[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 247 (Wednesday, December 23, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 83957-83961]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28407]



[[Page 83957]]

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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 192 3126]


Ascension Data & Analytics, LLC; Analysis To Aid Public Comment

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Proposed consent agreement; request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged 
violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices. The attached Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes both 
the allegations in the complaint and the terms of the consent order--
embodied in the consent agreement--that would settle these allegations.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before January 22, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file comments online or on paper by 
following the instructions in the Request for Comment part of the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. Please write ``Ascension Data 
& Analytics, LLC; File No. 192 3126'' on your comment, and file your 
comment online at https://www.regulations.gov by following the 
instructions on the web-based form. If you prefer to file your comment 
on paper, mail your comment to the following address: Federal Trade 
Commission, Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 
CC-5610 (Annex D), Washington, DC 20580, or deliver your comment to the 
following address: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary, 
Constitution Center, 400 7th Street SW, 5th Floor, Suite 5610 (Annex 
D), Washington, DC 20024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jarad Brown (202-326-2927), Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue 
NW, Washington, DC 20580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to Section 6(f) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 2.34, 16 CFR 2.34, 
notice is hereby given that the above-captioned consent agreement 
containing a consent order to cease and desist, having been filed with 
and accepted, subject to final approval, by the Commission, has been 
placed on the public record for a period of thirty (30) days. The 
following Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes the terms of the 
consent agreement and the allegations in the complaint. An electronic 
copy of the full text of the consent agreement package can be obtained 
from the FTC website at this web address: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/commission-actions.
    You can file a comment online or on paper. For the Commission to 
consider your comment, we must receive it on or before January 22, 
2021. Write ``Ascension Data & Analytics, LLC; File No. 192 3126'' on 
your comment. Your comment--including your name and your state--will be 
placed on the public record of this proceeding, including, to the 
extent practicable, on the https://www.regulations.gov website.
    Because of the public health emergency in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic and the agency's heightened security screening, postal mail 
addressed to the Commission will be subject to delay. We strongly 
encourage you to submit your comments online through the https://www.regulations.gov website.
    If you prefer to file your comment on paper, write ``Ascension Data 
& Analytics, LLC; File No. 192 3126'' on your comment and on the 
envelope, and mail your comment to the following address: Federal Trade 
Commission, Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 
CC-5610 (Annex D), Washington, DC 20580; or deliver your comment to the 
following address: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary, 
Constitution Center, 400 7th Street SW, 5th Floor, Suite 5610 (Annex 
D), Washington, DC 20024. If possible, submit your paper comment to the 
Commission by courier or overnight service.
    Because your comment will be placed on the publicly accessible 
website at https://www.regulations.gov, you are solely responsible for 
making sure your comment does not include any sensitive or confidential 
information. In particular, your comment should not include sensitive 
personal information, such as your or anyone else's Social Security 
number; date of birth; driver's license number or other state 
identification number, or foreign country equivalent; passport number; 
financial account number; or credit or debit card number. You are also 
solely responsible for making sure your comment does not include 
sensitive health information, such as medical records or other 
individually identifiable health information. In addition, your comment 
should not include any ``trade secret or any commercial or financial 
information which . . . is privileged or confidential''--as provided by 
Section 6(f) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 4.10(a)(2), 
16 CFR 4.10(a)(2)--including in particular competitively sensitive 
information such as costs, sales statistics, inventories, formulas, 
patterns, devices, manufacturing processes, or customer names.
    Comments containing material for which confidential treatment is 
requested must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled 
``Confidential,'' and must comply with FTC Rule 4.9(c). In particular, 
the written request for confidential treatment that accompanies the 
comment must include the factual and legal basis for the request, and 
must identify the specific portions of the comment to be withheld from 
the public record. See FTC Rule 4.9(c). Your comment will be kept 
confidential only if the General Counsel grants your request in 
accordance with the law and the public interest. Once your comment has 
been posted on the https://www.regulations.gov website--as legally 
required by FTC Rule 4.9(b)--we cannot redact or remove your comment 
from that website, unless you submit a confidentiality request that 
meets the requirements for such treatment under FTC Rule 4.9(c), and 
the General Counsel grants that request.
    Visit the FTC website at http://www.ftc.gov to read this Notice and 
the news release describing the proposed settlement. The FTC Act and 
other laws that the Commission administers permit the collection of 
public comments to consider and use in this proceeding, as appropriate. 
The Commission will consider all timely and responsive public comments 
that it receives on or before January 22, 2021. For information on the 
Commission's privacy policy, including routine uses permitted by the 
Privacy Act, see https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacy-policy.

Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment

    The Federal Trade Commission (``Commission'') has accepted, subject 
to final approval, an agreement containing a consent order from 
Ascension Data & Analytics, LLC (``Respondent''). The proposed consent 
order (``Proposed Order'') has been placed on the public record for 
thirty (30) days for receipt of comments by interested persons. 
Comments received during this period will become part of the public 
record. After thirty (30) days, the Commission again will review the 
agreement and the comments received, and will decide whether it should 
withdraw from the agreement or make final the agreement's Proposed 
Order.
    Respondent is a Delaware company with its principal place of 
business in Texas. Respondent provides data, analytics, and technology 
services to other companies in its corporate family

[[Page 83958]]

and their service providers relating to residential mortgages.
    In early 2017, as part of work for a related company, Respondent 
hired a vendor to conduct Optical Character Recognition on a set of 
documents pertaining to 37,000 residential mortgages. The documents 
contained the personal information of 60,593 consumers. The type of 
personal information included names, dates of birth, Social Security 
numbers, loan information, credit and debit account numbers, drivers' 
license numbers, and credit files. Before providing the documents to 
the vendor, Respondent did not take steps to make sure the vendor was 
capable of protecting the personal information in the documents. 
Furthermore, Respondent did not require the vendor by contract to 
protect the documents or the consumer information contained therein.
    From January 2018 to January 2019, the vendor inadvertently exposed 
the information from the mortgage documents online, by misconfiguring a 
cloud server and storage location containing information from the 
documents. As a result, anyone who could figure out the web address of 
the server or storage location could view and download the contents. 
The server and storage location were accessed by fifty-two unauthorized 
computers during the year they were exposed.
    The Commission's proposed one-count complaint alleges that 
Respondent violated the Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information 
Rule (``Safeguards Rule'') of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (``GLB Act''). 
The Safeguards Rule requires financial institutions, which includes 
companies like Respondent, to implement a comprehensive information 
security program that contains certain elements.
    The proposed complaint alleges that Respondent violated the 
Safeguards Rule by failing to include two of the required elements in 
its information security program. First, the proposed complaint 
alleges, Respondent did not oversee service providers, by failing to 
take reasonable steps to choose service providers capable of 
safeguarding personal information, and failing to require those service 
providers by contract to maintain the safeguards. Second, the proposed 
complaint alleges, Respondent failed to identify risks to the security 
of personal information, and assess whether any safeguards it had in 
place were sufficient. Respondent did not satisfy this element of the 
Safeguards Rule because it failed to consider risks related to many 
service providers, and did not conduct risk assessments before 
September 2017.
    The Proposed Order contains provisions designed to prevent 
Respondent from engaging in the same or similar acts or practices in 
the future. Part I of the Proposed Order prohibits Respondent from 
violating the Safeguards Rule.
    Part II of the Proposed Order requires Respondent to establish and 
implement, and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive data security 
program that protects the security of Covered Information, the 
definition of which is modeled off the definitions of the Safeguards 
Rule. Part III of the Proposed Order requires Respondent to obtain 
initial and biennial data security assessments for ten years. Part IV 
of the Proposed Order requires Respondent to disclose all material 
facts to the assessor and prohibits Respondent from misrepresenting any 
fact material to the assessments required by Part III. Part V of the 
Proposed Order requires Respondent to submit an annual certification 
from a senior corporate manager (or senior officer responsible for its 
data security program) that Respondent has implemented the requirements 
of the Order and is not aware of any material noncompliance that has 
not been corrected or disclosed to the Commission.
    Part VI of the Proposed Order requires Respondent to notify the 
Commission any time it is required to make a notification to a state or 
local government that personal information has been breached or 
disclosed. Parts VII through X of the Proposed Order are reporting and 
compliance provisions, which include recordkeeping requirements and 
provisions requiring Respondent to provide information or documents 
necessary for the Commission to monitor compliance. Part XI states that 
the Proposed Order will remain in effect for 20 years, with certain 
exceptions.
    The purpose of this analysis is to aid public comment on the 
Proposed Order. It is not intended to constitute an official 
interpretation of the complaint or Proposed Order, or to modify in any 
way the Proposed Order's terms.

    By direction of the Commission, Commissioner Chopra dissenting, 
Commissioner Slaughter not participating.
April J. Tabor,
Acting Secretary.

Statement of Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips Regarding Ascension Data 
& Analytics, LLC

    The Commission today announced our most recent settlement resolving 
an alleged violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Safeguards Rule 
(``Rule''), a critical facet of the Commission's data privacy and 
security enforcement program. According to the complaint, Ascension 
Data & Analytics (``Ascension'') violated the Rule by failing to vet 
properly and oversee a provider of optical character recognition (OCR) 
services, and by failing to conduct appropriate risk assessments. This 
settlement requires Ascension to implement a comprehensive data 
security program including annual third-party assessments.
    I write to address several points in Commissioner Chopra's 
dissenting statement. Commissioner Chopra dissents because he believes 
the Commission should name Rocktop Partners, a company in the same 
corporate family as Ascension, as a respondent. Commissioner Chopra 
points to corporate affiliation and certain overlaps in management and 
facilities between the two firms, and other entities as well. It is not 
clear under what legal theory--whether veil piercing, common 
enterprise, or the like--he would name other defendants; but, without 
more, the facts alleged do not support doing so.\1\
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    \1\ For example, Commissioner Chopra cites no facts to suggest 
that corporate formalities were not observed, that Ascension is 
under-capitalized, or that corporate form was abused to inoculate 
Rocktop from liability (mind the reader, for Ascension's failure to 
oversee a vendor) to justify piercing the corporate veil. Courts 
generally take a dim view of piercing the corporate veil without a 
substantial basis to do so. See, e.g., Trinity Indus., Inc. v. 
Greenlease Holding Co., 903 F.3d 333, 365 (3d Cir. 2018) (``the 
corporate veil may be pierced only in extraordinary circumstances, 
such as when the corporate form would otherwise be misused to 
accomplish certain wrongful purposes'') (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). And for good reason: The ability to make 
investments without risk of liability is foundational to the 
American legal and economic system.
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    In terms of relief, Commissioner Chopra argues that Rocktop will 
dissolve Ascension and set up a new firm or transfer its functions, 
just to avoid its obligations under the settlement. This is the kind of 
conduct characteristic of boiler rooms and other frauds. It is not 
clear to me why Rocktop--an entity regulated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission--would dissolve and reconstitute an affiliate for 
the sole purpose of failing to oversee vendors, or otherwise evading 
this order.\2\
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    \2\ Commissioner Chopra cites FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
No. 2:13-cv-01887 (ES), 2014 WL 2812049, at *8 (D.N.J. June 23, 
2014), for the proposition that companies other than frauds may 
reorganize in an effort to avoid responsibilities under FTC orders. 
Of course that is true, but that does not mean that every entity in 
a corporate family can or should be bound by every FTC order. And, 
certainly, that is not what the court--considering a motion to 
dismiss--held in that case.

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    Commissioner Chopra also would have the Commission allege that 
Ascension's conduct was unfair. In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act, 
Congress gave us a specialized data security statute, and the 
Safeguards Rule, promulgated pursuant to that Act, establishes 
liability under the facts alleged in this case.\3\ We should use that 
authority, and here we are. I do not see what an additional allegation 
of unfairness would achieve--certainly, no change in the remedy, and 
nothing better for consumers. What is more, when pleading that lax data 
security was unfair under Section 5, we need evidence to satisfy the 
unfairness test; that gets into thornier questions of whether the 
oversight failure here can constitute unfairness. Thanks to GLB, we 
need not answer that.
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    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq; 16 CFR part 314. The limits of 
applying Section 5 to data security cases are precisely why the 
Commission, on a bipartisan basis, seeks data security legislation 
from Congress.
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    Commissioner Chopra claims that Ascension is being favored because, 
in the Commission's 2014 case against GMR Transcription Services, it 
pleaded an unfairness count. He attributes the difference in treatment 
to the small size of the respondent in that case. GMR was not a 
financial services firm, however, so the Commission could not have 
alleged a violation of the GLB Safeguards Rule in that case; and the 
respondent in this case, Ascension, is also a small company. It is not 
at all unusual for the Commission to charge a violation of the 
Safeguards Rule without an accompanying unfairness count.\4\
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    \4\ See, e.g., TaxSlayer, LLC, No. C-4626 (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/162-3063/taxslayer; James B. Nutter & Co., No. C-4258 (June 16, 2009), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/072-3108/james-b-nutter-company-corporation-matter; United States v. American United 
Mortgage Co., No. 07-cv-7064 (N.D. Ill.), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/062-3103/american-united-mortgagecompany-united-states-america-ftc. I am unaware of any case 
where we alleged a failure to oversee as a violation of both GLB and 
Section 5, as Commissioner Chopra would have us do here.
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    This is a strong case and a good result. I commend Staff for its 
thoughtful and energetic efforts to use the authority at our disposal 
to protect American consumers.

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding Ascension 
Data & Analytics, LLC [Redacted]

Summary

     After an egregious data breach involving extremely 
sensitive financial information, the Commission has struck a settlement 
that provides no help for victims and does little to deter.
     It appears Ascension Data & Analytics is really just an 
offshoot of a large investment fund, and the Commission's proposed 
order fails to bind the appropriate parties.
     To achieve meaningful results, the Commission must 
reevaluate its enforcement strategy when it comes to safeguarding 
consumer financial information by working collaboratively with other 
regulators and applying its unfairness authority in an even-handed 
manner.
    Americans have been burned by the mortgage industry before--not 
just by slipshod practices that maximize profits at the expense of 
responsible stewardship, but also by slippery accountability when 
things go wrong. Regulators got lost in a labyrinth of shell companies 
and subsidiaries, and too many who profited escaped unscathed, leaving 
families in ruin.
    To achieve the dream of homeownership, Americans typically have to 
fork over a boatload of personal data to mortgage lenders, like our 
Social Security numbers, our driver's license numbers, our pay stubs, 
and more. This is the norm when you borrow to buy a home. The lender 
then transfers this data onward through the financial system, with 
banks, servicers, mortgage funds, investment vehicles--and their 
vendors--all gaining access. This data, in the wrong hands, is valuable 
intelligence not only for identity thieves but also for nation states, 
leading to threats to our financial and national security. That's why 
federal law ensures that financial institutions have safeguards in 
place to secure this highly sensitive data.
    After a data breach of highly sensitive data from mortgage 
applications, the FTC launched an investigation into Ascension Data & 
Analytics. Ascension worked on behalf of its sister companies, such as 
investment funds to analyze mortgages. Ascension also hired other 
vendors to help. Even though Ascension was required under the law to 
guard consumer financial data, in fact, they were using third parties 
with shoddy security, as alleged in the complaint. Given the breadth 
and sensitivity of the data compromised in this breach, an individual 
consumer would probably prefer to be affected by the Equifax breach 
than this one, if forced to make a choice.
    In my view, the Commission's proposed resolution of this 
investigation suffers from three key flaws: It fails to hold all of the 
right parties accountable. It fails to charge unfair conduct as unfair. 
And it fails to redress consumers or deter other firms from engaging in 
similar misconduct.

Ascension, Rocktop Partners, and Corporate Musical Chairs

    Ascension is not really an independent company.\1\ It's in the same 
corporate family as Rocktop Partners,\2\ a multi-billion dollar private 
equity fund that buys up defective mortgages, such as those with title 
disputes.\3\ Ascension's President, Brett Benson, is also Managing 
Director of Rocktop Partners.\4\ Its office sits on the same floor as 
Rocktop Partners at 701 Highlander Boulevard in Arlington, Texas.\5\ 
When the Ascension breach hit the news, it was Rocktop's General 
Counsel, Sandy Campbell, who confirmed the key details of the 
incident.\6\ It is unclear whether Ascension has any clients other than 
Rocktop Partners or others in its corporate family.\7\ This is a common 
arrangement in finance, since it allows fund managers to profit when 
they can bill their investors for services.
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    \1\ My office has endeavored to cite public sources showing a 
portion of the web of companies involving Ascension, Rocktop, and 
Reidpin LLC.
    \2\ Zack Whittaker, Millions of bank loan and mortgage documents 
have leaked online, TechCrunch (Jan. 23, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/23/financial-files/.
    \3\ Rocktop Partners, https://rocktoppartners.com/ (last visited 
on Oct. 2, 2020).
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ Id., Compl., In the Matter of Ascension Data & Analytics, 
LLC, Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. 1923126.
    \6\ Supra note 2.
    \7\ Id.
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    Further, Rocktop's Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer, 
Jonathan Bray, is also the sole person (``manager'' or ``member'') 
listed on the LLC forms for a firm called Reidpin LLC.\8\ Langhorne 
Reid and Jason Pinson (``Reid'' and ``Pinson'') are cofounders of 
Rocktop.\9\ Unsurprisingly, Reidpin LLC is located at the same address 
as Ascension and Rocktop.\10\ It is therefore clear that Ascension is 
anything but arms-length from Rocktop. Rocktop's corporate structure 
confirms this conclusion:
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    \8\ Reidpin, LLC, Application to Register a Foreign Limited 
Liability Company (LLC) (Nov. 17, 2020) https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/Document/RetrievePDF?Id=201816410221-24379676.
    \9\ Supra note 3.
    \10\ Supra note 8.
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    Figure 1: [Redacted]
    The FTC has charged Ascension Data & Analytics--but not any other 
parties in the broader Rocktop family--with violating the Safeguards 
Rule by failing to police its agents processing personal data. I agree 
that Ascension violated the law, but I am concerned that the proposed 
settlement will do little to prevent future failures. In addition, our 
complaint and the Analysis to Aid

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Public Comment would be strengthened with critical information about 
the Rocktop corporate structure.\11\
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    \11\ Commissioner Phillips points to the fact that Rocktop 
Partners may be a registered investment fund under the securities 
laws, but does not discuss the other entities within the corporate 
family and in any related mortgage vehicles that are not.
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    The FTC's order binds only one company: Ascension. The company that 
actually appears to manage more than $7 billion worth of Americans' 
mortgages--Rocktop--is not being required to change a single thing 
about its practices.\12\ And while Ascension will be required to clean 
up its act, nothing is stopping the controllers of Rocktop from 
creating a ``new'' analytics firm staffed with exactly the same 
executives, or even transferring the functions within their corporate 
family, but without any obligations under the FTC's order. This would 
be economically rational. The Commission does not cite any sworn 
testimony or other evidence to show why they believe the controllers of 
Ascension would act irrationally.
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    \12\ Supra note 3.
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    Commissioner Phillips argues that this is a concern in cases 
involving ``boiler rooms and other frauds.'' I respectfully disagree. 
When the FTC charged Wyndham in 2012 with lax data security practice, 
it named not only the parent corporation but also three subsidiaries, 
alleging that they operated with common control, shared offices, 
overlapping staff, and as part of a maze of interrelated companies. 
Defending these charges against dismissal, the Commission argued that 
``[i]f the Court were to enter an order against only [the subsidiary], 
Wyndham would be able to transfer responsibility for data security to 
another Wyndham entity[,]'' allowing the company to sidestep its 
obligations under any order.\13\ The court agreed, specifically 
rejecting the view that only ``shell companies designed to perpetrate 
fraud'' can face charges.\14\
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    \13\ Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Wyndham et al., 2013 WL 11116791 
(D.N.J. May 20, 2013).
    \14\ Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 2014 WL 
2812049, at *7 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014).
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    The FTC should not be allowing companies to evade accountability 
through a game of corporate musical chairs. An effective order would 
bind not only Ascension, but also all of the parties liable under the 
law. While one of these parties may be outside the jurisdiction of the 
FTC's Safeguards Rule, there is no question that they are bound by the 
FTC Act's prohibition on unfair practices.

Unfair Conduct Is Unlawful, Regardless of Size

    The FTC has declined to include a charge of violating the FTC's 
prohibition on unfair practices. This represents a departure from 
previous cases involving similar misconduct, and raises questions as to 
whether the FTC is engaging in disparate treatment based on business 
size and type, rather than on facts and evidence.
    In 2014, the FTC charged Ajay Prasad, Shreekant Srivastava, and 
their company, GMR Transcription Services, with violating the FTC Act's 
prohibition on unfair practices when it failed to ensure its vendors 
protected sensitive data. As detailed in the Commission's complaint, 
GMR failed to ensure that their vendors implemented reasonable security 
measures, and failed to prevent one vendor from storing sensitive files 
in plain text. The complaint does not allege that malicious actors 
attacked the vendor's systems, nor does it allege that GMR's failure to 
oversee the vendor directly led to the improper data disclosure, but 
nevertheless charges both the firm and its owners with engaging in 
unfair business practices by failing to employ reasonable security 
measures.\15\
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    \15\ Compl., In the Matter of GMR Transcription Services, Inc., 
Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. 1223095 (Aug. 21, 2014), https://wwwftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140821gmrcmpt.pdf.
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    If GMR faced this scrutiny, why wouldn't Ascension? The FTC's 
complaint alleged that GMR's lax policies created a vulnerability that 
was exploited at least once, and the FTC's complaint in this matter 
details some of the consequences of this catastrophic breach, which 
involved dozens of actors, mainly from overseas, including those with 
IP addresses in China and Russia. They were able to access more than 
60,000 Americans' sensitive financial information. Furthermore, in 
failing to prevent this mass theft, Ascension disregarded its own risk 
management policies, failing to take ``any of the steps described in 
its own policy to evaluate [its vendors'] security practices.'' \16\
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    \16\ Compl., In the Matter of Ascension Data & Analytics, LLC, 
Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. 1923126.
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    Taken together, the allegations against Ascension leave little 
doubt that the company's practices were unfair, causing far more 
unavoidable injury than GMR, without any apparent benefit to consumers 
or competition.\17\ When the Commission settled with GMR, the law was 
exactly the same. The only thing that changed is the five members of 
the Commission.
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    \17\ See 15 U.S.C. 45n, defining as unfair those practices that 
cause or are likely to cause substantial injury that is not 
reasonably avoidable, and is not outweighed by benefits to consumers 
or competition.
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    My colleague suggests there are questions about whether Ascension's 
practices were unfair, but the Commission's complaint details how 
elementary the missteps were that led to this breach. A reasonable 
person would expect if these problems could have been prevented simply 
by Ascension following its own vendor management policies. Ascension 
could have also heeded the FTC's 2015 business guidance, which warns 
firms to ``[m]ake sure service providers implement reasonable security 
measures.'' \18\
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    \18\ Start With Security, A Guide For Business, Lessons Learned 
From FTCc Cases, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Jun. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf.
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    My colleague also cites instances where the Commission has charged 
a firm with violating the FTC's Safeguards Rule without also including 
charges of unfair practices. However, these cases do not involve 
conduct related to inadequate service provider oversight, which is the 
core allegation at issue with Rocktop and Ascension.
    We must apply more evenhanded enforcement to ensure that large 
businesses and investment firms are not getting less scrutiny than 
small businesses. The Commission's failure to charge Ascension and its 
affiliates with an unfairness violation is not only inconsistent with 
prior practice but also undermines our ability to hold the company 
accountable for its failures.

Rethinking Remedies

    The most effective way to address serious data breaches like this 
one is to compensate the victims, penalize the wrongdoers, and insist 
on changes to the responsible company's practices. Unfortunately, the 
Commission's proposed order misses the mark on identifying the 
responsible company, while doing nothing to compensate victims or 
penalize those responsible for this catastrophic breach. I am therefore 
not confident that the remedies proposed in today's order will deter 
other companies from engaging in the same slipshod practices.
    We could have done more. I recognize that consumers harm can be 
difficult to estimate in these cases, and that the Commission lacks 
civil penalty authority for offenses like this one. But that problem 
can be solved. The FTC is not the only enforcer in this space--dozens 
of state attorneys general and financial regulators can enforce a 
nearly identical unfairness authority under

[[Page 83961]]

federal law that is backed up with strong tools to both seek redress 
and penalties. By partnering with a state enforcer, the Commission can 
dramatically improve its data security actions--ensuring that there is 
compensation for victims and consequences for wrongdoing.\19\
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    \19\ In addition to having unfairness jurisdiction, many state 
enforcers have their own versions of the Safeguards Rule. See, e.g., 
Industry Guidance Re: Standards for Safeguarding Customer 
Information and Regulation 173, New York State Dep't of Fin. Serv., 
https://www.dfs ny.gov/insurance/ogco2002/rg204021.htm.
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    Unfortunately, the FTC almost never invites state regulators, 
particularly state banking regulators with significant expertise, to 
join our investigations and enforcement actions to obtain additional 
relief when it comes to data protection. This must change.

Conclusion

    We should all be unconvinced that chasing after dangerous data 
breaches and resolving them without any redress or penalties is an 
effective strategy. Making matters worse, holding a ``company'' 
accountable that is really just an extension of a financial firm might 
allow our order to be completely ignored. After this settlement, 
Ascension could ``fold,'' and the Rocktop family of companies can 
reconstitute it, escaping any obligations under the order.\20\
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    \20\ For context, public information indicates that there are 
seven companies with interrelated officers or agents currently 
active, including ``Reidpin LLC,'' ``Reidpin, LLC,'' ``Reidpin 
Investments, LLC,'' Reidpin Rocktop 1, LLC,'' ``Reidpin Rocktop III, 
LLC,'' ``Reidpin Rocktop IV, LLC,'' ``Reidpin Rocktop V, LLC'' 
founded in 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, two in 2017, and one in 2018. 
There are two other entities with these characteristics which appear 
to have folded. https://opencorporates.com/companies?q=REIDPIN%2C+LLC.
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    The FTC is currently considering changes to its rule on 
safeguarding consumer financial information.\21\ But we also need to 
rethink our enforcement strategy. Our go-it-alone strategy is doing 
nothing for breach victims and little to deter, and our two-track 
approach to unfairness is penalizing small companies while giving a 
pass to financial firms like Rocktop. For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent.
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    \21\ Fed. Trade Comm'n., Standards on Safeguarding Customer 
Information, 84 FR 13158 (Apr. 4, 2019), https://wwwfederalregister.gov/documents/2019/04/04/2019-04981/standards-for-safeguarding-customer-information.

[FR Doc. 2020-28407 Filed 12-22-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-P