[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 239 (Friday, December 11, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 79826-79828]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26047]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. FAA-2020-1102; Notice No. 27-052-SC]


Special Conditions: Garmin International, Inc., Bell Textron 
Canada Limited Model 505 Helicopter, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and 
Stability Augmentation System

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Bell Textron 
Canada Limited (BTCL) Model 505 helicopter. This helicopter as modified 
by Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin), will have a novel or unusual 
design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in 
the airworthiness standards for helicopters. This design feature is 
associated with the installation of an autopilot and stability 
augmentation system (AP/SAS). The applicable airworthiness regulations 
do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design 
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety 
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a 
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing 
airworthiness standards.

DATES: Send comments on or before January 11, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by Docket No. FAA-2020-1102 using 
any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending 
your comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as 
described in the following paragraph, and other information as 
described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments it receives, 
without change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal 
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the 
docket website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all 
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the 
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an 
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act 
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478).
    Confidential Business Information: CBI is commercial or financial 
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by 
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), 
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to 
these special conditions contain commercial or financial information 
that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as 
private, and that is relevant or responsive to these special 
conditions, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of these special conditions. Submissions containing CBI should 
be sent to Andy Shaw, Continued Operational Safety Section, AIR-682, 
Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood 
Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5384. Any commentary 
that the FAA receives which is not specifically designated as CBI will 
be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andy Shaw, Continued Operational 
Safety Section, AIR-682, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and 
Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone 
(817) 222-5384; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

    The FAA has determined, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) 
and 553(d)(3), that notice and opportunity for prior public comment 
hereon are unnecessary because substantially identical special 
conditions have been previously subject to the public comment process 
in several prior instances such that the FAA is satisfied that new 
comments are unlikely. For the same reason, the FAA finds that good 
cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The 
FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views 
that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities 
for comment.

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         Special conditions number          Company and helicopter model
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No. 27-048-SC \1\.........................  Bell Helicopter Textron
                                             Canada Limited Bell Model
                                             505 helicopter.
No. 27-046-SC \2\.........................  Robinson Helicopter Company
                                             Model R66 helicopter.

[[Page 79827]]

 
No. 27-043-SC \3\.........................  Airbus Helicopters Model
                                             AS350B2 and AS350B3
                                             helicopters.
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\1\ 84 FR 64233, November 21, 2019.
\2\ 84 FR 30050, June 26, 2019.
\3\ 82 FR 57685, December 07, 2017.

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking 
by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date for 
comments. The FAA may change these special conditions based on the 
comments received.

Background

    On December 18, 2019, Garmin applied for a supplemental type 
certificate (STC) to install an AP/SAS in the BTCL Model 505 
helicopter. The BTCL Model 505 helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27 normal 
category, single turbine engine, conventional helicopter designed for 
civil operation. This helicopter model can carry up to four passengers 
with one pilot and has a maximum gross weight (MGW) of up to 4,475 
pounds, depending on the model configuration. The major design features 
include a two-blade main rotor, an anti-torque tail rotor system, skid 
landing gear, and a visual flight rule (VFR) basic avionics 
configuration. Garmin proposes to modify this model helicopter by 
installing an AP/SAS.
    The AP/SAS provides attitude stabilization in two or three axes 
(pitch and roll with optional yaw) and higher-level AP functions such 
as altitude hold, heading command, and navigation tracking. However, 
the possible failure conditions for this system, and their effect on 
the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter, are more 
severe than those envisioned by the present rules.
    The effect on safety is not adequately covered under 14 CFR 27.1309 
for the application of new technology and the new application of 
standard technology. Specifically, the present provisions of Sec.  
27.1309(c) do not adequately address the safety requirements for 
systems whose failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/
severe-major failure conditions or complex systems whose failures could 
result in major failure conditions in VFR rotorcraft. The current 
regulations are inadequate because when Sec.  27.1309(c) was 
promulgated, it was not envisioned that this type of VFR rotorcraft 
would use systems that are complex or whose failure could result in 
``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the 
rotorcraft. This inadequacy is particularly true with the application 
of new technology, a new application of standard technology, or other 
applications not envisioned by the rule that affect safety.

Type Certification Basis

    Under 14 CFR 21.101, Garmin must show that the BTCL Model 505 
helicopter, as changed, continues to meet the applicable regulations 
listed in Type Certificate Number R00008RD or the applicable regulation 
in effect on the date of application for the change. The regulations 
listed in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the 
``original type certification basis.'' The regulations listed in Type 
Certificate Number R00008RD are as follows:
    For approved MGW configuration of 1670 kg (3680 lb.) internal 
loading and 2030 kg (4475 lbs.) external loading:
14 CFR part 27, dated October 2, 1964, amendment 27-1 through 27-47
14 CFR part 36 Amendment 36-1 through 36-30
    Equivalent Level of Safety Findings issued against:
(a) FAA Cover Issue Paper CIP-01
(b) 14 CFR part 27.307(b)(5) Proof of Structure Landing Gear Drop Test
(c) 14 CFR part 27.723 Landing Gear Shock Absorption Tests
(d) 14 CFR part 27.725 Landing Gear Limit Drop Test
(e) 14 CFR part 27.727 Landing Gear Reserve Energy Absorption Drop Test
(f) 14 CFR part 27.995(d) Fuel Shut-off Valve
(g) 14 CFR part 27.1545(b)(2) Airspeed Indicator
    The Administrator has determined that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (e.g., 14 CFR part 27) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the BTCL Model 505 helicopter type 
certificate number R00008RD because of a novel or unusual design 
feature. Therefore, special conditions are prescribed under the 
provisions of Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should Garmin apply for an STC to modify any other 
model included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same 
novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also 
apply to the other model under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, the BTCL Model 505 helicopter must comply with the noise 
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type 
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The BTCL Model 505 helicopter will incorporate the following novel 
or unusual design features: An AP/SAS. An AP system is a system used to 
control an aircraft trajectory without constant input from the pilot. 
This system allows the pilot to focus on other aspects of the 
operation, such as weather and other flight associated systems. SAS is 
another type of automatic flight control system; however, instead of 
maintaining the aircraft on a predetermined attitude or flight path, 
the SAS will reduce pilot workload by dampening the rotorcraft's 
buffeting regardless of the attitude or flight path.

Discussion

    The BTCL Model 505 helicopter's type certification basis as 
modified by Garmin does not contain adequate airworthiness standards 
for the AP/SAS. The FAA requires these special conditions to comply 
with airworthiness standards. The FAA requires that Garmin provide the 
FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS 
installation configuration to adequately address the safety objectives 
established by a functional hazard assessment (FHA). This assessment 
will ensure that all failure conditions and their effects are 
adequately addressed for the installed AP/SAS. The SSA process is part 
of the overall safety assessment process discussed in FAA Advisory 
Circular 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and 
Society of Automotive Engineers document Aerospace Recommended Practice 
4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.
    These special conditions require that the AP/SAS installed on the 
BTCL Model 505 helicopter meet the requirements to adequately address 
the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by 
the SSA, within the defined design integrity requirements.
    Failure conditions are classified according to the severity of 
their effects on the rotorcraft. Radio Technical

[[Page 79828]]

Commission for Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document DO-178C, Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, 
provides software design assurance levels most commonly used for the 
major, hazardous/severe-major, and catastrophic failure condition 
categories. The AP/SAS equipment must be qualified for the expected 
installation environment. The test procedures prescribed in RTCA 
Document DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for 
Airborne Equipment, are recognized by the FAA as acceptable 
methodologies for finding compliance with the environmental 
requirements. Equivalent environment test standards may also be 
acceptable.
    The environmental qualification provides data to show that the AP/
SAS can perform its intended function under the expected operating 
condition. Some considerations for environmental concerns are 
installation locations and the resulting exposure to environmental 
conditions for the AP/SAS equipment, including considerations for other 
equipment that may be environmentally affected by the AP/SAS equipment 
installation. The level of environmental qualification must be related 
to the severity of the considered failure conditions and effects on the 
rotorcraft.
    These special conditions contain the additional safety standards 
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of 
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness 
standards.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the 
BTCL Model 505 helicopter. Should Garmin apply at a later date for a 
STC to modify any other model included on Type Certificate Number 
R00008RD to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these 
special conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only a certain novel or unusual design feature 
on the BTCL Model 505 helicopter. It is not a rule of general 
applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for 
approval of this feature on the helicopter.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

Authority Citation

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the supplemental type certification basis for Bell Textron Canada 
Limited (BTCL) Model 505 helicopters, as modified by Garmin 
International, Inc.
    Instead of the requirements of 14 CFR Sec.  27.1309(b) and (c), the 
following must be met for certification of the autopilot and stability 
augmentation system installed on BTCL Model 505 helicopters:
    (a) The equipment and systems must be designed and installed so 
that any equipment and systems do not adversely affect the safety of 
the rotorcraft or its occupants.
    (b) The rotorcraft systems and associated components considered 
separately and in relation to other systems must be designed and 
installed so that:
    (1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is 
extremely improbable;
    (2) The occurrence of any hazardous failure condition is extremely 
remote; and
    (3) The occurrence of any major failure condition is remote.
    (c) Information concerning an unsafe system operating condition 
must be provided in a timely manner to the crew to enable them to take 
appropriate corrective action. An appropriate alert must be provided if 
immediate pilot awareness and immediate or subsequent corrective action 
is required. Systems and controls, including indications and 
annunciations, must be designed to minimize crew errors that could 
create additional hazards.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on November 19, 2020.
Jorge Castillo,
Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-26047 Filed 12-9-20; 4:15 pm]
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