[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 244 (Friday, December 18, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 82798-82866]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-27825]



[[Page 82797]]

Vol. 85

Friday,

No. 244

December 18, 2020

Part V





Department of Labor





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Employee Benefits Security Administration





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29 CFR Part 2550





Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2020-02, Improving Investment Advice 
for Workers & Retirees; Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 244 / Friday, December 18, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 82798]]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employee Benefits Security Administration

29 CFR Part 2550

[Application No. D-12011]
ZRIN 1210-ZA29


Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2020-02, Improving Investment 
Advice for Workers & Retirees

AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
Labor.

ACTION: Adoption of class exemption and interpretation.

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SUMMARY: This document contains a class exemption from certain 
prohibited transaction restrictions of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, as amended (the Act). Title I of the Act codified 
a prohibited transaction provision in title 29 of the U.S. Code 
(referred to in this document as Title I). Title II of the Act codified 
a parallel provision now found in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended (the Code). These prohibited transaction provisions of Title I 
and the Code generally prohibit fiduciaries with respect to ``plans,'' 
including workplace retirement plans (Plans) and individual retirement 
accounts and annuities (IRAs), from engaging in self-dealing and 
receiving compensation from third parties in connection with 
transactions involving the Plans and IRAs. The provisions also prohibit 
purchasing and selling investments with the Plans and IRAs when the 
fiduciaries are acting on behalf of their own accounts (principal 
transactions). This exemption allows investment advice fiduciaries to 
plans under both Title I and the Code to receive compensation, 
including as a result of advice to roll over assets from a Plan to an 
IRA, and to engage in principal transactions, that would otherwise 
violate the prohibited transaction provisions of Title I and the Code. 
The exemption applies to Securities and Exchange Commission--and state-
registered investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, insurance 
companies, and their employees, agents, and representatives that are 
investment advice fiduciaries. The exemption includes protective 
conditions designed to safeguard the interests of Plans, participants 
and beneficiaries, and IRA owners. The class exemption affects 
participants and beneficiaries of Plans, IRA owners, and fiduciaries 
with respect to such Plans and IRAs. This notice also sets forth the 
Department's final interpretation of when advice to roll over Plan 
assets to an IRA will be considered fiduciary investment advice under 
Title I and the Code.

DATES: The exemption is effective as of: February 16, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Wilker, telephone (202) 693-
8557, or Erin Hesse, telephone (202) 693-8546, Office of Exemption 
Determinations, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. 
Department of Labor (these are not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act) 
provides, in relevant part, that a person is a fiduciary with respect 
to a ``plan'' to the extent he or she renders investment advice for a 
fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any 
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so. Title I of the Act (referred to herein as 
Title I), which generally applies to employer-sponsored Plans (Title I 
Plans), includes this provision in section 3(21)(A)(ii).\1\ The Act's 
Title II (referred to herein as the Code), includes a parallel 
provision in section 4975(e)(3)(B), which defines a fiduciary of a tax-
qualified plan, including IRAs.\2\
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    \1\ Section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. 
1002(3)(21)(A)(ii). As noted above, Title I of the Act was codified 
in Title 29 of the U.S. Code. As a matter of practice, this preamble 
refers to the codified provisions in Title I by reference to the 
sections of ERISA, as amended, and not by its numbering in the U.S. 
Code.
    \2\ As noted above, Title II of the Act was codified in the 
Internal Revenue Code.
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    In 1975, the Department issued a regulation establishing a five-
part test for fiduciary status under this provision of Title I.\3\ The 
1975 regulation also applies to the definition of fiduciary in the 
Code, which is identical in its wording.\4\ Under the 1975 regulation, 
for advice to constitute ``investment advice,'' a financial institution 
or investment professional who is not a fiduciary under another 
provision of the statute must--(1) render advice as to the value of 
securities or other property, or make recommendations as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or 
other property (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding with the Plan, Plan fiduciary 
or IRA owner, that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for 
investment decisions with respect to Plan or IRA assets, and that (5) 
the advice will be individualized based on the particular needs of the 
Plan or IRA. A financial institution or investment professional that 
meets this five-part test, and receives a fee or other compensation, 
direct or indirect, is an investment advice fiduciary under Title I and 
under the Code.
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    \3\ 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c)(1), 40 FR 50842 (October 31, 1975).
    \4\ 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c), 40 FR 50840 (October 31, 1975).
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    Investment advice fiduciaries, like other fiduciaries to Plans and 
IRAs, are subject to duties and liabilities established in Title I and 
the Code. Fiduciaries to Title I Plans must act prudently and with 
undivided loyalty to the plans and their participants and 
beneficiaries. Although these statutory fiduciary duties are not in the 
Code, both Title I and the Code contain provisions forbidding 
fiduciaries from engaging in certain specified ``prohibited 
transactions,'' involving Plans and IRAs, including conflict of 
interest transactions.\5\ Under these prohibited transaction 
provisions, a fiduciary may not deal with the income or assets of a 
Plan or an IRA in his or her own interest or for his or her own 
account, and a fiduciary may not receive payments from any party 
dealing with the Plan or IRA in connection with a transaction involving 
assets of the Plan or IRA. The Department has authority in ERISA 
section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2) to grant administrative 
exemptions from the prohibited transaction provisions in Title I and 
the Code.\6\
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    \5\ ERISA section 406 and Code section 4975. Cf. Code section 
4975(f)(5), which defines ``correction'' with respect to prohibited 
transactions as placing a Plan or an IRA in a financial position not 
worse than it would have been in if the person had acted ``under the 
highest fiduciary standards.''
    \6\ Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 1 (2018)) 
generally transferred the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to grant administrative exemptions under Code section 4975 to the 
Secretary of Labor.
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    In 2016, the Department finalized a new regulation that would have 
replaced the 1975 regulation, and granted new associated prohibited 
transaction exemptions.\7\ After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit vacated that rulemaking, including the new exemptions, in 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. U.S. Department of Labor in 
2018 (the Chamber opinion),\8\ the Department issued Field Assistance 
Bulletin (FAB) 2018-02, a temporary enforcement policy providing 
prohibited transaction relief to investment advice fiduciaries.\9\

[[Page 82799]]

In the FAB, the Department stated it would not pursue prohibited 
transaction claims against investment advice fiduciaries who worked 
diligently and in good faith to comply with ``Impartial Conduct 
Standards'' for transactions that would have been exempted in the new 
exemptions, or treat the fiduciaries as violating the applicable 
prohibited transaction rules. The Impartial Conduct Standards have 
three components: A best interest standard; a reasonable compensation 
standard; and a requirement to make no misleading statements about 
investment transactions and other relevant matters.
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    \7\ See Definition of the Term ``Fiduciary''; Conflict of 
Interest Rule--Retirement Investment Advice, 81 FR 20945 (Apr. 8, 
2016).
    \8\ 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).
    \9\ Available at www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-02. The Impartial 
Conduct Standards incorporated in the FAB were conditions of the new 
exemptions granted in 2016. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 
FR 21002 (Apr. 8, 2016), as corrected at 81 FR 44773 (July 11, 
2016).
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    On July 7, 2020, the Department proposed this class exemption, 
which took into consideration the public correspondence and comments 
received by the Department since February 2017 and responded to 
informal industry feedback seeking an administrative class exemption 
based on FAB 2018-02.\10\ On the same day, the Department issued a 
technical amendment to 29 CFR 2510-3.21, instructing the Office of the 
Federal Register to remove language that was added in 2016 and reinsert 
the text of the 1975 regulation.\11\ This ministerial action reflected 
the Fifth Circuit's vacatur of the 2016 fiduciary rule.\12\ The 
technical amendment also reinserted into the CFR Interpretive Bulletin 
96-1 relating to participant investment education, which had been 
removed and largely incorporated into the text of the 2016 fiduciary 
rule.\13\ The Department received 106 written comments on the proposed 
exemption, and on September 3, 2020, held a public hearing at which the 
commenters were permitted to give additional testimony.\14\
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    \10\ 85 FR 40834 (July 7, 2020).
    \11\ 85 FR 40589 (July 7, 2020).
    \12\ The amendment also corrected a typographical error in the 
original text of the 1975 regulation, at 29 CFR 2510-3.21(e)(1)(ii).
    \13\ 29 CFR 2509.96-1.
    \14\ Hearing on Improving Investment Advice for Workers & 
Retirees, 85 FR 52292 (August 25, 2020).
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    After careful consideration of the comments and testimony on the 
proposed exemption, the Department is granting the exemption. While the 
final exemption makes a number of significant changes in response to 
comments, it retains the proposal's broad protective framework, 
including the Impartial Conduct Standards; disclosures, including a 
written acknowledgment of fiduciary status; policies and procedures 
prudently designed to ensure compliance with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards and that mitigate conflicts of interest; and a retrospective 
compliance review. The exemption, like the proposal, also specifies the 
circumstances in which Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals are ineligible to rely upon its terms.
    In response to commenters, the Department made a number of 
important changes. First, the final exemption's recordkeeping 
requirements have been narrowed to allow only the Department and the 
Department of the Treasury to obtain access to a Financial 
Institution's records as opposed to plan fiduciaries and other 
Retirement Investors. Second, the final exemption's disclosure 
requirements have been revised to include written disclosure to 
Retirement Investors of the reasons that a rollover recommendation was 
in their best interest. Third, the final exemption's retrospective 
review provision has been revised to provide that certification can be 
made by any Senior Executive Officer, as defined in the exemption, 
rather than requiring certification by the chief executive officer (or 
equivalent officer) as proposed. Fourth, a self-correction provision 
has also been added to the final exemption.
    This document also sets forth the Department's final interpretation 
of the five-part test of investment advice fiduciary status for 
purposes of this exemption, and provides the Department's views on when 
advice to roll over Title I Plan assets to an IRA will be considered 
fiduciary investment advice under Title I and the Code.\15\ Comments on 
the interpretation, which was proposed in the notice of proposed 
exemption, are discussed below.
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    \15\ For purposes of any rollover of assets from a Title I Plan 
to an IRA described in this preamble, the term ``Plan'' only 
includes an employee pension benefit plan described in ERISA section 
3(2) or a plan described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(A), and the term 
``IRA'' only includes an account or annuity described in Code 
section 4975(e)(1)(B) or (C).
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    The Department has also provided explanation in the preamble to 
respond to issues raised during the comment period. Additionally, to 
the extent public comments were based on concerns about compliance and 
interpretive issues with the final exemption or the Act, the Department 
intends to support Financial Institutions, Investment Professionals, 
plan sponsors and fiduciaries, and other affected parties, with 
compliance assistance following publication of the final exemption.
    The Department further announces that FAB 2018-02 will remain in 
effect until December 20, 2021. This will provide a transition period 
for parties to develop mechanisms to comply with the provisions in the 
new exemption.
    The Department grants this exemption, which was proposed on its own 
motion, pursuant to its authority under ERISA section 408(a) and Code 
section 4975(c)(2) and in accordance with procedures set forth in 29 
CFR part 2570, subpart B (76 FR 66637 (October 27, 2011)). The 
Department finds that the exemption is administratively feasible, in 
the interests of Plans and their participants and beneficiaries and of 
IRA owners, and protective of the rights of participants and 
beneficiaries of Plans and IRA owners. The Department has determined 
that the exemption is an Executive Order (E.O.) 13771 deregulatory 
action because it provides broader and more flexible exemptions that 
allow investment advice fiduciaries with respect to Plans and IRAs to 
receive compensation and engage in certain principal transactions that 
would otherwise be prohibited under Title I and the Code.

Overview of the Final Exemption and Discussion of Comments Received

    This exemption is available to registered investment advisers, 
broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (Financial Institutions) 
and their individual employees, agents, and representatives (Investment 
Professionals) that provide fiduciary investment advice to Retirement 
Investors.\16\ The exemption defines Retirement Investors as Plan 
participants and beneficiaries, IRA owners, and Plan and IRA 
fiduciaries.\17\ Under the exemption, Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals can receive a wide variety of payments that 
would otherwise violate the prohibited transaction rules, including, 
but not limited to, commissions, 12b-1 fees, trailing commissions, 
sales loads, mark-ups and mark-downs, and revenue sharing payments from 
investment providers or third parties. The exemption's relief extends 
to prohibited transactions arising as a result of investment advice to 
roll over assets from a Plan to an IRA, as detailed later in this 
exemption. The

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exemption also allows Financial Institutions to engage in principal 
transactions with Plans and IRAs in which the Financial Institution 
purchases or sells certain investments from its own account.
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    \16\ References in the preamble to registered investment 
advisers include both SEC- and state-registered investment advisers.
    \17\ As defined in Section V(i) of the exemption, the term 
``Plan'' means any employee benefit plan described in ERISA section 
3(3) and any plan described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(A). In 
Section V(g), the term ``Individual Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' 
is defined as any account or annuity described in Code section 
4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), including an Archer medical savings 
account, a health savings account, and a Coverdell education savings 
account.
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    As noted above, Title I and the Code include broad prohibitions on 
self-dealing. Absent an exemption, a fiduciary may not deal with the 
income or assets of a Plan or an IRA in his or her own interest or for 
his or her own account, and a fiduciary may not receive payments from 
any party dealing with the Plan or IRA in connection with a transaction 
involving assets of the Plan or IRA. As a result, fiduciaries who use 
their authority to cause themselves or their affiliates \18\ or related 
entities \19\ to receive additional compensation violate the prohibited 
transaction provisions unless an exemption applies.\20\
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    \18\ As defined in Section V(a) of the exemption, an 
``affiliate'' includes: (1) Any person directly or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or 
under common control with the Investment Professional or Financial 
Institution. (For this purpose, ``control'' means the power to 
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of 
a person other than an individual); (2) any officer, director, 
partner, employee, or relative (as defined in ERISA section 3(15)), 
of the Investment Professional or Financial Institution; and (3) any 
corporation or partnership of which the Investment Professional or 
Financial Institution is an officer, director, or partner.
    \19\ As defined in Section V(j) of the exemption, a ``related 
entity'' is an entity that is not an affiliate, but in which the 
Investment Professional or Financial Institution has an interest 
that may affect the exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary.
    \20\ As articulated in the Department's regulations, ``a 
fiduciary may not use the authority, control, or responsibility 
which makes such a person a fiduciary to cause a plan to pay an 
additional fee to such fiduciary (or to a person in which such 
fiduciary has an interest which may affect the exercise of such 
fiduciary's best judgment as a fiduciary) to provide a service.'' 29 
CFR 2550.408b-2(e)(1).
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    This exemption conditions relief on the Investment Professional and 
Financial Institution investment advice fiduciaries providing advice in 
accordance with the Impartial Conduct Standards. In addition, the 
exemption requires Financial Institutions to acknowledge in writing 
their and their Investment Professionals' fiduciary status under Title 
I and the Code, as applicable, when providing investment advice to the 
Retirement Investor, and to describe in writing the services to be 
provided and the Financial Institutions' and Investment Professionals' 
material conflicts of interest. Financial Institutions must document 
the reasons that a rollover recommendation is in the best interest of 
the Retirement Investor and provide that documentation to the 
Retirement Investor. Financial Institutions are required to adopt 
policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure compliance with 
the Impartial Conduct Standards and conduct a retrospective review of 
compliance. The exemption also provides, subject to additional 
safeguards, relief for Financial Institutions to enter into principal 
transactions with Retirement Investors, in which they purchase or sell 
certain investments from their own accounts.
    In order to ensure that Financial Institutions provide reasonable 
oversight of Investment Professionals and adopt a culture of 
compliance, the exemption provides that Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals will be ineligible to rely on the exemption 
if, within the previous 10 years, they were convicted of certain crimes 
arising out of their provision of investment advice to Retirement 
Investors. They will also be ineligible if they engaged in systematic 
or intentional violation of the exemption's conditions or provided 
materially misleading information to the Department in relation to 
their conduct under the exemption. Ineligible parties are permitted to 
rely on an otherwise available statutory exemption or administrative 
class exemption, or they can apply for an individual prohibited 
transaction exemption from the Department. This targeted approach of 
allowing the Department to give special attention to parties with 
certain criminal convictions or with a history of egregious conduct 
with respect to compliance with the exemption will provide meaningful 
protections for Retirement Investors.
    While the exemption's eligibility provision provides an incentive 
to maintain an appropriate focus on compliance with legal requirements 
and with the exemption, it does not represent the only available 
enforcement mechanism. The Department has investigative and enforcement 
authority with respect to transactions involving Plans under Title I of 
ERISA, and it has interpretive authority as to whether exemption 
conditions have been satisfied. Further, ERISA section 3003(c) provides 
that the Department will transmit information to the Secretary of the 
Treasury regarding a party's violation of the prohibited transaction 
provisions of ERISA section 406. In addition, participants, 
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries with respect to Plans covered under 
Title I have a statutory cause of action under ERISA section 502(a) for 
fiduciary breaches and prohibited transactions under Title I. The 
exemption, however, does not expand Retirement Investors' ability to 
enforce their rights in court or create any new legal claims above and 
beyond those expressly authorized in Title I or the Code, such as by 
requiring contracts and/or warranty provisions.

Exemption Approach and Alignment With Other Regulators' Conduct 
Standards

    This exemption provides relief that is broader and more flexible 
than the other prohibited transaction exemptions currently available 
for investment advice fiduciaries. Those exemptions generally provide 
relief to specific types of financial services providers, for discrete, 
specifically identified transactions, and often do not extend to 
compensation arrangements that developed after the Department first 
granted the exemptions.\21\ In comparison, this new exemption provides 
relief for multiple categories of Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals, and extends broadly to their receipt of reasonable 
compensation as a result of the provision of fiduciary investment 
advice. The conditions are principles-based rather than prescriptive, 
so as to apply across different financial services sectors and business 
models. The exemption provides additional certainty regarding covered 
compensation arrangements and avoids the complexity associated with 
requiring a Financial Institution to rely upon a patchwork of different 
exemptions when providing investment advice.
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    \21\ See e.g., PTE 86-128, Class Exemption for Securities 
Transactions involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers, 51 
FR 41686 (Nov. 18, 1986), as amended, 67 FR 64137 (Oct. 17, 2002) 
(providing relief for a fiduciary's use of its authority to cause a 
Plan or an IRA to pay a fee for effecting or executing securities 
transactions to the fiduciary, as agent for the Plan or IRA, and for 
a fiduciary to act as an agent in an agency cross transaction for a 
Plan or an IRA and another party to the transaction and receive 
reasonable compensation for effecting or executing the transaction 
from the other party to the transaction); PTE 84-24, Class Exemption 
for Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, 
Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, Investment Companies and 
Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 49 FR 13208 (Apr. 3, 
1984), as corrected, 49 FR 24819 (June 15, 1984), as amended, 71 FR 
5887 (Feb. 3, 2006) (providing relief for the receipt of a sales 
commission by an insurance agent or broker from an insurance company 
in connection with the purchase, with plan assets, of an insurance 
or annuity contract).
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    The exemption's principles-based approach is rooted in the 
Impartial Conduct Standards for fiduciaries providing investment 
advice. The Impartial Conduct Standards include a best interest 
standard, a reasonable compensation standard, and a requirement to make 
no misleading statements about investment transactions and other 
relevant matters.

[[Page 82801]]

In the proposed exemption, the Department noted that the best interest 
standard was based on concepts of law and equity ``developed in 
significant part to deal with the issues that arise when agents and 
persons in a position of trust have conflicting interests,'' and 
accordingly, the standard is well-suited to the problems posed by 
conflicted investment advice.\22\ The Department believes that 
conditioning the exemption on satisfaction of the Impartial Conduct 
Standards protects the interests of Retirement Investors in connection 
with this broader grant of exemptive relief.
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    \22\ 85 FR 40842.
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    The best interest standard in the exemption is broadly aligned with 
recent rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in 
particular. On June 5, 2019, the SEC finalized a regulatory package 
relating to conduct standards for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers. The package included Regulation Best Interest which 
establishes a best interest standard applicable to broker-dealers when 
making a recommendation of any securities transaction or investment 
strategy involving securities to retail customers.\23\ The SEC also 
issued an interpretation of the fiduciary conduct standards applicable 
to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (SEC 
Fiduciary Interpretation).\24\ In addition, as part of the package, the 
SEC adopted new Form CRS, which requires broker-dealers and SEC-
registered investment advisers to provide retail investors with a short 
relationship summary with specified information (SEC Form CRS).\25\
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    \23\ Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of 
Conduct, 84 FR 33318 (July 12, 2019) (Regulation Best Interest 
Release).
    \24\ Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for 
Investment Advisers, 84 FR 33669 (July 12, 2019).
    \25\ Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, 84 
FR 33492 (July 12, 2019) (Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). In 
addition to the SEC's rulemaking, the Massachusetts Securities 
Division amended its regulations for broker-dealers to apply a 
fiduciary conduct standard, under which broker-dealers and their 
agents must ``[m]ake recommendations and provide investment advice 
without regard to the financial or any other interest of any party 
other than the customer.'' 950 Mass. Code Regs. 12.204 & 12.207 as 
amended effective March 6, 2020.
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    The exemption's best interest standard is also aligned with the 
standard included in the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC)'s Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model 
Regulation (NAIC Model Regulation) which was updated in Spring 
2020.\26\ The model regulation provides that all recommendations by 
agents and insurers must be in the best interest of the consumer and 
that agents and carriers may not place their financial interest ahead 
of the consumer's interest. Both Iowa and Arizona have adopted updated 
rules following the update of the NAIC Model Regulation.\27\
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    \26\ NAIC Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation, 
Spring 2020, available at www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-275.pdf (NAIC 
Model Regulation).
    \27\ Iowa Code Sec.  507B.48 (2020), available at https://iid.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/bi_af.pdf; Arizona Senate Bill 1557 
(2020), available at www.azleg.gov/legtext/54Leg/2R/laws/0090.pdf. 
The New York State Department of Financial Services also amended its 
insurance regulations to establish a best interest standard in 
connection with life insurance and annuity transactions. New York 
State Department of Financial Services Insurance Regulation 187, 11 
NYCRR 224, First Amendment, effective August 1, 2019 for annuity 
transactions.
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    Some commenters expressed general support for the approach taken in 
the proposed exemption, although they opposed certain specific 
conditions as discussed in greater detail below. Commenters cited the 
flexible, principles-based approach rather than a prescriptive approach 
to exemptive relief, and they also praised the proposed exemptive 
relief for a broad range of otherwise prohibited compensation types 
which they said did not favor certain market segments or arrangements. 
Many of these commenters supported what they viewed as the proposed 
exemption's alignment with regulatory conduct standards under the 
securities laws, particularly Regulation Best Interest. The commenters 
said this approach would reduce compliance costs and burdens, which 
will ultimately benefit Retirement Investors through reduced fees. 
Commenters also stated that they believed the exemption's approach 
would facilitate providing investment advice to Retirement Investors 
through a wide variety of methods.
    Some commenters urged the Department to more closely mirror 
Regulation Best Interest or offer an explicit safe harbor for 
compliance with Regulation Best Interest, or with any ``primary 
financial regulator'' of the Financial Institution, rather than 
including additional conditions in the exemption. They argued that 
otherwise Financial Institutions would have to comply with two 
differing yet mostly redundant regimes, with their attendant additional 
costs and liability exposure, and that the Department had failed to 
show that Retirement Investors would be insufficiently protected by 
other regulators' standards. Some commenters focused on conduct 
standards, disclosures, and policies and procedures as areas for 
increased alignment, which they said would further reduce compliance 
burdens. These comments, as they pertain to these particular aspects of 
the exemption, are discussed in greater detail below in their 
respective parts of the preamble.
    Commenters made similar points with respect to alignment with the 
NAIC Model Regulation. Some commenters asked the Department to go 
further in aligning the exemption's terms to the NAIC Model Regulation, 
or even offer a safe harbor based on compliance with it. Commenters 
asserted that increased alignment is particularly important to allow 
for distribution of insurance products by independent insurance agents. 
Specifically, commenters expressed the view that the exemption 
establishes a structure of Financial Institution oversight for 
Investment Professionals that is incompatible with the independent 
agent distribution model, because independent insurance agents sell the 
products of more than one insurance company. They suggested that the 
NAIC Model Regulation better accommodated that business model.
    In contrast, many commenters opposed the approach taken in the 
proposed exemption as insufficiently protective of Retirement 
Investors, and urged the Department to withdraw the proposal. Some of 
these commenters expressed the view that the exemption would not 
satisfy the statutory criteria under ERISA section 408(a) for the 
granting of an exemption or, more generally, that the conditions would 
not protect Plans and IRAs and their participants and beneficiaries 
from the dangers of conflicts of interest and self-dealing.
    These commenters focused much of their opposition on the 
exemption's alignment with Regulation Best Interest and the NAIC Model 
Regulation, which the commenters said do not encompass a ``true'' 
fiduciary standard. Commenters stated that the provisions of Regulation 
Best Interest and the NAIC Model Regulation restricting conflicts of 
interest do not sufficiently protect investors from conflicted 
investment advice. Furthermore, commenters stated that the Act was 
enacted to provide additional protections to individuals saving for 
retirement, above and beyond existing laws. Some commenters noted that 
at the time the Act was enacted, Congress was aware of other federal 
and state regulatory schemes and that there was no suggestion of 
congressional purpose to base compliance on federal securities laws or 
other regulatory schemes.
    Some commenters took the position that the alignment with the 
conduct

[[Page 82802]]

standards in Regulation Best Interest rendered many of the exemption's 
other conditions, which are designed to support investment advice that 
meets the standards, too lax. Some commenters also opposed the breadth 
of the exemption. These commenters suggested that the exemption should 
not allow receipt of payments from third parties. Some commenters also 
opposed the exemption's application to recommendations of proprietary 
products. Further, commenters also stated that the failure to provide a 
mechanism for IRA owners to enforce the Impartial Conduct Standards was 
a significant flaw in the exemption's approach. Some of these 
commenters noted that the Department also lacks the authority to 
enforce the exemption with respect to these investors.
    The Department has carefully considered these comments on the 
exemption's approach, its alignment with other regulators' conduct 
standards, as well as the comments on specific provisions of the 
exemption discussed below. The Department has proceeded with granting 
the final exemption based on the view that the exemption will provide 
important protections to Retirement Investors in the context of a 
principles-based exemption that permits a broad range of otherwise 
prohibited compensation, including compensation from third parties and 
from proprietary products.
    In this regard, the Impartial Conduct Standards are strong 
fiduciary standards based on longstanding concepts in the Act and the 
common law of trusts. The exemption includes additional supporting 
conditions including a written acknowledgment of fiduciary status to 
ensure that the nature of the relationship is clear to Financial 
Institutions, Investment Professionals, and Retirement Investors; 
policies and procedures that require mitigation of conflicts of 
interest to the extent that a reasonable person reviewing the policies 
and procedures and incentive practices as a whole would conclude that 
they do not create an incentive for a Financial Institution or 
Investment Professional to place their interests ahead of the interest 
of the Retirement Investor; and documentation and disclosure to 
Retirement Investors of the reasons that a rollover recommendation is 
in the Retirement Investor's best interest.
    The exemption does not include a provision permitting IRA owners to 
enforce the Impartial Conduct Standards. In developing the exemption, 
the Department was mindful of the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion 
holding that the Department did not have authority to include certain 
contract requirements in the new exemptions enforceable by IRA owners 
as granted by the 2016 fiduciary rulemaking. In addition, the 
Department intends to avoid any potential for disruption in the market 
for investment advice that may occur related to a contract requirement. 
Instead, the exemption includes many protective measures and targeted 
opportunities for the Department to review compliance within its 
existing oversight and enforcement authority under the Act. For 
example, Financial Institutions' reports regarding their retrospective 
review are required to be certified by a Senior Executive Officer \28\ 
of the Financial Institution and provided to the Department within 10 
business days of request. The exemption also includes eligibility 
provisions, discussed below, which the Department believes will 
encourage Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals to 
maintain an appropriate focus on compliance with legal requirements and 
with the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Senior Executive Officer is defined in Section V(l) as any 
of the following: The chief compliance officer, the chief executive 
officer, president, chief financial officer, or one of the three 
most senior officers of the Financial Institution.
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    The Department believes that general alignment with the other 
regulators' conduct standards is beneficial in allowing for the 
development of compliance structures that lack complexity and 
unnecessary burden. The Department has not, however, offered a safe 
harbor based solely on compliance with regulatory conduct standards 
under federal or state securities laws. The Department disagrees with 
commenters' arguments that the failure to do so will create a 
redundant, cost-ineffective regime, or one that could create unexpected 
liabilities at the edges. This exemption is offered as a deregulatory 
option for interested parties; it does not unilaterally impose any 
obligations. The additional conditions of the exemption provide 
important protections to Retirement Investors, who are investing 
through tax advantaged accounts and are the subject of unique 
protections under Title I and the Code.\29\ The approach in the final 
exemption exemplifies the Department's important role in protecting 
Retirement Investors through promulgating only those exemptions that 
meet the requirements of ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 
4975(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See ERISA section 2(a).
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    For the same reasons, the Department likewise declines to provide a 
safe harbor based on the NAIC Model Regulation. A uniform approach to 
safeguards for Retirement Investors receiving fiduciary investment 
advice in the insurance marketplace is particularly important given the 
potential for variation across state insurance laws. Moreover, although 
commenters expressed concern about the scope of an insurance company's 
supervisory oversight responsibilities as a Financial Institution, the 
Department believes that the exemption is workable for the insurance 
industry, as discussed in greater detail below.
    Some commenters raised questions as to whether the Department 
intends to defer to the SEC or other regulators on enforcement and how 
the Department will treat violations under other regulatory regimes. 
The Department has worked with other regulatory agencies, including the 
SEC, in numerous cases that implicate violations under different laws. 
The interaction of findings or settlements in parallel suits or 
investigations is decidedly a case-by-case determination. The 
Department confirms that it will coordinate with other regulators, 
including the SEC, on enforcement strategies and will harmonize regimes 
to the extent possible, but will not defer to other regulators on 
enforcement under the Act. Retirement Investors who have concerns about 
whether they have received investment advice that is not in accordance 
with the Impartial Conduct Standards or other conditions of the 
exemption are encouraged to contact the Department.\30\
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    \30\ Contact information for regional offices of the 
Department's Employee Benefits Security Administration is available 
at www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/regional-offices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Interpretation of Fiduciary Investment Advice in Connection With 
Rollover Recommendations

    As stated in the proposed exemption, amounts accrued in a Title I 
Plan can represent a lifetime of savings, and often comprise the 
largest sum of money a worker has at retirement. Therefore, the 
decision to roll over assets from a Title I Plan to an IRA is 
potentially a very consequential financial decision for a Retirement 
Investor.\31\ A sound decision on the rollover will typically turn on 
numerous factors, including the relative costs associated with the new 
investment options, the range of available investment options under the

[[Page 82803]]

plan and the IRA, and the individual circumstances of the particular 
investor.
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    \31\ For simplicity, this preamble interpretation uses the term 
Retirement Investor, which is a defined term in the exemption. This 
is not intended to suggest that the interpretation is limited to 
Retirement Investors impacted by the class exemption. In this 
preamble interpretation, the term Retirement Investor is intended to 
refer more generally to Plan participants and beneficiaries and IRA 
owners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollovers from Title I Plans to IRAs are expected to approach $2.4 
trillion cumulatively from 2016 through 2020.\32\ These large sums of 
money eligible for rollover represent a significant revenue source for 
investment advice providers. A firm that recommends a rollover to a 
Retirement Investor can generally expect to earn transaction-based 
compensation such as commissions, or an ongoing advisory fee, from the 
IRA, but may or may not earn compensation if the assets remain in the 
Title I Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Cerulli Associates, ``U.S. Retirement Markets 2019.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of potential conflicts of interest related to rollovers 
from Title I Plans to IRAs, Title I and the Code prohibit an investment 
advice fiduciary from receiving fees resulting from investment advice 
to Title I Plan participants to roll over assets from the plan to an 
IRA, unless an exemption applies. The exemption provides relief, as 
needed, for this prohibited transaction, if the Financial Institution 
and Investment Professional provide investment advice that satisfies 
the Impartial Conduct Standards and comply with the other applicable 
conditions discussed below.\33\ In particular, the Financial 
Institution is required to document the reasons that the advice to roll 
over was in the Retirement Investor's best interest, and provide the 
documentation to the Retirement Investor.
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    \33\ The exemption would also provide relief for investment 
advice fiduciaries under either Title I or the Code to receive 
compensation for advice to roll Plan assets to another Plan, to roll 
IRA assets to another IRA or to a Plan, and to transfer assets from 
one type of account to another, all limited to the extent such 
rollovers are permitted under applicable law. The analysis set forth 
in this section will apply as relevant to those transactions as 
well. For purposes of any rollover of assets between a Title I Plan 
and an IRA described in this preamble, the term ``IRA'' includes 
only an account or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) 
or (C).
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    The preamble to the proposed exemption provided the Department's 
proposed views on when advice to roll over Plan assets to an IRA should 
be considered fiduciary investment advice under the Department's 
regulation defining fiduciary investment advice,\34\ and requested 
comment on all aspects of the interpretation. The proposed 
interpretation addressed both Advisory Opinion 2005-23A (the Deseret 
Letter) as well as the facts and circumstances analysis of rollover 
recommendations under the five-part test. The discussion also touched 
on the statutory definitional prerequisite that advice be provided 
``for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect.'' Comments on 
the proposed interpretation are discussed below. The Department has 
carefully considered these comments and has adopted the final 
interpretation, as follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ 29 CFR 2510-3.21.
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Deseret Letter

    The proposed exemption announced that, in determining the fiduciary 
status of an investment advice provider in the context of advice to 
roll over Title I Plan assets to an IRA, the Department does not intend 
to apply the analysis in the Deseret Letter stating that advice to roll 
assets out of a Title I Plan, even when combined with a recommendation 
as to how the distribution should be invested, did not constitute 
investment advice with respect to the Title I Plan. The Department 
believes that the analysis in the Deseret Letter was incorrect when it 
stated that advice to take a distribution of assets from a Title I Plan 
is not advice to sell, withdraw, or transfer investment assets 
currently held in the plan. A recommendation to roll assets out of a 
Title I Plan is necessarily a recommendation to liquidate or transfer 
the plan's property interest in the affected assets and the 
participant's associated property interest in plan investments.\35\ 
Typically the assets, fees, asset management structure, investment 
options, and investment service options all change with the decision to 
roll money out of a Title I Plan. Moreover, a distribution 
recommendation commonly involves either advice to change specific 
investments in the Title I Plan or to change fees and services directly 
affecting the return on those investments. Accordingly, the better view 
is that a recommendation to roll assets out of a Title I Plan is advice 
with respect to moneys or other property of the plan. An investment 
advice fiduciary making a rollover recommendation would be required to 
avoid prohibited transactions under Title I and the Code unless an 
exemption, including this one, applies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Similarly, the SEC and FINRA have each recognized that 
recommendations to roll over Plan assets to an IRA will almost 
always involve a securities transaction. See Regulation Best 
Interest Release, 84 FR 33339; FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45 
Rollovers to Individual Retirement Accounts (December 2013), 
available at www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p418695.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters supported the Department's announcement that it 
would not apply the reasoning of the Deseret Letter but would rather 
approach the analysis of rollovers based on all the facts and 
circumstances under the five-part test. These commenters generally 
supported the possibility that rollover recommendations could be 
considered fiduciary investment advice if the five-part test is 
satisfied, particularly given the consequence of the decision to roll 
over large sums typically accumulated in a Retirement Investor's 
workplace Plan.
    Some commenters stated the Department's proposed interpretation did 
not go far enough in protecting Retirement Investors, and that all 
rollover recommendations should be deemed fiduciary investment advice 
regardless of whether the five-part test is satisfied. Commenters noted 
that financial professionals have adopted titles such as financial 
consultant, financial planner, and wealth manager. These commenters 
stated that reinsertion of the five-part test makes it all too easy for 
financial services providers to hold themselves out as acting in 
positions of trust and confidence, even as they effectively avoided 
fiduciary status by relying on the ``regular basis,'' ``mutual 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding'' and ``primary basis'' prongs 
of the test.\36\ One commenter argued that a rollover recommendation 
should be viewed as always satisfying the ``regular basis'' prong 
because, in its view, there are two distinct steps--the decision to do 
a rollover, and the decision to invest its proceeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Comments on the reinsertion of the five-part test are 
discussed in greater detail below in the section ``Reinsertion of 
the Five-Part Test.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters asserted that the facts-and-circumstances analysis 
would lead to uncertainty as to fiduciary status and that a consequence 
of that uncertainty is a potential reduction in access to advice. One 
commenter argued that would lead to more leakage, missing participants, 
and abandoned accounts. Commenters disagreed with the conclusion that 
rollover recommendations typically include investment recommendations. 
Many commenters expressed concern that the Department intended to apply 
the facts and circumstances analysis to transactions occurring in the 
past. They said the Department's statement that it would no longer 
apply the reasoning in the Deseret Letter would expose financial 
services providers to liability for transactions entered into in the 
past. Some commenters asked for additional guidance on other types of 
interactions, including recommendations to increase contributions to a 
Plan.
    After careful consideration of these comments, the Department has 
determined that, consistent with the position taken in the proposal, 
the facts and circumstances analysis required by the five-part test 
applies to rollover recommendations. A recommendation

[[Page 82804]]

to roll assets out of a Title I Plan is advice with respect to moneys 
or other property of the plan and, if provided by a person who 
satisfies all of the requirements of the five-part test, constitutes 
fiduciary investment advice. This outcome is more aligned with both the 
facts and circumstances approach taken by Congress in drafting the 
Act's statutory functional fiduciary test, and with an approach 
centered on whether the parties have entered into a relationship of 
trust and confidence.\37\ This outcome is also consistent with the 
Act's goal of protecting the interests of Retirement Investors given 
the central importance to investors' retirement security consequences 
of a decision to roll over Title I Plan assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ For example, ERISA section 3(21) discusses a fiduciary 
relationship surrounding the ``disposition of [plan] assets.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department agrees that not all rollover recommendations can be 
considered fiduciary investment advice under the five-part test set 
forth in the Department's regulation. Parties can and do, for example, 
enter into one-time sales transactions in which there is no ongoing 
investment advice relationship, or expectation of such a relationship. 
If, for example, a participant purchases an annuity based upon a 
recommendation from an insurance agent without receiving subsequent, 
ongoing advice, the advice does not meet the ``regular basis'' prong as 
specifically required by the regulation.\38\ Nor is the Department 
persuaded by the commenter who suggested that a rollover transaction 
should always satisfy the regular basis prong on the grounds that it 
can be viewed as involving two separate steps--the rollover and a 
subsequent investment decision. These two steps do not, in and of 
themselves, establish a regular basis.
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    \38\ Where a broker-dealer or investment adviser makes a 
recommendation or provides advice that does not meet the five-part 
test, the recommendation or advice could still be subject to 
Regulation Best Interest or the investment adviser's fiduciary duty 
under securities laws, as applicable.
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    The Department does not believe that its interpretation will lead 
to loss of access to investment advice due to uncertainty of financial 
services providers as to their fiduciary status. Taken together, the 
five-part test as interpreted here and Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 
regarding participant investment education, provide Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals a clear roadmap for when they 
are, and are not, Title I and Code fiduciaries. Since the exemption 
provides prohibited transaction relief for rollover recommendations 
that do constitute fiduciary investment advice, Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals would be free to provide fiduciary 
investment advice and comply with the exemption to avoid a prohibited 
transaction. In this regard, some commenters specifically supported the 
proposed exemption as facilitating investment advice and options for 
consumers. Alternatively, financial services providers can choose not 
to provide fiduciary investment advice and have no need of this 
exemption. And, of course, the Department acknowledges some commenters' 
observations that Retirement Investors may choose on their own to 
withdraw assets from a Title I Plan and roll over funds to an IRA; 
however, this exemption focuses on the interests of those Retirement 
Investors who do receive fiduciary investment advice. The Department 
further addresses concerns regarding purported uncertainty over whether 
certain relationships meet the prongs of the five-part test, including 
the ``regular basis'' and ``mutual agreement'' prongs, later in this 
preamble.
    Some commenters stated that the Department should have engaged in 
notice and comment prior to announcing that it would no longer apply 
the analysis in the Deseret Letter. Commenters said that the position 
in the Deseret Letter contributed to a longstanding understanding of 
the five-part test which should be reversed only through the regulatory 
process. A commenter noted that, in 2016, the Department characterized 
the 2016 fiduciary rule as ``superseding'' the Deseret Letter, and 
asserted that characterization as evidence that the Department's 
procedure in this exemption proceeding is inadequate.
    The Department does not believe these comments have merit. Advisory 
opinions, such as the Deseret Letter, are interpretive statements that 
were not subject to the notice and comment process. As such, the 
Department need not go through notice and comment to offer a new 
interpretation of the regulation based on a better reading of governing 
statutory and regulatory authority, as here.\39\ Moreover, in this 
instance, the statements made in the preamble to the now-vacated 2016 
fiduciary rule are also unpersuasive as to the effect of the Deseret 
Letter for the same reasons. Rather than take the 2016 fiduciary rule's 
approach of removing the five-part test through an amendment to the 
Code of Federal Regulations and, thus, ``superseding'' the Deseret 
Letter, the Department now is only changing its view on the Deseret 
Letter (and specifically, one aspect of it). The five-part test still 
applies without the Deseret Letter, as it did for decades before the 
letter. The 2016 fiduciary rule is not in effect, and statements made 
in the preamble to the vacated rule bear no weight. And, in this 
instance, the Department solicited and has had the benefit of public 
comment on its interpretation through the notice and comment process 
for the exemption. Comments regarding the Department's compliance with 
Executive Order 13891 are addressed later in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assoc., 575 U.S. 92, 100-01 
(2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, in response to commenters expressing concern about 
the possibility of being held liable for past transactions that would 
not have been treated as fiduciary under the Deseret analysis, the 
Department will not pursue claims for breach of fiduciary duty or 
prohibited transactions against any party, or treat any party as 
violating the applicable prohibited transaction rules, for the period 
between 2005, when the Deseret Letter was issued, and February 16, 
2021, based on a rollover recommendation that would have been 
considered non-fiduciary conduct under the reasoning in the Deseret 
Letter. The Department recognizes that advisory opinions issued under 
ERISA Procedure 76-1, while directly applicable only to their 
requester, see ERISA Procedure 76-1 section 10, can also constitute ``a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which the courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.'' Raymond B. Yates, M.D., 
P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (quoting 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). For this reason, 
and because the Department does not wish to disturb the reliance 
interests of those who looked to the Deseret Letter for guidance, the 
Department also does not expect or intend a private right of action to 
be viable for a transaction conducted in reliance on the Deseret Letter 
prior to that date. Further, the extension of the temporary enforcement 
policy in FAB 2018-02 until its expiration on December 20, 2021 will 
allow parties a transition period during which the Department will not 
pursue prohibited transaction claims against investment advice 
fiduciaries who work diligently and in good faith to comply with the 
Impartial Conduct Standards for rollover recommendations or treat such 
fiduciaries as violating the applicable prohibited transaction 
rules.\40\

[[Page 82805]]

Additionally, although the Department declines to set broad guidelines 
in this preamble for what is necessarily a facts-and-circumstances 
determination about particular business practices, to the extent public 
comments were based on concerns about compliance and interpretive 
issues with the final exemption or the Act, the Department intends to 
support Financial Institutions, Investment Professionals, plan sponsors 
and fiduciaries, and other affected parties with compliance assistance 
following publication of the final exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ On March 28, 2017, the Treasury Department and the IRS 
issued IRS Announcement 2017-4 stating that the IRS will not apply 
Sec.  4975 (which provides excise taxes relating to prohibited 
transactions) and related reporting obligations with respect to any 
transaction or agreement to which the Labor Department's temporary 
enforcement policy described in FAB 2017-01, or other subsequent 
related enforcement guidance, would apply. The Treasury Department 
and the IRS have confirmed that, for purposes of applying IRS 
Announcement 2017-4, this preamble discussion and FAB 2018-02 
constitute ``other subsequent related enforcement guidance.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Facts and Circumstances Analysis

    All the elements of the five-part test must be satisfied for the 
investment advice provider to be a fiduciary within the meaning of the 
regulatory definition, including the ``regular basis'' prong as well as 
requirements that the advice be provided pursuant to a ``mutual'' 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding that the advice will serve as 
``a primary basis'' for investment decisions. In addition to satisfying 
the five-part test, a person must also receive a fee or other 
compensation to be an investment advice fiduciary under the provisions 
of Title I and the Code.
    If, under this facts and circumstances analysis, advice to roll 
Title I Plan assets over to an IRA is fiduciary investment advice under 
Title I, the fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty under ERISA 
section 404 would apply to the initial instance of advice to take the 
distribution and to roll over the assets. Fiduciary investment advice 
concerning investment of the rollover assets and ongoing management of 
the assets, once distributed from the Title I Plan into the IRA, would 
be subject to obligations in the Code. For example, a broker-dealer who 
satisfies the five-part test with respect to a Retirement Investor in 
advising on assets in a Title I Plan, advises the Retirement Investor 
to move his or her assets from the plan to an IRA, and receives any 
fees or compensation incident to distributing those assets, will be a 
fiduciary subject to Title I, including section 404, with respect to 
the advice regarding the rollover. Following the rollover, the broker-
dealer will be a fiduciary under the Code subject to the prohibited 
transaction provisions in Code section 4975.
Final Interpretation
    The Department acknowledges that a single instance of advice to 
take a distribution from a Title I Plan and roll over the assets would 
fail to meet the regular basis prong. Likewise, sporadic interactions 
between a financial services professional and a Retirement Investor do 
not meet the regular basis prong. For example, if a Retirement Investor 
who is assisted with a rollover expresses the intent to direct his or 
her own investments in a brokerage account, without any expectation of 
entering into an ongoing advisory relationship and without receiving 
repeated investment recommendations from the investment professional, 
the Department would not view the regular basis prong as being 
satisfied merely because the investor subsequently sought the 
professional's advice in connection with another transaction long after 
receiving the rollover assistance.
    However, advice to roll over plan assets can also occur as part of 
an ongoing relationship or an intended ongoing relationship that an 
individual enjoys with his or her investment advice provider. In 
circumstances in which the investment advice provider has been giving 
advice to the individual about investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities or other financial instruments through tax-advantaged 
retirement vehicles subject to Title I or the Code, the advice to roll 
assets out of a Title I Plan is part of an ongoing advice relationship 
that satisfies the regular basis prong. Similarly, advice to roll 
assets out of a Title I Plan into an IRA where the investment advice 
provider has not previously provided advice but will be regularly 
giving advice regarding the IRA in the course of a more lengthy 
financial relationship would be the start of an advice relationship 
that satisfies the regular basis prong. It is clear under Title I and 
the Code that advice to a Title I Plan includes advice to participants 
and beneficiaries in participant-directed individual account pension 
plans, so in these scenarios, there is advice to the Title I Plan--
meaning the Plan participant or beneficiary--on a regular basis.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See ERISA section 408(b)(14) (providing a statutory 
exemption for transactions in connection with the provision of 
investment advice described in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) to a 
participant or beneficiary of an individual account plan that 
permits such participant or beneficiary to direct the investment of 
assets in their individual account); Code section 4975(d)(17) 
(same); see also Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 29 CFR 2509.96-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This interpretation is consistent with the approach of other 
regulators and protects Plan participants and beneficiaries under 
today's market practices, including the increasing prevalence of 401(k) 
Plans and self-directed accounts. Numerous sources acknowledge that an 
outcome of advice given to a Retirement Investor to roll over Title I 
Plan assets is the compensation an advice provider receives from the 
investments made in an IRA. For example, in a 2013 notice reminding 
firms of their responsibilities regarding IRA rollovers, FINRA stated 
that ``a financial adviser has an economic incentive to encourage an 
investor to roll plan assets into an IRA that he will represent as 
either a broker-dealer or an investment adviser representative.'' \42\ 
Similarly, in 2011, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
discussed the practice of cross-selling, in which 401(k) service 
providers sell Plan participants products and services outside of their 
Title I Plans, including IRA rollovers. GAO reported that industry 
professionals said ``cross-selling IRA rollovers to participants, in 
particular, is an important source of income for service providers.'' 
\43\ These types of transactions can initiate a future, ongoing 
relationship.\44\
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    \42\ FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45.
    \43\ U.S. General Accountability Office, 401(k) Plans: Improved 
Regulation Could Better Protect Participants from Conflicts of 
Interest, GAO 11-119 (Washington, DC 2011), available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/320/315363.pdf.
    \44\ It is by no means uncommon to interpret regulatory or 
statutory terms phrased in the present to incorporate the future 
tense. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In applying the regular basis prong of the five-part test, however, 
the Department intends to preserve the ability of financial services 
professionals to engage in one-time sales transactions without becoming 
fiduciaries under the Act, including by assisting with a rollover.\45\ 
For example, such parties can make clear in their communications that 
they do not intend to enter into an ongoing relationship to provide 
investment advice and act in conformity with that communication. In the 
event that assistance with a rollover does in fact mark the beginning 
of an ongoing relationship, however, the functional fiduciary test 
under Title I and the Code appropriately covers the entire fiduciary 
relationship, including the first instance of advice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Merely executing a sales transaction at the customer's 
request also does not confer fiduciary status.
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    With respect to determining whether there is ``a mutual agreement, 
arrangement, or understanding'' that the investment advice will serve 
as ``a primary basis for investment decisions,''

[[Page 82806]]

the Department intends to consider the reasonable understanding of each 
of the parties, if no mutual agreement or arrangement is demonstrated. 
Written statements disclaiming a mutual understanding or forbidding 
reliance on the advice as a primary basis for investment decisions will 
not be determinative, although such statements will be appropriately 
considered in determining whether a mutual understanding exists. 
Similarly, after consideration of the comments, the Department also 
intends to consider marketing materials in which Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals hold themselves out as trusted advisers, 
in evaluating the parties' reasonable understandings with respect to 
the relationship.
    The Department believes that Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals who meet the five-part test and are investment advice 
fiduciaries relying on this exemption should clearly disclose their 
fiduciary status to their Retirement Investor customers. By making this 
disclosure, they provide important clarity to the Retirement Investor 
and put themselves in the best possible position to meet their 
fiduciary obligations and comply with the exemption. By setting clear 
expectations and acting accordingly, the mutual understanding prong of 
the five-part test should seldom be an issue for parties relying on the 
exemption. Similarly, if a Financial Institution or Investment 
Professional does not want to assume a fiduciary relationship or create 
misimpressions about the nature of its undertaking, it can clearly 
disclose that fact to its customers up-front, clearly disclaim any 
fiduciary relationship, and avoid holding itself out to its Retirement 
Investor customer as acting in a position of trust and confidence.
    The Department does not intend to apply the five-part test to 
determine whether the advice serves as ``the'' primary basis of 
investment decisions, as advocated by some commenters, but whether it 
serves as ``a'' primary basis, as the regulatory text provides.
Comments on the Regular Basis Analysis
    Some commenters on the Department's proposed interpretation of the 
regular basis prong asserted that the regular basis prong would always 
be satisfied under the interpretation, and, therefore, the prong was 
effectively being eliminated from the five-part test. In this regard, 
one commenter stated that every financial professional wants to develop 
an ongoing relationship with her customers. Commenters opposed the 
statement that a rollover recommendation could be the first step in an 
ongoing advice relationship that would satisfy the regular basis prong. 
Some commenters characterized this statement as allowing for the 
``retroactive'' imposition of fiduciary status on financial services 
providers in the event an ongoing relationship develops. Some 
commenters additionally opined that to be ``regular,'' the interactions 
would have to be more than discrete or episodic. Some commenters stated 
that the advice to a Retirement Investor in a Title I Plan should be 
viewed as distinct from the advice to the same Retirement Investor 
whose assets have been transferred to an IRA, for purposes of the 
analysis of the regular basis prong. Commenters also cautioned that the 
preamble statement about rollover advice following a pre-existing 
advice relationship appeared to be overbroad with respect to the types 
of pre-existing advice relationships to which it would apply.
    Commenters in the insurance industry asked the Department to 
confirm that insurance transactions generally would not be considered 
fiduciary investment advice, because commenters said they occur 
infrequently and that ongoing interactions may occur but they are 
related to servicing the insurance or annuity contract. Some commenters 
objected to the Department's statement in the preamble that agents who 
receive trailing commissions on annuity transactions may continue to 
provide ongoing recommendations or service with respect to the annuity. 
Commenters asserted that this method of compensation is paid for a 
variety of reasons and does not indicate an ongoing advice 
relationship.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ A few commenters in the insurance industry and the 
brokerage industry cited statements in the Fifth Circuit's Chamber 
opinion for the proposition that brokers-dealers and insurance 
agents would ordinarily not develop a relationship of trust and 
confidence with prospective customers so as to properly be 
considered fiduciaries under Title I and the Code. These comments 
related to the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion are discussed later 
in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has carefully considered these comments in 
clarifying its interpretation of the ``regular basis'' prong of the 
five-part test. The Department does not believe that the regular basis 
prong has effectively been eliminated by stating that this prong may be 
satisfied, in some cases, with the occurrence of first-time advice on 
rollovers that is intended to be the beginning of a long-term 
relationship. The regulation still requires, in all cases, that advice 
will be provided on a regular basis. The Department's interpretation 
merely recognizes that the rollover recommendation can be the beginning 
of an ongoing advice relationship. It is important that fiduciary 
status extend to the entire advisory relationship.
    In this regard, when the parties reasonably expect an ongoing 
advice relationship at the time of the rollover recommendation, the 
regular basis prong is satisfied. This expectation can be shown by 
various kinds of objective evidence, of which some examples are 
discussed below, such as the parties agreeing to check-in periodically 
on the performance of the customer's post-rollover financial products. 
In such cases, the parties' expectation at the time of the rollover 
recommendation appropriately demonstrates that the regular basis prong 
has been satisfied, and, if the other prongs of the test are satisfied, 
the financial service providers making the recommendation are 
appropriately treated as investment advice fiduciaries under Title I 
and the Code. Likewise, to the extent that financial service providers 
hold themselves out to the customer as providing such ongoing services, 
and meet the other elements of the five-part test, they are 
fiduciaries.
    In the Department's view, the updated conduct standards adopted by 
the SEC and the NAIC reflect an acknowledgment of the fact that broker-
dealers and insurance agents commonly provide investment and annuity 
recommendations to their customers.\47\ To the extent these 
professionals engage in an ongoing advice relationship, they will 
likely satisfy the regular basis prong. Moreover, the Department does 
not intend to interpret ``regular basis'' to be limited to 
relationships in which advice is provided at fixed intervals, as 
suggested by a commenter, but, instead, believes the term ``regular 
basis'' broadly describes a relationship where advice is recurring, 
non-sporadic, and expected to continue. When insurance agents or 
broker-dealers frequently or periodically make recommendations to their 
clients on annuity or investment products or features, or on the

[[Page 82807]]

investment of additional assets in existing products, they may meet the 
``regular basis'' prong of the five-part test, and are appropriately 
treated as fiduciaries, assuming that they meet the remaining elements 
of the fiduciary definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See Regulation Best Interest, 17 CFR 240.15l-1(a) (``A 
broker, dealer, or a natural person who is an associated person of a 
broker or dealer, when making a recommendation of any securities 
transaction or investment strategy involving securities (including 
account recommendations) to a retail customer, shall act in the best 
interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is 
made, without placing the financial or other interest of the broker, 
dealer, or natural person who is an associated person of a broker or 
dealer making the recommendation ahead of the interest of the retail 
customer.'') and NAIC Model Regulation Section 6.A. (``A producer, 
when making a recommendation of an annuity, shall act in the best 
interest of the consumer under the circumstances known at the time 
the recommendation is made, without placing the producer's or the 
insurer's financial interest ahead of the consumer's interest.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department's interpretation of the regular basis prong does not 
result in retroactive imposition of fiduciary status, as suggested by 
some commenters. As noted above, fiduciary status is determined by the 
facts as they exist at the time of the recommendation, including 
whether the parties, at that time, mutually intend an ongoing advisory 
relationship. Every relationship has a beginning, and the five-part 
test does not provide that the first instance of advice in an ongoing 
relationship is automatically free from fiduciary obligations. The fact 
that the relationship of trust and confidence starts with a 
recommendation to roll the investor's retirement savings out of a Title 
I Plan is not an argument for treating the recommendation as non-
fiduciary. Rather, fiduciary status extends to the entire advisory 
relationship, including the first--and often most important--advice on 
rolling the investor's retirement savings out of the Title I Plan in 
the first place. A financial services provider that recommends that 
Retirement Investors roll potential life savings out of a Title I Plan 
with the expectation of offering ongoing advice to the same Retirement 
Investor whose retirement assets will now be held in an IRA should 
reasonably understand that the provider will be held to fiduciary 
standards.
    This does not mean that fiduciary status applies to a prior 
isolated interaction, if the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
interaction do not reflect that the interaction marked the beginning of 
an ongoing fiduciary advice relationship. The Department recognizes 
that relationships, and the parties' understandings of their 
relationships, can change over time. The Department emphasizes that 
parties who do not wish to enter into an ongoing relationship can make 
that fact consistently clear in their communications and act 
accordingly.
    The Department disagrees with commenters who suggested that the 
``regular basis'' requirement must first be met with respect to the 
Title I Plan, and then again with respect to the IRA. Under the logic 
of this position, even if the investment advice provider specifically 
recommended the rollover to the IRA as part of a planned ongoing 
investment advice relationship, the ``regular basis'' requirement would 
not be satisfied with respect to the rollover advice because there was 
only one instance of advice under the Title I Plan, notwithstanding the 
expectation of a continued advisory relationship with the same customer 
with respect to the same assets that were rolled out of the plan. 
Similarly, the argument asserts that even if the investment advice 
provider regularly advised the Plan participant on how to invest plan 
assets, recommended the rollover to an IRA, and then continued to give 
advice on the IRA account, the first instance of advice post-rollover 
did not count because the ``regular basis'' requirement had only been 
satisfied with respect to the Title I Plan, but not the IRA.
    In response, the Department notes that under Title I and the Code, 
advice to a Title I Plan includes advice to participants and 
beneficiaries in participant-directed individual account pension 
plans.\48\ Given that the identical five-part test definition appears 
in the regulatory definition under both Title I and the Code, the 
advice is rendered to the exact same Retirement Investor (first as a 
Plan participant and then as IRA owner), and the IRA assets are 
derived, in the first place, from that Retirement Investor's Title I 
Plan account, it is appropriate to conclude that an ongoing advisory 
relationship spanning both the Title I Plan and the IRA satisfies the 
regular basis prong. It is enough, in the scenarios outlined above, 
that the same financial services provider is giving advice to the same 
person with respect to the same assets (or proceeds of those assets), 
pursuant to identical five-part tests. A different outcome could all 
too easily defeat legitimate investor expectations of trust and 
confidence by arbitrarily dividing an ongoing relationship of ongoing 
advice and uniquely carving out rollover advice from fiduciary 
protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See supra, n. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Department believes an approach that coordinates the 
five-part test under Title I with the identical test under the Code is 
consistent with the transfer of authority to the Department under 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.\49\ Pursuant to the Reorganization 
Plan, the Secretary of Labor has authority to issue regulations, 
rulings, opinions, and exemptions under Code section 4975, with some 
limited exceptions not relevant here. The message of the President that 
accompanied the Reorganization Plan indicated an intent to streamline 
administration of the Act, and to entrust the Department of Labor with 
responsibility to oversee fiduciary conduct.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ 5 U.S.C. App. (2018).
    \50\ Presidential Statement of October 14, 1978 on Congressional 
Action on Reorganization Plan No. 4, 1978, Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents, Vol. 14, No. 42 (Aug. 10, 1978) 
(accompanying the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 
1, 43 FR 47713-16 (Oct. 17, 1978)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For similar reasons, the Department's interpretation of the regular 
basis prong does not artificially distinguish between advice to a 
Retirement Investor in a Title I Plan and advice to the same Retirement 
Investor in an IRA, when evaluating a rollover recommendation made in 
the context of a pre-existing advice relationship. Likewise, the 
Department does not arbitrarily subdivide advice rendered to a plan 
sponsor on multiple Title I Plans. It is enough, in that case, that the 
parties have an ongoing advisory relationship with respect to Title I 
Plans. If, on the other hand, the investment professional only made 
recommendations to the investor on non-``plan'' assets held outside a 
Plan or an IRA, he or she would not meet the ``regular basis'' test 
based solely on additional one-time advice with respect to the Plan or 
IRA. To meet the regular basis prong in that circumstance, there must 
be ongoing advice to a ``plan'' (including Plans and IRAs).
    As indicated by the discussion above, whether insurance 
transactions will fall within or outside the scope of the fiduciary 
definition in Title I and the Code depends on the related facts and 
circumstances. Like other transactions involving Retirement Investors, 
insurance and annuity transactions must be evaluated based on 
application of the five-part test to the particular scenario. Some 
commenters raised concerns that trailing annuity commissions could be 
seen as indicating ongoing service that the Department would view as 
fiduciary investment advice. Other commenters asserted that the 
Department's view on this point fails to recognize that insurance 
agents may receive trailing commissions for reasons wholly unrelated to 
their relationship with a Retirement Investor, and that how an agent is 
compensated does not impact whether the regular basis prong of the 
five-part test is satisfied. The Department clarifies that payment of a 
trailing commission will not, in and of itself, result in the 
Department taking the position that the regular basis prong of the 
five-part test is satisfied with respect to a transaction. On the other 
hand, if the trailing commission is intended to compensate a financial 
professional for providing advice to the

[[Page 82808]]

Retirement Investor on an ongoing basis, the conclusion could be 
different, depending on the full facts and circumstances of the advice 
arrangement.
Mutual Agreement, Arrangement, or Understanding That the Investment 
Advice Will Serve as a Primary Basis for Investment Decisions
    Similar to the comments discussed above, some commenters also 
asserted that the Department's interpretation of the ``mutual 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding'' and the ``primary basis'' 
requirements is so broad as to render them meaningless. Some of these 
commenters objected to the statement that recommendations by financial 
professionals, particularly pursuant to a best interest standard or 
another requirement to provide advice based on the individualized needs 
of the Retirement Investor, will typically involve a reasonable 
understanding by both parties that the advice will serve as at least a 
primary basis for the decision. The commenters asserted that the 
statement is inconsistent with the fact that the broker-dealer and 
insurance regulatory regimes do not incorporate a fiduciary standard. A 
few commenters sought confirmation that compliance with Regulation Best 
Interest would not automatically result in satisfaction of the primary 
basis prong of the five-part test. Some commenters stated that 
investors may consult multiple financial professionals and, therefore, 
the response by any one professional should not be considered a primary 
basis for the investment decision.
    Some commenters opposed the Department's interpretive statement 
that written disclaimers of fiduciary status or elements of the five-
part test will not be determinative. They stated that this 
interpretation ignores the requirement of ``mutuality.'' Some 
commenters also criticized the statement that the five-part test 
focuses on ``a'' primary basis, not ``the'' primary basis, although 
some acknowledged that ``a'' is, in fact, the word used in the 
regulation. Commenters said the interpretation is at odds with the 
common understanding of the word ``primary'' and will result in an 
unwarranted expansion of the five-part test. Commenters also asserted 
that the statement in the Department's interpretation conflated the 
primary basis requirement with a separate requirement for 
individualized advice. On the other hand, another commenter advocated 
that a Retirement Investor's position as to whether there is an 
understanding for the advice to provide a primary basis for the 
investment decision should be provided a presumption of correctness, 
which can only be overcome with significant evidence.
    The Department is not persuaded by these comments to revise its 
interpretation. As stated above, the Department's interpretation has 
not rendered these requirements of the five-part test meaningless. 
Rather, the Department is appropriately applying the five-part test to 
current marketplace conduct and realities. The fact that a financial 
services professional is not considered a fiduciary under other laws, 
such as securities law or insurance law, is not a determinative factor 
under the five-part test. The focus is on the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the recommendation and the relationship, including whether 
those facts and circumstances give rise to a mutual agreement, 
arrangement, or understanding that the advice will serve as a primary 
basis for an investment decision. While satisfying the other laws may 
implicate parts of the test, fiduciary status applies only if all five 
prongs are satisfied.
    The Department does not interpret the ``primary basis'' requirement 
as requiring proof that the advice was the single most important 
determinative factor in the Retirement Investor's investment decision. 
This is consistent with the regulation's reference to the advice as 
``a'' primary basis rather than ``the'' primary basis. Similarly, the 
fact that a Retirement Investor may consult multiple financial 
professionals about a particular investment does not indicate that the 
Department's analysis is incorrect. If, in each instance, the parties 
reasonably understand that the advice is important to the Retirement 
Investor and could determine the outcome of the investor's decision, 
that is enough to satisfy the ``primary basis'' requirement. Even so, 
all elements of the five-part test must be satisfied for a particular 
recommendation to be considered fiduciary investment advice, and if a 
Retirement Investor does not act on a recommendation made by a 
financial professional, the financial professional would not have any 
liability for that recommendation.
    The Department also recognizes that the requirement for 
``individualized'' advice is separate from the ``primary basis'' 
requirement, but this does not mean that the individualized nature of a 
particular advice recommendation is irrelevant to whether the parties 
understood that the advice could serve as a ``primary basis'' for 
investment decisions.
    The Department also is not persuaded by commenters to change its 
position on the role of written disclaimers of fiduciary status or of 
elements of the five-part test. In the context of the rendering of 
investment advice by a financial services professional, written 
statements disclaiming a mutual understanding or forbidding reliance on 
the advice as a primary basis for investment decisions will not be 
determinative, although such statements can be appropriately considered 
in determining whether a mutual understanding exists. This 
interpretation will not deprive parties of the ability to define the 
nature of their relationship, but recognizes that there needs to be 
consistency in that respect. A financial services provider should not, 
for example, expect to avoid fiduciary status through a boilerplate 
disclaimer buried in the fine print, while in all other communications 
holding itself out as rendering best interest advice that can be relied 
upon by the customer in making investment decisions. While financial 
services professionals may contractually disclaim engaging in 
activities that trigger elements of the five-part test, such as 
rendering advice that can be relied upon as a primary basis for the 
Retirement Investor's investment decisions, they must do so clearly and 
act accordingly to demonstrate that there is in fact no mutual 
agreement, arrangement, or understanding to the contrary.
    One commenter similarly requested that the Department confirm that 
broker-dealers can disclaim a mutual agreement, arrangement or 
understanding in cases in which they provide investment recommendations 
that comply with Regulation Best Interest. The Department declines to 
do so expressly. As discussed above, the Department has not provided a 
safe harbor in this exemption for compliance with other regulators' 
conduct standards. The Department also declines in this exemption to 
set forth evidentiary burdens applied to establish a mutual 
understanding, including any presumptions as one commenter suggested. 
That question is better left to development by the courts or, if 
necessary, future guidance or rulemaking. The Department reiterates, 
however, that all prongs of the five-part test, including the regular 
basis prong, must be satisfied for a person or entity to be a 
fiduciary. Further, as noted above, a broker-dealer who does not wish 
to establish a fiduciary relationship in connection with a rollover may 
make clear in its communications that it does not intend to enter into 
an ongoing relationship to

[[Page 82809]]

provide investment advice and act in conformity with that 
communication.
``Hire Me'' Communications
    Some commenters asked the Department to confirm that so-called 
``hire me'' communications, in which financial services professionals 
engage in introductory conversations to promote their advisory services 
to Retirement Investors, will not be treated as fiduciary 
communications under Title I and the Code. Commenters indicated that 
these types of communications are an important part of the process for 
a Retirement Investor to select an investment advice provider. A 
commenter pointed to statements in the Department's 2016 fiduciary 
rulemaking about the ability of a person or firm to ``tout the quality 
of his, her, or its own advisory or investment management services'' 
without being considered an investment advice fiduciary.\51\ The 
commenter also pointed to an FAQ issued by the SEC staff in the context 
of Regulation Best Interest, which confirmed that, absent other 
factors, the SEC staff would not view this type of communication as a 
recommendation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Definition of the Term ``Fiduciary''; Conflict of Interest 
Rule--Retirement Investment Advice, 81 FR 20946, 20968 (April 8, 
2016).

    I have been working with our mutual friend, Bob, for fifteen 
years, helping him to invest for his kids' college tuition and for 
retirement. I would love to talk with you about the types of 
services my firm offers, and how I could help you meet your goals. 
Here is my business card. Please give me a call on Monday so that we 
can discuss.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See Frequently Asked Questions on Regulation Best Interest, 
available at www.sec.gov/tm/faq-regulation-best-interest.

    In the context of the present exemption proceeding, the Department 
does not believe that there should be significant concerns about 
introductory ``hire me'' conversations. This is because all prongs of 
the five-part test must be satisfied for a financial services provider 
to be considered a fiduciary. Nevertheless, the Department confirms 
that the interpretive statements in this preamble are not intended to 
suggest that marketing activity of the type described above would be 
treated as investment advice covered under the five-part test. To the 
extent, however, that the marketing of advisory services is accompanied 
by an investment recommendation, such as a recommendation to invest in 
a particular fund or security, the investment recommendation would be 
covered if all five parts of the test were satisfied.

For a Fee or Other Compensation, Direct or Indirect

    The Department's preamble interpretation in the proposal noted that 
in addition to satisfying the five-part test, a person must receive a 
``fee or other compensation, direct or indirect'' to be an investment 
advice fiduciary.\53\ The Department has long interpreted this 
requirement broadly to cover ``all fees or other compensation incident 
to the transaction in which the investment advice to the plan has been 
rendered or will be rendered.'' \54\ The Department previously noted 
that ``this may include, for example, brokerage commissions, mutual 
fund sales commissions, and insurance sales commissions.'' \55\ In the 
rollover context, fees and compensation received from transactions 
involving rollover assets would be incident to the advice to take a 
distribution from the Plan and to roll over the assets to an IRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii); Code section 4975(e)(3)(B).
    \54\ Preamble to the Department's 1975 Regulation, 40 FR 50842 
(October 31, 1975).
    \55\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While commenters acknowledged this discussion is consistent with 
the Department's longstanding interpretive position, they asserted that 
it is inconsistent with views expressed by the Fifth Circuit in the 
Chamber opinion and with the definition of a fiduciary in Title I and 
the Code. Responses to arguments about the fee requirement and the 
Chamber opinion follow in the next section.

Procedural and Legal Arguments

    Many commenters asserted that the Department failed to comply with 
the Administrative Procedure Act because the interpretation of the 
five-part test set forth in the proposal, in their view, effectively 
amended the five-part test without appropriate procedures. As discussed 
above, the commenters expressed the view that the Department's preamble 
interpretation effectively eliminated the ``regular basis'' and 
``mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding'' prongs of the five-
part test. A few commenters additionally suggested that providing the 
interpretation in the preamble of a proposed class exemption did not 
provide sufficient notice and opportunity for comment.
    The Department's interpretation does not amend the five-part test, 
but only provides interpretive guidance, in the context of the relief 
provided in the new exemption, as to how that test applies to current 
practices in providing investment advice. The regulatory five-part test 
has long been understood to provide a functional fiduciary test, and 
the Department's interpretation is based on this understanding. The 
Department's interpretation does not effectively eliminate any of the 
elements of the five-part test, but rather applies them to current 
marketplace conduct and harmonizes with the current regulatory 
environment.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ One commenter asserted that the Department's interpretation 
was in substance a ``legislative rule'' which required notice and 
comment rulemaking, citing Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health 
Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and Chao v. Rothermel, 
327 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2003). The Department disagrees that the 
factors cited in these cases are satisfied. In this regard, there 
would be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement in the 
absence of the interpretation; the preamble interpretation will not 
be published in the CFR; the Department has not invoked its general 
legislative authority; and for the reasons stated above, the 
interpretation does not effectively amend the five-part test. The 
Department further notes that the interpretation was subject to 
notice and comment as part of the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters opined that the Department's proposed 
interpretation of the five-part test would result in parties being 
considered fiduciaries under Title I and the Code under circumstances 
that would be inconsistent with pronouncements and holdings by the 
Fifth Circuit in the Chamber opinion. In particular, commenters invoked 
statements by the court that fiduciary status is based on the existence 
of a relationship of trust and confidence. Commenters stated that at 
the time of the first instance of advice in an ongoing relationship, a 
financial services professional may not have developed a relationship 
of trust and confidence with its customer.
    In response, the Department notes that the Fifth Circuit's Chamber 
opinion discussed approvingly the Department's 1975 regulation, which 
established the five-part test. The court did not indicate that, in an 
ongoing relationship, there should be any initial instances of advice 
free of fiduciary status until some later period in which a 
relationship of trust and confidence has been demonstrated repeatedly. 
To the contrary, the court expressed agreement that investment advisers 
registered under the Investment Advisers Act may appropriately be 
considered fiduciaries without indicating that fiduciary status would 
only apply after a period of time. Of particular importance, in the 
Department's view, is the court's approving discussion that the SEC has 
``repeatedly held'' that ``[t]he very function of furnishing 
[investment advice for compensation]--learning the personal and 
intimate details of the financial affairs of clients and making 
recommendations as to purchases and

[[Page 82810]]

sales of securities--cultivates a confidential and intimate 
relationship.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 885 F.3d 360, 374 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Hughes, Exchange 
Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *4, *7 (Feb. 18, 1948), 
aff'd sub nom., Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) and 
Mason, Moran & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4832, 1953 WL 44092, at 
*4 (Apr. 23, 1953)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed exemption preamble included a discussion of some 
Financial Institutions paying unrelated parties to solicit clients for 
them in accordance with Rule 206(4)-3 under the Investment Advisers 
Act.\58\ The Department noted that advice by a paid solicitor to take a 
distribution from a Title I Plan and to roll over assets to an IRA 
could be part of ongoing advice to a Retirement Investor, if the 
Financial Institution that pays the solicitor provides ongoing 
fiduciary advice to the IRA owner. A commenter asserted that the 
interpretation appeared to confer fiduciary status on the solicitor in 
the absence of a relationship of trust or confidence, which would be 
impermissible under the Fifth Circuit's opinion. The commenter further 
asked the Department to clarify whether the mere fact of an 
affiliation, such as between a broker-dealer and a registered 
investment adviser, would result in a recommendation by a broker-dealer 
being considered fiduciary investment advice if an ongoing relationship 
later developed with an affiliated registered investment adviser.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ 85 FR 40840 at n.40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department's statement regarding paid solicitors was intended 
to ensure that Financial Institutions do not take the position that the 
actions of a party paid to solicit business for them would be 
considered distinct from any ongoing relationship that resulted. 
Although the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion expressed agreement that 
investment advisers registered under the Investment Advisers Act may 
appropriately be considered fiduciaries under Title I and the Code, the 
opinion did not address the practice of paid solicitors. The Department 
confirms, however, that its statement about paid solicitors was not 
intended to suggest that a broker-dealer that makes an isolated 
recommendation would be considered a fiduciary if, entirely unrelated 
to the recommendation, an ongoing relationship developed with an 
affiliated investment adviser.
    Commenters likewise pointed to statements made in the proposed 
exemption preamble regarding the statutory requirement that, for 
fiduciary status to attach, advice must be provided ``for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect.'' The preamble stated, ``[i]n 
the rollover context, fees and compensation received from transactions 
involving rollover assets would be incident to the advice to take a 
distribution from the Plan and to roll over the assets to an IRA.'' 
\59\ This is consistent with the Department's longstanding position 
that the statutory language covers ``all fees or other compensation 
incident to the transaction in which the investment advice to the plan 
has been rendered or will be rendered.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Id. at 40840.
    \60\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters stated that the preamble interpretation is inconsistent 
with the statute because, in their view, the fee would be for completed 
sales, rather than for advice. Some commenters asserted that their view 
was supported by the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion. The Fifth 
Circuit's Chamber opinion, however, did not criticize the Department's 
longstanding interpretation of this statutory requirement. The Fifth 
Circuit, in fact, indicated the interpretation is appropriate as 
applied to a party that has met the elements of the five-part test.\61\ 
The Department's interpretation of the requirement of a ``fee or 
compensation, direct or indirect'' is consistent with the statutory 
language defining a fiduciary under Title I and the Code. Of course, 
this does not suggest that the Department intends to take the position 
that transactional compensation to an investment professional who does 
not meet the elements of the five-part test is a fee for advice. 
Rather, the Department recognizes that investment professionals may 
engage in non-fiduciary sales activity in which, as in many sales 
activities, recommendations are made to a customer. The Department's 
interpretation respects the legitimate sales function of such a non-
fiduciary investment professional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ 885 F.3d at 374 (discussing approvingly the Department's 
Advisory Opinion 83-60 (Nov. 21 1983) which provided that, ``if, 
under the particular facts and circumstances, the services provided 
by the broker-dealer include the provision of `investment advice', 
as defined in regulation 2510.3-21(c), it may be reasonably expected 
that, even in the absence of a distinct and identifiable fee for 
such advice, a portion of the commissions paid to the broker-dealer 
would represent compensation for the provision of such investment 
advice'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters additionally asserted that the Department's 
preamble interpretation is inconsistent with Executive Orders 13891, 
Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents, 
and 13892, Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness 
in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication, which they 
described as requiring transparency and fairness, and as imposing 
notice and comment requirements, or new restrictions, on agencies when 
issuing guidance documents.\62\ Even assuming the preamble 
interpretation is guidance regulated by the Executive Orders, the 
proposed preamble statement provided notice of the interpretation and 
solicited public comments on it.\63\ Accordingly, the Department 
complied with the Executive Orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Executive Order 13891, 84 FR 55235 (Oct. 15, 2019); 
Executive Order 13892, 84 FR 55238 (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \63\ See 85 FR 40840 (``The Department requests comment on all 
aspects of this part of its proposal.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters contended that the Department's preamble 
interpretation is inconsistent with the characterization of the 
regulatory package as deregulatory. In the Department's view, the 
exemption as a whole is deregulatory because it provides a broader and 
more flexible means under which investment advice fiduciaries to Plans 
and IRAs may receive compensation and engage in certain principal 
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under Title I and the 
Code. Some commenters stated that the exemption effectively reinstates 
the 2016 fiduciary rule, and one asserted that the Department did so 
without addressing the President's related concerns in his Memorandum 
on Fiduciary Duty Rule.\64\ As discussed above, the proposed exemption 
did not amend the 1975 regulation as the 2016 fiduciary rule sought to 
undertake. In addition, unlike the 2016 fiduciary rulemaking, this 
project did not amend other, previously granted, prohibited transaction 
exemptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule (Feb. 3, 
2017), www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Description of the Final Exemption

Scope of Relief--Section I

Financial Institutions

    The exemption is available to entities that satisfy the exemption's 
definition of a ``Financial Institution.'' The exemption limits the 
types of entities that qualify as a Financial Institution to SEC- and 
state-registered investment advisers, broker-dealers, insurance 
companies, and banks.\65\ The definition is based on the entities 
identified in the statutory exemption for investment advice under ERISA 
section 408(b)(14)

[[Page 82811]]

and Code section 4975(d)(17), which are subject to well-established 
regulatory conditions and oversight \66\ and have been deemed able to 
prudently mitigate certain conflicts of interest in their investment 
advice through adherence to tailored principles under the statutory 
exemption. The Department takes a similar approach here, and, 
therefore, is including the same group of entities. To fit within the 
definition of Financial Institution, the firm must not have been 
disqualified or barred from making investment recommendations by any 
insurance, banking, or securities law or regulatory authority 
(including any self-regulatory organization).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ The exemption includes a ``bank or similar financial 
institution supervised by the United States or a state, or a savings 
association (as defined in section 3(b)(1) of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(b)(1)).'' The Department interprets 
this definition to extend to credit unions.
    \66\ ERISA section 408(g)(11)(A) and Code section 
4975(f)(8)(J)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department recognized in the proposed exemption that different 
types of Financial Institutions have different business models, and the 
exemption is drafted to apply flexibly to these institutions.\67\ 
Following is a discussion of the different types of Financial 
Institutions and comments received in connection with the definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Some of the Department's existing prohibited transaction 
exemptions would also apply to the transactions described in the 
next few paragraphs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Broker-Dealers
    Broker-dealers provide a range of services to Retirement Investors, 
ranging from executing one-time transactions to providing personalized 
investment recommendations, and they may be compensated on a 
transactional basis such as through commissions.\68\ If broker-dealers 
that are investment advice fiduciaries with respect to Retirement 
Investors provide investment advice that affects the amount of their 
compensation, they must rely on an exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33319.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that broker-dealers should not be able to rely 
on the exemption because they are not fiduciaries under the securities 
laws. The fiduciary definition in Title I and the Code does not turn, 
however, on whether parties are characterized as fiduciaries under the 
securities laws, but rather on whether the persons rendering advice 
meet the conditions of the functional test of fiduciary status as set 
forth in the Department's regulation. Moreover, the best interest 
standard applicable to broker-dealers under Regulation Best Interest is 
rooted in fiduciary principles.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ The SEC explained ``key elements of the standard of conduct 
that applies to broker-dealers, at the time a recommendation is 
made, under Regulation Best Interest will be substantially similar 
to key elements of the standard of conduct that applies to 
investment advisers pursuant to their fiduciary duty under the 
Advisers Act.'' Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33461.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed by the SEC, under the securities laws, a key 
difference between broker-dealers and investment advisers is that 
investment advisers typically have a duty to monitor their customers' 
investments, whereas broker-dealers may more readily limit the scope of 
their obligations to the specific transactions recommended.\70\ Under 
Title I and the Code, investment advice fiduciaries are not necessarily 
obligated to assume a duty to monitor, absent an agreement, arrangement 
or understanding with their investor client to the contrary. The 
Department's exemption places the transaction-based advice model on an 
even playing field with the investment adviser model, and applies 
fiduciary standards in both contexts that are generally consistent with 
the standards imposed by the SEC. In this manner, the exemption avoids 
undue expense and generally aligns its requirements with SEC 
requirements. Moreover, Congress included broker-dealers and registered 
investment advisers in the statutory advice exemption in ERISA section 
408(b)(14) and Code section 4975(d)(17), according to the same set of 
conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ The SEC explained that ``[t]here are also key differences 
between Regulation Best Interest and the Advisers Act fiduciary 
standard that reflect the distinction between the services and 
relationships typically offered under the two business models. For 
example, an investment adviser's fiduciary duty generally includes a 
duty to provide ongoing advice and monitoring, while Regulation Best 
Interest imposes no such duty and, instead, requires that a broker-
dealer act in the retail customer's best interest at the time a 
recommendation is made.'' Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 
33321 (emphasis in the original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Registered Investment Advisers
    Registered investment advisers generally provide ongoing investment 
advice and services and are commonly paid either an assets under 
management fee or a fixed fee.\71\ If a registered investment adviser 
is an investment advice fiduciary that charges only a level fee that 
does not vary on the basis of the investment advice provided, the 
registered investment adviser may not violate the prohibited 
transaction rules.\72\ However, if the registered investment adviser 
provides investment advice that causes itself to receive the level fee, 
such as through advice to roll over Plan assets to an IRA, the fee 
(including an ongoing management fee paid with respect to the IRA) is 
prohibited under Title I and the Code.\73\ Additionally, if a 
registered investment adviser that is an investment advice fiduciary is 
dually-registered as a broker-dealer, the registered investment adviser 
may engage in a prohibited transaction if it recommends a transaction 
that increases the firm's compensation, such as for execution of 
securities transactions in its brokerage capacity. Of course, as 
discussed above, rollover recommendations or assistance with a rollover 
do not constitute fiduciary investment advice if the five-part test, 
including the regular basis prong, is not satisfied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ 84 FR 33319.
    \72\ As noted above, fiduciaries who use their authority to 
cause themselves or their affiliates or related entities to receive 
additional compensation violate the prohibited transaction 
provisions unless an exemption applies. 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(e)(1).
    \73\ As discussed above, the Department has long interpreted the 
requirement of a fee to cover ``all fees or other compensation 
incident to the transaction in which the investment advice to the 
plan has been rendered or will be rendered.'' Preamble to the 
Department's 1975 Regulation, 40 FR 50842 (October 31, 1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters sought clarification of the exemption's coverage of 
certain transactions particularly relevant to registered investment 
advisers. The commenters inquired about reliance on the exemption 
solely for a rollover recommendation, under circumstances in which the 
advice arrangement after the rollover does not involve prohibited 
transactions (e.g., the compensation arrangement involves only a level 
fee that does not vary on the basis of the investment transactions) or 
is not eligible for relief because it is discretionary. The Department 
confirms that the exemption is available for fiduciary investment 
advice regarding rollover transactions, even in situations where the 
exemption is not available (or needed) either before or after the 
rollover transaction. The commenter also inquired as to whether a 
financial services provider that serves as a discretionary investment 
manager to a Plan pursuant to ERISA section 3(38), a transaction that 
is not covered by the exemption, can rely on the exemption to provide 
fiduciary investment advice to the Plan's participants and 
beneficiaries on distribution options. The Department confirms that the 
exemption is available in that circumstance as well.
Insurance Companies
    Insurance companies commonly compensate insurance agents on a 
commission basis, which generally creates prohibited transactions when 
insurance agents are investment advice fiduciaries that provide 
investment advice to Retirement Investors in connection with the sales. 
The Department is aware that insurance companies often sell insurance 
products and fixed (including indexed) annuities through different 
distribution channels

[[Page 82812]]

than broker-dealers and registered investment advisers. While some 
insurance agents are employees of an insurance company, other insurance 
agents are independent, and work with multiple insurance companies. The 
final exemption applies to all of these business models.
    In the proposal, the Department suggested insurance companies would 
have several options for compliance. The proposal stated that insurance 
companies could comply with the new exemption by overseeing independent 
insurance agents; they could comply with the new exemption by creating 
oversight and compliance systems through contracts with insurance 
intermediaries such as independent marketing organizations (IMOs), 
field marketing organizations (FMOs) or brokerage general agencies 
(BGAs); or they could rely on the existing class exemption for 
insurance transactions, PTE 84-24,\74\ as an alternative. Further, the 
Department sought comment on whether the exemption should include 
insurance intermediaries as Financial Institutions for the 
recommendation of fixed (including indexed) annuity contracts, and if 
so, how the insurance intermediaries should be defined and whether 
additional protective conditions might be necessary with respect to the 
intermediaries. Discussion of comments on these aspects of the proposal 
follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Class Exemption for Certain Transactions Involving 
Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance 
Companies, Investment Companies and Investment Company Principal 
Underwriters, 49 FR 13208 (Apr. 3, 1984), as corrected, 49 FR 24819 
(June 15, 1984), as amended, 71 FR 5887 (Feb. 3, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Direct Oversight
    In the proposal, the Department stated that insurance companies 
could supervise independent insurance agent Investment Professionals 
who provide investment advice on their products. To comply with the 
exemption, the Department stated that an insurance company could adopt 
and implement supervisory and review mechanisms and avoid improper 
incentives that preferentially push the products, riders, and annuity 
features that might incentivize Investment Professionals to provide 
investment advice to Retirement Investors that does not meet the 
Impartial Conduct Standards. Insurance companies could implement 
procedures to review annuity sales to Retirement Investors to ensure 
that they were made in satisfaction of the Impartial Conduct Standards, 
much as they may already be required to review annuity sales to ensure 
compliance with state-law suitability requirements.\75\ The Department 
stated in the proposal that insurance company Financial Institutions 
would be responsible only for an Investment Professional's 
recommendation and sale of products offered to Retirement Investors by 
the insurance company in conjunction with fiduciary investment advice, 
and not unrelated and unaffiliated insurers.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Cf. NAIC Model Regulation Section 6.C.(2)(d) (``The insurer 
shall establish and maintain procedures for the review of each 
recommendation prior to issuance of an annuity that are designed to 
ensure that there is a reasonable basis to determine that the 
recommended annuity would effectively address the particular 
consumer's financial situation, insurance needs and financial 
objectives. Such review procedures may apply a screening system for 
the purpose of identifying selected transactions for additional 
review and may be accomplished electronically or through other means 
including, but not limited to, physical review. Such an electronic 
or other system may be designed to require additional review only of 
those transactions identified for additional review by the selection 
criteria''); and (e) (``The insurer shall establish and maintain 
reasonable procedures to detect recommendations that are not in 
compliance with subsections A, B, D and E. This may include, but is 
not limited to, confirmation of the consumer's consumer profile 
information, systematic customer surveys, producer and consumer 
interviews, confirmation letters, producer statements or 
attestations and programs of internal monitoring. Nothing in this 
subparagraph prevents an insurer from complying with this 
subparagraph by applying sampling procedures, or by confirming the 
consumer profile information or other required information under 
this section after issuance or delivery of the annuity''),. The 
prior version of the model regulation, which was adopted in some 
form by a number of states, also included similar provisions 
requiring systems to supervise recommendations. See Annuity 
Suitability (A) Working Group Exposure Draft, Adopted by the 
Committee Dec. 30, 2019, available at www.naic.org/documents/committees_mo275.pdf. (comparing 2020 version with prior version).
    \76\ Cf. id., Section 6.C.(4) (``An insurer is not required to 
include in its system of supervision: (a) A producer's 
recommendations to consumers of products other than the annuities 
offered by the insurer'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters took the position in response to the proposal that 
insurance companies are not set up in such a manner as to be able to 
act as Financial Institutions with respect to independent insurance 
agents, which they said would ultimately put insurance companies and 
insurance products at a competitive disadvantage. Commenters asserted 
that insurance companies do not have insight into or control over 
independent agents' business and/or behavior and do not consent to or 
authorize their activities. While several commenters acknowledged that 
the proposal was consistent with the NAIC Model Regulation in providing 
that an insurance company Financial Institution would be responsible 
only for recommendations with respect to its own products, they argued 
that the proposed exemption deviated from the NAIC's approach in 
failing to also state that insurers do not have to include in their 
supervisory systems ``consideration of or comparison to options 
available to the producer or compensation relating to those options 
other than annuities or other products offered by the insurer.'' \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ NAIC Model Regulation Section 6.C.(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, the Department notes that the NAIC Model Regulation 
contemplates that insurance companies will maintain a system of 
oversight with respect to insurance agents. Section I provides that the 
purpose of the Model Regulation is to ``require producers, as defined 
in this regulation, to act in the best interest of the consumer when 
making a recommendation of an annuity and to require insurers to 
establish and maintain a system to supervise recommendations so that 
the insurance needs and financial objectives of consumers at the time 
of the transaction are effectively addressed.'' \78\ Accordingly, the 
Department believes that a system of oversight by insurance companies 
over independent insurance agents is achievable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Id., Section 1.A. The Department also notes that the prior 
version of the Model Regulation, which was adopted in some form by a 
number of states, contains a similar statement. (``The purpose of 
this regulation is to require insurers to establish a system to 
supervise recommendations and to set forth standards and procedures 
for recommendations to consumers that result in transactions 
involving annuity products so that the insurance needs and financial 
objectives of consumers at the time of the transaction are 
appropriately addressed.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In terms of the specific oversight requirements, the Department 
reiterates the statement in the proposal that the exemption requires 
insurance company Financial Institutions to be responsible only for an 
Investment Professional's recommendation and sale of products offered 
to Retirement Investors by the insurance company in conjunction with 
fiduciary investment advice, and not an unrelated and unaffiliated 
insurer. The Department also clarifies, in response to commenters, that 
the exemption does not require consideration of or comparison to 
specific options available to an independent insurance agent or 
compensation relating to those options, other than annuities or other 
products offered by the insurer. The Department's approach is 
consistent with the approach of the NAIC Model Regulation in this 
regard as well. However, the Department does not intend to suggest that 
insurance company Financial Institutions have no obligation to evaluate 
the financial inducements they offer to independent agents to ensure 
that the exemption's standards are

[[Page 82813]]

satisfied. As discussed above, Financial Institutions can implement 
procedures to review annuity sales to Retirement Investors under 
fiduciary investment advice arrangements to ensure that they were made 
in satisfaction of the Impartial Conduct Standards, much as they may 
already be required to review annuity sales to ensure compliance with 
state-law suitability requirements.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See supra n. 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Insurance Intermediaries
    In the proposal, the Department stated that insurance companies 
could create a system of oversight and compliance by contracting with 
an insurance intermediary or other entity to implement policies and 
procedures designed to ensure that all of the agents associated with 
the intermediary adhere to the conditions of this exemption. Thus, for 
example, as one possible approach, the preamble stated that an 
insurance intermediary could eliminate compensation incentives across 
all the insurance companies that work with the insurance intermediary, 
assisting each of the insurance companies with their independent 
obligations under the exemption. This might involve the insurance 
intermediary's review of documentation prepared by insurance agents to 
comply with the exemption, as may be required by the insurance company, 
or the use of third-party industry comparisons available in the 
marketplace to help independent insurance agents recommend products 
that are prudent for the Retirement Investors they advise.
    This type of arrangement is also contemplated by the NAIC Model 
Regulation, which provides that an insurer is not restricted from 
contracting for performance of supervisory review functions.\80\ Also, 
insurance intermediaries can receive payment for these services; to the 
extent they are ``affiliates'' or ``related entities'' of the Financial 
Institution or Investment Professional, the exemption extends to their 
receipt of compensation so long as the conditions of the exemption are 
satisfied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ NAIC Model Regulation, Section 6.C.(3)(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter that is an IMO supported the suggestion in the 
preamble that insurance intermediaries could serve this function. The 
commenter stated that it currently works with insurance companies to 
ensure that their policies and procedures are carried out by 
independent agents. The commenter took the position that it is 
positioned to work directly with insurance companies to ensure that the 
proper oversight and compliance systems are in place to comply with the 
exemption.
PTE 84-24
    To the extent that insurance companies determine that the 
supervisory requirements of this exemption are not well-suited to their 
business models, it is important to note that insurance and annuity 
products can also continue to be recommended and sold under the 
existing exemption for insurance transactions, PTE 84-24. Unlike in the 
Department's 2016 fiduciary rulemaking, PTE 84-24 is not being amended 
in connection with the current proposed exemption.
    PTE 84-24 provides prohibited transaction relief for the ``receipt, 
directly or indirectly, by an insurance agent or broker . . . of a 
sales commission from an insurance company in connection with the 
purchase, with plan assets, of an insurance or annuity contract.'' The 
agent or broker must generally disclose its sales commission and 
receive written approval of the transaction from an independent 
fiduciary.
    A commenter expressed concern that the Department's disavowal of 
the Deseret Letter would result in a requirement to provide the 
disclosures required by PTE 84-24 to a plan fiduciary, rather than the 
IRA owner, in the case of a rollover recommendation. The Department 
confirms that when a transaction under PTE 84-24 involves an IRA, the 
disclosure can be provided to the IRA owner. Further, to avoid 
uncertainty, the Department also confirms that an insurance 
intermediary can receive a part of the commission payment that is 
permitted under PTE 84-24, provided the conditions of the exemption are 
satisfied.
Insurance Intermediaries as Financial Institutions
    The Department also sought comment in the proposal as to whether 
the exemption's definition of Financial Institution should be expanded 
to include insurance intermediaries. Under that approach, the insurance 
intermediary would implement the conditions of the exemption applicable 
to Financial Institutions, and insurance companies would not have to do 
so.
    Several commenters supported the addition of insurance 
intermediaries as Financial Institutions, in connection with their 
contention that insurance companies are not in a position to exert 
oversight over independent insurance agents because the independent 
agents sell products of other insurance companies as well. A few 
commenters stated that the insurance intermediaries are in a position 
to do so because of their proximity to and expertise working with 
independent insurance agents. The commenters stated that insurance 
intermediaries have greater insight into and control over the actions 
of independent insurance agents than insurance companies. Further, the 
commenters emphasized that insurance intermediaries are regulated by 
the states as insurance agencies, and they have sufficient resources 
and staff to act as Financial Institutions. These commenters also 
asserted insurance intermediaries' similarity to the registered 
investment adviser business model and stated that a failure to include 
insurance intermediaries as Financial Institutions would result in a 
competitive disadvantage for insurance intermediaries and potentially 
less choice for Retirement Investors.
    Other commenters, however, indicated that insurance intermediaries 
are not in a position to oversee independent insurance agents because 
it is common for independent insurance agents to work with multiple 
intermediaries, raising issues as to whether multiple intermediaries 
would have to oversee the same independent agent. One commenter also 
indicated that independent agents have contracts or arrangements 
directly with the insurance company; by contrast, there is no contract 
or implied contract between insurance intermediaries and independent 
insurance agents, and insurance intermediaries do not direct the 
independent insurance agents' recommendations to Retirement Investors. 
A few commenters asserted that unlike the other entities included in 
the definition of a Financial Institution, insurance intermediaries do 
not have a regulator that sets standards regarding oversight and 
supervisory policies and procedures. One commenter asserted that the 
exemption would need to include conditions addressing the Department's 
oversight of insurance intermediaries if they were included in the 
definition of a Financial Institution. Another commenter urged the 
Department to work closely with insurance intermediaries before 
including them as Financial Institutions, so as to avoid imposing 
conditions that are impractical or burdensome.
    Based on the record before it, the Department has concluded that it 
should not expand the scope of the definition of Financial Institution 
to insurance intermediaries, such as IMOs, FMOs, or BGAs. These 
entities do not have supervisory obligations over independent insurance 
agents under state or federal law that are comparable

[[Page 82814]]

to those of the other entities, such as insurance companies, banks, and 
broker-dealers, or a history of exercising such supervision in 
practice. They are generally described as wholesaling and marketing and 
support organizations, but not tasked with ensuring compliance with 
regulatory standards. In addition, they are not subject to the sort of 
capital and solvency requirements imposed on state-regulated insurance 
companies and banks.
    Commenters also did not provide specific suggestions for how to 
define the insurance intermediaries that could be Financial 
Institutions. One commenter suggested that Financial Institution status 
and its attendant compliance responsibilities should be placed on the 
intermediary that is closest to the Retirement Investor and the 
Investment Professional advising that investor. However, this 
suggestion does not alleviate the operational issues that would exist 
when an independent agent works with or through more than one 
intermediary. Commenters also did not offer suggestions as to 
substantive conditions that should be included to make up for the lack 
of regulatory oversight. The considerations above may not be 
insuperable obstacles to treating insurance intermediaries as Financial 
Institutions under the terms of a future exemption that is based on an 
appropriate record focused on such support organizations. The 
Department anticipates that any such exemption would specifically focus 
on the unique attributes, strengths, and weaknesses of these entities, 
and on any special conditions that would be necessary to ensure they 
are able to act in the necessary supervisory capacity as Financial 
Institutions.
    The Department also has maintained the provision in this exemption 
under which the definition of a Financial Institution can expand based 
upon subsequently granting individual exemptions to additional entities 
that are investment advice fiduciaries that meet the five-part test and 
are seeking to be treated as covered Financial Institutions. Thus, 
additional types of entities, such as IMOs, FMOs, or BGAs may 
separately apply for prohibited transaction relief to receive 
compensation in connection with the provision of investment advice, 
according to the same conditions that apply to the Financial 
Institutions covered by this exemption. If the Department grants to 
such an entity an individual exemption under ERISA section 408(a) and 
Code section 4975(c)(2) after the date this exemption is granted, the 
expanded definition of Financial Institution in the individual 
exemption would be added to this class exemption so other entities that 
satisfy the definition could similarly use this class exemption.
    The Department acknowledges that some commenters felt this approach 
would put insurance intermediaries at a disadvantage as compared to 
other Financial Institutions. As discussed above, however, there is 
cause for concern about including insurance intermediaries in the final 
exemption on the same footing as the types of entities included in the 
Financial Institution definition. On the record before it, the 
Department has concluded that the better course of action is to invite 
any insurance intermediaries to apply for a separate exemption as part 
of a public notice and comment process that can specifically focus on 
their unique attributes, so that the Department can determine whether 
and how to grant exemptive relief, subject to appropriate definitional 
and protective conditions.
Banks
    Banks and similar institutions are permitted to act as Financial 
Institutions under the exemption if they or their employees are 
investment advice fiduciaries with respect to Retirement Investors. The 
Department sought comment on whether banks and their employees provide 
investment advice to Retirement Investors, and if so, whether the 
proposal needed adjustment to address any unique aspects of their 
business models.
    A trade association representing banks submitted a comment that 
described a wide variety of interactions with banking customers, 
including IRA investment programs and bank networking arrangements and 
referral programs. The commenter stated that banks that render 
investment advice are fully subject to applicable federal and state 
banking laws governing fiduciary status and activities.\81\ The 
commenter expressed support for the exemption, so long as certain 
suggested changes were adopted to conform to banks' distinct business 
model, particularly with respect to the retrospective review and the 
recordkeeping provision. The Department's responses to these comments 
on the exemption are discussed below in the sections on the 
retrospective review and recordkeeping provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Citing 12 CFR part 9 (fiduciary activities of banks).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Affiliates and Related Entities
    One commenter stated that the exemption text should include a 
definition of ``affiliate'' and ``related entity.'' The Department has 
added the definitions that previously appeared in the preamble of the 
proposed exemption, in Section V(a) and (j), respectively, of the final 
exemption text.
    An affiliate is defined as (1) any person directly or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or 
under common control with the Investment Professional or Financial 
Institution (for this purpose, ``control'' means the power to exercise 
a controlling influence over the management or policies of a person 
other than an individual); (2) any officer, director, partner, 
employee, or relative (as defined in ERISA section 3(15)), of the 
Investment Professional or Financial Institution; and (3) any 
corporation or partnership of which the Investment Professional or 
Financial Institution is an officer, director, or partner. A related 
entity is defined as an entity that is not an affiliate, but in which 
the Investment Professional or Financial Institution has an interest 
that may affect the exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary.
    Another commenter stated that the Department should add foreign 
affiliates of banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and 
registered investment advisers to the entities covered by the 
exemption, given the increasingly global nature of retirement services. 
The proposed exemption indicated that relief would be available to 
affiliates and related entities of a Financial Institution and 
Investment Professional, if the Financial Institution and Investment 
Professional satisfied the exemption's conditions. The Department did 
not exclude foreign affiliates in the proposal, and confirms that they 
are not excluded in the exemption, as finalized.
Other Entities--Recordkeepers and HSA Providers
    One commenter requested that recordkeepers be included as Financial 
Institutions. To the extent that an entity hired to act as a 
recordkeeper to a Plan or an IRA falls within the list of defined 
Financial Institutions, it may rely upon the exemption. However, the 
Department declines to add a general category for recordkeepers to the 
definition. The Department does not believe a recordkeeper that is not 
also a bank, broker-dealer, insurance company, or registered investment 
adviser would have the requisite regulatory oversight to necessarily 
act as a Financial Institution. However, such parties can seek an 
individual exemption from the Department, as

[[Page 82815]]

provided in the definition of a Financial Institution in Section V(e).
    One commenter addressed health savings accounts (HSAs), indicating 
that the exemption should apply to advice to individuals with HSAs. The 
commenter did not indicate whether the definition of Financial 
Institution needed to be expanded to facilitate advice regarding HSAs. 
The exemption, as proposed and finalized, defines an IRA as ``any 
account or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through 
(F)'' which includes a ``health savings account described in [Code] 
section 223(d).'' Therefore, advice may be provided to individuals with 
HSAs, subject to the conditions of the exemption.

Investment Professionals

    As defined in the proposal, an Investment Professional is an 
individual who is a fiduciary of a Plan or an IRA by reason of the 
provision of investment advice, who is an employee, independent 
contractor, agent, or representative of a Financial Institution, and 
who satisfies the federal and state regulatory and licensing 
requirements of insurance, banking, and securities laws (including 
self-regulatory organizations) with respect to the covered transaction, 
as applicable. Similar to the definition of Financial Institution, this 
definition also includes a requirement that the Investment Professional 
has not been disqualified from making investment recommendations by any 
insurance, banking, or securities law or regulatory authority 
(including any self-regulatory organization).
    One commenter suggested that the exemption should require 
investment professionals to be certified by an accredited organization 
or state agency in financial planning issues. The Department has not 
adopted this suggestion because it does not have sufficient information 
in the record on this type of certification to incorporate it as a 
condition.
    Another commenter asked the Department to confirm that insurance 
agents unaffiliated with a broker-dealer or registered investment 
adviser are investment advice fiduciaries when providing investment 
advice to Retirement Investors through the sale of insurance products 
and fixed (including indexed) annuities, and are subject to the 
requirements under the exemption. The Department confirms that an 
insurance agent that meets the elements of the five-part test and 
receives a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect 
to a particular transaction, is a fiduciary with respect to that 
transaction. Under those circumstances, the insurance agent must avoid 
prohibited transactions or comply with a prohibited transaction 
exemption.

Retirement Investors and Plans

    The exemption provides relief for specified Covered Transactions 
when Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals provide 
investment advice to Retirement Investors. A Retirement Investor is 
defined as (1) a participant or beneficiary of a Plan with authority to 
direct the investment of assets in his or her account or to take a 
distribution, (2) the beneficial owner of an IRA acting on behalf of 
the IRA, or (3) a fiduciary of a Plan or an IRA. A Plan for purposes of 
the exemption is defined as any employee benefit plan described in 
ERISA section 3(3) and any plan described in Code section 
4975(e)(1)(A). An IRA is defined as any plan that is an account or 
annuity described in the other parts of section 4975(e)(1): Paragraphs 
4975(e)(1)(B) through (F).
    A few commenters questioned the meaning of Retirement Investor with 
respect to the definition's use of the word Plan. One commenter 
requested clarification that the use of the term Plan with respect to a 
Retirement Investor, in fact, included Title I welfare benefit plans 
despite the use of the word ``retirement.'' Two other commenters 
requested that the definition of Plan specifically exclude Title I 
welfare benefit plans that do not include an investment component, such 
as health insurance plans, disability insurance plans, and term life 
insurance plans.
    While the exemption uses the term Retirement Investor throughout 
the exemption, the use of the term was not intended to exclude 
investment advice provided to Title I welfare benefit plans. In fact, 
the exemption's definition of Plan states that it is defined, in part, 
by reference to ERISA section 3(3), which explicitly includes Title I 
welfare benefit plans.
    With respect to the request to exclude Plans that do not contain an 
investment component, the Department responds that the exemption is 
only necessary and available to fiduciaries who provide investment 
advice as described in the five-part test. If there is no fiduciary 
investment advice, the exemption would not be applicable or needed. In 
light of this limitation, the Department does not believe any further 
amendment to the definition of a Plan is necessary.

Covered Transactions

    The exemption permits Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals, and their affiliates and related entities, to receive 
reasonable compensation as a result of providing fiduciary investment 
advice. The exemption specifically covers compensation received as a 
result of investment advice to roll over assets from a Plan to an IRA. 
The exemption also provides relief for a Financial Institution to 
engage in the purchase or sale of an asset in a riskless principal 
transaction or a Covered Principal Transaction, and receive a mark-up, 
mark-down, or other payment. The exemption provides relief from ERISA 
section 406(a)(1)(A) and (D) and 406(b) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(A), 
(D), (E), and (F).\82\
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    \82\ The exemption does not include relief from ERISA section 
406(a)(1)(C) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(C) for the furnishing of 
goods, services, or facilities between a Plan/IRA and a party in 
interest/disqualified person. The statutory exemptions in ERISA 
section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) provide this necessary 
relief for Plan or IRA service providers, subject to the applicable 
conditions and accompanying regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section I(b)(1) of the exemption provides broad relief for 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals that are investment 
advice fiduciaries to receive all types of compensation as a result of 
their investment advice to Retirement Investors, so long as the 
compensation is reasonable. For example, it covers compensation 
received as a result of investment advice to acquire, hold, dispose of, 
or exchange securities and other investments. It also covers 
compensation received as a result of investment advice to take a 
distribution from a Plan or to roll over the assets to an IRA, or from 
investment advice regarding other similar transactions including (but 
not limited to) rollovers from one Plan to another Plan, one IRA to 
another IRA, or from one type of account to another account (e.g., from 
a commission-based account to a fee-based account), all limited to the 
extent such rollovers are permitted under applicable law.
    Section I(b)(2) addresses the circumstance in which the Financial 
Institution may, in addition to providing investment advice, engage in 
a purchase or sale of an investment with a Retirement Investor and 
receive a mark-up or a mark-down or similar payment on the transaction. 
The exemption extends to both riskless principal transactions and 
Covered Principal Transactions. A riskless principal transaction is a 
transaction in which a Financial Institution, after having received an 
order from a Retirement Investor to buy or sell an investment product, 
purchases or sells the same investment product for the Financial 
Institution's own account to offset the contemporaneous transaction 
with the Retirement Investor. Covered Principal

[[Page 82816]]

Transactions are defined in the exemption as principal transactions 
involving certain specified types of investments, discussed in more 
detail below. Principal transactions that are not riskless and that do 
not fall within the definition of Covered Principal Transaction are not 
covered by the exemption.
General Comments on the Covered Transactions
    Several commenters expressed concern about the scope of the 
exemption extending to the receipt of payments from third parties, such 
as 12b-1 fees and revenue sharing. One commenter also objected to 
relief for sales loads. The commenter opined that the market itself is 
moving away from these types of fees and expenses and numerous court 
decisions indicate that a Plan's payment of such fees may be a 
violation of the duty of prudence. Another commenter likened this type 
of payment as akin to doctors taking kickbacks from pharmaceutical 
companies. Another commenter stated that the exemption should not 
provide relief for principal transactions and proprietary products.
    The Department believes that the flexibility provided under the 
exemption ensures that the various business models used by different 
Financial Institutions are accommodated under the exemption to ensure 
Retirement Investors have full access to their preferred advice 
provider and method of paying for advice. The conditions of the 
exemption are designed to ensure that Financial Institutions assess all 
sources of fees and revenue to identify and mitigate conflicts of 
interest that they create, and ultimately receive no more than 
reasonable compensation in connection with investment advice 
transactions. These conditions are designed to ensure that Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals act in the best interest of 
Retirement Investors, even if some sources of compensation come from 
12b-1 fees, revenue sharing, sales loads, principal transactions, or 
proprietary products. The Department continues to believe that this 
principles-based approach provides flexibility to Financial 
Institutions while ensuring all advice is in the best interest of 
Retirement Investors, compensation is limited to reasonable 
compensation, and Investment Professionals do not subordinate the 
Retirement Investors' interest to their own.
    Another commenter asked the Department to expand the scope of 
relief in the exemption to ERISA section 406(a)(1)(B) and Code section 
4975(c)(1)(B) for extensions of credit, in order to cover items such as 
overdraft protection, receipt of float, error corrections, settlement 
accommodations, short sales and other margin transactions, and paying 
fees in advance.
    The Department has not expanded the exemption as requested by the 
commenter. The commenter did not provide information on these 
transactions and how the exemption conditions would protect the 
interests of Retirement Investors engaging in the transactions. An 
existing exemption, PTE 75-1, Part V, provides relief for an extension 
of credit by a broker-dealer in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities; however, the exemption does not extend to the receipt of 
compensation for the extension of credit if the broker-dealer renders 
fiduciary investment advice with respect to the transaction. This does 
not foreclose the Department, however, from considering expanding the 
relief in PTE 75-1, Part V, based upon a separate request for exemptive 
relief.

Principal Transactions

    Principal transactions involve the purchase from, or sale to, a 
Plan or an IRA, of an investment, on behalf of the Financial 
Institution's own account or the account of a person directly or 
indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controlling, controlled 
by, or under common control with the Financial Institution. Because an 
investment advice fiduciary engaging in a principal transaction is on 
both sides of the transaction, the firm has a clear and direct conflict 
of interest. In addition, the securities typically traded in principal 
transactions often lack pre-trade price transparency and Retirement 
Investors may, therefore, have difficulty in prospectively evaluating 
the fairness of a particular principal transaction. These investments 
also can be associated with low liquidity, low transparency, and the 
possible incentive to sell unwanted investments held by the Financial 
Institution.
    Consistent with the Department's historical approach to prohibited 
transaction exemptions for fiduciaries, this exemption includes relief 
for principal transactions that is limited in scope and subject to 
additional conditions, as set forth in the definition of Covered 
Principal Transaction, described below. Importantly, certain 
transactions are not considered principal transactions for purposes of 
the exemption, and so can occur under the more general conditions. This 
includes the sale of an insurance or annuity contract, or a mutual fund 
transaction.
    Principal transactions that are ``riskless principal transactions'' 
are covered under the exemption as well, subject to the general 
conditions. A riskless principal transaction is a transaction in which 
a Financial Institution, after having received an order from a 
Retirement Investor to buy or sell an investment product, purchases or 
sells the same investment product in a contemporaneous transaction for 
the Financial Institution's own account to offset the transaction with 
the Retirement Investor.
Limited Definition of ``Covered Principal Transaction''
    The exemption uses the defined term Covered Principal Transaction 
to describe the types of non-riskless principal transactions that are 
covered under the exemption. For purchases from a Plan or an IRA, the 
term is broadly defined to include any security or other investment 
property. This is to reflect the possibility that a principal 
transaction will be needed to provide liquidity to a Retirement 
Investor. However, for sales to a Plan or an IRA, the exemption 
provides more limited relief. For sales, the definition of Covered 
Principal Transaction is limited to transactions involving: U.S. dollar 
denominated corporate debt securities offered pursuant to a 
registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. Treasury 
securities, debt securities issued or guaranteed by a U.S. federal 
government agency other than the U.S. Department of Treasury, debt 
securities issued or guaranteed by a government-sponsored enterprise 
(GSE), municipal securities, certificates of deposit, and interests in 
Unit Investment Trusts. In response to one commenter's specific 
question as to whether the term ``certificates of deposit'' includes 
brokered certificates of deposit, the Department clarifies that the use 
of the term ``certificates of deposit'' includes brokered certificates 
of deposit that are sold in principal transactions.
    With respect to the definition of Covered Principal Transaction, 
some commenters wrote that there should not be a limit on the types of 
investments that can be sold by Financial Institutions to Retirement 
Investors, including one commenter who stated that the Department 
should eliminate or adjust exemption conditions that would limit 
Retirement Investors' access to full service brokerage accounts, 
including access to principal markets. They argued that some products 
would generally only be available through a

[[Page 82817]]

principal transaction, and that the Department should not substitute 
its judgment for a fiduciary acting in accordance with the Act's 
standards. Further, they stated that the existing limit is inconsistent 
with Regulation Best Interest which does not include any limitations on 
principal transactions, and that there were sufficient existing 
protections under securities laws. Commenters identified a variety of 
potential investments that they would like to see incorporated as 
Covered Principal Transactions, including foreign debt, structured 
notes, corporate debt in the secondary market, equity securities 
(including initial public offerings and national market system 
securities), new issues, issuers other than corporations, foreign 
currency, foreign securities, and closed end funds.
    The Department has considered these comments but has not expanded 
the exemption's definition of a Covered Principal Transaction, 
including its enumerated list of investments. The definition of Covered 
Principal Transaction is intentionally narrow, based on the potentially 
acute conflicts of interest created by principal transactions. While 
commenters argued that the Department is substituting its own judgment 
for that of Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals, the 
Department believes that the risks created by principal transactions' 
unique conflicts are great enough to only justify allowing otherwise 
prohibited transactions if those transactions are set within prescribed 
conditions specifically designed to address those conflicts of 
interest. Further, because the exemption is addressing transactions 
prohibited solely under Title I and the Code, whether the definition of 
a Covered Principal Transaction is consistent with Regulation Best 
Interest, or subject to other securities law protections, is not 
determinative. The Department is required to make findings as to 
whether the exemption is in the interests of, and protective of the 
rights of, Plan participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners.\83\ The 
Department stresses its obligation to exercise great care in 
authorizing transactions that Congress prohibited based upon their 
potential for abuse and resulting injury to Plan participants and IRA 
owners. Given the unique starting point--that Congress statutorily 
prohibited these transactions in Title I and the Code--the Department 
does not agree that the approach suggested by the commenters is 
appropriate. To the extent parties have interpretive questions 
regarding the scope of the exemption in this regard, the Department 
intends to support Financial Institutions, Investment Professionals, 
plan sponsors and fiduciaries, and other affected parties, with 
compliance assistance following publication of the final exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department believes the best way to address commenters' 
concerns regarding additional investments is to include the provision 
allowing the definition of Covered Principal Transaction to expand upon 
the Department's grant of an individual exemption covering a particular 
type of principal transaction. An individual exemption request would 
provide the Department with the opportunity to gain the additional 
information it would need to determine whether an investment should be 
included in this exemption. Further, individual exemptions are required 
to be published in the Federal Register and allow for public comment 
before they are finalized. These procedural requirements are protective 
of Retirement Investors.
    One commenter disagreed with the addition of investments through 
the individual prohibited transaction exemption process. The commenter 
argued that the addition of investments should be accomplished through 
a formal amendment to the exemption. The Department believes that the 
procedural requirements described in the preceding paragraph provide 
protections to Retirement Investors, and the ability to incorporate 
additional investments by adopting an individual exemption provides an 
appropriately streamlined approach to address discrete areas of scope 
within the class exemption.
Credit Quality and Liquidity
    For sales of a debt security to a Plan or an IRA, the definition of 
Covered Principal Transaction requires the Financial Institution to 
adopt written policies and procedures related to credit quality and 
liquidity. Specifically, the policies and procedures must be reasonably 
designed to ensure that the debt security, at the time of the 
recommendation, has no greater than moderate credit risk and has 
sufficient liquidity that it could be sold at or near its carrying 
value within a reasonably short period of time. This standard is 
included to prevent the exemption from being available to Financial 
Institutions that recommend speculative or illiquid debt securities 
from their own accounts.
    A few commenters opposed the proposed condition requiring adoption 
of policies and procedures related to credit quality and liquidity. The 
commenters argued that this condition substitutes the Department's 
judgment for that of the Retirement Investor. Further, they stated that 
the standards would be difficult to apply, requiring firms to look into 
the future to know whether a bond would be actively traded. One 
commenter stated specifically that a liquidity condition should not be 
included.
    The Department has considered these comments, but has included the 
credit quality and liquidity policies and procedures condition in the 
final exemption. Principal transactions are inherently conflicted 
transactions. As a result, the Department believes that unique 
conditions, such as the credit and liquidity requirements, address the 
heightened conflicts of interest and are specifically tailored to 
address conflicts inherent with respect to debt securities. The 
Department is not substituting its judgment for that of Retirement 
Investors; it is only setting necessary safeguards to prevent abuses by 
Financial Institutions relying on the exemption. Additionally, the 
Department notes that the exemption is not necessary for self-directed 
retirement accounts or transactions that do not involve fiduciary 
investment advice. Therefore, such truly self-directed accounts and 
transactions may involve the purchase of any type of investment on a 
principal basis.
    Further, the Department does not believe the standards are 
unworkable. Financial Institutions regularly evaluate the credit risk 
associated with their investments and assess their liquidity. And it is 
important to note that the policies and procedures must be reasonably 
designed to ensure that the standards are met at the time of the 
transaction; the exemption does not require them to be satisfied for 
the duration of the investment. Indeed, a commenter who raised concerns 
about the requirement went on to point out ways a Financial Institution 
could reasonably consider the liquidity at the time of the transaction. 
This commenter stated that it is the very nature of bond trading that 
liquidity generally tends to diminish as bonds mature. The Department 
expects that a Financial Institution would consider this and other 
reasonably available information at the time of the transaction in 
designing its policies and procedures. It is also important to note 
that Financial Institutions may consider credit ratings as a part of a 
Financial Institution's policies and procedures in this respect.

[[Page 82818]]

Municipal Bonds
    The exemption covers principal transactions involving municipal 
bonds, including tax-exempt municipal bonds. The Department cautions, 
however, that Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals 
should pay special care when recommending that Retirement Investors 
invest in municipal bonds. Tax-exempt municipal bonds are typically a 
poor choice for investors in Title I Plans and IRAs because the Plans 
and IRAs are already tax-advantaged and, therefore, do not benefit from 
paying for the bond's tax-favored status.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See e.g., Seven Questions to Ask When Investing in 
Municipal Bonds, available at www.msrb.org/~/media/pdfs/msrb1/pdfs/
seven-questions-when-investing.ashx. (``[T]ax-exempt bonds may not 
be an efficient investment for certain tax advantaged accounts, such 
as an IRA or 401k, as the tax-advantages of such accounts render the 
tax-exempt features of municipal bonds redundant. Furthermore, since 
withdrawals from most of those accounts are subject to tax, placing 
a tax exempt bond in such an account has the effect of converting 
tax-exempt income into taxable income. Finally, if an investor 
purchases bonds in the secondary market at a discount, part of the 
gain received upon sale may be subject to regular income tax rates 
rather than capital gains rates.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter stated that no tax-exempt investment (including tax-
exempt municipal bonds and certain annuities) should be included in the 
exemption, absent evidence that such investments are beneficial when 
purchased through a retirement account. The Department believes, 
however, that there are certain limited circumstances where these 
investments may benefit a Retirement Investor. For example, a 
particular municipal bond may have a higher tax-equivalent yield than a 
comparable taxable bond. Alternatively, a fiduciary adviser may 
conclude based upon careful analysis that a particular tax-exempt 
municipal bond carries less risk than a comparable corporate bond. 
Accordingly, the Department has not written the exemption to flatly 
exclude tax-exempt investments. However, given the increased risk of 
imprudence when making such recommendations, Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals may wish to document the reasons for any 
recommendation of a tax-exempt municipal bond or other tax-exempt 
investment and why the recommendation is in the Retirement Investor's 
best interest.
Separate Exemption
    One commenter asserted that principal transaction relief should be 
provided through a separate exemption. The commenter argued that the 
exemption's conditions are not sufficiently protective with respect to 
the unique nature of principal transactions. Instead, the commenter 
advocated for a separate prohibited transaction class exemption modeled 
after the statutory exemption for cross-trading in ERISA section 
408(b)(19) and Code section 4975(d)(22). Using the statutory exemption 
as a model, the commenter suggested that the exemption include 
conditions such as minimum size requirements and a requirement that the 
transaction occur at the ``independent current market price.''
    The Department has considered this suggestion, but has not adopted 
it. Although the Department agrees that the conflicts of interest in 
cross-trades are significant, the transactions contemplated by the 
statutory exemptions for cross-trades are not, in the Department's 
view, necessarily so analogous to the principal transactions covered by 
this exemption that the conditions of the statutory exemption are 
easily applied in this context. The statutory exemption is aimed at 
discretionary investment managers that are managing large accounts, 
while this exemption is designed to include investment advice providers 
who may be providing advice in the retail market. It would be 
difficult, for example, for the Department to arrive at a minimum size 
that would be appropriate for engaging in principal transactions with 
retail investors. The Department also believes that combining relief 
for principal transactions within the exemption for other transactions 
arising out of the provision of fiduciary investment advice assists 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals in developing a 
comprehensive compliance approach.

Exclusions

    Section I(c) provides that certain specific transactions are 
excluded from the exemption. The exemption retains the exclusions as 
proposed. Therefore, the exemption is not available for Title I Plans 
if the Investment Professional, Financial Institution, or an affiliate 
is (1) The employer of employees covered by the Plan; or (2) a named 
fiduciary or plan administrator, or an affiliate, who was selected to 
provide advice to the Plan by a fiduciary who is not independent. The 
exemption excludes investment advice generated solely by an interactive 
website in which computer software-based models or applications provide 
investment advice based on personal information each investor supplies 
through the website, without any personal interaction or advice with an 
Investment Professional (i.e., robo-advice). The exemption is also 
specifically limited to investment advice fiduciaries within the 
meaning of the five-part test and does not include discretionary 
arrangements.
Employers, Named Fiduciaries, and Plan Administrators
    Section I(c)(1) of the exemption provides that the exemption does 
not extend to transactions involving Title I Plans if the Investment 
Professional, Financial Institution, or an affiliate is either (1) the 
employer of employees covered by the Plan; or (2) is a named fiduciary 
or plan administrator, or an affiliate thereof, who was selected to 
provide advice to the Plan by a fiduciary who is not independent of the 
Financial Institution, Investment Professional, and their affiliates.
    The Department believes that employers generally should not be in a 
position to use their employees' retirement benefits as potential 
revenue or profit sources, without additional safeguards. Employers can 
always render advice and recover their direct expenses in transactions 
involving their employees without need of this exemption.\85\
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    \85\ A few existing prohibited transaction exemptions apply to 
employers. See ERISA section 408(b)(5), a statutory exemption that 
provides relief for the purchase of life insurance, health 
insurance, or annuities, from an employer with respect to a Plan or 
a wholly owned subsidiary of the employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Department does not intend for the exemption to be 
used by a Financial Institution or Investment Professional that is the 
named fiduciary or plan administrator of a Title I Plan or an affiliate 
thereof, unless the Financial Institution or Investment Professional is 
selected as an advice provider by a fiduciary (such as the employer 
sponsoring the Title I Plan) that is independent of them. Named 
fiduciaries and plan administrators have significant authority over 
plan operations and accordingly, the Department believes that any 
selection of these parties to also provide investment advice to the 
Title I Plan or its participants and beneficiaries should be made by an 
independent party who will also monitor the performance of the 
investment advice services.
    For purposes of the exemption, the plan sponsor or other fiduciary 
is independent of the Financial Institution and Investment Professional 
if: (1) The fiduciary is not the Financial Institution, Investment 
Professional, or an affiliate; (2) the fiduciary does not have a 
relationship to or an interest in the Financial Institution, Investment 
Professional, or any affiliate that might affect the exercise of the 
fiduciary's best judgment in connection with

[[Page 82819]]

transactions covered by the exemption; and (3) the fiduciary does not 
receive and is not projected to receive within the current federal 
income tax year, compensation or other consideration for his or her own 
account from the Financial Institution, Investment Professional, or an 
affiliate, in excess of 2% of the fiduciary's annual revenues based 
upon its prior income tax year.
    Some commenters urged the Department to delete the exclusion of 
employers as fiduciary investment advice providers to Title I Plans 
covering their own employees. The commenters stated that the conditions 
of the exemption are protective for transactions involving employees of 
the Financial Institution, and there is no reason to prevent employees 
from choosing their own advice provider and benefiting from their 
employer's particular area of expertise. A different commenter raised 
the concern that employees would lose access to a valuable service 
their employer provides to others. In response, the Department notes 
that employers will continue to be able to provide such services to 
employees, just as they always have, if they recoup only their direct 
expenses. The Department has decided to maintain the exclusion as it 
was proposed, because of the Department's concerns that the danger of 
abuse is compounded when the advice recipient receives recommendations 
from the employer, upon whom he or she depends for a job, to make 
investments in which the employer has a financial interest.
    Several commenters addressed the exclusion of named fiduciaries and 
plan administrators, unless selected by a fiduciary that is independent 
of them. One commenter sought clarification with respect to a 
particular factual scenario in which a plan sponsor appoints a bank as 
a directed trustee and named fiduciary. The commenter asked whether the 
exemption would require the bank to be selected to provide advice to 
the Title I Plan by the employer, and contended that this would result 
in disparate treatment as compared to other fiduciary service 
providers. For example, the commenter stated that the Title I Plan's 
investment adviser can solicit rollovers without selection by the 
employer.
    The Department responds that the exemption would require a bank 
that is a named fiduciary to be selected by a fiduciary that is 
independent of the bank, as defined in the exemption. As noted above, 
this exclusion is based on the significant authority of named 
fiduciaries and plan administrators over Title I Plan operations.
    Some commenters focused on the ``independence'' requirement under 
which the fiduciary selecting the advice provider cannot receive more 
than 2% of its income in the current tax year from the Financial 
Institution, Investment Professional, or an affiliate. The commenters 
urged the Department to increase the 2% limit to as high as 20%. One 
commenter stated this definition was far more restrictive than any 
definition ever used by the Department. The Department disagrees that 
the 2% limitation is unduly restrictive, and notes that the 
Department's exemption procedure regulation provides for a presumption 
that a 2% limitation will indicate that a fiduciary is independent.\86\ 
The Department did not increase the 2% limit so as to avoid any concern 
that compensation may impact the fiduciary's selection of an advice 
provider for the Title I Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ 29 CFR 2570.31(j) (definition of ``qualified independent 
fiduciary'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pooled Employer Plans Under the SECURE Act
    In connection with the exemption's exclusion of named fiduciaries 
and plan administrators unless selected by a fiduciary that is 
independent, several commenters requested additional guidance and 
clarification regarding the exemption's application to Pooled Employer 
Plans (PEPs), which were authorized by the SECURE Act, passed in 
2019.\87\ The SECURE Act mandates that a PEP must be established by a 
Pooled Plan Provider (PPP) that is designated as a named fiduciary, 
plan administrator, and the person responsible for specified 
administrative duties. Commenters envisioned that some PPPs would want 
to make investment advice available through PEPs, by utilizing 
themselves or an affiliate as the advice provider. Commenters requested 
clarification that an employer that participates in a PEP could be 
considered ``independent'' so that this exclusion would not be 
applicable despite the fact that the PPP or an affiliate is providing 
advice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ PEPs may not begin operating until January 1, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department believes it is premature to address issues related 
to PEPs, given their recent origination, unique structure, and 
likelihood of significant variations in fact patterns and potential 
business models, as the PEPs' sponsors decide how to structure their 
operations. In particular, the Department believes it is premature to 
provide any views regarding the ``independence'' of participating 
employers. The Department recently published a request for information 
on prohibited transactions applicable to PEPs and is separately 
considering exemptions related to these types of Plans.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 85 FR 36880 (June 18, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Robo-Advice
    Section I(c)(2) of the exemption excludes from relief transactions 
that result from investment advice generated solely by an interactive 
website in which computer software-based models or applications provide 
investment advice that do not involve interaction with an Investment 
Professional (referred to herein as ``pure robo-advice''). ``Hybrid'' 
robo-advice arrangements, which involve both computer software models 
and personal investment advice from an Investment Professional, are 
permitted under the exemption.
    A detailed statutory exemption that specifically addresses computer 
model advice is set forth in ERISA section 408(b)(14), (g), and Code 
section 4975(d)(17) and 4975(f)(8), and the regulations thereunder.\89\ 
The statutory exemption includes specific conditions governing the 
operation of the computer model, including a requirement that the model 
apply generally accepted investment theories and that it operate in an 
unbiased manner, and the exemption further requires that an expert 
certify that the computer model meets certain of the exemption's 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ 29 CFR 2550.408g-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters objected to the exclusion of pure robo-
advice from the class exemption, arguing that there is no reason to 
treat it differently from other types of advice that are covered in the 
exemption. Commenters described robo-advice as providing a low-cost 
option that might become less available if it is not included in the 
exemption. Commenters indicated that covering pure robo-advice would 
allow Financial Institutions to adopt a single set of policies and 
procedures for all advice arrangements, and noted that the SEC does not 
treat robo-advice differently than other forms of advice. Some argued 
that the existence of a statutory exemption should not prevent the 
Department from issuing an administrative exemption, and that there are 
other examples in which multiple exemptions are available for a certain 
transaction. Some commenters argued that the statutory exemption is 
costly and cumbersome, and expressed concern about whether it extended 
to

[[Page 82820]]

rollovers, even though the exemption does not, by its terms, exclude 
rollovers.
    The final exemption maintains the exclusion of pure robo-advice. As 
noted above, the statutory exemption in ERISA section 408(b)(14), (g), 
and Code section 4975(d)(17) and 4975(f)(8), includes specific 
conditions that are tailored to computer-generated investment advice. 
This exemption, by contrast, is tailored to investment advice that is 
provided through a human Investment Professional who is supervised by a 
Financial Institution. The conditions of this exemption are not 
designed to address advice without an Investment Professional. Because 
of the different approaches, the Department does not believe that 
Financial Institutions would easily be able to develop a single set of 
conflict mitigation policies under this exemption that would govern 
both hybrid and pure robo-advice arrangements. The policies and 
procedures required by this exemption contemplate consideration of 
factors beyond those that may be considered in a pure robo-advice 
situation. A person may design a pure robo-advice model that 
incorporates other incentives than those addressed here. Further, 
without specificity as to how Financial Institutions' policies and 
procedures would address pure robo-advice in a way that improved upon 
the existing exemption, the Department is not persuaded that extending 
this exemption to cover pure robo-advice is in the interests of 
Retirement Investors and is protective of their rights, as it must find 
under ERISA section 408(a)(2) and (3) and Code section 4975(c)(2)(B) 
and (C) before issuing a new exemption. For these reasons, the 
Department has decided to retain the exclusion from the exemption, as 
proposed.
    With regard to hybrid robo-advice arrangements that are covered by 
the exemption, one commenter suggested that the final exemption should 
require an Investment Professional who uses a computer model and 
deviates from its recommendation to provide the Retirement Investor 
with a written explanation of the reasons for the deviation. However, 
the Department has determined generally to avoid such a prescriptive 
approach to disclosure in the final exemption. Without additional 
information about the commenter's concerns related to Investment 
Professionals deviating from computer generated recommendations, the 
Department does not believe that a specific disclosure requirement is 
necessary in such circumstances.
Discretionary Arrangements
    Under Section I(c)(3), the exemption does not extend to 
transactions in which the Investment Professional is acting in a 
fiduciary capacity other than as an investment advice fiduciary. For 
clarity, Section I(c)(3) specifically cites the Department's five-part 
test as the governing authority for status as an investment advice 
fiduciary.
    Several commenters opposed this exclusion and stated that the 
conditions of the exemption are sufficiently protective in the context 
of discretionary arrangements. These commenters indicated that 
Retirement Investors who want discretionary management services should 
not be treated differently than those receiving non-discretionary 
advice services.
    After consideration of the comments, the Department is adopting 
this exclusion as proposed. The protections that are included in the 
exemption were designed specifically for non-discretionary investment 
advice arrangements, consistent with standards from other regulators 
regarding similar arrangements. The Department does not believe this 
will unfairly prejudice discretionary arrangements because the same 
pool of exemptions for discretionary arrangements currently exists that 
existed before this exemption was proposed. Additionally, the 
Department understands there are a variety of ways to avoid prohibited 
transactions in discretionary arrangements, including utilizing fee 
structures that ensure compensation does not vary based on investment 
choice.
    Moreover, the Department believes the differences between a 
discretionary and non-discretionary arrangement are not insignificant. 
For example, the potential for conflicts in a discretionary arrangement 
is heightened because most, if not all, of the investment transactions 
will occur without interaction with the Retirement Investor. The 
Department does not believe that the conditions of this exemption are 
appropriately tailored to address such conflicts. However, the 
Department remains open to requests for additional prohibited 
transaction relief for discretionary arrangements.

Exemption Conditions

    Section II of the exemption sets forth the general conditions of 
the exemption. Section III establishes the eligibility requirements. 
Section IV requires parties to maintain records to demonstrate 
compliance with the exemption. Section V includes the defined terms 
used in the exemption. These sections are discussed below. In order to 
obtain prohibited transaction relief under the exemption, the Financial 
Institution and Investment Professional must comply with all of the 
conditions of the exemption, and may not waive or disclaim compliance 
with any of the conditions. Similarly, a Retirement Investor may not 
agree to waive any of the conditions.

Investment Advice Arrangement--Section II

    Section II sets forth conditions that govern the Financial 
Institution's and Investment Professional's investment advice 
arrangement. As discussed in greater detail below, Section II(a) 
requires Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals to comply 
with the Impartial Conduct Standards by providing advice that is in 
Retirement Investors' best interest, charging only reasonable 
compensation, and making no materially misleading statements about the 
investment transaction and other relevant matters. The Impartial 
Conduct Standards further require the Financial Institution and 
Investment Professional to seek to obtain the best execution of the 
investment transaction reasonably available under the circumstances, as 
required by the federal securities laws. Section II(b) requires 
Financial Institutions, prior to engaging in a transaction pursuant to 
the exemption, to provide a written disclosure to the Retirement 
Investor acknowledging that the Financial Institution and its 
Investment Professionals are fiduciaries under Title I and the Code, as 
applicable.\90\ The disclosure must also include a written description, 
accurate in all material respects, regarding the services to be 
provided and the Financial Institution's and Investment Professional's 
material conflicts of interest. Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals would also be required to document and disclose the 
reasons that a recommendation to roll over assets is in the Retirement 
Investor's best interest. Under Section II(c), the Financial 
Institution is required to establish, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure that the Financial 
Institution and its Investment Professionals comply with the Impartial 
Conduct Standards. Section II(d)

[[Page 82821]]

requires Financial Institutions to conduct an annual retrospective 
review.\91\ Finally, Section II(e) provides a mechanism for Financial 
Institutions to correct certain violations of the exemption conditions 
and maintain relief under the exemption.
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    \90\ As noted above, the Department does not intend the 
exemption to expand Retirement Investors' ability, such as by 
requiring contracts and/or warranty provisions, to enforce their 
rights in court or create any new legal claims above and beyond 
those expressly authorized in the Act, and the Department does not 
believe the exemption would create any such expansion.
    \91\ One commenter suggested that the exemption should be 
separated into different exemptions with different conditions to 
reflect diverse issues of Retirement Investors who are individuals, 
small plans, and large plans. The Department has not adopted that 
suggestion because of the concern that this would be overly complex 
for Financial Institutions to implement and could lead to concerns 
about technical violations of the exemptions.
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Impartial Conduct Standards--Section II(a)

    Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals must comply 
with the Impartial Conduct Standards by providing advice that is in 
Retirement Investors' best interest, charging only reasonable 
compensation, and making no materially misleading statements about the 
investment transaction and other relevant matters.
Best Interest Standard
    Section II(a)(1) requires investment advice that is, at the time it 
is provided, in the best interest of the Retirement Investor. Section 
V(b) of the exemption defines ``best interest'' advice as advice that 
``reflects the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the 
investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and 
needs of the Retirement Investor, and does not place the financial or 
other interest of the Investment Professional, Financial Institution or 
any affiliate, related entity or other party ahead of the interests of 
the Retirement Investor, or subordinate the Retirement Investor's 
interests to their own.''
    This standard is based on longstanding concepts in the Act and the 
high fiduciary standards developed under the common law of trusts, and 
is intended to comprise objective standards of care and undivided 
loyalty, consistent with the requirements of ERISA section 404. These 
longstanding concepts of law and equity were developed in significant 
part to deal with the issues that arise when agents and persons in a 
position of trust have conflicting interests, and accordingly are well-
suited to the problems posed by conflicted investment advice.
    The best interest standard is an objective standard that requires 
the Financial Institution and Investment Professional to investigate 
and evaluate investments, provide advice, and exercise sound judgment 
in the same way that knowledgeable and impartial professionals would. 
The standard of care is measured at the time the advice is provided, 
and not in hindsight.\92\ The standard does not measure compliance by 
reference to how investments subsequently performed or turn Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals into guarantors of investment 
performance; rather, the appropriate measure is whether the Investment 
Professional gave advice that was prudent and in the best interest of 
the Retirement Investor at the time the advice is provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 
1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The standard also provides that Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals have a duty to ``not place the financial or 
other interest of the Investment Professional, Financial Institution or 
any Affiliate, Related Entity or other party ahead of the interests of 
the Retirement Investor, or subordinate the Retirement Investor's 
interests to their own.'' The Department intends for the standard to be 
interpreted and applied consistently with the standard set forth in 
Regulation Best Interest \93\ and the SEC's interpretation regarding 
the conduct standard for investment advisers.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ Regulation Best Interests' best interest obligation 
provides that a ``broker, dealer, or a natural person who is an 
associated person of a broker or dealer, when making a 
recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy 
involving securities (including account recommendations) to a retail 
customer, shall act in the best interest of the retail customer at 
the time the recommendation is made, without placing the financial 
or other interest of the broker, dealer, or natural person who is an 
associated person of a broker or dealer making the recommendation 
ahead of the interest of the retail customer.'' 17 CFR 240.15l-
1(a)(1).
    \94\ See SEC Fiduciary Interpretation, 84 FR 33671 (``An 
investment adviser's fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act comprises 
a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. This fiduciary duty requires 
an adviser `to adopt the principal's goals, objectives, or ends.' 
This means the adviser must, at all times, serve the best interest 
of its client and not subordinate its client's interest to its own. 
In other words, the investment adviser cannot place its own 
interests ahead of the interests of its client.'') (internal 
citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This best interest standard allows Investment Professionals and 
Financial Institutions to provide investment advice despite having a 
financial or other interest in the transaction, so long as they do not 
place their own interests ahead of the interests of the Retirement 
Investor, or subordinate the Retirement Investor's interests to their 
own. For example, in choosing between two investments equally available 
to the investor, it is not permissible for the Investment Professional 
to advise investing in the one that is worse for the Retirement 
Investor because it is better for the Investment Professional's or the 
Financial Institution's bottom line. Because the standard does not 
forbid the Financial Institution or Investment Professional from having 
an interest in the transaction, this standard does not foreclose the 
Investment Professional and Financial Institution from being paid, nor 
does it foreclose investment advice on proprietary products or 
investments that generate third party payments. This best interest 
standard also does not impose an unattainable obligation on Investment 
Professionals and Financial Institutions to somehow identify the single 
``best'' investment for the Retirement Investor out of all the 
investments in the national or international marketplace, assuming such 
advice were even possible at the time of the transaction.
    Several commenters expressed support for the best interest standard 
and specifically for the phrasing aligned with Regulation Best 
Interest's conduct standard. Commenters articulated benefits to both 
Retirement Investors and to Financial Institutions that will come from 
clarity and consistency of alignment with the SEC. Some commenters 
requested that the Department specifically provide a safe harbor based 
on compliance with the SEC's requirements. According to these 
commenters, the Department should not merely rely on the phrasing in 
the securities regulations, but should also incorporate the securities 
laws enforcement through the SEC and FINRA.
    Some commenters objected to the incorporation of the best interest 
standard and other Impartial Conduct Standards as conditions of the 
exemption. They stated that the conduct standards are duplicative for 
transactions involving Title I Plans because of the standards set forth 
in ERISA section 404. Some specifically opposed the Department's use of 
a prudence standard in the best interest standard. They noted that the 
specific word ``prudence'' is not included in the final Regulation Best 
Interest or in the NAIC Model Regulation, and, therefore, including it 
in the exemption standard would be an area of inconsistency. In 
addition, some commenters opined that the application of the best 
interest standard, including the prudence obligations, on IRAs is not 
permitted under the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion. In particular, 
these commenters opined that the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
Department

[[Page 82822]]

was acting outside its authority by adding to the requirements of the 
Code provisions that Congress chose not to apply to such accounts.
    Other commenters maintained that the Department's proposed best 
interest standard was not sufficiently protective of Retirement 
Investors. Commenters noted that the SEC described its standard as 
``separate and distinct from the fiduciary duty that has developed 
under the Advisers Act.'' These commenters argued that the Department 
should condition the exemption on what they referred to as a ``true'' 
fiduciary standard. They stated this is what Congress intended as part 
of the statutory framework for tax-advantaged treatment accorded to 
retirement investments. Some commenters specifically objected to the 
exemption's loyalty formulation, including that it was not a true 
loyalty standard and needed alternative wording such as ``without 
regard to'' or ``solely in the interest of.''
    The Department has included the best interest standard in the final 
exemption as it was proposed. The Department believes that the 
standard, in combination with the other conditions of the exemption, 
will protect the interests of Retirement Investors affected by the 
exemption. Although the standards of ERISA section 404 already apply to 
transactions involving Title I Plans and their participants and 
beneficiaries, incorporating the Impartial Conduct Standards as 
conditions of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to 
demonstrate compliance with the standards and increases the consequence 
of non-compliance because of the excise tax. This creates an important 
incentive for Financial Institutions to ensure compliance with the 
standards. For that reason, the Department does not believe the 
standards are unnecessary or duplicative for those Retirement Investors 
who are Title I Plan participants or beneficiaries. The Department also 
is not persuaded that it should eliminate the reference to ``prudence'' 
from the best interest standard, given its importance in the Title I 
framework and longstanding application to the problems of agency that 
the exemption addresses.
    The Department does not believe that including the Impartial 
Conduct Standards as conditions for transactions involving IRAs is 
impermissible in light of the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion. The 
Fifth Circuit's opinion addressed the 2016 fiduciary rule and related 
exemptions, particularly the perceived ``over-inclusiveness'' of the 
new definition of a fiduciary that the opinion indicated, in some 
circumstances, resulted in ordinary sales conduct activities causing a 
person to be classified as a fiduciary under Title I and the Code. 
Unlike the 2016 fiduciary rule and related exemptions, the present 
exemption provides relief to a more limited group of persons already 
deemed to be fiduciaries within the meaning of the five-part test and 
does not impose contract or warranty requirements on fiduciaries.\95\ 
Further, the Fifth Circuit observed that the five-part test ``captured 
the essence of a fiduciary relationship known to the common law as a 
special relationship of trust and confidence between the fiduciary and 
his client.'' Chamber, 885 F.3d 360, 364 (2018) (citation omitted). The 
same five-part test exists under the Code's regulations, based on an 
identical definition of fiduciary in the Code. This exemption merely 
recognizes that fiduciaries of IRAs, if they seek to use this exemption 
for relief from prohibited transactions, should adhere to a best 
interest standard consistent with their fiduciary status and a special 
relationship of trust and confidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ In connection with the description of the best interest 
standard in the proposed exemption the Department included a 
footnote referencing Code section 4975(f)(5), which defines 
``correction'' with respect to prohibited transactions as placing a 
Plan or an IRA in a financial position not worse than it would have 
been in if the person had acted ``under the highest fiduciary 
standards.'' The footnote stated that while the Code does not 
expressly impose a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries, the exemption's 
best interest standard is intended to ensure adherence to the 
``highest fiduciary standards'' when a fiduciary advises a Plan or 
an IRA owner under the Code. Commenters asked the Department to 
disavow this statement in the final exemption, asserting that the 
imposition of the Impartial Conduct Standards as an exemption 
condition for IRAs was rejected by the Fifth Circuit's Chamber 
opinion. The Department disagrees with the commenters' 
interpretation of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, and its application 
to this exemption which applies only to plan fiduciaries who meet 
the five-part test and which does not impose contract or warranty 
requirements on these fiduciaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also disagrees with the suggestion that the best 
interest standard is not a ``true'' fiduciary standard. The Department 
acknowledges that the Best Interest Contract Exemption and other 
exemptions granted in association with the 2016 fiduciary rule used a 
loyalty formulation of ``without regard to,'' which was described as 
``a concise expression of Title I's duty of loyalty, as expressed in 
section 404(a)(1)(A) of ERISA and applied in the context of advice.'' 
\96\ In connection with concerns expressed by commenters on those 
exemptions, however, the Department had to provide specific 
confirmation that the standard was not so exacting as to prevent a 
fiduciary from being paid.\97\ The Department also provided a special 
definition of ``best interest'' in section IV of the exemption to 
accommodate concerns about proprietary products and limited menus of 
investment options that generate third party payments.\98\ It is 
important to note that for decades the Department has also articulated 
the duty of loyalty in ERISA section 404 as prohibiting a fiduciary 
from ``subordinating the interests of participants and beneficiaries in 
their retirement income to unrelated objectives.'' \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 FR 21002, 21026 
(April 8, 2016).
    \97\ Id. at 21029.
    \98\ Id. at 21080.
    \99\ See e.g., Advisory Opinion 2008-05A (June 27, 2008); 
Advisory Opinion No. 93-33A (Dec. 16, 1993); Advisory Opinion 85-36A 
(Oct. 23, 1985); Letter to James K. Tam (June 14, 1983); Letter to 
Harold G. Korbee (Apr. 22, 1981). The Department has also repeated 
this articulation of the loyalty standard in recent proposed and 
final regulations. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan 
Investments final rule, 85 FR 72846, 72847 (Nov. 13, 2020) (In 
describing prior guidance on environmental, social, and corporate 
governance investing, noting that the Department ``has construed the 
requirements that a fiduciary act solely in the interest of, and for 
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to, participants and 
beneficiaries as prohibiting a fiduciary from subordinating the 
interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement 
income to unrelated objectives.''). See also Fiduciary Duties 
Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights proposed rule, 85 FR 
55219, 52220-21 (September 4, 2020) (In discussing prior 
interpretations of proxy voting, noting that in 1994 ``the 
Department also reiterated its view that ERISA does not permit 
fiduciaries, in voting proxies or exercising other shareholder 
rights, to subordinate the economic interests of participants and 
beneficiaries to unrelated objectives.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As set forth above, however, the Department notes that the 
exemption's best interest standard requires Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals to not ``place the financial or other 
interests of the Investment Professional, Financial Institution or any 
affiliate, related entity or other party ahead of the interests of the 
Retirement Investor, or subordinate the Retirement Investor's interests 
to their own.'' The duty not to subordinate the Retirement Investor's 
interests to their own is the standard applicable to investment 
advisers, who are fiduciaries under securities laws.\100\ Although the 
SEC indicated in Regulation Best Interest that it was not subjecting 
broker-dealers to ``a wholesale and complete application of the 
existing fiduciary standard under the Advisers Act,'' it also said, 
``[a]t the time a recommendation is made, key elements of the 
Regulation Best Interest standard of conduct that applies to broker-
dealers will be similar to key elements of the

[[Page 82823]]

fiduciary standard for investment advisers.'' \101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ SEC Fiduciary Interpretation, 84 FR 33671.
    \101\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33321-33322. The 
SEC stated that the phrasing in Regulation Best Interest (``without 
placing the financial or other interest . . . ahead of the interest 
of the retail customer'') aligns with an investment adviser's 
fiduciary duty, noting the discussion in the SEC Fiduciary 
Interpretation (``This means the adviser must, at all times, serve 
the best interest of its client and not subordinate its client's 
interest to its own. In other words, the investment adviser cannot 
place its own interests ahead of the interests of its client.'') 84 
FR 33671.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the best interest standard is intended to be consistent 
with the securities law standards as discussed above, the Department 
declines to provide a safe harbor for compliance with the standards as 
interpreted by the SEC or FINRA. The Department confirms that it will 
coordinate with other regulators, including the SEC, on enforcement 
strategies and interpretive issues to the extent appropriate, but it 
cannot simply defer to other regulators on how best to discharge its 
own interpretive and enforcement responsibilities under Title I and the 
Code.\102\ When Congress enacted the Act, it made a deliberate decision 
to entrust the protection of Retirement Investors to the Secretary of 
Labor, subject to an overarching regulatory structure that departs in 
significant ways from the securities laws (e.g., by creating a 
prohibited transaction structure that flatly prohibits many 
transactions, such as those at issue in this exemption, unless the 
Department first grants an exemption after making statutorily required 
participant-protective findings). While the Department has exercised 
its discretion in this exemption to incorporate a best interest 
standard that it believes is consistent with the securities law 
standard, it nevertheless retains full interpretive responsibility 
over, and must account for, the Title I and Code provisions at issue in 
this exemption, as well as the terms of the exemption, and for the 
protection of Retirement Investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ See, e.g., ERISA sections 502, 504, 505, and 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additional Guidance on the Best Interest Standard
    A few commenters requested additional guidance on the best interest 
standard. One commenter asked the Department to clarify how Title I's 
standards differed from the Impartial Conduct Standards. Another 
commenter asked the Department to make clear what an Investment 
Professional would be required to do to satisfy the standards, other 
than engaging in a prudent process. In this regard, the Department 
notes that the exemption is applicable solely to ERISA section 406 and 
Code section 4975; it does not provide an exemption from a Title I 
fiduciary's obligations under ERISA section 404.
    As set forth above, the Department does not believe there is a 
distinction between ERISA's section 404 standards of prudence and 
loyalty and the Impartial Conduct Standards, given that the best 
interest standard includes a prudence obligation and the Department has 
in the past described the duty of loyalty as prohibiting fiduciaries 
from subordinating the interests of participants and beneficiaries in 
their retirement income to unrelated objectives
    Financial Institutions wishing to be certain that they complied 
with the ERISA section 404 standard and the Impartial Conduct Standards 
would adopt rigorous policies and procedures to align the interests of 
Investment Professionals with their Retirement Investor customers, 
refrain from creating incentives for Investment Professionals to 
violate the Impartial Conduct Standards, and prudently oversee the 
implementation and enforcement of the policies and procedures. 
Investment Professionals would comply with the Financial Institution's 
policies and procedures, engage in a prudent process in recommending 
investment products, and ensure that their advice does not put the 
interests of the Investment Professional, Financial Institution, or 
other party ahead of the interests of the Retirement Investor.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ One commenter asked the Department to explain the 
difference between the exemption's best interest standard and a 
suitability standard. Given the recent developments in conduct 
standards applicable to broker-dealers and insurance agents, the 
Department does not believe it is appropriate or necessary for it to 
addresses these differences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter asked the Department to clarify the remedies 
available to a participant under Title I who receives fiduciary 
investment advice to roll over assets from a Title I Plan to an IRA. 
Specifically, the commenter sought confirmation that whenever a 
participant is the recipient of advice, the participant retains all of 
the rights and remedies under Title I even if the investment advice 
provider is selected by the participant's employer. The Department 
responds that individual participants and beneficiaries in a Title I 
Plan have a cause of action under ERISA section 502(a) for prohibited 
transactions, even if the investment advice provider is selected by the 
employer. As noted earlier, the Act does not permit exemptions to 
release fiduciaries from their Title I obligations under ERISA section 
404 to a Plan, and its remedies remain available.
Monitoring
    In connection with the best interest standard, several commenters 
raised concerns that the conditions of the exemption could require 
Financial Institutions to provide ongoing monitoring services of 
certain investment property. The Department stated in the preamble to 
the proposed exemption that:

    Financial Institutions should carefully consider whether certain 
investments can be prudently recommended to the individual 
Retirement Investor in the first place without ongoing monitoring of 
the investment. Investments that possess unusual complexity and 
risk, for example, may require ongoing monitoring to protect the 
investor's interests.

    Some commenters interpreted this statement to require Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals to monitor certain 
investments. According to the commenters, any obligation for broker-
dealers to monitor investments would be inconsistent with the 
securities laws. Another commenter stated that the monitoring 
requirement is inconsistent with the prudence standards because the 
Department's regulation at 29 CFR 2550.404a-1 regarding a fiduciary's 
duty of prudence in connection with investment decisions does not 
require account monitoring. Commenters asked the Department to confirm 
that the exemption does not require Financial Institutions or 
Investment Professionals to provide monitoring, particularly where the 
Financial Institution clearly discloses it will not do so. Commenters 
also stated the Department should not impose ongoing monitoring 
requirements based on a vague standard of ``unusual complexity and 
risk.''
    Other commenters asked for more guidance on when monitoring would 
be required. They requested more specificity on which investments are 
considered complex and risky as described in the preamble of the 
proposed exemption. Some commenters sought the Department's assurance 
that annuities would not require ongoing monitoring. However, one 
commenter asserted that the Department's statement on monitoring did 
not go far enough; an ongoing fiduciary relationship should require 
ongoing monitoring. At the very least, this commenter noted, the 
Department should adopt the position that the SEC takes with regard to 
investment advisers' monitoring obligations, that for advice that is 
provided on a regular basis, there should be some duty to monitor

[[Page 82824]]

consistent with the nature of that relationship.
    As was stated in the proposal, the Department confirms that nothing 
in the final exemption requires Financial Institutions or Investment 
Professionals to provide ongoing monitoring services. Of course, the 
exemption's general prohibition against misleading statements applies, 
and Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals should be clear 
and candid with Retirement Investors about the existence, scope, and 
duration of any monitoring services. Accordingly, the Department does 
not believe it is requiring broker-dealers to engage in any activity 
that is not permitted under securities laws or that it is barring 
broker-dealers from recommending certain classes of investments. The 
Department did not require all Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals to offer monitoring because the exemption takes the 
approach of preserving the availability of a wide variety of investment 
advice arrangements and products. However, as part of making a best 
interest recommendation, the Department expects that Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals will consider whether the 
investment can be prudently recommended without some mechanism or plan 
for ongoing monitoring. To the extent that prudence requires ongoing 
monitoring, the final exemption does not require that such monitoring 
be done by the Financial Institution or Investment Professional; such 
monitoring could be performed by a third party, but the advice 
fiduciary should clearly explain the need for monitoring to the 
investor when making the recommendation.
    In response to requests for guidance identifying specific products 
that will require monitoring, or what constitutes a product of unusual 
complexity and risk, the Department notes that Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals will need to make these decisions on a 
case-by-case basis. The Department expects that Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals have the expertise necessary to evaluate 
the need for monitoring based on all the facts and circumstances.
Reasonable Compensation
    Section II(a)(2) of the exemption includes a reasonable 
compensation standard. The exemption provides that compensation 
received, directly or indirectly, by the Financial Institution, 
Investment Professional, and their affiliates and related entities for 
their services is not permitted to exceed reasonable compensation 
within the meaning of ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 
4975(d)(2).
    The obligation to pay no more than reasonable compensation to 
service providers has been long recognized under Title I and the Code. 
The statutory exemptions in ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 
4975(d)(2) expressly require all types of services arrangements 
involving Plans and IRAs to result in no more than reasonable 
compensation to the service provider. Investment Professionals and 
Financial Institutions--when acting as service providers to Plans or 
IRAs--have long been subject to this requirement, regardless of their 
fiduciary status.
    The reasonable compensation standard requires that compensation not 
be excessive, as measured by the market value of the particular 
services, rights, and benefits the Investment Professional and 
Financial Institution are delivering to the Retirement Investor. Given 
the conflicts of interest associated with the commissions and other 
payments that would be covered by the exemption, and the potential for 
self-dealing, it is particularly important that Investment 
Professionals and Financial Institutions adhere to these statutory 
standards, which are rooted in common law principles.
    The reasonable compensation standard applies to all transactions 
under the exemption, including investment products that bundle services 
and investment guarantees or other benefits, such as with annuities. In 
assessing the reasonableness of compensation in connection with these 
products, it is appropriate to consider the value of the guarantees and 
benefits as well as the value of the services. When assessing the 
reasonableness of a charge, one generally needs to consider the value 
of all the services and benefits provided for the charge, not just 
some. If parties need additional guidance in this respect, they should 
refer to the Department's interpretations under ERISA section 408(b)(2) 
and Code section 4975(d)(2).
    One commenter expressed support for the proposed exemption's 
reasonable compensation requirement. However, several other commenters 
maintained that the requirement is not specific enough and too lenient. 
The commenters objected to the exemption not requiring recommendation 
of investments with the lowest fees. One commenter stated that, by 
focusing on the ``market value,'' the standard may incorporate existing 
practices that involve conflicts of interest and inflated prices. The 
same commenter stated that applying a fact-specific test to the 
reasonableness of fees encourages investment advice providers to 
contrive reasons why compensation is reasonable.
    As the Department indicated in the preamble to the proposed 
exemption, and reiterates here, the reasonableness of fees will depend 
on all the facts and circumstances at the time of the recommendation. 
The Department outlines several of those factors below which are 
intended to ensure the objective reasonableness of the fee. Several 
factors inform whether compensation is reasonable, including the nature 
of the service(s) provided, the market price of the service(s) and/or 
the underlying asset(s), the scope of monitoring, and the complexity of 
the product. No single factor is dispositive in determining whether 
compensation is reasonable; the essential question is whether the 
charges are reasonable in relation to what the investor receives.
    The Department did not intend to suggest that reasonableness will 
be assessed solely against the existing market practices. The 
reasonable compensation standard will not be met if the fees bear 
little relationship to the value of the services actually rendered. And 
separately, the exemption will not be satisfied if the Financial 
Institution does not establish, maintain, and enforce written policies 
and procedures prudently designed to ensure that the Financial 
Institution and its Investment Professionals comply with the reasonable 
compensation standard in connection with covered fiduciary advice and 
transactions.
    One commenter stated that the reasonable compensation requirement 
is unnecessary because it is already applicable to Title I fiduciaries 
under ERISA section 408(b)(2).\104\ Another commenter asserted that the 
reference to ERISA section 408(b)(2) indicated the exemption would 
adopt not only the substance but the established process for reasonable 
compensation determinations (i.e., a determination made by an 
independent Plan or IRA fiduciary who engages the service provider).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See also Code section 4975(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Incorporating the reasonable compensation standard as a condition 
of relief in this exemption increases the consequence of non-compliance 
and improves the protections of the exemption. It is also a critical 
protection in the context of an exemption which provides relief not 
only for prohibited transaction violations under section 406(a) of 
ERISA, but for self-dealing violations under section 406(b).\105\ In

[[Page 82825]]

the context of this exemption, the standard serves the important 
function of preventing investment advice fiduciaries from overcharging 
their Retirement Investor customers, despite the conflicts of interest 
associated with their compensation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See also Code section 4975(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this regard, one commenter suggested that Investment 
Professionals should be required to disclose, in writing, the reasons 
that the Investment Professional is not recommending an investment with 
lower fees and the reasons the recommendation is more beneficial to the 
Retirement Investor. Thus, the Financial Institution would be required 
to demonstrate, in writing, that the compensation arising from an 
investment is reasonable and in the Retirement Investor's best 
interest.
    Although the exemption places the burden on the Financial 
Institution and Investment Professional not to charge fees in excess of 
reasonable compensation, the Department declines to require 
documentation as suggested by the commenter. Under the exemption, the 
Financial Institution and Investment Professional are not required to 
recommend the transaction that is the lowest cost or that generates the 
lowest fees without regard to other relevant factors. In fact, the 
Department agrees with commenters that recommendations of the ``lowest 
cost'' security or investment strategy, without consideration of other 
factors, could in in some cases even violate the exemption. In 
addition, given the wide variety of investment products and fee 
structures available to investors, the commenter that asked for 
documentation did not provide a useful model to define lower fee 
investments that would serve as benchmarks for these purposes.
    One commenter suggested that the exemption text should specifically 
provide that the cost of an investment product is a factor, although it 
need not be the determinative factor, in applying the best interest 
standard. While the Department agrees that the cost of an investment 
product will be a factor in every recommendation, the best interest 
standard envisions that all of the characteristics of an investment 
product--not just its cost--will be evaluated based on Retirement 
Investors' investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial 
circumstances, and needs. Therefore, the Department has not added a 
reference to cost to the best interest standard or elsewhere in the 
Impartial Conduct Standards.
Best Execution
    Section II(a)(2)(B) of the exemption requires, in accordance with 
the federal securities laws, that the Financial Institution and 
Investment Professional seek to obtain the best execution of the 
investment transaction reasonably available under the circumstances. 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals subject to federal 
securities laws such as the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and 
rules adopted by FINRA and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
(MSRB), are obligated to adhere to a longstanding duty of best 
execution. As described recently by the SEC, ``[a] broker-dealer's duty 
of best execution requires a broker-dealer to seek to execute 
customers' trades at the most favorable terms reasonably available 
under the circumstances.'' \106\ This condition complements the 
reasonable compensation standard set forth in the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33373, note 565.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department applies the best execution requirement consistent 
with the federal securities laws. Financial Institutions that are FINRA 
members satisfy this subsection if they comply with the best execution 
standards under federal securities laws and FINRA rules 2121 (Fair 
Prices and Commissions) and 5310 (Best Execution and Interpositioning), 
or any successor rules in effect at the time of the transaction, as 
interpreted by FINRA. Financial Institutions engaging in a purchase or 
sale of a municipal bond satisfy this subsection if they comply with 
the standards in MSRB rules G-30 (Prices and Commissions) and G-18 
(Best Execution), or any successor rules in effect at the time of the 
transaction, as interpreted by MSRB. Financial Institutions that are 
subject to and comply with the fiduciary duty under section 206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act--which, as described by the SEC, encompasses a 
duty to seek best execution--will also satisfy this subsection.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ SEC Fiduciary Interpretation, 84 FR 33674-75 (Section 
II.B.2 ``Duty to Seek Best Execution'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed general support but also stated that the 
exemption should clarify that the ``best execution'' standard for 
executing portfolio transactions includes not only the price of the 
transaction itself but, if applicable, fees and expenses including 
commissions that provide the most favorable total cost or proceeds 
reasonably obtainable under the circumstances. In response, the 
Department notes that the exemption's requirement that the Financial 
Institution and Investment Professional seek to obtain best execution 
is the second part of an overarching ``reasonable compensation'' 
condition which is not limited to best execution. As outlined above, 
the best execution requirement is consistent with federal securities 
law, and compliance by the Financial Institution and Investment 
Professional with the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions is 
sufficient to comply with the requirement. The condition builds upon 
Section II(a)(2)(A), which requires that compensation not exceed 
reasonable compensation. To the extent that the applicable securities 
law provisions do not address certain fees and expenses, those amounts 
are still captured in the overall requirement that the compensation not 
exceed reasonable compensation.
    A number of commenters broadly objected to the inclusion of a best 
execution condition. The general critique was that the condition 
duplicates existing securities laws and is, therefore, unnecessary. In 
conjunction with this critique, multiple commenters argued that the 
best execution condition could result in the Department creating 
divergent and inconsistent interpretations of the best execution rule 
as compared to interpretations by FINRA, the SEC, and the MSRB. One 
commenter viewed the best execution requirement as an existing 
fiduciary obligation under ERISA section 404, stating that Title I 
fiduciaries are already obligated to seek to obtain the most favorable 
terms in a transaction, but should not lose the exemption for failure 
to do so.
    The Department has considered these comments, but determined to 
retain the best execution condition. With respect to the exemption's 
application to Covered Principal Transactions, the condition will 
provide protection to Retirement Investors that may not be provided by 
the more general reasonable compensation requirement. The Department 
believes that the best execution requirement is a meaningful way to do 
so. The Department exercises its interpretive authority here to take 
the position that Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals 
that comply with applicable securities laws and their successors will 
satisfy this condition of the exemption, because of this requirement's 
origination in securities law. As a result, the Department does not 
believe the condition will result in divergent or inconsistent 
interpretations of securities laws.
    Two additional commenters raised questions regarding the 
expansiveness of the condition. One commenter

[[Page 82826]]

objected to the best execution condition on the grounds that Financial 
Institutions might rely on third parties, such as trustees or 
custodians, to execute particular transactions with respect to which 
they provided investment advice. A second commenter requested that the 
Department clarify that the best execution requirement is limited to 
circumstances similar to those covered by FINRA rules 2121 and 5310. 
With respect to both of these comments, the Department notes that the 
best execution condition is applicable as it would otherwise be 
applicable under the federal securities laws.

Misleading Statements

    Section II(a)(3) requires that statements by the Financial 
Institution and its Investment Professionals to the Retirement Investor 
about the recommended transaction and other relevant matters are not 
materially misleading at the time they are made. Other relevant matters 
include fees and compensation, material conflicts of interest, and any 
other fact that could reasonably be expected to affect the Retirement 
Investor's investment decisions. For example, the Department would 
consider it materially misleading for the Financial Institution or 
Investment Professional to include any exculpatory clauses or 
indemnification provisions in an arrangement with a Retirement Investor 
that are prohibited by applicable law.\108\
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    \108\ See, e.g., ERISA section 410 and see also ERISA 
Interpretive Bulletin 75-4--Indemnification of fiduciaries. (``The 
Department of Labor interprets section 410(a) as rendering void any 
arrangement for indemnification of a fiduciary of an employee 
benefit plan by the plan. Such an arrangement would have the same 
result as an exculpatory clause, in that it would, in effect, 
relieve the fiduciary of responsibility and liability to the plan by 
abrogating the plan's right to recovery from the fiduciary for 
breaches of fiduciary obligations.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department received a few comments on this requirement in the 
proposal. One commenter stated this standard is unnecessary because 
misleading statements are already addressed by the proposal's 
disclosure requirement. Another commenter asked the Department to 
clarify what is considered a ``misleading statement.'' Other commenters 
suggested that the Department expand the standard to specifically 
include material omissions because material omissions may be equally 
damaging to a Retirement Investor's understanding.
    The Department has not changed the specific language in Section 
II(a)(3) from the proposal. Misleading statements are not necessarily 
addressed by the exemption's disclosure requirement, which is limited 
to certain specific topics. Further, the Department notes that the 
requirement is to avoid ``materially misleading'' statements, so as to 
provide a standard for the condition and avoid uncertainty.
    The Department agrees with commenters that materially misleading 
statements are properly interpreted to include statements that omit a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
Retirement Investors are clearly best served by statements and 
representations that are free from material misstatements and 
omissions. Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals best 
promote the interests of Retirement Investors by ensuring that accurate 
communications are a consistent standard in all their interactions with 
their customers.
    In connection with the prohibition against misleading statements in 
Section II(a)(3), one commenter reacted to the Department's preamble 
statement about exculpatory statements. The commenter objected on 
several grounds, including the view that this statement effectively 
incorporates state and local laws that may vary and, thus, undermines 
the Act's aim to provide a uniform national standard in the retirement 
space. The commenter opined that this statement creates an uncertain 
and unworkable standard and even Financial Institutions that attempt to 
comply in good faith may lose the exemption if they inadvertently fail 
to comply with a law.
    The Department does not believe that the inclusion of an 
exculpatory statement that is prohibited by applicable law is fairly 
characterized as an inadvertent failure to comply with the law. 
Financial Institutions that provide fiduciary investment advice to 
Retirement Investors should be well aware of the laws in the 
jurisdictions within which they operate. If a Financial Institution 
fails to apprise itself of its legal responsibilities, it should not be 
permitted to rely upon an exemption that includes a best interest 
standard for advice that incorporates the principles of care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a 
prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 
like aims. Permitting false and misleading statements that have the 
effect of dissuading a Retirement Investor from seeking lawfully 
available remedies is not consistent with the requirement, under Title 
I and the Code, that the Department find that an exemption is 
protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of Plans and 
IRA owners. Furthermore, the Department notes that all Title I 
fiduciaries remain subject to the uniform fiduciary responsibility 
provisions in ERISA section 404 with respect to Title I Plan assets. 
Finally, the Department has included provisions in the exemption, which 
enable fiduciaries to cure violations of the exemption conditions, 
under certain circumstances, and thereby avoid loss of the exemption.

Disclosure--Section II(b)

    Section II(b) of the exemption requires the Financial Institution 
to provide certain written disclosures to the Retirement Investor prior 
to engaging in any transactions pursuant to the exemption. The 
Financial Institution must acknowledge, in writing, that the Financial 
Institution and its Investment Professionals are fiduciaries under 
Title I and the Code, as applicable, with respect to any fiduciary 
investment advice provided by the Financial Institution or Investment 
Professional to the Retirement Investor. The Financial Institution must 
also provide a written description of the services to be provided and 
material conflicts of interest arising out of the services and any 
recommended investment transaction. The description must be accurate in 
all material respects. The Financial Institution also must provide 
documentation of the specific reasons that any recommendation to roll 
over assets from one Plan or IRA to another Plan or IRA, or from one 
type of account to another, is in the Retirement Investor's best 
interest.
    The disclosure obligations are designed to protect Retirement 
Investors by enhancing the quality of information they receive in 
connection with fiduciary investment advice. The disclosures should be 
in plain English, taking into consideration Retirement Investors' level 
of financial experience. The requirement can be satisfied through any 
disclosure, or combination of disclosures, required to be provided by 
other regulators so long as the disclosure required by Section II(b) is 
included. Once disclosure has been provided, the Financial Institution 
is not obligated to provide it again, except at the Retirement 
Investor's request or if the information has materially changed.
Written Fiduciary Acknowledgment
    Section II(b)(1) of the final exemption includes the requirement to 
provide Retirement Investors with a written fiduciary acknowledgment as 
proposed. This disclosure is designed to ensure that the fiduciary 
nature of the

[[Page 82827]]

relationship is clear to the Financial Institution and Investment 
Professional, as well as the Retirement Investor, at the time of the 
investment transaction.
    This exemption gives broad relief for a wide range of activities 
that fiduciaries otherwise would be prohibited from engaging in. Given 
this wide field of action, the Department has concluded that clear 
disclosure is one of the necessary protections for Retirement 
Investors. A Financial Institution and Investment Professional that 
seek to provide investment advice to a Retirement Investor and 
otherwise engage in a relationship that satisfies the five-part test 
should, at a minimum (if they wish to avail themselves of this 
particular exemption), make a conscious up-front determination of 
whether they are acting as fiduciaries; tell their Retirement Investor 
customers that they are rendering advice as fiduciaries; and, based on 
their conscious decision to act as fiduciaries, implement and follow 
the exemption's conditions. The requirement also supports Retirement 
Investors' ability to choose a provider of advice that is a fiduciary 
within the meaning of Title I and the Code.
    The written fiduciary acknowledgment supports the exemption's 
objectives of preserving the availability of a wide variety of business 
models and expanding investor choice. Retirement Investors benefit from 
knowing if they are receiving advice from a fiduciary. Further, this 
disclosure increases the likelihood that Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals will take their compliance obligations 
seriously. This exemption contemplates that the Financial Institution 
and Investment Professional will put down a marker as fiduciaries when 
they indeed are acting as such. Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals may not rely on the exemption merely as a back-up 
protection for engaging in possible prohibited transactions when their 
ultimate intention is to deny the fiduciary nature of their investment 
advice.
Model Language
    To assist Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals in 
complying with this condition of the exemption, the Department provides 
the following model fiduciary acknowledgment language as an example of 
language that will satisfy the disclosure requirement in Section 
II(b)(1):

    When we provide investment advice to you regarding your 
retirement plan account or individual retirement account, we are 
fiduciaries within the meaning of Title I of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act and/or the Internal Revenue Code, as applicable, 
which are laws governing retirement accounts. The way we make money 
creates some conflicts with your interests, so we operate under a 
special rule that requires us to act in your best interest and not 
put our interest ahead of yours.

    In addition, although the exemption does not require it, Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals could more fully explain the 
exemption's terms with the following model disclosure:
    Under this special rule's provisions, we must:
     Meet a professional standard of care when making 
investment recommendations (give prudent advice);
     Never put our financial interests ahead of yours when 
making recommendations (give loyal advice);
     Avoid misleading statements about conflicts of interest, 
fees, and investments;
     Follow policies and procedures designed to ensure that we 
give advice that is in your best interest;
     Charge no more than is reasonable for our services; and
     Give you basic information about conflicts of interest.
Discussion of Comments
    A few commenters expressed support for the written fiduciary 
acknowledgment. A number of other commenters objected to the 
acknowledgment condition in the proposal. Some commenters stated that 
it would require them to say they were fiduciaries at the outset of a 
relationship, at a time when the ongoing nature of the relationship may 
be uncertain, which some commenters said would be unworkable. Some 
asserted that the written fiduciary acknowledgment requirement would 
deter some financial services providers from relying on the exemption 
because of fear of increased liability, thus causing Retirement 
Investors to lose access to the full range of investment advice 
arrangements. Several commenters argued that Financial Institutions 
will not be fiduciaries for all purposes, including under securities 
laws, and that the acknowledgement could confuse investors and also 
potentially undermine the purpose of the SEC's Form CRS as a 
comprehensive source of investor information. Some of these commenters 
said that they already disclose their duties under the best interest 
standard under Regulation Best Interest and believed that a similar 
disclosure would more accurately characterize their duties to 
Retirement Investors under the exemption. Some of these commenters also 
said that the proposal was inconsistent with other exemptions such as 
PTE 84-24, which have traditionally covered such inadvertent 
fiduciaries.
    Some commenters said the disclosure was inconsistent with the Fifth 
Circuit's Chamber opinion because the statement would determine 
fiduciary status, rather than the five-part test. Other commenters 
argued that the fiduciary acknowledgment could create a unilateral 
contract between the Financial Institution and the Retirement Investor, 
which they said was also impermissible in light of the Fifth Circuit's 
Chamber opinion. Some expressed concern about interaction with other 
laws, including the possibility that the acknowledgment could be 
considered to create a ``contractual fiduciary duty'' under 
Massachusetts securities law which could impose additional requirements 
on broker-dealers.
    Other commenters described the standard as not providing enough 
protection for Retirement Investors. According to these commenters, the 
exemption's best interest standard is not a ``true'' fiduciary 
standard. Some commenters also indicated the lack of a ``true'' 
fiduciary standard makes it misleading for Financial Institutions to 
disclose that they are fiduciaries and thereby causes Retirement 
Investors to expect protections that they will not in fact receive. 
These commenters pointed to the Act's legislative purpose to provide 
tax-advantaged accounts with more protection for participants than 
other, existing standards. Some commenters noted that the Regulation 
Best Interest standard is new, and the Department cannot determine that 
it offers the necessary protections until it has been fully tested in 
the market. One commenter stated that the fiduciary acknowledgement 
would allow investment advice providers to ``pose'' as fiduciaries and 
give non-fiduciary advice to Retirement Investors, who are depending on 
them for important decisions.
    Some commenters suggested alternatives to the fiduciary 
acknowledgement, such as requiring an acknowledgment of the 
applicability of the best interest standard. Commenters said this would 
avoid unnecessary complexity and preserve Retirement Investors' access 
to low-cost, high quality advice. One commenter suggested that the 
Department work on an expanded version of the SEC Form CRS which would 
explain the standards applicable to Title I and Code fiduciaries, 
broker-dealers, and investment advisers. However, other commenters 
opposed the idea of a

[[Page 82828]]

disclosure of the best interest standard, expressing concern that any 
expansion of required disclosure would cause even more Retirement 
Investor confusion. According to these commenters, any problems 
associated with a fiduciary acknowledgment--including increased 
liability--could also apply to acknowledgment of the best interest 
standard.
    The Department has carefully considered comments on the requirement 
to provide written acknowledgment of fiduciary status. The Department 
believes the acknowledgment ensures clarity as to the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, supports Retirement Investors' 
ability to choose a provider of advice that is a fiduciary within the 
meaning of Title I and the Code, and promotes compliance with the 
conditions of the exemption. To increase that clarity, the voluntary 
model disclosure includes disclosure of the best interest standard. 
Financial Institutions that do not want to act as fiduciaries can also 
make that clear and act accordingly. The five-part test, as interpreted 
above, and Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 regarding participant investment 
education, provide Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals 
a clear roadmap for determining when they are, and are not, Title I and 
Code fiduciaries.
    The Department disagrees with commenters who stated that the 
disclosure could be misleading to Retirement Investors because the 
exemption's best interest standard is not, in their assessment, a 
``true'' fiduciary standard. The exemption is only applicable to 
``fiduciaries'' within the meaning of Title I and the Code. 
Accordingly, the acknowledgment does not mislead investors as to the 
nature of the advice relationship, but rather accurately recites the 
Financial Institution's and Investment Professional's fiduciary status 
under Title I and the Code. Moreover, as discussed above, although the 
best interest standard does not include a ``without regard to'' 
formulation of the loyalty standard, the standard is consistent with 
interpretive statements by the Department as to Title I's duty of 
loyalty in other contexts.
    With respect to the commenters who stated they should not have to 
acknowledge fiduciary status if they are uncertain as to whether they 
satisfy the five-part test, the Department believes, in light of the 
broad scope of relief in the exemption, that it is critical for 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals who choose to rely 
on the exemption to determine up-front if they intend to act as 
fiduciaries, and structure their relationship with the Retirement 
Investor accordingly. Financial Institutions are unlikely to comply 
fully with the exemption if they are simply relying on the exemption as 
a fallback position in the event that a primary argument of non-
fiduciary status fails. Financial services providers that are not 
fiduciaries have no need of this exemption. Financial services 
providers that are fiduciaries, however, have a statutory obligation to 
adhere to the prohibited transaction rules or meet the terms of the 
exemption. Compliance with the law turns on financial services 
providers knowing whether or not they are acting as fiduciaries and 
acting in accordance with that understanding.
    This exemption is not designed as a backup method of compliance for 
Financial Institutions that intend to deny the fiduciary nature of 
their investment advice despite their actions to the contrary. Instead, 
it is intended to provide broad relief for parties who are indeed 
fiduciaries under the five-part test, as manifested by their purposes 
and actions, and who implement fiduciary structures to govern their 
relationship with their customers. In response to comments asserting 
inconsistency of this exemption with PTE 84-24, which does not require 
written fiduciary acknowledgment, the Department responds that it is 
the responsibility of the Department to craft exemptions to ensure they 
are protective of and in the interests of plans and plan participants. 
The conditions in the Department's exemptions are designed to address 
the scope of the relief in the exemption and the attendant conflicts of 
interest. The Department has determined that the written fiduciary 
acknowledgment serves as an important safeguard in connection with the 
very broad grant of relief in this exemption from the self-dealing 
prohibitions of Title I and the Code. Other pre-existing prohibited 
transaction exemptions that do not have a fiduciary acknowledgment as a 
requirement, including statutory exemptions, remain available as 
alternatives.
    As for the related argument that some financial service providers 
will withdraw their services rather than provide their Retirement 
Investor customers a written fiduciary acknowledgment, the Department 
does not believe that will have significant effects on Retirement 
Investors' choices. The exemption in fact offers new exemptive relief 
for Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals that provide 
fiduciary investment advice to Retirement Investors. Pre-existing 
exemptions, with different conditions, remain in place as alternatives. 
And, for Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals that are 
not fiduciaries, this exemption is unneeded.
    The Department also does not believe that the possibility of 
investor confusion or lack of understanding of the term ``fiduciary,'' 
or concerns about the interaction with SEC Form CRS, present sound 
bases for eliminating the requirement. The acknowledgment does not 
contradict SEC Form CRS, and it is limited to fiduciary investment 
advice as defined in Title I and the Code. The Department believes that 
the model acknowledgment and additional voluntary model disclosure set 
forth above meets the objectives of the exemption by communicating the 
fiduciary status of the Financial Institution and Investment 
Professional as well as the requirement that they are operating under 
the exemption's best interest standard.
    The Department does not intend that the fiduciary acknowledgment or 
any of the disclosure obligations create a private right of action as 
between a Financial Institution or Investment Professional and a 
Retirement Investor, and it does not intend that any of the exemption's 
terms, including the acknowledgement, give rise to any causes of action 
beyond those expressly authorized by statute.\109\ Similarly, the 
fiduciary acknowledgement does not create a contractual fiduciary duty. 
ERISA section 502(a) provides a cause of action for fiduciary breaches 
and prohibited transactions with respect to Title I Plans (but not 
IRAs). Code section 4975 imposes a tax on disqualified persons 
participating in a prohibited transaction involving Plans and IRAs 
(other than a fiduciary acting only as such). These are the sole 
remedies for engaging in non-exempt prohibited transactions. The 
exemption does not create any new causes of action, nor does it require 
firms to make enforceable contractual commitments or give enforceable 
warranties to Retirement Investors, as was true of the 2016 fiduciary 
rulemaking which the Fifth Circuit set aside in its Chamber opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ The SEC similarly stated with respect to its Form CRS, 
which describes the conduct standard applicable to broker-dealers 
and investment advisers, that it is not intended to create a private 
right of action. Form CRS Relationship Summary Release, 84 FR 33530. 
See also Regulation Best Interest Release 84 FR 33327 
(``Furthermore, we do not believe Regulation Best Interest creates 
any new private right of action or right of rescission, nor do we 
intend such a result.'').

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[[Page 82829]]

Description of Services and Material Conflicts of Interest
    Under Section II(b)(2) of the exemption, the Financial Institution 
must also provide a written description of the services to be provided 
and material conflicts of interest arising out of the services and any 
recommended investment transaction. The description must be accurate in 
all material respects. The Department believes disclosure of these 
items is necessary to ensure Retirement Investors receive information 
to assess the services that will be provided and related conflicts of 
interest. The disclosure requirement is principles-based and intended 
to allow flexibility to apply to a wide variety of business models and 
practices.
    While one commenter agreed with the Department that a principles-
based approach to disclosure provides the flexibility necessary to 
apply to a wide variety of business models with respect to the services 
and conflict disclosure requirements, some commenters contended the 
required disclosures would be insufficiently protective of Retirement 
Investors. Some commenters focused on the Department's position in the 
2016 rulemaking that disclosure alone is ineffective in mitigating the 
impact of conflicts of interest.
    Some commenters opposed the ability to satisfy the disclosure 
requirement through disclosures required to be provided by other 
regulators, particularly in cases where such disclosures may not be in 
plain English. Commenters argued that other disclosure regimes, such as 
Forms CRS and ADV, are not sufficient and are not designed to comply 
with the Act. The same commenters also stated that the Department 
should ensure that Retirement Investors receive accurate, not 
misleading, information that does not omit any material conditions or 
information including information that the Financial Institution or 
Investment Professional knows or should know that the Retirement 
Investors needs to determine whether to maintain the advice 
relationship and/or investment(s). Some commenters supported allowing 
disclosure requirements to be satisfied by using disclosures such as 
Forms ADV and CRS.
    A commenter suggested specific additional items, perhaps in a model 
form, that should be included in the disclosure, including an estimate 
of the retirement savings needs of each participant and that the 
Department should develop a model disclosure and/or test proposed 
disclosures for their effectiveness. Another commenter suggested that 
the Department should develop a highly prescriptive, one-page model 
form that would allow consumers to compare service providers. Other 
commenters requested full safe harbors based on disclosure requirements 
under securities laws or insurance laws.
    After consideration of the comments, the Department has determined 
to adopt the disclosure provisions as they were proposed. The 
Department believes the exemption's disclosure of the provided services 
and associated conflicts is appropriate and important, and it is by no 
means the sole protection in the exemption. The disclosure requirement 
works in concert with the other protections, such as the Impartial 
Conduct Standards and policies and procedures, and reinforces the 
exemption's important focus on conflict mitigation. The Department 
additionally stresses that conflict mitigation is not the sole purpose 
of disclosure, as some comments appeared to assume. In the Department's 
view, disclosure also promotes consumer choice and permits Retirement 
Investors to enter into a professional relationship and make 
investments with a clear understanding of the nature of that 
relationship and of the investments' salient features. These are 
important values, independent of their impact in mitigating conflicts.
    The Department's approach in the proposal allowed for the 
disclosure to be satisfied through disclosures provided pursuant to 
other regulators' requirements. Since the Department's 2016 rulemaking, 
other regulators have developed additional conflict of interest 
disclosure requirements and oversight that provide a greater measure of 
accountability and investor protection in the marketplace. Permitting 
use of other regulators' disclosures was intended to minimize the 
potential for duplicative and voluminous disclosures which could 
contribute to reduced effectiveness. For this reason, the Department 
has declined to offer a model disclosure with respect to this aspect of 
the disclosure or add additional specific items to the required 
disclosure. Although the Department supports participants receiving 
information about retirement savings needs, for example, that type of a 
required disclosure is beyond the scope of this exemption proceeding.
    In response to commenters who expressed concern that the 
exemption's approach would not ensure accurate and complete 
disclosures, the Department responds that the exemption text requires 
the disclosure of services to be provided and material conflicts of 
interest to be ``accurate and not misleading in all material 
respects.'' Inaccurate disclosures will not satisfy the exemption 
conditions, nor will disclosures with material omissions. However, the 
Department declines to specify that the disclosure must provide 
information that the Financial Institution or Investment Professional 
knows or should know the Retirement Investor needs to determine whether 
to maintain the advice relationship and/or the investments, out of 
concern that this sets up a standard for disclosure that may be 
difficult to satisfy.
    A commenter urged the Department to delete the written fiduciary 
acknowledgment and, instead, consistent with Regulation Best Interest, 
require disclosure instead of all material facts relating to the scope 
and terms of the relationship and all material facts relating to 
conflicts of interest that are associated with the recommendation. As 
discussed above, the Department has retained the written fiduciary 
acknowledgment in the final exemption as well as the requirement to 
disclose in writing the services to be provided and the material 
conflicts of interest. The Department did not adopt the approach taken 
in Regulation Best Interest, despite the belief that the exemption's 
disclosure requirements involve similar information, because the 
exemption is available to Financial Institutions that are not subject 
to Regulation Best Interest and Department believes that a specific 
disclosure of fiduciary status is important to the goals of this 
exemption.
    However, the Department confirms that, like the Regulation Best 
Interest requirements, the standard for materiality for purposes of 
this obligation is consistent with the one the Supreme Court 
articulated in Basic v. Levinson,\110\ and, in the context of this 
exemption, the standard of materiality is centered on those facts that 
a reasonable Retirement Investor, as defined in the exemption, would 
consider important. Material conflicts of interest that would be 
required to be disclosed under the exemption would include, for 
example, conflicts associated with proprietary products, payments from 
third parties, and compensation arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also requested additional guidance regarding 
satisfaction of the exemption's disclosure obligations through (1) the 
use of disclosures required by other regulators or other Title I and 
Code requirements, or (2) safe harbors when such disclosures are used. 
Commenters argued this would avoid duplication and Retirement Investor 
confusion. In doing so, most commenters emphasized a desire to ensure 
harmonization between the

[[Page 82830]]

exemption condition and other disclosure regimes.
    While the exemption does not include specific safe harbors, the 
Department confirms that Financial Institutions may rely, in whole or 
in part, on other regulatory disclosures to satisfy certain aspects of 
this disclosure requirement, for example, the disclosures required 
under Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS, applicable to broker-
dealers; Form ADV and Form CRS, applicable to registered investment 
advisers; and disclosures required under insurance and banking laws 
when such disclosures cover services to be provided and the Financial 
Institution's and Investment Professional's material Conflicts of 
Interest. Avoiding duplication of disclosures is important and the 
Department reiterates that the disclosure standard under this exemption 
may be satisfied in whole, or in part, by using other required 
disclosures to the extent those disclosures include information 
required to be disclosed by the exemption. Allowing the use of other 
disclosures to meet the disclosure standard under this exemption should 
serve to harmonize this exemption's conditions with those of other 
disclosure regimes.
    The Department also confirms that the disclosure required by the 
exemption may be included with or accompanied by the disclosure 
provided to responsible Plan fiduciaries under 29 CFR 2550.408b-2, as 
applicable, and that such disclosures may satisfy, in whole or in part, 
the disclosure obligations under this exemption when the fiduciary of 
the Plan is the Retirement Investor receiving advice, as defined in 
Section V(k)(3). However, if advice is provided to individual Plan 
participants, disclosure to the Plan fiduciary will not satisfy the 
disclosure obligation under the exemption. In such cases, the 
Retirement Investor is the individual participant receiving the 
investment advice, as defined in Section V(k)(1), and the disclosure 
obligation applies to that particular individual.
    The Department cautions Financial Institutions that the 
requirements under this exemption are not merely a ``check-the-box'' 
activity. Rather, it is imperative that Financial Institutions engage 
in a careful analysis to identify their material conflicts so that they 
and their Investment Professionals are able to provide accurate 
disclosures and make recommendations that satisfy the best interest 
standard. The Department notes that although disclosures are required 
under the statutory exemption in ERISA section 408(b)(2) and the 
accompanying regulation at 29 CFR 2550.408b-2, the 408(b)(2) 
disclosures do not require an accompanying focus on conflict 
mitigation. Relatedly, the 408(b)(2) statutory exemption does not 
provide prohibited transaction relief from the self-dealing prohibited 
transactions in ERISA section 406(b).
Documentation of Rollover Recommendation
    Section II(b)(3) of the final exemption requires Financial 
Institutions to provide Retirement Investors, prior to engaging in a 
rollover recommended pursuant to the exemption, with documentation of 
the specific reasons that the recommendation to roll over assets is in 
the best interest of the Retirement Investor. This requirement extends 
to recommended rollovers from a Plan to another Plan or IRA as defined 
in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) or (C), from an IRA as defined in Code 
section 4975(e)(1)(B) or (C) to a Plan, from an IRA to another IRA, or 
from one type of account to another (e.g., from a commission-based 
account to a fee-based account). The requirement to document the 
specific reasons for these recommendations is part of the required 
policies and procedures, in Section II(c)(3).
    Rollover recommendations are a primary concern of the Department, 
as Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals may have a 
strong economic incentive to recommend that investors roll over assets 
into one of their institution's IRAs, whether from a Plan or from an 
IRA account at another Financial Institution, or even between different 
account types. The decision to roll over assets from a Title I Plan to 
an IRA, in particular, may be one of the most important financial 
decisions that Retirement Investors make, as it may have a long-term 
impact on their legal rights and remedies and their retirement 
security.
    The requirement to document the reasons that a rollover is in the 
best interest of the Retirement Investor is included in the exemption's 
policies and procedures provision to ensure that Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals take the time to form a prudent 
recommendation, and that a record is available for later review. The 
written record serves an important role in protecting Retirement 
Investors during this significant decision. The final exemption also 
includes the additional new provision in Section II(b)(3) requiring 
this documentation be provided to the Retirement Investor. Because of 
the special importance of rollover recommendations, the Department has 
concluded that Retirement Investors should be provided with the 
rollover documentation.
    Some commenters on the proposal expressed support for the 
requirement to document the reasons for rollover recommendations, 
although some suggested it be expanded to provide additional 
protections. One suggestion was for the requirement to apply to all 
recommendations or at least to an expanded list of consequential 
recommendations beyond rollovers. One commenter suggested that the 
written documentation of all recommendations should demonstrate how the 
recommendations comply with the Financial Institution's written 
policies and procedures. Commenters also suggested additional factors 
to consider and document, including a clear examination of the long-
term impact of any increased costs and why the added benefits justify 
those added costs, as well as consideration of economically significant 
features--such as surrender schedules and index annuity cap and 
participation rate--that the commenter indicated providers use in lieu 
of direct fees. One commenter provided an example of how the 
documentation could look, including scoring alternative investments. 
Another commenter indicated that the documentation requirement is not 
fully protective unless the documentation is provided to the Retirement 
Investor.
    Other commenters urged the Department not to include this condition 
in the final exemption. They wrote that the documentation requirement 
was overly burdensome on Financial Institutions, generally is not 
required in other exemptions, and would not provide meaningful 
protections to Retirement Investors. Commenters stated it may be 
difficult to obtain the required information and noted that the SEC 
chose specifically not to include this requirement in Regulation Best 
Interest, even though the SEC did encourage it as a good practice.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33360 
(``Similarly, we encourage broker-dealers to record the basis for 
their recommendations, especially for more complex, risky or 
expensive products and significant investment decisions, such as 
rollovers and choice of accounts, as a potential way a broker-dealer 
could demonstrate compliance with the Care Obligation.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters felt that the specific considerations identified in 
the preamble were too prescriptive, and the exemption should instead 
rely on a more principles-based approach, such as the Financial 
Institutions' reasonable oversight of Investment Professionals. A few 
commenters requested clarification that the factors included in the

[[Page 82831]]

preamble are merely factors that Financial Institutions ``may include'' 
in their documentation but that Financial Institutions are ultimately 
permitted to use their judgment to determine the appropriate factors to 
be considered, depending on the facts and circumstances of particular 
Retirement Investors. On the other hand, a commenter supported the 
factors and suggested that the Department should include them in the 
exemption text.
    Certain commenters expressed further concern that the preamble 
discussion of the requirement did not appropriately weigh the benefits 
of a rollover (including the loss of the professional expertise and 
advice if the Retirement Investor chooses to stay in a workplace Plan) 
or other factors that are important to a Retirement Investor (such as 
access to distribution options, asset consolidation, and access to 
discretionary asset management). A commenter also asserted that the 
documentation should not extend to recommendations related to IRA 
transfers and transfers between brokerage and advisory accounts, 
asserting that these transfers are not irrevocable.
    Some commenters were concerned about potential enforcement related 
to this provision of the exemption. One asked the Department to state 
that Financial Institutions are not required to review and approve each 
recommendation on a case by case basis. Another requested a non-
enforcement policy so that a Financial Institution would not lose the 
exemption if an Investment Professional failed to document the reasons 
for any specific transaction, as long as the Financial Institution 
worked diligently and in good faith to implement technology and systems 
to efficiently document and supervise rollover recommendations. One 
commenter requested a safe harbor from the requirement to document 
rollover recommendations as long as Regulation Best Interest is 
satisfied.
    Upon consideration of the comments, the Department has determined 
to include the documentation requirement in the exemption, as proposed. 
Given the importance of these decisions, the Department does not find 
it unnecessarily burdensome to require Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals to document their reasons for the 
recommendation. The documentation can provide an important opportunity 
for evaluation and oversight of these recommendations by Financial 
Institutions, Retirement Investors, and the Department, and is 
appropriate in the context of this broad exemption. Requiring specific 
documentation for rollover transactions provides appropriate protection 
of Retirement Investors while minimizing the burden on Financial 
Institutions that would be attached to documentation of all 
recommendations. By additionally requiring that the rollover 
documentation be provided to the Retirement Investor, the Department 
believes that the Retirement Investor will be better positioned to 
understand the significance of a rollover decision and how acting upon 
a rollover recommendation will satisfy the best interest standard under 
this exemption. The Department has retained the scope of the 
documentation requirement to include IRA transfers and transfers 
between brokerage and advisory accounts, even though those decisions 
may not be irrevocable, because they may involve significant cost, 
particularly over the long term.
    With respect to recommendations to roll assets out of an Title I 
Plan and into an IRA, the factors that a Financial Institution and 
Investment Professional should consider and document include the 
following: The Retirement Investor's alternatives to a rollover, 
including leaving the money in his or her current employer's Plan, if 
permitted, and selecting different investment options; the fees and 
expenses associated with both the Plan and the IRA; whether the 
employer pays for some or all of the Plan's administrative expenses; 
and the different levels of services and investments available under 
the Plan and the IRA. For rollovers from another IRA or changes from a 
commission-based account to a fee-based arrangement, a prudent 
recommendation would include consideration and documentation of the 
services that would be provided under the new arrangement. The 
Department agrees with commenters that the long-term impact of any 
increased costs and the reason(s) why the added benefits justify those 
added costs, as well as the impact of features such as surrender 
schedules and index annuity cap and participation rates, should be 
considered as part of any rollover recommendation, as relevant.
    In response to commenters who asked whether these factors cited in 
the proposal's preamble are required to be documented in all cases, or 
whether they are suggested considerations, it is the Department's view 
that these factors are relevant to a prudent fiduciary's analysis of a 
rollover. It would be difficult to justify a rollover recommendation 
that did not consider these factors. Of course, the discussion of 
factors identified above is not intended to suggest that Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals may not consider other 
factors, including those that are important to a particular Retirement 
Investor, as part of their rollover recommendation.\112\ For that 
reason, the Department has not added the specific factors identified in 
the preamble to the exemption text, as a commenter suggested.\113\
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    \112\ For example, in the Regulation Best Interest Release, the 
SEC identified a number of factors that should be considered by 
broker-dealers in determining whether a particular account would be 
in a particular retail customer's best interest, including (1) the 
services and products provided in the account (ancillary services 
provided in conjunction with an account type, account monitoring 
services, etc.); (2) the projected cost to the retail customer of 
the account; (3) alternative account types available; (4) the 
services requested by the retail customer; and (5) the retail 
customer's investment profile. The SEC also cited factors that 
should be considered by broker-dealers in making a recommendation to 
roll over Title I Plan assets to an IRA, including: Fees and 
expenses; level of service available; available investment options; 
ability to take penalty-free withdrawals; application of required 
minimum distributions; protection from creditors and legal 
judgments; holdings of employer stock; and any special features of 
the existing account. 84 FR 33382-83.
    \113\ A commenter suggested a number of other factors that 
should be documented as part of the rollover recommendation, 
including: any incentives and/or fees the Financial Institution and/
or the Investment Professional receives if they keep the account 
when employees leave their employer (i.e., maintaining the rollover 
account) or if they obtain additional fees for investments of the 
participants outside of the Plan; and fees and historic rates of 
return comparing the rollover recommendation and its proposed 
investment with the alternative(s), including leaving the assets in 
the current Plan, in a chart, over a 1, 5, and 10-year period. While 
the Department has chosen to take a less prescriptive and burdensome 
approach to the documentation and disclosure requirements than the 
commenter suggested, the Department stresses that Retirement 
Investors' interests should be protected by the overarching 
obligations to adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards and to 
implement policies and procedures that require mitigation of 
conflicts of interest to the extent that a reasonable person 
reviewing the Financial Institution's policies and procedures and 
incentive practices would conclude that they do not create an 
incentive for a Financial Institution or Investment Professional to 
place their interests ahead of the interest of the Retirement 
Investor. The Department also agrees that a prudent fiduciary would 
consider the impact of fees and returns under alternative 
investments over time-horizons consistent with the Plan 
participant's financial interests and needs. Such analyses, however, 
should turn on the fiduciary's assessment of the unique facts and 
circumstances applicable to the Plan participant, as opposed to a 
single standardized analysis mandated by the Department for all 
cases.
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    To satisfy this condition for Title I Plan to IRA rollovers, the 
Department expects that Investment Professionals and Financial 
Institutions evaluating this type of potential rollover will make 
diligent and prudent efforts to obtain information about the existing 
Title I Plan and the participant's interests in it. In general, such 
information should be readily available as a result of DOL

[[Page 82832]]

regulations mandating disclosure of Plan-related information to the 
Plan's participants (see 29 CFR 2550.404a-5). If the Retirement 
Investor is unwilling to provide the information, even after a full 
explanation of its significance, and the information is not otherwise 
readily available, the Financial Institution and Investment 
Professional should make a reasonable estimation of expenses, asset 
values, risk, and returns based on publicly available information. The 
Financial Institution and Investment Professional should document and 
explain the assumptions used and their limitations. In such cases, the 
Investment Professional could rely on alternative data sources, such as 
the most recent Form 5500 or reliable benchmarks on typical fees and 
expenses for the type and size of Plan at issue.
    A few commenters suggested that Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals should not have to go beyond any information 
provided by Retirement Investors. One commenter suggested that 
Investment Professionals should not be compelled to make an estimate 
and should be permitted to include in the documentation: Any reasons 
why, in the absence of certain information, other information supports 
a recommendation; the fact that the Retirement Investor was unwilling 
to provide the relevant information; and/or that the Investment 
Professional after best efforts, was unable to obtain the relevant 
information. The Department concurs that the documentation can include 
these statements, but notes that the statements would not be sufficient 
as an alternative to the estimates described in the previous paragraph.
    Several commenters reacted to the proposed exemption's preamble 
statement that the documentation should address the Retirement 
Investor's alternatives to a rollover, including leaving the money in 
his or her current employer's Plan, if permitted, and selecting 
different investment options. A commenter queried whether Investment 
Professionals would be required to reallocate plan investments into an 
ideal asset allocation. Some insurance industry commenters expressed 
concern that the requirement would cause them to evaluate non-insurance 
options which they asserted was not permitted under insurance laws. The 
preamble statement was not intended, however, to suggest that 
Investment Professionals need to make advice recommendations as to 
investment products they are not qualified or legally permitted to 
recommend. Instead, the Department was merely indicating that a 
rollover recommendation should not be based solely on the Retirement 
Investor's existing allocation without any consideration of other 
investment options in the Plan.\114\ A prudent fiduciary would 
carefully consider the options available to the investor in the Plan, 
including options other than the Retirement Investor's existing plan 
investments, before recommending that the participant roll assets out 
of the Plan.
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    \114\ FINRA has recognized that broker-dealers making a rollover 
recommendation should consider investment options among other 
factors. ``The importance of this factor will depend in part on how 
satisfied the investor is with the options available under the plan 
under consideration. For example, an investor who is satisfied by 
the low-cost institutional funds available in some plans may not 
regard an IRA's broader array of investments as an important 
factor.'' See Regulatory Notice 13-45, supra note 42.
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    Likewise, the Department notes that nothing in the exemption or the 
Impartial Conduct Standards prohibits investment advice by ``insurance-
only'' agents or requires such insurance specialists to render advice 
with respect to other categories of assets outside their specialty or 
expertise. An Investment Professional should disclose any limitation on 
the types of products he or she recommends, and refrain from 
recommending an annuity if it is not in the best interest of the 
Retirement Investor. If, for example, it would not be in the investor's 
best interest for the investor to purchase an annuity in light of the 
investor's liquidity needs, existing assets, lack of diversification, 
financial resources, or other considerations, the Investment 
Professional should not recommend the annuity purchase, even if that 
means the agent cannot make a sale.
    The exemption also does not mandate that a Financial Institution 
review documentation of each and every rollover recommendation. 
However, depending on the Financial Institution's business model and 
the other methods available to mitigate conflicts of interest, regular 
review of some or all rollover recommendations may be an effective 
approach to compliance with the exemption. Because of the importance of 
this condition, the Department declines to provide a non-enforcement 
policy related to an Investment Professional's failure to document the 
recommendation or a safe harbor for general compliance with Regulation 
Best Interest. However, an isolated failure will only expose the 
Financial Institution to liability for that recommended transaction.
Timing of the Disclosure
    Some commenters urged the Department to modify the timing 
requirements of the disclosure. A few requested that, consistent with 
Regulation Best Interest, the Department allow the disclosure to be 
provided ``prior to or at the time of the recommendation.'' Another 
commenter was concerned that Retirement Investors would not have 
sufficient time to review the information, and suggested that the 
disclosures should be provided 14 days before the close of the 
recommended transaction.
    The Department has included the disclosure timing requirements in 
the final exemption as proposed. Because the exemption requires the 
disclosure to be provided prior to the transaction, parties wishing to 
provide disclosure at the time of the recommendation would be permitted 
to do so. The Department has not adopted the suggestion that the 
exemption require disclosure at least 14 days before the close of a 
recommended transaction due to concerns that this requirement could 
create an artificial timeframe that may, depending on the 
circumstances, prevent a Retirement Investor from entering into a 
beneficial transaction in a timely fashion.

Policies and Procedures--Section II(c)

    Section II(c)(1) of the exemption establishes an overarching 
requirement that Financial Institutions establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure 
that the Financial Institution and its Investment Professionals comply 
with the Impartial Conduct Standards. Under Section II(c)(2), Financial 
Institutions' policies and procedures are required to mitigate 
conflicts of interest to the extent that a reasonable person reviewing 
the policies and procedures and incentive practices as a whole would 
conclude that they do not create an incentive for a Financial 
Institution or Investment Professional to place their interests ahead 
of the interest of the Retirement Investor.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ Section II(c)(3) of the exemption, regarding documentation 
of the reasons for a rollover recommendation, is discussed above in 
the section on the disclosure of the documentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As defined in section V(c), a Conflict of Interest is ``an interest 
that might incline a Financial Institution or Investment Professional--
consciously or unconsciously--to make a recommendation that is not in 
the Best Interest of the Retirement Investor.'' Conflict mitigation is 
a critical condition of the exemption, and is important to the required 
findings under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section

[[Page 82833]]

4975(c)(2), that the exemption is in the interests of, and protective 
of, Retirement Investors.
    To comply with Section II(c)(2) of the exemption, Financial 
Institutions would need to identify and carefully focus on the 
conflicts of interest in their particular business models that may 
create incentives to place their interests ahead of the interest of 
Retirement Investors. Under the exemption condition, Financial 
Institutions' policies and procedures must be prudently designed to, 
among other things, protect Retirement Investors from recommendations 
to make excessive trades, or to buy investment products, annuities, or 
riders that are not in the investor's best interest or that allocate 
excessive amounts to illiquid or risky investments. Examples of 
policies and procedures and conflict mitigation strategies are provided 
later in this preamble.
    Some commenters on the proposal expressed the view that the 
policies and procedures requirement was not sufficiently protective 
because it is based on the exemption's best interest standard, which 
the commenters believed was not a ``true'' fiduciary standard. Further, 
the commenters indicated that the exemption should include substantive 
provisions regarding the policies and procedures, beyond the statement 
that they must be prudent. One commenter suggested a number of specific 
provisions, including a description of the criteria that will be 
applied in determining that the recommendation did not place the 
interests of the Financial Institution or Investment Professional ahead 
of the interests of the Retirement Investor; a description of how the 
Financial Institution and Investment Professional will mitigate 
conflicts of interest; a requirement that the Financial Institution and 
investment professionals maintain written records showing the basis for 
each recommendation and how it complies with the written policies and 
procedures; the engagement of an independent compliance officer; 
identification, in the annual report, of the compliance officer and his 
or her qualifications; a statement describing the scope of the review 
conducted by the compliance officer; to the extent the self-review 
uncovers any violations of the policies and procedures, an unwinding of 
the transaction(s); and distribution of the self-review to all 
Retirement Investors receiving conflicted fiduciary investment advice. 
Another commenter expressed concern that the stated intention of the 
policies and procedures requirement did not align with what the 
proposal indicated would actually be accepted as demonstrating 
compliance.
    In the proposal, Section II(c)(2) provided that a Financial 
Institution's policies and procedures would be required to mitigate 
conflicts of interest to the extent that the policies and procedures, 
and the Financial Institution's incentive practices, when viewed as a 
whole, are prudently designed to avoid misalignment of the interests of 
the Financial Institution and Investment Professionals and the 
interests of Retirement Investors. Some commenters criticized the 
proposal's approach to conflict mitigation, asserting that the 
proposal's terms were vague and lacked sufficient specifics. For 
instance, one commenter noted disapprovingly that the proposal required 
that policies and procedures be designed to ``mitigate'' conflicts of 
interest rather than ``eliminate'' them. Another commenter took issue 
with the proposal's suggestion that financial institutions should 
simply ``consider minimizing'' incentives that operate at the firm 
level. The commenter opined that the exemption's language does not 
address how to minimize the conflicts associated with receipt of 
revenue sharing payments, for instance.
    Commenters also objected to the alignment of the best interest 
standard with the SEC's regulatory standards, which they asserted were 
intentionally designed to avoid disruption of broker dealers' highly 
conflicted business model. These commenters described the SEC standards 
as allowing that the vast majority of conflicted practices to continue 
unabated, and they said the same would be the case in the exemption. At 
the September 3, 2020, public hearing, several commenters warned the 
Department that the Regulation Best Interest standards were untested, 
and it was premature for the Department to rely on the SEC. Some 
commenters urged the Department to go further and describe specific 
lines of prohibited conduct.
    Commenters also criticized the proposal for suggesting that 
significant conflicts of interest can be addressed through more 
rigorous supervision, stating that firms often have no incentive to 
constrain the conduct that their practices encourage. One commenter 
pointed specifically to the preamble's statement that a firm with 
``significant variation in compensation across different investment 
products would need to implement more stringent supervisory 
oversight,'' and noted that, in practice, when firms' bottom lines also 
benefit from recommending the higher compensating investment products, 
they will likely turn a blind eye when their financial professionals 
improperly push those products.
    On the other hand, a few commenters urged the Department to 
increase alignment of the policies and procedures with securities laws, 
including Regulation Best Interest. A commenter requested the 
Department to clarify that, consistent with their understanding of 
Regulation Best Interest, firm-level conflicts must be disclosed or 
eliminated and any conflicts for the Investment Professional must be 
disclosed and mitigated. Other commenters asked that the wording of the 
policies and procedures be aligned to a greater degree with Regulation 
Best Interest and that the Department make clear that the satisfaction 
of other existing regulatory standards will satisfy the relevant 
conditions of the exemption for investment advice providers in order to 
eliminate confusion. Several commenters also asked the Department to 
acknowledge that ``prudently'' developed policies and procedures are 
the same as ``reasonably'' developed policies and procedures, or to 
simply revise the exemption requirement to use the term ``reasonably 
designed'' in accord with the text of Regulation Best Interest. These 
commenters opined that the difference between ``prudence'' and 
``reasonableness'' was either unclear or nonexistent. One commenter 
urged the Department to adopt a definition of commission-based 
incentives limited to ones where incentives are tied to the sale of 
specific financial or insurance products within a limited period of 
time.
    After consideration of all comments, the Department has adopted 
Section II(c)(1) as proposed. As discussed above, the Department 
believes that the best interest standard in the exemption is consistent 
with Title I's fiduciary standard and that it is sufficiently 
protective of Retirement Investors' interests. As the Department 
intends to retain interpretive authority with respect to satisfaction 
of the standards, it does not agree with commenters that it is 
necessary to defer action until further evaluation of the impact of 
Regulation Best Interest.

[[Page 82834]]

    However, the Department has revised Section II(c)(2) to provide 
that Financial Institutions' policies and procedures must mitigate 
conflicts of interest ``to the extent that a reasonable person 
reviewing the policies and procedures and incentive practices as a 
whole would conclude that they do not create an incentive for a 
Financial Institution or Investment Professional to place their 
interests ahead of the interest of the Retirement Investor.'' The 
Department believes this revised phrasing provides a standard that more 
clearly communicates the intent that incentives must be mitigated, and 
provides a standard of mitigation based on the view of a ``reasonable 
person.'' The preamble to the proposed exemption communicated this type 
of ``reasonable person'' standard in discussing the meaning of the 
proposal's standard to avoid misalignment of interests.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ 85 FR 40845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The standard retains the requirement that the policies and 
procedures and incentive practices must be viewed as a whole, so that 
Financial Institutions have flexibility in adopting practices that both 
mitigate compensation incentives and use supervisory oversight to 
prudently ensure that the standard is satisfied. The exemption's 
policies and procedures requirement is deliberately principles-based, 
enabling multiple types of Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals to rely upon the exemption in connection with providing 
investment advice to Retirement Investors. The Department agrees, 
however, with the commenter that suggested that the Financial 
Institution's written policies and procedures would necessarily express 
the criteria for determining that the exemption's standards will be met 
and describe the Financial Institution's conflict mitigation 
methods.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ The commenter's other specific suggestions related to 
documentation of recommendations and to the retrospective review are 
discussed in the sections of the preamble on those requirements of 
the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although some commenters requested the elimination of certain 
practices or asserted that the exemption should include more specific 
provisions regarding conflict mitigation, the Department has maintained 
the approach from the proposal. The Department disagrees with the 
commenters who stated that the vast majority of conflicted practices 
can continue unabated under the exemption. This claim is expressly 
contrary to the proposal's requirement that the policies and procedures 
be prudently designed to avoid misalignment of the interests of the 
Financial Institution and Investment Professional with the Retirement 
Investors they serve, which was clarified in this final exemption as 
discussed above.
    As stated in the preamble to the proposal, Financial Institutions 
that continue to offer transaction-based compensation would focus on 
both financial incentives to Investment Professionals and supervisory 
oversight of investment advice to meet the standards. The exemption 
lacks additional specific mandates regarding conflict mitigation in 
order to accommodate the wide variety of business models used 
throughout the financial services industry. The type and degree of 
conflicts is susceptible to change over time. The Department believes 
that prescriptive conflict mitigation provisions would decrease the 
utility of the exemption, now and in the future.
    Although a commenter criticized the suggestion that supervisory 
oversight can be protective, the Department believes that it is an 
important component of a Financial Institution's policies and 
procedures. Given that the exemption permits Investment Professionals 
to be compensated on a transactional basis, it is not possible to fully 
mitigate compensation incentives and accordingly Financial Institutions 
will always be required to oversee recommendations. In this regard, the 
Department declines to adopt the position suggested by a commenter 
that, for purposes of the exemption, commission-based incentives are 
limited to ones where incentives are tied to the sale of specific 
financial or insurance products within a limited period of time. Among 
other things, this approach would be inconsistent with the broad 
definition of a conflict of interest in the exemption, as an interest 
that might incline a Financial Institution or Investment Professional--
consciously or unconsciously--to make a recommendation that is not in 
the Best Interest of the Retirement Investor.
    As described above, one commenter identified a number of sales 
practices the commenter believed would still be permitted under the 
exemption, and stated that the exemption should more clearly limit 
incentive practices that a reasonable person would view as creating 
incentives to recommend investments that are not in Retirement 
Investors' best interest. The Department notes that the preamble to the 
proposal described the exemption as requiring this level of conflict 
mitigation, and the final exemption was revised to use that standard so 
that the meaning would be clearer.\118\ Therefore, for example, the 
final exemption would not permit Financial Institutions to pay 
Investment Professionals significantly more to recommend one investment 
product over another, without putting in place stringent oversight 
mechanisms to ensure that the compensation structure does not 
incentivize recommendations that do not adhere to the exemption's 
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ See 85 FR 40845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department notes that regulators in the securities and 
insurance industry have adopted provisions requiring policies and 
procedures to eliminate sales contests and similar incentives such as 
sales quotas, bonuses, and non-cash compensation that are based on 
sales of certain investments within a limited period of time.\119\ The 
Department intends to apply a principles-based approach to sales 
contests and similar incentives. To satisfy the exemption's standard of 
mitigation, Financial Institutions would be required to carefully 
consider all performance and personnel actions and practices that could 
encourage violation of the Impartial Conduct Standards.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33394-97; NAIC 
Model Regulation, Section 6.C.(2)(h).
    \120\ None of the conditions of the exemption are intended to 
categorically bar the provision of employee benefits to insurance 
company statutory employees, despite the practice of basing 
eligibility for such benefits on sales of proprietary products of 
the insurance company. See Code section 3121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department further notes that the exemption's obligation to 
mitigate conflicts is not limited to conflicts of Investment 
Professionals. The conflict mitigation requirement in the policies and 
procedures obligation extends to the Financial Institution's own 
interests, including interests in proprietary products and limited 
menus of investment options that generate third party payments. The 
Department believes this exemption's standard of mitigation ensures 
that Financial Institutions will take a broad-based approach to 
addressing their conflicts of interest, which will provide a strong 
threshold foundation for the formulation of best interest investment 
recommendations.
    In response to commenters seeking guidance on the differences, if 
any, between the prudence standard under this part of the exemption and 
the reasonableness standards under the federal securities laws, the 
Department states that it does not have interpretive authority over the 
federal securities laws, and declines to provide interpretations as to 
how these standards may differ. The prudence requirement indicates a 
level of care,

[[Page 82835]]

skill, and diligence that a person acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of 
a like character and with like aims.
    The Department offers the following examples of business models and 
practices that may present conflicts of interest that a Financial 
Institution would address through its policies and procedures:
    Example 1: A Financial Institution anticipates that prohibited 
conflicts of interest related to compensation in its business model 
will only arise in connection with advice to roll over Plan or IRA 
assets, because after the rollover, the Financial Institution and 
Investment Professional will provide ongoing investment advice and be 
compensated on a level-fee basis. The Financial Institutions decides to 
seek prohibited transaction relief in connection with rollover 
conflicts by relying upon the exemption.\121\ The Financial 
Institution's policies and procedures would focus on rollover 
recommendations.\122\ Additionally, the policies and procedures should 
appropriately address how to document rollover recommendations, 
consistent with the requirement in Section II(c)(3) to document the 
reason for a rollover recommendation and why such recommendation is in 
the best interest of the Retirement Investor.
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    \121\ In general, after the rollover, the ongoing receipt of 
compensation based on a fixed percentage of the value of assets 
under management may not require a prohibited transaction exemption. 
However, the Department cautions that certain practices such as 
``reverse churning'' (i.e. recommending a fee-based account to an 
investor with low trading activity and no need for ongoing advice or 
monitoring) or recommending holding an asset solely to generate more 
fees may be prohibited transactions. This exemption would not be 
available for such practices because they would not satisfy the 
Impartial Conduct Standards.
    \122\ As explained earlier, it is the Department's view that a 
recommendation to roll assets out of a Plan is advice with respect 
to moneys or other property of the Plan. Advice to take a 
distribution of assets from a Title I Plan is advice to sell, 
withdraw, or transfer investment assets currently held in the Plan. 
A distribution recommendation commonly involves either advice to 
change specific investments in the Plan or to change fees and 
services directly affecting the return on those investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example 2: A Financial Institution intends to receive transaction-
based compensation, and generate compensation for the Financial 
Institution and its Investment Professionals based on transactions that 
occur in a Retirement Investor's accounts, such as through commissions. 
The Financial Institution's policies and procedures would address the 
incentives created by these compensation arrangements.
    Example 3: Insurance company Financial Institutions can comply with 
the new exemption by supervising independent insurance agents, or by 
creating oversight and compliance systems through contracts with 
insurance intermediaries. The Financial Institution and/or intermediary 
would address incentives created with respect to independent agents' 
recommendations of the Financial Institution's insurance or annuity 
products.
    In connection with these examples, following is a discussion of 
various possible components of effective policies and procedures. While 
the Department is not adjusting the policies and procedures to provide 
a safe harbor for compliance with securities or other law, many of the 
conflict mitigation approaches identified below were identified by the 
SEC in Regulation Best Interest.\123\
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    \123\ As one commenter noted, the scope of Regulation Best 
Interest and the Department's exemption do not overlap precisely. 
Therefore, the commenter asked the Department to acknowledge that 
Financial Institutions developing policies and procedures will need 
to address interactions with Retirement Investors that are not 
addressed in Regulation Best Interest. This is another reason that 
the Department intends to maintain interpretive authority with 
respect to the exemption.
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Commission-Based Compensation Arrangements
    Financial Institutions that compensate Investment Professionals 
through transaction-based payments and incentives would be required to 
minimize the impact of these compensation incentives on fiduciary 
investment advice to Retirement Investors, so that the Financial 
Institution would be able to meet the exemption's standard of conflict 
mitigation set forth in Section II(c)(2). As noted above, this standard 
would require mitigation of conflicts to the extent that a reasonable 
person reviewing the policies and procedures and incentive practices as 
a whole would conclude that they do not create an incentive for a 
Financial Institution or Investment Professional to place their 
interests ahead of the interest of the Retirement Investor.
    For commission-based compensation arrangements, Financial 
Institutions would be encouraged to focus on financial incentives to 
Investment Professionals and supervisory oversight of investment 
advice. These two aspects of the Financial Institution's policies and 
procedures would complement each other, and Financial Institutions 
could retain the flexibility, based on the characteristics of their 
businesses, to adjust the stringency of each component provided that 
the exemption's overall standards would be satisfied. Financial 
Institutions that significantly mitigate commission-based compensation 
incentives would have less need to rigorously oversee individual 
Investment Professionals and individual recommendations. Conversely, 
Financial Institutions that have significant variation in compensation 
across different investment products would need to implement the 
policies and procedures by using more stringent supervisory 
oversight.\124\
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    \124\ This is not to suggest that a Financial Institution that 
analyzes the conflicts associated with commission-based compensation 
incentives does not need to engage in a separate mitigation analysis 
with respect to the conflicts specifically associated with rollover 
recommendations as opposed to non-rollover recommendations. Nor does 
it suggest that every financial incentive can be effectively 
mitigated through oversight, no matter how severe the conflict of 
interest. As reflected in the SEC's ban on time-limited sales 
contests, some incentive structures are too prone to abuse to permit 
as part of firm policies and procedures.
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    In developing compliance structures, the Department expects that 
Financial Institutions will also look to conflict mitigation strategies 
identified by the Financial Institutions' other regulators. For 
illustrative purposes only, the following are non-exhaustive examples 
of practices identified as options by the SEC that could be implemented 
by Financial Institutions in compensating Investment Professionals: (1) 
Avoiding compensation thresholds that disproportionately increase 
compensation through incremental increases in sales; (2) minimizing 
compensation incentives for employees to favor one type of account over 
another; or to favor one type of product over another, proprietary or 
preferred provider products, or comparable products sold on a principal 
basis, for example, by establishing differential compensation based on 
neutral factors; (3) eliminating compensation incentives within 
comparable product lines by, for example, capping the credit that an 
associated person may receive across mutual funds or other comparable 
products across providers; (4) implementing supervisory procedures to 
monitor recommendations that are: Near compensation thresholds; near 
thresholds for firm recognition; involve higher compensating products, 
proprietary products, or transactions in a principal capacity; or, 
involve the rollover or transfer of assets from one type of account to 
another (such as recommendations to roll over or transfer assets in a 
Title I Plan account to an IRA) or from one product class to another; 
(5) adjusting compensation for associated persons who fail to

[[Page 82836]]

adequately manage conflicts of interest; and (6) limiting the types of 
retail customer to whom a product, transaction or strategy may be 
recommended.\125\
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    \125\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33392.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Financial Institutions also must review and mitigate incentives at 
the Financial Institution level. Firms should establish or enhance the 
review process for investment products that may be recommended to 
Retirement Investors. This process should include procedures for 
identifying and mitigating conflicts of interest associated with the 
product or declining to recommend a product if the Financial 
Institution cannot effectively mitigate associated conflicts of 
interest.\126\
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    \126\ For additional discussion of Financial Institution 
conflicts, see the preamble discussion below, ``Proprietary Products 
and Limited Menus of Investment Products.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Insurance Companies
    To comply with the exemption, insurance company Financial 
Institutions could adopt and implement supervisory and review 
mechanisms and avoid improper incentives that preferentially push the 
products, riders, and annuity features that might incentivize 
Investment Professionals to provide investment advice to Retirement 
Investors that does not meet the Impartial Conduct Standards. Insurance 
companies could implement procedures to review annuity sales to 
Retirement Investors under fiduciary investment advice arrangements to 
ensure that they were made in satisfaction of the Impartial Conduct 
Standards, much as they may already be required to review annuity sales 
to ensure compliance with state-law suitability requirements.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Cf. NAIC Model Regulation, Section 6.C.(2)(d) (``The 
insurer shall establish and maintain procedures for the review of 
each recommendation prior to issuance of an annuity that are 
designed to ensure that there is a reasonable basis to determine 
that the recommended annuity would effectively address the 
particular consumer's financial situation, insurance needs and 
financial objectives. Such review procedures may apply a screening 
system for the purpose of identifying selected transactions for 
additional review and may be accomplished electronically or through 
other means including, but not limited to, physical review. Such an 
electronic or other system may be designed to require additional 
review only of those transactions identified for additional review 
by the selection criteria''); and (e) (``The insurer shall establish 
and maintain reasonable procedures to detect recommendations that 
are not in compliance with subsections A, B, D and E. This may 
include, but is not limited to, confirmation of the consumer's 
consumer profile information, systematic customer surveys, producer 
and consumer interviews, confirmation letters, producer statements 
or attestations and programs of internal monitoring. Nothing in this 
subparagraph prevents an insurer from complying with this 
subparagraph by applying sampling procedures, or by confirming the 
consumer profile information or other required information under 
this section after issuance or delivery of the annuity''). The prior 
version of the model regulation, which was adopted in some form by a 
number of states, also included similar provisions requiring systems 
to supervise recommendations. See Annuity Suitability (A) Working 
Group Exposure Draft, Adopted by the Committee Dec. 30, 2019, 
available at www.naic.org/documents/committees_mo275.pdf. (comparing 
2020 version with prior version).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this regard, as discussed above, insurance company Financial 
Institutions would be responsible only for an Investment Professional's 
recommendation and sale of products offered to Retirement Investors by 
the insurance company in conjunction with fiduciary investment advice, 
and not to product sales of unrelated and unaffiliated insurers.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Cf. id., Section 6.C.(4) (``An insurer is not required to 
include in its system of supervision: (a) A producer's 
recommendations to consumers of products other than the annuities 
offered by the insurer'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Insurance companies could also create a system of oversight and 
compliance by contracting with an insurance intermediary or other 
entity to implement policies and procedures designed to ensure that all 
of the agents associated with the intermediary adhere to the conditions 
of this exemption. The intermediary could, for example, take action 
directly aimed at mitigating or eliminating compensation incentives. 
The intermediary could also review documentation prepared by insurance 
agents to comply with the exemption, as may be required by the 
insurance company, or use third-party industry comparisons available in 
the marketplace to help independent insurance agents recommend products 
that are prudent for the Retirement Investors they advise.
Periodic Review of Policies and Procedures
    The Department notes that Financial Institutions complying with the 
exemption would need to review their policies and procedures 
periodically and reasonably revise them as necessary to ensure that the 
policies and procedures continue to satisfy the conditions of this 
exemption. In particular, the exemption requires ongoing vigilance as 
to the impact of conflicts of interest on the provision of fiduciary 
investment advice to Retirement Investors. As a matter of prudence, 
Financial Institutions should regularly review their policies and 
procedures to ensure that they are achieving their intended goal of 
ensuring compliance with the exemption and the provision of advice that 
satisfies the Impartial Conduct Standards. For example, to the extent 
new products, lines of business, or compensation structures are 
introduced, Financial Institutions should consider whether their 
policies and procedures continue to be appropriate and effective. To 
the extent that the policies are failing to achieve their goal of 
ensuring compliance, the deficiencies should be corrected.

Proprietary Products and Limited Menus of Investment Products

    The best interest standard can be satisfied by Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals that provide investment 
advice on proprietary products or on a limited menu of investment 
options, including limitations to proprietary products \129\ and 
products that generate third party payments.\130\ Product limitations 
can serve a beneficial purpose by allowing Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals to develop increased familiarity with the 
products they recommend. At the same time, limited menus, particularly 
if they focus on proprietary products and products that generate third 
party payments, can result in heightened conflicts of interest. 
Financial Institutions and their affiliates and related entities may 
receive more compensation than they would for recommending other 
products, and, as a result, Investment Professionals and Financial 
Institutions may have an incentive to place their interests ahead of 
the interest of the Retirement Investor.
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    \129\ Proprietary products include products that are managed, 
issued, or sponsored by the Financial Institution or any of its 
affiliates.
    \130\ Third party payments include sales charges when not paid 
directly by the Plan or IRA; gross dealer concessions; revenue 
sharing payments; 12b-1 fees; distribution, solicitation or referral 
fees; volume-based fees; fees for seminars and educational programs; 
and any other compensation, consideration or financial benefit 
provided to the Financial Institution or an affiliate or related 
entity by a third party as a result of a transaction involving a 
Plan or an IRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the Department explained in the proposal, Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals providing investment advice on proprietary 
products or on a limited menu can satisfy the conditions of the 
exemption. They can do so by providing complete and accurate disclosure 
of their material conflicts of interest in connection with such 
products or limitations and adopting policies and procedures that 
mitigate conflicts to the extent that a reasonable person reviewing the 
policies and procedures and incentive practices as a whole would 
conclude that they do not create an incentive for a Financial 
Institution or Investment Professional to place their interests

[[Page 82837]]

ahead of the interest of the Retirement Investor.
    The Department envisions that Financial Institutions complying with 
the Impartial Conduct Standards and policies and procedures would 
carefully consider their product offerings and form a reasonable 
conclusion about whether the menu of investment options would permit 
Investment Professionals to provide fiduciary investment advice to 
Retirement Investors in accordance with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards. The exemption would be available if the Financial 
Institution prudently concludes that its offering of proprietary 
products, or its limitations on investment product offerings, in 
conjunction with the policies and procedures, would not create an 
incentive for Financial Institutions or Investment Professionals to 
place their interests ahead of the interest of the Retirement Investor.
    Several commenters expressed general support for the Department's 
approach to proprietary products and limited menus. One commenter noted 
that practical considerations call for limiting the investment menu 
when thousands of mutual funds and securities exist on a Financial 
Institution's platform. Another commenter agreed that Financial 
Institutions would form a reasonable conclusion about whether the 
limited menu supports recommendations that satisfy the Impartial 
Conduct Standards.
    Some commenters expressed concern about the exemption's coverage of 
recommendations involving proprietary products or limited menus because 
it would allow recommendations of poorly performing, high commission 
products. One commenter stated the exemption should not extend to such 
recommendations, as they create the largest potential for conflicts 
that cannot be fully eliminated, and suggested that the Department 
require that such recommendations be handled through the individual 
prohibited transaction exemption process. Another commenter indicated 
that the proposal did not address some ``non-financial structures'' 
used in connection with rollovers, such as requirements imposed by 
service providers for investors to fill out lengthy forms in order to 
roll plan assets over to third-party entities, while simultaneously 
providing simple and easy mechanisms for rollovers from the Plan into 
proprietary products maintained by the provider. Another commenter 
thought the exemption should specifically require Financial 
Institutions to document their conclusions as to why their offering of 
proprietary products or limited menus, in conjunction with the policies 
and procedures, would not cause a misalignment of their interests with 
Retirement Investors.
    In response to comments, the Department has not restricted the 
exemption to exclude recommendations of proprietary products and 
products from a limited menu, or required them to be addressed solely 
through individual exemptions. The Department believes that the 
conditions of the class exemption, including the best interest 
standard, appropriately address concerns about proprietary products. 
The Department has not added a specific requirement that Financial 
Institutions document their conclusions as to why their offering of 
proprietary products or limited menus, in conjunction with the policies 
and procedures, would not create an incentive for the Financial 
Institutions or Investment Professionals to place their interests ahead 
of the interest of the Retirement Investor. However, the Department 
notes that this is a best practice and may serve the interests of 
Financial Institutions since they are required under Section IV to keep 
records demonstrating compliance with the exemption. Even though there 
is no specific documentation requirement, the Department expects a 
Financial Institution would be able to explain clearly the process it 
used in making this determination. The Department also cautions 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals about practices 
that selectively promote Retirement Investors' purchase of products 
that are not in their best interest in the manner suggested by the 
commenter above (e.g., by making it much more burdensome for the 
Retirement Investor to rollover assets to one investment rather than 
another). Even if the practices do not directly involve the provision 
of fiduciary advice, they potentially undermine the required policies 
and procedures to mitigate conflicts of interest and may facilitate 
violations of fiduciary standards. Such practices should also be a 
matter of concern for the fiduciaries responsible for hiring the 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals to provide plan 
services.
    A few commenters sought clarification of the Department's preamble 
statement that a Financial Institution's policies and procedures should 
extend to circumstances in which the Financial Institution or 
Investment Professional determines that its proprietary products or 
limited menu do not offer Retirement Investors an investment option in 
their best interest when compared with other investment alternatives 
available in the marketplace. They sought confirmation that the 
Department did not intend to require Financial Institutions to compare 
their product offerings to all available investment alternatives, a 
confirmation they stated is consistent with guidance provided by the 
SEC on Regulation Best Interest. These commenters asserted that 
imposing such a requirement would serve to limit investor access to 
prudent investment advice, and could potentially require Investment 
Professionals that are insurance-only agents to compare annuities 
against securities, which they are not be licensed to sell, and which 
would potentially cause compliance issues under state securities laws.
    The Department confirms that the exemption does not require 
Financial Institutions to compare proprietary products with all other 
investment alternatives available in the marketplace. There is no 
obligation to perform an evaluation of every possible alternative, 
including those the Financial Institution or Investment Professional 
are not licensed to recommend, and the exemption does not contemplate 
that there is a single investment that is in a Retirement Investor's 
best interest. The exemption merely provides that Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals cannot use a limited menu to 
justify making a recommendation that does not meet the Impartial 
Conduct Standards.

Retrospective Review--Section II(d)

    Section II(d) of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to 
conduct a retrospective review, at least annually, that is reasonably 
designed to assist the Financial Institution in detecting and 
preventing violations of, and achieving compliance with, the Impartial 
Conduct Standards and the policies and procedures governing compliance 
with the exemption. While mitigation of Financial Institutions' and 
Investment Professionals' conflicts of interest is critical, Financial 
Institutions must also monitor Investment Professionals' conduct to 
detect advice that does not adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards 
or the Financial Institution's policies and procedures.
    The methodology and results of the retrospective review must be 
reduced to a written report that is provided to one of the Financial 
Institution's Senior Executive Officers.
    That officer is required to certify annually that:
    (A) The officer has reviewed the report of the retrospective 
review;
    (B) The Financial Institution has in place policies and procedures 
prudently

[[Page 82838]]

designed to achieve compliance with the conditions of this exemption; 
and
    (C) The Financial Institution has in place a prudent process to 
modify such policies and procedures as business, regulatory and 
legislative changes and events dictate, and to test the effectiveness 
of such policies and procedures on a periodic basis, the timing and 
extent of which is reasonably designed to ensure continuing compliance 
with the conditions of this exemption.
    This retrospective review, report and certification must be 
completed no later than six months following the end of the period 
covered by the review. The Financial Institution is required to retain 
the report, certification, and supporting data for a period of six 
years. If the Department requests the written report, certification, 
and supporting data within those six years, the Financial Institution 
would make the requested documents available within 10 business days of 
the request, to the extent permitted by law including 12 U.S.C. 484. 
The Department believes that the requirement to provide the written 
report within 10 business days will ensure that Financial Institutions 
diligently prepare their reports each year, resulting in meaningful 
protection of Retirement Investors.
    Financial Institutions can use the results of the review to find 
more effective ways to ensure that Investment Professionals are 
providing investment advice in accordance with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards and to correct any deficiencies in existing policies and 
procedures. Requiring a Senior Executive Officer to certify review of 
the report is a means of creating accountability for the review. This 
would serve the purpose of ensuring that more than one person 
determines whether the Financial Institution is complying with the 
conditions of the exemption and avoiding non-exempt prohibited 
transactions. If the officer does not have the experience or expertise 
to determine whether to make the certification, he or she would be 
expected to consult with a knowledgeable compliance professional to be 
able to do so.
    The retrospective review is based on FINRA rules governing how 
broker-dealers supervise associated persons,\131\ adapted to focus on 
the conditions of the exemption. The Department is aware that other 
Financial Institutions are subject to regulatory requirements to review 
their policies and procedures; \132\ however, for the reasons stated 
above, the Department believes that the specific certification 
requirement in the exemption will serve to protect Retirement Investors 
in the context of conflicted investment advice transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See FINRA rules 3110, 3120, and 3130.
    \132\ See, e.g., Rule 206(4)-7(b) under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters expressed support for a retrospective review but 
indicated the provision needs strengthening. One commenter stated that 
the requirement would be strengthened if the best interest standard is 
strengthened.\133\ One commenter suggested several methods of 
strengthening the exemption's retrospective review requirements, 
including requiring an independent audit, requiring appointment of a 
compliance officer and identification of the compliance officer and his 
or her qualifications in the report, and requiring the report of the 
retrospective review to be provided to Retirement Investors. One 
commenter provided an example of how the report could look and 
criticized the Department's statement that sampling would be permitted, 
asserting that the concentration of noncompliance is more likely to 
occur in large transactions. A few commenters stated the exemption 
should specify consequences of violations of the policies and 
procedures when such violations do not rise to the level of egregious 
patterns of misconduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ The best interest standard and the comments received on it 
are discussed above in ``Impartial Conduct Standards.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters opposed the requirement, stating it is 
burdensome, costly and unnecessary. As support for this assertion, some 
commenters stated that other exemptions do not include this condition 
and it also is not a requirement of Regulation Best Interest. Some 
commenters urged the Department to avoid what they viewed as a separate 
``prescriptive'' requirement in terms of ensuring that Financial 
Institutions satisfy the conditions of the exemption, in favor of a 
review incorporated into a firm's policies and procedures. Some 
asserted that the other exemption conditions will provide a sufficient 
compliance structure and the consequences of failing to comply with the 
exemption will provide sufficient incentive for Financial Institutions 
to oversee their own compliance. One commenter said wording of the 
condition was too vague and could expose Financial Institutions to 
liability for not meeting the standard. A few commenters suggested 
eliminating subsections (B) and (C) of the certification requirement, 
and, instead, merely referencing Section II(c)'s policies and 
procedures requirement.\134\ Another commenter asked the Department to 
provide a safe harbor based on compliance with FINRA's similar review 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Subsection (B) requires certification that ``[t]he 
Financial Institution has in place policies and procedures prudently 
designed to achieve compliance with the conditions of this 
exemption;'' and subsection (C) requires certification that ``[t]he 
Financial Institution has in place a prudent process to modify such 
policies and procedures as business, regulatory and legislative 
changes and events dictate, and to test the effectiveness of such 
policies and procedures on a periodic basis, the timing and extent 
of which is reasonably designed to ensure continuing compliance with 
the conditions of this exemption.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As further described below, the Department has adopted the 
retrospective review requirement largely as proposed based on the view 
that compliance review is a critical component of a Financial 
Institution's policies and procedures. Without this specific 
requirement, some Financial Institutions may take the position that 
adoption of policies and procedures is sufficient, without paying 
attention to whether the policies and procedures are prudently designed 
and whether Investment Professionals are complying with the policies 
and procedures and the Impartial Conduct Standards. The Department does 
not agree with those commenters who claimed such a review was 
unnecessary or overly burdensome.
    While some commenters expressed concern that the retrospective 
review needed strengthening, the Department notes the review must be 
signed and certified. The Department believes that requiring the 
results to be reduced to a written document certified by a Senior 
Executive Officer increases the likelihood that isolated compliance 
failures will be corrected before they become systemic. Although some 
commenters expressed the general view that the exemption relies upon 
self-policing, the requirement that Financial Institutions make their 
report available to the Department within 10 business days upon request 
ensures that the Department retains an appropriate level of oversight 
over exemption compliance.
    To maintain this principles-based approach, the Department did not 
mandate specific detailed components of the retrospective review. 
Financial Institutions will be free to design the review process in the 
context of their own business models and the particular conflicts of 
interest they face. Although the exemption does not specify that a 
compliance officer must be appointed, the Department envisions that 
Financial Institutions will, as a practical matter,

[[Page 82839]]

assign a compliance role to an appropriate officer.
    The Department did not narrow subsections (B) and (C) of the 
certification requirements merely to reference the requirements of 
Section II(c) as suggested by a few commenters. The broader 
certification properly focuses the Financial Institution's assessment 
of the ongoing effectiveness of the policies and procedures, the 
periodic testing of those policies and procedures, and the need to make 
modifications to the extent they are not working. A strong process to 
review the effectiveness of the Financial Institution's policies and 
procedures and to make course corrections as necessary is critical to 
the protection of Retirement Investors affected by the exemption.
    In the proposal, the Department indicated that it envisioned that 
the review would involve testing a sample of transactions to determine 
compliance. In response to a comment that indicated sampling may not be 
appropriate since non-compliance may occur more frequently with respect 
to large transactions, the Department clarifies that an appropriate 
retrospective review would be aimed at detecting non-compliance across 
a wide range of transactions types and sizes, large and small, 
identifying deficiencies in the policies and procedures, and rectifying 
those deficiencies. For large Financial Institutions that conduct large 
numbers of transactions each year, sampling may not be the sole means 
of testing compliance, but it is an important and necessary component 
of any prudent review process, and should be performed in a manner 
designed to identify potential violations, problems, and deficiencies 
that need to be addressed.
    The Department considered the alternative of requiring a Financial 
Institution to engage an independent party to provide an external 
audit, as suggested by a commenter. Because of the potential costs of 
such audits, and the exemption's reliance on the retrospective review 
process, the Department elected not to impose this additional 
requirement. The Department is not convinced that an independent, 
external audit would yield sufficient benefits in addition to the 
results of the retrospective review to justify the increased cost, 
especially in the case of smaller Financial Institutions without any 
past practice of actions that may render it ineligible to rely on this 
class exemption. The Department also has not included a requirement 
that the report of the retrospective review be provided to all 
Retirement Investors. As discussed below in the section on 
recordkeeping, the Department believes that Financial Institutions' 
internal compliance documents should be available to regulators but not 
Retirement Investors, so as to promote full identification and 
remediation of compliance issues without undue concern about the 
widespread disclosure of the issues.
    The Department does not believe the requirement is too vague for 
Financial Institutions to know how to comply. The requirement that the 
review be ``reasonably designed'' is consistent with reasonableness as 
a term commonly used in a variety of legal settings, and especially 
under the Act. Further, as noted above, the Department provided this 
approach to allow Financial Institutions flexibility in designing their 
compliance reviews.
    Although a retrospective review is not a requirement of Regulation 
Best Interest, as one commenter pointed out, the Department notes that 
an analogous requirement is already applicable to broker-dealers under 
FINRA rules. The Department declines to provide a safe harbor based on 
compliance with the FINRA rule because that rule is aimed at reviewing 
compliance with FINRA rules, not the Financial Institution's separate 
compliance with the terms of this exemption.
    Some commenters said that a retrospective review was an unusual 
requirement for a class exemption, and that the Department had not 
pointed to any noncompliance to warrant such a condition. The 
Department, however, has routinely made independent audits a condition 
in individual exemptions. It is important that entities comply with the 
terms of the exemption and that the Department can readily verify such 
compliance. Here, the Department continues to believe that a 
retrospective review, which is less costly than an audit, strikes the 
appropriate balance for this class exemption. Additionally, the 
Department notes that it frequently imposes a recordkeeping requirement 
documenting compliance as a condition of exemption. In drafting a 
principles-based exemption that works with different business models, 
the Department has determined that this retrospective review is a 
crucial way to determine compliance with the exemption, and to ensure 
covered entities review, enforce, and update their policies and 
procedures as needed.
    In response to commenters who asked the Department to specify the 
consequences of a violation discovered in the retrospective review, and 
other commenters who asked for the ability to correct compliance issues 
uncovered during the review, the Department has included a self-
correction feature in the final exemption, as described below. If self-
correction is not available or a Financial Institution decides not to 
self-correct, then the Financial Institution remains liable for a 
prohibited transaction associated with the transaction for which there 
was a failure.
    One commenter stated that the Department should not require 
Financial Institutions to provide the report within 10 business days of 
request by the Department because Financial Institutions may have 
legitimate difficulties meeting this requirement. However, this aspect 
of the exemption provides an important mechanism for the Department to 
ensure that Financial Institutions are taking their roles under the 
exemption seriously. The Department does not intend for Financial 
Institutions to prepare a retrospective review only after it has been 
requested by the Department. The exemption provides a separate deadline 
for the completion of each annual review, so the obligation to provide 
the accompanying report within 10 business days of request will only 
apply to completed reports. For this reason, the Department has not 
extended the 10 business-day period.\135\
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    \135\ Another commenter stated that the retrospective review 
should be required only once every three years. The Department has 
not adopted this suggestion. A review that is conducted as 
infrequently as once every three years would be unlikely to identify 
compliance concerns within a reasonable amount of time so as to 
prevent more systemic violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter requested a transition period for the 
retrospective review through 2022, for the creation and testing of the 
report that is required in connection with the retrospective review. 
The commenter suggested that so long as the Financial Institution is 
working towards creating and testing the process, it should be able to 
use the exemption. As there is not a specified form of the report, the 
Department does not believe an additional transition period is 
warranted. Because the report is annual and retrospective, preparation 
of the first report would not need to begin until at least one year 
after the exemption's effective date, and the report does not need to 
be completed for an additional six months after that. The Department 
believes this will give the Financial Institution sufficient time to 
create and test its reporting methods. Furthermore, Financial 
Institutions that are subject to the FINRA regulation should already be 
conducting a similar type of review. The Department believes it would 
be inconsistent with the principles and protective nature of the

[[Page 82840]]

exemption to further delay implementation of the retrospective review.
    One commenter addressed the interaction of banking law with the 
requirement in Section II(d)(5) to provide the report of the 
retrospective review, the certification and supporting data available 
to the Department. The commenter stated that a provision of the 
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 484, prohibits any person from exercising 
visitorial powers over national banks and federal savings associations 
except as authorized by federal law. The commenter requested that 
Section II(d)(5) be revised with the addition, at the end of the 
sentence, of, ``except as prohibited under 12 U.S.C. 484.'' Without 
conceding that the Department's authority is limited by this provision, 
the Department has made the requested edit.
    One commenter indicated that the Department does not have 
jurisdiction to enforce the prohibited transaction rules for 
transactions involving IRAs, so the Department's interest in and access 
to the report of the retrospective review should be limited to Title I 
Plan transactions. As the agency with authority to grant prohibited 
transaction exemptions under the Code, the Department retains the 
ability to determine whether the conditions of an exemption are being 
met by reviewing records for the purpose of determining parties' 
compliance for IRAs.\136\
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    \136\ See Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 and discussion 
supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Senior Executive Officer Certification
    While the proposal stated that the Financial Institution's chief 
executive officer (or equivalent) must certify the retrospective 
review, the final exemption provides, instead, that the retrospective 
review may be certified by any of the Financial Institution's Senior 
Executive Officers. The exemption defines a ``Senior Executive 
Officer'' as any of the following: The chief compliance officer, the 
chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer, or one of 
the three most senior officers of the Financial Institution. In making 
this change, the Department accepts the views of a number of commenters 
that stated that the CEO should not be the only person who can provide 
a certification regarding the retrospective review. The Department does 
not believe that permitting the Financial Institution to choose 
whichever Senior Executive Officer it believes is most appropriate to 
perform the certification alters the protective nature of this 
condition. As commenters pointed out, other officers than the CEO, such 
as the chief compliance officer, may have more information, specific 
training, and be better able to understand the retrospective review. 
Further, no matter which Senior Executive Officer is selected to 
provide the certification, the definition of a Senior Executive Officer 
ensures that an officer of sufficient authority within the Financial 
Institution will be held accountable for oversight of exemption 
compliance. In this way, the Department believes that requiring 
certification will help reinforce a culture of compliance within the 
Financial Institution.
    One commenter raised concerns regarding the applicability of the 
CEO certification requirement in the banking regulatory environment, 
stating that this type of certification is unusual for bank CEOs. 
Another commenter worried more broadly that a CEO certification might 
interfere with other financial certifications required of the CEO or 
unduly burden corporate governance. The Department believes that 
allowing the certification to be performed by any Senior Executive 
Officer addresses these concerns while still preserving the protective 
nature of the condition.
    Some commenters objected to the certification requirement as a 
whole. They argued that the certification is burdensome and increases 
liability exposure without necessarily improving compliance. Others 
asserted certification is not required under Regulation Best Interest 
or the NAIC Model Regulation. On the other hand, some commenters 
acknowledged the similar existing requirements under FINRA but argued 
the requirement would be duplicative or should be harmonized.
    The certification provides an important protection of Retirement 
Investors by creating accountability for the retrospective review and 
report at an executive level within the Financial Institution. Without 
a requirement that a Senior Executive Officer be held accountable by 
certifying the review, there is no assurance that any person in the 
leadership of a Financial Institution will review or be aware of its 
contents. The Department is required to find that the exemption is 
protective of, and in the interests of, Plans and their participants 
and beneficiaries, and IRA owners. This condition is important to the 
Department's ability to make these required findings.
    One commenter indicated that an exemption with the certification 
requirement would not be considered ``deregulatory'' as was stated in 
the proposal. The Department responds that the exemption as a whole is 
deregulatory because it provides a broader and more flexible means for 
investment advice fiduciaries to Plans and IRAs to engage in certain 
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under Title I and the 
Code. Financial Institutions remain free to structure their business in 
a manner that complies with the statutes and their prohibitions, or to 
request an individual exemption tailored to their specific business.
    Finally, one commenter requested that the Department state that 
signing the certification does not implicate personal liability for the 
signing officer under the Act. The Department responds that signing the 
certification would not, in and of itself, impact the officer's 
personal liability under the Act; any such liability would be based on 
the officer's status as a fiduciary, the Act's statutory framework, and 
other relevant facts and circumstances.

Self-Correction--Section II(e)

    The Department has added a new Section II(e) to the exemption, 
under which Financial Institutions will be able to correct certain 
violations of the exemption. Under the new Section II(e), the 
Department will not consider a non-exempt prohibited transaction to 
have occurred due to a violation of the exemption's conditions, 
provided: (1) Either the violation did not result in investment losses 
to the Retirement Investor or the Financial Institution made the 
Retirement Investor whole for any resulting losses; (2) the Financial 
Institution corrects the violation and notifies the Department via 
email to [email protected] within 30 days of correction; (3) the correction 
occurs no later than 90 days after the Financial Institution learned of 
the violation or reasonably should have learned of the violation; and 
(4) the Financial Institution notifies the persons responsible for 
conducting the retrospective review during the applicable review cycle, 
and the violation and correction is specifically set forth in the 
written report of the retrospective review.
    While this section was not a part of the proposal, several 
commenters raised the issue of instituting a self-correction procedure 
as it related to the Department's proposal requiring a retrospective 
review. Commenters requested that the Department provide a means for 
Financial Institutions, acting in good faith, to avoid loss of the 
exemption for violations of the conditions. Some commenters focused on 
minor or technical violations, others on violations in connection with 
specific conditions, such as allowing a

[[Page 82841]]

correction for failure to provide disclosures. Some pointed to existing 
methods of correction allowed by the Department and other regulators, 
including the Department's regulation under ERISA section 
408(b)(2).\137\ One commenter specified that there should be a 
correction process in connection with the retrospective review, because 
failure to include this could put Financial Institutions in a difficult 
position of having discovered technical violations but not being able 
to cure them without being subject to an excise tax for the prohibited 
transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(vii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Upon consideration of the comments, the Department determined to 
provide this self-correction procedure. Although many commenters cited 
minor or technical violations, the Department does not view violations 
of any condition of the exemption as necessarily minor or technical. 
Accordingly, the section allows for correction even if a Retirement 
Investor has suffered investment losses, provided that the Retirement 
Investor is made whole. The Department believes that the self-
correction provision will provide Financial Institutions with an 
additional incentive to take the retrospective review process 
seriously, timely identify and correct violations, and use the process 
to correct deficiencies in their policies and procedures, so as to 
avoid potential future penalties and lawsuits.

Eligibility--Section III

    Section III of the exemption identifies circumstances under which 
an Investment Professional or Financial Institution will become 
ineligible to rely on the exemption for a period of 10 years. The 
grounds for ineligibility involve certain criminal convictions or 
certain egregious conduct with respect to compliance with the 
exemption. Ineligible parties may rely on an otherwise available 
statutory exemption or administrative class exemption, or the parties 
can apply for an individual prohibited transaction exemption from the 
Department. This will allow the Department to give special attention to 
parties with certain criminal convictions or with a history of 
egregious conduct regarding compliance with the exemption.
    Many commenters expressed concern that the conditions of the 
proposed exemption were not sufficiently enforceable to provide 
meaningful protections. Commenters noted that, unlike the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption granted in connection with the 2016 fiduciary rule, 
this exemption did not include a contract or other means of making the 
Impartial Conduct Standards enforceable. Therefore, IRA owners would 
not have a mechanism to enforce the requirements of the exemption, and 
the Department lacks direct enforcement authority over Plans not 
covered by Title I. Even with respect to Retirement Investors in ERISA-
covered Plans, some commenters described the structure of the exemption 
as effectively allowing the financial services industry to self-
regulate; they said the exemption would permit the ``fox to guard the 
henhouse.'' One commenter specifically criticized the proposed 
exemption's eligibility provision as too weak to prevent or punish 
violations of the exemption. Other commenters were concerned that the 
eligibility provision did not provide any incentive for Financial 
Institutions to comply with the requirements of the exemption.
    Other commenters objected to the exemption including any 
eligibility provision, arguing that the Department's investigative 
authority and existing consequences for prohibited transactions are 
sufficient. Some raised concerns that the exemption's eligibility 
provision has no basis in the statute and may be unconstitutional. Some 
acknowledged that the Department's QPAM class exemption has a similar 
provision related to criminal convictions, but one commenter argued 
this too, is impermissible.\138\ Some commenters cited the Fifth 
Circuit's Chamber opinion as support for the position that the 
eligibility provision impermissibly expands the Department's 
enforcement authority over IRAs. One commenter indicated that the 
eligibility provision would only serve to increase compliance 
complexity, costs, and burdens, along with compliance uncertainty, 
under the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See PTE 84-14, Class Exemption for Plan Asset Transactions 
Determined by Independent Qualified Professional Asset Managers, 49 
FR 9494 (Mar. 13, 1984) as corrected at 50 FR 41430 (Oct. 10, 1985), 
as amended at 67 FR 9483 (Mar. 1, 2002), 70 FR 49305 (Aug. 23, 
2005), and 75 FR 38837 (July 6, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has considered comments on the eligibility provision 
in Section III and has adopted it generally as proposed, but with non-
substantive revisions.\139\ The Department disagrees with commenters 
that expressed the view that the exemption is essentially self-
regulatory and that the Department should not proceed with the 
exemption because it lacks an express enforcement mechanism for IRA 
owners. The Department believes that the eligibility provision will 
encourage Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals to 
maintain an appropriate focus on compliance with legal requirements and 
with the exemption, and, therefore, it has not eliminated them as 
overly burdensome, as suggested by a commenter. The Department intends 
to use its investigative, enforcement, and referral authority to 
enforce compliance with the exemption, and it will impose ineligibility 
on Financial Institutions or Investment Professionals that demonstrate 
the type of compliance issues described in the exemption. The 
Department notes that, in developing the exemption, it was mindful of 
the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion holding that the Department did not 
have authority to include certain contract requirements in the new 
exemptions enforceable by IRA owners granted as part of the 2016 
fiduciary rulemaking. The Department's approach was designed to avoid 
any potential for disruption in the market for investment advice that 
may occur related to a contract requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ As described in more detail below, all references to the 
``Office of Exemption Determinations'' have been replaced with 
references to the ``Department.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department disagrees that this eligibility provision is 
problematic simply because only one other class exemption includes this 
condition. It is the responsibility of the Department to craft 
exemptions to ensure they are protective of and in the interests of 
plans and plan participants. The conditions in the Department's 
exemptions are designed to address the conflicts of interest raised by 
the transactions covered by the exemption. The Department has 
determined that limiting eligibility in this manner serves as an 
important safeguard in connection with this very broad grant of relief 
from the self-dealing prohibitions of ERISA and the Code in this 
exemption.
    The specific provision governing eligibility and the comments 
received on the provision are discussed in the next sections.

Criminal Convictions

    An Investment Professional or Financial Institution will become 
ineligible upon the conviction of any crime described in ERISA section 
411 arising out of provision of advice to Retirement Investors, except 
as described below. Crimes described in ERISA section 411 are likely to 
directly contravene the Investment Professional's or Financial 
Institution's ability to maintain a high standard of integrity and will 
cast doubt on their ability to act in accordance with the Impartial 
Conduct Standards. The Department intends that the phrase

[[Page 82842]]

``arising out of the provision of advice to Retirement Investors'' be 
interpreted broadly to include, for example, a Financial Institution or 
Investment Professional embezzling money from the account of a 
Retirement Investor to whom they provide or provided investment advice.
    An Investment Professional will automatically become ineligible 
after a criminal conviction in ERISA section 411 arising out of 
provision of advice to Retirement Investors. However, a Financial 
Institutions with such a criminal conviction may submit a petition to 
the Department and seek a determination that continued reliance on the 
exemption would not be contrary to the purposes of the exemption. 
Petitions must be submitted within 10 business days of the conviction 
to the Department by email at [email protected].
    Following submission of the petition, the Financial Institution has 
the opportunity to be heard, in person or in writing or both. Because 
of the 10-business day timeframe for submitting a petition, the 
Department does not expect the Financial Institution to set forth its 
entire position or argument in its initial petition. The opportunity to 
be heard in person will allow the Financial Institution to address the 
facts and circumstances more fully. The opportunity to be heard will be 
limited to one in-person conference unless the Department determines in 
its sole discretion to allow additional conferences.
    The Department's determination as to whether to grant a Financial 
Institution's petition to continue relying on the exemption following a 
criminal conviction will be based solely on its discretion. In 
determining whether to grant the petition, the Department will consider 
the gravity of the offense; the relationship between the conduct 
underlying the conviction and the Financial Institution's system and 
practices in its retirement investment business as a whole; the degree 
to which the underlying conduct concerned individual misconduct, 
corporate managers, and/or policy; how recently the underlying conduct 
occurred and any related lawsuit; remedial measures taken by the 
Financial Institution upon learning of the underlying conduct; and such 
other factors as the Department determines in its discretion are 
reasonable in light of the nature and purposes of the exemption. The 
Department will consider whether any extenuating circumstances indicate 
that the Financial Institution should be able to continue to rely on 
the exemption despite the conviction. In sum, the Department will focus 
on the Financial Institution's ability to fulfill its obligations under 
the exemption for the protection of Retirement Investors.
    Upon making a determination as to a Financial Institution's 
petition, the Department will provide a written determination to the 
Financial Institution that states the basis for the determination. 
Denial of a Financial Institution's petition will not necessarily 
indicate that the Department will not entertain a separate individual 
exemption request submitted by the same Financial Institution; however, 
any individual exemption is likely to be subject to additional 
protective conditions. The final exemption provides that Financial 
Institution will have 21 days after denial of the petition before 
becoming ineligible. This will allow Financial Institutions, and other 
Financial Institutions in the same Controlled Group, to assess their 
legal and operational options.
    Some commenters on the proposal expressed general agreement that a 
Financial Institution that is convicted of a crime should be ineligible 
for the exemption. One commenter believed there are due process 
concerns if ineligibility occurs at the time of conviction rather than 
allowing for an appeal. Other commenters stated that the Department can 
take action under ERISA section 411 to seek to disqualify an entity 
from acting as a fiduciary so a provision in the exemption is 
unnecessary.
    The Department believes that the criminal basis for ineligibility 
is appropriately applied in the context of both Title I Plans and IRAs. 
Despite the availability of action under ERISA section 411, it is 
appropriate to condition further reliance on the broad relief in the 
exemption more directly on the lack of such convictions, without the 
Department having to take further action. The Department does not agree 
that the application of the crimes listed in ERISA section 411 would 
not be permitted by the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion. The 2016 
fiduciary rule and related exemptions did not contain a comparable 
provision, and the Fifth Circuit did not address the issue. As part of 
its authority to craft exemptions and make findings under ERISA section 
408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2), the Department is permitted to 
impose reasonable protective conditions, including those related to the 
conduct of those entrusted with investors' funds. The Department does 
not view ERISA section 411 or the statutory penalties for exemption 
noncompliance as creating a negative inference that prohibits a 
criminal prohibition as part of this exemption, whether in the Title I 
or Code context, especially when both provisions share the same 
essential purpose. Further, the only consequence flowing from a 
violation of the criminal conviction provision of this exemption is the 
loss of eligibility to use the exemption; no further penalties attach.
    The Department also does not believe that the eligibility provision 
raises due process issues. The exemption specifically entitles the 
Financial Institution to submit a petition informing the Department of 
the conviction and seeking a determination that the Financial 
Institution's continued reliance on the exemption would not be contrary 
to the purposes of the exemption. This process constitutes notice and 
an opportunity to be heard, and parties aggrieved by the denial of an 
exemption can appeal that final agency action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. The Department also does not believe it is appropriate 
to defer ineligibility until the conclusion of an appeal because of the 
significant delay that an appeal may entail, during which time 
Retirement Investors' interests may be at risk.
    The Department has also clarified, in response to another comment, 
that ineligible parties under this exemption may alternatively rely on 
a statutory exemption or an administrative class exemption, if one is 
available. Ineligible Financial Institutions may also request an 
individual exemption, subject to additional protective conditions as 
warranted, and with the same appeal rights.

Conduct With Respect to Compliance With the Exemption

    Investment Professionals and Financial Institutions will also 
become ineligible if they are issued a written ineligibility notice 
from the Department stating that they (i) engaged in a systematic 
pattern or practice of violating the conditions of the exemption, (ii) 
intentionally violated the conditions of the exemption, or (iii) 
provided materially misleading information to the Department in 
connection with the Investment Professional's or Financial 
Institution's conduct under the exemption. These categories of 
noncompliance militate against the Investment Professional or Financial 
Institution continuing to rely on the broad prohibited transaction 
relief in the class exemption. Provided that a Financial Institution 
has established, maintained and enforced prudent policies and 
procedures as required by this exemption, a minor number of isolated 
violations of the conditions of the exemption does not

[[Page 82843]]

constitute a systematic pattern or practice.
    The exemption sets forth a process governing the issuance of the 
written ineligibility notice, as follows. Prior to issuing a written 
ineligibility notice, the Department will issue a written warning to 
the Investment Professional or Financial Institution, as applicable, 
identifying specific conduct that could lead to ineligibility, and 
providing a six-month opportunity to cure. At the end of the six-month 
period, if the Department determines that the conduct has persisted, it 
will provide the Investment Professional or Financial Institution with 
the opportunity to be heard, in person or in writing, before the 
Department issues the written ineligibility notice. If a written 
ineligibility notice is issued, it will state the basis for the 
determination that the Investment Professional or Financial Institution 
engaged in conduct warranting ineligibility. The final exemption 
provides that Financial Institution will have 21 days after the date of 
the written ineligibility notice before becoming ineligible. This will 
allow Financial Institutions, and other Financial Institutions in the 
same Controlled Group, to assess their legal and operational options.
    A number of commenters expressed opposition to this basis of 
ineligibility in the proposed exemption. Most of the opposition 
centered on the proposal's specific references to the Office of 
Exemption Determinations (OED) in determining ineligibility. Commenters 
stated that the standards in the exemption are not objective or 
detailed and asserted this could result in a violation of due process, 
inconsistency, and unfairness. Further, because of these concerns, one 
commenter requested an appeals process beyond OED and another requested 
the use of administrative law judges. Some commenters raised concerns 
about the QPAM exemption and a few commenters cited a GAO report 
regarding OED procedures as evidence that OED should not be permitted 
to oversee this process.\140\ Some commenters cited a recent Supreme 
Court case, Lucia v. SEC, which they said struck down a similar 
structure.\141\ Other commenters stated that this eligibility provision 
overstepped the Department's authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ Individual Retirement Accounts, Formalizing Labor's and 
IRS's Collaborative Efforts Could Strengthen Oversight of Prohibited 
Transactions, GAO-19-495 (June 2019), available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/699575.pdf.
    \141\ 585 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 2044 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters, the eligibility provision has been non-
substantively revised to state that the Department will determine 
eligibility. This will ensure that the Department, acting under the 
direction of the Secretary of Labor, maintains full responsibility for 
eligibility determinations under the exemption. As laid out in the 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, the Secretary of Labor has the 
authority to issue exemptions, oversee fiduciary conduct and prohibited 
transactions. Accordingly, the Department disagrees with those 
commenters who claim the Department lacks the appropriate authority, or 
is overstepping its role. On the contrary, the Department is acting 
squarely within the authority granted to it to issue regulations, 
rulings, opinions, and exemptions under Code section 4975. The 
Department believes that the eligibility provision does not need 
additional adjustments given that the exemption specifies an extensive 
process before a written ineligibility notice will be issued. The 
Department has clarified, in response to a comment, that ineligible 
parties under this exemption may alternatively rely on a statutory 
exemption or an administrative class exemption, if one is available.
    The Department also disagrees with those commenters who claim that 
the ineligibility provision is too vague as to be meaningful. The 
exemption clearly states that an entity will be provided with a 
statement of the specific conduct at issue, and will be provided with a 
six-month period to cure the conduct. Commenters expressed concerned 
that the Department did not provide a specific number of violations a 
Financial Entity may commit before such violations become egregious 
(and, therefore, disqualifying). The Department has crafted a 
principles-based exemption, and does not consider it appropriate to set 
forth all of the possible ways in which an entity may engage in 
egregious conduct. The Department continues to believe that providing 
entities with specific notice and an opportunity to cure better 
balances the issues at stake.
    The Department also notes that, in connection with its earlier 
response to a commenter, clarifying that the scope of relief in this 
exemption extends to foreign affiliates of Financial Institutions,\142\ 
so too does the application of the eligibility provision regarding 
egregious conduct with respect to compliance with the exemption. As 
that commenter indicated, including relief for foreign affiliates is 
important, given the increasingly global nature of retirement services. 
The Department agrees, and, therefore, impresses upon Financial 
Institutions the importance of ensuring proper oversight of foreign 
affiliates with respect to compliance with the conditions of the 
exemption. If a foreign affiliate performs services in connection with 
a transaction covered by this exemption, but does so in a manner that 
is in violation of the conditions of this exemption, this will subject 
the Financial Institution to possible ineligibility under Section 
III(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See discussion on Scope of Relief--Section I, Affiliates 
and Related Entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Scope of Ineligibility

    A Financial Institution's ineligibility would be triggered by its 
own conviction or receipt of a written ineligibility notice, or by the 
conviction or receipt of such a notice by another Financial Institution 
in the same Controlled Group. A Financial Institution is in the same 
Controlled Group with another Financial Institution if it would be 
considered in the same ``controlled group of corporations'' or ``under 
common control'' with the Financial Institution, as those terms are 
defined in Code section 414(b) and (c), in each case including the 
accompanying regulations. The Department is including in the 
eligibility provision other Financial Institutions in the same 
Controlled Group to ensure that a Financial Institution facing 
ineligibility for its actions affecting Retirement Investors cannot 
simply transfer its fiduciary investment advice business to another 
Financial Institution that is closely related and that also provides 
fiduciary investment advice to Retirement Investors, thus avoiding 
ineligibility entirely. The definition of Controlled Group is narrowly 
tailored to cover only other investment advice fiduciaries that share 
significant ownership. This definition ensures that a Financial 
Institution would not become ineligible based on the actions of an 
entity engaged in unrelated services that happens to share a small 
amount of common ownership.
    The proposed exemption provided that a Financial Institution is in 
a Control Group with another Financial Institution if, directly or 
indirectly, the Financial Institution owns at least 80 percent of, is 
at least 80 percent owned by, or shares an 80 percent or more owner 
with, the other Financial Institution. If the Financial Institutions 
are not corporations, the proposal provided that ownership would be 
defined to include interests in the Financial Institution such as 
profits interest or capital interests in which,

[[Page 82844]]

directly or indirectly, the Financial Institution owns at least 80 
percent of, is at least 80 percent owned by, or shares an 80 percent or 
more owner with, the other Financial Institution. For purposes of this 
provision, the proposal provided if the Financial Institutions are not 
corporations, ownership would be defined to include interests in the 
Financial Institution such as profits interest or capital interests.
    The Department stated in the proposal that the 80 percent threshold 
is consistent with the Code's rules for determining when employees of 
multiple corporations should be treated as employed by the same 
employer, citing Code section 414(b). The Department also sought 
comment on this approach. In response, one commenter asserted that 
different forms of ownership would make it difficult to determine how 
to apply the 80% threshold suggested. Accordingly, the Department 
revised the definition to directly incorporate both definitions in both 
Code section 414(b) and 414(c) which address these arrangements. The 
Department believes these provisions will provide a well-known frame of 
reference for Financial Institutions and avoid uncertainty as to how 
the definition will be applied.
    A few other commenters opposed including Control Group members 
within the eligibility provision, as proposed. These commenters 
asserted that a common parent is not an indicator of any other 
connection between corporate entities; rather, these commenters stated 
that affiliates typically maintain different policies and procedures. 
One commenter asserted that conduct by the Financial Institution's 
affiliates may not relate to investment advice or conduct involving 
Title I Plans or IRAs. This commenter stated that affiliates typically 
maintain different compliance policies and procedures and a Financial 
Institution and its affiliates are managed by different officers and 
compliance staff. Another commenter asserted that a Financial 
Institution may not know of the conviction of another Financial 
Institution in the same Controlled Group within 10 business days. 
Another commenter stated that independent firms may have common 
ownership but different business models or professional culture.
    The Department has not revised its approach in response to these 
comments. The eligibility provision and the definition of Controlled 
Group are narrowly drafted so that they identify conduct involving 
services to Retirement Investors, and also are limited to Financial 
Institutions, within the meaning of the exemption, that are Controlled 
Group members with a high level of common ownership. The Department 
continues to believe that the tailored definition of Controlled Group 
and provision that a Financial Institution becomes ineligible on the 
10th business day after conviction ensures that there is a culture of 
compliance across the Controlled Group for entities engaging in this 
otherwise prohibited transaction. The Department notes that given the 
high level of ownership, it is not unreasonable for the Financial 
Institution be aware of the conviction of another Financial Institution 
in the same Controlled Group and it should not be difficult for 
Financial Institutions to keep track of such convictions. Accordingly, 
the Department has not adjusted the 10 business-day deadline.

Period of Ineligibility

    The period of ineligibility under Section III is 10 years; however, 
the eligibility provision would apply differently to Investment 
Professionals and Financial Institutions. An Investment Professional 
that is convicted of a crime would become ineligible immediately upon 
the date the Investment Professional is convicted by a trial court, 
regardless of whether that judgment remains under appeal, or upon the 
date of the written ineligibility notice from the Department, as 
applicable.
    Financial Institutions, on the other hand, would have a one-year 
winding down period after becoming ineligible, during which they may 
continue to rely on the exemption, as long as they comply with the 
exemption's other conditions during that year. The winding down period 
begins 10 business days after the date of the trial court's judgment, 
regardless of whether that judgment remains under appeal. Financial 
Institutions that timely submit a petition regarding the conviction 
would become ineligible 21 days after the date of a written notice of 
denial from the Department. Financial Institutions that become 
ineligible due to conduct with respect to exemption compliance would 
become ineligible 21 days after the date of the written ineligibility 
notice from the Department and begin their winding down period at that 
point.
    Financial Institutions or Investment Professionals that become 
ineligible to rely on this exemption may rely on a statutory or 
administrative class prohibited transaction exemption if one is 
available or may seek an individual prohibited transaction exemption 
from the Department. The Department encourages any Financial 
Institution or Investment Professional facing allegations that could 
result in ineligibility, or that otherwise determines it may need 
individual prohibited transaction relief, to begin the application 
process as soon as possible. An applicant is not guaranteed an 
individual exemption, even if one is proposed. If an exemption is 
proposed, the Department is required to provide notice and a period of 
public comment and to consider those comments before granting an 
exemption. If an individual exemption applicant becomes ineligible and 
the Department has not granted a final individual exemption, the 
Department will consider additional retroactive relief, consistent with 
its policy as set forth in 29 CFR 2570.35(d). Retroactive relief may 
require inclusion of additional exemption conditions.

Recordkeeping--Section IV

    Under Section IV of the exemption, Financial Institutions must 
maintain records for six years demonstrating compliance with the 
exemption. The Department generally includes a recordkeeping 
requirement in its administrative exemptions to ensure that parties 
relying on an exemption can demonstrate, and the Department can verify, 
compliance with the conditions of the exemption. Section IV requires 
that the records be made available, to the extent permitted by law, to 
any authorized employee of the Department or the Department of the 
Treasury.
    To demonstrate compliance with the exemption, Financial 
Institutions are required to maintain, among other things, 
documentation of rollover recommendations; their written policies and 
procedures adopted pursuant to Section II(c); and the report of the 
retrospective review, certification, and supporting data. Except with 
respect to rollovers, the Department does not expect Financial 
Institutions to document the reason for every investment recommendation 
made pursuant to the exemption. However, documentation may be 
especially important for recommendations of particularly complex 
products or recommendations that might, on their face, appear 
inconsistent with the best interest standard.
    One commenter supported the recordkeeping requirement as proposed 
but recommended extending the recordkeeping requirement to 10 years. 
The Department declines to extend the time period. The six-year time 
period is consistent with standard recordkeeping requirements imposed 
in many existing exemptions, and it is consistent with the

[[Page 82845]]

statute of limitation set forth in ERISA section 413.
    Other commenters opposed the scope of access to records in the 
proposed exemption. The proposal provided that records should be 
available for review by the following parties in addition to the 
Department: Any fiduciary of a Plan that engaged in an investment 
transaction pursuant to this exemption; any contributing employer and 
any employee organization whose members are covered by a Plan that 
engaged in an investment transaction pursuant to this exemption; or any 
participant or beneficiary of a Plan, or IRA owner that engaged in an 
investment transaction pursuant to this exemption. Several commenters 
stated that allowing parties other than the Department to review 
records would increase the burden placed on Financial Institutions. In 
particular, they expressed the view that parties might overwhelm 
Financial Institutions with requests for information in order to 
generate claims for use in litigation. Fear of potential litigation 
could, in turn, they argued, lead to a ``culture of quiet'' in which 
employees of Financial Institutions elect not to address compliance 
issues because of the fear of this disclosure.
    In response to these comments, the Department has revised the final 
exemption's recordkeeping provisions so that access is limited to the 
Department and the Department of the Treasury, although, in connection 
with this change, the Department has revised Section II(b) of the 
exemption, as described above, to provide Retirement Investors with 
documentation of the reasons that a rollover recommendation made to 
them was in their best interest. The Department accepts that Financial 
Institutions may have concerns about internal compliance records, 
particularly the record of their retrospective reviews, becoming widely 
accessible. However, the Department believes that it is important for 
the exemption to be conditioned on Retirement Investors receiving 
documentation of the reasons for rollover recommendations made to them, 
to allow them to carefully evaluate those important recommendations. 
The Department also notes that even if the exemption does not require 
disclosure of certain records, Financial Institutions would not be 
precluded from providing them voluntarily as a matter of customer 
relations.
    One commenter raised concerns that the proposal's recordkeeping 
requirements were inconsistent with certain ``visitorial powers'' under 
banking law, discussed above. The Department notes that the exemption, 
as well as the proposal, contains the limiting language ``to the extent 
permitted by law including 12 U.S.C. 484,'' which the Department 
believes substantially addresses these concerns.
    A few commenters also asserted that the Department should not be 
permitted to request records regarding IRA transactions because the 
Department does not have enforcement jurisdiction over IRAs, and under 
the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion, the records provision would be an 
impermissible attempt to usurp enforcement jurisdiction. In conjunction 
with this, one commenter suggested the Internal Revenue Service should 
be able to obtain records regarding IRAs. While the Department may lack 
certain enforcement jurisdiction with respect to IRAs, it does not lack 
the ability to issue exemptions to the prohibited transaction 
provisions under Code section 4975.\143\ The Department has authority 
to grant prohibited transaction exemptions, as well as the associated 
authority to determine whether the conditions of its exemption are 
being met by reviewing records for the purpose of determining that 
compliance. The Department does not, based on those same grounds, agree 
that a recordkeeping requirement that impacts IRAs is inconsistent with 
the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion, which did not specifically address 
the issue. However, the Department has added the Department of the 
Treasury, which includes the Internal Revenue Service, as an additional 
regulator that can obtain a Financial Institution's records under the 
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, one commenter was concerned about the application of a 30-
day requirement to notify the Department of a decision to withhold 
documents from parties other than the Department. Because the exemption 
has been modified to only provide for the Department's and the 
Department of the Treasury's review, the commenter's concern has been 
addressed.

Effective Date

    The exemption is effective 60 days after its publication in the 
Federal Register. This responds to several commenters who urged the 
Department to make the exemption available promptly. Some commenters 
requested that the exemption be effective immediately upon publication 
in the Federal Register, rather than after 60 days. Another commenter, 
however, suggested that the exemption should be effective no earlier 
than July 1, 2021, 180 days after the publication of the exemption, or 
90 days after the end of the current public health emergency, because 
of market turmoil and COVID-19.
    The Department has retained the 60 day effective date timeframe to 
permit transmittal of the exemption to Congress and the Comptroller 
General for review in accordance with the Congressional Review Act 
provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.). As stated above, parties can continue to 
rely on FAB 2018-02 for one year following publication of the final 
exemption, so there will be a transition period for Financial 
Institutions to develop compliance structures. The Department has not 
delayed the effective date as suggested by one commenter. The 
Department believes that the exemption's conditions provide protections 
of Retirement Investors even in the event of market turmoil, and, 
therefore, a delay in the effective date is not in the interests of 
Retirement Investors.

Procedural Issues

    Following the proposal, the Department received comments about the 
process it has followed in this exemption proceeding. Some commenters 
requested that the Department extend the proposed exemption's 30-day 
comment period. Many commenters also requested the Department hold a 
public hearing, which it did on September 3, 2020, although a few other 
commenters asserted that the procedure establishing the hearing was 
improper. Commenters in particular pointed to the more extensive 
comment period provided in the Department's 2016 fiduciary rulemaking.
    The Department believes that its procedure with respect to the 
proposal was appropriate under applicable requirements, including the 
Administrative Procedure Act. The Department received and carefully 
reviewed 106 comments on the proposal. Further, the Department 
accommodated all requests by commenters to testify at the hearing, and 
this resulted in 21 organizations testifying. This hearing was 
broadcast publicly, and all interested parties were invited to watch 
the hearings. The hearings gave the Department time to hear oral 
testimony from these 21 different organizations, and question them on 
aspects of the comments and their testimony. Moreover, the general 
issues and concerns raised by the proposal have been subject to 
significant amounts of commentary and discussion between the Department 
and the public

[[Page 82846]]

since October 2010. In light of the narrower issues raised in the 
present exemption project as opposed to the 2016 fiduciary rulemaking, 
as well as the public record developed on the proposal, the Department 
does not believe that the shorter comment period indicates an 
insufficient opportunity for public comment.

Reinsertion of the Five-Part Test for Investment Advice Fiduciary 
Status

    On the same day as the Department published the proposed exemption, 
the Department issued a technical amendment to 29 CFR 2510-3.21 
instructing the Office of the Federal Register to remove language that 
was added in 2016 and reinsert the text of the 1975 regulation. The 
1975 regulation established the five-part test for investment advice 
fiduciary status.
    Many commenters on the Department's proposed exemption addressed 
the Department's technical amendment reinserting the five-part test. 
Some commenters supported the technical amendment, stating that it 
provides welcome certainty to the regulated community as to the current 
legal definition of an investment advice fiduciary. Some commenters 
indicated that the five-part test properly defines an investment advice 
fiduciary. Some expressed the view that reinsertion of the five-part 
test was the appropriate response to the Fifth Circuit's Chamber 
opinion.
    Many commenters expressed significant opposition to the reinsertion 
of the five-part test via the technical amendment, and the five-part 
test in general. They stated that the five-part test was established 
before the prevalence of 401(k) plans and IRAs, and is now outdated and 
ill-suited to address the complex investment products offered in 
today's marketplace. They also said the five-part test is narrower than 
the statutory definition in Title I and the Code, which defines a 
fiduciary as anyone who ``renders investment advice for a fee or other 
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other 
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do 
so.'' \144\ These commenters said despite the Department's preamble 
interpretation regarding rollovers, many rollovers would occur without 
the protections of a fiduciary standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii); Code section 4975(e)(3)(B).
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    Commenters criticized several of the individual elements of the 
five-part test. The ``regular basis'' prong in particular, they said, 
creates loopholes for financial professionals to avoid fiduciary status 
while holding themselves out as trusted advisers. Some commenters 
particularly pointed to transactions involving non-securities which 
they said can involve significant conflicts of interest and may often 
be considered one-time transactions. Commenters also stated that the 
regular basis prong will mean that advice to a plan sponsor regarding 
investment options in a Title I Plan will rarely be fiduciary advice, 
which will adversely affect Plan participants' investment options. The 
commenters also stated that disclaimers of a `mutual agreement' or that 
the advice will serve as `a primary basis' for investment decisions 
will be used to avoid application of the fiduciary standard. As a 
result of all these factors, the commenters said Retirement Investors 
would be harmed by unchecked conflicts of interest.
    Some of the commenters raised legal arguments in connection with 
the technical amendment reinserting the five-part test. The commenters 
stated the Department had discretion as to whether to reinstate the 
five-part test, and, therefore, should have provided notice, economic 
analysis, and an opportunity for public comment before it took action.
    While this exemption proceeding interprets aspects of the five-part 
test, including by providing a new interpretation as to how it applies 
to rollovers, this exemption has not put at issue the five-part test 
itself as codified at 26 CFR 54.4975-9 and 29 CFR 2510.3-21. Thus, 
these comments are outside the scope of this exemption proceeding.
    Additionally, as stated in its technical amendment, the five-part 
test was reinstated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chamber, not by 
any discretionary action of the Department. As a result of that 
decision, the 2016 fiduciary regulation and associated exemptions were 
vacated in toto. The Department merely directed the Office of the 
Federal Register to update the Code of Federal Regulations to correctly 
reflect current law.
    Finally, as explained below regarding the need for this rulemaking, 
this exemption appropriately takes into account the reasoning in the 
Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion and changes in the regulatory landscape 
that have occurred since the 2016 fiduciary rulemaking.

Regulatory Impact Analysis

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 Statement

    Executive Orders 12866 \145\ and 13563 \146\ direct agencies to 
assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, 
if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that 
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, 
public health, and safety effects; distributive impacts; and equity). 
Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying costs 
and benefits, reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and promoting 
flexibility.
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    \145\ Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 
1993).
    \146\ Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 FR 3821 
(Jan. 21, 2011).
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    Under Executive Order 12866, ``significant'' regulatory actions are 
subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Section 
3(f) of the Executive Order defines a ``significant regulatory action'' 
as any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may:

    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more 
or adversely and materially affect a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or 
safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities (also 
referred to as ``economically significant'');
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with 
an action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impacts of entitlement 
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
the Executive Order.

    The Department anticipates that this exemption is economically 
significant within the meaning of section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 
12866. Therefore, the Department provides the following assessment of 
the potential benefits and costs associated with this exemption. In 
accordance with Executive Order 12866, this exemption was reviewed by 
OMB.
    The final exemption will be transmitted to Congress and the 
Comptroller General for review in accordance with the Congressional 
Review Act provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.). Pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act, OMB has designated this final exemption as a 
``major rule,'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2), because it

[[Page 82847]]

would be likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more.

Need for Regulatory Action

    Participants in individual participant-directed defined 
contribution Plans (DC Plans) and IRA investors are responsible for 
investing their retirement savings, and they often seek high quality, 
impartial advice from financial service professionals to make prudent 
investment decisions. This is especially true as the share of total 
plan participation attributable to Defined Contribution (DC) Plans 
continues to grow. In 2017, 83 percent of DC Plan participation was 
attributable to 401(k) Plans, and 98 percent of 401(k) Plan 
participants were responsible for directing some or all of their 
account investments.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historic Tables and Graphs 
1975-2017, Employee Benefits Security Administration (Sep. 2018), 
www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirement-bulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletin-historical-tables-and-graphs.pdf.
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    Following the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion, the Department 
issued a temporary enforcement policy under FAB 2018-02 and announced 
its intent to provide additional guidance in the future. Since then, as 
discussed earlier in this preamble, the regulatory landscape has 
changed as other regulators, including the SEC, have adopted enhanced 
conduct standards for financial services professionals.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ The SEC's Regulation Best Interest went into effect June 
30, 2020. Although not a regulatory agency, the NAIC approved 
revisions to Model Regulation 275 in February 2020 and recommended 
adoption by state insurance regulators. According to a commenter in 
the insurance industry, the updated NAIC's Model Regulation 275 has 
been finalized in two states (Arizona and Iowa), and four others 
(Idaho, Kentucky, Ohio, and Rhode Island) have publicly stated their 
intention to pursue adoption in late 2020 or early 2021. Other 
commenters expect the updated NAIC Model Regulation to be adopted in 
a majority of states within the next two to three years. These 
commenters also stated that the Dodd-Frank Act requires adoption of 
the NAIC Model Regulation amendments within five years to maintain 
exclusive state regulation of fixed annuity and insurance products.
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    Some commenters claimed that the Department changed its previous 
position from its 2016 fiduciary rulemaking without providing detailed 
justification. In response to these comments, the Department more 
clearly specifies some of the factors that compelled it to take this 
action. First, the Department's current action follows and is guided by 
the Fifth Circuit's Chamber opinion decision that vacated the 
Department's 2016 fiduciary rule and associated exemptions, in toto. 
The Department carefully studied the court's decision and developed 
this exemption consistent with it. Second, the regulatory landscape has 
changed since the Department issued the 2016 fiduciary rule and 
exemptions. At that time, no other regulators had adopted enhanced 
conduct standards of financial service professionals. Currently, other 
regulators such as the SEC and state insurance commissioners have 
adopted or are currently in the process of enhancing the conduct 
standards of financial service professionals. These developments 
encourage the Department to take these regulatory changes into account 
when taking this action.
    For instance, at the Department's September 3, 2020, public hearing 
on the proposed exemption, a witness testified that financial services 
firms made fundamental changes in their business models for several 
years after the Department issued its 2016 fiduciary rule and the SEC 
issued Regulation Best Interest. Those changes include new commission 
and fee schedules, the elimination of certain products and services, 
and third-party revenue sources, modified compensation and incentive 
programs, and caps on mutual fund and annuity upfront fees and trailing 
commissions. Additionally, according to data in studies cited by some 
commenters, the Department's 2016 fiduciary rulemaking also correlated 
with financial service professionals transitioning to lower-fee 
products, which has remained the case even after the rulemaking was 
vacated by the Fifth Circuit, but when FAB 2018-02 was in effect.
    In sum, the Department considered the changes in regulatory 
landscape, business practices, and product offerings as it developed 
this exemption. To the extent Financial Institutions have already 
implemented measures to mitigate conflicts of interest and reduce 
related investor harms, the benefits of this exemption will be reduced. 
Similarly, to the extent Financial Institutions have already incurred 
costs to comply with other regulators' actions and the Department's 
2016 fiduciary rulemaking, the costs of this exemption also will be 
reduced. Accordingly, these changes are reflected in the baseline that 
the Department applies when it evaluates the benefits and costs 
associated with this exemption that are discussed below.
    Given this background, the Department believes that it is 
appropriate to replace the relief provided in FAB 2018-02 with a 
permanent exemption. The exemption will provide Financial Institutions 
and Investment Professionals with broader, more flexible prohibited 
transaction relief than is currently available, while safeguarding the 
interests of Retirement Investors. Offering a permanent exemption based 
on FAB 2018-02 will provide certainty to Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals that currently may be relying on the temporary 
enforcement policy.

Benefits

    This exemption will generate several benefits. It will provide 
Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals with flexibility to 
choose between this new exemption or existing exemptions, depending on 
their needs and business models. In this regard, the exemption will 
help preserve different business models, compensation arrangements, and 
products that meet different needs in the market. This can, in turn, 
help preserve the existing wide availability of investment advice 
arrangements and products for Retirement Investors. Furthermore, the 
exemption will provide certainty for Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals that opted to comply with the enforcement 
policy the Department announced in FAB 2018-02 to continue with, and 
build upon, that compliance approach. Further, the exemption will 
ensure that investment advice satisfying the Impartial Conduct 
Standards is widely available to Retirement Investors without 
interruption.
    As described above, in FAB 2018-02, the Department announced a 
temporary enforcement policy that would apply until the issuance of 
further guidance. Its designation as ``temporary'' communicated its 
status as a transitional measure following the vacatur of the 
Department's 2016 fiduciary rulemaking. FAB 2018-02 was not intended to 
represent a permanent approach for prohibited transaction relief. This 
is due in part to the fact that FAB 2018-02 allows Financial 
Institutions to avoid enforcement action by the Department, but it does 
not (and cannot) provide relief from private litigation related to 
prohibited transactions.
    In addition to the more permanent relief it will provide, this 
exemption will have more specific conditions than FAB 2018-02, which 
requires only good faith compliance with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards. The conditions in the exemption are designed to support the 
provision of investment advice that meets the Impartial Conduct 
Standards. For example, the required policies and procedures and 
retrospective review work in concert with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards to help Financial

[[Page 82848]]

Institutions comply with the standards that will protect Retirement 
Investors.
    Some Financial Institutions may consider whether to rely on the 
Department's existing exemptions rather than adopt the specific 
conditions in this new exemption. The existing exemptions generally 
condition relief on disclosure and cover narrowly tailored transactions 
and types of compensation arrangements as well as the parties that may 
rely on the exemption. For example, the existing exemptions were never 
amended to clearly cover third-party compensation arrangements, such as 
revenue sharing, that developed over time. Investment advice 
fiduciaries relying on some of the existing exemptions will be limited 
to the types of compensation that tend to be more transparent to 
Retirement Investors, such as commission payments.
    For a number of reasons, Financial Institutions may decide to rely 
on this new exemption, instead of the Department's existing exemptions. 
First, this exemption is broadly available for a wide variety of 
investment advice transactions and compensation arrangements, which 
gives Financial Institutions greater flexibility and simplifies 
compliance. Additionally, Financial Institutions may determine that 
there is a marketing advantage to acknowledging their fiduciary status 
with respect to Retirement Investors, as required by the new exemption.
    Some commenters questioned the effectiveness of this disclosure 
because investors may decline to read or not fully understand such 
disclosures. In response to these concerns, the Department strongly 
encourages Financial Institutions to design disclosures that are easy 
to understand and written in plain English. The Department has provided 
model language that Financial Institutions may use for this purpose. 
The Department believes this required disclosure will further help 
Retirement Investors to make informed investment decisions.
    In addition, one study suggests that disclosure requirements 
sometimes directly affect disclosers' actions. It showed that 
disclosers sometimes made changes to their practices before sending 
disclosures to consumers, especially when corporate reputation is 
particularly important. For example, corporate managers concerned with 
protecting market share or reputation often introduced lines of healthy 
products or tightened corporate governance before the public 
responded.\149\ This suggests that disclosures can be effective even 
when investors may not read or not fully understand them.
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    \149\ Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of 
Technopopulism (2002). When Congress required manufacturers to 
disclose how many pounds of toxic chemicals they released into the 
air, water, and land and required chief executives to sign off on 
these reports, some chief executives became aware of total toxic 
pollutions for the first time and publicly announced the future 
reductions at the same time or before they issued their reports. In 
response to the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), which 
mandated the uniform nutrition label, some food companies added 
healthier options. Furthermore, some food companies added healthier 
products before the NLEA was implemented but after enacted. (See 
Christine Moorman, Market-Level Effects of Information: Competitive 
Responses and Consumer Dynamics, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 
35, No. 1 (Feb., 1998). Another experimental study shows that when 
advisors have a choice to accept or reject conflicts of interest, 
advisors who would have to disclose their conflict would more likely 
to reject conflicts of interest, so that they have nothing to 
disclose except the absence of conflicts. (See Sah, Sunita, and 
George Loewenstein. ``Nothing to declare: Mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest.'' 
Psychological science 25.2 (2014): 575-584.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the exemption will apply to multiple types of investment advice 
transactions, it will potentially allow Financial Institutions to rely 
on one exemption for investment advice transactions under a single set 
of conditions. This approach may allow Financial Institutions to 
streamline compliance, as compared to relying on multiple exemptions 
with multiple sets of conditions, resulting in a lower overall 
compliance burden for some Financial Institutions.
    This exemption's alignment with other regulatory conduct standards 
can result in a reduction in overall regulatory burden as well. As 
discussed earlier in this preamble, the exemption was developed in 
consideration of other regulatory conduct standards. The Department 
envisions that Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals that 
have already developed, or are in the process of developing, compliance 
structures for other regulators' standards will be able to rely on the 
new exemption while incurring less costs than they otherwise would if 
other regulators' compliance structures did not exist.
    As discussed above, the Department believes that the exemption will 
provide significant protections for Retirement Investors. The exemption 
relies in large measure on Financial Institutions' reasonable oversight 
of Investment Professionals and their adoption of a culture of 
compliance. Accordingly, in addition to the Impartial Conduct 
Standards, the exemption includes conditions designed to support 
investment advice that meets those standards, such as the provisions 
requiring written policies and procedures, documentation of rollover 
recommendations, and retrospective review. However, the exemption will 
not expand Retirement Investors' ability to enforce their rights in 
court or create any new legal claims above and beyond those expressly 
authorized in Title I or the Code, such as through required contracts 
and warranty provisions.
    Finally, this exemption provides that Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals with certain criminal convictions or that 
engage in egregious conduct with respect to compliance with the 
exemption would become ineligible to rely on the exemption, for a 
period of 10 years. Engaging in these types of conduct would suggest 
that the Financial Institution or Investment Professional is not able 
or willing to maintain a high standard of integrity and will cast doubt 
on their ability to act in accordance with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards. This will allow the Department to give special attention to 
parties with certain criminal convictions or with a history of 
egregious conduct regarding compliance with the exemption which should 
provide significant protections for Retirement Investors while 
preserving wide availability of investment advice arrangements and 
products.
    Although the Department expects this exemption to generate 
significant benefits, it does not have sufficient data to quantify such 
benefits. However, the Department expects the benefits to justify the 
compliance costs associated with this exemption because it creates an 
additional pathway for Financial Institutions to comply with the 
prohibited transaction provisions in Title I and the Code. This new 
pathway is broader than existing exemptions, and, thus, applies to a 
wider range of transactions and compensation arrangements and products 
than the relief that is currently available. The Department anticipates 
that entities will generally take advantage of this exemptive relief 
only if it is less costly than other alternatives currently available, 
including avoiding prohibited transactions or complying with an 
existing exemption. The Department requested comments in the proposal 
about the specific benefits that may flow from the exemption and 
invited commenters to submit quantifiable data that would support or 
contradict the Department's expectations about benefits. In response, 
the Department received no comments or data that could help it quantify 
the benefits associated with this exemption.

[[Page 82849]]

Costs

    To estimate compliance costs associated with the exemption, the 
Department considers the changed regulatory baseline. For example, the 
Department assumes affected entities will likely incur only incremental 
costs if they are already subject to another regulator's similar rules 
or requirements. Because this exemption is intended to align 
significantly with other regulators' rules and standards of conduct, 
the Department expects that satisfying the exemption conditions will 
not be unduly burdensome. The Department estimates that the exemption 
would impose costs of more than $87.8 million in the first year and 
$78.9 million in each subsequent year.\150\ Over 10 years, the costs 
associated with the exemption would total approximately $562 million, 
annualized to $80.1 million per year (using a seven percent discount 
rate).\151\ Using a perpetual time horizon (to allow the comparisons 
required under E.O. 13771), the annualized costs in 2016 dollars are 
$57 million at a seven percent discount rate. These costs are broken 
down and explained below. More details are provided in the Paperwork 
Reduction Act section as well. The Department solicited any 
quantifiable data that would support or contradict any aspect of its 
analysis and received none.
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    \150\ These estimates rely on the Employee Benefits Security 
Administration's 2018 labor rate estimates. See Labor Cost Inputs 
Used in the Employee Benefits Security Administration, Office of 
Policy and Research's Regulatory Impact Analyses and Paperwork 
Reduction Act Burden Calculation, Employee Benefits Security 
Administration (June 2019), www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/technical-appendices/labor-cost-inputs-used-in-ebsa-opr-ria-and-pra-burden-calculations-june-2019.pdf.
    \151\ The costs would be $682 million over 10-year period, 
annualized to $79.9 million per year, if a three percent discount 
rate were applied.
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    The Department also requested comments on this overall estimate and 
the cost burdens across different entities. In response, the Department 
received several comments concerning its proposed cost burden analysis. 
After careful reviews of those comments, the Department revised its 
cost estimate upward from the proposed cost estimate. For example, in 
the proposal, the Department applied an hourly rate for compliance 
attorneys based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' average 
attorney hourly rate.\152\ Because this rate is significantly lower 
than the average senior compliance officer's hourly wage, one commenter 
noted that the wage suggested the Department believed such compliance 
activities would be handled by junior attorneys, rather than more 
senior compliance counsel. In response, the Department's new cost 
burden analysis relies on a higher hourly wage rate that reflects the 
hourly wage of senior compliance attorneys in the financial services 
sector.\153\ Details of the comments and the Department's revised cost 
estimates are discussed below.
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    \152\ In the proposal, the Department used $138.41 as an 
attorney's hourly rate. For more details about the Department's 
methodologies, see Labor Cost Inputs Used in the Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, Office of Policy and Research's Regulatory 
Impact Analyses and Paperwork Reduction Act Burden Calculation, 
Employee Benefits Security Administration (June 2019), www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/technical-appendices/labor-cost-inputs-used-in-ebsa-opr-ria-and-pra-burden-calculations-june-2019.pdf.
    \153\ In the final exemption, the Department used $365.39 as an 
attorney's hourly rate. This is an hourly rate estimate for an in-
house compliance counsel, obtained from the SEC's Regulation Best 
Interest Release, 84 FR 33455, footnote 1304: Hour for in-house 
compliance counsel. Available at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-07-12/pdf/2019-12164.pdf.
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Affected Entities

    As a first step in its analysis, the Department examines the 
entities likely to be affected by the exemption. The exemption will 
potentially impact SEC- and state-registered investment advisers (IAs), 
broker-dealers (BDs), banks, and insurance companies, as well as their 
employees, agents, and representatives. The Department acknowledges 
that not all these entities will serve as investment advice fiduciaries 
to Plans and IRAs within the meaning of Title I and the Code. 
Additionally, because other exemptions are also currently available to 
these entities, it is unclear how widely Financial Institutions will 
rely upon this exemption and which firms are most likely to choose to 
rely on it. To err on the side of caution, the Department includes all 
entities eligible for this relief in its cost estimate. The Department 
solicited comments about which, and how many, entities would likely use 
this exemption. Although no commenters provided precise counts of 
entities that would use this exemption, many commenters expressed their 
support for an exemption that is broad and flexible enough to cover a 
wide range of transactions and circumstances. They further expressed 
their interest in consolidating multiple exemptions into one exemption 
to streamline compliance. As discussed earlier in this preamble, the 
Department clarified points raised by commenters and considered all 
comments in finalizing this exemption. Thus, the Department expects 
that this exemption will be widely used across different entities.

Broker-Dealers (BDs)

    As of December 2018, there were 3,764 registered BDs. Of those, 
2,766, or approximately 73.5 percent, reported retail customer 
activities, while 998 were estimated to have no retail customers.\154\ 
The Department does not have information about how many BDs provide 
investment advice to Retirement Investors, which, as defined in the 
exemption include Plan fiduciaries, Plan participants and 
beneficiaries, and IRA owners. However, according to one compliance 
survey, about 52 percent of IAs provide services to retirement 
plans.\155\ Assuming the same percentage of BDs provide advice to 
retirement plans, nearly 2,000 BDs will be affected by the 
exemption.\156\ This exemption may also impact BDs that provide 
investment advice to Retirement Investors that are Plan participants or 
beneficiaries, or IRA owners, but the Department does not have a basis 
to estimate the number of these BDs. The Department assumes that such 
BDs would be considered as providing recommendations to retail 
customers under the SEC's Regulation Best Interest.
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    \154\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33407.
    \155\ 2019 Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey, 
Investment Adviser Association (Jun. 18, 2019), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/INVESTMENTADVISER/aa03843e-7981-46b2-aa49-c572f2ddb7e8/UploadedImages/about/190618_IMCTS_slides_after_webcast_edits.pdf.
    \156\ If this assumption is relaxed to include all BDs, the 
costs would increase by $2.8 million for the first year.
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    To continue providing investment advice to retirement plans with 
respect to transactions that otherwise would be prohibited under Title 
I and the Code, this group of BDs will be able to rely on the 
exemption.\157\ Because BDs with retail customers are subject to the 
SEC's Regulation Best Interest, they already comply with standards 
substantially similar to those set forth in the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ The Department's estimate of compliance costs does not 
include any state-registered BDs because the exception from SEC 
registration for BDs is very narrow. See Guide to Broker-Dealer 
Registration, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 2008), 
www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html.
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SEC-Registered Investment Advisers (IAs)

    As of December 2018, there were approximately 13,299 SEC-registered 
IAs.\158\ Generally, an IA must register with the appropriate 
regulatory authorities--the SEC or state securities

[[Page 82850]]

authorities.\159\ IAs registered with the SEC are generally larger than 
state-registered IAs, both in staff and in regulatory assets under 
management (RAUM).\160\ SEC-registered IAs that provide investment 
advice to retirement plans and other Retirement Investors would be 
directly affected by the exemption.
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    \158\ Form CRS Relationship Summary Release, 84 FR 33564.
    \159\ Generally, a person that meets the definition of 
``investment adviser'' under the Advisers Act (and is not eligible 
to rely on an enumerated exclusion) must register with the SEC, 
unless it: (i) Is prohibited from registering under Section 203A of 
the Advisers Act, or (ii) qualifies for an exemption from the Act's 
registration requirement. An adviser precluded from registering with 
the SEC may be required to register with one or more state 
securities authorities.
    \160\ After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, an IA with $100 million or more in regulatory assets 
under management generally registers with the SEC, while an IA with 
less than $100 million registers with the state in which it has its 
principle office, subject to certain exceptions. For more details 
about the registration of IAs, see General Information on the 
Regulation of Investment Advisers, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Mar. 11, 2011), www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm; see also A Brief Overview: The Investment 
Adviser Industry, North American Securities Administrators 
Association (2019), www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/investment-advisers/investment-adviser-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some IAs are dual-registered as BDs. To avoid double counting when 
estimating compliance costs, the Department counted dually-registered 
entities as BDs and excluded them from the burden estimates of 
IAs.\161\ Therefore, the Department estimates there to be 12,940 SEC-
registered IAs, a figure produced by subtracting the 359 dually-
registered IAs from the 13,299 SEC-registered IAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ The Department applied this exclusion rule across all 
types of IAs, regardless of registration (SEC registered versus 
state only) and retail status (retail versus nonretail).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to BDs, the Department assumes that about 52 percent of 
SEC-registered IAs provide investment advice to retirement plans.\162\ 
Applying this assumption, the Department estimates that approximately 
6,729 SEC-registered IAs currently provide investment advice to 
retirement plans. An inestimable number of IAs may provide advice only 
to Retirement Investors that are Plan participants or beneficiaries or 
IRA owners, rather than the workplace retirement plans themselves. 
These IAs are fiduciaries, and they already operate under standards 
substantially similar to those required by the exemption.\163\ 
Accordingly, the exemption will pose no more than a nominal burden for 
these entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ 2019 Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey, 
supra note 155.
    \163\ SEC Standards of Conduct Rulemaking: What It Means for 
RIAs, Investment Adviser Association (July 2019), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/INVESTMENTADVISER/aa03843e-7981-46b2-aa49-c572f2ddb7e8/UploadedImages/resources/IAA-Staff-Analysis-Standards-of-Conduct-Rulemaking2.pdf.
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State-Registered Investment Advisers

    As of December 2018, there were 16,939 state-registered IAs.\164\ 
Of these state-registered IAs, 13,793 provide advice to retail 
investors, while 3,146 do not.\165\ State-registered IAs tend to be 
smaller than SEC-registered IAs, both in RAUM and staff. For example, 
according to one survey of both SEC- and state-registered IAs, about 47 
percent of respondent IAs reported 11 to 50 employees.\166\ In 
contrast, an examination of state-registered IAs reveals about 80 
percent reported only up to two employees.\167\ According to one 
report, 64 percent of state-registered IAs manage assets under $30 
million.\168\ A study by the North American Securities Administrators 
Association found that about 16 percent of state-registered IAs provide 
advice or services to retirement plans.\169\ Based on this study, the 
Department assumes that 16 percent of state-registered IAs provide 
investment advice to retirement plans. Thus, the Department estimates 
that approximately 2,710 state-registered IAs provide advice to 
retirement plans and other Retirement Investors.
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    \164\ This excludes state-registered IAs that are also 
registered with the SEC or dual registered BDs.
    \165\ Form CRS Relationship Summary Release.
    \166\ 2019 Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey, 
supra note 155.
    \167\ 2019 Investment Adviser Section Annual Report, North 
American Securities Administrators Association (May 2019), 
www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-IA-Section-Report.pdf.
    \168\ 2018 Investment Adviser Section Annual Report, North 
American Securities Administrators Association (May 2018), 
www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-NASAA-IA-Report-Online.pdf.
    \169\ 2019 Investment Adviser Section Annual Report, supra note 
167.
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Insurance Companies

    The exemption will affect insurance companies, which primarily are 
regulated by states. No single regulator records a national-level count 
of insurance companies. Although state regulators track insurance 
companies, the total number of insurance companies cannot be calculated 
by aggregating individual state totals because individual insurance 
companies often operate in multiple states. However, the NAIC estimates 
there were approximately 386 insurance companies directly writing 
annuities in 2018. Some of these insurance companies may not sell any 
annuity contracts in the IRA or Title I retirement plan markets.\170\ 
Furthermore, insurance companies can rely on other existing exemptions 
instead of this exemption. Some insurance industry commenters 
questioned whether the Department's existing exemptions offer realistic 
alternatives. In response to these concerns, the Department clarified 
earlier in this preamble that insurance companies can rely on other 
existing exemptions if such exemptions better fit their current 
business models. In the proposal, the Department invited comments about 
how many insurance companies would use this exemption. No commenters 
provided data that could help the Department more precisely quantify 
the number of insurance companies that will rely on this exemption or 
the associated compliance costs. Due to lack of data, the Department 
includes all 386 insurance companies in its cost estimate, although 
this likely presents an upper bound.
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    \170\ One comment letter from the insurance industry stated that 
about half of annuity products sold by insurance agents were IRA or 
tax-qualified products. This suggests that fewer than 386 of the 
insurers included in this analysis will be affected by this 
exemption. However, the comment did not provide data quantifying the 
number of insurers likely to be affected by or likely to use this 
exemption.
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Banks

    There are 5,066 federally insured depository institutions in the 
United States.\171\ Banks will be permitted to act as Financial 
Institutions under the exemption if they or their employees are 
investment advice fiduciaries with respect to Retirement Investors. The 
Department nevertheless believes that most banks will not be affected 
by the exemption for the reasons discussed below.
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    \171\ The FDIC reports there are 4,430 Commercial banks and 636 
Savings Institutions (thrifts) for 5,066 FDIC- Insured Institutions 
as of June 30, 2020. For more details, see Statistics at a Glance, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Jun 30, 2020), www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2020jun/industry.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department understands that banks most commonly use 
``networking arrangements'' to sell retail non-deposit investment 
products (RNDIPs), including, among other products, equities, fixed-
income securities, exchange-traded funds, and variable annuities.\172\ 
Under such arrangements,

[[Page 82851]]

bank employees are limited to performing only clerical or ministerial 
functions in connection with brokerage transactions. However, bank 
employees may forward customer funds or securities and may describe, in 
general terms, the types of investment vehicles available from the bank 
and BD under the arrangement. Similar restrictions exist with respect 
to bank employees' referrals of insurance products and IAs. Because of 
these limitations, the Department believes that in most cases such 
referrals will not constitute fiduciary investment advice within the 
meaning of the exemption. Due to the prevalence of banks using 
networking arrangements for transactions related to RNDIPs, the 
Department believes that most banks will not be affected with respect 
to such transactions.\173\
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    \172\ For more details about ``networking arrangements,'' see 
Conflict of Interest Final Rule, Regulatory Impact Analysis for 
Final Rule and Exemptions, U.S. Department of Labor (Apr. 2016), 
www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2/ria.pdf. Financial 
Institutions that are broker-dealers, investment advisers, or 
insurance companies that participate in networking arrangements and 
provide fiduciary investment advice would be included in the counts 
in their respective sections.
    \173\ A comment letter from the banking industry described 
various interactions with customers, including those related to 
RNDIP and IRA investment programs. According to this commenter, 
there are generally two types of bank IRA investment programs 
available for retirement customers: (i) Customer-directed bank IRA-
CD and other bank deposit programs, and (ii) bank discretionary IRA 
programs. This commenter stated that they believe neither program 
would be required to rely on the exemption, which implies that most 
banks will not be affected by this exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department does not have sufficient data to estimate the costs 
to banks of any other investment advice services, because it does not 
know how frequently banks use their own employees to perform activities 
that would be otherwise prohibited. The Department invited comments on 
the magnitude of such costs and solicited data that would facilitate 
their quantification in the proposal. No comments expressly discussed 
costs to banks nor provided data for the Department to quantify the 
compliance burden, if any, imposed on banks.

Costs Associated With Disclosures

    The Department estimates the compliance costs associated with the 
exemption's disclosure requirement will be approximately $2 million in 
the first year and $0.2 million per year in each subsequent year.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ Except where specifically noted, all cost estimates are 
expressed in 2019 dollars throughout this document.
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    Section II(b) of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to 
acknowledge, in writing, their status as fiduciaries under Title I and 
the Code, as applicable. In addition, Financial Institutions must 
furnish a written description of the services they provide and any 
material conflicts of interest. For many entities, including IAs, this 
condition will impose only modest additional costs, if any at all. Most 
IAs already disclose their status as a fiduciary and describe the types 
of services they offer in Form ADV. As of June 30, 2020, BDs with 
retail investors are also required to provide disclosures about 
services provided and conflicts of interest on Form CRS and pursuant to 
the disclosure obligation in Regulation Best Interest. Even among 
entities that currently do not provide such disclosures, such as 
insurance companies and some BDs, the Department believes that 
developing disclosures required in this exemption will not 
substantially increase costs because the required disclosures are 
clearly specified and limited in scope.
    Not all entities will decide to use the exemption. Some may instead 
rely on other existing exemptions that better align with their business 
models. However, for this cost estimation, the Department assumes that 
all eligible entities will use the exemption and incur, on average, 
modest costs.
    The Department estimates that developing disclosures that 
acknowledge fiduciary status and describe the services offered and any 
material conflicts of interest will cost regulated parties 
approximately $1.9 million in the first year.\175\
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    \175\ A written acknowledgment of fiduciary status would cost 
approximately $0.6 million, while a written description of the 
services offered and any material conflicts of interest would cost 
another $1.3 million. The Department assumes that 11,782 Financial 
Institutions, comprising 1,957 BDs, 6,729 SEC-registered IAs, 2,710 
state-registered IAs, and 386 insurers, are likely to engage in 
transactions covered under this exemption. For a detailed 
description of how the number of entities is estimated, see the 
Paperwork Reduction Act section, below. The $0.6 million cost 
associated with a written acknowledgment of fiduciary status is 
calculated as follows. The Department assumes that it will take each 
retail BD firm 15 minutes, each nonretail BD or insurance firm 30 
minutes, and each registered IA five minutes to prepare a disclosure 
conveying fiduciary status at an hourly labor rate of $365.39, 
resulting in cost burden of $584,130. Accordingly, the estimated 
per-entity cost ranges from $30.45 for IAs to $182.7 for non-retail 
BDs and insurers. The $1.3 million costs associated with a written 
description of the services offered and any material conflicts of 
interest are calculated as follows. The Department assumes that it 
will take each retail BD or IA firm five minutes, each small 
nonretail BD or small insurer 60 minutes, and each large nonretail 
BDs or larger insurer five hours to prepare a disclosure conveying 
services provided and any conflicts of interest at an hourly labor 
rate of $365.39, resulting in cost burden of $1,348,628. 
Accordingly, the estimated per-entity cost ranges from $30.45 for 
retail broker-dealers and IAs to $182.7 for large non-retail BDs and 
insurers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department estimates that it will cost Financial Institutions 
about $0.2 million to print and mail required disclosures to Retirement 
Investors, but it assumes most required disclosures will be 
electronically delivered to Retirement Investors.\176\ The Department 
assumes that approximately 92 percent of participants who roll over 
their plan assets to IRAs will receive required disclosures 
electronically.\177\ According to one study, approximately 3.6 million 
accounts in defined contribution plans were rolled over to IRAs in 
2019.\178\ Of those, slightly less than half, 1.8 million, were rolled 
over by financial services professionals.\179\ Therefore, prior to 
transactions necessitated by rollovers, participants are likely to 
receive required disclosures from their Investment Professionals. In 
some cases, Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals may 
send required disclosures to participants, particularly those with 
participant-directed defined contribution accounts, before providing 
investment advice.
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    \176\ The Department estimates that approximately 1.8 million 
Retirement Investors are likely to engage in transactions covered 
under this PTE, of which 8.1 percent are estimated to receive paper 
disclosures. Distributing paper disclosures is estimated to take a 
clerical professional one minute per disclosure, at an hourly labor 
rate of $64.11, resulting in a cost burden of $151,341. Assuming the 
disclosures will require two sheets of paper at a cost $0.05 each, 
the estimated material cost for the paper disclosures is $14,164. 
Postage for each paper disclosure is expected to cost $0.55, 
resulting in a printing and mailing cost of $92,063.
    \177\ The Department estimates approximately 56.4 percent of 
participants receive disclosures electronically based on data from 
various data sources including the National Telecommunications and 
Information Agency (NTIA). In light of the 2020 Electronic 
Disclosure Regulation, the Department estimates that additional 35.5 
percent of participants receive their disclosures electronically. In 
total, 91.9 percent of participants are expected to receive 
disclosures electronically.
    \178\ U.S. Retirement-End Investor 2020: Helping Participants 
Navigating Uncertainty, The Cerulli Report (2020).
    \179\ Id.
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    The Financial Institution now must provide documentation of the 
specific reasons that any rollover recommendation is in the Retirement 
Investor's best interest to the Retirement Investor. The Department 
estimates and presents costs associated with documenting rollover 
recommendations in the section below. Beyond the cost associated with 
producing the documentation, Financial Institutions may incur 
additional costs to provide such documentation to Retirement Investors. 
The Department expects that once the Financial Institutions document 
rollover recommendations, any additional costs for providing the 
documentation, such as printing and mailing costs, will be somewhat 
modest.\180\
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    \180\ The costs associated with documenting rollover 
recommendations are estimated and discussed in more details below in 
the section entitled ``Costs associated with rollover 
documentation.'' To avoid double-counting, this section only 
includes associated distribution costs of such documentation. As 
discussed above, the Department estimates that approximately 92 
percent of Retirement Investors will receive disclosures 
electronically, eliminating printing and mailing costs. Thus, 
providing rollover documentation will increase costs by 
approximately $240,000.

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[[Page 82852]]

    The Department sought further comments in the proposed RIA on the 
costs associated with the required disclosures. In response, a 
commenter argued that the associated hourly wage of a legal 
professional used in the Department's cost estimate did not correspond 
to that of a compliance counselor. The Department acknowledges the 
importance of taking into account the level of experience and 
specialization of legal professionals in charge of compliance testing. 
Accordingly, the Department updated its legal professional's hourly 
labor rate to reflect the typical compensation of those who provide 
such services to Financial Institutions.\181\
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    \181\ The hourly wage estimate for an in-house compliance 
counsel was obtained from Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 
33455, note 1304, www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-07-12/pdf/2019-12164.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs Associated With Written Policies and Procedures

    The Department estimates that developing policies and procedures 
prudently designed to ensure compliance with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards will cost approximately $4.4 million in the first year.\182\
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    \182\ The Department assumes that 11,782 Financial Institutions, 
comprising 1,957 BDs, 6,729 SEC-registered IAs, 2,710 state-
registered IAs, and 386 insurers, are likely to engage in 
transactions covered under this exemption. For a detailed 
description of how the number of entities is estimated, see the 
Paperwork Reduction Act section, below. The Department assumes that 
it will take a legal professional, at an hourly labor rate of 
$365.39, 22.5 minutes at each small retail BD, 45 minutes at each 
large retail BD, five hours at each small nonretail BD, 10 hours at 
each large nonretail BD, 15 minutes at each small IA, 30 minutes at 
each large IA, five hours at each small insurer, and 10 hours at 
each large insurer to meet the requirement. This results in a cost 
burden estimate of $4,393,011. Accordingly, the estimated per-entity 
cost ranges from $91.35 for small IAs to $3,653.90 for large non-
retail BDs and insurers. These compliance cost estimates are not 
discounted.
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    The estimated compliance costs reflect the different regulatory 
baselines under which various entities are currently operating. For 
example, IAs already operate under a fiduciary standard substantially 
similar to that required under the exemption,\183\ and report how they 
address conflicts of interests in Form ADV.\184\ Similarly, BDs subject 
to the SEC's Regulation Best Interest also operate under a standard 
that is substantially similar to the exemption. To comply fully with 
the exemption, however, these entities may need to review and amend 
their existing policies and procedures. These additional steps will 
impose additional, but not substantial, costs at the Financial 
Institution level.
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    \183\ See SEC Fiduciary Interpretation, 84 FR 33669.
    \184\ See Form ADV, 17 CFR 279.1 (1979). (Part 2A of Form ADV 
requires IAs to prepare narrative brochures that contain information 
such as the types of advisory services offered, fee schedules, 
disciplinary information, and conflicts of interest. For example, 
item 10.C of part 2A asks IAs to identify if certain relationships 
or arrangements create a material conflict of interest, and to 
describe the nature of the conflict and how to address it. If an IA 
recommends or selects other IAs for its clients, and receives 
compensation directly or indirectly from those advisers that creates 
a material conflict of interest, or has other business relationships 
with those advisers that create a material conflict of interest, an 
adviser must describe these practices, discuss the material 
conflicts of interest these practices create, and how the adviser 
addresses them. See Item 10.D of Part 2A of Form ADV.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Insurers and non-retail BDs currently operating under a suitability 
standard in most states and largely relying on transaction-based forms 
of compensation, such as commissions, will be required to establish 
written policies and procedures that comply with the Impartial Conduct 
Standards if they choose to use this exemption. These activities will 
likely involve higher cost increases than those experienced by IAs and 
retail BDs. To a large extent, however, the entities facing potentially 
higher costs will likely elect to continue to rely on other existing 
exemptions. In this regard, the burden estimates on these entities are 
likely overestimated to the extent that many of them would not use this 
exemption.
    Smaller entities may have less complex business practices and 
arrangements than their larger counterparts, it may cost less for these 
entities to comply with the exemption. This is reflected in the 
compliance cost estimates presented in this economic analysis.

Costs Associated With Annual Report of Retrospective Review

    Section II(d) of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to 
conduct an annual retrospective review reasonably designed to ensure 
that the Financial Institution is in compliance with the Impartial 
Conduct Standards and its own policies and procedures. Section II(d) 
further requires the institution to produce a written report on the 
review that is certified by a Senior Executive Officer of the 
institution. In the proposal, the Department required certification by 
the chief executive officer of the Financial Institution, however 
several comments stated that this requirement is overly burdensome and 
unnecessary. After careful deliberation, the Department changed the 
requirement to allow certification from a Senior Executive Officer, 
which is defined to include any of the following: The chief compliance 
officer, chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer, 
or one of the three most senior officers of the Financial Institution, 
to reduce any unnecessary burden. Furthermore, by having a Senior 
Executive Officer certify the report, any inadequacies or 
irregularities may be detected during the review process and addressed 
appropriately before becoming systematic failures.
    Some commenters suggested that this requirement could create the 
perverse incentive for a Financial Institution to carefully craft the 
language in the report to avoid any suggestion that any violation has 
occurred or even that its compliance could be improved. These 
commenters were particularly concerned because the penalty of 
noncompliance is severe--loss of exemption and exposure to litigation. 
In response to these comments, the Department amended the rule to allow 
Financial Institutions to self-correct certain violations of the 
exemption by following the procedures specified in Section II(e). 
Furthermore, Section IV now requires Financial Institution to make 
records available, to the extent permitted by law, to any authorized 
employee of the Department and the Department of the Treasury, not to 
others.\185\ The Department believes that these changes will minimize 
any perverse incentives and encourage Financial Institutions to use the 
retrospective review process for its intended purposes--to (1) detect 
any business models creating conflicts of interests, (2) test the 
adequacies of the policies and procedures, (3) identify any compliance 
areas for improvements, and (4) update and modify its compliance system 
based on the review results. As a result, protection for Retirement 
Investors will be strengthened without imposing any unnecessary burden 
on Financial Institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ In the proposal, Section IV required that the records be 
made available to (1) any authorized employee of the Department, (2) 
any fiduciary of a Plan that engaged in an investment transaction 
pursuant to this exemption, (3) any contributing employer and any 
employee organization whose members are covered by a Plan that 
engaged in an investment transaction pursuant to this exemption, or 
(4) any participant or beneficiary of a Plan or an IRA owner that 
engaged in an investment transaction pursuant to this exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department estimates that this requirement will impose $15.9 
million

[[Page 82853]]

in costs in the first year.\186\ FINRA requires BDs to establish and 
maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to facilitate 
compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations,\187\ to 
test the supervisory system, and to amend the system based on the 
testing.\188\ Furthermore, the BD's chief executive officer (or 
equivalent officer) must annually certify that it has processes in 
place to establish, maintain, test, and modify written compliance 
policies and written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to 
achieve compliance with FINRA rules.\189\
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    \186\ The Department assumes that 794 Financial Institutions, 
comprising 20 BDs, 538 SEC-registered IAs, 217 state-registered IAs, 
and 20 insurers, would be likely to incur costs associated with 
producing a retrospective review report. The Department estimates it 
will take a legal professional, at an hourly labor rate of $365.39, 
five hours for small firms and ten hours for large firms to produce 
a retrospective review report, resulting in an estimated cost burden 
of $2,569,337. The per-entity cost estimate ranges from $1,826.95 
for small entities to $3,653.9 for large entities. In addition, the 
Department assumes that 11,782 Financial Institutions, comprising 
1,957 BDs, 6,729 SEC-registered IAs, 2,710 state-registered IAs, and 
386 insurers, would be likely to incur costs associated with adding 
and modifying this report. The Department estimates it will take a 
legal professional one hour for small firms and two hours for large 
firms to add and modify the report, resulting in an estimated cost 
burden of $7,573,614. The estimated per-entity cost ranges from 
$365.39 for small entities to $730.78 for large entities. Lastly, 
the Department also assumes that 9,845 Financial Institutions, 
comprising 20 BDs, 6,729 SEC-registered IAs, 2,710 state-registered 
IAs, and 386 insurers, would be likely to incur costs associated 
with reviewing and certifying the report. The Department estimates 
it will take a certifying officer two hours for small firms and four 
hours for large firms to review the report and certify the 
exemption, resulting in an estimated cost burden of $5,750,451. The 
estimated per-entity cost ranges from $331.26 for small entities to 
$584.12 for large entities. For a detailed description of how the 
number of entities for each cost burden is estimated, see the 
Paperwork Reduction Act section.
    \187\ Rule 3110. Supervision, FINRA Manual, www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3110.
    \188\ Rule 3120. Supervisory Control System, FINRA Manual, 
www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3120.
    \189\ Rule 3130. Annual Certification of Compliance and 
Supervisory Processes, FINRA Manual, www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many insurance companies are already subject to similar 
standards.\190\ For instance, the NAIC's Model Regulation contemplates 
that insurance companies establish a supervision system that is 
reasonably designed to comply with the Model Regulation and annually 
provide senior management with a written report that details findings 
and recommendations on the effectiveness of the supervision 
system.\191\ States that have adopted the Model Regulation also require 
insurance companies to conduct annual audits and obtain certifications 
from senior managers. Based on these regulatory baselines, the 
Department believes the compliance costs attributable to this 
requirement will be modest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ The previous NAIC Suitability in Annuity Transactions 
Model Regulation (2010) was adopted by many states before the newer 
NAIC Model Regulation was approved in 2020. Both previous and 
updated Model Regulations contain standards similar to that of the 
written report of retrospective review required under the proposed 
exemption.
    \191\ Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation, NAIC 
Regulation, Section 6.C.(2)(i). (The same requirement is found in 
the previous NAIC Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model 
Regulation (2010), Section 6.F.(1)(f).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SEC-registered IAs are already subject to Rule 206(4)-97, which 
requires them to adopt and implement written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the Advisers Act, and 
rules adopted thereunder, and review them annually for adequacy and the 
effectiveness of their implementation. Under the same rule, SEC-
registered IAs must designate a chief compliance officer to administer 
the policies and procedures. However, they are not required to produce 
a report detailing findings from its audit. Nonetheless, many seem to 
voluntarily produce reports after conducting internal reviews. One 
compliance testing survey reveals that about 92 percent of SEC-
registered IAs voluntarily provide an annual compliance program review 
report to senior management.\192\ Relying on this information, the 
Department estimates that only eight percent of SEC-registered IAs 
advising retirement plans will start to produce a retrospective review 
report for this exemption.\193\ The rest will incur some incremental 
costs to revise their existing review reports to fully satisfy the 
conditions related to this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ 2019 Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey, 
Investment Adviser Association (Jun. 18, 2019), https://www.acacompliancegroup.com/blog/2019-investment-management-compliance-testing-survey-results.
    \193\ One commenter questioned the Department's assumption that 
only the eight percent of SEC- and state-registered IAs that do not 
currently produce reports will incur costs to produce them. 
According to this commenter, to fully comply with this exemption, 
most of the IAs that currently produce reports will need to somewhat 
modify their current reports. The Department incorporated this 
comment in this analysis and now assumed that all entities will 
likely see somewhat modest increases in their costs to make any 
additional entries in their reports. For more details, see the 
discussion later in this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to lack of data, the Department based the cost estimates 
associated with state-registered IAs on the assumption that eight 
percent of state-registered IAs advising retirement plans currently do 
not produce compliance review reports, and, thus, will incur costs 
associated with the oversight conditions in the exemption. As discussed 
above, compared with SEC-registered IAs, state-registered IAs tend to 
be smaller in terms of RAUM and staffing, and, thus, may not have 
formal procedures in place to conduct retrospective reviews to ensure 
regulatory compliance. If that were often the case, the Department's 
assumption would likely underestimate costs. However, because state-
registered IAs tend to be smaller than their SEC-registered 
counterparts, they tend to handle fewer transactions, limit the range 
of transactions they handle, and have fewer employees to 
supervise.\194\ Therefore, the costs associated with establishing 
procedures to conduct internal retrospective reviews and produce 
compliance reports will likely be low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ An examination of state-registered IAs reveals about 80 
percent reported only up to two employees. See supra note 167.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter mentioned that the Financial Institutions would 
likely revise their retrospective review reports to fully comply with 
the exemption even if they already produce the reports to comply with 
other regulators or to voluntarily improve their compliance system. The 
Department accepted this comment and incorporated in its compliance 
cost estimates potential burden increases on all entities relying on 
this exemption regardless of whether they already produce reports. 
However, the Department believes that this burden increase will be 
incremental, because the Department takes a principles-based approach 
in the exemption and provides Financial Institutions with flexibility 
to design and perform this review in a way that works best with their 
business model. Therefore, the Department expects Financial 
Institutions to develop and implement procedures that are least 
burdensome and work with their current system to meet the standard set 
forth in the exemption.
    According to another commenter, the Department did not estimate 
sufficient time for a certifying official to review and certify the 
retrospective review report. No commenters provided data the Department 
could use to more accurately estimate the burden associated with this 
requirement. Despite this lack of data, in response to these comments, 
the Department substantially increased its estimated burden associated 
with certification to dispel any misconception that this

[[Page 82854]]

requirement is a mere formality.\195\ The Department expects the 
certification process will facilitate on-going communications about 
compliance issues among senior executives and compliance staffers.
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    \195\ The Department assumes that it will take the certifying 
officer two hours (small firms) or four hours (large firms). If we 
assume that an average person reads 250 words per minute, this 
individual can read 30,000 words for two hours or 60,000 words for 
four hours. This implies a retrospective review report would be 
approximately 125 pages to 250 pages if this report is written in 
double space with 12 font size.
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    In sum, the Department estimates that the costs associated with the 
retrospective review requirement of the exemption will be approximately 
$15.9 million in the first year.

Costs Associated With Rollover Documentation

    In 2019, slightly more than 3.6 million defined contribution plan 
accounts rolled over to an IRA, while 0.5 million accounts rolled over 
to other defined contribution plans.\196\ Not all rollovers were 
managed by financial services professionals. As discussed above, 
slightly less than half of all rollovers from plans to IRAs were 
handled by financial services professionals, while the rest were self-
directed.\197\ Based on this information, the Department estimates 
slightly less than 1.8 million participants obtained advice from 
financial services professionals.\198\ These rollovers tended to be 
larger than the self-directed rollovers. For example, in 2019, the 
average account balance of rollovers by financial services 
professionals was $169,000, whereas the average account balance of 
self-directed rollovers was $109,000.\199\ Some of these rollovers 
likely involved financial services professionals who were not 
fiduciaries under the Department's five-part investment advice 
fiduciary test; thus, the actual number of rollovers affected by this 
exemption is likely lower than 1.8 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ U.S. Retirement-End Investor 2020, supra note 178. (To 
estimate costs associated with documenting rollovers, the Department 
did not include rollovers from plans to plans because plan-to-plan 
rollovers are unlikely to be mediated by Investment Professionals. 
Also plan-to-plan rollovers occur far less frequently than plan-to-
IRA rollovers. Thus, even if plan-to-plan rollovers were included in 
the cost estimation, the impact would likely be small.)
    \197\ Id.
    \198\ Another report suggested that a higher share, 75 percent, 
of households owning IRAs held their IRAs through Investment 
Professionals. The same report indicated that about half of 
traditional IRA-owning households with rollovers primarily relied on 
professional financial advisers for their rollover decisions. Note 
that this is household level data based on an IRA owners' survey, 
which was not particularly focused on rollovers. (See Sarah Holden & 
Daniel Schrass, The Role of IRAs in US Households' Saving for 
Retirement, 2019, ICI Research Perspective, vol. 25, no. 10 (Dec. 
2019).)
    \199\ U.S. Retirement-End Investor 2020, supra note 178.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters discussed various issues concerning rollovers in 
the five-part test context. In discussing rollovers, they sometimes 
distinguished new relationships between financial services 
professionals and investors from existing relationships. A close 
inspection of rollover data suggests that most rollovers do not occur 
in a vacuum. Specifically, 87 percent of rollovers handled by financial 
services professionals were executed by professionals with whom 
investors had an existing relationship, while only 13 percent were 
handled by new financial services professionals.\200\ Furthermore, 
rollovers handled by existing financial service professionals were, on 
average, larger ($174,000) than rollovers handled by new financial 
service professionals ($132,000).\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ Id.
    \201\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The exemption requires Financial Institutions to document why a 
recommended rollover is in the best interest of Retirement Investors 
and provide that documentation to the Retirement Investor. As a best 
practice, the SEC already encourages firms to record the basis for 
significant investment decisions, such as rollovers, although doing so 
is not required under Regulation Best Interest.\202\ In addition, some 
firms may voluntarily document significant investment decisions to 
demonstrate compliance with applicable law, even if not required.\203\ 
Therefore, in the proposal, the Department stated that it expects many 
Financial Institutions already document significant decisions like 
rollovers.
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    \202\ Regulation Best Interest Release, 84 FR 33360.
    \203\ According to a comment letter about the proposed 
Regulation Best Interest, BDs have a strong financial incentive to 
retain records necessary to document that they have acted in the 
best interest of clients, even if it is not required. Another 
comment letter about the proposed Regulation Best Interest suggests 
that BDs generally maintain documentation for suitability purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter disagreed with the Department, stating that the 
Department's expectation was not realistic. However, a report 
commissioned by this commenter found that slightly more than half (52 
percent) of asset management firms implementing Regulation Best 
Interest require their financial service professionals to document 
rollover recommendations. About half require documentation on all 
recommendations, while 56 percent require documentation for specific 
product recommendations, such as mutual funds and variable 
annuities.\204\ Since Regulation Best Interest is now in effect, the 
Department expects that these Financial Institutions already are 
implementing these policies and procedures. Therefore, the Department 
assumes that 52 percent of Financial Institutions already require 
documentation for rollover recommendations, and, thus, will face no 
more than an incremental burden increase.\205\ The remaining 48 percent 
will face a larger burden increase to implement new documentation 
procedures for rollover recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ Regulation Best Interest: How Wealth Management Firms are 
Implementing the Rule Package, Deloitte (Mar. 6, 2020). (This report 
is based on a survey given to 48 SIFMA member firms providing 
financial advice and related services to retail customers. The 
survey ended on December 2, 2019. Ninety percent of survey 
participant firms were dual registrants.)
    \205\ Therefore, the Department estimates that 52 percent of 
rollovers are done by financial professionals whose institutions 
already require such documentations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In estimating costs associated with rollover documentations, the 
Department faces uncertainty in determining the number of rollovers 
affected by the exemption. The Department assumes that 67.4 percent of 
rollovers involving financial services professionals will be affected 
by the exemption.\206\ Using this assumption, the estimated costs will 
be $65 million per year.\207\ The Department acknowledges that 
uncertainty still remain, because the lack of available data makes it 
difficult to estimate how many financial services professionals may act 
in a fiduciary capacity when making certain rollover recommendations 
that meet all elements

[[Page 82855]]

of the five-part test, and, thus, will be affected by the exemption. 
The Department invited comments and data that could help it more 
precisely estimate the number of rollovers affected by the exemption 
and did not receive any comments countering its 67.4 percent 
assumption. Therefore, the Department maintained that assumption in its 
cost estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ In 2019, a survey was conducted on financial services 
professionals who hold more than 50 percent of their practice's 
assets under management in employer-sponsored retirement plans. 
These financial services professionals include both BDs and IAs. 
Forty-five percent of those surveyed indicated that they make a 
proactive effort to pursue IRA rollovers from their DC plan clients, 
and approximately 32.6 percent reported that they function in a non-
fiduciary capacity. Therefore, the Department assumes that 
approximately 67.4 percent of financial service professionals serve 
their Plan clients as fiduciaries. (See U.S. Defined Contribution 
2019: Opportunities for Differentiation in a Competitive Landscape, 
The Cerulli Report (2019).) The Department assumes that 67.4 percent 
of 1.8 million rollovers involving financial service professionals 
will likely be affected by this exemption.
    \207\ The Department assumes that financial advisors whose firms 
do not currently document rollover justifications will take, on 
average, 30 minutes per rollover to comply with this exemption. In 
contrast, financial advisors whose firms already require such 
documentation will take, on average, an additional five minutes per 
rollover to fully satisfy the requirement. The Department estimates 
over 335,000 burden hours in aggregate and slightly more than $65 
million assuming $194.77 hourly rate for a personal financial 
advisor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Department invited comments about financial 
services professionals' practices related to documenting rollover 
recommendations, particularly whether financial services professionals 
often use a form with a list of common reasons for rollovers and how 
long, on average, it would take for a financial services professional 
to document a rollover recommendation. One commenter stated that the 
Department's proposed estimate was ambitious but reasonable, 
particularly for firms using compliance software to automate this 
process. This commenter, however, pointed out that the Department did 
not take into account the cost associated with purchasing compliance 
software. According to this commenter, the Department's low estimate 
for time spent documenting rollovers suggests that hasty and 
superficial analysis would satisfy this requirement. The Department 
fervently disagrees with this claim. As explained in the proposal, the 
Department did not expect this requirement to create an undue burden 
for the following reasons: (1) Financial services professionals 
generally seek and gather information on investor profiles in 
accordance with other regulators' rules; and (2) as a best practice, 
financial professionals often discuss the basis for their 
recommendations and associated risks with their clients.\208\ Because 
financial professionals already collect relevant information and 
discuss the basis for certain recommendations with clients, the 
Department believes that it would be relatively easy for them to 
document such information with respect to rollover recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ FINRA, Reg BI and Form CRS Firm Checklist. Also Regulation 
Best Interest Release 84 FR 33360 (July 12, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, as discussed above, a report indicates that the 
majority of wealth management firms already require their financial 
service professionals to document rollover recommendations in response 
to Regulation Best Interest.\209\ According to the same report, almost 
eight in ten firms that require such documentation use a predetermined 
list for this purpose.\210\ Furthermore, approximately three out of 
four firms surveyed indicated that they would change their technology 
in response to Regulation Best Interest before it became 
effective.\211\ Some Financial Institutions might have elected not to 
enhance their technologies in the wake of Regulation Best Interest 
because they recently updated their technology capabilities or decided 
to rely more on manual processes. This implies that most Financial 
Institutions are not likely to incur large technological costs, such as 
purchasing compliance software to comply with this exemption. 
Therefore, the Department assumes Financial Institutions that have not 
enhanced technology capabilities for other regulator's rule will take a 
mixed approach, combining current technology solutions with manual 
processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ Regulation Best Interest: How Wealth Management Firms are 
Implementing the Rule Package, Deloitte (Mar. 6, 2020). The 
participating firms in this study included dual-registrants, BDs and 
RIAs that were owned by or affiliated with banks, holding companies, 
insurance companies, and trust companies, as well as independent 
dually-registered BDs and RIAs. 90% of participating firms were dual 
registrants.
    \210\ Id.
    \211\ Id.
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    In sum, the Department estimates that Financial Institutions 
already requiring rollover documentation will face no more than a 
nominal burden increase, and only to the extent that their current 
compliance systems do not meet the requirements of this exemption. 
Those firms currently not documenting rollover recommendations will 
likely face a larger, but still somewhat limited, burden increase due 
to the reasons discussed above.

Costs Associated With Recordkeeping

    Section IV of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to 
maintain records demonstrating compliance with the exemption for six 
years. The Financial Institutions are required to make records 
available to the Department and the Department of the Treasury. 
Recordkeeping requirements in Section IV are generally consistent with 
requirements made by the SEC and FINRA.\212\ In addition, the 
recordkeeping requirements correspond to the six-year period in section 
413 of ERISA. The Department understands that many firms already 
maintain records, as required in Section IV, as part of their regular 
business practices. Therefore, the Department expects that the 
recordkeeping requirement in Section IV would impose a negligible 
burden.\213\ The Department solicited comments regarding the 
recordkeeping burden in the proposed regulatory impact analysis but did 
not receive any comments disagreeing with the Department's approach. 
Therefore, the Department took the same approach in this final 
regulatory impact analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ The SEC's Regulation Best Interest amended Rule 17a-
4(e)(5) requires that BDs retain all records of the information 
collected from or provided to each retail customer pursuant to 
Regulation Best Interest for at least six years after the date the 
account was closed or the date on which the information was last 
replaced or updated, whichever comes first. FINRA Rule 4511 also 
requires its members to preserve for a period of at least six years 
those FINRA books and records for which there is no specified period 
under the FINRA rules or applicable Exchange Act rules.
    \213\ The Department notes that the insurers most likely to use 
the exemption are generally not subject to the SEC's Regulation Best 
Interest and FINRA rules. The Department understands, however, that 
some states' insurance regulations require insurers to retain 
similar records for less than six years. For example, some states 
require insurers to maintain records for five years after the 
insurance transaction is completed. Thus, the recordkeeping 
requirement of the proposed exemption will likely impose an 
additional burden on the insurers that rely on this exemption. 
However, the Department expects most insurers to maintain records 
electronically. Electronic storage prices have decreased 
substantially as cloud services become more widely available. For 
example, cloud storage space costs, on average, $0.018 to $0.021 per 
GB per month. Some estimate that approximately 250,000 PDF files or 
other typical office documents can be stored on 100GB. Accordingly, 
the Department believes that maintaining records in electronic 
storage for an additional year or two will not impose a significant 
cost burden on the affected insurers. (For more detailed pricing 
information of three large cloud service providers, see https://cloud.google.com/products/calculator, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/calculator, or https://calculator.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 1 provides a summary of the associated costs discussed.

[[Page 82856]]



                    Table 1--Associated Costs Summary
                              [$ Millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Subsequent
               Requirement                  First year         years
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclosures.............................            $2.2            $0.2
Policies and Procedures.................             4.4               -
Rollover Documentation..................            65.3            65.3
Annual Report of Retrospective Review...            15.9            13.3
                                         -------------------------------
    Total...............................            87.8            78.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals in table may not sum precisely due to rounding.

Regulatory Alternatives

    The Department considered various alternative approaches in 
developing this exemption that are discussed below.

No New Exemption

    The Department considered merely leaving in place the existing 
exemptions that provide prohibited transaction relief for investment 
advice transactions. However, the existing exemptions generally apply 
to more limited categories of transactions and investment products, and 
they include conditions that are tailored to the particular 
transactions or products covered under each exemption. Therefore, under 
the existing exemptions, Financial Institutions may find it inefficient 
to implement advice programs for all the different products and 
services they offer. By providing a single set of conditions for a wide 
variety of investment advice transactions, this exemption allows the 
use and availability of investment advice for a variety of types of 
transactions in a manner that aligns with the conduct standards of 
other regulators, such as the SEC.

Keeping FAB 2018-02

    Similarly, the Department considered keeping FAB 2018-02 in effect 
without finalizing this exemption. However, the Department rejected 
this alternative, because FAB 2018-02 was intended to be a temporary 
policy. Furthermore, replacing the relief provided in FAB 2018-02 with 
a permanent exemption will provide certainty and stability to Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals that may currently be relying 
on the temporary enforcement policy. The final exemption includes 
conditions designed to support investment advice that meets the 
Impartial Conduct Standards.
    To provide a transition period for Financial Institutions relying 
on FAB 2018-02 to comply with the final exemption, the Department has 
announced that FAB 2018-02 will remain in effect place for one year 
after the final exemption is published. This will allow some Financial 
Institutions to defer incurring compliance costs associated with this 
exemption for a limited period. The cost estimates discussed in this 
regulatory impact analysis are overstated to the extent such costs are 
deferred. On the other hand, the benefits discussed in this analysis 
will not be fully realized to the extent that some Financial 
Institutions rely on FAB 2018-02 during the transition period. However, 
the Department believes that most Financial Institutions will begin 
complying with all the conditions of the final exemption before the end 
of the transition period, because it provides protection from private 
litigation and Financial Institutions will be better positioned in an 
extremely competitive market.

Including an Independent Audit Requirement in the Exemption

    This exemption will require Financial Institutions to conduct a 
retrospective review, at least annually, designed to detect and prevent 
violations of the Impartial Conduct Standards and to ensure compliance 
with the policies and procedures governing the exemption. The exemption 
does not require that the review be conducted by an independent party, 
allowing Financial Institutions to self-review.
    As an alternative to this approach, the Department considered 
requiring independent audits to ensure compliance under the exemption. 
The Department decided against this approach, because it is not 
convinced that an independent, external audit would yield sufficient 
benefits in addition to the results of the retrospective review to 
justify the increased cost, especially in the case of smaller Financial 
Institutions. This exemption instead requires that Financial 
Institutions provide a written report documenting the retrospective 
review, and supporting information, to the Department and within 10 
business days of a request. The Department believes this requirement 
compels Financial Institutions to take the review obligation seriously, 
regardless of whether they choose to hire an independent auditor to 
conduct the review.
    While the proposal stated that the Financial Institution's chief 
executive officer (or equivalent) must certify the retrospective 
review, the final exemption provides, instead, that the retrospective 
review may be certified by any of the Financial Institution's Senior 
Executive Officers. The exemption defines a ``Senior Executive 
Officer'' as any of the following: The chief compliance officer, the 
chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer, or one of 
the three most senior officers of the Financial Institution. In making 
this change, the Department accepts the views of a number of commenters 
that stated that the CEO should not be the only person who can provide 
a certification regarding the retrospective review.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA 95) (44 
U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)), the Department solicited comments concerning the 
information collection request (ICR) included in the proposed exemption 
entitled ``Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees'' (85 FR 
40834). At the same time, the Department also submitted an information 
collection request (ICR) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). OMB filed a comment on the 
proposed rule with the Department on September 21, 2020, requesting the 
Department to provide a summary of comments received on the ICR and 
identify changes to the ICR made in response to the comments. OMB did 
not approve the ICR and requested the Department to file future 
submissions of the ICR under OMB control number 1210-0163.
    The Department received no comments that specifically addressed the 
paperwork burden analysis of the

[[Page 82857]]

information collections. Additionally, comments were submitted which 
contained information relevant to the costs and administrative burdens 
attendant to the proposed exemption. The Department considered such 
public comments in connection with making changes to the final 
exemption, analyzing the economic impact of the proposal, and 
developing the revised paperwork burden analysis summarized below.
    In connection with publication of this final exemption, the 
Department is submitting an ICR to OMB requesting approval of a new 
collection of information under OMB Control Number 1210-0163. The 
Department will notify the public when OMB approves the ICR.
    A copy of the ICR may be obtained by contacting the PRA addressee 
shown below or at www.RegInfo.gov.
    PRA Addressee: Address requests for copies of the ICR to G. 
Christopher Cosby, Office of Regulations and Interpretations, U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW, Room N-5718, Washington, DC, 20210. Telephone 
(202) 693-8425; Fax: (202) 219-5333; ([email protected]). These are 
not toll-free numbers. ICRs submitted to OMB also are available at 
www.RegInfo.gov.
    As discussed in detail below, the exemption requires Financial 
Institutions and/or their Investment Professionals to (1) make certain 
disclosures to Retirement Investors, (2) adopt written policies and 
procedures, (3) document the basis for rollover recommendations, (4) 
prepare a written report of the retrospective review, and (5) maintain 
records showing that the conditions have been met to receive relief 
under the exemption. These requirements are ICRs subject to the 
Paperwork Reduction Act. The Department has made the following 
assumptions in order to establish a reasonable estimate of the 
paperwork burden associated with these ICRs:
     Disclosures distributed electronically will be distributed 
via means already used by respondents in the normal course of business, 
and the costs arising from electronic distribution will be negligible;
     Financial Institutions will use existing in-house 
resources to prepare the disclosures, policies and procedures, rollover 
documentations, and retrospective reviews, and to maintain the 
recordkeeping systems necessary to meet the requirements of the 
exemption;
     A combination of personnel will perform the tasks 
associated with the ICRs at an hourly wage rate of $194.77 for a 
personal financial advisor, $64.11 for mailing clerical personnel, and 
$365.39 for a legal professional; \214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ The Department's 2018 hourly wage rate estimates include 
wages, benefits, and overhead, and are calculated as follows: Mean 
wage (from the 2018 National Occupational Employment Survey, May 
2018, www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ocwage_03292019.pdf), wages 
as a percent of total compensation (from the Employer Cost for 
Employee Compensation, December 2018, www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_03192019.pdf), and overhead cost corresponding to each 
2-digit NAICS code (from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 
December 2017, www.census.gov/data/Tables/2016/econ/asm/2016-asm.html) multiplied by the percent of each occupation within that 
NAICS industry code based on a matrix of detailed occupation 
employment for each NAICS industry (from the BLS Office of 
Employment projections, 2016, www.bls.gov/emp/data/occupational-data.htm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Approximately 11,782 Financial Institutions will take 
advantage of the exemption and they will use the exemption in 
conjunction with transactions involving nearly all their clients that 
are defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, and IRA 
holders.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ For this analysis, ``IRA holders'' include rollovers from 
Title I Plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The exemption's impact on the hour and cost burden associated with 
the Department's information collections are discussed in more detail 
below.

Disclosures, Documentation, Retrospective Review, and Recordkeeping

    Section II(b) of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to 
furnish Retirement Investors with a disclosure prior to engaging in a 
covered transaction. Section II(b)(1) requires Financial Institutions 
to acknowledge in writing that the Financial Institution and its 
Investment Professionals are fiduciaries under Title I and the Code, as 
applicable, with respect to any investment advice provided to the 
Retirement Investors. Section II(b)(2) requires Financial Institutions 
to provide a written description of the services they provide and any 
material conflicts of interest. The written description must be 
accurate in all material respects. Financial Institutions will 
generally be required to provide the disclosure to each Retirement 
Investor once, but Financial Institutions may need to provide updated 
disclosures to ensure accuracy. Section II(b)(3) requires Financial 
Institutions to provide the documentation of specific reasons for the 
rollover recommendation to the Retirement Investor.
    Section II(c)(1) of the exemption requires Financial Institutions 
to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
prudently designed to ensure that they and their Investment 
Professionals comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards. Section 
II(c)(2) further requires that the Financial Institutions design the 
policies and procedures to mitigate conflicts of interest. Section 
II(c)(3) of the exemption requires Financial Institutions to document 
the specific reasons for any rollover recommendation and show that the 
rollover is in the best interest of the Retirement Investor.
    Under Section II(d) of the exemption, Financial Institutions are 
required to conduct an annual retrospective review that is reasonably 
designed to prevent violations of the exemption's Impartial Conduct 
Standards and the institution's own policies and procedures. The 
methodology and results of the retrospective review are reduced to a 
written report that is certified by a Senior Executive Officer of the 
Financial Institution. The certifying officer will be required to 
verify that (1) the officer has reviewed the report of the 
retrospective review, (2) the Financial Institution has in place 
policies and procedures prudently designed to achieve compliance with 
the conditions of the exemption, and (3) the Financial Institution has 
a prudent process for modifying such policies and procedures. The 
process for modifying policies and procedures will need to be 
responsive to business, regulatory, and legislative changes and events, 
and the Financial Institution will be required to periodically test 
their effectiveness. The review, report, and certification must be 
completed no later than six months following the end of the period 
covered by the review. The Financial Institution will be required to 
retain the report, certification, and supporting data for at least six 
years, and to make these items available to the Department within 10 
business days of the request.
    Section IV sets forth the recordkeeping requirements in the 
exemption.

Production and Distribution of Required Disclosures

    The Department assumes that 11,782 Financial Institutions, 
comprising 1,957

[[Page 82858]]

BDs,\216\ 6,729 SEC-registered IAs,\217\ 2,710 state-registered 
IAs,\218\ and 386 insurance companies,\219\ are likely to engage in 
transactions covered under this exemption. Each will need to provide 
disclosures that (1) acknowledge its fiduciary status, and (2) identify 
the services it provides and any material conflicts of interest. The 
Department estimates that preparing a disclosure indicating fiduciary 
status would take a legal professional between five and 30 minutes, 
depending on the nature of the business,\220\ resulting in an hour 
burden of 1,599 \221\ and a cost burden of $584,130.\222\ Preparing a 
disclosure identifying services provided and conflicts of interest 
would take a legal professional an estimated five minutes to five 
hours, depending on the nature of the business,\223\ resulting in an 
hour burden of 3,691 \224\ and an equivalent cost burden of 
$1,348,628.\225\
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    \216\ The SEC estimated that there were 3,764 BDs as of December 
2018 (see Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The IAA Compliance 
2019 Survey estimates that 52 percent of IAs have a pension 
consulting business. The estimated number of BDs affected by this 
exemption is the product of the SEC's estimate of total BDs in 2018 
and IAA's estimate of the percent of IAs with a pension consulting 
business.
    \217\ The SEC estimated that there were 12,940 SEC-registered 
IAs that were not dually registered as BDs as of December 2018 (see 
Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The IAA Compliance 2019 
Survey estimates that 52 percent of IAs have a pension consulting 
business. The estimated number of IAs affected by this exemption is 
the product of the SEC's estimate of SEC-registered IAs in 2018 and 
the IAA's estimate of the percent of IAs with a pension consulting 
business.
    \218\ The SEC estimated that there were 16,939 state-registered 
IAs that were not dually registered as BDs as of December 2018 (see 
Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The NASAA 2019 estimates 
that 16 percent of state-registered IAs have a pension consulting 
business. The estimated number of state-registered IAs affected by 
this exemption is the product of the SEC's estimate of state-
registered IAs in 2018 and NASAA's estimate of the percent of state-
registered IAs with a pension consulting business.
    \219\ NAIC estimates that the number of insurers directly 
writing annuities as of 2018 is 386.
    \220\ The Department assumes that it will take each retail BD 
firm 15 minutes, each nonretail BD or insurance firm 30 minutes, and 
each registered IA five minutes to prepare a disclosure conveying 
fiduciary status.
    \221\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of each firm type by the estimated time it will take each 
firm to prepare the disclosure.
    \222\ The hourly cost burden is calculated by multiplying the 
burden hour of each firm associated with preparation of the 
disclosure by the hourly wage of a legal professional.
    \223\ The Department assumes that it will take each retail BD or 
IA firm five minutes, each small nonretail BD or small insurer 60 
minutes, and each large nonretail BDs or large insurer five hours to 
prepare a disclosure conveying services provided and conflicts of 
interest.
    \224\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of each firm type by the estimated time it will take each 
firm to prepare the disclosure.
    \225\ The hourly cost burden is calculated by multiplying the 
burden hour of each firm associated with preparation of the 
disclosure by the hourly wage of a legal professional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department estimates that approximately 1.8 million Retirement 
Investors \226\ have relationships with Financial Institutions and are 
likely to engage in transactions covered under this exemption. Of these 
1.8 million Retirement Investors, it is assumed that 8.1 percent \227\ 
or 141,636 Retirement Investors, will receive paper disclosures. 
Distributing paper disclosures is estimated to take a clerical 
professional one minute per disclosure, resulting in an hourly burden 
of 2,361 \228\ and an equivalent cost burden of $151,341.\229\ Assuming 
the disclosures will require two sheets of paper at a cost $0.05 each, 
the estimated material cost for the paper disclosures is $14,164. 
Postage for each paper disclosure is expected to cost $0.55, resulting 
in a printing and mailing cost of $92,063.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ The Department estimates the number of affected Plans and 
IRAs be approximately equal to 49 percent of rollovers from defined 
contribution plans to IRAs. Cerulli has estimated the number of 
accounts in defined contribution plans rolled into IRAs to be 
3,593,592 (see U.S. Retirement-End Investor 2020, supra note 178).
    \227\ According to data from the National Telecommunications and 
Information Agency (NTIA), 37.7 percent of individuals age 25 and 
over have access to the internet at work. According to a Greenwald & 
Associates survey, 84 percent of plan participants find it 
acceptable to make electronic delivery the default option, which is 
used as the proxy for the number of participants who will not opt-
out of electronic disclosure if automatically enrolled (for a total 
of 31.7 percent receiving electronic disclosure at work). 
Additionally, the NTIA reports that 40.5 percent of individuals age 
25 and over have access to the internet outside of work. According 
to a Pew Research Center survey, 61 percent of internet users use 
online banking, which is used as the proxy for the number of 
internet users who will affirmatively consent to receiving 
electronic disclosures (for a total of 24.7 percent receiving 
electronic disclosure outside of work). Combining the 31.7 percent 
who receive electronic disclosure at work with the 24.7 percent who 
receive electronic disclosure outside of work produces a total of 
56.4 percent who will receive electronic disclosure overall. In 
light of the 2019 Electronic Disclosure Regulation, the Department 
estimates that 81.5 percent of the remaining 43.6 percent of 
individuals will receive the disclosures electronically. In total, 
91.9 percent of participants are expected to receive disclosures 
electronically.
    \228\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of plans receiving the disclosures non-electronically by the 
estimated time it will take to prepare the physical disclosure.
    \229\ The hourly cost burden is calculated as the burden hours 
associated with the physical preparation of each non-electronic 
disclosure by the hourly wage of a clerical professional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Written Policies and Procedures Requirement

    The Department assumes that 11,782 Financial Institutions, 
comprising 1,957 BDs,\230\ 6,729 SEC-registered IAs,\231\ 2,710 state 
registered IAs,\232\ and 386 insurance companies,\233\ are likely to 
engage in transactions covered under this exemption. The Department 
estimates that establishing, maintaining, and enforcing written 
policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure compliance with 
the Impartial Conduct Standards will take a legal professional between 
15 minutes and 10 hours, depending on the nature of the business.\234\ 
This results in an hour burden of 12,023 \235\ and an equivalent cost 
burden of $4,393,011.\236\
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    \230\ The SEC estimated that there were 3,764 BDs as of December 
2018 (see Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The IAA Compliance 
2019 Survey estimates that 52 percent of IAs have a pension 
consulting business. The estimated number of BDs affected by this 
exemption is the product of the SEC's estimate of total BDs in 2018 
and IAA's estimate of the percent of IAs with a pension consulting 
business.
    \231\ The SEC estimated that there were 12,940 SEC-registered 
IAs, who were not dually registered as BDs, as of December 2018 (see 
Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The IAA Compliance 2019 
Survey estimates that 52 percent of IAs have a pension consulting 
business. The estimated number of IAs affected by this exemption is 
the product of the SEC's estimate of SEC-registered IAs in 2018 and 
IAA's estimate of the percent of IAs with a pension consulting 
business.
    \232\ The SEC estimated that there were 16,939 state-registered 
IAs who were not dually registered as BDs as of December 2018 (see 
Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The NASAA 2019 estimates 
that 16 percent of state-registered IAs have a pension consulting 
business. The estimated number of state-registered IAs affected by 
this exemption is the product of the SEC's estimate of state-
registered IAs in 2018 and NASAA's estimate of the percent of state-
registered IAs with a pension consulting business.
    \233\ NAIC estimates that 386 insurers were directly writing 
annuities as of 2018.
    \234\ The Department assumes that it will take each small retail 
BD 22.5 minutes, each large retail BD 45 minutes, each small 
nonretail BD five hours, each large nonretail BD 10 hours, each 
small IA 15 minutes, each large IA 30 minutes, each small insurer 
five hours, and each large insurer 10 hours to meet the requirement.
    \235\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of each firm type by the estimated time it will take each 
firm to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures.
    \236\ The hourly cost burden is calculated as the burden hour of 
each firm associated with meeting the written policies and 
procedures requirement multiplied by the hourly wage of a legal 
professional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollover Documentation Requirement

    To meet the requirement of the rollover documentation, Financial 
Institutions must document the specific reasons that any recommendation 
to roll over assets is in the best interest of the Retirement Investor. 
The Department

[[Page 82859]]

estimates that 1.8 million defined contribution plan accounts rolled 
into IRAs in accordance with advice from a financial services 
professional.\237\ Facing uncertainty, the Department assumes that 67.4 
percent of rollovers will be affected by the exemption.\238\ Under this 
assumption, the Department estimates that the costs for documenting the 
basis for rollover decisions will come to $65 million per year.\239\ 
This was based on the assumption that most financial services 
professionals already incorporate documenting the basis for rollover 
recommendations in their regular business practices and another 
assumption that 67.4 percent of rollovers are handled by financial 
services professionals who act in a fiduciary capacity.\240\ The 
Department estimates that documenting each rollover recommendation will 
require 30 minutes for a personal financial advisor whose firms 
currently do not require rollover documentations and five minutes for 
financial advisors whose firms already require them to do so,\241\ 
resulting in 335,330 \242\ burden hours and an equivalent cost burden 
of $65,313,770.\243\
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    \237\ Cerulli has estimated the number of accounts in defined 
contribution plans rolled into IRAs to be 3,593,591 (see U.S. 
Retirement-End Investor 2020, supra note 178). The Department 
estimates that 49 percent of these rollovers will be handled by a 
financial professional.
    \238\ See supra note 206.
    \239\ See supra note 207.
    \240\ See supra note 206.
    \241\ See supra note 207.
    \242\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of rollovers affected by this proposed exemption by the 
estimated hours needed to document each recommendation.
    \243\ The hourly cost burden is calculated as the burden hour of 
each firm associated with meeting the rollover documentation 
requirement multiplied by the hourly wage of a personal financial 
advisor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Annual Retrospective Review Requirement

    Under the internal retrospective review requirement, a Financial 
Institution is required to (1) conduct an annual retrospective review 
reasonably designed to assist the Financial Institution in detecting 
and preventing violations of, and achieving compliance with the 
Impartial Conduct Standards and their policies and procedures; and (2) 
produce a written report that is certified by a Senior Executive 
Officer of the Financial Institution.
    The Department understands that, as per FINRA Rule 3110,\244\ FINRA 
Rule 3120,\245\ and FINRA Rule 3130,\246\ broker-dealers are already 
held to a standard functionally identical to that of the retrospective 
review requirements of this exemption. Accordingly, in this analysis, 
the Department assumes that broker-dealers will incur minimal costs to 
meet this requirement. In 2018, the Investment Adviser Association 
estimated that 92 percent of SEC-registered IAs voluntarily provide an 
annual compliance program review report to senior management.\247\ The 
Department estimates that only eight percent, or 538,\248\ of SEC-
registered IAs advising retirement plans will incur costs associated 
with producing a retrospective review report. Due to lack of data, the 
Department assumes that state-registered IAs exhibit similar 
retrospective review patterns and estimates that eight percent, or 
217,\249\ of state-registered IAs will also incur costs associated with 
producing a retrospective review report.
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    \244\ Rule 3110. Supervision, FINRA Manual, www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3110.
    \245\ Rule 3120. Supervisory Control System, FINRA Manual, 
www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3120.
    \246\ Rule 3130. Annual Certification of Compliance and 
Supervisory Processes, FINRA Manual, www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3130.
    \247\ 2018 Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey, 
Investment Adviser Association (Jun. 14, 2018), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/INVESTMENTADVISER/aa03843e-7981-46b2-aa49-c572f2ddb7e8/UploadedImages/publications/2018-Investment-Management_Compliance-Testing-Survey-Results-Webcast_pptx.pdf.
    \248\ The SEC estimated that there were 12,940 SEC-registered 
IAs that were not dually registered as BDs as of December 2018 (see 
Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The IAA Compliance 2019 
Survey estimates that 52 percent of IAs have a pension consulting 
business. The IAA Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey 
estimates that 92 percent of SEC-registered IAs provide an annual 
compliance program review report to senior management. The estimated 
number of IAs affected by this exemption who do not meet the 
retrospective review requirement is the product of the SEC's 
estimate of SEC-registered IAs in 2018, the IAA's estimate of the 
percent of IAs with a pension consulting business, and IAA's 
estimate of the percent of IA's who do not provide an annual 
compliance program review report.
    \249\ The SEC estimated that there were 16,939 state-registered 
IAs that were not dually registered as BDs as of December 2018 (see 
Form CRS Relationship Summary Release). The NASAA 2019 estimates 
that 16 percent of state-registered IAs have a pension consulting 
business. The IAA Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey 
estimates that 92 percent of SEC-registered IAs provide an annual 
compliance program review report to senior management. The 
Department assumes state-registered IAs exhibit similar 
retrospective review patterns as SEC-registered IAs. The estimated 
number of state-registered IAs affected by this exemption is the 
product of the SEC's estimate of state-registered IAs in 2018, 
NASAA's estimate of the percent of state-registered IAs with a 
pension consulting business, and IAA's estimate of the percent of 
IA's who do not provide an annual compliance program review report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As SEC-registered IAs are already subject to SEC Rule 206(4)-7, the 
Department assumes these IAs will incur minimal costs to satisfy the 
conditions related to this requirement. Insurance companies in many 
states are already subject state insurance law based on the NAIC's 
Model Regulation.\250\ Thus, the Department assumes that insurance 
companies will incur negligible costs associated with producing a 
retrospective review report. This is estimated to take a legal 
professional five hours for small firms and 10 hours for large firms, 
depending on the nature of the business. This results in an hour burden 
of 7,032 \251\ and an equivalent cost burden of $2,569,337.\252\
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    \250\ NAIC Model Regulation, Section 6.C.(2)(i) (The same 
requirement is found in the NAIC Suitability in Annuity Transactions 
Model Regulation (2010), Section 6.F.(1)(f).)
    \251\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of each firm type by the estimated time it will take each 
firm to review the report and certify the exemption.
    \252\ The hourly cost burden is calculated by multiplying the 
burden hours for reviewing the report and certifying the exemption 
requirement by the hourly wage of a legal professional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Financial Institutions that already produce retrospective review 
reports voluntarily or in accordance with other regulators' rules 
likely will spend additional time to fully comply with this exemption 
condition such as revising their current retrospective review reports. 
This is estimated to take a financial professional one hour for small 
firms and two hours for large firms, depending on the nature of the 
business. This results in an hour burden of 20,727 hours and an 
equivalent cost burden of $7,573,614.
    In addition to conducting the audit and producing a report, 
Financial Institutions also will need to review the report and certify 
the exemption. The Department substantially increased the burden hours 
associated with this requirement in response to concerns raised by a 
commenter that this is a superficial process.\253\ This is estimated to 
take the certifying officer two hours for small firms and four hours 
for large firms, depending on the nature of the business.\254\ This 
results in an hour

[[Page 82860]]

burden of 34,718 \255\ and an equivalent cost burden of 
$5,750,451.\256\
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    \253\ For more detailed discussion, see the corresponding Cost 
section of the Regulatory Impact Analysis above.
    \254\ Due to lack of data, the Department estimates the hourly 
labor cost of a certifying officer to be that of a Financial 
Manager, as outlined on the Employee Benefits Security 
Administration's 2018 labor rate estimates. See Labor Cost Inputs 
Used in the Employee Benefits Security Administration, Office of 
Policy and Research's Regulatory Impact Analyses and Paperwork 
Reduction Act Burden Calculation, Employee Benefits Security 
Administration (June 2019), www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/technical-appendices/labor-cost-inputs-used-in-ebsa-opr-ria-and-pra-burden-calculations-june-2019.pdf. The Department assumes that it will take the 
certifying officer two hours for small firms and four hours for 
large firms. If we assume that an average person reads 250 words per 
minute, the certifying officer can read 30,000 words in two hours or 
60,000 words in four hours. This implies a retrospective review 
report would be approximately 125 pages to 250 pages if this report 
is double-spaced with a with 12 point font size.
    \255\ Burden hours are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of each firm type by the estimated time it will take each 
firm to review the report and certify the exemption.
    \256\ The hourly cost burden is calculated by multiplying the 
burden hours for reviewing the report and certifying the exemption 
requirement by the hourly wage of a financial professional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overall Summary

    Overall, the Department estimates that in order to satisfy the 
exemption, 11,782 Financial Institutions will produce 1.8 million 
disclosures and notices annually. These disclosures and notices will 
result in 417,480 burden hours during the first year and 393,136 burden 
hours in subsequent years, at an equivalent cost of $87.7 million and 
$78.8 million respectively. The disclosures and notices in this 
exemption will also result in a total cost burden for materials and 
postage of $92,063 annually.
    These paperwork burden estimates are summarized as follows:
     Type of Review: New collection.
     Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Department of Labor.
     Title: Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees.
     OMB Control Number: 1210-0163.
     Affected Public: Business or other for-profit institution.
     Estimated Number of Respondents: 11,782.
     Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 1,755,959.
     Frequency of Response: Initially, Annually, and when 
engaging in exempted transaction.
     Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 417,480 during the 
first year and 393,136 in subsequent years.
     Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $92,063 during the 
first year and $92,063 in subsequent years.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) \257\ imposes certain 
requirements on rules subject to the notice and comment requirements of 
section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act or any other 
law.\258\ Under section 604 of the RFA, agencies must submit a final 
regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) of a proposal that is likely to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, such as small businesses, organizations, and governmental 
jurisdictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \258\ 5 U.S.C. 601(2), 603(a); see also 5 U.S.C. 551.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has determined that this final class exemption will 
likely have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. Therefore, the Department has prepared the FRFA 
presented below.

Need for and Objectives of the Rule

    As discussed earlier in this preamble, the final class exemption 
will allow investment advice fiduciaries to receive compensation and 
engage in transactions that would otherwise violate the prohibited 
transaction provisions of Title I and the Code. As such, the final 
exemption will provide Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals with flexibility to address different business models and 
would lessen their overall regulatory burden by coordinating 
potentially overlapping regulatory requirements. The exemption 
conditions, including the Impartial Conduct Standards and other 
conditions supporting the standards, are expected to provide 
protections to Retirement Investors. Therefore, the Department expects 
that the final exemption will benefit Retirement Investors that are 
small entities and provide efficiencies to small Financial 
Institutions.

Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments

    In response to the Department's Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (IRFA), no significant issue was raised by public comments. In 
the preamble to the proposed class exemption, the Department solicited 
comments regarding whether the proposed exemption would have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
and received no comments in response. Moreover, the Department received 
no public comments from the Small Business Administration. As a result, 
the Department made no major changes to the IFRA.

Affected Small Entities

    The Small Business Administration (SBA),\259\ pursuant to the Small 
Business Act,\260\ defines small businesses and issues size standards 
by industry. The SBA defines a small business in the Financial 
Investments and Related Activities Sector as a business with up to 
$41.5 million in annual receipts. Due to a lack of data and shared 
jurisdiction, for purpose of performing Regulatory Flexibility Analyses 
pursuant to section 601(3) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the 
Department, after consultation with SBA's Office of Advocacy, defines 
small entities included in this analysis differently from the SBA 
definitions.\261\ For instance, in this analysis, the small-business 
definitions for BDs and SEC-registered IAs are consistent with the 
SEC's definitions, as these entities are subject to the SEC's rules as 
well as the Act.\262\ As with SEC-registered IAs, the size of state-
registered IAs is determined based on total value of the assets they 
manage.\263\ The size of insurance companies is based on annual sales 
of annuities. The Department requested comments on the appropriateness 
of the size standard used to evaluate the impact of the proposed 
exemption on small entities and received no comments in response. In 
particular, the Department received no comments asserting that it is 
inappropriate for the Department to use size standards that are 
different from those promulgated by the SBA.
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    \259\ 13 CFR 121.201.
    \260\ 15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.
    \261\ The Department consulted with the Small Business 
Administration Office of Advocacy in making this determination as 
required by 5 U.S.C. 603(c).
    \262\ 17 CFR parts 230, 240, 270, and 275, www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7548.txt.
    \263\ Due to lack of available data, the Department includes 
state-registered IAs managing assets less than $30 million as small 
entities in this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In December 2018, there were 985 small-business BDs and 528 SEC-
registered, small-business IAs.\264\ The Department estimates that 
approximately 52 percent of these small-businesses will be affected by 
the final class exemption.\265\ In December 2018, the Department 
estimates there were approximately 10,840 small state-registered 
IAs,\266\ of which about 1,700 are estimated to be affected by the 
final exemption.\267\ There were

[[Page 82861]]

approximately 386 insurers directly writing annuities in 2018,\268\ 316 
of which the Department estimates are small entities.\269\ Table 1 
summarizes the distribution of affected entities by size.
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    \264\ See Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, 
84 FR 33492 (Jul. 12, 2019).
    \265\ 2019 Investment Management Compliance Testing Survey, 
Investment Adviser Association (Jun. 18, 2019), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/INVESTMENTADVISER/aa03843e-7981-46b2-aa49-c572f2ddb7e8/UploadedImages/about/190618_IMCTS_slides_after_webcast_edits.pdf.
    \266\ The SEC estimates there were approximately 17,000 state-
registered IAs (see Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to 
Form ADV, 84 FR 33492 (Jul. 12, 2019)). The Department estimates 
that about 64 percent of state-registered IAs manage assets less 
than $30 million, and it considers such entities small businesses. 
(See 2018 Investment Adviser Section Annual Report, North American 
Securities Administrators Association (May 2018), www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-NASAA-IA-Report-Online.pdf.) Therefore, 
the Department estimates there were about 10,840 small, state-
registered IAs.
    \267\ Of the small, state-registered IAs, the Department 
estimates that 16 percent provide advice or services to retirement 
plans (see 2019 Investment Adviser Section Annual Report, North 
American Securities Administrators Association, (May 2019)).
    \268\ NAIC estimates that the number of insurers directly 
writing annuities as of 2018 is 386.
    \269\ LIMRA estimates in 2016, 70 insurers had more than $38.5 
million in sales. (See U.S. Individual Annuity Yearbook: 2016 Data, 
LIMRA Secure Retirement Institute (2017)).

                                                   Table 2--Distribution of Affected Entities by Size
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             BDs
                                                     SEC-registered IAs
                                                    State-registered IAs
                                                          Insurers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small...........................................          985          26%          528           4%       10,840          64%          316          82%
Large...........................................        2,779          74%       12,412          96%        6,099          36%           70          18%
                                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................        3,764         100%       12,940         100%       16,939         100%          386         100%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements

    As discussed above, the final exemption provides Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals with flexibility to choose 
between the new final exemption or the Department's existing 
exemptions, depending on their individual needs and business models. 
Furthermore, the final exemption provides Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals broader, more flexible prohibited transaction 
relief than is currently available, while safeguarding the interests of 
Retirement Investors. In this regard, this final exemption could 
present a less burdensome compliance alternative for some Financial 
Institutions because it would allow them to streamline compliance 
rather than rely on multiple exemptions with multiple sets of 
conditions.
    This final exemption simply provides an additional alternative 
pathway for Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals to 
receive compensation and engage in certain transactions that would 
otherwise be prohibited under Title I and the Code. Financial 
Institutions would incur costs to comply with conditions set forth in 
the final exemption. However, the Department believes the costs 
associated with those conditions are modest because the final exemption 
was developed in consideration of other regulatory conduct standards. 
The Department believes that many Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals have already developed compliance structures for similar 
regulatory standards. Therefore, the Department does not expect that 
the final exemption will impose a significant compliance burden on 
small entities. For example, the Department estimates that a small 
entity would incur, on average, an additional $3,034 in compliance 
costs to meet the conditions of this final exemption. These additional 
costs represent 0.6 percent of the net capital of BD with $500,000. A 
BD with less than $500,000 in net capital is generally considered 
small, according to the SEC.

Steps Taken To Minimize Impacts and Significant Alternatives Considered

    Section 604 of the RFA requires the Department to consider 
significant alternatives that would accomplish the stated objective, 
while minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities. 
Title I and the Code rules governing advice on the investment of 
retirement assets overlap with SEC rules that govern the conduct of IAs 
and BDs who advise retail investors. The Department considered conduct 
standards set by other regulators, such as SEC, state insurance 
regulators, and FINRA, in developing the final exemption, with the goal 
of avoiding overlapping or duplicative requirements. To the extent the 
requirements overlap, compliance with the other disclosure or 
recordkeeping requirements can be used to satisfy the exemption, 
provided the conditions are satisfied. This will lead to overall 
regulatory efficiency.
    The Department describes below additional steps it has taken to 
minimize the significant economic impact on small entities consistent 
with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a 
statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the 
alternatives adopted in the final exemption.
    Revisions to Annual Retrospective Review Requirement: Under section 
II(d) of the final exemption, Financial Institutions are required to 
conduct an annual retrospective review that is reasonably designed to 
detect and prevent violations of, and achieve compliance with, the 
Impartial Conduct Standards and the institution's own policies and 
procedures. The Department considered the alternative of requiring a 
Financial Institution to engage an independent party to provide an 
external audit. The Department elected not to require this condition to 
avoid the increased costs this approach would impose. Smaller Financial 
Institutions may have been disproportionately impacted by such costs, 
which would have been contrary to the Department's goals of promoting 
access to investment advice for Retirement Investors. Further, the 
Department is not convinced that an independent, external audit would 
yield useful information commensurate with the cost, particularly to 
small entities. Instead, the final exemption requires that Financial 
Institutions to document their retrospective review, and provide it, 
and supporting information, to the Department, within 10 business days 
of request, to the extent permitted by law.
    Addition of Self-Correction Provision: The Department has added a 
new Section II(e) to the exemption, under which Financial Institutions 
will be able to correct certain violations of the exemption. Under the 
new Section II(e), the Department will not consider a non-exempt 
prohibited transaction to have occurred due to a violation of the 
exemption's conditions, provided: (1) Either the violation did not 
result in investment losses to the Retirement Investor or the Financial 
Institution made the Retirement Investor whole for any resulting 
losses; (2) the Financial Institution corrects the violation and 
notifies the Department via email to [email protected] within 30 days of 
correction; (3) the correction occurs no later than 90 days after the 
Financial Institution learned of the violation or reasonably should 
have learned of the violation; and (4) the Financial Institution 
notifies the persons responsible for conducting the retrospective 
review during the applicable review cycle, and the violation and 
correction is specifically set forth in the written report of the 
retrospective review.

[[Page 82862]]

    While this section was not a part of the proposal, several 
commenters requested that the Department provide a means for Financial 
Institutions, acting in good faith, to avoid loss of the exemption for 
violations of the conditions. One commenter specified that there should 
be a correction process in connection with the retrospective review, 
because failure to include this could put Financial Institutions in a 
difficult position of having discovered technical violations but not 
being able to cure them without being subject to an excise tax for the 
prohibited transaction.
    Upon consideration of the comments, the Department determined to 
provide this self-correction procedure. Accordingly, the section allows 
for correction even if a Retirement Investor has suffered investment 
losses, provided that the Retirement Investor is made whole. The 
Department believes that the self-correction provision will provide 
Financial Institutions with an additional incentive to take the 
retrospective review process seriously, timely identify and correct 
violations, and use the process to correct deficiencies in their 
policies and procedures, so as to avoid potential future penalties and 
lawsuits.
    Revision to Recordkeeping Requirements: Under Section IV of the 
exemption, Financial Institutions must maintain records for six years 
demonstrating compliance with the exemption. The Department generally 
includes a recordkeeping requirement in its administrative exemptions 
to ensure that parties relying on an exemption can demonstrate, and the 
Department can verify, compliance with the conditions of the exemption. 
The proposal provided that records should be available for review by 
the following parties in addition to the Department: Any fiduciary of a 
Plan that engaged in an investment transaction pursuant to this 
exemption; any contributing employer and any employee organization 
whose members are covered by a Plan that engaged in an investment 
transaction pursuant to this exemption; or any participant or 
beneficiary of a Plan, or IRA owner that engaged in an investment 
transaction pursuant to this exemption. Several commenters stated that 
allowing parties other than the Department to review records would 
increase the burden placed on Financial Institutions. In particular, 
they expressed the view that parties might overwhelm Financial 
Institutions with requests for information in order to generate claims 
for use in litigation. Fear of potential litigation, could in turn, 
they argued, lead to a ``culture of quiet'' in which employees of 
Financial Institutions elect not to address compliance issues because 
of the fear of this disclosure. In response to these comments, the 
Department has revised the final exemption's recordkeeping provisions 
so that access is limited to the Department and the Department of the 
Treasury.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 \270\ requires 
each federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the 
effects of any federal mandate in a proposed or final rule that may 
result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation with the base year 1995) in any one year by state, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector. For 
purposes of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, as well as Executive 
Order 12875, this exemption does not include any Federal mandate that 
will result in such expenditures.
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    \270\ Public Law 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Federalism Statement

    Executive Order 13132 outlines fundamental principles of 
federalism. It also requires federal agencies to adhere to specific 
criteria in formulating and implementing policies that have 
``substantial direct effects'' on the states, the relationship between 
the national government and states, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Federal 
agencies promulgating regulations that have these federalism 
implications must consult with state and local officials and describe 
the extent of their consultation and the nature of the concerns of 
state and local officials in the preamble to the final regulation. The 
Department does not believe this class exemption has federalism 
implications because it has no substantial direct effect on the states, 
on the relationship between the national government and the states, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.

General Information

    The attention of interested persons is directed to the following:
    (1) The fact that a transaction is the subject of an exemption 
under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2) does not relieve 
a fiduciary, or other party in interest or disqualified person with 
respect to a Plan or an IRA, from certain other provisions of Title I 
and the Code, including any prohibited transaction provisions to which 
the exemption does not apply and the general fiduciary responsibility 
provisions of ERISA section 404 which require, among other things, that 
a fiduciary act prudently and discharge his or her duties respecting 
the Plan solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries 
of the Plan. Additionally, the fact that a transaction is the subject 
of an exemption does not affect the requirement of Code section 401(a) 
that the Plan must operate for the exclusive benefit of the employees 
of the employer maintaining the Plan and its beneficiaries;
    (2) In accordance with section 408(a) of ERISA and section 
4975(c)(2) of the Code, and based on the entire record, the Department 
finds that this exemption is administratively feasible, in the 
interests of Plans and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA 
owners, and protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries 
of the Plan and IRA owners;
    (3) The exemption is applicable to a particular transaction only if 
the transaction satisfies the conditions specified in the exemption; 
and
    (4) The exemption is supplemental to, and not in derogation of, any 
other provisions of Title I and the Code, including statutory or 
administrative exemptions and transitional rules. Furthermore, the fact 
that a transaction is subject to an administrative or statutory 
exemption is not dispositive of whether the transaction is in fact a 
prohibited transaction.

Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees

Section I--Transactions

    (a) In general. ERISA Title I (Title I) and the Internal Revenue 
Code (the Code) prohibit fiduciaries, as defined, that provide 
investment advice to Plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) 
from receiving compensation that varies based on their investment 
advice and compensation that is paid from third parties. Title I and 
the Code also prohibit fiduciaries from engaging in purchases and sales 
with Plans or IRAs on behalf of their own accounts (principal 
transactions). This exemption permits Financial Institutions and 
Investment Professionals who provide fiduciary investment advice to 
Retirement Investors to receive otherwise prohibited compensation and 
engage in riskless principal transactions and certain other principal 
transactions (Covered Principal Transactions) as described below. The 
exemption provides relief from the prohibitions of ERISA section 
406(a)(1)(A), (D), and 406(b), and the sanctions imposed by

[[Page 82863]]

Code section 4975(a) and (b), by reason of Code section 4975(c)(1)(A), 
(D), (E), and (F), if the Financial Institutions and Investment 
Professionals provide fiduciary investment advice in accordance with 
the conditions set forth in Section II and are eligible pursuant to 
Section III, subject to the definitional terms and recordkeeping 
requirements in Sections IV and V.
    (b) Covered transactions. This exemption permits Financial 
Institutions and Investment Professionals, and their Affiliates and 
Related Entities, to engage in the following transactions, including as 
part of a rollover from a Plan to an IRA as defined in Code section 
4975(e)(1)(B) or (C), as a result of the provision of investment advice 
within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 
4975(e)(3)(B):
    (1) The receipt of reasonable compensation; and
    (2) The purchase or sale of an asset in a riskless principal 
transaction or a Covered Principal Transaction, and the receipt of a 
mark-up, mark-down, or other payment.
    (c) Exclusions. This exemption does not apply if:
    (1) The Plan is covered by Title I of ERISA and the Investment 
Professional, Financial Institution or any Affiliate is (A) the 
employer of employees covered by the Plan, or (B) a named fiduciary or 
plan administrator with respect to the Plan that was selected to 
provide advice to the Plan by a fiduciary who is not independent of the 
Financial Institution, Investment Professional, and their Affiliates;
    (2) The transaction is a result of investment advice generated 
solely by an interactive website in which computer software-based 
models or applications provide investment advice based on personal 
information each investor supplies through the website, without any 
personal interaction or advice with an Investment Professional (i.e., 
robo-advice); or
    (3) The transaction involves the Investment Professional acting in 
a fiduciary capacity other than as an investment advice fiduciary 
within the meaning of the regulations at 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c)(1)(i) and 
(ii)(B) or 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c)(1)(i) and (ii)(B) setting forth the test 
for fiduciary investment advice.

Section II--Investment Advice Arrangement

    Section II requires Investment Professionals and Financial 
Institutions to comply with Impartial Conduct Standards, including a 
best interest standard, when providing fiduciary investment advice to 
Retirement Investors. In addition, the exemption requires Financial 
Institutions to acknowledge fiduciary status under Title I and/or the 
Code, and describe in writing the services they will provide and their 
material Conflicts of Interest. Finally, Financial Institutions must 
adopt policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure compliance 
with the Impartial Conduct Standards when providing fiduciary 
investment advice to Retirement Investors and conduct a retrospective 
review of compliance.
    (a) Impartial Conduct Standards. The Financial Institution and 
Investment Professional comply with the following ``Impartial Conduct 
Standards'':
    (1) Investment advice is, at the time it is provided, in the Best 
Interest of the Retirement Investor. As defined in Section V(b), such 
advice reflects the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the 
investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and 
needs of the Retirement Investor, and does not place the financial or 
other interests of the Investment Professional, Financial Institution 
or any Affiliate, Related Entity, or other party ahead of the interests 
of the Retirement Investor, or subordinate the Retirement Investor's 
interests to their own;
    (2)(A) The compensation received, directly or indirectly, by the 
Financial Institution, Investment Professional, their Affiliates and 
Related Entities for their services does not exceed reasonable 
compensation within the meaning of ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code 
section 4975(d)(2); and (B) as required by the federal securities laws, 
the Financial Institution and Investment Professional seek to obtain 
the best execution of the investment transaction reasonably available 
under the circumstances; and
    (3) The Financial Institution's and its Investment Professionals' 
statements to the Retirement Investor about the recommended transaction 
and other relevant matters are not, at the time statements are made, 
materially misleading.
    (b) Disclosure. Prior to engaging in a transaction pursuant to this 
exemption, the Financial Institution provides the disclosures set forth 
in (1) and (2) to the Retirement Investor:
    (1) A written acknowledgment that the Financial Institution and its 
Investment Professionals are fiduciaries under Title I and the Code, as 
applicable, with respect to any fiduciary investment advice provided by 
the Financial Institution or Investment Professional to the Retirement 
Investor;
    (2) A written description of the services to be provided and the 
Financial Institution's and Investment Professional's material 
Conflicts of Interest that is accurate and not misleading in all 
material respects; and
    (3) Prior to engaging in a rollover recommended pursuant to the 
exemption, the Financial Institution provides the documentation of 
specific reasons for the rollover recommendation, required by Section 
II(c)(3), to the Retirement Investor.
    (c) Policies and Procedures.
    (1) The Financial Institution establishes, maintains, and enforces 
written policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure that the 
Financial Institution and its Investment Professionals comply with the 
Impartial Conduct Standards in connection with covered fiduciary advice 
and transactions.
    (2) Financial Institutions' policies and procedures mitigate 
Conflicts of Interest to the extent that a reasonable person reviewing 
the policies and procedures and incentive practices as a whole would 
conclude that they do not create an incentive for a Financial 
Institution or Investment Professional to place their interests ahead 
of the interest of the Retirement Investor.
    (3) The Financial Institution documents the specific reasons that 
any recommendation to roll over assets from a Plan to another Plan or 
an IRA as defined in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) or (C), from an IRA as 
defined in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) or (C) to a Plan, from an IRA to 
another IRA, or from one type of account to another (e.g., from a 
commission-based account to a fee-based account) is in the Best 
Interest of the Retirement Investor.
    (d) Retrospective Review.
    (1) The Financial Institution conducts a retrospective review, at 
least annually, that is reasonably designed to assist the Financial 
Institution in detecting and preventing violations of, and achieving 
compliance with, the Impartial Conduct Standards and the policies and 
procedures governing compliance with the exemption.
    (2) The methodology and results of the retrospective review are 
reduced to a written report that is provided to a Senior Executive 
Officer.
    (3) A Senior Executive Officer of the Financial Institution 
certifies, annually, that:
    (A) The officer has reviewed the report of the retrospective 
review;

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    (B) The Financial Institution has in place policies and procedures 
prudently designed to achieve compliance with the conditions of this 
exemption; and
    (C) The Financial Institution has in place a prudent process to 
modify such policies and procedures as business, regulatory, and 
legislative changes and events dictate, and to test the effectiveness 
of such policies and procedures on a periodic basis, the timing and 
extent of which is reasonably designed to ensure continuing compliance 
with the conditions of this exemption.
    (4) The review, report and certification are completed no later 
than six months following the end of the period covered by the review.
    (5) The Financial Institution retains the report, certification, 
and supporting data for a period of six years and makes the report, 
certification, and supporting data available to the Department, within 
10 business days of request, to the extent permitted by law including 
12 U.S.C. 484.
    (e) Self-Correction. A non-exempt prohibited transaction will not 
occur due to a violation of the exemption's conditions with respect to 
a transaction, provided:
    (1) Either the violation did not result in investment losses to the 
Retirement Investor or the Financial Institution made the Retirement 
Investor whole for any resulting losses;
    (2) The Financial Institution corrects the violation and notifies 
the Department of Labor of the violation and the correction via email 
to [email protected] within 30 days of correction;
    (3) The correction occurs no later than 90 days after the Financial 
Institution learned of the violation or reasonably should have learned 
of the violation; and
    (4) The Financial Institution notifies the person(s) responsible 
for conducting the retrospective review during the applicable review 
cycle and the violation and correction is specifically set forth in the 
written report of the retrospective review required under subsection 
II(d)(2).

Section III--Eligibility

    (a) General. Subject to the timing and scope provisions set forth 
in subsection (b), an Investment Professional or Financial Institution 
will be ineligible to rely on the exemption for 10 years following:
    (1) A conviction of any crime described in ERISA section 411 
arising out of such person's provision of investment advice to 
Retirement Investors, unless, in the case of a Financial Institution, 
the Department grants a petition pursuant to subsection (c)(1) below 
that the Financial Institution's continued reliance on the exemption 
would not be contrary to the purposes of the exemption; or
    (2) Receipt of a written ineligibility notice issued by the 
Department for (A) engaging in a systematic pattern or practice of 
violating the conditions of this exemption in connection with otherwise 
non-exempt prohibited transactions; (B) intentionally violating the 
conditions of this exemption in connection with otherwise non-exempt 
prohibited transactions; or (C) providing materially misleading 
information to the Department in connection with the Financial 
Institution's or Investment Professional's conduct under the exemption; 
in each case, as determined by the Department pursuant to the process 
described in subsection (c).
    (b) Timing and Scope of Ineligibility.
    (1) An Investment Professional shall become ineligible immediately 
upon (A) the date of the trial court's conviction of the Investment 
Professional of a crime described in subsection (a)(1), regardless of 
whether that judgment remains under appeal; or (B) the date of the 
written ineligibility notice described in subsection (a)(2), issued to 
the Investment Professional.
    (2) A Financial Institution shall become ineligible following (A) 
the 10th business day after the conviction of the Financial Institution 
or another Financial Institution in the same Controlled Group of a 
crime described in subsection (a)(1) regardless of whether that 
judgment remains under appeal, or, if the Financial Institution timely 
submits a petition described in subsection (c)(1) during that period, 
21 days after the date of the Department's written denial of the 
petition; or (B) 21 days after the date of the written ineligibility 
notice, described in subsection (a)(2), issued to the Financial 
Institution or another Financial Institution in the same Controlled 
Group.
    (3) Controlled Group. A Financial Institution is in the same 
Controlled Group with another Financial Institution if it would be 
considered in the same ``controlled group of corporations'' or ``under 
common control'' with the Financial Institution, as those terms are 
defined in Code section 414(b) and (c), in each case including the 
accompanying regulations.
    (4) Winding Down Period. Any Financial Institution that is 
ineligible will have a one-year winding down period during which relief 
is available under the exemption subject to the conditions of the 
exemption other than eligibility. After the one-year period expires, 
the Financial Institution may not rely on the relief provided in this 
exemption for any additional transactions.
    (c) Opportunity to be heard.
    (1) Petitions under subsection (a)(1).
    (A) A Financial Institution that has been convicted of a crime 
described under subsection (a)(1) or another Financial Institution in 
the same Controlled Group may submit a petition to the Department 
informing the Department of the conviction and seeking a determination 
that the Financial Institution's continued reliance on the exemption 
would not be contrary to the purposes of the exemption. Petitions must 
be submitted, within 10 business days after the date of the conviction, 
to the Department by email at [email protected].
    (B) Following receipt of the petition, the Department will provide 
the Financial Institution with the opportunity to be heard, in person 
or in writing or both. The opportunity to be heard in person will be 
limited to one in-person conference unless the Department determines in 
its sole discretion to allow additional conferences.
    (C) The Department's determination as to whether to grant the 
petition will be based solely on its discretion. In determining whether 
to grant the petition, the Department will consider the gravity of the 
offense; the relationship between the conduct underlying the conviction 
and the Financial Institution's system and practices in its retirement 
investment business as a whole; the degree to which the underlying 
conduct concerned individual misconduct, or, alternately, corporate 
managers or policy; how recent was the underlying lawsuit; remedial 
measures taken by the Financial Institution upon learning of the 
underlying conduct; and such other factors as the Department determines 
in its discretion are reasonable in light of the nature and purposes of 
the exemption. The Department will provide a written determination to 
the Financial Institution that articulates the basis for the 
determination.
    (2) Written ineligibility notice under subsection (a)(2). Prior to 
issuing a written ineligibility notice, the Department will issue a 
written warning to the Investment Professional or Financial 
Institution, as applicable, identifying specific conduct implicating 
subsection (a)(2), and providing a six-month opportunity to cure. At 
the end of the six-month period, if the Department determines that the 
conduct persists, it will provide the Investment

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Professional or Financial Institution with the opportunity to be heard, 
in person or in writing or both, before the Department issues the 
written ineligibility notice. The opportunity to be heard in person 
will be limited to one in-person conference unless the Department 
determines in its sole discretion to allow additional conferences. The 
written ineligibility notice will articulate the basis for the 
determination that the Investment Professional or Financial Institution 
engaged in conduct described in subsection (a)(2).
    (d) A Financial Institution or Investment Professional that is 
ineligible to rely on this exemption may rely on a statutory or 
separate administrative prohibited transaction exemption if one is 
available or seek an individual prohibited transaction exemption from 
the Department. To the extent an applicant seeks retroactive relief in 
connection with an exemption application, the Department will consider 
the application in accordance with its retroactive exemption policy as 
set forth in 29 CFR 2570.35(d). The Department may require additional 
prospective compliance conditions as a condition of retroactive relief.

Section IV--Recordkeeping

    The Financial Institution maintains for a period of six years 
records demonstrating compliance with this exemption and makes such 
records available, to the extent permitted by law including 12 U.S.C. 
484, to any authorized employee of the Department or the Department of 
the Treasury.

Section V--Definitions

    (a) ``Affiliate'' means:
    (1) Any person directly or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with the Investment Professional or Financial Institution. (For this 
purpose, ``control'' would mean the power to exercise a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of a person other than an 
individual);
    (2) Any officer, director, partner, employee, or relative (as 
defined in ERISA section 3(15)), of the Investment Professional or 
Financial Institution; and
    (3) Any corporation or partnership of which the Investment 
Professional or Financial Institution is an officer, director, or 
partner.
    (b) Advice is in a Retirement Investor's ``Best Interest'' if such 
advice reflects the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the 
investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and 
needs of the Retirement Investor, and does not place the financial or 
other interests of the Investment Professional, Financial Institution 
or any Affiliate, Related Entity, or other party ahead of the interests 
of the Retirement Investor, or subordinate the Retirement Investor's 
interests to their own.
    (c) A ``Conflict of Interest'' is an interest that might incline a 
Financial Institution or Investment Professional--consciously or 
unconsciously--to make a recommendation that is not in the Best 
Interest of the Retirement Investor.
    (d) A ``Covered Principal Transaction'' is a principal transaction 
that:
    (1) For sales to a Plan or an IRA:
    (A) Involves a U.S. dollar denominated debt security issued by a 
U.S. corporation and offered pursuant to a registration statement under 
the Securities Act of 1933, a U.S. Treasury Security, a debt security 
issued or guaranteed by a U.S. federal government agency other than the 
U.S. Department of Treasury, a debt security issued or guaranteed by a 
government-sponsored enterprise, a municipal security, a certificate of 
deposit, an interest in a Unit Investment Trust, or any investment 
permitted to be sold by an investment advice fiduciary to a Retirement 
Investor under an individual exemption granted by the Department after 
the effective date of this exemption that includes the same conditions 
as this exemption; and
    (B) If the recommended investment is a debt security, the security 
is recommended pursuant to written policies and procedures adopted by 
the Financial Institution that are reasonably designed to ensure that 
the security, at the time of the recommendation, has no greater than 
moderate credit risk and sufficient liquidity that it could be sold at 
or near carrying value within a reasonably short period of time; and
    (2) For purchases from a Plan or an IRA, involves any securities or 
investment property.
    (e) ``Financial Institution'' means an entity that is not 
disqualified or barred from making investment recommendations by any 
insurance, banking, or securities law or regulatory authority 
(including any self-regulatory organization), that employs the 
Investment Professional or otherwise retains such individual as an 
independent contractor, agent or registered representative, and that 
is:
    (1) Registered as an investment adviser under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.) or under the laws of the 
state in which the adviser maintains its principal office and place of 
business;
    (2) A bank or similar financial institution supervised by the 
United States or a state, or a savings association (as defined in 
section 3(b)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 
1813(b)(1)));
    (3) An insurance company qualified to do business under the laws of 
a state, that: (A) Has obtained a Certificate of Authority from the 
insurance commissioner of its domiciliary state which has neither been 
revoked nor suspended; (B) has undergone and shall continue to undergo 
an examination by an independent certified public accountant for its 
last completed taxable year or has undergone a financial examination 
(within the meaning of the law of its domiciliary state) by the state's 
insurance commissioner within the preceding five years, and (C) is 
domiciled in a state whose law requires that an actuarial review of 
reserves be conducted annually and reported to the appropriate 
regulatory authority;
    (4) A broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.); or
    (5) An entity that is described in the definition of Financial 
Institution in an individual exemption granted by the Department after 
the date of this exemption that provides relief for the receipt of 
compensation in connection with investment advice provided by an 
investment advice fiduciary under the same conditions as this class 
exemption.
    (f) For purposes of subsection I(c)(1), a fiduciary is 
``independent'' of the Financial Institution and Investment 
Professional if: (i) The fiduciary is not the Financial Institution, 
Investment Professional, or an Affiliate; (ii) the fiduciary does not 
have a relationship to or an interest in the Financial Institution, 
Investment Professional, or any Affiliate that might affect the 
exercise of the fiduciary's best judgment in connection with 
transactions covered by the exemption; and (iii) the fiduciary does not 
receive and is not projected to receive within the current federal 
income tax year, compensation or other consideration for his or her own 
account from the Financial Institution, Investment Professional, or an 
Affiliate, in excess of 2% of the fiduciary's annual revenues based 
upon its prior income tax year.
    (g) ``Individual Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' means any plan 
that is an account or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) 
through (F).

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    (h) ``Investment Professional'' means an individual who:
    (1) Is a fiduciary of a Plan or an IRA by reason of the provision 
of investment advice described in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) or Code 
section 4975(e)(3)(B), or both, and the applicable regulations, with 
respect to the assets of the Plan or IRA involved in the recommended 
transaction;
    (2) Is an employee, independent contractor, agent, or 
representative of a Financial Institution; and
    (3) Satisfies the federal and state regulatory and licensing 
requirements of insurance, banking, and securities laws (including 
self-regulatory organizations) with respect to the covered transaction, 
as applicable, and is not disqualified or barred from making investment 
recommendations by any insurance, banking, or securities law or 
regulatory authority (including any self-regulatory organization).
    (i) ``Plan'' means any employee benefit plan described in ERISA 
section 3(3) and any plan described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(A).
    (j) A ``Related Entity'' is any party that is not an Affiliate, but 
in which the Investment Professional or Financial Institution has an 
interest that may affect the exercise of its best judgment as a 
fiduciary.
    (k) ``Retirement Investor'' means:
    (1) A participant or beneficiary of a Plan with authority to direct 
the investment of assets in his or her account or to take a 
distribution;
    (2) The beneficial owner of an IRA acting on behalf of the IRA; or
    (3) A fiduciary of a Plan or an IRA.
    (l) A ``Senior Executive Officer'' is any of the following: The 
chief compliance officer, the chief executive officer, president, chief 
financial officer, or one of the three most senior officers of the 
Financial Institution.

Jeanne Klinefelter Wilson,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security, Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2020-27825 Filed 12-17-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-29-P