Sec.  1010.311 and the 
transportation of currency or monetary instruments reporting 
requirement at Sec.  1010.340. Therefore, other requirements in this 
chapter that depend on the definition of ``monetary instruments'' are 
not affected by the determination in paragraph (a).
    (b) Except as exempted by paragraph (d) or otherwise exempted by 
regulation, each bank or money services business, as defined in Sec.  
1010.100, shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange, or 
other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial 
institution which involves a transaction in convertible virtual 
currency or a digital asset with legal tender status with a value of 
more than $10,000. Such report shall include, in a form prescribed by 
the Secretary, the name and address of each counterparty, and such 
other information as the Secretary may require.
    (c) For purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b):
    (1) Convertible virtual currency means a medium of exchange (such 
as cryptocurrency) that either has an equivalent value as currency, or 
acts as a substitute for currency, but lacks legal tender status.
    (2) Digital assets with legal tender status means any type of 
digital asset issued by the United States or any other country that is 
designated as legal tender by the issuing country and accepted as a 
medium of exchange in the country of issuance.
    (d) Banks and money services businesses are not required to file a 
report under paragraph (b) in relation to a transaction in convertible 
virtual currency or a digital asset with legal tender status that is 
between the financial institution's customer and a counterparty whose 
account is held at a financial institution regulated under the BSA, or 
at a foreign financial institution, except for a foreign financial 
institution in a jurisdiction listed on the List of Foreign 
Jurisdictions Subject to this section and Sec.  1010.410(g) 
Recordkeeping, which is maintained on FinCEN's website on the Resources 
page. If a single transaction involves multiple counterparties, the 
transaction is only subject to this exemption if the account of each 
counterparty to the transaction is held at a financial institution 
regulated under the BSA, or at a foreign financial institution, except 
for a foreign financial institution in a jurisdiction listed on the 
List of Foreign Jurisdictions Subject to this section and Sec.  
1010.410(g) Recordkeeping.
0
9. Amend Sec.  1010.410 by adding paragraph (g) to read as follows:


Sec.  1010.410  Records to be made and retained by financial 
institutions.

* * * * *
    (g) Each bank or money services business, as defined by 31 CFR 
1010.100, is subject to the requirements of this paragraph (g) with 
respect to a withdrawal, exchange or other payment or transfer, by, 
through, or to such financial institution which involves a transaction 
in convertible virtual currency or a digital asset with legal tender 
status, as those terms are defined in Sec.  1010.316(c), with a value 
of more than $3,000.
    (1) Recordkeeping Requirements: For each withdrawal, exchange, or 
other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial 
institution which involves a transaction in convertible virtual 
currency or a digital asset with legal tender status, as those terms 
are defined in Sec.  1010.316(c), a bank or money services business 
shall obtain and retain an electronic record of the following 
information:
    (i) The name and address of the financial institution's customer;
    (ii) The type of convertible virtual currency or legal tender 
digital assets used in the transaction;
    (iii) The amount of convertible virtual currency or legal tender 
digital assets in the transaction;
    (iv) The time of the transaction;
    (v) The assessed value of the transaction, in dollars, based on the 
prevailing exchange rate at the time of the transaction;

[[Page 83861]]

    (vi) Any payment instructions received from the financial 
institution's customer;
    (vii) The name and physical address of each counterparty to the 
transaction of the financial institution's customer, as well as other 
counterparty information the Secretary may prescribe as mandatory on 
the reporting form for transactions subject to reporting pursuant to 
Sec.  1010.316(b);
    (viii) Any other information that uniquely identifies the 
transaction, the accounts, and, to the extent reasonably available, the 
parties involved; and,
    (ix) Any form relating to the transaction that is completed or 
signed by the financial institution's customer.
    (2) Verification: In addition to obtaining and retaining the 
information required in paragraph (g)(1) of this section, before 
concluding any transaction in relation to which records must be 
retained under this paragraph, a financial institution shall verify the 
identity of its customer engaging in the transaction. Consistent with 
the financial institution's anti-money laundering and countering the 
financing of terrorism program, the financial institution should 
establish risk-based procedures for verifying the identity of its 
customer. The procedures must enable the financial institution to form 
a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of its customer 
engaging in a transaction. These procedures must be based on the 
financial institution's assessment of the relevant risks, including 
those presented by the nature of its relationship with its customer, 
the transaction activity, and other activity associated with the 
convertible virtual currency or digital assets with legal tender status 
involved in the transaction.
    Note to paragraph (g)(2): If a bank or money services business has 
knowledge that a person has accessed the bank's or money services 
business's customer's wallet to conduct a transaction for which records 
must be maintained who is not the bank's or money services business's 
customer, the bank or money services business should treat that person 
as a customer for the purposes of this paragraph, and verify both the 
person accessing the account and the customer.
    (3) Retrievability. The information that a financial institution 
must retain under paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this section shall be 
retrievable by the financial institution by reference to the name or 
account number of the financial institution's customer, or the name of 
a counterparty to the financial institution's customer's transaction. 
This information need not be retained in any particular manner, so long 
as the financial institution is able to retrieve the information 
required by this paragraph, either by accessing records directly or 
through reference to some other record maintained by the financial 
institution.
    (4) Exceptions. Banks and money services businesses are not 
required to retain records under this subsection in relation to a 
transaction in convertible virtual currency or a digital asset with 
legal tender status that is between the financial institution's 
customer and a counterparty whose account is held at a financial 
institution regulated under the BSA, or at a foreign financial 
institution, except for a foreign financial institution in a 
jurisdiction listed on the List of Foreign Jurisdictions Subject to 31 
CFR 1010.316 Reporting and Sec.  1010.410(g) Recordkeeping, which is 
maintained on FinCEN's website on the Resources page.

PART 1020--RULES FOR BANKS

0
10. The authority citation for part 1020 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314 
and 5316-5332; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307; 
sec. 701, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 599.

0
11. Revise Sec.  1020.310 to read as follows:


Sec.  1020.310  Reports of transactions in currency, convertible 
virtual currency, and digital assets with legal tender status.

    The reports of transactions in currency and transactions in 
convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status requirements for banks are located in subpart C of part 1010 of 
this chapter and this subpart.
0
12. Revise Sec.  1020.312 to read as follows:


Sec.  1020.312  Identification required.

    Refer to Sec.  1010.312 of this chapter for identification 
requirements for reports of transactions in currency and transactions 
in convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status filed by banks.
0
13. Revise Sec.  1020.313 to read as follows:


Sec.  1020.313  Aggregation.

    Refer to Sec.  1010.313 of this chapter for reports of transactions 
in currency and transactions in convertible virtual currency and 
digital assets with legal tender status aggregation requirements for 
banks.
0
14. Amend Sec.  1020.315 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a), (b)(4) and (5), (b)(6) introductory text 
and (b)(7) introductory text;
0
b. Adding paragraph (c)(2)(iii); and
0
c. Revising (g)(1) and (3), and (h).
    The addition and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  1020.315  Transactions of exempt persons.

    (a) General. (1) No bank is required to file a report otherwise 
required by Sec.  1010.311 with respect to any transaction in currency 
between an exempt person and such bank, or, to the extent provided in 
paragraph (e)(6) of this section, between such exempt person and other 
banks affiliated with such bank. (A limitation on the exemption 
described in this paragraph (a) is set forth in paragraph (f) of this 
section.)
    (2) No bank is required to file a report otherwise required by 
Sec.  1010.316 with respect to any transaction in convertible virtual 
currency or digital assets with legal tender status between an exempt 
person defined in paragraphs (b)(1) to (3) of this section and such 
bank, or, to the extent provided in paragraph (e)(6) of this section, 
between such exempt person and other banks affiliated with such bank. 
(A limitation on the exemption described in this paragraph (a) is set 
forth in paragraph (f) of this section.)
    (b) * * *
    (4) Solely for purposes of the exemption applicable to any 
transaction in currency in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, any 
entity, other than a bank, whose common stock or analogous equity 
interests are listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American 
Stock Exchange or whose common stock or analogous equity interests have 
been designated as a NASDAQ National Market Security listed on the 
NASDAQ Stock Market (except stock or interests listed under the 
separate ``NASDAQ Capital Markets Companies'' heading), provided that, 
for purposes of this paragraph (b)(4), a person that is a financial 
institution, other than a bank, is an exempt person only to the extent 
of its domestic operations;
    (5) Solely for purposes of the exemption applicable to any 
transaction in currency in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, any 
subsidiary, other than a bank, of any entity described in paragraph 
(b)(4) of this section (a ``listed entity'') that is organized under 
the laws of the United States or of any State and at least 51 percent 
of whose common stock or analogous equity interest is owned by the 
listed entity, provided that, for purposes of this paragraph (b)(5), a 
person that is a financial institution, other than a bank, is an exempt 
person only to the extent of its domestic operations;

[[Page 83862]]

    (6) Solely for purposes of the exemption applicable to any 
transaction in currency in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, to the 
extent of its domestic operations and only with respect to transactions 
conducted through its exemptible accounts, any other commercial 
enterprise (for purposes of this section, a ``non-listed business''), 
other than an enterprise specified in paragraph (e)(8) of this section, 
that:
* * * * *
    (7) Solely for purposes of the exemption applicable to any 
transaction in currency in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, with 
respect solely to withdrawals for payroll purposes from existing 
exemptible accounts, any other person (for purposes of this section, a 
``payroll customer'') that:
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (iii) A bank is not required to file a FinCEN Form 110 with respect 
to the transfer of convertible virtual currency or digital assets with 
legal tender status to or from any exempt person as described in 
paragraphs (b)(1) to (3) of this section.
* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (1) No bank shall be subject to penalty under this chapter for 
failure to file a report required by Sec.  1010.311 or Sec.  1010.316 
of this chapter with respect to a transaction in currency, convertible 
virtual currency, or digital assets with legal tender status by an 
exempt person with respect to which the requirements of this section 
have been satisfied, unless the bank:
* * * * *
    (3) A bank that files a report with respect to a currency, 
convertible virtual currency, or digital asset with legal tender status 
transaction by an exempt person rather than treating such person as 
exempt shall remain subject, with respect to each such report, to the 
rules for filing reports, and the penalties for filing false or 
incomplete reports that are applicable to reporting of transactions in 
currency, convertible virtual currency, or digital assets with legal 
tender status by persons other than exempt persons.
    (h) Obligations to file suspicious activity reports and maintain 
system for monitoring transactions in currency, convertible virtual 
currency, or digital assets with legal tender status.
    (1) Nothing in this section relieves a bank of the obligation, or 
reduces in any way such bank's obligation, to file a report required by 
Sec.  1020.320 with respect to any transaction, including any 
transaction in currency, convertible virtual currency, or digital 
assets with legal tender status, that a bank knows, suspects, or has 
reason to suspect is a transaction or attempted transaction that is 
described in Sec.  1020.320(a)(2)(i), (ii), or (iii), or relieves a 
bank of any reporting or recordkeeping obligation imposed by this 
chapter (except the obligation to report transactions in currency, 
convertible virtual currency, or digital assets with legal tender 
status, pursuant to this chapter to the extent provided in this 
section). Thus, for example, a sharp increase from one year to the next 
in the gross total of currency transactions made by an exempt customer, 
or similarly anomalous transactions trends or patterns, may trigger the 
obligation of a bank under Sec.  1020.320.
0
15. Add Sec.  1020.316 to read as follows:


Sec.  1020.316  Convertible virtual currency and digital assets with 
legal tender status filing obligations.

    Refer to Sec.  1010.316 of this chapter for reports of transactions 
in convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status filing obligations for banks.

PART 1022--RULES FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES

0
16. The authority citation for part 1022 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314 
and 5316-5332; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307; 
sec. 701, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 599.

0
17. Revise Sec.  1022.310 to read as follows:


Sec.  1022.310  Reports of transactions in currency, convertible 
virtual currency, and digital assets with legal tender status.

    The reports of transactions in currency and transactions in 
convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status requirements for money services businesses are located in 
subpart C of part 1010 of this chapter and this subpart.
0
18. Revise Sec.  1022.312 to read as follows:


Sec.  1022.312  Identification required.

    Refer to Sec.  1010.312 of this chapter for identification 
requirements for reports of transactions in currency and transactions 
in convertible virtual currency and digital assets with legal tender 
status filed by money services businesses.
0
19. Revise Sec.  1022.313 to read as follows:


Sec.  1022.313  Aggregation.

    Refer to Sec.  1010.313 of this chapter for reports of transactions 
in currency and transactions in convertible virtual currency and 
digital assets with legal tender status aggregation requirements for 
money services businesses.
0
20. Add Sec.  1022.316 to read as follows:


Sec.  1022.316  Convertible virtual currency and digital assets with 
legal tender status filing obligations.

    Refer to Sec.  1010.316 of this chapter for reports of transactions 
in convertible virtual currency filing obligations for money services 
businesses.

    By the Department of the Treasury.
Kenneth A. Blanco,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2020-28437 Filed 12-18-20; 4:20 pm]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P