[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 238 (Thursday, December 10, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 79566-79740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-22042]



[[Page 79565]]

Vol. 85

Thursday,

No. 238

December 10, 2020

Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration





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14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, et al.





Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 238 / Thursday, December 10, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 79566]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, 
440, 450, and 460

[Docket No.: FAA-2019-0229; Amdt. No(s). 401-9; 404-7, 413-12, 414-4, 
415-7, 417-6, 420-9, 431-7, 433-3, 435-5, 437-3, 440-5, 450-2, and 460-
3]
RIN 2120-AL17


Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements

AGENCY: FAA Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation 
(DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule streamlines and increases flexibility in the FAA's 
commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and removes obsolete 
requirements. It consolidates and revises multiple regulatory parts and 
applies a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several 
types of operations and vehicles. The rule describes the requirements 
to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the 
terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.

DATES: 
    Effective date: This rule is effective March 10, 2021, except for 
amendatory instructions 3, 11, 17, 20, 27, 44 and 54, concerning 
Sec. Sec.  401.5, 413.1, and 413.23, the removal of parts 415, 417, 
431, and 435, and instructions 68 and 73 amending Sec. Sec.  440.3 and 
460.45, respectively, which are effective March 10, 2026.
    Compliance: Affected parties, however, are not required to comply 
with the information collection requirements in part 450 until the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approves the collection and 
assigns a control number under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The 
FAA will publish in the Federal Register a notice of the control number 
assigned by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for these 
information collection requirements.

ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking 
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How 
To Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this action, contact Randy Repcheck, Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8760; email 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended and codified at 
51 U.S.C. 50901-50923 (the Act), authorizes the Secretary of 
Transportation to oversee, license, and regulate commercial launch and 
reentry activities, and the operation of launch and reentry sites 
within the United States or as carried out by U.S. citizens. Section 
50905 directs the Secretary to exercise this responsibility consistent 
with public health and safety, safety of property, and the national 
security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In 
addition, Sec.  50903 requires the Secretary to encourage, facilitate, 
and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the private 
sector. As codified at 49 CFR 1.83(b), the Secretary has delegated 
authority to carry out these functions to the FAA Administrator.
    This rulemaking amends the FAA's launch and reentry requirements, 
consolidating and revising multiple regulatory parts to set forth a 
single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of 
operations and vehicles. It also streamlines the commercial space 
regulations by, among other things, replacing many prescriptive 
regulations with performance-based rules, and giving industry greater 
flexibility to develop means of compliance that maximize their 
objectives while maintaining public safety.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

AC--Advisory Circular
CEC--Conditional expected casualty
EC--Expected casualty
ELOS determination--Equivalent-level-of-safety determination
ELV--Expendable launch vehicle
FSA--Flight safety analysis
FSS--Flight safety system
RLV--Reusable launch vehicle

Table of Contents

I. Overview
II. Background
III. Discussion of the Rule
    A. Safety Framework
    B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule
    1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based Regulations, ELOS, Safety 
Case
    2. Part 450 Subpart A--General Discussion
    a. Pre-Application Consultation
    b. Application Process
    c. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses (Sec.  450.1(b))
    d. Definition and Scope of Launch (Sec.  450.3)
    e. Safety Element Approval (Part 414)
    f. Vehicle Operator License--Issuance, Duration, Additional 
License Terms and Conditions, Transfer, and Rights Not Conferred 
(Sec. Sec.  450.5 Through 450.13)
    3. Part 450 Subpart B--Requirements To Obtain a Vehicle Operator 
License
    a. Incremental Review and Determinations (Sec.  450.33)
    b. Means of Compliance (Sec.  450.35)
    c. Use of Safety Element Approval (Sec.  450.39)
    d. Policy Review (Sec.  450.41)
    e. Payload Reviews (Sec.  450.43)
    f. Safety Review and Approval (Sec.  450.45)
    g. Environmental Review (Sec.  450.47)
    4. Part 450 Subpart C--Safety Requirements
    a. Neighboring Operations Personnel (Sec.  450.101(a) and (b))
    b. High Consequence Event Protection (Sec.  450.101(c))
    c. Critical Asset and Critical Payload Protection
    d. Other Safety Criteria (Sec.  450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g))
    e. System Safety Program (Sec.  450.103)
    f. Hazard Control Strategies (Sec.  450.107)
    g. Hazard Control Strategy Determination (Sec.  450.107(b))
    h. Flight Abort (Sec.  450.108)
    i. Flight Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.109)
    j. Physical Containment (Sec.  450.110)
    k. Wind Weighting (Sec.  450.111)
    l. Flight Safety Analysis (Sec. Sec.  450.113 to 450.139)
    m. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope (Sec.  450.113)
    n. Flight Safety Analysis Methods (Sec.  450.115)
    o. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight (Sec.  450.117)
    p. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight (Sec.  450.119)
    q. Debris Analysis (Sec.  450.121)
    r. Population Exposure Analysis (Sec.  450.123)
    s. Probability of Failure Analysis (Sec.  450.131)
    t. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (Sec.  450.133)
    u. Debris Risk Analysis (Sec.  450.135)
    v. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis, or Distant 
Focus Overpressure (DFO) (Sec.  450.137)
    w. Toxic Hazards (Sec. Sec.  450.139 and 450.187)
    x. Computing Systems (Sec.  450.141)
    y. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation 
(Sec.  450.143)
    z. Flight Safety Systems (Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145)
    aa. Hybrid Vehicles
    bb. Agreements and Airspace (Sec.  450.147)
    cc. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications (Sec.  450.149)
    dd. Work Shift and Rest Requirements (Sec.  450.151)
    ee. Radio Frequency (Sec.  450.153)
    ff. Readiness and Rehearsals (Sec.  450.155)
    gg. Communications (Sec.  450.157)
    hh. Pre-Flight Procedures (Sec.  450.159)
    ii. Control of Hazard Areas (Sec.  450.161)
    jj. Lightning Hazard Mitigation (Sec.  450.163)
    kk. Flight Commit Criteria (Sec.  450.165)
    ll. Tracking (Sec.  450.167)
    mm. Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements 
(Sec.  450.169)

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    nn. Safety at End of Launch (Sec.  450.171)
    oo. Mishap (Definition, Sec. Sec.  450.173 and 450.175)
    pp. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements and Practices (Sec.  
450.177)
    qq. Ground Safety (Sec.  450.179 to Sec.  450.189)
    5. Part 450 Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle 
Operator License
    a. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, 
Financial Responsibility, Human Spaceflight Requirements (Sec. Sec.  
450.201 to 450.207)
    b. Compliance Monitoring (Sec.  450.209)
    c. Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application for 
Modification of License (Sec.  450.211)
    d. Pre-Flight Reporting (Sec.  450.213)
    e. Post-Flight Reporting (Sec.  450.215)
    f. Registration of Space Objects (Sec.  450.217)
    6. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 433, 437, and 440
     7. Miscellaneous Comments
    8. Responses to Regulatory Impact Analysis Comments
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
    A. Regulatory Evaluation
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. International Trade Impact Assessment
    D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
    E. Paperwork Reduction Act
    F. International Compatibility
    G. Environmental Analysis
V. Executive Order Determinations
    A. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs
    B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect 
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
VI. How To Obtain Additional Information
Rulemaking Documents
Comments Submitted to the Docket
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

I. Overview

Overview of Final Rule

    This rule amends 14 CFR parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 by 
consolidating, updating, and streamlining all launch and reentry 
regulations into a single part 450. After March 10, 2026, parts 415, 
417, 431, and 435 will be removed. This rule also revises multiple 
regulatory parts to apply a single set of licensing and safety 
regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. In 
addition, this rule replaces many prescriptive regulations with 
performance-based rules, giving industry greater flexibility to develop 
means of compliance that meet their objectives while maintaining public 
safety. Where possible, the FAA has adopted performance standards, and 
considered the prescriptive requirements for placement in advisory 
circulars (AC) that will identify possible means of compliance, but not 
the only means of compliance, with this rule. The goal of this approach 
is to afford the industry and the FAA the added flexibility of using 
new methods to better enable future innovative concepts and operations. 
While some of the provisions in this rule may increase the risk to 
public safety compared to the current regulations, such as the 
provisions that apply to neighboring operations personnel, the FAA has 
ensured that the increased risk is minimal and there is a corresponding 
public interest benefit.
    Part 450 accommodates all vehicle operators, including hybrid 
vehicle operators. The revisions include more performance-based 
requirements, alternatives to flight abort and flight safety analysis 
(FSA) requirements based on demonstrated reliability, use of equivalent 
level of safety (ELOS) for the measurement of a high consequence event, 
and allowing application process alternatives as agreed to by the FAA.
    Part 450 is divided into subparts A through D. Part 450 is 
organized by sections that have both safety requirements for what an 
operator must do to be safe and application requirements for what must 
be submitted in an application. By ``applicant,'' the FAA intends to 
reference an applicant for either a vehicle operator license, an 
incremental approval, a payload determination, a policy approval, or an 
environmental determination. By ``operator,'' the FAA intends to 
reference the holder of a license, which is consistent with the 
definition of ``operator'' in Sec.  401.7.
    This preamble will discuss in detail the safety framework 
encapsulated in part 450, part 450 requirements in sequential order, 
followed by corresponding and related changes to other parts, and cost 
implications for this rule.
i. Subpart A
    Subpart A includes a general discussion on the application process, 
licensing scope and duration, and compliance dates. Pre-application 
consultation, which may include discussion of any applicable 
flexibilities in the application process, scope of license, and means 
of compliance, is required by part 413.
    Figure 1 illustrates the licensing process. The licensing process 
begins with pre-application consultation, which sets the stage for an 
applicant to submit a license application. The application evaluation 
consists of five major components: (1) A policy review, (2) a payload 
review, (3) a safety review, (4) a determination of maximum probable 
loss (MPL) for establishing financial responsibility requirements, and 
(5) an environmental review. The license specifies the range of 
activities the licensee may undertake along with any limitations. 
Requirements after a license is issued encompass the licensee's 
responsibility for public safety and compliance with its license, 
representations in the license application, and FAA regulations. An 
important component of this compliance is the FAA's authority to 
perform safety inspections.

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10DE20.000

    In the final rule, the FAA does not make any changes to the 
existing pre-application consultation provision, except to update the 
term ``safety approval'' to the newly adopted ``safety element 
approval.'' The FAA makes this change to delineate between the safety 
approval portion of a license application and a safety element approval 
that the FAA grants under Part 414. This distinction between terms will 
not affect industry.
    During the pre-application consultation stage, an applicant will 
work with the FAA to develop an application and licensing process that 
best fits its proposed operation. This stage will focus on compliance 
planning and positioning the applicant to prepare an acceptable 
application, which will increase the efficiency of the licensing 
process. The length of pre-application consultation will vary based on 
the proposed operation. For example, pre-application consultations may 
be lengthy when involving new launch vehicles that are under 
development or with operators inexperienced with the FAA's regulations. 
Alternatively, pre-application consultation with experienced operators 
using proven vehicles from established sites may be considerably 
shorter.
    During this stage, the FAA expects to discuss the following topics 
with an applicant: Entrance and exit criteria for pre-application 
consultation, the intended means of compliance to meet the regulatory 
requirements in part 450, the scope of the license, safety element 
approvals, incremental review, review period for license evaluation, 
compliance expectations, and time frames an operator is required to 
meet to satisfy part 450. Some of the topics allow for flexibility that 
can result in a more efficient licensing process for both the applicant 
and the FAA.
    The rule allows an applicant and the FAA flexibility to establish 
the scope of the license. Determining the point at which launch begins 
will be discussed during pre-application consultation. The applicant 
will describe to the FAA its launch site and its intended concept of 
operations leading up to a launch, including any operations that are 
hazardous to the public. Once the FAA and the applicant have a mutual 
understanding of the applicant's intended concept of operations, the 
FAA will determine what constitutes hazardous pre-flight operations and 
thus the beginning of launch. The applicant will then scope its 
application materials based on this starting point.
    In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the FAA proposed to 
set the scope of activity authorized by a vehicle operator license by 
identifying the beginning and end of launch and reentry. The final rule 
provides flexibility to scale the beginning of launch to the operation. 
Specifically, the FAA will identify the beginning and end of launch on 
a case-by-case basis and in consultation with an applicant. The final 
rule does not adopt the proposed default that hazardous ground pre-
flight operations commence when a launch vehicle or its major 
components arrive at a U.S. launch site. Instead, the final rule 
identifies certain activities that qualify as hazardous pre-flight 
operations, including, but not limited to, pressurizing or loading of 
propellants into the vehicle or launch system, operations involving a 
fueled launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to initiate 
flight, or any hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for flight. 
This rule also clarifies that hazardous pre-flight operations do not 
include the period between the end of the previous launch and launch 
vehicle reuse when the vehicle is in a safe and dormant state.
    For the end of launch and reentry, the FAA replaces each use of 
``vehicle stage'' in the proposed rule with ``vehicle component'' in 
the final rule. The FAA adopts this change in recognition that 
components other than vehicle stages may return to Earth. Also, the FAA 
now includes ``impact or landing'' in the end of launch and reentry 
sections in the scope of license requirements to accommodate increasing 
efforts to reuse components.
ii. Subpart B
    Subpart B contains the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator 
license. The topics include incremental review and determinations, 
means of compliance,

[[Page 79569]]

policy review, payload review, safety review and approval, and 
environmental review. This rule retains the key components of a license 
application review: The policy review, payload review, safety review, 
MPL determination, and environmental review. This rule continues to 
allow operators to submit the payload, policy, environmental, and 
financial responsibility portions of its application independently of 
each other.
    The final rule will also allow an applicant to submit an 
application for a safety review in modules using an incremental 
approach approved by the FAA. The safety review is typically the most 
complex part of the license application and usually involves submission 
of numerous documents. In this rule, the FAA has concluded that a 
structured approach agreed to during pre-application consultation will 
reduce regulatory uncertainty by allowing the FAA to affirm at an early 
stage of development that the proposed safety measure or methodology 
meets the FAA's requirements. An applicant must have its incremental 
review approach approved by the FAA prior to submitting its application 
so that the FAA can ensure that the modules can be reviewed 
independently and in a workable order under an agreed time frame.
    The rule makes it easier for an applicant to seek a safety element 
approval in conjunction with its license application. A safety element 
approval is an FAA document containing the FAA determination a safety 
element, when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter, or 
situation, will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of 
property. A safety element includes a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, 
safety system, process, service, or any identified component thereof; 
and qualified and trained personnel, performing a process or function 
related to licensed activities or vehicles. An applicant may also 
leverage existing safety element approvals by citing a safety element 
approval in another license application, thus streamlining the 
subsequent licensing process.
    After the final rule becomes effective on March 10, 2021, operators 
holding an active launch or reentry license, or who have an accepted 
launch or reentry license application within 90 days after the 
effective date, may choose to operate under parts 415 and 417 for 
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), part 431 for reusable launch 
vehicles (RLVs), or part 435 for reentry vehicles, until five years 
after the effective date of this rule.\1\ All operators, including 
those exercising this provision, must come into compliance with this 
regulation's requirements for critical asset protection and collision 
avoidance (COLA) analysis beginning from the effective date of this 
rule. Any operator may also choose to operate under part 450 on the 
effective date of this rule. Operators conducting operations under 
parts 415, 417, 431 or 435 may submit requests for license renewals 
such that their license remains valid for up to five years after the 
effective date of this rule. A license renewal issued after the 
effective date of this rule will be valid for no longer than five years 
after the effective date of this rule.\2\ All operators will need to 
comply with all parts of this rule five years after its effective date. 
Any operator may also choose to operate under part 450 on the effective 
date of this rule.
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    \1\ The FAA refers to these licenses as ``legacy licenses'' 
throughout this preamble. After that time, all operators must come 
into compliance with the new regulations.
    \2\ Operators holding a part 431 mission operator license have a 
2-year renewable period, operators holding a part 435 reentry 
operator license have a 2-year renewable period, and operators 
holding a part 415 launch operator license have a 5-year renewable 
period.
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    For an application for a license modification submitted after this 
rule becomes effective and within five years of the effective date, the 
FAA will determine the applicability of part 450 on a case-by-case 
basis. In determining whether to apply part 450 in evaluating a license 
modification under this scenario in consultation with the applicant, 
the FAA will consider the extent and complexity of the modification, 
whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts of the 
application, and if the application requires significant reevaluation.
    The final rule allows most time frames to be determined during pre-
application consultation, or during the application review process. An 
operator may propose alternative time frames for any of the 
requirements listed in the newly created Appendix A to part 404.
    Compliance with the performance requirements in this rule may be 
demonstrated by using a means of compliance that is accepted by the 
FAA. Means of compliance may be government standards, industry 
consensus standards, or unique means of compliance developed by an 
individual applicant. During pre-application consultation, the FAA will 
work with applicants on compliance planning. The FAA will review the 
submitted means of compliance to determine whether they satisfy the 
regulatory safety standard.
    For five requirements, an applicant must use a means of compliance 
the FAA has accepted in advance of submitting an application. Those 
requirements for which an applicant must use an accepted means of 
compliance in advance are identified in Sec.  450.35 and include FSA 
methods, airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds for any 
toxic hazards for flight, highly reliable flight safety systems (FSS), 
lightning commit criteria, and airborne toxic concentration and 
duration thresholds toxic hazard mitigation for ground operations. For 
all other requirements, an applicant may include an accepted means of 
compliance or a means of compliance the FAA has not yet accepted as 
part of its application for the FAA to review during application 
evaluation. The FAA will publish any publicly available means of 
compliance that it accepts. In addition, an operator may request that 
the FAA publish the operator's unique means of compliance, once 
reviewed and accepted.
    The FAA evaluates five major components in an application for a 
vehicle operator license. The FAA adopts the proposed requirements for 
the policy review without modification. For the FAA to conduct a policy 
review, an applicant must identify the launch or reentry vehicle and 
its proposed flight profile, and describe the vehicle by 
characteristics that include individual stages and their dimensions, 
the type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. The final 
rule clarifies that a payload review is not required when the proposed 
launch or reentry vehicle will not carry a payload or when the payload 
is owned or operated by the U.S. Government. The FAA will continue to 
conduct safety reviews to determine whether an applicant is capable of 
conducting a launch or reentry without jeopardizing public health and 
safety and safety of property as specified in Sec. Sec.  415.103, 
431.31(a), and 435.31. Finally, the FAA adopts with revisions the 
proposed requirements for environmental review. The revisions include 
clarification on the FAA requirements for an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) and the FAA's responsibility to determine whether a Categorical 
Exemption (CATEX) applies, in accordance with current regulations. The 
MPL calculation and financial responsibility requirements are discussed 
under Subpart D.
iii. Subpart C
    Subpart C addresses safety requirements. In the final rule, the FAA 
revises numerous sections under

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subpart C in response to public comments on the proposed rule, so that 
the rule is more performance-based. Subpart C includes regulations for 
key areas of concern to Federal launch or reentry sites that had not 
been covered in previous FAA regulations (e.g., the treatment of 
neighboring operations personnel and critical assets, including 
critical payloads). Throughout this document, the terms ``Federal 
launch or reentry sites'' and ``Federal sites'' replace the NPRM's use 
of ``Federal launch range.''
    The FAA structured the rule to facilitate elimination of 
duplication of the requirements of Federal launch or reentry sites by 
incorporating critical asset protections, to avoid the need for Federal 
sites to impose this requirement. The rule also creates a path for the 
FAA to determine that a Federal launch or reentry site's ground safety 
processes, requirements, and oversight are not inconsistent with the 
Secretary's statutory authority over commercial space activities.
    The safety criteria in Sec.  450.101 (Safety Criteria) set the 
public and property safety criteria that must be met before an operator 
may initiate the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.\3\ The 
quantitative safety criteria continue to be the linchpin requirement 
for flight safety, which is fundamental for all operators. There are 
quantitative risk criteria for collective risk, individual risk, and 
aircraft risk. The final rule applies collective and individual risk 
criteria to people on waterborne vessels, enabling risk management 
techniques that previously required a waiver. The rule carves out 
neighboring operations personnel on a launch or reentry site as a 
separate category of the public subject to different risk criteria. 
This rule also adds risk criteria for the protection of critical assets 
essential to the national interests of the United States, including a 
more stringent requirement for the protection of critical payloads. The 
final rule uses conditional risk management to ensure (1) mitigations, 
such as flight abort, will be implemented to protect against high 
consequence events, and (2) implementation of mitigations will produce 
reasonable conditional risks.
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    \3\ The FAA changes the title of Sec.  450.101 from ``public 
safety criteria'' in the NPRM to ``safety criteria'' in the final 
rule. This is because the FAA changed the definition of ``public'' 
in new Sec.  401.7 of the final rule. In the NPRM, ``public'' was 
defined to include ``people and property that are not involved in 
supporting the launch or reentry and includes those people and 
property that may be located within the launch or reentry site, such 
as visitors, individuals providing goods or services not related to 
launch or reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and 
its personnel.'' In the final rule, the FAA removed references to 
property, limiting the scope of the term ``public'' to people. This 
was done to provide better clarity throughout part 450 regarding the 
protection of people, property, or both. Because Sec.  450.101 
includes criteria for both people and property, the FAA removes 
``public'' from the title.
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    The rule allows for neighboring operations personnel to be 
protected as members of the public, but to a less stringent risk 
threshold as compared to other members of the public. In the final 
rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements on neighboring 
operations personnel in Sec. Sec.  401.7, 440.3, 450.101(a) and (b), 
and 450.137 (Far-field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis) paragraph 
(c)(6), but removes the phase ``as determined by the Federal or 
licensed launch or reentry site operator'' from the definition of 
``neighboring operations personnel'' in Sec.  401.7. Instead, the 
Federal or licensed site operator will determine those persons who are 
eligible for neighboring operations personnel status in coordination 
with the operators at the site and in accordance with definition in 
Sec.  401.7. A site operator at a non-Federal site will have the option 
to designate certain personnel as neighboring operations personnel.
    In the final rule, critical assets include property, facilities, or 
infrastructure necessary to maintain national security, or assured 
access to space for national priority missions. In the final rule, the 
FAA does not adopt the proposed requirement for operators to calculate 
the risks to critical assets in preparing a flight hazard analysis, 
debris analysis, and debris risk analysis. The FAA anticipates that it 
will perform all critical asset and critical payload risk assessments 
for commercial space transportation operations involving non-Federal 
sites.
    Under Sec.  450.101(c) of the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require an 
operator to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy if the 
consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any 
one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-\3\ 
CEC for uncontrolled areas. The FAA amends the title of 
Sec.  450.101(c) from ``Flight Abort'' in the NPRM to ``High 
Consequence Event Protection'' in the final rule, because the final 
rule allows an operator to use a method other than flight abort in 
certain situations in which the operator can show sufficient protection 
against high consequence events. The FAA retains the CEC 
requirement as a quantitative criterion that an applicant must use to 
measure high consequence events, but revises the final rule to allow 
ELOS for the CEC requirement. The final rule also allows 
options for how an applicant may protect against a low likelihood, high 
consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase of flight, such 
as using flight abort in accordance with Sec.  450.108 (Flight Abort) 
or demonstrating that CEC is below a certain threshold 
without using flight abort.
    The FAA adopts with revisions the proposal that an operator must 
implement and document a system safety program throughout the 
operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system in Sec.  450.103 
(System Safety Program). The system safety program includes a safety 
organization, hazard management, configuration management and control, 
and post-flight data review. In the final rule, the FAA removes the 
proposed term ``operational'' to clarify that the regulation applies to 
hazards throughout the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system--not 
just to operational hazards. The FAA also does not adopt the proposed 
requirement in Sec.  450.105 to conduct a preliminary safety 
assessment, because that requirement has been replaced with a 
requirement to conduct a functional hazard analysis under the Hazard 
Control Strategies section in the final rule.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed under the Hazard Control Strategies 
section (Sec. Sec.  450.107 to 450.111) that, for each phase of a 
vehicle's flight, an operator would not need to conduct a flight hazard 
analysis for that phase of flight if the public safety and safety of 
property hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment could 
be mitigated adequately to meet the requirements of proposed Sec.  
450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort. In 
the final rule, the FAA concludes that an operator must use one or more 
of the hazard control strategies defined in Sec. Sec.  450.108 through 
450.111 to meet the safety criteria. The FAA also adds a new paragraph 
to this section to address how an operator determines its hazard 
control strategy or strategies for any phase of flight during a launch 
or reentry.
    The FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.108, which is a consolidation and 
revision of several proposed sections associated with flight abort 
requirements in the NPRM. As a result of this consolidation, the FAA 
removes the flight abort related requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.123, 
450.125, 450.127, and 450.129. The requirements in these sections have 
been revised to be performance-based standards included in Sec.  
450.108(c), which addresses flight safety limits objectives, and Sec.  
450.108(d), which addresses flight safety limits constraints.

[[Page 79571]]

    Section 450.109 (Flight Hazard Analysis) details requirements for 
an operator using a flight hazard analysis as its hazard control 
strategy for one or more phases of flight. A flight hazard analysis 
must identify, describe, and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards 
to public safety and safety of property resulting from the flight of a 
launch or reentry vehicle, mitigate hazards as appropriate, and 
validate and verify the hazard mitigations. The FAA revises the final 
rule to reflect that performing a flight hazard analysis is included as 
a hazard control strategy to derive hazard controls for the flight, or 
phase of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle.
    Regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated an 
operator must conduct an FSA to demonstrate quantitatively that a 
launch or reentry meets the safety criteria for debris, far-field 
overpressure, and toxic hazards. An operator may be required to conduct 
additional analyses to use flight abort or wind weighting hazard 
control strategies. The FAA anticipates that an operator will be 
required to conduct some FSA for at least some phases of flight, 
regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated. For 
example, an FSA must determine flight hazard areas for any vehicle with 
planned debris impacts capable of causing a casualty.
    The FAA revises the FSA requirements in Sec.  450.113 (Flight 
Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope), which establish the portions of 
flight for which an operator would be required to perform and document 
an FSA. An operator must perform and document an FSA for all phases of 
flight, unless otherwise agreed to by the FAA. The FAA may agree there 
is no need for an FSA for certain phases of flight based on 
demonstrated reliability for any launch or reentry vehicle, instead of 
just for hybrid vehicles as proposed in the NPRM. The FAA expands this 
exception because, conceivably, an operation involving a vehicle other 
than a hybrid could have an extensive and safe enough flight history to 
demonstrate compliance with the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101 based on 
empirical data in lieu of the traditional risk analysis.
    An FSA generally consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to 
determine flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard 
areas, and other mitigation measures, and to demonstrate compliance 
with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101. In the NPRM, the FAA 
proposed 15 sections associated with FSA requirements in Sec. Sec.  
450.113 to 450.141. The final rule moves requirements associated with 
flight safety limits to Sec.  450.108 and condenses the remaining FSA 
requirements into 11 performance-based sections that cover the scope of 
the analyses, general methodology requirements, and specific sections 
on normal trajectories, malfunction trajectories, hazardous debris 
characterization, population exposure, probability of failure, flight 
hazard areas, debris risks, and far-field overpressure blast effects. 
The FAA moved some of the proposed FSA requirements such that an 
operator could generally perform the analyses in the order that they 
appear in the final rule, if they choose.
    The FAA revises the FSA sections to be more performance-based than 
what was proposed in the NPRM. Specifically, the FAA revises the FSA 
requirements to identify their fundamental purpose, the essential 
constraints, and the objectives in each section. The FSA requirements 
in the final rule are consistent with current practice, but the rule 
articulates important, often misunderstood, aspects of flight analysis 
such as the creation of hazard areas and other operating constraints 
necessary to protect public health and safety and safety of property.
    Sections 450.139 (Toxic Hazards for Flight) and 450.187 (Toxic 
Hazards Mitigation for Ground Operations) contain the requirements for 
toxic release analysis. In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec. Sec.  
450.139 and 450.187 with some revisions. The FAA clarifies that 
operators are not required to perform a toxic release hazard analysis 
for kerosene-based fuels unless directed by the FAA. Also, the FAA 
revises the requirements for performing toxic containment.
    In the NPRM, Sec.  450.111 contained computing systems and software 
requirements. In the final rule, the FAA revises and relocates the 
requirements for computing systems and software to Sec.  450.141 
(Computing Systems and Software). In response to comments, the FAA 
revises the requirements of Sec.  450.141 to be more performance-based, 
and levies requirements for computing system safety items in proportion 
to their criticality instead of the item's level of autonomy. The final 
rule also requires independent verification and validation for 
computing system safety items that meet the definition of ``safety-
critical'' in Sec.  401.7.
    The requirements of Sec.  450.143 (Safety-Critical System Design, 
Test, and Documentation) apply to all safety-critical systems except 
highly reliable FSS and safety-critical software items, which are 
regulated by the requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.145 and 450.141 
respectively. In the final rule, the FAA revises the reference to FSS 
requirements in Sec.  450.143(a); amends Sec.  450.143(b) to include 
other means of compliance and broader safe design concepts; and removes 
the term ``vehicle'' in Sec.  450.143(c) because safety-critical 
systems can be located off-vehicle. In addition, the FAA amends the 
application requirements in Sec.  450.143(f) to require that applicants 
describe the method used to validate predicted operating environments 
and any standards used for each safety-critical system.
    Section 450.145 (Highly Reliable Flight Safety System) contains the 
requirements for certain FSS. The FAA revises Sec.  450.145 to apply to 
a highly reliable FSS, which consists of any onboard portion and if 
used, any ground-based, space-based, or otherwise not onboard portion 
of the system. Conventional FSS with airborne flight termination 
receivers and ground-based command transmitter systems will have both 
airborne and ground-based subsystems. The final rule provides 
additional flexibility for operations where the CEC is 
between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ and exempts the 
FSS for such operations from the requirements of Sec.  450.145; 
however, the FSS for such operations must still meet the requirements 
of Sec.  450.143. The FAA makes these changes to scope the FSS design, 
testing, and analysis more closely to potential consequence and risk. 
These changes will reduce burden on operators that have a lower 
potential for causing high consequence events. The FAA also removes the 
reliability threshold required of an FSS for operations where 
CEC is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 
10-\3\. The final rule provides that an FSS required for 
operations for which the CEC is between 1 x 
10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ must meet the requirements 
of Sec.  450.143.
    Section 450.147 (Agreements) requires a vehicle operator to have a 
written agreement with any entity that provides a service or use of 
property to meet a requirement in part 450. In the final rule, the FAA 
requires an operator to enter into multiple agreements if the operator 
works with multiple entities. Also, operators will continue to be 
required to enter into agreements with the appropriate entities for 
launches and reentries that cross airspace or impact water not under 
U.S. jurisdiction.
    Section 450.153 contains the requirements for radio frequency. In 
the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to 
identify each frequency, all allowable frequency tolerances, and each 
frequency's intended use, operating power, and

[[Page 79572]]

source; and provide for the monitoring of frequency usage and 
enforcement of frequency allocations. In the final rule, the FAA adopts 
the proposed requirements with modifications to the performance-based 
objectives central to radio frequency management. Operators will be 
required to ensure that radio frequency does not adversely affect the 
performance of FSS or safety-critical systems, and to coordinate radio 
frequency with local and Federal authorities.
    Section 450.157 contains the requirements for communications. In 
the NRPM, the FAA proposed that personnel that have authority to issue 
``hold/resume,'' ``go/no go,'' and abort commands must monitor each 
common intercom channel during countdown and flight. The FAA does not 
adopt the proposal because it was overly prescriptive.
    Section 450.161 (Control of Hazard Areas) contains the control of 
hazard areas. In the final rule, the FAA does not remove the 
requirement for an operator to verify that warnings have been issued 
when the operator relies on another party to publicize those warnings. 
Instead, the FAA clarifies that the requirement may be met by 
demonstrating due diligence pursuant to agreements that the operator 
has with that party and notifying the FAA of any deviations from the 
agreements by any party. The FAA also adds an application requirement 
for the applicant to give a description of how the applicant will 
provide for any publication of flight hazard areas.
    In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the four mishap 
categories proposed in the NPRM. The FAA agrees with commenters that 
the regulatory requirements for the proposed mishap classes, from most 
severe (Class 1) to least severe (Class 4), were largely the same, and 
concludes that the mishap classes are not needed to achieve the 
objective of consolidating mishap-related terms and streamlining the 
requirements to report, respond to, and investigate mishaps. Instead, 
the FAA combines the substantive criteria of Mishap Classes 1-4 under 
the definition of ``mishap.'' The revised definition in the final rule 
describes events that constitute a mishap. The requirements to report, 
respond to, and investigate mishaps are incumbent upon an operator 
regardless of a mishap's severity.
    Section 450.173 (Mishap Plan--Reporting, Response, and 
Investigation Requirements) contains the requirements for the mishap 
plan. In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the proposed 
requirement for a licensee to cooperate with FAA and NTSB 
investigations contained in the NPRM. The FAA finds this requirement 
duplicative of Sec.  450.13, which states that a vehicle operator 
license does not relieve a licensee of its obligations to comply with 
all applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to its 
activities. Also, the final rule standardizes criteria for mishap plans 
across all of 14 CFR Chapter III by making Sec.  450.173 applicable to 
launch and reentry licensees, experimental permittees, and site 
operators.
    The FAA proposed to give license applicants and licensees the 
option to pre-coordinate testing activities with the FAA. In the final 
rule, the FAA clarifies that Sec.  450.175 (Test-induced Damage) will 
only apply to licensees or license applicants who choose to apply for 
the exception. The final rule also allows an operator to coordinate the 
possibility of test-induced damage prior to an operation and exclude 
damage meeting certain requirements from constituting a mishap, thereby 
reducing unnecessary reporting.
v. Subpart D
    Subpart D addresses the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator 
license. This includes compliance monitoring (Sec.  450.209), material 
changes and continuing accuracy (Sec.  450.211), pre-flight reporting 
(Sec.  450.213), post-flight reporting (Sec.  450.215), and 
registration of space objects (Sec.  450.217). In the final rule, the 
FAA adopts these sections as proposed with the exception of revisions 
to Sec.  450.213 (Pre-flight Reporting) as described below.
    The final rule makes few changes to the post-licensing 
requirements, for which the final rule standardizes requirements for 
all launches and reentries from Federal sites and commercial spaceports 
or exclusive use launch sites. In line with the previous requirements, 
operators will provide information and comply with reported collision 
avoidance closures. A Federal agency will continue to provide operators 
the appropriate launch or reentry closures, but the rule allows the 
possibility of some other entity's providing this service in the 
future. The final rule offers operators flexibility, in coordination 
with the FAA, to use different timelines for the submission of pre-
flight and post-flight reports. The FAA revises Sec.  450.213(d) to 
allow an operator the flexibility to identify an appropriate time frame 
in coordination with the FAA. The FAA also revises Sec.  450.217(c) so 
that licensees will only need to notify the FAA that they removed an 
object from orbit if removal occurs during or immediately after 
licensed activities.

II. Background

    This rulemaking arose from work by the National Space Council that 
led to President Donald J. Trump's Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2) in 
May 2018, directing the U.S. Department of Transportation to streamline 
the regulations governing commercial space launch and reentry 
licensing. The goals of this streamlining include creating a single 
licensing regime for all types of commercial space flight launch and 
reentry operations, and replacing prescriptive requirements with 
performance-based criteria. The final rule is consistent with DOT's 
regulations under 49 CFR 5.5(e), which instruct that regulations should 
be technologically neutral, and, to the extent feasible, should specify 
performance objectives, rather than prescribing specific conduct that 
regulated entities must adopt.
    On March 8, 2018, the FAA chartered the Streamlined Launch and 
Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to 
provide a forum for a broad range of stakeholders from the aviation and 
space communities to discuss regulations to set forth procedures and 
requirements for commercial space transportation launch and reentry 
licensing. The FAA tasked the ARC with developing recommendations for a 
performance-based regulatory approach in which the regulations set 
forth the safety objectives to be achieved while providing the 
applicant flexibility to produce tailored and innovative means of 
compliance.
    On April 30, 2018, the ARC submitted its final recommendation 
report to the FAA.\4\ The FAA addressed the recommendations in more 
detail throughout the NPRM. This final rule incorporates 
recommendations provided by the ARC.
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    \4\ Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements ARC, 
Recommendations Final Report (April 30, 2008). The ARC Report is 
available for reference in the docket (Docket FAA-2019-0229).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 26, 2019, the FAA posted on its website an NPRM titled 
``Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements'' that would revise parts 
401, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, and 440, and 
create a new part 450. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to streamline and 
increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry 
regulations, remove obsolete requirements, consolidate and revise 
multiple regulatory parts, and apply a single set of licensing and 
safety

[[Page 79573]]

regulations across several types of operations and vehicles.
    On April 15, 2019, the FAA published this NPRM in the Federal 
Register (85 FR 15296). The initial comment period was 60-days from the 
date of publication, ending on June 14, 2019.
    In the ensuing month, commenters submitted fifty-six requests for 
an extension of the comment period to a total of 120 days, or until 
August 13, 2019.
    In response, on May 31, 2019, the FAA published an extension of the 
comment period on the NPRM (84 FR 25207), for an additional 45-days to 
July 30, 2019, to allow commenters more time to analyze the proposed 
rule.
    On June 14, 2019, the FAA posted to the docket a response \5\ to 
MLA Space, LLC, which had requested that the FAA reconvene the ARC to 
engage in dialogue regarding the NPRM. In the response, the FAA stated 
its belief that engagement with industry in the form of an ARC, a 
public meeting, or through a special session of Commercial Space 
Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) would not be beneficial at 
that point in the rulemaking process. The FAA encouraged members of 
industry to submit any questions requesting clarification regarding the 
NPRM to the docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See FAA-2019-0229-0088.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 16, 2019, the FAA posted to the docket the first of its 
responses \6\ to commenters' questions requesting clarification. Also 
on July 16, 2019, the FAA posted a statement \7\ to the docket 
encouraging commenters to post any further requests for clarification 
in the docket as soon as possible. That statement reasserted the FAA's 
judgment that further engagement with industry through a public meeting 
to have clarifying dialogue regarding the NPRM would not be beneficial, 
but also offered to entertain meetings in the month of July 2019 with 
members of the public who wished to provide to the FAA their 
information bearing on the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See FAA-2019-0229-0106.
    \7\ See FAA-2019-0229-0107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequently, the FAA met with Blue Origin,\8\ the Coalition for 
Deep Space Exploration,\9\ Space Exploration Technologies Corp. 
(SpaceX),\10\ Virgin Galactic,\11\ and Virgin Orbit \12\ to receive 
their clarifying questions and a preview of their comments on the 
NPRM.\13\
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    \8\ See FAA-2019-0229-0127.
    \9\ See FAA-2019-0229-0178.
    \10\ See FAA-2019-0229-0129.
    \11\ See FAA-2019-0229-0128.
    \12\ See FAA-2019-0229-0126.
    \13\ Since the information provided at these meetings is already 
captured in these commenters' clarifying questions or comments 
submitted to the docket, the FAA gave these commenters the option of 
not posting to the docket a summary of the meeting, as required by 
the FAA's Statement Regarding Requests for Public Meetings (see FAA-
2019-0229-0107), as this would be a duplicative effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 22, 2019, the FAA published a second extension of the 
comment period to the NPRM (84 FR 35051). To provide commenters with 
sufficient time to review the FAA's clarifications in response to the 
commenter's questions, the FAA extended the comment period to August 
19, 2019.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See 84 FR 35051.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 16, 2019, the FAA posted its response to the docket \15\ 
to commenters' questions for clarification received by July 12, 2020, 
and July 29, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See FAA-2019-0229-0134 and FAA-2019-0229-0135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 19, 2019, the comment period closed, with a total of 155 
submissions from 85 commenters, and two submissions containing 
proprietary information. Of these comments, 62 requested an extension 
of the comment period, 10 requested to reconvene the ARC, 29 requested 
a public meeting, 18 requested a Supplemental Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (SNPRM), 18 contained clarifying questions for parts of the 
NPRM, and 53 comments contained substantive feedback regarding the 
proposed rule. The FAA discusses the adjudication of these comments in 
more detail later in the preamble.

III. Discussion of the Rule

A. Safety Framework

[[Page 79574]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10DE20.001

    General. The final rule relies on a safety framework that provides 
the flexibility needed to accommodate current and future launch and 
reentry operations. The safety framework encompasses both ground safety 
and flight safety. Acceptable safety for ground operations is achieved 
primarily through a process-based hazard analysis and certain 
prescribed hazard controls. Acceptable safety for flight operations is 
achieved through several elements discussed further in this preamble 
section. The FAA identifies specific safety criteria and requirements 
in Sec.  450.101 that must be met before a launch or reentry can take 
place, including collective risk, individual risk, aircraft risk, risk 
to critical assets, protection against high consequence events, 
disposal of orbiting stages, risk to people and property on orbit, and 
notification of planned impacts.
    System Safety Program. All operators are required to have a system 
safety program that establishes system safety management principles for 
both ground safety and flight safety throughout the operational 
lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The system safety program 
includes a safety organization, hazard management, configuration 
management and control, and post-flight data review.
    Hazard Control Strategies. To address the wide variety of 
commercial launch and reentry systems and operations concepts, the 
final rule includes four hazard control strategies. An operator can use 
multiple hazard control strategies during flight because different 
strategies may be appropriate for different phases of flight. Different 
hazard control strategies may also be appropriate during any one phase 
of flight to protect different sets of people and property. The hazard 
control strategies are physical containment, wind weighting, flight 
abort, and flight hazard analysis.
     Physical containment would most likely be used for low 
energy test flights, when a launch vehicle does not have sufficient 
energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach the public 
or critical assets.
     Wind weighting is traditionally used in the launch of 
unguided suborbital launch vehicles, otherwise known as sounding 
rockets, where the operator adjusts launcher azimuth and elevation 
settings to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of 
flight to provide impact locations for the launch vehicle or its 
components that will ensure compliance with the safety criteria in 
Sec.  450.101.
     Flight abort is the traditional safety approach for 
expendable launch vehicles, and is a process to limit or restrict the 
hazards to public safety and the safety of property presented by a 
launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in 
flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle 
flight. With the exception of phases of flight with demonstrated 
reliability, flight abort is mandated as a hazard control strategy if 
the potential for a high consequence event is above a certain 
threshold.
     Flight hazard analysis is the traditional safety approach 
for reusable launch vehicles, and is the most flexible hazard control 
strategy because an operator derives specific hazard controls unique to 
its launch or reentry vehicle system and operations concept. Flight 
hazard analysis is mandated as a hazard control strategy if the other 
three hazard control strategies cannot mitigate the safety hazards 
sufficient to meet the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101.
    An operator determines the appropriate hazard control strategy by 
conducting a functional hazard analysis.

[[Page 79575]]

    Flight Safety Analyses. Regardless of the hazard control strategy 
chosen or mandated, an operator is required to conduct several FSA. 
These include trajectory analyses for normal and malfunction flight, a 
debris analysis, a population exposure analysis, and a probability of 
failure analysis. These analyses provide input to a debris risk 
analysis, a far-field overpressure blast effects analysis, and a toxic 
hazard analysis that together demonstrate compliance with the safety 
criteria of Sec.  450.101, and provide input to a flight hazard area 
analysis.
    Derived Hazard Controls. With respect to flight operations, an 
operator would derive several hazard controls by conducting the FSA 
and, if necessary, a flight hazard analysis. Because hazard controls 
are derived from these analyses, they are not specifically addressed in 
part 450.
    Prescribed Hazard Controls for Computing Systems and Software and 
Safety-Critical Hardware. Regardless of the hazard controls derived 
from a flight hazard analysis and FSA, the FAA requires many other 
hazard controls. The first set of hazard controls includes requirements 
for computing systems and software, safety-critical systems, and highly 
reliable FSS.
    Other Prescribed Hazard Controls. The second set of hazard controls 
have historically been necessary to achieve acceptable flight safety. 
These include requirements for (1) written agreements, (2) safety-
critical personnel qualifications, (3) work shift and rest 
requirements, (4) radio frequency management, (5) readiness, (6) 
communications, (7) pre-flight procedures, (8) control of hazard areas, 
(9) lightning hazard mitigation, (10) flight commit criteria, (11) 
tracking, (12) collision avoidance, (13) safety at the end of launch, 
and (14) mishap plans.
    Ground Safety. With respect to the safety of ground operations, the 
safety framework includes (1) coordination with a site operator, (2) 
explosive siting, (3) a ground hazard analysis, (4) toxic hazard 
mitigations, and (5) prescribed hazard controls addressing visitors, 
countdown aborts, fire suppression, and emergency procedures. These 
together provide an acceptable set of public safety considerations for 
ground operations.

B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule

1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based Regulations, ELOS, Safety Case
i. Prescriptive
    The FAA sought in the NPRM to propose changes that would convert 
many of its prescriptive requirements to more performance-based 
requirements that would allow for different means of compliance. The 
FAA received several comments stating generally that the proposed rule 
was still too prescriptive. The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) 
and SpaceX commented that some of the proposed requirements would 
unnecessarily drive applicants to a burdensome equivalent level of 
safety (ELOS) process as a default. Blue Origin recommended broadly 
that the FAA remove all prescriptive portions of the proposed rule.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Blue Origin submitted to the rulemaking docket a letter to 
Admiral James Ellis, Jr, USN (ret.), Chairman, Users' Advisory 
Group, National Space Council, in which Blue Origin expressed 
concerns with the NPRM. The letter encouraged Adm. Ellis to 
communicate the concerns to the Administration and the members of 
the National Space Council and advise the Office of the Secretary of 
Transportation and FAA to engage further with industry through a 
public meeting to address concerns with the NPRM and then to issue a 
supplemental NPRM that achieves the goals of SPD-2. The FAA is 
construing the contents of the letter as comments on the proposals 
in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA agrees that some of the requirements in proposed part 450 
were unnecessarily prescriptive, particularly those for software and 
FSA. The FAA has modified those requirements to remove unnecessary 
prescriptiveness and provide additional flexibility while still 
preserving safety and providing regulatory clarity. For many of the 
requirements amended for this purpose in the final rule, the 
prescriptive parts of the proposal will be moved to a corresponding AC 
as guidance on means of compliance. Specific changes to the 
requirements are discussed later in this preamble.
    Several commenters, including Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX, also 
stated that the FAA should base its new requirements on parts 431 and 
435 and add details on how to comply through guidance. CSF also stated 
that the FAA ignored the draft regulatory text provided by the ARC, 
which used parts 431 and 435 as a basis for updated rules.
    The FAA disagrees that parts 431 and 435 should be used as the sole 
basis for part 450. Part 431 depends on an operator to use the system 
safety process to derive hazard controls, which as reflected in part 
450, is appropriate for some launch and reentry vehicle systems and 
operations. However, as also reflected in part 450, not all launch and 
reentry vehicle systems and operations require an operator to derive 
hazard controls through the system safety process. Specifically, 
physical containment, wind weighting, and, most importantly, flight 
abort are often sufficient. Part 450 incorporates the flexibility of 
part 431, but acknowledges the acceptability of other hazard control 
strategies. Part 450 also builds on the precedent set by part 431's 
limits on the foreseeable consequences of a failure in terms of 
conditional expected casualties and establishes a less stringent 
threshold.\17\ Furthermore, the FAA stated in the NPRM that it would 
not specifically address the ARC's proposed regulatory text because 
that regulatory text did not receive broad consensus within the ARC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Section 431.43(d) sets a limit for foreseeable public 
consequences in terms of CEC, but only for an unproven 
RLV. Section 431.43(d) provides an unproven RLV may only be operated 
so that during any portion of flight, the expected number of 
casualties does not exceed 1 x 10-\4\ given a vehicle 
failure will occur at any time the instantaneous impact point is 
over a populated area. This is in greater detail in the high 
consequence event protection section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One individual commenter noted that streamlining was long overdue. 
Another individual commenter noted that the proposed rule is longer and 
more complicated than the rule it proposes to replace, and that past 
FAA approaches led to codifying Federal launch and reentry site 
requirements, which the Federal sites subsequently changed such that 
they no longer matched the FAA requirements.
    In response, the FAA notes that the proposed regulation combined 
elements from parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. Part 450 is shorter than 
parts 415 and 417 and more performance-based. Although it is longer 
than parts 431 and 435, part 450 is more flexible and encompasses more 
types of launch and reentry operations. This final rule allows 
operators to use a means of compliance that will accommodate customized 
operations, changing technologies, and innovation.
ii. Equivalent Level of Safety (Sec.  450.37)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.37 (Equivalent Level of 
Safety) that for all requirements in part 450, except Sec.  450.101, an 
applicant may clearly and convincingly demonstrate that an alternative 
approach provides an equivalent level of safety (ELOS) to the 
requirement.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises Sec.  450.37 so that only some 
portions of Sec.  450.101--specifically Sec.  450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), 
(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g)--are excluded from eligibility for an ELOS 
approach. This change allows an applicant to propose an equivalent 
level of safety to the orbital debris requirement in Sec.  
450.101(e)(2) and the notification of planned impacts requirement in 
Sec.  450.101(f). Most significantly, this change also allows an 
applicant to propose an equivalent level of safety to the use of a 
CEC of 1 x 10-\3\

[[Page 79576]]

as the measure of a high consequence event in Sec.  450.101(c)(2). 
Section 450.101(c) is discussed more fully later in this preamble.
    Virgin Galactic commented that ELOS determinations should be part 
of the license application process. The FAA agrees with the comment and 
incorporates ELOS determinations into the license application process. 
To exercise this option, an applicant must demonstrate, through 
technical rationale, that the proposed alternative provides a level of 
safety equivalent to the requirement it would replace. The FAA will 
evaluate the proposal during the application evaluation.
    CSF stated that, if the FAA adopted the parts 431 and 435 
framework, ELOS would be unnecessary because the ELOS process does not 
exist under those regulations.\18\ Blue Origin urged the FAA to 
consider the need for an ELOS option in this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The FAA added equivalent level of safety provisions to 
parts 431 and 435 in a 2018 final rule. 83 FR 28528 (June 20, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to CSF's comments, the FAA acknowledges that, in 
theory, a performance-based regulation like part 450 could function 
without an ELOS provision, because, in concept, a performance-based 
rule allows many different means of compliance with the required safety 
standard. The FAA considered eliminating the ELOS provision from the 
final rule, but decided that eliminating the ELOS provision would 
remove a useful regulatory tool that provides flexibility. Unlike means 
of compliance, which demonstrate compliance with the regulation, ELOS 
allows an applicant to propose and demonstrate a method that ensures an 
ELOS to the requirement, but not necessarily compliance with the 
requirement itself. The FAA has chosen to retain the option of ELOS to 
allow operators to propose unique processes and procedures that this 
rule may not have contemplated.
    Blue Origin stated that it supports the use of safety cases as a 
means to establish an ELOS under proposed Sec.  450.37. A safety case 
is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides 
a compelling, comprehensive, and valid case that a system is safe, for 
a given application in a particular setting. Regarding process, Blue 
Origin recommended requiring only one layer of external-to-applicant 
audit, and that the audit criteria be transparently developed with 
industry input to ensure understanding of the scope of compliance with 
the ELOS proposal process. Another individual commenter stated that the 
FAA should add a provision that would allow use of an alternate process 
for obtaining a license based on the use of a ``safety case'' 
methodology. This methodology would consist of voluntary audits of an 
applicant's safety and risk management program, followed by development 
of a safety case showing how the public would be protected during 
licensed activities.
    The FAA finds that the proposed regulation is flexible in allowing 
an applicant to propose a means of compliance. It also affords the 
possibility of meeting most requirements by demonstrating an ELOS.\19\ 
An applicant may wish to use a safety case to demonstrate that it is 
has satisfied the ELOS standard; however, the FAA declines to add 
prescriptive audit requirements for its use. An applicant could, but is 
not required to, use a safety case to show that a certain method 
satisfies an ELOS to a regulatory requirement, excluding the 
requirements of Sec.  450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and 
(g). A safety case is not required to demonstrate ELOS. It is one way 
to provide rationale for ELOS. An applicant could use a safety case or 
other justification for ELOS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ ELOS is not applicable to Sec.  450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), 
(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Galactic recommended that safety cases be counted as an 
alternative to CEC in Sec.  450.101(c). The Boeing Company 
(Boeing), Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin), Northrop 
Grumman Corporation (Northrop Grumman), and United Launch Alliance 
(ULA) sought clarification as to why Sec.  450.37 would not apply to 
Sec.  450.101. Similarly, Blue Origin, CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic 
commented that ELOS should be allowed for Sec.  450.101(c).
    The FAA agrees with allowing ELOS for Sec.  450.101(c)(2). This 
allows an operator to make a safety case or provide some other 
justification for an ELOS determination for an alternative method to 
protect against a high consequence event, such as safeguards other than 
flight abort, or an alternative to CEC as a measurement of 
the potential for a high consequence event, such as a risk profile, 
both of which are described more in the preamble section discussing 
Sec.  450.101(c). Section 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), 
and (g) contain the core safety requirements to protect people and 
property on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. Any proposed non-
compliance with these risk requirements will require a waiver and are 
not eligible for a demonstration of ELOS. By contrast, all other flight 
safety requirements in part 450 subpart C, which can be demonstrated 
through ELOS, support the achievement of these underlying risk 
criteria. To use an ELOS, an operator may demonstrate that an 
alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety to a 
requirement in accordance with Sec.  450.37. A petition for waiver must 
be submitted at least 60 days in advance and address why granting the 
request for relief is in the public interest and will not jeopardize 
the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security 
and foreign policy interests of the United States in accordance with 
Sec.  404.5.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented that 
the FAA should accept a Federal launch or reentry site's safety 
processes as providing an ELOS to the FAA's own safety standards 
without any additional safety requirements.
    The FAA disagrees. FAA regulations apply to licensed launches and, 
in accordance with Sec.  450.45(b) (Safety Review and Approval), the 
FAA will accept any safety-related launch or reentry service provided 
by a Federal launch or reentry site or other Federal entity by 
contract, if the FAA determines that the launch or reentry service 
satisfies part 450. Although it is possible for the FAA to find that a 
service provided by a Federal launch or reentry site does not satisfy a 
requirement in part 450 but does provide an ELOS, the FAA needs to make 
that determination on a case-by-case basis.
iii. ``As agreed to by the Administrator''
    Throughout the NPRM, the FAA used the clause ``as agreed to by the 
Administrator.'' The term was used in all time frame requirements, as 
well as in proposed Sec. Sec.  450.3(a) and (b)(1), 450.33, 450.101(c), 
450.113(a)(5), 450.107(b)(2), 450.107(d), 450.147(c), 450.173(g), 
450.213(a), and 450.215(b). As stated in the proposal, this clause is 
used to mean that an operator may submit an alternative to the proposed 
requirement to the FAA for review. The FAA must agree to the operator's 
proposal for the operator to use the alternative.
    CSF and SpaceX commented that it was unclear how the clause ``as 
agreed to by the Administrator'' differed from an ELOS determination. 
CSF and SpaceX requested that the FAA describe its expectations and 
capture any process associated with this option in guidance. CSF and 
SpaceX also recommended adding ``unless otherwise agreed to by the 
Administrator'' to the beginning of proposed Sec.  450.101(c).

[[Page 79577]]

    The clause ``as agreed to by the Administrator'' means that an 
operator may submit an alternative to a regulatory requirement. The FAA 
must agree to the operator's proposal for the operator to use this 
alternative. Unlike an ELOS determination, an applicant need not 
demonstrate that this alternative satisfies an ELOS to the requirement. 
Each use of the term ``as agreed to by the Administrator'' includes 
criteria or considerations by which the FAA will agree to a different 
approach than the regulatory requirement. An applicant should look to 
these criteria or considerations to determine what the FAA would expect 
from an applicant when providing an alternative proposal.
    For most of the requirements in part 450, an applicant may 
demonstrate an equivalent level of safety if the applicant is unable to 
meet a requirement. In addition, an operator may request a waiver to 
any requirement. An ELOS may be submitted in a license application and 
must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that an alternative approach 
provides an equivalent level of safety to the requirement. A petition 
for waiver must be submitted 60 days in advance and address why 
granting the request for relief is in the public interest and will not 
jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of property, and 
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
    For some requirements, the FAA anticipated the need for additional 
regulatory flexibility without the burden of providing an equivalent 
level of safety or applying for a separate waiver. For those 
requirements, the FAA has incorporated the clause ``as agreed to by the 
Administrator'' to mean that an operator may submit an alternative to 
the proposed requirement to the FAA for review. For each requirement 
where the FAA has provided additional flexibility by including the ``as 
agreed to by the Administrator'' clause, the FAA has also provided 
criteria that the Administrator will consider in determining whether to 
approve the alternative approach, including safety considerations when 
appropriate. For example, an alternative time frame will generally be 
accepted if it provides sufficient time for the FAA to review the 
submittal. These alternatives will typically be agreed to in pre-
application consultation.
    The FAA addresses the recommendation from CSF and SpaceX by 
including ELOS in Sec.  450.101(c)(2). The use of ELOS and ``agreed to 
by the Administrator'' for Sec.  450.101(c) is discussed in more detail 
in the preamble section addressing CEC.
iv. Time frames
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to allow an operator to propose 
different time frames for certain regulatory sections if ``agreed to by 
the Administrator''. Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX disagreed with this 
approach and requested that the FAA remove any requirement to submit 
such a request in a specific time frame other than as soon as the 
operator understands that a different time frame is necessary. Virgin 
Galactic recommended that alternate time frames should be spelled out 
within an operator's license application documents and suggested 
alternative regulatory text.
    The FAA disagrees with the approach to remove specific time frames 
because the time frames are designed to ensure the FAA has sufficient 
time to conduct its review and make the requisite public health and 
safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy 
findings. The FAA notes that the time frames proposed in the NPRM and 
adopted in the final rule are default time frames. An applicant can 
propose and the FAA can accept an alternative time frame. The FAA 
expects alternative time frames to be proposed and accepted during pre-
application consultation or during the application process so that the 
agreed to time frames are then reflected in the license once issued. 
Time frames can be adjusted after a license is issued through the 
license modification process, as opposed to the waiver process under 
the current regulations. However, in most cases, the FAA expects 
flexible time frames to be negotiated for all the launches or reentries 
under the license prior to the first licensed activity.
v. Level of Rigor Based on Experience
    An individual commenter stated startup launch operators should not 
operate under the same regimen as experienced operators. This 
individual stated that startup operators should be subject to strict 
and precise regulations. Similarly, another individual expressed 
concern that the proposed rule would apply performance-based 
requirements to launch vehicles with no prior launch history. 
SpinLaunch, Inc. (SpinLaunch) commented that the correct regulatory 
framework should consist of an applicant's demonstrating the necessary 
skills and knowledge to perform safe and accepted operations.
    The FAA disagrees that startup launch operators should operate 
under a different regulatory regime than experienced operators, and 
that performance-based requirements should not apply to launch vehicles 
with no prior launch history. Performance-based requirements provide 
flexibility to all operators. Means of compliance located in ACs and 
other standards that have been identified as accepted means of 
compliance to part 450 provide detailed guidance to those new operators 
that have not yet established safety processes and procedures. In 
response to SpinLaunch's comment, the final rule is structured such 
that an applicant must demonstrate to the FAA the necessary skills and 
knowledge to perform safe operations in its launch or reentry license 
application.
2. Part 450 Subpart A--General Discussion
a. Pre-Application Consultation
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to retain the requirement for pre-
application consultation from Sec.  413.5 (Pre-Application 
Consultation) because the various flexibilities proposed in this rule 
would benefit from pre-application discussions. These include 
incremental review, timelines, and the performance-based nature of the 
regulatory requirements. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposal 
with no changes to the existing pre-application consultation provision.
    As proposed, this rule retains pre-application consultation for 
vehicle operators seeking a license. The FAA will also publish a pre-
application consultation Advisory Circular, which will provide 
additional guidance but will not establish new regulatory requirements. 
Pre-application consultation will continue to focus on compliance 
planning and ensuring the applicant can prepare an acceptable 
application, which will increase the efficiency of the licensing 
process. The length of pre-application consultation will vary based on 
the proposed operation. For example, pre-application consultations may 
be longer when involving new launch vehicles that are under development 
or with operators inexperienced with FAA's regulations. Alternatively, 
pre-application consultations with operators who demonstrate knowledge 
of FAA regulations and/or use proven vehicles from established sites 
should be considerably shorter. The FAA expects to discuss the 
following topics with an applicant during pre-application consultation, 
to the extent they are relevant to the applicant's proposed operation: 
Entrance and exit criteria for pre-application consultation, the 
intended means of compliance to meet the regulatory requirements in 
part 450,

[[Page 79578]]

the scope of the license, safety element approvals, incremental review, 
review period for license evaluation, compliance expectations, and time 
frames an operator is required to meet to satisfy part 450. Some of the 
topics allow for flexibility that can result in a more efficient 
licensing process for both the applicant and the FAA.
    The FAA will continue to consider the following factors to 
determine if a prospective applicant is ready to begin pre-application 
consultation: Whether the concept of operations is realistic and 
whether the prospective applicant is able to provide a program schedule 
that includes definition of significant milestones and a funding source 
or sources. The regulatory requirements for a launch and reentry 
license are the same for all applicants; however, FAA expects it will 
take longer for less experienced operators to meet all of the 
requirements. As currently required, to exit pre-application 
consultation and begin the license evaluation period, an application 
must be complete enough in accordance with Sec.  413.11 (Acceptance of 
an application). A complete enough application must include enough 
information for the FAA to start its review. The FAA will screen an 
application in its entirety or in modules to determine whether it is 
complete enough for the FAA to start its review. The components of a 
vehicle operator license application are listed in Sec.  450.31 
(General) and include a policy review, a payload review, a safety 
review that complies with Subpart C, an environmental review, and 
information necessary to satisfy the maximum probable loss analysis 
required by part 440.
    For the five sections listed in Sec.  450.35(a), an applicant must 
use a means of compliance that has been accepted by the Administrator 
prior to application acceptance. An applicant may propose another 
standard or a unique means of compliance for these five sections before 
submitting its application.\20\ Furthermore, many requirements 
throughout the final rule allow an operator to use an alternative 
method if that method has been agreed to by the Administrator. This 
allowance maximizes flexibility and will reduce the need for the 
applicant and the FAA to use process waivers. During pre-application 
consultation, the FAA anticipates that applicants will discuss the 
means of compliance they plan to use for the remaining sections of the 
rule, and any alternative means they plan to use for those sections 
that allow alternative means of compliance. While the FAA anticipates 
that this pre-application consultation will expedite license review 
times and aid both FAA and applicant, it is only required for the 
sections listed in Sec.  450.35(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Further discussion on this topic is in the preamble section 
for performance-based regulations and means of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule has built-in flexibilities for determining the 
beginning and end of launch such that the launch is scoped to an 
individual operator's unique circumstances. It is important that the 
applicant and the FAA come to a mutual understanding during pre-
application consultation about the beginning and end of launch for the 
license. The beginning and end points of a launch operation define the 
extent of a number of requirements, including, but not limited to, 
indemnification and FAA oversight. Therefore, an applicant should 
define the beginning and end of its operation during pre-application 
consultation, and should coordinate with the FAA before finalizing and 
submitting its application.\21\ In this way, the applicant can ensure 
that the FAA will evaluate the complete scope of its proposed 
operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ A discussion on what constitutes beginning and end of 
launch is in the preamble section discussing scope of launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If an applicant is planning to seek a safety element approval, the 
applicant must continue to consult with the FAA before submitting its 
application in accordance with Sec.  414.9 (Pre-Application 
Consultation). Doing so will help ensure that the FAA and the applicant 
have a thorough understanding of how the applicant will comply with the 
regulatory requirements surrounding a safety element approval before 
submitting an application. During pre-application consultation, the FAA 
would expect an applicant to be able to discuss, at a minimum, the 
following information as outlined in Sec.  414.15: (1) How the 
applicant will meet the applicable requirements of part 450; (2) the 
information required in Sec.  414.13(b)(3), (c)(2), and (c)(3); and (3) 
the sections of the license application that support the application 
for a safety element approval.
    If an applicant is proposing an incremental review of its 
application, the applicant must have its approach approved by the FAA 
prior to submitting its application, in accordance with Sec.  450.33 
(Incremental Review and Determinations). Incremental review is intended 
primarily to give additional flexibility to the applicant, by allowing 
the applicant to separate the safety review into sections so that those 
sections can be approved independently. In many ways, the incremental 
review process is similar to the independent payload review or a safety 
element approval process because it allows the applicant to comply with 
the safety approval portion of the regulation in modules or sections 
rather than all at once. An applicant considering the use of the 
incremental review process should indicate to the FAA during pre-
application consultation which portions of its application will be 
evaluated under the incremental review process. See the Incremental 
Review section of this preamble for further discussion.
    Finally, part 450 allows an operator to propose alternative time 
frames for certain requirements, which are listed in Appendix A to part 
404. If an operator knows in advance of application submittal that it 
will propose an alternative time frame, the applicant should raise this 
proposal during pre-application consultation. The FAA would also be 
able to discuss during pre-application consultation the FAA's expected 
review period to make its determination on the proposed alternative 
time frame. Flexible time frames are discussed at length later in this 
preamble.
    The FAA received several comments on the pre-application 
consultation process. An individual commenter stated that pre-
application consultation may not provide substantial benefits for an 
existing program and suggested allowing the FAA to request a pre-
application consultation process with a 30-day completion timeline for 
any ``material changes'' to existing programs deemed as posing a 
significant risk to the safety of the vehicle. The commenter also 
suggested the FAA could request this process at least 60 days before 
the integration of the launch vehicle. The commenter stated that past 
performance of space flights and aircraft should be taken into 
consideration for the level of rigor for the pre-application process.
    The FAA will not attach a schedule to pre-application consultation 
but agrees with the commenter that a material change can be discussed 
as part of pre-application consultation. The FAA acknowledges that pre-
application consultation should be minimal for experienced operators 
using proven vehicles from established sites. This type of abbreviated 
consultation period for experienced operators would be consistent with 
the pre-application process prior to issuance of this final rule. The 
FAA disagrees with a 30-day completion timeline for pre-application 
consultation for any material change to existing programs. The FAA also 
disagrees with the suggestion that the

[[Page 79579]]

FAA request pre-application consultation at least 60 days before 
integration of the launch vehicle or that pre-application consultation 
be tied to the flight safety risk of the vehicle. These timelines and 
criteria may be inadequate in some cases to prepare a complete 
application properly; in others, they might result in unnecessary 
delays in addressing and implementing critical safety changes. In 
addition, the FAA will not tie pre-application consultation to risk to 
the vehicle because the FAA does not oversee risk to the vehicle but 
rather risk to the public.
    Sierra Nevada noted that operators could work with the FAA to 
develop a program schedule and define anticipated data submissions 
during pre-application consultation. Sierra Nevada noted that this use 
of the consultation process was not specifically codified in the 
proposed regulations and recommended including it expressly in an AC.
    The FAA agrees and will include guidance on application scheduling 
and data submissions in the pre-application consultation AC. The FAA 
considered including more robust requirements for pre-application 
consultation in the final rule, however, the FAA concluded that the 
current regulation both prepares the applicant to submit a complete 
application and the FAA to accept it, while also providing flexibility 
to the applicant to approach pre-application consultation in a manner 
that best fits the proposed operation.
b. Application Process
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to clarify in Sec.  413.1 (Scope of 
this Part) that the term ``application'' means either an application in 
its entirety or a portion of an application for incremental review. In 
Sec.  413.21 (Denial of a License or Permit Application), the FAA 
proposed to remove ``license'' from paragraph (c) so the regulation 
applied to both license and permit applications. In part 414 (Safety 
Element Approvals), the FAA proposed to change the term ``sufficiently 
complete'' to ``complete enough,'' as used in Sec.  413.11 (Acceptance 
of an Application), because the two terms both described the point at 
which the FAA determined it had sufficient information to accept an 
application and begin its evaluation. Finally, the FAA proposed to 
amend Sec.  413.7 (Application Submission) paragraph (a)(3) to allow an 
applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to a 
secure server and remove the requirement that an application be in a 
format that cannot be altered. In the final rule, the FAA adopts these 
changes as proposed.
    A joint set of comments submitted by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
Northrop Grumman, and ULA expressed support for the proposal to allow 
the submission of an application using physical electronic storage.
    In addition, the FAA received suggested changes to the generic 
application process. The American Association of Airport Executives 
(AAAE) and the Denver International Airport commented on the need for 
further engagement with stakeholders during an operator's application 
process. These commenters said the FAA should provide an opportunity 
for affected stakeholders to provide input on an operator's application 
regarding issues such as impacts to the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Denver International Airport stated that stakeholders should be able to 
submit comments on license applications.
    The FAA does not agree that an application should be open to a 
public input process. The FAA issues a license based on whether the 
applicant's proposal will not jeopardize public health and safety, the 
safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States. The FAA coordinates with government or 
private entities as necessary to make this determination. A broad 
public input process outside the environmental review process is 
unnecessary for the FAA to make its licensing determination. While 
commenters may seek the opportunity to raise issues such as non-safety 
impacts to the NAS or the economic impact to land adjacent to a launch, 
the FAA cannot consider such issues in the licensing determination.
    The NPRM specifically sought comments on how the FAA could 
standardize and better implement the ``complete enough'' application 
standard. Sierra Nevada inquired whether the FAA will still conduct a 
complete enough review. Sierra Nevada concurred with the FAA's approach 
in conducting complete enough reviews but commented that the FAA should 
specify a timeline for these reviews. SpaceX commented that the FAA 
should aim to conduct its complete enough review within ten days of 
receipt of submission and apply that standard to submissions for 
continuing accuracy, renewals, and modifications. Furthermore, Sierra 
Nevada asserted that the review should be included in the FAA's 
statutory 180-day review period or a new, defined timeline. CSF and 
SpaceX recommended that the complete enough standard in current Sec.  
413.11 be expanded to apply to any application submission, including 
the initial license application, continuing accuracy submissions, and 
modification submissions. CSF and SpaceX suggested regulatory text 
changes to Sec.  413.11 to this end. Both commenters also requested the 
FAA issue an AC that that explains how the agency makes the complete 
enough determination, including a checklist comprising regulatory 
sections that require submissions. Virgin Galactic recommended that 
what constitutes ``complete enough'' be agreed upon by both the 
applicant and the FAA during the pre-application consultation phase and 
provided several changes to the regulatory text.
    The FAA will continue to use the complete enough standard to 
determine whether a license is sufficiently complete to begin review. 
The FAA endeavors to make these determinations within 14 calendar days 
of receiving an application. Limiting the FAA to ten days, as suggested 
by SpaceX, may not provide adequate time for review. The FAA begins the 
calculation of the 180-day statutory review period on the date that it 
receives the information needed to make the application complete 
enough, regardless of how long it takes to make that determination. The 
FAA does not base this calculation on the date it determines that the 
application is complete enough. The complete enough standard applies to 
any submission, including those for license modifications for 
consistency. The FAA has applied this standard to submissions for 
license modifications and, when necessary, requested additional 
information and clarifications to allow it to proceed with its 
evaluation. Section 450.211(c) states that an application to modify a 
license must be prepared and submitted in accordance with part 413. 
Therefore, Sec.  413.11 is applicable to an initial license application 
submission and license modification submissions and does not need to be 
modified to apply to any application submission. The FAA will work 
closely with applicants on a case-by-case basis to determine what 
changes may be made without invalidating the license. In accordance 
with Sec.  450.211(c), the licensee must apply to the FAA for 
modification of the license once a license has been issued, except for 
the allowable changes identified by the FAA. An operator may propose an 
alternate method from part 413 to request a license modification. This 
alternate method could include an agreed-upon submittal schedule and 
FAA review period.
    It should be noted that Sec.  450.211 (Continuing Accuracy of 
License

[[Page 79580]]

Application; Application for Modification of License) also covers 
license modification submissions related to continuing accuracy. The 
FAA will provide an AC that includes application checklists that an 
applicant can choose to use to help guide application submittal. 
However, additional information may be needed depending on the type of 
operation.
    In response to Virgin Galactic's comments, the FAA agrees that 
dialogue as to what constitutes ``complete enough'' can be part of the 
pre-application consultation, but disagrees that any change in the 
regulatory text is required. One of the primary purposes of pre-
application consultation is to provide the applicant guidance in 
preparing its license application. Although the FAA determines when an 
application is complete enough to begin its review, the FAA expects to 
develop collaboratively agreed upon criteria with an applicant for 
determining ``complete enough'' during pre-application consultation. By 
allowing applicants and the FAA to negotiate criteria for ``complete-
enough'' during pre-application, the FAA anticipates applicants will be 
able to more predictably track their progress toward completing the 
application.
    CSF and SpaceX also suggested that the FAA provide a substantive 
response to submittals within 30 days of receiving the application. CSF 
also suggested the FAA provide status updates to an applicant every two 
weeks.
    The FAA already typically provides written response to submittals 
within 30 days, often much sooner. In some instances, however, the FAA 
requires more than 30 days to draft a response, especially for highly 
technical analyses. The FAA also provides a substantive response to an 
applicant in writing whenever additional information is required and, 
therefore, does not see a compelling rationale for a requirement to 
provide status updates on a predetermined schedule. However, FAA 
recognizes the concerns expressed by operators regarding extended 
delays between communications in certain circumstances. While the FAA 
does not believe establishing a specific time period for communication 
to applicants is a necessary component of its regulatory framework, it 
also recognizes the need for applicants to stay informed and 
anticipates communicating with applicants throughout the application 
process, including procedural changes to ensure applicants will be 
provided a status update within 14 days of receipt of an application.
c. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses (Sec.  450.1(b))
    In the NPRM, under proposed Sec.  450.1(b) and subject to two 
exceptions, the FAA would permit an operator to conduct a launch or 
reentry pursuant to a license issued by the FAA under parts 415,\22\ 
431, and 435 before the effective date of the new part 450 or an 
application accepted by the FAA before the effective date of part 450. 
Even though the operator could continue to conduct operations under the 
regulations in effect at the time of license or application as 
referenced above, the proposed requirements under Sec. Sec.  450.169 
for collision avoidance analysis (COLA) and 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) 
for critical asset protection would apply to all operators subject to 
the FAA's authority under 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 conducting launches 
after the effective date of the new regulations. The FAA would 
determine the applicability of part 450 to an application for a license 
modification submitted after the effective date of the part on a case-
by-case basis based on the extent and complexity of the modification, 
whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts of the 
application, or if the application requires significant reevaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ The FAA notes that an operator operating under a license 
issued under part 415 would also be subject to the requirements of 
part 417.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.1 (Applicability) with revisions. The FAA 
does not adopt Sec.  450.1(b) as proposed in the NPRM. While the FAA 
adopts the concept as proposed in Sec.  450.1(b) in parts 415, 417, 
431, and 435, it also makes corresponding changes to Sec. Sec.  413.23 
and 415.3 to limit the duration of all licenses issued or renewed to no 
more than five years after the effective date of part 450. The FAA 
refers to these licenses as ``legacy licenses'' throughout this 
preamble. After that time, all operators must come into compliance with 
the new regulations. In the final rule, the FAA makes numerous 
revisions to certain regulations that apply to operators conducting 
operations under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. These revisions include 
amending Sec.  401.5 title to read ``Definitions as Applied to Parts 
415, 417, 431, 435,'' adding new Sec.  401.7 for definitions, updating 
Sec.  413.1, and amending parts 415, 417, 431, 435, 440, and 460 to 
reference compliance with part 450.
    The FAA notes that certain definitions in Sec.  401.5 apply to 
parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. Therefore, because the FAA will allow 
operators that hold an approved license at the time this rule goes into 
effect, or an accepted license application within 90 days after the 
effective date of the final rule, to operate under parts 415, 417, 431, 
and 435 for up to five years, this rule preserves Sec.  401.5 without 
change. Section 401.5 will be removed five years after the effective 
date of the final rule.
    The FAA adds Sec.  401.7, which contains the definitions that apply 
to Chapter III other than parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, and which 
broadly captures those changes proposed in Sec.  401.5 in the NPRM. The 
FAA notes that parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 and Sec.  401.5 will be 
removed five years after the effective date of the final rule.
    Part 413 explains how to apply for a license or experimental 
permit. In the final rule, the FAA amends the table in Sec.  413.1(b) 
to identify that the requirements in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 apply 
only to applicants whose launch or reentry license has been approved or 
license application has been accepted by the FAA no later than 90 days 
after the effective date of the final rule. As previously mentioned, 
operators holding an approved launch or reentry license, or who have an 
accepted launch or reentry license application may choose to continue 
to operate under parts 415 and 417, part 431, and part 435, until five 
years after the effective date of this rule. The FAA also adds ``Launch 
and Reentry License Requirements'' as a subject in the table in Sec.  
413.1(b). Finally, the FAA adopts the provision that the FAA may grant 
a request to renew a license issued under parts 415, 417, 431 or with a 
non-standard duration in proposed Sec.  450.1(b) and re-designates it 
as Sec.  413.23(a)(2) in the final rule. Specifically, the FAA may 
grant a request to renew a under parts 415, 431, and 435 with a non-
standard duration so as not to exceed five years after the effective 
date of this rulemaking. The FAA adds an applicability section to parts 
415, 431, and 435. These parts apply to such licenses issued before the 
effective date of the final rule and licenses issued on or after the 
effective date of the final rule if the FAA accepted the application 
under Sec.  413.11 no later than 90 days after the effective date. All 
operators must comply with the COLA and critical asset protection 
requirements in part 450.
    In the final rule, the FAA adds the phrase ``pursuant to a license 
issued under part 415 of this chapter'' to the scope in Sec.  417.1(a). 
The FAA also removes Sec.  417.1(e), which addresses grandfathering 
that is no longer used from when part 417 was first established. For 
the same reason, the FAA also removes the grandfathering

[[Page 79581]]

reference to paragraph (e) in Sec.  417.1(f). As a result of this 
amendment, the FAA re-designates Sec.  417.1(f) and (g) as Sec.  
417.1(e) and (f) in the final rule.
    The FAA further revises Sec. Sec.  417.11 and 431.73 in the final 
rule. The FAA adds a paragraph stating that the Administrator may 
determine that a modification to a license issued under these parts 
must comply with the requirements in part 450. The Administrator will 
base the determination on the extent and complexity of the 
modification, whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts 
of the application, or if the application requires significant 
evaluation.
    The FAA revises Sec.  440.3, which addresses definitions. In the 
final rule, Sec.  440.3 references the definitions contained in 
Sec. Sec.  401.5 and 401.7. The reference to Sec.  401.5 will be 
removed from Sec.  440.3 five years after the effective date of the 
final rule.
    Finally, the FAA revises Sec.  460.45 to identify which mishap 
definitions an operator should apply in the description of the safety 
record of the vehicle to each space flight participant. Specifically, 
Sec.  460.45(d)(1) addresses licenses issued under part 450. For these 
licenses, the operator's safety record must cover events that meet 
paragraphs (1), (4), (5), and (8) of the definition of a ``mishap'' in 
Sec.  401.7 that occurred during and after vehicle verification 
performed in accordance with Sec.  460.17. Section 460.45(d)(2) 
addresses licenses issued under parts 415, 431, or 435. For these 
licenses, the operator's safety record must cover launch and reentry 
accidents and human space flight incidents as defined by Sec.  401.5. 
Section 460.45(d)(1) will be re-designated to Sec. Sec.  460.45(d) and 
460.45(d)(2) will be removed from Sec.  460.45 five years after the 
effective date of the final rule.
    Several commenters asked for clarity on the FAA's approach in Sec.  
450.1(b) to legacy licenses issued under the current regulations. CSF 
objected to requiring renewals of licenses issued under the current 
regulations to meet the requirements of proposed part 450, as this 
would result in significant cost and regulatory burdens for the 
operator and the FAA.
    As previously noted, the FAA does not adopt Sec.  450.1(b) in the 
final rule. However, the FAA implements the concept as proposed in 
Sec.  450.1(b) in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. In the final rule, the 
FAA establishes a five-year period after the effective date of this 
rule. Operators holding either an active license or an accepted license 
application no later than 90 days after the effective date of this rule 
may operate under the applicable regulatory provisions upon which the 
licensing determination was made. In addition, these operators may 
submit requests for license renewals within that five-year period and 
will be required to comply with the regulations under which the license 
determination was made.\23\ The FAA has revised Sec. Sec.  413.23 and 
415.3 to reflect that no license issued under parts 415, 431 or 435 
will be renewed with an expiration date that extends beyond the five-
year period. As such, applications for renewal submitted near the end 
of the five-year period will be valid only for a short time. All 
operators will need to comply with this rule in its entirety five years 
after its effective date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ As noted, all operators are also required to comply with 
the critical assets and COLA provisions of part 450 beginning from 
the effective date of this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSF noted that operators under current parts 431 and 435 would need 
to come into compliance with the proposed part 450. Similarly, Virgin 
Galactic requested that FAA allow currently licensed operators to be 
grandfathered into part 450 for vehicles that cannot meet certain part 
450 requirements as long as the current public safety requirements are 
met. Virgin Galactic stated that, unlike ELV operators, RLV operators 
use their vehicles repeatedly, and the FAA has not shown why it is 
necessary for current operators to undergo new analyses and possible 
design changes. Virgin Galactic noted that the FAA's aviation 
regulations allow for ``true'' grandfathering. Virgin Galactic 
commented that if the FAA chooses not to allow for ``true'' 
grandfathering, it should work with each licensee during pre-
application consultation to determine applicability of the new rule to 
modifications to current licenses.
    The FAA notes that as the final rule is more performance-based than 
the rule as proposed in the NPRM, many of the current requirements 
would serve as a means of compliance to meet the new regulations. The 
FAA anticipates that there would be few, if any, additional 
requirements that will not be fulfilled by previously submitted 
information. The FAA will not allow operating under parts 415, 417, 
431, and 435 indefinitely because the current rule is more streamlined, 
performance-based, and up-to-date than the previous regulations. 
Therefore, the FAA will require all operators to come into compliance 
with the new rule five years after the effective date. The FAA will 
consult with existing licensees shortly after the final rule is 
published to assist operators with the transition to part 450 so they 
may take advantage of the significant number of new flexibilities.
    CSF objected to the lack of clarity on grandfathering and 
recommended that the FAA make clear that a licensee approved under the 
current licensing regime may continue to renew its approvals, with no 
significant changes, without having to apply under part 450. License 
renewals without significant changes may continue to be renewed, but 
not to exceed the five-year compliance period.
    Operators currently holding an active, valid license will have five 
years after the effective date of this rule to come into compliance 
with the entirety of part 450. If a license expires before the end of 
this period, an applicant may seek a renewal under the previous 
provisions in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, but the renewal will only 
be valid for however much time remains between the time of issuance of 
the renewal and the end of the five-year period.
    Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA hold a pre-application phase 
for all current license holders to ensure that licensees and the FAA 
are in agreement as to whether the FAA would require part 450 
requirements or parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 requirements when an 
operator requests to modify a legacy license once part 450 becomes 
effective.
    During the five-year compliance period, an operator may need to 
modify its legacy license. The provisions that relate to modification 
are contained in Sec. Sec.  417.11 and 431.73. Whether or not new 
license modifications need to comply with part 450 is subject to 
Administrator approval on a case-by-case basis, which can be determined 
during consultation with the FAA before the applicant requests the 
modification. In making the determination as to whether a license 
modification is necessary to comply with the new requirements, the 
Administrator will consider the extent and complexity of the 
modification, whether the licensee would need to modify multiple parts 
of the application, or if the license requires significant 
reevaluation. The FAA encourages licensees to consult with the FAA on 
transitioning to part 450 in advance of the compliance period deadline.
d. Definition and Scope of Launch (Sec.  450.3)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to set the scope of activity 
authorized by a vehicle operator license by identifying the beginning 
and end of launch in

[[Page 79582]]

Sec.  450.3 (Scope of Vehicle Operator License).\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The FAA proposed to move the beginning and end of launch 
and reentry language from the definition of ``launch'' in Sec.  
401.5 to proposed Sec.  450.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Beginning of Launch
    In Sec.  450.3(b)(1) and (b)(2), the FAA proposed that launch 
begins under a license with the start of hazardous activities that pose 
a threat to the public at a U.S. launch site. The proposed rule further 
stated that, unless agreed to by the Administrator, those hazardous 
pre-flight ground operations would commence when a launch vehicle or 
its major components arrive at a U.S. launch site. For a non-U.S. 
launch site, the FAA proposed that launch begins at ignition or first 
movement that initiates flight.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.3(b)(1) and 
(b)(2) with revisions. First, the FAA does not adopt the proposed 
default that hazardous ground pre-flight operations commence when a 
launch vehicle or its major components arrive at a U.S. launch site. 
The final rule identifies certain activities that qualify as hazardous 
pre-flight operations, including but not limited to, pressurizing or 
loading of propellants into the vehicle or launch system, operations 
involving a fueled launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to 
initiate flight, or any hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for 
flight. Second, this rule also clarifies that hazardous pre-flight 
operations do not include the period between the end of the previous 
launch and launch vehicle reuse when the vehicle is in a safe and 
dormant state. Finally, this rule adds language in Sec.  450.3(a) that 
allows the Administrator to agree to a scope of license different from 
that laid out in Sec.  450.3(b), as discussed later in this document. 
An applicant wishing to deviate from the scope of license parameters 
laid out in Sec.  450.3(b) would discuss the deviation during pre-
application consultation. The FAA would only allow a deviation for 
unique operations where the scope of license continued to cover those 
hazardous launch activities identified by statute.
    CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic suggested proposed Sec.  
450.3(b)(1) be revised to remove reference to the arrival of major 
components at a U.S. launch site as beginning of launch. Virgin 
Galactic noted that the beginning of hazardous pre-flight ground 
operations should be determined only on a case-by-case basis and 
commented that the arrival of components at a launch site was an 
inappropriate prescriptive default limit chosen for administrative 
convenience. CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic also requested that the 
FAA limit the beginning of hazardous pre-flight operations only to 
include potential threats to the public over which no other Federal 
regulatory agency has jurisdiction.
    The FAA agrees that the beginning of pre-flight ground operations 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis because each operation is 
unique. The FAA recognizes that with this flexibility comes some 
ambiguity as to when launch will begin for each unique operation. The 
designation of when launch begins is important for both operators and 
the FAA. Among other things, the financial responsibility protections 
apply from beginning to end of launch. Therefore, a clear understanding 
of when launch begins is essential for an operator to understand fully 
its responsibilities under chapter III and for the FAA to satisfy its 
obligations, including the calculation of maximum probable loss (MPL).
    Because the proposed default beginning of launch, phrased as 
``arrival of major components at a U.S. launch site,'' is removed from 
Sec.  450.3(b)(1) in the final rule, an application requirement is 
added to Sec.  450.3(d) to require an operator to identify the scope of 
the license being sought in the application, specifically pre- and 
post-flight ground operations. The final rule requires an applicant 
intending to launch from a U.S. launch site to identify pre- and post-
flight ground operations such that the FAA is able to determine when 
the launch operation would begin and end. This requirement applies only 
to launches from a U.S. launch site, as launches from a non-U.S launch 
site begin at ignition or first movement that initiates flight. The FAA 
anticipates that an applicant would identify hazardous pre- and post-
flight operations that are reasonably expected to pose a risk to the 
public. During pre-application consultation, the applicant is expected 
to describe to the FAA its launch site and its intended concept of 
operations leading up to a launch, including any operations that are 
potentially hazardous to the public. Once the FAA and the applicant 
have a clear, mutual understanding of the applicant's concept of 
operations, the FAA and the applicant will agree on a starting point 
for hazardous pre-flight operations, and thus, the beginning of launch. 
The applicant will provide that information in its application and 
scope its application materials based on this starting point. The scope 
of the license lends itself to the first module of an incremental 
review.
    The FAA also agrees that the arrival of components at the launch 
site is an unnecessarily prescriptive baseline that may not constitute 
the threshold for hazardous pre-flight operations for all launches. 
Therefore, the FAA revises Sec.  450.3(b)(1) to remove the reference to 
arrival of components at a launch site. Because the beginning of launch 
is an important designation upon which many licensee responsibilities 
rely, the FAA has added to the regulatory text certain activities that 
constitute hazardous pre-flight operations. The list of hazardous pre-
flight operations added to the final regulatory text is derived from 
the preamble text in the NPRM explaining the proposal.\25\ Hazardous 
pre-flight operations include, but are not limited to, pressurizing or 
loading of propellants into the vehicle or launch system, operations 
involving a fueled launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to 
initiate flight, or any hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for 
flight. This list is not exhaustive, and during pre-application 
consultation the FAA or an applicant may identify an activity not 
included in this list that poses a hazard to the public and may 
constitute the beginning of launch. The FAA retains the ability to 
determine that licensed oversight is unnecessary for certain activities 
if the Administrator determines that they do not jeopardize public 
health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and 
foreign policy interests of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ See 84 FR at 15361.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA further amends Sec.  450.3(b)(1) to indicate clearly that 
activities occurring between launches of reusable vehicles will not be 
considered hazardous pre-flight activities if the vehicle is in a safe 
and dormant state. Generally, a launch system is in a safe and dormant 
state when it is not undergoing the pressurizing or loading of 
propellants, a transfer of energy necessary to initiate flight, 
operations involving a fueled launch vehicle, or any other hazardous 
activity preparing the vehicle for flight. The NPRM preamble discussed 
the exemption of RLVs if a vehicle is in a safe and dormant state.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See 84 FR at 15359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter suggested the definition of beginning of flight for 
hybrid vehicles be changed to include the first forward motion of the 
vehicle with the intent for takeoff.
    The FAA agrees that the beginning of flight for a hybrid vehicle is 
the first forward motion of the vehicle with the

[[Page 79583]]

intent to takeoff. However, the FAA will continue to use ``first 
movement that initiates flight'' to define beginning of the flight 
phase of launch because it better accommodates all vehicle types.
    Regarding the FAA's jurisdiction over launch activities at a non-
U.S. launch site, CSF stated that proposed Sec.  450.3(b)(2) could be 
problematic for captive carry technologies for which an operator must 
comply with the oversight of foreign aviation authorities. CSF 
suggested removing reference to ``the first movement that initiates 
flight.''
    The FAA does not adopt CSF's recommendation because the current 
regulation is flexible enough to accommodate all launch vehicle 
technologies at non-U.S. sites, as well as comprehensive enough to 
protect public safety. Starting launch at ignition will not capture the 
full flight of the captive carry hybrid vehicle system. The FAA 
regulates all of the components of a hybrid vehicle system, including 
any captive carry operations under a license; however, as discussed 
earlier, the flexibility in Sec.  450.3(a) for the Administrator to 
adjust the scope of license applies to Sec.  450.3(b)(2) as well. In 
the case of a unique operation for which hazardous activities begin 
later than first movement or ignition, the Administrator may agree to a 
different beginning of launch for that operation.
    Virgin Galactic recommended that the FAA continue to avoid 
duplicating oversight and memorialize that commitment in its 
description of the beginning of launch as starting when hazardous pre-
flight ground operations commence at a U.S. launch site that pose a 
threat to the public and over which no other Federal regulatory agency 
has jurisdiction.
    The FAA has amended the regulation to address duplicative oversight 
at Federal launch or reentry sites in the final rule. These changes are 
discussed in the preamble section addressing launch and rentries from a 
Federal launch or reentry site. The FAA does not agree with the comment 
that launch under this chapter may only begin at a site over which no 
other Federal agency has jurisdiction. In fact, many sites, such as 
Federal sites or launch sites co-located at airports, may be subject to 
the jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies depending on the types of 
activities that are conducted.
ii. End of Launch
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend the definition of end of 
launch to remove reference to RLVs and ELVs. Although it did not 
receive comment on this proposal specifically, the FAA makes the 
following additional changes to the end of launch language: The 
addition of ``vehicle component'' and ``impact or landing'' throughout 
to ensure the definition captures a broader variety of operations; and 
the addition of ``deployment'' in Sec.  450.3(b)(3) to include 
operations for which a payload remains on the vehicle. Under Sec.  
450.3(b)(3) and (c), the FAA replaces each use of ``vehicle stage'' in 
the proposed rule in recognition of the fact that components other than 
vehicle stages may return to Earth. Examples include a discarded engine 
or payload fairing. In addition, throughout Sec.  450.3(b)(3) and (c), 
the FAA includes ``impact or landing'' in the end of launch and reentry 
sections in the scope of license requirements where the proposal only 
referred to one or the other or failed to reference either. With the 
increasing efforts to reuse components, including both impact and 
landing throughout Sec.  450.3(b)(3) and (c) encompasses a broader 
range of activities because landing includes a soft vertical landing or 
runway landing of a vehicle or component, whereas impact is more 
accurate to describe a hard landing of a stage or component. Under 
Sec.  450.3(b)(3)(ii), the FAA adds that, for an orbital launch of a 
vehicle with a reentry of the vehicle, launch may also end ``after 
vehicle component impact or landing on Earth, after activities 
necessary to return the vehicle or component to a safe condition on the 
ground after impact or landing.'' This additional language accommodates 
a carrier vehicle landing after the completion of the orbital part of 
the launch.
    CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic expressed confusion regarding 
proposed Sec.  450.3(b)(3), and requested clarity regarding proposed 
Sec.  450.3(b)(3)(iv), including when reentry applies to suborbital 
vehicles and end of launch. The FAA introduced suborbital reentry in 
its experimental permit final rulemaking in 2007. In that rulemaking, 
the FAA stated that:

A suborbital rocket may engage in reentry. For most suborbital 
launches, whether the flight entails a reentry will not matter from 
a regulatory perspective. The FAA will authorize the flight under a 
single license or permit, implementing safety requirements suitable 
to the safety issues involved. Recognizing suborbital reentry 
matters for two reasons. First, if a suborbital rocket is flown from 
a foreign country by a foreign entity into the United States, that 
entity may require a reentry license or permit from the FAA, 
depending on whether the planned trajectory of the rocket includes 
flight in outer space. Second, a permanent site that supports the 
landing of suborbital rockets may now be considered a reentry site 
depending, once again, on whether the planned trajectory reaches 
outer space.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See 72 FR 17001, 17002.

    The NPRM did not propose any change to this framework, and no 
change is made in the final rule.
    Virgin Galactic commented that the FAA should include specific 
parameters for suborbital reentry. Virgin Galactic also recommended 
additional regulatory language specifying that, for a suborbital 
reentry, reentry ends when each vehicle has returned to Earth and has 
been returned to a safe condition as defined in the operator's 
application documents. As noted earlier, a suborbital reentry requires 
flight into outer space.
    This distinction does not change when launch ends for a suborbital 
vehicle because, whether a vehicle or vehicle component impacts or 
lands on Earth due to a launch or reentry, the launch or reentry would 
end at the same point in time; namely, after activities necessary to 
return the vehicle or vehicle component to a safe condition on the 
ground after landing. (See Sec.  450.3(b)(3)(iv) and (c)).
    CSF and SpaceX suggested that orbital launch without a reentry in 
proposed Sec.  450.3(b)(3)(i) did not need to be separately defined by 
the regulation, stating that, regardless of the type of launch, 
something always returns: Boosters land or are disposed, upper stages 
are disposed. CSF and SpaceX further requested that the FAA not 
distinguish between orbital and suborbital vehicles for end of launch.
    The FAA does not agree because the distinctions in Sec.  
450.3(b)(3)(i) and (ii) are necessary due to the FAA's limited 
authority on orbit. For a launch vehicle that will eventually return to 
Earth as a reentry vehicle, its on-orbit activities after deployment of 
its payload or payloads, or completion of the vehicle's first steady-
state orbit if there is no payload, are not licensed by the FAA. In 
addition, the disposal of an upper stage is not a reentry under 51 
U.S.C. Chapter 509, because the upper stage does not return to Earth 
substantially intact.
    The FAA proposed in Sec.  450.3(b)(3)(ii) that for an orbital 
launch of a vehicle with a reentry of the vehicle, launch ends after 
deployment of all payloads, upon completion of the vehicle's first 
steady-state orbit if there is no payload, after vehicle component 
impact or landing on Earth, after activities necessary to return the 
vehicle or component to a safe condition on the ground after impact or 
landing, or after activities necessary to return the site to a safe 
condition, whichever occurs later. The final rule changes ``if there is 
no payload'' to ``if there is no payload

[[Page 79584]]

deployment'' to clarify the FAA's intent on how to determine the end of 
launch for a vehicle carrying no payload or payloads that stay onboard 
a vehicle.
    Both CSF and SpaceX proposed ``end of launch'' should be defined on 
a case-by-case basis in pre-application consultation and specified in 
the license. The FAA disagrees, in part. The FAA only regulates on a 
case-by-case basis if the nature of an activity makes it impossible for 
the FAA to promulgate rules of general applicability. This need has not 
arisen, as evidenced by decades of FAA oversight of end-of-launch 
activities. That said, because the commercial space transportation 
industry continues to innovate, Sec.  450.3(a) gives the FAA the 
flexibility to adjust the scope of license, including end of launch, 
based on unique circumstances as agreed to by the Administrator. Unique 
circumstances may include, but are not limited to, unconventional 
technologies like railguns that may use innovative launch and reentry 
procedures requiring adjustments to a scope of license.
    Finally, CSF pointed out that in the proposed rule, for hybrid 
vehicles, end of launch did not mention the recovery of carrier 
aircraft.
    Section 450.3(b)(3) distinguishes orbital vehicles with and without 
a reentry, and suborbital vehicles with and without a reentry. A 
separate section for end of launch for hybrid vehicles is unnecessary 
because the same parameters apply to hybrids as apply to non-hybrid 
vehicles regarding end of launch. The FAA also acknowledges that the 
end-of-launch parameters do not mention the recovery of a carrier 
aircraft. Again, it is unnecessary to include this distinction because, 
during launch, a carrier aircraft is considered part of the launch 
vehicle.\28\ Therefore, to the extent that Sec.  450.3(b)(3) refers to 
activities necessary to return the vehicle or component to a safe 
condition on the ground after impact or landing, this reference will 
include returning the carrier aircraft to a safe condition after impact 
or landing.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ See Legal Interpretation to Pamela Meredith from Mark W. 
Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel for International Law, Legislation and 
Regulations (Sept. 26, 2013); available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/Data/interps/2013/Meredith-ZuckertScoutt&Rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20Legal%20Interpretation.pdf.
    \29\ See Legal Interpretation to Laura Montgomery from Lorelei 
Peter, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations (Dec. 10, 2019); 
available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/Data/interps/2019/Montgomery-Ground%20Based%20Space%20Matters%20-%202019%20Legal%20Interpretation.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Blue Origin asked how the FAA plans to prevent disparate impacts of 
the proposed rule on those operators at multiuse facilities and at U.S. 
facilities. While the meaning of disparate impacts is unclear, the FAA 
construes the commenter as asking how the FAA will distinguish between 
launch and non-launch (e.g., manufacturing or refurbishment of pre-
flown stages) activities at a launch site. Because launch begins with 
the start of hazardous pre-flight ground operations that prepare a 
vehicle for flight, an operator may manufacture or refurbish launch 
vehicle components or perform certain other activities on a launch site 
without requiring an FAA authorization during the time after the end of 
the launch and before hazardous operations begin for the next launch. 
This treatment is consistent with existing practice prior to this rule: 
a vehicle operator could theoretically perform non-launch related 
activities on a launch site without needing a license as long as those 
activities are not in the scope of the license and do not pose a risk 
to public safety.
    The Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) suggested the FAA define 
``family of vehicles.''
    The FAA does not define ``family of vehicles'' in this final rule 
because the industry continues to innovate and it would be premature to 
attempt to classify all types of vehicle families for the emerging and 
still-evolving commercial space industry. As discussed in the NPRM, 
launch operators often define ``family of vehicles'' themselves. 
Usually, the vehicles have similar base operational characteristics, 
but each member of the family may be capable of different performance 
characteristics.
    AAAE and Denver International Airport believed that operating at a 
specific site should necessitate a separate and thorough review from 
the FAA, and that operators should not be able to receive one license 
covering multiple sites.
    The FAA will perform a thorough and complete review of all sites 
where a vehicle is authorized to operate. An applicant will not be able 
to add another location to its license ``with a lesser review 
standard'' as described by the commenter. A licensee will have to meet 
all applicable regulations for all sites authorized in a license. 
Denver International Airport cited 49 U.S.C 50904(d) to argue the FAA 
lacked statutory authority to grant a vehicle operator permission to 
operate from multiple launch and/or reentry sites on a single license. 
The FAA believes Denver International Airport meant to cite 51 U.S.C. 
50904(d), which states that the Secretary of Transportation (the 
``Secretary'') shall ensure that only 1 license or permit is required 
from the DOT to conduct activities, including launch and reentry. The 
law does not prohibit the FAA from issuing a license that allows an 
operator to conduct an approved operation from various sites. Rather, 
section 50904(d) merely prevents the FAA from requiring multiple 
licenses for the same type of activity for which a license or permit is 
required under title 51 chapter 509.
e. Safety Element Approval (Part 414)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to change the part 414 term from 
``safety approval'' to ``safety element approval'' to distinguish it 
from ``safety approval'' as used in parts 415, 431, 435, and 450. Also, 
the NPRM proposed to modify part 414 to streamline the process by 
enabling applicants to request a safety element approval in conjunction 
with a license application. The final rule adopts the changes as 
proposed.
    Several commenters expressed general support for the FAA's proposed 
regulations regarding safety element approvals in part 414. Blue Origin 
concurred with the FAA's proposal and anticipated many benefits to an 
applicant's ability to submit a separate safety element approval. One 
individual commented that more extensive use of these approvals could 
increase operator flexibility and significantly simplify the licensing 
process for future launches.
    Virgin Galactic recommended an operator that already holds a 
license be able to use previously submitted data to apply for a safety 
element approval. Virgin Galactic also noted that the language in the 
first sentence of proposed Sec.  414.23 should be changed from ``safety 
approval'' to ``safety element approval'' to reflect the updated 
terminology.
    The FAA agrees that an operator that already holds a license may 
use previously submitted data to apply for a safety element approval. 
Just as is the case with a license application or modification, an 
applicant can reference previously submitted data in its safety element 
approval application. The applicant will need to specify clearly what 
it is referencing and indicate the referenced material is still valid. 
In addition, the FAA has corrected ``safety approval'' to ``safety 
element approval'' in Sec. Sec.  414.23 and 414.3.
    An individual commenter suggested a new definition for safety 
element approvals for hybrid vehicles. The commenter suggested the 
definition include a reference to hybrid vehicle components that are 
critical to avoiding

[[Page 79585]]

or mitigating hazards to the public, including vehicle characteristics.
    The FAA does not agree that it should add a separate definition of 
``safety element approvals'' specifically for hybrid vehicles. The 
definition of ``safety element approval'' is broad enough to encompass 
approvals for hybrid and non-hybrid vehicle systems. The definition 
already includes the phrase ``any identified component thereof,'' which 
includes a carrier vehicle. The FAA agrees that it is possible to craft 
a safety element approval for the types of hazard control strategies 
employed by hybrid vehicles. The FAA notes that the definition of a 
``safety element'' includes launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety 
system, process, service, or any identified component thereof; or 
qualified and trained personnel performing a process or function 
related to licensed activities or vehicles. This definition would allow 
a hybrid operator to apply for a wide range of safety element 
approvals.
    Regarding process, a joint set of comments submitted by Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA stated an operator should 
not be required to apply to the FAA to transfer a safety element 
approval under proposed Sec.  414.33 when the transfer is due to a 
corporate transaction, reorganization, or restructure that does not 
affect the material content of the original application.
    The FAA will apply the same standard for application, transfer, and 
issuance of a safety element approval as it does for a license. Name 
changes and internal corporate restructuring do not typically require a 
license transfer and therefore will not require a safety element 
approval transfer.
    Microcosm, Inc. (Microcosm), inquired as to how the FAA will issue 
a safety element approval. The FAA will issue a safety element approval 
applied for concurrently with a part 450 license in accordance with 
part 414.
f. Vehicle Operator License--Issuance, Duration, Additional License 
Terms and Conditions, Transfer, and Rights Not Conferred (Sec. Sec.  
450.5 Through 450.13)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements addressing the issuance, 
duration, and transfer of a vehicle operator license in proposed 
Sec. Sec.  450.5 (Issuance of a Vehicle Operator License), 450.7 
(Duration of a Vehicle Operator License), and 450.11 (Transfer of a 
Vehicle Operator License), respectively. The FAA also proposed 
requirements addressing the addition and modification of licensing 
terms in proposed Sec.  450.9 (Additional License Terms of Conditions). 
Finally, the FAA proposed requirements describing those rights that 
would not be conferred by a vehicle operator license in proposed Sec.  
450.13 (Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License). The FAA 
proposed these rules to consolidate the requirements for different 
types of launch and reentry licenses in parts 415, 431, and 435 into a 
single vehicle operator license.
    AIA and Sierra Nevada commented that the FAA should not be allowed 
to make modifications to the terms and conditions of a license except 
within a limited time frame and subject to specified procedures to 
ensure reasonable notice and due process to the vehicle operator. The 
FAA will not adopt this recommendation and retains the provision in 
Sec.  450.9 that allows the FAA to modify a vehicle operator license at 
any time by modifying or adding license terms and conditions to ensure 
compliance with the Act and its implementing regulations. This 
provision was introduced in 1999 in 14 CFR 415.11 because the FAA 
recognized that a particular licensee's launch (or reentry) may present 
unique circumstances that were not covered by the license terms and 
conditions in place. Because such a modification would be based on 
unique circumstances, the FAA is unable to specify a timeline as 
requested by the commenter.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts these requirements as proposed 
and adds specificity to Sec.  450.11 to indicate that either the holder 
of a vehicle operator license or the prospective transferee may request 
a vehicle operator license transfer, both the holder and prospective 
transferee must agree to the transfer, and the FAA will provide written 
notice of its determination to the person requesting the vehicle 
operator license transfer. These additions mirror the language used for 
the transfer of a safety element approval and reflect current practice.
    The FAA did not receive any comments on these proposed 
requirements.
3. Part 450 Subpart B--Requirements To Obtain a Vehicle Operator 
License
a. Incremental Review and Determinations (Sec.  450.33)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend part 413 and to include 
provisions in part 450 to allow an applicant the option for an 
incremental review of all portions of its application. This proposal 
was in response to the ARC recommendations. Specifically, the FAA 
proposed to amend Sec.  413.15 (Review Period) to provide that the time 
frame for any incremental review and determinations would be 
established with an applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-
application consultation. As stated in the NPRM, the FAA did not 
propose to reduce by regulation the statutory review period of 180 
days.
    In the final rule, the FAA provides clarification on the basis the 
Administrator would consider when approving an incremental approach.
    In the NPRM, the FAA sought comment on how a formal incremental 
review process would account for the statutory 180-day review period 
when application increments or modules are likely to be submitted and 
reviewed at different times, other useful guidelines for applicants 
crafting incremental approaches, and any safety approval sections that 
would be appropriate for incremental review. The FAA did not receive 
any comments with feasible solutions on any of these topics.
    Several commenters expressed support for the FAA's proposed 
incremental review process, stating that it would increase flexibility. 
Virgin Galactic supported the FAA's proposed approach to incremental 
review and commented that it aligned with many other approval processes 
in other divisions of the FAA.
    Many commenters, including Leo Aerospace, Microcosm, Sierra Nevada, 
SpaceX, and Virgin Orbit asked about the duration of incremental review 
periods. Noting the FAA's statutory mandate to issue a license 
determination not later than 180 days after accepting an application, 
commenters inquired whether each module would be subject to this 180-
day review period. Several commenters, including CSF and Sierra Nevada, 
stated they interpret the 180-day statutory requirement to mean that 
the sum total of all module reviews must not exceed 180 days. 
Commenters noted that if every module was subject to a 180-day review, 
the process would be very time-intensive.
    Until the FAA has more experience with the incremental review 
process, the FAA will review each module in accordance with a schedule 
discussed with the prospective applicant during pre-application 
consultation. In developing the incremental review schedule, the FAA 
will consider the interdependence of parts of the evaluation and the 
sequence of their submissions. The FAA makes these criteria explicit in 
this rule in Sec.  450.33 (Incremental Review and

[[Page 79586]]

Determinations) paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2).\30\
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    \30\ These criteria derived from the discussion in the preamble 
to the NPRM on what an applicant should consider when proposing an 
incremental approach. In relevant part, the NPRM stated: ``1. 
Application increments submitted at different times should be not be 
dependent on other increments to the extent practicable. 2. 
Application increments should be submitted in a workable 
chronological order. In other words, an applicant should not submit 
an application increment before a separate application increment on 
which it is dependent. For example, the FAA would not expect to 
agree to review a risk analysis before reviewing a debris analysis 
or probability of failure analysis because the risk analysis is 
directly dependent on the other two analyses.'' 84 FR at 15366.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Review of any modules prior to submittal of an application in its 
entirety will not initiate or be bound by the statutory 180-day review 
period. Rather, an agreed upon review period will begin once the FAA 
has a complete enough application in its entirety. During pre-
application consultation, an applicant seeking an incremental review 
may negotiate a time frame shorter than the statutory 180-day review 
period. As the FAA gains more experience with the incremental review 
process, it may develop guidance concerning expected timelines for 
various sequences of modular submissions.
    Sierra Nevada commented that, if a module is denied, proposed Sec.  
413.21 (Denial of a License or Permit Application) should allow the FAA 
to extend the review period by up to 60 days to consider a revised 
application. The commenter noted it supports the FAA's practice of 
tolling the review period in the case of a deficient application as 
long as the applicant understands the deficiency and what must be 
submitted for the FAA to continue its review. Leo Aerospace inquired 
whether an application would be considered accepted after the 
incremental process is defined, or after the last step of the 
incremental process is completed, and asked how an operator would be 
notified if its safety review was accepted.
    Sierra Nevada's interpretation of incremental review is incorrect 
because a module cannot be denied under Sec.  413.21. If the FAA 
determines a module does not contain sufficient information, the FAA 
and the applicant will discuss amending the agreed upon incremental 
review schedule to allow time for the applicant to submit a revised 
module. An applicant will be notified in writing when its complete 
application has been accepted.
    Sierra Nevada noted the primary concern with module time frames was 
the transparency of the FAA's license application process and the 
ability for operators to reduce operational risk associated with the 
various time frames. To that end, a number of commenters, including 
Sierra Nevada, Leo Aerospace, and SpaceX, requested the FAA provide an 
outline of acceptance and review timelines and example timelines for 
incremental applications. CSF and Sierra Nevada agreed with the FAA's 
proposal to establish the timeline for incremental submissions in the 
pre-application phase but suggested the FAA include in an AC its goal 
for maximum review time frames for particular modules. CSF and Sierra 
Nevada recommended the AC include the following time frames: 60 days 
for policy approval; 30 days for payload review; 60 days for safety 
approval; 5 days for environmental assessment; and 15 days for 
financial responsibility assessment. CSF and Sierra Nevada noted that 
the FAA's review of the environmental assessment should only take 5 
days because the FAA has had insight into the contractor used to 
conduct the environmental assessment, and the FAA's review should 
therefore simply be a verification that the applicant has submitted the 
final product. CSF and Sierra Nevada acknowledged that the financial 
responsibility assessment could take longer than 15 days for methods 
other than obtaining insurance, but stated that this possibility could 
be mitigated by the FAA's providing guidance that addresses the type of 
information that a licensee would need to submit to satisfy FAA review 
under Sec.  440.9(f).
    Commenters suggested that time frames for incremental review should 
be based on the complexity of the review and that they should be 
shorter than the statutory limit for the review of a complete 
application. Specifically, Virgin Galactic commented time frames should 
be based on the complexity of the item being reviewed. Sierra Nevada 
recommended modules be subject to a shorter review time frame than full 
application reviews and to define that time frame in Sec.  413.15. 
Sierra Nevada stated the FAA should consider a shorter timeline of 90 
days for review of a license application in order to meet the direction 
in Space Policy Directive-2 to streamline the review process.
    The FAA declines to incorporate the suggested time frame changes 
because they will not provide adequate time for the FAA to assess 
application materials for completeness in all situations and for all 
potential applications. The FAA agrees that modules will likely be 
reviewed faster than an entire application, and that review times will 
depend largely on complexity; however, at this point it is premature to 
define those time frames until FAA has more experience with incremental 
reviews. The FAA will not at this time adopt maximum time frames, 
because each evaluation is a unique review that must be adjusted to 
each operation. The FAA's evaluation of the safety implications of an 
application typically requires the most effort and time, usually far 
more than the 60 days suggested by the commenters. The MPL is derived 
from the safety analysis and cannot be completed independently of it. 
An environmental review must be completed before a license can be 
issued. Particularly for new operations, the environmental process can 
be lengthy, and the FAA advises applicants to begin it early, even 
before a license application is submitted. For example, an applicant 
must submit a completed environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared 
by the FAA (or an FAA-selected and managed consultant contractor), FAA-
approved environmental assessment (EA), categorical exclusion 
determination, or written re-evaluation as part of its application 
materials. The 180-day statutory application review period is not 
intended to encompass the time needed for the applicant to develop the 
necessary application materials, including environmental documentation. 
Five days may not be enough time to evaluate an environmental document, 
such as a complex EA.
    For conventional operations that do not pose substantial policy-
related challenges, policy and payload reviews can be conducted in less 
time than the safety review. However, these reviews are often performed 
concurrently with the safety review so their completion typically does 
not reduce the overall time required to reach a license determination. 
As the FAA gains more experience with the incremental review process, 
it may elect to update guidance to reflect timelines that have 
consistently proven effective.
    Submitting an application incrementally affords an applicant the 
approval of various systems and processes earlier than the current non-
incremental review process. The FAA expects that the central value of 
an incremental approach is regulatory certainty for components of the 
application and flexibility for applicants rather than a reduction in 
overall review time. However, the FAA anticipates that a determination 
of an accepted application that utilizes safety element approvals or 
approved modules will be completed faster than a similar application 
that does not use safety element approvals or incremental review.

[[Page 79587]]

    Sierra Nevada recommended that an AC should also address the type 
of information a licensee would need to submit for the FAA's financial 
responsibility review. The financial responsibility requirements 
contained in part 440 are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. However, 
the financial responsibility requirements are adequately addressed in 
Appendix A to Part 440--Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
Maximum Probable Loss Determination for Licensed or Permitted 
Activities. Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA take into account FAA 
AVS \31\ Project Specific Certification Plans to inform the incremental 
review process in proposed part 414. The FAA will discuss project-
specific information, including AVS documents, during pre-application 
consultation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ AVS is the FAA's Office of Aviation Safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Galactic also inquired how the operator would be notified 
when the operator's safety review has been accepted or rejected. The 
FAA will inform an applicant in writing as to whether each module is 
accepted or rejected.
b. Means of Compliance (Sec.  450.35)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an applicant would be required 
to use an accepted means of compliance for the following requirements: 
Highly reliable FSS, FSA methods, lightning flight commit criteria, and 
airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds for both flight 
and ground hazards. For these requirements, the means of compliance 
would need to be accepted by the FAA prior to the submission of an 
application. For all other performance-based requirements, an applicant 
would be able to use a means of compliance proposed in an application.
    While the final rule maintains that an applicant must use an 
accepted means of compliance in an application for specified 
requirements, the FAA has made amendments to the structure of the 
regulatory text to identify more clearly that the use of accepted means 
of compliance is an application requirement. This requirement is now 
specified in Sec.  450.35(a) of the final rule.
    As stated above, for those five sections now identified in Sec.  
450.35, an applicant must use a means of compliance in its application 
that has been reviewed and accepted by the Administrator. The FAA will 
not accept an application that uses a means of compliance that has not 
already been accepted by the Administrator for any of the five 
requirements listed in Sec.  450.35. The five requirements listed in 
Sec.  450.35 are essential to public safety and involve well-
established and complex methodologies, thresholds, or practices. 
Because of the complex nature and public safety impact of these 
requirements, the FAA would be unable to review unique means of 
compliance for these five requirements during its application 
evaluation within its review time frame. Rather, an applicant could 
choose to use an accepted means of compliance in its evaluation, or 
could submit a unique means of compliance for review and acceptance 
prior to submitting its application. Unique means of compliance for the 
requirements identified in Sec.  450.35 may require evaluation before 
they are accepted as demonstrating fidelity and safety, however this 
rule allows unique means of compliance for these sections to be 
submitted in advance of a license application in order to provide 
flexibility and enable innovative concepts. For all other sections of 
part 450, an applicant may propose in its application a means of 
compliance that has not been previously accepted by the Administrator, 
and the FAA will review the means of compliance as part of its 
application review process. It is worth noting that an applicant who 
uses means of compliance that have already been accepted by the FAA in 
its license application will likely experience a more expeditious 
license review and determination.
    A means of compliance is one means, but not the only means, by 
which a requirement can be met and may be used to demonstrate 
compliance with any of the performance-based requirements. For all 
performance-based requirements other than those listed in Sec.  450.35, 
an applicant may include a unique means of compliance in an application 
for the FAA to review during the application evaluation. In the NPRM 
docket,\32\ the FAA included a table listing all publicly available 
means of compliance for each proposed performance-based requirement 
(the ``Means of Compliance Table'') in subpart C that the FAA has 
accepted to date. An applicant need not include the entirety of an 
accepted means of compliance standard in an application, but may 
instead reference the accepted means of compliance using identifying 
features such as title and date or version.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See FAA-2019-0229-0018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters interpreted the NPRM as only allowing the means 
of compliance listed in the Means of Compliance Table. Conversely, the 
CSF commented that applying means of compliance flexibility only to the 
regulations cited in the Means of Compliance Table would be too 
limited, and should be expanded. The CSF also requested that the FAA 
remove or correct the preamble text to reflect that any applicant can 
seek to add an accepted means of compliance to the Means of Compliance 
table. The CSF specifically mentioned that the FAA should allow 
flexible means of compliance to meet the conditional expected casualty 
calculation in proposed Sec.  450.101(c). SpaceX also commented that 
the FAA should expand the scope of flexible means of compliance and 
specifically identified proposed Sec.  450.101(c).
    The FAA emphasizes that any requirement in part 450 can have one or 
more means of compliance. The Means of Compliance Table provides one 
way, but not the only way, to meet the requirements in part 450. The 
conditional expected casualty thresholds in proposed Sec.  450.101(c) 
were intended as safety criteria to measure and protect against 
potential high consequence events. In the final rule, the FAA has 
clarified Sec.  450.101(c) to allow alternative demonstrations of high 
consequence event mitigation. This change is discussed in detail later 
in the preamble. The FAA will review the submitted means of compliance 
to determine whether they satisfy the regulatory safety standard. These 
means of compliance may be government standards, industry consensus 
standards, or unique means of compliance developed by an individual 
applicant. For government standards or means of compliance developed by 
a consensus standards body, the FAA will provide public notice of those 
accepted means of compliance that it determines satisfy the 
corresponding regulatory requirement. The FAA will also review unique 
means of compliance developed by an individual applicant to determine 
whether they satisfy the regulatory requirement.
    Once a means of compliance is accepted by the FAA, it may be used 
to demonstrate compliance with the corresponding regulatory 
requirement. An updated Means of Compliance Table will be placed on the 
docket once the final rule publishes. This updated table identifies the 
means of compliance accepted by the FAA at this time for the 
corresponding regulation. This table will be made available on the FAA 
website and updated as additional means of compliance are accepted by 
the FAA. Unique individual operator-developed means of compliance will 
not be included in the Means of Compliance Table to protect proprietary 
information,

[[Page 79588]]

unless the operator that developed the means of compliance requests 
that its means of compliance be included.
    CSF requested that the FAA clarify that it would not require 
compliance with an untailored RCC 319 \33\ in order to demonstrate 
reliability. Blue Origin commented that the preamble does not address 
accepted means of compliance as a standalone flexibility measure. CSF 
and SpaceX commented that the proposed rule risks being quickly 
outdated and could discourage innovation because it does not allow 
tailoring of the requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ The Range Commanders Council (RCC) addresses the common 
concerns and needs of operational ranges within the United States. 
It works with other government departments and agencies to establish 
various technical standards to assist range users. RCC 319 provides 
for the safety of people and missions during launch and flight 
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule does not require compliance with an untailored RCC 319 in 
order to demonstrate reliability; however, at this time, RCC 319 is the 
only accepted means of compliance for flight abort with a highly 
reliable FSS under Sec.  450.145. An applicant may propose a tailored 
version of any accepted means of compliance, including RCC 319. If an 
applicant wishes to tailor RCC 319, the applicant must propose its 
tailored means of compliance as a unique means of compliance in advance 
of its license application. An applicant may include any unique means 
of compliance as part of its license application, other than those 
sections identified in Sec.  450.35(a) that require a means of 
compliance to be accepted prior to application submittal. An applicant 
may also propose a unique means of compliance to meet these 
requirements in advance of its license application.
    An individual commenter recommended that the FAA allow tailoring 
and include a clause to attend United States Air Force (USAF) tailoring 
meetings as part of meeting parts 415 and 417 requirements. As noted 
earlier, the FAA does allow tailoring. Part 450 will not change the 
FAA's current practice of attending tailoring meetings.
    Virgin Galactic also recommended that the current part 417 
appendices and range analyses continue to satisfy the requirements in 
part 450, and that the FAA complete its Launch Site Safety Assessments 
(LSSAs) in order for operators to know which Federal launch or reentry 
site's analyses and processes the FAA would find acceptable as means of 
compliance. ULA commented that the rule should more clearly allow work 
performed by another Federal agency to meet FAA requirements.
    The part 417 appendices that can be used as an accepted means of 
compliance to part 450 requirements are listed in the Means of 
Compliance Table in the docket. The FAA agrees that it needs to 
determine and communicate to the industry which Federal launch or 
reentry site analyses and processes satisfy part 450. As noted earlier, 
the FAA will accept any safety-related launch or reentry service 
provided by a Federal launch or reentry site or other Federal entity by 
contract, as long as the FAA determines that the launch or reentry 
service satisfies part 450.
    The New Zealand Space Agency (NZSA) and Virgin Galactic asked what 
process and standards the Administrator would employ for accepting 
means of compliance. Virgin Galactic asked what accepted means of 
compliance would be and whether the Administrator would use means of 
compliance that have not been published. Virgin Galactic also stated 
that means of compliance would need to be published prior to any work 
being performed that would require the means of compliance. Northrup 
Grumman supported the publication of newly accepted means of 
compliance.
    The FAA will provide public notice of each publicly available means 
of compliance that the Administrator has accepted by posting the 
acceptance on its website. This notification will communicate to the 
public and the industry that the FAA has accepted a means of compliance 
or any revision to an existing means of compliance. The FAA will not 
post unique means of compliance documents with proprietary information 
submitted by applicants, unless specifically authorized by the 
applicant. The applicant may wish to consider offering its unique means 
of compliance to a consensus standards body for inclusion as part of an 
industry-developed consensus standard. The final rule does not adopt 
proposed Sec.  450.35(b), which stated that the FAA would provide 
public notice of each means of compliance that the Administrator has 
accepted. The FAA removes this requirement because it is not a 
licensing requirement.
    Proposed Sec.  450.35(c) is amended and renumbered as Sec.  
450.35(b). The provision is renumbered because the final rule removes 
the proposed Sec.  450.35(b), as discussed previously. In the final 
rule, Sec.  450.35(b) allows a person to submit a means of compliance 
to the FAA for review outside the licensing process. The means of 
compliance must be submitted in a form and manner acceptable to the 
Administrator. The proposed rule limited this provision to applicants, 
whereas the final rule would allow any person to request acceptance of 
a proposed means of compliance. This is because the FAA anticipates 
other people or entities other than applicants may wish to submit a 
proposed means of compliance, such as operators that plan to be 
applicants in the future, and voluntary consensus standards bodies. The 
FAA wants to enable this. Section 450.35(b) is limited to requests for 
acceptance of a proposed means of compliance outside a license 
application, because the license application process is already defined 
in parts 413 and 450. Lastly, the FAA changes the modifier in front of 
``means of compliance'' from ``alternative'' to ``proposed.'' The term 
``proposed'' is better suited to the types of means of compliance the 
FAA would expect from this provision.
    The process the FAA employs to accept a means of compliance will be 
set forth in guidance. \34\ When submitting a unique means of 
compliance, an applicant's proposal should identify the regulation that 
the proposed means of compliance will address and provide the rationale 
as to why it demonstrates compliance with the applicable regulation. 
When reviewing a unique means of compliance, the FAA will consider past 
engineering practices, the technical quality of the proposal to 
demonstrate compliance with the part 450 regulations, the safety risk 
of the proposal, best practice history, and consultations with 
technical specialists for additional guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See AC 450.35-1, Means of Compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NZSA and Virgin Galactic asked how the FAA would protect an 
operator's proprietary information when publishing means of compliance. 
NZSA recommended that the FAA retain the ability to share, with consent 
of the applicant, information about the means of compliance used to 
issue a license that may include proprietary information.
    As a general matter, the FAA does not share proprietary data with 
the public. The FAA will treat any proprietary data linked to a unique 
means of compliance in the same manner as it protects proprietary data 
that an applicant uses to support a license application.
    An individual commenter suggested the development of a Space Safety 
Institute to develop industry consensus standards. A consensus 
standards body, any individual, or any organization would be able to 
submit means of compliance documentation to the FAA for consideration 
and potential acceptance. The FAA recommends that in developing 
standards, a voluntary

[[Page 79589]]

consensus standards body consider the processes outlined in OMB 
Circular A-119.
c. Use of Safety Element Approval (Sec.  450.39)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed Sec.  450.39 (Use of Safety Element 
Approval) to allow an applicant to use any vehicle, safety system, 
process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety 
element approval under part 414 without the FAA's reevaluation of that 
safety element during a license application evaluation to the extent 
its use is within its approved envelope. The proposed rule would also 
change the part 414 term from ``safety approval'' to ``safety element 
approval'' to distinguish it from ``safety approval'' as used in parts 
415, 431, and 435, and proposed part 450, because these terms have 
different meanings.
    In the final rule, the FAA replaces the word ``envelope'' with the 
word ``scope.'' ``Scope'' more accurately captures ``envelope, 
parameter, or situation'' as used in the definition of ``safety element 
approval.'' For consistency, the same change is made in Sec.  437.21.
d. Policy Review (Sec.  450.41)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove the requirement that 
applications include, for the purpose of conducting a policy review, 
information related to the structural, pneumatic, propulsion, 
electrical, thermal, guidance, and avionics systems used in the launch 
vehicle and all propellants. Instead, in order for the FAA to conduct 
its policy review, the FAA proposed that an applicant identify the 
launch or reentry vehicle and its proposed flight profile and describe 
the vehicle by characteristics that include individual stages, its 
dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. In 
the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.41 (Policy Review and 
Approval) as proposed.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Sierra Nevada, and ULA 
suggested the FAA change the word ``normal'' in proposed Sec.  
450.41(e)(4)(iv) to ``nominal'' to be consistent with industry 
vernacular.
    The FAA disagrees with this suggestion because the FAA seeks a 
range of possible impact areas in this section, not a particular impact 
point inferred by the use of ``nominal.''
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended the 
FAA add to Sec.  450.41(b)(3) the phrase ``but not limited to'' in 
order to allow the FAA to consult Federal agencies other than the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
    The FAA disagrees that the additional language is needed to clarify 
that the FAA may consult Federal agencies other than NASA pursuant to 
Sec.  450.41(b)(3). The term ``include'' implies the phrase ``but not 
limited to.''
    The FAA notes, consistent with current practice, that if a launch 
or reentry proposal would potentially jeopardize U.S. national security 
or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United 
States, the FAA may seek additional information from an applicant in 
support of interagency consultation to protect U.S. Government 
interests.
    An individual commenter recommended the FAA require licensees to 
comply with the Committee on Space Research's planetary protection 
policy (COSPAR PPP) as a means of ensuring that commercial launches 
comply with the Outer Space Treaty and of resolving existing gaps in 
the statutory prohibition on obtrusive advertising in outer space.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenter's concerns, but the scope of 
this rulemaking does not encompass COSPAR's PPP or the statutory 
prohibition on obtrusive advertising.
e. Payload Reviews (Sec.  450.43)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate payload review 
requirements, remove the requirement to identify the method of securing 
the payload on an RLV, add application requirements to assist the 
interagency review, such as the identification of approximate transit 
time to final orbit and any encryption, clarify the FAA's relationship 
with other Federal agencies for payload reviews, and modify the 60-day 
notification requirements currently found in Sec. Sec.  415.55 and 
431.53.
    The FAA stated in the NPRM preamble that, while it would review all 
payloads to determine their effect on the safety of launch, the FAA 
will not make a determination on those aspects of payloads that are 
subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or 
the Department of Commerce or on payloads owned or operated by the U.S. 
Government. In addition, the proposed rule added informational 
requirements that would include the composition of the payload and any 
hosted payloads, anticipated life span of the payload in space, any 
planned disposal, and any encryption associated with data storage on 
the payload and transmissions to or from the payload. Finally, the NPRM 
proposed to preserve the ability of payload operators to request a 
payload review independent of a launch license application. The FAA 
sought comments on the approach of including more requirements for a 
payload review in the regulation in order to expedite payload review 
application processing, but received none.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.43 (Payload Review and 
Determination) with revisions. The FAA adds the term, ``if 
applicable,'' to Sec. Sec.  450.31(a)(3) and 450.43(a) to clarify that 
a payload review is not always required. The FAA notes that all 
payloads include any hosted or secondary payloads.
    The Commercial Smallsat Spectrum Management Association (CSSMA) 
suggested that the FAA adopt a sixty (60) day timeline for independent 
payload review. CSSMA found little incentive for a payload owner or 
operator to use the independent payload review process, absent a fixed 
timeline for such payload reviews. CSSMA also recommended language that 
would render Sec.  413.21(a) (Denial of a License or Permit) applicable 
to independent payload reviews.
    The FAA declines to revise Sec.  413.21(a) as suggested because the 
payload review is a requirement to obtain a launch or reentry license 
under part 450. The FAA notes that a favorable payload determination 
does not itself constitute a license. As such, the procedures set forth 
in Sec.  413.21(a) do not apply to payload reviews, whether conducted 
independently of or in conjunction with a license application.
    The FAA also declines to incorporate CSSMA's suggested timeline for 
review. The FAA has not specified a timeline to complete payload 
reviews independent of a license application because, historically, 
payload owners or operators have requested such reviews for unique 
missions that have raised novel concerns regarding public health and 
safety, safety of property, or national security or foreign policy 
interests of the United States. Because independent payload reviews 
often raise complex issues and often require extensive interagency 
consultation, the FAA cannot anticipate a standard timeline for payload 
reviews conducted independently from a license application. 
Accordingly, FAA will not establish a standard timeline for such 
reviews in its regulations. Applicants are encouraged to discuss 
timelines to review their particular proposals during pre-application 
consultation.
    NZSA requested the FAA include in the final rule all legislative or 
regulatory standards by which the FAA will assess payloads at the 
application stage. NZSA stated that doing so would give owners

[[Page 79590]]

of novel payloads and non-U.S. operators regulatory certainty on the 
standards they must meet to be launched on a vehicle licensed by the 
FAA. As one example of a rule that would affect payload review but did 
not appear in proposed Sec.  450.41, NZSA cited the prohibition on 
launching payloads for ``Obtrusive Space Advertising.''
    The FAA declines to expand the bases for issuing an unfavorable 
payload determination beyond those set forth in Sec.  450.43(a). It 
would not be practical to list every law, regulation, and policy that 
may possibly affect a proposed payload under Sec.  450.43. Rather, 
applicants are required to complete a pre-application consultation 
during which the FAA can learn about the proposed action and advise the 
applicant on a path forward, including any U.S. regulations, laws, or 
policies that may impact its proposal. Payload owners and operators may 
also use the independent payload review process set forth in Sec.  
450.43(d), which provides greater regulatory certainty for novel 
payloads.
    Virgin Galactic suggested the FAA treat payloads that stay within a 
vehicle as additional equipment on the launch vehicle, subject only to 
the safety analysis required of any other piece of equipment on board a 
launch vehicle. Virgin Galactic commented that requiring a payload 
review for items not ejected from a launch vehicle places an 
unnecessary burden on operators and the FAA. Virgin Galactic also 
requested clarification on seemingly contradictory language in the NPRM 
preamble regarding a payload placed in outer space versus a payload 
that remained on or within the vehicle.
    The FAA disagrees with Virgin Galactic's suggestion. Payloads that 
(1) stay within a vehicle, (2) do not contain hazardous materials, or 
(3) have previously been approved may require less scrutiny but are 
still being placed in outer space and therefore meet the 14 CFR 401.5 
definition of ``payload'' and require a payload review. Under 51 U.S.C. 
50904(c), the FAA must verify that all licenses, authorizations, and 
permits required for a payload have been obtained; and that the 
proposed launch or reentry will not jeopardize public health and 
safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy 
interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA 
therefore declines to exclude from the requirement to obtain a payload 
review any payload that remains on the vehicle.
    Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA amend proposed Sec.  
450.31(a)(3), which seemed to require favorable payload determinations 
for any launch or reentry, noting that not all vehicles carry payloads. 
Absent this amendment, Virgin Galactic commented it would need to seek 
a waiver for each non-payload flight, creating an unnecessary burden.
    The FAA agrees that an applicant does not need to seek a payload 
determination if the proposed launch or reentry will not involve a 
payload. Therefore, the FAA revises Sec.  450.31(a)(3) by adding the 
phrase, ``if applicable.''
    Space Logistics, LLC (Space Logistics) urged the FAA to coordinate 
with other Federal agencies before expanding its payload review process 
in order to avoid duplicating activities. Space Logistics noted that 
the requirements to describe encryption associated with a payload's 
data storage and transmissions and to provide any information deemed 
necessary by the FAA under proposed Sec.  450.43(i) were open-ended and 
may duplicate requirements of the FCC, NASA, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), or Office of Space Commerce (OSC).
    The FAA agrees with Space Logistics's comment that Federal agencies 
must continue to streamline requirements applicable to commercial space 
activities and work closely to eliminate duplicative requirements and 
minimize review times for policy and payload issues. The FAA has 
engaged its Federal partners in this rulemaking process in order to 
minimize duplication. For instance, the FAA proposed to require that 
applicants provide encryption data (in Sec.  450.43(i)(1)(x)) in part 
to support the Department of Defense (DOD) review of payloads for 
impacts to national security. Encryption information allows the DOD to 
assess impacts on national security due to potential cyber intrusion or 
loss of vehicle control. Through its interagency coordination, the FAA 
endeavors not to request information already provided to other Federal 
agencies.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA suggested adding 
to proposed Sec.  450.43(a) a requirement for FAA coordination with the 
applicable Federal agency to ensure that the payload will not interfere 
with or impede launch, on[hyphen]orbit operations, or reentry of other 
approved missions. The commenters stated this addition would avoid 
adverse impacts to other federally-approved missions or operating 
systems.
    Although the FAA agrees that coordination with applicable Federal 
agencies is important to ensure a payload or payload class will not 
interfere with agency operations, the FAA disagrees that the 
recommended addition to Sec.  450.43(a) is necessary. The interagency 
coordination required for both payload and license application review, 
coupled with the criteria set forth in Sec.  450.43(a)(1) and (a)(2), 
adequately addresses the commenters' concerns. Those provisions direct 
that the FAA will issue a favorable payload determination if (1) the 
applicant, payload owner, or payload operator has obtained all required 
licenses, authorizations, and permits; and (2) the launch or reentry of 
the payload would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of 
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or 
international obligations of the United States. The FAA notes, 
consistent with current practice, that if a payload or payload class 
presents a potential risk to an agency's asset or other mission, the 
FAA may seek additional information from an applicant on behalf of the 
agency to protect U.S. Government interests and assets consistent with 
these two objectives. However, in light of commenters' concerns, the 
FAA is working with the appropriate agencies to increase transparency 
and support the development of agency guidance on the interagency 
consultation process during a payload review. The FAA also plans to 
publish its own guidance on payload review, in the form of an Advisory 
Circular, which will reference NASA, DOD, or other agency guidance. 
Insight into the interagency process will help operators anticipate 
what questions and concerns may arise during interagency consultation, 
which may vary depending on the operation, and will allow operators to 
be better prepared to address any potential issues during payload 
review. To the extent the commenters intended to address space traffic 
management or access-to-space issues, such matters exceed the scope of 
this rulemaking.
    Boeing suggested the FAA refrain, in proposed Sec.  450.43(b)(2), 
from issuing a determination on payload components owned, sponsored, or 
operated by the U.S. Government. Similarly, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended the FAA exclude from the review 
requirement in proposed Sec.  450.31(a)(3) any payloads that have 
undergone safety review or received approval by another Federal agency.
    The FAA declines to exclude from review under Sec.  450.43(b) 
payloads that are sponsored by the U.S. Government. Section 
450.43(b)(2) excludes payloads owned or operated by the U.S.

[[Page 79591]]

Government. Payloads that are not owned or operated by the U.S. 
Government may not have undergone the same scrutiny, and hence the FAA 
review is warranted. The FAA also disagrees with the recommended change 
to Sec.  450.31(a)(3). Although the FAA does not make a determination 
on those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by other 
Federal agencies, the FAA does review all payloads to determine their 
effect on the safety of launch, which may differ from the purpose of 
another agency's payload review. As such, no change from the proposal 
is made.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended 
adding to the agencies listed in proposed Sec.  450.43(e)(3) the FCC, 
NOAA, and the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration. The commenters also proposed adding to the interagency 
consultation process set forth in proposed Sec.  450.43(e) a 
requirement that the FAA consult with Federal launch or reentry sites 
to coordinate facility information for MPL determination, and to 
coordinate collision avoidance analysis with the cognizant Federal 
agency, when the launch or reentry activity is not on a Federal launch 
or reentry site. The commenters stated that operators should not have 
to obtain and provide Federal site facility information, which is often 
sensitive and not available to commercial operators.
    The FAA disagrees that the recommended addition to Sec.  
450.43(e)(3) is necessary. The list of agencies that the FAA consults 
with under Sec.  450.43(e) is not exhaustive and does not preclude 
consultation with any other Federal entity in order to ensure that a 
payload meets the criteria set forth in Sec.  450.43. With respect to 
the recommendation for the FAA to add the interagency consultation 
process to its MPL determination, current regulations address 
coordination. In addition, changes to part 440 are outside the scope of 
the rulemaking. In accordance with 14 CFR 440.7(b), the FAA consults 
with Federal agencies that are involved in, or whose personnel or 
property are exposed to risk of damage or loss as a result of, a 
licensed activity and obtains any information needed to determine 
financial responsibility requirements. Similarly, collision avoidance 
analysis is conducted wholly outside of the payload review. Part 450 
provides for coordination of collision avoidance analyses with the 
cognizant Federal agency, though this coordination is primarily 
conducted on a launch-by-launch basis, and well after the payload 
review process, which often occurs during the application review 
process.
f. Safety Review and Approval (Sec.  450.45)
i. Launch and Reentries From a Federal Launch or Reentry Site (Sec.  
450.45(b))
    In the NPRM, to address concerns regarding duplicative government 
requirements at Federal launch or reentry sites, the FAA proposed 
largely performance-based requirements for both ground and flight 
safety that an operator could meet using Air Force and NASA practices 
as means of compliance. The FAA pointed out that it issues a safety 
approval to a license applicant proposing to launch from a Federal 
launch or reentry site if the applicant satisfies the requirements of 
part 415, Subpart C (Safety Review and Approval for Launch from a 
Federal Launch Range), and has contracted with the Federal site for the 
provision of safety-related launch services and property, as long as an 
FAA LSSA shows that the site's launch services and launch property 
satisfy part 417. The FAA did not refer to the LSSA process in the 
regulatory text in proposed part 450. The FAA did propose, in Sec.  
450.45 (Safety Review and Approval) paragraph (b), that the FAA would 
accept any safety-related launch or reentry service or property 
provided by a Federal launch or reentry site or other Federal entity by 
contract, as long as the FAA determined that the launch or reentry 
services or property provided satisfy part 450.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.45(b) as proposed, with one revision. The 
FAA changes the reference to ``Federal range'' to ``Federal launch or 
reentry site'' throughout part 450, to include NASA and DOD launch and 
reentry sites.
    As discussed in the NPRM preamble, the FAA assesses each Federal 
launch or reentry site and determines if the Federal site meets FAA 
safety requirements. If the FAA assessed a Federal launch or reentry 
site and found that an applicable safety-related launch service or 
property satisfies FAA requirements, then the FAA treats the Federal 
site's launch service or property as that of a launch operator's, and 
there is no need for further demonstration of compliance to the FAA. 
The FAA reassesses a site's practices only when the site changes its 
practice. The final rule maintains the position discussed in the NPRM, 
namely that these performance-based regulations allow an operator to 
use DOD and NASA practices as a means of compliance. In addition, this 
rule introduces a provision that allows operators operating from 
certain Federal sites to opt out of demonstrating compliance with the 
FAA's ground safety requirements.
    CSF and Space Florida submitted comments indicating their 
dissatisfaction with the NPRM's approach to reducing duplication 
regarding launch from a Federal launch or reentry site. ULA encouraged 
the FAA to reduce duplication between the FAA and Federal sites.
    Northrop Grumman commented that the FAA should accept the Federal 
launch or reentry site safety processes as satisfying FAA requirements 
because it was reasonable to presume changes to launch range 
regulations would continue to provide for safe pre-flight and flight 
operations on Federal launch or reentry sites. Similarly, SpaceX stated 
that part 450 or its supporting documents should reference agreements 
between the FAA and other Federal entities, including the USAF, which 
allow each agency to accept the analyses and technical determinations 
of the other. Blue Origin commented that it looks forward to 
understanding the contents of any agreements between the ranges and the 
FAA.
    Another individual commenter raised similar concerns that the FAA's 
proposed licensing regulations do not resolve long-standing issues with 
duplicative and overlapping rules burdening commercial launch operators 
at the KSC and CCAFS. CSF stated that duplicative or conflicting rules 
among overlapping Federal jurisdictions create a barrier to entry for 
small startups and unnecessarily increase the cost of space access to 
all users by forcing all providers either to pass those costs on to 
their customers (including the U.S. Government) or to be denied the 
availability of new capabilities due to lack of bandwidth and 
resources. CSF argued that this burden will drive internationally-
competed business to other countries to avoid the cost or schedule 
impacts arising from duplicative, conflicting, and overlapping sets of 
rule. CSF also argued the FAA did not address the overlapping 
jurisdiction of the FAA and other Federal and State agencies (the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF), and their State and local equivalents) for hazardous 
ground operations.
    The FAA does not agree with the comment that the FAA is duplicating 
oversight with other agencies such as OSHA, EPA, and ATF. Commercial 
space activities may be subject to the

[[Page 79592]]

jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies depending on the types of 
activities that are being conducted. OSHA, EPA, and ATF may regulate or 
provide oversight for different aspects of an operation without 
duplicating FAA oversight. The authority for protecting public health 
and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States during commercial space launches 
and reentries remains solely with the FAA.
    In the interest of removing duplicative authorities, CSF suggested 
the FAA should acknowledge when other agencies have jurisdiction over 
activities and not duplicate that oversight. SpaceX recommended that 
instead of the FAA's determining that the launch or reentry services or 
property provided by a Federal launch or reentry site or other Federal 
entity satisfy part 450, the FAA should just determine that the site 
operations are in good standing.
    In the final rule, an operator may meet part 450's performance-
based requirements using DOD and NASA practices that have been accepted 
by the FAA as a means of compliance. An applicant would reference in 
its application those DOD or NASA requirements or procedures accepted 
as means of compliance. The 2015 Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to consult 
with the Secretary of Defense, Administrator of NASA, and other 
agencies, as appropriate, to identify and evaluate requirements imposed 
on commercial space launch and reentry operators to protect the public 
health and safety, safety of property, national security interests, and 
foreign policy interests of the United States. It also directed the 
Secretary of Transportation to resolve any inconsistencies and remove 
any outmoded or duplicative Federal requirements or approvals 
applicable to any commercial launch of a launch vehicle or commercial 
reentry of a reentry vehicle.\35\ The FAA has worked closely with DOD 
and NASA in developing part 450 to minimize any need for a DOD or a 
NASA facility to impose additional requirements.\36\ The FAA will 
continue to work with DOD and NASA in reviewing means of compliance 
that involve these Federal entities' practices to ensure those 
practices continue to satisfy the FAA's part 450 requirements. The FAA 
expects that there will be few, if any, instances in which DOD or NASA 
practices do not satisfy part 450's performance-based requirements. In 
addition, part 450 should provide enough flexibility to accommodate 
changes in DOD and NASA practices in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Public Law 114-90--Nov. 25, 2015 U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act.
    \36\ Note that the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA) includes a provision stating that 
the Secretary of Defense may not impose any requirement on a 
licensee or transferee that is duplicative of, or overlaps in intent 
with, any requirement imposed by the Secretary under 51 U.S.C. 
chapter 509, unless imposing such a requirement is necessary to 
avoid negative consequences for the national security space program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to issuing performance-based requirements that an 
operator could meet using DOD and NASA practices as means of 
compliance, the FAA has addressed concerns regarding duplicative 
government requirements by modifying its approach to ground safety at 
certain Federal sites. For ground safety, the Administrator may 
determine that the Federal launch or reentry site's ground safety 
processes, requirements, and oversight are not inconsistent with the 
Secretary's statutory authority over commercial space activities. 
Therefore, under Sec.  450.179 (Ground Safety--General) paragraph (b), 
an operator is not required to comply with the ground safety 
requirements of part 450 if:
    (1) The launch or reentry is being conducted from a Federal launch 
or reentry site;
    (2) The operator has contracted with the Federal launch or reentry 
site for ground safety services or oversight; and
    (3) The Administrator has determined that the Federal launch or 
reentry site's ground safety processes, requirements and oversight are 
not inconsistent with the Secretary's statutory authority over 
commercial space activities.
    In making the determination to accept the Federal site's processes 
without specific compliance with ground safety regulations, under Sec.  
450.179(c), the Administrator will consider the nature and frequency of 
launch and reentry activities conducted from the Federal launch or 
reentry site, coordination between the FAA and the Federal launch or 
reentry site safety personnel, and the Administrator's knowledge of the 
Federal site's requirements. The FAA will consider the nature and 
frequency of the activity in order to evaluate a site's level of 
experience with different types of launch and reentry operations. An 
example of the ``nature'' of the launch and reentry activities would be 
that a site's experience with non-toxic or non-explosive propellant 
might not qualify the site for an exemption from FAA ground safety 
requirements involving toxic or explosive materials. The FAA makes this 
change to respond to the direction of SPD-2, the National Space 
Council, and the recommendation of the ARC to address duplicative 
requirements across Federal agencies for commercial space licensing.
    In the final rule, an operator need not comply with the ground 
safety requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  450.181 (Coordination with 
a Site Operator) through 450.189 (Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard 
Controls) if the conditions in Sec.  450.179(b) are met. In making this 
change, the FAA preserves its statutory jurisdiction over those ground 
safety activities that are part of launch and reentry, but recognizes 
certain Federal processes and procedures as sufficient to meet the 
FAA's mandate.
    For Sec.  450.179(b) to apply, an operator must conduct launch or 
reentry activities from a Federal launch or reentry site. The FAA 
limits the applicability of this provision to certain Federal sites, 
such as Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, 
because they have a long history of conducting launches and reentries 
in a manner consistent with FAA regulations. In addition, an operator 
must contract with the Federal launch or reentry site for ground safety 
services or oversight. The FAA would require that the operator have a 
written agreement with the Federal site to use its ground safety 
services or oversight and comply with its ground safety processes and 
requirements. Finally, the Administrator must have determined, 
consistent with the considerations in Sec.  450.179(c), that the 
Federal launch or reentry site's ground safety processes, requirements, 
and oversight are not inconsistent with the Secretary's statutory 
authority over commercial space activities. In considering the site's 
ground safety record, the Administrator will consider the extent and 
sophistication of both its ground safety procedures and the frequency 
with which the site uses them during FAA-licensed activities.
    In making the determination to accept a Federal site's ground 
safety procedures, the Administrator generally will accept only those 
sites that have a regular cadence of both commercial and government 
launches and highly developed, well-understood processes and 
procedures. In considering the coordination between the FAA and the 
Federal site safety personnel, the Administrator generally will approve 
only those sites with which the FAA has a long-term working 
relationship through the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG). 
Familiarity with a Federal site's ground safety practices and 
procedures is the only means by which the FAA can ensure it has met its 
statutory obligation to ensure public health and safety, safety of

[[Page 79593]]

property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States. When the Administrator finds that a site meets the 
conditions in Sec.  450.179(b), the FAA will develop a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) with the approved site and publish the MOA on the FAA's 
website. If these conditions are met, then the operator can seek FAA 
permission during pre-application consultation to comply only with the 
ground safety regulations imposed by the Federal site. The FAA will 
publish, maintain, and update the Federal launch and reentry site 
ground safety MOAs on its website.
    For Federal launch or reentry sites or other Federal entities that 
do not satisfy the conditions in Sec.  450.179(b), the final rule 
retains the LSSA-like process in accordance with Sec.  450.45(b). As 
noted earlier, the FAA believes that because of the performance-based 
nature of part 450, Federal launch or reentry sites will typically 
satisfy most or all FAA requirements.
ii. Radionuclides (Sec.  450.45(e)(6))
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.45(e)(6) that the FAA 
would evaluate the launch or reentry of any radionuclide on a case-by-
case basis, and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or 
reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of 
property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States. For any radionuclide on a launch or reentry vehicle, an 
applicant would need to identify the type and quantity, include a 
reference list of all documentation addressing the safety of its 
intended use, and describe all approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission for pre-flight ground operations.
    SpaceX requested that the FAA clarify the intent of this 
regulation, as this topic is heavily regulated by other Federal 
entities. In addition, SpaceX recommended that the FAA defer to and 
accept results from other Federal entities when applicable, and stated 
that processes for acceptance and deferral should be provided in an AC.
    As discussed in the NPRM preamble, Sec.  450.45(e)(6) will address 
the potential launch or reentry of radionuclides, similar to current 
Sec.  415.115(b), but with the addition of reentries. It is the current 
practice of the FAA to address novel public safety issues on a case-by-
case basis because such proposals are so rarely encountered in 
commercial space transportation. When applicable, FAA will work closely 
with other Federal entities to avoid duplicative requirements. Moving 
forward however, the Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft 
Containing Space Nuclear Systems \37\ directs the Secretary to issue 
public guidance for applicants seeking a license for launch or reentry 
of a space nuclear system. The FAA is currently developing this 
guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-launch-spacecraft-containing-space-nuclear-systems/ (August, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Environmental Review (Sec.  450.47)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate and clarify 
environmental review requirements for launch and reentry operators in a 
single section, Sec.  450.47 (Environmental Review). In addition, the 
FAA proposed to revise Sec. Sec.  420.15, 433.7, 433.9, and 437.21 to 
conform to the changes in proposed Sec.  450.47. These revisions codify 
the environmental review process as currently conducted, in accordance 
with FAA Order 1051.F, in which applicants for a launch or reentry 
license provide the FAA with the information needed to comply with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable 
environmental laws, regulations, and Executive Orders.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.47 as proposed with 
revisions. The FAA revises Sec.  450.47(b) to affirmatively state that 
an applicant must prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA), assume 
financial responsibility for preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), or provide information to support a written re-
evaluation of a previously submitted EA or EIS, when directed by the 
FAA. The FAA revised this section to clarify that the FAA, not the 
applicant, determines which environmental documentation is required by 
NEPA. If the FAA determines that under NEPA an EIS is required, the FAA 
will select a contractor to prepare the EIS for the license applicant 
who will pay the contractor. The FAA also revised Sec. Sec.  420.15(b), 
433.7(c), 437.21(b)(1)(iii), and 450.47(c) to clarify that it is the 
FAA's responsibility to determine whether a Categorical Exemption 
(CATEX) applies under NEPA.
    An applicant may provide data and analysis to assist the FAA in 
determining whether a CATEX could apply (including whether an 
extraordinary circumstance exists) to a license action. Examples 
include modifications that are administrative in nature or involve 
minor facility siting, construction, or maintenance actions. In the 
final rule, the FAA revises Sec. Sec.  420.15(b), 433.7(c), 
437.21(b)(1)(iii), and 450.47(c) to state affirmatively that it is the 
FAA's responsibility to determine whether a CATEX applies rather than 
an applicant's responsibility to request a CATEX.
    If a CATEX does not apply to the proposed action, but it is not 
anticipated to have significant environmental effects, then NEPA 
requires the preparation of an EA. When directed by the FAA, an 
applicant must prepare an EA with FAA oversight. When NEPA requires an 
EIS for commercial space actions, the FAA uses third-party contracting 
to prepare the document. That is, the FAA selects a contractor to 
prepare the EIS, and the license applicant pays the contractor. 
Finally, if an EA or EIS was previously developed, the FAA may require 
an applicant to submit information to support a written re-evaluation 
of the environmental document by an FAA-selected contractor to ensure 
the document's continued adequacy, accuracy, and validity.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ FAA Order 1050.1, Environmental Impacts: Policies and 
Procedures, provides a more detailed description of the FAA's 
policies and procedures for NEPA and CEQ compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule will not alter the current environmental review 
requirements. However, as explained in the NPRM preamble, the 
consolidation of the launch and reentry regulations necessitates a 
consolidation of the environmental review requirements.
    CSF asked the FAA to explain why it added the requirement that 
applicants prepare EAs with FAA oversight, assume financial 
responsibility for preparation of an EIS, or submit a written re-
evaluation of a previously submitted EA or EIS. CSF requested 
clarification on the phrase ``under FAA oversight'' in proposed Sec.  
450.47, versus the current language in FAA Order 1050.1 that requires 
FAA approval of an applicant-prepared EA. CSF requested further that 
the FAA clarify when and for what purpose the FAA might require an 
applicant to prepare a written re-evaluation of a previously-submitted 
EA or EIS, noting that the costs and schedule impacts of this 
requirement are unclear.
    As noted in the NPRM, the changes to the regulatory text on 
environmental review do not represent a substantive change to past 
regulations or to current practice. Section 450.47 reflects the 
existing environmental review process that Sec. Sec.  415.201 and 
415.203 broadly described, in which applicants must provide sufficient 
information to enable the FAA to comply with NEPA. Section 450.47 
replaces this general requirement by identifying the specific documents 
that the FAA may require applicants to

[[Page 79594]]

provide and the process to prepare those documents. The language added 
to Sec.  450.47 reflects current practice and is consistent with NEPA 
and FAA policy. According to FAA Order 1050.1, unless the FAA 
determines that a categorical exclusion applies, the FAA may prepare an 
EA, EIS, or written re-evaluation, or direct an applicant to provide 
the information as described in Sec. Sec.  450.47(b)(1), (2), and 
(3).\39\ In response to CSF's comment, the FAA revises Sec.  450.47(b), 
as well as Sec. Sec.  420.15(b), 433.7(b), and 437.21(b)(1)(ii), from 
the language proposed in the NPRM to state expressly that an applicant 
must provide the documents set forth in paragraph (b) ``when directed 
by the FAA.'' The modified text clarifies the applicant's 
responsibilities in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1 (Paragraph 2-2-2). 
These responsibilities are consistent with current practice and will 
not increase the cost, impact schedules, or alter the burden under the 
previous regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Currently, the FAA has not established categorical 
exclusions for this program. However, the FAA may propose new 
categorical exclusions applicable to the program after the FAA's 
performance of NEPA reviews of proposed actions finds that the 
actions, when implemented, do not result in significant individual 
or cumulative environmental effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to Sec.  450.47(b)(1), ``with FAA oversight'' means 
the FAA will guide the work of an applicant or an applicant's 
contractor. In order to use an applicant or contractor-prepared 
document for compliance with NEPA or other environmental requirements, 
the FAA must evaluate and take responsibility for the document. The 
FAA's oversight ensures that: (1) The applicant's potential conflict of 
interest does not impair the objectivity of the document; and (2) the 
EA meets the requirements of FAA Order 1050.1. The FAA may require an 
applicant to submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a 
previously prepared environmental document (i.e., a draft or final EA 
or EIS) to determine whether the document remains valid or a new or 
supplemental environmental document is required. Applicants should work 
closely with the FAA to determine the documentation requirements of 
NEPA and other applicable environmental requirements.\40\ In response 
to CSF's comment, the FAA revises Sec.  450.47(b)(3), as well as 
Sec. Sec.  420.15(b), 433.7(b), and 437.21(b)(1)(ii), to clarify that 
an applicant would submit ``information to support'' a written re-
evaluation of a previously submitted EA or EIS, rather than the re-
evaluation document itself, as proposed. The contractor selected by the 
FAA will use the information provided by the applicant to prepare the 
re-evaluation document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See FAA Order 1050.1, Section 9-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSF commented that the FAA should adopt, to the greatest extent 
possible, NEPA documentation from other Federal agencies or licensed 
site operators.
    The FAA notes that it may adopt, in whole or in part, another 
Federal agency's draft or final EA, the EA portion of another agency's 
EA/FONSI, \41\ or EIS in accordance with applicable regulations and 
authorities implementing NEPA.\42\ Whenever possible, the FAA will 
adopt the other Federal agency's NEPA documents to support the issuance 
of launch and reentry licenses. Further, the FAA encourages early 
coordination with the FAA to benefit applicants that are seeking 
approvals from other Federal agencies related to the FAA-issued license 
(e.g., an applicant seeking approval from a Federal agency to make 
modifications on a Federal launch or reentry site in anticipation of 
receiving a launch license from the FAA). This coordination will 
increase the likelihood of a more efficient environmental review 
process as the applicant seeks different but related approvals from 
multiple Federal agencies. The applicant should consult with the FAA 
early in the project's development phase, prior to the development of 
the NEPA document, to determine environmental review responsibilities, 
and the appropriate level of review, and to foster efficient procedures 
to develop documentation to meet the agencies' legal requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Finding of No Significant Impact.
    \42\ 40 CFR 1506.3 of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
Regulations and FAA Order 1050.1, as of the publication date of this 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSF also encouraged the FAA to request appropriations to fund 
regional or area EAs. This recommendation is beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking.
    The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) stated its 
concern that, under the proposed regulations, existing Special Use 
Airspace approvals (SUAs) would be activated for purposes that may not 
align with the original environmental determinations that led to 
approval of the SUAs. AOPA noted that the environmental process for 
establishing SUAs includes detailed studies of the intended activity, 
its frequency, and its effect on the public. Many of the SUAs activated 
in support of commercial space activity originally underwent 
environmental review and approval on the assumption that they were 
supporting military or governmental activity, not commercial civil 
space operators.
    This rule will not affect the environmental determination process 
for establishing or altering SUAs. Environmental review concerns 
associated with the designation or activation of SUAs are not the 
subject of this rulemaking. The FAA notes that all environmental 
impacts associated with a proposed launch or reentry will be addressed 
in the NEPA document prepared for that activity.
    AOPA urged the FAA to ensure that the documentation for commercial 
space operations is complete and transparent so that the public can 
understand and identify potential impacts.
    This rule will not alter the current environmental review process, 
which requires documentation of environmental impacts. The FAA remains 
responsible for complying with NEPA and other applicable environmental 
laws, regulations, and Executive Orders prior to issuing a launch or 
reentry license. The FAA ensures transparency of the potential 
environmental impacts by publishing all draft and final EAs and EISs, 
and associated Findings of No Significant Impact and Records of 
Decisions.
    CSF and Denver International Airport requested clarification on how 
the environmental reviews required under NEPA would apply to multiple 
sites. In accordance with applicable regulations and authorities 
implementing NEPA, the FAA's decision-making process must consider and 
disclose the potential impacts of a proposed action and its 
alternatives on the quality of the human environment. This process 
includes considering the impacts of launches from multiple sites, which 
may be covered in a single NEPA document when appropriate. In some 
instances, one single NEPA document may not be possible and individual 
site-specific NEPA documents could be developed. The FAA is examining 
the use of programmatic NEPA documents to analyze the impacts of 
launches from multiple sites. Under such an approach, applicants could 
tier their individual, site-specific NEPA analyses from the 
programmatic document.\43\ The FAA will conduct programmatic EA 
analyses consistent with FAA Order 1050.1 and CEQ regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See Order 1050.1, Section 3-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SpinLaunch stated the environmental review process is lengthy, 
sometimes taking as long as 2 years or more. To facilitate the process, 
it recommended (1) including the environmental review within the 
statutory period, thereby

[[Page 79595]]

forcing an expedited process; and (2) establishing limited 
environmental approval for proposed activities (e.g., non-rocket launch 
systems) that do not have the adverse environmental impacts of a 
traditional rocket.
    The FAA does not consider the 180-day statutory review period to 
include NEPA document preparation. Specifically, the applicant must 
submit a completed EIS prepared by the FAA (or an FAA-selected and 
managed consultant contractor) or an FAA-approved EA, categorical 
exclusion determination from the FAA, or written re-evaluation as part 
of its application materials. The statutory application review period 
is not intended to encompass the time needed for the applicant to 
develop the necessary application materials, including environmental 
documentation. Regarding the commenter's second recommendation, the FAA 
is bound by CEQ's NEPA regulations. There are three levels of NEPA 
review: CATEX, EA, and EIS. Each of the three levels of review is 
described in FAA Order 1050.1. The required level of review depends on 
the nature of the commercial space action. Applicants should coordinate 
with the FAA early in the application process to determine the 
appropriate level of NEPA review based on the potential for significant 
impact.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA jointly 
recommended adding to proposed Sec.  450.47(a) a statement requiring 
the FAA to coordinate with other government entities to assist the 
applicant in completing EAs, in order to alleviate the cost impact on 
operators who currently have to negotiate multiple sets of requirements 
by Federal, State, and local governments. The joint commenters also 
recommended amending Sec. Sec.  420.15(b)(ii), 433.7(b)(2), and 
450.47(b)(2) to allow EISs to be prepared by an FAA-approved consultant 
contractor, in addition to one selected and managed by the FAA. The 
commenters suggested these changes would provide flexibility and allow 
an operator to use qualified EIS contractors at the State- or local-
level as long as the contractor meets the qualifications for completing 
an EIS in accordance with the law.
    The FAA declines the suggested regulatory text changes.
    Section 1506.5(c) of the CEQ Regulations for Implementing the 
Provisions of NEPA and Appendix C of FAA Order 1050.1 state that EISs 
must be prepared by a contractor selected by the lead agency to avoid a 
conflict of interest.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended the 
FAA craft an additional section to proposed Sec.  450.47 to address 
space environmental impacts such as debris, collision risk, and 
interference.
    The FAA does not agree with this recommendation. The applicability 
of NEPA to space debris is outside the scope of this rulemaking.
    One individual commenter expressed concern that the proposed part 
450 may cause companies to forgo environmental considerations or 
somehow bypass compliance requirements. The proposal does not alter 
NEPA and will continue to require potential licensees to comply with 
all policies and procedures implementing NEPA, as well as other 
applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive Orders 
intended to protect the environment.
4. Part 450 Subpart C--Safety Requirements
a. Neighboring Operations Personnel (Sec.  450.101(a) and (b))
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to carve out separate individual and 
collective risk criteria for neighboring operations personnel. The 
proposal was intended to reduce the need to clear or evacuate other 
launch operator personnel during a commercial launch or reentry 
operation. Under the current regulations, an operator may be required 
to clear anywhere from a handful of employees to over a thousand 
employees from a neighboring site for a significant portion of a day. 
To address this issue, the NPRM proposed to define ``public'' and 
``neighboring operations personnel'' in Sec.  401.5. Under the 
proposal, neighboring operations personnel would still be members of 
the public, but would be subject to different individual and collective 
risk criteria. These proposed regulations were intended to enable 
neighboring operations personnel to remain within safety clear zones 
and hazardous launch areas during flight as long as their risk did not 
exceed the newly designated thresholds.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposal for neighboring 
operations personnel in Sec. Sec.  401.7, 440.3, 450.101(a) and (b), 
and 450.137(c)(6). The FAA revises the Sec.  401.7 definition of 
``neighboring operations'' by removing the phrase ``as determined by 
the Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator'' because the 
phrase is not relevant to the definition of neighboring operations 
personnel. The FAA also revises Sec.  450.133 (Flight Hazard Area 
Analysis) paragraph (e)(2) to require that an applicant provide the 
hypothetical location of any member of the public that could be exposed 
to a probability of casualty of 1 x 10-\5\ or greater for 
neighboring operations personnel, in response to a comment to clarify 
representative probability contours.
    The FAA sought comment on the proposed approach, as well as on 
proposals (1) not to require that neighboring operations personnel be 
specially trained, (2) not to designate ground operations hazard 
criteria for neighboring operations personnel, and (3) for the purpose 
of determining MPL, to align the individual risk threshold for 
neighboring operations personnel with the threshold for losses to 
government property and involved government personnel. Many commenters 
agreed with the FAA's proposal to change the risk threshold for 
neighboring operations personnel, stating that a higher risk threshold 
is necessary to allow for co-processing of multiple operations at a 
single facility. Despite this general agreement, some commenters 
disagreed with the specifics of the proposal. Several commenters 
pointed out that the FAA's approach to neighboring operations personnel 
differs from the ARC recommendation to exclude permanently badged 
personnel and neighboring launch operations from the definition of 
``public'' but still to employ mitigation measures for uninvolved 
neighboring operations personnel when a hazardous operation or launch 
is scheduled.
    Several commenters, including Blue Origin, Boeing, CSF, Lockheed 
Martin, Northrop Grumman, Space Florida, SpaceX, ULA, and Virgin Orbit, 
commented that neighboring operations personnel should not be included 
as members of the public. CSF stated that neighboring operations 
personnel should not be considered members of the public because they 
have essential, on-going requirements to conduct neighboring space 
transportation activities. CSF further stated that the FAA has the 
flexibility to exclude neighboring operations personnel from its 
definition of ``public.'' Blue Origin similarly stated that neighboring 
operations personnel are more familiar with the hazardous operations 
present at a launch site and may have a relationship or engagement with 
their neighboring operators and, therefore, should be treated 
differently from the public who are completely uninvolved and are not 
knowledgeable about launch and reentry operations. Space Florida also 
commented that employees of the licensee who may be working on a test 
program or a different launch or reentry program are not members of the 
public and raised the question whether the

[[Page 79596]]

FAA should have statutory authority over launch essential personnel of 
a neighboring operator for other launch, reentry, or associated 
operations. Virgin Orbit commented that it would be better to include 
neighboring operations personnel under launch personnel, rather than 
requiring a new and possibly burdensome expected casualty analysis.
    The FAA agrees that neighboring operations personnel are a unique 
category of people because of their essential, ongoing tasks. The FAA 
disagrees, however, with commenters' assertions that neighboring 
operations personnel should be excluded from the definition of 
``public'' because of their involvement in launch operations or the 
tasks they are expected to perform. The FAA has a statutory obligation 
to protect the health and safety of members of the public. Prior to 
this rulemaking, the FAA defined public safety, for a particular 
licensed launch, as the safety of people and property that are not 
involved in supporting the launch, including those people and property 
that may be located within the boundary of a launch site, such as 
visitors, individuals providing goods or services not related to launch 
processing or flight, and any other launch operator and its personnel. 
The FAA's definition of ``public'' is derived from the definition of 
``public safety'' in Sec.  401.5 and the definition of ``public'' in 
Sec.  420.5.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Both of these definitions are being replaced by the new, 
consolidated definition of ``public'' in Sec.  401.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA's definition of ``public'' encompasses neighboring 
operations personnel because they are not involved in supporting the 
specific launch or reentry they are neighboring. The FAA agrees that 
neighboring operations personnel are more familiar with the hazardous 
operations present at a launch site and may have a relationship or 
engagement with their neighboring operators, but the FAA does not find 
that to be sufficient to exclude them from the definition of 
``public.'' It was a factor, however, in the FAA's decision to apply a 
risk requirement to neighboring operations personnel different from the 
requirement applied to other members of the public. Although this rule 
includes neighboring operations personnel in the definition of 
``public,'' the FAA recognizes that neighboring operations personnel 
are aware of the inherent risks associated with launch and reentry 
activities and are likely trained and prepared to respond to hazards 
present at these sites. Because of these differences, as well as their 
unique role in performing safety, security, and critical tasks, the FAA 
considers neighboring operations personnel a separate category of 
public, whose collective exposure to risk may not exceed 2 x 
10-\4\ and for whom the risk to any individual may not 
exceed 1 x 10-\5\.
    The FAA disagrees with Virgin Orbit's comment that neighboring 
operations personnel should be included as launch personnel so as to be 
exempted from risk calculations and eliminate the burden of the 
additional risk calculation. Neighboring operations personnel are not 
supporting the licensed activity and are members of the public; 
therefore, they must be protected under the FAA's statutory mandate. 
The FAA acknowledges that this conclusion requires risk analysis for 
the neighboring operations personnel; however, the FAA expects that 
this analysis will involve little additional effort because the 
operator already has to perform a similar analysis for the other 
members of the public and will only need to account for the population 
of neighboring operations personnel, if any. For these reasons, the FAA 
adopts the proposal without amendment.
    In addition to comments recommending that neighboring operations 
personnel be excluded from the definition of ``public,'' several 
commenters had other recommendations for the proposed definition of 
``public.'' CSF commented that the proposal does not specify how 
involved in a licensed operation a person needs to be to fall outside 
public risk protections. CSF also proposed that the definition of 
``public'' should allow for a risk threshold for those who have been 
briefed on the risks and hazards and chosen to participate to the same 
level as neighboring operations personnel, and that historic NASA 
operations have followed this model. CSF further stated that the 
definition of ``public'' should not include persons who have a passive 
involvement in the licensed activity, such as invited guests of the 
operator, customers, families of astronauts, and other stakeholders 
with a legitimate enough interest in the launch or reentry activity to 
be on-site. SpaceX echoed CSF's comments on this issue, and further 
suggested that the definition of ``public'' should generally include 
only those people who reside and work outside the controlled areas of a 
launch or reentry site. Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX recommended 
excluding invited guests of the launch or reentry operator from the 
definition of ``public.''
    As discussed earlier, the FAA's definition of ``public'' was 
derived from the definition of ``public safety'' in Sec.  401.5 and the 
definition of ``public'' in Sec.  420.5. Historically, the FAA has 
considered ``public'' to include all people and property that are not 
involved in supporting a licensed or permitted launch and in the final 
rule extends the same definition to reentry. While neighboring 
operations personnel or invited guests \45\ may accept a higher level 
of background risk, they are not involved in supporting the particular 
licensed operation and this rule continues the FAA's longstanding 
practice of protecting them as members of the ``public.'' While the FAA 
expects that certain members of the public may be briefed and aware of 
hazards, the FAA does not agree with CSF's rationale that being 
informed is a sufficient condition for such persons to be treated under 
the higher risk threshold for neighboring operations personnel. In 
addition to being informed of potential hazards, neighboring operations 
personnel are required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks 
at the neighboring site. The FAA finds that the necessity of these 
tasks justifies the minimal increase in risk to which neighboring 
operations personnel are exposed. Informed members of the public do not 
meet this criterion and, therefore, will continue to be protected at 
the public threshold rather than the higher threshold for neighboring 
operations personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The FAA is not proposing a higher risk threshold for 
invited guests or other consenting members of the public at this 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA considered potential regulatory mechanisms for allowing 
public stakeholders with a legitimate enough interest in the launch or 
reentry activity to be on-site as requested by commenters. However, the 
FAA identified certain statutory and regulatory challenges with making 
these changes as a part of this final rule. Given the inherent risks 
associated with commercial space activity, Congress established a 
framework for liability insurance and financial responsibility that 
distinguishes individuals involved in launch or reentry activities from 
third parties. Section 50902 defines third party as persons other than 
launch or reentry participants.\46\ Section 50914

[[Page 79597]]

states that a licensee must obtain liability insurance to protect 
launch or reentry participants from third party claims, based on 
maximum probable loss calculations.\47\ Additionally, section 50914(b) 
establishes a reciprocal waiver of claims regime for applicable parties 
whereby each party to the waiver agrees to be responsible for personal 
injury to, death of, or property damage or loss sustained by it or its 
own employees resulting from an activity carried out under the 
applicable license. This regime includes certain parties waiving claims 
against the U.S. Government.\48\ The FAA has codified these 
requirements in the part 440 regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Specifically, in accordance with Sec.  50902(26), ``third 
party'' means a person except--
    (A) the United States Government or the Government's contractors 
or subcontractors involved in launch services or reentry services;
    (B) a licensee or transferee under this chapter;
    (C) a licensee's or transferee's contractors, subcontractors, or 
customers involved in launch services or reentry services;
    (D) the customer's contractors or subcontractors involved in 
launch services or reentry services; or
    (E) crew, government astronauts, or space flight participants.
    \47\ Specifically, in accordance with Sec.  50914(a)(4), the 
insurance must protect the following, to the extent of their 
potential liability for involvement in launch services or reentry 
services, at no cost to the Government:
    (A) the Government.
    (B) executive agencies and personnel, contractors, and 
subcontractors of the Government.
    (C) contractors, subcontractors, and customers of the licensee 
or transferee.
    (D) contractors and subcontractors of the customer.
    (E) space flight participants.
    \48\ 51 U.S.C. 50914(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the FAA may waive certain risk requirements in order to allow 
members of the public to be present in hazard areas during launch or 
reentry activities, these individuals are third parties under title 51 
and will therefore be included in maximum probable loss calculations. 
This would likely increase insurance costs, which would be borne by the 
licensee. Additionally, these individuals are not currently included in 
title 51's cross-waiver framework nor has the FAA gone beyond the scope 
of title 51 in part 440 to expand the cross-waiver framework to include 
them. As such, their presence in hazard areas during launch or reentry 
activities may increase the liability of the United States (and others 
involved in the launch who have executed cross-waivers with the 
operator) because of the increased potential for third party claims. 
Finally, any regulatory changes would need to be effectuated in part 
440 where the FAA's financial responsibility requirements for 
commercial space transportation are located; however, the FAA did not 
contemplate substantial changes to part 440 in this rulemaking. Because 
of these challenges, the FAA elects to proceed with a waiver regime 
rather than a regulatory change at this time.The FAA notes that 
operators may request waivers to allow members of the public to be 
present in areas where risk requirements under part 450 would not 
otherwise allow them to be during launch and reentry activities.\49\ 
Such requests can serve a purpose of encouraging, facilitating, or 
promoting commercial space launches and reentries by the private 
sector, facilitating private sector involvement in commercial space 
transportation activity, and promoting public-private partnerships. 
However, the FAA expects operators to articulate more specifically the 
reasons why allowing particular individuals to be in areas they 
otherwise would be prohibited from entering is in the public interest. 
In considering such waiver requests, the FAA would be mindful of its 
role in protecting the public and accounting for any additional 
liability such a waiver would impose on the U.S. Government. Some 
factors that would affect the FAA's decision may include the number of 
people an operator seeks to have present and the strength of 
association between those people and the launch or reentry activity. 
Individuals that have an employment or contractual arrangement with the 
licensee, or are otherwise part of the cross-waiver framework of the 
license, may pose minimal, if any, liability for the U.S. Government. 
This could include high-level company officials and U.S. Government 
officials. Members of the public for whom a waiver is requested should 
have a strong connection to the launch, reentry, or licensee; for 
example, future customers, major investors, or invited press might 
qualify.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Should the FAA grant such a waiver, any individuals to whom 
the waiver applied would still constitute third parties under title 
51 U.S.C. 50902, and operators would continue to be required to 
obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility 
to cover third party claims as required by 51 U.S.C. 50914 and 14 
CFR part 440.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The operator bears the burden of providing adequate justification 
for this relief through the waiver process. The operator should include 
in its waiver application an assessment of the risks to the individuals 
covered by the requested waiver,\50\ information on how the operator 
will assume liability and hold the U.S. Government harmless, and the 
individuals' association to the launch, reentry, or licensee. The FAA 
anticipates using its experience in considering waivers to accommodate 
the presence of additional members of the public during commercial 
space launch and reentry activities to inform potential future 
rulemaking in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ An operator may perform a risk analysis using its own 
methods or the risk analyses identified in part 450 in order to 
demonstrate the individual and collective risks imposed on the 
individuals identified in the waiver request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA also received several comments on the proposed definition 
of ``neighboring operations personnel.'' Blue Origin requested that the 
FAA further define the term ``critical tasks'' referenced in the new 
definition to include ``tasks that are critical to normal business 
operations.''
    The FAA does not agree that adding Blue Origin's definition of 
``critical tasks'' is necessary. In the absence of a regulatory 
definition, the plain language definition applies and is sufficient 
here. In addition, the FAA gave context in the preamble to the NPRM for 
the types of activity that may qualify as ``safety, security, or 
critical tasks.'' The plain language definition maintains flexibility 
to include various tasks as industry practices evolve over time. These 
tasks include maintaining the security of a site or facility or 
performing critical launch processing tasks such as monitoring pressure 
vessels or testing safety-critical systems of a launch vehicle for an 
upcoming mission. These tasks also include business operations that 
cannot be reasonably conducted off site, such as onsite hardware work 
as well as data processing that must be conducted in a secure facility. 
Neighboring operations personnel do not include individuals conducting 
normal business operations that need not be conducted in hazardous 
areas, individuals in training for any job, or individuals performing 
routine activities such as administrative, office building maintenance, 
human resource functions, or janitorial work. This flexibility 
accommodates practices like those USAF and NASA follow at their launch 
sites and is intended to allow critical operations to proceed at 
neighboring locations without jeopardizing those operations. As 
explained in the NPRM, neighboring operations personnel are members of 
the public. The FAA allows a slightly increased risk to these personnel 
over that permissible to other members of the public. The FAA does not 
believe that an increase in risk is justified for reasons other than to 
facilitate performing safety, security, or critical tasks at the site. 
The FAA estimates that the collective risk criteria in the final rule 
for neighboring operations personnel will enable, on average, 
approximately forty additional personnel to operatate in this capacity, 
which the FAA believes will ensure that neighboring operators can 
maintain operations with minimum disruption.
    Virgin Galactic commented that the definition of ``neighboring 
operations personnel'' should include all personnel who have been 
properly trained to respond to hazards present at a launch or reentry 
site and who are notified of hazardous operations occurring by other 
licensed operators at that site. Virgin

[[Page 79598]]

Galactic objected to including in the definition a requirement that 
neighboring operations personnel be notified of the operation, stating 
that a lack of notification should not exclude individuals from 
qualifying as neighboring operations personnel. Similarly, ULA 
commented that the requirement appeared to be mostly in the definition, 
which ``removes the definition's objectivity.''
    FAA disagrees with Virgin Galactic that training and notification 
are sufficient to justify the inclusion of personnel in the neighboring 
operations personnel category. Training alone does not justify placing 
personnel at a raised level of risk. Only those personnel performing 
safety, security, or critical tasks qualify as neighboring operations 
personnel who may be subjected to a higher risk threshold because of 
the nature of those tasks, as discussed previously and in the NPRM. 
Furthermore, as explained in the NPRM, requiring a licensee to ensure 
neighboring operations personnel are trained would be burdensome and is 
not necessary to justify the increase in risk allowed for workers 
performing safety, security, or critical tasks.
    The FAA does not agree with Virgin Galactic and ULA that the 
definition of ``neighboring operations personnel'' imposes a regulatory 
requirement. Rather, it enables neighboring operations to continue by 
describing which individuals qualify as neighboring operations 
personnel. Notification of an operation is a precondition to qualify as 
neighboring operations personnel. Personnel cannot be designated as 
neighboring operations personnel and be subject to the higher risk 
thresholds, if they have not been notified of the operation. For these 
reasons, the FAA declines to accept these particular changes to the 
proposed definition.
    A number of commenters focused on which authority designates 
personnel as neighboring operations personnel. Many commenters, 
including CSF, Space Florida, and SpaceX, noted their agreement that 
the designation of neighboring operations personnel should be 
coordinated and determined by the site operator, but urged the FAA to 
remove its proposed neighboring operations personnel risk thresholds 
and instead allow site operators to designate what mitigations would be 
necessary to protect neighboring operations personnel. CSF urged the 
FAA generally to defer to Federal, State, local, or private site owners 
and operators as the sole decision-makers responsible for determining 
which personnel would be considered essential to ongoing operations and 
what hazard mitigation measures should be observed.
    Other commenters, including ULA and Virgin Galactic, commented that 
the FAA should designate neighboring operations personnel. These 
commenters argued that a site operator should not determine who 
qualifies as neighboring operations personnel, because it would be 
tantamount to the FAA's reassigning its decision-making authority on 
the matter. Sierra Nevada recommended that the FAA collect the 
neighboring operations personnel information and calculate the risk on 
behalf of the applicant so that the proprietary nature of workforce 
numbers can be maintained between competitive companies. The Aerospace 
Industry Association (AIA), Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, and other 
commenters also raised concerns about how proprietary data would be 
shared after neighboring operations are designated. Virgin Galactic 
commented that those best suited to know which employees are required 
for safety, security, or critical tasks are the other launch operators, 
not the site operator.
    As previously described, the FAA maintains that the separate risk 
thresholds are the appropriate protections for neighboring operations 
personnel, and the FAA does not agree with removing its proposed 
neighboring operations personnel risk thresholds and instead allowing 
site operators to designate what mitigations would be necessary to 
protect neighboring operations personnel. The FAA does not agree with 
ULA and Virgin Galactic that the FAA or the launch operator should 
determine what individuals are appropriately classified as neighboring 
operations personnel. Site operators are in the best position to know 
what operations occur on their sites and which individuals are 
appropriately designated as neighboring operations personnel. The FAA 
expects that the site operator (i.e., an operator of a Federal site or 
FAA-licensed launch or reentry site) would work with operators of 
neighboring sites to identify these personnel because the site operator 
is in the best position to identify which personnel are required to 
perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the launch site. The 
site operator has a formal relationship with all operators on its site 
and has an interest in enabling continued and unimpeded operations 
amongst its tenants. At Federal sites, the site operator already 
fulfills this function, and thus enabling neighboring operations 
personnel does not impose any additional costs on the site operator. 
The designation of neighboring operations personnel is optional for 
FAA-licensed or exclusive use site operators. The FAA will monitor a 
launch site operator's designation and vehicle operator's 
implementation of neighboring operations personnel to ensure the 
appropriateness of these designations, thereby retaining its authority 
to determine which individuals are properly characterized as 
neighboring operations personnel.
    Further, site operators are best positioned to adjudicate between 
tenants, to coordinate acceptable numbers of neighboring operations 
personnel during licensed operations, and to protect their tenants' 
proprietary information and furnish the necessary information to the 
licensed operator. The FAA expects that the coordination of the 
necessary data transfer will be collaborative between the licensed 
operator, the site operator, and the neighboring operators. Neighboring 
operators have the option of removing their personnel during the flight 
of a neighboring flight or reentry. As discussed above, neighboring 
operators have the option of discussing with the site operator which 
personnel they believe need to remain present in order to maintain 
safety, security, or other critical tasks. The accommodation of 
neighboring operations personnel through the risk thresholds benefits 
the launch or reentry operator by reducing the possibility that their 
presence without evacuation could result in a violation of the public 
risk criteria. It also benefits the neighboring operators to allow 
safety, security, or critical tasks to continue in cases where the site 
operator might otherwise require evacuation of personnel. Hence, the 
FAA believes that generally, as is current practice at Federal sites, 
neighboring operations personnel can be accommodated with little direct 
intervention by the FAA.
    Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX all commented that the neighboring 
operations personnel provisions should apply to exclusive-use or 
private sites. Blue Origin asked whether the FAA intended to exclude 
such sites from its proposal because, although these are sites that the 
FAA does not license, launch and reentry activities at these sites can 
cause disruptions to non-licensed neighboring activities, such as 
developmental or test programs.
    The FAA does not license exclusive-use sites, but it does license 
launch and reentry activities that occur at exclusive-use sites. The 
FAA does not anticipate that many exclusive-use sites would have 
personnel within a launch or reentry site, or an adjacent launch or 
reentry site, that qualify as neighboring

[[Page 79599]]

operations personnel. Nevertheless, the FAA may accept the designation 
of neighboring operations personnel at an exclusive-use site if they 
are designated by the licensed vehicle operator that operates the site. 
Such designations will only apply to members of the public located 
within the site or an adjacent launch or reentry site who are not 
associated with the specific hazardous licensed or permitted operation 
being conducted, but who are required to perform safety, security, or 
critical tasks at the site and are notified of the operation. This 
approach is accommodated by the proposed regulations without change.
    The FAA recognizes that there are activities that currently take 
place at launch sites that are not explicitly associated with launch or 
reentry operations. For example, payload processing typically occurs at 
launch sites. The Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein also has facilities 
that are essential for tracking objects in space. The U.S. Navy has a 
presence at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS). These activities 
may sometimes require critical personnel to remain on site during 
neighboring launch activities to ensure the continuation of operations. 
While the FAA envisioned primarily facilitating launch operations by 
proposing a carve out for neighboring operations personnel, it will 
allow other personnel conducting non-licensed activities on a launch or 
reentry site or an adjacent launch or reentry site to qualify as 
neighboring operations personnel as long as they meet the criteria 
enumerated in the definition.
    ALPA and Space Florida questioned whether the neighboring 
operations personnel provisions would apply at joint spaceport/airport 
facilities to allow airport staff to stay in the hazard area or clear 
zone based on risk assessments during licensed space operations. In the 
NPRM, the FAA took into account that neighboring operations personnel 
are more likely than the rest of the public to be specially trained and 
prepared to respond to hazards present at a launch or reentry site. The 
USAF and NASA definitions specify that these personnel are either 
trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by a properly trained 
escort. However, the FAA did not require that neighboring operations 
personnel be trained or accompanied by a trained escort because such a 
requirement would be burdensome, and training is not necessary to 
justify the slight increase in risk allowed for workers performing 
safety, security, or critical tasks. Although in developing the NPRM, 
the FAA did not contemplate airport personnel at co-located sites as 
neighboring operations personnel, the proposed definition did not 
preclude the possibility. In response to commenters, the FAA finalizes 
the definition of ``neighboring operations personnel'' as proposed, and 
agrees that the definition may include airport personnel working at a 
launch site.
    Many commenters expressed concerns about the impact of designating 
neighboring operations personnel on the MPL calculation and the 
associated financial responsibility requirements. Northrup Grumman, 
Sierra Nevada, SpaceX, and ULA all commented that the inclusion of 
neighboring operations personnel would likely raise MPL, even at the 
proposed lower threshold in the NPRM. CSF, Space Florida, and SpaceX 
requested that neighboring operations personnel should be excluded from 
MPL calculations via waivers of liability.
    Section 50914(c) of title 51 of the U.S. Code states that the 
Secretary of Transportation shall determine the maximum probable losses 
for which a licensee must obtain liability insurance or demonstrate 
financial responsibility. This amount must include the maximum probable 
loss from claims by, in relevant part, third parties. 51 U.S.C. 
50914(a)(1)(A). Neighboring operations personnel are third parties 
under chapter 509 of title 51.\51\ Therefore, the FAA must include 
neighboring operations personnel in its MPL calculations.
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    \51\ ``Third party'' means a person except--(A) the United 
States Government or the Government's contractors or subcontractors 
involved in launch services or reentry services; (B) a licensee or 
transferee under this chapter; (C) a licensee's or transferee's 
contractors, subcontractors, or customers involved in launch 
services or reentry services; (D) the customer's contractors or 
subcontractors involved in launch services or reentry services; or 
(E) crew, government astronauts, or space flight participants. 51 
U.S.C. 50902(26).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA agrees with the comments that MPL calculations could be 
affected by the designation of neighboring operations personnel because 
the proposed rule allowed more people to stay inside the 1 x 
10-\5\ probability of casualty hazard area. While the FAA 
must include neighboring operations personnel in the MPL calculation, 
it does not expect the inclusion to affect materially the MPL amount. 
This expectation is based on the adoption in the proposed rule, for the 
purpose of determining MPL, of setting the threshold for neighboring 
operations personnel at the same threshold for losses to government 
property and involved government personnel. The MPL will determine 
losses to property and personnel of neighboring operators that have a 
probability of occurrence of no less than one in one hundred thousand 
(1 x 10-\5\), instead of the more stringent requirement of 
one in ten million (1 x 10-\7\) used for other third party 
losses. This threshold is appropriate for neighboring operations 
personnel because, unlike other third parties, except for involved 
government personnel, the presence of neighboring operations personnel 
at a launch or reentry site is necessary either for security reasons or 
to avoid the disruption of co-located activities at neighboring sites. 
The MPL methodology captures catastrophic events that, while extremely 
unlikely, still fall within the probability threshold.
    The FAA's examination of past MPL determinations gives it 
confidence that these other events will generally drive MPL amounts 
more than the limited presence of neighboring operations personnel.\52\ 
While additional insurance costs are expected to be minimal, these 
minimal cost burdens are more appropriately placed on the launch or 
reentry operator creating the hazards, rather than the neighboring 
operator who otherwise must halt its operation. The FAA notes, however, 
that these regulations do not prevent a launch operator from entering 
into an agreement with a neighboring operator to recover costs as a 
result of any increase in the required amount of third party liability 
insurance due to the presence of neighboring operations personnel. 
Should a launch operator choose to enter into such an agreement, the 
launch operator would still be required to purchase insurance to cover 
all third parties, to include any neighboring operations personnel, and 
could seek reimbursement as a secondary measure. Therefore, the FAA 
adopts the proposal without amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ For example, the third party MPL for an Atlas 541 launch 
from CCAFS is currently $164M, which accounts for an event involving 
30 third party casualties based on the risk profile method. An 
unlicensed government launch of the same vehicle occurred with 12 
people deemed neighboring operations personnel that were located 
within the 1 x 10-\6\ PC contour. If the 
conditions present during that unlicensed launch were to occur under 
part 450, then those 12 neighboring operations personnel would be 
accounted for in the third party MPL calculation at the 1 x 
10-\5\ probability threshold (instead of the current 
standard 1 x 10-\7\ threshold for third parties as 
explained in the previous paragraph). The presence of the 12 
neighboring operations personnel does not exceed the event involving 
30 third party casualties. Therefore, it is unlikely that those 12 
neighboring operations personnel would lead to an increase in the 
MPL for the Atlas 541 under part 450.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 79600]]

b. High Consequence Event Protection (Sec.  450.101(c))
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to expand the FAA's use of 
consequence criteria to protect the public from an unlikely but 
catastrophic event. Specifically, the FAA proposed to use conditional 
expected casualties (CEC) as the quantitative metric for: 
(1) Determining the need for flight abort \53\ as a hazard control 
strategy in proposed Sec.  450.101(c); (2) setting reliability 
standards for an FSS required by Sec.  450.101(c) in proposed Sec.  
450.145(a); and (3) determining when to initiate a flight abort in 
proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2). The proposed use of 
CEC represented the most significant change in the NPRM 
because it introduced a new safety criteria pertaining to low 
probability, high consequence events and provided a means by which an 
operator could demonstrate that expensive, highly reliable FSS design 
and testing may be unnecessary to protect public safety. As explained 
in the NPRM, consequence can be measured in terms of CEC 
without regard to the probability of failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ In the final rule, flight abort is defined as the process 
to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and safety, and 
the safety of property, presented by a launch vehicle or reentry 
vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by initiating and 
accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight. Flight abort is 
discussed more fully in the discussion of Sec.  450.108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received extensive comments on this proposal and, as a 
result, has made significant changes in the final rule to allow for 
additional flexibility in measuring and mitigating high consequence 
events. The following subsections provide an overview of the finalized 
CEC requirements in Sec.  450.101(c), the FAA's rationale 
for making the change, and specific responses to comments. The FAA 
notes that this section of the preamble focuses on CEC as a 
means to measure the potential for high consequence events under Sec.  
450.101(c). CEC will be discussed further in the preamble 
sections addressing Sec. Sec.  450.108 (Flight Abort) and 450.145 
(Highly Reliable Flight Safety System).
i. Sec.  450.101(c)
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.101(c) would require an operator to 
use flight abort as a hazard control strategy if the consequence of any 
reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any one-second period 
of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-\3\ CEC for 
uncontrolled areas. The FAA further proposed that the requirement would 
apply to all phases of flight, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
Administrator based on the demonstrated reliability of the launch or 
reentry vehicle during that phase of flight. Although not specifically 
spelled out in the regulatory text, the FAA explained in the preamble 
that Sec.  450.101(c) was designed to ensure the public was 
sufficiently protected against low probability, high consequence events 
using CEC as a measure of the potential for high consequence 
events.
    In the final rule, the FAA retains the use of CEC as a 
quantitative criteria that an applicant may use to measure the 
potential for high consequence events. However, as explained in the 
preamble section addressing Sec.  450.101(c)(2), the FAA revises Sec.  
450.37(b) (Equivalent Level of Safety) to allow an applicant to propose 
an alternative way to measure high consequence events other than by 
CEC. The final rule also allows multiple ways an applicant 
may protect against a low probability, high consequence event in 
uncontrolled areas for each phase of flight in Sec.  450.101(c)(1) 
through (3). As discussed in more detail later in this section, an 
operator sufficiently protects against a high consequence event by (1) 
using flight abort in accordance with Sec.  450.108; (2) demonstrating 
that CEC is below a certain threshold without any FSS; or 
(3) demonstrating sufficient vehicle reliability and in consideration 
of CEC.\54\ The FAA changes the heading of Sec.  450.101(c) 
from ``Flight Abort'' in the NPRM to ``High Consequence Event 
Protection'' in the final rule because this section allows an operator 
in certain circumstances to use a method other than flight abort to 
protect against high consequence events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ A CEC value is calculated as the mean number of 
casualties predicted to occur given a specified failure mode in a 
given time interval with a probability of 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Multiple commenters, including CSF, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX, 
stated that the NPRM requirements in Sec.  450.101(c) were too 
prescriptive and objected to the lack of an explicit provision allowing 
an applicant to propose another approach to address a high consequence 
event, absent a waiver. The FAA agrees that the final rule should 
provide additional flexibility and discusses those changes in more 
detail later in this section.
    Multiple commenters, including CSF and Virgin Galactic, indicated 
that the EC collective risk criteria alone should be enough 
to establish the need for an FSS, the reliability of the FSS, and when 
an FSS would be required to be activated to ensure public safety.\55\ 
The FAA finds that the use of collective risk through analyses of 
EC and individual risk through analysis of Probability of 
Casualty (PC) is inherently inadequate to establish 
sufficient protection against low probability, high consequence events 
during launch and reentry operations. Whereas PC limits the 
maximum risk to an individual and EC limits the average 
outcome in terms of casualties in a group of people, both PC 
and EC are indifferent to the risk of events that involve 
multiple casualties. This indifference means that, if the risk of a 
potential event that could result in a high number of casualties is low 
enough, the PC and EC criteria would not act to 
prevent that event. As explained in the NPRM, the purpose of 
CEC is to protect the public from certain high consequence 
events, regardless of the probability of those events. Thus, the final 
rule includes specific provisions, such as in Sec. Sec.  450.101, 
450.108, and 450.145, to ensure adequate protection against low 
probability but high consequence events during launch and reentry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ As proposed, Sec.  450.101(c) simply used CEC to 
determine whether flight abort would be required as a hazard control 
strategy. Other proposed regulations relied on CEC to 
establish FSS reliability and activation of FSS. These regulations 
and the response to commenters' concern with using CEC for those 
purposes are discussed later in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a conditional risk assessment ensures adequate 
mitigation measures are in place to protect against a low probability, 
high consequence event in circumstances in which EC and Pc 
may not dictate the need for mitigation. As explained in the NPRM, 
unlike collective risk that determines the expected casualties 
factoring in the probability that a dangerous event will occur, 
conditional risk determines the expected casualties assuming the 
dangerous event will occur.\56\ This assumption means that using 
EC alone may result in a lack of mitigations, such as flight 
abort capability and preparedness, for certain high consequence events 
because the low probability of occurrence would translate into an 
EC below the 1 x 10-\4\ limit. Conversely, using 
a conditional risk assessment ensures that, if a high consequence event 
is reasonably foreseeable, such as an incorrect azimuth at lift-off, 
then an operator will have a mitigation in place to prevent that event 
from producing catastrophic results. This result is assured because the 
decision to activate an FSS is always made in response to a system 
failure in the operational environment, as no operator plans to 
implement a flight abort unless the mission objectives include an 
intentional test of the FSS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See 84 FR at 15298.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 79601]]

    Calculating CEC ensures an operator correctly recognizes 
certain system failures that may have catastrophic consequences and 
builds mitigations into the system to account for those failures. As 
such, an FSS is generally activated in the following context: (1) The 
vehicle is no longer performing nominally; (2) the vehicle is outside 
the limits of a useful mission; \57\ and (3) continued flight would 
increase public risks in uncontrolled areas. Hence, the risk to the 
public associated with the decision to activate an FSS is inherently 
conditioned on the fact that a system failure has occurred. An operator 
would only identify a system failure for low probability, high 
consequence events if the operator used a CEC-based 
analysis, rather than an EC calculation, because a 
CEC analysis assumes that the event will occur. Therefore, 
relying on the collective risk criteria alone would not adequately 
protect against low probability, high consequence events that could 
result in multiple public casualties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Limits of a useful mission are defined in the final rule as 
the trajectory data or other parameters that bound the performance 
of a useful mission, including flight azimuth limits. This concept 
is discussed in greater detail in Sec.  450.119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received several comments regarding the potential for 
various launch operations to comply with the proposed CEC 
thresholds in the NPRM. Rocket Lab USA, Inc. (``Rocket Lab'') commented 
that it would be ``nearly impossible'' for any orbital launch vehicle 
to meet the CEC thresholds defined in the proposal and 
recommended the use of cumulative risk and individual risk metrics as 
additional or alternative means of determining the reliability required 
for the flight abort system. Blue Origin also stated that most, if not 
all operators, including those operating smaller suborbital launch 
vehicles in remote locations, would be forced to implement an FSS that 
complies with an unmodified set of USAF requirements. SpaceX 
recommended that the FAA gather more detail on CEC for 
different launch vehicles and trajectory profiles to evaluate 
appropriate lower tiers of reliability.
    The FAA sponsored a series of tasks, performed by ACTA, LLC (ACTA), 
to investigate the potential conditional risks associated with a wide 
array of past and foreseeable future launch operations using the best 
available information and tools. The study \58\ provided an independent 
evaluation of the potential for the CEC-related requirements 
in the NPRM to necessitate changes to current practice for more than a 
dozen missions involving large, medium, and small launch vehicles from 
a wide variety of sites. The results of this study demonstrate that the 
required reliability of an FSS for relatively small rockets depends 
greatly on the launch site. Specifically, the ACTA study found that a 
small ELV launched from Cape Canaveral or Wallops Island would need a 
highly reliable FSS compliant with proposed Sec.  450.145 to meet the 
NPRM requirements, but that a less reliable FSS, such as an FSS 
compliant with proposed Sec.  450.143, would suffice for the same 
vehicle launched from more remote locations, such as the Mahia 
Peninsula and Kodiak Island. To the extent that commenters suggested 
proposed Sec.  450.101(c) would require currently licensed operators to 
use an FSS, the ACTA study results indicate that no changes would be 
required under the final rule regarding the need for an FSS for any 
currently licensed launch vehicle launched from a Federal launch or 
reentry site.\59\ The ACTA study also indicates that, for operators who 
currently employ an FSS to meet the FAA's public risk criteria, their 
current practices regarding FSS reliability and activation criteria 
would be sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the requirements in 
Sec.  450.108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ The report can be found in docket number FAA-2019-0229.
    \59\ The ACTA study made four notable conclusions:
    1. For two current launch vehicles launched from outside the 
continential US, the 1 x 10-\3\ CEC threshold 
is not exceeded. Thus, part 450 will not require an FSS for either 
of these two launches, yet both are designed to employ an FSS (as 
required by part 417).
    2. For ten launch vehicles launched from within the continential 
US9, the part 450 CEC requirements are consistent with 
current practice, where part 417 requires the highly reliable FSS.
    3. For two piloted launch vehicles, one would require no 
changes, and the other would require no FSS although a flight abort 
capability is currently employed under part 431.
    4. One current reentry poses CEC well above the 1 x 
10-\2\ threshold. Thus, under part 450 this reentry 
operation would either need to be modified to reduce the consequence 
of failure modes that would result in an intact impact, or be 
granted a waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters asserted that the proposed CEC 
requirements would increase cost for operators, particularly for 
current RLV operators.
    CEC analysis is not mandatory. If an operator chooses to 
use a Sec.  450.145 compliant FSS, it does not need to do the 
CEC analysis to establish if a Sec.  450.145 compliant FSS 
is necessary or if a Sec.  450.143 compliant FSS would suffice. A 
CEC analysis to establish compliant Flight Safety Limits is 
unnecessary if the operator chooses to demonstrate compliance with 
Sec.  450.108(c)(6).
    The FAA does not agree that the cost of a CEC analysis 
is prohibitively expensive. The FAA provides estimates in the final 
Regulatory Impact Assessment of the costs of the CEC 
analyses as well as estimates of cost savings on those launches that 
will not need an FSS.
    The ACTA study calculated CEC for a sample of licensed 
RLVs and the results indicate that the final rule will not require any 
changes regarding the FSS robustness and FSS activation criteria 
currently used for the operations at the Mojave Air and Space Port. The 
ACTA study results suggest that launches from Spaceport America would 
not need to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy to meet the 
CEC requirements in the final rule. Thus, the ACTA study 
suggests the final rule could facilitate a reduction in costs for RLV 
launches from non-Federal launch sites for current part 431 licenses 
that include flight abort as a hazard control strategy. Ultimately, the 
ACTA study indicates that CEC will not drive a requirement 
for flight abort for currently licensed RLVs operating from non-Federal 
sites and is therefore not expected to drive costs for RLV operators. 
In the final Regulatory Impact Analysis, the FAA discusses in detail 
estimated voluntary costs to perform CEC analyses as well as 
cost savings that result when an FSS is not required.
    Several commenters, including CSF, Rocket Lab, Sierra Nevada, 
SpaceX, and an individual commenter, expressed a need for clarification 
of acceptable methodologies to compute CEC. CSF and Sierra 
Nevada commented that there are no publicly available methodologies or 
background for conducting CEC analysis. CSF noted that the 
CEC analysis is computationally intensive and approved risk 
analysis tools and input data were not readily available. SpaceX stated 
it needed guidance on several specific technical issues on the 
computation of CEC. Rocket Lab stated that, without 
standardized methods and input data, results would vary widely.
    The FAA notes that CEC is inherent in the calculation of 
EC for launch or reentry operations. There are extensive 
guidance documents available currently that explain methodologies that 
can be used to compute EC and, as a byproduct, 
CEC as well.\60\ The FAA is aware of at least one operator 
that has used these guidelines to develop and implement its own safety 
analysis tools to demonstrate

[[Page 79602]]

compliance with the current public risk criteria under part 417. Some 
tools have already been modified to compute CEC with only a 
few hours of effort. Even so, the FAA remains dedicated to improving 
the guidance materials available to applicants and plans to provide 
additional advisory materials to explain acceptable safety analysis 
methods, including those that address any unique aspects of 
CEC computations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See e.g., the FAA Flight Safety Analysis Handbook v 1.0, 
2009 and the Range Commanders Council Risk Committee of the Range 
Safety Group, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges--
Supplement, RCC 321-20, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sierra Nevada commented that CEC analysis was not a 
widely accepted practice, nor had it been subject to rigorous testing, 
and it was not ready to be implemented. In response, the FAA notes that 
RCC 321 Standard and Supplement has included conditional risk standards 
and guidelines since 2010. Moreover, CEC analysis has been 
used to help inform important decisions regarding the safety of 
commercial space transportation operations since 2016, when the FAA 
first cited CEC as part of a formal waiver evaluation.\61\ 
As noted in the NPRM preamble, in granting these waivers, the FAA has 
adopted the conditional risk management approach, noting that the 
predicted consequence was below a threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ 
CEC.\62\ The FAA further stated in the preamble that 
measuring the consequence from reasonably foreseeable, albeit unlikely, 
failures is an appropriate metric to assess prudent mitigations of 
risks to public health and safety and the safety of property. In recent 
years, the USAF has also used CEC analyses to establish 
appropriate FSS activation criteria for launch operations from both 
CCAFS and VAFB. Most recently, the FAA considered the results of 
CEC analyses in granting waivers to the debris containment 
requirements in Sec.  417.213(a) and (d) that enabled the SAOCOM-1B 
mission to be conducted safely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 
81 FR 1470, 1470-1472 (January 12, 2016).
    \62\ 84 FR 15312.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters, including CSF, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX, 
recommended that the proposed CEC-related requirements be 
moved to a guidance document as an accepted means of compliance to a 
more performance-based regulation to preserve flexibility. CSF stated 
that, at a minimum, the quantitative criteria should be moved to a 
guidance document.
    The FAA considered replacing the proposed quantitative 
CEC criteria with a qualitative standard and moving the 
quantitative criteria to a guidance document as one acceptable means of 
compliance. However, the FAA finds that a qualitative approach to 
determine the three key CEC-related issues (i.e., the need 
for flight abort with a reliable FSS as a hazard control strategy, the 
reliability standards for any required FSS, and the criteria for 
activation of an FSS) would lack regulatory clarity necessary to ensure 
a consistent level of public protection, given the wide variety of 
launch and reentry operations. As noted by Rocket Lab and other 
commenters, even the results of quantitative high consequence event 
assessments can vary significantly from operator to operator without 
standardized methods and input data.
    Although quantitative CEC is retained in the final rule, 
the FAA adds flexibility in both the manner in which a high consequence 
may be measured and the manner in which an operator can sufficiently 
protect against a high consequence event. First, in the NPRM, ELOS 
would not have been allowed for the requirements in Sec.  450.101. As 
noted in the discussion of ELOS earlier in the preamble, the FAA has 
revised Sec.  450.37 in the final rule to allow operators to use ELOS 
to measure a high consequence event under Sec.  450.101(c)(2). Second, 
Sec.  450.101(c)(2) permits an operator whose CEC is greater 
than 1 x 10-\3\ to propose safeguards other than flight 
abort to reduce the CEC below 1 x 10-\3\. These 
revisions are discussed in greater detail later in this section.
    Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA provide a definition of 
CEC. In addition, Virgin Galactic commented that, in the 
NPRM preamble, CEC was described using the phrase, ``without 
regard to the probability of failure,'' which appeared to Virgin 
Galactic to translate to ``assume 100% failure probability.'' Virgin 
Galactic recommended the FAA use the terminology ``assuming the failure 
will occur'' and clearly state the probability of failure would be 1, 
if that was what was intended.
    The FAA does not agree that CEC should be defined in the 
final rule. Rather, the preamble and associated AC (on High Consequence 
Event Protection) discuss in detail what the requirement entails and 
how to calculate CEC. A CEC value is calculated 
as the mean number of casualties predicted to occur given a specified 
failure mode in a given time interval with a probability of 1. As 
previously mentioned, there are extensive guidance documents currently 
available that explain methodologies that can be used to compute 
EC and, as a byproduct, CEC as well.\63\ The term 
``high consequence'' appears in Sec.  417.107(a)(1)(ii), but the FAA 
chose not to define this term formally at this time to allow for 
operational flexibility. High consequence events include incidents that 
could involve multiple casualties, massive toxic exposures, extensive 
property or environmental damage, or events that jeopardize the 
national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ The FAA notes that CEC is inherent in the 
calculation of EC because the total EC for the 
operation is the sum of all EC contributions from each 
failure mode and failure time, and each EC contribution 
for a failure mode and failure time is the probability of failure 
multiplied by CEC. Therefore, CEC for a given 
failure mode and failure time can be found by dividing the 
EC contribution by the probability of failure for that 
failure mode and failure time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA provided 
regulatory text recommendations for Sec.  450.101(c) including removal 
of ``flight abort,'' stating that a distinction needed to be made from 
flight abort that was not initiated based on threat to public health 
and safety because not all abort systems are considered FSS.
    The FAA understands that the term ``flight abort'' has been used in 
other U.S. Government contexts to mean something different, but the FAA 
finds that ``flight abort'' accurately describes the required hazard 
mitigations while remaining flexible as to implementation. For these 
reasons, the FAA will not amend the rule to remove the term ``flight 
abort.'' The final rule adopts the proposed definition of flight abort 
in Sec.  401.7, which means the process to limit or restrict the 
hazards to public health and safety, and the safety of property, 
presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any 
payload, while in flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled 
ending to vehicle flight. The final rule also adopts in Sec.  401.7 the 
proposed definition of ``flight safety system,'' which means a system 
used to implement flight abort, for which a human can be a part of an 
FSS.
    The FAA finds that the definition of ``flight abort'' is consistent 
with current practice for licensed launches and reentries. Most RLVs 
use some method to achieve flight abort reliably, either in the form of 
a pilot that can safely abort flight using system controls or an 
automated system to terminate thrust. Traditional FSS for ELVs are 
comprised of an onboard flight termination system, a ground-based 
command and control system, and tracking and telemetry systems. 
Historically, the flight safety crew monitoring the course of a vehicle 
would send a command to self-destruct,

[[Page 79603]]

thus aborting the flight, if the vehicle crossed flight safety limits 
and in doing so threatened a protected area. Redundant transceivers in 
the launch vehicle would receive the destruct command from the ground, 
set off charges in the vehicle to destroy the vehicle and disperse the 
propellants so that an errant vehicle's hazards would not impact 
populated areas. While this method of flight abort through ordnance is 
conventional, the existing definition in Sec.  417.3 and the definition 
in the final rule do not require an FSS to be destructive.
    In response to commenters' concerns, the FAA finds that the 
definitions of ``flight abort'' and ``flight safety system'' adopted in 
the final rule remove any perceived confusion over the use of these 
terms for the purpose of FAA licensing under part 450.
ii. Sec.  450.101(c)(1)
    Section 450.101(c)(1) states that an operator must protect against 
a high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase of flight 
by using flight abort as a hazard control strategy in accordance with 
the requirements of Sec.  450.108. The FAA has not included the 
reference to the CEC threshold of 1 x 10-\3\ in 
Sec.  450.101(c)(1) because an operator who uses flight abort in 
accordance with Sec.  450.108 has demonstrated compliance with Sec.  
450.101(c)'s requirement to protect against a high consequence event 
without further inquiry into CEC beyond the requirements in 
Sec.  450.108(c). This change is consistent with the concept proposed 
in Sec.  450.101(c) of the NPRM that required an operator to use flight 
abort with a reliable FSS \64\ if CEC was greater than 1 x 
10-\3\ for any phase of flight. Under the proposal, if an 
operator elected to use flight abort with an FSS that met the 
reliability requirements in Sec.  450.145, the FAA would not have 
required the operator to calculate CEC for the purposes of 
determining compliance with proposed Sec.  450.101(c) because the 
operator opted into flight abort as a hazard control strategy 
irrespective of CEC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Proposed Sec.  450.101(c) required an operator to use fight 
abort with an FSS that met the reliability requirements set forth in 
Sec.  450.145. The reference to reliability requirements for FSS has 
been moved to Sec.  450.108(b) and will be discussed in that section 
of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As such, in the final rule, there is no need to reference a 
CEC threshold in Sec.  450.101(c)(1) because an operator who 
elects to use flight abort as its hazard control strategy and complies 
with Sec.  450.108 does not need to calculate CEC (beyond 
the requirements in Sec.  450.108(c) discussed later in the preamble) 
to determine that it has sufficiently protected against a high 
consequence event. Rather, use of flight abort consistent with the 
requirements in Sec.  450.108 by itself demonstrates compliance with 
Sec.  450.101(c).
    As explained in the next two sections, operators who do not elect 
to use flight abort consistent with the requirements of Sec.  450.108 
must demonstrate they can protect against a high consequence event by 
means other than flight abort. If an operator cannot demonstrate 
compliance with Sec.  450.101(c)(2)--including through ELOS--or (c)(3), 
the operator would be required to rely on Sec.  450.101(c)(1) as the 
only remaining means to protect against a high consequence event.
iii. Sec.  450.101(c)(2)
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.101(c)(2) states that an operator must 
protect against a high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each 
phase of flight by ensuring the consequence of any reasonably 
foreseeable failure mode, in any significant period of flight, is not 
greater than 1 x 10-\3\ CEC. As noted, proposed 
Sec.  450.101(c) would have required an operator with a CEC 
greater than 1 x 10-\3\ to use flight abort with an FSS that 
meets the reliability requirements of proposed Sec.  450.145 except for 
a single exception explained in greater detail in the discussion of 
Sec.  450.101(c)(3).
    The FAA recognizes that flight abort is not the only method to 
protect against low probability, high consequence events. Therefore, in 
the final rule, Sec.  450.101(c)(2) allows an operator with 
CEC greater than 1 x 10-\3\ in any significant 
period of flight to demonstrate protection against a low probability, 
high consequence event through means other than flight abort. This 
added flexibility in the final rule allows operators to implement other 
safeguards that sufficiently protect against a high consequence event. 
For example, one company included a design feature in a system so that 
a launch failure during downrange overflight would result in break-up 
and demise and thus mitigate the risk from the potential for the 
capsule to survive intact to impact.
    In addition, although this provision retains the quantitative 
CEC threshold proposed in Sec.  450.101(c), the FAA provides 
additional flexibility by modifying Sec.  450.37 to allow applicants to 
propose alternative approaches that provide an equivalent level of 
safety, which can be approved by the FAA without a waiver. The FAA 
added this flexibility because it is aware of methods other than using 
CEC to measure high consequence events, such as conditional 
risk profile. If an operator chooses to propose an alternative means of 
measuring a high consequence event, the FAA would expect the 
alternative means to account for the potential for any event that would 
be expected to produce multiple casualties,\65\ using a method that 
demonstrates equivalent level of safety to a CEC analysis. 
The operator must ensure that the alternative means accurately assesses 
that the operation would not exceed an acceptable threshold for high 
consequence events. In order to determine whether an alternative 
threshold for high consequence events is acceptable, the FAA will 
compare the alternative measurement to the CEC threshold. 
Alternatively, the applicant would be expected to demonstrate that 
either the consequence of any failure during any significant period of 
flight is at least an order of magnitude less than the average results 
from a fixed-wing general aviation aircraft fatal accident.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ High consequence events include incidents that could 
involve multiple casualties, massive toxic exposures, extensive 
property or environmental damage, or events that jeopardize the 
national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
    \66\ The FAA computed this risk profile using NTSB accident data 
between 1982 and 2019 for fixed-wing aircraft operated under FAR 
parts 91, 135, and 137, excluding aircraft type certificated under 
part 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, the Range Commanders Council Document 321-17, ``Common 
Risk Criteria Standards for National Test Ranges'' (RCC 321) includes 
catastrophic risk protection provisions that use a ``risk profile.'' 
\67\ In fact, the FAA currently uses a modified risk profile method to 
establish the insurance requirements for certain launch or reentry 
operations.\68\ The

[[Page 79604]]

FAA understands that risk profiles are currently in use in other 
industries \69\ and could be a useful means to quantify the probability 
of high consequence events associated with a wide variety of hazardous 
operations. However, the computation of a risk profile generally 
entails significantly more effort than the CEC evaluation 
because a risk profile involves more sophisticated computations and 
additional input data. Specifically, the development of a risk profile 
for a launch or reentry operation would consist of an evaluation of the 
absolute probability of each foreseeable failure mode and the relative 
probability of each outcome of each failure mode in terms of the number 
of public casualties that could result in uncontrolled areas. The RCC 
321 Supplement describes a more simplified and conservative method to 
screen for excessive catastrophic risk, which the FAA finds as another 
acceptable method to measure high consequence events.\70\ In contrast, 
a CEC analysis is independent of the probability of each 
failure mode and requires an assessment of only the average outcome of 
each failure mode. In addition, the FAA is publishing an AC that 
describes how an applicant can demonstrate compliance with Sec.  
450.101(c)(2) by showing that the conditional risk profile for its 
proposed launch or reentry mission is comparable with the conditional 
risk profile empirically derived from evidence from a set of past 
fixed-wing general aviation fatal accidents. Finally, the FAA 
recognizes that industry may develop new innovative and less burdensome 
methods, and therefore the final rule allows applicants to propose 
methods other than CEC to measure high consequence events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ RCC 321-17 defines a risk profile as ``a plot that shows 
the probability of N or more casualties (vertical axis) as a 
function of the number of casualties, N (horizontal axis),'' such 
that the area under a risk profile is equal to the EC. Unlike the 
single valued EC, risk profiles illustrate whether the collective 
risk is from a relatively low probability, high consequence event or 
from more frequent, smaller consequence outcomes.
    \68\ See, e.g., the 2016 Report to Congress ``FAA's Development 
of an Updated Maximum Probable Loss Method'' in response to Public 
Law 114-90, Section 102. An MPL analysis must model each accident 
scenario as a discrete event with discrete results, e.g., no 
casualties, exactly one casualty, two casualties, etc. Each accident 
scenario also has a quantitative probability of occurrence. The MPL 
analysis process involves simulation of many thousands of discrete 
accident scenarios that cover the parameter space of the problem 
(i.e., all foreseeable accident scenarios for each and every failure 
time and vehicle failure mode). The predicted results of all 
foreseeable accident scenarios are accumulated into a histogram and 
the risk profile is computed as the complementary cumulative 
distribution. For details, see Collins, Brinkman, and Carbon paper 
``Determination of Maximum Probable Loss'' presented at 2nd IAASS 
conference in Chicago, May 2007.
    \69\ For example, Santa Barbara County, California (where 
Vandenberg AFB is located) uses risk profiles as part of their 
management of public casualty risks from activities that involve 
significant quantities of hazardous materials as explained in the 
County of Santa Barbara, Planning and Development, Environmental 
Thresholds and Guidelines Manual, October 2008. Several European 
countries, including the UK and Netherlands, use risk profiles as 
part of their governance of a wide array of industries that pose 
public risks.
    \70\ For example, the catastrophic risk averse pseudo-
EC contribution from people in ships may be computed 
using a standard EC computation but replacing the number 
of casualties contributed by type of ship, N, with N raised to an 
exponent of 1.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In Sec.  450.101(c)(2), the FAA replaces the term ``one-second 
period of flight'' in proposed Sec.  450.101(c) with ``significant 
period of flight.'' A period of flight would be significant if it is 
long enough for a mitigation, such as flight abort, to decrease the 
public risks or consequences materially from any reasonably foreseeable 
failure mode. The FAA makes this change because it recognizes that for 
some launch and reentry concepts, such as relatively slow-moving 
vehicles like balloons, a ``significant'' period of flight could exceed 
one second. In addition, the FAA foresees circumstances in which an 
elevated CEC in a single second of flight would not warrant 
additional mitigation, such as when no additional mitigation would 
improve public safety meaningfully in terms of the public risks and 
consequences. The preamble discussion of Sec.  450.108 contains further 
explanation of what constitutes a material decrease.
    Finally, the final rule replaces the phrase ``any reasonably 
foreseeable vehicle response mode'' proposed in Sec.  450.101(c) with 
``any reasonably foreseeable failure mode'' in Sec.  450.101(c)(2) of 
the final rule. The NPRM defined ``vehicle response mode'' as a 
mutually exclusive scenario that characterizes foreseeable combinations 
of vehicle trajectory and debris generation. Thus, the NPRM would have 
required an evaluation of CEC for each foreseeable 
combination of vehicle trajectory and debris generation. By replacing 
the term ``vehicle response mode'' (VRM) with ``failure mode,'' the 
final rule is both less prescriptive and consistent with the current 
requirements.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ As part of the demonstration required under Sec.  
431.35(c), a part 431 applicant is required in Sec.  431.35(d)(4) to 
identify and describe all safety-critical failure modes and their 
consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the FAA defined a VRM as a mutually exclusive scenario 
that characterizes foreseeable combinations of vehicle trajectory and 
debris generation. As stated in the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.101(c) 
would have required, at a minimum, that an operator compute the 
effective casualty area and identify the population density that would 
be impacted for each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in 
any one-second period of flight in terms of CEC. The NPRM 
further explained that the casualty area, population density, and 
predicted consequence for each vehicle response mode are intermediate 
quantities that are necessary to demonstrate compliance with the 
individual and collective risk criteria currently; thus, these new 
requirements would not necessarily impart significant additional burden 
on operators.
    The draft AC 450.115-1 on High Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis 
published for comment in conjunction with the NPRM further explained 
that ``VRMs are a combination of debris list and failure modes'' and 
provided a description of typical failure modes for launch and reentry 
systems, including loss of thrust, engine explosion, attitude control 
failure, structural failure, separation failure, guidance or navigation 
failure, etc. Because the final rule replaces the term ``vehicle 
response mode'' with ``failure mode,'' an operator is no longer 
required to evaluate CEC for each foreseeable combination of 
failure mode and debris generation. Instead, an operator is required to 
evaluate CEC for each reasonably foreseeable failure mode in 
any significant period of flight.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ As an example of the distinction between ``vehicle response 
mode'' in the NPRM and ``reasonably foreseeable failure mode,'' in 
the final rule consider, a loss of thrust (LoT) failure mode. Under 
the NPRM, LoT failure mode would need to be accounted for by three 
VRMs: A LoT resulting in an intact impact, a LoT resulting in 
aerodynamic break-up, and a LoT resulting in explosion due to FSS 
activation. Under the NPRM's proposal, the operator would have been 
required to compute CEC for three VRMs associated with 
LoT, but under the same circumstances the final rule will require 
only one CEC for the LoT. The final rule CEC 
for LoT will equal the average CEC for the three VRMs 
that the NPRM would have required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing suggested changing the term ``reasonably foreseeable'' to 
``credible'' vehicle response modes. The FAA does not agree that the 
term ``reasonably foreseeable'' should be replaced by the term 
``credible'' in this section. As previously noted, the term 
``reasonably foreseeable'' is used in Sec.  431.35 and commonly used in 
system safety. In the absence of a compelling reason to change, the FAA 
prefers to continue to use language consistent with previous 
regulations instead of introducing a new term at this time. 
Furthermore, the FAA finds that the term ``credible'' is prone to 
errors in judgment whereas the term ``reasonably foreseeable'' is more 
readily discerned by analysis (e.g., fault trees).
iv. Sec.  450.101(c)(3)
    In the NPRM, in instances in which CEC was greater than 
1 x 10-\3\, proposed Sec.  450.101(c) provided relief from 
the use of flight abort if the Administrator agreed that flight abort 
was not necessary based on the demonstrated reliability of the launch 
or reentry vehicle during a phase of flight. The NPRM preamble cited 
the flight of a certificated aircraft carrying a rocket to a drop point 
as an example of a phase of flight when the use of an FSS would likely 
not be necessary, even though the CEC could be above the threshold 
because the aircraft would have demonstrated reliability.
    While the final rule retains the ``demonstrated reliability 
concept'' proposed in the Sec.  450.101(c) of the

[[Page 79605]]

NPRM, it has been revised and relocated to Sec.  450.101(c)(3). Section 
450.101(c)(3) of the final rule states that an operator must protect 
against a high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase 
of flight by establishing the launch or reentry vehicle has sufficient 
demonstrated reliability based on the CEC during that phase 
of flight.
    Because demonstrated reliability provides an alternative to flight 
abort when CEC is greater than 1 x 10-\3\, it is 
appropriate to assess it consistent with the approach to flight abort 
and FSS reliability, which depends on CEC with a 1 x 
10-\2\ threshold.\73\ Notably, the ARC recommended that the 
need for an FSS should be determined by taking into account population 
density, the realm of reasonably foreseeable failures, trajectory, 
size, and explosive capabilities of the vehicle. CEC 
accounts for all those factors. As such, the CEC computed 
for a proposed operation is inherent in determining whether the vehicle 
has sufficient demonstrated reliability to protect against a high 
consequence event. This revision informs operators on the approach the 
FAA will take in determining whether the launch or reentry vehicle has 
sufficient demonstrated reliability to protect against a high 
consequence event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ In the proposal and the final rule, the FAA uses 
CEC not only as a basis to determine whether flight abort 
is required but also as a basis to determine the appropriate FSS 
requirements. As noted, FSS requirements are discussed later in the 
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More specifically, the FAA will use the demonstrated reliability 
and average ground consequence results from fatal accidents involving 
U.S. civil aviation aircraft with standard airworthiness certificates 
to establish what constitutes sufficient demonstrated reliability to 
protect against a high consequence event based on CEC. For 
example, a carrier vehicle with a CEC near 1 x 
10-\2\ in a given phase of flight would need to have 
demonstrated reliability during that phase of flight on par with the 
subset of fixed-wing general aviation aircraft that empirically produce 
CEF \74\ near 1 x 10-\2\. However, the same 
carrier vehicle operated in a more densely populated area could have a 
CEC near 1 in a given phase of flight and thus would need to 
have demonstrated reliability during that phase of flight on par with 
commercial transport aircraft that empirically produce CEF 
near 1.\75\ This approach is consistent with the longstanding and often 
cited principle that launch and reentry should be no more hazardous to 
the public than over-flight of conventional aircraft, as explained in 
the NPRM preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ CEF represents conditional expected fatalities 
and is used to measure the mean number of fatalities predicted to 
occur given an event with a probability of 1. As noted in the NPRM, 
the FAA found that about one ground fatality resulted on average 
from one-hundred fatal accidents involving US aircraft operated 
under part 91 between 1984 and 2013 based on NTSB data. A comparison 
of CEC to CEF is appropriate here because the 
CEF values cited here are empirical results from aviation 
accidents, whereas the CEC values used here are the 
results of physics-based computer simulations for launch and reentry 
operations. In addition, the differences between aviation and space 
operations justify some margin in the tolerability of the 
conditional risks predicted for space transportation operations.
    \75\ As noted in the NPRM, the FAA found that about one ground 
fatality resulted on average from a fatal accident involving US 
aircraft operated under part 121 between 1984 and 2013 based on NTSB 
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received multiple comments seeking clarification of the 
provision to use demonstrated reliability as a means to ensure a low 
probability, high consequence event is sufficiently mitigated. In the 
NPRM, the FAA noted that ``demonstrated reliability'' in this context 
refers to statistically valid probability of failure estimates based on 
the outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or stage. For 
example, a probability of failure analysis that complies with Sec.  
450.131 will provide a valid basis to establish the demonstrated 
reliability of a launch or reentry vehicle in a given phase of flight. 
That concept is also applicable to Sec.  450.101(c)(3) of the final 
rule. Furthermore, the FAA will consider the magnitude of the high 
consequence event in determining what level of reliability will be 
sufficient to ensure that the high consequence event is mitigated. One 
way to show that a vehicle has demonstrated reliability during a phase 
of flight is to show that it has demonstrated reliability during that 
phase of flight equivalent to a specific aircraft type or an average 
aircraft of similar size and performance characteristics with a 
standard airworthiness certificate.\76\ The FAA notes an average 
aircraft of similar size would have less uncertainty than a specific 
type aircraft because there would be more data collected for an average 
aircraft, and thus the demonstrated reliability of an average aircraft 
could be more readily characterized with a reasonable level of 
confidence. Furthermore, both a specific aircraft type and an average 
aircraft with a standard airworthiness certificate generally will not 
need additional flight abort capability unless the addition of the 
rocket substantially increased the risk from a high consequence event. 
However, aside from some carrier aircraft used as a component of a 
launch vehicle, no launch vehicle, including U.S. government owned and 
operated vehicles, to date has a significant amount of historical 
flights to ensure sufficient protection against a high consequence 
event based on demonstrated reliability in accordance with Sec.  
450.101(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ As discussed in the preamble section on Hybrid Vehicles, 
the FAA agreed with a comment that the FAA should not similarly find 
that an aircraft with only an experimental airworthiness certificate 
(EAC) would satisfy the demonstrated reliability standard. An 
aircraft with an EAC may demonstrate sufficient reliability through 
the use of a rigorous flight test program or numerous flights 
without a failure as defined in Sec.  450.131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Critical Asset and Critical Payload Protection
    Commercial space transportation operations occur increasingly in 
close proximity to critical assets. In order to maintain the continuing 
functionality of critical assets, the FAA proposed to define ``critical 
assets'' in Sec.  401.5 (Sec.  401.7 in the final rule) and add a 
quantitative risk criterion (1 x 10-\3\) for the protection 
of critical assets during launch or reentry activity under Sec.  
450.101 in the NPRM.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the ``critical asset'' definition 
in Sec.  401.7 with modification, as discussed below. The FAA adopts 
the risk criterion as proposed but removes the requirement for 
operators to assess the risks to critical assets in preparing a flight 
hazard analysis (proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3)(ii)), debris analysis 
(proposed Sec.  450.121(c)(1) and (c)(2)), debris risk analysis (Sec.  
450.135), and ground hazard analysis (Sec.  450.185(c)). Instead, in 
accordance with Sec.  450.101(a)(4)(iii) and (b)(4)(iii), either the 
FAA or a Federal launch or reentry site operator will determine whether 
the proposed activity would expose critical assets to a risk of loss of 
functionality that exceeds the risk criterion in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or 
(b)(4) and convey any necessary constraints to the operator. The 
operator must receive confirmation from the FAA or Federal launch or 
reentry site operator that the risk to critical assets satisfies the 
risk criterion in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) prior to launch or 
reentry. The FAA anticipates that most critical assets for a given 
launch site will be known when an applicant begins pre-application 
consultation. Current practice demonstrates that the critical asset 
evaluation can often be completed using preliminary flight safety data 
(during pre-application or during the license evaluation), sufficient 
to show critical assets risks are acceptable. Where the prevailing 
weather conditions are important to the critical asset risks, an 
assessment is performed either close to or on the day-of-launch.

[[Page 79606]]

    In the final rule, the FAA also clarified in Sec.  
450.101(a)(4)(ii) and (b)(4)(ii) the Federal procedure by which 
critical assets will be identified. To identify critical assets, the 
FAA will consult with relevant Federal agencies, and each agency will 
identify, for purposes of part 450, any critical assets that the agency 
owns or otherwise depends on. The FAA will accept any identification by 
the Secretary of Defense that an asset is critical to national 
security. For critical assets identified by other relevant Federal 
agencies, such as NASA, the FAA will work with the agency to ensure its 
identification of critical assets aligns with the requirements of part 
450.
    The FAA also adds in Sec.  450.165(a)(5) (Flight Commit Criteria) a 
requirement that operators' flight commit criteria include confirmation 
from the FAA that the risk to critical assets satisfies the 
requirements of Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4). Lastly, the FAA sought 
comments in the NPRM on its proposal to add to the final rule a 
definition for ``critical payload'' and a requirement that the 
probability of loss of functionality not exceed 1 x 10-\4\ 
for each critical payload. The FAA adopts the proposed definition and 
requirement in the final rule.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the risk criterion proposed for 
critical assets in the NPRM. The property protection criteria in Sec.  
450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) are consistent with current practice at 
Federal sites. Launch operations from NASA-operated ranges are 
currently subject to requirements that limit the probability of debris 
impact to less than or equal to 1 x 10-\3\ for designated 
assets. The USAF requirement in AFI 91-202 and the Guidance Memorandum 
to AFSPCI 13-610 match those proposed by the FAA. The FAA also adopts 
its proposal to extend the protection of critical assets to non-Federal 
launch or reentry sites because the protection of critical assets is 
necessary irrespective of the location of the launch.
    As proposed in the NPRM, a critical asset is an asset that is 
essential to the national interests of the United States. The proposed 
definition noted that critical assets include property, facilities, or 
infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense, or assured 
access to space for national priority missions.\77\ In the final rule, 
the FAA replaces ``necessary to maintain national defense'' with 
``necessary for national security'' to be more consistent with the rest 
of 14 CFR Chapter III. The FAA also adds that critical assets may 
include those necessary for high priority civil space purposes, for 
clarity. An example of this would be infrastructure necessary to 
support launch and reentry services to deliver cargo to and from the 
International Space Station.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ ``Property'' includes launch vehicles, reentry vehicles, 
and payloads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSF and SpaceX noted that critical assets are frequently located on 
or near Federal launch or reentry sites, and that the current practice 
at Federal launch or reentry sites is to allow a site operator or 
neighboring operator to waive the critical asset requirement for its 
own facilities. The commenters requested the regulation provide a 
similar allowance to reduce the frequency with which operators would 
need to apply for waivers. SpaceX recommended revising the regulation 
to allow for the waiver of an operator's own designated critical 
assets, as well as assets that may be shared or used as common 
infrastructure at a range.
    The FAA acknowledges that critical assets located on a launch site, 
including the launch facility itself, may be exposed to a risk of loss 
of functionality that exceeds 1 x 10 -\3\ during launch 
activity. The FAA finds that it would be burdensome to require a waiver 
of the critical asset protection requirement when a launch site 
operated by the U.S. Government or licensed by the FAA allows an 
operator to use its facility for launch. Therefore, the FAA revises 
Sec.  450.101(b)(4) to not apply the critical asset risk criteria to 
property, facilities, or infrastructure supporting the launch that are 
within the public area distance, as defined in part 420 Appendix E, 
Tables E1 and E2 or associated formulae, of the vehicle's launch 
point.\78\ Assets that fall within this exception, located at Sec.  
450.101(b)(4)(v), are exempt from the critical asset protection 
requirements in Sec.  450.101(a)(4)(i) and (b)(4)(ii) for a licensed 
launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Part 420 defines public area distance as ``the minimum 
distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard 
facility.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Assets excepted from risk criteria are determined by the required 
distance to a public area specified in Table E-1 or E-2 or associated 
formulae in Appendix E to part 420, using the quantities of propellants 
or other explosives on the vehicle, including any payloads. These 
distances are equivalent to Inhabited Building Distances commonly 
observed on Federal launch or reentry sites to protect critical assets. 
The exception limits consideration to quantities of propellants on the 
vehicle, including any payloads. Any critical assets within this area 
that are not supporting the activity would be subject to the risk 
criteria. This exclusion would be applicable from ignition or at the 
first movement that initiates flight, whichever occurs earlier, and end 
when the launch ends.
    The FAA received many comments on the definition of ``critical 
asset.'' ULA expressed support for the proposed definition. A number of 
commenters, including CSF and Sierra Nevada, asked who will determine 
whether an asset is ``critical'' and how the determination would be 
communicated to an applicant. Virgin Galactic commented that the 
proposed definition is vague and did not provide enough information to 
the operator to ensure protection of critical assets because the 
definition could potentially apply to all property at a Federal site. 
Virgin Orbit commented that the lack of clarity could result in Federal 
agencies incorrectly concluding their assets were protected. CSF and 
SpaceX commented that there was no limit on the number or location of 
assets for which an operator would need to perform a risk analysis. CSF 
and SpaceX recommended the definition of ``critical asset'' be limited 
to U.S. Government assets located on Federal property that the 
Secretary of Defense or Administrator of NASA determines to be 
essential to the national interests of the United States. Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended critical assets 
be defined as assets for which incapacitation or destruction would have 
a very serious, debilitating effect on national defense, or assured 
access to space for national priority missions. The commenters noted 
this change would be consistent with the definition in DCMA-MAN 3401-
02, Defense Industrial Base Critical Asset Identification and 
Prioritization. Furthermore, the commenters stated that classification 
as a critical asset should be determined by minimum criteria (not 
specified in the comment) and an assessment by the asset owner.
    The FAA disagrees that the definition of ``critical asset'' is 
vague or overbroad. The proposed definition, along with the examples 
provided in the NPRM preamble, bound the scope of critical assets 
appropriately and provide sufficient clarity for operators. Only those 
facilities, property, or infrastructure that are necessary for national 
security purposes, high priority civil space purposes, or assured 
access to space for national priority missions will be deemed critical 
assets under Sec.  401.7. Critical assets will also include certain 
military, intelligence, and civil payloads, including essential 
infrastructure when directly supporting the payload at the launch site. 
The FAA provided several examples of critical

[[Page 79607]]

assets in the NPRM. Critical assets include assets that, if 
incapacitated or destroyed, would have a serious, debilitating effect 
on national security or assured access to space for national security 
missions, but the FAA disagrees that the additional words proposed by 
the commenters add clarity beyond the proposed definition.
    Virgin Orbit's concern that Federal agency may assume incorrectly 
that a critical asset was protected is alleviated by the fact that 
critical assets will be identified by Federal agencies that own or 
otherwise depend on assets that are essential to the national interests 
of the United States. The FAA will work with operators to identify any 
measures that operators may need to undertake in order to protect 
critical assets to the level required by Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4).
    With respect to the concern that Federal agencies might be inclined 
to overestimate their assets as critical, the FAA does not find that 
experience at Federal launch or reentry sites warrants such a concern. 
In fact, discussions with safety officials at CCAFS indicate that the 
risk to critical assets or critical payloads has rarely exceeded the 
risk thresholds adopted by the FAA. Federal launch or reentry sites 
have not excessively designated assets as critical, nor have they 
imposed significant restrictions on launch activity. When approving the 
use of their sites for launch activity, Federal sites consider the 
potential of launch activities endangering other facilities. Similarly, 
other users of the site do not knowingly put their assets at risk. The 
FAA maintains that similar considerations would hold at non-Federal 
sites. Non-Federal launch or reentry site operators will consider the 
siting and scheduling of activities to avoid one user's activity 
threatening the assets of another user. Occasionally, delays in one 
site user's activity may necessitate rescheduling another user's 
activity. Otherwise, a new activity that was not anticipated when 
siting decisions were made, such as fly-back of a stage, is most likely 
to expose a critical asset to risk exceeding the criterion.
    Only property, facilities, or infrastructure located close to the 
launch point might typically be expected to exceed the criteria, and 
those assets are generally associated with the subject launch 
operation. As discussed in this section, the FAA revised Sec.  
450.101(a)(4) to eliminate the need to seek waivers for assets located 
within the immediate vicinity of a launch point during the launch. 
Although many of these assets may be critical, meeting the critical 
asset criteria would be impractical during a launch from the particular 
launch point. Hence, assets located within the public area distance 
required by part 420 during a licensed launch are exempt from the 
critical asset protection requirements in Sec.  450.101(a)(4)(i) and 
(b)(4)(i). As such, the FAA anticipates that operations exceeding the 
risk criteria for critical assets will continue to be few, resulting in 
minimal restrictions on launch activity.
    The FAA maintains that establishing explicit risk criteria for 
protecting critical assets in this final rule provides a level of 
certainty. Launch and reentry site operators will have a metric to 
determine what activities are appropriate for various locations on 
their sites. Either the FAA or Federal site will perform any necessary 
analysis, and will provide written confirmation to the operator that 
the criteria in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) have been met. If the 
risk to critical assets posed by the proposed activity exceeds the 
criteria in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4), then the FAA will work with 
asset owners and operators to reach solutions that allow operations 
without sacrificing safety to the critical assets or mission 
objectives.
    The FAA does not adopt the suggestion by CSF and SpaceX to limit 
critical assets to U.S. Government assets located on Federal property 
that the Secretary of Defense or the Administrator of NASA determines 
to be essential to the national interests of the United States. Federal 
entities other than the DOD and NASA might own or otherwise depend on 
critical assets, such as NOAA. Thus, it would be inappropriate to 
assign the determination of critical assets to only these agencies. 
However, as noted earlier, critical assets will be identified by 
Federal agencies, such as DOD and NASA, which own or otherwise depend 
on assets that are essential to the national interests of the United 
States, and the FAA will accept any identification by the Secretary of 
Defense that an asset is critical to national security. Note also that 
the FAA does not limit the definition of ``critical assets'' to assets 
that are owned or located on property owned by the U.S. Government. As 
stated in the NPRM, the FAA extended the protection of critical assets 
to non-Federal launch or reentry sites, which previously had no 
regulatory assurance of protection from loss of functionality of 
critical assets. The FAA maintains the same safety standards for 
critical assets for launches that take place on a Federal launch or 
reentry site as those that take place on a non-Federal launch or 
reentry site, some of which are dual use, supporting both commercial 
and military operations. Similarly, as explained in the NPRM the FAA 
will deem any commercial property that meets the definition set forth 
in Sec.  401.7 a critical asset.
    Blue Origin asked the FAA to provide examples of critical 
infrastructure. The FAA notes that in the past, the launch complexes at 
CCAFS that support Atlas V and Delta IV launches have been designated 
as critical assets because they support missions essential to the 
interests of the United States.
    An individual commenter recommended the FAA define categories of 
national security interests, including cybersecurity, security 
controls, and classification level. Although these are important 
national interests, they are not by themselves critical assets, and the 
FAA does not find it necessary to add categories of national security 
interests.
    Airlines for America (A4A) recommended the FAA extend the safety 
protections of critical assets to include critical aviation 
infrastructure, including airports. The FAA notes that the definition 
of ``critical asset'' does not preclude aviation infrastructure from 
being a critical asset. More generally, the definition of ``critical 
asset'' can include non-space associated assets, including those not 
located at or adjacent to a launch or reentry site. However, the 
criterion for loss of functionality likely limits aviation 
infrastructure assets from being subject to protection.
    Commenters were divided on the need for critical asset protection. 
ULA acknowledged the need for protection of critical assets. Virgin 
Galactic questioned whether the FAA's proposed critical asset 
requirements were within the FAA's statutory authority, as title 51 did 
not reference ``national interests'' or ``national priority missions.'' 
Blue Origin acknowledged the FAA's statutory authority to protect 
property and asked the FAA to explain how it will interpret and 
implement this authority. An individual commenter stated only assets 
directly related to national security should be given heightened 
protection. CSF, Spaceport Strategies, LLC (Spaceport Strategies), and 
SpaceX commented that critical assets were already protected by current 
requirements at Federal launch and reentry sites, rendering the FAA's 
regulations duplicative. SpaceX added that NASA or DOD may not agree 
with the FAA's proposed critical asset requirements, which may lead to 
further duplication of requirements at Federal sites.

[[Page 79608]]

    The FAA has the authority to protect critical assets. The 
Commercial Space Launch Act authorizes the DOT, and the FAA by 
delegation, to protect public health and safety, safety of property, 
and national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States. In carrying out its responsibility to protect property, the FAA 
has established a quantitative requirement to protect assets that are 
essential to the national interests of the United States. As noted in 
the NPRM, national interests go beyond national security and include 
infrastructure such as that used to support high priority NASA 
missions. As noted earlier, an example of this would be infrastructure 
necessary to support launch and reentry services to deliver cargo to 
and from the International Space Station.
    As CSF, Spaceport Strategies, and SpaceX noted, the FAA's critical 
asset requirements codify current practice at Federal launch or reentry 
sites, but also extend the same regulatory protection for launch or 
reentry activity at non-Federal launch or reentry sites. Although 
critical assets are primarily located on Federal launch or reentry 
sites at this time, the FAA foresees increased commercial space 
activity at non-Federal sites that may result in the presence of 
critical assets at those sites. In licensing commercial launch or 
reentry activities, the FAA safeguards critical assets--which by 
definition are essential to the national interests of the United 
States--irrespective of their location.
    The FAA does not find the critical asset requirements to be 
unnecessarily duplicative of requirements at Federal launch or reentry 
sites. As discussed in the NPRM, the FAA proposed these requirements to 
further the goal of common standards for launches from any U.S. launch 
or reentry site, Federal or non-Federal. Inclusion of critical asset 
protection in FAA regulations aligns FAA licensing with Federal launch 
or reentry site requirements and removes duplication of effort. The FAA 
closely coordinated the critical asset requirements with the CSWG and 
its interagency partners, including NASA and DOD. As a result of this 
coordination, the FAA anticipates that the methodologies used by the 
Federal launch or reentry sites will satisfy the FAA's requirements for 
critical asset protection.
    Many commenters, including AIA, Blue Origin, Boeing, CSF, Lockheed 
Martin, Northrop Grumman, Sierra Nevada, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and 
ULA raised concerns about how an applicant would obtain the information 
necessary to perform the proposed critical asset analysis, including 
proprietary or confidential information. CSF and SpaceX noted the same 
data should be provided to all operators to ensure the fair and 
unbiased application of this regulation. Sierra Nevada recommended the 
FAA provide a method of acceptable means of compliance that does not 
require a commercial company to contract with DOD to complete this 
analysis. Alternatively, Sierra Nevada recommended the FAA provide the 
analysis instead of the applicant. CSF and SpaceX also recommended the 
FAA publish an AC that would provide an acceptable means for analyzing 
critical assets, describe how the FAA would obtain a definitive list of 
critical assets, and how the FAA would provide operators the data 
necessary to conduct the analysis. Blue Origin stated that, by 
requiring information that includes data from other entities, the FAA 
would become responsible for facilitating acquisition of this data or 
would risk implementing a requirement that would not be possible to 
comply with or a requirement that would establish a sole source 
provider of a service.
    The FAA acknowledges the practical problems an applicant would 
likely encounter in collecting the input data necessary to identify and 
perform a risk assessment for critical assets, especially critical 
payloads. The FAA agrees with Sierra Nevada that it would be better for 
the U.S. Government to perform all critical asset and critical payload 
risk assessments necessary to ensure operators comply with the risk 
criteria in part 450. The FAA therefore removes the requirement for 
operators to assess the risks to critical assets in preparing a flight 
hazard analysis, debris analysis, and debris risk analysis. The FAA 
also removes from Sec.  450.185 (Ground Hazard Analysis) the 
requirement that the ground hazard analysis ensure that the likelihood 
of any hazardous condition that may cause damage to critical assets is 
remote. The FAA notes that the input data and analysis tools necessary 
to perform a risk assessment for critical assets are often a subset of 
those the FAA uses to establish the MPL values. The FAA will perform 
all critical asset and critical payload risk assessments for commercial 
space transportation operations involving non-Federal sites. Hence, 
operators should not bear additional cost for the analyses associated 
with critical assets.
    Blue Origin asked how the FAA will address overflight of critical 
assets. The FAA notes that overflight of a critical asset is possible 
if the safety criteria set forth in Sec.  450.101 are satisfied. Past 
experience demonstrates that the critical asset criteria in Sec.  
450.101 are satisfied except in occasional cases involving critical 
assets located within the same launch site. Historically, the risk to 
critical assets from overflight outside the launch site is negligible.
    Virgin Galactic asked how an operator would have input on or 
dispute the determination of a critical asset. The FAA will discuss 
with operators any concerns they may have about ensuring protection of 
critical assets during their licensed activities, but the FAA is not 
proposing a formal dispute mechanism to adjudicate its determination 
that an asset is critical or threatened within the risk criterion. 
Often, it might not be possible to share such information due to 
national security issues and proprietary interests. The FAA notes, 
however, that if the FAA denies an application for a license based on 
its determination that the proposed activity exceeds the risk threshold 
for critical assets, an applicant may request reconsideration under 
Sec.  413.21 or a hearing in accordance with part 406 of this chapter.
    CSF asked how the FAA will manage proprietary and national security 
concerns among operators and asset-owners. The FAA does not foresee a 
need to share proprietary data with non-Federal entities because the 
Federal Government will conduct the assessment of critical asset risk 
on behalf of the licensee. Based on discussions with relevant Federal 
agencies, it is also possible to perform an assessment of critical 
assets without disclosing the precise location or nature of each asset, 
thereby eliminating the need to share proprietary and national security 
information. For example, the USAF 45th Space Wing/Wing Safety 
identifies what facilities are threatened within the thresholds and 
shares that information with the appropriate tenants. The tenant can 
then inform the USAF, or another entity performing the analysis, that 
an asset is threatened without divulging sensitive information to any 
entity outside the U.S. Government. The FAA will work with the entities 
responsible for critical assets to ensure any necessary coordination, 
taking into account the need to protect proprietary and confidential 
data.
    Several commenters, including CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic 
requested clarification as to the meaning of ``loss of functionality'' 
and how the FAA or other entity would determine what could result in 
the ``loss of functionality'' of a critical asset. CSF sought 
clarification on whether infrastructure was ``critical'' if it was 
needed to support full functionality of a critical asset and on the 
standard for

[[Page 79609]]

determining whether an asset's function had been lost. It inquired 
whether it would matter if the function could be restored in a timely 
manner or met with an alternative asset.
    CSF and SpaceX also recommended that ``loss of functionality'' be 
defined in Sec.  401.7 as an asset designated critical by the Secretary 
of Defense or Administrator of NASA that (a) has been rendered unable 
to support a specific mission or program deemed critical to the 
national interest; (b) for which the loss of function will preclude the 
assurance of a time-critical mission or program unless promptly 
restored; or (c) for which the asset's function cannot be restored by 
an accelerated recovery strategy or replaced by an alternate means of 
mission/program execution. SpaceX and Virgin Galactic requested the FAA 
include this new definition in an SNPRM, along with a clear rationale 
for the FAA's proposed requirements for protecting critical assets.
    Under the final rule, the party responsible for the critical asset 
would determine what constitutes loss of functionality. The FAA 
recognizes that the threshold conditions that cause loss of 
functionality will be different depending on the type of asset and its 
robustness. For example, infrastructure is typically more robust than a 
payload that may be more fragile. For this reason, the FAA does not 
elect to incorporate a specific standard for what may constitute loss 
of functionality into the final rule. Likewise, the FAA does not find 
that it is useful to create a more detailed definition of ``loss of 
functionality'' but agrees that considerations such as those suggested 
by CSF and SpaceX (e.g., ability to support missions critical to 
national interests, or ability to repair or restore function through 
alternative means in a timely manner) would be relevant and appropriate 
to determining loss of functionality.
    An individual commenter stated that critical asset protection 
should not compromise protection of the public and neighboring 
operation personnel. The commenter stated that an operator's required 
insurance should already cover losses to critical assets.
    The FAA notes that the critical asset protection requirements will 
not compromise the protection of the public or neighboring operation 
personnel. The FAA retains stringent requirements for protecting the 
public, including neighboring operations personnel, which are 
independent of the requirements protecting critical assets. The FAA 
also disagrees with the commenter that an operator's financial 
responsibility requirements are adequate to protect critical assets. 
The FAA is limited by statute to imposing no more than $100 million in 
financial responsibility to compensate for losses to U.S. Government 
property. The value of many critical assets easily exceeds that limit, 
with some critical payloads reportedly costing over a billion dollars. 
More importantly, financial compensation for a loss may not address the 
delay before repairs or replacement, during which time national 
security might be jeopardized or the opportunity to accomplish 
important national interests missed.
    The FAA sought comments on its proposal to require a more stringent 
criterion for critical assets of utmost importance to the U.S., to be 
defined as ``critical payloads'' in Sec.  401.7. The FAA proposed to 
require that the probability of loss of functionality for critical 
payloads, including essential infrastructure when directly supporting 
the payload, not exceed 1 x 10-\4\. In the past, Federal 
launch or reentry sites have, on occasion, applied a more stringent 
requirement, limiting the probability of debris impact caused by launch 
or reentry hazards to less than or equal to 1 x 10-\4\ for 
national security payloads, including essential infrastructure when 
directly supporting the payload at the launch site. The FAA asked 
commenters to identify (1) the impacts a 1 x 10-\4\ risk 
criterion would have on their operations if applied to critical 
payloads; (2) whether a more stringent risk criterion should be imposed 
on any commercial payload; and (3) potential additional costs and 
benefits associated with applying a 1 x 10-\4\ risk 
criterion to critical payloads.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the risk criterion and definition 
as discussed in the NPRM preamble, with minor clarifications.
    ULA supported the 1 x 10-\4\ risk criterion for critical 
payloads, stating that given the time and expense associated with 
replacing these assets, it was essential they receive the greatest 
protection possible. It further commented that this risk criterion 
should also apply to infrastructure and booster hardware in direct 
support of critical payloads, beginning when booster hardware for that 
particular critical payload was received and began processing at the 
launch site. Under ULA's suggestion, at the completion of the launch 
campaign, the risk criterion should revert to 1 x 10-\4\. 
Virgin Galactic, however, commented that it was not necessary to adopt 
a heightened risk criteria for critical payloads. It saw no benefit to 
the discussed 1 x 10-\4\ requirement over the 1 x 
10-\4\ requirement. It also inquired whether the criterion 
would apply to payloads on the vehicle of the operator that might be 
subject to this new risk threshold. If so, Virgin Galactic stated this 
would constitute managing mission success. Virgin Galactic also 
inquired whether this risk criterion would apply to payloads at 
neighboring launch sites. If so, Virgin Galactic believes the FAA must 
demonstrate need and a nexus to statutorily obligated concerns. It 
further stated that a more stringent criterion for commercial payloads 
would place undue burden on operators, potentially requiring additional 
analyses or redesign. Virgin Galactic noted that it did not intend to 
carry critical payloads, so impacts to its operations from this 
requirement would be negligible.
    In the final rule, the FAA defines a critical payload as a payload 
and essential infrastructure directly supporting such a payload that is 
a critical asset (1) that is so costly or unique that it cannot be 
readily replaced, or (2) for which the time frame for its replacement 
would adversely affect the national interests of the United States. As 
noted in the NPRM, a commercial payload that meets this definition will 
be treated as a critical payload. The critical payload protection 
requirement does not apply to payloads on the vehicle of the operator 
regulated under part 450 but will apply to payloads on neighboring 
launch sites. The FAA agrees with ULA that the 1 x 10-\3\ 
risk criterion should apply to essential infrastructure directly 
supporting the critical payload, and notes that it will likely apply to 
booster hardware in direct support of the launch of a critical payload. 
After a launch of a critical payload, the infrastructure supporting the 
launch will be critical only if it is essential to the national 
interests of the United States. The risk criterion determines the 
protection required for critical assets and payloads. It is not 
necessary to specify in the regulation that this requirement does not 
apply during activities that do not exceed the risk threshold.
    The FAA disagrees with Virgin Galactic that there is no benefit in 
applying a 1 x 10-\4\ risk criterion to critical payloads. 
As explained in the NPRM, during the interagency review process, DOD 
requested that the FAA consider specifying a more stringent criterion 
for certain critical assets of utmost importance. The FAA considers a 
critical payload a type of critical asset. The FAA finds it necessary 
to protect payloads such as vital national security payloads and high-
priority NASA and NOAA payloads. The NPRM noted that a payload such as 
NASA's Curiosity rover would likely be afforded this

[[Page 79610]]

protection. In the final rule, the FAA adopts this higher protection 
criterion to safeguard those payloads of utmost importance to the U.S. 
meriting a greater degree of protection than other critical assets. 
While the FAA is providing for heightened protection for critical 
payloads, it expects the protection to have minimal effects on 
commercial launch and reentry operations. Currently there are few 
commercial payloads that would rise to the level of being considered 
critical payloads, although the FAA recognizes that might change in the 
future, if for instance, DOD were to rely on a commercial service for 
critical communication support.
    Virgin Galactic requested the FAA adopt neither 1 x 
10-\3\ nor a more stringent criterion. It argued the 
proposed requirement contradicted the requirement in 51 U.S.C. Sec.  
50901(a)(7) that the FAA regulate only to the extent necessary. Virgin 
Galactic stated the FAA did not show why these requirements were 
necessary, given that Federal launch or reentry sites already protect 
their own property. Furthermore, Virgin Galactic commented that the FAA 
would be enforcing a more stringent, but undisclosed criterion and 
argued the proposed regulation was non-transparent and would deprive 
the public of the opportunity to comment on this criterion as required 
by the Administrative Procedure Act. The commenter asserted this 
undisclosed criterion could prevent operators from planning ahead and 
would create two standards that might conflict.
    As articulated in the NPRM, the FAA finds it necessary to codify 
current practice at Federal launch or reentry sites to protect critical 
assets that are of utmost importance to the U.S. and to extend the same 
protections for launch or reentry activity conducted at non-Federal 
sites. For launches from Federal sites, this rule does not change 
current practice; rather it incorporates that practice in a regulation. 
This regulation consolidates the FAA's requirements for protection of 
critical assets and critical payloads in all commercial launch or 
reentry operations, in accordance with the FAA's statutory authority. 
This rule reduces the need for a Federal or non-Federal site operator 
to impose critical asset protection requirements on operators as a 
contractual condition for the use of its facility. The FAA expects that 
the instances in which a more stringent criterion will be necessary 
will be rare. Preserving the flexibility to protect particularly vital 
assets at a more stringent criterion in a license, as proposed in the 
NPRM, is consistent with current practice at Federal launch and reentry 
sites and will reduce the need for a Federal or non-Federal launch site 
operator to impose a more stringent criterion on operators through 
contract.
    CSF and SpaceX commented that the FAA did not assess the cost 
burden on industry for compliance with the critical asset requirements. 
Virgin Orbit commented that critical asset calculations would require 
additional analysis and resources.
    In the final rule, the FAA's removal of the requirements for 
operators to assess impacts to critical assets in flight hazard, ground 
hazard, debris or debris risk analyses assuages the commenters' 
concerns for costs associated with performing those analyses. As 
compared to the proposal, there will be much reduced administrative 
burden on the operator. The FAA will coordinate as necessary with 
critical assets owners, and either the FAA or the Federal site operator 
will provide written confirmation to the operator that the criteria in 
Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) have been met. If the FAA or Federal site 
operator determines that the criteria have not been met, either the FAA 
or Federal site operator will work with the operator to identify any 
measures that operators may need to undertake in order to protect 
critical assets to the level required by Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4).
    An individual commenter stated that the proposed regulation would 
require companies to perform trade studies to determine if additional 
controls would be needed to reduce the likelihood of critical asset 
loss of functionality. The commenter requested the FAA require a cost-
benefit analysis to ensure that upfront investment of controls to 
protect critical assets would be less than the cost of replacing that 
asset.
    When determining whether an asset is a critical asset, the cost of 
an asset is a factor. However, ultimately an asset is critical if it is 
essential to the national interests of the United States. If it cannot 
be replaced in a time frame that satisfies those interests, the cost of 
the asset is irrelevant. Furthermore, the FAA does not find that most 
mitigations will impose significant cost.
    Virgin Galactic indicated the need for FAA assistance in planning 
hazard control strategies pursuant to proposed Sec.  450.107(e)(2)(ii) 
\79\ due to the secrecy of some critical assets. If an operator is 
using physical containment as a hazard control strategy, the FAA or 
Federal launch or reentry site operator will work with the operator to 
ensure no critical assets are within the flight hazard area. The most 
likely mitigation is shifting the launch point or, if the critical 
asset is mobile, changing in the launch schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ As proposed, an applicant using physical containment as a 
hazard control strategy would have been required to describe the 
methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas are cleared of the 
public and critical assets. This requirement has been relocated to 
Sec.  459.110(c)(2) in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sierra Nevada requested the FAA conduct a publicly-available 
assessment to determine if the proposed critical asset protection 
requirements would impact an operator's MPL calculation. CSF requested 
the FAA engage industry on the topic of critical assets.
    The FAA does not find that the protection of critical assets will 
increase MPL. The designation of an asset as critical is unrelated to 
financial responsibility. In performing its MPL calculation for U.S. 
Government property, the FAA ascertains the financial responsibility 
required so that the likelihood of exceeding losses to government 
property involved in a licensed activity (taken to mean such property 
on a Federal launch or reentry site) that are reasonably expected to 
result from that activity does not exceed 1 x 10-\5\; or, in 
the rarer situation in which a critical asset might not be U.S. 
Government property on a Federal launch or reentry site, 1 x 
10-\7\. Critical assets are protected to a less stringent 1 
x 10-\3\, or in the case of certain critical payloads, 1 x 
10-\4\, and financial responsibility and protection are not 
directly related. If anything, the requirement to protect critical 
assets has the potential to lower MPL for U.S. Government property 
because the mitigation employed may well remove the possibility that 
the asset can be damaged even within the more stringent MPL threshold. 
This would be the case if, to avoid placing the critical asset at risk 
a launch was rescheduled, its trajectory adjusted, or the critical 
asset was moved or physically protected. The FAA finds that it is 
unlikely that a mitigation employed to protect critical assets will 
change the MPL for third-party liability.
d. Other Safety Criteria (Sec.  450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g))
    The FAA adopts the criteria in Sec.  450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g) 
with no changes. Section 450.101(d) addresses disposal safety criteria, 
Sec.  450.101(e) is the requirement for the protection of people and 
property on orbit, Sec.  450.101(f) requires the notification of 
planned impacts, and Sec.  450.101(g) addresses the validity of 
analyses.
    The FAA received public comments from Virgin Galactic on the 
notification of planned impacts. Specifically, Virgin

[[Page 79611]]

Galactic advised that a carrier aircraft operating under an 
airworthiness certificate should be exempt from proposed Sec.  
450.101(f). This comment is discussed in further detail in the preamble 
section on hybrid vehicles. The FAA will not exempt all hybrid vehicle 
operators from the requirement in Sec.  450.101(f). If an operation has 
no planned impacts from debris capable of causing a casualty, then no 
notification will be necessary to comply with Sec.  450.101(f). The 
regulation is adopted as proposed.
e. System Safety Program (Sec.  450.103)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.103 that an operator 
must implement and document a system safety program throughout the 
operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The system safety 
program was proposed to include a safety organization (Sec.  
450.103(a)), procedures to evaluate the operational lifecycle of the 
launch or reentry system (Sec.  450.103(b)), configuration management 
and control (Sec.  450.103(c)), and post-flight data review (Sec.  
450.103(d)).
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.103 with 
revisions. The FAA replaced the term ``operational lifecycle'' in the 
introductory paragraph of Sec.  450.103 with simply ``lifecycle'' to 
clarify that the regulation applies to hazards throughout the lifecycle 
of a launch or reentry system, not just operational changes to the 
system. This change is consistent with the statements in the NPRM 
indicating that, due to the complexity and variety of vehicle concepts 
and operations, a system safety program would be necessary to ensure 
that an operator considers and addresses all risks to public safety, 
which include both design and operational changes to a system.
i. Safety Organization
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that the system safety program would 
require an operator to maintain and document a safety organization that 
has clearly defined lines of communication and approval authority for 
all public safety decisions, and that includes a mission director and 
safety official. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed rule 
with a revision. The FAA removes ``and document'' from the proposed 
requirement because the first sentence in Sec.  450.103 already 
requires a system safety program to be documented.
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(a)(1) stated that for each launch or 
reentry, an operator would be required to designate a position 
responsible for the safe conduct of all licensed activities and 
authorized to provide final approval to proceed with licensed 
activities. This position is referred to as the mission director. In 
the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.103(a)(1) as proposed. The FAA 
did not receive comments on this section.
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(a)(2) stated that, for each launch or 
reentry, an operator would be required to designate a position with 
direct access to the mission director who would be responsible for 
communicating potential safety and noncompliance issues to the mission 
director and would be authorized to examine all aspects of the 
operator's ground and flight safety operations, and to independently 
monitor compliance with the operator's safety policies, safety 
procedures, and licensing requirements. This position would be referred 
to as a safety official. The FAA noted in the NPRM preamble that the 
absence of a safety official could result in a lack of independent 
safety oversight and a potential for a breakdown in communications of 
important safety-related information. The FAA also noted that a safety 
organization that included a safety official was essential to public 
safety; however, identifying that individual by name was not necessary. 
In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.103(a)(2) as proposed. 
Thus, a safety official will need to be in place prior to and 
throughout any licensed activity.
    Rocket Lab supported the proposed safety organization documentation 
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.103(a), noting the requirements 
would provide improved flexibility for the industry and support growth 
in operations, while maintaining clear lines of communication and 
independence in safety decision making. Virgin Galactic noted that it 
agreed with the FAA's approach not to require a specific person be 
listed as the safety official. Microcosm inquired if a specific named 
safety official would be required for each launch site for operators 
with licensed activity at multiple sites, and how far in advance that 
information would need to be provided to the FAA.
    The FAA notes that a safety official must be named and in place 
prior to the initiation of any licensed activity, and an operator may 
use the same safety official for multiple launch or reentry sites. It 
may be difficult for a single individual to serve as a safety official 
for multiple sites if launch or reentry activities were to occur close 
in time to each other. In those instances, an operator may choose to 
have multiple safety officials. An operator needs to provide the name 
of the safety official to the FAA only when requested. The FAA may 
request the name of the individual who will act as a safety official as 
part of a compliance monitoring action. As is current practice, the FAA 
will coordinate in advance with the operator prior to a compliance 
monitoring action.
    ALPA concurred with the requirement for operators to develop a 
general system safety program. It also recommended that that embedding 
FAA representatives within commercial space companies would assist the 
commercial space community in growing robust system safety procedures. 
The FAA notes that embedding FAA representatives within commercial 
space companies is outside the scope of this rulemaking.
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(a)(3) requires the mission director to 
ensure that all of the safety official's concerns are addressed. In the 
final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.103(a)(3) as proposed. The FAA did 
not receive any comments on this section.
ii. Hazard Management
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(b) would have required an operator to 
establish procedures to evaluate the operational lifecycle of the 
launch or reentry system, including methods to review and assess the 
validity of the proposed preliminary safety assessment and any flight 
hazard analysis throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or 
reentry system, methods for updating the preliminary safety assessment 
and flight hazard analysis, and methods for communicating and 
implementing the updates throughout the organization. For operators 
that would need to conduct a flight hazard analysis, the proposed rule 
would also require an operator's system safety program to include a 
process for tracking hazards, risks, mitigation and hazard control 
measures, and verification activities.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.103(b) with 
revisions. The FAA renames this section ``Hazard management'' to be 
more descriptive than the proposed name of ``Procedures.'' The FAA also 
does not adopt the proposed requirement in Sec.  450.103(b)(1) to 
conduct a preliminary safety assessment because that requirement has 
been replaced with the requirement to conduct a hazard control strategy 
determination in Sec.  450.107(b) in the final rule, as will be 
discussed later.
    As noted, proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(1) would have required the 
system safety program to include: (i) Methods to review and assess the 
validity of the preliminary safety assessment throughout the 
operational lifecycle of

[[Page 79612]]

the launch or reentry system; (ii) methods for updating the preliminary 
safety assessment; and (iii) methods for communicating and implementing 
the updates throughout the organization. For those operators required 
to conduct a flight hazard analysis, proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(2) would 
have required the system safety program to include the same methods for 
the flight hazard analysis and a process for tracking hazards, risks, 
mitigation and hazard control measures, and verification activities.
    In the final rule, the FAA consolidates the requirements in 
proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(1) and (b)(2) into Sec.  450.103(b)(1) of the 
final rule. Section 450.103(b)(1) requires a system safety program to 
include methods to assess the system to ensure the validity of the 
hazard control strategy determination and any flight hazard or FSA 
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system.\80\ The FAA 
added FSA to this requirement because, as proposed in Sec.  450.101(g) 
and adopted in the final rule, any analysis used to demonstrate 
compliance with Sec.  450.101 must use accurate data. This is 
consistent with the proposal because proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(1)(i) 
would have required methods to review and assess the validity of the 
preliminary safety assessment, which would have included components of 
FSA such as vehicle response modes, public safety hazards associated 
with vehicle response modes, population exposed to hazards, and 
CEC. As previously noted, the final rule in Sec.  
450.103(b)(1) uses the term ``lifecycle'' by itself to clarify that the 
regulation applies to hazards throughout the lifecycle of a launch or 
reentry system, not just operations hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)(ii) would have 
required the system safety program to include methods for updating 
the preliminary safety assessment and flight hazard analysis. In the 
final rule, the FAA simplifies the regulatory text of Sec.  
450.103(b) in the final rule, which requires an operator to 
implement methods to assess the system to ensure the validity of the 
hazard control strategy determination and any flight hazard or 
flight safety analysis throughout the lifecycle of the launch or 
reentry system. Updating the safety analyses is a component of 
ensuring their validity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(iii) would have 
required the system safety program to include methods for communicating 
and implementing the updates throughout the organization. In the final 
rule, the FAA consolidates the requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.103(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(iii) into Sec.  450.103(b)(2) of the 
final rule with a revision. The FAA changes the term ``the updates'' to 
``any updates'' to clarify the intent for comprehensiveness.
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(b)(2)(iv) would have required the system 
safety program, for operators that must conduct a flight hazard 
analysis, to include a process for tracking hazards, risks, mitigation 
and hazard control measures, and verification activities. The FAA 
adopts the language proposed in Sec.  450.103(b)(2)(iv) of the NPRM in 
Sec.  450.103(b)(3) of the final rule with a revision. The FAA deletes 
the terms ``hazard control,'' because it is duplicative with the 
existing term ``mitigation measures.''
iii. Configuration Management and Control
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(c) would have required an operator to (1) 
employ a process that tracks configurations of all safety-critical 
systems and documentation related to the operation; (2) ensure the use 
of correct and appropriate versions of systems and documentation 
tracked under the subsection; and (3) maintain records of launch or 
reentry system configurations and document versions used for each 
licensed activity, as required by the requirement for records in 
proposed Sec.  450.219.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.103(c)(1) and (c)(2) as 
proposed and revises Sec.  450.103(c)(3) as discussed later.
    Blue Origin commented that tracking and maintaining records of 
individual configurations and associated operations documentation for 
completed operations does not, by itself, enhance public safety. Blue 
Origin believes that changes should be evaluated for safety impact 
according to a configuration management plan, which is a deliverable 
under the current regulations. Blue Origin stated that an approved 
configuration management plan, coupled with continued accuracy of the 
application, should suffice without additional requirements for 
increased documentation and storage of records.
    The FAA agrees that tracking and maintaining records for completed 
operations in isolation does not directly enhance public safety, but 
tracking and maintaining records for completed operations is an 
important component of configuration management, which, as a whole, 
does enhance public safety. The FAA agrees with Blue Origin that an 
approved configuration management plan coupled with continued accuracy 
of the application should suffice, but does not agree that current 
requirements are sufficient. Part 431 does not have any requirements 
for configuration management, and Sec.  417.111(e) is more general in 
its requirement to define the launch operator's process for managing 
and controlling any change to a safety-critical system to ensure its 
reliability. Section 450.103(c) adds necessary detail.
    Blue Origin also stated that proposed Sec.  450.103(c) is 
repetitive of the recordkeeping requirements in proposed Sec.  450.219, 
making it unnecessary. Blue Origin added that if the FAA were to 
maintain the requirement, it should be written in the context of 
safety-critical systems, which would tie directly to FAA's 
responsibility to protect public safety.
    While the FAA considers Sec.  450.103(c) necessary, proposed Sec.  
450.103(c)(3) could be perceived as repetitive. Proposed Sec.  
450.103(c)(3) would have required an operator to maintain records of 
launch or reentry system configurations and document versions used for 
each licensed activity, as required by Sec.  450.219 (Records). Section 
450.219 requires a licensee to maintain for 3 years all records, data, 
and other material necessary to verify that a launch or reentry is 
conducted in accordance with representations contained in the 
licensee's application, the requirements of part 450 subparts C and D, 
and the terms and conditions contained in the license. The FAA removes 
the reference to maintaining records in Sec.  450.103(c)(3) and revises 
the provision to require an operator to document the configurations and 
versions identified in paragraph (c)(2) for each licensed activity. 
This is a more focused requirement than Sec.  450.219 and limits the 
documentation requirement specifically to safety-critical systems, 
consistent with Blue Origin's recommendation.
iv. Post-Flight Data Review
    Proposed Sec.  450.103(d) would have required an operator to employ 
a process for evaluating post-flight data to (1) ensure consistency 
between the assumptions used for the preliminary safety assessment, any 
hazard or flight safety analysis, and associated mitigation and hazard 
control measures; (2) resolve any identified inconsistencies prior to 
the next flight of the vehicle; (3) identify any anomaly that may 
impact any flight hazard analysis, FSA, or safety-critical system, or 
would otherwise be material to public health and safety and the safety 
of property; and (4) address any anomaly identified in (3) prior to the 
next flight, including updates to any flight hazard analysis, FSA, or 
safety-critical system. The FAA explained in the NPRM that this 
requirement was consistent with industry practice to review post-flight 
data to address

[[Page 79613]]

vehicle reliability and mission success and that this requirement 
imposes no additional burden. The FAA sought comment on whether 
proposed Sec.  450.103(d) would change an operator's approach to 
reviewing post-flight data.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.103(d)(1), 
(d)(2), and (d)(4) with revisions, and adopts Sec.  450.103(d)(3) as 
proposed. Section 450.103(d)(1) was modified to replace ``preliminary 
safety assessment'' with ``hazard control strategy determination'' as 
discussed earlier. The FAA also added the word ``flight'' in front 
``hazard or flight safety analysis'' to make clear that the requirement 
addresses any flight hazard analysis or FSA.
    CSF, Rocket Lab, and Sierra Nevada commented that proposed Sec.  
450.103(d) should be deleted because it was overly burdensome and 
inconsistent with the directive to streamline the regulations. The 
commenters stated that the requirement would extend the industry 
practice beyond the typical analysis for reliability and mission 
success. Sierra Nevada suggested that the section could be re-written 
to address only post-flight data of safety-critical systems.
    As discussed in the NPRM, operator review of post-flight data 
provides valuable safety information on future operations. The 
inconsistencies that need to be resolved in this subsection are only 
those that affect safety analyses and associated mitigation and hazard 
control measures, such as greater population in the launch area than 
modeled. The anomalies that need to be addressed are only those that 
may impact any flight hazard analysis, FSA, or safety-critical system, 
or are otherwise material to public health and safety and the safety of 
property, such as the momentary drop-out of an FSS. Therefore, while 
the FAA revises Sec.  450.103(d)(2) to narrow its applicability, as 
discussed below, it declines to remove proposed Sec.  450.103(d)(2).
    Blue Origin proposed a revision of Sec.  450.103(d)(2) to specify 
``public safety.'' Virgin Galactic recommended removing the word 
``any'' in front of ``identified inconsistencies,'' and recommended 
limiting applicable inconsistencies to those that have an effect on the 
safety criteria of Sec.  450.101.
    The FAA agrees that proposed Sec.  450.103(d)(2) could be read to 
reach more broadly than public safety, so the FAA has revised the 
section to require that an operator resolve any inconsistencies 
``identified in paragraph (d)(1) of this section'' prior to the next 
flight of the vehicle. This language would explicitly limit the 
applicability of the provision to the hazard control strategy 
determination, and any hazard or flight safety analyses and associated 
mitigation and hazard control measures, as opposed to mission success. 
The FAA does not agree with Virgin Galactic's suggestion to limit 
applicable inconsistencies to those that have an effect on the safety 
criteria of Sec.  450.101. That change would imply that a quantitative 
analysis is all that is required. As discussed earlier in the hazard 
management section, the hazard control strategy determination and the 
hazard and flight safety analyses must be kept up to date throughout 
the lifecycle of the launch and reentry system, so inconsistencies need 
to be addressed. The FAA also does not agree with Virgin Galactic to 
remove the word ``any'' in front of ``inconsistencies'' because it 
would not change the scope of the requirement, because Sec.  
450.103(d)(2) explicitly refers to the analyses in Sec.  450.103(d)(1).
    Virgin Galactic recommended that proposed Sec.  450.103(d)(4)--
which would have required an operator to address any anomaly identified 
in paragraph (d)(3) prior to the next flight, including updates to any 
flight hazard analysis, FSA, or safety-critical system--be revised to 
state the FAA should review and provide a determination on an 
operator's post-flight data to approve the operator's ability to launch 
according to schedule, rather than delaying until all anomalies are 
resolved.
    The FAA notes that proposed Sec.  450.103(d)(4) would not have 
required FAA approval of the methodology an operator uses to address 
anomalies in general or a specific anomaly in particular. In order to 
avoid Virgin Galactic's interpretation that all anomalies must be 
resolved prior to the next flight, the FAA revised the final rule to 
require an operator to address any anomaly identified in paragraph 
(d)(3) prior to the next flight as necessary to ensure public safety. 
As proposed, this would include updates to any flight hazard analysis, 
FSA, or safety-critical system. To ensure public safety, the FAA would 
expect an operator to reassess its safety analyses to determine any 
potentially new public safety hazards or increased risks to known 
public safety hazards due to the anomaly and, if necessary, determine 
the need for any additional mitigation strategies or updates to its 
safety analyses.
v. Application Requirements
    An applicant under proposed Sec.  450.103(e) would have to submit 
(1) a description of the applicant's safety organization, identifying 
the applicant's lines of communication and approval authority, both 
internally and externally, for all public safety decisions and the 
provision of public safety services; and (2) a summary of the processes 
and products identified in the system safety program requirements.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.103(e) as proposed. The 
FAA did not receive any comments on this section.
f. Hazard Control Strategies (Sec.  450.107)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.107 that, for each phase 
of a vehicle's flight, an operator does not need to conduct a flight 
hazard analysis for that phase of flight if the public safety hazards 
identified in the preliminary safety assessment (PSA) can be mitigated 
adequately to meet the requirements of proposed Sec.  450.101 using 
physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, in accordance 
with Sec.  450.107(b), (c), and (d). If the public safety hazards 
identified in the PSA could not be adequately mitigated using these 
methods, an operator would be required to conduct a flight hazard 
analysis in accordance with proposed Sec.  450.109 to derive hazard 
controls for that phase of flight.
    The FAA has restructured Sec.  450.107 in the final rule to require 
an operator to use a functional hazard analysis to make a hazard 
control strategy determination. This requirement is based on the 
requirements for the PSA that was proposed, but not adopted, in Sec.  
450.105. In addition, the FAA has removed from Sec.  450.107 specific 
details for each hazard control strategy available to operators and 
instead directs operators to Sec. Sec.  450.108, 450.109, 450.110, and 
450.111, which provide requirements for flight abort,\81\ flight hazard 
analysis, physical containment,\82\ and wind weighting, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ In the NPRM, the requirements for flight abort had been 
scattered throughout proposed Sec. Sec.  450.107, 450.123, 450.125, 
450.127, 450.129, and 450.165. Section 450.108 is discussed more 
fully later in the preamble section titled Flight Abort.
    \82\ The NPRM did not include a separate section for physical 
containment. In the final rule, as will be discussed later, the 
requirements from proposed Sec.  450.107(b) are relocated to a new 
Sec.  450.110 (Physical Containment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.107 also characterizes flight hazard analysis as a 
hazard control strategy. Although a flight hazard analysis is different 
from the other hazard control strategies in that it does not lay out 
specific hazard controls, it does lay out a process by which hazard 
controls can be derived. The hazard controls that are derived from the 
flight hazard analysis, like those defined in the other three hazard

[[Page 79614]]

control strategies, are then used as part of the input to the FSA that 
is used to show compliance with Sec.  450.101(a), (b), and (c). 
Therefore, because a flight hazard analysis is a means by which an 
operator derives the appropriate hazard controls, the FAA has 
characterized it as a hazard control strategy in this final rule. As 
such, throughout the final rule, a flight hazard analysis is listed 
with physical containment, wind-weighting, and flight abort as a hazard 
control strategy.\83\ Further, Sec.  450.107(c) retains the proposed 
requirement that an operator must conduct a flight hazard analysis if 
the public safety hazards for that phase of flight cannot be mitigated 
adequately to meet the requirements of Sec.  450.101 through physical 
containment, wind weighting, or flight abort.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ The FAA notes that, throughout the preamble, it uses the 
phrase ``as a hazard control strategy'' to modify physical 
containment, wind-weighting, flight abort, and flight hazard 
analysis. For example, in the preamble, the FAA refers to operators 
who use ``flight abort as a hazard control strategy.'' In such 
instances, the FAA means that flight abort is being used as a hazard 
control strategy consistent with the requirements in Sec.  450.108. 
Likewise, when an operator uses flight hazard analysis as a hazard 
control strategy, the operator is conducting a flight hazard 
analysis consistent with the requirements set forth in Sec.  
450.109.
    \84\ Although proposed Sec.  450.107 was written in the 
negative, stating that an operator was not required to conduct a 
flight hazard analysis if the public safety hazards identified in 
the preliminary safety assessment for that phase of flight could be 
mitigated adequately to meet the requirements of Sec.  450.101 
through physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, the 
final rule has revised this language to be more easily understood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, the final rule fixes an error in proposed Sec.  450.107, 
which referenced Sec.  450.101 in its entirety as being relevant to the 
hazard control strategies, even though certain requirements in Sec.  
450.101 regarding the disposal of upper stages, protection of people 
and property on orbit, and notification of planned impacts, are not 
relevant to the hazard control strategies defined in Sec.  450.107. 
Section 450.107 refers instead to Sec.  450.101(a), (b), or (c).
    The FAA adds paragraph (b) to Sec.  450.107 to address how an 
operator determines its hazard control strategy or strategies for any 
phase of flight during a launch or reentry. This paragraph is based on 
and replaces a portion of the preliminary safety assessment in proposed 
Sec.  450.105 of the NPRM. Because an operator determines a hazard 
control strategy or strategies based on an assessment of potential 
hazards, the requirements for such an assessment are better suited for 
this section. The next preamble section discusses the revision to Sec.  
450.107(b) more fully.
    Proposed Sec.  450.107(e) would have required an applicant in its 
application to describe its hazard control strategy for each phase of 
flight. The application requirements in the final rule, in Sec.  
450.107(d), similarly require an applicant to provide a description of 
its hazard control strategy or strategies for each phase of flight. The 
FAA added the phrase ``or strategies'' to reflect the fact that an 
operator may use one or more hazard control strategies for any given 
phase of flight. In addition, because the requirements for physical 
containment have been relocated to Sec.  450.110, the FAA has likewise 
relocated the application requirements for physical containment 
proposed in Sec.  450.107(e) to Sec.  450.110(c).\85\ These 
requirements have been adopted as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ The proposed rule also required an applicant using physical 
containment as a hazard control strategy to demonstrate that the 
launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards 
associated with its flight to reach outside the flight hazard area 
developed in accordance with Sec.  450.133, and to describe the 
methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas are cleared of the 
public and critical assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, Sec.  450.107(d) in the final rule requires an applicant to 
submit in its application the results of its hazard control strategy 
determination, including all functional failures identified under Sec.  
450.107(b)(1), the identification systems, and a timeline of all 
safety-critical events. These relate to the hazard control strategy 
determination, which is discussed in the next section of this preamble.
    The FAA received a few comments for proposed Sec.  450.107. One 
individual commenter supported the additional flexibility inherent in 
allowing an operator to select its hazard control strategy and noted 
that this flexibility would help to reduce overall design costs for the 
private enterprise. Virgin Galactic requested that the FAA define 
``traditional hazard controls'' and provide opportunity for public 
comment through the issuance of an SNPRM. Blue Origin proposed that the 
FAA amend proposed Sec.  450.107(e)(2)(ii) to require that an applicant 
describe the methods used to ensure that risk to the public and 
critical assets in flight hazard areas meet allowable criteria. This 
latter comment is discussed later in the preamble section titled 
Physical Containment.
    To the extent that Virgin Galactic commented that the term 
``traditional hazard controls'' should be defined and comment allowed 
through publication of an SNPRM, the FAA notes that the NPRM stated 
that traditional hazard controls included physical containment, wind 
weighting, and flight abort.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See 84 FR 15316 (footnote 62).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Hazard Control Strategy Determination (Sec.  450.107(b))
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.105 to require that 
every operator conduct and document a PSA for the flight of a launch or 
reentry vehicle to identify potential public safety impacts early in 
the design process. The FAA intended the PSA to be a top-level 
assessment of the potential public safety impacts identifiable early in 
the design process and broad enough that minor changes in vehicle 
design or operations would not have a significant impact on, or 
invalidate the products produced by, the PSA. As proposed, the PSA 
would have required the operator to identify a number of items, 
including: A preliminary hazard list that documents all hardware, 
operational, and design causes of vehicle response modes that, 
excluding mitigation, have the capability to create a hazard to the 
public; safety-critical systems; and a timeline of all safety-critical 
events.\87\ An applicant would have been required to submit the PSA 
result, including the items identified above, in its application for a 
license.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ The operator would also have needed to identify (1) vehicle 
response modes; (2) public safety hazards associated with vehicle 
response modes, including impacting inert and explosive debris, 
toxic release, and far field blast overpressure; (3) geographical 
areas where vehicle response modes could jeopardize public safety; 
(4) any population exposed to public safety hazards in or near the 
identified geographical areas; and (5) the CEC, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the Administrator based on the demonstrated reliability 
of the launch or reentry vehicle during any phase of flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule removes proposed Sec.  450.105 in its entirety but 
relocates certain items from the PSA section into Sec.  450.107(b) as 
part of the hazard control strategy determination. The final rule 
replaces the requirement for a PSA with a functional hazard analysis 
and replaces the term ``vehicle response mode'' with ``reasonably 
foreseeable hazardous events.'' The FAA finds these changes are less 
prescriptive and burdensome on an operator, while preserving the 
intended benefits and level of safety of the proposed requirements.
    Blue Origin and Microcosm commented that requiring operators to 
develop a preliminary hazard list that identifies all causes of hazards 
and vehicle response modes for a PSA, prior to analysis or testing of 
their vehicle systems, was unreasonable. Blue Origin stated it would be 
infeasible to document in a preliminary hazard list all hardware, 
operational, and design causes of vehicle response modes capable of 
causing a hazard to the public at the preliminary design phase.

[[Page 79615]]

The commenters noted that operators identify potential hazards, but not 
all causes of vehicle response modes, prior to the detailed design 
phase. Blue Origin added that identification of causes was a continuous 
process that evolves as hardware and operations design matures, and 
recommended the PSA be limited to analyzing and identifying all 
functional failures that could have the capability to create a hazard 
to the public, rather than analyzing the detailed design, which may 
still be maturing. Blue Origin also noted that early engagement with 
the FAA through the pre-application process, before a design is mature, 
was beneficial to both parties.
    The FAA concurs that the detailed design may not be mature enough 
at a preliminary stage such that an operator could define all hardware, 
operational, and design causes of vehicle response modes with minimal 
changes downstream in the development process in a preliminary hazard 
list. Although the preliminary hazard list would not have been provided 
to the FAA until an applicant submitted an application, the FAA agrees 
with the commenters that the proposed rule would have required a launch 
or reentry operator to complete the preliminary hazard list early in 
the design process, to enable the operator to then carry out its hazard 
control strategy or strategies. This, as noted by Blue Origin, would 
not have been practicable as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA does not 
adopt the proposed requirement for an operator to identify a 
preliminary hazard list. Instead, the FAA requires an operator, in 
Sec.  450.107(b), to determine its hazard control strategy or 
strategies for any phase of flight during a launch or reentry, based on 
a functional hazard analysis accounting for all functional failures 
associated with reasonably foreseeable hazardous events, safety-
critical systems, and safety-critical events. Even with this change, 
the FAA also agrees with Blue Origin that this approach will encourage 
operators to engage early with the FAA, prior to the design becoming 
mature.
    In the final rule, the FAA eliminates proposed Sec.  450.105, but 
moves, with some revision, the requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  
450.105(a)(6) through (a)(8) into Sec.  450.107(b). Section 450.107(b), 
titled ``Hazard Control Strategy Determination,'' requires that for any 
phase of flight during a launch or reentry, an operator must use a 
functional hazard analysis to determine a hazard control strategy or 
strategies accounting for (1) all functional failures associated with 
reasonably foreseeable hazardous events that, excluding mitigation, 
have the capability to create a hazard to the public, (2) safety-
critical systems, and (3) a timeline of all safety-critical events.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.105(a)(6) would have required a 
preliminary hazard list documenting all hardware, operational, and 
design causes of vehicle response modes that, excluding mitigation, 
have the capability to create a hazard to the public. The final rule 
requires an operator to use a functional hazard analysis that accounts 
for, among other things, all functional failures associated with 
reasonably foreseeable hazardous events that, excluding mitigation, 
have the capability to create a hazard to the public. A functional 
failure is a condition of a system, subsystem, or component function 
derived by assessing each function against multiple potential failure 
modes during each phase of the system's mission. This addresses Blue 
Origin's concerns about the preliminary hazard list because identifying 
functional failures does not require detailed design information that 
may not be finalized at the stage of design when a hazard control 
strategy is being considered.
    A functional hazard analysis is a common system safety tool that, 
as articulated in DOD's MIL-STD-882E, is used to identify and classify 
the system functions and the safety consequences of functional failure 
or malfunction.\88\ A functional hazard analysis is a foundational tool 
useful throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system that 
helps drive the design and development process at a preliminary stage 
by identifying safety-critical functions of which launch and reentry 
vehicle developers should be cognizant throughout the process to ensure 
public safety. The requirement to perform a functional hazard analysis 
instead of a preliminary hazard list, as proposed in Sec.  450.105, 
should reduce the burden on operators, for the reasons cited by Blue 
Origin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ Department of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety, 
MIL-STD-882E, May 11, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA finds that a functional hazard analysis will preserve the 
benefits of the preliminary safety assessment proposed in the NPRM, but 
reduce the burden on applicants by not requiring detailed design 
information that may not be finalized at the stage of design when a 
hazard control strategy is being considered. Like the PSA, a functional 
hazard analysis should help an operator identify specific information 
relevant to public safety, scope the analyses that must be conducted to 
ensure that the launch or reentry operation satisfies safety criteria, 
identify the effect of design and operational decisions on public 
safety, and provide the operator with an appropriate hazard control 
strategy for its proposed operation.
    Section 450.107(b)(1) in the final rule requires an operator to use 
a functional hazard analysis to determine a hazard control strategy 
accounting for all functional failures associated with reasonably 
foreseeable hazardous events that, excluding mitigation, have the 
capability to create a hazard to the public. As noted earlier, a 
functional failure is a condition of a system, subsystem, or component 
function derived by assessing each function against multiple potential 
failure modes during each phase of the system's mission. The failure 
end-effect is the resulting system behavior from each functional 
failure. Failure end-effects that result in impacts to public safety 
should in turn identify the safety-critical systems and can be grouped 
to identify the system hazards to the public. Thus, the inability of a 
safety-critical system, subsystem, or component to function as 
designed, or to function erroneously, may potentially result in a 
hazard to the public. It is important to note that public exposure to a 
hazard should only be accounted for after determining the potential 
hazards to the public. That is, limits to public exposure can be a 
mitigation when considering hazards at the overall system or mission 
level, and thus not considered when determining what constitutes a 
hazard to the public (i.e., functional sources of the hazard) for the 
purposes of Sec.  450.107(b)(1).
    The FAA does not retain in Sec.  450.107(b) the items in proposed 
Sec.  450.105(a)(1) through (a)(5) for an operator to identify (1) 
vehicle response modes, (2) public safety hazards associated with 
vehicle response modes, (3) geographical areas where vehicle response 
modes could jeopardize public safety, (4) any population exposed to 
public safety hazards in or near the identified geographical areas, and 
(5) the CEC. These are addressed in the four hazard control 
strategies and in FSA.
    Finally, the FAA replaces the term ``vehicle response mode'' in the 
NPRM with ``reasonably foreseeable hazardous events'' in Sec.  
450.107(b)(1) in the final rule. As explained in the preamble section 
discussing Sec.  450.101(c), the NPRM defined ``vehicle response mode'' 
as a mutually-exclusive scenario that characterizes foreseeable 
combinations of vehicle trajectory and debris generation. The final 
rule is less prescriptive by requiring that an operator account for 
reasonably foreseeable hazardous events, instead of

[[Page 79616]]

each foreseeable combination of vehicle trajectory and debris 
generation. Accounting for reasonably foreseeable hazardous events in a 
functional hazard analysis is consistent with common industry 
standards. This change also means the FAA does not adopt the proposed 
definition of ``vehicle response mode'' in Sec.  401.7.
    Blue Origin also requested clarification from the FAA on its 
interpretation of the requirement proposed in Sec.  450.105(a)(8) to 
provide ``a timeline of all safety-critical events.'' Blue Origin noted 
that it interprets ``safety'' to mean meeting the collective and 
individual risk requirements for launch and reentry and, in essence, 
suggested that the PSA should be limited in scope based on the 
collective risk criteria resulting from the FSA.
    The FAA does not agree with Blue Origin's interpretation nor with 
its suggestion that this requirement, now in Sec.  450.107(b)(3) in the 
final rule, be limited by the results of FSA. The FAA will consider any 
event that occurs during a phase of flight of a launch or reentry 
vehicle that meets the definition of ``safety critical'' in Sec.  401.7 
to be a ``safety-critical event.''
    As noted earlier, proposed Sec.  450.105 would have required that 
every operator conduct and document a PSA for the flight of a launch or 
reentry vehicle and submit its results. Virgin Galactic inquired as to 
when the PSA would be due to the FAA, as well as the timeline for the 
review. The final rule replaces the requirement to conduct a PSA with 
the requirement to conduct a functional hazard analysis in Sec.  
450.107(b). The application requirements for Sec.  450.107(b) are in 
Sec.  450.107(d) and are due with the application, even though a launch 
or reentry operator will conduct the functional hazard analysis early 
in the design phase, well before it applies for a license. This 
approach is consistent with Blue Origin's recommendation that the 
analysis be limited to analyzing and identifying all functional 
failures that could have the capability to create a hazard to the 
public, rather than analyzing the detailed design, which may still be 
maturing. As such, in the final rule an applicant is required to 
provide the results of the functional hazard analysis, including all 
functional failures, the identification of all safety-critical systems, 
and a timeline of all safety-critical events.
h. Flight Abort (Sec.  450.108)
    As discussed, if an operator cannot ensure by means other than 
flight abort \89\ that it has sufficiently protected against a high 
consequence event (as measured by CEC), the only remaining 
way to satisfy Sec.  450.101(c) is to use flight abort consistent with 
the requirements in Sec.  450.108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ As discussed, Sec.  450.101(c)(2) and (c)(3) allow an 
operator to demonstrate it can sufficiently protect against a high 
consequence event through other means that reduce CEC 
below 1 x 10-\3\ or through demonstrated reliability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to address flight abort in several 
sections. As proposed, to implement flight abort as a hazard control 
strategy, an operator would have been required to:

    (1) Establish flight safety limits and gates in accordance with 
proposed Sec. Sec.  450.123 (Flight Safety Limits Analysis) and 
450.125 (Gate Analysis);
    (2) establish when an operator must abort a flight following the 
loss of vehicle tracking information with proposed Sec.  450.127 
(Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses);
    (3) establish the mean elapsed time between the violation of a 
flight abort rule and the time when the FSS is capable of aborting 
flight for use in establishing flight safety limits in accordance 
with proposed Sec.  450.129 (Time Delay Analysis);
    (4) establish flight abort rules in accordance with Sec.  
450.165(c) (Flight Abort Rules); and
    (5) employ an FSS in accordance with Sec.  450.145 and software 
in accordance with Sec.  450.111.

Many of these requirements were derived from existing requirements in 
part 417 and retained a more prescriptive approach to flight abort than 
the final rule adopts.
    Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX commented that the FSA requirements in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  450.117 through 450.141 were too prescriptive and 
should be replaced with a performance standard. The commenters cited a 
lack of flexibility and the use of an approach directed at large 
orbital launches from Federal launch or reentry sites.
    In the final rule, the FAA consolidates the requirements for flight 
abort in Sec.  450.108 and revises the more prescriptive requirements 
from the proposal into a single performance-based regulation. As a 
result of this consolidation, proposed Sec. Sec.  450.123, 450.125, 
450.127, and 450.129 are not included in the final rule. The 
requirements in these sections have been revised to reflect the 
performance-based standards in Sec.  450.108(c), which establishes 
flight safety limits objectives, and Sec.  450.108(d), which 
establishes flight safety limits constraints. The FAA adds Sec.  
450.108(e) in the final rule to relieve the operator from the 
requirement to use flight abort in certain situations in which high 
consequence events are possible but would not be effectively mitigated 
by an FSS. In addition, the flight abort rule requirements proposed in 
Sec.  450.165(c) have been revised and relocated to Sec.  450.108(f) to 
reflect the revisions to the flight safety limits requirements. The FAA 
also moves the reference to FSS reliability from proposed Sec.  
450.101(c) to Sec.  450.108(b).
    The FAA will provide guidance to illustrate how operators may 
demonstrate compliance with these requirements. The guidance will 
encompass many of the traditional means of developing flight safety 
limits, but operators can develop other means of demonstrating 
compliance with the performance-based objectives and constraints. As 
discussed in more detail throughout this section of the preamble, the 
revisions in the final rule allow for greater flexibility for operators 
while maintaining the same level of safety as proposed in the NPRM.
i. FSS Thresholds Using CEC
    In the NPRM, an operator required to use flight abort under 
proposed Sec.  450.101(c) was referred to proposed Sec.  450.145 to 
determine the required reliability of its FSS based on CEC. 
Section 450.145(a)(1) proposed to require an operator to employ an FSS 
with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and 
commensurate design, analysis, and testing if the consequence of any 
vehicle response mode is 1 x 10-\2\ CEC or 
greater. This is the reliability standard for a highly reliable FSS 
under part 417. Section 450.145(a)(2) proposed to require that, if the 
consequence of any vehicle response mode is between 1 x 
10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ CEC for 
uncontrolled areas, an operator must employ an FSS with a design 
reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, 
analysis, and testing. The FAA explained that, for operations for which 
the consequence of a flight failure is less, an FSS--while still being 
reliable--may not need to be as highly reliable as an FSS for a vehicle 
operating in an area where the consequence of a flight failure is 
higher.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ The FAA anticipated that this proposed relaxation of the 
FSS reliability requirements would be applicable to operations 
launching or reentering in remote locations or for stages that do 
not overfly population centers. 84 FR 15328.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, the CEC thresholds for establishing 
the reliability or other requirements for an FSS proposed in Sec.  
450.145(a) have been moved to Sec.  450.108(b). The requirements for a 
highly reliable FSS proposed in

[[Page 79617]]

Sec.  450.145(a)(1) remain in Sec.  450.145.\91\ However, the 
requirements for an FSS proposed in Sec.  450.145(a)(2) have been 
revised and relocated to Sec.  450.143.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ The reliability requirements for a highly reliable FSS will 
be discussed later in the preamble in the section pertaining to 
Sec.  450.145.
    \92\ The reliability requirements for an FSS that is not 
required to meet the standard for highly reliable FSS will be 
discussed later in the preamble in the section pertaining to Sec.  
450.143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rocket Lab agreed with the concept of quantifying consequence as a 
key metric in determining the reliability of a flight abort system. 
Other commenters were critical of the proposed use of CEC 
thresholds to set reliability standards for any required FSS, 
particularly in situations in which a lower reliability FSS may be 
sufficient to protect the public. For example, SpaceX commented that 
the requirement in RCC 319 for an FSS with 0.999 at 95 percent 
confidence reliability was overly prescriptive for low-risk mission 
profiles. CSF noted that, by ``binning'' the CEC of a 
vehicle and then prescribing a fixed reliability requirement for the 
FSS, risk of an unmitigated (by FSS) CEC event was not 
consistent. CSF commented that such an approach requires the same FSS 
even though the risk varies by an order of magnitude between the 
extreme values. Several other commenters, including CSF and Sierra 
Nevada commented that the FAA should not preclude applicants from 
making a ``safety case'' to justify a certain level of rigor for their 
FSS.
    As noted in the discussion of Sec.  450.101(c), the FAA has 
retained CEC as the appropriate regulatory standard for 
measuring high consequence events. Likewise, for the reasons set forth 
in that section of the preamble, the FAA has retained the use of 
CEC in Sec.  450.108(b) to determine the level of 
reliability required for an FSS. However, in response to comments, the 
FAA has added flexibility for FSS that do not need to meet the standard 
for highly reliable FSS in proposed Sec.  450.145(a)(1) based on the 
CEC. The FAA notes that an operator does not need to 
calculate CEC for the purposes of determining reliability 
under Sec.  450.108(b) if it elects to use a highly reliable FSS that 
meets the requirements of Sec.  450.145.
    In the final rule, the FAA removes the prescribed reliability 
threshold proposed in Sec.  450.145(a)(2) of the NPRM for operations 
with a maximum CEC value between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 
x 10-\3\. Accordingly, an operator does not need to employ 
an FSS with a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and 
commensurate design, analysis, and testing. Rather, under Sec.  
450.108(b)(2), an operator must use an FSS that meets the requirements 
of Sec.  450.143 if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable 
failure mode in any significant period of flight is between 1 x 
10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ CEC for 
uncontrolled areas.
    The requirements for the two types of FSS, as well as the removal 
of the proposed requirements, are discussed in more detail later in 
this preamble in the discussion of Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145.
ii. Flight Safety Limits Objectives
    Proposed Sec.  450.123(a) stated an FSA must identify the location 
of uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define 
when an operator must initiate flight abort to: (1) Ensure compliance 
with the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101; and (2) prevent debris 
capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if 
the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission.
    The introductory language of Sec.  450.108(c) is a revision of 
proposed Sec.  450.123(a).\93\ In the final rule, Sec.  450.108(c), 
titled ``Flight Safety Limits Objectives,'' requires an operator to 
determine and use flight safety limits that define when an operator 
must initiate flight abort if the conditions enumerated in Sec.  
450.108(c)(1) through (c)(5) are met. Alternatively, an operator could 
meet Sec.  450.108(c)(6) to satisfy the requirements of Sec.  
450.108(c)(2) and (c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ The FAA has not included in the final rule the language in 
Sec.  450.123(a) that would have required the operator to identify 
the location of uncontrolled areas. The FAA finds it is unnecessary 
to specify this language in the introductory paragraph of Sec.  
450.108(c) because an operator must identify the location of 
uncontrolled areas to meet the objectives of Sec.  450.108(c)(2) 
through (6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following sections provide additional detail on the 
performance-based flight safety limits objectives derived from the more 
prescriptive requirements proposed in the NPRM and respond to public 
comments on the proposals in the NPRM to the extent they are relevant 
to compliance with the final rule.
Section 450.108(c)(1)
    Section 450.108(c)(1) requires that an operator initiate flight 
abort to ensure compliance with the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101(a) 
and (b). The FAA proposed a related requirement in Sec.  450.123(a)(1), 
which stated that an FSA must identify the location of uncontrolled 
areas and establish flight safety limits that define when an operator 
must initiate flight abort to ensure compliance with the safety 
criteria of Sec.  450.101. In the final rule, Sec.  450.108(c)(1) 
specifies the relevant subparagraphs in Sec.  450.101 to which this 
requirement applies. The FAA makes this change in the final rule 
because the requirement in Sec.  450.101(c)(1) is met through use of 
flight abort as a hazard control strategy, and Sec.  450.101(d), (e), 
and (f) are not relevant to flight abort.
Section 450.108(c)(2)
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.123(a)(2) required the operator to 
prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in 
uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful 
mission. In the final rule, Sec.  450.108(c)(2) requires that an 
operator initiate flight abort to prevent continued flight from 
increasing risk in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is unable to 
achieve a useful mission.
    Although proposed Sec.  450.123(a)(2) focused on debris impacts in 
uncontrolled areas to define when an operator must initiate flight 
abort, Sec.  450.108(c)(2), as finalized, acknowledges that debris 
impact is not the only risk contributor that must be accounted for in 
determining flight safety limits. For example, a release of toxic 
propellant following a debris impact may also contribute to risk. 
Therefore, in Sec.  450.108(c)(2), an operator must determine and use 
flight safety limits to prevent continued flight from increasing risk 
once a vehicle can no longer achieve a useful mission. The FAA 
recognizes that a vehicle may deviate from the limits of a useful 
mission during a period when hazard containment through flight abort is 
not possible. In this case, the requirement is not to allow continued 
flight to increase risk, though some risk from either flight abort or 
continued flight may be unavoidable.
    For example, a vehicle may begin an unplanned turn away from a 
nominal trajectory while overflying an island. Once the vehicle leaves 
the limits of a useful mission, the operator should initiate flight 
abort if continued flight would result in an increase in risk. Pursuant 
to Sec.  450.108(c)(2), depending on the risk to the public, it may be 
better to withhold flight abort until the hazards resulting from the 
abort would not affect the island. However, if the turn is towards a 
major population center on the island, it may pose less of a risk to 
the public to abort the flight as soon as it leaves the limits of a 
useful mission, even if it might result in a hazard posed to less-dense 
populated areas.

[[Page 79618]]

    The concepts of ``useful mission'' and ``limits of a useful 
mission'' \94\ are discussed in greater detail in the preamble section 
on FSA methods (specifically, in Sec.  450.119 (Trajectory Analysis for 
Malfunction Flight)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ A useful mission means a mission that can attain one or 
more objectives. Limits of a useful mission means the trajectory 
data or other parameters that bound the performance of a useful 
mission, including flight azimuth limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA also notes that the maximum extents of a gate,\95\ 
determined by the limits of a useful mission in proposed Sec.  
450.125(c)(2), are addressed by Sec.  450.108(c)(2) in the final rule, 
which requires flight abort to prevent continued flight from increasing 
risk in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is unable to achieve a useful 
mission. Therefore, trajectories outside the limits of a useful mission 
that intersect flight safety limits that prevent increased risk in 
uncontrolled areas must trigger flight abort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ A gate is an opening in a flight safety limit through which 
a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined 
conditions such that the vehicle performance indicates an ability to 
continue safe flight. Gate analysis has been removed from the final 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Galactic recommended that the term ``prevent'' in proposed 
Sec.  450.123(a)(2) be qualified, as it could be taken to mean many 
probabilistic values. Although proposed Sec.  450.123(a)(2) has been 
removed from the final rule, Sec.  450.108(c) uses the term ``prevent'' 
in five places including Sec.  450.108(c)(2). In Sec.  450.108 (c)(2), 
(3), (5), and (6), prevention is dependent on the proper functioning of 
the FSS. There is no expectation that these objectives will be met if 
the FSS fails to function properly. In Sec.  450.108(c)(4), when the 
reliability of the FSS is accounted for pursuant to Sec.  
450.108(d)(5), prevention is considered to be achieved.
Section 450.108(c)(3)
    As noted earlier, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.125 to establish 
the requirements for a gate analysis. The FAA explained that the 
primary purpose of gates is to establish safe locations and conditions 
to abort the flight prior to the vehicle entering a region or condition 
where it may endanger populated or other protected areas if flight were 
to continue. A gate should be placed where a trajectory within the 
limits of a useful mission intersects a flight safety limit as long as 
that trajectory meets the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101. In response 
to comments that the proposed gate analysis requirements created 
confusion and should be more performance-based, Sec.  450.125 is not 
included in the final rule.
    In the final rule, the concept of gate analysis in proposed Sec.  
450.125 is captured in a more performance-based manner in Sec.  
450.108(c)(3).\96\ Section 450.108(c)(3) requires that an operator 
initiate flight abort to prevent the vehicle from entering a period of 
materially increased public exposure in uncontrolled areas, including 
before orbital insertion, if a critical vehicle parameter is outside 
its pre-established expected range or indicates an inability to 
complete flight within the limits of a useful mission. The FAA removes 
the term ``gate'' in the final rule to allow operators to use another 
method to comply with the requirements. Furthermore, the term ``gate'' 
can have different meanings within the industry, which can cause 
confusion. However, although the term ``gate'' is not used in the final 
rule, the FAA expects a similar approach to a gate analysis will be 
used by many operators and by Federal launch or reentry sites. With the 
removal of explicit gate requirements, the term ``tracking icon'' is no 
longer required, and the FAA therefore removes the term from the final 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ The performance-based requirement in Sec.  450.108(c)(3) 
incorporates elements of proposed Sec.  450.125(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), 
and (b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA notes that a period of materially increased public exposure 
would include the beginning of a period when the vehicle will overfly a 
major landmass prior to orbital insertion (e.g., Europe, Africa, or 
South America). Overflight of large islands with substantial population 
may also constitute a period of materially increased public exposure, 
while overflight of islands with small populations or other areas of 
sparse population will not constitute a period of materially increased 
public exposure. Consequence may be used to determine if an exposed 
area should be considered an area of materially increased public 
exposure. Orbital insertion also results in a material increase in 
public exposure due to the possibility of a random reentry from a 
vehicle that cannot achieve a minimum safe orbit. A vehicle intended 
for orbit that cannot achieve a minimum safe orbit would require flight 
abort under Sec.  450.108(c)(3). The FAA will provide guidance on what 
constitutes materially increased public exposure.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ For example, a period of materially increased public 
exposure would include any area where the CEC from any 
on-trajectory failure mode is greater than 1 x 10-\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA notes that, for purposes of Sec.  450.108(c)(3), a 
``critical vehicle parameter'' is a parameter that demonstrates the 
vehicle is capable of completing safe flight through the upcoming phase 
of flight for which population is exposed to hazardous debris effects 
from reasonably foreseeable failure modes. An example of a critical 
vehicle parameter outside its pre-established expected range is a tank 
pressure that is higher than the normal operating range and could lead 
to a rupture. An example of a critical vehicle parameter that indicates 
an inability to complete flight within the limits of a useful mission 
is an acceleration that is too low and would result in a vehicle 
failing to reach orbit. The operator must select parameters and their 
acceptable ranges that are appropriate for the vehicle and mission, 
with consideration of the ability to measure and act on the parameters, 
and describe in the application the parameters that will be used and 
how their ranges were determined, pursuant to the application 
requirement in Sec.  450.108(g)(3).
    The intent of the gate analysis in proposed Sec.  450.125 was to 
prevent unnecessarily exposing the public to hazards from a mission 
that can no longer be useful. Proposed Sec.  450.125(a) required that 
an FSA include a gate analysis for an orbital launch or any launch or 
reentry where one or more trajectories that represent a useful mission 
intersect a flight safety limit that provides containment of debris 
capable of causing a casualty. Gate analysis was necessary if a vehicle 
on a useful mission needed to fly in an area where population could be 
exposed to hazards in the event of a vehicle failure. As long as a 
trajectory met the individual and collective risk criteria of Sec.  
450.101(a)(1) and (a)(2) for a launch, or (b)(1) and (b)(2) for a 
reentry, when treated like a nominal trajectory with normal trajectory 
dispersions, the flight safety limit with which it intersected would be 
removed (or ``relaxed,'' as described in the NPRM),\98\ so flight of 
the vehicle would not be aborted. Alternatively, under proposed Sec.  
450.125(b)(1), the flight safety limit could be replaced with a gate 
that allowed continued flight as long as a real-time measure of 
performance indicated that the vehicle was able to complete a useful 
mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See 84 FR 15386.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.108(c)(3) achieves the intent in proposed Sec.  
450.125(a) because it codifies the goals achieved by gate analysis but 
allows for alternative approaches to achieve the same objective. 
Similar to the gate analysis in proposed Sec.  450.125(a), the analysis 
in Sec.  450.108(c)(3) is required when a trajectory that represents a 
useful

[[Page 79619]]

mission approaches an uncontrolled area.
    Proposed Sec.  450.125(b)(1) required that a gate analysis 
establish a relaxation of the flight safety limits that allows 
continued flight or a gate where a decision will be made to abort the 
launch or reentry or allow continued flight. This proposed requirement 
is addressed in Sec.  450.108(c)(3) because it also either allows 
continued flight without a check of critical vehicle parameters if the 
upcoming population exposure is not materially increased, or requires a 
check of critical vehicle parameters before continued flight if the 
upcoming population exposure is materially increased. In this respect, 
the final rule provides clarity on the point at which the check of 
critical vehicle parameters is required, whereas the proposal was 
ambiguous on when a gate would be required.
    Proposed Sec.  450.125(b)(2) stated that, if a gate is established, 
a gate analysis must include a measure of performance at the gate that 
enables the flight abort crew or autonomous FSS to determine whether 
the vehicle is able to complete a useful mission or abort the flight if 
it is not. In the final rule, this requirement is addressed in Sec.  
450.108(c)(3), which states, ``if a critical vehicle parameter is 
outside its pre-established expected range or indicates an inability to 
complete flight within the limits of a useful mission.'' The pre-
established expected range of the critical vehicle parameters are those 
values that do not predict the vehicle will fail or exit the limits of 
a useful mission, or simply those that indicate the vehicle is 
performing as intended. Accordingly, as with gate analysis under the 
proposal, the operator will establish the measure of performance--
referred to as the critical vehicle parameter(s) and pre-established 
expected range(s) in the final rule--that will determine whether flight 
abort must be initiated.
    Proposed Sec.  450.125(b)(4) stated that a gate analysis must 
establish, for an orbital launch, a gate at the last opportunity to 
determine whether the vehicle's flight is in compliance with the flight 
abort rules and can make a useful mission, and to abort the flight if 
it is not. This requirement is addressed by the Sec.  450.108(c)(3) 
requirement that critical vehicle parameters must be checked before 
orbital insertion. Therefore, Sec.  450.108(c)(3) is a more 
performance-based requirement that is consistent with the proposed 
Sec.  450.125(b)(4).
    The FAA notes that certain concepts in proposed Sec.  450.125 are 
also captured in Sec.  450.108(c)(2), (c)(4), and (d)(7), as discussed 
in the preamble associated with those sections. The FAA finds that the 
intent of the proposed gate analysis requirements would be clearer if 
these requirements are included as separate flight safety limits 
objectives and constraints because they can also be applied outside of 
a traditional gate analysis.
    The FAA received several comments on proposed Sec.  450.125 focused 
on the proposed definition of the term ``gate,'' the prescriptive 
nature of the requirements for a gate analysis, and the manner in which 
gates would be applied. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and 
ULA commented that the gate analysis must establish a relaxation of the 
flight safety limits that allows continued flight or a gate where a 
decision will be made to abort the launch or reentry or allow continued 
flight. The commenters asserted that flight rules and placards can 
constrain allowable trajectories, and that it is appropriate to 
disapprove a trajectory if the nominal trajectory is beyond the flight 
safety limits. The FAA declined to make the recommended change because 
Sec.  450.108(c)(3) allows a nominal vehicle to overfly a populated 
area, which is current practice. A flight safety limit that intersects 
the nominal trajectory trace can only be enforced if the vehicle has 
experienced a malfunction before reaching the limit. These limits are 
common, such as gates protecting downrange landmasses before 
overflight.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended 
replacing ``flight abort'' with ``flight termination'' to distinguish 
between a flight abort for a reason unrelated to public safety. The FAA 
did not adopt this change because the term ``flight abort'' is meant to 
encompass hazard control strategies that may not include destruction of 
a vehicle or termination of thrust. For example, flight abort for a 
captive carry mission may entail aborting the mission and returning to 
base or landing at a contingency site. The FAA finds that the term 
``flight termination'' has connotations that are inconsistent with the 
FAA's intent.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA requested 
clarification on the term ``relaxation of a flight safety limit'' in 
the NPRM and questioned whether it is appropriate for an operator to 
relax a flight safety limit.
    The FAA agrees that the proposed language ``relaxation of a flight 
safety limit'' lacked clarity and that the regulation should be clear 
about when a vehicle may overfly population without a performance 
check. The final rule removes terms related to relaxed flight safety 
limits and states in Sec.  450.108(c)(3) that the critical vehicle 
parameter check is required prior to entering a period of materially 
increased public exposure in uncontrolled areas, including before 
orbital insertion. The meaning of ``materially increased public 
exposure'' is discussed earlier in this section.
    Rocket Lab inquired whether a gate analysis is required for when a 
trajectory intersects a flight safety limit, if an operator was using 
flight abort only as a hazard control strategy.
    In the final rule, pursuant to Sec.  450.108(c)(3), this 
performance check is not necessary if the vehicle is not approaching an 
area of materially increased public exposure regardless of how the 
operator develops flight safety limits, as long as it meets 
requirements in Sec.  450.108(c) and (d). The FAA also notes that if 
flight abort is not required as a hazard control strategy to meet the 
safety criteria of Sec.  450.101, an operator may still choose to use 
flight abort at its discretion. Compliance with Sec.  450.108(c)(3) is 
only required for an operator required to use flight abort as a hazard 
control strategy to meet the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101.
Section 450.108(c)(4)
    As noted earlier, proposed Sec.  450.125(c) would have required the 
extent of any gate or relaxation of the flight safety limits to be 
based on normal trajectories, trajectories that may achieve a useful 
mission, collective risk, and consequence criteria. Section 
450.108(c)(4) in the final rule is related to proposed Sec.  
450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) in that it describes the consequence 
requirements for flight safety limits; however, it contains differences 
as explained in this section of the preamble.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.108(c)(4) requires that an operator 
initiate flight abort to prevent conditional expected casualties 
greater than 1 x 10-\2\ in uncontrolled areas due to flight 
abort or due to flight outside the limits of a useful mission from any 
reasonably foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode initiating in any 
significant period of flight. The purpose of Sec.  450.108(c)(4) is to 
ensure that, when an operator cannot develop flight safety limits that 
prevent hazards from affecting uncontrolled areas, the failure modes 
that result in deviations from the planned trajectory will not result 
in a high consequence event if the vehicle is unable to achieve a 
useful mission. This scenario can arise when some public exposure must 
be accepted to allow useful vehicles to continue during a phase of 
flight when flight abort is still used as a hazard control strategy.

[[Page 79620]]

    This situation frequently occurs, for example, on northeasterly 
missions launched from the Eastern Range that are permitted to overfly 
some portions of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland on trajectories within 
the limits of a useful mission. If the vehicle fails after the 
overflight has begun and reaches flight safety limits protecting more 
westerly portions of the uncontrolled areas from flight outside the 
limits of a useful mission, the consequence from flight abort must meet 
the criteria in Sec.  450.108(c)(4).
    Proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) included the consequence 
requirements as a part of gate analysis. In the final rule, the 
consequence requirements are a standalone flight safety limits 
objective in Sec.  450.108(c)(4). The final rule also makes several 
revisions. First, the final rule expressly states flight safety limits 
are required only to prevent high consequence events in uncontrolled 
areas. This concept was implied in the NPRM because, per proposed Sec.  
450.123(a)(2), flight safety limits must prevent debris capable of 
causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle 
is outside the limits of a useful mission. The consequence criteria in 
proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) were applicable to flight 
safety limits that did not prevent debris from impacting in 
uncontrolled areas following a gate or relaxation in a flight safety 
limit developed per Sec.  450.123(a)(2). Therefore, the proposed 
consequence criteria only applied to uncontrolled areas.
    Second, the requirement in the final rule applies in cases of 
flight abort and in cases where the vehicle is outside the limits of a 
useful mission. The consequence criteria in proposed Sec.  
450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) were only applicable in cases of flight abort. 
If only flight abort action were considered, a high consequence event 
resulting from other outcomes (intact impacts, structural breakup, 
etc.) outside the limits of a useful mission might not be identified.
    Vehicle failures within the limits of a useful mission are excluded 
from the consequence criteria in Sec.  450.108(c)(4) in the final rule 
because flight abort cannot prevent a failure from affecting 
uncontrolled areas that must be exposed to allow a vehicle on a useful 
mission to continue flight. For example, if a vehicle begins an 
unplanned turn from the nominal trajectory while overflying 
uncontrolled areas and breaks up aerodynamically before exiting the 
limits of a useful mission, this failure would not count against the 
consequence criteria because the vehicle was within the limits of a 
useful mission when the outcome of the failure occurred. Collective 
risk requirements still apply in these scenarios and ensure that the 
risk is met for any trajectory that the operator declares as 
representing a useful mission, pursuant to Sec.  450.108(d)(7).
    Third, whereas proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) concerned 
the consequence from flight abort ``resulting from any reasonable 
vehicle response mode,'' Sec.  450.108(c)(4) concerns the consequence 
from any ``reasonably foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode.'' The 
replacement of ``vehicle response mode'' with ``failure mode'' is 
discussed in the preamble section on Sec.  450.101(c)(2).\99\ The term 
``off-trajectory'' was added to explain further which types of failures 
must result in the consequence criteria being met. Off-trajectory 
failures are those for which the vehicle deviates from its intended 
flight path--for example due to failures of the guidance, navigation, 
or control systems. Outcomes from on-trajectory failures, such as an 
explosion or loss of thrust along the intended flight path, are not 
able to be fully mitigated by an FSS because once the failure occurs 
the hazard cannot be prevented from affecting uncontrolled areas if the 
failure occurred during a period in which the uncontrolled areas were 
exposed. At best, the hazard can be reduced for some failure modes such 
as a loss of thrust that may result in an intact impact unless a 
destructive abort that disperses propellants is implemented. In this 
case, flight abort may still be required to reduce risk per Sec.  
450.108(c)(2) since the vehicle is unable to achieve a useful mission, 
but the consequence criteria would not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ The FAA also notes that the term ``in any one-second period 
of flight'' has been changed throughout the final rule to the term 
``in any significant period of flight,'' as described in the 
preamble section discussing Sec.  450.101(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA requested 
clarification on the intent of the CEC limits in proposed 
Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2). In the final rule, the FAA retained the 
CEC limits related to flight abort. The intent of these 
limits is to ensure that, when flight abort or a flight outside the 
limits of a useful mission resulting from an off-trajectory failure 
mode produces debris capable of causing a casualty, it nonetheless 
protects against a high consequence event. In other words, flight abort 
provides sufficient protection against a high consequence event when 
flight abort is implemented to prevent the CEC from any 
reasonably foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode initiating in any 
significant period of flight from exceeding 1 x 10-\2\ 
casualties, even though the public in uncontrolled areas might be 
exposed to debris from a flight abort.
    SpaceX asked if there were restrictions to using flight safety 
limits that met the risk requirements of proposed Sec.  450.101 but did 
not meet the 1 x 10-\2\ CEC requirement.
    Under Sec.  450.108(c)(4), flight safety limits must not allow 
CEC greater than
    1 x 10-\2\ unless the consequence resulted from a 
vehicle within the limits of a useful mission and therefore could not 
be mitigated by flight abort without aborting a vehicle on a useful 
mission, or the consequence resulted from an on-trajectory failure 
mode.
    An example of when the consequence requirement would not apply is 
when a vehicle on a normal trajectory suffers a spontaneous breakup. 
This on-trajectory event cannot be mitigated by flight abort without 
terminating a useful vehicle before it overflies uncontrolled areas. An 
operator would not be required to initiate flight abort under the final 
rule for this scenario. An example of when the consequence requirement 
would apply is if a malfunction causes the vehicle to depart from the 
limits of a useful mission. If CEC is used to measure high 
consequence events, the flight safety limits must prevent the 
consequence from such a failure mode (i.e., a malfunction that causes 
the vehicle to depart from the limits of a useful mission) from 
exceeding 1 x 10-\2\ CEC, whether produced by 
flight abort or other reasonably foreseeable outcomes (such as 
aerodynamic/structural breakup, intact impact, etc.).
    SpaceX requested guidance on how an operator should balance 
EC and CEC when designing flight safety limits 
and expressed concern that EC may increase as an operator 
attempts to reduce CEC. SpaceX also recommended removing all 
numerical values associated with CEC and requiring the 
consequence of flight abort at the flight safety limits to be 
minimized.
    Regarding the balance of EC and CEC, the FAA 
notes that flight safety limits must be designed to meet the 
EC and CEC requirements as described in Sec.  
450.108(c)(1) and (c)(4), respectively. If the flight safety limits 
must be modified to reduce the CEC to acceptable levels, 
EC must still be kept within acceptable levels. The FAA does 
not agree with the recommendation to remove the numerical value 
associated with the CEC requirement because this could allow 
flight safety limits that result in a high consequence through flight 
abort or through flight abort inaction. However, the final rule does

[[Page 79621]]

allow for methods of measuring consequence other than CEC 
that provide an equivalent level of safety under Sec.  450.37.
Section 450.108(c)(5)
    Section 450.108(c)(5) requires that an operator initiate flight 
abort to prevent the vehicle state from reaching identified conditions 
that are anticipated to compromise the capability of the FSS if further 
flight has the potential to violate a flight safety limit. For example, 
if a roll rate of a particular magnitude would preclude ground-based 
flight abort commands from being received by the vehicle, a flight 
safety limit should be developed that triggers flight abort before the 
roll rate reaches this value.
    Section 450.108(c)(5) is related to the flight abort rule in 
proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(ii), which required that flight abort 
rules include that the FSS must abort flight when the vehicle state 
approaches conditions that are anticipated to compromise the capability 
of the FSS and further flight has the potential to violate the FSS. In 
the NPRM, the FAA did not include a flight safety limit objective that 
corresponded with the flight abort rule in proposed Sec.  
450.165(c)(3)(ii). The FAA adds this flight safety limit objective in 
Sec.  450.108(c)(5). The flight abort rule in proposed Sec.  
450.165(c)(3)(ii) is in Sec.  450.108(f)(2)(ii) and is discussed 
further under Flight Abort Rules in the following paragraphs.
Section 450.108(c)(6)
    Section Sec.  450.108(c)(6) states that, in lieu of meeting Sec.  
450.108(c)(2) and Sec.  450.108(c)(4), an operator may initiate flight 
abort to prevent debris capable of causing a casualty due to any hazard 
from affecting uncontrolled areas using an FSS that complies with Sec.  
450.145. The FAA adds this regulation to clarify that a CEC 
analysis is not required if an FSS that complies with Sec.  450.145 
provides hazard containment. Hazard containment is a means of achieving 
the goals of Sec.  450.108(c)(2) and (c)(4) because, if an operator 
provides for hazard containment, continued flight will not increase 
risk in uncontrolled areas and hazard containment would prevent 
conditional expected casualties greater than 1 x 10-\2\ in 
uncontrolled areas. This requirement is consistent with the NPRM 
because if an operator is able to contain hazards throughout the period 
when flight abort is used, the proposed consequence requirements in 
Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) would not apply since a gate analysis 
would not be necessary.
    In developing the NPRM, the FAA considered alternatives to a 
conditional risk limit, including the current approach employed in 
Sec.  417.213.\100\ The FAA rejected using the approach in Sec.  
417.213 as a requirement in part 450 because it is unnecessarily 
restrictive to require designated impact limit lines to bound the area 
where debris with a ballistic coefficient of three pounds per square 
foot or more is allowed to impact if the FSS functions properly, as 
evidenced by the need for the FAA to grant waivers to allow innovative 
missions to proceed safely, such as return of boosters to the launch 
site.\101\ However, if an operator satisfies the current requirements 
in Sec.  417.213, it would meet the requirement in Sec.  450.108(c)(6). 
This strategy is not an option when hazard containment is not possible 
during a phase of flight when flight abort must be used as a hazard 
control strategy. For example, if an area of overflight occurs on the 
nominal trajectory during a phase of flight when flight abort is still 
used as a hazard control strategy, an operator cannot claim containment 
during this phase and must meet Sec.  450.108(c)(2) and (c)(4). The FAA 
notes that its approach in Sec.  450.108(c) to employing conditional 
risk limits is consistent with a recommendation made by the National 
Academy of Sciences.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ The FAA currently requires in Sec.  417.213 that ``a 
flight safety analysis must identify the location of populated or 
other protected areas, and establish flight safety limits that 
define when an FSS must terminate a launch vehicle's flight to 
prevent the hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from 
reaching any populated or other protected area and ensure that the 
launch satisfies the public risk criteria.''
    \101\ See Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 
81 FR 1470, 1470-1472 (January 12, 2016).
    \102\ In 2001, the National Research Council published a report 
on ``Streamlining Space Launch Range Safety,'' which included a 
recommendation that ``destruct lines and flight termination system 
requirements should be defined and implemented in a way that is 
directly traceable to accepted risk standards.'' See p. 44 of IBSN 
0-309-51648-X available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9790.html. The 
flight safety limit requirements currently in Sec.  417.213(d) are 
not directly traceable to accepted risk standards in that they 
require the analysis to ``establish designated impact limit lines to 
bound the area where debris with a ballistic coefficient of three or 
more is allowed to impact if the flight safety system functions 
properly.'' As noted earlier, the approach in Sec.  417.213 has been 
rejected because it is unnecessarily restrictive, as evidenced by 
the need for the FAA to grant waivers to allow innovative missions 
to proceed safely, such as return of boosters to the launch site. 
The FAA found that those waivers did not jeopardize public safety 
based on conditional risk analyses that are inherent in methods the 
NAS referred to as accepted risk standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Galactic recommended adding an exclusion to the requirement 
for flight safety limits in proposed Sec.  450.123 for vehicles that 
already meet the public risk criteria, as flight safety limits analysis 
amounts to an additional layer of regulation that Virgin Galactic 
believed was redundant and unneeded.
    The FAA determined that a clarification is required in response to 
this recommendation. Pursuant to Sec.  450.108(a), flight safety limits 
are only required in phases of flight in which flight abort is used as 
a hazard control strategy to meet the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101. 
The FAA does not agree that meeting public risk criteria, or just 
collective and individual risk, are the only objectives of flight 
abort, as explained in the preamble section on CEC. The FAA 
finds it necessary to include additional objectives for flight abort in 
Sec.  450.108(c) to protect public safety adequately. Lastly, the 
preamble section on CEC describes why a conditional risk 
assessment is appropriate to provide the public protection from 
unlikely but catastrophic events in the context of launch and reentry 
operations.
iii. Flight Safety Limits Constraints
    Section 450.108(d) in the final rule describes flight safety limits 
constraints. This subsection consolidates the flight safety limits 
constraints in proposed Sec. Sec.  450.123 through 450.129.
Section 450.108(d)(1)
    Proposed Sec.  450.123(b)(1) required flight safety limits to 
account for temporal and geometric extents on the Earth's surface of 
any vehicle hazards resulting from any planned or unplanned event for 
all times during flight.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.108(d)(1) requires that flight safety 
limits account for temporal and geometric extents on the Earth's 
surface of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle hazards under all 
reasonably foreseeable conditions during normal and malfunctioning 
flight. The FAA adds ``reasonably foreseeable'' before ``vehicle 
hazards'' to be consistent with language elsewhere in the regulation. 
As noted earlier, ``reasonably foreseeable'' is a term commonly used in 
system safety. The FAA also replaces ``from any planned or unplanned 
event for all times during flight'' in proposed Sec.  450.123(b)(1) 
with ``under all reasonably foreseeable conditions during normal and 
malfunctioning flight'' in Sec.  450.108(d)(1). This revision does not 
result in a substantive change from the proposal, but the FAA finds the 
revised language to be clearer and consistent with language elsewhere 
in the regulation through use of the term ``reasonably foreseeable 
conditions'' in place of the proposed ``planned or

[[Page 79622]]

unplanned event.'' This standard does not hold the operator responsible 
for unforeseeable events.
Section 450.108(d)(2)
    Section 450.108(d)(2) requires that flight safety limits account 
for the physics of hazard generation and transport including 
uncertainty. This articulation represents a revision of proposed Sec.  
450.123(b)(2), which stated flight safety limits must account for 
potential contributions to debris impact dispersions. The FAA finds the 
NPRM language was unclear as to the scope of the requirement. The NPRM 
would have required an operator to consider how factors like winds, 
imparted velocities, and uncertainty in mass properties affect where 
debris from a failed vehicle may impact. However, direct debris impacts 
are not the only hazards posed by vehicle failures. For example, an 
intact impact of a vehicle may lead to a blast wave or release of toxic 
propellant, both of which must be considered when developing flight 
safety limits. Hazard generation and transport are factors that apply 
to all hazards, unlike factors that only apply to determining debris 
impact dispersions. Hazard generation refers to the process by which a 
vehicle becomes a hazard, and transport is how the hazard moves from 
the source to an exposed person or asset. Simply accounting for 
potential contributions to debris impact dispersions would not 
encompass all hazards, though debris impact dispersions also need to be 
accounted for under Sec.  450.108(d)(2).
    Blue Origin requested clarification of the term ``potential 
contributions'' in proposed Sec.  450.123(b)(2). The FAA notes the term 
``potential contributions'' to debris impact dispersions are those that 
influence the propagation of debris following a vehicle breakup, such 
as explosion-induced velocities, winds, uncertainty in aerodynamic 
properties, etc. The FAA further notes the term ``potential 
contributions'' does not appear in the final rule. The FAA will address 
development of debris impact dispersions in guidance, similar to the 
existing Flight Safety Analysis Handbook.
Section 450.108(d)(3)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate and update data loss 
flight times and planned safe flight states requirements in proposed 
Sec.  450.127 (Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State 
Analyses). As explained in the proposal, data loss flight time analysis 
is necessary to establish when an operator must abort a flight 
following the loss of vehicle tracking information. In the NPRM, the 
FAA explained that data loss flight time would be the shortest elapsed 
thrusting or gliding time during which a vehicle flown with an FSS can 
move from its trajectory to a condition in which it is possible for the 
vehicle to violate a flight safety limit. Data loss flight times would 
have been required from the initiation of flight until the minimum 
elapsed thrusting or gliding time was no greater than the time it would 
take for a normal vehicle to reach the final gate crossing or the 
planned safe flight state.
    Section 450.108(d)(3) revises the prescriptive requirements in 
Sec.  450.127 to require that flight safety limits account for the 
potential to lose valid data necessary to evaluate the flight abort 
rules. Data is valid when it is of sufficient quality to be used to 
make flight abort decisions. Data used to make flight abort decisions 
can be missing or invalid for a number of reasons, but resulting from 
an unplanned event, such as disruption or loss of communication 
pathways with ground-based or onboard tracking sensors. Despite an 
operator's or launch site's best efforts, the potential to lose track 
data is a contingency for which operators must plan.
    Section 450.108(d)(3) requires an operator to account for the 
potential to lose valid data necessary to evaluate the flight abort 
rules because the loss of valid data does not absolve the operator from 
attempting to meet the flight safety limits requirements in Sec.  
450.108(c) and (d). Section 450.108(d)(3) captures the performance-
based intent of proposed Sec.  450.127 (Data Loss Flight Time and 
Planned Safe Flight State Analyses). The FAA finds that this revision 
allows for the use of data loss flight times as a means of satisfying 
Sec.  450.108(d)(3), but also allows operators to propose other methods 
of meeting the requirement.
    Microcosm and SpaceX requested clarification of the intent for 
proposed Sec.  450.127. The FAA notes that the purpose of proposed 
Sec.  450.127 was to determine when flight abort is required if track 
data used to evaluate the flight abort rules is lost. If a vehicle is 
able to reach a flight safety limit when track data is lost, then a 
countdown begins that would indicate, upon reaching zero, that a flight 
safety limit may have been reached. Under proposed Sec.  
450.165(c)(3)(iii), flight abort would have to occur no later than when 
the countdown reaches zero. Throughout flight, the time for the 
countdown to reach zero is the data loss flight time. If reliable 
tracking sources are regained before the countdown reaches zero, then 
flight abort rule evaluation resumes and the countdown resets. In 
Federal launch site parlance, data loss flight times are known as 
``green numbers.''
    In the NPRM, data loss flight times would not be used if a 
vehicle's tracking icon has potentially passed a final gate when the 
countdown reaches zero because this could result in introducing hazards 
in uncontrolled areas that the gate protects. As described in proposed 
Sec.  450.127(b)(1), there are no data loss flight times when the 
minimum elapsed thrusting or gliding time is greater than the time it 
would take for a normal vehicle to reach the final gate crossing, to 
preclude abort from occurring after a gate crossing.
    Proposed Sec.  450.127(c)(1) through (c)(3) described other phases 
of flight when data loss flight times would be unnecessary. If a 
vehicle cannot reach a flight safety limit, then a data loss flight 
time cannot be computed and would be unnecessary. It may seem futile to 
have a flight safety limit that cannot be reached, but for purposes of 
data loss flight times a flight safety limit is considered unreachable 
if the vehicle cannot reach it starting from within normal trajectory 
limits when track data is lost. The flight safety limit may still be 
reachable if the vehicle was outside of normal trajectory limits at the 
time data was lost. Therefore, these flight safety limits may still 
have value.
    Finally, in the NPRM, data loss flight times would not be necessary 
in phases of flight when an FSS is not required. There may still be 
flight safety limits during such phases if an operator retains an FSS 
and active flight abort rules even though they are not required. Loss 
of track data would not require flight abort since the flight safety 
limits themselves are unnecessary. This approach would allow operators 
to be conservative in the use of flight safety limits in phases of 
flight when they are unnecessary, with no threat of flight abort from 
loss of track data.
    Proposed Sec.  450.127(b)(3) would have permitted the real-time 
computation and application of data loss flight times during vehicle 
flight, in which case the state vector just prior to loss of data 
should be used as the nominal state vector. The FAA finds that Sec.  
450.108(d)(3) provides the same level of safety as the proposed 
requirement in Sec.  450.127 and provides additional flexibility. The 
FAA will provide guidance on compliance with Sec.  450.108(d)(3). The 
proposed requirement in Sec.  450.127 can be part of a viable means of 
compliance with Sec.  450.108(d)(3). An operator may propose other 
means of compliance with Sec.  450.108(d)(3). Microcosm and SpaceX 
requested clarification of the intent for proposed Sec.  450.127. The 
FAA

[[Page 79623]]

notes that the purpose of proposed Sec.  450.127 was to determine when 
flight abort is required if track data used to evaluate the flight 
abort rules is lost.
Section 450.108(d)(4)
    Proposed Sec.  450.129 (Time Delay Analysis) would have required an 
operator to perform a time delay analysis to establish the mean elapsed 
time between the violation of a flight abort rule and the time when the 
FSS is capable of aborting flight for the purpose of establishing 
flight safety limits. The time delay analysis would have been required 
to determine a time delay distribution that accounts for all 
foreseeable sources of delay.
    While proposed Sec.  450.129 does not appear in the final rule, the 
objective of proposed Sec.  450.129 is captured by Sec.  450.108(d)(4). 
Section 450.108(d)(4) requires that flight safety limits account for 
the time delay, including uncertainties, between the violation of a 
flight abort rule and the time when the FSS is expected to activate. 
The term in the final rule ``time delay including uncertainties'' is 
consistent in intent with the NPRM language ``mean elapsed time'' and 
``determine a time delay distribution.''
    The time delay distribution in proposed Sec.  450.129 is 
distribution in a statistical sense. The uncertainties referred to in 
Sec.  450.108(d)(4) are the same as the time delay distribution 
referred to in proposed Sec.  450.129. To meet Sec.  450.108(d)(4), the 
operator must consider the range of values that the actual time delay 
could fall between. While proposed Sec.  450.129 stated that the time 
delay analysis would be used in establishing flight safety limits, the 
final rule specifies that the time delay is a constraint in developing 
flight safety limits. Time delays are important in a flight safety 
limits analysis because the decision to abort flight must be made in 
time to achieve the flight safety limits objectives. This is not 
possible unless the time delay between the violation of a flight abort 
rule and the time when the FSS is expected to activate is known. The 
FAA finds that including this requirement in the flight safety limits 
constraints provides more clarity regarding the relation between this 
requirement and the flight safety limits.
Section 450.108(d)(5)
    Section 450.108(d)(5) requires an operator to determine flight 
safety limits that account for individual, collective, and conditional 
risk evaluations both for proper functioning of the FSS and failure of 
the FSS. To satisfy this requirement, an operator must account for the 
reliability of the FSS under two scenarios when determining whether 
individual, collective, or conditional risk requirements are met with 
the flight safety limits objectives. The applicable flight safety 
limits objectives are located in Sec.  450.108(c)(1), which addresses 
individual and collective risk, and Sec.  450.108(c)(4), which 
addresses conditional risk. Although Sec.  450.108(c)(2) is also 
associated with risk, it is independent of the FSS reliability because 
it is a comparison between the risk if the FSS is activated and the 
risk if it is not activated.
    To comply with Sec.  450.108(d)(5), first, the FSS must be assumed 
to have a reliability of one, meaning it is presumed to function 
without error. The risk evaluations using an FSS reliability of one 
ensure that the criteria are met if the FSS functions as intended. This 
requirement is important because an FSS failure should not be relied 
upon to make flight safety limits compliant with risk requirements. The 
decision to implement a flight abort is a deliberate safety 
intervention. The FAA wants to be sure that the public is safe given 
any deliberate safety intervention. This objective is consistent with 
proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2), which contain requirements for 
consequence from flight abort, implying that the flight abort action 
occurs, and is also consistent with current practice for all risk 
evaluations.
    Second, the risk evaluations must consider the predicted 
reliability of the FSS. Predicted reliability of the FSS is important 
because even low probabilities of FSS failures can have significant 
impacts on risk. This consideration is consistent with the NPRM because 
FSS reliabilities are a fundamental component of the viability of 
flight abort as a hazard control strategy, and it is expressly stated 
in the final rule for clarity. Consideration of the FSS reliability in 
risk evaluations is also consistent with current practice.
    The final rule allows an operator flexibility to establish the 
design, analysis, and testing of its FSS and the conditions that 
require initiation of flight abort as long as the CEC is no 
greater than 1 x 10-\2\ for any reasonably foreseeable 
failure mode in any significant period of flight that could require the 
operator to initiate flight abort, accounting for the reliability of 
the FSS pursuant to Sec.  450.108(d)(5).
Section 450.108(d)(6)
    Proposed Sec.  450.123(b)(3) would have added a requirement to 
design flight safety limits to avoid flight abort under conditions that 
result in increased collective risk to people in uncontrolled areas, 
compared to continued flight. In the NPRM, the FAA explained that the 
proposed requirement is equivalent to the U.S. Government consensus 
standard that a conditional risk management process should be 
implemented to ensure that mission rules do not induce unacceptable 
consequences when they are implemented.
    Section 450.108(d)(6) requires that flight safety limits be 
designed to avoid flight abort that results in increased collective 
risk to the public in uncontrolled areas, compared to continued flight. 
This language is very similar to proposed Sec.  450.123(b)(3), with one 
change. The FAA changes the term ``people'' in the proposed rule to 
``the public'' in the final rule because the FAA regulates the safety 
of the public. The term ``people'' could be construed as meaning 
something broader than ``public,'' such as mission essential personnel 
who may be in uncontrolled areas.
    Blue Origin stated that proposed Sec. Sec.  450.123(d), 
450.125(b)(2), 450.125(c), and 450.125(c)(3) were in conflict and 
commented on the definition of a ``useful mission.'' Blue Origin 
explained that, even though the intent was to meet the public safety 
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.101, terminating a vehicle that may 
not meet the definition of a ``useful mission'' may result in an 
increase in risk to the public, including those on ships and aircraft, 
compared to continued flight that may result in reaching orbit. Blue 
Origin commented that, if the limits were defined only with respect to 
the risk criteria in proposed Sec.  450.101, allowing the vehicle to 
continue flight may result in a safer risk profile.
    The FAA agrees that the risk to the public must not be increased by 
flight abort. However, if a vehicle intended for orbit is outside the 
limits of a useful mission and approaching populated uncontrolled 
areas, there is likely an optimum location to abort the flight without 
increasing risk. For launches where the instantaneous impact point 
(IIP) \103\ approaches a landmass from the ocean, aborting flight 
before the resulting debris would encroach on the landmass and dense 
coastal shipping traffic would be compliant with Sec.  450.108(d)(6). 
Current practice for orbital launches from Federal launch sites is to 
allow the vehicle to continue to orbit if it can achieve a minimum safe 
orbit and is within the limits of a useful

[[Page 79624]]

mission in the IIP projection. This practice is consistent with the 
requirements in Sec.  450.108. If an operator proposes to allow a 
vehicle outside the IIP limits of a useful mission to overfly 
population to proceed to orbit, it must demonstrate that this option 
presents lower risk than aborting the flight before the overflight 
begins.
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    \103\ Section 401.5 has a long-standing definition of IIP: 
``instantaneous impact point means an impact point, following thrust 
termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of 
atmospheric drag effects.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA agrees that a discrepancy existed in the NPRM in proposed 
Sec.  450.123(d) but is uncertain if this is the conflict to which Blue 
Origin referred. The proposed Sec.  450.123(d) referred to risk 
criteria in Sec.  450.101, but mistakenly omitted the requirement to 
prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in 
uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful 
mission. The option to determine the need for flight abort in real time 
as described in proposed Sec.  450.123(d) does not appear in the final 
rule because it is just one means of meeting the requirements for 
flight safety limits. However, this does not preclude an operator from 
determining the need for flight abort entirely in real-time, as long as 
requirements in Sec.  450.108 are met.
Section 450.108(d)(7)
    As noted in the section on flight safety limits objectives, 
proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(1) stated that flight safety limits would be 
required to be gated or relaxed where they intersect with a normal 
trajectory if that trajectory would meet the individual and collective 
risk criteria of proposed Sec.  450.101(a)(1) and (a)(2) or (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) when treated like a nominal trajectory with normal trajectory 
dispersions. Proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(2) stated that flight safety 
limits may be gated or relaxed where they intersect with a trajectory 
within the limits of a useful mission if that trajectory would meet the 
individual and collective risk criteria of proposed Sec.  450.101(a)(1) 
and (a)(2) or (b)(1) and (b)(2) when treated like a nominal trajectory 
with normal trajectory dispersions.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.108(d)(7) requires an operator to 
determine flight safety limits that ensure that any trajectory within 
the limits of a useful mission that is permitted to be flown without 
abort would meet the collective risk criteria of Sec.  450.101(a)(1) or 
(b)(1) when analyzed as if it were the planned mission pursuant to 
Sec.  450.213(b)(2).\104\ The relocation of requirements in proposed 
Sec.  450.125 to Sec.  450.108(c)(2) through (c)(4) and Sec.  
450.108(d)(7) necessitated a revision to the language in Sec.  
450.108(d)(7). Section 450.108(d)(7) requires only that any trajectory 
within the limits of a useful mission that is permitted to be flown 
without abort would meet the collective risk criteria of Sec.  
450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1) when analyzed as if it were the planned mission 
pursuant to Sec.  450.213(b)(2). As stated in the NPRM, the philosophy 
behind proposed Sec.  450.125(c)(2) was to allow a non-normal flight to 
continue as long as the mission does not pose an unacceptable 
conditional risk given the present trajectory. The intent of Sec.  
450.108(d)(7) is similar but is stated in a different context than in 
the NPRM and also revised for clarity. In the final rule, the FAA 
removes the individual risk criterion from the requirement because the 
intent of the requirement was not to potentially create flight hazard 
areas along every azimuth within the limits of a useful mission 
wherever an individual risk contour exceeds 1 x 10-\6\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ As part of pre-flight planning, an operator must submit to 
the FAA planned mission information, including the vehicle, launch 
site, planned flight path, staging and impact locations, each 
payload delivery point, intended reentry or landing sites including 
any contingency abort location, and the location of any disposed 
launch or reentry vehicle stage or component that is deorbited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA found that the phrase ``when analyzed as if it were the 
planned mission pursuant to Sec.  450.213(b)(2)'' was more precise than 
``when treated like a nominal trajectory with normal trajectory 
dispersions.'' A planned mission must be characterized with 
uncertainties and assessed for risk from planned events and reasonably 
foreseeable failure modes; therefore, trajectories must be within the 
limits of a useful mission that are permitted to be flown without 
abort, pursuant to Sec.  450.108(d)(6).
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended 
replacing the terms ``normal trajectories'' and ``limits of a useful 
mission trajectories'' in proposed Sec.  450.123(c) and Sec.  
450.125(c) with ``nominal trajectories.'' The FAA finds that such a 
change would restrict severely the allowable flight corridor of 
vehicles that could achieve a potentially useful mission by requiring 
that a vehicle be on a nominal trajectory to enter a period of 
materially increased public exposure in uncontrolled areas. As such, 
Sec. Sec.  450.108(c)(3) and 450.108(d)(7) in the final rule allow 
vehicles within the limits of a useful mission to enter a period of 
materially increased public exposure in uncontrolled areas, provided 
the trajectory meets the collective risk requirement.
iv. End of Flight Abort
    The FAA adds Sec.  450.108(e) in the final rule, which states that 
a flight does not need to be aborted to protect against high 
consequence events in uncontrolled areas beginning immediately after 
critical vehicle parameters are validated, if the vehicle is able to 
achieve a useful mission and certain conditions are met for the 
remainder of flight. Specifically, the conditions which must be present 
are: (1) Flight abort would not materially decrease the risk from a 
high consequence event, and (2) there are no key flight safety events. 
Section 450.108(e) relieves the operator from the requirement to use 
flight abort in certain situations in which high consequence events are 
possible but would not be effectively mitigated by an FSS. This change 
responds to comments and addresses a common occurrence during a period 
of planned overflight of an uncontrolled area before orbital insertion.
    Section 450.108(e) applies to a flight beginning immediately after 
critical vehicle parameters are validated, if the vehicle is able to 
achieve a useful mission. As discussed in the section on flight safety 
limits objectives, ``critical vehicle parameters'' are those parameters 
that demonstrate the vehicle is capable of completing safe flight 
through the upcoming phase of flight where population is exposed to 
hazardous debris effects from reasonably foreseeable failure modes. Due 
to the wide variety of launch and reentry vehicles that could be 
licensed, there is a wide variety of vehicle parameters that could be 
considered critical in this context. For example, recent state vector 
history data, as well as vehicle health indicators such as motor 
chamber pressure, generally will qualify as critical vehicle 
parameters.
    Section 450.108(e) only applies when the following conditions are 
met. The first condition is that flight abort would not decrease the 
risk from a high consequence event materially as measured by CEC or 
other means identified through ELOS. The FAA expects that the 
requirement in Sec.  450.108(e)(1) can be met by implementation of the 
current practices at the 45th SW, specifically, performing a comparison 
of the CEC and EC in uncontrolled areas with and 
without flight abort from each reasonably foreseeable failure mode in 
any significant period of flight during the subject phase of flight. If 
flight abort would not reduce the CEC and EC 
associated with each failure mode materially, then this condition is 
met.

[[Page 79625]]

    A material decrease would exclude any best estimate of the mean 
value that is already two orders of magnitude or more below the 
criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b). As the best estimate approaches 
the established limits in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b) on the mean 
predicted values, a material decrease would be smaller, including: (1) 
Any reduction that brings the operation into compliance with Sec.  
450.101(a) and (b) limits, (2) any half-order of magnitude reduction in 
the best estimate of the mean value of EC, or (3) a 
reduction by an amount at least as large as the coefficient of 
variation due to uncertainty in the population distribution. Section 
450.108(e)(1) uses the phrase ``risk from a high consequence event'' 
deliberately so that other measures of collective risk and 
consequences, not just CEC and EC, can be 
considered in evaluating compliance with this requirement, absent a 
waiver. The FAA will provide guidance on what constitutes material 
decrease.
    The second condition in Sec.  450.108(e) requires that there are no 
key flight safety events for the remainder of flight. The FAA currently 
has a formal definition of the term ``key flight-safety event'' in part 
437 (Experimental Permits). Section 437.3 states that key flight-safety 
event means a permitted flight activity that has an increased 
probability of causing a launch accident compared with other portions 
of flight. In addition, Sec.  437.59(a) states that, at a minimum, a 
key flight-safety event includes: (1) Ignition of any primary rocket 
engine, (2) any staging event, or (3) any envelope expansion. The 
current description of key flight safety events in the permit 
regulation conveys what the FAA may consider a key flight safety event 
in the context of part 450.
    Section 401.7 of the final rule has added a definition of ``key 
flight safety events'' and states that a key flight safety event means 
a flight activity that has an increased probability of causing a 
failure compared with other portions of flight. The term key flight 
safety event in the context of part 450 includes events that could 
compromise any safety-critical system, or otherwise increase the risk 
from high consequence events, such as events that subject a safety-
critical system to environments at or near the maximum predicted 
environment.
    SpaceX commented that launches that overfly major landmasses (e.g., 
Europe, Africa, or South America) prior to orbital insertion would 
violate the CEC requirement in proposed Sec.  450.101(c) 
during overflight. SpaceX urged the FAA to update the regulation to 
clarify that an operator would not have to perform a CEC 
analysis for the ''overflight'' phase of flight. SpaceX also 
recommended that the CEC requirement apply only to vehicle 
response modes that are mitigated by the FSS.
    The FAA acknowledges that some launches that overfly major 
landmasses prior to orbital insertion produce CEC levels in 
excess of the 1 x 10-\2\ threshold and that flight abort 
will not mitigate the consequences associated with those failure modes. 
The FAA modifies the final rule to address such circumstances by 
adopting requirements proposed in the NPRM, such as Sec.  450.125(c). 
Specifically, Sec.  450.108(e) identifies conditions that, if met, 
demonstrate a high consequence event is sufficiently mitigated. These 
conditions are met generally by U.S. launches that overfly downrange 
landmasses prior to orbital insertion. Thus, the final rule includes 
specific provisions designed to allow the current practice where some 
launches proceed through a phase of flight, such as the downrange 
overflight of a major landmass just prior to orbital insertion, without 
additional protections against low probability, high consequence 
events.
    The FAA finds that meeting the requirements in Sec.  450.108(e) 
demonstrates sufficient protection against the probability of high 
consequence events, even though the CEC may exceed the 1 x 
10-\3\ or 1 x 10-\2\ thresholds during the 
subject phase of flight. The use of collective risk to determine 
acceptability of downrange overflight is consistent with current 
practice.
    Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX commented that flight abort may 
actually increase risk during overflight where vehicle hazards cannot 
be contained. Even for vehicles that implement an FSS with a 
reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent, it would still be possible to fall 
into the highest risk bin and not improve a risk posture measured by 
CEC.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters. In the final rule in Sec.  
450.108(e), the FAA sets conditions that demonstrate that a high 
consequence event is sufficiently mitigated, including if flight abort 
in that phase of flight would not materially decrease the risk from a 
high consequence event.
vi. Flight Abort Rules
    Proposed Sec.  450.165(c) (Flight Commit Criteria) contained the 
requirements for flight abort rules. As explained in the NPRM, an 
operator would identify the conditions under which an FSS, including 
the functions of any flight abort crew, must abort the flight to ensure 
compliance with Sec.  450.101. An operator would be required to abort a 
flight if a flight safety limit is violated or if some condition exists 
that could lead to a violation, such as a compromised FSS or loss of 
data.
    In the final rule, the FAA revised and relocated the flight abort 
rules to Sec.  450.108 consistent with the objective of consolidating 
relevant flight abort requirements into a single section in the final 
rule. In Sec.  450.108(f), an operator must establish and observe 
flight abort rules that govern the conduct of launch and reentry.
    Section 450.108(f)(1) requires that vehicle data required to 
evaluate flight abort rules must be available to the FSS under all 
reasonably foreseeable conditions during normal and malfunctioning 
flight. A similar requirement appeared in proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(2), 
which required vehicle data necessary to evaluate flight abort rules to 
be available to the FSS across the range of normal and malfunctioning 
flight. The FAA adds ``under all reasonably foreseeable conditions'' to 
Sec.  450.108(f)(1) to acknowledge that some conditions that prevent 
vehicle data from being available to evaluate flight abort rules might 
be unforeseeable and therefore unpreventable through planning and 
design.
    Section 450.108(f)(2) describes when the FSS must abort flight, 
similar to proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(3). Section 450.108(f)(2)(i) 
requires that the FSS must abort flight when valid, real-time data 
indicate the vehicle has violated any flight safety limit developed 
pursuant to this section. In the final rule, the FAA revised the 
language from proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(i) to add ``developed 
pursuant to this section'' because the flight safety limits 
requirements now appear in the same section as this flight abort rule.
    As proposed in Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(ii), the flight abort rules 
would have required the FSS to abort flight when the vehicle state 
approaches conditions that are anticipated to compromise the capability 
of the FSS and further flight has the potential to violate a flight 
safety limit.
    Blue Origin commented that, while it is possible to write flight 
abort rules to account for specific cases, there was not currently a 
practical means of writing general rules that would abort flight when 
the vehicle state approaches conditions that could result in a 
compromise of the FSS for every circumstance proposed in Sec.  
450.165(c)(3)(ii). It also commented that the potential to violate a 
flight safety limit is vague and outside the capability of current 
generation autonomous FSS. Blue Origin

[[Page 79626]]

recommended the rule be reworded as ``the flight safety system must 
abort flight when the vehicle state approaches identified conditions 
from the system safety analysis that are anticipated to compromise the 
capability of the flight safety system and the flight safety system is 
required to contain the risk to an acceptable level (as analyzed in the 
flight safety analysis).''
    In the final rule, the revised requirement in Sec.  
450.108(f)(2)(ii) adopts Blue Origin's recommendation to add 
``identified'' before ``conditions that are anticipated to compromise 
the capability of the flight safety system.'' The FAA finds this 
addition reasonable because it avoids requiring protections against 
unknown conditions. As revised, Sec.  450.108(f)(2)(ii) requires that 
the FSS must abort flight when the vehicle state approaches identified 
conditions that are anticipated to compromise the capability of the FSS 
and further flight has the potential to violate a flight safety limit. 
This requirement is used in conjunction with the flight safety limits 
objective in Sec.  450.108(c)(5).
    The FAA declines to adopt Blue Origin's recommendation to limit 
this requirement to the system safety analysis because a system safety 
analysis is not the only means to identify these conditions. For 
example, an FSS survivability analysis or a link analysis for a command 
destruct architecture may identify conditions anticipated to compromise 
the capability of the FSS. The FAA also does not adopt Blue Origin's 
recommendation to change Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(ii) by replacing ``and 
further flight has the potential to violate a flight safety limit'' 
with ``and the flight safety system is required to contain the risk to 
an acceptable level (as analyzed in the flight safety analysis).''
    The FAA finds an acceptable level of risk might be interpreted as 
only meeting collective and individual risk requirements, while flight 
safety limits must meet other requirements as described in Sec.  
450.108 in the final rule. The FAA recognizes that a real-time 
determination of whether a particular failure may evolve to reach a 
flight safety limit is not possible. The operator must determine in 
pre-flight analyses (system safety analysis, link analysis, etc.) which 
failure modes can compromise the capability of the FSS. The operator 
must then use FSA to determine if those failure modes can potentially 
violate a flight safety limit. If it finds a failure mode that can 
potentially violate a flight safety limit, the operator must develop 
flight abort rules that protect against those modes. If the ability to 
reach a flight safety limit via a particular failure mode is uncertain, 
the assumption should be made that it is possible during any phase of 
flight where flight abort is used as a hazard control strategy. This 
approach is consistent with acceptable methods of compliance with 
proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(ii).
    Section 450.108(f)(2)(iii) requires that the FSS must abort flight 
in accordance with methods used to satisfy Sec.  450.108(d)(3) if 
tracking data is invalid and further flight has the potential to 
violate a flight safety limit. This requirement is similar to proposed 
Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(iii), which stated that the FSS must incorporate 
data loss flight times to abort flight at the first possible violation 
of a flight safety limit, or earlier, if valid tracking data is 
insufficient for evaluating a minimum set of flight abort rules 
required to maintain compliance with proposed Sec.  450.101.
    As noted in the discussion of flight abort constraints, the FAA has 
replaced proposed Sec.  450.127, which contained requirements for a 
data loss flight time analysis, with the more performance-based 
approach in Sec.  450.108(d)(3). Consistent with that change, the FAA 
revises the language in proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(iii) in final 
Sec.  450.108(f)(2)(iii). Data loss flight times are not the only means 
of compliance with the performance-based requirement in Sec.  
450.108(d)(3) to account for the potential to lose valid data necessary 
to evaluate the flight abort rules. The FAA also removes the 
requirement to abort flight at the first possible violation of a flight 
safety limit, or earlier, if valid tracking data is insufficient for 
evaluating a minimum set of flight abort rules required to maintain 
compliance with proposed Sec.  450.101. This statement was associated 
with implementation of data loss flight times, but the performance-
based requirement in Sec.  450.108(d)(3) will allow other methods of 
compliance that may not be consistent in all cases with the NPRM 
language in Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(iii). The FAA will provide guidance on 
compliance with Sec. Sec.  450.108(d)(3) and 450.108(f)(2)(iii). The 
FAA also does not adopt the proposed definition for ``data loss flight 
time'' in Sec.  401.7 in the final rule. The relation between 
Sec. Sec.  450.108(d)(3) and 450.108(f)(2)(iii) in the final rule is 
substantively the same as that between proposed Sec. Sec.  450.127 and 
450.165(c)(3)(iii).
    The FAA removes proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(1), which required that 
for a vehicle that uses an FSS, the flight abort rules must identify 
the conditions under which the FSS, including the functions of any 
flight abort crew, must abort the flight. These included proposed Sec.  
450.165(c)(1)(i), to ensure compliance with proposed Sec.  450.101, and 
proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(1)(ii), to prevent debris capable of causing 
a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is 
outside the limits of a useful mission. The FAA finds this requirement 
to be unnecessary, as flight safety limits requirements and flight 
abort rules requirements are clearly stated in Sec.  450.108(c) through 
(f). In addition, in the final rule the FAA does not adopt the proposed 
definition for ``flight abort crew'' in Sec.  401.7 because the term is 
no longer used in the final rule.
    Virgin Galactic commented that proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(ii) seems 
unachievable for an operator with a nominal trajectory that meets 
EC requirements but can result in debris outside of the 
controlled area. Virgin Galactic recommended deleting the requirement 
or excluding the requirement if EC was met.
    The FAA finds, based on the context of the comment, that Virgin 
Galactic meant to refer to proposed Sec.  450.165(c)(1)(ii). The FAA 
acknowledges that a mission that flies over uncontrolled areas on the 
nominal trajectory cannot always prevent debris impacts on the 
uncontrolled area, but the requirement only applies to vehicles outside 
the limits of a useful mission. A nominal vehicle is on a useful 
mission; therefore, this requirement would not apply to the scenario in 
Virgin Galactic's comment. In the final rule, the intent of proposed 
Sec.  450.165(c)(1)(ii) is covered in Sec.  450.108(f)(2)(i).
    The FAA removes the requirement proposed in Sec.  450.165(c)(3)(iv) 
that a flight may continue past any gate established under proposed 
Sec.  450.125 only if the parameters used to establish the ability of 
the vehicle to complete a useful mission are within limits. The 
replacement of proposed Sec.  450.125 with performance-based 
requirements in Sec.  450.108(c) and (d) makes this requirement 
unnecessary.
    SpinLaunch commented that the FAA should simplify the proposed 
flight safety limits analysis (Sec.  450.123), gate analysis (Sec.  
450.125), and time delay analysis (Sec.  450.129) regulations by 
stating that the safety analyses must address certain goals and relying 
on a training and evaluation structure to assure applicants are 
knowledgeable and capable of performing the analyses in a manner that 
sufficiently addresses those goals. The FAA revises the requirements in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  450.123, 450.125, and 450.129 to be more

[[Page 79627]]

performance-based. However, the FAA does not agree that training 
applicants to be capable of performing the subject analyses is 
sufficient to ensure compliance with the regulations.
v. Application Requirements
    Section 450.108(g) contains application requirements for flight 
abort. Section 450.108(g)(1) requires an applicant to submit a 
description of the methods used to demonstrate compliance with Sec.  
450.108(c), including descriptions of how each analysis constraint in 
Sec.  450.108(d) is satisfied in accordance with Sec.  450.115 (Flight 
Safety Analysis Methods). This rule is similar to proposed Sec.  
450.123(e)(1), which required that an applicant submit in its 
application a description of how each flight safety limit would be 
computed, including references to the safety criteria of proposed Sec.  
450.101.\105\ The intent of the requirement in the final rule is 
similar to the proposal. However, the reference to Sec.  450.101 is 
excluded in the final rule because not all flight safety limits 
objectives in Sec.  450.108(c) refer directly to Sec.  450.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Section 450.115 addresses the scope and level of fidelity 
required for FSA methods. The level of fidelity must demonstrate 
that any risk to the public satisfies the safety criteria of Sec.  
450.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.108(g)(2) requires that an applicant must submit in its 
application a description of how each flight safety limit and flight 
abort rule is evaluated and implemented during vehicle flight, 
including the quantitative criteria that will be used, a description of 
any critical parameters, and how the values required in Sec.  
450.108(c)(3) and 450.108(e) are identified. This provision is derived 
from three requirements in the NPRM. First, proposed Sec.  
450.123(e)(2) would have required an applicant to submit representative 
flight safety limits and associated parameters. Second, proposed Sec.  
450.125(d)(2) would have required an applicant to submit a description 
of the measure of performance used to determine whether a vehicle would 
be allowed to cross a gate without flight abort, the acceptable ranges 
of the measure of performance, and how these ranges were determined. 
Third, proposed Sec.  450.165(d)(2)(i) would have required an applicant 
to submit, for flight abort rules, a description of each rule and the 
parameters that would be used to evaluate each rule.
    As discussed earlier, the FAA has removed Sec. Sec.  450.123 and 
450.125 from the final rule and relocated the flight abort rules from 
Sec.  450.165 to reflect a more performance-based approach to flight 
abort and allow greater flexibility than would have been possible under 
the flight safety limits analysis and traditional gate analysis 
proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly, the application requirements 
associated with those sections have been combined in Sec.  
450.108(g)(2) in the final rule. This approach improves organization 
and increases flexibility with regard to how an operator demonstrates 
compliance with Sec.  450.108.
    Section 450.108(g)(3) requires an applicant to submit a graphic 
depiction or series of depictions of flight safety limits for a 
representative mission, together with the launch or landing point, all 
uncontrolled area boundaries, the nominal trajectory, extents of normal 
flight, and limits of a useful mission trajectories, with all 
trajectories in the same projection as each of the flight safety 
limits. This rule is similar to proposed Sec.  450.123(e)(4), which 
required that an applicant submit a graphic depiction or series of 
depictions of representative flight safety limits, the launch or 
landing point, all uncontrolled area boundaries, and vacuum IIP traces 
for the nominal trajectory, extents of normal flight, and limits of a 
useful mission trajectories.
    The final rule clarifies that an applicant will need only to submit 
flight safety limits for a representative mission. Also, the FAA finds 
that the requirement for depictions of vacuum IIP trajectories would 
not be appropriate for flight safety limits in different projections 
(such as present position) and revises the final rule to require all 
trajectories in the same projection as each of the flight safety 
limits. This change will not result in an increased burden compared to 
the NPRM because the applicant would have to depict the trajectories in 
either case; the final rule simply states explicitly that the 
trajectories must be depicted in the appropriate projection.
    Section 450.108(g)(4) requires an applicant to submit a description 
of the vehicle data that will be available to evaluate flight abort 
rules under all reasonably foreseeable conditions during normal and 
malfunctioning flight. This section is similar to proposed Sec.  
450.165(d)(2)(iii), which required an applicant to submit a description 
of the vehicle data that would be available to evaluate flight abort 
rules across the range of normal and malfunctioning flight. In the 
final rule, the FAA replaces ``across the range of normal and 
malfunctioning flight'' with ``under all reasonably foreseeable 
conditions during normal and malfunctioning flight'' to be consistent 
with language elsewhere in the regulation. It results in no increased 
burden on the operator from the application requirement proposed in the 
NPRM.
    Microcosm requested clarification of proposed Sec.  
450.165(d)(2)(i) and (iii), which would require that the applicant 
submit, for flight abort rules, a description of each rule, and the 
parameters that would be used to evaluate each rule; and a description 
of the vehicle data that would be available to evaluate flight abort 
rules across the range of normal and malfunctioning flight.
    The FAA provides the following examples in response to Microcosm's 
comment. An example of a flight abort rule would be a line on the 
Earth's surface that, when crossed by an IIP (the parameter), would 
trigger flight abort. In this example, the vehicle data would be 
position and velocity data necessary to compute the IIP, as provided by 
external (such as ground-based) or onboard sensors. The operator should 
consider the availability of this data during normal and malfunctioning 
flight and the effect on the operator's ability to evaluate the 
applicable flight abort rule--which in this example is that flight 
abort be initiated if the IIP crosses the line on the Earth's surface.
    Another example would be an altitude versus downrange distance 
constraint. If the vehicle is outside of a range of altitudes as a 
function of the downrange distance, flight abort would be triggered. 
The ranges of altitudes and downrange distances are the parameters in 
this example. In this example, the vehicle data would be position data, 
similarly reported by external or onboard sensors.
    Other examples of parameters used in flight abort rules could be 
chamber pressure, body rates, health and status of critical systems, 
etc. In the final rule, the requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.165(d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(iii) are addressed by Sec.  450.108(g)(2) 
and Sec.  450.108(g)(4), respectively.
i. Flight Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.109)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.109 that, unless an 
operator uses physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort as 
a hazard control strategy, an operator would be required to perform and 
document a flight hazard analysis and continue to maintain it 
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. As explained 
in the NPRM, the use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard 
controls would provide flexibility that does not currently exist under 
the prescriptive requirements in part 417 and is broadly consistent 
with the practice in parts 431 and 435.

[[Page 79628]]

    As proposed in Sec.  450.109(a), the flight hazard analysis would 
need to identify, describe, and analyze all reasonably foreseeable 
hazards to public safety and safety of property resulting from the 
flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. Each flight hazard analysis 
would need to: (1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards, and the 
corresponding vehicle response mode for each hazard, associated with 
the launch or reentry system relevant to public safety and safety of 
property; (2) assess each hazard's likelihood and severity; (3) ensure 
that the risk associated with each hazard would meet certain defined 
criteria; (4) identify and describe the risk elimination and mitigation 
measures required to satisfy the criteria; and (5) demonstrate that the 
risk elimination and mitigation measures would achieve the necessary 
risk levels through validation and verification.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises Sec.  450.109 by adding a new 
applicability paragraph (a) and by re-designating proposed Sec.  
450.109(a) through (e) as Sec.  450.109(b) through (f).\106\ The FAA 
adds an applicability paragraph in Sec.  450.109(a) that applies to the 
use of a flight hazard analysis as a hazard control strategy to derive 
hazard controls for the flight, or phase of flight, of a launch or 
reentry vehicle. Hazards associated with computing systems and software 
are further addressed in Sec.  450.141. This revised language reflects 
that performing a flight hazard analysis is included as one of the 
hazard control strategies in Sec.  450.107(c) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ The FAA changes the term ``vehicle response mode'' in 
proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(1) to ``failure mode,'' consistent with 
similar changes throughout the final rule as discussed in the 
conditional expected casualty section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  450.109 included several provisions that required 
the flight hazard analysis to address hazards to property. For 
instance, the FAA proposed in the introductory language to Sec.  
450.109(a) that operators identify, describe, and analyze all 
reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety and safety of property. 
The FAA proposed in Sec.  450.109(a)(1) that an operator identify all 
reasonably foreseeable hazards, and the corresponding vehicle response 
mode for each hazard, associated with the launch or reentry system 
relevant to public safety and safety of property. The FAA also proposed 
in Sec.  450.109(a)(3)(ii) that the likelihood of any hazardous 
condition that may cause major damage to public property or critical 
assets must be remote.
    Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic commented on the property 
protection requirements in proposed Sec.  450.109. Blue Origin 
acknowledged the FAA's statutory authority to protect property but 
noted that FAA regulations do not define property nor the criteria for 
the safety of property. Blue Origin also expressed concern that the 
requirements in Sec.  450.109 extended to critical assets and property 
located in controlled areas. Blue Origin requested clarity on these 
issues. Virgin Galactic commented that the protection of property was a 
new requirement and also expressed concerns about the criteria 
requiring an operator to mitigate the likelihood of any hazardous 
condition that can cause a major property damage to ``remote.''
    In response, the FAA has not adopted the requirement to identify, 
describe, and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards to property 
resulting from the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. Although 
property protection is codified in current licensing requirements for 
reusable launch vehicles in Sec.  431.35(c), launch and reentry 
operators have not in the past been required to account for hazards to 
property due to flight. However, the FAA retains in the final rule 
specific requirements for critical assets and property on orbit, which 
have specific safety criteria in Sec.  450.101 and Sec.  450.169, 
respectively. The FAA notes that the emergency response requirements in 
Sec.  450.173(d), which address fire hazards, may also mitigate hazards 
to property. The FAA may address other property and property hazards in 
a future rulemaking if launch and reentry flight operations dictate 
such a need.
    Blue Origin also recommended proposed Sec.  450.109(a) be revised 
to require that a flight hazard analysis identify, describe, and 
analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety and safety 
of critical assets and safety of property resulting from the flight of 
a launch or reentry vehicle.
    The FAA declines to adopt this recommended language because, as 
discussed in the preamble section dedicated to critical assets, the FAA 
will determine whether an asset is critical in consultation with the 
entity responsible for the asset, and either the FAA or a Federal 
launch or reentry site will determine whether the proposed activity 
would expose critical assets to a risk of loss of functionality that 
exceeds the risk criterion in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4), and convey 
any necessary constraints to the operator.
    Virgin Galactic commented on proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(1)(i) 
through (a)(1)(x) and noted the list of error sources, or very similar, 
shows up in four other locations: (1) Sec.  437.55, (2) AC 431.35-2A, 
(3) FAA Flight Safety Handbook, and (4) the AIAA Safety Critical RLV 
guide. Virgin Galactic noted that the wording differed slightly from 
one source to another and recommended that the FAA harmonize the 
various lists. The FAA notes this comment is outside the scope of this 
rulemaking.
    Proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3) stated that a flight hazard analysis 
must ensure that the risk associated with each hazard would meet the 
following criteria: (1) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that 
may cause death or serious injury to the public must be extremely 
remote; and (2) the likelihood of any hazardous condition that may 
cause major damage to public property or critical assets must be 
remote.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises this requirement to remove the 
property protection requirement in proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3)(ii), as 
discussed earlier. Section 450.109(b)(3) states that a flight hazard 
analysis must ensure that the likelihood of any hazardous condition 
that may cause death or serious injury to the public is extremely 
remote.
    Proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(5) stated a flight hazard analysis must 
demonstrate that the risk elimination and mitigation measures would 
achieve the risk levels of proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3) through 
validation and verification. Verification includes analysis, test, 
demonstration, or inspection. The FAA adopts and re-designates proposed 
Sec.  450.109(a)(5) as Sec.  450.109(b)(5) in the final rule, with one 
revision. In Sec.  450.109(b)(5), the FAA changes the term 
``demonstrate'' in the introductory paragraph to ``document.''
    Virgin Galactic noted that the NPRM used the term ``demonstrate'' 
as both part of the introductory paragraph in proposed Sec.  
450.109(a)(5) and as a verification method in proposed Sec.  
450.109(a)(5)(iii). Virgin Galactic commented that demonstration is a 
standard verification method, and use of the word in both places could 
drive confusion. Virgin Galactic recommended changing the term 
``demonstrate'' in Sec.  450.109(a)(5) to ``verify and validate'' to 
clarify that demonstration is not the only method of completing 
validation and verification.
    The FAA agrees that the proposed language could cause confusion, 
and that demonstration is not the only method of completing validation 
and verification. The FAA changes ``demonstrate'' to ``document'' to 
avoid that confusion. The FAA does not adopt Virgin Galactic's specific 
suggestion because ``verification'' and ``validation'' are terms used 
later in the sentence, and are defined in Sec.  401.7.
    Virgin Galactic commented on proposed Sec.  450.109(c) and 
recommended that there be an exclusion

[[Page 79629]]

for vehicles that follow the same standard trajectory each flight.
    The FAA disagrees with Virgin Galactic's recommendation. Even if an 
operator follows a stable trajectory, vehicle design changes or other 
operational changes may introduce new hazards. An operator must confirm 
that the flight hazard analysis is valid for each mission in order to 
ensure that all hazards are identified and mitigated to an acceptable 
level. That said, the FAA expects that operators with stable vehicle 
designs and operations will typically not have major updates to their 
flight hazard analyses.
    The FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.109(d) as Sec.  450.109(e) 
in the final rule, and removes the term ``operational'' to reflect that 
an operator must continually update the flight hazard analysis 
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system, rather than 
just address operational changes. As discussed in the preamble 
discussion on the system safety program (Sec.  450.103), design and 
operational changes to a system can have an impact on public safety.
    Virgin Galactic commented that the term ``continually'' in Sec.  
450.109(d) is not defined and is vague. In addition, Virgin Galactic 
noted that the requirement appears to duplicate the current continuing 
accuracy requirements in part 413 and the proposed continuing accuracy 
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.211. Virgin Galactic recommends this 
requirement be removed.
    The FAA notes that, for the purposes of the flight hazard analysis, 
``continually'' means that the operator must update the flight hazard 
analysis as aspects of the mission change or as new information is 
learned about an operation, if potential impacts to the analysis are 
identified. Although somewhat redundant with the requirement in Sec.  
450.211 for a licensee to maintain the continuing accuracy of 
representations in its application, proposed Sec.  450.109(d) (re-
designated Sec.  450.109(e) in the final rule) provides the specific 
expectation that the flight hazard analysis must be complete and all 
hazards must be mitigated to an acceptable level for every launch or 
reentry.
    SpinLaunch commented that the requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.109(c) and (d) were an onerous burden, and that to achieve a 
regulatory framework that can effectively and efficiently oversee 
multi-site, multi-vehicle operations, a shift away from the traditional 
regulatory verification of each component to a more practical method 
would be necessary. SpinLaunch recommended that an applicant just 
demonstrate knowledge and skills to perform safe and accepted 
operations.
    Operators have a responsibility to ensure that public safety 
analyses are consistent with their proposed operations and that all 
hazards are mitigated to an acceptable level. This practice is 
consistent with system safety practices and current commercial space 
regulations. The framework recommended by SpinLaunch would not achieve 
these public safety outcomes because it is too broad and lacks 
performance metrics.
    In the final rule, the FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.109(e) 
as Sec.  450.109(f), (Application requirements). Except for number re-
designations, the FAA adopts the requirements as proposed.
j. Physical Containment (Sec.  450.110)
    As discussed earlier, unlike other hazard control strategies, the 
FAA did not propose a separate section for the physical containment 
hazard control strategy in the NPRM. Rather, proposed Sec.  450.107(b) 
simply contained the requirements for physical containment as a hazard 
control strategy. The FAA proposed that, to use physical containment as 
a hazard control strategy, an operator would be required to ensure that 
the launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards 
associated with its flight to reach outside the flight hazard area 
developed in accordance with proposed Sec.  450.133 (Flight Hazard Area 
Analysis), and would be required to apply other mitigation measures to 
ensure no public exposure to hazards as agreed to by the Administrator 
on a case-by-case basis. In addition, proposed Sec.  450.107(e) 
included specific application requirements for an operator using 
physical containment as a hazard control strategy; namely, that it must 
(1) demonstrate that the launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy 
for any hazards associated with its flight to reach outside the flight 
hazard area developed in accordance with Sec.  450.133, and (2) 
describe the methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas are 
cleared of the public and critical assets.
    In the final rule, the FAA places the requirements for the physical 
containment hazard control strategy in a separate section, Sec.  
450.110. With one exception, the proposed requirements are unchanged in 
the final rule. The one exception, as discussed next in response to a 
comment, is that the FAA clarifies that the hazard area must be clear 
of the public and critical assets.
    As noted earlier in the discussion of Sec.  450.107, Blue Origin 
commented that the FAA amend proposed Sec.  450.107(e)(2)(ii), which 
proposed to require an applicant to describe the methods used to ensure 
that flight hazard areas are cleared of the public and critical assets, 
and to require that an applicant describe the methods used to ensure 
that risk to the public and critical assets in flight hazard areas meet 
allowable criteria. Blue Origin pointed out that critical assets cannot 
be cleared from a flight hazard area. In addition, Blue Origin stated 
that the proposed definition of ``flight hazard area'' in Sec.  401.5 
already captured that the area would be controlled to risk limits and 
that can be achieved through methods other than clearing the area.
    The FAA disagrees with Blue Origin that proposed Sec.  
450.107(e)(2)(ii), now Sec.  450.110(c)(2), should be amended to 
require an applicant to describe the methods used to ensure that risk 
to the public and critical assets in flight hazard areas meet allowable 
criteria, as opposed to ensuring that the area is cleared of the public 
and critical assets. Although Blue Origin is correct in noting that the 
definition of ``flight hazard area'' is not limited to clearing the 
area,\107\ the physical containment hazard control strategy is designed 
to be a simple method of protecting public safety by launching within 
an area that is cleared of the public and critical assets, and within 
an area that contains hazards based on the potential energy of the 
vehicle. The FAA modifies what was proposed in Sec.  450.107(b)(1) and 
(b)(2), now Sec.  450.110(b)(1) and (b)(2), from what was proposed in 
the NPRM, to clarify that the hazard area must be clear of the public 
and critical assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ The proposed definition of ``flight hazard area'' in the 
NPRM was ``any region of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, 
publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect public 
health and safety and the safety of property.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA also modifies the definition of ``flight hazard area'' in 
Sec.  401.7 to change the language from ``in order to protect public 
health and safety and the safety of property'' to ``in order to ensure 
compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101.'' The FAA makes 
this change to tie flight hazard areas to the safety criteria in Sec.  
450.101.
k. Wind Weighting (Sec.  450.111)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed wind weighting requirements in Sec.  
450.141. As discussed earlier, the wind weighting requirements have 
been moved to Sec.  450.111 in order to group all hazard control 
strategies together. Although the FAA did not receive any comments on 
this hazard control strategy, the FAA

[[Page 79630]]

has made a few changes in the final rule.
    In the applicability section, the FAA specifies that an operator 
may use wind weighting as a hazard control strategy to meet the safety 
criteria of Sec.  450.101 to Sec.  450.101(a), (b), and (c), which 
address launch risk criteria, reentry risk criteria, and high 
consequence event protection. The FAA makes this change because the 
criteria in Sec.  450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g)--addressing disposal 
safety criteria, the protection of people and property on orbit, the 
notification of planned impacts, and the validity of analyses, 
respectively--are not relevant to wind weighting. Therefore, an 
operator does not need to demonstrate that wind weighting satisfies 
these requirements.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.141(b) would require that for the 
flight of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind 
weighting safety system, the launcher azimuth and elevation settings 
must be wind weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at 
the time of flight to provide a safe impact location. The FAA has 
replaced ``to provide a safe impact location'' with ``to provide impact 
locations that will ensure compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  
450.101.'' This change removes any ambiguity as to the meaning of 
``safe impact location.''
    Also in the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.141(b) would require that for 
the flight of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind 
weighting safety system, an operator must use launcher azimuth and 
elevation angle settings that ensures the rocket will not fly in an 
unintended direction given wind uncertainties. The FAA has replaced 
``given wind uncertainties'' with ``accounting for uncertainties in 
vehicle and launcher design and manufacturing, and atmospheric 
uncertainties.'' This change acknowledges that the uncertainties that 
affect an unguided suborbital launch vehicle's ability to fly in an 
unintended direction are broader than just wind uncertainties--they 
include uncertainties in vehicle and launcher design and manufacturing, 
and other atmospheric uncertainties. The FAA makes two grammatical 
changes to the application requirements, which in the final rule are in 
Sec.  450.111(e). First, in Sec.  450.111(e)(2), the FAA replaces ``and 
identify'' with ``including.'' In Sec.  450.111(e)(3), the FAA removes 
the word ``provide.''
    Lastly, similar to other sections in this rule, the FAA removes the 
proposed requirement for an applicant to provide additional products 
that allow an independent analysis as requested by the Administrator 
because the requirement was redundant with Sec.  450.45(e)(7)(ii).
l. Flight Safety Analysis (Sec. Sec.  450.113 to 450.139)
    Regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated, the 
FAA anticipates that an operator will be required to conduct an FSA for 
at least some phases of flight. For example, an FSA must determine 
flight hazard areas for any vehicle with planned debris impacts capable 
of causing a casualty. Also, an FSA must quantitatively demonstrate 
that a launch or reentry meets the safety criteria for debris, far-
field overpressure, and toxic hazards. An operator may be required to 
conduct additional analyses to use flight abort or wind weighting 
hazard control strategies.
    Generally, an FSA consists of a set of quantitative analyses used 
to determine flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard 
areas, and other mitigation measures and to demonstrate compliance with 
the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 15 
sections associated with FSA requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.113 through 
450.141. The final rule moves requirements associated with flight 
safety limits to Sec.  450.108, such that 11 interrelated sections 
remain component parts of an FSA.
    There are 11 performance-based sections with FSA requirements that 
fall into three groups. The first group, Sec. Sec.  450.113 and 
450.115, provides requirements on the scope and fidelity of the 
analyses required by the remaining nine sections. The second group, 
which consists of five sections from Sec.  450.117 through Sec.  
450.131, specifies the requirements for analyses necessary to develop 
quantitative input data used by the last four sections. The last group 
consists of four sections that specify quantitative risk analyses with 
products necessary to evaluate compliance with the safety criteria in 
Sec.  450.101. All of the FSA sections must use methods that comply 
with Sec.  450.101(g) because they are essential to demonstrating 
compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101.
    To aid in holistically understanding the substance of, and 
relationships between, the FSA sections, the following provides a brief 
overview, before a more detailed discussion of each FSA section. 
Section 450.113 specifies the overall scope of the subsequent analyses 
in terms of the period of flight for which the public risks must be 
quantified. For example, for an orbital launch, an FSA must account for 
all phases of flight from liftoff through orbital insertion and through 
all component impacts or landings. Section 450.115 specifies that the 
operator's analysis methods must account for all reasonably foreseeable 
events and failures of safety-critical systems during nominal and non-
nominal launch or reentry that could jeopardize public health and 
safety, and the safety of property. Section 450.115 also specifies that 
the operator's methods must have a level of fidelity sufficient (1) to 
demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101, 
accounting for all known sources of uncertainty, using means of 
compliance accepted by the Administrator; and (2) to identify the 
dominant source of each type of public risk with a criterion in Sec.  
450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase of flight, source of hazard (such 
as toxic exposure, inert, or explosive debris), and failure mode. An 
operator must comply with these foundational sections when performing 
any of the separate analyses that together comprise the FSA.
    Sections 450.117 and 450.119 specify the constraints and objectives 
of analyses sufficient to characterize the trajectory of the vehicle 
during normal and malfunction flight. Section 450.121 specifies the 
constraints and objectives of an analysis sufficient to quantify the 
physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of hazardous debris, 
including impact probability distributions generated from normal and 
malfunction flight. Section 450.123 specifies requirements to 
characterize the population exposed to a significant probability of 
impact by hazardous debris, including the vulnerability of people in 
various structure types. Section 450.131 specifies requirements for 
statistically valid estimates of the probability of reasonably 
foreseeable failures based on the outcomes of previous flights. 
Depending on the type of operation or the hazard control strategy used, 
an operator may be required to perform some or all of these analyses in 
developing its FSA.
    Finally, Sec. Sec.  450.133, 450.135, 450.137, and 450.139 specify 
the requirements for quantitative risk analyses to demonstrate that the 
risks to the public from debris, far-field overpressure, and toxic 
hazards are consistent with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101. 
Generally, the analyses conducted under Sec. Sec.  450.117 through 
450.131 are used to inform the analyses for these final portions of the 
FSA. Flight commit criteria, flight hazard areas, flight abort rules, 
and other mitigation measures are typically derived as necessary to 
demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101, and 
thus are typical byproducts of the risk analyses

[[Page 79631]]

performed to satisfy the requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.133, 450.135, 
450.137, and 450.139. The requirements for each of the FSA sections are 
described in more detail in the following sections.
m. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope (Sec.  450.113)
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.113 stated the scope and 
applicability of FSA requirements. Proposed Sec.  450.113(a), which 
covered scope, stated an operator would be required to perform and 
document an FSA: (1) For orbital launch, from liftoff through orbital 
insertion, and any component or stage landings; (2) for suborbital 
launch, from liftoff through final impact; (3) for disposal, from the 
beginning of the deorbit burn through final impact; (4) for reentry, 
from the beginning of the deorbit burn through landing; and (5) for 
hybrid vehicles, for all phases of flight, unless the Administrator 
determines otherwise based on demonstrated reliability. Proposed Sec.  
450.113(b), which covered applicability, identified what sections 
needed to be included in an FSA depending on the type of operation or 
hazard control strategy being used.
    In the final rule, the FAA has removed the proposed applicability 
provision and adopted the scope provisions with some changes and 
reorganization. The FAA revised Sec.  450.113(a) to state that an 
operator must perform and document an FSA for all phases of flight, 
except as specified in Sec.  450.113(b). The FAA also revised Sec.  
450.113 to add in paragraph (b) an operator is not required to perform 
and document an FSA for a phase of flight if agreed to by the 
Administrator based on demonstrated reliability. An operator 
demonstrates reliability by using operational and flight history to 
show compliance with the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b). 
Operational history includes the flight time and/or cycles of an 
aircraft, which may have an airworthiness certificate, operating under 
part 91, part 135 or part 121 as an example. Flight history could be 
represented by flight time accumulated through a period of 
developmental and flight tests of a vehicle that does not have an 
airworthiness certificate. Although the demonstrated reliability 
language was limited to hybrid vehicles in the proposed rule, the FAA 
is providing additional flexibility by expanding it to all vehicles. 
Some vehicles other than hybrids could conceivably have an extensive 
and safe enough flight history to demonstrate compliance with the risk 
criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b) based on empirical data in lieu of 
the traditional risk analysis.
    In the final rule, the FAA modifies Sec.  450.113(a)(1), which 
addresses orbital launches, to clarify that an FSA covers from liftoff 
through orbital insertion and through ``all component impacts or 
landings'' instead of proposed ``any component or stage landings or 
final impacts.'' Likewise, for the scope of an FSA for suborbital 
launches, the FAA changes Sec.  450.113(a)(2) to ``through all 
component impacts or landings'' instead of proposed ``through final 
impact.'' These changes reflect the reality that orbital and suborbital 
launch vehicles often have multiple components that can either impact 
the Earth or land intact. An FSA should address all such impacts or 
landings.
    The FAA modifies Sec.  450.113(a)(4) for a similar reason. For the 
scope of a reentry analysis, the FAA changes Sec.  450.113(a)(4) to 
include ``through all component impacts or landings'' instead of 
proposed ``through landing.'' This change reflects the reality that 
reentry vehicles often have multiple components that can either impact 
the Earth or land intact.
    The FAA modifies Sec.  450.113(a)(3) and (4) by replacing the term 
``the beginning of the deorbit burn'' with ``the initiation of the 
deorbit.'' The FAA notes not all deorbit operations will include a 
``burn.'' The FAA notes that, for a disposal, an operator could 
discontinue the analysis prior to final impact and demonstrate an 
equivalent level of safety by presenting evidence of complete demise 
due to aerothermal heating. The scope of the FSA is consistent with the 
risk criteria in Sec.  450.101 and the long-standing definition of 
``reentry'' in Sec.  401.7. The FAA clarifies here that, for the 
purposes of the FSA and risk criteria, the initiation of the deorbit 
for a reentry or disposal from orbit generally coincides with the final 
health check prior to the final command to commit the vehicle to a 
perigee below 70 nautical miles.
    The final rule removes the language proposed in Sec.  450.113(b) 
covering applicability, because the reorganization of the flight abort 
related sections means that all FSA sections are applicable, unless 
otherwise agreed to by the Administrator based on demonstrated 
reliability. Instead, Sec.  450.113(b) in the final rule addresses how 
an operator demonstrates reliability, as discussed.
n. Flight Safety Analysis Methods (Sec.  450.115)
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.115 outlined the methods for 
conducting FSA. The FAA did not receive comments on this proposal 
unique to this section.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.115 as proposed with 
one change. The term ``vehicle response mode'' is changed to ``failure 
mode'' to be consistent with the changes to this term made elsewhere in 
the final rule. Consistent with the NPRM, Sec.  450.115(c)(4) requires 
that an FSA methodology must identify the evidence for validation and 
verification required by Sec.  450.101(g), which addresses the required 
accuracy and validity of data and scientific principles. For example, 
the ``accounting for all known sources of uncertainty'' requirement 
specified in Sec.  450.115(b)(1) must produce results consistent with 
or more conservative than the results available from previous mishaps, 
tests, or other valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.
o. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight (Sec.  450.117)
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.117 (Trajectory Analysis for Normal 
Flight) set requirements for an FSA for normal trajectories. The 
proposed provision was meant to distinguish between variability in the 
intended trajectory and uncertainties due to random sources of 
dispersion such as winds and vehicle performance. The FAA explained 
that all FSAs depend on some form of analysis of the trajectory under 
normal conditions, otherwise known as a normal trajectory. That is, a 
vehicle's trajectory when it performs as intended and under normal 
conditions must be understood to determine the effects of malfunctions 
along its flight path.
    Proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(1) required an FSA to include a 
trajectory analysis that established, for any phase of flight within 
the scope of proposed Sec.  450.113(a), the limits of a launch or 
reentry vehicle's normal flight as defined by the nominal trajectory, 
and sets of trajectories sufficient to characterize variability and 
uncertainty during normal flight. First, proposed Sec.  
450.117(a)(1)(i) required a set of trajectories to characterize 
vulnerability. This set would be required to describe how the intended 
trajectory could vary due to the conditions known prior to initiation 
of flight. Second, proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(1)(ii) required a set of 
trajectories to characterize uncertainty. This set would be required to 
describe how the actual trajectory could differ from the intended 
trajectory due to random uncertainties. The FAA also proposed to 
require an FSA to include a trajectory analysis establishing a fuel 
exhaustion trajectory in proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(2) and, for vehicles 
with an

[[Page 79632]]

FSS, trajectory data or parameters that describe the limits of a useful 
mission in proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(3).
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.117 with 
revisions. The FAA makes clarifying changes for a number of 
requirements regarding trajectory analysis; removes and relocates the 
fuel exhaustion trajectory requirement to Sec.  450.119; and removes 
and relocates references to ``limits of a useful mission'' to Sec.  
450.119. The FAA also makes changes to remove prescriptiveness in favor 
of more performance-based language.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Sierra Nevada, and ULA 
recommended changing the term ``normal'' flight to ``nominal'' flight 
in numerous parts of proposed Sec.  450.117. The FAA does not agree 
with this recommendation because both of these terms are defined by the 
FAA and are distinct. Section 401.7 defines ``nominal'' to mean, in 
reference to launch vehicle performance, trajectory, or stage impact 
point, a launch vehicle flight for which all vehicle aerodynamic 
parameters are as expected, all vehicle internal and external systems 
perform as planned, and there are no external perturbing influences 
other than atmospheric drag and gravity. Section 401.7 defines ``normal 
flight'' to mean the flight of a properly performing vehicle whose 
real-time vacuum IIP does not deviate from the nominal vacuum 
instantaneous impact point by more than the sum of the wind effects and 
the three-sigma guidance and performance deviations in the uprange, 
downrange, left-crossrange, or right-crossrange directions. Thus, in 
simple terms, a nominal trajectory is a single trajectory that the 
vehicle would fly in the absence of wind effects and guidance and 
performance variability. Section 401.7 defines ``normal trajectory'' to 
mean ``a trajectory that describes normal flight.'' The FAA retains the 
definitions of these terms. It is virtually impossible for flights to 
be nominal such that all aerodynamic parameters and systems are as 
expected without the influence of any uncertainties. To replace 
``normal'' with ``nominal'' would substantively change the meaning of 
the rule, as uncertainty does not apply to a nominal trajectory. 
Requiring normal flight trajectories is a more permissive range of 
trajectories than nominal flight and allows the rule to be performance 
based within safe parameters. The FAA retains the use of the terms as 
proposed.
    In the final rule, the FAA narrows the scope of the set of 
trajectories to characterize uncertainty due to random uncertainties 
``in all parameters with a significant influence on the vehicle's 
behavior through normal flight'' in Sec.  450.117(a)(2). Generally, the 
FAA considers ``a significant influence'' to include any parametric 
uncertainties within three-sigma that affect the crossrange IIP 
location or downrange IIP rate by at least one percent because the IIP 
location and rate is often a convenient surrogate for the potential 
impact locations of hazardous debris. One percent is a typical 
threshold value used in RCC 321-20 Standard and Supplement. Thus, the 
final rule does not intend for applicants to characterize the influence 
of all random uncertainties or variability, but only those with a 
significant influence on the potential impact locations for hazardous 
debris.
    The FAA removes the NPRM requirements for a fuel exhaustion 
trajectory in proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(2) and its associated 
application requirement in proposed Sec.  450.117(d)(3)(ii). The 
requirements for this analysis are more appropriately located in the 
malfunction flight section because a fuel exhaustion trajectory is a 
malfunction trajectory that results when thrust termination does not 
occur as planned. A fuel exhaustion trajectory is not always required; 
however, such an analysis could be necessary for certain operations. 
For example, a fuel exhaustion trajectory will be necessary under the 
final rule Sec.  450.119(a)(2) for a return to launch site scenario. As 
a result of this removal, the FAA combines proposed Sec.  450.117 
paragraph (a) with paragraph (a)(1) as a new paragraph (a), and re-
designates proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii) as Sec.  
450.117(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively.
    The NPRM referenced the limits of a useful mission in proposed 
Sec.  450.117(a)(3). In the final rule, the FAA moves all references to 
the limits of a useful mission from Sec.  450.117, including proposed 
Sec.  450.117(a)(3), to Sec.  450.119 (Trajectory Analysis for 
Malfunction Flight). The FAA finds that the requirements associated 
with the limits of a useful mission belong in the malfunction flight 
section because limits of a useful mission can exceed the bounds of 
normal flight.
    The FAA received several comments on the proposed use of the term 
``limits of a useful mission.'' A summary of the comments and FAA's 
responses can be found in the preamble section on Trajectory Analysis 
for Malfunction Flight.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.117(b) as proposed. A final trajectory 
analysis must use a six-degree of freedom trajectory model to satisfy 
the requirements of Sec.  450.117(a). The FAA did not receive comments 
on this proposal.
    Proposed Sec.  450.117(c) would have required a trajectory analysis 
to account for all wind effects including profiles of winds that are 
not less severe than the worst wind conditions under which flight might 
be attempted and for uncertainty of the wind conditions. In the final 
rule, the FAA revises the requirement to state that a trajectory 
analysis must account for ``atmospheric conditions that have an effect 
on the trajectory'' rather than ``all wind effects.'' The FAA notes 
that the revision captures the intent of (1) the proposed requirement 
to account specifically for wind effects under all foreseeable 
conditions within the flight commit criteria and consistent with the 
flight abort rules, and (2) the proposed requirement in Sec.  
450.117(a) to establish sets of trajectories sufficient to characterize 
variability and uncertainty during normal flight.
    The FAA recognizes that wind is the primary atmospheric 
consideration for most vehicles, but, for some (non-traditional) 
vehicles, other atmospheric parameters such as density, humidity, or 
temperature may affect trajectory and be part of the flight commit 
criteria. Although these other conditions would have necessarily been 
accounted for in the trajectory analysis for normal flight as 
``uncertainties'' in the introductory language to Sec.  450.117(a), the 
final rule expressly refers to all atmospheric conditions in Sec.  
450.117(c). The FAA also notes that flight in the context of this 
section refers to the period of launch or reentry within the scope of 
Sec.  450.113.
    Boeing commented that it is impossible to account for all wind 
effects, as wind models were local and limited in altitude. Boeing 
recommended incorporating an altitude limit of 60,000 feet, and 
modifying the requirement to state, ``a trajectory analysis must 
account for launch and, if different, reentry site wind effects, as 
applicable, including profiles of winds that are no less severe than 
the worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and 
for uncertainty in the wind conditions.''
    The FAA notes that the proposed requirement concerning wind 
effects, revised to ``atmospheric effects'' in the final rule, 
specifies profiles under which flight may be attempted based on the 
launch commit criteria and flight abort rules. The NPRM and the final 
rule set performance level requirements that avoid placing an arbitrary 
altitude limit that may not encompass all the conditions that may have 
an effect on a

[[Page 79633]]

normal trajectory. Accordingly, the final rule requires a trajectory 
analysis to account not for all wind effects, but instead for 
atmospheric conditions that have an effect on the trajectory, including 
any uncertainty. Accounting for atmospheric effects on the trajectory 
will be addressed in guidance.
    Blue Origin stated the requirements in proposed Sec.  450.117(b) 
through (d)(2) amount to translating complex vehicle trajectory models 
into verbiage for delivery to FAA for licensing. Blue Origin proposed 
revising the language to specify vehicle state vector parameters in 
terms of position, attitude, velocity, thrust, and mass. In terms of a 
statistical distribution of each parameter, Blue Origin recommends 
providing a covariance matrix describing vehicle guidance and 
performance uncertainty as meeting the intent of the requirement.
    The FAA notes Blue Origin's recommendation to specify the vehicle's 
position and velocity during normal flight using covariance matrices 
would satisfy the requirement in Sec.  450.117(a)(2) because that 
approach was identified in Appendix A to part 417 under 
A417.7(g)(7)(xiii). The approach in Appendix A to part 417 under 
A417.7(g)(7)(xiii) meets the requirement in Sec.  450.117(a)(2) because 
a set of covariance matrices for the vehicle position coordinates and 
velocity component magnitudes are an acceptable means to describe how 
the actual trajectory could differ from the intended trajectory due to 
random uncertainties in all parameters with a significant influence on 
the vehicle's behavior throughout normal flight. However, the FAA 
recognizes that other approaches, including a sufficiently large \108\ 
set of Monte Carlo sample trajectories,\109\ may also satisfy the 
requirement. The FAA does not intend to prescribe a specific method to 
characterize normal flight. Therefore, the FAA declines Blue Origin's 
recommendation to revise the requirement to specify vehicle state 
vector and covariance parameters. Instead, the final rule implements 
performance-based trajectory analysis requirements as proposed, such 
that an applicant must submit a description of the methods and input 
data used to characterize the vehicle's flight behavior throughout 
normal flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ The FAA will determine what constitutes a sufficiently 
large set of Monte Carlo trajectories pursuant to the level fidelity 
of analysis requirements in Sec.  450.115(b).
    \109\ Monte Carlo methods include computational algorithms that, 
for example, repeatedly sample from probability distributions that 
characterize input parameters (such as the weight, thrust, and drag 
of a vehicle) and perform physics-based (such as Newton's laws) 
simulations to obtain numerical results (such as a set of 
trajectories that characterize flight under normal or malfunction 
conditions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA proposed application requirements for trajectory analysis 
for normal flight in Sec.  450.117(d). In the final rule, the FAA 
adopts proposed Sec.  450.117(d) with revisions. Specifically, the FAA 
removes the proposed requirement to describe the methodology used to 
determine the limits of a useful mission in Sec.  450.117(d)(1). 
Instead, an equivalent requirement appears in Sec.  450.119(c)(2) of 
the final rule. The FAA also removes the items proposed in Sec.  
450.117(d)(1)(i) through (d)(1)(iv) because they were redundant with 
the performance-based requirements that apply to all FSA in accordance 
with Sec.  450.115(c).\110\ The FAA removes the prescriptive 
requirements in Sec.  450.117(d)(2)(ii) through (d)(2)(iv) proposed in 
the NPRM because these requirements are captured with the final rule 
requirement in Sec.  450.117(d)(2), as explained later in this preamble 
section. In addition, the FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  
450.117(d)(2)(i) as (d)(3), and 450.117(d)(3) as (d)(4) with a minor 
revision. The FAA removed proposed Sec.  450.117(d)(4), which required 
an applicant to submit additional products that allow an independent 
analysis, as requested by the Administrator, because the requirement 
was redundant with Sec.  450.45(e)(7)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ Section 450.115(c) requires an applicant to submit a 
description of the FSA methodology, including identification of: (1) 
The scientific principles and statistical methods used; (2) all 
assumptions and their justifications; (3) the rationale for the 
level of fidelity; (4) the evidence for validation and verification 
required by Sec.  450.101(g); (5) the extent that the benchmark 
conditions are comparable to the foreseeable conditions of the 
intended operations; and (6) the extent that risk mitigations were 
accounted for in the analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.117(d)(2) required an applicant to 
submit a description of the input data used to characterize the 
vehicle's flight behavior throughout normal flight and limits of a 
useful mission. The proposal would have required a description of the 
wind input data, including uncertainties (Sec.  450.117(d)(2)(ii)); a 
description of the parameters with a significant influence on the 
vehicle's behavior throughout normal flight, including a quantitative 
description of the nominal value for each significant parameter 
throughout normal flight (Sec.  450.117(d)(2)(iii)); and a description 
of the random uncertainties with a significant influence on the 
vehicle's behavior throughout normal flight, including a quantitative 
description of the statistical distribution for each significant 
parameter (Sec.  450.117(d)(2)(iv)).
    Commenters asserted these proposed requirements were too 
prescriptive, and the FAA agrees. The FAA revises Sec.  450.117(d)(2) 
to require an applicant to submit the quantitative input data, 
including uncertainties, used to model the vehicle's normal flight in 
six degrees of freedom. This revision in the final rule captures the 
parameters of the proposed requirements in Sec.  450.117(d)(2)(ii) 
through (d)(2)(iv), while allowing for more flexibility in the 
application of the regulatory requirements. Quantitative input data 
used to model the vehicle's normal flight in six degrees of freedom 
includes comprehensive sets of aerodynamic and mass properties. 
Explanation and details on how to comply with these requirements will 
be included in Advisory Circular 450.117-1, ``Trajectory Analysis.''
    The FAA retains the requirement proposed in Sec.  450.117(d)(2)(i) 
and re-designates it as Sec.  450.117(d)(3) in the final rule. In 
addition, the FAA changes the term ``wind effects'' to ``atmospheric 
effects'' to be consistent with Sec.  450.117(c) of the final rule.
    The FAA revises proposed Sec.  450.117(d)(3) as discussed in this 
paragraph and re-designates it as Sec.  450.117(d)(4) in the final 
rule. The proposal required an applicant to submit representative 
normal flight trajectory analysis outputs, including the position, 
velocity, and vacuum IIP, for each second of flight. Blue Origin 
commented that this requirement created an unnecessary burden to 
calculate vacuum IIP for potentially hundreds or thousands of normal 
and malfunction vehicle trajectories. Blue Origin stated that vacuum 
IIP was not representative of where vehicle hazards may impact the 
Earth and believed this requirement should only apply to the nominal 
trajectory.
    The FAA disagrees that the IIP application requirement would have 
created an unnecessary burden; however, the final rule removes the 
application requirement because vacuum IIP can be readily computed if 
necessary from the position and velocity vectors, which are a part of 
the application materials. In the final rule, Sec.  450.117(d)(4) 
specifies that the representative normal flight trajectory analysis 
outputs include orientation of the vehicle in addition to the position 
and velocity data specified in the proposal. The FAA notes that 
orientation is inherent in any six-degree of freedom trajectory model, 
as required by both the proposed and final Sec.  450.117(b). 
Orientation is important to

[[Page 79634]]

public safety when the induced velocities have a preferred direction.
    The FAA also removes the requirement proposed in Sec.  
450.117(d)(3)(ii) that applies to fuel exhaustion trajectory under 
otherwise nominal conditions, because a fuel exhaustion trajectory is 
merely one specific type of malfunction trajectory and is not 
necessarily required for all applicants. For example, a fuel exhaustion 
trajectory would be necessary under the final rule for a return to 
launch site scenario but not for a typical unguided suborbital rocket. 
The requirement in Sec.  450.119(a)(2) of the final rule is used to 
determine whether an applicant must include a fuel exhaustion 
trajectory.
p. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight (Sec.  450.119)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements associated with 
trajectory analysis for malfunction flight in Sec.  450.119. As stated 
in the NPRM, a malfunction trajectory analysis is necessary to 
determine how far a vehicle can deviate from normal flight. This 
analysis helps determine potential impact points in the case of a 
malfunction and is therefore a vital input for the analyses needed to 
demonstrate compliance with risk criteria.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.119 with 
revisions. The FAA removes, as unnecessary, proposed Sec.  
450.119(a)(1), which required that an FSA include a trajectory analysis 
that establishes the vehicle's capability to depart from normal flight, 
formally defined in terms of IIP in Sec.  401.7. Proposed Sec.  
450.119(a)(2) is re-designated (a)(1) and requires that a trajectory 
analysis establish the vehicle's deviation capability in the event of a 
malfunction during flight. The FAA adds a new requirement, designated 
as Sec.  450.119(a)(2), which requires that an FSA must include a 
trajectory analysis that establishes the trajectory dispersion 
resulting from reasonably foreseeable malfunctions. This language 
retains the concept of proposed Sec.  450.119(a)(1), but revises the 
regulatory language to allow for a medium-fidelity FSA approach (e.g., 
corridor method) for which the vehicle vacuum IIP during a malfunction 
is not specified, as explained in the FAA's Flight Safety Analysis 
Handbook.\111\ More specifically, the proposed requirement in Sec.  
450.119(a)(1) to establish the vehicle's capability to depart from 
normal flight would have required the analysis to account for the IIP 
in modeling of a malfunction trajectory because normal flight is 
defined in terms of IIP. Thus, the proposed requirement in Sec.  
450.119(a)(1) would have foreclosed a valid medium-fidelity FSA 
approach. In the final rule, Sec.  450.119(a)(1) and Sec.  
450.119(a)(2) provide flexibility and permit at least one approach that 
allows a simpler computation of risk but still preserves safety. Not 
all operations are eligible for this corridor method, but it is valid 
when the vehicle debris risks are due to flight phases where the IIP is 
moving steadily downrange, and when the failure modes do not involve 
distorted impact distributions.\112\ In the final rule, the FAA amended 
the requirement to allow this and other simplified methods for those 
operations for which they may be valid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ See Flight Safety Analysis Handbook, V1.0, August 2009 
(available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/Flight_Safety_Analysis_Handbook_final_9_2011v1.pdf).
    \112\ Distorted impact distributions are often caused by actions 
taken in response to abort criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA adds Sec.  450.119(a)(3) in the final rule. Section 
450.119(a)(3) states that an FSA must include a trajectory analysis 
that establishes, for vehicles using flight abort as a hazard control 
strategy under Sec.  450.108, trajectory data or parameters that 
describe the limits of a useful mission. This requirement was found in 
Sec.  450.117(a)(3) of the NPRM. The FAA finds that trajectory analysis 
requirements associated with the limits of a useful mission belong in 
the malfunction flight section because presumably normal flight can 
attain the one or more objectives within the flight azimuth limits.
    The requirement in Sec.  450.119(a)(3) is related to the 
requirement proposed in Sec.  450.119(a)(1) because trajectories that 
are outside of the normal envelope can still be ``useful,'' even though 
they involve a malfunction.\113\ The FAA notes that an operator can 
elect to designate the normal mission trajectories as the limits of a 
useful mission and meet the application requirement to submit data that 
describes the limits of a useful mission, but this may result in the 
termination of a flight that could still achieve a mission objective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ Publicly available information indicates that the flight 
of the Ariane 5 VA241 that occurred from the Guiana Space Centre on 
January 25, 2018 may be a potential empirical example. There the 
flight path anomaly was evident from the beginning of flight and the 
payloads were deployed into an orbital inclination that was 
approximately 18 degrees from the intended orbit, yet the payloads 
were still able to deliver useful data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received several comments on the NPRM's proposal to use the 
``limits of a useful mission'' to inform the development of flight 
safety limits and when flight abort was necessary, and to establish the 
width of a gate. Microcosm requested that the FAA define ``a useful 
mission.'' Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA 
recommended changing the definition of ``limits of a useful mission'' 
to mean the trajectory or other parameters that bound performance of a 
mission that can attain its primary objective. Blue Origin disagreed 
with the addition of ``limits of a useful mission'' to the regulation 
and stated that regulating what is considered a useful mission was 
outside of the FAA's jurisdiction.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts a new definition of a ``useful 
mission'' in Sec.  401.7 and amends the proposed definition of ``limits 
of a useful mission'' to mean the trajectory data or other parameters 
that bound the performance of a useful mission, including flight 
azimuth limits. A ``useful mission'' means a mission that can attain 
one or more objectives and is based on the definition of ``limits of a 
useful mission'' proposed in the NPRM. The definition of ``limits of a 
useful mission'' adopted in the final rule removes the language 
``describe the limits of a mission that can attain the primary 
objective'' and replaces it with ``bound the performance of a useful 
mission,'' consistent with the commenters' recommendation. In this 
context, bounding the performance will include flight azimuth limits 
and could include limits on the altitude versus distance downrange or 
other physics-based limits depending on the nature of the operation. 
The FAA makes these changes because it recognizes that pursuit of 
objectives other than the primary objective may be considered a useful 
mission. However, when all other objectives can no longer be achieved 
the FAA does not consider the collection of data related to a failure 
in and of itself to be a useful mission. This is because mere failure 
data collection alone does not justify continued risk to the public. 
Therefore, the final rule states in Sec.  450.119(a)(3) that the FAA 
does not consider the collection of data related to a failure to be a 
useful mission.
    The FAA finds the requirements associated with ``useful mission'' 
and ``limits of a useful mission'' are central to the hazard control 
strategies. The FAA is not attempting to regulate what the operator or 
its customer considers a useful mission. The FAA instead is simply 
requiring that the applicant identify which missions are useful so that 
vehicles that fly outside of these parameters erroneously are not 
permitted to threaten the public. The FAA finds it necessary to include 
a

[[Page 79635]]

requirement that would prevent a launch or reentry vehicle from 
continued flight that would increase risk to the public if that vehicle 
can no longer achieve an objective of the operator, outside of the 
collection of data related to a failure.
    Blue Origin recommended replacing ``limits of a useful mission'' 
with ``limits to meet public risk criteria.'' The FAA does not agree 
with this recommendation. As described in the section on 
CEC, public risk criteria alone are inadequate to establish 
the need for an FSS, the reliability of the FSS, or the timing of an 
FSS activation to ensure public safety. Similarly, while some might 
consider risk-based flight safety limits as a reasonable approach to 
risk management when a vehicle is on a potentially useful mission, once 
a malfunction results in a mission that can no longer achieve an 
objective, then hazard containment should be the goal and flight abort 
must be used to protect the public against high consequence events. 
Application of the limits of a useful mission benefits the operator 
because flights with trajectories that are outside of the normal 
envelope, but still useful according to the operator, will be permitted 
to continue without flight abort as long as they comply with Sec.  
450.108(d)(7), including trajectories that overfly the public. This was 
the intent of proposed Sec.  450.123(b)(6) in the NPRM, and remains the 
intent of Sec.  450.108(d)(7) in the final rule.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented that 
limits of a useful mission were already addressed in flight termination 
triggers, and that proposed Sec.  450.117(a)(3) requiring trajectory 
data or parameters that describe the limits of a useful mission should 
be replaced with limits that trigger flight termination.
    The FAA declines to adopt this recommendation because of the 
relationship between the limits of a useful mission and flight safety 
limits. Pursuant to Sec.  450.108(c)(2) in the final rule (similar to 
proposed Sec.  450.123(a)(2) of the NPRM), flight safety limits define 
when an operator must initiate flight abort to prevent continued flight 
from increasing public risk in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is 
unable to achieve a useful mission. Under the final rule, flight safety 
limits will be developed after the limits of a useful mission are 
identified. An operator can elect to designate the normal mission 
trajectories as the limits of a useful mission and meet the application 
requirement to submit data describing the limits of a useful mission, 
but this may result in the termination of a flight that could still 
achieve a mission objective. As an example, during an operation for 
which a gate width was determined using only a vehicle's normal 
trajectory envelope, a failure before the gate resulted in the flight 
nearly being terminated at the gate, even though it went on to achieve 
the mission's primary objective. In that instance, if the limits of a 
useful mission data included flight azimuth limits, this vehicle would 
have had more margin in the form of a wider gate. Under the final rule, 
if an operator decides that placing a payload in any orbit or 
withholding abort for crewed flights is more useful than terminating a 
flight, it may declare that flight is useful at any azimuth or altitude 
and may fly the vehicle on any trajectory that meets Sec.  
450.108(d)(7). However, flight safety limits that terminate flights 
that are no longer useful should be placed so that they do not increase 
risk compared to continued flight, pursuant to Sec.  450.108(d)(6).
    The FAA found it necessary to move all references to the limits of 
a useful mission from Sec.  450.117 to Sec.  450.119 (Trajectory 
Analysis for Malfunction Flight), including proposed Sec.  
450.117(a)(3). The FAA finds that the requirements associated with the 
limits of a useful mission belong in the malfunction flight section 
because limits of a useful mission can exceed the bounds of normal 
flight.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.119(b) that a 
malfunction trajectory analysis must account for each cause of a 
malfunction flight, including software and hardware failures. For each 
cause of a malfunction trajectory, the analysis would have been 
required to characterize the foreseeable trajectories resulting from a 
malfunction. The proposal included six items in Sec.  450.119(b)(1) 
through (b)(6) that would be required to be included in the analysis.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.119(b) with 
revisions. The FAA removes proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(1) through (b)(3) 
because they are no longer needed due to the adoption of performance-
based standards and re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(4) through 
(b)(6) as (b)(1) through (b)(3). Also, the FAA revises the introductory 
language in Sec.  450.119(b) to improve clarity and remove prescriptive 
language.
    Blue Origin commented that it was not feasible to model a 
malfunction turn trajectory for each software or hardware cause, only 
for vehicle responses to the cause as proposed in Sec.  450.119(b). 
Blue Origin recommended striking the phrase, ``for each cause of a 
malfunction trajectory,'' and instead indicate that a malfunction 
trajectory analysis must characterize the foreseeable trajectories 
resulting from a malfunction.
    The FAA partially agrees with Blue Origin's recommendations. The 
FAA deletes the proposed language in Sec.  450.119(b), ``for each cause 
of a malfunction trajectory, the analysis must characterize the 
foreseeable trajectories resulting from a malfunction,'' but retains 
the phrase ``for each cause of a malfunction flight'' in the first 
sentence of Sec.  450.119(b). The FAA notes the analysis must account 
for the probability of each set of trajectories that characterize a 
type of malfunction flight, and that probability must account for each 
cause of a malfunction flight, including software and hardware 
failures, for every period of normal flight.
    The FAA notes that use of the phrase ``for each type of 
malfunction'' in Sec.  450.119(b) of the final rule addresses Blue 
Origin's comment that it is not feasible to model a malfunction turn 
trajectory for each cause, but only for vehicle responses to the cause. 
The term ``each type of malfunction'' refers to the vehicle response to 
the cause and multiple causes could result in a similar vehicle 
response. For example, under part 417 a malfunction turn analysis would 
account for a series of ``tumble turns,'' as enumerated in Appendix A 
to part 417 under A417.9(d)(5), which result in the launch vehicle 
rotating due to a constant thrust vector offset angle. The FAA 
recognizes that there could be multiple causes for a constant thrust 
vector offset, such as a jammed mechanism, loss of electrical power, or 
loss of hydraulic fluid pressure. Thus, the probability of a tumble 
turn must account for ``each cause of a malfunction flight, including 
software and hardware failures,'' in accordance with Sec.  450.119(b). 
Furthermore, the FAA recognizes that multiple sets of trajectories are 
necessary to characterize the vehicle behavior in response to a 
malfunction. An example is a malfunction that results in a constant 
thrust vector offset, because a range of thrust vector offsets is 
reasonably foreseeable (from very small angles that would cause a slow 
departure from normal flight up to the maximum feasible thrust offset 
that would typically result in a rapid tumble of the vehicle). Thus, 
there is a natural question regarding the appropriate resolution of the 
malfunction trajectory analysis. The intent of the requirements in 
Sec.  450.119 is to produce sets of trajectories that are sufficient to 
characterize the public risks posed by each type of malfunction. Thus, 
the final rule sets a performance standard in Sec.  450.119(b) that the 
analysis for each

[[Page 79636]]

type of malfunction must have sufficient temporal and spatial 
resolution to establish flight safety limits, if any, and individual 
risk contours that are smooth and continuous.
    In order to be less prescriptive, the FAA further amends Sec.  
450.119(b) in response to Blue Origin's comment. The NPRM proposed in 
Sec.  450.119(b)(1) through (b)(3) that the malfunction trajectory 
analysis must account for (1) all trajectory times during the thrusting 
phases, or when the lift vector is controlled, during flight; (2) the 
duration, starting when a malfunction begins to cause each flight 
deviation throughout the thrusting phases of flight; and (3) trajectory 
time intervals between malfunction turn start times that are sufficient 
to establish flight safety limits, if any, and individual risk contours 
that are smooth and continuous. The FAA removes proposed Sec.  
450.119(b)(1) through (b)(3) and consolidates these requirements into 
Sec.  450.119(b). This revision sets more performance-based 
requirements for the scope and resolution of the malfunction trajectory 
analysis to create flexibility in demonstrating the trajectory 
dispersion resulting from reasonably foreseeable malfunctions. In the 
final rule, Sec.  450.119(b) will require the analysis for each type of 
malfunction to have sufficient temporal and spatial resolution to 
establish flight safety limits, if any, and individual risk contours 
that are smooth and continuous.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(2) required that a 
malfunction trajectory analysis account for the duration, starting when 
a malfunction begins to cause each flight deviation throughout the 
thrusting phases of flight. Virgin Galactic commented that a 
malfunction turn analysis would not apply to operations for which a 
pilot is in control of a winged vehicle because the pilots act as an 
FSS.
    The FAA is aware that having pilots onboard and in control of a 
vehicle during flight may mitigate the need for certain malfunction 
analyses; however, there may still be instances when pilots may become 
incapacitated during flight. In any such instances, a trajectory 
analysis for malfunction flight would still potentially be necessary to 
identify impact points as an essential input for risk analyses to 
demonstrate compliance with risk criteria in Sec.  450.101. The FAA 
notes that flight simulators can facilitate the development of 
representative malfunction trajectory analysis outputs in cases in 
which pilot responses have a significant influence on the trajectory 
dispersion resulting from reasonably foreseeable malfunctions.
    Virgin Galactic also recommended a wording change to Sec.  
450.119(b)(2) to define the duration as, ``starting when a malfunction 
begins . . . until such time the effects of the malfunction are 
mitigated.'' As previously discussed, the FAA does not adopt proposed 
Sec.  450.119(b)(2) in the final rule. However, the FAA notes in the 
final rule, the combination of the requirement for sufficient temporal 
resolution to establish smooth and continuous individual risk contours, 
along with the requirement to account for the timing of each 
malfunction trajectory's termination due to means other than flight 
abort, including vehicle breakup, ground impact, or orbital insertion, 
provide a sufficient performance-based specification to establish the 
duration of the malfunction trajectory analysis. In addition, the FAA 
finds that the commenter's suggestion that the duration of the analysis 
continue only ``until such time the effects of the malfunction are 
mitigated'' would not analyze both the success and the failure of the 
mitigation necessary to quantify the risk and consequence in the event 
that the FSS fails.
    As a result of removing proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(1) through 
(b)(3), the FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(4) as Sec.  
450.119(b)(1) in the final rule. Proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(4) required 
that a trajectory analysis for malfunction flight account for the 
relative probability of occurrence of each malfunction turn for which 
the vehicle is capable. In the final rule, the FAA revises Sec.  
450.119(b)(1) to reflect that the analysis must account for the 
relative probability of occurrence of each malfunction, and not 
specifically a malfunction turn. The FAA views the term ``malfunction 
turn'' as outdated. The requirement in the final rule is consistent 
with the proposal.
    The FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(5) as Sec.  
450.119(b)(2) in the final rule. The FAA also revises Sec.  
450.119(b)(2) to correct an omission of the word ``trajectory.'' 
Furthermore, the FAA adds ground impact and orbital insertion as 
potential termination states. The FAA found the exclusion of these 
states in the NPRM to be a deficiency that would have resulted in an 
operator's inability to meet regulatory requirements for quantifying 
the risk because malfunctions can result in trajectories that result in 
ground impact or orbital insertion, as well as vehicle break-up, and 
those additional outcomes can pose significant public risks as well.
    The FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(b)(6) as Sec.  
450.119(b)(3) in the final rule and revises the requirements. Section 
450.119(b)(3) requires that a malfunction trajectory analysis account 
for the parameters with a significant influence on a vehicle's flight 
behavior from the time when a malfunction begins to cause a flight 
deviation until each malfunction trajectory will terminate due to 
vehicle breakup, ground impact, or orbital insertion. The FAA adds the 
phrase ``parameters with a significant influence on vehicle's flight 
behavior'' because the analysis must account for these parameters to 
characterize sufficiently the vehicle's flight behavior. This language 
was proposed in the application requirements in Sec.  
450.119(c)(2)(iii) and has been added to paragraph (b)(3) in the final 
rule. The FAA received no comments on this language. The FAA also 
clarifies that a malfunction trajectory can terminate due to orbital 
insertion, not just ground impact or predicted structural failure 
(vehicle breakup), as specified in the NPRM, for the same reason that 
those outcomes were added to Sec.  450.119(b)(2). Finally, the FAA 
replaces the proposed term ``predicted structural failure'' with the 
term ``vehicle break-up'' in the final rule. This change is consistent 
with the terminology used in Sec.  450.121 (Debris Analysis).
    Blue Origin commented that smooth and continuous contours were not 
typically feasible unless flight limits were also included in the 
malfunction turn analysis. Blue Origin also recommended adding flight 
abort to the list of vehicle end state conditions.
    The FAA did not add flight abort to the list of vehicle end state 
conditions based on Blue Origin's comment because of the relationship 
between trajectory analysis for malfunction flight and risk analyses 
that produce risk contours. Risk analyses must consider outcomes of 
flight abort and FSS inaction, whether through failure of the FSS or 
because no flight abort rules were violated, which could result in 
vehicle breakup, ground impact, or orbital insertion. If the 
trajectories for malfunction flight were terminated when flight abort 
was predicted, no trajectory data would exist for cases when the FSS 
failed. The rule ensures that complete trajectory data exists to 
account for flight abort action and inaction in risk analyses. More 
specifically, ending the malfunction trajectories at the flight safety 
limits conflicts with the requirement in Sec.  450.108(d)(5) to account 
for proper functioning of the FSS and failure of the FSS in individual, 
collective, and conditional risk evaluations. It was not necessary to 
amend the rule according

[[Page 79637]]

to Blue Origin's comment because flight abort is already a necessary 
end case to be analyzed when producing risk contours in accordance with 
Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(iii), which is a separate analysis from producing 
trajectories for malfunction flight.
    Section 450.119(b)(4) explicitly requires a malfunction trajectory 
analysis to account for potential FSS failure, if an FSS is used, 
because that can also influence the termination condition of a 
malfunction trajectory. For example, if a malfunction trajectory 
triggers a flight abort rule, potential outcomes of the trajectory are 
abort (through destruct, thrust termination, or other method) or 
continued flight resulting in aerodynamic breakup, intact impact, or 
orbital insertion if the FSS fails. The requirement in Sec.  
450.119(b)(4) is consistent with the proposal because both the proposed 
and final Sec.  450.115(a) explicitly require that an operator's FSA 
method must account for all failures of safety-critical systems during 
nominal and non-nominal launch or reentry that could jeopardize public 
health and safety and the safety of property. Furthermore, any FSS 
required to comply with Sec.  450.143 or Sec.  450.145 necessarily will 
meet the definition of a safety-critical system. Therefore, the 
proposed requirement Sec.  450.123(a) would have necessitated that the 
malfunction trajectory analysis account for the potential failure of 
the FSS.
    In the NPRM, Sec.  450.119(c) addressed the application 
requirements associated with trajectory analysis for malfunction 
flight. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the application requirements 
in proposed Sec.  450.119(c) with revisions. The revisions include 
adding a new Sec.  450.119(c)(2), re-designating proposed Sec.  
450.119(c)(2) through (c)(4), and removing proposed Sec.  
450.119(c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(iv).
    Proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(1) required an applicant to submit a 
description of the methodology used to characterize the vehicle's 
flight behavior throughout malfunction flight. In the final rule, the 
FAA adopts the proposal and adds a reference to the requirements in 
Sec.  450.115(c), which sets the standards for the methodologies used 
in the FSA. Also, the FAA removes the items proposed in Sec.  
450.119(c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(iv) because they were redundant with 
the performance-based requirements that apply to all FSA in accordance 
with Sec.  450.115(c).
    In the final rule, a new Sec.  450.119(c)(2) requires an applicant 
to submit a description of the methodology used to determine the limits 
of a useful mission, in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c). This 
requirement was proposed as Sec.  450.117(d)(1) in the NPRM. Moving 
this application requirement to Sec.  450.119 is consistent with the 
relocation of its associated analysis requirement to Sec.  
450.119(a)(3). The FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(2) as 
Sec.  450.119(c)(3) in the final rule. The FAA captures the 
requirements of proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) and 
relocates them in Sec.  450.119(c)(3)(i) and (c)(3)(ii).
    The FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(2)(iii) as Sec.  
450.119(c)(3)(iii) in the final rule and revises the final Sec.  
450.119(c)(3)(iii) to specify the need for an applicant to submit a 
quantitative description of the parameters, including uncertainties, 
with significant influence on the vehicle's malfunction behavior for 
each type of malfunction flight characterized. Proposed Sec.  
450.119(c)(2)(iii) required an applicant to submit a description of the 
input data used to characterize the vehicle's malfunction flight 
behavior, including a description of the parameters with a significant 
influence on the vehicle's behavior throughout malfunction flight for 
each type of malfunction flight characterized. Proposed Sec.  
450.119(c)(2)(iii) also required a quantitative description of the 
nominal value for each significant parameter throughout normal flight. 
The FAA specifically replaces the proposed requirements in Sec.  
450.119(c)(2)(iii) and (c)(2)(iv) \114\ with the requirement in Sec.  
450.119(c)(3)(iii) in the final rule. This revision retains the intent 
of the requirements proposed in the NPRM but is more flexible in its 
application because, although it still requires a quantitative 
description, the regulation permits something other than the 
statistical distribution that would have been required by the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ Proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(2)(iv) required an applicant to 
submit a description of the random uncertainties with a significant 
influence on the vehicle's behavior throughout malfunction flight 
for each type of malfunction flight characterized, including a 
quantitative description of the statistical distribution for each 
significant parameter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(3) as Sec.  
450.119(c)(4) in the final rule. The FAA also removes the need for the 
vacuum IIP for each second of flight. The FAA makes this change in 
response to Blue Origin's comment on computing vacuum IIP for a large 
number of trajectories, as addressed in the preamble section on Sec.  
450.117.
    The FAA adopts the requirements in Sec.  450.119(c)(4)(i) as 
proposed in Sec.  450.119(c)(3)(i) in the NPRM. The FAA received no 
comments on proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(3)(i). The FAA adopts, with 
revisions, the requirements in Sec.  450.119(c)(4)(ii) as proposed in 
Sec.  450.119(c)(3)(ii) in the NPRM. Proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(3)(ii) 
required submission of the probability of each trajectory that 
characterizes a type of malfunction flight. Blue Origin commented that 
delivering probabilities for each trajectory modelled was not practical 
or useful for independent assessment. Instead, Blue Origin proposed 
revising the regulatory language to require the applicant to submit the 
probability of each set of malfunction trajectories. The FAA agrees 
with this comment and revises Sec.  450.119(c)(4)(ii) in the final rule 
to reflect Blue Origin's recommendation.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.119(c)(4)(iii) requires an applicant 
to submit a representative malfunction flight trajectory analysis 
output, including the position and velocity as a function of flight 
time for a set of trajectories that characterize the limits of a useful 
mission as described in Sec.  450.119(a)(3) of this section. This 
requirement was proposed as Sec.  450.117(d)(3)(v) in the NPRM. As 
discussed earlier, the FAA moves the limits of a useful mission 
requirement from proposed Sec.  450.117 to Sec.  450.119 in the final 
rule.
    Lastly, similar to other sections in this rule, the FAA removes the 
requirement for an applicant to provide additional products that allow 
an independent analysis, as requested by the Administrator. The FAA 
finds the requirement redundant with Sec.  450.45(e)(7)(ii). Blue 
Origin and the CSF objected to proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(4). Blue 
Origin strongly disagreed that the FAA should be in the business of 
recreating analysis completed by operators. It submitted that the FAA 
should vet the process used by the operator to conduct the analysis, 
along with the products of the analysis, to determine whether approval 
was warranted. Blue Origin further stated that such independent 
recreation of the analysis could lead to protracted back and forth 
between an operator and the FAA that was unnecessary if the FAA had 
vetted the process used by the operator to conduct the analysis. Blue 
Origin proposed to delete this requirement in order to limit the scope 
to what was required to establish confidence in the validity of an 
operator's analysis. CSF stated that the FAA's practice of recreating 
an applicant's analysis should be ended, as it was expensive and 
burdensome. CSF recommended that an AC should guide and inform this 
analysis.
    Virgin Galactic noted that numerous regulations under part 450, 
including proposed Sec.  450.119(c)(4), call for additional products 
that allow an

[[Page 79638]]

independent analysis, as requested by the Administrator. Virgin 
Galactic stated that ``additional products'' was neither defined nor 
constrained, permitting the FAA to request any information from 
operators at any time. This would create uncertainty regarding the kind 
of products an applicant or operator would need to prepare for the FAA. 
Virgin Galactic recommended striking the above references in their 
entirety. Virgin Galactic commented that, based on prior experience 
under part 431 with the FAA requesting additional information, these 
regulations may have a significant time and monetary impact on an 
operator, if implemented.
    The FAA does not agree with the commenters' recommendation to 
delete this requirement in its entirety from the final rule. The goal 
is for the FAA to evaluate, in an efficient and thorough manner, the 
validity of an analysis, along with the products of the analysis 
submitted by an operator. The FAA finds that at times it may be 
necessary to conduct an independent analysis of the process used by the 
operator in order to ensure safety. Additional product requests under 
part 431 may have been more frequent due to a lack of well-defined 
application requirements. However, under part 450, the FAA expects the 
application requirements are sufficient and will generally not request 
additional products beyond those that are necessary to protect public 
safety. Furthermore, as noted in the NPRM, the FAA has evaluated the 
validity of an applicant's proposed methods by comparing the results to 
valid benchmarks such as data from mishaps, tests, or validated high-
fidelity methods. Once that has occurred, the FAA can issue an 
operator's license for a repeatable operation at a specific site for a 
specified range of trajectory azimuths.
    Using published benchmarks, the FAA intends to facilitate the 
validation and verification of FSA methods to alleviate some of the 
needs for the FAA to perform independent analyses. However, the FAA 
finds that relying on an approved process alone is insufficient when 
certain critical variables may change that affect flight safety or the 
MPL determination, or in cases in which the operator proposes launch or 
reentry operations that are so unique that relevant benchmarks are 
unavailable. Also, the FAA will continue to verify flight operations 
for new vehicles, for existing vehicles conducting operations at new 
sites, for vehicles flying a trajectory outside the accepted range of 
trajectory azimuths, and vehicles that have undergone significant 
modifications to vehicle design or flight safety critical systems. 
Thus, the FAA foresees continuing to perform independent analyses in 
certain circumstances to assure that it has met its statutory 
obligation to ensure public health and safety and safety of property.
    Although the FAA declines to remove the ``additional products'' 
reference in Sec.  450.45(e)(7)(ii) of the final rule, the FAA does not 
include the redundant references proposed in other sections. 
``Additional products'' refers to data that will allow the FAA to 
conduct an independent safety analysis in support of its application 
assessment and licensing determination. It would be impractical to list 
everything needed for every independent analysis. As explained in the 
NPRM, the FAA's decision to conduct an independent analysis is usually 
reserved for new vehicle concepts, new analysis methods, or proposals 
involving unique public safety cases. In all instances, the request for 
information is bounded by the regulatory requirements for obtaining a 
license and the FAA's need to ensure compliance with the safety 
criteria. The FAA adopts the requirement that an applicant submit 
additional products to facilitate an independent analysis, as requested 
by the Administrator in Sec.  450.45(e)(7)(ii).
q. Debris Analysis (Sec.  450.121)
    The NPRM proposed in Sec.  450.121 to require a debris analysis 
that characterized the debris generated for each foreseeable vehicle 
response mode as a function of vehicle flight time, accounting for the 
effects of fuel burn and any configuration changes. The proposal 
required that the debris analysis account for each foreseeable cause of 
vehicle breakup, including any breakup caused by an FSS activation or 
by impact of an intact vehicle. As noted in the NPRM, this would 
include debris from a vehicle's jettisoned components and payloads 
because such debris could cause a casualty due to impact with an 
aircraft or waterborne vessel or could pose a toxic or fire 
hazard.\115\ Under proposed Sec.  450.121(c), the debris analysis would 
include inert, explosive, and other hazardous vehicle debris from both 
normal and malfunctioning flight during launch or reentry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ 84 FR 15383.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.121 with 
revisions. Specifically, the FAA preserves the scope of the debris 
analysis from the NPRM but consolidates, clarifies, and increases the 
flexibility of the regulations in this section. The final rule's 
revisions include (1) replacing the requirement to characterize the 
debris from ``each foreseeable vehicle response mode'' with ``debris 
generated from normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight,'' (2) relying 
upon a new definition for ``hazardous debris,'' (3) replacing ``flight 
time'' with ``flight sequence,'' and (4) removing prescriptive 
thresholds for various debris hazards in favor of a performance-based 
standard of ``capable of causing a casualty or loss of functionality to 
a critical asset.'' Each of these changes is discussed in the following 
paragraphs.
    Proposed Sec.  450.121(a) required that an FSA include a debris 
analysis that characterizes the debris generated for each foreseeable 
vehicle response mode as a function of vehicle flight time, accounting 
for the effects of fuel burn and any configuration changes. The NPRM 
noted that an operator's debris list generally changes over time with 
variations in the amount of available propellant and the jettisoning of 
hardware.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.121(a) with 
revisions. The FAA replaces the proposed requirement to characterize 
``the debris generated for each foreseeable vehicle response mode as a 
function of vehicle flight time, accounting for the effects of fuel 
burn and any configuration changes'' with a more flexible and 
performance-based requirement to characterize ``the hazardous debris 
generated from normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight as a function 
of vehicle flight sequence.''
    Several commenters suggested changing the term ``foreseeable'' 
vehicle response modes in Sec.  450.121(a) of the NPRM to ``credible'' 
vehicle response modes. The commenters stated that credibility was 
determined during the system safety analysis, and that the debris 
analysis should not have to include extremely improbable, non-credible 
failure modes.
    The FAA does not agree that the term ``foreseeable'' should be 
replaced by the term ``credible'' in this section or throughout the 
final rule. The term ``foreseeable'' is used in Sec.  431.35 and also 
commonly used in system safety; therefore, the FAA is not changing 
these references. The FAA finds that the term ``credible'' is 
unacceptably prone to errors in judgment whereas the term 
``foreseeable'' is more readily discerned by analysis (e.g., fault 
trees). With regard to Sec.  450.121(a) of the final rule, the FAA 
adopts the more flexible and performance-based requirement recommended 
by the commenters to characterize the hazardous debris generated from 
normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight as a

[[Page 79639]]

function of vehicle flight sequence. With the removal of the reference 
to ``each foreseeable vehicle response mode'' in Sec.  450.121(a), the 
final rule standard for the scope is set by the language in Sec.  
450.115(a), specifically by the reference to reasonably foreseeable 
events. In addition, the resolution of the failure modes accounted for 
in the debris analysis is set by the level of fidelity necessary to 
comply with Sec.  450.115(b). The FAA also notes that, in the context 
of Sec.  450.121, reasonably foreseeable events that can generate 
hazardous debris during malfunctioning vehicle flight generally include 
engine/motor explosion, exceeding structural limits due to aerodynamic 
loads, inertial loads, aerothermal heating, and activation of a flight 
termination system.
    In reference to the use of the term ``hazardous debris'' in Sec.  
450.121(a), the final rule in Sec.  401.7 includes a definition of this 
term. Hazardous debris means any object or substance capable of causing 
a casualty or loss of functionality to a critical asset. Hazardous 
debris includes inert debris and explosive debris such as an intact 
vehicle, vehicle fragments, any detached vehicle component, whether 
intact or in fragments, payload, and any planned jettisoned bodies. 
This definition is based on proposed Sec.  450.121(c)(1), which 
required a debris analysis to identify all inert debris that could 
cause a casualty or loss of functionality of a critical asset. The FAA 
clarifies that the clause ``whether intact or in fragments'' applies to 
the payload and jettisoned bodies as well.
    The final rule's definition of ``hazardous debris'' facilitated 
streamlining in proposed Sec. Sec.  450.113 through 450.139. For 
example, the term hazardous debris in Sec.  450.121(a) establishes a 
performance-based threshold, which resulted in the elimination of the 
prescriptive debris thresholds proposed in Sec.  450.121(c)(1)(i) 
through (v).\116\ Section 450.121(a) retains the essential performance 
standards in proposed Sec.  450.121(c)(1) and (c)(2) (i.e., that the 
analysis must identify all inert and explosive debris capable of 
causing a casualty or loss of functionality to a critical asset), and 
allows operators to propose impact vulnerability models appropriate for 
the materials used in their licensed operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ As proposed, an operator would have been required to 
include all debris that could impact a human being with a mean 
expected kinetic energy at impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-
lbs; impact a human being with a mean impact kinetic energy per unit 
area at impact greater than or equal to 34 ft-lb/in2; cause a 
casualty due to impact with an aircraft; cause a casualty due to 
impact with a waterborne vessel; or pose a toxic or fire hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, recent research and development sponsored by the FAA 
demonstrates that the threshold kinetic energy capable of causing a 
casualty from a collision with a rigid object is substantially lower 
than for a collision with an object made of certain composite 
materials.\117\ The FAA will provide an AC with valid debris impact 
thresholds, such as those proposed in Sec.  450.121(c)(1)(i) and (ii). 
Thus, in the final rule, Sec.  450.121(a) uses the definition of 
``hazardous debris'' in a way that will enable those debris impact 
thresholds to be updated as appropriate based on future research and 
development. In addition, the definition of ``hazardous debris'' is 
used in Sec.  450.121(a) in a way that replaces the relatively verbose 
requirement in proposed Sec.  450.121(c) that ``a debris analysis must 
account for all inert, explosive, and other hazardous vehicle, vehicle 
component, and payload debris foreseeable from normal and 
malfunctioning vehicle flight.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ ``The crash test results and subsequent analysis strongly 
suggest that RCC-based thresholds are overly conservative because 
they do not accurately represent the collision dynamics of 
elastically-deformable sUAS with larger contact areas in comparison 
to the metallic debris analysis methods for high speed missiles on 
the national test ranges.'' Final Report for the FAA UAS Center of 
Excellence Task A4; UAS Ground Collision Severity Evaluation 
Revision 2, Arterburn et al, 2017. http://www.assureuas.org/projects/deliverables/a4/ASSURE_A4_Final_Report_UAS_Ground_Collision_Severity_Evaluation.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In summary, the final rule uses the performance-based definition of 
``hazardous debris'' that currently equates to the same debris 
thresholds as proposed in the NPRM because ``hazardous debris'' means 
any object or substance capable of causing a casualty, including people 
in aircraft or waterborne vessels or loss of functionality to a 
critical asset. Thus, by relying on the definition of ``hazardous 
debris,'' the final rule retains the standard in proposed Sec.  
450.121(c) of debris capable of causing a casualty or loss of 
functionality to a critical asset and allows operators to propose 
impact vulnerability models appropriate for the materials used in their 
vehicle.
    In the final rule, the FAA replaces the term ``flight time'' in 
Sec.  450.121(a) with the more flexible term ``flight sequence'' 
because it is a better independent variable. For example, during a 
reentry operation, the transitions between phases of flight, which 
generally produce substantially different hazardous debris, such as 
prior to and after peak aero-thermal heating, can occur at widely 
variable flight times. Also, imparted velocities due to break-up 
typically correlate with propellant load better than flight time does. 
Therefore, the final rule uses ``flight sequence'' as a less 
prescriptive and more accurate independent variable. The FAA notes that 
the term ``sequence'' is used in the common meaning of the word, which 
is a series of related things or events, or the order in which things 
or events follow each other. The phrase ``as a function of vehicle 
flight sequence'' would naturally include ``accounting for the effects 
of fuel burn and any configuration changes,'' so the final rule deletes 
those elements of the proposed requirement as redundant.
    In Sec.  450.121(b) of the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that 
the debris analysis account for each foreseeable cause of vehicle 
breakup, including any breakup caused by FSS activation, and for impact 
of an intact vehicle. Consistent with Sec.  450.133(a)(4), this 
proposal included debris from a vehicle's jettisoned components and 
payloads because such debris could cause a casualty due to impact with 
an aircraft or waterborne vessel or could pose a toxic or fire 
hazard.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ The preamble to the NPRM stated that ``this proposal would 
include debris from a vehicle's jettisoned components and payloads 
because such debris could cause a casualty due to impact with an 
aircraft or waterborne vessel or could pose a toxic or fire 
hazard,'' but the proposed regulatory text did not include that 
specific language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.121(b) retains the requirement that a debris analysis 
account for each reasonably foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup and 
intact impact. As explained in the NPRM, this would include ``engine or 
motor explosion, or exceeding structural limits due to aerodynamic 
loads, inertial loads, or aerothermal heating.'' \119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ 84 FR 15383.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the final rule requires an operator to account for 
vehicle structural characteristics and materials and energetic effects 
during break-up or at impact. Although these items would be necessary 
considerations in any debris analysis, the FAA has added them expressly 
in Sec.  450.121(b). The requirement to account for energetic effects 
in Sec.  450.121(b)(3) is consistent with the requirement in proposed 
Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(iii) which addresses ``indirect or secondary 
effects such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide, or ricochet.'' \120\ 
Moreover, accounting for the fundamental physical phenomena identified 
in Sec.  450.121(b)(2) of the final rule would logically be necessary 
to comply with the requirement in

[[Page 79640]]

proposed Sec.  450.135(d) to ``model the casualty area, and compute the 
predicted consequences of each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response 
mode.'' As explained in the NPRM, ``the casualty area and consequence 
analysis would be required to account for all relevant debris fragment 
characteristics.'' The characteristics of all relevant debris 
fragments, such as the size and kinetic energy at impact, depend on the 
three fundamental physical phenomena identified in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ This language in proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(iii) is 
removed in the final rule, as discussed in the preamble associated 
with that section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, the NPRM proposed to require in Sec.  450.121(c) 
that a debris analysis account for all inert, explosive, and other 
hazardous vehicle, vehicle component, and payload debris foreseeable 
from normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight. The NPRM also specified 
a set of items for which a debris analysis would be required to 
account, at a minimum. These items included highly specific and 
prescriptive debris thresholds requirements. With the addition of the 
hazardous debris definition, Sec.  450.121 no longer requires a 
specific subsection establishing debris thresholds.
    In the final rule, new Sec.  450.121(c) contains requirements 
associated with the propagation of debris that are relocated from the 
proposed debris risk analysis requirements in Sec.  450.135(b). 
Specifically, a debris analysis must compute statistically valid debris 
impact probability distributions. The propagation of debris from each 
predicted breakup location to impact must account for all foreseeable 
forces that can influence any debris impact location, and all 
foreseeable sources of impact dispersion, including, at a minimum: The 
uncertainties in atmospheric conditions; debris aerodynamic parameters, 
including uncertainties; pre-breakup position and velocity, including 
uncertainties; and breakup-imparted velocities, including 
uncertainties. The FAA notes that a quantitative description of the 
physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of hazardous debris 
is a prerequisite to compute statistically valid debris impact 
probability distributions and to quantify the risks to the public.
    The propagation of debris is a physics-based analysis that predicts 
where debris impacts will occur given a debris event while the vehicle 
is in flight, such as jettison of a vehicle stage or an explosion. The 
FAA moves the requirements in proposed Sec.  450.135(b) to Sec.  
450.121(c) because the computation of statistically-valid debris impact 
distributions naturally depends on the nature of the debris and the 
trajectory analysis products from Sec. Sec.  450.117 and 450.119. 
Similarly, the final rule requirements in Sec.  450.121(c) are nearly 
identical to those in proposed Sec.  450.135(b), except that the final 
rule removes the term ``including uncertainties'' from the regulation. 
The FAA finds inclusion of this term to be superfluous, as accounting 
for foreseeable sources of impact dispersion naturally includes the 
uncertainties in the debris aerodynamic parameters, pre-breakup state 
vectors, and breakup-imparted velocities. The FAA notes that the debris 
analysis must compute statistically valid debris impact probability 
distributions of all hazardous debris to be consistent with the scope 
identified in Sec.  450.121(a).
    Virgin Galactic recommended that the FAA allow operators to provide 
their own assessments of casualty causing debris. The FAA agrees that 
the specific impact vulnerability thresholds specified in the NPRM were 
overly prescriptive and potentially overly conservative for some non-
rigid debris impacts. Thus, the final rule removes these proposed 
requirements in Sec.  450.121(c) entirely.
    In the NPRM, Sec.  450.121(d) provided the debris analysis 
application requirements. In the final rule, the FAA relocates and 
revises proposed Sec.  450.121(d)(1), which was a requirement to submit 
a description of the debris analysis methodology, to Sec.  
450.121(d)(2). The FAA re-designates and revises proposed Sec.  
450.121(d)(2) as Sec.  450.121(d)(1) in the final rule. In the NPRM, 
proposed Sec.  450.121(d)(2) required an operator submit a description 
of all vehicle breakup modes and the development of debris lists. In 
the final rule, the re-designated Sec.  450.121(d)(1) makes use of the 
formal definition of ``hazardous debris,'' requiring a description of 
all scenarios that can lead to hazardous debris.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.121(d)(2) and (d)(3) require an 
operator to submit a description of the methods used to perform the 
vehicle impact and breakup analysis in accordance with Sec.  
450.115(c), which is consistent with similar changes in other FSA 
sections. The final rule also moves the requirements relevant to the 
debris propagation analysis from proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(2) and 
(e)(5) to Sec.  450.121(d)(3) and (d)(4).
    The FAA re-designates and revises proposed Sec.  450.121(d)(3) as 
Sec.  450.121(d)(5). In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.121(d)(3) required 
an applicant to submit all debris fragment lists necessary to describe 
the physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of each debris 
fragment or fragment class quantitatively. Section 450.121(d)(5) of the 
final rule requires a quantitative description of the physical, 
aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of hazardous debris. The FAA 
finds that ``quantitative description'' will allow alternative 
approaches for the applicant to demonstrate compliance with this 
section.
    Virgin Galactic stated the proposal would introduce additional 
workload to the company. Virgin Galactic raised concern that proposed 
Sec.  450.121 introduced requirements for waterborne vessels that were 
not referenced in other parts of the rule. The NPRM proposed, and the 
final rule requires in Sec.  450.133(b), that a flight hazard area 
analysis must determine waterborne vessel hazard areas. Also, the NPRM 
preamble explained that the requirement includes people on ships in the 
collective risk computation (see proposed Sec.  450.101(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)), and thus explicitly allows the application of risk management 
principles to protect people on waterborne vessels. The FAA finds that 
the scope of the FSA requirements in the final rule are consistent with 
current practice and will not introduce additional workload.
    Virgin Galactic stated that the FAA should quantify the debris that 
could cause a casualty on a waterborne vessel. The FAA notes that it 
provided guidance on debris thresholds for waterborne vessels in Table 
10 of the draft AC on High-Fidelity FSA published with the NPRM.
r. Population Exposure Analysis (Sec.  450.123)
    In the NPRM, the exposure model requirements were addressed in the 
debris risk analysis section in proposed Sec.  450.135(c) and (d) 
because a complete risk analysis must account for the distribution of 
people and how those people may be sheltered. The FAA received numerous 
comments stating the proposed requirements were too prescriptive. The 
FAA agrees and has revised the requirements to be more performance-
based.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises the exposure model requirements 
and moves them from proposed Sec.  450.135(c) and (d) to Sec.  450.123 
(Population Exposure Analysis). The FAA moves the population exposure 
analysis requirements out of the proposed debris risk analysis section 
because this analysis informs other sections of the FSA. A population 
exposure analysis must also be used to provide input to other public 
risk analyses to address toxic hazards and far-field overpressure blast 
effects, if any. This change does

[[Page 79641]]

not an expand the scope of the final rule beyond what was proposed in 
the NPRM because the NPRM identified the need for population exposure 
input to address toxic hazards for flight and far-field overpressure 
blast effects.\121\ The rationale for the final rule requirements 
remains the same as proposed in the NPRM: An exposure model provides 
critical input data on the geographical location of people and critical 
assets at various times when the launch or reentry operation could 
occur. While the rationale remains the same, the FAA makes two changes 
in Sec.  450.123. Consistent with the change discussed in the critical 
assets section of the preamble, the FAA removes the requirement for an 
operator to characterize the distribution and vulnerability of critical 
assets. The FAA also revises the population exposure analysis to 
require that input data must account for the vulnerability of people to 
hazardous debris effects. The FAA will issue a Population Exposure 
Assessment AC to describe a possible means of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ Specifically, in Sec.  450.139(f) the FAA proposed to 
require an applicant submit (ii) the population density in receptor 
locations that are identified by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic 
hazard areas; and (iv) the identity of the population database used. 
Also, in Sec.  450.137(c)(1) the FAA proposed to require an 
applicant submit a description of the population centers, terrain, 
building types, and window characteristics used as input to the far-
field overpressure analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.123(a) requires that an FSA must account for the 
distribution of people for the entire region where there is a 
significant probability of impact of hazardous debris. This final rule 
is consistent with the requirement in proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(1) that 
the population exposure data would be required to include the entire 
region where there is a significant probability of impact of hazardous 
debris. The definition of ``hazardous debris'' in Sec.  401.7 informs 
the scope of this requirement. In Sec.  450.123(a), the standard of 
``significant'' means that the scope of the population exposure 
analysis is bounded by what is necessary to demonstrate compliance with 
the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b), consistent with the 
scope requirements set in Sec. Sec.  450.113 and 450.115.
    Section 450.123(b) sets constraints on the population exposure 
analysis consistent with proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(2) through (c)(7). 
Specifically, Sec.  450.123(b) requires that the exposure analysis must 
characterize the distribution of people both geographically and 
temporally; account for the distribution of people among structures and 
vehicle types; and use reliable, accurate, and timely source data.
    Section 450.123(b)(1) relocates the requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.135(c)(2), but removes the term ``vulnerability'' and the reference 
to critical assets, as discussed earlier.\122\ The final rule removes 
proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(4), which would have required the exposure 
model to have sufficient temporal and spatial resolution that a uniform 
distribution of people within each defined region can be treated as a 
single average set of characteristics without degrading the accuracy of 
any debris analysis output. By removing this requirement, an operator 
may demonstrate compliance with Sec.  450.123(b) in the manner set 
forth in proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(4), but also has flexibility to 
demonstrate compliance through other means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ However, the proposed requirement in Sec.  450.135(c)(4) 
to characterize the vulnerability of people both geographically and 
temporally is effectively preserved in the final rule requirement in 
Sec.  450.123(b)(4) to account for vulnerability of people to 
hazardous debris effects in the population exposure analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.123(b)(2) replaces the more prescriptive requirements 
in proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(3) by removing the requirement that, in 
accounting for the distribution of people among structures and vehicle 
types, an exposure analysis includes ``a resolution consistent with the 
characteristic size of the impact probability distributions for 
relevant fragment groups.'' The language removed from the final rule 
remains a valid means for an operator to demonstrate compliance with 
Sec.  450.123(b)(2) in the final rule.
    Section 450.123(b)(3) replaces the more prescriptive requirements 
in proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(5) and (c)(6) so that an exposure analysis 
must use reliable, accurate, and timely source data.
    Section 450.123(b)(4) consolidates and replaces the requirements to 
account for the vulnerability of people to hazardous debris effects 
that were proposed in Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(i) and (ii), as well as 
proposed in Sec.  450.137(b)(4). In the final rule, the FAA removes the 
requirement in proposed Sec.  450.135(c)(7) altogether. Proposed Sec.  
450.135(c)(7) is redundant in conjunction with the requirements in 
Sec.  450.115(b), which specify the necessary fidelity of any FSA, and 
the requirement in Sec.  450.101(g) that an operator must use accurate 
data and scientific principles and the analysis must be statistically 
valid.
    The FAA moves and revises the application requirements in proposed 
Sec.  450.135(e)(3) as Sec.  450.123(c)(1) in the final rule. The FAA 
revises the final Sec.  450.123(c)(1), which requires an applicant to 
submit a description of the FSA methodology, to reference Sec.  
450.115(c). As previously noted, the population exposure analysis must 
also be used to provide input to other public risk analyses to address 
toxic hazards and far-field overpressure blast effects, if any. Section 
450.123(c)(2) requires an applicant to submit complete population 
exposure data, in tabular form, which is a more concise statement 
equivalent to proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(4). In the final rule, the FAA 
specifies that the complete population exposure data must be in tabular 
form and deletes the requirement that the description of the exposure 
input data include, for each population center, a geographic definition 
and the distribution of population among shelter types as a function of 
time of day, week, month, or year. The population exposure data 
provided under Sec.  450.123(c)(2) may reflect some or all of the 
information described in proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(4).
s. Probability of Failure Analysis (Sec.  450.131)
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.131 covered probability of failure 
analysis requirements for all launch and reentry vehicles. In the final 
rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.131 with minor revisions 
codifying current practices and eliminating the proposed classes of 
mishaps referenced in Sec.  450.131.
    Section 450.131(a) proposed that for each hazard and phase of 
flight, an FSA for a launch or reentry would be required to account for 
vehicle failure probability. The probability of failure would be 
required to be consistent for all hazards and phases of flight. For a 
vehicle stage with fewer than two flights, the failure probability 
estimate would be required to account for the outcome of all previous 
flights of vehicles developed and launched or reentered in similar 
circumstances. For a vehicle or vehicle stage with two or more flights, 
vehicle failure probability estimates would be required to account for 
the outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or vehicle stage in 
a statistically valid manner. The outcomes of all previous flights of 
the vehicle or vehicle stage would be required to account for data on 
any partial failure and anomalies, including Class 3 and Class 4 
mishaps, as defined in proposed Sec.  401.5. The FAA adopts Sec.  
450.131(a) as proposed with a minor change to the language pertaining 
to mishaps to reflect revisions to the definition of ``mishap'' in 
Sec.  401.7. The FAA notes that the final rule replaced the term 
``partial failures'' with ``mishap'' in Sec.  450.131(a)(2)

[[Page 79642]]

 because the proposed language referenced both anomalies and mishaps, 
and ``partial failure'' is redundant since any partial failure could 
qualify as an anomaly or a mishap under Sec.  401.7, depending on the 
nature of the failure.
    Virgin Galactic commented that the proposed requirements to gather 
and account for anomaly data in the probability of failure analysis 
introduced additional workload compared to the current regulation. It 
recommended the FAA adopt a performance-based standard in an SNPRM.
    The FAA does not agree that this requirement results in additional 
workload from current regulations. The FAA notes that the final rule 
requirement in Sec.  450.101(g) is relevant here because it requires 
that a method must produce results consistent with, or more 
conservative than, the results available from previous mishaps, tests, 
or other valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.\123\ Hence, 
an operator has the option to use a more conservative approach to avoid 
any unnecessary additional workload. For example, an operator can 
assume one more failure than the actual outcomes of all previous 
flights of the vehicle or vehicle stage. Therefore, the FAA does not 
find that the requirements in the final rule constitute additional 
workload compared to current regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Because the FSA is necessary to demonstrate compliance 
with the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101, the requirements set forth 
in that section regarding the validity of analysis apply to all 
parts of the FSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing requested clarification on what is meant by a ``consistent'' 
probability of failure in this section. The FAA clarifies that the 
vehicle or vehicle stage probability of failure must be consistent 
internally with outcomes of previous flights, as described in Sec.  
450.131(a)(1) and (a)(2). Furthermore, the probability of failure input 
data must be consistent for all phases of flight and hazards. In this 
context, ``consistent'' does not mean identical and does not preclude 
an operator from varying the probability of failure within statistical 
confidence limits for the same event in different contexts, in order to 
bias an analysis towards a conservative outcome.\124\ The probability 
of failure input data should be reasonably conservative and consistent 
across phases of flight and for various hazards given the uncertainty 
in each probability of failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ Section 450.115(b)(1) requires an operator to demonstrate 
that any risk to the public satisfies the safety criteria of Sec.  
450.101 accounting for all known sources of uncertainty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A hypothetical example is a proposed launch of a two-stage launch 
vehicle from both CCAFS and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). In this 
case, the best-available data indicates the mean conditional 
probability of a failure during first stage and second stages of flight 
are both 50 percent, with plus or minus 10 percent uncertainty at a 
minimal level of confidence (e.g., 60 percent lower and upper bound 
confidence limits at 40 percent and 60 percent based on the binomial 
distribution).
    Given the fact that the public exposure to hazardous debris effects 
for launches from VAFB is relatively high during stage one, and the 
opposite is true for launches from CCAFS, a consistent and reasonably 
conservative probability of failure analysis would use a 60-40 split in 
the conditional probability of failure during stage one and stage two 
flight for launches from VAFB, but a 40-60 split in the conditional 
probability of failure during stage one and stage two flight for 
launches from CCAFS. Furthermore, the conditional probability of a 
failure applied to different hazards, such as debris and toxics, must 
be consistent with each other. More details on means of compliance are 
provided in the High Fidelity FSA Methods AC published with this rule, 
and a future AC on probability of failure.
    Leo Aerospace asked if the FAA would consider a balloon platform to 
be a stage.
    The FAA will discuss project-specific information, including 
whether a balloon platform is part of a launch vehicle stage, during 
pre-application consultation.
    Boeing, Blue Origin, and Sierra Nevada commented on the lack of 
availability of previous flight information for vehicles not operated 
or owned by the applicant.
    The FAA responded to this comment in the FAA's ``Responses to the 
Public's Clarifying Questions Received by July 12, 2019,'' \125\ which 
is posted in the docket. An operator should use the best-available 
data, which in many cases would be limited to publicly available data. 
The FAA will also provide data and guidance on failure mode and phase 
of flight allocations in the High Fidelity FSA Methods AC, which will 
be finalized with this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ See FAA-2019-02290-0134.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, the FAA replaces all references to Class 3 and 
Class 4 mishaps in Sec.  450.131 with the term ``mishap.'' As 
previously noted, the FAA eliminates the proposed classes of mishaps in 
the revised definition of mishap in Sec.  401.7 of the final rule.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that, for FSA purposes, a failure 
occurs when a vehicle does not complete any phase of normal flight or 
when any anomalous condition exhibits the potential for a stage or its 
debris to impact the Earth or reenter the atmosphere outside the normal 
trajectory envelope during the mission or any future mission of similar 
vehicle capability. It further stated that Class 1 or Class 2 mishaps 
would constitute failures.
    Blue Origin commented that defining failure as not completing any 
phase of normal flight is ``overly punitive'' as proposed in Sec.  
450.131(b). Operators may define secondary mission objectives for 
research and development purposes that, if not achieved, do impact 
mission success but do not impact safety. Blue Origin proposed deleting 
the language ``when a vehicle does not complete any phase of normal 
flight or'' and anchor the definition in impacts outside the normal 
envelope. Virgin Galactic recommended that the FAA should only account 
for failures, partial failures, and anomalies that affect public 
safety. Blue Origin also commented that including anomalies that might 
impact a future mission conflicts with the causal logic that an anomaly 
experienced on a given mission will be subject to corrective actions 
prior to the next mission.
    The FAA understands the concerns raised by the commenters but finds 
it unnecessary to change the regulatory text to address these concerns. 
An operator may adjust its final failure probability estimates to 
account for various extenuating circumstances, as will be described in 
a future Probability of Failure Analysis AC. For example, the 
probability of failure may be adjusted based on extenuating 
circumstances with justification (e.g., if the failure is not public 
safety related or if corrective actions implemented after a failure 
were demonstrated to be successful). If an operator makes any 
adjustments to the final failure probability estimates to account for 
various extenuating circumstances, it can update its FSA in accordance 
with Sec.  450.103(d).
    The FAA notes that, for FSA purposes, the vehicle failure 
probability accounts for any failure of the launch or reentry system 
because of the way failure is defined in Sec.  450.131(b). 
Specifically, for FSA purposes, a failure occurs when a vehicle does 
not complete any phase of normal flight or when any anomalous condition 
exhibits the potential for a stage or its debris to impact the Earth or 
reenter the atmosphere outside the normal trajectory envelope during 
the mission or any future mission of similar vehicle

[[Page 79643]]

capability. Therefore, in the context of FSA, any failure of the launch 
or reentry system, including pilot error, that produced vehicle failure 
as defined in Sec.  450.131(b) must be taken into account.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ The SpaceShipTwo accident on October 31, 2014, is an 
example of this situation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  450.131(c) defined ``previous flight'' by stating 
that the flight of a launch vehicle begins at a time when a launch 
vehicle normally or inadvertently lifts off from a launch platform and 
the flight of a reentry vehicle or deorbiting upper stage begins at a 
time when a vehicle attempts to initiate a deorbit. The FAA adopts 
Sec.  450.131(c)(1) as proposed with a minor change. The FAA strikes 
the words ``normally or inadvertently'' as redundant, since any lift 
off, whether normal or inadvertent, would count as a flight under the 
proposed and final rule requirements in Sec.  450.131(c)(1).
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, ULA, and Virgin Galactic 
requested explanation on whether the proposed requirement in Sec.  
450.131(c) would apply to hybrid vehicles.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises the regulatory text in response 
to these comments. The FAA changes ``launch platform'' to ``surface of 
the Earth'' as the point at which flight begins for a probability of 
failure analysis. This change reflects the fact that various types of 
vehicles, such as hybrids, do not lift off from launch platforms. The 
probability of failure analysis must account for the probability of 
failure during all phases of flight to ensure public safety, including 
captive carry, unless the exception in Sec.  450.113(b) applies to that 
phase of flight. For example, an aircraft crash with a rocket attached 
can present much higher risks to the public from an explosion, toxic 
release, or inert impact, than the risks posed by an aircraft crash 
without a rocket attached.
    For the purposes of Sec.  450.131(c)(1) and (c)(2), a previous 
flight may include flights conducted outside FAA licensed activity, 
such as amateur, permitted, U.S. government, or foreign launches, 
reentries, or flights. For the purposes of Sec.  450.131(c)(1) and 
(c)(2), a previous flight may include FAA-licensed activity, such as 
the Falcon 9 launch vehicle anomaly which destroyed the vehicle and its 
AMOS-6 payload,\127\ if the outcome exhibited the potential for a stage 
or its debris to impact the Earth or reenter the atmosphere outside the 
normal trajectory envelope during the mission or any future mission of 
similar vehicle capability. The FAA also changes the word ``deorbit'' 
to ``reentry'' to accommodate a reentry that starts on a suborbital 
trajectory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ On September 1, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, Sec.  450.131(d) proposed to require that a vehicle 
probability of failure be distributed across flight times and vehicle 
response modes. The distribution would be consistent with the data 
available from all previous flights of vehicles developed and launched 
or reentered in similar circumstances and data from previous flights of 
vehicles, stages, or components developed and launched or reentered by 
the subject vehicle developer or operator. As proposed, the data could 
include previous experience involving, among other things, a similar 
level of experience of the vehicle operation and development team 
members.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.131(d) with revisions. Specifically, the 
FAA changes ``flight time'' to ``flight phase.'' ``Flight phase'' gives 
applicants more flexibility in their analysis because it is less 
specific than ``flight time.'' The FAA also changes ``vehicle response 
mode'' to ``failure mode,'' consistent with similar changes throughout 
the final rule. Finally, the FAA replaces the phrase ``launched or 
reentered'' in Sec.  450.131(d)(2) to ``launched, reentered, flown, or 
tested.'' This change will enable the probability of failure allocation 
across flight phases and failure modes to account for data from 
previous flights of vehicles, stages, or components by the subject 
vehicle developer or operator that did not qualify as launch or reentry 
operations, such as drop tests or glide flights. The FAA also revises 
``flight phases'' and ``failure modes'' to be plural in the final rule. 
This amended language is a minor grammatical change and is consistent 
with the intent of the proposed requirement.
    Virgin Galactic commented that the FAA should not employ a 
subjective measure of ``level of experience'' and requested this 
language be stricken.
    The FAA asserts that this measure is not subjective. The High 
Fidelity FSA Methods draft AC contained specific quantitative 
thresholds that have been used for many years as guidelines to 
distinguish new versus experienced developers for the purposes of 
probability of failure analyses. Because the quantitative thresholds 
are in guidance, the FAA may consider other quantitative thresholds as 
appropriate. Furthermore, the data available from previous flights of 
ELVs developed by experienced and inexperienced operators demonstrates 
a statistically significant difference between the relative frequency 
of failures during the first and second phases of flight. Therefore, 
because the required input data may involve a similar level of 
experience of the vehicle operation and development team members, the 
final rule in Sec.  450.131(d)(2)(iii) retains that consideration.
    The FAA adopts the observed and conditional failure rate 
requirements in Sec.  450.131(e) as proposed and the application 
requirements in Sec.  450.131(f) with revisions. Section 450.131(f)(1) 
to require methods used in probability of failure analysis be in 
accordance with Sec.  450.115(c) because that section sets out the 
requirements for FSA methodologies. In Sec.  450.131(f)(2), the FAA 
changes the term ``vehicle response mode'' to ``failure mode,'' which 
is consistent with similar changes throughout this final rule.
t. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (Sec.  450.133)
    In Sec.  450.133, the NPRM proposed general requirements for the 
flight hazard area analysis as well as requirements specific to 
waterborne vessel hazard areas, land hazard areas, airspace hazard 
volumes, and the license application. In the final rule, the FAA adopts 
Sec.  450.133 with revisions. The revisions include changing terms 
proposed in the NPRM and removing redundant requirements.
    Proposed Sec.  450.133(a) stated that an FSA would be required to 
include a flight hazard area analysis that identifies any region of 
land, sea, or air that would be required to be surveyed, publicized, 
controlled, or evacuated in order to control the risk to the public. A 
flight hazard area analysis would be required to account for all 
reasonably foreseeable vehicle response modes during nominal and non-
nominal flight that could result in a casualty. The NPRM specified six 
items that would be required to be included in a flight hazard area 
analysis, at a minimum.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.133(a) with revisions. The FAA moves the 
requirement in Sec.  450.133(a) that a flight hazard area analysis must 
account for all reasonably foreseeable vehicle response modes during 
nominal and non-nominal flight that could result in a casualty to Sec.  
450.133(a)(1). This text is also revised, as discussed below. The 
replacement of ``vehicle response modes'' with ``failure modes'' was 
discussed in the preamble section on Sec.  450.101(c)(2).
    In Sec.  450.133(a)(1), the FAA proposed that the flight hazard 
analysis must account for the regions of land, sea, and air potentially 
exposed to debris impact resulting from normal flight events and from 
debris hazards resulting from any

[[Page 79644]]

potential malfunction. The FAA revises proposed Sec.  450.133(a)(1) by 
adding the term ``hazardous debris'' as discussed in the preamble 
section for Sec.  450.121 (Debris Analysis). As defined, hazardous 
debris includes any object or substance capable of causing a casualty 
or loss of functionality to a critical asset, such as an intact 
vehicle, vehicle fragments, any detached vehicle component, whether 
intact or in fragments, payload, and any planned jettison bodies. The 
FAA also replaces ``vehicle response mode'' with ``failure modes'' for 
consistency throughout the final rule.
    In Sec.  401.7, the FAA modifies the definition of ``flight hazard 
area'' as applied to part 450. The NPRM proposed that flight hazard 
area means any region of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, 
publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to ``protect public 
health and safety and the safety of property.'' This language was 
inconsistent with the language in Sec.  450.133. As such, in the final 
rule, the definition has been revised in Sec.  401.7 for consistency to 
state that a flight hazard area is any region of land, sea, or air that 
must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to 
``ensure compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101.''
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA suggested 
replacing ``all reasonably foreseeable'' with ``credible'' because 
credibility is established in the system safety analysis. As discussed 
previously, the FAA does not agree with the recommendation because the 
term credible is prone to errors in judgment whereas the term 
foreseeable is more readily discerned by analysis (e.g., fault trees). 
The final rule moves the term ``reasonably foreseeable'' from proposed 
Sec.  450.133(a) to Sec.  450.133(a)(1), where it more appropriately 
modifies the language in Sec.  450.133(a)(1) that specifies the 
analysis must account for the regions of land, sea, and air potentially 
exposed to hazardous debris generated during normal flight events and 
all reasonably foreseeable failure modes.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.133(a)(2) with a minor correction. The FAA 
replaces ``control risk to any hazard'' in the NPRM with ``control risk 
from any hazard'' in the final rule.
    In Sec.  450.133(a)(3), the FAA proposed that the analysis account 
for the limits of a launch or reentry vehicle's normal flight, 
including winds that were no less severe than the worst wind conditions 
under which flight might be attempted and uncertainty in the wind 
conditions. The FAA adopts Sec.  450.133(a)(3) with revisions. The FAA 
changes ``wind conditions'' to ``atmospheric conditions'' because in 
some cases, such as far-field overpressure blast and toxics analyses, 
the temperature profile is an atmospheric condition that may also be 
stipulated as part of the flight commit criteria (in addition to the 
wind profile). This change does not create any additional burden to the 
operator because the proposed and final requirements in Sec.  
450.135(e)(1) and Sec.  450.165(b)(2) already require an operator to 
account for and identify the conditions immediately prior to enabling 
the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle that 
are necessary to demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria in 
Sec.  450.101, such as the atmospheric conditions and any 
meteorological conditions. The final rule in Sec.  450.133(a)(3) 
clarifies that all atmospheric conditions are considerations when the 
operator establishes the worst conditions under which flight might be 
attempted.
    In Sec.  450.133(a)(4), the FAA proposed that the analysis account 
for the debris identified for each foreseeable cause of breakup, and 
any planned jettison of debris, launch or reentry vehicle components, 
or payload. The FAA adopts Sec.  450.133(a)(4) with a revision. For 
reasons previously discussed, the FAA replaces this section with ``all 
hazardous debris,'' which uses the term defined in Sec.  401.7 of the 
final rule. This revision does not change the intent of the 
requirement.
    In Sec.  450.133(a)(5), the FAA proposed that the analysis account 
for all foreseeable sources of debris dispersion during freefall, 
including wind effects, guidance and control, velocity imparted by 
breakup or jettison, lift, and drag forces. The FAA adopts Sec.  
450.133(a)(5) with revisions. In the final rule, the analysis must 
account for sources of debris dispersion in accordance with Sec.  
450.121(c). The FAA makes this revision to avoid replication of 
requirements between Sec. Sec.  450.133(a)(5) and 450.121(c) and to 
ensure consistency in the FSA.
    AOPA commented that the FAA should provide the public an 
authoritative source of flight hazard area information as well as 
guidance on various flight hazard area analysis methodology. The FAA is 
working on the NOTAM/Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) 
Modernization effort, which will redesign the current NOTAM management 
information system with a single technology gateway for entering, 
processing, and retrieving all NOTAM data, making it easier for all 
users of the airspace to access safety-critical information. The FAA 
finds that the issue raised by AOPA is best addressed by the NOTAM/AIS 
Modernization effort rather than this rulemaking. Industry can provide 
input on this effort through the Aeronautical Information Systems 
Coalition. Information regarding temporary flight restrictions (TFR) 
can be found at: https://tfr.faa.gov/tfr2/list.html and is searchable 
by the type of TFR being implemented. The FAA plans to complete the 
NOTAM/AIS Modernization effort by late 2022. In addition, an acceptable 
flight hazard area analysis methodology is addressed in the High 
Fidelity FSA AC.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA also provided 
suggested regulatory text that stated the airspace hazard volume was 
only necessary for airspace up to 60,000 feet mean sea level. The FAA 
agrees that the analysis only needs to account for reasonably expected 
air traffic in a given region, but, in order to account for operations 
in different regions, does not change the text to a specific altitude.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.133(b), (c), and (d) as proposed. Section 
Sec.  450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) state that flight hazard areas 
must be determined as necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability 
of containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable 
of causing a casualty to any person located on land, sea, or air. In 
the NPRM, the FAA explained that proposed Sec.  450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), 
and (d)(1) would align FAA regulations with practices at the Federal 
launch or reentry sites by allowing operators to reduce or otherwise 
optimize the size of the regions for warnings of potential hazardous 
debris resulting from normal flight events.
    Virgin Galactic stated that, given the currently available 
information and tools regarding debris, the 97 percent probability of 
containment requirement in proposed Sec.  450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and 
(d)(1) would result in inflated hazard area determinations. Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented on proposed Sec.  
450.133(b)(1) and suggested it reference current 3-sigma standards. 
Boeing stated that, given the new limitation on debris, changing from 
99.7 percent to 97 percent containment appeared less safe.
    The final rule retains the 97 percent containment requirement 
proposed in the NPRM. The FAA notes that the comments demonstrate a 
difference of opinion in the industry regarding the appropriate 
probability of containment requirement for flight hazard areas, with 
Virgin Galactic claiming the proposal would result in inflated hazard 
area determinations, as opposed to the other commenters calling for 
more stringent

[[Page 79645]]

hazard area requirements to maintain public safety. The FAA finds the 
97 percent containment requirement strikes an appropriate balance, 
particularly when coupled with the requirement to include the 
collective risk contribution from people in waterborne vessels in the 
public risk criteria in Sec.  450.101. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA 
adopts flight hazard area regulations for waterborne vessels consistent 
with past waivers that the FAA granted to ensure they align with 
current practices at the Federal launch ranges, where most commercial 
launches take place currently. Recent experience from commercial and 
U.S. Government launch and reentry operations demonstrates that the 
requirements adopted eliminate unnecessary launch delays while ensuring 
that the overall level of safety provided to the public remains 
consistent with the public risk criteria in Sec.  450.101. The FAA 
notes that the application of a risk management approach to ensure the 
safety of people in waterborne vessels is consistent with 
recommendations made by the National Academy of Sciences.\128\ The FAA 
finds that public safety is not compromised by changing 99.7 percent 
containment to 97 percent containment because the overall public risk 
criteria must also be met, irrespective of the size of the hazard 
areas. From a policy perspective, the final rule approach to protect 
people in waterborne vessels achieves the goal of common standards for 
launches from any U.S. launch site, Federal or non-Federal. Both 
industry and the National Space Council have urged government agencies 
involved in the launch and reentry of vehicles by commercial operators 
to work towards common standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ In 2001, the NRC published a report on ``Streamlining 
Space Launch Range Safety,'' which included a recommendation that 
``safety procedures based on risk avoidance should be replaced with 
procedures consistent with the risk management philosophy specified 
by EWR 127-1.'' See p. 44 of IBSN 0-309-51648-X available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9790.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing also requested clarification on how containment boxes for 
nominal impacts can use the same standard as hazard areas intended to 
contain debris in the much less likely event of a failure. The FAA 
notes that planned hazardous debris impacts must use a probability of 1 
in the analysis in accordance with Sec.  450.133(a)(6), while hazardous 
debris impacts due to a failure will have a probability applied as 
determined from the Sec.  450.131 probability of failure analysis.
    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.133(b)(2), (c)(2), and (d)(2) as proposed. 
These sections use probability of impact contours or probability of 
casualty contours to meet the risk requirements in Sec.  450.101 for 
sea, land, and air.
    Blue Origin commented that the intent of these requirements seems 
to be to establish hazard areas for normal operations and mishaps, but 
the requirements do not explicitly state that the risk criteria applies 
to malfunction trajectories. Blue Origin proposed that the FAA should 
specify that risk contours should be conducted for malfunction 
trajectories.
    The FAA notes the proposed requirement in Sec.  450.133(a) that a 
flight hazard area analysis must account for all reasonably foreseeable 
vehicle response modes during nominal and non-nominal flight that could 
result in a casualty also specified that the risk contours required in 
proposed Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(iii) through (v) must account for 
malfunction trajectories. However, the FAA revises the requirement to 
state in Sec.  450.133(a)(1) that the flight hazard area analysis must 
account for the regions of land, sea, and air potentially exposed to 
hazardous debris generated during normal flight events and ``all 
reasonably foreseeable failure modes,'' which includes malfunction 
trajectories. In addition, the FAA revises the risk contour requirement 
in Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(iii), which is explained below in the discussion 
on that requirement. The FAA notes that the High-Fidelity FSA Methods 
AC describes one acceptable methodology for flight hazard areas, which 
accounts for malfunction trajectories.
    Virgin Galactic commented that requirements for waterborne vessels 
should also be in Sec.  450.101. The FAA notes that the operator must 
meet individual and collective risk requirements, as stated in Sec.  
450.101. People on waterborne vessels are included in the collective 
and individual risk calculations. However, as explained in the NPRM, 
operators have the option to use the current approach in part 417 as a 
means of compliance, which requires surveillance to ensure no ship is 
exposed to more than 1 x 10-\5\ probability of impact, 
because that will be generally sufficient to ensure compliance with 
Sec.  450.101.
    In Sec.  450.133(e)(1), the FAA proposed that the applicant submit 
a description of the methodology to be used in the flight hazard area 
analysis including all assumptions and justifications for the 
assumptions, vulnerability models, analysis methods, and input data. In 
the final rule, the FAA revises this requirement by adding that the 
analysis must be done in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c) to avoid 
replication of requirements and ensure consistency throughout subpart C 
of part 450.
    In Sec.  450.133(e)(1)(i), the FAA proposed that an applicant 
provide input wind data and justification in the application. The FAA 
did not adopt this proposal in the final rule. Rather, the FAA deletes 
proposed Sec.  450.133(e)(1)(i) because this application requirement is 
covered in Sec.  450.117(c). Section 450.117(c) accounts for all 
atmospheric conditions that have an effect on the trajectory, including 
worst case atmospheric profile conditions under which flight might be 
attempted.
    In Sec.  450.133(e)(2), the FAA proposed that an applicant submit 
tabular data and graphs of the results of the flight hazard area 
analysis, including in Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(iv) and (v) the following: 
if applicable, representative 1 x 10-\5\ and 1 x 
10-\6\ probability of impact contours for all debris capable 
of causing a casualty to persons on a waterborne vessel regardless of 
location; and representative 1 x 10-\6\ and 1 x 
10-\7\ probability of impact contours for all debris capable 
of causing a casualty to persons on an aircraft regardless of 
location.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ The FAA received no comments on Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(i) and 
(ii) and adopts Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(i) as proposed and Sec.  
450.133(e)(2)(ii) a revision include a cross-reference to the hazard 
area publication requirement in Sec.  450.161.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Blue Origin commented that, by requiring 1 x 10-\6\ and 
1 x 10-\7\ risk contours for waterborne vessels and 
aircraft, respectively, the FAA was extending application requirements 
beyond those either currently codified in part 400 or proposed in part 
450.
    The FAA notes that, as stated in the NPRM preamble, these contours 
are necessary for the applicant to demonstrate to the FAA sufficient 
computational resolution and analysis fidelity for the results that are 
critical to public safety. Thus, the FAA declines to adopt the 
recommended change. For these reasons, the FAA adopts Sec.  
450.133(e)(2)(iv) and (e)(2)(v) as proposed.
    In Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(iii), the FAA proposed that an applicant 
would be required to submit representative individual probability of 
casualty contours regardless of location.
    Virgin Galactic requested clarification on the meaning of the term 
``regardless of location.'' Based on the context in proposed Sec.  
450.133(a), which required the flight hazard area analysis to identify 
any region of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, 
controlled, or evacuated in order to control the risk to the public, 
the term ``regardless of location'' referred to whether the contours 
are on land, sea,

[[Page 79646]]

or air. In the final rule, the FAA changes the term ``regardless of 
location'' to ``for all locations specified in paragraph (a)'' for more 
specificity. The FAA further specifies that ``representative 
probability of casualty contours'' must account for both neighboring 
operations personnel (at the 1 x 10-\5\ probability of 
casualty level) and other members of the public (at the 1 x 
10-\6\ probability of casualty level). Hence, the 
requirement in Sec.  450.133(e)(2)(iii) of the final rule specifies 
that representative individual probability of casualty contours include 
tabular data and graphs showing the hypothetical location of any member 
of the public that could be exposed to a probability of casualty of 1 x 
10-\5\ or greater for neighboring operations personnel, and 
1 x 10-\6\ or greater for other members of the public, given 
all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria.
    The FAA adds this explicit language to the application requirement 
to reflect what is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the 
substantive requirements for flight hazard area analysis as proposed in 
the NPRM and as set forth in the final rule. Specifically, the 
substantive requirements proposed in Sec.  450.133(b)(2) and (c)(2), 
which required an operator to determine the areas of water and land 
where the individual probability of casualty for any person on a vessel 
or on land would exceed the criterion in Sec.  450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2), 
would necessarily have required a demonstration consistent with the 
revised application requirements.
u. Debris Risk Analysis (Sec.  450.135)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that a debris risk 
analysis be performed to determine whether the individual and 
collective risk of public casualties meet the safety criteria in Sec.  
450.101. The debris risk analysis would be required to compute 
statistically-valid debris impact probability distributions using the 
input data produced by FSAs required in proposed Sec. Sec.  450.117 
through 450.133. In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.135 with 
revisions.
    Proposed Sec.  450.135(a) stated that a debris risk analysis would 
be required to demonstrate compliance with safety criteria in proposed 
Sec.  450.101, either prior to the day of the operation, by accounting 
for all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria or 
during the countdown using the best available input data. The FAA 
adopts Sec.  450.135(a) with revisions. Specifically, the FAA adds in 
Sec.  450.135(a)(2) that the ``best available input data'' used during 
the countdown must include any applicable ``flight commit criteria and 
flight abort rules'' if such controls are necessary to ensure 
compliance with the public risks as required in proposed and final 
Sec.  450.165(b).
    There is no additional burden on the operator due to the updated 
language in Sec.  450.135(a)(2), because this requirement is consistent 
with the proposed requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.135(e)(1) and 
450.165(b)(2). An operator is required to account for and identify the 
conditions immediately prior to enabling the flight of a launch vehicle 
or the reentry of a reentry vehicle that are necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101, such as the 
atmospheric conditions and any other commit criteria. The final rule in 
Sec.  450.135(a)(2) now explicitly acknowledges that a valid debris 
risk analysis must account for any applicable flight commit criteria 
and flight abort rules when the operator establishes if the present 
conditions produce public risks consistent with the safety criteria in 
Sec.  450.101.
    In Sec.  450.135(b), the FAA proposed performance-based 
requirements to address the physical phenomena that influence the 
propagation of debris, which the analysis would be required to account 
for to compute the probability of impact of debris on people and 
critical assets. In the final rule, the FAA adopts and moves these 
requirements with revisions to Sec.  450.121(c), as discussed in the 
section of this preamble on Debris Analysis. There were two reasons for 
moving the proposed propagation of debris requirements in Sec.  
450.135(b) to Sec.  450.121(c). First, the computation of valid impact 
probability distributions is relevant to more than the debris risk 
analyses; for example, valid impact probability distributions are 
necessary for the development of flight hazard areas and the yield-
probability pairs used as input to the far-field overpressure analysis. 
Second, although the relationships between the FSA sections are complex 
and interdependencies exist, the FAA sought to lay out the FSA 
requirements in a sequential order.
    In Sec.  450.135(c), the FAA proposed the features of a valid 
population exposure analysis. In the final rule, the FAA adopts and 
moves these requirements with revisions to Sec.  450.123, as discussed 
in the preamble associated with that section. As noted, the FAA moved 
the population exposure analysis requirements out of the proposed 
debris risk analysis section because a population exposure analysis 
must also be used to provide input to other public risk analyses to 
address toxic hazards and far-field overpressure blast effects, if any. 
As discussed earlier, this is not an expansion of the scope because the 
NPRM identified the need for population exposure input to address toxic 
hazards for flight and far-field overpressure blast effects.
    In proposed Sec.  450.135(d), the FAA set forth the features of a 
valid casualty area and consequence analysis. Proposed Sec.  450.135(d) 
stated that a debris risk analysis would be required to model the 
casualty area and compute the predicted consequences of each reasonably 
foreseeable vehicle response mode in any one-second period of flight in 
terms of CEC. The NPRM also specified that the contents of a 
casualty area and consequence analysis must account for, at a minimum, 
the items proposed in Sec.  450.135(d)(1) through (d)(3).\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ The FAA received no comments on Sec.  450.135(d)(1), which 
requires the casualty and consequence analysis to account for all 
relevant debris fragment characteristics and the characteristics of 
a representative person exposed to any potential hazard. The FAA 
adopts this requirement without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, the FAA revises and re-designates the 
requirements proposed in Sec.  450.135(d) to Sec.  450.135(b). In 
addition, the FAA replaces the term ``vehicle response mode'' with 
``failure mode,'' consistent with similar changes made throughout the 
final rule and discussed further in Sec.  450.101(c)(2) of this 
preamble. The FAA also replaces the term ``one-second period of 
flight'' with ``significant period of flight,'' as discussed in the 
preamble section associated with high consequence event protection.
    In the NPRM, the FAA included a definition of ``casualty area'' in 
Sec.  401.5, defined as the area surrounding each potential debris or 
vehicle impact point where serious injuries, or worse, can occur. The 
FAA adopts this definition as proposed.
    SpaceX commented the FAA should modify proposed Sec.  450.135(d) to 
require that the casualty area and consequence analysis not only 
account for the items in proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(1) through (d)(3) 
but also model them conservatively. The FAA notes that the term 
``account for'' already includes using conservative data or assumptions 
for all inputs and results of an analysis, pursuant to Sec.  
450.101(g). Thus, this change would be redundant.
    As previously discussed, the requirements for debris propagation in 
Sec.  450.135(b) have been relocated in the final rule to Sec.  
450.121(c). As a result, the FAA adds a requirement in Sec.  
450.135(b)(2) that a casualty area and consequence analysis must 
account for

[[Page 79647]]

statistically-valid debris impact probability distributions. This 
requirement is derived from the requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.135(b). The FAA notes that without statistically-valid impact 
probability distributions it would be impossible to compute the 
predicted consequences of each reasonably foreseeable failure mode in 
any significant period of flight in terms of conditional expected 
casualties, as required in proposed Sec.  450.135(d) and Sec.  
450.135(b) of the final rule, because the consequence of any failure 
depends on the characteristics of the debris (such as the casualty 
area) predicted to impact exposed populations. Thus, the FAA finds the 
final rule is consistent with the NPRM in requiring this information as 
part of a debris risk analysis.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that the casualty area and 
consequence analysis account for any direct impacts of debris 
fragments, intact impact, or indirect impact effects, in proposed Sec.  
450.135(d)(2). It also proposed that the analysis account for the 
vulnerability of people and critical assets to debris impacts including 
all hazard sources, such as the potential for any toxic or explosive 
energy releases, in proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(ii) and indirect or 
secondary effects such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide or ricochet, 
including accounting for terrain, in proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(iii).
    In the final rule, the FAA consolidates the three proposed 
requirements into Sec.  450.135(b)(3). Section 450.135(b)(3) more 
simply states that the analysis must account for ``any impact or 
effects of hazardous debris,'' because the new definition of 
``hazardous debris'' in Sec.  401.7 reflects the scope of the NPRM 
requirements. In the final rule, the use of the defined term 
``hazardous debris'' in Sec.  450.135(b)(3) replaces the requirement in 
proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(ii) to account for all hazard sources, 
such as the potential for any toxic or explosive energy releases. It 
also replaces the requirement in proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(2) to 
account for any direct impacts of debris fragments, intact impact, or 
indirect impact effects. Also, the final rule uses the phrase ``any 
impact or effects'' of hazardous debris to replace the proposed 
requirements to account for any direct or indirect effects, including 
indirect or secondary effects such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide, or 
ricochet, including accounting for terrain. The FAA's use of the 
defined term hazardous debris, discussed previously, allows for 
consistency throughout the final rule with regard to the scope of the 
FSA requirements. This revision does not change the scope of the 
proposed requirements because the definition includes the concept of 
all hazard sources and the direct impacts of debris fragments, intact 
impact, or indirect impact effects.
    In the NPRM, the FAA required in proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3) that 
the analysis account for the vulnerability of people and critical 
assets to debris impacts. In the final rule, the FAA moves proposed 
Sec.  450.135(d)(3) as Sec.  450.135(b)(4) and strikes the reference to 
critical assets, as explained in the preamble section on critical 
assets. The FAA also re-designates and adopts proposed Sec.  
450.135(d)(3)(i) as Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(i) in the final rule. As 
discussed, the proposed requirements in Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(ii) and 
(d)(3)(iii) are captured in Sec.  450.135(b)(3) in the final rule.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(iv) that the 
analysis must account for the effect of wind on debris impact vector 
and toxic releases. In the final rule, the FAA re-designates proposed 
Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(iv) as Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(ii). The FAA also 
revises the requirement so that the analysis must account for the 
effect of atmospheric conditions on debris impact and effects known to 
influence the vulnerability of people to hazardous debris impacts. For 
example, wind can typically have a pronounced effect on the debris 
impact vector as illustrated in the FAA FSA Handbook. In addition, 
other atmospheric conditions, such as the presence of a temperature 
inversion can have a significant effect on the vulnerability of people 
to toxic releases.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ The FAA re-designates and adopts proposed Sec.  
450.135(d)(3)(v) as Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(iii) without substantive 
changes in the final rule. The FAA received no specific comments on 
the proposed requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The change from the proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(iv) implemented in 
the final rule in Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(ii) does not create any 
additional burden to the operator because this requirement is 
consistent with the proposed requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.135(e)(1) 
and 450.165(b)(2). An operator is required to account for and identify 
the conditions immediately prior to enabling the flight of a launch 
vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle that are necessary to 
demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101, such 
as the atmospheric conditions and any meteorological conditions. 
Furthermore, given the proposed requirement in Sec.  450.135(d)(vi) to 
account for the uncertainty in fragment impact parameters in assessing 
the vulnerability of people to debris impacts, an operator already 
would have contemplated the need to account for the effect of 
atmospheric conditions on debris impact effects now explicitly required 
under Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(ii).
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(vi) specified that the 
analysis account for uncertainty in fragment impact parameters. In the 
final rule, the FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.135(d)(3)(vi) as 
Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(iv). The FAA also requires in the final rule that 
the analysis account for uncertainty in the input data, such as 
fragment impact parameters. Although the uncertainty in fragment impact 
parameters typically has a pronounced effect, it is conceivable that 
uncertainties in the input data more generally could affect the 
vulnerability of people to hazardous debris effects. The FAA finds 
these changes consistent with the proposed and final requirements in 
Sec.  450.115(b)(1) that an operator's FSA method must have a level of 
fidelity sufficient to account for all known sources of 
uncertainty.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ The FAA re-designates and adopts proposed Sec.  
450.135(d)(3)(vii) as Sec.  450.135(b)(4)(v) without substantive 
change in the final rule. The FAA received no specific comments on 
the proposed requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.135(e) listed the application 
requirements associated with the debris risk analysis, including the 
casualty area and consequence analysis. Proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(1) 
required an applicant to submit a description of the methods used to 
compute the parameters required to demonstrate compliance with the 
safety criteria in proposed Sec.  450.101, including a description of 
how the operator would account for the conditions immediately prior to 
enabling the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry 
vehicle, such as the final trajectory, atmospheric conditions, and the 
exposure of people and critical assets.
    In the final rule, the FAA re-designates and adopts proposed Sec.  
450.135(e)(1) as Sec.  450.135(c)(1) with revisions. The FAA removes 
the proposed requirement to submit a description of the methods ``used 
to compute the parameters'' required to demonstrate compliance with the 
safety criteria in Sec.  450.101. Instead, the FAA replaces this 
requirement with a requirement to submit a description of the methods 
used to demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  
450.101, in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c). This change is consistent 
with other FSA sections. Also, the FAA strikes the reference to 
critical assets as explained in the preamble section associated with 
critical assets.

[[Page 79648]]

    In the NPRM, the application requirements in Sec.  450.135(e)(2) 
addressed the methods used to compute debris impact distributions. In 
the final rule, the FAA moves proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(2) to Sec.  
450.121(d)(3). Proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(3) and (e)(4) addressed 
population exposure data. In the final rule, those requirements are 
moved to Sec.  450.123(c). These changes are described in the preamble 
sections associated with those sections.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ The FAA adopts without change and re-designates proposed 
Sec.  450.135(e)(5) through (e)(7) as Sec.  450.135(c)(2) through 
(c)(4) in the final rule. The FAA received no specific comments on 
these proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA moves the application requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.135(e)(8)(i) through (iii) regarding the collective and individual 
debris risk outputs to Sec.  450.135(c)(5)(i) through (iii) and removes 
the proposed requirement to report critical asset results in Sec.  
450.135(e)(8)(iv), as discussed further in the critical asset section 
of this preamble.
    The FAA revises and re-designates the application requirements in 
proposed Sec.  450.135(e)(9) on the collective and individual debris 
risk outputs as Sec.  450.135(c)(6). The FAA replaces the term 
``vehicle response mode'' with ``failure mode.'' This revision is 
consistent with changes throughout the final rule. The FAA also changes 
the term ``one-second interval'' to ``significant period,'' as 
explained in the preamble section on CEC.
    SpaceX commented that it was not clear why proposed Sec.  
450.135(e)(8) and (9) would require debris risk analysis to include 
both representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions, 
arguing that if the worst foreseeable conditions meet requirements, 
then representative conditions are of no consequence. The FAA responds 
that, for the purposes of Sec.  450.135(c)(5) and (c)(6), worst 
foreseeable conditions means those conditions that produce the highest 
individual, collective, and conditional risks under which the operator 
would initiate the launch or reentry. An operator can submit the same 
debris risk analysis results for representative conditions and the 
worst foreseeable conditions in cases where there is no difference 
between representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions 
that are significant to public safety.
    However, the FAA foresees the potential for situations where the 
differences between the representative conditions and the worst 
foreseeable conditions would require additional operational 
mitigations. An example would be running the debris risk analysis using 
input data for atmospheric conditions that lead to risks just below the 
limits set in Sec.  450.101 (i.e., worst foreseeable conditions) and 
running the debris risk analysis using more typical atmospheric 
conditions that produce risks clearly below the limits. Under the worst 
foreseeable conditions, the collective risk results for people on land 
could be such that the operator would need to perform additional 
surveillance of areas to ensure the absence of waterborne vessels, 
whereas under representative conditions such surveillance would not be 
necessary to ensure compliance with collective risk limits in Sec.  
450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1). The FAA does not anticipate that there will 
be significant additional burden in providing the analysis for 
representative conditions.
v. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis, or Distant Focus 
Overpressure (DFO) (Sec.  450.137)
    In the NPRM, Sec.  450.137 proposed requirements for far-field 
overpressure blast effects analysis. Proposed Sec.  450.137(a) required 
that a far-field overpressure blast effect analysis demonstrate 
compliance with safety criteria in proposed Sec.  450.101 either prior 
to the day of the operation, accounting for all foreseeable conditions 
within the flight commit criteria, or during the countdown using the 
best available input data. In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  
450.137(a) with one revision.
    The final rule in Sec.  450.137(a)(2) specifies that far-field 
overpressure analysis performed during the countdown using the best 
available input data must also include flight commit criteria and 
flight abort rules. The FAA notes that the best available input data 
specified in proposed Sec.  450.137(a)(2) would naturally include 
flight commit criteria and flight abort rules because those would 
generally have a significant influence on the public risks posed by 
hazardous debris effects. Hence, the phrase ``including flight commit 
criteria and flight abort rules'' is consistent with the requirement 
for a debris risk analysis in Sec.  450.135(a)(2).
    Virgin Galactic commented that Sec.  450.137(a)(1) appeared to 
require an FSA the day before launch for the portion of its launches 
involving its carrier aircraft's captive carriage of the spaceship. 
Virgin Galactic expressed a concern about the operational impact and 
additional workload of a day of launch analysis. Microcosm requested 
clarification on whether the regulations required a day of launch 
analysis if meteorological conditions did not present an environment 
conducive to far-field overpressure.
    Section 450.137(a)(1) does not require a full FSA the day before 
launch. Instead, Sec.  450.137(a) requires the far-field overpressure 
blast effect analysis be performed either as a ``screening'' analysis 
prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all foreseeable 
conditions within the flight commit criteria, or during the countdown 
using the best available input data. The requirement in Sec.  
450.137(a)(1) does not have a time constraint for when the ``screening 
analysis'' must be completed. In response to Microcosm's comment, the 
FAA notes that, in order to determine that local meteorological 
conditions do not present an environment conducive to far-field 
overpressure, an operator would necessarily be required to perform an 
analysis under Sec.  450.137(a)(1). As such, Sec.  450.137(a)(1), as 
proposed and adopted without change, allows an operator to demonstrate 
that a far-field overpressure analysis need not be performed during the 
countdown if the flight commit criteria are sufficient to ensure 
compliance with Sec.  450.101.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements associated with analysis 
constraints in Sec.  450.137(b) that set required performance outcomes 
and the specific factors that a far-field overpressure blast effect 
analysis must consider. Blue Origin commented that the proposed 
requirements in Sec.  450.137(b) were prescriptive. The FAA agrees that 
the proposal was unnecessarily specific in Sec.  450.137(b)(3) through 
(5) and revises these requirements.
    In the NPRM, Sec.  450.137(b)(3) proposed that the analysis account 
for the explosive capability of the vehicle at impact and at altitude, 
and potential explosions resulting from debris impacts, including the 
potential for mixing of liquid propellants. In the final rule, the FAA 
revises the language in proposed Sec.  450.137(b)(3) and relocates it 
to Sec.  450.137(b)(1) to reflect the order in which the FAA expects 
the analysis will be conducted. As rewritten, Sec.  450.137(b)(1) in 
the final rule requires the analysis to account for the explosive 
capability of the vehicle and hazardous debris at impact and at 
altitude. As discussed previously, the FAA uses the definition for 
``hazardous debris'' to reflect the scope of the NPRM requirements. The 
final rule also removes the phrase ``potential for mixing of liquid 
propellant'' because it is redundant with ``explosive capability,'' 
which is already included in the requirement. The FAA has also removed 
reference to solid propellant

[[Page 79649]]

impacts because they are part of the explosive capability.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.137(b)(1) required that the 
analysis account for the potential for distant focus overpressure or 
overpressure enhancement given current meteorological conditions and 
terrain characteristics. In the final rule, the FAA re-designates 
proposed Sec.  450.137(b)(1) as Sec.  450.137(b)(2). The FAA also 
requires in Sec.  450.137(b)(2) that the analysis must account for the 
influence of meteorological conditions and terrain characteristics. The 
FAA notes meteorological conditions are known to have a potentially 
substantial influence on the propagation and attenuation of blast waves 
with peak incident overpressures at or below 1.0 psi. In the final 
rule, the FAA removes the reference to current meteorological 
conditions in proposed Sec.  450.137(b)(1) to reflect that an applicant 
may use a screening analysis pursuant to Sec.  450.137(a)(1) to 
demonstrate additional analysis is not required by accounting for all 
foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.137(b)(2) required that the 
analysis account for the potential for broken windows due to peak 
incident overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties. In the 
final rule, the FAA re-designates proposed Sec.  450.137(b)(2) as Sec.  
450.137(b)(3) and adds the essential elements from proposed Sec.  
450.137(b)(4) through (b)(6). Those sections contained unnecessary 
details regarding shelter types, time of day, characteristics of 
potentially affected windows including size, location, glazing 
material, and characteristics of potential glass shards.
    Section 450.137(b)(3) removes these details and captures the 
concept of the requirements proposed in Sec.  450.137(b)(4) through 
(b)(6) by adding language to reflect that the potential for broken 
windows due to peak incident overpressures below 1.0 psi and related 
casualties must ``be based on the characteristics of exposed windows 
and the population's susceptibility to injury, with considerations 
including, at a minimum, shelter types, window types, and the time of 
day of the proposed operation.''
    Blue Origin commented that the constraints could be accomplished by 
an analysis tool available only to the government. The FAA disagrees 
that the far-field overpressure analyses can only be accomplished using 
a tool available to the U.S. government. Currently available materials 
contain a detailed technical description of a valid approach.\134\ 
Furthermore, the FAA confirms that the analysis tool in use by the U.S. 
government has been used by the U.S. commercial space transportation 
industry at non-Federal sites as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ A valid approach is described in ``Safety Design for Space 
Operations,'' Allahdadi, Firooz A., Isabelle Rongier, Tommaso 
Sgobba, Paul D. Wilde (Eds.), ``Safety Design for Space 
Operations,'' Sponsored by The International Association for the 
Advancement of Space Safety, published by Elsevier, Watham, MA, 
2013. The only three topics not addressed in that reference (updated 
explosive impact yield models, launch availability analyses based on 
past measurements of meteorological conditions, and satisfaction of 
license application requirements) are addressed in AC 450.137 
``Distant Focusing Overpressure Risk Analysis Supplemental Topics,'' 
which is planned to be published after this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA adopts Sec.  450.137(c) with only two minor modifications. 
In the NPRM, Sec.  450.137(c)(6) explicitly identified that an 
applicant would be required to submit the analysis results given 
foreseeable meteorological conditions, yields, and population 
exposures.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.137(c)(6) requires that the 
application include the individual risk data given foreseeable 
conditions. The FAA also revises Sec.  450.137(c)(7) in this manner. 
The FAA notes generally that the same elements of the foreseeable 
conditions listed in the NPRM influence the results of the far-field 
overpressure blast effects analysis. Thus, the reworded final rule 
maintains the same scope and intent of the NPRM application 
requirements. The FAA adds this language because the proposal was 
unnecessarily limited.
w. Toxic Hazards (Sec. Sec.  450.139 and 450.187)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate requirements for toxic 
release analysis into two performance-based regulations: Sec. Sec.  
450.139 (Toxic Hazards for Flight) and 450.187 (Toxic Hazards 
Mitigation for Ground Operations). Although the two proposed sections 
contained a number of similarities, the FAA divided them into two 
sections because ground operations and flight operations had different 
proposed criteria to establish an acceptable level of public safety.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  450.139(a) and 450.187(a) made the sections 
applicable to any launch or reentry vehicle, including all vehicle 
components and payloads, that use toxic propellants or other toxic 
chemicals.
    Virgin Galactic requested that the FAA create an exception to 
Sec. Sec.  450.139 and 450.187 for carrier aircraft on hybrid systems 
that already possess a standard airworthiness certificate or 
experimental airworthiness certificate from FAA, as these aircraft most 
commonly carry jet fuel. Virgin Galactic commented that, although jet 
fuel may be considered a toxic substance, it is carried by thousands of 
aircraft every day and thus performing a toxic release hazard analysis 
for jet fuel would not have a material effect on public safety.
    The FAA acknowledges that, historically, no toxic release hazard 
analysis has been required for kerosene-based fuels, such as jet fuel, 
and agrees that such an analysis would be unnecessary in most 
instances. Therefore, in the final rule, the FAA revises the 
applicability language in Sec. Sec.  450.139(a) and 450.187(a) to 
create an exception from the toxic release hazard analysis for 
kerosene-based fuels unless the Administrator determines that an 
analysis is necessary to protect the public safety. The FAA anticipates 
that such an analysis will be required for uses of kerosene-based fuels 
that are novel or inconsistent with standard industry practices. The 
FAA will work with operators during pre-application consultation to 
identify any kerosene-based propellants requiring a toxic release 
hazard analysis under Sec. Sec.  450.139 or 450.187.
    Proposed Sec.  450.139(b) required an operator to conduct a toxic 
release hazard analysis and manage the risk of casualties from exposure 
to toxic release either through containing hazards in accordance with 
proposed Sec.  450.139(d) or by performing a toxic risk assessment, 
under proposed Sec.  450.139(e), that protects the public consistent 
with the safety criteria proposed in Sec.  450.101. Furthermore, 
proposed Sec.  450.139(b)(3) required an operator to establish flight 
commit criteria based on the results of its toxic release hazard 
analysis, containment analysis, or toxic risk assessment for any 
necessary evacuation of the public from any toxic hazard area. The FAA 
adopts Sec.  450.139(b) as proposed.
    In the NPRM, paragraph (b) was inadvertently omitted from the 
regulatory text to Sec.  450.187; however, the preamble discussed that 
proposed Sec.  450.187(b) would, like proposed Sec.  450.139(b), 
require an operator to manage the risk of casualties from exposure to 
toxic release by either containing the hazards or performing a toxic 
risk assessment. The preamble stated that for ground operations, an 
operator using a toxic risk assessment must demonstrate compliance with 
proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3), rather than Sec.  450.185(c).\135\ The 
FAA adds paragraph (b) to Sec.  450.187 in the final rule. As discussed 
later in this section,

[[Page 79650]]

the FAA revises the toxic risk assessment criteria for ground 
operations by replacing the reference to proposed Sec.  450.109(b)(3) 
with a reference to Sec.  450.185(c). The FAA also revises Sec.  
450.139(b)(3) to refer to ``toxic containment,'' rather than a ``toxic 
containment analysis,'' as this term does not appear in the regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ 84 FR 15395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  450.139(c) and 450.187(b) set forth the 
requirements for toxic release hazard analysis. The FAA adopts the 
substance of those provisions in the final rule, but re-designates 
proposed Sec.  450.187(b) as Sec.  450.187(c), to account for the 
addition of new Sec.  450.187(b).
    As noted, Sec. Sec.  450.139(b) and 450.187(b) in the final rule 
require an operator to manage the risk of casualties that could arise 
from the exposure to toxic release through toxic containment or by 
using a toxic risk assessment. Toxic containment, as proposed in 
Sec. Sec.  450.139(d) and 450.187(c), required an operator to manage 
the risk of casualty from the exposure to toxic release either by 
evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from a toxic 
hazard area, or by employing meteorological constraints. In either 
scenario--evacuation or employment of meteorological constraints--the 
operator would be required to demonstrate that an average member of the 
public would not be exposed to greater than one percent conditional 
individual probability of casualty in the event of a worst-case release 
or maximum credible release scenario. The FAA received a formal comment 
from NASA during the interagency review on proposed Sec.  450.139(d) 
and Sec.  450.187(c). The FAA revised these provisions in the final 
rule consistent with the updated definition of toxic hazard area 
described below. Specifically, Sec.  450.139(d)(1) and Sec.  
450.187(c)(1) require an operator using toxic containment to manage the 
risk of casualty from the exposure to toxic release either by 
evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from any toxic 
hazard area. These revisions are consistent with current practice. The 
FAA also re-designates proposed Sec.  450.187(c) as Sec.  450.187(d) to 
account for the addition of new Sec.  450.187(b).
    The FAA proposed to define ``toxic hazard area'' in Sec.  401.5 
(Sec.  401.7 in the final rule) as ``a region on the Earth's surface 
where toxic concentrations and durations may be greater than approved 
toxic thresholds for acute casualty, in the event of a release during 
launch or reentry.''
    In the final rule, the FAA revises the proposed definition of 
``toxic hazard area'' to include the language from proposed Sec. Sec.  
450.139(d) and 450.187(c) regarding the ``a worst-case toxic or maximum 
credible release scenario.'' Thus, in the final rule, a ``toxic hazard 
area'' means ``a region on the Earth's surface where toxic 
concentrations and durations may be greater than accepted toxic 
thresholds for acute casualty in the event of a worst-case toxic or 
maximum credible release scenario during launch or reentry.'' The FAA 
revises this definition to ensure that the toxic hazard area is 
consistent whether the operator performs a toxic risk assessment or 
toxic containment. The revised definition of ``toxic hazard area'' is 
consistent with the approach taken in current regulation in Appendix I 
to part 417 under I417.5(c), which directly links the toxic 
concentration thresholds to the size of the toxic hazard area. The FAA 
anticipates that the toxic concentration thresholds used in an accepted 
means of compliance for Sec. Sec.  450.139 and 450.187 will generally 
be consistent with those in Appendix I to part 417 under I417.5(c).
    The final rule's requirements for a toxic risk assessment under 
Sec.  450.139(e) are unchanged from the proposal. A toxic risk 
assessment must meet the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101 and account 
for: Airborne concentration and duration thresholds of toxic 
propellants or other chemicals; physical phenomena expected to 
influence any toxic concentration and duration; the toxic hazard area 
and the meteorological conditions involved; and all members of the 
public that may be exposed to the toxic release.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.187(e), which contains the 
requirements for a toxic risk assessment for ground operations, 
includes one revision from the proposal. As mentioned, proposed Sec.  
450.187(d) required an operator using toxic risk assessment to manage 
the risk from any toxic release hazard and demonstrate compliance with 
the criteria in Sec.  450.109(a)(3). The FAA replaces the reference to 
proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3) with a reference to Sec.  450.185(c) 
because the flight hazard analysis risk criteria were removed from 
Sec.  450.109. The standard in Sec.  450.185(c) is the same as in 
proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3); therefore, there is no substantive change 
in the criteria. As a result, an operator complies with the 
requirements for a toxic risk assessment by demonstrating no more than 
an extremely remote likelihood of toxic exposure causing death or 
serious injury to the public, using toxic concentration and duration 
thresholds accepted by the Administrator as a means of compliance.
    In the final rule, the FAA amends the application requirements 
proposed in Sec. Sec.  450.139(f) and 450.187(e). Although proposed 
Sec. Sec.  450.139(d) and 450.187(c) detailed the two ways in which an 
operator could perform toxic containment, the NPRM did not specify how 
an operator would demonstrate compliance with the toxic containment 
requirements in their application. In the final rule, the FAA adds an 
application requirement for toxic containment, in Sec. Sec.  
450.139(f)(8)(i) and 450.187(f)(8), which reflects the substantive 
requirements for performing toxic containment. That is, if toxic 
containment is selected, the applicant must identify the evacuation 
plans or meteorological constraints and associated launch commit 
criteria or ground hazard controls that it will employ to ensure that 
the public will not be within a toxic area in the event of a worst-case 
or maximum credible release scenario. The FAA notes that an applicant 
will need to submit the information required by this subsection in 
order to demonstrate compliance with the substantive requirements for 
toxic containment in Sec. Sec.  450.139(d) and 450.187(c).
    The FAA revises the application requirements, in Sec. Sec.  
450.139(f)(8)(ii) and 450.187(f)(9), to reflect the substantive 
requirements of toxic risk assessment. If a toxic risk assessment is 
performed, then the applicant must account for the public that may be 
exposed to airborne concentrations above the toxic concentration and 
duration thresholds, describe any risk mitigations applied in the toxic 
risk assessment, describe the population exposure input data used in 
accordance with Sec.  450.123 (Population Exposure Analysis), and 
demonstrate compliance with the applicable public risk criteria (for 
flight, the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101; for ground operations, the 
risk criteria in Sec.  450.185(c)). Lastly, the FAA replaced the term 
``population density'' with ``population characteristics'' in Sec.  
450.139(f)(8)(ii)(2) and Sec.  450.187(f)(9)(ii) because 
characteristics other than density (e.g., vulnerability of population) 
would be relevant to assessing potential effects of toxic release, as 
indicated by the Population Exposure Analysis criteria in Sec.  
450.123.
    Blue Origin commented that toxic risk analysis tools were not 
currently available to operators, and that, unless the FAA facilitated 
access to these tools, a sole-source provider of this service may 
arise. One individual commenter asked what dispersion models were 
acceptable to the FAA and commented that the FAA should provide 
specific examples of allowable and acceptable toxic release and 
dispersion mitigations.

[[Page 79651]]

    The FAA disagrees that the tools needed to analyze risks associated 
with a potential release of toxic substances during launch or reentry 
are not currently available to operators. However, the FAA will issue 
an AC entitled, ``Toxic Hazards for Flight,'' that will provide 
guidance and examples of publicly available tools for conducting the 
required toxic release hazard analyses, as well as a toxic risk 
assessment and toxic containment. This guidance will include 
information on:
     Determining the airborne toxic concentration threshold or 
level of concern (LOC) for each toxic propellant or toxic combustion 
by-product;
     Determining the worst-case quantity of any toxic release 
that might occur during the proposed flight of a launch vehicle, or 
that might occur in the event of a flight mishap;
     Determining the worst-case quantity of any toxic release 
that might occur during normal launch processing, and that might occur 
in the event of a mishap during launch processing;
     Characterizing the terrain, as a precursor for modeling 
the atmospheric transport of a toxic release from its source to 
downwind receptor locations;
     Determining the meteorological conditions for the 
atmospheric transport of any toxic release from its source to downwind 
receptor locations;
     Performing air quality dispersion modeling to predict 
concentrations at selected downwind receptor locations (by 
characterizing the atmospheric processes that disperse a toxic 
substance emitted by a source); and
     Determining the population density in receptor locations 
that could potentially be identified by air quality dispersion modeling 
as toxic hazard areas.\136\
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    \136\ SpaceX made a comment referencing an agreements subsection 
of Sec.  450.139(b), but no such subsection existed in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

x. Computing Systems (Sec.  450.141)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.111 (Computing Systems 
and Software) to require operators to develop a process that identifies 
and assesses hazards to public safety and the safety of property 
arising from computing systems and software. Operators would have 
needed to identify all safety-critical functions associated with its 
computing systems and software and to classify software based on degree 
of autonomy. In the NPRM, software safety requirements would have 
increased in rigor with the rise in the degree of autonomy of the 
software. Conversely, software safety requirements would have decreased 
in rigor with reductions in the software's degree of autonomy.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises proposed Sec.  450.111 and re-
designates it as Sec.  450.141 (Computing Systems). Although the scope 
of the requirements for operators under Sec.  450.141 does not differ 
substantially from the proposed version, the FAA replaces prescriptive 
requirements with performance-based standards and provides increased 
flexibility for operators to demonstrate compliance with Sec.  450.141. 
The final rule levies requirements for computing system safety items in 
proportion to their criticality rather than their autonomy; requires 
independent verification and validation for safety-critical computing 
system safety items; and retains the NPRM's focus on development and 
testing processes instead of direct inspection of software by the FAA. 
The FAA removed the term, ``software,'' from the section heading since 
``computing systems'' would include software. The FAA also removes the 
definition of ``control entity'' proposed in Sec.  401.5 because the 
term is no longer used in the final rule.
    A number of commenters stated the requirements proposed in Sec.  
450.111 were overly prescriptive or difficult to meet. SpaceX stated 
that the proposed software process would be more burdensome and costly 
for applicants than it had been under current regulations and would 
prevent applicants from utilizing safer methods to construct a safety 
case. Blue Origin and SpaceX argued the proposed requirement would 
hinder technological advances that could improve safety. Blue Origin 
stated the proposal threatened innovation towards lower cost, higher 
quality, and safer software approaches, but did not specify the 
approaches that would be impeded by the NPRM. Rocket Lab similarly 
asserted that the proposal would hinder the development of software for 
FSS, the automation of which is currently a major area for innovation. 
Rocket Lab commented that the proposal did not allow flexibility to use 
other means of functional system safety from equivalent industries or 
government standards, and that the requirements would become quickly 
outdated as software technologies and best practices evolve. CSF also 
viewed the proposal as highly prescriptive and uneconomical for the FAA 
or for industry.
    CSF and SpaceX specifically rejected the degree of autonomy 
approach proposed in Sec.  450.111, noting that human involvement did 
not always produce a safer system. CSF suggested the FAA scale the 
levels of rigor based on hazard effects and architectural mitigations. 
Virgin Galactic stated that software need not be categorized by levels 
of consequence and degrees of control if the software development 
process was linked to a system safety program.
    The FAA agrees that some of the requirements proposed in Sec.  
450.111 were too prescriptive, potentially overly burdensome, and could 
have the effect of discouraging technological innovation to improve 
safety.\137\ The FAA also agrees with the commenters' discussion of the 
limitations of autonomy as a criterion for level of rigor. In the final 
rule, the FAA revises the requirements for computing systems, which are 
now located in Sec.  450.141 to address the commenters' concerns. 
Section 450.141 scales level of rigor for computing system requirements 
based on system-level criticality rather than on degree of autonomy, 
and is designed to parallel the requirements of computing system safety 
responses to the existing regulations. The existing regulations require 
plans for software development and validation and verification plans 
but remain silent on the acceptable content of those plans. The final 
rule requirements are designed to align with current software safety 
submissions. The FAA also removes prescriptive requirements from Sec.  
450.141, as detailed in the following paragraphs, to increase 
flexibility in application to current and future computing system 
designs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ As an example, the FAA acknowledges the commenter's 
concerns in particular with regard to the requirements to document a 
process for identifying hazards arising from software; to meet 
software testing standards and hazard analyses based on levels of 
autonomy; and to detail the functionality of all software having no 
safety impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.141 requires the identification and assessment of the 
public safety-related computing system requirements, functions, and 
data items, in order to streamline the evaluation of computing system 
safety. The final rule retains the requirement proposed in Sec.  
450.111 to identify and assess the public safety implications of 
computing systems, which derives from the current requirements in 
Sec. Sec.  417.123(a) and 431.35(c) to perform this assessment as part 
of a system safety process. The explicit identification of the public 
safety related aspects of computing systems enables a reduction in the 
scope of FAA's evaluation compared to the current regulations.
    In the final rule, Sec.  450.141(a) requires an operator to 
identify computing system safety items, meaning any software or data 
that implements a capability that could present a hazard to

[[Page 79652]]

the public, and the criticality of each computing system safety item, 
commensurate with its degree of control over hazards to the public and 
the severity of those hazards. For purposes of this section, a 
computing system safety item is any item that is a computing system or 
software that has some degree of control over hazards to the public; a 
computing system that is either a cause of or a mitigation for a hazard 
that can affect the public. Computing system safety items include not 
only software, but also software elements, including data, and 
interfaces that present or control risks to the public (e.g., software/
hardware interfaces, and software/human interfaces). The FAA uses the 
term ``computing system safety item'' in order to provide a clean 
interface between software safety, which controls risks due to flaws in 
logic, and system safety, which controls risk. Software runs on 
hardware in response to commands and inputs, so a computing system 
safety item is often more than just software. ``Level of criticality'' 
here means the combination of a computing system safety item's 
importance in the causal chain for a given hazard, which is 
commensurate to its degree of control, and the severity of that hazard. 
Computing system safety items that are more influential on a causal 
chain for a hazard of a given severity would be subject to a 
proportionally higher level of rigor in development and testing. The 
degree of control may be evident in (1) a system's tolerance to a given 
computing system fault, (2) the computing system's autonomy in causing 
or preventing a hazard, (3) the number and characteristics of other 
system faults or failures required for the hazard to manifest itself, 
or (4) some other measure devised by the applicant.
    The requirement proposed in Sec.  450.111(c) to allocate 
development process rigor according to degree of autonomy has been 
replaced with the requirement in Sec.  450.141(a)(2) to use system-
level criticality to set the minimum level of rigor in developing and 
testing each computing system safety item. The FAA agrees with the 
comments received on the shortcomings of allocation by degree of 
autonomy and the recommendation to use a system safety approach to 
computing system safety. System safety allocates level of rigor 
according to the criticality of each item in the system, and the 
revised regulation aligns software and computing system level of rigor 
allocation with system safety's level of rigor allocation, erasing a 
difference between the two safety analyses.\138\ For some systems, 
system-level criticality and degree of autonomy will produce the same 
or similar allocations of rigor in computing system development. An 
applicant can propose to use degree of autonomy as a proxy for system-
level criticality based on that similarity, as it is an industry 
standard method of determining level of rigor allocation. This revision 
achieves the objective stated in the NPRM of tailoring safety 
requirements based on criticality but eliminates the prescriptive 
criticality levels proposed in the NPRM. The criticality of each 
computing system or function must be assessed at the system level so 
the applicant can clearly demonstrate to the FAA how the system uses 
computing systems and the influence of each computing system safety 
item on public safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ Since the approach in proposed Sec.  450.111 of using 
degrees of autonomy was largely informed by MIL-STD-882E, this 
revised approach in Sec.  450.141 of the final rule will reduce 
confusion and error caused by translating between different 
allocation schemes already adopted by other industry standards. This 
will also improve the rule's resilience to future changes to 
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.141(b) requires an operator to develop safety 
requirements for each computing system safety item. A safety 
requirement specifies the implementation of one or more public safety-
related functions, capabilities, or attributes in a computing system 
safety item. The FAA notes that it uses the phrase ``safety 
requirements'' in the final rule differently than it did in the NPRM. 
In the NPRM, ``software safety requirements'' referred to regulatory 
requirements for software. In Sec.  450.141 of the final rule, ``safety 
requirements'' means computing system requirements that specify 
computing system attributes or functionality that have public safety 
significance. Identification of this subset of computing system 
requirements related to public safety is essential to focus an 
operator's safety efforts on those parts of the computing system safety 
item that have public safety consequences. It will also streamline the 
scope and depth of data required of applicants and the FAA's evaluation 
process relative to current requirements, to the same extent as 
proposed Sec.  450.111.
    Section 450.141(b)(1) requires an operator to identify and evaluate 
safety requirements for each computing system safety item. Safety 
requirements are the subset of requirements that define features, 
capabilities, or behaviors that have public safety implications. This 
identification and evaluation process may identify new computing system 
safety items if safety requirements are identified for items that did 
not previously have known safety requirements.
    Section 450.141(b)(2) requires an operator to ensure the safety 
requirements are complete and correct. A computing system requirement 
set is complete if it contains all of the requirements necessary to 
specify all of the functions and attributes needed for the computing 
system to perform its required tasks. A computing system requirement is 
correct if it specifies the correct functionality or attributes for the 
item to perform its intended system-level functions. This can be 
accomplished as part of an applicant's normal software and computing 
system requirement review process. The FAA does not require the 
applicant to conduct a separate public safety-specific review, provided 
the applicant's computing system requirement review process 
accomplishes the intent of Sec.  450.141(b)(2).
    Section 450.141(b)(3) requires an operator to implement each safety 
requirement. That is, the safety requirements reviewed in accordance 
with Sec.  450.141(b)(2) must be built into the system for verification 
in Sec.  450.141(b)(4). Requirements are normally implemented by 
operators, and no special implementation process is required for safety 
requirements.
    Section 450.141(b)(4) requires that the applicant verify and 
validate the implementation of each safety requirement using a method 
appropriate for the level of criticality of the computing system safety 
item. Computing system requirements are normally verified and validated 
by a combination of testing, analysis, and inspection. The NPRM 
proposed to require specific testing and verification methods that have 
not been retained in the final rule due to the removal of specific 
criticality levels for software. The final rule allows sufficient 
flexibility for operators to implement methods and levels of rigor 
appropriate for their operations. For example, a development process 
that traces from computing system requirements to verification and 
validation evidence is necessary but may not be the only process for 
adequate verification and validation; a process that traces from 
verification and validation tests to the intended computing system 
functionality may be more appropriate for third-party products. 
Operators may use many different processes that accomplish traceability 
as long as the process demonstrates that the verification and 
validation evidence is sufficient to verify and validate all of

[[Page 79653]]

the computing system safety requirements.
    Section 450.141(b)(4) further specifies that, for each computing 
system safety item that meets the definition of ``safety critical'' in 
Sec.  401.7, verification and validation must include testing by a test 
team independent of the development division or organization. As 
defined in Sec.  401.7, a safety-critical item means a system, 
subsystem, component, condition, event, operation, process, or item, 
whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance, is 
essential to ensuring public safety. A safety-critical computing system 
safety item is a computing system safety item of which proper 
recognition, control, performance, or tolerance is essential to 
ensuring public safety. As described in the NPRM, the FAA uses the term 
``independent'' to designate a verification and validation group that 
has substantial and credible independence from the development team. 
This independent group has a separate personnel structure through at 
least senior leadership, operates under distinct performance, 
technical, schedule, and incentive pressures, and has the latitude to 
develop and test requirements independently. This independent 
verification and validation group can be a third party or an in-house 
group but in either case must have the technical, managerial, schedule, 
and incentive independence \139\ to carry out its functions without 
undue pressure from the development team. The requirement for 
independent verification and validation of safety-critical computing 
system safety items is broadly aligned with current practices for 
verification and validation. Specifically, the minimum expectation is 
that safety-critical computing systems, such as autonomous FSS, are 
subjected to a level of verification and validation rigor that can only 
be achieved by verification and validation staff that are independent 
of the development organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ Incentive independence means that the independent 
verification and validation group is rewarded based on some metric 
other than schedule or throughput, so that the schedule or 
throughput demands that drive error rates upward do not also drive 
testing thoroughness downward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement in proposed Sec.  450.111(b) to identify all 
safety-critical functions involving software is revised and included in 
Sec.  450.141(b) of the final rule. Section 450.141(b) requires the 
applicant to identify all safety requirements performed by computing 
system safety items, check that the safety requirements are complete 
and correct, implement the safety requirements, and verify and validate 
their implementation including independent verification and validation 
for safety-critical computing system safety items. These regulatory 
requirements have the net effect of identifying all safety-critical 
functions involving computing systems, since safety requirements 
necessarily include all safety-critical functions, capabilities, and 
attributes of computing systems.
    Section 450.141(c) requires operators to implement and document a 
development process for computing system safety items identified in 
Sec.  450.141(a) appropriate for the level of criticality of the 
computing system safety item. The requirement to implement and document 
such a development process for all computing system safety items is 
substantially similar to both existing rules and the requirements 
proposed in Sec.  450.111, except in the final rule the requirement is 
no longer contained in separate subsections for each level of autonomy 
(proposed Sec.  450.111(d) through (g)). As explained in the NPRM 
preamble, the FAA needs to understand the computing system development 
processes used for each computing system safety item, relative to its 
effect on public safety, in order to assess computing system safety. 
The final rule calls for a development ``process,'' rather than a 
``plan,'' that achieves the same objectives key to a development plan 
but affords applicants greater flexibility to structure their processes 
as needed to satisfy Sec.  450.141(c). Operators need not employ a 
separate development process for each computing system item. However, 
the development process must be appropriate to the level of criticality 
of each computing system safety item to which it is applied, and must 
satisfy the criteria listed in Sec.  450.141(c), at a minimum.
    In order to demonstrate that a development process is appropriate 
to the level of criticality of each computing system safety item, an 
operator would need to identify the tasks associated with each safety 
item, along with its processes for reviewing, verifying, and validating 
computing system safety requirements. Section 450.141(c)(1) requires a 
development process to define responsibilities for each task associated 
with a computing system safety item. This requirement derives from the 
requirement proposed in Sec.  450.111(d)(5) for a software development 
plan; in order to be acceptable, the development process must assign 
responsibilities for its execution. This requirement intends to ensure 
that development tasks for computing system safety items are carried 
out by defined personnel in the organization, though not necessarily 
individuals by name.
    Under Sec.  450.141(c)(2), a development process must include 
processes for internal review and approval, including review that 
evaluates the implementation of all safety requirements, such that no 
person approves their own work. This is consistent with proposed Sec.  
450.111(d)(4), which required independent verification and validation, 
and proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(5)(i), which required coding standards. 
Neither of those requirements could be met in absence of a review and 
approval process that meets Sec.  450.141(c)(2) of the final rule, 
since acceptable performance of those tasks inherently includes review 
and approval by a person independent of those who did the work. 
Software and computing system development is a complex set of actions, 
and some subsets of those actions are milestones that require review 
and approval. This requirement means that those reviews and approvals 
must have some degree of independence such that no person approves 
their own work, and requires that the minimum set of reviews and 
approvals contains reviews of the implementation of safety 
requirements. This association is defined by generation, such as code 
written to implement a safety requirement, or by interaction, such as 
code that must function in order for a safety requirement to be met. 
Code reviews conducted to meet this requirement need not be single 
events but may be modularized in a manner similar to the code itself as 
long as comprehensive understanding is communicated between modular 
reviews. Computing system development efforts that use pre-commit and 
post-commit reviews to conduct a modularized code review process could 
meet Sec.  450.141(c)(2). The intent is that code developed to 
implement safety requirements should be checked by at least one 
independent technical reviewer prior to its release.
    Section 450.141(c)(3) requires the operator to ensure that 
development personnel are trained, qualified, and capable of performing 
their roles. This is consistent with Sec.  450.111(d)(5)(i) of the 
NPRM, which required coding standards, which are an implicit part of 
the training of development personnel. The final rule makes this 
implicit requirement in the NPRM explicit. Personnel responsible for 
public safety tasks must have training and experience that enables them 
to discharge their responsibilities effectively. In its

[[Page 79654]]

application review, the FAA does not intend to verify the 
qualifications of individual development personnel, but rather to 
verify that the operator has a process in place to put appropriately-
trained and experienced personnel in public safety roles.
    Section 450.141(c)(4) requires a development process to define 
processes that trace requirements to verification and validation 
evidence. This requirement is a performance criterion that was implicit 
in the proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(5) software development plan; FAA is 
making this criterion explicit and performance-based in the final rule 
to address commenters' concerns. Traceability from computing system 
requirement to verification and validation evidence significantly 
streamlines computing system safety evaluations by connecting the 
requirements that define a computing system's capabilities to evidence 
of their implementation. Importantly, this requirement applies to all 
requirements for computing system safety items, as a lack of rigor 
inmanaging requirements on any computing system safety item is an 
opportunity for undocumented or unintended computing system safety 
requirements to be introduced into the system.
    Section 450.141(c)(5) requires a development process to define 
processes for configuration management that specify the content of each 
released version of a computing system safety item. This requirement is 
a performance-based version of proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(5)(ii), which 
required configuration control. Configuration management at this level 
of performance is the baseline expectation for any computing system 
safety item because a known configuration with a known history is 
required to provide adequately for safety. The revised requirement 
contains the performance criteria that were implicit in the NPRM.
    Section 450.141(c)(6) requires a development process to define 
processes for testing that verify and validate all safety requirements 
to the extent required by Sec.  450.141(b)(4). This means that safety 
requirements must be tested in a manner consistent with their level of 
criticality. The FAA removed a prescriptive requirement proposed in the 
NPRM for testing on flight-like hardware \140\ to increase flexibility. 
The FAA requires verification and validation that is appropriate for 
the level of criticality of the computing system safety item, and 
allows the operator to define the levels of criticality that are 
appropriate for its operations. The operator must determine, and the 
FAA will verify, which of the operator's levels of criticality affect 
public safety and which of the computing systems described in the 
proposed operation are in each of those public safety levels. Operators 
must then define verification and validation procedures to test 
computing system safety items in appropriately representative 
environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ For each level of criticality in proposed 450.111(d) 
through (g), the FAA proposed that the software component's safety-
critical functions must be tested on flight-like hardware, which 
must include nominal operation and fault responses for all safety-
critical functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 450.141(c)(7) requires a development process to define 
reuse policies that verify and validate the safety requirements for 
reused computing system safety items. This requirement was retained 
from proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(5)(v), which similarly required an 
operator to develop and implement software development plans, to 
include descriptions of a policy on software reuse. In essence, the 
applicant is required to have processes in place to understand the 
safety implications of any computing system safety item developed for a 
different project or purpose.
    Section 450.141(c)(8) requires a development process to define 
third-party product use policies that verify and validate the safety 
requirements for any third-party product. This requirement was retained 
from proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(5)(iv), which required an operator to 
develop and implement software development plans, to include a 
description of a policy on use of any commercial-off-the-shelf 
software. The FAA replaces the term ``commercial-off-the-shelf 
software'' in the proposal with ``third-party product'' because 
commercial software is not the only kind of third-party computing 
system that an applicant could use; government-off-the-shelf and free, 
open source products need strategies for safe use, and the policy does 
not need to vary based on the nature of the third party. The important 
characteristic is that the computing system was not developed by the 
applicant, so FAA now uses ``third-party'' to describe it. The final 
rule sets performance criteria for this requirement with the addition 
of the phrase ``that verify and validate the safety requirements in any 
third-party product.'' This means that the safety requirements 
implemented by third-party products must be subjected to verification 
and validation just like applicant-developed computing system safety 
items.
    Section 450.141(d) contains the application requirements for this 
section. Each of the first five requirements in paragraph (d) mirrors a 
key aspect of computing system safety, allowing the applicant and FAA 
to understand the rigor of development in terms of public safety. This 
structure is meant to reflect the typical formats of computing system 
safety data submissions received by the FAA to date. The regulation 
requires an applicant to describe the computing system safety items, 
identify the safety requirements implemented by each computing system 
safety item, provide the development processes that generated them, 
provide evidence that the development process was followed, and provide 
data verifying the correct implementation of the safety requirements. 
These application requirements need not be met in separate documents.
    The application requirements of Sec.  450.141(d) essentially 
replicate those proposed in Sec.  450.111(h), except that the revised 
regulation allows greater latitude to implement development processes 
that achieve the same goals by different means. An example of such an 
alternative process would be a formal mathematical proof that the code 
will function only as designed and that the design meets all of its 
requirements. A formal proof is preferable to an iterative development 
and testing process, whenever practical, because a formal proof 
demonstrates that every possible action that a computing system system 
can take is safe whereas iterative development can only approximate 
that demonstration. A formal proof would have required waivers under 
proposed Sec.  450.111 but will not under Sec.  450.141.
    Several commenters recommended that hazards associated with 
computing systems and software be addressed through other sections in 
part 450, rather than in a dedicated section on computing systems and 
software. CSF, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and Virgin Orbit stated that 
hazards associated with computing systems and software should be 
addressed through the system safety requirements for flight hazard 
analyses, proposed Sec.  450.109. CSF commented that a computing system 
was just one of many critical subsystems integrated into a larger 
complex system, that all systems and subsystems should be analyzed and 
controlled for hazards, and that the fact that a particular system may 
contain software should be irrelevant to top level performance-based 
safety requirements. Blue Origin and CSF recommended that the 
requirements for safety-critical systems in Sec.  450.143 be used for 
software

[[Page 79655]]

systems. SpaceX recommended that hazard analyses be limited to 
demonstrating one fault tolerance for safety-critical functions, 
including tolerance to faults in any inputs to the functions (e.g., 
data loss, data corruption) and any downstream hardware or software 
effects required for public safety (e.g., effecting thrust 
termination).
    The FAA will retain a separate section for computing system 
requirements in the final rule. As stated in the NPRM preamble, the FAA 
consolidated the computing system safety requirements applicable to 
launch or reentry operations under a single section in Sec.  450.141 of 
the final rule to address software, firmware, and data, and the way 
they operate in computing systems. The FAA based this approach on a 
determination that software safety cannot be evaluated outside of the 
computing system in which it operates. Software and computing systems 
are decision engines that, like humans, control other vehicle systems 
that can present hazards to the public and therefore merit analysis of 
their control logic. Although computing systems and software must be 
factored into an operator's system safety process and hazard control 
strategies, the FAA has determined that computing systems warrant 
separate consideration due to distinct characteristics that make them 
uniquely ill-suited to most traditional system safety methods.
    Software assurance is often a more appropriate mitigation strategy 
than fault tolerance for software faults. The FAA anticipates that any 
emergent method for system safety analysis that handles software and 
computing systems well will meet Sec.  450.141 because such a method 
would necessarily produce the essential elements of computing system 
safety embodied in the regulation. That is, Sec.  450.141 applies 
equally well to dedicated computing system safety analyses and to 
system safety analyses that handle computing systems in an integrated 
manner.
    Furthermore, although computing systems can be ``safety critical,'' 
as defined in Sec.  401.7, the FAA declines to apply the requirements 
set forth in Sec.  450.143 regarding safety-critical system design, 
test, and documentation to computing systems because those requirements 
do not adequately address the idiosyncrasies of computing systems. For 
example, Sec.  450.143(b) in the final rule requires an operator to 
design safety-critical systems to be fault-tolerant, fail safe, damage-
tolerant, or otherwise designed such that no fault can lead to 
increased risk to the public beyond nominal safety-critical system 
operation. Fault tolerance is not achievable for many software faults. 
Similarly, the predicted environments are defined and evaluated very 
differently for software than for other safety-critical systems under 
Sec.  450.143. The predicted operating environment for computing 
systems is defined in computing system requirements, but those 
requirements are derived from the mathematical relationships that the 
software must embody, so the requirement to provide predicted 
environments for computing systems is indistinguishable from providing 
the computing system requirements and design documentation for 
computing systems.
    Blue Origin, CSF, Sierra Nevada, Virgin Galactic, and Virgin Orbit 
commented that any prescription in the regulation should be moved to an 
AC as a means of compliance. Virgin Galactic commented that guidance 
material should be based on industry standard development assurance 
processes. CSF suggested that ACs reference industry standards and to 
refer to new or existing FAA ACs, such as AC 20-115C, AC 20-152, AC 20-
153, AC 20-170, and AC 20-174, to provide a detailed means of 
compliance to performance-based regulations for computing systems.
    As discussed, the FAA has revised the proposed requirements to be 
less prescriptive in the final rule. The FAA regulates software 
assurance only to the extent that it is used as a mitigation strategy 
for computing system hazards. The FAA plans to issue guidance that will 
provide further clarity on the requirements in Sec.  450.141, including 
the integration of existing software assurance standards, such as the 
referenced ACs, with computing system safety processes. The FAA 
considers these changes in the final rule to be consistent with the 
comments received.
    Blue Origin, CSF, Rocket Lab, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic commented 
that the requirements in proposed Sec.  450.111 did not integrate well 
with most industry applications and best practices. CSF and SpaceX 
commented that the methods prescribed by the proposal were incompatible 
with proven industry standards such as ISO 26262 \141\ and DO-
178C.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ ISO 26262 is an adaptation of the Functional Safety 
standard IEC 61508 for Automotive Electric/Electronic Systems. ISO 
26262 defines functional safety for automotive equipment applicable 
throughout the lifecycle of all automotive electronic and electrical 
safety-related systems.
    \142\ DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification, is the primary document by which the 
certification authorities such as FAA, EASA, and Transport Canada 
approve all commercial software-based aerospace systems. The FAA 
approved AC 20-115C July 2013, making DO-178C a recognized 
``acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance 
with the applicable airworthiness regulations for the software 
aspects of airborne systems and equipment certification.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA revises the regulation in a way that aligns better with the 
system safety process and replaces the prescriptive requirements 
identified by commenters with performance-based metrics. The final rule 
also aligns better with industry standards, including ISO 26262 and DO-
178C. Virgin Galactic noted similarities between proposed Sec.  450.111 
and existing standards, and this similarity is intentional as the FAA 
was attempting to codify those parts of industry standards that were 
well suited to standardization. The final rule bears less similarity to 
existing standards, instead specifying the goals of those standards as 
requirements in Sec.  450.141. The FAA has revised the computing 
systems and software safety requirements to contain the minimum set of 
performance requirements necessary to address the public safety 
implications of a given operation. The FAA also removed many 
prescriptive requirements from the regulation. This revision allows for 
more flexibility and thus consistency with industry standards.
    CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic commented that the proposed rule 
was not comprehensive enough and was missing items such as aeronautical 
databases, integrated modular avionics, regression testing, and other 
details. Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX stated that the proposal failed 
to address object-oriented technology, model-based development, machine 
learning, tool qualification, load control, formal methods, robust 
protection and partitioning, integrated modular avionics, and 
integration with the system process.
    As discussed, the final rule has been revised to remove 
prescriptiveness and increase flexibility. Therefore, because such 
prescription was removed from the final rule, the FAA does not find the 
changes recommended by these comments to be necessary. The FAA will 
address items like aeronautical databases, integrated modular avionics, 
regression testing, and other details in guidance documents. These 
items will be addressed by Sec.  450.141(c), which implements safety 
requirements for these and all other computing system safety items.
    An individual commenter suggested that all hardware dependent on 
software be vertically integrated and signal proof to protect against 
issues posed by cyber

[[Page 79656]]

security or signal interference. The FAA does not believe a change to 
the regulations is necessary. Issues posed by cyber security or signal 
interference that could pose a threat to public safety are adequately 
addressed by the hazard identification and mitigation requirements in 
Sec.  450.141.
    SpinLaunch recommended that the proposed set of software 
requirements, compliance plans, and test data be replaced with the 
requirement either to submit a software plan and sample results or to 
demonstrate the capability of the software to perform as required.
    The requirement that an operator either submit a software plan and 
sample results or demonstrate the capability of the software would not 
protect public safety adequately for three reasons. First, a software 
plan is insufficient without evidence of its execution. Section 450.141 
requires an operator to document a development process for all 
computing system safety items and provide evidence of its execution. 
Second, the minimum set of sample results that would be sufficient to 
verify protection of the public is the set that meets the requirements 
in Sec.  450.141(b)(4) for verification of public safety-related 
functionality. Third, an adequate demonstration of software capability 
necessarily will include the level of testing specified by Sec.  
450.141. For these reasons, the FAA does not see a distinction between 
Sec.  450.141 and either the submission of a software plan and sample 
results or a demonstration of software capability.
y. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation (Sec.  
450.143)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed standalone performance-based 
requirements for safety-critical systems in Sec.  450.143. The proposed 
requirements covered fault tolerance, qualification testing, acceptance 
of hardware, and lifecycle management for all safety-critical systems 
including FSS.\143\ In the NPRM, the FAA noted that applicants using an 
FSS of any reliability threshold would be required to meet the proposed 
Sec.  450.143 safety-critical system design, test, and documentation 
requirements.\144\ In addition, under proposed Sec.  450.143(a), 
operators required to use an FSS under Sec.  450.101(c) would be 
required to meet the standards in Sec.  450.145.
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    \143\ As noted in the NPRM, an FSS is an integral tool to 
protect public health and safety and the safety of property from 
hazards presented by a vehicle in flight. An FSS allows an operator 
to exercise positive control of a launch or reentry vehicle, 
enabling an operator to destroy the vehicle, terminate thrust, or 
otherwise achieve flight abort. A highly reliable FSS that controls 
the ending of vehicle flight according to properly established rules 
nearly ensures containment of hazards within acceptable limits. For 
that reason, the FAA considers an FSS a safety-critical system. See 
84 FR 15326.
    \144\ See 84 FR 15329.
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    The FAA also proposed to revise the definition of ``safety 
critical'' in Sec.  401.5. As proposed, ``safety critical'' retained 
the longstanding definition of being something ``essential to safe 
performance or operation,'' and the proposed definition further 
explained that a safety-critical system, subsystem, component, 
condition, event, operation, process, or item, is one whose proper 
recognition, control, performance, or tolerance, is essential to 
ensuring public safety. The FAA proposed to remove language in the 
existing definition stating that something is ``safety critical'' if it 
creates a safety hazard or provides protection from a safety hazard, 
because that language is redundant.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.143 with some revisions 
discussed later in this section. The FAA also adopts the proposed 
definition of ``safety critical'' without substantive change and 
relocates it to Sec.  401.7. Based on the change to the definition of 
``public'' in the final rule, the FAA changes the reference to ``public 
safety'' in the definition of ``safety critical'' to ``public safety 
and the safety of property.''
    Blue Origin, CSF, and one individual commented that the term 
``safety critical'' was ambiguous in light of the proposed revision to 
Sec.  401.5.
    A system is safety critical if its performance is essential to safe 
performance or operation. If the failure of a system can create a 
hazard to the public, then the system is a safety-critical system. 
Section 450.143 would apply to a safety-critical system unless an 
operator demonstrates through its flight hazard analysis that the 
likelihood of any hazardous condition associated with the system that 
may cause death or serious injury to the public is extremely remote, 
pursuant to Sec.  450.109(b)(3). Due to the inherent risk to the 
public, an operator must demonstrate the reliability of a safety-
critical system by meeting the requirements of Sec.  450.143.\145\
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    \145\ In addition to Sec.  450.143, requirements in the final 
rule that apply to safety-critical systems are also found in 
Sec. Sec.  450.45(e)(3)(ii)(C), 450.103(c)(1), 450.103(d)(4), 
450.107(b)(2), and 450.107(d)(1)(ii). These requirements are 
discussed within those sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The applicant's identification and proper management of safety-
critical systems is fundamental to mitigating potential hazards and 
ensuring public safety, and the FAA will work with an applicant if it 
believes the applicant has failed to identify all safety-critical 
systems. The potential failure of safety-critical systems is integral 
to the FSA, and the vulnerabilities of safety-critical systems must be 
accounted for in the flight commit criteria, hazard analyses, lightning 
protection criteria, management of radio frequency to prevent 
interference, and communications plans.
    Virgin Galactic commented that the requirements of Sec.  450.143 
are costly, time-consuming, burdensome, and contrary to the Commercial 
Space Launch Act requirement to only regulate to the extent necessary. 
Virgin Galactic requested that an applicant not be mandated to comply 
with Sec.  450.143 if it can provide proof that a safety-critical 
system meets the safety criteria.
    The FAA acknowledges that, under certain circumstances, an operator 
could demonstrate that a safety-critical system would not need to have 
the robust design and testing required of Sec.  450.143. The FAA 
considered relieving an operator from the requirements in Sec.  450.143 
if the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101 were met. However, the FAA 
found that use of the safety criteria for this purpose is not 
appropriate because whereas the requirements in Sec.  450.143 apply to 
safety critical systems--which, as defined, can be a system, subsystem, 
component, condition, event, operation, process, or item--the safety 
criteria in Sec.  450.101 measure the effects of the failure modes of 
the vehicle as a whole, as analyzed in the FSA. Therefore, 
demonstrating compliance with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101 is 
not sufficient to relieve an operator from the requirements in Sec.  
450.143, because that alternative would relieve the operator from 
analyzing the vehicle's discrete systems, subsystems, components, 
conditions, events, operations, processes, and items. The FAA finds 
that analysis at this more discrete level is necessary to ensure safety 
of the public.
    The FAA finds that a more appropriate method to provide flexibility 
and be responsive to Virgin Galactic's concern is to rely on the flight 
hazard analysis in Sec.  450.109. Specifically, the FAA revises Sec.  
450.143(a) to exclude safety-critical systems for which an operator 
demonstrates through its flight hazard analysis that the likelihood of 
any hazardous condition specifically associated with the system that 
may cause death or serious injury to the public is extremely remote, 
pursuant to Sec.  450.109(b)(3). As explained in the preamble section 
associated with

[[Page 79657]]

Sec.  450.109, the flight hazard analysis focuses on the reasonably 
foreseeable hazards to public safety resulting from the flight of a 
launch or reentry vehicle. In performing the flight hazard analysis, 
the operator is required in Sec.  450.109(b)(1)(ii) to identify 
reasonably foreseeable hazards and corresponding failure modes relevant 
to public safety resulting from system, subsystem, and component 
failures or faults. Therefore, unlike the safety criteria in Sec.  
450.101, the flight hazard analysis explicitly requires the operator to 
examine the hazards associated with the discrete systems, subsystems, 
and components of the vehicle.
    Thus, to provide increased flexibility without reducing safety, the 
final rule excludes certain safety-critical systems from the 
requirements of Sec.  450.143 if an operator demonstrates through its 
flight hazard analysis that the likelihood of any hazardous condition 
specifically associated with the system that may cause death or serious 
injury to the public is extremely remote, pursuant to Sec.  
450.109(b)(3). That is, the operator must show that specific 
requirements in Sec.  450.143, which ensure that the system will 
function reliably, are not entirely necessary to mitigate the hazards 
specifically associated with the system to an extremely remote level.
    For example, an operator's launch vehicle may have a number of 
systems whose failure could potentially cause hazardous debris to 
impact the public. If an operator chooses to launch in a sparsely 
populated area and limit propellant loading to minimize risk to the 
public to an extremely remote level despite the failure of one or more 
safety-critical systems, then those systems would not need to be 
designed or tested to the level set forth in Sec.  450.143. The 
operator must show that the exception in Sec.  450.143(a)(2) applies 
for a particular safety-critical system through its flight hazard 
analysis. If the operator cannot show that all hazards involving the 
system are sufficiently mitigated to an extremely remote level despite 
a failure of that system, then that system must meet the design and 
testing requirements in Sec.  450.143.
    However, the FAA anticipates that certain systems will not qualify 
for the exception in Sec.  450.143(a)(2). Specifically, safety critical 
systems that prevent hazards from reaching the public given other 
system failures would likely be required to meet Sec.  450.143. This is 
also true of systems that create hazards to the public that are not 
otherwise mitigated by other hazard controls. The FAA anticipates that 
it is unlikely that an operator would be able to demonstrate that the 
hazards associated with these systems meet the ``extremely remote'' 
standard in Sec.  450.109(b)(3) without subjecting them to the 
reliability requirements in Sec.  450.143. Furthermore, FSS required by 
Sec.  450.108(b)(2) must meet Sec.  450.143 without exception.
    The FAA also revises Sec.  450.143(a) and removes the proposed 
requirement that all FSS required by Sec.  450.101(c) must meet 
Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145. Instead, Sec.  450.143(a) requires all 
safety-critical systems except for the highly reliable FSS required by 
Sec.  450.108(b)(1) to meet the requirements in Sec.  450.143. As 
discussed in the flight abort section of this preamble, an FSS required 
by Sec.  450.108(b)(2) must comply only with Sec.  450.143 rather than 
meeting the additional requirements proposed in Sec.  450.145. 
Likewise, an operator who chooses to use flight abort as a hazard 
control strategy for reasons other than protecting against a high 
consequence event under Sec.  450.101(c)(1) must also satisfy the 
requirements of Sec.  450.143 for its FSS. For reasons explained later 
in this section, highly reliable FSS under Sec.  450.145 do not need to 
comply with the general safety-critical systems requirements of Sec.  
450.143 as was proposed in the NPRM.
    The FAA proposed in Sec.  450.143(b) to require that all safety-
critical systems follow reliable design principles. Specifically, an 
operator would be required to design those systems to be fault-tolerant 
so that no single credible fault could lead to increased risk to the 
public.
    Both Sierra Nevada and Virgin Galactic commented that requiring 
fault tolerance would be so burdensome to the applicant that several 
current operators would not be able to meet the requirement for systems 
on existing vehicles. Sierra Nevada commented that using fault 
tolerance as a catch-all hazard control can add risk in certain cases, 
and the determination regarding whether something is fault-tolerant is 
not straightforward.
    Fault tolerance \146\ is the idea that a system must be designed so 
that it is able to perform its function in the event of a failure of 
one or more of its components. In a fault-tolerant design of a safety-
critical system, no single credible fault should be capable of 
increasing the risk to public safety beyond that of a nominal 
operation. Although the FAA proposed fault tolerance for the design of 
safety-critical systems in the regulatory text, the FAA intended to 
accept other methods of safety design, including fail-safe \147\ and 
damage-tolerant \148\ systems like primary structures that generally 
cannot be redundant. This broader view of safe design allows an 
operator to factor planned operational restrictions, testing, and 
inspection into the design to demonstrate that a system is broadly 
fault-tolerant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ Typically, a fault-tolerant design applies redundancy or a 
system of safety barriers to ensure the system can function, though 
perhaps with reduced performance. An example of a fault-tolerant 
design is an aircraft with multiple engines that can continue flying 
even if one of the engines fails.
    \147\ A fail-safe design is a system that can fail in a 
controlled way, such that the failure will still ensure public 
safety, like elevator brakes held open by the tension of the 
elevator cable such that, if the cable snaps, the brakes engage and 
stop the elevator from falling.
    \148\ Damage-tolerant design allows for robust design, or design 
to fail gracefully, for systems like a vehicle hull that cannot be 
redundant or fail-safe. Fault-tolerant, fail-safe, and damage-
tolerant designs are all design concepts meant to prevent credible 
faults or prevent increased risk to the public if failures do occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA acknowledges that its articulation of a fault-tolerant 
design requirement in the proposed regulation did not accurately 
reflect the FAA's statements in the NPRM preamble allowing other 
methods of safe design, like fail-safe systems, damage-tolerant 
systems, or other designs for graceful degradation.\149\ A system that 
is designed to be fail-safe or degrade gracefully, whether it functions 
at a reduced level or fails completely, does so in a way that protects 
people and property from injury or damage, or generally prevents a more 
serious failure event. Such design is desirable, and was intended to be 
captured in the FAA's design requirements for safety-critical systems. 
In the final rule, the FAA amends Sec.  450.143(b) to state only that 
safety-critical systems must be designed such that no credible fault 
can lead to increased risk to the public beyond nominal safety-critical 
system operation. The final rule gives the operator flexibility to 
achieve this requirement through a design that is fault-tolerant, fail-
safe, damage-tolerant, or any other solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ 84 FR 15325-15326.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA views design for reduced risk as a necessary characteristic 
of any reliable system. The FAA recognizes there may be other 
acceptable design principles that protect the public adequately from or 
in spite of a credible fault. In the final rule, the FAA removed the 
word ``single'' from Sec.  450.143(b) to clarify that some design 
concepts may allow faults, but that the faults should not lead to 
increased risk to the public. The FAA also removed ``safety'' from 
Sec.  450.143(b) because ensuring no increased risk to the public 
necessarily addresses public safety. An applicant

[[Page 79658]]

may demonstrate that no credible fault can lead to increased risk 
through analysis, identification of possible failure modes, 
implementation of redundant systems or other mitigation measures, and 
verification that the mitigation measures will not fail simultaneously.
    Safety-critical systems requirements necessitate testing that 
accounts for the operating environment the system will encounter. For 
that reason, the FAA proposed to define ``operating environment'' in 
Sec.  401.5 (Sec.  401.7 in the final rule) as ``an environment that a 
launch or reentry vehicle component will experience during its 
lifecycle.'' The proposed definition further stated that operating 
environments include shock, vibration, thermal cycle, acceleration, 
humidity, and thermal vacuum.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed definition with 
additional language indicating that operating environments also include 
other environments relevant to system or material degradation. As 
stated in the NPRM, the list of examples in the definition is not 
exhaustive, and the additional language in the final rule establishes a 
standard for operators to consider in assessing relevant environmental 
factors when qualifying an FSS or other safety-critical system design 
through testing and analysis.
    In addition to meeting the design requirements of Sec.  450.143(b), 
the FAA proposed qualification testing \150\ requirements in Sec.  
450.143(c) that required, in part, that an operator demonstrate the 
design of the vehicle's safety-critical systems functionally at 
conditions beyond its predicted operating environment. An operator must 
select environmental test levels that ensure the design is sufficiently 
stressed to demonstrate that system performance is not degraded due to 
design tolerances, manufacturing variances, or uncertainties in the 
environment. Qualification testing will demonstrate margin over all 
operating and non-operating environments to which the flight unit can 
be exposed, including margin over all component acceptance tests. Valid 
qualification testing environments should--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ Qualification testing is an assessment of a prototype or 
other structural article to verify the structural integrity of a 
design. Generally, functional demonstration of the design's 
qualification at operating environments involves testing the design 
under a number of different environmental factors to stress the 
design, with a multiplying factor applied to the expected 
environmental testing limit. This qualification testing is conducted 
for temperatures, tensile loads, handling shocks, and other expected 
environmental stressors relevant to system or material degradation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Account for material variation, because all materials have 
properties that have a variance from nominal values.
     Account for manufacturing variation, because the 
functionality of a system is not only dictated by the quality of 
materials used, but also the quality of the manufacturing processes 
employed.
     Account for environmental variation, because environmental 
predictions can have a great deal of uncertainty, particularly early in 
a program.
     Demonstrate margin against failure, because safety-
critical systems often fail in complex and unpredictable ways.
    The FAA also proposed requirements for acceptance \151\ of hardware 
in Sec.  450.143(d) that required, in part, an operator to demonstrate 
any safety-critical system functionally while exposed to its predicted 
operating environment with margin to demonstrate that it is free of 
defects, free of integration and workmanship errors, and ready for 
operational use. Acceptance testing on flight units should uncover 
critical workmanship errors, and damaged, weak, or out-of-specification 
components before they fail in flight. Because this testing is done on 
flight units, valid acceptance testing should avoid over-testing 
safety-critical components. This avoidance is accomplished by testing 
significantly under qualification levels and durations, but still over 
nominal operation levels and durations. The FAA adopts these 
requirements as proposed, with minor editorial corrections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Unlike qualification testing that is performed on 
qualification units, acceptance testing or other functional 
demonstration of acceptance required by Sec.  450.143(d) is 
performance testing conducted on the actual hardware to be used on a 
vehicle after the completion of the manufacturing process. 
Generally, acceptance tests are performed on each article of the 
safety-critical flight hardware to verify that it is free of 
defects, free of integration and workmanship errors, and ready for 
operational use. Acceptance testing includes testing for defects, 
along with environmental testing similar to the qualification 
testing described earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, the FAA proposed requirements pertaining to the lifecycle 
of safety-critical systems in Sec.  450.143(e), which required an 
operator to monitor the flight environments experienced by safety-
critical system components to the extent necessary to validate the 
predicted operating environment.\152\
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    \152\ Applicants must account for environments that any safety-
critical system is expected to encounter throughout the lifecycle of 
the system in accordance with Sec.  450.143(e), including storage, 
transportation, installation, and flight, which generally are built 
into qualification and acceptance testing levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, the FAA makes one minor revision to Sec.  
450.143(c), (d), and (e). In each of those subsections, the FAA has 
changed the term ``operating environment'' to ``operating 
environments'' because all systems will experience multiple operating 
environments. As stated in the NPRM preamble,\153\ applicants must 
account for all operating environments that any safety-critical system 
is expected to encounter throughout the lifecycle of the system in 
accordance with Sec.  450.143(e), including storage, transportation, 
installation, and flight, which generally are built into qualification 
and acceptance testing levels. Other than this minor revision, the FAA 
adopts these subsections as proposed. Note also that in the means of 
compliance table released with the NPRM, the FAA identified SMC-S-016, 
``Test Requirements For Launch, Upper-Stage and Space Vehicles,'' as an 
acceptable means of compliance with Sec.  450.143. SMC-S-016 is an Air 
Force standard that defines environmental test requirements for launch 
vehicles, upper-stage vehicles, space vehicles, and their subsystems 
and units. The FAA maintains that the environmental test levels in that 
standard are acceptable for safety-critical systems under Sec.  
450.143, except, as noted in the means of compliance table, 
protoqualification testing testing found in 4.2.3 and B.1.3-4, and 
protoqualification by similarity in 4.10.1.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ 84 FR 15323.
    \154\ Protoqualification is used when test hardware is planned 
to be used for flight, generally for designs that will have limited 
production. Tests conducted to demonstrate satisfaction of design 
requirements use reduced margins, supplemented with other analyses 
and tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, FSS required pursuant to Sec.  450.108(b)(2), 
when the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any 
significant period of flight is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 
10-\3\ CEC for uncontrolled areas, must satisfy 
the requirements in Sec.  450.143. This approach is consistent with the 
NPRM, which required all safety-critical systems including all FSS to 
satisfy the general requirements in Sec.  450.143. For the reasons 
explained more fully in the next section, the final rule does not adopt 
the additional requirements for such an FSS that were proposed in Sec.  
450.145(a)(2), which would have required the FSS to have a design 
reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, 
analysis, and testing. The FAA no

[[Page 79659]]

longer finds this reliability value necessary because, as a commenter 
noted, it was unnecessarily prescriptive.\155\ Moreover, as discussed 
in the NPRM, there are no established standards to demonstrate the 
0.975 reliability number, other than a single string FSS that otherwise 
meets the requirements of RCC 319.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ CSF commented that by binning the CEC of a 
vehicle and then prescribing a fixed reliability requirement for the 
FSS, the risk of an unmitigated CEC event is not 
consistent because the binning requires the same FSS even though the 
risk varies by an order of magnitude. Although the FAA does not 
agree with CSF's solution to move the entire concept of 
CEC into an Advisory Circular, as discussed earlier, the 
FAA does agree that it is unnecessary to establish a fixed 
reliability number for all Sec.  450.108(b)(2) flight FSS required 
for operations with CECs that could be an order of 
magnitude apart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Instead, the FAA requires Sec.  450.108(b)(2) FSS to meet the 
requirements in Sec.  450.143. This regulatory approach should support 
ongoing innovation in the development of FSS. As noted in the NPRM, the 
commercial space transportation industry has continued to mature and 
operators have proposed FSS alternatives. These alternative approaches 
include fail-safe single string systems that trade off mission 
assurance and redundancy, other fail-safe consequence mitigation 
systems, and dual-purpose systems such as FSS that reuse the output of 
safety-critical GPS components for primary navigation avionics. The FAA 
is publishing a ``Safety-Critical Systems'' AC to provide an acceptable 
means of compliance with Sec.  450.143. However, the FAA does not claim 
that an FSS approved under Sec.  450.143 necessarily has a reliability 
of 0.975. Although some standard in the future may be able to establish 
a reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence, that standard does not 
exist today. FSS are discussed more fully in the next section of this 
preamble.
    The FAA amends the proposed application requirements in Sec.  
450.143(f) for safety-critical systems to require that applicants 
describe the methods used to validate the predicted operating 
environments. In order to comply with Sec.  450.143(e)(2)(i), 
applicants must validate the predicted operating environments for their 
safety-critical systems. However, the NPRM inadvertently omitted the 
corresponding application requirement from proposed Sec.  450.143(f). 
This change results in no additional burden as an operator would have 
to demonstrate compliance with the substantive provision by providing 
this information.
    The FAA also adds new Sec.  450.143(f)(7) to the application 
requirements, which requires an applicant to describe the standards 
used in each phase of a safety-critical system's lifecycle. This 
addition is consistent with current practice and will not increase the 
burden on operators, because an operator would likely provide this 
information to support its finding that a safety-critical system is 
designed such that no credible fault can lead to increased risk to the 
public beyond nominal safety-critical system operation. In addition, 
this description of standards is necessary to help identify previous 
flights of a vehicle developed and launched or reentered in similar 
circumstances, as required under Sec.  450.131(d)(1).
    Virgin Galactic asked how the requirements of Sec.  450.143 would 
apply to safety-critical systems that have been licensed previously. 
Virgin Galactic generally objected to proposed Sec.  450.143, arguing 
its requirements were similar to aircraft certification rules and would 
be appropriate for a more mature industry. Virgin Galactic requested an 
exclusion from proposed Sec.  450.143 for hybrid vehicles that have 
been issued an experimental airworthiness certificate by the FAA and 
operate as aircraft.
    As discussed in the preamble section on Hybrid Vehicles, the FAA 
does not agree that an airworthiness certificate issued by the FAA 
should automatically exempt a vehicle used in a launch or reentry from 
the safety-critical system requirements in Sec.  450.143. An applicant 
may make an ELOS case for a component of a launch vehicle, such as a 
carrier aircraft, if it holds a airworthiness certificate with an 
acceptable flight test history. Section 450.143 is flexible and broad 
enough that the FAA is not aware of any currently licensed vehicles or 
operators in formal pre-application consultation that would not meet 
the new requirements. For example, operators licensed under parts 431 
or 435 use a system safety process to verify and validate the 
reliability and mitigation of hazards for any safety-critical system. 
The treatment of safety-critical systems under part 431 and 435 
provides an ELOS to the safety-critical systems requirements in Sec.  
450.143. Flight Safety Systems (Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145)
z. Flight Safety Systems (Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145)
    As previously discussed, proposed Sec.  450.101(c) would have 
required an operator to use flight abort with an FSS that meets the 
requirements of Sec.  450.145 if the consequence of any reasonably 
foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any one-second period of flight, 
was greater than 1 x 10-\3\ CEC for uncontrolled 
areas.\156\
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    \156\ As explained in the section of the preamble on high 
consequence events, this proposed requirement would have applied to 
all phases of flight unless otherwise agreed to by the Administrator 
based on the demonstrated reliability of the launch or reentry 
vehicle during that phase of flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As proposed in Sec.  450.145(a)(1), if the consequence of any 
vehicle response mode was 1 x 10-\2\ CEC or 
greater for uncontrolled areas, an operator would have been required to 
employ an FSS with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence 
and commensurate design, analysis, and testing. The FAA noted that RCC 
319 is the only government standard that would meet the requirement for 
a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate 
design, analysis, and testing.
    Proposed Sec.  450.145(a)(2) required that, if the consequence of 
any vehicle response mode was between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 
10-\3\ CEC for uncontrolled areas, an operator 
would have been required to employ an FSS with a design reliability of 
0.975 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and 
testing. In the NPRM, the FAA acknowledged that, although no standard 
exists for an FSS with this design reliability, it expected individual 
applicants to create their own FSS requirements based on RCC 319 and 
have them approved as an accepted means of compliance by the FAA prior 
to application submittal.\157\ The FAA anticipated the industry would 
develop voluntary consensus standards for FSS, particularly for those 
FSS that are only required to have a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 
percent confidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ The FAA indicated that this approach would be akin to 
``tailoring'' RCC 319, which is current practice at Federal launch 
ranges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA explained the proposed lower reliability by noting that, 
for operations in which the consequence of a flight failure is lower, 
the FSS, while still being reliable, may not need to be as highly 
reliable as an FSS for a vehicle operating in an area where the 
consequence of a flight failure is higher. As such, in order to make 
regulations adaptable to innovative operations while maintaining 
appropriate levels of safety, the FAA proposed to allow an FSS with 
less demonstrated design reliability for operations with lower 
potential consequences. In the final rule, the FAA removes the proposed 
requirement for an FSS with design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent 
confidence, as will be discussed later in this preamble section.
    In the final rule, the FAA has maintained the proposed requirement

[[Page 79660]]

for an operator to employ an FSS with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 
percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing if 
the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any 
significant period of flight is greater than 1 x 10-\2\ 
CEC in uncontrolled areas.\158\ Operators currently meet 
this requirement for launches conducted under legacy regulations by 
tailoring RCC 319, and an operator could submit a tailored version of 
RCC 319 to the FAA as a means of compliance for Sec.  450.145(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ As previously explained, the FAA has replaced the term 
``vehicle response mode'' with ``failure mode'' and the term ``one-
second period of flight'' with ``significant period of flight,'' 
throughout the final rule. The basis for these changes is discussed 
in the preamble section on flight abort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, the FAA has revised the section heading for 
Sec.  450.145 from ``Flight safety system'' to ``Highly reliable flight 
safety system'' because it now contains only those requirements for an 
FSS required by Sec.  450.108(b)(1) when the consequence of any 
reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any significant period of flight 
is greater than 1 x 10-\2\ CEC in uncontrolled 
areas. The FAA has also reorganized the section and moved the 
reliability requirements in proposed Sec.  450.145(a) to Sec.  
450.145(b) with revisions.
    While the design reliability required for a highly reliable FSS 
remains 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, 
analysis, and testing, the FAA has specified in Sec.  450.145(b)(1) of 
the final rule that this reliability applies to the portion of the FSS 
onboard the vehicle. In addition, if a portion of an operator's FSS is 
ground-based, space-based, or otherwise not onboard the vehicle, the 
FAA has specified in Sec.  450.145(b)(2) of the final rule that it must 
have the same reliability as the onboard portion; that is, 0.999 at 95 
percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing. 
Although not all FSS have a ground portion, this requirement reflects 
past and current practice for launches from both Federal and non-
Federal sites, in which the ground portion of an FSS and the airborne 
portion of an FSS are independently designed, tested, and operated to 
rigorous standards. This independence ensures that the appropriate 
command is sent by the ground-based system with a high reliability, and 
received and acted upon with high reliability by the onboard portion of 
the system, to result in the desired termination action.
    The reference in Sec.  450.145(a) to an FSS ``on the launch or 
reentry vehicle'' did not reflect the FAA's intention accurately, as 
stated in the NPRM, to include FSS not onboard the vehicle in the 
design reliability requirements in Sec.  450.145.\159\ Conventional FSS 
with onboard flight termination receivers and not-onboard command 
transmitter systems will have both onboard and not-onboard subsystems. 
Many current autonomous FSS only have onboard systems. As discussed 
previously, the final rule requires both onboard and not-onboard FSS 
systems independently to demonstrate 0.999 at 95 percent reliability. 
This requirement is because FSS with both onboard and not onboard 
systems that individually meet 0.999 at 95 percent reliability could 
have a combined reliability as low as 0.998 at 95 percent confidence, 
whereas FSS with only onboard systems would be required to have a 
reliability of at least 0.999 at 95 percent confidence. To ensure that 
FSS all meet the same standard required to protect public safety, the 
final rule requires that onboard systems and not onboard independently 
meet the 0.999 at 95 percent confidence level of reliability. The 
collective FSS design reliability requirement is not specifically 
stated in the final rule since the onboard FSS and not-onboard FSS 
design reliability requirements are independently defined in Sec.  
450.145 and the overall FSS design reliability is dependent on the type 
of FSS employed.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the reliability standard 
in proposed Sec.  450.145(a)(1) would be consistent with various 
sections of part 417, in particular Sec.  417.309(b)(2), that 
require major FSS component systems, such as onboard flight 
termination systems and ground-based command control systems, to be 
tested to demonstrate 0.999 design reliability at 95 percent 
confidence. The FAA further noted that this reliability threshold 
would have to be demonstrated for the operation of the entire 
system, including any systems located on-board the launch or reentry 
vehicle, any ground-based systems, and any other component or 
support systems. 84 FR 15328.
    \160\ As discussed earlier in the preamble, if the consequence 
of any vehicle response mode is less than 1 x 10-\3\, the 
FAA will not require an FSS or mandate its reliability if an 
operator chooses to use one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For Sec.  450.108(b)(1) FSS that must meet the requirements of 
Sec.  450.145, unless alternative methods are accepted by the 
Administrator, the FAA has identified RCC 319 as an existing means of 
compliance to demonstrate FSS reliability. This standard is currently 
used by applicants that employ traditional flight abort under part 417. 
The FAA expects to continue the current practice of working with 
applicants to tailor RCC 319 in order to comply with Sec.  450.145. A 
tailored RCC 319 that is used as a means of compliance for Sec.  
450.145(b) must be submitted to the FAA for acceptance prior to being 
included in a license application.
    As noted in the previous preamble section, the FAA has removed the 
additional requirements proposed in Sec.  450.145(a)(2), and is relying 
on requirements in Sec.  450.143 to ensure that an FSS required by 
Sec.  450.108(b)(2) is sufficiently reliable. As with the NPRM, the 
final rule reduces the burden on operators that have a lower potential 
for causing high consequence events. This change maintains the intent 
of the proposal to protect against high consequence events using a 
means different from the traditional highly reliable FSS.
    As noted in the previous section, the Safety-Critical Systems AC 
will provide an approach to compliance with Sec.  450.143 that modifies 
the provisions in RCC 319. The approach uses a menu of potential 
options that, when met, would demonstrate that an operator has met 
Sec.  450.143. The AC will provide combinations of various tailored RCC 
319 requirements that the FAA has determined demonstrate compliance 
with Sec.  450.143. Some of the tailored requirements include:
     Reducing the random vibration and thermal cycle 
qualification test margins to a level and duration that remains above 
acceptance test levels;
     Reducing the number of required qualification test units;
     Reducing the minimum required sample size for ordnance lot 
acceptance testing and ordnance qualification testing;
     Allowing qualification by similarity with deviations to 
RCC 319 qualification by similarity criteria;
     Reducing the required number of thermal cycles for 
component level qualification thermal cycle test requirements;
     Reducing the radio frequency link margin requirements for 
traditional commanded FSS;
     Allowing single string fail-safe FSS;
     Reducing electronic piece parts requirements; and
     Allowing use of vehicle components or systems for FSS use 
such as vehicle power source or flight computer.
    An operator could work with the FAA to determine what combination 
of options would satisfy Sec.  450.143 for specific FSS. In addition, 
an operator could develop its own combination of tailored RCC 
requirements to demonstrate compliance, or could elect to use a 
different means of compliance outside of the RCC 319 requirements.
    An operator may demonstrate compliance with Sec.  450.143 through 
other means that adequately establish

[[Page 79661]]

design, qualification testing, and acceptance testing. As mentioned 
earlier, the environmental test levels in SMC-S-016 are acceptable for 
safety-critical systems under Sec.  450.143, including some FSS 
components, except protoqualification testing found in 4.2.3 and B.1.3-
4, and protoqualification by similarity in 4.10.1.
    Lastly, the FAA also makes minor changes to the application 
requirements in Sec.  450.145. In the NPRM, Sec.  450.145(d) stated 
that an FSS includes any FSS located onboard a launch or reentry 
vehicle; any ground based command control system; any support system, 
including telemetry subsystems and tracking subsystems, necessary to 
support a flight abort decision; and the functions of any personnel who 
operate the FSS hardware or software. This provision has been moved to 
the definition of ``flight safety system'' and deleted from Sec.  
450.145(d).\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ In the final rule, the definition of FSS is ``a system 
used to implement flight abort. A flight safety system includes any 
flight safety system located onboard a launch or reentry vehicle; 
any ground based command control system; any support system, 
including telemetry subsystems and tracking subsystems, necessary to 
support a flight abort decision; and the functions of any personnel 
who operate the flight safety system hardware or software.'' In the 
NRPM, the definition also included that a human can be a part of an 
FSS. The FAA removed this sentence from the definition because ``the 
functions of any personnel who operate the flight safety system'' 
covers this circumstance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received several comments on the limited means of 
compliance available to demonstrate compliance with the FSS reliability 
requirements. Blue Origin commented that the industry had only been 
given one means of compliance for both tiers of FSS reliability. Blue 
Origin also commented that the proposal indicated the only accepted 
means of complying with Sec.  450.145 would be an untailored RCC 319. 
Blue Origin and CSF suggested that there exist other industry and 
government standards that should be accepted means of compliance with 
the reliability requirements of Sec.  450.145. Blue Origin and 
Microcosm stated that a tailored RCC 319 or SMC-S-016 should also be an 
accepted means of compliance. SpaceX commented that RCC 319 was an 
acceptable standard, but only if the document may be tailored for each 
operator.
    The FAA clarifies that RCC 319 is a means of compliance the FAA has 
identified to date that ensures compliance with Sec.  450.145, but RCC 
319 is not the only possible means of compliance that the FAA will 
consider. The performance-based nature of Sec.  450.145 allows an 
operator to submit its own unique means of compliance to the FAA. An 
applicant may propose a tailored version of RCC 319 prior to submitting 
its application as a unique means of compliance to be accepted by the 
Administrator. As discussed earlier, the Safety-Critical Systems AC 
will provide guidance to operators on how to comply with the 
requirements for Sec.  450.108(b)(2) FSS. This approach uses RCC 319 as 
one starting point. The AC will also refer to SMC-S-016, as discussed 
earlier. The FAA notes that, unlike for highly reliable FSS required to 
meet Sec.  450.145, for an FSS required by Sec.  450.108(b)(2) an 
operator is not required to have a means of compliance with Sec.  
450.143 accepted in advance of application submittal. However, it would 
be advisable for an operator to consult with the FAA early in its 
program's development on the approach to compliance with Sec.  450.143, 
whether for an FSS or other safety-critical systems.
    The performance-based nature of Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145 also 
allows an industry consensus standards body to submit a proposed means 
of compliance to the FAA for general use. This process is discussed in 
more detail in the Means of Compliance section of the preamble. 
Applicants are encouraged to work with the FAA in pre-application 
consultation to discuss potential unique means of compliance. For 
example, for Sec.  450.108(b)(1) FSS, an applicant could work with the 
FAA during pre-application consultation to tailor RCC 319 to the 
operation while still ensuring compliance with Sec.  450.145. The FAA 
will review the documents tailored to vehicle programs and mission-
specific applications as unique means of compliance for a given 
license.
    Blue Origin, CSF, and Virgin Galactic expressed concern that a 
vehicle that did not require an FSS under parts 431 or 435 might 
require one under part 450. The FAA disagrees. This rule maintains the 
level of safety required under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 for FSS. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the High Consequence Event Protection 
section of this preamble, the ACTA study results indicate that no 
changes would be required under the final rule regarding the need for 
an FSS for any currently licensed launch vehicle launched from a 
Federal or commercial launch or reentry site. Therefore, the FAA does 
not expect to require an FSS under part 450 for any launch vehicle that 
would not have been required to have an FSS under parts 431 and 435.
    CSF commented that the NPRM's proposed structure for requiring 
flight abort was overly prescriptive and would not give an operator 
flexibility to define the type of FSS to implement. CSF recommended 
requiring operators to make a safety case and moving CEC and 
the reliability requirements for FSS of the NPRM to an AC.
    The FAA disagrees that a safety case should take the place of 
discrete CEC thresholds and the requirements for FSS in 
Sec. Sec.  450.143 and 450.145. Although a safety case is a potential 
approach to applying for an ELOS determination for many of the 
regulatory requirements, the FAA does not believe that requiring a 
safety case, by itself, provides sufficient regulatory clarity as to 
what is expected of a launch or reentry operator to obtain and maintain 
a license.
    Blue Origin commented that the means of compliance for FSS 
requirements in the NPRM was unclear, particularly for systems not on 
the launch vehicle such as tracking systems, ground systems, and flight 
abort crew. As examples, Blue Origin mentioned RCC 324 \162\ and EWR 
127-1 \163\ for tracking systems, AFSPCI 91-701 \164\ for ground 
systems, and AF 13-602 \165\ for flight abort crew.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ RCC 324-01 Global Positioning and Inertial Measurements 
Range Safety Tracking Systems' Commonality Standard.
    \163\ Eastern and Western Range (EWR) 127-1 Range Safety 
Requirements.
    \164\ AFSPCI 91-701, Launch and Range Safety Program Policy and 
Requirements.
    \165\ AFI 13-602 Ready Spacecrew Program Training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, Sec.  450.145(b) has been amended to address 
more clearly the part of the FSS onboard the vehicle and the part not 
onboard the vehicle, such as ground-based and space-based systems. In 
addition, this preamble addresses means of compliance for FSS 
requirements specifically, as well as means of compliance used to meet 
the requirements of part 450 more generally. As discussed previously, 
an untailored RCC 319-19 is currently the only means of compliance the 
FAA has reviewed and accepted to meet the Sec.  450.145 FSS 
requirements; however, the FAA anticipates operators will provide 
unique tailored versions of RCC 319-19 to the FAA for acceptance under 
part 450. In addition, RCC 324 is an acceptable means of compliance for 
the airborne tracking sources such as C-Band transponders used with 
ground based command systems and for GPS receivers and inertial 
measurement units used as airborne tracking data sources. EWR 127-1 is 
not a current means of compliance for tracking systems because it is 
out of date. AFSPCI 91-701 is an acceptable means of compliance for 
FSS-related ground systems. Lastly, AFI 13-602 is an acceptable means 
of compliance for flight abort crew.

[[Page 79662]]

    Blue Origin noted that proposed Sec.  450.143 appeared to be 
appropriately performance-based and applicable to all safety-critical 
systems, including software. Except for Sec.  450.108(b)(1) FSS and 
software, the FAA agrees with Blue Origin that Sec.  450.143 is 
appropriately performance-based and applicable to all safety-critical 
systems. The requirements in Sec.  450.143 are not sufficient for Sec.  
450.108(b)(1) FSS because those systems require a higher reliability 
due to the potential for high consequence events, as measured by 
CEC. As discussed earlier, the unique hazards due to 
software have a separate set of requirements in Sec.  450.141. 
Otherwise, Sec.  450.143 is sufficient for safety-critical systems and 
FSS that do not fall under Sec.  450.145 because it includes 
performance standards for design, testing, and lifecycle management. 
Note that Sec.  450.143 covers a Sec.  450.108(b)(2) FSS that an 
operator uses to comply with the high consequence protection 
requirements of Sec.  450.101(c), as well as an FSS that an operator 
uses when it chooses flight abort as a hazard control strategy under 
Sec.  450.107, notwithstanding Sec.  450.101(c). The requirements are 
the same for either FSS because, although the potential for a high 
consequence event is less of a concern in the latter case, each FSS is 
critical to meeting the collective, individual, aircraft, and critical 
asset risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b).
    Blue Origin sought clarification as to whether an operator would 
need to comply with the software requirements of RCC 319 under the 
requirements proposed for Sec.  450.145, in addition to the software 
requirements under Sec.  450.141. An operator is not required to comply 
with the software requirements of RCC 319 under the requirements for 
Sec.  450.145. Section 450.141 applies to any software or data that 
implements a capability that, by intended operation, unintended 
operation, or non-operation, can present a hazard to the public. 
Section 450.141 applies to FSS under either Sec.  450.108(b)(1) or 
(b)(2). An operator is not required to meet RCC 319 in order to satisfy 
Sec.  450.141, but RCC 319 is an acceptable means of demonstrating 
compliance with Sec.  450.141.
    Blue Origin and CSF commented that the NPRM's assertion that to get 
a 0.999 design reliability at 95 percent confidence by testing at 
predicted environment levels, an operator would have to test 2,995 
units was incorrect because it did not take into account the dual 
redundant string architecture traditionally implemented for an FSS. The 
FAA concurs that its statement in the NPRM was an oversimplification 
that did not describe typical FSS component testing adequately. FSS 
testing generally consists of testing a certain number of units of an 
individual component to determine its reliability and confidence level, 
and that testing is part of determining the overall FSS system 
reliability. The FAA maintains that, for most operators, testing a few 
units at greater than expected operating environments is significantly 
less burdensome than testing many units at expected operating 
environments. Operating environments include shock, vibration, thermal 
cycle, acceleration, humidity, and thermal vacuum, or other 
environments relevant to system or material degradation. The 
opportunity for operators to submit new means of compliance to be 
accepted by the Administrator prior to application submission will 
allow applicants to propose their own means of compliance if they 
believe that another method of FSS design reliability, testing, and 
analysis is less burdensome than a means of compliance currently 
accepted by the FAA.
    Microcosm asked if all orbital operators launching from the United 
States would be required to have a 0.999 design reliability FSS in 
accordance with proposed Sec.  450.145. The FAA does not expect that 
all orbital operators launching from the U.S. will have operations with 
a potential consequence of a reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any 
significant period of flight that is greater than 1 x 10-\2\ 
CEC in uncontrolled areas. The FAA notes that, as described in 
reference to the high consequence event protection requirements of 
Sec.  450.101(c), operators will be required to have an FSS if the 
consequence of any reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any 
significant period of flight is greater than 1 x 10-\3\ 
CEC in uncontrolled areas, and, as proposed, that FSS will 
need to have the high design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent 
confidence if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable failure 
mode in any significant period of flight is greater than 1 x 
10-\2\ CEC in uncontrolled areas. However, the 
FAA has removed the additional requirements proposed in Sec.  
450.145(a)(2) in the final rule if the consequence of any reasonably 
foreseeable failure mode is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 
10-\3\ CEC, and in that scenario will only 
require an operator to use an FSS that complies with Sec.  450.143.
    SpaceX commented that RCC 319, section 1.10, allowed previously 
approved components and systems to be grandfathered such that they not 
be required to meet subsequent versions of RCC 319 unless certain 
criteria apply. SpaceX suggested that this approach be taken by the FAA 
in accepting previously tailored documents. SpaceX further recommended 
allowing such grandfathered acceptance of different standards such as 
AFSPCMAN 91-710.
    The FAA's current practice is to accept FSS that have been approved 
under a standard such as AFSPCMAN 91-710 and RCC 319 even after updated 
versions of those standards are released. Licensing under part 450 
should be consistent with that practice; a licensee should be able to 
renew its license without changes to its FSS simply because a standard 
that was used as a means of compliance has evolved with time. There 
would be exceptions, however, if a significant flaw was discovered in 
the earlier version of the standard.
    SpaceX also commented on proposed Sec.  450.145(d)(3), which stated 
that an applicant must submit any analyses and detailed analysis 
reports of all FSS subsystems necessary to demonstrate the reliability 
and confidence levels required by proposed Sec.  450.145. SpaceX 
pointed out that while other government requirements, such as RCC 319, 
provide guidance on what analyses and reports are necessary, the 
proposed rule was unclear as to what specific analyses and reports are 
necessary.
    As noted earlier, RCC 319 is an accepted means of compliance for 
Sec.  450.145. An FSS design, testing, and analysis process that 
complies with the analysis requirements for RCC 319, or other accepted 
means of compliance, will satisfy the FSS analysis requirements of 
Sec.  450.145.
    Rocket Lab requested clarification as to whether the FSS design 
reliability is for hardware components only, and how to apply 
reliability requirements to safety systems that include software. The 
FAA notes that design reliability is for hardware only. The computing 
system safety requirements in Sec.  450.141 do not provide an estimated 
reliability, but instead establish process controls that prevent or 
mitigate computing system faults.
    The International Space Safety Foundation commented that FSS is the 
only system of a launcher for which the operational experience did not 
provide reliability significant data, because the system was ready but 
rarely operated. The FAA concurs with the comment that there is a lack 
of operational experience with FSS as far as terminating vehicles. 
However, operational parameters are captured throughout flights, 
whether the result is termination or not, and this data verifies many 
of the expected operating modes.

[[Page 79663]]

Also, reliability is gained from design and thorough test programs, as 
well as review of post-flight data.
    The International Space Safety Foundation also commented that to 
base the approval of a safety-critical system on reliability 
predictions was not advisable considering the key role played by 
software, which cannot be taken into account in the reliability 
prediction. The International Space Safety Foundation recommended that 
the FAA should instead define fault tolerance requirements for the FSS, 
and specific software and computing system requirements in addition to 
generic software development processes.
    The FAA disagrees, noting that FSS reliability is also based on 
design architecture, component selection, and testing that accounts for 
fault tolerance and the overall system. Recognizing that there are some 
difficulties in establishing reliability standards below a design 
reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, 
analysis, and testing, the FAA removes the proposed additional 
requirements for Sec.  450.108(b)(2) FSS and instead relies solely on 
Sec.  450.143 for design, testing, and monitoring requirements. In 
addition, recognizing the importance of computing systems to system 
reliability and public safety, the FAA proposed, and is including in 
the final rule robust computing system requirements in Sec.  450.141. 
Computing system requirements are further discussed in the preamble 
section on Computing Systems and Software.
    The International Space Safety Foundation recommended that the FAA 
set up a multidisciplinary team of design and operation experts to draw 
a strategy for the definition of FSS design performance requirements, 
and for addressing the above issues. The FAA believes that standards 
for FSS should continue to evolve and that industry should be 
significantly involved in their development. An industry-led 
development of a voluntary consensus standard or standards addressing 
design, analysis, or testing of FSS would be particularly beneficial. 
These standards could become new acceptable means of compliance with 
FAA regulations.
aa. Hybrid Vehicles
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed one set of requirements for all 
vehicle types without distinction between traditional and hybrid 
vehicles. Hybrid vehicles are launch or reentry vehicles that have some 
characteristics of aircraft and other characteristics of traditional 
launch or reentry vehicles.
    The FAA acknowledges that hybrid operations differ from traditional 
rocket launches. Part 450 has been revised to accommodate better all 
vehicle operators, including hybrid vehicle operators. The 
accommodations include more performance-based requirements, 
alternatives to flight abort, FSA requirements based on demonstrated 
reliability, use of equivalent level of safety, and allowing 
application process alternatives as agreed to by the Administrator. The 
regulations allow currently licensed hybrid vehicle operators to 
continue to use a flight hazard analysis as a hazard control strategy. 
However, one or more hazard control strategies may be required to meet 
the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101.
    The FAA received numerous comments from industry regarding safety 
requirements for hybrid vehicles, hybrid configurations, component 
systems, and related operations. The FAA addresses the hybrid vehicle 
comments that would be applicable to other operators in the applicable 
topic area sections of this preamble. This section of the preamble 
addresses the comments that are specific to hybrid operations, such as 
aircraft certification, piloted vehicles, part 91 applicability, and 
space support vehicles.
    Two commenters stated that the applicability of hybrid systems 
should be clarified and consolidated in a separate section of the 
regulation. An individual commenter recommended that the preamble 
material include a discussion of how the regulations would be applied 
to hybrid configurations since their characteristics and operations are 
significantly different from the more traditional RLV or ELV vertical 
launch systems.
    The FAA notes that the final rule provides flexible performance-
based regulations that work for all vehicle types, including hybrid 
vehicles and other innovative architectures. Like all operators, an 
operator of a hybrid launch or reentry vehicle must choose one or more 
hazard control strategies for each phase of flight in accordance with 
Sec.  450.107. The FAA anticipates that hybrid vehicle operators will 
elect to use a flight hazard analysis as their hazard control strategy 
for at least some phases of flight because the flight hazard analysis 
is most similar to the existing system safety process in part 431.
    An individual commenter stated that for hybrid vehicles, flying 
qualities should be identified as safety critical and as a safety 
element eligible for a safety element approval.
    The FAA will work with operators during pre-application 
consultation and throughout the application review to understand a 
specific operation to determine what systems are safety critical as 
defined in Sec.  401.7. All launch vehicles, reentry vehicles, safety 
systems, processes, services, or personnel are eligible for safety 
element approvals. The FAA will consider safety element approvals on a 
case-by-case basis for hybrid vehicles. This concept is discussed in 
the Safety Element Approval section of the preamble.
    An individual commenter recommended that the FAA consider other 
demonstrated measures of reliability for carrier aircraft to estimate 
the public risk, such as ``attributed reliability'' and ``validated 
reliability.''
    In the final rule, the FAA uses the term ``demonstrated 
reliability'' in Sec. Sec.  450.101(c)(3) and 450.113(b). The use of 
this phrase in Sec.  450.101(c)(3) allows an operator to protect 
against a high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase 
of flight by establishing the launch or reentry vehicle has sufficient 
demonstrated reliability as agreed to by the Administrator based on 
CEC criteria during that phase of flight. The use of this 
phrase in Sec.  450.113(b) provides an exception for an operator from 
performing and documenting an FSA for a phase of flight, if agreed to 
by the Administrator, based on demonstrated reliability. These 
requirements are discussed in more detail in the High Consequence Event 
Protection and FSA preamble sections, respectively.
    As discussed in the Conditional Expected Casualties section of this 
preamble and in the NPRM, demonstrated reliability refers to 
statistically valid probability of failure estimates based on the 
outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or stage in accordance 
with Sec.  450.131, which is discussed later in the preamble. The draft 
High Fidelity FSA Methods AC,\166\ published with the NPRM, described 
acceptable methods, including Bayesian and binomial methods, to 
calculate demonstrated reliability and demonstrate compliance with 
Sec.  450.131. As discussed in the draft AC, the prior estimate for the 
probability of failure during a captive carry phase of flight could be 
based on a different flight history database \167\ compared to 
traditional ELVs. For example, the prior estimate for the probability 
of failure during a captive carry phase of flight could be based on the 
flight history of aircraft that also used certain proven or

[[Page 79664]]

industry standard design, manufacturing, or quality methods. Similarly, 
if a carrier vehicle were based on or modified from a type certificated 
commercial aircraft or used certified aircraft components, then the 
carrier vehicle could be considered a derived vehicle.\168\ In this 
example, the certification results and operational history for the 
unmodified components of the aircraft would be accounted for in the 
calculation of the demonstrated reliability. Under a performance-based 
regulation, an applicant is free to propose a unique means of 
compliance with other methods to calculate demonstrated reliability. 
The FAA will consider other methods to calculate demonstrated 
reliability for hybrid vehicles such as binomial methods consistent 
with Appendix A to part 417 under A417.25(b)(5), and other methods used 
in the past for launch and reentry vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ See FAA-2019-0229-0019.
    \167\ More specifically, a different set of outcomes of all 
previous flights of vehicles developed and launched or reentered in 
similar circumstances.
    \168\ A derived vehicle is a term used when analyzing a new 
variant of a known rocket. A derived vehicle should be alike in 
substance or essentials considering the following factors that can 
influence the probability of failure: (1) The development and 
integration processes of the vehicle, including the extent of 
testing; (2) the design and manufacture of safety-critical systems, 
including but not limited to the structure (including the payload 
faring), propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation; (3) all 
aspects of the environment experienced by the vehicles, stages, and 
components that can affect performance and reliability, including 
but not limited to aerodynamic, thermal, acoustic, vibration, and 
inertial environments; (4) vehicle performance in terms of payload 
capability, maximum dynamic pressure, and maximum velocity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA notes that other vehicle characteristics, such as flying 
qualities, do not lend themselves to analysis with statistical 
reliability measures. For example, acceptable flying qualities in one 
portion of the envelope do not necessarily predict good flying 
qualities throughout the full operational envelope, and small 
aerodynamic modifications or changes to the flight control system can 
lead to disproportionally large and potentially hazardous changes in 
flying qualities. In these cases, the FAA would consider flight test 
results using proven flight test techniques and data analysis methods 
as validated reliability.
    An individual commenter urged the FAA to consider more than just 
the fact that a vehicle holds an airworthiness certificate as evidence 
of demonstrated reliability.
    The FAA agrees that possession of an airworthiness certificate 
alone does not guarantee that a vehicle or operation will have a level 
of reliability sufficient to meet the part 450 public safety 
requirements. The FAA considers other factors to determine reliability. 
The FAA will consider the aircraft's original certification, its 
current certification, and any modifications introduced through 
issuance of supplemental type certificates. For example, a transport 
category aircraft that has held a standard airworthiness certificate 
and then been recertified to a restricted or experimental category. Any 
modifications to the aircraft design certification may affect the 
aircraft's reliability for the purposes of part 450, and the FAA 
therefore will take these modifications into consideration. An 
understanding of an aircraft's past and current operating environments 
and its maintenance history are also relevant to the current 
reliability estimate.
    In addition, the FAA may consider other factors outside of 
certification, such as a rigorous flight test program. Some launch 
operators have or are developing new, purpose-built launch vehicles 
that may serve as a component of a hybrid launch or may be designed as 
rocket-powered aircraft and transitioned to licensed launch operations 
following flight testing. These operators may hold experimental 
airworthiness certificates for testing design concepts and aircraft 
operating techniques. Experimental airworthiness certificates may also 
be offered as part of a hybrid operator's application to establish the 
vehicle's demonstrated reliability. The FAA's Office of Commercial 
Space Transportation will continue to coordinate with the FAA's 
Aviation Safety organization on issuance of an experimental 
airworthiness certificate and the vehicle's developmental program to 
understand its demonstrated reliability.
    The FAA will also consider each crewmember's level of pilot 
certification and flight experience, as well as the recency of that 
experience as evidence of demonstrated reliability of the launch or 
reentry system.\169\ While part 460 requires flight crew to hold at 
least a private pilot certificate with an instrument rating, operators 
using flight crew with higher levels of certification, operationally 
related flight experience, and recent flight experience and training 
can demonstrate higher reliability. For example, a crewmember holding 
commercial and airline transport pilot certificates have more flight 
experience and have been tested to a higher level of proficiency than a 
crewmember who holds a private pilot certificate. In addition, 
crewmembers with operationally related flight experience will have an 
understanding of the decision-making required for high-altitude flight 
and airspeed regimes, and the recent flight experience and training of 
all crewmembers is recognized as foundational to ensuring a safe 
operating environment of an aircraft or launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ For FSA purposes, the vehicle failure probability accounts 
for any failure of the launch or reentry system because of the way 
failure is defined in Sec.  450.131(b). In the context of FSA, any 
failure of the launch or reentry system, including pilot error, that 
produced vehicle failure as defined in Sec.  450.131(b) must be 
accounted for to establish the demonstrated reliability. Therefore, 
the FAA would consider the pilot experience and training in making a 
demonstrated reliability determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An individual commenter stated that the phase of a hybrid vehicle 
operation in which the carrier vehicle is alone would be required to 
take into account any potential aggressive maneuvers the vehicle may 
have to make to clear a just-released rocket. The commenter further 
stated that a civil airworthiness certificate may not be adequate to 
cover the risks posed to the public by these unusual maneuvers.
    The FAA agrees that the entirety of a launch or reentry operation 
must be analyzed for hybrid operations. The FAA notes that once a 
rocket is released, the carrier vehicle remains in the launch phase 
until all components of the launch system have impacted or landed on 
the earth and been rendered safe. Therefore, any maneuvers the carrier 
vehicle makes after a rocket is released but before both components 
have impacted or landed and been returned to a safe condition will 
occur under the license and be assessed consistent with the 
requirements of part 450.
    Virgin Galactic expressed concerns that rather than streamlining 
the requirements to create performance-based standards, the FAA is 
combining its requirements for ELVs and hybrid RLVs so that each type 
of operator might be subject to inappropriate or ambiguous 
requirements. Virgin Galactic commented that it appreciated the 
flexibility that some of the new regulations would provide but noted 
that others seem too vague.
    The FAA finds the final rule provides sufficient flexibility for 
hybrid vehicles. The performance-based regulations in the final rule 
allow operators like Virgin Galactic to propose an alternate approach 
by demonstrating an equivalent level of safety or use a unique means of 
compliance. To retain the maximum flexibility to adjust to dynamic 
industry changes, the FAA will continue to offer operators the choice 
to request ELOS determinations. In addition, 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) 
allows the Secretary to waive a requirement in the public interest and 
will not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, and 
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. 
Rather than explicitly

[[Page 79665]]

reference hybrid vehicles, the final rule provides the flexibilities to 
all operators, including operators of hybrid vehicles and other 
innovative concepts.
    Virgin Galactic also stated that the intent of the requirement 
should be publicly articulated in the regulations and not reside in the 
preamble. The FAA notes both the preamble and the regulations are 
publicly available. The intent behind the regulations correctly resides 
in the preamble because the regulations contain only the regulatory 
requirements by which regulated entities are bound. The preamble 
provides further explanation as to why the FAA has elected to adopt the 
regulatory requirements in order to provide transparency and further 
elaborate on the agency's intent.
    An individual commenter stated that hybrid configurations, carrier 
aircraft flying alone, and reentry vehicles using aerodynamic controls 
should follow controller instructions and abide by the general 
operating and flight rules of aviation found in 14 CFR part 91. The 
individual commented that hybrid launch vehicles with pilot-in-the-loop 
control systems spend much more time than RLV and ELV systems in 
restricted airspace and overflying populated areas and that this 
requires hybrid configurations to have the capability to operate safely 
in a controlled airspace environment like other aircraft.
    The FAA agrees and notes that applicants may elect to mitigate 
hazards to the public by proposing applicable sections of part 91 to 
demonstrate compliance with specific requirements in part 450. However, 
all components of a hybrid vehicle operate solely under a license when 
the intent of flight is to conduct a launch or reentry.
    Virgin Galactic stated that the FAA should have a narrowly tailored 
CEC exemption from the flight abort requirements of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  450.101(c) and 450.145 for piloted aircraft because the 
pilot would already provide an FSS with abort capability. Virgin 
Galactic further stated that a carrier aircraft in a hybrid system that 
operated safely under its experimental airworthiness certificate should 
not be subjected to the CEC requirement in proposed Sec.  
450.101(c).
    The FAA does not agree with Virgin Galactic's comment to include an 
exemption from demonstrating protection against a high consequence 
event for a piloted carrier vehicle because the operation of such a 
vehicle may result in a high consequence event. As discussed earlier in 
this preamble, operators must protect against a high consequence event 
because such an event could result in a large number of casualties. The 
FAA notes that the final rule allows an operator to seek an ELOS 
determination for Sec.  450.101(c)(2). However, an exemption for all 
piloted carrier vehicles would not be appropriate for launch or reentry 
vehicle systems that have not yet been evaluated. Hence, an applicant 
can use another method of measuring the potential for a high 
consequence event that demonstrates an equivalent level of safety in 
accordance with Sec.  450.37. Reusable vehicles and other innovative 
architectures may be required by Sec.  450.101(c) to have a method to 
achieve flight abort reliably to mitigate flight risks and consequences 
fully, either in the form of a pilot that can safely abort flight using 
system controls or a more traditional FSS. A pilot may provide 
protection against a high consequence event. The FAA may consider a 
pilot to be an FSS performing a flight abort if the pilot can initiate 
and accomplish a controlled ending to vehicle flight reliably to limit 
or restrict the hazards to public health and safety, and the safety of 
property. Under the provision in Sec.  450.101(c)(3), the flight of a 
carrier vehicle carrying a rocket to a drop point could be an example 
of sufficient protection against a high consequence event, even if the 
CEC were above the 1 x 10-\3\ threshold, if the 
carrier vehicle has sufficient demonstrated reliability. Demonstrated 
reliability and other flexibilities are discussed more fully in the 
High Consequence Protection section of this preamble.
    Virgin Galactic noted that a carrier aircraft operating under an 
airworthiness certificate should be exempt from proposed Sec.  
450.101(f), which, for any launch, reentry, or disposal, requires an 
operator to notify the public of any region of land, sea, or air that 
contains, with 97 percent probability of containment, all debris 
resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a casualty. 
Virgin Galactic stated that the requirement was unclear because it 
discussed debris resulting from normal flight events. Virgin Galactic 
requested further clarification on the purpose of public notification 
if the proposed requirement was intended to address returning vehicles 
that remain intact and on a nominal trajectory to the intended reentry 
site. Virgin Galactic recommended that, if this regulation was intended 
to apply to jettisoning of orbital rocket stages and the return/
disposal of upper stages, it should state as much.
    The FAA agrees that returning vehicles on a normal trajectory do 
not constitute ``debris'' as the term is used in Sec.  450.101(f). 
However, the FAA will not exempt all hybrid vehicle operators from the 
requirement in Sec.  450.101(f) because future hybrid operators could 
possibly generate debris capable of causing a casualty from normal 
vehicle flight. If an operation has no planned impacts from debris 
capable of causing a casualty, then no notification will be necessary 
to comply with Sec.  450.101(f).
    Several commenters, including ALPA, Starfighters, and Virgin 
Galactic, submitted comments regarding the applicability of FSA 
requirements for hybrid vehicles under proposed Sec.  450.113(a)(5). 
Virgin Galactic noted that, for the captive carry phase of a hybrid 
vehicle mission, the FAA should exempt operators from performing an FSA 
for a piloted aircraft that operated in accordance with aviation 
regulations. Virgin Galactic stated the FAA should include such an 
exemption because the pilot would already provide abort capability as 
an FSS. Starfighters commented that an FSA should be required only for 
the air-release launch phase of a hybrid vehicle mission, not the 
earlier captive-carry phase, which might be many miles away from the 
actual release point. However, ALPA stated that the FAA should require 
an FSA for all phases of flight until sufficient quantitative data for 
hybrid commercial space vehicles becomes available for analysis and to 
conduct a regulatory process to standardize airworthiness requirements 
for hybrid commercial space vehicles. An individual commenter noted 
airworthiness certificates issued by the FAA are part of a safety 
analysis but are not conclusive evidence of demonstrated reliability 
for the purpose of proposed Sec.  450.113(a)(5). ALPA noted that flight 
test results using proven flight test techniques and data analysis 
methods should serve to validate reliability of hybrid vehicles' 
carrier aircraft under proposed Sec.  450.113(a)(5), without requiring 
documentation and statistical analysis of all previous flights.
    In the final rule, the FAA is not providing a blanket exemption to 
the FSA requirements for hybrid operations. The final rule removes 
Sec.  450.113(a)(5) but maintains the flexibility proposed in the NPRM 
to enable an operator of a hybrid vehicle with a high level of 
demonstrated reliability to be exempt from performing some FSAs for 
some phases of flight without seeking a waiver. The FAA will work with 
hybrid vehicle applicants during pre-application consultation on how to 
comply with FSA, CEC, and FSS requirements utilizing the 
flexibilities that may be applicable depending on the applicant's 
vehicle and concept of

[[Page 79666]]

operations. For example, the FAA might determine the quantitative FSA 
requirements for those portions of an operation for which the vehicle 
operates similarly to a civil aviation aircraft governed by civil 
aviation regulations are unnecessary because the vehicle has 
demonstrated reliability for operations using a certificated aircraft 
or a valid airworthiness certificate with an acceptable flight test 
history.
    The FAA expands the flexibility for hybrid vehicles in proposed 
Sec.  450.113(a)(5) to all vehicle operators in the final rule in Sec.  
450.113, as discussed in more detail in the preamble section for FSA 
Requirements Scope and Applicability. The FAA finds this flexibility 
should be available to all operators if agreed to by the Administrator 
based on demonstrated reliability. This wider availability will provide 
a common regulatory construct across different operators to identify 
the phases of flight for which FSA must be performed. Based on current 
licensed operations, the FAA anticipates that initially only carrier 
vehicles that have an airworthiness certificate and extensive flight 
history would be able to meet the demonstrated reliability standard. 
Aside from some carrier aircraft used as a component of a launch 
vehicle, no existing launch vehicle has enough history to ensure 
sufficient protection against a high consequence event based on 
demonstrated reliability in accordance with Sec.  450.101(c) or enough 
empirical evidence to demonstrate compliance with the public risk 
criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) or (b).\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ The L-1011 carrier vehicle used for Pegasus launches is an 
example of a carrier aircraft with enough empirical evidence to 
demonstrate compliance with the public risk criteria in Sec.  
450.101(a) or (b). Using flight history to demonstrate compliance 
with the risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b) is relatively 
simple, given a statistically significant number of flights relative 
to the expected casualty limit of 1 x 10-\4\. As 
discussed elsewhere in the preamble, the FAA notes that the operator 
must also perform a system safety analysis to demonstrate that any 
modifications made to the carrier vehicle introduce only hazards to 
the public that are extremely remote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Galactic asked about the applicability of the rule for 
hybrid vehicles, including certain operational exemptions. Virgin 
Galactic commented that the safety-critical system requirements in 
Sec.  450.143 should not apply to hybrid carrier aircraft that operate 
under an FAA-issued license and hold an airworthiness certificate 
issued by the FAA. Virgin Galactic noted the requirements of this 
section were akin to aircraft certification, which are spelled out in 
the applicable parts of 14 CFR Chapter 1 that have been developed over 
decades as the aviation industry matured. Virgin Galactic stated that 
the commercial space industry is not at the state of maturity as 
commercial aviation, and applying these similar ``certification'' 
requirements is contrary to the requirement in the Commercial Space 
Launch Act to promote the commercial space launch industry and only 
regulate to the extent necessary.
    The FAA does not agree that carrier vehicles operating under an 
FAA-issued license with an airworthiness certificate issued by the FAA 
should be exempt from the safety-critical system requirements in Sec.  
450.143. While airworthiness certification likely indicates increased 
reliability because a certificated aircraft has satisfied many separate 
FAA regulations, the satisfaction of those regulations does not alone 
demonstrate that the carrier vehicle will meet the applicable 
requirements under chapter III. However, an applicant may make a safety 
case supporting an equivalent level of safety for a component of a 
launch system if it holds a valid airworthiness certificate with an 
acceptable flight test history. In the final rule, Sec.  450.143 
includes the requirements for all safety-critical system components and 
eliminates the ambiguity that existed in the part 431 regulations 
regarding required testing of safety-critical systems. Section 
450.143(e)(3) also requires a summary of the analysis detailing how 
applicants arrived at the predicted operating environment and duration 
for all qualification and acceptance testing. Such a summary is current 
practice, and Sec.  450.143(e) makes this requirement explicit for all 
vehicles. In response to Virgin Galactic's comments regarding the 
relative maturity of commercial aviation versus the commercial space 
industry and the appropriate approach to regulating the commercial 
space industry, the FAA believes that the performance-based 
requirements of the final rule fulfill statutory mandates and are 
appropriate for the commercial space industry's capabilities now and as 
they will evolve in the future.
    An individual commenter stated that the carrier aircraft portion of 
their launch system would also be capable of conducting operations as a 
space support vehicle (SSV). The commenter sought clarification as to 
whether part 450 would require adjustment to be consistent with new SSV 
operations. SSVs and SSV flight are defined in section 50902 of title 
51. Requirements to conduct the flight of a space support vehicle would 
be promulgated pursuant to Section 44737, and are beyond the scope of 
this rulemaking.
bb. Agreements and Airspace (Sec.  450.147)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to streamline the existing 
requirements for agreements by removing specific requirements for a 
variety of agreements and procedures and allowing an operator to 
determine what agreements would be needed for its particular operation. 
As proposed in Sec.  450.147, a vehicle operator would be required to 
have written agreements with any entity that provides a service or use 
of property to meet a requirement in part 450. The regulation 
identified various entities for which agreements may be required 
including a Federal launch range operator, a licensed launch or reentry 
site operator, any party that provides access to or use of property and 
services required to support a safe launch or reentry under part 450, 
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the FAA.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposal with one minor 
change. The FAA has replaced the words ``Federal launch range'' in 
Sec.  450.147(a)(1) with ``Federal launch or reentry site'' to 
encompass all Federal sites used for licensed activities.
    AAAE asked whether proposed Sec.  450.147(a)(1) would require 
agreements with alternative or contingent landing sites and requested 
that the FAA expressly require such agreements to ensure that they are 
included in the licensing and launch preparation process. In Sec.  
450.147(a)(1), the FAA requires agreements with any entity that 
provides access to property required to support a safe launch or 
reentry. Contingency abort locations are taken into consideration by 
the applicant as part of its public safety analyses and by the FAA in 
its environmental review. Because contingency abort locations 
necessarily involve planned access to property, the FAA will not revise 
the regulation to expressly require agreements with alternative or 
contingent landing sites. The language in Sec.  450.147(a)(1) is 
sufficient to ensure agreements are in place for all planned locations. 
The FAA will not require such agreements for emergency landing sites or 
other locations that are being considered, but have not been finalized 
by the operator.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ The FAA notes that it has distinguished emergency abort 
landing sites from planned contingency abort sites in other 
rulemakings. For example, in the Commercial Space Transportation 
Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations final 
rule, Sec.  431.23 required an operator to identify contingency 
abort sites in its application. The FAA stated that contingency 
abort sites are pre-planned, and their potential use may be 
identified as part of an application in order to meet mission risk 
criteria and, therefore, are separate and distinct from emergency 
abort landing situations that may potentially be anywhere. 65 FR 
56617, 56635 (November 20, 2000).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 79667]]

    Section 450.147(a)(3) requires operators to have written agreements 
with FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) or foreign air navigation 
service providers (ANSP) to establish procedures for the issuance of a 
Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) prior to a launch or reentry.
    AOPA recommended that the FAA establish procedures for the issuance 
of a Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) at least 72 hours prior to a launch or 
reentry to forewarn the public about activation of different airspace.
    It would not be appropriate within this commercial space rulemaking 
to impose a requirement on the FAA ATO or a foreign ANSP to issue 
NOTAMs within a particular time frame. Each ANSP is responsible for the 
safe and efficient use of its airspace and can be expected to provide 
notification consistent with its obligations. As such, notification 
requirements necessary to protect the public, including any minimum 
times for notification, should be determined as part of the agreement 
development process with the FAA ATO or foreign ANSP.
    Section 450.147(a)(4) requires an operator to enter into such 
agreements with emergency response providers, including local 
government authorities, as necessary to satisfy the requirements of 
Sec.  450.173 (Mishap plan--reporting, response, and investigation 
requirements).
    SpaceX recommended that proposed Sec.  450.147(a)(4) exclude 
government installations where responsibilities and mutual aid protocol 
rendered separate agreements with local authorities unnecessary. SpaceX 
believes this addition would manage expectations where multiple Federal 
entities may have overlapping jurisdiction for addressing mishap 
response.
    Because Sec.  450.173(d)(5) requires an operator to implement 
agreements with government authorities and emergency responders ``as 
necessary'' to satisfy the requirements of Sec.  450.173, no change to 
the proposed language in Sec.  450.147(a)(4) is required. An operator 
that is launching from a Federal launch site is not required to execute 
agreements with local authorities if the Federal site already has the 
necessary coordination in place to satisfy the requirements in Sec.  
450.173.
    Section 450.147(b) requires that agreements clearly delineate the 
roles and responsibilities of each party to support the safe launch or 
reentry under part 450. SpaceX suggested adding language to require 
parties to delineate roles and responsibilities ``within their 
jurisdiction.'' Indeed, an entity may only enter into an agreement to 
the extent they are authorized, but the FAA disagrees that this 
language is needed in the regulation.
    Section 450.147(d) requires operators to describe each agreement 
submitted in accordance with the section.
    SpaceX asked the FAA to clarify in a guidance document the intent 
of proposed Sec.  450.147(d) and allow operators to provide other 
acceptable documentation (e.g., business processes like the Universal 
Documentation System) to avoid literal interpretations of requirements. 
To comply with this requirement, the operator will enumerate those 
services that the site operator is providing through various 
agreements. The FAA may request a specific agreement that the site 
operator has established to provide such a service. As long as each 
agreement required by this section meets the criteria set forth in 
Sec.  450.147, the operator may choose the format of the agreement. 
Therefore, the FAA adopts the proposed rule without change.
    Virgin Galactic asked whether an agreement would be required with 
local authorities to ensure that the area is cleared of the public and 
critical assets if an operator cannot meet conditional risk factor 
criteria for an uncontrollable area of land. The FAA notes that 
conditional risk does not trigger the need for an agreement with a 
local authority. Instead, it is related to the need for an FSS. 
However, such an agreement might be a means of mitigating conditional 
risk, potentially to a degree at which the operator does not need to 
employ an FSS.
    A number of commenters expressed concern that the NPRM did not 
require that airspace efficiency be taken into consideration as part of 
a launch or reentry operation. AAAE, A4A, ACI, ALPA, AOPA, CAA, NATCA, 
RAA, and Southwest Airlines recommended the FAA incorporate airspace 
efficiency consideration into the licensing process to minimize 
negative operational and financial impacts for airlines, passengers, 
cargo shippers, and the public that will result from this rulemaking. 
A4A, AAAE, and Southwest Airlines advocated increased transparency and 
collaboration with airspace stakeholders in developing agreements 
pursuant to proposed Sec.  450.147. A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, AOPA, CAA, 
NATCA, and RAA recommended the FAA ensure the safety requirements for 
commercial space operations, particularly those addressing risks to 
other aviation users, are commensurate with the expectations of the 
flying public. AOPA recommended the FAA prioritize funding and 
implementation of the Aeronautical Information Management Modernization 
program, which would provide real-time airspace information. A4A, AAAE, 
ACI, and AOPA recommended the FAA incorporate and implement various 
recommendations from the Airspace Access Priorities ARC and Spaceport 
Categorization ARC.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenters' concerns regarding airspace 
efficiency, but these issues are not within the scope of this 
rulemaking. Operational oversight and management of airspace impacts 
are managed at the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center. As 
noted in the Flight Hazard Area Analysis section of this preamble, FAA 
is working to address this issue through the Airspace Access ARC and 
other initiatives.
cc. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications (Sec.  450.149)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove the certification 
requirements found in Sec. Sec.  417.105, 417.311, and 415.113 and 
replace them with performance-based requirements in proposed Sec.  
450.149 (Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications). Section 450.149(a) 
would require an operator to ensure safety-critical personnel are 
trained, qualified, and capable of performing their safety-critical 
tasks, and that their training is current. Under proposed Sec.  
450.149, an applicant would be required to identify in the application 
all safety-critical tasks and internal requirements or standards for 
personnel to meet prior to performing the identified tasks. The 
application would be required to identify internal training and 
currency requirements, completion standards, or any other means of 
demonstrating compliance with the requirements of proposed Sec.  
450.149. The applicant would also be required to describe the process 
for tracking training currency.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended that 
the FAA require that safety-critical personnel comply with the Federal 
Drug-Free Workplace requirements set forth in 14 CFR 120. These 
commenters noted that the Federal Drug-Free Workplace requirements 
apply to government contractors, but commercial operators are only 
subject to company policy, which may not address the use of drugs and 
alcohol. The FAA did not propose to require drug and alcohol testing 
and finds that such a requirement would exceed the scope of

[[Page 79668]]

this rulemaking. The FAA may consider proposing such action in a future 
rulemaking.
    The FAA received a comment from Blue Origin supporting the changes 
to the safety-critical personnel qualifications requirements. In the 
final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.149 as proposed.
dd. Work Shift and Rest Requirements (Sec.  450.151)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to combine the rest requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  417.113(f) and 431.43(c)(4) into Sec.  450.151 (Work Shift 
and Rest Requirements), which would require an applicant to document 
and implement rest requirements that ensure safety-critical personnel 
are physically and mentally capable of performing assigned tasks. These 
requirements would apply to operations of all launch and reentry 
vehicles and would allow operators flexibility to employ rest rules 
that fit their particular operations. Section 450.151(b)(1) would 
require an operator's rest rules to include the duration of each work 
shift and the process for extending this shift, including the maximum 
allowable length of any extension. An operator's rest rules would be 
required to include the number of consecutive work shift days allowed 
before rest is required. Section 450.151(b)(3) would also require an 
operator's rest rules to include the minimum rest period required 
between each work shift, including the period of rest required 
immediately before the flight countdown work shift. Applicants would be 
required to submit their rest rules during the license application. In 
the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.151 as proposed.
    The FAA received seven comments on its proposed work shift and rest 
requirements. Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, Virgin Galactic, and an 
individual commenter agreed with FAA's proposed requirements permitting 
greater flexibility in ensuring sufficient rest for safety-critical 
personnel. Rocket Lab commented that the proposed approach would enable 
operators to develop work shift and rest requirements that are 
appropriate for the individual operating conditions, environment, and 
mitigations that exist.
    Virgin Galactic requested the FAA provide further guidance of what 
would satisfy proposed Sec.  450.151 beyond the example of Sec.  
431.43(c)(4). Section 431.43(c)(4) or the crew rest requirements of 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 are two possible, but not the only, means of compliance 
with Sec.  450.151.
    ALPA opposed the performance-based approach to work shift and rest 
requirements, stating that prescriptive duty limits were necessary to 
reduce the likelihood of human error related to fatigue. ALPA indicated 
the proposed rule made it possible for a commercial space operator ``to 
set unrealistic crew rest requirements for cost management (doing more 
with less) instead of safety.'' ALPA recommended the FAA adopt the rest 
rules contained in Sec.  437.51.
    The FAA elected a performance-based requirement over a prescriptive 
one akin to Sec.  437.51 in order to allow operators to develop 
requirements that are suited to their particular operations. In 
addition, prescriptive requirements fail to account for the various 
factors that can affect crew rest, such as the time of day of an 
operation, length of pre-flight operations, and travel to and from the 
launch or reentry site. The performance-based requirement set forth in 
Sec.  450.151 allows operators to take into account such factors 
affecting crew rest and adopt mitigations and procedures unique to each 
launch operation. The FAA also disagrees that Sec.  450.151 will enable 
operators to set unrealistic crew rest requirements in the interest of 
cutting costs. Although operators can develop rest rules that fit their 
operations, operators must demonstrate in their application that their 
rest rules ensure safety-critical personnel are physically and mentally 
capable of performing assigned tasks. The FAA will evaluate the rest 
rules during review of the license application, and, if accepted, they 
will become part of the license. The FAA finds that no change to the 
proposed regulation is warranted.
    ALPA and Blue Origin stated the commercial space operator should be 
responsible for monitoring compliance with work shift and rest 
requirements. Blue Origin noted the companies should be responsible for 
monitoring compliance after the FAA accepts an operator's rules through 
the application and approval process. Rocket Lab commented that a 
specific requirement for operators to monitor compliance with work 
shift and rest requirements was unnecessary as the regulation 
explicitly required that the rest rules implemented ensure safety-
critical personnel are physically and mentally capable of performing 
all assigned tasks.
    Operators are expected to monitor compliance with their approved 
crew rest rules so that personnel are fit to perform safety-critical 
tasks and to provide records of compliance with those rules, as 
required by Sec.  450.219(a), where requested by the FAA. The FAA finds 
that a specific requirement for operators to monitor compliance with 
work shift and rest requirements is unnecessary. The rest requirements 
in Sec.  450.151(b) ensure safety-critical personnel are physically and 
mentally capable of performing all tasks. It is up to the company to 
monitor compliance with its work shift and rest rules to ensure 
personnel are mentally and physically capable of performing safety-
critical tasks. An operator must comply with the rest rules accepted by 
the FAA as part of the license because it must comply with the 
representations in its application. Therefore, even absent an express 
requirement, an operator must monitor compliance with its rest rules in 
order to ensure that the objectives of Sec.  450.151 are met and that 
the operator does not act contrary to its application.
    Blue Origin asked the FAA to clarify the time period to which the 
rest rules apply in finalizing the rest requirements and the scope of 
license rule (Sec.  450.3). Blue Origin suggested the rest requirements 
should only apply during the period an action could present a distinct 
impact to safety, akin to how NASA closely monitors astronauts' rest/
work periods but does not mandate crew rest requirements for aerospace 
employees in manufacturing plants or NASA mission control staff.
    Although the FAA declines to limit the scope of Sec.  450.151 as 
Blue Origin recommends, the FAA clarifies that Sec.  450.151 is 
intended to ensure safety-critical personnel are prepared to perform 
tasks that have an inherent impact on public safety. Operators must 
document and implement rest rules to ensure that safety-critical 
personnel have received adequate rest before they perform any safety-
critical task. Operators would not be able to ensure that personnel are 
physically and mentally prepared to perform safety-critical tasks if 
the rest rules set forth in Sec.  450.151 applied only during 
activities that could distinctly affect safety (i.e., during safety-
critical tasks). For example, the rest rules apply to safety-critical 
tasks such as end to end testing and safety-critical hardware 
installation that may occur before hazardous pre-flight operations 
trigger the start of launch. Operators must therefore comply with Sec.  
450.151 for the duration of their license. The regulation is flexible 
enough that an operator can develop rules that treat different parts of 
launch activity differently. The FAA finds that no change to the 
regulation is warranted.
    Blue Origin suggested removing the definition of ``vehicle safety 
operations personnel,'' as it has caused confusion in the industry. The 
FAA agrees and does not adopt the definition.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA asserted the

[[Page 79669]]

requirements proposed in Sec.  450.151(b) reflect a relaxation of work 
rule standards compared to the current FAA and range policies. They 
further noted other DOT-regulated industries have explicit rest 
criteria and recommended that the FAA publish the acceptable criteria 
rather than having operators negotiate the hours deemed safe.
    The requirements proposed in Sec.  450.151(b) are not a relaxation 
of work rule standards compared to current FAA and range policies 
because, as previously stated, two of the ways an operator can show 
compliance with Sec.  450.151 are to meet current FAA rules (Sec.  
431.43(c)(4)) or AFSPCMAN 91-710, and the FAA retains oversight to 
determine that an operator's rules achieve the standard.
    As previously stated, the FAA will issue an AC on a means of 
compliance for Sec.  450.151. The crew rest requirements previously set 
forth in part 431 and the current crew rest requirements in AFSPCMAN 
91-710 will satisfy Sec.  450.151.
ee. Radio Frequency (Sec.  450.153)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that, for any radio frequency used, 
an operator would be required to: (1) Identify each frequency, all 
allowable frequency tolerances, and each frequency's intended use, 
operating power, and source; (2) provide for the monitoring of 
frequency usage and enforcement of frequency allocations; and (3) 
coordinate use of radio frequencies with any site operator and local 
and Federal authorities. Proposed Sec.  450.153(b) contained 
application requirements and required an applicant to submit procedures 
or other means to demonstrate compliance with the radio frequency 
requirements.
    Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Sierra Nevada commented the proposed 
requirements were duplicative of Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) licensing requirements and, according to Blue Origin, were an 
unnecessary burden on operators. Blue Origin explained that operators 
coordinate frequency management through the FCC licensing process, 
which is robust in its technical review of transmitter capabilities. 
Blue Origin also noted FCC licenses are public information that the FAA 
can verify. Sierra Nevada suggested the regulation should either 
require only that the applicant demonstrate it has coordinated with the 
FCC or be omitted altogether.
    The FAA agrees that the proposed requirements in Sec.  
450.153(a)(1) and (a)(2) are duplicative of FCC requirements for 
radiating systems and overly burdensome. The FCC requires in Section 
308(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, all the items in 
proposed Sec.  450.153(a)(1) and (a)(2) as part of an FCC license for 
radiating systems that an operator must obtain to operate radiating 
equipment as part of a launch. The purpose of radio frequency 
management, as stated in the NPRM,\172\ is to mitigate hazards 
associated with radio frequency usage including interference that could 
adversely affect the FSS or any safety-critical system of a vehicle, 
including RLVs and reentry vehicles. The intent of proposed Sec.  
450.153 (a)(1) and (a)(2) was to ensure radio transmissions would not 
interfere with commanded flight termination systems and would be 
compatible with the receiving system on the vehicle. The FAA finds that 
operators can identify and mitigate hazards affecting FSS or safety-
critical systems effectively without duplicating information required 
by the FCC. In the final rule, the FAA amends Sec.  450.153(a) by 
replacing (a)(1) and (a)(2) with the performance-based objective 
central to Sec.  450.153 that requires operators to ensure radio 
frequency interference does not adversely affect performance of any FSS 
or safety-critical system. Proposed Sec.  450.153(a)(3) is re-
designated as (a)(2) and continues to require operators to coordinate 
use of radio frequencies with any site operator and any local and 
Federal authorities, including any State, tribal, or territorial 
authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ 84 FR 15334, footnote 98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Blue Origin commented that proposed Sec.  450.153 added to the 
burden previously placed on operators under part 431, which ought to be 
included in the FAA's cost analysis. Blue Origin explained an applicant 
would be required to submit to FAA the substantive content of a 
frequency management plan and submit procedures to demonstrate 
compliance with that plan. Blue Origin pointed out that under part 431, 
the FAA did not require operators to prove they acquired FCC licenses 
for a mission or that they coordinated the use of radio frequencies.
    As previously explained, the FAA has removed the duplicative 
provisions from Sec.  450.153, which would have amounted to a greater 
burden on operators than has previously been required under part 431. 
As such, in the final rule, Sec.  450.153 requires no more of operators 
than what part 431 required for analysis of hazards associated with 
licensed activities, creating no additional cost to operators.
    Blue Origin recommended proposed Sec.  450.153 be removed since 
applicants were already required to address and mitigate hazards 
associated with frequency coordination or radiation exposure or power 
limits as part of their hazard analysis. Blue Origin added that, for 
launches at Federal launch or reentry sites, proposed Sec.  450.153 
would duplicate much of the information submitted to the Federal site, 
whose frequency management office typically works with range scheduling 
to regulate radiation and power limits to prevent exceeding radiation 
exposure and power limits while on the pad and harming the vehicle or 
payload. For operations that do not occur on Federal sites, Blue Origin 
indicated an operator would proceed as under the current part 431 by 
identifying hazards and mitigation measures required to meet the public 
safety limits. According to Blue Origin, operators should incorporate 
hazards associated with this issue in their hazard analysis, including 
identifying mitigation issues.
    The FAA disagrees that Sec.  450.153 is unnecessary or duplicative 
of hazard analysis requirements. As stated in the NPRM, the FAA has 
determined that the public safety risks posed by radio frequency 
interference warrant specific attention apart from the general 
requirement that operators identify and mitigate hazards associated 
with licensed activity. To the extent Federal launch or reentry site 
procedures provide for coordination of radio frequencies used, an 
operator may rely on those procedures to demonstrate compliance with 
Sec.  450.153. The FAA does not prescribe the manner in which an 
operator ensures that radio frequency interference does not adversely 
affect a vehicle's FSS or any safety-critical system. The FAA merely 
requires that operators set forth in their applications a means of 
complying with Sec.  450.153 so that the FAA can ensure that radio 
interference issues are appropriately addressed.
    In an effort to streamline radio frequency requirements, SpaceX 
recommended the FAA revise proposed Sec.  450.153(a)(2) to require that 
operators ensure frequency utilization according to frequency 
authorization parameters. SpaceX also recommended the FAA revise 
proposed Sec.  450.153(b) to require coordination with site operators 
and local and Federal authorities only for launches that do not occur 
on a Federal launch or reentry site with existing radio frequency 
policies and procedures.
    The FAA disagrees that any frequency authorization parameters 
issued by the FCC, which are geared toward managing

[[Page 79670]]

frequency use and operation, would be sufficient to assess hazards to 
public safety posed by radio frequency interference, which are properly 
within the FAA's purview. As previously discussed, the FAA has removed 
the prescriptive requirements that it deemed duplicative of FCC 
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.153(a) and replaces them with a 
central performance-based objective. The FAA declines to accept 
SpaceX's suggestion to amend Sec.  450.153(b). The coordination 
required by Sec.  450.153(b) allows an operator to operate a command 
transmitter at a frequency and power that ensures a flight termination 
system signal can be successfully transmitted, and thereby prevent 
harmful radio interference, in the interest of public safety. The FAA 
declines to remove the requirement that all operators coordinate use of 
radio frequencies with any site operator and local and Federal 
authorities in order to protect the public and public property, because 
such coordination is necessary to prevent radio interference that could 
affect public safety. Users of Federal launch or reentry sites may use 
Federal site procedures for radio frequency to demonstrate compliance 
with Sec.  450.153.
    Virgin Galactic asked if an operator could contract a third party 
to meet the frequency management requirements.
    The FAA does not prescribe the means by which an operator complies 
with Sec.  450.153. An operator could therefore enter into an agreement 
in accordance with Sec.  450.147 to have a third party, such as a 
spaceport or Federal launch or reentry site, satisfy the radio 
frequency management requirements contained in Sec.  450.153.
    As noted, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.153 (Radio Frequency Management) 
with revisions. The FAA replaces paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) with 
performance-based objectives central to radio frequency management. 
Operators will be required to ensure that radio frequency does not 
adversely affect the performance of FSS or safety-critical systems and 
to coordinate use of radio frequencies with any site operator and local 
and Federal authorities.
ff. Readiness and Rehearsals (Sec.  450.155)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an operator would be required to 
document and implement procedures to assess readiness to proceed with 
the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. As part of the application 
requirements, proposed Sec.  450.155(b)(2) would require an applicant 
to describe the criteria for establishing readiness to proceed with the 
flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.
    Rocket Lab expressed support for the proposed requirements as 
reducing the risk of unintended consequences that resulted from 
stringent time requirements. SpaceX recommended that the FAA clarify 
its intent for flight commit criteria in proposed Sec.  450.155(b)(2) 
to ensure that mission success is not a factor by having applicants 
describe the criteria ``to ensure public safety'' for establishing 
readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.
    The FAA agrees that a change to the proposed regulatory language 
would clarify the scope of the requirement. Therefore, the FAA revises 
Sec.  450.155(b)(2) by adding the phrase ``so that public safety is 
maintained'' to the end of the paragraph. The FAA did not adopt the 
language recommended by SpaceX because the requirement calls for 
criteria that establish readiness to proceed with flight or reentry 
while ensuring public safety. The FAA's revision maintains the emphasis 
on developing criteria to determine readiness to proceed with launch or 
reentry, and clarifies that the operator need only identify those 
criteria that affect public safety.
gg. Communications (Sec.  450.157)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to preserve the substantive 
communications requirements from parts 417 and 431 but eliminate the 
requirement to implement a communications plan. Proposed Sec.  
450.157(a) would require an operator to define the authority of 
personnel to issue ``hold/resume,'' ``go/no go,'' and abort commands, 
assign communication networks so those personnel have direct access to 
real-time safety-critical information, ensure those personnel monitor 
each common intercom channel during countdown and flight, and implement 
a protocol for using defined radio telephone communications 
terminology. Proposed Sec.  450.157(c) would also require an operator 
during each countdown to record all safety-critical communications 
network channels that are used for voice, video, or data transmissions 
to support safety-critical systems. This requirement is substantially 
the same requirement in Sec. Sec.  417.111(l)(5)(vii) and 431.41. In 
the final rule, with the exception of proposed Sec.  450.157(a)(3) as 
discussed later in this preamble section, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.157 
as proposed.
    As explained in the NPRM, operators would not need to submit their 
communication procedures during the application process as those 
procedures generally are not mature at that time. The FAA will verify 
compliance with Sec.  450.157 during inspections.\173\ The inspections 
will be consistent with current practice, in which FAA inspectors often 
review the operator's final communications procedures. Given that 
operators do not need to demonstrate compliance with Sec.  450.157 at 
the application stage, operators may be required to revise their 
communication procedures to resolve issues identified during compliance 
monitoring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ 84 FR 15337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received three comments addressing the communications 
requirements proposed in Sec.  450.157. AAAE recommended the FAA 
require procedures and protocols on how the operator would communicate 
with contingency or alternative landing sites, and emergency 
responders. AAAE also suggested the FAA consider providing these same 
stakeholders with the ability to monitor countdown and communications 
channels, just as operators would be required to provide the FAA with 
such access under proposed Sec.  450.209.
    The FAA finds no additional requirements are necessary, as the 
accident investigation and agreement requirements address AAAE's 
concerns. Operators must include emergency response procedures in their 
mishap plans pursuant to Sec.  450.173, which could, in many instances 
include communication procedures with emergency response service 
providers. In addition, operators must enter into and implement any 
necessary agreements with local authorities and emergency response 
services, such as first responders. Any other stakeholder, such as a 
contingency abort site, may request to monitor channels as part of its 
agreement with the operator, but the FAA does not find it necessary for 
safety to mandate this type of monitoring in all situations.
    Sierra Nevada commented that the requirement to monitor each common 
intercom channel is excessive and would decrease the safety of an 
operation. It noted that, for operators with multiple channels (e.g., 
more than 10), monitoring each channel would serve to decrease the 
overall situational awareness of the controller. Sierra Nevada 
recommended the FAA revise proposed Sec.  450.157(a)(3) to require that 
personnel monitor only the applicable intercom channels during 
countdown and flight.
    The FAA agrees with Sierra Nevada's recommendation and removes 
Sec.  450.157(a)(3). The persons responsible for the launch need to 
maintain situational awareness and have all

[[Page 79671]]

safety-critical information in order to make decisions that affect 
public safety. In cases in which there are multiple channels, all 
channels do not have to be monitored at the same time. It is common 
practice to turn down or turn off channels in order to listen to a 
channel that has critical information. Each person identified in 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section is not required to listen actively at 
all times. Operator personnel other than those listed in (a)(1) may 
listen to channels as necessary to relay critical information to the 
personnel listed in (a)(1).
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended the 
FAA qualify the requirement to record safety-critical communications 
channels in Sec.  450.157(c) as ``subject to records retention 
requirements of Sec.  450.219.'' The FAA agrees that an operator must 
record all safety-critical channels and retain them for the time 
periods specified in Sec.  450.219, but does not agree that a change to 
the regulatory text is necessary.
hh. Pre-Flight Procedures (Sec.  450.159)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to streamline countdown procedures 
and requirements. Specifically, the FAA proposed not to include in part 
450 the requirements for safety directives or safety notebooks in Sec.  
431.37(a)(2) and for a countdown plan in Sec.  417.111(l), as well as 
the requirement to file such plans, because there are many methods of 
documenting pre-flight procedures that do not involve a plan or 
notebook. In addition, the FAA proposed a performance-based requirement 
in which an operator who needs to implement pre-flight procedures would 
verify that all flight commit criteria are satisfied before flight and 
ensure the operator is capable of returning the vehicle to a safe state 
after a countdown abort or delay. In the final rule, the FAA adopts 
Sec.  450.159 (Pre-flight Procedures) as proposed.
    Virgin Galactic commented that, if the FAA knows which events must 
take place as a part of a countdown, it should require them in proposed 
Sec.  450.159(a)(1). Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA require 
operators to identify the sequence of events that must take place to 
initiate flight in order to verify that flight commit criteria are 
satisfied.
    Flight commit criteria involve much more than the launch sequence 
of events, including interdependent conditions such as meteorological 
conditions, lightning protection equipment measurements, and status of 
safety system components. Therefore, the requirements of Sec.  450.159 
cannot be satisfied by merely having operators identify the launch 
sequence of events. Furthermore, the FAA does not think a prescriptive 
requirement listing which events must take place as part of a countdown 
is necessary to ensure safety. Rather, this section takes a performance 
based approach that focuses more comprehensively on verification of 
flight commit criteria and the operator's ability to ensure that it can 
return the vehicle to a safe state after a countdown abort or delay. 
The FAA notes that the requirements for the flight commit criteria 
itself are clearly provided in Sec.  450.165(b).
ii. Control of Hazard Areas (Sec.  450.161)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to 
publicize, survey, and evacuate each flight hazard area before 
initiating flight or reentry to the extent necessary to ensure 
compliance with proposed Sec.  450.101. Proposed Sec.  450.161(a) did 
not change the need for surveillance relative to the current 
requirements in parts 417 and 431 \174\ for people on land or aircraft 
because an operator must continue to ensure all regions where any 
individual member of the public would be exposed to more than 1 x 
10-\6\ PC (probability of casualty) are 
evacuated. However, the FAA proposed to revise the requirement to 
evacuate and monitor areas where a waterborne vessel would be exposed 
to greater than 1 x 10-\5\ PI (probability of 
impact) currently required by Appendix B to part 417 under B417.5(a). 
The NPRM allowed an operator to include people in waterborne vessels in 
collective risk computations, rather than clearing a waterborne vessel 
from a hazard area because the vessel is exposed to 1 x 
10-\5\ PI. The NPRM proposal to include people on 
ships in the collective risk computation in Sec.  450.101(a)(1) and 
(b)(1) would allow the application of risk management principles to 
protect people on waterborne vessels. In the final rule, the FAA adopts 
Sec.  450.161 with revisions. It updates Sec.  450.161 to be consistent 
with the language in flight hazard area analysis section, Sec.  
450.133, and adds an application requirement for a description of how 
the applicant will provide for any publication of flight hazard areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ Part 417 requirements for establishing and surveying 
hazard areas for ELVs are found in Sec. Sec.  417.205, 417.223, and 
part 417 appendix B. Part 431 does not set explicit requirements for 
surveillance but both Sec. Sec.  417.107(b)(2) and 431.35(b)(1)(ii) 
require that an operator ensure all members of the public are 
cleared of all regions, whether land, sea, or air, where an 
individual would be exposed to more than 1 x 10-\6\ PC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA changes the title of this section from ``Surveillance and 
Publication of Hazard Areas'' to ``Control of Hazard Areas'' to 
describe the contents of this section fully, as the requirements cover 
more than surveillance and publication. The FAA also changed the 
proposed wording in Sec.  450.161(a) from ``publicize, survey, and 
evacuate'' to ``survey, publicize, control or evacuate'' to match the 
language in Sec.  450.133(a), which describes flight hazard area 
analysis. The term ``control'' is used to describe the overall 
management of hazard areas, including control of entry and exit points 
such as roadblocks and security checkpoints. The FAA also adds language 
in Sec.  450.161(a) that references the flight hazard area requirements 
in Sec.  450.133, which requires an applicant to identify the flight 
hazard areas it needs to control.
    The FAA notes that the requirements in Sec.  450.161 are consistent 
with the recommendations made by the National Academy of Sciences 
National Research Council.\175\ An applicant could apply conservative 
estimates of the ship traffic and vulnerability to demonstrate 
acceptable public risks. However, as explained in the NPRM, the 
operators still have the option to use the current approach in part 
417, where surveillance is required to ensure no ship is exposed to 
more than 1 x 10-\5\ PI, because that would be 
sufficient to ensure compliance with Sec.  450.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ In 2001, the National Research Council published a report 
on ``Streamlining Space Launch Range Safety,'' which included a 
recommendation that ``safety procedures based on risk avoidance 
should be replaced with procedures consistent with the risk 
management philosophy specified by EWR 127-1.'' See p. 44 of IBSN 0-
309-51648-X available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9790.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA proposed that 
the phrase ``unless otherwise assigned through agreement with a launch 
or reentry facility'' be added to proposed Sec.  450.161(a) for 
clarification. Virgin Galactic also recommended that this requirement 
be handled through Letters of Agreement. Although the operator may 
contract with another party for the provision of services to meet this 
requirement, the licensee remains responsible for complying with the 
requirement. As such, the FAA does not agree that this recommended 
addition is necessary.
    SpinLaunch commented that the goals of the NOTAM required under 
proposed Sec.  450.161 can be addressed through area designations on 
Sectional Aeronautical Charts, controlled airspace designation, and 
coordination with Air Traffic Control. The FAA is responsible for the

[[Page 79672]]

management of the NAS and establishes the regulations, processes, and 
procedures for restricting airspace including airspace restrictions for 
commercial space activity. Under Sec.  450.147, when an operator enters 
into a letter of agreement with the FAA, the airspace needed to 
accomplish the proposed operation safely is notionally identified and 
air traffic control coordination procedures are established 
accordingly. The FAA did not propose changes to airspace management 
regulations or processes, so SpinLaunch's comment is beyond the scope 
of this rulemaking.
    AOPA commented that airspace hazard volumes are not communicated in 
a standardized manner today, nor are pilots educated on what to do with 
this information. AOPA further commented that a publicly accessible, 
authoritative source for launch information would greatly increase 
awareness and mitigate adverse impacts caused by short notice 
announcements of launches. The commenter also suggested that 
prospective users of the system should be part of this capability's 
development process.
    As discussed more fully in the preamble section associated with 
Flight Hazard Area Analysis, the FAA finds that the issue raised by 
AOPA is best addressed by the NOTAM/AIM Modernization effort rather 
than this rulemaking.
    Boeing commented that, currently, not all areas that are publicized 
are also surveyed, controlled, and evacuated. Boeing stated that the 
need to survey and evacuate should be scalable and dependent upon the 
risk magnitude and area, remoteness of the hazard areas, capabilities 
for monitoring, and overall risk/benefit tradeoff. The FAA does not 
believe a change to the proposed rule is necessary to address these 
concerns. The requirement to survey, publicize, control, and evacuate 
each flight hazard area is scalable, as these measures are required 
``to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with Sec.  450.101.'' 
This reference to Sec.  450.101 means that the need to control the 
hazard areas is dependent on the public risk criteria, as well as the 
inputs and assumptions used in the FSA.
    Sierra Nevada commented that Sec.  450.161 would be an increase in 
regulatory burden due to surveillance over a large area being cost-
prohibitive and nearly impossible to implement for smaller companies. 
Sierra Nevada recommended that operators only be required to ensure 
NOTAMs and Notices to Mariners are in place prior to operation, and 
should not bear consequences if the public breaches those areas. Sierra 
Nevada also asked how an operator could reasonably survey an aircraft 
hazard area over a large area of ocean.
    The FAA disagrees with this comment and notes that this requirement 
codifies current practice. The FAA further notes that the only change 
to current practice--the inclusion of people on ships in collective 
risk--actually decreases regulatory burden for waterborne vessel hazard 
areas. An operator is no longer required to evacuate and monitor areas 
where a waterborne vessel would be exposed to greater than 1 x 
10-\5\ PI. In issuing its first waiver of the 
existing requirement in Sec.  417.107(b)(3),\176\ the FAA explained 
that successful application of the public risk management for the 
protection of people in waterborne vessels has the potential for 
reducing launch costs by reducing delays due to ship traffic in warning 
areas while maintaining a high level of public safety. For example, 
prior to the waiver of Sec.  417.107(b)(3), a launch from Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station was delayed, in order to meet the 
requirements of Sec.  417.107(b)(3), by the presence of a tug boat 
towing a large barge inside the ship hazard area. The final rule 
addresses Sierra Nevada's concerns regarding surveillance of a large 
portion of ocean by including people on ships in the collective risk 
criterion. Furthermore, the FAA notes that this requirement could be 
met a number of ways, including through an operator agreement with a 
Federal launch or reentry site or the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ See Waivers of Ship Protection Probability of Impact 
Requirement, 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Galactic asked whether it is necessary to require an 
operator to meet the EC criteria if the operator is using a 
flight hazard area, thus ensuring no member of the public is in the 
area. The FAA addressed this issue during the public comment period in 
``Responses to the Public's Clarifying Questions Received by July 12, 
2019.'' An EC analysis is still required even if launch 
hazards are contained over regions of land, sea, or air that are 
completely void of members of the public because the systems necessary 
to achieve such containment, such as an FSS, may fail. If an FSS fails, 
debris may fall outside of hazard areas where members of the public are 
present. The EC analysis ensures that the potential failure 
of those systems is accounted for when calculating risk to the public.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.161(b) would have required an 
operator to perform surveillance sufficient to verify or update the 
assumptions, input data, and results of the FSA. The NPRM preamble 
stated that, given that there are numerous assumptions and input data 
that are critical to the validity of the FSA, this requirement could 
have a variety of surveillance implications beyond the surveillance 
necessary to ensure the public exposure at the time of the operation is 
consistent with the assumptions and input data for the FSA. As 
described in the NPRM preamble, an example would be that an FSA could 
assume that a jettisoned stage remains intact to impact or breaks up 
into pieces that are not all capable of causing casualties to people on 
the ground but could still be capable of causing casualties to people 
in a particularly vulnerable class of aircraft, such as helicopters.
    In the final rule, the FAA maintains the requirement that an 
operator employ some type of surveillance (e.g., telemetry data, or 
remote sensors such as a camera or radar) to verify that the jettisoned 
stage behaves in a manner consistent with the FSA if that behavior is 
germane to the size of the aircraft hazard area. The FAA clarifies that 
if an FSA includes conservative assumptions and inputs, or a 
sensitivity analysis to demonstrate that the assumptions regarding 
break-up of a jettisoned stage are not germane to the size of the 
aircraft hazard area, the operator will only be required under Sec.  
450.161(b) to demonstrate surveillance sufficient to verify the 
accuracy of the FSA. If the assumptions and inputs are sufficiently 
conservative, this contingency could mean an operator does not need to 
employ surveillance at all.
    Blue Origin provided suggested text for Sec.  450.161(b) related to 
vehicle tracking rather than surveillance. The FAA declines to adopt 
this change because vehicle tracking requirements in Sec.  450.167 
(Tracking) are distinct from the requirement to surveil the flight 
hazard areas in Sec.  450.161. The requirements and comments regarding 
vehicle tracking are discussed in the preamble section associated with 
Sec.  450.167.
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX also commented that if a member of 
the public or another Federal agency chooses to breach a hazard area 
and put itself at risk, the operator should not bear the consequences. 
Many commenters identified this possibility as a problem in the case of 
a hazard area violation that occurs after the decision to commit to a 
reentry.
    The FAA understands the unique challenges of reentry operations 
with respect to the control of hazard areas because of the long time 
lag between the commitment to reenter and the planned or potential 
unplanned vehicle presence

[[Page 79673]]

in a hazard area. The FAA will work with operators during the license 
application process in applying this requirement to ensure verification 
procedures protect the public adequately for each unique operation.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  450.161(c) would require an applicant 
to publicize warnings for each flight hazard area, except for regions 
of land, sea, or air under the control of the vehicle or site operator 
or other entity by agreement. If the operator relies on another entity 
to publicize these warnings, the proposed rule required the operator to 
verify that the warnings have been issued. CSF and SpaceX commented 
that operators would have very little ability to ensure and enforce 
closures when launching from a Federal launch or reentry site or if the 
hazard area falls within a foreign country's airspace.
    The FAA agrees with these comments. To address this issue, the FAA 
changes the language in proposed Sec.  450.161(c) from ``verify that 
the warnings have been issued'' to ``determine whether the warnings 
have been issued'' in Sec.  450.161(c)(1) in the final rule. The FAA 
recognizes that an operator would be unable to meet the proposed 
regulation to verify the warnings have been issued if the foreign Air 
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) fails to publicize the warnings. The 
FAA also adds in Sec.  450.161(c)(2) of the final rule that the 
operator must notify the FAA if the warnings have not been issued so 
that the FAA can determine if the launch or reentry can be conducted in 
a manner that protects the public sufficiently, and that this 
notification must provide sufficient information to enable the FAA to 
issue warnings to U.S. aircraft. An involved party could determine 
whether the warnings have been issued pursuant to the agreements the 
operator has with, for example, a Federal launch or reentry site or a 
foreign government. In cases in which a foreign ANSP does not issue the 
warnings in a timely manner, the operator must notify the FAA in 
accordance with a means of compliance accepted by the FAA. The means of 
compliance will describe information that the operators should 
communicate to the FAA to (1) show due diligence in the fulfillment of 
their requirements in accordance with agreements in place, and (2) 
enable FAA to issue warnings to U.S. aircraft. The FAA finds that the 
final rule requirement in Sec.  450.161(c)(2) is responsive to the 
comment that operators have very little ability to enforce closures 
when launching from a Federal launch or reentry site or if the hazard 
area falls within a foreign country's airspace.
    The FAA proposed in Sec.  450.161(d)(1) that an applicant must 
submit a description of how the applicant will provide for day-of-
flight surveillance of flight hazard areas, if necessary, to ensure 
that the presence of any member of the public in or near a flight 
hazard area is consistent with flight commit criteria developed for 
each launch or reentry as required by Sec.  450.165(b). In the final 
rule, the FAA adds in Sec.  450.161(d)(1) that the applicant must also 
provide for day-of-flight control of flight hazard areas. The FAA notes 
that the nature of any surveillance (in terms of extent and frequency) 
necessary to ensure conditions consistent with flight commit criteria 
is naturally linked to the level of control an operator can exercise to 
limit access to a flight hazard area.
    In Sec.  450.161(d)(2), the FAA adds as an application requirement 
that the applicant must submit a description of how they will provide 
for any publication of flight hazard areas necessary to meet the 
requirements of Sec.  450.161(c). This application requirement is 
necessary for the FAA to evaluate compliance with the requirements of 
Sec.  450.161(c), including verifying whether the warnings have been 
issued.
jj. Lightning Hazard Mitigation (Sec.  450.163)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require operators to mitigate 
natural and triggered lightning by (1) implementing flight commit 
criteria that avoid and mitigate the potential for intercepting or 
initiating lightning strike or encountering discharge; (2) using a 
vehicle designed to continue safe flight if struck by lightning or 
encountering a nearby discharge; or (3) ensuring satisfaction of the 
safety criteria set forth in proposed Sec.  450.101 in the event of a 
lightning strike on the vehicle.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.163 (Lightning Hazard 
Mitigation) with modification. It revises Sec.  450.163 to remove 
paragraphs (a)(3) and (b)(3). It adds the modifier ``direct'' to 
``lightning strike'' in paragraph (a)(1), to match the application 
requirement in paragraph (b)(1). The FAA also modifies Sec.  
450.163(a)(2) in response to a comment as described below.
    Blue Origin commented that proposed Sec.  450.163(a)(3) diverged 
from the preamble to Sec.  450.163 and the rest of the proposed rule, 
which clearly convey that satisfaction of the safety criteria in 
proposed Sec.  450.101 was not optional. An operator would be required 
to satisfy proposed Sec.  450.101 regardless of whether it chooses to 
implement flight commit criteria or utilize a lightning-resistant 
vehicle.
    The FAA agrees with Blue Origin's comment and revises Sec.  
450.163(a) by removing proposed Sec.  450.163(a)(3). Proposed Sec.  
450.163(a)(3) was intended to cover an operator's use of physical 
containment as a hazard control strategy when damage to a vehicle 
caused by a lightning strike would not impact the safety of the launch. 
The FAA has found this section to be unnecessary because lightning 
would not be a concern for an operator using physical containment as a 
hazard control strategy since, by definition, the launch vehicle does 
not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight 
to reach outside the flight hazard area.
    Blue Origin requested that the FAA define ``continue safe flight'' 
in proposed Sec.  450.163(a)(2). In response, the FAA modifies Sec.  
450.163(a)(2) to require the operator to use a vehicle designed to 
protect safety-critical systems in the event of a direct lightning 
strike or nearby discharge. Thus, the final rule requirement in Sec.  
450.163(a)(2) mirrors the proposed application requirement in Sec.  
450.163(b)(2) to submit documentation providing evidence that the 
vehicle is designed to protect safety-critical systems against the 
effects of a direct lightning strike or nearby discharge.
    Virgin Galactic expressed concern for the amount of time it would 
take operators to redesign their vehicles to satisfy proposed Sec.  
450.163(a)(2) and asked that the FAA ``grandfather'' currently licensed 
operators out of this requirement. The FAA notes that Sec.  450.163(a) 
provides two ways for an operator to mitigate natural and triggered 
lightning and does not mandate a lightning-related design change. The 
decision to pursue flight commit criteria versus a lightning-resistant 
vehicle rests with the operator.
    The performance-based standards set forth in Sec.  450.163 will be 
accompanied by AC 450.163-1 ``Lighting Hazard Mitigation'' in the 
future, which will contain one, but not the only, acceptable means of 
compliance for Sec.  450.163(a)(1). The AC will include references to 
NASA-STD-4010, as well as relevant standards for the design of a 
vehicle to withstand the direct and indirect effects of a lightning 
discharge. Commenters largely supported this approach. Blue Origin 
noted that, while the Lightning Flight Commit Criteria adopted by the 
FAA have successfully prevented lightning attachment to vehicles in the 
past, operators may demonstrate that the avoidance criteria can be 
satisfied with their specific mission profile and vehicle design. 
Aerospace Corporation echoed support for enabling operators to

[[Page 79674]]

develop new methods and evaluations for lighting avoidance and 
mitigation.
    Regarding proposed Sec.  450.163(a)(1), two commenters expressed 
concern that the FAA, in adopting only NASA-STD-4010 as an accepted 
means of compliance for now, may not accept unique means of compliance 
in the future. The Aerospace Corporation and Weather Modification 
International argued the FAA should adopt prelaunch in situ measurement 
of electric fields as a means of demonstrating compliance with Sec.  
450.163, noting that NASA-STD-4010 is imperfect because it relies 
exclusively on observable ground data.
    The FAA considered using direct measurement of the electric field 
within a cloud as an option for compliance with Sec.  450.163. However, 
the ambient electrostatic field within and near electrified clouds can 
vary rapidly in both space and time because of the charge separation 
and redistribution processes inside and around the clouds, and because 
lightning can rearrange this charge abruptly over distances of many 
kilometers. Because no measuring technique today can be applied 
everywhere simultaneously and it is difficult to prove that electric 
field measurements taken near the flight path at an earlier time will 
remain valid at the time of launch or landing, this option is not 
viable on its own.
    The FAA agrees that the optimal standards for avoiding and 
mitigating natural and triggered lightning may be achieved through 
technological advancement in the future. Currently, NASA-STD-4010 is 
the only standard of which the FAA is aware that will satisfy the 
requirements of Sec.  450.163(a)(1). However, ongoing research efforts 
could soon allow for modifications of the NASA's Lightning Launch 
Commit Criteria, providing additional means of compliance. As stated in 
the NPRM, the FAA anticipates that industry will develop and submit new 
standards to the FAA to serve as unique means of compliance under Sec.  
450.35(b).
    The FAA also acknowledges the suggestion of Weather Modification 
International that the FAA take the lead in developing a definitive set 
of lightning standards. The FAA has traditionally relied upon the 
Lightning Advisory Panel, with its technical expertise in mitigating 
lightning hazards, to develop lightning standards. The FAA relied upon 
the lightning standards recommended by the Lightning Advisory Panel in 
developing the lightning requirements in part 417. Given the 
performance-based nature of this rule, the FAA is not prescribing a 
particular standard for mitigating lightning hazards, but instead will 
allow applicants to develop their own means of complying with Sec.  
450.163. The FAA notes, however, that the means of compliance 
identified, NASA-STD-4010, was developed by the Lightning Advisory 
Panel, and thus, would achieve the same result that the commenter 
requests.
    Blue Origin commented that, to the extent the FAA looks to aircraft 
lightning protection standards (e.g., AC 20-136B, AC 20-107B) to 
determine the appropriate industry standards applicable to Sec.  
450.163(a)(2), the agency should adopt only those standards clearly 
applicable to space vehicles. The commenter added that the use of SAE 
recommended practices would create an undue burden on applicants since 
the SAE protection rules apply to transport aircraft, which require a 
much higher level of safety than that prescribed by part 450.
    The FAA agrees that only those aircraft standards which are 
appropriate to apply to space vehicles should be used to assess 
compliance with Sec.  450.163(a)(2).
kk. Flight Commit Criteria (Sec.  450.165)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.165 that an operator 
establish and observe flight safety rules in order to initiate flight. 
The proposed rule also required an operator to establish and observe 
flight abort rules in order to end flight. Proposed Sec.  450.165 would 
require that an operator's flight safety rules include flight commit 
criteria identifying each condition necessary to satisfy proposed Sec.  
450.101 prior to initiating flight. These flight commit criteria would 
include: (1) Surveillance; (2) monitoring of meteorological conditions; 
(3) implementing window closures for the purpose of collision 
avoidance; (4) monitoring the status of any FSS; and (5) any other 
hazard controls derived from system safety, computing system safety, or 
FSA.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts proposed Sec.  450.165 with 
revisions. The FAA moves the flight abort rules proposed in Sec.  
450.165(c) to Sec.  450.108. The discussion of the revisions related to 
abort rules in proposed Sec.  450.165 is in the Flight Abort Rules 
section of the preamble. The FAA combines proposed Sec.  450.165(a) and 
(b) into a single paragraph (a) to reflect that this section now only 
relates to flight commit criteria.
    In addition, the FAA adds a requirement that the flight commit 
criteria must include confirmation from the FAA that the risk to 
critical assets satisfies the requirements of Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or 
(b)(4). This requirement is consistent with the changes to the critical 
asset requirements discussed earlier in the preamble and ensures that a 
flight is not initiated if it does not meet the risk criteria. The FAA 
will work with the applicant to create a streamlined process to achieve 
this confirmation. The FAA anticipates that it will generally be able 
to provide this confirmation well before the actual flight countdown.
    Sierra Nevada commented that the use of the term ``surveillance'' 
may be broader than the FAA intended. The FAA discusses surveillance in 
the preamble section for Control of Hazard Areas (Sec.  450.161).
ll. Tracking (Sec.  450.167)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed vehicle tracking requirements, 
including that an operator would be required to measure and record in 
real time the position and velocity of the vehicle. The system used to 
track the vehicle would be required to provide data to determine the 
actual impact locations of all stages and components, and to obtain 
vehicle performance data for comparison with the pre-flight performance 
predictions. The FAA intended the proposed requirements to capture 
current practice. As explained in the NPRM, tracking data sufficient to 
identify the location of any vehicle impacts following an unplanned 
event are necessary to ensure a proper response to an emergency.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ See 84 FR 15344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSF, SpaceX, SpinLaunch, and Virgin Orbit commented that the 
proposed language in Sec.  450.167(a) could be interpreted as tracking 
stages and components all the way down to the earth or body of water. 
CSF also sought clarity regarding the intent of the requirement to 
``provide data to determine the actual impact locations of all stages 
and components,'' and whether this requirement would mean that 
operators must predict the expected impact locations or actual impact 
locations. To clarify this point, CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Orbit 
suggested using the phrase ``predict the expected impact locations'' 
rather than ``determine the actual impact locations.'' The FAA concurs 
and adopts the recommended change in the final rule. The change more 
accurately reflects the intent of the requirement.
    Blue Origin commented that RCC 321 requirements to coordinate with 
the FAA to ensure timely notification of any expected air traffic 
hazard do not actually mention vehicle tracking, and that it may be 
possible to provide

[[Page 79675]]

notification of traffic hazards without the need for tracking (such as 
a straight up suborbital trajectory \178\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ A straight up suborbital trajectory is a nearly vertical 
suborbital trajectory. ``Suborbital trajectory'' is defined in Sec.  
401.5 as the intentional flight path of a launch vehicle, reentry 
vehicle, or any portion thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous impact 
point does not leave the surface of the Earth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Tracking data is an important element of current practice used to 
ensure the safety of people in aircraft. In the past, tracking vehicles 
was inherently a part of flight abort and an important means to ensure 
safety in the event of a mishap in which hazardous debris falls outside 
of designated hazard areas. During launch or reentry operations that 
lack the ability to inform the FAA rapidly of the volume and duration 
of airspace for which an aircraft hazard is predicted following a 
mishap, the FAA must close inordinately large regions of airspace to 
provide a sufficient level of safety to aircraft flying in regions 
where hazardous debris could fall in the event of a break-up. Although 
RCC 321 does not call for tracking per se, the FAA finds tracking 
essential to the safe and efficient integration of launch and reentry 
operations into the NAS. For example, the Columbia accident in 2003 
\179\ demonstrated that there is often a significant period of time 
between a vehicle break-up and when hazardous debris reaches aircraft 
altitudes. The time between vehicle break-up and when hazardous debris 
reaches aircraft altitudes enables the FAA to close a minimum amount of 
airspace while ensuring a high level of safety for aircraft flying in 
regions where hazardous debris could fall in the event of a break-up. 
As explained in the NPRM preamble, tracking data are generally 
necessary to ensure a proper response to an emergency, facilitate 
flight abort, obtain vehicle performance data for comparison with the 
preflight performance predictions in accordance with Sec.  450.103(d), 
and facilitate safe and efficient integration of launch and reentry 
operations into the NAS. Therefore, the final rule is consistent with 
the NPRM and current practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ See Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board at 
https://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSF, Leo Aerospace, Microcosm, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX commented 
that the proposed language regarding tracking was too broad and would 
seem to require an operator to track pieces of debris to impact during 
an off-nominal event. As clarified by the FAA during the public comment 
period in ``Answers to Clarifying Questions Received by June 28, 2019'' 
and ``Answers to Clarifying Questions Received by July 29, 2019,'' the 
term ``all stages and components'' does not mean that all debris must 
be tracked to the ground after a vehicle breakup.
    CSF and SpaceX suggested adding the word ``nominal'' to this 
requirement when referring to flight tracking. The FAA declines to 
adopt this change because it is important to track during off-nominal 
trajectories as well, including during normal flight and for off-
trajectory malfunctions at least until flight abort is initiated or 
vehicle break-up occurs. Tracking data can enable an appropriate 
response to an off-nominal situation, such as where to evacuate the 
public to protect against predicted toxic fumes or where to apply fire 
suppression resources.
    Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX commented that real time telemetry is 
often not possible for the entire mission, such as when a vehicle 
passes over the horizon or during a reentry blackout period. The FAA 
concurs with the commenters that real time telemetry is not always 
possible. In the past, there were times during reentry that the 
presence of plasma typically blocked vehicle-to-ground communications. 
More recently, space-based tracking and communications have made it 
feasible to overcome reentry plasma and over the horizon limitations. 
However, the final rule does not require operators to use space-based 
tracking and communications to meet Sec.  450.167 unless it is 
necessary to protect public safety, safety of property, and national 
security and foreign interests of the United States. The FAA does not 
currently foresee any licensed launch or reentry activity that will 
require the use of space-based tracking to protect public safety, 
safety of property, and national security and foreign interests of the 
United States. Furthermore, ``real time'' does not mean ``zero lag 
time.'' The tracking must be sufficient to meet the requirements in 
Sec.  450.167(a) to predict the expected impact locations and obtain 
vehicle performance data for comparison with pre-flight predictions. 
The FAA would not hold an operator accountable if there was some lag 
for reasons outside of the operator's control. The FAA believes that 
this leeway answers Blue Origin's recommendation that tracking 
requirements be limited to phases of launch or reentry vehicle flight 
identified in Sec.  450.113(a), since on-orbit tracking is not 
practical.
mm. Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements (Sec.  
450.169)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to update the information required 
for launch collision avoidance (LCOLA) and expand the analysis 
requirements to determine launch and reentry window closures, including 
updated protections for human spaceflight and additional closures to 
protect active payloads and prevent orbital debris generation. The FAA 
proposed that all operators would be required to come into compliance 
with the LCOLA requirements by the effective date of the rulemaking.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.169 with revisions. The 
finalized LCOLA rules better align with the existing processes used at 
Federal sites, provide adequate orbital safety measures for launch and 
reentry operations, and incorporate updated options for collision 
avoidance analysis. The FAA maintains that all operators must come into 
compliance with the LCOLA requirements by the effective date of this 
rule. The FAA adds the words ``are met'' to Sec.  450.169(b) to fix a 
typographical error in the NPRM.
    For an orbital or suborbital launch or reentry, Sec.  450.169(a) 
requires an operator to establish window closures needed to ensure that 
the launch or reentry vehicle, any jettisoned components, or payloads, 
meet the identified requirements with respect to orbiting objects, not 
including objects being launched or reentered as part of the same 
launch or reentry activity (e.g., dual manifested payloads). In 
performing a launch or reentry collision avoidance analysis against 
inhabitable objects, an operator may choose to stipulate an ellipsoidal 
separation distance, a spherical separation distance, or satisfy the 
probability of collision threshold (1 x 10-\6\). Collision 
avoidance analyses must also account for other orbital objects, such as 
spacecraft, and tracked debris. For these uninhabitable active objects, 
operators must satisfy either a less restrictive probability of 
collision threshold (1 x 10-\5\) or a spherical separation 
distance of 25 km. As discussed more fully later, in response to 
comments, the FAA revises Sec.  450.169(a)(3), which covers all other 
known orbital debris, so that operators must maintain either a 
spherical separation distance of 2.5 km or a less restrictive 
probability of collision threshold (1 x 10-\5\) from orbital 
debris that is medium or large in size (radar cross section greater 
than 0.1m\2\), as identified by the FAA or another Federal Government 
entity.
    The FAA also received a number of comments to proposed Sec.  
450.169(d), which identified when LCOLA analysis would not be required. 
This section was not a new requirement, but a consolidation of the 
existing regulations, Sec.  417.231(d) and Appendix C to part 417 under 
C417.11. As

[[Page 79676]]

proposed, an LCOLA analysis would not be required if the maximum 
altitude attainable by a launch operator's suborbital launch vehicle 
and any released debris is less than 150 km. The proposed requirement 
stated that the maximum altitude attainable is an optimized trajectory, 
assuming maximum performance within 99.7 percent confidence bounds, 
extended through fuel exhaustion of each stage, to achieve a maximum 
altitude.
    SpaceX opposed the requirement that LCOLA exclusions (launch and 
reentry window closures) be based on fuel depletion trajectories or the 
maximum attainable altitude of a launch vehicle. SpaceX commented that 
both bases exceeded the scope of past requirements and requested that 
LCOLA exclusions be based exclusively on the maximum performance case. 
SpaceX also recommended the FAA delete proposed Sec.  450.169(d) due to 
unclear technical or public safety benefits. Blue Origin recommended 
that fuel exhaustion from each stage be excluded from proposed Sec.  
450.169(d) because remaining fuel will always be required to land RLVs.
    The FAA disagrees with the recommendation to remove Sec.  
450.169(d). The FAA notes that, without this subsection, operators 
would need to conduct LCOLA analyses for all launches, regardless of 
altitude. The FAA has determined that no LCOLA analysis is needed for 
missions that do not exceed 150 km in altitude because orbital objects 
below this level are exceedingly sparse and usually are not present for 
long durations. Furthermore, launch operators currently do not provide 
trajectories for stages or objects that do not exceed 150 km. As such, 
it is appropriate to specify in the regulation when the LCOLA analysis 
is not required.
    The FAA agrees, however, that the language proposed in Sec.  
450.169(d) did not reflect current practice and could prove 
impracticable. The requirement for accomplishing LCOLA for all objects 
launched over 150 km was complicated by existing regulatory language on 
maximum altitude calculations. LCOLA is accomplished using only the 
nominal trajectory provided by the launch or reentry operator. No 
screening is accomplished using maximum possible altitudes because 
there is no planned trajectory to screen, and the FAA did not intend 
for operators to develop alternate trajectories. Therefore, the FAA 
revises Sec.  450.169(d) so that no LCOLA is required if the object's 
maximum planned altitude is less than 150 km.
    Similarly, the FAA revises Sec.  450.169(b)(1) to require LCOLA 
analysis only for the entire segment of flight of a suborbital launch 
vehicle above 150 km. The FAA agrees with SpaceX's comment that 
requiring operators to conduct LCOLA analyses below 150 km is 
unnecessary and would prove burdensome. This revision is consistent 
with the requirements for orbital vehicles and acknowledges that only 
the portions of flight above 150 km are screened in either case.
    Virgin Galactic recommended that proposed Sec.  450.169(d) be 
retitled, ``Applicability.'' SpaceX recommended the regulation refer to 
a ``body'' or ``object,'' rather than ``suborbital'' or ``debris.'' The 
FAA agrees with Virgin Galactic and SpaceX that these terms and the 
title could be clearer and more consistent with current usage. The FAA 
retitles Sec.  450.169(d) ``Exception,'' which more accurately 
describes this subsection, and substitutes ``object'' in place of 
suborbital vehicle in Sec.  450.169(d).
    Regarding requirements proposed in Sec.  450.169(a) and (b), the 
FAA received numerous comments questioning the need for a 200 km keep-
away distance for human spaceflight and the absence of probability of 
collision screening for debris. Numerous commenters also recommended a 
narrower trajectory data requirement for suborbital launches.
    An individual commenter stated that a spherical separation distance 
of 200 km from inhabitable objects, as set forth in proposed Sec.  
450.169(a)(1)(ii) and (a)(1)(iii), may not be appropriate due to 
advances in spaceflight systems such as autonomous flight termination 
systems (AFTS) and autonomous flight systems (AFS). The commenter 
recommended the FAA allow the 200-km limit to be tailored depending on 
the reaction time of the flight termination system. The commenter also 
suggested the 200-km limit could be tailored if the launch vehicle 
contains a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) (akin to what 
aircraft use to avoid planes) that can reasonably avoid nearby crewed 
vehicles.
    The FAA disagrees that a spherical separation distance of less than 
200 km is appropriate for inhabitable objects. No termination systems 
are currently used in orbit, and termination systems are not likely to 
be viable safety measures in orbit. The 200 km safety standoff distance 
is only for orbital spaceflight protection; it is not a separation 
standard for airspace integration. An orbital termination system would 
increase the danger to human spaceflight and increase the orbital 
debris population. Safety and efficiency must be accomplished with a 
screening prior to launch. Launch vehicles do not have TCAS-like 
operations and are not expected to acquire such capabilities.
    SpaceX asked the FAA to explain why Sec.  450.169(a)(3) requires 
operators to screen orbital debris greater than 10 cm\2\ against a 
spherical miss distance of 2.5 km, rather than meet a probability of 
collision threshold, as the FAA allows for inhabitable objects and 
active payloads. SpaceX stated that the requirement to maintain a 
spherical miss distance, without the option to evaluate probability of 
collision, is more restrictive than current requirements and 
inconsistent with USAF practices. SpaceX argued there should be an 
option to waive miss distance less than 2.5 km if probability of 
collision is sufficiently low, as is done for active payloads.
    The FAA agrees with SpaceX that probability of collision could be 
used for medium and large orbital debris because those objects are 
routinely well-tracked and have valid orbital covariances available. 
This option would provide for higher fidelity screening of collisions 
that could produce significant amounts of orbital debris. As such, the 
FAA revises Sec.  450.169(a)(3) to allow operators to screen for 
orbital debris identified by the FAA or other Federal Government entity 
using either a spherical separation distance of 2.5 km or a less 
restrictive probability of collision threshold (1 x 10-\5\). 
The use of probability of collision will require realistic covariance 
data on both the launching object and the screened orbital object to 
produce meaningful results. Operators who do not provide realistic 
covariance will be required to have the launch or reentry screened with 
stand-off distance. The probability of collision threshold required for 
debris is the same as that required for active payloads in Sec.  
450.169(a)(2), which mirrors current USAF requirements. The USAF 
requirements for debris screening use the same probability of collision 
as a high-fidelity analysis in place of both 25 km and 2.5 km standoff 
screening. The FAA slightly relaxed the debris screening size 
requirement to include only medium (0.1 m\2\ to 1 m\2\) and large 
objects (greater than 1 m\2\) in order to provide for accurate use of 
probability of collision analysis. Medium and large debris objects are 
well-tracked, and the U.S. Government maintains accurate covariance on 
these objects. This requirement achieves the objectives stated in the 
NPRM of avoiding conjunction analysis with micro-debris, while 
preventing the generation of space debris since these objects are well-
tracked and capable of

[[Page 79677]]

creating significant amounts of persistent space debris in the event of 
a collision.
    In proposed Sec.  450.169(f), the FAA would require an operator to 
prepare a collision avoidance analysis worksheet for each launch or 
reentry using a standardized format that contains the input data 
required by Appendix A to part 450. Proposed Sec.  450.169(f)(1) would 
require an operator to file the input data with a Federal entity 
identified by the FAA and with the FAA at least 15 days before the 
first attempt at the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a 
reentry vehicle or in a different time frame in accordance with 
proposed Sec.  404.15. Proposed Sec.  450.169(f)(2) would require an 
operator to obtain a collision avoidance analysis performed by a 
Federal entity identified by the FAA 6 hours before the beginning of a 
launch or reentry window.
    CSF and SpaceX requested the FAA alter proposed Sec.  450.169(f)(1) 
to require operators to file input data 7 days before launch or reentry 
rather than 15 days. The commenters stated the 15-day requirement 
conflicts with current processes at Federal launch or reentry sites, 
which allow submissions 7 to 10 days before launch or reentry. CSF and 
SpaceX stated that 7 days prior to launch has proven sufficient to 
produce screening results by 6 hours before launch. CSF and SpaceX also 
indicated that the requirement to obtain final results 6 hours before 
launch was inconsistent with current practice. The Federal entity 
performing LCOLA screenings delivers the final data hours before 
launch. CSF and SpaceX recommended adding a clause to proposed Sec.  
450.169(f)(2) allowing trajectory data to be delivered within timelines 
agreed to by the launch operator and the entity performing the 
screening. Alternatively, SpaceX recommended the FAA either require the 
data be submitted 3 hours before launch in Sec.  450.169(f)(2), as 
currently practiced by the USAF, or allow operators flexibility to 
obtain LCOLA data ``within'' 6 hours of the launch or reentry window 
beginning, but no later than 3 hours before launch.
    The FAA partially agrees with CSF's and SpaceX's recommended 
changes to the timelines established in Sec.  450.169(f)(1) and (f)(2). 
For launch or reentry operations that have successfully developed an 
internal process that results in repeatable LCOLA data submission, the 
FAA recognizes that 7 days prior to launch is an adequate time for 
Federal entities to process the LCOLA data based on recent LCOLA 
submissions reviewed for the last year. The FAA revises Sec.  
450.169(f)(1) to require that most operators submit LCOLA data at least 
7 days in advance of launch or reentry. However, the FAA disagrees that 
a shorter time frame would be appropriate for operators that have not 
yet conducted launch or reentry activities. The FAA has repeatedly 
noted that LCOLA data submitted from first-time launch or reentry 
operators often require significant reiterative work to achieve an 
acceptable submission. As such, the FAA will require operators that 
have not yet received conjunctive assessments to submit LCOLA data at 
least 15 days in advance of launch or reentry. This approach is similar 
to that of the USAF, which requires entities that have not yet received 
conjunctive assessments to submit LCOLA data 30 days in advance of 
launch. The FAA revises Sec.  450.169(f)(1)(i) to require that entities 
that have not yet received conjunctive assessments to submit LCOLA data 
at least 15 days in advance of launch. All other operators must submit 
LCOLA data at least 7 days in advance of launch.
    The FAA agrees that the requirement to receive results within 6 
hours before beginning of the launch or reentry window could be reduced 
to 3 hours. Later delivery will produce LCOLA results that are timelier 
and therefore more accurate for orbital safety purposes. Therefore, the 
FAA revises Sec.  450.169(f)(2) to alter delivery to 3 hours before 
beginning of the launch or reentry window.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented that 
much of proposed Sec.  450.169(a) focused on analysis that was not 
applicable to operators since applicants do not have the data and tools 
to perform LCOLA analysis, but merely provide inputs and implement 
operational windows based on closures provided. The commenters 
advocated for a streamlined commercial process for licensed launches or 
reentries that do not occur at a Federal launch or reentry site, in 
which the FAA would take the applicant's trajectory inputs to the 
Federal agency responsible for LCOLA analysis and establish stay-out 
windows. The commenters argued a standardized process would eliminate 
the need for multiple applicants to establish interfaces and procedures 
with an agency that rarely deals with commercial (space transportation) 
entities.
    The FAA declines to streamline the LCOLA process further by 
removing the analysis requirements of Sec.  450.169(a), such that 
applicants only need to provide data and abide by results. Transparency 
in LCOLA analysis provides confidence and understanding of the LCOLA 
process for launch, reentry, and payload, for operators as well as the 
public.
    The same commenters noted that the FAA could act as a go-between 
entity for all operators in a similar manner to Federal sites' 
processes. The FAA agrees that operators could use the FAA or the 
Federal sites as conduits to the LCOLA processing entity and recognizes 
that this flexibility remains in the final rule language. This type of 
activity is appropriately coordinated during the launch operator or 
reentry operator pre-application discussions. The FAA disagrees with 
requiring the FAA to act as a pass-through because the FAA believes 
that removing launch operators from direct contact with the USAF 18th 
Space Control Squadron could have unintended negative consequences. For 
instance, an early orbit breakup emergency may require prompt exchange 
of data between launch operators and on-orbit support services 
providers using processes already tested during LCOLA development and 
adding a pass-through element could hamper or slow analysis, 
notifications, and potential mitigation actions. Moreover, the FAA does 
not place orbital safety analysts on duty during launch or reentry 
operations. To adequately support the passthrough, the FAA would need 
to establish launch support teams and exercise the team in advance of 
emergency operations.
    Blue Origin and SpaceX recommended the FAA allow LCOLA analyses to 
be conducted by non-Federal entities. Blue Origin recommended that 
proposed Sec.  450.169(e) require LCOLA analyses be obtained from 
Federal entities, unless otherwise agreed to by the Administrator. 
SpaceX recommended proposed Sec.  450.169(f) allow operators to file 
input data and obtain LCOLA analyses from approved third parties, as 
opposed to Federal entities. SpaceX argued the FAA should foster a 
competitive market and allow flexibility in using commercial services 
as commercial entities enter the space situational awareness (SSA) 
market and aim to provide the same services as Federal entities. Virgin 
Galactic asked if the FAA anticipated a cost associated with obtaining 
the analysis from the Federal entity.
    The FAA declines to remove the reference to Federal entities in 
Sec.  450.169. Although commercial entities are developing space 
traffic support services that could eventually provide adequate safety 
for launch collision avoidance, to date, only Federal entities have 
full access to the authoritative catalog maintained by the DOD. Rather

[[Page 79678]]

than remove this clause, the FAA adds the phrase, ``or another entity 
agreed to by the Administrator,'' to Sec.  450.169(e) in order to 
provide flexibility should the space traffic authority and framework 
change over time. The Administrator may allow another entity to provide 
this service based on a demonstration that the data includes a complete 
and accurate catalogue of all identifiable objects in the relevant 
space environment. Currently, the DOD is the only entity that meets 
this criterion. In response to Virgin Galactic's question regarding 
cost, the current LCOLA analysis from the U.S. Government is provided 
free of charge.
    SpaceX recommended the FAA defer to or allow operators to use the 
LCOLA processes and standards of Federal launch or reentry sites for 
launches from Federal sites as means of compliance. SpaceX argues that 
doing so would minimize confusion regarding the applicable standards 
and procedures at different operating sites. SpaceX also suggested that 
Sec.  450.169(e) be revised to state that operators may use Federal 
launch or reentry site services with existing policies and processes to 
ensure acceptable compliance.
    The FAA declines to defer to the Federal launch or reentry sites. 
The FAA and Federal sites have different waiver requirements and 
processes. The FAA finds the language as proposed in the NPRM is 
adequate when coupled with the existing waiver process and equivalent 
level of safety process. In addition, the FAA notes that launches from 
non-Federal sites are not required to follow Federal site practices, 
and using a single FAA standard minimizes confusion both on and off 
Federal launch or reentry sites.
    Citing the discrepancy between the proposed collision avoidance 
analysis and current USAF practice, CSF stated the proposed rule 
attempted to ``fix'' parts of the licensing process that were not 
broken.
    The FAA disagrees that the collision avoidance analysis process is 
incompatible with the current USAF practice. The procedures for launch 
collision avoidance under Sec. Sec.  417.107, 417.231, 417.31, and 
417.43 did not reflect current practice as they excluded any 
probability of collision, referenced outdated processes and agencies, 
and required outdated adjustments to closures. The updated LCOLA 
process is compatible with USAF practices where appropriate (e.g., 
LCOLA timelines, screening options for human spaceflight protection, 
and active payload protection), noting that the FAA regulation must 
also guide operations of launch and reentry operations at non-Federal 
sites.
nn. Safety at End of Launch (Sec.  450.171)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  450.171 (Safety at End of 
Launch) requirements for the prevention of creating orbital debris, 
with which an applicant would be required to demonstrate compliance in 
its application.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.171 as proposed. The 
FAA did not receive comments on these proposed requirements.
oo. Mishap (Definition, Sec. Sec.  450.173 and 450.175)
i. Mishap Definition
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate the definitions of 
``Mishap,'' ``Launch Accident,'' ``Launch Incident,'' ``Reentry 
Accident,'' ``Reentry Incident,'' ``Human Spaceflight Incident,'' and 
``Launch Site Accident'' under the definition of ``Mishap'' in Sec.  
401.5. The FAA proposed four mishap categories, from most severe (Class 
1) to least severe (Class 4).
    In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the proposed 
classification system. Instead, the FAA combines the substantive 
criteria of Mishap Classes 1 through 4 under the definition of 
``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7. The revised definition describes events that 
constitute a mishap in a straightforward manner that better corresponds 
to regulatory requirements. The FAA incorporates additional changes to 
the final rule as discussed in the following paragraphs.
    Numerous commenters from industry expressed confusion about the 
types of activities that would fall under each class. The commenters 
questioned the necessity of classifying mishaps based on severity since 
the regulatory requirements were largely the same for all mishaps.
    The FAA reviewed the regulatory requirements associated with each 
of the proposed mishap classes and agrees there were no significant 
differences among the regulatory requirements for each class. The 
requirements to report, respond to, and investigate mishaps are 
incumbent upon an operator regardless of a mishap's severity. Mishap 
classes are not needed to achieve the objective of consolidating 
mishap-related terms and streamlining the requirements to report, 
respond to, and investigate mishaps. Accordingly, the FAA removes the 
proposed classification system. Except as discussed later in this 
preamble, the criteria proposed under each mishap class have been 
consolidated under ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that a Class 1 mishap would include 
any event resulting in (1) a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 
49 CFR 830.2) resulting from licensed or permitted activity to any 
person who is not associated with the licensed or permitted activity, 
or (2) a fatality or serious injury to any space flight participant, 
crew, or government astronaut. This proposal was consistent with 
longstanding definitions of ``launch accident'' and ``reentry 
accident'' in Sec.  401.5.
    A fatality or serious injury to a person associated with licensed 
or permitted activity constitutes a mishap under Sec.  401.5, rather 
than a launch or reentry accident. The FAA proposed to incorporate each 
of the mishap-related terms found in Sec.  401.5 under the definition 
of ``mishap.'' \180\ As such, save for the removal of the $25,000 
monetary threshold, all events that meet the current accident, 
incident, and mishap definitions would continue to be mishaps under the 
consolidated definition.\181\ In combining the mishap-related terms, 
the FAA inadvertently excluded from the proposed definition a fatality 
or serious injury to persons associated with licensed or permitted 
activity, which has been covered by the term ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.5. 
The FAA did not intend to depart from current practice by excluding 
these serious events from the definition, as evidenced by the NPRM 
preamble. In revising the definition of ``mishap,'' the FAA stated its 
intent to streamline and clarify existing definitions, eliminate the 
monetary threshold, and consolidate the accident and incident 
investigation sections of parts 417, 420, 431, 435, 437 into one 
section applicable to all licenses, permits, and vehicles.\182\ In 
proposing to consolidate existing definitions, the FAA did not propose 
to narrow the scope of activities deemed a mishap. In the final rule, 
the FAA revises the definition of ``mishap'' to include any fatality or 
serious injury resulting from licensed or permitted activity, 
irrespective of the person's involvement in the launch activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ 84 FR 15351 (``The proposed mishap classification system 
would streamline and clarify the current accident, incident, and 
mishap definitions to create four mishap categories organized by 
severity, from most severe (Class 1) to least severe (Class 4).'').
    \181\ 84 FR 15352.
    \182\ 84 FR 15351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA consolidates under paragraph (1) of the definition those 
criteria proposed for Mishap Class 1 and the previous definition of 
``mishap'' in Sec.  401.5. This revision is consistent with the mishap 
reporting requirements

[[Page 79679]]

under Sec.  450.173(c)(1) for the occurrence of a fatality or serious 
injury during FAA-authorized activities. The FAA removes the phrase 
``including ground activities at a launch or reentry site'' from the 
criterion addressing fatality or serious injury because the phrase 
``events associated with a licensed or permitted activity'' adequately 
covers such activities.
    In the final rule, the FAA re-designates criterion (1) of proposed 
Mishap Class 2 as paragraph (2) of the definition, which applied to the 
malfunction of an FSS or safety-critical system. The FAA notes that it 
removed the term ``flight safety system'' from paragraph (2) because an 
FSS is a safety-critical system.
    Paragraph (7) of the definition consolidates two criteria proposed 
under Class 3 and 4 for permanent loss of a vehicle during licensed and 
permitted activity, respectively. Since the FAA is discarding the 
mishap classification system, there is no longer a need to 
differentiate loss of a launch or reentry vehicle during licensed 
versus permitted activity. Nor does the FAA intend to differentiate 
loss of a ``vehicle'' from loss of a ``launch or reentry vehicle.''
    The FAA proposed to replace the clause, ``failure to complete a 
launch or reentry as planned,'' in the previous definition of 
``mishap'' in Sec.  401.5, with the clause, ``failure to achieve 
mission objectives.'' AIA, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX objected to this 
criterion, arguing that failure to achieve mission objectives related 
to mission assurance and exceeded the FAA's authority to ensure public 
safety.
    Based on industry comments, the FAA reverts to the original phrase, 
``failure to complete a launch or reentry as planned,'' but adds a 
citation to a regulatory requirement that narrows the scope of this 
criterion. Failure to complete a launch or reentry according to the 
parameters provided by the operator under the pre-flight reporting 
requirements of Sec.  450.213(b) \183\ will constitute a mishap. This 
criterion more accurately reflects the scope of activities that the FAA 
deems to be a mishap and alleviates the commenters' concerns about 
mission assurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ As discussed later in the preamble, Sec.  450.213(b)(2) 
requires a licensee to submit planned mission information, including 
the vehicle, launch site, planned flight path, staging and impact 
locations, each payload delivery point, intended reentry or landing 
sites including any contingency abort location, and the location of 
any disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage or component that is 
deorbited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA removes from the final rule all references to the proposed 
mishap classes. The FAA revises Sec.  450.131(a)(2) to clarify that a 
probability of failure analysis must account for data on any mishap and 
anomaly. While the NPRM stated that the probability analysis must 
account for all partial failures and anomalies, ``including Class 3 and 
Class 4 mishaps,'' the language implied that it would also apply to 
Class 1 and Class 2 mishaps--the more severe events. The FAA replaces 
the mishap classes referenced in Sec.  450.173(a) with the term, 
``mishap.'' Finally, the FAA replaces the mishap classes referenced in 
Sec.  450.219(b) with a reference to the portion of the mishap 
definition that corresponds to the proposed requirement: Events listed 
in paragraphs (1) through (5) and (8).
    The removal of the mishap classes dispenses with commenters' 
requests for clarification or guidance in ACs on applying and 
differentiating the proposed mishap classes.
    The final rule adds three changes to sections that cross-reference 
the mishap-related terms that the FAA proposed to replace with the 
revised mishap definition: Sec. Sec.  420.61(b), 437.87(b), and 
460.45(d). The FAA replaces the term ``launch or launch site accident'' 
in Sec.  420.61(b) with a reference to the portions of the mishap 
definition that replace these terms: Paragraphs (1), (5), and (8). The 
FAA also replaces the word ``shall'' with the word ``must'' in Sec.  
420.61 because ``shall'' is no longer used in FAA regulations. 
Similarly, in Sec.  437.87(b), the FAA replaces the phrase, ``launch or 
reentry accident or incident,'' with a reference to corresponding 
portions of the mishap definition in paragraphs (1) through (3), (5), 
and (8). As noted in the section of this preamble discussing the 
compliance period for legacy licenses (Sec.  450.1(b)), the FAA revises 
Sec.  460.45(d) to require part 415, 431, and 435 licensees to apply 
the mishap-related definitions in Sec.  401.5, and part 450 licensees 
to apply the definitions in Sec.  401.7 when describing the safety 
record of the vehicle to space flight participants. Specifically, Sec.  
460.45(d)(1) requires that part 450 licensees identify events that meet 
paragraphs (1), (4), (5), and (8) of the definition of a mishap in 
Sec.  401.7, which occur during and after vehicle verification 
performed in accordance with Sec.  460.17.
    The FAA also revises Sec.  420.59 to identify the portions of the 
mishap definition applicable to launch site operators licensed under 
part 420. Not all of the events described under the definition of 
``mishap'' apply to part 420 licenses, which do not authorize launch or 
reentry activities, though the NPRM did not state this fact expressly. 
Nor did the FAA intend the revised definition of ``mishap'' to expand 
the scope of the previous ``launch site accident'' definition under 
part 420. The FAA therefore revises Sec.  420.59(a) to state that a 
licensee must report, respond to, and investigate mishaps that meet 
paragraph (1) or (5) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7. 
The FAA specified in the final rule that part 420 licensees must 
prepare mishap plans that meet Sec.  450.173(b) through (f), including 
allocation of roles and responsibilities between the launch operator 
and site operator for reporting, responding to, and investigating any 
mishap during ground activities at the site, to specify the scope of 
the mishap plan more accurately. The FAA also deletes the word 
``response'' in Sec.  420.59(a) since Sec.  450.173 and the rest of 
Sec.  420.59 refer to a ``mishap plan,'' not a ``mishap response 
plan.''
    AIA and Virgin Galactic commented that the term ``failure of a 
safety organization'' in the ``mishap'' definition was unclear. The FAA 
notes this term previously appeared under ``launch incident'' and 
``reentry incident'' in Sec.  401.5. ``Failure of a safety 
organization'' occurs when an operator fails to complete an action 
expected or required by the safety organization, or when the 
organization stops functioning normally, such that it creates a public 
safety risk. For example, the FAA would consider an operator's failure 
to follow existing safety processes or procedures, thereby placing the 
public at risk, a failure of a safety organization. Additional examples 
include (1) the failure of operator personnel to communicate a hold 
condition upon a violation of launch commit criteria, (2) a safety 
official failing to report potential safety matters to the mission 
director, or (3) the failure of an organization to recognize and 
mitigate a hazard, resulting in a public safety risk. No change was 
made to the regulation based on this comment.
    SpaceX and Virgin Galactic sought clarification on the meaning of 
``high risk'' of causing serious or fatal injury and ``substantial 
damage'' to property. SpaceX requested examples of high risk versus 
non-high risk events. AIA asked how the FAA would determine whether an 
event rises to the level of ``high risk.'' Virgin Galactic recommended 
``high risk'' be defined in Sec.  401.5 as an event that would have 
caused a casualty had one or more humans been present.
    The FAA has used ``high risk'' of causing serious or fatal injury 
to define ``human space flight incident'' in Sec.  401.5. As stated in 
the FAA's ``Answers to Clarifying Questions

[[Page 79680]]

Received by June 28, 2019,'' \184\ the FAA would consider any off-
nominal event during pre-flight or flight operations that posed a high 
probability of fatality or serious injury to spaceflight participants, 
crew, government astronauts, or the public, to be ``high risk.'' The 
FAA stated in the NPRM that it would determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether damage to property not associated with the licensed activity is 
``substantial damage,'' based on such factors as direct replacement 
cost, repair cost, and the property's intended use and functionality. 
When making a substantial damage determination, the FAA will include 
damage caused by debris impacts, toxic plumes, and fires ignited by the 
vehicle or its debris. The FAA provided, as an example, structural 
damage to public property exceeding 50 percent of its market value, 
such as a failed launch attempt with debris impacts outside a defined 
hazard area resulting in a post-impact fire and loss of a residential 
structure. The FAA will evaluate unplanned damage to property 
associated with a licensed or permitted activity on the same bases. 
Examples might include a major repair or replacement of launch 
facilities due to an unsuccessful launch attempt, including processing 
facilities, launch pads, or propellant tanks, based on cost of repair 
or replacement or loss of use. Similar to the NTSB's definition of 
``substantial damage'' (49 CFR 830.2), under paragraph (6) of the 
``mishap'' definition in Sec.  401.7, the FAA may deem any damage that 
adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight 
characteristics of a launch or reentry vehicle which normally require 
major repair or replacement of the affected component, to be 
substantial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ See FAA-2019-0229-0106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA declines Virgin Galactic's suggested definition of ``high 
risk'' because the suggested standard is too narrow and would exclude 
serious injury short of fatality. As noted above, the FAA would 
consider any off-nominal event during pre-flight or flight operations 
that pose a high probability of fatality or serious injury to 
spaceflight participants, crew, government astronauts, or the public, 
to be high risk. The FAA intends ``high risk'' to cover events akin to 
a near miss or close-call. This approach is consistent with USAF and 
NASA practices. Virgin Galactic's suggestion would prove impracticable, 
requiring near certainty that a casualty would have occurred.
    Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA prescribe a timeline and 
specific process for determining whether ``high risk'' or ``substantial 
damage'' occurred. Virgin Galactic suggested the FAA develop such a 
process and incorporate it elsewhere in the regulations, not in the 
definition of ``mishap.'' Virgin Galactic argued the FAA should have no 
more than 14 days to make these determinations in order to minimize 
operational impacts.
    It would not be appropriate to limit the time frame or implement 
procedures to determine whether an event posed a high risk of causing 
serious or fatal injury or resulted in substantial damage to property. 
Although the FAA will begin to evaluate a mishap upon receiving notice 
and details of the event, the rate at which the FAA can make these 
determinations will necessarily depend on the attendant circumstances 
and information supplied by the licensee. Moreover, the FAA retains the 
ability to modify its determination upon receipt of new information 
about the mishap.
    SpaceX recommended the FAA remove ``government astronauts'' from 
the ``mishap'' definition because, unlike the uninvolved public, those 
individuals accept risk by virtue of their informed involvement in a 
vehicle's flight. Acceptance of risk does not preclude a fatality or 
serious injury from being considered a mishap. The FAA removes the 
references to space flight participants, government astronauts, and 
crew from the ``mishap'' definition to make it clear that the FAA will 
deem any fatality or serious injury associated with licensed or 
permitted activity a mishap irrespective of whether persons are 
involved in the licensed activity.
    SpaceX recommended the Class 2 definition be limited to events 
``during a licensed or permitted activity,'' rather than events 
``associated with'' licensed or permitted activity. The commenter 
offered no rationale for temporally limiting the criteria now described 
in paragraphs (2) through (5) of the ``mishap'' definition, and the FAA 
sees no reason to do so. The FAA would only deem a mishap those events 
that are within the scope of the FAA's statutory authority. No change 
to the regulation is made based on this comment.
    Sierra Nevada commented that treating the impact of a vehicle, 
payload, or components thereof ``outside the designated area'' as a 
mishap was overly prescriptive and unrealistic. Sierra Nevada commented 
that since hazard areas are generated as probability contours, not 
contours of total containment, debris could realistically exist outside 
the hazard area that would not warrant segregation in the event of a 
breakup scenario. Sierra Nevada also recommended removing from proposed 
Sec.  450.173(d) the requirement to report vehicle or debris impact 
points outside the hazard area to the FAA, which it claimed was 
burdensome, cost prohibitive, and unreasonable.
    The criterion cited by Sierra Nevada, now captured in paragraph (8) 
of the mishap definition, does not require licensees to track every 
possible piece of debris in an off-nominal scenario, but rather only 
debris that presents a hazard to the public. The proposed criterion 
closely followed the definitions of ``launch accident'' and ``reentry 
accident'' in Sec.  401.5, but used ``hazard area'' in lieu of ``impact 
limit lines'' and ``designated'' landing or reentry site, to be 
consistent with the hazard analysis framework set forth in part 450. To 
clarify the scope of this mishap criterion, the FAA replaces the term 
``vehicle or debris'' in paragraph (8) with the term ``hazardous 
debris,'' which is defined in Sec.  401.7. Thus, this criterion applies 
to the impact of hazardous debris (i.e., debris capable of causing a 
casualty or loss of functionality to a critical asset) outside the 
planned landing site or hazard area. The occurrence of debris outside 
the hazard area that does not meet the definition of ``hazardous 
debris'' in Sec.  401.7 is not a mishap.
    The FAA similarly revises Sec.  450.173(c)(3)(iv) to require that 
operators identify ``hazardous debris'' impact points as part of a 
preliminary mishap report, so that the FAA can assess potential public 
safety risks. The FAA makes this change to be consistent with the new 
definition of ``hazardous debris,'' and it is consistent with the 
intent of the proposed regulation. The FAA also replaces the term 
``impact area'' with the term ``designated hazard area'' to be 
consistent with the terminology used in the mishap definition. This 
revision does not change the scope of the requirement from the NPRM; 
the FAA only requires an operator to report the hazardous debris impact 
locations, not all debris impact locations. Use of the term ``hazard 
area'' is also consistent with requirements for an operator to 
establish ``hazard areas'' under part 450 to protect the public from 
hazards associated with their operations.
    The requirement to track and report hazardous debris is reasonable, 
given that operators must employ vehicle tracking for normal flight, 
and hazardous debris falling outside the designated area poses a 
serious risk to public safety. In the event of a vehicle breakup, 
operators should be able to approximate any hazardous debris impacts in 
relation to the designated landing site or hazard area based on the

[[Page 79681]]

vehicle's last-known state vector or other tracking resources required 
for normal flight.
ii. Mishap Plan (Sec.  450.173)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate mishap planning, 
reporting, response, and investigation requirements under proposed 
Sec.  450.173. The FAA also proposed to revise Sec. Sec.  420.59 and 
437.41 to require an applicant to submit a mishap plan that meets the 
requirements of Sec.  450.173. Proposed Sec.  450.173(c) required an 
operator to report to and cooperate with FAA and NTSB investigations 
and designate one or more points of contact for the FAA and NTSB. 
Proposed Sec.  450.173(d) required operators to notify the FAA of 
mishaps and submit a preliminary report within certain time frames. 
Proposed Sec.  450.173(f) required that, in the event of a mishap, an 
operator must investigate the root causes of the mishap and report 
investigation results to the FAA.
    Virgin Galactic broadly expressed support for the proposed rule. 
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended adding 
to proposed Sec.  450.173(f) a requirement for licensees to support any 
NTSB or government agency-led mishap investigation and to cooperate 
with any other government investigative agencies.
    The FAA declines to incorporate the suggested addition. Upon review 
of the NPRM and comments received, the FAA determines that the 
requirement originally proposed in Sec.  450.173(c) regarding NTSB and 
FAA cooperation is unnecessary. Section 450.13 (Rights Not Conferred by 
a Vehicle Operator License) plainly states that issuance of a license 
does not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with all 
applicable requirements of law or regulation. The duty of operators to 
comply with lawful investigations, whether conducted by the FAA or 
another entity with investigative authority, exists irrespective of the 
language proposed in Sec.  450.173(c). Accordingly, the FAA removes 
proposed Sec.  450.173(c) from the final rule. For the same reason, the 
FAA also removes paragraph (b)(2) from proposed Sec.  420.59 (Mishap 
Plan). Operators remain responsible for reporting investigation results 
to the FAA under Sec.  450.173(e).
    Sierra Nevada asked whether licensees must coordinate with the FAA 
and NTSB for all mishaps. For the reasons stated above, the FAA removed 
the requirement proposed in Sec.  450.173(c).
    The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) recommended the FAA 
revise proposed Sec.  450.173(e), which contained emergency response 
requirements, to require a level of safety based on its spaceport fire 
safety and emergency response standards. The FAA supports the 
development of industry consensus standards for fire safety and 
emergency response, but disagrees that it would be appropriate to 
prescribe such a code or standard in this performance-based rule.
    In addition to removing proposed Sec.  450.173(c), the FAA replaces 
the term ``vehicle and debris impact points, including those outside a 
planned landing or impact area'' in proposed Sec.  450.173(d)(3)(iv) 
with the term ``hazardous debris impact points, including those outside 
a planned landing site or designated hazard area'' in Sec.  
450.173(c)(3)(iv).\185\ This change is consistent with changes 
previously discussed in the preamble. Lastly, the FAA revises the 
emergency response requirements in Sec.  450.173(d)(1) to include the 
term ``property'' because, as discussed in this preamble, the FAA 
removed the reference to ``property'' from the definition of ``public'' 
in Sec.  401.7. The FAA adopts the rest of this section of the proposed 
rule without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ The FAA removes proposed Sec.  450.173(c) from the final 
rule and re-designates Sec.  450.173(d) through (h) as Sec.  
450.173(c) through (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Test-Induced Damage (Sec.  450.175)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to give license applicants and 
licensees the option to pre-coordinate testing activities with the FAA. 
This pre-coordination would take place during FAA-licensed activities 
to prevent the FAA from labeling test failures or associated damage as 
mishaps.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.175 with a 
modification. Section 450.175 will only apply to licensees or license 
applicants seeking this exception. The FAA will consider test failures 
and damage covered by this section, including damage to ground support 
equipment, ground support systems, and flight hardware, as test-induced 
damage and not a mishap, so long as the failure falls within the pre-
coordinated scope and FAA-approved testing profile. Any mishap 
resulting in a serious injury or fatality, damage to property not 
associated with the licensed activity, or hazardous debris leaving the 
pre-defined hazard area, will be treated as a mishap and not test-
induced damage, and will be subject to the reporting, response, and 
investigation requirements of Sec.  450.173.
    Several commenters expressed confusion about the effect of proposed 
Sec.  450.175 on the part 450 licensing process. Boeing, Leo Aerospace, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA asked how test-induced 
damage would impact the licensing process. Boeing also commented that 
all planned test operations within the scope of a license should be 
assessed for public risk during the application process. Blue Origin 
asked what type of test is contemplated by ``test-induced damage,'' and 
if it would include tests conducted at a launch site with co-located 
test facilities, as opposed to integrated vehicle tests that 
traditionally happen at a launch site. Sierra Nevada and Microcosm 
commented that testing was outside the FAA's jurisdiction, and the 
proposed regulation should only apply to damage induced by a test 
performed under a license.
    The test-induced damage exception set forth in Sec.  450.175 only 
applies to license applicants or licensees seeking a mishap exception 
for test activities conducted during licensed activities. The test-
induced damage exception is optional. To clarify that the test-induced 
damage exception is optional, the FAA adds paragraph (a) 
(Applicability), which states that Sec.  450.175 only applies to 
license applicants or licensees who choose to pre-coordinate and apply 
for an optional test-induced damage exception. The FAA also replaces 
the word ``operator'' with the term ``license applicants or licensees'' 
to clarify that this provision is only available through the part 450 
licensing process. Experimental permittees under part 437, by contrast, 
cannot seek to pre-coordinate test-induced damage with the FAA.
    The exception does not apply to test activities that are not 
associated with FAA-licensed activities, nor to any activities outside 
FAA jurisdiction. The information submitted by the applicant will 
define the scope and type of test activities considered for test-
induced damage. The FAA confirms that all planned test operations 
occurring during the scope of a license will be assessed for public 
safety risks. As stated in the FAA's ``Answers to Clarifying Questions 
Received by June 28, 2019,'' test-induced damage refers to damage 
expected to occur as part of a licensed activity approved by the FAA 
prior to the operation. An applicant must identify expected outcomes 
and potential risks associated with the proposed test activity. The FAA 
expects an applicant to identify potential failure outcomes and their 
consequences or risks, and plan for them appropriately. In order to 
except damage from becoming a mishap, the applicant needs to identify 
that potential damage to the

[[Page 79682]]

FAA. Unanticipated test damage may be excepted if it results from 
activities conducted within the scope of the FAA approval, and does not 
result in any of the events listed in Sec.  450.175(b)(2).
    To seek an exception, an applicant must submit the information 
listed in Sec.  450.175(c) to the FAA in advance with sufficient time 
to evaluate the proposal. Although the FAA anticipates the amount of 
time required to evaluate an applicant's proposal will be minimal, the 
scope of review required will vary based on the proposed test 
activities and completeness of information provided.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended 
without explanation that the subheading for proposed Sec.  450.175(a) 
be changed to, ``Coordination of risk of test-induced damage.'' The FAA 
declines to incorporate this recommendation, as it does not accurately 
describe the coordination set forth in Sec.  450.175. The possibility 
of test-induced damage is assumed under Sec.  450.175. Identification 
of potential risks associated with a testing activity is but one of the 
items applicants must submit to seek an exception under this section. 
The FAA agrees, however, that the proposed text was unclear, as the 
heading used the term, ``anticipated,'' which does not appear in Sec.  
450.175. Accordingly, the FAA revises the subheading for Sec.  
450.175(b) to clarify that operators would be coordinating 
``potential,'' rather than ``anticipated,'' test-induced damage.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA also 
recommended, without explanation, that applicants be required to 
coordinate test-induced damage with any affected third parties or 
public authorities, in addition to the FAA. The FAA declines to 
incorporate this recommendation. Section 450.175 provides a process for 
license applicants and licensees to pre-coordinate with the FAA test-
induced damage that would otherwise fall under the FAA's definition of 
``mishap.'' The FAA is the only entity with whom coordination will be 
needed to seek exception from the FAA's ``mishap'' definition. It 
should be noted, however, that pre-coordination of test-induced damage 
under this section will not affect the duty of licensees to comply with 
all other requirements of their license, and with all other applicable 
laws and regulations.
    In reference to what is now Sec.  450.175(b)(2), Boeing recommended 
the FAA take into consideration insight gleaned from near-misses, 
noting that while a test may not have resulted in damage, the same 
anomaly could induce significant damage in a similar operational 
sequence. The FAA acknowledges the commenter's concern for the net 
effect of unreported anomalies but finds it unnecessary to change the 
regulatory text. Section 450.175 provides an exception to the 
``mishap'' definition. Test-induced damage that exceeds the scope of 
FAA-approved activities will be treated as a mishap. It is possible for 
an anomaly to occur during pre-coordinated test activities. Any 
condition during licensed or permitted activity (including pre-
coordinated test activity) that deviates from what is standard, normal, 
or expected during verification or operation of a system, process, 
facility, or equipment is an anomaly under Sec.  401.7. Given that 
Sec.  450.215 (Post-flight Reporting) requires operators to identify 
anomalies and corrective actions taken in response in their post-flight 
report, the FAA finds it will have notice of the ``near-miss'' 
anomalies referenced by the commenter.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended that 
proposed Sec.  450.175(c) be made consistent with ground hazard 
analysis requirements in proposed Sec.  450.185 or be deleted 
altogether. The FAA disagrees with this comment because the 
requirements of Sec.  450.185 apply to the entire launch and reentry 
vehicle lifecycle, and are therefore much more comprehensive than the 
information requirements for test-induced damage. Imposing ground 
hazard analysis requirements would place an undue burden on applicants 
seeking a test-induced damage exception. Moreover, the test-induced 
paradigm is intended for the testing of a specific system, function, or 
component during licensed activities. As stated in the NPRM, the test-
induced damage exception is not available for the operation of an 
entire vehicle, but rather the testing of specific components and 
systems. Lastly, unlike the ground hazard analysis requirements, the 
information requirements of Sec.  450.175(c) only apply to applicants 
seeking a mishap exception for damage resulting from specific test 
activities taking place within a defined time-period, as coordinated 
with and approved by the FAA.
pp. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements and Practices (Sec.  450.177)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements under Sec.  450.177 for 
operators to implement unique policies, requirements, and practices 
needed to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and 
the national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States. Proposed Sec.  450.177(a) would require an operator to review 
operations, system designs, analysis, and testing, and to identify any 
unique launch or reentry hazards not otherwise addressed by proposed 
part 450. Proposed Sec.  450.177(b) would provide that the FAA may 
identify and impose a unique policy, requirement, or practice, as 
needed, to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, 
and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.177 (Unique Safety 
Policies, Requirements and Practices) with two revisions. For the 
reasons discussed below, the FAA removes the references to property 
protection and national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States, and adds ``safety'' to the section title.
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, and Spaceport Strategies commented that 
proposed Sec.  450.177(b) expanded regulatory uncertainty by allowing 
the FAA to impose new requirements when needed to protect public health 
and safety, safety of property, and national security or U.S. foreign 
policy interests. CSF noted that part 417 previously allowed the FAA to 
impose new requirements when needed ``to protect the public.'' CSF and 
Sierra Nevada commented that proposed Sec.  450.177(b) expanded the 
FAA's ability to impose requirements on an operator outside of 
regulatory process even if the operator met all other criteria. The 
commenters suggested that the ability to impose unknown requirements as 
a result of innovation will adversely impact costs and could have a 
chilling effect on innovation and investments in U.S. space industries 
if the FAA's discretion under proposed Sec.  450.177 was unbounded. 
They further contended that the proposed requirement would give the FAA 
discretion to impose new requirements ``as-needed'' and result in no 
cost savings. CSF also expressed concern that such requirements could 
be inequitably imposed on a singular licensee or disparately among 
licensees developing similar technologies or operational approaches. 
CSF recommended the FAA be required to collaborate with the operator or 
with industry before requiring a unique policy, rule, or practice. CSF 
and Sierra Nevada recommended the rule be bounded to limit the scope 
and timeline for the FAA to impose restrictions, and give applicants 
due process.
    The FAA agrees that it is unnecessary to include hazards to the 
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States 
under this section because those considerations are adequately covered 
under policy and

[[Page 79683]]

payload reviews in part 450. In the final rule, the FAA removes 
``national security and foreign policy interests of the United States'' 
from Sec.  450.177(b) and (c)(2).
    In the final rule, the FAA also removes ``safety of property'' from 
Sec.  450.177(b) and (c). As explained in other parts of this preamble, 
the FAA is retaining in the final rule only specific requirements for 
property protection (e.g. critical assets, property on orbit), which 
have specific safety criteria. Operators may be required to mitigate 
hazards to property through emergency response requirements in Sec.  
450.173(d), but otherwise, the FAA declines to impose a more specific 
property protection requirement at this time. Removal of the references 
to property protection and national security and foreign policy 
interests largely dispenses with the commenters' concerns that Sec.  
450.177 would expand the scope of Sec.  417.127. Although the final 
rule retains the provision in Sec.  450.177(b) regarding FAA's ability 
to impose a unique requirement, policy, or practice needed to protect 
public health and safety, the FAA does not foresee a substantive change 
for operators from Sec.  417.127, which provides that FAA may impose 
such unique requirements as needed to protect the public.
    The FAA's authority to impose a unique requirement, policy, or 
practice is bounded, as it is in Sec.  417.127, by the FAA's statutory 
authority to protect public health and safety. The FAA understands the 
concern expressed by Spaceport Strategies and others that the 
imposition of unique policies, requirements, or practices deemed 
necessary by the FAA to protect public health and safety has the 
potential to impose additional costs on the operator. However, given 
the rarity of the FAA's invocation of Sec.  417.127, and the prosperity 
of today's commercial space industry under part 417, the FAA does not 
foresee any additional costs to operators or a chilling of innovation 
resulting from Sec.  450.177.
    Moreover, as discussed in the NPRM preamble, the necessity for 
Sec.  450.177 is the same as that for Sec.  417.127: The FAA expects 
that advances in technology and implementation of innovations by launch 
and reentry operators will likely introduce new and unforeseen safety 
challenges. These advances and innovations can present regulatory 
challenges that are unforeseen in existing regulations. In this case, 
the FAA must work with operators on a case-by-case basis to identify 
and mitigate those unique hazards posed to public health and safety, 
which are not addressed by part 450. The FAA expects the need for the 
use of this provision to be rare, as has the need to use Sec.  417.127, 
due to the comprehensiveness and performance-based nature of part 450. 
In the rare instance that it is used, the FAA will work with the 
operator to reach a mutually satisfactory solution that allows the 
activity while protecting public health and safety, but the FAA 
declines to require collaboration in the regulation, as CSF suggests.
qq. Ground Safety (Sec.  450.179 to Sec.  450.189)
i. Ground Safety General (Sec.  450.179)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to 
protect the public from the adverse effects of hazardous operations and 
systems associated with preparing a launch vehicle for flight, 
returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after flight, 
or after an aborted launch attempt, and returning a site to a safe 
condition.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.179 with 
revisions.\186\ This final rule moves proposed subsections (b) and (c) 
to Sec.  450.179(a)(1) through (3) and adds new subsections (b) and 
(c). These additions are discussed in more detail in the preamble 
section addressing Launch and Reentries from a Federal Launch or 
Reentry Site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ Proposed Sec.  450.179 required an operator at a U.S. 
launch or landing site to protect the public from adverse effects of 
hazardous operations and systems. The FAA changed ``protect the 
public'' to ``protect the public and property'' in the final rule. 
This change is because, as discussed earlier in this preamble, 
property was removed from the definition of ``public.'' Thus, 
``property'' was added to this section to keep the requirement 
equivalent to what was proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Coordination With a Licensed Launch or Reentry Site Operator (Sec.  
450.181)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to 
coordinate with site operators as both entities have public safety 
obligations during ground operations. Operators would be required to 
coordinate with site operators to ensure that access to public sites is 
controlled and prevent unsafe interference of ground hazards. For a 
launch or reentry conducted from or to an FAA licensed site, an 
operator would be required to coordinate mishap reporting, response, 
and investigations with the site operator for any mishap during ground 
activities at the site.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.181 as proposed with 
two exceptions. In Sec.  450.181(a)(3), the ground hazard areas must be 
coordinated with a site operator during the designation of those ground 
hazard areas. In the final rule, the FAA changes the language used to 
describe this coordination to ``[t]he designation of any ground hazard 
area that affects the operations of a launch or reentry site is 
coordinated with the Federal or licensed launch or reentry site 
operator.'' This amended language is a minor grammatical change and is 
consistent with the intent of the proposed requirement. In addition, 
proposed Sec.  450.181(a)(4) required an operator to coordinate with a 
site operator to ensure, in part, prompt and effective response in the 
event of a mishap that could impact ``public safety.'' In the final 
rule, the FAA changes this phrasing to require that a prompt and 
effective response ``is undertaken'' in the event of a mishap that 
could impact ``the safety of the public and property.'' The FAA changes 
``public safety'' to ``the safety of the public and property'' in the 
final rule because, as discussed earlier in this preamble, property was 
removed from the definition of ``public.'' Thus, the FAA makes this 
wording change to keep the requirement equivalent to what was proposed. 
The FAA adds ``is undertaken'' as a minor grammatical change that is 
consistent with the intent of the proposed requirement.
    Sierra Nevada commented that proposed Sec.  450.181 seems to be 
duplicative of proposed Sec.  450.147 (Agreements) and thus should be 
removed. While agreements made with a Federal or licensed site operator 
may satisfy the requirements of Sec.  450.181, the FAA finds the 
requirement to coordinate with a site operator specifies what 
coordination must be in place to prevent unsafe interference among 
users of a site and ensure clear lines of responsibility for related 
aspects of public safety. The FAA concurs that an applicant may be able 
to show compliance with both requirements by providing an agreement 
that shows compliance with the specific criteria in Sec.  450.181. 
However, the two requirements are different and intentionally separate. 
Specifically, Sec.  450.181 provides additional detail about 
coordination that is necessary for public safety because improperly 
coordinated neighboring operations that occur on or near the launch 
site have the ability to create hazards to the public. In addition, the 
agreement required by Sec.  450.147 is not an application deliverable, 
whereas Sec.  450.181 requires an application deliverable. Accordingly, 
the FAA adopts both Sec. Sec.  450.181 and 450.147.
    Denver International Airport commented that, although it supported 
the proposed requirements for

[[Page 79684]]

coordination with site operators, these requirements were too narrow to 
keep site operators and surrounding communities properly informed. 
Denver International Airport also commented that operators should be 
required to coordinate on launch and reentry activities and mishaps 
with a wider group of interested and affected stakeholders, including 
first responders and local governments. Similarly, AAAE proposed that 
licensed operators be required to notify contingent landing sites and 
nearby airports of safety hazards, including providing them with the 
ground safety hazard analysis. AAAE suggested such notifications could 
be accomplished as part of the notifications required in proposed Sec.  
450.147 or as part of a broader public disclosure.
    The FAA notes that the notification requirements in Sec.  420.57 
require licensed site operators to notify local officials and adjacent 
landowners of flight schedules. In addition, Sec.  450.147 requires 
vehicle operators to have agreements with any sites or services that 
are necessary to meet the safety requirements for a license. These 
requirements serve to notify the necessary entities about licensed 
operations. Including notification requirements beyond those in 
Sec. Sec.  420.57 and 450.147 is outside the needs of this rulemaking 
to protect public health and safety, safety of property, and national 
security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended the 
FAA revise proposed Sec.  450.181(a)(3) to require only that 
coordination ensure that any ground hazard areas are identified. The 
FAA does not find the commenters' recommendation sufficient to protect 
public safety and avoid adverse impacts on neighboring space 
operations. The vehicle operator must take an active role in ensuring 
the site operator is aware of ground hazard areas and how they may 
impact other site operations.
iii. Explosive Site Plan (Sec.  450.183)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require an applicant to include an 
explosive site plan as part of its vehicle operator license application 
for a launch or reentry from or to a site exclusive to its own use. 
This plan would be required to demonstrate compliance with the 
explosive siting requirements in part 420.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.183 (Explosive Site 
Plan) as proposed. The FAA received no comments on this section.
iv. Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.185)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an operator would be required to 
complete a ground hazard analysis that would include an assessment of 
the launch or reentry vehicle, the launch or reentry integrated 
systems, ground support equipment, and other site hardware. In its 
analysis, an applicant must identify hazards; include a risk 
assessment; and identify and describe mitigations, controls, and 
provisions for hazard control verification and validation. Although the 
analysis might incorporate aspects of employee safety and mission 
assurance, an applicant would only be required to identify the hazards 
that affect the public and describe how those hazards are mitigated.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.185 as proposed, with 
minor edits to remove the reference to ``public property'' because 
``property'' has been removed from the final rule's definition of 
``public,'' as discussed in the preamble section for Neighboring 
Operations Personnel. Instead, the FAA refers to ``property not 
associated with the launch or reentry.''
    In response to the proposed requirements, NFPA suggested its own 
standards as guidance for complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  450.179, 
450.185, and 450.189. Space Florida also commented that the FAA did not 
provide clear guidance on what standards would be acceptable and how 
the agency would judge the sufficiency of the ground hazard analysis. 
Space Florida did not recommend a specific change to proposed Sec.  
450.185.
    In response to NFPA's comment, the FAA notes that applicants are 
free to explore the use of any industry standard to demonstrate 
compliance with these sections. If the industry standard has not 
already been accepted by the FAA, the FAA would review the proposed 
standard as part of an applicant's application. NFPA is also welcome to 
submit its standards to the FAA for acceptance at any time.
    In response to Space Florida, the FAA recommends that the applicant 
identify proposed standards and common practices during pre-application 
consultation to reach an agreement with the FAA on their applicability 
for proposed operations. For items that may deviate from current 
standards and practices, the FAA may seek additional justification or 
analysis to determine whether ground hazards pose a risk to public 
safety.
    Virgin Galactic asked the FAA to retain the ground safety analysis 
practices used under part 431 and not to impose proposed Sec.  450.185. 
Virgin Galactic also asked that existing launch vehicles be 
``grandfathered.'' Finally, Virgin Galactic commented that conducting a 
ground hazard analysis would place a cost burden on hybrid vehicle 
operators and asked the FAA to outline its reasoning for imposing the 
requirement on hybrid operators.
    The FAA discusses Virgin Galactic's question regarding cost burden 
in the preamble section addressing Responses to Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Comments. Part 431 does not have an explicit ground safety 
requirement, and as a result it is often difficult for applicants to 
ascertain how to meet the safety standard for pre-flight operations. 
Concurrently, the ground safety requirements in part 417 are overly 
prescriptive and onerous. The ground hazard analysis requirements in 
part 450 strike a balance between the two parts, providing additional 
guidance to applicants, while at the same time preserving flexibility.
    An operation that was licensed prior to the effective date of this 
rulemaking will be permitted to continue under its license for five 
years from the effective date or when the license expires if the 
operator does not seek a renewal. For further discussion, please see 
the preamble section on Legacy Licenses. All regulated operators, 
including hybrid launch or reentry systems operators, will need to 
prepare a ground hazard analysis to ensure public safety is protected. 
Hybrid launch or reentry vehicles may still pose a risk to the public; 
therefore, the FAA imposes its ground hazard analysis requirements on 
hybrid launch vehicles in order to identify and mitigate those risks. 
Some launch or reentry systems will have very limited ground hazards, 
and thus the ground hazard analysis will be similarly limited. An 
operator would not need its ground hazard analysis to include carrier 
aircraft activities that do not constitute launch or reentry.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \187\ Such activities may include, for example, activities 
conducted by a carrier aircraft without a rocket attached when the 
carrier aircraft plus rocket constitutes the launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop, and the ULA recommended the FAA 
modify proposed Sec.  450.185(a) by adding that a ground hazard 
analysis must identify system and operation hazards posed by the 
vehicle ``and any of its components.'' The FAA does not adopt this 
change because any requirement levied on the vehicle also necessarily 
includes the vehicle's components.
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, and Space Florida recommended that the FAA 
consider an alternative regulatory approach giving site operators more

[[Page 79685]]

authority over ground safety. Specifically, CSF and Sierra Nevada 
recommended that the FAA consider an alternative regulatory approach 
that would give the responsibility for assessing and controlling ground 
safety and hazards mitigations to the site operator.
    Historically, the launch or reentry operator has been responsible 
for ground safety and, as reflected in the NPRM, the FAA determined 
that this allocation of responsibility was appropriate given that the 
operator has the most comprehensive understanding of the parameters of 
the licensed activity. The FAA expects that the launch or reentry 
operator will work closely with the site operator to ensure all 
requirements are met. Accordingly, the FAA retains the proposed 
language in the final rule.
v. Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls (Sec.  450.189)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to 
implement certain prescribed hazard controls during the ground 
operations period of launch or reentry. These prescribed hazard 
controls would require that an operator document how it would protect 
members of the public who enter areas under the operator's control, and 
mitigate hazards created by a countdown abort. They would also require 
the operator to establish plans for controlling fires and emergency 
procedures. In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.189 as 
proposed.
    AAAE suggested licensed operators be required to notify nearby 
airports and contingent landing sites of potential safety hazards and 
their controls, including those described under this section and 
proposed Sec.  450.185. The notification requirements in Sec.  420.57 
require licensed site operators to notify local officials and adjacent 
landowners of flight schedules. In addition, Sec.  450.147 requires 
vehicle operators to have agreements with any sites or services that 
are necessary to meet the safety requirements for a license. These 
requirements serve to notify the necessary entities about licensed 
operations.
5. Part 450 Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator 
License
a. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Financial 
Responsibility, Human Spaceflight Requirements (Sec. Sec.  450.201 to 
450.207)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements addressing how a 
licensee is responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of 
property during the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry in proposed 
Sec.  450.201, how a licensee would be required to comply with a 
license in proposed Sec.  450.203 (Compliance with License), with 
financial responsibility requirements of part 440 in proposed Sec.  
450.205 (Financial Responsibility Requirements), and with human 
spaceflight requirements in part 460 in proposed Sec.  450.207 (Human 
Spaceflight Requirements).
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the requirements as proposed. The 
FAA received no comments on these proposals.
b. Compliance Monitoring (Sec.  450.209)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to combine the compliance monitoring 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  417.23 and 431.83 in Sec.  450.209. The FAA 
also proposed to allow an operator the option to provide the FAA with 
means other than a console for monitoring the communication and 
countdown channels. The compliance monitoring requirements of proposed 
Sec.  450.209 would apply to all launch and reentry operations. 
Finally, proposed Sec.  450.209 codified the FAA practice for 
conducting compliance monitoring of part 435 operations. In final rule, 
the FAA adopts Sec.  450.209 as proposed.
    Virgin Galactic expressed concern regarding proposed Sec.  
450.209(b), which stated a licensee must provide the FAA with the 
capability to communicate with the mission director. Virgin Galactic 
suggested replacement language that gave the operator the 
responsibility for assigning a radio communications point-of-contact 
for the FAA during operations. The FAA does not adopt this suggestion 
because the FAA must have direct contact with the mission director 
during licensed operations to ensure any risk to public safety during 
ongoing operations is immediately addressed. It will continue to be FAA 
practice not to contact the mission director unless there is an 
immediate and urgent risk to public safety.
    The FAA also deletes Sec.  450.209(c) because it imposed a 
requirement only on the FAA and was unnecessary legacy language.
c. Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application for 
Modification of License (Sec.  450.211)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to preserve the continuing accuracy 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  417.11 and 431.73, and consolidate them in 
proposed Sec.  450.211. In addition, the FAA proposed to allow an 
applicant to request approval of an alternate method for requesting 
license modifications during the application process.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.211 as proposed with 
only a minor revision to split the second requirement in proposed Sec.  
450.211(a) into a new Sec.  450.211(b). Accordingly, proposed Sec.  
450.211(b) and (c) were renumbered to become Sec.  450.211(c) and (d) 
in the final rule, respectively.
    CSF and SpaceX suggested that the FAA could update Sec.  413.17(a) 
to clarify that it would agree to a modification to an existing license 
when the FAA accepts and approves a continuing accuracy submission. CSF 
requested that the FAA clarify its use of these terms in an AC.
    Virgin Galactic noted that operators may have separate definitions 
for continuing accuracy and license modifications. Virgin Galactic 
proposed what it believed to be simpler requirements for continuing 
accuracy updates and license modifications, which in Virgin Galactic's 
experience aligned with how the FAA has processed Virgin Galactic's 
license and license application updates over the past three years. 
Specifically, Virgin Galactic recommended that proposed Sec.  
450.211(a)(1) be rewritten to change the requirement so that after a 
license has been issued, a licensee would be required to apply to the 
FAA for modification of the license if the licensee proposes to make 
changes that affect the license, as issued by the FAA. It also proposed 
to add the term ``continuing accuracy updates'' for changes that a 
licensee proposes that do not affect the license but do affect the 
license application. Virgin Galactic maintained that this approach 
would provide schedule assurance for operators, as license modification 
usually involves time-intensive coordination between the FAA and an 
operator.
    Sierra Nevada commented that general edits to the listed documents 
should not trigger the requirement of continuing accuracy, as such a 
requirement would create an extremely burdensome amount of document 
overhead an applicant would be required to maintain that is not 
necessary for maintaining public safety.
    The FAA does not agree that the suggested changes are necessary; 
however, the FAA has split the two requirements in Sec.  450.211(a) so 
that the application for modification of license is in Sec.  450.211(b) 
for added clarity. The regulation states that a licensee is responsible 
for the continuing accuracy of representations contained in its 
application. A license modification is

[[Page 79686]]

required only if the licensee proposes to conduct a launch or reentry 
in a manner not authorized by the license; or, if any representation 
contained in the license application that is material to public health 
and safety or the safety of property is no longer accurate and 
complete, or does not reflect the licensee's procedures governing the 
actual conduct of a launch or reentry. For representations that do not 
meet either of these criteria, such as administrative information, 
Sec.  450.211(b) continues to require an applicant to inform the FAA of 
the change in order to ensure the representations made in the 
application are accurate.
    The NPRM preamble identified the following as areas that constitute 
a material change: Reuse, after an earlier launch or reentry, of 
safety-critical systems or components, requiring refurbishment, re-
qualification testing, and re-acceptance testing. Virgin Galactic 
believed performing refurbishment and pre-flight testing of reusable 
safety-critical systems or components would not constitute a material 
change that affects public safety. Both vehicles of a hybrid RLV launch 
system are reused, and pre-flight testing and refurbishment are 
performed prior to each mission. Virgin Galactic recommended this reuse 
language be stricken from the preamble because it is not a material 
change to public safety.
    The FAA clarifies that normal pre-flight testing and refurbishment 
that are evaluated and accepted during a license application are not 
considered a material change. The FAA further clarifies that only pre-
flight testing and refurbishment that is not evaluated during a 
licensing process will be considered a material change. As discussed 
above, a material change is a change that affects public safety that 
has not been evaluated and authorized by the FAA during the licensing 
process.
    Virgin Orbit commented that some of the changes noted in preamble, 
such as retesting a valve or changing a safety officer, should not 
require a modification to a license. Virgin Orbit recommended that what 
constituted a material change should be based on how the change 
affected public safety elements contained within the FSA and PSA. 
Virgin Orbit further recommended that the FAA allow operators to 
determine how the areas that constituted a material change as 
identified in the preamble affected the public safety elements.
    As noted earlier, a material change is a change that affects public 
safety that has not been evaluated and authorized by the FAA during the 
licensing process. These changes may go beyond just the FSA and any PSA 
\188\ as suggested by Virgin Orbit. All public safety requirements in 
part 450 are applicable. The FAA does agree with Virgin Orbit that the 
burden lies on the operator to determine what constitutes a material 
change. The FAA notes, however, that an operator should consult with 
the FAA regarding those changes for which an operator is unsure whether 
the change is material or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ As discussed earlier, the FAA removed the requirement for 
a PSA from the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Orbit requested a definition of a ``minor'' change. It 
further requested that minor changes would not require a full 180-day 
review period, and that the regulation define a maximum review time for 
minor changes. The FAA does not distinguish between major and minor 
changes, only those changes that will or will not have a material 
impact on public safety. Categorizing all potential changes that have a 
material impact on public safety into only two categories is 
problematic due to the variety of potential changes. The FAA does 
agree, however, that not all requests for modification would require 
extensive review. Although the statutory 180-day review period does not 
apply to modifications, the FAA makes every effort to act upon all 
requests for modifications in a timely manner. The FAA is able to 
respond quickly if a change is indeed minor.
d. Pre-Flight Reporting (Sec.  450.213)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a licensee to provide the 
FAA with the following information prior to each launch or reentry: 
Mission-specific information, FSA products, FSS test data, data 
required by the FAA to conduct a collision avoidance analysis, and a 
launch or reentry schedule.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.213 with four 
revisions. First, in Sec.  450.213(d)(2), the FAA replaces the term 
``flight information'' with ``planned mission information'' because the 
information required includes launch site information, and the term 
``planned mission information'' is used in the final Sec.  
450.208(d)(6). Second, the FAA revises Sec.  450.213(d) to allow an 
operator the flexibility to identify an appropriate time frame in 
coordination with the FAA. Third, in Sec.  450.213(e) the FAA removes 
the reference to the time frames to submit LCOLA data, which the FAA 
has revised in the final rule, so that Sec.  450.213(e) simply requires 
operators to submit LCOLA data in accordance with Sec.  450.169(f). 
Lastly, the FAA replaces ``operator'' with ``licensee'' throughout the 
section to be consistent with the rest of subpart D. The FAA makes 
similar changes in Sec.  450.450.215.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented that 
they appreciated the streamlining of pre-flight reporting. CSF 
recommended that the FAA allow the submittal of test reports in 
accordance with proposed Sec.  450.213(d) less than 30 days before 
flight. SpinLaunch also stated that the proposed Sec.  450.213(d) 
requirement to submit test reports 30 days prior to launch was too 
burdensome.
    The FAA agrees that not all test reports for the FSS, such as end-
to-end tests and pre-flight tests, can be delivered 30 days before 
flight. The FAA therefore revises Sec.  450.213(d) to allow an operator 
the flexibility to identify an appropriate time frame in coordination 
with the FAA. The FAA discusses this flexibility in more detail in the 
preamble section on Time Frames.
    AAAE noted that, under proposed Sec.  450.213(f), launch schedules 
would be required to be provided to the FAA in advance. AAAE 
recommended that these schedules, including any changes to the 
schedule, should also be distributed to nearby airports (within at 
least five nautical miles of the launch site or along the vehicle's 
trajectory), contingent landing sites, and any emergency responders 
supporting the launch operation.
    The FAA declines to adopt this recommendation. Section 450.147 
requires that an operator establish written agreements with any entity 
that provides a service that meets a requirement. The FAA notes that 
these written agreements will include any agreements necessary to 
ensure the safety of airspace. The FAA has drafted Sec.  450.147 to be 
as performance-based as possible; therefore, the specificity 
recommended by AAAE is unnecessary. That said, the FAA agrees that such 
notifications would usually be required.
    CSF noted that proposed Sec.  450.213 would require that the 
licensee provide payload details to the FAA 60 days in advance of a 
launch or reentry. CSF commented that operators often cannot meet that 
time frame due to changes in manifests for passive or minor payloads 
that occur inside of 60 days before flight. Proposed Sec.  404.15 would 
not allow an operator to request that the time frame for payload 
notification be changed unless it knew more than 60 days in advance of 
flight that the manifest was going to change. CSF considered the 
proposal inflexible and requested that FAA allow proposed Sec.  404.15 
be made more flexible. The FAA disagrees with the comment, as Sec.  
404.15 currently allows for an

[[Page 79687]]

applicant to request the FAA to relax the 60-day pre-flight reporting 
requirement for payload information.
e. Post-Flight Reporting (Sec.  450.215)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an operator be required to provide 
the actual trajectory flown by the vehicle and, for an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle, the actual impact location of all impacting 
stages and impacting components, if requested by the FAA. In the final 
rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.215 as proposed.
    SpaceX generally agreed with the provisions of proposed Sec.  
450.215 but suggested that the FAA remove proposed Sec.  450.215(b)(4) 
because it contended that post-flight auditing was already an option 
for the FAA and that the specific reference to a potential request for 
a flown trajectory was redundant and unnecessary. Although the FAA 
agrees with SpaceX that the FAA can request these data as part of its 
inspection, the FAA finds that the explicit reference in the regulatory 
text is necessary to ensure compliance. The FAA included this 
requirement in the proposed rule because some operators failed to 
provide flown trajectory information when the FAA requested it as part 
of an inspection or post-flight review. The FAA will only ask for flown 
trajectory data when necessary to verify models and assess vehicle 
performance.
f. Registration of Space Objects (Sec.  450.217)
    In the NPRM, the FAA consolidated and updated the requirements for 
registration of space objects in proposed Sec.  450.217. The FAA 
proposed to remove the caveat excluding foreign payloads and to add the 
requirement to notify the FAA when removing objects placed in orbit. 
The FAA noted that it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to 
register objects and launch operator data is used to make relevant 
decisions on what to register. Proposed Sec.  450.217(c) retained Sec.  
431.85's requirement that an operator notify the FAA when it removes a 
space object.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.217 as proposed.
    NZSA asked if operators would have to report the reentry of an 
object due to atmospheric reentry, presumably much later than launch. 
NZSA supported the requirement of information on foreign-owned space 
objects to determine who would register the objects, which NZSA also 
requires. NZSA recommended the FAA clarify whether removal would relate 
only to active removal or if it would include passive deorbiting. NZSA 
viewed the latter to be in alignment with the terms of the Registration 
Convention.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space provides that the United Nations maintains a registry of 
objects left in space by on data provided by the launching state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA did not intend the requirement to notify the FAA of objects 
removed from orbit to cover eventual decays through atmospheric 
reentry. NZSA is correct that the Registration Convention requires the 
notification of objects removed from space. Yet, the FAA does not 
believe there is a need to require launch operators to track the 
orbital status of all objects previously launched in perpetuity.
6. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 433, 437, and 440
Part 401--Organization and Definitions
i. Sec.  401.5
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed new and amended definitions to Sec.  
401.5 (Definitions). The new proposed definitions in proposed Sec.  
401.5 were: ``anomaly,'' ``casualty area,'' ``command control system,'' 
``control entity,'' ``countdown,'' ``critical asset,'' ``crossrange,'' 
``data loss flight time,'' ``deorbit,'' ``disposal,'' ``dose-response 
relationship,'' ``downrange,'' ``effective casualty area,'' ``expected 
casualty,'' ``explosive debris,'' ``flight abort,'' ``flight abort 
crew,'' ``flight abort rules,'' ``flight hazard area,'' ``flight safety 
limit,'' ``gate,'' ``hazard control,'' ``launch or reentry system,'' 
``launch window,'' ``liftoff,'' ``limits of a useful mission,'' 
``mishap, class 1,'' ``mishap, class 2,'' ``mishap, class 3'', 
``mishap, class 4,'' ``neighboring operations personnel,'' ``normal 
flight,'' ``normal trajectory,'' ``operating environment,'' ``operation 
hazard,'' ``orbital insertion,'' ``physical containment,'' 
``probability of casualty,'' ``public,'' ``reentry window,'' ``service 
life,'' ``software function,'' ``sub-vehicle point,'' ``system 
hazard,'' ``toxic hazard area,'' ``tracking icon,'' ``uncontrolled 
area,'' ``unguided suborbital launch vehicle,'' ``uprange,'' and 
``vehicle response modes,'' ``wind weighting safety system,'' and 
``window closure.''
    The amended definitions in proposed Sec.  401.5 were ``contingency 
abort,'' ``flight safety system,'' ``instantaneous impact point,'' 
``launch,'' ``mishap,'' ``reenter; reentry,'' ``safety critical,'' and 
``State and United States''. These new and revised definitions were 
necessary additions to accompany the proposed part 450 requirements.
    The FAA also proposed to remove a number of definitions from Sec.  
401.5 that were no longer used in the regulations: ``emergency abort,'' 
``human space flight incident,'' ``launch accident,'' ``launch 
incident,'' ``public safety,'' ``reentry accident,'' ``reentry 
incident,'' and ``vehicle safety operations personnel.''
    In the final rule, the FAA does not make any immediate changes to 
Sec.  401.5. Instead, Sec.  401.5 will remain in effect for five years 
after the effective date of this final rule, and its definitions will 
be applied to parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. After five years, Sec.  
401.5 will be removed from part 401 and all operators will use the 
definitions in the new Sec.  401.7.
ii. Sec.  401.7
    In the final rule, existing and proposed definitions from Sec.  
401.5 are adopted as new Sec.  401.7 (Definitions) specifically 
applicable to part 450 requirements, with the exception of the 
following proposed definitions: ``control entity,'' ``data loss flight 
time,'' ``dose-response relationship,'' ``flight abort crew,'' 
``gate,'' ``mishap, class 1,'' ``mishap, class 2,'' ``mishap, class 
3'', ``mishap, class 4,'' ``tracking icon,'' and ``vehicle response 
modes.'' In addition, Sec.  401.7 does not contain the definitions for 
``Federal launch range'' and ``launch site safety assessment'' that 
exist in Sec.  401.5. These definitions are not adopted because they 
are no longer used in the regulations. Section 401.7 will apply to all 
of Chapter III except parts 415, 417, 431, 435, and 440, where Sec.  
401.5 will continue to apply until five years after the effective date 
of this rule.
    The FAA notes that the proposed definition of ``probability of 
casualty'' uses the phrase ``serious injury or worse.'' Consistent with 
current practice for launch and reentry safety analyses, as well as 
other DOT modal administrations, the FAA maintains that the use of the 
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) Level 3 or greater (of the Association 
for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine) is appropriate for 
describing a medical condition sufficiently to allow modeling of 
casualties for purposes of determining whether a launch or reentry 
satisfies the public risk criteria. For additional information 
regarding casualty modeling, the FAA refers the reader to the preamble 
of a previous rulemaking.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ See 67 FR 49464 (July 30, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA adds new definitions for ``critical payload,'' ``hazardous 
debris,'' ``key flight safety event,'' and ``useful mission,'' which 
were not proposed in the NPRM. These definitions and the rationale to 
remove, adopt, or amend them are discussed in the relevant topic 
sections of this preamble.
    Sierra Nevada suggested including a specific reference to ground 
safety for

[[Page 79688]]

the public in the definition of ``reentry.'' The FAA declines to adopt 
this suggestion because public safety is the core of the FAA's 
statutory mission, and including additional reference to public safety 
for the definition of ``reentry'' is unnecessary.
Part 413--Application Procedures
    In the NPRM, to enable incremental application submission and 
review, the FAA proposed to modify Sec.  413.1 to clarify the term 
``application'' to mean either an application in its entirety, or a 
portion of an application for incremental review and determination in 
accordance with proposed Sec.  450.33.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the provision as proposed. This 
decision is further discussed in the Incremental Review section of the 
preamble. The FAA did not receive any comments on this part.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise the table in Sec.  413.1 by 
replacing parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, with part 450. The FAA adopts 
the proposed table with revisions as discussed in the preamble section 
for Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend Sec.  413.7(a)(3) to allow 
an applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to 
a secure server and removed the requirement that an application be in a 
format that cannot be altered. The FAA adopts Sec.  413.7(a)(3) as 
proposed and this decision is further discussed in the Application 
Process section of the preamble.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise Sec.  413.11(a) by removing 
the reference to initiate a review ``required to make a decision about 
the license or permit.'' This revision would enable incremental 
application submission and review. In the final rule, the FAA adopts 
the change as proposed.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a change to Sec.  413.15 to allow the 
FAA to establish a time frame for any incremental review with an 
applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-application consultation. 
In the final rule, the FAA adopts this change with a revision. The FAA 
revises the explicit time frames in Sec.  413.15 to reference the time 
frames specified in 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1) and 50906(a) so that a future 
rulemaking will not be required if the time frames are modified in the 
statute. This decision is further discussed in the Incremental Review 
section of the preamble.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to correct the section heading of 
Sec.  413.21 to reflect the content of the section, and to correct 
Sec.  413.21(c) to reference both license and permit applications. The 
FAA adopts these changes as proposed.
    In the NPRM, the FAA included license and permit renewals in the 
flexible time frames table in Appendix A to Part 404. The FAA 
inadvertently omitted making the same change in the corresponding 
regulatory text in Sec.  413.21. The FAA adopts the change as proposed, 
and revises Sec.  413.21 to allow flexible time frames for license and 
permit renewals. This decision is further discussed in the Time Frames 
section of the preamble.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed conforming changes in part 413 where 
a part 414 safety approval is referenced, to change those references to 
``safety element approval.'' The FAA adopts the changes as proposed. 
This decision is further discussed in the Safety Element Approval 
section of the preamble.
Part 414--Safety Element Approvals
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to change the part 414 term ``safety 
approval'' to ``safety element approval,'' to distinguish it from the 
term ``safety approval'' as used in parts 415, 431, and 435, and 
proposed part 450. Also, the FAA proposed to modify part 414 to enable 
applicants to request a safety element approval in conjunction with a 
license application in accordance with proposed part 450.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the changes as proposed with 
minor editorial corrections. The FAA did not receive any comments on 
this part.
Part 420--License To Operate a Launch Site
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed multiple changes in part 420. 
Specifically, the FAA proposed changes in Sec. Sec.  420.5, 420.15, 
420.51, 420.57, 420.59, and 420.61 to align with requirements in part 
450.
    In Sec.  420.5, the FAA proposed to remove the definitions of 
``instantaneous impact point,'' ``launch site accident,'' and 
``public'' from Sec.  420.5. The FAA did not receive comments on these 
changes and adopts them as proposed.
    In Sec.  420.15(b), the FAA proposed to revise the environmental 
review requirements under part 420 to match the environmental review 
requirements proposed in Sec.  450.47. As discussed in the 
Environmental Review section of this preamble, the FAA adopts this 
change as proposed, with revisions that affirmatively state the 
responsibilities of the FAA and an applicant in accordance with FAA 
Order 1050.1.
    The FAA proposed a minor edit to Sec.  420.51, and proposed to 
allow alternate time frames in Sec.  420.57. The FAA adopts these 
changes as proposed.
    In Sec.  420.59, the FAA proposed changing the heading from 
``Launch Site Accident Investigation Plan'' to ``Mishap Plan,'' and 
modifying the requirements for Mishap Plans to match the requirements 
for ``mishap plans'' in Sec.  450.173. As discussed in the Mishap 
section of this preamble, the FAA revises Sec.  420.59(a) to state that 
the requirements of this section only apply in the event of a mishap 
that meets paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(5) of the definition of ``mishap'' 
in Sec.  401.7 and removes the requirement for the licensee to 
cooperate with an FAA or NTSB investigations of a mishap for launches 
launched from the launch site.
    Lastly, in Sec.  420.61(b), the FAA replaces the word ``shall'' 
with the word ``must,'' and replaces the term ``launch or launch site 
accident'' with a reference to the portions of the ``mishap'' 
definition that replace this term: paragraphs (1), (5), and (8). As 
explained in the Mishap section of this preamble, the NPRM 
inadvertently omitted these changes necessitated by the revised 
definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7.
Part 433--License To Operate a Reentry Site
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed changes to the environmental 
requirements in Sec.  433.7 to align them with the environmental 
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.47 and removed and reserved Sec.  
433.9.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements in 
Sec.  433.7 with revisions to align with the revisions in Sec.  450.47. 
The revisions are discussed in the Environmental Review section of the 
preamble. The FAA also adopts the proposal to remove and reserve Sec.  
433.9. The FAA did not receive any comments on these proposals.
Part 437--Experimental Permits
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed the following changes to part 437 
(Experimental Permits).
     First, the FAA proposed to remove the definition of 
``anomaly'' from Sec.  437.3 and include a modified version in proposed 
Sec.  401.5.
     Second, the FAA proposed to modify the environmental 
requirements in Sec.  437.21(b)(1) to match the environmental 
requirements proposed in Sec.  450.47.
     Third, the FAA proposed to change the name of ``safety 
approval'' to ``safety element approval'' in Sec.  437.21.
     Fourth, the FAA proposed to modify the mishap plan 
requirements in Sec.  437.41 to require that they meet the

[[Page 79689]]

requirements of proposed Sec.  450.173 and remove and reserve the 
requirements in Sec.  437.75.
     Fifth, the FAA proposed to change the requirements in 
Sec.  437.65 for collision avoidance to match proposed Sec.  450.169.
     Finally, the FAA proposed allowing for alternate time 
frames for pre-flight reporting in Sec.  437.89.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements with 
the following exceptions. The FAA revises the environmental 
requirements in Sec.  437.21 to align with Sec.  450.47, and replaces 
the word ``envelope'' with the word ``scope.'' ``Scope'' more 
accurately captures ``envelope, parameter, or situation'' as used in 
the definition of ``safety element approval.'' The rationale for this 
revision is discussed in the Environmental Review section of the 
preamble. The FAA also aligns the recordkeeping requirements in Sec.  
437.87(b) for an event that meets paragraph (a)(1) through (a)(3), 
(a)(5), or (b)(3) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7, for 
which a permittee must preserve all records related to the mishap 
event. The FAA removes the definition of ``anomaly'' from Sec.  437.3 
and includes a revised definition of ``anomaly'' in Sec.  401.7 instead 
of in Sec.  401.5 as proposed. The FAA also amends the language in 
Sec.  437.87(b) to state that records must be retained until completion 
of any Federal investigation and the FAA advises the permittee that the 
records need no longer be retained. These changes will clarify the 
records retention requirements and ensure consistency with part 450. 
The changes do not modify the scope of the requirements. The FAA did 
not receive any comments on this portion of the proposed rule.
Part 440--Financial Responsibility
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to modify Sec.  440.15 to allow for 
alternate time frames. The FAA also proposed to modify the definition 
of ``maximum probable loss'' in Sec.  440.3 to exclude neighboring 
operations losses from losses to third parties that are reasonably 
expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity and that have 
a probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten million (1 x 
10-\8\), and to include those losses to neighboring 
operations personnel that have a probability of occurrence of no less 
than one in one hundred thousand (1 x 10-\5\).
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts these changes as proposed. The 
FAA did not receive any comments on this proposal.
7. Miscellaneous Comments
i. General Support/Opposition
    Several commenters generally supported the proposed rule as a much-
needed effort to consolidate and update the licensing process in a way 
that would foster innovation and growth of the space industry. 
Individual commenters supported streamlined licensing as a way for 
space startups to enter the industry.
    The FAA also received comments stating the NPRM fell short in 
streamlining rules and procedures, as directed by SPD-2. The FAA 
received comments that the proposed rules made obtaining launch 
licenses too difficult or expensive for small companies because they 
require legal or technical experts for small, low-risk launches. An 
individual commenter asserted the FAA should ease restrictions for 
space startups. Another individual commenter stated the NPRM added 
administrative requirements that the FAA would not be able to manage. 
Virgin Galactic requested that the safety, efficiency, and clarity of 
the current regulatory regime for suborbital, reusable vehicles be 
maintained in any new rulemaking.
    Individual commenters asserted the NPRM did not contain adequate 
standards to evaluate the adverse effects of licensed activities on 
public safety and the environment. The Center for a Sustainable Coast 
(Center) stated the FAA should require applicants to analyze risks to 
private or public property, including infrastructure and natural 
resources. Without such a requirement, the Center and other commenters 
argued the proposed rule would make it easier to launch over 
residential areas, environmental preserves, or other areas presenting a 
high risk of harm to persons, property, and natural resources. The FAA 
also received comments raising concerns about Camden Spaceport, citing 
the proposed rule's lack of noise limitations, emissions requirements, 
and attention to the effects on the environment and residential areas.
    The FAA notes that the commenters did not recommend specific 
changes to the proposed rule, nor did they provide cost data to 
substantiate the economic concern for small companies. As such, the FAA 
cannot provide a specific response to these comments but notes its 
general disagreement with the claim that the new rule will make it too 
difficult or expensive for small companies to secure commercial space 
launch and reentry licenses from the FAA. In fact, publicly available 
means of compliance will assist small companies in entering the market 
by providing multiple options for complying with the regulations. 
Similarly, the FAA disagrees that it would be necessary or feasible to 
create an exception in the licensing process for ``space startups.''
    The FAA disagrees further that the administrative requirements to 
be placed on the FAA will prove impracticable to administer. The final 
rule upholds the FAA's responsibility to protect public safety and 
safety of property. In addition, the final rule makes no change to the 
FAA's assessment of environmental impacts. As such, the FAA disagrees 
that the final rule will enable operators to secure licenses for 
launches or reentries that do not satisfy the FAA's public safety or 
environmental review criteria.
    Finally, commenters' concerns regarding Camden Spaceport are beyond 
the scope of this rulemaking.
ii. Miscellaneous Comments
    Starfighters Aerospace asked if all present restrictions on 
compensation or hire would be removed for licenses and certificates 
developed collaboratively between AVS and AST.
    The FAA notes that this rule will not change any current practice 
or regulation regarding compensation or hire restrictions under 
aviation regulations. Changes to compensation or hire are outside the 
scope of this rulemaking.
    An individual commenter stated that the FAA should have 
incorporated the proposed regulatory text the ARC included at the end 
of its report, or, alternatively, the FAA should reconvene the SLR2 
ARC. Two individuals commented that the FAA did not provide sufficient 
public engagement for this rule. SpaceX and two individuals commented 
that the proposed rule did not adequately address stakeholder concerns. 
Several commenters, including SpaceX and Virgin Orbit, requested a 
public meeting.
    As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not address the ARC's 
recommended regulatory text because the recommended text did not 
receive broad consensus within the ARC. The FAA also disagrees that 
commenters did not have sufficient opportunity to comment on the NPRM. 
Although the FAA did not hold a public meeting, as some commenters 
requested, the FAA accepted written questions seeking clarification on 
the NPRM and, upon publication of the FAA's responses to those 
questions, extended the comment period to allow commenters sufficient 
time to review the FAA's clarifications. Similarly, while the FAA did 
not reconvene the SLR2 ARC, the FAA

[[Page 79690]]

relied heavily upon the recommendations of the ARC, in addition to 
industry and other public comments, in promulgating this rule.
    Relativity Space commented that the NPRM preamble and proposed rule 
diverged from stakeholder expectations and appeared contradictory. 
Sierra Nevada requested that the FAA identify in the docket any 
contractor support used to develop and draft the NPRM.
    The FAA generally disagrees that the preamble contradicted the 
proposed regulation, but notes that, as explained herein, the FAA has 
revised particular provisions that commenters specifically identified 
as unclear or impracticable. The question of contractor support is 
irrelevant to this rule or its promulgation by the FAA.
    CSF and SpaceX commented that the FAA should revise Sec.  440.15(c) 
so that operators would not need to submit proof of insurance, as 
required by Sec.  440.9, more than once if the insurance policy covered 
multiple licensed activities.
    CSF, Rocket Lab, and SpaceX requested the FAA revise Sec.  
440.15(c)(1)(iv) through (c)(1)(vi) to allow use of electronic 
signatures, in lieu of original signatures, for each party to the 
required waiver of claims.
    Denver International Airport asked the FAA to broaden the scope of 
financial responsibility required by part 440 to include employees, 
site operators, neighboring communities, and other stakeholders.
    Boeing and Northrop Grumman recommended the FAA add to Sec.  
404.5(b) a requirement that petitions for waivers specify the duration 
or specific mission for which petitioner seeks relief, noting the FAA 
should not assume a waiver applies to the entire license.
    The FAA notes that the previous four issues raised by the 
commenters are all beyond the scope of this rule because they contained 
comments on areas of the commercial space transportation regulations 
that were not part of the proposal.
    CSF commented that the NPRM was anti-competitive and discouraged 
operations from U.S. Government ranges, thereby favoring operators 
located elsewhere, including outside the United States.
    The FAA notes that CSF does not explain why it thinks the rule will 
discourage operations from U.S. Government ranges and favor operators 
located elsewhere, including outside the United States. Based on 
applications received by the FAA, the locations of operations are 
ultimately determined by the scale and complexity of operations, 
including the size and type of launch vehicle, resource inputs, 
infrastructure requirements, and payload considerations. The net cost 
savings provided by this rule do not significantly change the relative 
costs of operating from U.S. Government ranges in favor of locations 
elsewhere given these considerations of scale and complexity of 
operations. In addition, U.S. companies need a license from the FAA for 
a commercial space launch regardless of where the launch occurs--this 
rule does not change that. Currently, and prior to this rule, U.S. 
companies operate at locations outside of U.S. Government ranges in 
remote locations and abroad, such as New Zealand.
iii. Advisory Circulars (ACs)
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, Space Florida, SpaceX, and two individuals 
(including Congressman Steven M. Palazzo) commented that the FAA had 
failed to provide sufficient accompanying guidance documents and ACs to 
allow industry to provide meaningful input on the proposed regulations. 
CSF and SpaceX both commented that the FAA's approach to publish many 
ACs with the final rule did not allow industry to consider the proposed 
rules and the draft ACs as a complete package. Virgin Galactic 
recommended that the FAA release updated ACs and guidelines to coincide 
with the new rule's going into effect, or allow a grace period for 
applicants and currently licensed operators to be compliant.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenters' concerns, but disagrees that 
the lack of draft ACs, which are necessarily rooted in the text of 
regulations, prevented commenters from substantively commenting on the 
proposed rule. The preamble and table of accepted means of compliance 
provided sufficient detail to support the proposal. The ACs will be 
non-binding guidance documents designed to provide specific examples of 
means of compliance and recognized practices without prescribing 
regulatory requirements. The public and interested parties will have an 
opportunity to provide comment on the ACs.
    As noted under the performance-based regulations discussion, CSF 
and SpaceX stated that some of the proposed rules may be performance-
based, but it was difficult to make that determination without 
reviewing the accompanying ACs. Space Florida commented that there was 
an absence of performance criteria and guidance providing acceptable 
approaches.
    The FAA does not agree that the absence of additional draft ACs 
prevented members of the public from understanding the performance-
based requirements as proposed. The proposed requirements, along with 
discussions in the preamble, provided ample notice to the public. An AC 
would provide one means, but not the only means, of meeting any 
particular requirement.
iv. Designated Engineering Representative Model
    Blue Origin recommended the Designated Engineering Representative 
(DER) model to determine compliance with the FAA's launch and reentry 
regulations.
    Delegating the agency's authority to make engineering compliance 
findings to qualified individuals (DERs) in the context of licensing 
commercial space transportation is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 
The FAA may consider such a recommendation in the future.
v. Request for SNPRM
    The FAA received a number of comments requesting that the FAA issue 
an SNPRM. Denver International Airport commented that the FAA should 
wait to issue this rule until Congress adopts the Space Frontier Act, 
and then, if required, issue an SNPRM.
    One individual commenter asked the FAA to restart the rulemaking 
process and work closely with industry and the ARC to produce a final 
rule that would meet industry needs and would comply with the 
Commercial Space Launch Act and SPD-2.
    The FAA disagrees that the final rule is inconsistent with either 
the Commercial Space Launch Act or SPD-2. Through this rule, the FAA 
streamlines the licensing process for commercial launch and reentry 
operations, and replaces many prescriptive requirements with 
performance-based criteria, as directed by SPD-2. To forego rulemaking 
until Congress passes additional legislation on commercial space 
operations, as Denver International Airport suggested, would contravene 
the President's policy directive.
    The FAA finds no circumstances that would justify a second round of 
notice and comment or SNPRM. The FAA provided ample opportunity for 
members of the public to submit comments and supporting evidence to the 
administrative record, as shown by the large volume of substantive, 
diverse comments received. The FAA also provided two sets of written 
responses to clarifying questions, and extended the comment period 
following publication of those responses. Although the FAA has adjusted 
and revised parts of the NPRM in light of the

[[Page 79691]]

comments received and interagency review, the final rule does not 
materially differ from the proposed rule such that an SNPRM would have 
been warranted. Nor does the FAA view the presence of the circumstances 
that might otherwise necessitate publishing an SNPRM (e.g., 
availability of new studies or experiments affecting the agency's 
analysis; supervening legal developments that significantly affect the 
rulemaking; or any other important change to the agency's analytical 
framework in the rulemaking).
vi. Airspace
    The FAA received a number of comments on the effect of space 
operations on the NAS. A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, AOPA, CAA, NATCA, and RAA 
recommended the FAA implement tools to integrate commercial space 
activities safely and expeditiously into the NAS and to harmonize the 
regulatory regime governing aviation and commercial space. These 
commenters argue that greater communication and coordination with NAS 
users was needed to reduce delays and obstacles faced by both 
industries (e.g., coordinated vehicle surveillance, traffic management, 
and hazard mitigation plans).
    The same commenters recommended the FAA incorporate into the rule 
the recommendations of the ongoing Airspace Access ARC. AOPA stated the 
COMSTAC and SLR2 ARC should have included general aviation 
representation.
    A4A and Southwest Airlines asked that aviation stakeholders be 
given an opportunity to identify potential NAS impacts during the 
licensing process. A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, CAA, NATCA, and RAA 
recommended the FAA require licensees to identify and mitigate negative 
operational and financial impacts to NAS users resulting from licensed 
activities. A4A added that hazard mitigation plans and the FAA's 
accepted means of compliance should be subject to public comment, or 
otherwise allow NAS users the opportunity to identify airspace and 
ground safety risks.
    The FAA did not propose any changes for the protection of aircraft 
other than the aircraft risk criteria proposed in Sec.  450.101(a)(3). 
As such, these comments are beyond the scope of this rule. 
Recommendations from the Airspace Access ARC, which included commercial 
space and aviation industry representatives, may inform future actions 
addressing aircraft protection.
8. Responses to Regulatory Impact Analysis Comments
i. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses
    CSF commented that if the FAA required holders of licenses issued 
under current regulations to seek renewals under part 450, operators 
and the FAA would experience significant additional cost and regulatory 
burdens because currently licensed operators under parts 431 and 435 
would have to come into compliance with certain additional requirements 
in part 450. Blue Origin also expressed concern that, without 
grandfathering, there would be a cost to transition a license to part 
450. Blue Origin pointed out that, according to the NPRM, upon license 
renewal, an existing operation would have to comply with part 450. Blue 
Origin disagreed with the FAA's conclusion that operators would not 
have great difficulty transitioning existing programs to part 450. It 
cited, in particular, proposed CEC and associated 
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.145.
    The FAA notes that any request to renew a current license submitted 
after the effective date of the rule will result in a license valid for 
no more than five years after the effective date of this rule. However, 
upon the effective date, the operator will be required to come into 
compliance with COLA and critical asset requirements. The FAA does not 
estimate additional costs for those two requirements because the 
operator will provide the same information the operator currently 
provides, and the U.S. Government will perform the necessary analyses, 
as discussed in the preamble sections for Critical Asset and COLA.
    After five years from the effective date of the final rule, all 
vehicle operators must be in compliance with part 450, but information 
previously submitted to the FAA in obtaining a license under parts 417 
and 431 may be referenced as means of compliance to meet the 
requirements of part 450. Concerns over costs of proposed 
CEC and FSS requirements in Sec.  450.145 are discussed in 
the remainder of this section. There may be costs to transition 
licenses following the 5-year period after the rule's effective date. 
However, as mentioned previously, the FAA anticipates few, if any, 
additional requirements that could not be fulfilled by referencing 
previous submittals.
ii. Sec.  450.47 Environmental Review
    Several commenters stated that the proposed requirements would 
impose added costs for which the FAA did not account. Space Florida 
expressed concern that the FAA may determine that new or supplemental 
environmental analyses would be necessary for operators opting for a 
single vehicle license with vehicle and site flexibility. The commenter 
was concerned that such analyses would be required before the 
determination to add multiple vehicle configurations, operational 
parameters, or launch site locations to an operator's single license. 
Spaceport Strategies also expressed concern that the FAA had not 
analyzed the cost to launch operators or to launch site operators for 
additional or redundant environmental reviews that the FAA would likely 
require of an operator under the new rule in order for an operator to 
obtain a single license covering multiple launch or reentry sites or 
multiple vehicle configurations and flight operations. Spaceport 
Strategies noted that the added costs of repetitive or redundant 
environmental reviews would cause unquantified cost impacts on 
licensees, including State and local launch site license applicants. 
CSF stated that applicants using the licensing option to include 
multiple sites under one license may be vulnerable to time and cost 
uncertainty resulting from these environmental review requirements.
    The FAA does not agree that the final rule will impose additional 
costs beyond what is currently required of applicants for environmental 
reviews, including applications for a single vehicle license or 
licenses that include multiple sites, as the final rule codifies 
current practice. NEPA requires that an environmental review be 
completed for each site covered by the FAA license. As such, the final 
rule makes no change to the existing requirement that applicants submit 
information allowing the FAA to fulfill its responsibility under NEPA 
to assess the environmental impacts associated with the proposed 
activities, at each site where the licensed activities will occur. An 
applicant must submit these materials to allow the FAA to conduct site-
specific reviews regardless of whether multiple sites or vehicles are 
covered under one license or several licenses. This could be 
accomplished by including multiple sites into one NEPA document, or 
separating them into individual NEPA documents.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA did not consider the 
offsetting costs of environmental reviews for the new vehicles and 
launch sites for which cost savings were assessed. The FAA notes it did 
not include offsetting costs for new vehicles and launch sites because 
the same costs for environmental reviews will be imposed

[[Page 79692]]

under the current regulations. There will be no change in costs.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA's re-write of 
environmental review requirements was more than a simple 
``consolidation'' as reported in the Preliminary Regulatory Impact 
Assessment. The commenter stated that the proposed requirements had 
unquantified cost impacts upon licensees, including State and local 
launch site license applicants, for the additive costs of repetitive or 
redundant environmental reviews.
    As discussed in the Environmental Review section of this preamble, 
the final rule codifies existing environmental review requirements. The 
commenter did not identify the environmental reviews it deems 
repetitive or redundant. However, the FAA confirms that in codifying 
existing practice, the final rule will not impose additional costs for 
environmental review.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that licensees would face 
significant costs to redo environmental analyses for previously studied 
and permitted sites. As an example, the commenter referred to Space 
Florida's being required to spend almost $239,000 for another 
environmental assessment for its Launch Site Operator License for 
horizontal launch at the former Shuttle Landing Facility, when NASA had 
completed two previous environmental assessments on the same facility.
    The FAA notes this rule will impose no additional environmental 
reviews nor require a redo of an environmental assessment if an 
operator's operation remains within the scope of the original 
assessment. However, consistent with NEPA, an operator will be required 
to do additional environmental reviews if the scope of its operation 
has changed.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA did not address 
environmental review regulations derived from practices and policies 
being codified into rules as potential federalism issues with the State 
and local jurisdictions that operate the part 420-licensed sites. The 
commenter stated that the FAA also did not consider that some, if not 
all, of the local and State authorities are small governmental entities 
for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    The FAA determines that this rule codifies existing requirements in 
FAA Order 1050.1 and will not affect the applicability of NEPA or any 
other Federal environmental law to non-Federal launch or reentry sites. 
Therefore, the FAA finds that the final rule will not have an 
additional cost impact on small governmental jurisdictions.
iii. Sec.  450.101(a)(b) Neighboring Operations
    Virgin Orbit believed the costs of the additional EC 
analysis to use in determination of neighboring operations personnel 
would be $10,000. As discussed in the preamble section for Neighboring 
Operations Personnel, the FAA acknowledges that this requirement will 
require additional analysis; however, the FAA expects that this 
analysis will involve minor additional effort because the operator 
already has to perform a similar analysis for the public and will only 
need to account for the population of neighboring operations personnel, 
if any.
    Blue Origin expressed concern that the FAA might implement a 
requirement for which compliance would be impossible, or would lead to 
the creation of a sole source provider for a service necessary to 
demonstrate compliance, if the FAA does not explain how the transfer of 
neighboring operations personnel population data would take place. 
Sierra Nevada expressed concern regarding an applicant's ability to 
perform calculations to determine which neighboring operations 
personnel could remain on a launch site, because the applicant would 
need to get accurate data regarding the populations and locations of 
neighboring operations. Sierra Nevada pointed out that, because data 
could be on personnel performing operations for competing companies, 
the data could be proprietary or sensitive. Sierra Nevada suggested the 
FAA could perform this function to guard the proprietary nature of the 
data.
    In the final rule, the FAA notes that the Federal or licensed site 
operator will determine those personnel who are eligible for 
neighboring operations personnel status in coordination with the launch 
operators, because the site operator is in the best position to 
identify which personnel are required to perform safety, security, or 
critical tasks at the launch site. Further, as previously discussed, 
both the launch or reentry operator and the neighboring site operator 
benefit from this treatment of neighboring operations personnel.
    Spaceport Strategies faults the FAA for not comparing the estimated 
marginal productivity improvement created by allowing certain personnel 
of neighboring operators to remain at work during nearby operations 
with adverse schedule and competitiveness losses if the FAA did not 
adopt the alternative approaches suggested by the ARC and CSF.
    The alternative chosen by the FAA provides cost savings compared to 
the current regulations, and the FAA believes that this approach is 
consistent with the intent of SPD-2. The FAA acknowledges that other 
approaches exist, and considered three alternatives that are discussed 
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act section of this preamble.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the labor categories used to 
calculate neighboring operations personnel savings (engineers and 
technicians) did not align with the restricted categories of work 
functions allowed to remain (such as personnel required for safety, 
security, or critical tasks), indicating that the FAA's savings 
estimates may not actually be realized.
    The FAA received input from licensed operators on the labor 
categories that might be allowed to remain on the launch site and, 
based on that input, is confident that these are reasonable labor 
categories.
iv. Sec.  450.101(a) Incorporate Waterborne Vessels Into Collective 
Risk Criteria
    To incorporate waterborne vessels into collective risk assessment, 
Virgin Orbit requested the FAA and other regulators work with launch 
service providers by providing databases on global marine traffic. 
Virgin Orbit also requested guidance on debris size/fragment velocities 
that would result in injury to marine traffic, in an appendix or AC. 
Virgin Orbit asserted that this requirement is not found in the 
existing regulations, and estimated that the additional cost to analyze 
and document the effort would be approximately $20,000 per launch, 
which would become significant costs for a large number of launches.
    The FAA does not agree that there will be additional costs of any 
significance from the requirement to incorporate waterborne vessels 
into collective risk criteria. The operator can continue its current 
practice and demonstrate compliance in accordance with the RCC 321-20 
Supplement. The FAA does not find a need to provide databases on global 
marine traffic because there are several public sources of data on ship 
traffic available through the internet which aggregate near real-time 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) \191\ data from satellites and 
ground stations. The FAA notes that all vessels over 300 tons on an 
international voyage, all domestic vessels over 500 tons, and all 
passenger carriers, are

[[Page 79693]]

required to operate ``Class A'' AIS transponders, broadcasting 
continually-updated data, such as identity, position, course, speed, 
ship characteristics, cargo, and voyage information, to other vessels 
and the shore. The United States Coast Guard requires AIS Class A 
transponders on all U.S. vessels engaged in commercial service that are 
(1) self-propelled and over 65 feet in length, or (2) towing vessels of 
26 feet or more in length and more than 600 horsepower. The USCG also 
requires AIS Class B transponders on smaller vessels, such as fishing 
industry vessels.\192\ Detection of smaller vessels, which tend to 
remain close to shore, can be accomplished without AIS by fixed ground-
based and ship-board radar, as well as surveillance aircraft. The FAA 
will publish an AC on population exposure analyses that includes 
details about available databases that provide valid data on ship 
traffic, including near real-time ship traffic useful for EC 
analyses. The forthcoming RCC 321 Supplement will also include this 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ AIS is a standardized maritime navigation safety 
communications system that provides vessel information automatically 
to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft.
    \192\ USGC regulations regarding AIS are given in 33 CFR 164.46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ship probability of impact contours (PI) and 
individual risk contours are already required and computed based on 
current practice to establish ship hazard areas. The FAA Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation will facilitate access to the ship 
traffic densities so that the EC contribution from ships can 
be computed with a spreadsheet.
v. Sec.  450.101(a)(3) Aircraft Risk
    Virgin Orbit commented on the proposed requirement for an operator 
to establish aircraft hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability 
of impact with debris capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does 
not exceed 1 x 10-\6\. To incorporate airborne vessels into 
the collective risk assessment, Virgin Orbit requested FAA databases on 
civil and general aircraft, predicted air traffic, and debris size and 
velocities that would result in aircraft casualties in order to comply 
with this requirement. Virgin Orbit stated guidance on debris size and 
fragment velocities could be added in an appendix or AC. Virgin Orbit 
indicated that this is a new requirement relative to the existing 
regulations and estimated that the additional cost to analyze and 
document the effort would be $20,000 per launch. While not significant 
by itself, Virgin Orbit stated that the additional cost for a large 
number of launches becomes significant.
    The FAA does not agree that this is a new requirement. Current part 
431 regulations require an operator to demonstrate that the risk level 
to an individual does not exceed 1 x 10-\6\ probability of 
casualty per mission. The part 431 requirement is equivalent to the 
corresponding part 450 requirement, which requires that the probability 
of impact with debris capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does 
not exceed 1 x 10-\6\. Because people in aircraft are not 
excluded from the part 431 requirement, part 450 is not adding a new 
requirement to demonstrate risk level for aircraft. In addition, Sec.  
417.107(b)(4) is identical to the requirement in Sec.  450.101(a)(3). 
Part 450 does not require a collective risk assessment for aircraft, so 
aircraft traffic densities, data on civil and general aircraft, and 
predicted air traffic, are not necessary.
vi. Sec.  450.101(a)(4) Critical Assets
    Blue Origin commented that because operators on non-Federal launch 
or reentry sites would be required to comply with USAF Federal site 
requirements, the FAA would need either to confirm it had considered 
private and licensed spaceports in its cost assessment and that those 
operators would not need to complete any critical asset analyses, or to 
confirm they were not included. The commenter also stated that it was 
possible the new requirement would impose costs for operators not at 
Federal sites.
    Spaceport Florida voiced concern about the creation of a new 
category of property designated as a ``critical asset,'' which would be 
required to be protected against ``loss of functionality'' by 
prescribed risk criteria limiting each designated asset's exposure to 
launch or reentry hazards. The commenter indicated concerns about 
extraordinary analysis requirements, unknown costs, and program risks 
asking what limits the types and numbers of assets that may be 
designated by multiple parties within proximity to a licensed launch 
activity.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA had not conducted 
certain analyses. These included analyzing the cost to a licensee to 
perform a risk assessment on each FAA-identified critical asset to be 
incorporated into a flight safety risk analysis, analyzing the cost to 
identify critical assets to be evaluated as a property at risk, and 
analyzing operator time to process waivers required for an operator's 
own critical assets or for an asset that may be at risk for a 
particular critical licensed activity. Spaceport Strategies expressed 
concern that the proposed requirements duplicated existing standards 
imposed by NASA and the USAF, and noted that there was only brief 
mention of this newly proposed requirement in the FAA's Preliminary 
Regulatory Impact Analysis, which identified no costs associated with 
its implementation. As proposed, this requirement would apply to all 
licensed launches and reentries wherever they may occur, at any site in 
the United States. The commenter noted that in the Baseline Analysis of 
the cost impacts and cost savings of proposed Sec.  450.101, the FAA 
claimed no cost impact for a new requirement that clearly would add 
cost burden to every licensee, as well as to the FAA itself.
    The FAA notes that under the final rule the U.S. Government will 
perform the identification and analysis of critical assets. The FAA 
expects these costs to be relatively small. The Federal launch or 
reentry site will perform the analysis for launch or reentry operations 
from Federal sites, and the FAA will perform the analysis for 
operations from non-Federal launch or reentry sites. Therefore, 
operators should incur no costs for determination of critical assets.
vii. Sec.  450.101(c) High Consequence Event Protection
    Spaceport Strategies stated that the proposed requirement to use 
the CEC analysis tool would be prohibitively expensive--even 
technologically infeasible--to use, and faulted the Preliminary 
Regulatory Impact Analysis for not including these costs. The commenter 
also criticized the FAA for not including the costs for operators to 
learn the skills or contract for the analysis. In addition, they stated 
that the FAA did not include its cost to hire in-house personnel or 
contractor skills to validate that the operator's analysis justifies 
not needing an FSS.
    CSF found the CEC to be a new and costly calculation 
that may require significant resources, including possible reliance on 
contracts for expensive modeling capabilities. The commenter feared 
that meeting the CEC may result in substantial increase in 
cost to those operators currently able to show compliance. Based on its 
understanding of the proposed rule, CSF concluded that the majority, if 
not all, of the operators would be captured by proposed Sec.  
450.145(a)(1) and would be required to implement an FSS of the highest 
reliability. CSF disagreed with the FAA's estimated FSS cost savings 
and indicated there would be cost increases.
    Virgin Orbit stated that CEC, as a new requirement, 
would be burdensome to implement and would require changes to its in-
house algorithm to compute flight corridors with associated 
EC. According to Virgin Orbit, this new burden would impact 
timelines for future launches and would have

[[Page 79694]]

significant costs to implement. The commenter recommended 
CEC be included as one method to determine whether an FSS 
was needed and not as a required calculation. The commenter further 
noted that CEC, as proposed, would be better suited in an 
AC. Blue Origin described the proposed CEC as a complicated 
analysis with debatable accuracy. Several commenters disagreed with the 
FAA's conclusion that this new ``consequence risk'' methodology aligned 
with current practices.
    Rocket Lab explained that, because proposed CEC 
disregarded demonstrated reliability and experience, it appeared almost 
impossible for any orbital launch vehicle to meet the prescribed 
CEC thresholds. Preliminary calculations suggested that the 
majority of orbital launch vehicle operators would be directed toward a 
flight abort system of the highest prescribed reliability.
    The FAA does not agree that the cost to use CEC is 
prohibitive or that Virgin Orbit will be required to make significant 
changes to its in-house algorithm. Additional costs associated with 
modifications of analysis tools, adjustments to data development, 
additional analysis runtime, and interpretation of the results as 
detailed below, should not be significant.
    The modification of existing analysis tools is expected to take 
only a few hours. As explained earlier, CEC is inherent in 
the calculation of total casualty expectation. If the capability to 
output the CEC values is not already part of the calculation 
tool, adding the output of this value for each scenario should require 
no more than a few hours of effort. This estimate is included in the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis for those operators who choose to do the 
analysis.
    Because the CEC metric is more sensitive to the input 
data and to numerical sampling approaches than the collective 
EC metric, more rigor needs to be applied to the analysis or 
more uncertainty accepted in the result. Some data development may need 
to be of higher fidelity and more computation samples run to achieve a 
statistically meaningful answer. Therefore, the FAA finds there will be 
additional cost to perform the analysis. To comply with Sec.  
450.101(c), the operator first calculates the CEC, assuming 
no FSS is present, to determine whether flight abort with an FSS 
meeting the requirements of Sec.  450.108(b) is needed. These 
calculations will incur 5 percent of the debris analysis costs.\193\ 
These estimates are included in the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Debris cost analysis is estimated to cost $50,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Applicants using an FSS can use hazard containment or analysis of 
CEC as key criteria in the determination of flight safety 
limits. The cost to interpret CEC results for flight safety 
limit development is expected (after the debris analysis is run) to 
reduce the costs nominally compared to existing containment approaches.
    Using its CEC tool, ACTA, under contract to the FAA, has 
identified several launches in the launch forecast that will not need 
an FSS. The Regulatory Impact Analysis includes more information on 
these launches, as well as an updated estimate of cost savings 
anticipated because these launches will not need an FSS.
    The FAA notes that any operator that agrees to have a Sec.  
450.145-compliant FSS does not have to do a CEC analysis to 
determine the required reliability level of the FSS. However, a 
CEC analysis may still be needed to determine the flight 
safety limits. As discussed in the High Consequence Event Protection 
preamble section, the final rule now has a number of flexibilities in 
Sec.  450.101(c). Nevertheless, an operator could opt to use the flight 
safety limits approach in current Sec.  417.213 as a means of 
compliance with Sec.  450.108(5), and thus avoid any costs associated 
with CEC analysis.
viii. System Safety Program, Post-Flight Data Review, Post-Flight 
Reporting
    CSF disagreed with the FAA's rationale that any added burden of 
this section would be minimal because industry practice was to review 
post-flight data for reliability and mission success. CSF maintained 
that the proposed post-flight data requirement extended beyond industry 
practice. The commenter also stated that it was not clear whether the 
process for evaluating post-flight data would be subject to FAA review 
and approval, which would create an even larger burden. Sierra Nevada 
also commented that the proposed requirements extended beyond the 
industry practice of reviewing post-flight data for reliability and 
mission success, to requiring an operator to develop and employ a 
process for evaluating post-flight data to ensure consistency between 
the assumptions used for preliminary safety assessment, any flight 
hazard or FSA, and associated mitigation and control measures. Rocket 
Lab and Sierra Nevada stated the proposed Sec.  450.103(d) would 
require the operator to address any anomaly identified and resolve 
inconsistencies prior to the next flight of the vehicle. Rocket Lab 
pointed out that this was overly burdensome.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters. The FAA is only concerned 
with ensuring consistency between the assumptions used for any safety 
analysis and associated mitigation and hazard control measures. It is 
industry practice to review post-flight data to address vehicle 
reliability and mission success.
    The FAA further notes that current regulations already require that 
any representation contained in the license application that is 
material to public health and safety or the safety of property be kept 
accurate and complete, therefore any additional burden from Sec.  
450.103(d) will be minimal. Currently, operators review the post-flight 
data because it provides valuable information on future operations. At 
a minimum, in the final rule, Sec.  450.103(d)(1) will require that an 
operator employ a process for evaluating post-flight data to ensure 
consistency between the assumptions used for the hazard control 
strategy determination, any hazard or FSA, and associated mitigation 
and hazard control measures. With respect to Sec.  450.103(d), the FAA 
will evaluate the post-flight data review process during the 
application evaluation. Applicants will not be required to provide 
information obtained from the post-flight data review to the FAA unless 
specifically requested to do so during the compliance monitoring 
process. The FAA finds that it has always been the operator's 
responsibility to ensure the accuracy of the relevant safety analyses. 
Operators must review flight data in order to ensure that the operation 
is conducted as predicted, and to inform necessary safety analysis 
changes for future flights.
    Section 450.215 will continue to require licensees to submit a 
post-flight report no later than 90 days after an operation if there 
are any anomalies in the flight environment material to public health 
and safety and the safety of property, and if there is a need for 
associated corrective actions. This practice is currently required by 
Sec.  417.25(c). While RLV operators licensed under part 431 are not 
currently required to submit a post-flight report, they are required to 
ensure that all assumptions and representations made in their 
application that are material to public health and safety or the safety 
of property are kept accurate and complete, in accordance with 
Sec. Sec.  413.7 and 431.73(b)(2). As such, the FAA expects the added 
burden to be minimal because launch and reentry operators regularly 
track anomalies and

[[Page 79695]]

implement corrective actions for mission assurance, continuing license 
accuracy, and safety purposes. The FAA is normally made aware of any 
anomalies and corrective actions that are material to public health and 
safety through its inspection program.
ix. Sec.  450.141 (Proposed Sec.  450.111) Computing Systems and 
Software Systems
    Several commenters expressed concern that the NPRM proposed a 
prescriptive approach to the software hazard, which would impose a 
significant burden on operators to meet all of the proposed 
requirements and structure.
    An individual commenter estimated that changing the review process 
and structure of software would require a substantial new effort and 
add costs of over $40,000 per launch. Blue Origin faulted the FAA for 
proposing overly prescriptive regulations governing how the operator 
would design and test software. Blue Origin also contended that the 
prescriptive proposed requirements did not integrate well with most 
industry applications and best practices and failed to address critical 
aspects of safety sufficiently for aeronautical databases, complex 
distributed software systems, new techniques, and machine learning. 
Blue Origin indicated that these would threaten progress being made 
towards safer, lower cost and higher quality software approaches. CSF 
maintained that the requirements of proposed Sec.  450.111 prescribing 
how the operator would design and test software, and providing only one 
way to demonstrate that software was safe, failed to allow development 
of new technologies that could lead to safer solutions, and would 
greatly increase costs. Leo Aerospace stated that the testing 
requirements of proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(2) and (f)(1) were so 
prescriptive that they would be cost-prohibitive.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises Sec.  450.111 to mirror the 
typical structure of computing system safety application data 
submissions and adds flexibility in the means of compliance for key 
aspects of safe computing system development. The FAA notes that these 
revisions address the key aspects of commenters' concerns. The final 
rule on computing and software systems, now located in Sec.  450.141, 
aggregates the requirements in proposed Sec.  450.111 into performance-
based objectives set in the context of the appropriateness of each 
element for the system as a whole. This aggregation removes any 
prescriptive requirements and replaces them with the performance-based 
objectives. The performance-based objectives are the elements of 
software development and testing processes that enable an understanding 
of the public safety implications of each software component, and the 
objectives are structured to mirror typical software safety application 
data submissions to minimize or eliminate the need to adapt existing 
software safety processes to fit the new regulations. The final 
performance-based objectives expand the range of software safety 
approaches that could meet the regulation to enable more innovation 
while keeping the compliance burden at or below the level proposed in 
the NPRM.
x. Proposed Sec.  450.113(a)(5) Flight Safety Analysis Requirements
    Virgin Galactic commented that its launch system had an FSS in the 
form of its pilot, rendering the need for ``demonstrated reliability'' 
unnecessary. In addition, unlike the ELVs addressed by part 417, Virgin 
Galactic's launch system does not have a large effective casualty area, 
which raised the question of whether the risks truly justified the 
costs of the proposed requirement, particularly to small businesses.
    Under this rule, currently licensed hybrid systems will not have to 
do an FSA for phases of flight that have a flight history to 
demonstrate reliability based on operational and flight history in lieu 
of a traditional risk analysis. This allowance is discussed in greater 
detail in the Hybrid Vehicles section of the preamble.
xi. Sec.  450.115 Flight Safety Analysis Methods
    CSF commented that prescriptive FSA requirements are inappropriate 
for some vehicles and operations. An applicant would have to propose an 
alternative method of compliance or submit a waiver request, resulting 
in an increase in the amount of work. The lack of tool-availability 
might also cause some applicants to incur costs of performing these 
analyses themselves. CSF noted these costs had not been included in the 
cost analysis. The FAA agrees that prescriptive requirements are not 
appropriate and revises the requirements to be more performance-based.
x. Independent Analyses
    CSF stated that the NPRM's Flight Safety Analysis sections 
(proposed Sec. Sec.  450.119 and 450.135) include multiple references 
to an applicant submitting any additional products that allow an 
independent analysis as requested by the Administrator. CSF stated that 
this behavior of recreating an applicant's analysis was already an 
expensive and burdensome aspect of the current rules that should be 
ended. A couple of commenters provided estimates of additional hours of 
work that might be required to conduct independent analyses.
    As mentioned previously, the goal is for the FAA to evaluate, in an 
efficient and thorough manner, the validity of the analysis. The FAA 
finds that conducting an independent analysis is typically the most 
efficient and thorough means to verify compliance with the FSA 
requirements for novel launch or reentry operations or operators that 
propose to use substantially new FSA methods. Furthermore, the FAA 
plans to provide benchmarks for comparison purposes that operators can 
reference to as part of the validation and verification of their 
analysis methods.
    Therefore, the FAA does not anticipate this rule will impose an 
additional cost burden for independent analyses because conducting 
independent analyses is current practice.
xi. Sec.  450.135 Debris Risk Analysis
    An individual commenter indicated that the proposed rule would add 
significant work in additional debris risk analysis beyond what the 
operator was doing to comply with the current regulations. The 
commenter specified that the proposed rule would add requirements on 
explosive debris, toxic release effects from the debris, accounting for 
sheltering of individual from buildings and vehicles, a casualty mode 
that included ricochet fragments, and impacts to critical assets. It 
would also add reporting requirements for the top ten impacted 
population centers and the need to perform conditional probability 
calculations in the FSA.
    The FAA notes that an explosive debris or toxic release effects 
analysis will not be required if the vehicle does not have explosive 
debris and toxics. Explosive debris or toxic release effects analysis 
are currently required for ELVs under Sec.  417.107(b)(1) and for RLVs 
under Sec.  431.35(b)(1)(ii), so the requirement for those analyses 
under part 450 would not impose additional costs. The final rule 
requirements allow operators to determine how to conduct their debris 
risk analysis. For example, an operator will not need to update the 
debris risk analysis to account for sheltering or ricochet if it uses a 
conservative estimate of the casualty area for people in the open 
pursuant to Sec.  450.101(g). Under the final rule, the FAA or Federal 
launch or reentry site will do any critical asset risk assessment. The 
cost of the CEC

[[Page 79696]]

assessment is addressed in the High Consequence Event Protection 
preamble section. Reporting the top ten population centers is a minimal 
amount of additional paperwork.
xii. Sec.  450.143 Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and 
Documentation
    An individual commenter expressed concern that the proposed rule 
would constrain the design by prescribing fault tolerance where an 
operational mitigation solution might exist, and stated that this would 
result in a large burden.
    The FAA finds that industry interpreted this regulation to be 
burdensome due to a misunderstanding of the breadth of possible means 
of compliance to the ``fault-tolerant'' requirement in Sec.  
450.143(b). In the NPRM, the FAA noted that while redundancy was a 
currently prescribed requirement for some safety-critical components, 
the intent of this requirement was to accept other methods, including 
fail safety and damage tolerance for systems like primary structures 
that could not be redundant. This flexibility permits operational 
restrictions, testing, and inspection to factor into the design to 
demonstrate that a system is fault-tolerant. The FAA resolves these 
concerns by revising Sec.  450.143(b) to allow for other means of 
compliance.
xiii. Sec.  450.145 Flight Safety System
    Several commenters took issue with the FAA's assessment of cost 
savings associated with the new approach to FSS implementation. CSF 
disagreed there would be cost savings and expressed that the majority 
of operators would be required to implement an FSS of the highest 
reliability. CSF concluded that the result would be significant 
increases in cost and oversight burdens to every operator not already 
operating at a U.S. Federal site that has not yet implemented a RCC 
319-4-compliant FSS. Rocket Lab stated that preliminary calculations 
suggested that the majority of orbital launch vehicle operators would 
be directed toward a flight abort system of the highest prescribed 
reliability. Blue Origin stated that most, if not all, operators 
(whether smaller suborbital launch vehicles operating in remote 
locations, or larger orbital launch vehicles operating at Federal 
sites) would be forced down a path of implementing an FSS that must 
comply with an unmodified set of prescriptive USAF requirements. 
Spaceport Strategies criticized the FAA's analysis of cost savings from 
launches not requiring an FSS as being speculative and not providing 
information on whether the vehicles would fly from existing or newly 
licensed or private launch sites. It expressed that the uncertainties 
made the projected savings an overstatement.
    The FAA disagrees that most, if not all, operators will be required 
to implement an FSS of the highest reliability. For some launches, no 
FSS may be required; for others, an FSS will be required, but not of 
the highest reliability. The FAA sponsored an analysis performed by 
ACTA \194\ using a CEC model to evaluate selected \195\ 
prospective launches and determine those which would not need a FSS to 
be in compliance with part 450. The FAA then determined which of these 
launches identified as not needing an FSS under part 450 would be 
required to employ an FSS under part 431 or current practice. Based on 
cost input received from industry on FSS costs, the FAA then estimated 
cost savings due to the fact that some launches would not need an FSS 
under part 450, as determined by the ACTA analysis. The cost savings 
calculations are in the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ ACTA, LLC is a risk management company that evaluates 
safety hazards and risks from space launch vehicle debris, blast, 
fire, and toxic gases. The FAA sponsored ACTA to perform a series of 
tasks to investigate the potential conditional risks associated with 
past and foreseeable launch operations. The study provided an 
independent evaluation of the potential for the CEC 
related requirements in the NPRM to necessitate changes to current 
practice for more than a dozen missions involving large, medium, and 
small launch vehicles from a wide variety sites.
    \195\ In selecting which launches to analyze, the FAA analyzed 
those launches planned from remote areas, suborbital and launches 
with a certain kind of upper stage. This is because orbital launches 
that are not from remote areas are going to exceed the risk 
threshold of greater than 1 x 10-\3\ conditional expected 
casualties for uncontrolled areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

xiv. Sec.  450.161 Control of Hazard Areas
    CSF stated that, in cases in which the hazard area locations were 
in extremely remote locations or significant distances away from the 
launch and reentry site, it was unreasonable for cost and logistics 
reasons to expect that a commercial company could provide such 
surveillance. The FAA notes that Sec.  450.161 only requires 
surveillance to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with Sec.  
450.101. Hence, surveillance will be unnecessary in extremely remote 
locations.
xv. Sec.  450.167 Tracking
    Sierra Nevada expressed that, as written, the proposed rule seemed 
to imply that tracking would be required for every possible piece of 
debris in off-nominal scenarios. Sierra Nevada noted this would be 
burdensome, cost prohibitive, and increase the risk to the public. As 
clarified by the FAA in ``Answers to Clarifying Questions Received by 
June 28, 2019'' and ``Answers to Clarifying Questions Received by July 
29, 2019,'' the term ``all stages and components'' does not imply that 
all debris must be tracked to the ground after a vehicle breakup. In 
the final rule, the FAA replaces the requirement to ``determine the 
actual impact locations'' with the phrase, ``predict the expected 
impact locations,'' in Sec.  450.167. Hence, the FAA finds the final 
rule requirements are consistent with current practice and thus incur 
no additional costs.
xvi. Sec.  450. 173 Mishap Plan--Reporting, Response and Investigating 
Requirements
    Sierra Nevada recommended removing the mishap plan requirement to 
report debris impact points, including those outside a planned landing 
or impact area as proposed in Sec.  450.173(d)(3)(iv), this requirement 
would be burdensome, cost prohibitive, and not reasonable. Sierra 
Nevada stated that this burden would follow because hazard areas are 
generated as probability contours and not contours of total 
containment. The commenter further stated it was realistic that, in the 
event of a breakup scenario, debris would exist outside the hazard area 
but not at a high enough probability to warrant segregation.
    The FAA notes that the requirement to report hazardous debris 
impact points is consistent with the current 5-day reporting 
requirements for ELVs. It is not the FAA's intent to require tracking 
and surveillance for every possible piece of debris in off-nominal 
scenarios. However, based on the vehicle's last-known state vector, an 
operator should be able to calculate approximate hazardous debris 
impact points, including those points outside a planned landing site or 
designated hazard area. The FAA will consider an event that results in 
hazardous debris impact points outside a planned landing site or 
designated hazard area as a mishap. Considering the potential increased 
risk to public safety resulting from hazardous debris impacts outside 
planned landing site or designated hazard area, the FAA finds that this 
requirement is reasonable and necessary.
    In addition to requiring submission of a 5 day report in all mishap 
cases, there might be some additional cost associated with submitting 
debris impact location data, which is not currently required under part 
431. Part 417 requires submission of this data

[[Page 79697]]

only for debris that lands outside the impact limit lines.
    The FAA does not agree that this requirement will be costly or 
unreasonable for the following reasons. First, the requirement has been 
changed to require that only hazardous debris be reported. Second, 
operators currently must employ vehicle tracking for normal flight. In 
the event of a vehicle breakup, operators should be able to approximate 
any hazardous debris impacts in relation to the designated landing site 
or hazard area, based on the vehicle's last known state vector or other 
tracking resources required for normal flight. In other words, this 
requirement will involve only minimal costs because an operator can 
leverage vehicle tracking data it already collects in order to submit 
the debris impact location data. In addition, the FAA believes the 
operator will benefit from reporting this debris.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ The debris data reported can be valuable in assessing the 
current license representations to allow for adjustments to expand 
launch availability or enhance the safety of operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

xvii. Sec.  450.185 Ground Hazard Analysis
    Virgin Galactic commented that the ground hazard analysis 
requirements proposed in the NPRM would represent new requirements and 
a new cost burden, creating new work outside of its existing license. 
Virgin Galactic requested that the FAA determine whether a ground 
hazard analysis would be necessary for hybrid operators, in accordance 
with the Congressional direction that the FAA regulate only to the 
extent necessary.
    The FAA included estimated costs for ground hazard analyses in the 
NPRM. For the final rule, the FAA estimates that 75 percent of 
operators will spend no more than 80 hours on the ground hazard and 25 
percent of the operators will spend no more than 160 hours (non-
recurring one time per license).

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct 
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon 
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs. In addition, DOT rulemaking procedures in Subpart B 
of 49 CFR part 5 instruct DOT agencies to issue a regulation upon a 
reasoned determination that benefits exceed costs. Second, the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies 
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. 
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39 as amended) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with 
base year of 1995). The FAA has provided a more detailed Regulatory 
Impact Analysis of the benefits and costs of this final rule in the 
docket of this rulemaking. This portion of the preamble summarizes the 
findings of this analysis.
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this rule 
will unleash economic benefits that will outweigh its costs. This rule 
is a significant regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866, as it raises novel policy issues. This rule is 
also significant under DOT's administrative procedure rule on 
rulemaking at 49 CFR 5.13 for the same reason. The rule will have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
It will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, and will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, 
or tribal governments, or on the private sector.
Changes to Regulatory Impact Analysis Since the Proposed Rule
    The FAA updates its analysis for changes incorporated in the final 
rule and additional information and data identified during the comment 
period. The following is a summary of these changes (see the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis available in the docket for additional discussion and 
detail).
     Changes period of analysis from 5 to 10 years to capture 
the effects of a five-year compliance period and recurring impacts of 
the rule.
     Provides a range of net impacts from low to high based on 
launch forecast that includes base, low, and high scenarios. The FAA 
uses the base scenario as the primary estimate of the net impacts of 
this rule.
     Incorporates additional data to update savings estimates 
for changes to an FSS.
     Updates data and analysis of neighboring operations 
(number of personnel that evacuate) that decreased savings.
     Updates wage data and adds/clarifies small costs.
Statement of Need
    In 2018, DOT was directed by the National Space Council and SPD-2 
to streamline the regulations governing commercial space launch and 
reentry licensing. The purpose of the final rule is to streamline and 
simplify the licensing of launch and reentry operations by relying on 
performance-based regulations rather than prescriptive regulations. 
This action consolidates and revises multiple commercial space launch 
and reentry regulations addressing licensing into a single regulatory 
part that states safety objectives to be achieved for the launch of 
suborbital and orbital launch vehicles, and the reentry of reentry 
vehicles. This action also enables flexible time frames, removes 
unnecessarily burdensome ground safety regulations, redefines when 
launch begins to allow specified pre-flight operations prior to license 
approval, and allows applicants to seek a license to launch from 
multiple sites. This rule is necessary to reduce the need to file and 
process waivers, improve clarity of the regulations, and relieve 
unnecessary administrative and cost burdens on industry and the FAA. 
The intended effect of this action is to make commercial space 
transportation regulations more efficient and effective, while 
maintaining public safety.
Affected Operators and Launches
    At the time of writing based on FAA license data, the FAA estimates 
this rule will affect 12 operators that have an active license or 
permit to conduct launch or reentry operations. In addition, the FAA 
estimates this rule will affect approximately 672 to 800 launches over 
the next 10 years, with a base or primary estimate of approximately 737 
launches.\197\ The

[[Page 79698]]

FAA anticipates this rule will reduce the costs of current and future 
launch operations by removing current prescriptive requirements that 
are often burdensome to comply with or require a waiver. The FAA 
expects these changes will lead to more efficient launch operations and 
have a positive effect on expanding the number of future launch and 
reentry operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ Based on historical launch data from the FAA Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation and the 2020 FAA Aerospace Forecast 
(https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2020-40_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf). See the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis of this rule in the docket for more information. The 
FAA acknowledges that there is uncertainty estimating future 
launches over a 10-year period since industry is expanding and 
planning for more launches in the future given expected business and 
economic conditions. In addition, historical data has shown that 
there is uncertainty and variation with the number of planned 
launches that result in actual launches on annual basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Impacts
    The FAA bases the analysis of this rule on a launch forecast that 
includes base, low, and high scenarios. Accordingly, this analysis 
provides a range of net impacts from low to high based on these 
forecast scenarios. The FAA uses the base scenario as the primary 
estimate of the net impacts of this rule.
    For the primary estimate, over a 10-year period of analysis, the 
rule will result in present value net cost savings to industry of about 
$53.9 million at a seven percent discount rate with annualized net cost 
savings of about $7.7 million. At a three percent discount rate, the 
10-year present value net cost savings to industry is about $68.3 
million with annualized net cost savings of about $8.0 million. The 
rule will also result in net present value savings for the FAA of about 
$1.7 million at a seven percent discount rate over the same period of 
analysis, with annualized net cost savings of about $0.24 million. At a 
three percent discount rate, the net present value savings for the FAA 
is about $2.3 million with annualized net cost savings of about $0.27 
million.
    The largest quantified cost saving for industry will result from 
eliminating or modifying requirements for an FSS on some launches: 
About $52.6 million in present value savings over 10 years at a seven 
percent discount rate or about $66.6 million at a three percent 
discount rate. As previously discussed, the FAA will move from 
prescriptive FSS requirements to performance-based requirements. The 
rule will not require all launch vehicles to have an FSS. Launch 
vehicles that have a very low probability of multiple casualties even 
if vehicle control fails will not be required to have as robust an FSS. 
In addition, vehicles that have moderately low probability of casualty, 
even if vehicle control fails, will not be required to have robust 
FSS.\198\ These performance-based requirements will reduce costs for 
some vehicle operators, especially for small vehicles or those 
operating in remote locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See discussion in the FSS preamble section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule will also generate another important area of 
quantified savings by providing a new definition of ``neighboring 
operations personnel'' and establishing new criteria for neighboring 
launch site personnel for the purposes of risk and financial 
responsibility. The change will allow affected operators to reduce the 
number of personnel that must evacuate and will enable operations that 
are more concurrent by accepting a small safety risk tradeoff. The FAA 
has monetized the value of this small increased safety risk as 
summarized in the following tables. The FAA estimates the present value 
of these small increased safety risks to be about $0.16 million 
discounted at seven percent or about $0.2 million discounted at three 
percent over ten years.
    The FAA estimates some small costs to industry that will assist 
both industry and the FAA in the implementation of this final rule, 
such as providing information to the FAA that other agencies frequently 
request or performing one-time updates of flight safety limit analyses 
and ground hazard analyses that will be used to determine performance-
based means of compliance that provide future savings. In addition, 
there may be additional costs for the modification of existing licenses 
to benefit from the cost saving provisions of this final rule. The FAA 
will also incur small costs for payload review, flight hazard analysis, 
ground hazard analysis, and the review of modifications to existing 
licenses.
    The following tables present a summary of the primary, low, and 
high estimates of the quantified savings, costs, and the net impacts of 
the rule.

         Summary of 10-Year Quantified Savings, Costs and Net Impacts--Base Scenario or Primary Estimate
                                       [Presented in thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Industry         Industry
                   Impact                      present value    present value     FAA present      FAA present
                                                    (7%)             (3%)          value (7%)       value (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings................................        $54,634.8        $69,193.0         $1,864.2         $2,468.3
Costs.......................................           -733.3           -872.2           -162.7           -199.6
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings........................         53,901.5         68,320.7          1,701.5          2,268.7
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings.........          7,674.4          8,009.3            242.3            266.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Risks......................           -158.5           -197.3  ...............  ...............
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety           53,743.0         68,123.5          1,701.5          2,268.7
     Risks..................................
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings less              7,651.8          7,986.1            242.3            266.0
         Increased Safety Risks.............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: In this and the following tables, the sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding.
  Negative signs used to indicate costs and increased safety risks. Present value estimates provided at seven
  and three percent discount rates per OMB guidance.


                   Summary of 10-Year Quantified Savings, Costs and Net Impacts--Low Scenario
                                       [Presented in thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Industry         Industry
                   Impact                      present value    present value     FAA present      FAA present
                                                    (7%)             (3%)          value (7%)       value (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings................................        $44,274.1        $56,404.8         $1,850.3         $2,449.5

[[Page 79699]]

 
Costs.......................................           -695.3           -828.0           -146.8           -180.6
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings........................         43,578.8         55,576.7          1,703.5          2,268.9
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings.........          6,204.6          6,515.3            242.5            266.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Risks......................           -143.8           -179.6  ...............  ...............
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety           43,435.0         55,397.2          1,703.5          2,268.9
     Risks..................................
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings less              6,184.2          6,494.2            242.5            266.0
         Increased Safety Risks.............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   Summary of 10-Year Quantified Savings, Costs and Net Impacts--High Scenario
                                       [Presented in thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Industry         Industry
                   Impact                      present value    present value     FAA present      FAA present
                                                    (7%)             (3%)          value (7%)       value (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings................................        $64,993.7        $81,979.8         $1,878.4         $2,487.5
Costs.......................................           -769.6           -914.8           -179.2           -219.4
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings........................         64,224.1         81,065.0          1,699.3          2,268.1
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings.........          9,144.1          9,503.3            241.9            265.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Risks......................           -172.5           -214.3  ...............  ...............
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety           64,051.6         80,850.7          1,699.3          2,268.1
     Risks..................................
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings less              9,119.5          9,478.2            241.9            265.9
         Increased Safety Risks.............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following table summarizes quantified impacts by provision 
category for the primary estimate (see the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
in the docket for tables presenting low and high estimates of 
quantified impacts by provision category).

    Summary of 10-Year Quantified Savings, Costs and Net Impacts by Provision Base Scenario--Primary Estimate
                                       [Presented in thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Industry         Industry
          Provision category/impact            present value    present value     FAA present      FAA present
                                                    (7%)             (3%)          value (7%)       value (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Avoidance:
    --Definition of ``Launch''..............            $23.7            $32.1             $7.5            $10.1
    --Waterborne Vessel Hazard Areas........             47.5             64.2             14.9             20.2
    --Waiver for 48 Hour Readiness..........             29.7             40.1              9.3             12.6
System Safety Program--Safety Official......             28.4             38.4             33.3             45.0
Duration of a Vehicle License...............             36.6             49.4             76.1            102.8
Readiness--Elimination of pre-launch meeting            860.7          1,169.5            155.9            211.8
 15 days prior..............................
Flight Safety System--Not required for all           52,618.2         66,554.4          1,453.9          1,912.7
 launches...................................
Flight Safety Analysis no longer required                34.4             46.7              4.4              6.0
 for hybrids................................
Neighboring Operations *....................            873.6          1,087.4  ...............  ...............
Ground Hazard Analysis......................             81.9            110.7            108.8            147.0
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Cost Savings......................         54,634.8         69,193.0          1,864.2          2,468.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payload Review and Determination............            -52.5            -71.2            -54.0            -73.4
Safety criteria.............................            -55.3            -64.1  ...............  ...............
Flight Hazard Analysis......................            -56.9            -68.0            -15.9            -19.0
Flight Abort--Flight Safety Limits                       58.5             79.0  ...............  ...............
 Constraint.................................
Flight Safety Limit Analysis................           -114.0           -143.3  ...............  ...............
Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects                     -2.9             -3.9  ...............  ...............
 Analysis...................................
Safety-Critical System Design...............            -19.3            -26.1  ...............  ...............
Ground Hazard Analysis......................            -42.4            -57.3            -19.8            -26.8

[[Page 79700]]

 
Waivers for Neighboring Operations Personnel           -171.5           -192.9            -54.0            -60.7
Modification Costs for Existing Licenses....           -160.2           -166.4            -19.0            -19.8
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Costs.............................           -733.3           -872.2           -162.7           -199.6
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings........................         53,901.5         68,320.7          1,701.5          2,268.7
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings.........          7,674.4          8,009.3            242.3            266.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Risks: Neighboring                    -158.5           -197.3  ...............  ...............
 Operations *...............................
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety           53,743.0         68,123.5          1,701.5          2,268.7
     Risks..................................
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized Net Cost Savings less              7,651.8          7,986.1            242.3            266.0
         Increased Safety Risks.............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table notes: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs used to indicate
  costs and increased safety risks in this table. Present value estimates are provided at seven and three
  percent discount rates per OMB guidance.
* Changes to Neighboring Operations requirements result in net savings are less increased safety risks.

    The FAA also expects industry will gain additional unquantified 
savings and benefits from the final rule, because the rule provides 
flexibility and scalability through performance-based requirements that 
will reduce the future cost of innovation and improve the efficiency 
and productivity of U.S. commercial space transportation.
    The following table summarizes some of the changes that will result 
in unquantified savings.

                          Unquantified Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Change                               Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time Frames...................................  The rule revises time
                                                 frames in parts 404,
                                                 413, 414, 415, 417,
                                                 420, 431, 437, and 440
                                                 that may be burdensome
                                                 for some operators.
                                                 This will increase
                                                 flexibility by allowing
                                                 an operator the option
                                                 to propose alternative
                                                 time frames that better
                                                 suit its operations.
                                                 Eligible time frames
                                                 include preflight and
                                                 post-flight reporting
                                                 among others listed in
                                                 Appendix A to Part 404--
                                                 Alternative Time
                                                 Frames.
Safety Element Approval.......................  The rule removes the
                                                 requirement in part 414
                                                 to publish in the
                                                 Federal Register the
                                                 criteria upon which
                                                 safety element
                                                 approvals were based.
                                                 The purpose of this
                                                 notification
                                                 requirement was to make
                                                 clear the criteria and
                                                 standards the FAA used
                                                 to assess a safety
                                                 element, particularly
                                                 when no clear
                                                 regulatory requirement
                                                 existed and there could
                                                 be other potential
                                                 users of the safety
                                                 approval. However, the
                                                 FAA finds that this
                                                 requirement is
                                                 unnecessary, and has
                                                 potentially discouraged
                                                 applications for safety
                                                 element approvals due
                                                 to concerns that
                                                 proprietary data may be
                                                 disclosed. The FAA
                                                 anticipates that
                                                 removing this
                                                 requirement will lead
                                                 to increased use of
                                                 safety element
                                                 approvals, reducing
                                                 industry burden, and
                                                 potentially improving
                                                 safety.
Mishaps.......................................  The rule provides the
                                                 following mishap-
                                                 related enhancements,
                                                 which will better
                                                 tailor mishap
                                                 responses.
                                                    Replaces
                                                    current part 400
                                                    mishap related
                                                    definitions with a
                                                    consolidated mishap
                                                    definition
                                                    (streamlines and
                                                    reduces confusion).
                                                    Consolidates
                                                    existing part 400
                                                    mishap/accident
                                                    investigation and
                                                    emergency response
                                                    plan requirements
                                                    into a single part
                                                    (streamlines and
                                                    reduces confusion).
                                                    Exempts pre-
                                                    coordinated test-
                                                    induced property
                                                    damage from being a
                                                    mishap (removes need
                                                    to consider test-
                                                    induced property
                                                    damages from mishap
                                                    requirements and
                                                    likely results in
                                                    fewer investigations
                                                    of minor mishaps).
                                                    Eliminates
                                                    the small $25,000
                                                    monetary threshold
                                                    from the current
                                                    mishap and accident
                                                    investigation
                                                    requirements
                                                    potentially reducing
                                                    the number of
                                                    mishaps investigated
                                                    that do not pose a
                                                    threat to public
                                                    safety. Minor damage
                                                    that does not pose a
                                                    threat to public
                                                    safety can easily
                                                    exceed the $25,000
                                                    monetary threshold,
                                                    triggering
                                                    potentially costly
                                                    and burdensome
                                                    notification,
                                                    reporting, and
                                                    investigation
                                                    requirements.
                                                    Clarifies
                                                    that a mishap is
                                                    triggered by
                                                    hazardous debris
                                                    falling outside a
                                                    planned landing site
                                                    or designated hazard
                                                    area. As a result,
                                                    non-hazardous
                                                    debris, no matter
                                                    where it falls, will
                                                    not be considered a
                                                    mishap potentially
                                                    avoiding unnecessary
                                                    notification,
                                                    reporting, and
                                                    investigation
                                                    requirements.
Toxics........................................  The rule replaces part
                                                 417 toxic release
                                                 hazard analysis
                                                 requirements with
                                                 performance-based
                                                 regulations that will
                                                 provide flexibility for
                                                 operators to comply
                                                 with the required risk
                                                 criteria in varied and
                                                 innovative ways for
                                                 their ground
                                                 operations.
Lightning protection requirement..............  The rule removes
                                                 Appendix G to part 417,
                                                 Natural and Triggered
                                                 Lightning Flight Commit
                                                 Criteria, and replaces
                                                 it with the performance-
                                                 based requirements. The
                                                 current requirements
                                                 are outdated,
                                                 inflexible, overly
                                                 conservative, and not
                                                 explicitly applicable
                                                 to RLVs and reentry
                                                 vehicles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 79701]]

    The FAA analyzed the impacts of this rule based on the best 
available data at the time of writing. The FAA acknowledges that there 
are uncertainties with the savings and costs of this rule given the 
variety of operators, locations of operations, and the scale and 
complexity of operations. In addition, there is uncertainty regarding 
how operators holding an active license, or who have an accepted 
license application, will choose to operate during the five-year 
compliance period after the effective date of the rule (i.e., choose to 
operate under part 450 or operate under the legacy parts 415 and 417 
for expendable launch vehicles, part 431 for reusable launch vehicles, 
and part 435 for reentry vehicles). Lastly, there is uncertainty in the 
range and scope of future means of compliance, since this rule replaces 
many prescriptive regulations with performance-based rules, giving 
industry greater flexibility to develop means of compliance that meet 
their unique business objectives while maintaining public safety. All 
of these factors may result in variation of savings and costs for 
individual operators during and after the five-year compliance period. 
As previously discussed, the FAA will continue to work with industry to 
identify alternative means of compliance to provide future savings and 
efficiencies from this rule as industry continues to evolve.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) 
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall 
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale 
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions 
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required 
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given 
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities, 
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small 
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it would, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the RFA.
    The FAA estimates this final rule will have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities and therefore has 
performed the following Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in 
accordance with section 604(a)(1)-(a)(6).
    (1) A statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule.
    The Department of Transportation was directed by the National Space 
Council in February 2018, and SPD-2 to streamline the regulations 
governing commercial space launch and reentry licensing. The goal of 
the streamlining rule is to create a single licensing regime for 
expendable and reusable launch vehicles and reentry vehicles.
    The purpose of the final rule is to streamline and simplify the 
licensing of launch and reentry operations by relying on performance-
based regulations rather than prescriptive regulations. This action 
consolidates and revises multiple commercial space launch and reentry 
regulations addressing licensing into a single regulatory part that 
states safety objectives to be achieved for the launch of suborbital 
and orbital expendable and reusable launch vehicles, and the reentry of 
reentry vehicles. This action also enables flexible time frames, 
removes unnecessarily burdensome ground safety regulations, redefines 
when launch begins to allow specified pre-flight operations prior to 
license approval, and allows applicants to seek a license to launch 
from multiple sites. This rule is necessary to reduce the need to file 
and process waivers, improve clarity of the regulations, and relieve 
administrative and cost burdens on industry and the FAA. The intended 
effect of this action is to make commercial space transportation 
regulations more efficient and effective, while maintaining public 
safety.
    (2) A statement of the significant issues raised by the public 
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a 
statement of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a 
statement of any changes made in the proposed rule as a result of such 
comments.
    Commenters indicated that the FAA only identified two small 
entities that will be affected by the rule and left out numerous small 
entities that will be affected. The FAA has reevaluated and identified 
at least five small entities that will be affected by the rule and 
indicates this fact in the description of small entities section in 
this Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.
    An individual commenter also noted that beyond the small entities 
not addressed in the analysis as noted above, the FAA's proposal would 
also impact small companies that are subcontractors, suppliers, or 
service providers to licensed launch or reentry operators, both in 
regard to a particular event and in the activities of neighboring 
operations not involved in a particular licensed or permitted event.
    The FAA finds these subcontractors, suppliers, or service providers 
to licensed launch and reentry operators are not directly impacted by 
the rule. The RFA requires an agency to perform a regulatory 
flexibility analysis of small entity impacts only when a rule directly 
regulates small entities. A commenter indicated that small State or 
local governmental jurisdictions might be affected by the rule and 
these were not mentioned by the FAA in the RFA. The commenter appeared 
to be referring to potential costs from environmental review practices 
and policies now being codified into rules. The FAA addresses concerns 
related to potential costs from this codification in the comment 
section of this preamble and finds that the potential costs are 
negligible.
    An individual commenter claimed several proposed new flight safety 
requirements would impose complex and costly risk analyses on small 
entities, including the ``consequence protection'' requirement, the 
``critical assets'' risk assessment requirement, and flight software 
requirements. Also, the commenter pointed out the duplicative or 
conflicting rules among overlapping Federal jurisdictions as creating a 
barrier for small startups.
    The FAA finds the costs of these critical asset and consequence 
protection requirements will be small or nonexistent. Operators in 
remote locations will likely be able to avoid the higher costs of a 
highly reliable FSS by demonstrating through a CEC analysis 
that the launch in question will not exceed a certain risk threshold. 
The initial CEC analysis under Sec.  450.101 that is 
estimated to cost $2,500 may relieve some operators from the expense of 
any FSS. If a determination is made that an FSS is necessary, further 
analysis under Sec.  450.108 will be performed to determine the flight 
safety limits needed for the FSS. The FAA estimated the cost of the 
additional analysis to account for CEC in the flight safety 
limit is $10,000. Of course, an operator could avoid these analysis 
costs simply by choosing to use a highly reliable FSS, but the FAA 
assumes that an operator would not perform these analyses if it 
expected that it would still need the most highly reliable FSS. The 
worst case would be that the operator would incur $12,500 in costs but 
still need an FSS, just not a highly reliable FSS. The final rule also 
allows an applicant to propose an alternative to CEC that 
would measure

[[Page 79702]]

or mitigate the potential for a high consequence event by use of other 
safeguards.
    The identification of critical assets and the analysis to determine 
how to protect the critical assets will be performed by the ranges for 
launches from Federal sites and by the FAA for launches from non-
Federal sites. Therefore, small entities will not bear these costs.
    (3) The response of the agency to any comments filed by the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in response 
to the proposed rule, and a detailed statement of any change made to 
the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of the comments.
    The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
did not file comments in response to the proposed rule.
    (4) A description of and an estimate of the number of small 
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such 
estimate is available.
    The FAA identifies at least five licensees that would qualify as 
small businesses. The rule will have a large effect in terms of cost 
savings on some of these small businesses. In addition to the five 
operators, there are two licensees that will be affected by the rule 
that may fall under the small business threshold in terms of number of 
employees, but they are subsidiaries of large parent companies and 
therefore are not considered small businesses.
    (5) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and 
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the 
classes of small entities that will be subject to the requirement and 
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report 
or record.
    The rule will result in a reduction in reporting requirements 
because there will be fewer requests for waivers to certain provisions, 
fewer requests to modify licenses when a safety officer changes, and 
fewer licenses having to be issued because there will be extension of 
RLV licenses up to five years. The documentation accompanying a ground 
hazard analysis for ELV operators will be reduced due to change in 
launch scope.
    Some new requirements will result in additional reporting. This 
reporting includes the following:

    (1) Paperwork associated with payload review and determination, 
and safety criteria analyses;
    (2) Paperwork resulting from the flight safety limits analysis 
and the far-field overpressure blast effects analysis;
    (3) Paperwork submitted by legacy license who would like to 
waive the higher conditional expected casualty level for neighboring 
operations under the current regulations, or the new ground safety 
requirements for RLV operators; and
    (4) Paperwork costs for those operators who modify their 
licenses in the first five years to comply with the new regulations.

The paperwork costs are discussed in more detail in the Paperwork 
Reduction Analysis section of this preamble.
    (6) A description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the 
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the 
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the 
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative 
adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other significant 
alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the 
impact on small entities was rejected.
a. Factual, Policy, and Legal Reasons for Selecting the Adopted 
Alternative
    The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended and re-codified 
at 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923 (the Act), authorizes the Department of 
Transportation, and the FAA through delegation, to oversee, license, 
and regulate commercial launch and reentry activities, and the 
operation of launch and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens 
or within the United States. Section 50905 directs the FAA to exercise 
this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of 
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States. The FAA is authorized to regulate only to the extent 
necessary to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, 
and national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States. In addition, section 50903 requires that the FAA encourage, 
facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the 
private sector.
    This rulemaking streamlines and increases flexibility in the FAA's 
commercial space regulations. This action consolidates and revises 
multiple regulatory parts to apply a single set of licensing and safety 
regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. It also 
replaces many prescriptive regulations with performance-based rules, 
giving industry greater flexibility to develop means of compliance that 
maximize their business objectives while maintaining an equivalent 
level of safety to the agency's current regulations. Because this 
rulemaking amends the FAA's launch and reentry requirements, it falls 
under the authority delegated by the Act.
b. Alternatives Considered
    The FAA considered three alternatives to the proposed rule. The FAA 
restates these alternatives below. The FAA did not receive comment 
convincing it that any of these alternatives would be better than the 
rule it proposed and is now finalizing.
i. No Change to Current Regulations
    This alternative was not chosen because the current regulations are 
outdated, prescriptive, and do not adequately reflect industry current 
practices or technology development. The inefficiency of the licensing 
process due to current regulations risks stifling innovation and growth 
of the industry, especially for small operators.
ii. Propose a More Process-Based Regulatory Approach
    With this alternative, the FAA would have proposed less detailed 
regulations that would have relied primarily on the outcome of an 
operator's system safety process to protect public safety. The FAA did 
not chose this alternative because it would have lacked regulatory 
clarity and hazard control flexibility. System safety process is one 
method to derive hazard controls; however, there are other hazard 
control strategies that are more appropriate for some operations. 
Specifically, physical containment, wind weighting, and, most 
importantly, flight abort are often sufficient. Part 450 incorporates 
the flexibility of part 431, but acknowledges the acceptability of 
other hazard control strategies. Part 450 also builds on the precedent 
set by part 431's limits on the foreseeable consequences of a failure 
in terms of conditional expected casualties and establishes a less 
stringent threshold.With this final rule, the FAA declines to adopt 
this alternative.
iii. Propose a Defined Modular Application Process
    With this alternative, the FAA would have proposed similar safety 
requirements but would have added a more defined incremental or modular 
application process. The final rule enables an incremental application 
process, but does not define one with explicit modules and time frames. 
This alternative was not chosen because the FAA has no experience with 
an incremental or modular application process with which to base a 
rule. In addition, a more defined incremental or modular application 
process may be less flexible and scalable and therefore more burdensome 
to small operators.

[[Page 79703]]

    The FAA expects this final rule will provide regulatory relief to 
small entities from current prescriptive requirements and result in net 
savings. Accordingly, the FAA declines to adopt this alternative.
c. Cost Savings to Small Entities
    The following sections identifies key provisions of the rule that 
minimize impacts to and expand flexibilities for small entities.
i. Readiness--Elimination of Pre-Launch Meeting 15 Days Prior (Sec.  
450.155)
    ELV operators might save $4,683 per avoided launch readiness 
meeting; however, this assumes the average number of people at each 
meeting would be 25 and this might not apply to a small business.
ii. Flight Safety System--Not Required for All Launches (Sec.  450.145)
    For launches for which an FSS would not be required under the 
proposal, ELV operators might save $100,000 to $680,000 per launch and 
RLV operators might save $20,000 per launch vehicle.
    ELV operators might save between $479,000 and $1.4 million in non-
recurring costs and RLV operators might save approximately $375,000 for 
new FSS designs by not having to incur all the research, design, 
testing, materials, and installation costs for an FSS. This is likely 
to benefit small operators launching from remote sites.
iii. Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.185)
    An ELV operator might save approximately $28,026 per application by 
not having to do a ground hazard analysis under this final rule.
d. Costs to Small Entities
    The following sections identify provisions of the rule that might 
result in additional costs for small entities. However, the rule 
provides a compliance period of five years for holders of current 
licenses at the effective date of the final rule and those who have an 
accepted application within 90 days of the effective date of the final 
rule. This will provide small operators more time to comply with the 
final rule and will reduce costs.
i. Payload Review and Determination (Sec.  450.43)
    The final rule could cause small operators to incur about $206 more 
per launch than due to additional payload review and determination 
costs.
ii. Flight Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.107)
    Operators who do not need FSS, and choose to operate without one, 
will have to perform a flight hazard analysis. RLV operators currently 
do flight hazard analyses, while ELV operators do not. To save the 
costs of an FSS, an ELV operator will have to use another hazard 
control strategy which will likely be a flight hazard analysis. In the 
regulatory impact analysis, two small businesses have to perform a 
flight hazard analysis. However, the cost savings of not having to have 
an FSS will far exceed the costs of the flight hazard analysis.
iii. Flight Abort (Sec.  450.108(d)) Flight Safety Limits Constraint
    Some operators will choose to do a CEC analysis 
voluntarily as part of the flight safety limits analysis so they can 
expand the area their flights can pass through. These operators would 
only do this additional analysis if they expected the benefit to exceed 
the cost. The estimated voluntary cost of $10,000 per license could be 
incurred by small businesses.
iv. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis (Sec.  450.137)
    Additional costs are $330 per application.
v. Safety-Critical System Design (Sec.  450.143)
    Additional documentation costs are $1,649 per application.
vi. Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.185)
    RLV applicants might incur about $7,254 more per application due to 
having to perform ground hazard analyses under the final rule.
    As previously discussed, the FAA provides a compliance period of 
five years in the final rule for holders of current licenses at the 
effective date of the final rule and those who have an accepted 
application within 90 days of the effective date of the final rule. 
This will give all businesses, including the small operators, more time 
to comply with the final rule. This will reduce the burden on small 
entities.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, if the standard has a legitimate domestic objective, 
such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a manner that 
excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they serve as the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this final rule and determined that it will not 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The threshold 
after adjustment for inflation is $150 million using the most current 
annual (2017) Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Product from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. This final rule does not contain 
such a mandate; therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Act do 
not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995 
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an 
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor 
may it impose an information collection requirement, unless it displays 
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
    This action contains the following proposed consolidation of two 
existing information collection requirements, previously approved under 
OMB Control Numbers 2120-0608 and 2120-0643, under a new OMB control 
number. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), the FAA will submit the proposed information collection 
requirements to OMB for its review. In addition, the FAA has published 
a separate notice of the proposed requirements for public comment, and 
has included the notice in the docket for this rulemaking. The notice 
includes instructions on how to submit comments specifically to the 
proposed information collection requirements. Additional details on 
assumptions and

[[Page 79704]]

calculations used in this section are presented in the Preliminary 
Regulatory Impact Analysis available in the docket of this rulemaking. 
The following estimates are included in the total savings and costs 
summarized in the Regulatory Evaluation section and considered in the 
Regulatory Flexibility Determination section of this proposed rule.
    Because the FAA is allowing a five year compliance period for 
existing operators holding a license under parts 417, 431, or 435, OMB 
Control Numbers 2120-0608 and 2120-0643 will continue to be renewed for 
five years. After five years, all operators are expected to comply with 
part 450 and the new OMB number for collections.
    Summary: The FAA proposes to consolidate under a new part 450, the 
requirements currently contained in parts 415 and 417 for the launch of 
an ELV, in part 431 for the launch and reentry of an RLV, and in part 
435 for the reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV. The result 
of this effort will be streamlined regulations designed to be more 
flexible and scalable, with reduced timelines and minimal duplicative 
jurisdiction. The net result will be reduced paperwork for operators, 
although for some provisions paperwork would increase.
    Use: The information would be used by FAA to evaluate the launch 
and reentry operators' applications and to ensure safety.
Paperwork Impact to Industry
    Respondents: The information collection will potentially affect 12 
operators based on available data at the time of writing.
    Annual Burden Estimate: Most changes in part 450 will result in a 
reduction in paperwork burden. The paperwork associated with industry 
requesting waivers to certain provisions will be alleviated. Paperwork 
associated with industry requesting license modifications would also be 
reduced because an operator will not have to modify a license if the 
specific safety official were to change. In addition, with the 
extension of RLV licenses to up to five years, it is likely that fewer 
licenses will be issued, resulting in less paperwork. Due to the change 
in launch scope, the documentation accompanying a ground hazard 
analysis for ELV operators would be reduced.
Industry Cost Savings
    The following table indicates the frequency of responses, the 
estimated time per response, the burdened wage rate, annual hours, and 
the cost for each cost saving provision. Response frequency is provided 
for the estimated number of waivers avoided (Sec.  450.3), estimated 
reduction in annual number of licenses modified (Sec.  450.103), 
estimated reduction in annual license renewals, and estimated annual 
number of launches for which there would be a reduction in ground 
hazard analysis paperwork (Sec.  450.185). An estimated time for each 
response is also indicated below, as are burdened hourly wage rates for 
the specific personnel associated with each provision and annual hours 
and total cost savings.

                                         Industry Paperwork Cost Savings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Estimated time
           Description               Response      per response    Industry wage   Annual hours    Cost savings
                                     frequency        (hours)          rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Avoidance (Sec.   450.3).              17              20         $101.52             340         $34,518
System Safety Program--Safety                5.6              24           72.40           134.4           9,731
 Official (Sec.   450.103)......
Duration of a Vehicle License                1.2           126.5           82.43           151.8          12,513
 (Sec.   450.7).................
Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec.                   1             340           82.43             340          28,026
 450.185).......................
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Annual Savings........            24.8  ..............  ..............             966          84,788
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Cost savings includes paperwork related to waivers avoided due to 
the definition of ``launch,'' waterborne vessel protection, and removal 
of the 48-hour readiness requirement.
Industry Paperwork Burden
    Other changes will result in an increase in paperwork burden. The 
Payload Review and Determination section (Sec.  450.43) adds 
requirements for applicants to provide explosive potential of payload 
materials, alone and in combination with other materials on the payload 
for launches, as well as the appropriate transit time to final orbit 
for payloads with significant transit time after release from the 
vehicle. The FAA is adding requirements for ground hazard analysis 
(Sec.  450.185) for RLV launches. The provisions that will lead to 
additional paperwork burdens are listed in the table below. The final 
rule requires RLVs to submit information to the FAA.
    The table below indicates the frequency of responses, estimated 
time per response, burdened hourly wage rate, annual hours, and the 
cost for each provision that would add burden. An estimated time per 
response is also indicated below, as are burdened hourly wage rates for 
the specific personnel associated with each provision and annual hours 
and total cost savings.

                                            Industry Paperwork Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Estimated time
           Description               Response      per response    Industry wage   Annual hours        Cost
                                     frequency        (hours)          rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosive Potential (Sec.                     82               2          $82.43             164         $13,519
 450.43)........................
Transit time (Sec.   450.43)....              82             0.5           82.43            41.0           3,380
Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec.                   2              88           82.43             176          14,508
 450.185).......................
Safety criteria (Sec.                          4           60.66           82.43           80.88           6,667
 450.101(c))....................
Flight Hazard Analysis (Sec.                   2              53           82.43          106.67           8,793
 450.107).......................
Flight Abort (Sec.   450.108(d))               2             121           82.43          242.63          20,000
 Flight Safety Limits Constraint
Flight Safety Limit Analysis                  12              58           82.43             692          57,042
 (Sec.   450.123)...............
Far-field Overpressure Blast                   3               4           82.43              12             989
 Effects Analysis (Sec.
 450.137).......................

[[Page 79705]]

 
Safety-Critical System Design...               4              20           82.43              80           6,594
Waivers for Neighboring                     18.9              20          101.52             378          38,375
 Operations Personnel...........
Modification Costs for Existing                3             693           82.43             693          57,124
 Licenses.......................
Records set up, record, archive.              82               4           89.72             328          29,429
Records retrieve and present....               1               8           74.15               8             593
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Cost Burden...........             298  ..............  ..............           3,002         257,012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following table summarizes the industry total annual paperwork 
savings, total annual paperwork burden and the net annual paperwork 
savings.

                     Industry Net Paperwork Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                 Annual hours    Cost savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Savings....................             966         $84,787
Total Annual Burden.....................           3,002         257,012
                                         -------------------------------
    Net Annual Burden...................           2,036         172,225
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Paperwork Burden to the Federal Government
    The following tables summarizes FAA paperwork savings and burden. 
Similar to industry burden savings, the FAA receives burden relief from 
waivers avoided due to the definition of ``launch,'' waterborne vessel 
protection, and removal of the 48-hour readiness requirement. Other 
provisions the FAA receives relief from and provisions that will impose 
additional paperwork burden to the FAA are detailed in the tables 
below. See the Regulatory Impact Analysis available in the docket for 
more details on these estimates and calculations.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Estimated time
                   Description                     per response    FAA wage rate   Annual hours    Cost savings
                                                      (hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           FAA Paperwork Cost Savings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Avoidance (Sec.   450.3).................             7.5          $85.17           127.5         $10,859
System Safety Program--Safety Official (Sec.                  24           84.79           134.4          11,396
 450.103).......................................
Duration of a Vehicle License (Sec.   450.7)....           253.5           85.54           304.2          26,021
Ground Safety (Sec.   450.185)..................             439           84.79             439          37,223
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Annual Savings........................  ..............  ..............           1,005          85,499
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              FAA Paperwork Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosive Potential (Sec.   450.43).............             2.0           84.79             164          13,906
Transit time (Sec.   450.43)....................             0.5           84.79              41           3,476
Ground Safety (Sec.   450.185)..................              40           84.79              80           6,783
Flight Hazard Analysis (Sec.   450.107).........              47           78.27              31           2,452
Waivers for Neighboring Operations Personnel....               8           85.17             142          12,094
Modification Costs for Existing Licenses........              80           84.79              80           6,783
Records retrieve and present....................              20           84.79              20           1,696
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Annual Burden.........................  ..............  ..............             558          47,191
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                        FAA Net Paperwork Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                 Annual hours    Cost savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Savings....................           1,005         $85,499
Total Annual Burden.....................             558          47,191
                                         -------------------------------
    Net Annual Savings..................             447          38,308
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 79706]]

    Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information 
collection requirement to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section 
at the beginning of this preamble by March 10, 2021. Comments also 
should be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer for FAA, 
New Executive Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 
20053.

F. International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these proposed regulations.

G. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1 identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical 
exclusion identified in FAA Order 1050.1 paragraph 5-6.6 and involves 
no extraordinary circumstances.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs

    This final rule is considered an E.O. 13771 deregulatory action. 
Details on the estimated cost savings of this final rule can be found 
in the rule's economic analysis.

B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism.'' The agency 
determined that this action will not have a substantial direct effect 
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and 
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have 
federalism implications.

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
``Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use'' (May 18, 2001). The agency has 
determined that it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the 
executive order and it is not likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

D. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609, ``Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation,'' promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet 
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has 
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of 
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action will not 
affect international regulatory cooperation.

VI. How To Obtain Additional Information

Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained by 
using the internet--
    1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov;
    2. Visit the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Access the Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by 
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.

Comments Submitted to the Docket

    Comments received may be viewed by going to http://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the 
docket number for this action. Anyone may search the electronic form of 
all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name of the 
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted 
on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document, 
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. 
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 401

    Organization and functions (Government agencies), Space 
Transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 404

    Administrative practice and procedure, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 413

    Confidential business information, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 414

    Airspace, Aviation safety, Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 415

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 417

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 420

    Environmental protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 431

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 435

    Aviation safety, Environmental protection, Investigations, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Space transportation and 
exploration.

14 CFR Part 437

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recording keeping 
requirements, Space transportation and exploration.

[[Page 79707]]

14 CFR Part 440

    Indemnity payments, Insurance, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR Part 450

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Environmental protection, 
Investigations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Space 
transportation and exploration.

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends chapter III for commercial space transportation 
rules of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 401 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50101-50923.


0
2. Amend Sec.  401.5 by revising the introductory text to read as 
follows:


Sec.  401.5  Definitions.

    For the purposes of parts 415, 417, 431, 435, 440, and 460 of this 
chapter, the following definitions apply:
* * * * *


Sec.  401.5  [Removed and Reserved]

0
3. Effective March 10, 2026, remove and reserve Sec.  401.5.

0
4. Add Sec.  401.7 to read as follows:


Sec.  401.7  Definitions.

    For the purposes of this chapter unless otherwise excepted, the 
following definitions apply:
    Act means 51 U.S.C Subtitle V, Programs Targeting Commercial 
Opportunities, chapter 509--Commercial Space Launch Activities, 51 
U.S.C. 50901-50923.
    Anomaly means any condition during licensed or permitted activity 
that deviates from what is standard, normal, or expected, during the 
verification or operation of a system, subsystem, process, facility, or 
support equipment.
    Associate Administrator means the Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, or 
any person designated by the Associate Administrator to exercise the 
authority or discharge the responsibilities of the Associate 
Administrator.
    Casualty means serious injury or death.
    Casualty area means the area surrounding each potential debris or 
vehicle impact point where serious injuries, or worse, can occur.
    Command control system means the portion of a flight safety system 
that includes all components needed to send a flight abort control 
signal to the on-board portion of a flight safety system.
    Contingency abort means a flight abort with a landing at a planned 
location that has been designated in advance of vehicle flight.
    Countdown means the timed sequence of events that must take place 
to initiate flight of a launch vehicle or reentry of a reentry vehicle.
    Crew means any employee or independent contractor of a licensee, 
transferee, or permittee, or of a contractor or subcontractor of a 
licensee, transferee, or permittee, who performs activities in the 
course of that employment or contract directly relating to the launch, 
reentry, or other operation of or in a launch vehicle or reentry 
vehicle that carries human beings. A crew consists of flight crew and 
any remote operator.
    Critical asset means an asset that is essential to the national 
interests of the United States. Critical assets include property, 
facilities, or infrastructure necessary for national security purposes, 
high priority civil space purposes, or assured access to space for 
national priority missions.
    Critical payload means a payload and essential infrastructure 
directly supporting such a payload that is a critical asset that:
    (1) Is so costly or unique that it cannot be readily replaced; or
    (2) The time frame for its replacement would adversely affect the 
national interests of the United States.
    Crossrange means the distance measured along a line whose direction 
is either 90 degrees clockwise (right crossrange) or counter-clockwise 
(left crossrange) to the projection of a vehicle's planned nominal 
velocity vector azimuth onto a horizontal plane tangent to the 
ellipsoidal Earth model at the vehicle's sub-vehicle point. The terms 
right crossrange and left crossrange may also be used to indicate 
direction.
    Deorbit means the flight of a vehicle that begins with the final 
command to commit to a perigee below 70 nautical miles (approximately 
130 kilometers), and ends when all vehicle components come to rest on 
the Earth.
    Disposal means the return or attempt to return, purposefully, a 
launch vehicle stage or component, not including a reentry vehicle, 
from Earth orbit to Earth, in a controlled manner.
    Downrange means the distance measured along a line whose direction 
is parallel to the projection of a vehicle's planned nominal velocity 
vector azimuth into a horizontal plane tangent to the ellipsoidal Earth 
model at the vehicle sub-vehicle point. The term downrange may also be 
used to indicate direction.
    Effective casualty area means the aggregate casualty area of each 
piece of debris created by a vehicle failure at a particular point on 
its trajectory. The effective casualty area for each piece of debris is 
a modeling construct in which the area within which 100 percent of the 
population are assumed to be a casualty, and outside of which 100 
percent of the population are assumed not to be a casualty.
    Equivalent level of safety means an approximately equal level of 
safety as determined by qualitative or quantitative means.
    Expected casualty means the mean number of casualties predicted to 
occur per flight operation if the operation were repeated many times.
    Expendable launch vehicle means a launch vehicle whose propulsive 
stages are flown only once.
    Experimental permit or permit means an authorization by the FAA to 
a person to launch or reenter a reusable suborbital rocket.
    Explosive debris means solid propellant fragments or other pieces 
of a vehicle or payload that result from breakup of the vehicle during 
flight and that explode upon impact with the Earth's surface and cause 
overpressure.
    Federal launch or reentry site means a launch or reentry site, from 
which launches routinely take place, that is owned and operated by the 
government of the United States.
    Flight abort means the process to limit or restrict the hazards to 
public safety, and the safety of property, presented by a launch 
vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by 
initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight.
    Flight abort rules means the conditions under which a flight safety 
system must abort the flight to ensure compliance with the safety 
criteria in Sec.  450.101.
    Flight crew means crew that is on board a vehicle during a launch 
or reentry.
    Flight hazard area means any region of land, sea, or air that must 
be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated to ensure compliance 
with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101.
    Flight safety limit means criteria to ensure that public safety and 
critical assets are protected from the flight of a vehicle when a 
flight safety system functions properly.
    Flight safety system means a system used to implement flight abort. 
A flight safety system includes any flight safety system located on 
board a launch or

[[Page 79708]]

reentry vehicle; any ground based command control system; any support 
system, including telemetry subsystems and tracking subsystems, 
necessary to support a flight abort decision; and the functions of any 
personnel who operate the flight safety system hardware or software.
    Hazard control means a preventative measure or mitigation put in 
place for systems or operations to reduce the severity of a hazard or 
the likelihood of the hazard occurring.
    Hazardous debris means any object or substance capable of causing a 
casualty or loss of functionality to a critical asset. Hazardous debris 
includes inert debris and explosive debris such as an intact vehicle, 
vehicle fragments, any detached vehicle component whether intact or in 
fragments, payload, and any planned jettison bodies.
    Hazardous materials means hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR 
172.101.
    Instantaneous impact point means a predicted impact point, 
following thrust termination of a vehicle.
    Key flight safety event means a flight activity that has an 
increased likelihood of causing a failure compared with other portions 
of flight.
    Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry 
vehicle and any payload or human being from Earth in a suborbital 
trajectory, in Earth orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space, 
including activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or 
payload for launch, when those activities take place at a launch site 
in the United States.
    Launch operator means a person who conducts or who will conduct the 
launch of a launch vehicle and any payload.
    Launch or reentry system means the integrated set of subsystems, 
personnel, products, and processes that, when combined, carries out a 
launch or reentry.
    Launch site means the location on Earth from which a launch takes 
place (as defined in a license the Secretary issues or transfers under 
this chapter) and necessary facilities at that location.
    Launch vehicle means a vehicle built to operate in, or place a 
payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket.
    Launch window means an approved period of time during which the 
flight of a launch vehicle may be initiated.
    Liftoff means any motion of the launch vehicle with intention to 
initiate flight.
    Limits of a useful mission means the trajectory data or other 
parameters that bound the performance of a useful mission, including 
flight azimuth limits.
    Mishap means any event, or series of events associated with a 
licensed or permitted activity resulting in any of the following:
    (1) A fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2);
    (2) A malfunction of a safety-critical system;
    (3) A failure of the licensee's or permittee's safety organization, 
safety operations, safety procedures;
    (4) High risk, as determined by the FAA, of causing a serious or 
fatal injury to any space flight participant, crew, government 
astronaut, or member of the public;
    (5) Substantial damage, as determined by the FAA, to property not 
associated with licensed or permitted activity;
    (6) Unplanned substantial damage, as determined by the FAA, to 
property associated with licensed or permitted activity;
    (7) Unplanned permanent loss of a launch or reentry vehicle during 
licensed activity or permitted activity;
    (8) The impact of hazardous debris outside the planned landing site 
or designated hazard area; or
    (9) Failure to complete a launch or reentry as planned as reported 
in Sec.  450.213(b).
    Neighboring operations personnel means those members of the public 
located within a launch or reentry site, or an adjacent launch or 
reentry site, who are not associated with a specific hazardous licensed 
or permitted operation currently being conducted, but are required to 
perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the site and are 
notified of the operation.
    Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle internal 
and external systems perform exactly as planned, and there are no 
external perturbing influences other than atmospheric drag and gravity.
    Normal flight means the flight of a properly performing vehicle 
whose real-time vacuum instantaneous impact point does not deviate from 
the nominal vacuum instantaneous impact point by more than the sum of 
the wind effects and the three-sigma guidance and performance 
deviations in the uprange, downrange, left-crossrange, or right-
crossrange directions.
    Normal trajectory means a trajectory that describes normal flight.
    Operating environment means an environment that a launch or reentry 
vehicle component will experience during its lifecycle. Operating 
environments include shock, vibration, thermal cycle, acceleration, 
humidity, thermal vacuum, or other environments relevant to system or 
material degradation.
    Operation hazard means a hazard created by an operating environment 
or by an unsafe act.
    Operation of a launch site means the conduct of approved safety 
operations at a permanent site to support the launching of vehicles and 
payloads.
    Operation of a reentry site means the conduct of safety operations 
at a permanent site on Earth at which a reentry vehicle and its 
payload, if any, is intended to land.
    Operator means a holder of a license or permit under 51 U.S.C. 
Subtitle V, chapter 509.
    Orbital insertion means the point at which a vehicle achieves a 
minimum 70-nautical mile perigee based on a computation that accounts 
for drag.
    Payload means an object that a person undertakes to place in outer 
space by means of a launch vehicle, including components of the vehicle 
specifically designed or adapted for that object.
    Person means an individual or an entity organized or existing under 
the laws of a State or country.
    Physical containment means a launch vehicle does not have 
sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach 
the public or critical assets.
    Physical electronic storage means a physical device that can store 
electronic documents and files including but not limited to an optical 
disc, a memory card, a USB flash drive, or an external hard drive.
    Pilot means a flight crew member who has the ability to control, in 
real time, a launch or reentry vehicle's flight path.
    Populated area means--
    (1) An outdoor location, structure, or cluster of structures that 
may be occupied by people;
    (2) Sections of roadways and waterways that are frequented by 
automobile and boat traffic; or
    (3) Agricultural lands, if routinely occupied by field workers.
    Probability of casualty means the likelihood that a person will 
suffer a serious injury or worse, including a fatal injury, due to all 
hazards from an operation at a specific location.
    Public means, for a particular licensed or permitted launch or 
reentry, people that are not involved in supporting the launch or 
reentry and includes those people who may be located within the launch 
or reentry site, such as visitors, individuals providing goods or 
services not related to launch or reentry processing or flight, and any 
other operator and its personnel.
    Reenter; reentry means to return or attempt to return, 
purposefully, a

[[Page 79709]]

reentry vehicle and its payload or human being, if any, from Earth 
orbit or from outer space to Earth.
    Reentry operator means a person responsible for conducting the 
reentry of a reentry vehicle as specified in a license issued by the 
FAA.
    Reentry site means the location on Earth where a reentry vehicle is 
intended to return. It includes the area within three standard 
deviations of the intended landing point (the predicted three-sigma 
footprint).
    Reentry vehicle means a vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit 
or outer space to Earth substantially intact. A reusable launch vehicle 
that is designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth 
substantially intact is a reentry vehicle.
    Reentry window means an approved period of time during which the 
reentry of a reentry vehicle may be initiated.
    Remote operator means a crew member who--
    (1) Has the ability to control, in real time, a launch or reentry 
vehicle's flight path; and
    (2) Is not on board the controlled vehicle.
    Reusable launch vehicle (RLV) means a launch vehicle that is 
designed to return to Earth substantially intact and therefore may be 
launched more than one time or that contains vehicle stages that may be 
recovered by a launch operator for future use in the operation of a 
substantially similar launch vehicle.
    Risk means a measure that accounts for both the probability of 
occurrence of a hazardous event and the consequence of that event to 
persons or property.
    Safety critical means essential to safe performance or operation. A 
safety-critical system, subsystem, component, condition, event, 
operation, process, or item, is one whose proper recognition, control, 
performance, or tolerance, is essential to ensuring public safety and 
the safety of property.
    Service life means, for a safety-critical system component, the sum 
total of the component's storage life and operating life.
    Sigma means a single standard deviation from a fixed value, such as 
a mean.
    Software function means a collection of computer code that 
implements a requirement or performs an action. This includes firmware 
and operating systems.
    Space flight participant means an individual, who is not crew, 
carried aboard a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle.
    State and United States means, when used in a geographical sense, 
the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, 
and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
States.
    Suborbital rocket means a vehicle, rocket-propelled in whole or in 
part, intended for flight on a suborbital trajectory, and the thrust of 
which is greater than its lift for the majority of the rocket-powered 
portion of its ascent.
    Suborbital trajectory means the intentional flight path of a launch 
vehicle, reentry vehicle, or any portion thereof, whose vacuum 
instantaneous impact point does not leave the surface of the Earth.
    Sub-vehicle point means the location on an ellipsoidal Earth model 
where the normal to the ellipsoid passes through the vehicle's center 
of gravity.
    System hazard means a hazard associated with a system and generally 
exists even when no operation is occurring.
    Tether system means a device that contains launch vehicle hazards 
by physically constraining a launch vehicle in flight to a specified 
range from its launch point. A tether system includes all components, 
from the tether's point of attachment to the vehicle to a solid base, 
that experience load during a tethered launch.
    Toxic hazard area means a region on the Earth's surface where toxic 
concentrations and durations may be greater than accepted toxic 
thresholds for acute casualty, in the event of a worst case release or 
maximum credible release scenario during launch or reentry.
    Uncontrolled area is an area of land not controlled by a launch or 
reentry operator, a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site 
operator, or other entity by agreement.
    Unguided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that 
does not contain active guidance or a directional control system.
    United States citizen means:
    (1) Any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
    (2) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or 
other entity organized or existing under the laws of the United States 
or any State; and
    (3) Any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or 
other entity which is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign 
nation, if the controlling interest in such entity is held by an 
individual or entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this 
definition. Controlling interest means ownership of an amount of equity 
in such entity sufficient to direct management of the entity or to void 
transactions entered into by management. Ownership of at least fifty-
one percent of the equity in an entity by persons described in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of this definition creates a rebuttable 
presumption that such interest is controlling.
    Uprange means the distance measured along a line that is 180 
degrees to the downrange direction.
    Useful mission means a mission that can attain one or more 
objectives.
    Validation means an evaluation to determine that each safety 
measure derived from a system safety process is correct, complete, 
consistent, unambiguous, verifiable, and technically feasible. 
Validation ensures that the right safety measure is implemented, and 
that the safety measure is well understood.
    Verification means an evaluation to determine that safety measures 
derived from a system safety process are effective and have been 
properly implemented. Verification provides measurable evidence that a 
safety measure reduces risk to acceptable levels.
    Wind weighting safety system means equipment, procedures, analysis 
and personnel functions used to determine the launcher elevation and 
azimuth settings that correct for wind effects that an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle will experience during flight.
    Window closure means a period of time when launch or reentry is not 
permitted in order to avoid a collision with an object in orbit. A 
window closure may occur within a launch or reentry window, may delay 
the start of a window, or terminate a window early.

PART 404--REGULATIONS AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS

0
5. The authority citation for part 404 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


0
6. Revise Sec.  404.5 to read as follows:


Sec.  404.5  Filing a petition for waiver.

    (a) A petition for waiver must be submitted at least 60 days before 
the proposed effective date of the waiver, unless the Administrator 
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15.
    (b) The petition for waiver must include:
    (1) The specific section or sections of 14 CFR chapter III from 
which the petitioner seeks relief;
    (2) The extent of the relief sought and the reason the relief is 
being sought;
    (3) The reason why granting the request for relief is in the public 
interest and will not jeopardize the public

[[Page 79710]]

health and safety, safety of property, and national security and 
foreign policy interests of the United States; and
    (4) Any additional facts, views, and data available to the 
petitioner to support the waiver request.

0
7. Add Sec.  404.15 to read as follows:


Sec.  404.15  Alternative Time Frames.

    (a) General. Unless otherwise approved by the Administrator, an 
applicant, a licensee, a permittee, or a safety element approval holder 
must meet the time frames set forth in this chapter.
    (b) Request to change a time frame. An applicant, a licensee, a 
permittee, or a safety element approval holder may file a written 
request to the FAA to propose an alternative time frame to any of the 
time frames included in the chapter III sections listed in Appendix A 
to part 404. The request must be--
    (1) Emailed to [email protected] in accordance with Sec.  
413.7; or
    (2) Mailed to the Federal Aviation Administration, Associate 
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Room 331, 800 
Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Attention: Alternative 
Time Frame Request.
    (c) Administrator review. The Administrator will review and make a 
decision or grant a request for an alternative time frame as follows:
    (1) The FAA will conduct its review on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the complexity of the request, the timeliness of the 
request, and whether the requested alternative allows sufficient time 
for the FAA to conduct its review and make the requisite public health 
and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign 
policy findings;
    (2) The FAA will provide its decision in writing; and
    (3) The FAA may grant the request, deny the request, or grant an 
alternative time frame that differs from what was requested.

0
8. Add appendix A to part 404 the read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 404--Alternative Time Frames

A404.1 General

    Alternative time frames. This appendix lists the sections and 
corresponding paragraphs in this chapter that provide the eligible 
time frames for an applicant, licensee, permittee, or safety element 
approval holder, as applicable, to request an alternative time 
frame.

                   Table A404.1--Eligible Time Frames
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Sections                            Paragraphs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   404.5--Filing a petition for waiver......  (a).
Sec.   413.23--License or permit renewal........  (a).
Sec.   414.31--Safety element approval renewal..  (a).
Sec.   420.57--Notifications....................  (d).
Sec.   437.89--Pre-flight reporting.............  (a), (b).
Sec.   440.15--Demonstration of compliance......  (a)(1), (a)(2),
                                                   (a)(3), (a)(4).
Sec.   450.169--Launch and Reentry Collision      (f)(1).
 Avoidance Analysis Requirements.
Sec.   450.213--Pre-flight reporting............  (b), (c), (d), (e).
Sec.   450.215--Post-flight reporting...........  (a)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

PART 413--APPLICATION PROCEDURES

0
9. The authority citation for part 413 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


0
10. Revise Sec.  413.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  413.1  Scope of this part.

    (a) This part explains how to apply for a license or experimental 
permit. These procedures apply to all applications for obtaining a 
license or permit, transferring a license, and renewing a license or 
permit. In this part, the term application means either an application 
in its entirety, or a portion of an application for incremental review 
and determination in accordance with Sec.  450.33 of this chapter.
    (b) Use paragraphs (b)(1) through (7) in the following table to 
locate specific requirements:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Subject                               Part
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Obtaining a Launch License (only applications                    415
 accepted before June 8, 2021)..........................
(2) License to Operate a Launch Site....................             420
(3) Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle                  431
 (RLV) (only applications accepted before June 8, 2021).
(4) License to Operate a Reentry Site...................             433
(5) Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle other than a Reusable               435
 Launch Vehicle (RLV) (only applications accepted before
 June 8, 2021)..........................................
(6) Experimental Permits................................             437
(7) Launch and Reentry License Requirements.............             450
------------------------------------------------------------------------


0
11. Effective March 10, 2026, futher amend Sec.  413.1 by revising 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) and removing paragraphs (b)(5) through 
(7).
    The revisions read read as follows:


Sec.  413.1  Scope of this part.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Subject                               Part
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) License to Operate a Launch Site....................             420
(2) License to Operate a Reentry Site...................             433
(3) Experimental Permits................................             437
(4) Launch and Reentry License Requirements.............             450
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 79711]]


0
12. Amend Sec.  413.7 by revising the section heading and paragraph 
(a)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  413.7  Application submission.

    (a) * * *
    (3) For an application submitted by email, an applicant must send 
the application as an email attachment, or as a link to a secure 
server, to [email protected]. The application and the email to 
which the application is attached or linked must also satisfy the 
following criteria:
    (i) The email to which the application is attached or linked must 
be sent from an email address controlled by the person who signed the 
application or by an authorized representative of the applicant;
    (ii) The email must identify each document that is included as an 
attachment or that is stored on a secure server; and
    (iii) The electronic files must be date-stamped and have version 
control documentation.
* * * * *

0
13. Amend Sec.  413.11 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec.  413.11  Acceptance of an application.

* * * * *
    (a) The FAA accepts the application and will initiate review; or
* * * * *

0
14. Revise Sec.  413.15 to read as follows:


Sec.  413.15  Review period.

    (a) Review period duration. Unless otherwise specified in this 
chapter, the FAA reviews and makes a license or permit determination on 
an accepted application in accordance with the time frame specified in 
51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1). The FAA will establish the time frame for any 
incremental review and determination with an applicant on a case-by-
case basis during pre-application consultation.
    (b) Review period tolled. If an accepted application does not 
provide sufficient information to continue or complete the reviews or 
evaluations required by this chapter for a license, permit, or 
incremental determination, or an issue exists that would affect a 
determination, the FAA notifies the applicant, in writing, and informs 
the applicant of any information required to complete the application. 
If the FAA cannot review an accepted application because of lack of 
information or for any other reason, the FAA will toll the review 
period until the FAA receives the information it needs or the applicant 
resolves the issue.
    (c) Notice. Except for applications under incremental review and 
determination in accordance with Sec.  450.33, if the FAA does not make 
a decision in accordance with the time frame specified in 51 U.S.C. 
50905(a)(1) for an accepted license application or 51 U.S.C. 50906(a) 
for an accepted permit application, the FAA informs the applicant, in 
writing, of any outstanding information needed to complete the review, 
or of any issues that would affect the decision.

0
15. Amend Sec.  413.21 by revising pargraphs (b) and (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  413.21  Denial of a license or permit application.

* * * * *
    (b) If the FAA has denied an application in its entirety, the 
applicant may either--
    (1) Attempt to correct any deficiencies identified and ask the FAA 
to reconsider the revised application, in which case the FAA has 60 
days or the number of days remaining in the review period, whichever is 
greater, within which to reconsider the decision; or
    (2) Request a hearing in accordance with part 406 of this chapter, 
for the purpose of showing why the application should not be denied.
    (c) An applicant whose application is denied after reconsideration 
under paragraph (b)(1) of this section may request a hearing in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

0
16. Amend Sec.  413.23 by revising paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  413.23  License or permit renewal.

* * * * *
    (a) Eligibility. (1) A licensee or permittee may apply to renew its 
license or permit by submitting to the FAA a written application for 
renewal at least 90 days before the license expires or at least 60 days 
before the permit expires, unless the Administrator agrees to a 
different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15.
    (2) A request to renew a licensed under parts 415, 431, and 435 may 
be granted with a non-standard duration so as not to exceed March 10, 
2026.
* * * * *
    (d) Renewal of license or permit. After the FAA finishes its 
reviews, the FAA issues an order modifying the expiration date of the 
license or permit. The FAA may impose additional or revised terms and 
conditions necessary to protect public health and safety and the safety 
of property and to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy 
interests. The renewal period for a license issued under parts 415, 
431, or 435 of this chapter cannot extend beyond March 10, 2026.
* * * * *

0
17. Effective March 10, 2026, Sec.  413.23 is further amended by 
revising paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  413.23  License or permit renewal.

* * * * *
    (a) Eligibility. A licensee or permittee may apply to renew its 
license or permit by submitting to the FAA a written application for 
renewal at least 90 days before the license expires or at least 60 days 
before the permit expires, unless the Administrator agrees to a 
different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15.
* * * * *
    (d) Renewal of license or permit. After the FAA finishes its 
reviews, the FAA issues an order modifying the expiration date of the 
license or permit. The FAA may impose additional or revised terms and 
conditions necessary to protect public health and safety and the safety 
of property and to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy 
interests.
* * * * *

0
18. Revise part 414 to read as follows:

PART 414--SAFETY ELEMENT APPROVALS

Sec.
Subpart A--General
414.1 Scope
414.3 Definitions.
414.5 Applicability.
414.7 Eligibility.
Subpart B--Application Procedures
414.9 Pre-application consultation.
414.11 Application.
414.13 Application separate from a vehicle operator license 
application.
414.15 Application concurrent with vehicle operator license 
application.
414.17 Confidentiality.
414.19 Processing the initial application.
414.21 Maintaining the continued accuracy of the initial 
application.
Subpart C--Safety Element Approval Review and Issuance
414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a safety element approval 
application.
414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing a safety element approval; 
duration of a safety element approval.
414.27 Maintaining the continued accuracy of the safety element 
approval application.
414.29 Safety element approval records.
414.31 Safety element approval renewal.
414.33 Safety element approval transfer.
414.35 Monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of a 
safety element approval.
414.37 Modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety element 
approval.
Subpart D--Appeal Procedures
414.41 Hearings in safety element approval actions.
414.43 Submissions; oral presentations in safety element approval 
actions.

[[Page 79712]]

414.45 Administrative law judge's recommended decision in safety 
element approval actions.

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.

Subpart A--General


Sec.  414.1  Scope.

    This part establishes procedures for obtaining a safety element 
approval and renewing and transferring an existing safety element 
approval. Safety element approvals issued under this part may be used 
to support the application review for one or more vehicle operator 
license requests under other parts of this chapter.


Sec.  414.3  Definitions.

    Safety element. For purposes of this part, a safety element is any 
one of the items or persons (personnel) listed in paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of the definition of ``safety element approval'' in this section.
    Safety element approval. For purposes of this part, a safety 
element approval is an FAA document containing the FAA determination 
that one or more of the safety elements listed in paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this definition, when used or employed within a defined 
envelope, parameter, or situation, will not jeopardize public health 
and safety or safety of property. A safety element approval may be 
issued independent of a license, and does not confer any authority to 
conduct activities for which a license is required under 14 CFR chapter 
III. A safety element approval does not relieve its holder of the duty 
to comply with all applicable requirements of law or regulation that 
may apply to the holder's activities.
    (1) Launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, 
service, or any identified component thereof; or
    (2) Qualified and trained personnel, performing a process or 
function related to licensed activities or vehicles.


Sec.  414.5  Applicability.

    This part applies to an applicant that wants to obtain a safety 
element approval for any of the safety elements defined under this part 
and to persons granted a safety element approval under this part. Any 
person eligible under this part may apply to become the holder of a 
safety element approval.


Sec.  414.7  Eligibility.

    (a) There is no citizenship requirement to obtain a safety element 
approval.
    (b) You may be eligible for a safety element approval if you are--
    (1) A designer, manufacturer, or operator of a launch or reentry 
vehicle or component thereof;
    (2) The designer or developer of a safety system or process; or
    (3) Personnel who perform safety-critical functions in conducting a 
licensed launch or reentry.
    (c) A safety element approval applicant must have sufficient 
knowledge and expertise to show that the design and operation of the 
safety element for which safety element approval is sought qualify for 
a safety element approval.
    (d) Only the safety elements defined under this part are eligible 
for a safety element approval.

Subpart B--Application Procedures


Sec.  414.9  Pre-application consultation.

    The applicant must consult with the FAA before submitting an 
application. Unless the applicant or the FAA requests another form of 
consultation, consultation is oral discussion with the FAA about the 
application process and the potential issues relevant to the FAA's 
safety element approval decision.


Sec.  414.11  Application.

    An applicant may submit an application for a safety element 
approval in one of two ways:
    (a) Separate from a vehicle operator license application in 
accordance with Sec.  414.13; or
    (b) Concurrent with a vehicle operator license application in 
accordance with Sec.  414.15.


Sec.  414.13  Application separate from a vehicle operator license 
application.

    (a) An applicant must make an application in writing and in 
English. The applicant must file the application with the Federal 
Aviation Administration either by paper, by use of physical electronic 
storage, or by email in the following manner:
    (1) For an application submitted on paper, an applicant must send 
two copies of the application to the Federal Aviation Administration, 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Room 331, 
800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Attention: 
Application Review.
    (2) For an application submitted by use of physical electronic 
storage, the applicant must either mail the application to the address 
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section or hand-deliver the 
application to an authorized FAA representative. The application and 
the physical electronic storage containing the application must also 
satisfy all of the following criteria:
    (i) The application must include a cover letter that is printed on 
paper and signed by the person who signed the application or by an 
authorized representative of the applicant;
    (ii) The cover letter must identify each document that is included 
on the physical electronic storage; and
    (iii) The physical electronic storage must be in a format such that 
its contents cannot be altered.
    (3) For an application submitted by email, an applicant must send 
the application as an email attachment, or as a link to a secure 
server, to [email protected]. The application and the email to 
which the application is attached must also satisfy the following 
criteria:
    (i) The email to which the application is attached must be sent 
from an email address controlled by the person who signed the 
application or by an authorized representative of the applicant; and
    (ii) The email must identify each document that is included as an 
attachment or that is stored on a secure server; and
    (iii) The electronic files must be date-stamped and have version 
control documentation.
    (b) The application must identify the following basic information:
    (1) Name and address of the applicant.
    (2) Name, address, and telephone number of any person to whom 
inquiries and correspondence should be directed.
    (3) Safety element as defined under this part for which the 
applicant seeks a safety element approval.
    (c) The application must contain the following technical 
information:
    (1) A Statement of Conformance letter, describing the specific 
criteria the applicant used to show the adequacy of the safety element 
for which a safety element approval is sought, and showing how the 
safety element complies with the specific criteria.
    (2) The specific operating limits for which the safety element 
approval is sought.
    (3) The following as applicable:
    (i) Information and analyses required under this chapter that may 
be applicable to demonstrating safe performance of the safety element 
for which the safety element approval is sought.
    (ii) Engineering design and analyses that show the adequacy of the 
proposed safety element for its intended use, such that the use in a 
licensed launch or reentry will not jeopardize public health or safety 
or the safety of property.
    (iii) Relevant manufacturing processes.

[[Page 79713]]

    (iv) Test and evaluation procedures.
    (v) Test results.
    (vi) Maintenance procedures.
    (vii) Personnel qualifications and training procedures.
    (d) The application must be legibly signed, dated, and certified as 
true, complete, and accurate by one of the following:
    (1) For a corporation, an officer or other individual authorized to 
act for the corporation in licensing or safety element approval 
matters.
    (2) For a partnership or a sole proprietorship, a general partner 
or proprietor, respectively.
    (3) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, an officer 
or other individual duly authorized to act for the joint venture, 
association, or other entity in licensing matters.
    (e) Failure to comply with any of the requirements set forth in 
this section is sufficient basis for denial of a safety element 
approval application.


Sec.  414.15  Application concurrent with vehicle operator license 
application.

    (a) An applicant for a vehicle operator license may also identify 
one or more sections of its application for which it seeks to obtain a 
safety element approval concurrently with a license. An applicant 
applying for a safety element approval concurrently with a license 
must--
    (1) Meet the applicable requirements of part 450;
    (2) Provide the information required in Sec.  414.13(b)(3) and 
(c)(2) and (3); and
    (3) Specify the sections of the license application that support 
the application for a safety element approval.
    (b) The scope of the safety element approval will be limited to 
what the application supports. The technical criteria for reviewing a 
safety element submitted as part of a vehicle operator license 
application are limited to the applicable requirements of part 450.


Sec.  414.17  Confidentiality.

    (a) To ensure confidentiality of data or information in the 
application, the applicant must--
    (1) Send a written request with the application that trade secrets 
or proprietary commercial or financial data be treated as confidential, 
and include in the request the specific time frame confidential 
treatment is required.
    (2) Mark data or information that require confidentiality with an 
identifying legend, such as ``Proprietary Information,'' ``Proprietary 
Commercial Information,'' ``Trade Secret,'' or ``Confidential Treatment 
Requested.'' Where this marking proves impracticable, attach a cover 
sheet that contains the identifying legend to the data or information 
for which confidential treatment is sought.
    (b) If the applicant requests confidential treatment for previously 
submitted data or information, the FAA will honor that request to the 
extent practicable in case of any prior distribution of the data or 
information.
    (c) Data or information for which confidential treatment is 
requested or data or information that qualifies for exemption under 
section 552(b)(4) of title 5, U.S.C., will not be disclosed to the 
public unless the Associate Administrator determines that withholding 
the data or information is contrary to the public or national interest.


Sec.  414.19  Processing the initial application.

    (a) The FAA will initially screen an application to determine if 
the application is complete enough for the FAA to start the review.
    (b) After completing the initial screening, the FAA will inform the 
applicant in writing of one of the following:
    (1) The FAA accepts the application and will begin the reviews or 
evaluations required for a safety element approval determination under 
this part.
    (2) The FAA rejects the application because it is incomplete or 
indefinite, making initiation of the reviews or evaluations required 
for a safety element approval determination under this part 
inappropriate.
    (c) The written notice will state the reason(s) for rejection and 
corrective actions necessary for the application to be accepted. The 
FAA may return a rejected application to the applicant or may hold it 
until the applicant provides more information.
    (d) The applicant may withdraw, amend, or supplement an application 
any time before the FAA makes a final determination on the safety 
element approval application by making a written request to the 
Associate Administrator. If the applicant amends or supplements the 
initial application, the revised application must meet all the 
applicable requirements under this part.


Sec.  414.21  Maintaining the continued accuracy of the initial 
application.

    The applicant is responsible for the continuing accuracy and 
completeness of information provided to the FAA as part of the safety 
element approval application. If at any time after submitting the 
application, circumstances occur that cause the information to no 
longer be accurate and complete in any material respect, the applicant 
must submit a written statement to the Associate Administrator 
explaining the circumstances and providing the new or corrected 
information. The revised application must meet all requirements under 
Sec.  414.13 or Sec.  414.15.

Subpart C--Safety Element Approval Review and Issuance


Sec.  414.23  Technical criteria for reviewing a safety element 
approval application.

    The FAA will determine whether a safety element is eligible for and 
may be issued a safety element approval. The FAA will base its 
determination on performance-based criteria, against which it may 
assess the effect on public health and safety and on safety of 
property, in the following hierarchy:
    (a) FAA or other appropriate Federal regulations.
    (b) Government-developed or adopted standards.
    (c) Industry consensus performance-based criteria or standard.
    (d) Applicant-developed criteria. Applicant-developed criteria are 
performance standards customized by the manufacturer that intends to 
produce the system, system component, or part. The applicant-developed 
criteria must define--
    (1) Design and minimum performance;
    (2) Quality assurance system requirements;
    (3) Production acceptance test specifications; and
    (4) Continued operational safety monitoring system characteristics.


Sec.  414.25  Terms and conditions for issuing a safety element 
approval; duration of a safety element approval.

    (a) The FAA will issue a safety element approval to an applicant 
that meets all the requirements under this part.
    (b) The scope of the safety element approval will be limited by the 
scope of the safety demonstration contained in the application on which 
the FAA based the decision to grant the safety element approval.
    (c) The FAA will determine specific terms and conditions of a 
safety element approval individually, limiting the safety element 
approval to the scope for which it was approved. The terms and 
conditions will include reporting requirements tailored to the 
individual safety element approval.
    (d) A safety element approval is valid for five years and may be 
renewed.

[[Page 79714]]

Sec.  414.27  Maintaining the continued accuracy of the safety element 
approval application.

    (a) The holder of a safety element approval must ensure the 
continued accuracy and completeness of representations contained in the 
safety element approval application, on which the approval was issued, 
for the entire term of the safety element approval.
    (b) If any representation contained in the application that is 
material to public health and safety or safety of property ceases to be 
accurate and complete, the safety element approval holder must prepare 
and submit a revised application according to Sec.  414.13 or Sec.  
414.15 under this part. The safety element approval holder must point 
out any part of the safety element approval or the associated 
application that would be changed or affected by a proposed 
modification. The FAA will review and make a determination on the 
revised application under the terms of this part.


Sec.  414.29  Safety element approval records.

    The holder of a safety element approval must maintain all records 
necessary to verify that the holder's activities are consistent with 
the representations contained in the application for which the approval 
was issued for the duration of the safety element approval plus one 
year.


Sec.  414.31  Safety element approval renewal.

    (a) Eligibility. A holder of a safety element approval may apply to 
renew it by sending the FAA a written application at least 90 days 
before the expiration date of the approval, unless the Administrator 
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15.
    (b) Application. (1) A safety element approval renewal application 
must meet all the requirements under Sec.  414.13 or Sec.  414.15.
    (2) The application may incorporate by reference information 
provided as part of the application for the expiring safety element 
approval or any modification to that approval.
    (3) Any proposed changes in the conduct of a safety element for 
which the FAA has issued a safety element approval must be described 
and must include any added information necessary to support the fitness 
of the proposed changes to meet the criteria upon which the FAA 
evaluated the safety element approval application.
    (c) Review of application. The FAA conducts the reviews required 
under this part to determine whether the safety element approval may be 
renewed. We may incorporate by reference any findings that are part of 
the record for the expiring safety element approval.
    (d) Grant of safety element approval renewal. If the FAA makes a 
favorable safety element approval determination, the FAA issues an 
order that amends the expiration date of the safety element approval or 
issues a new safety element approval. The FAA may impose added or 
revised terms and conditions necessary to protect public health and 
safety and the safety of property.
    (e) Written notice. The FAA will provide written notice to the 
applicant of its determination on the safety element approval renewal 
request.
    (f) Denial of a safety element approval renewal. If the FAA denies 
the renewal application, the applicant may correct any deficiency the 
FAA identified and request a reconsideration of the revised 
application. The applicant also has the right to appeal a denial as set 
forth in subpart D of this part.


Sec.  414.33  Safety element approval transfer.

    (a) Only the FAA may approve a transfer of a safety element 
approval.
    (b) Either the holder of a safety element approval or the 
prospective transferee may request a safety element approval transfer.
    (c) Both the holder and prospective transferee must agree to the 
transfer.
    (d) The person requesting the transfer must submit a safety element 
approval application according to Sec.  414.13 or Sec.  414.15, must 
meet the applicable requirements of this part, and may incorporate by 
reference relevant portions of the initial application.
    (e) The FAA will approve a transfer of a safety element approval 
only after all the approvals and determinations required under this 
chapter for a safety element approval have been met. In conducting 
reviews and issuing approvals and determinations, the FAA may 
incorporate by reference any findings made part of the record to 
support the initial safety element approval determination. The FAA may 
modify the terms and conditions of a safety element approval to reflect 
any changes necessary because of a safety element approval transfer.
    (f) The FAA will provide written notice to the person requesting 
the safety element approval transfer of our determination.


Sec.  414.35  Monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of a 
safety element approval.

    Each holder of a safety element approval must allow access by, and 
cooperate with, Federal officers or employees or other individuals 
authorized by the Associate Administrator to inspect manufacturing, 
production, testing, or assembly performed by a holder of a safety 
element approval or its contractor. The FAA may also inspect a safety 
element approval process or service, including training programs and 
personnel qualifications.


Sec.  414.37  Modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety 
element approval.

    (a) The safety element approval holder. The safety element approval 
holder may submit an application to the FAA to modify the terms and 
conditions of the holder's safety element approval. The application 
must meet all the applicable requirements under this part. The FAA will 
review and make a determination on the application using the same 
procedures under this part applicable to an initial safety element 
approval application. If the FAA denies the request to modify a safety 
element approval, the holder may correct any deficiency the FAA 
identified and request reconsideration. The holder also has the right 
to appeal a denial as set forth in subpart D of this part.
    (b) The FAA. If the FAA finds it is in the interest of public 
health and safety, safety of property, or if the safety element 
approval holder fails to comply with any applicable requirements of 
this part, any terms and conditions of the safety element approval, or 
any other applicable requirement, the FAA may--
    (1) Modify the terms and conditions of the safety element approval; 
or
    (2) Suspend or revoke the safety element approval.
    (c) Effective date. Unless otherwise stated by the FAA, any 
modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety element approval 
under paragraph (b)--
    (1) Takes effect immediately; and
    (2) Continues in effect during any reconsideration or appeal of 
such action under this part.
    (d) Notification and right to appeal. If the FAA determines it is 
necessary to modify, suspend, or revoke a safety element approval, we 
will notify the safety element approval holder in writing. If the 
holder disagrees with the FAA's determination, the holder may correct 
any deficiency the FAA identified and request a reconsideration of the 
determination. The applicant also has the right to appeal the 
determination as set forth in subpart D of this part.

Subpart D--Appeal Procedures


Sec.  414.41  Hearings in safety element approval actions.

    (a) The FAA will give the safety element approval applicant or 
holder, as appropriate, written notice stating the reason for issuing a 
denial or for

[[Page 79715]]

modifying, suspending, or revoking a safety element approval under this 
part.
    (b) A safety element approval applicant or holder is entitled to a 
determination on the record after an opportunity for a hearing.


Sec.  414.43  Submissions; oral presentations in safety element 
approval actions.

    (a) Determinations in safety element approval actions under this 
part will be made on the basis of written submissions unless the 
administrative law judge, on petition or on their own initiative, 
determines that an oral presentation is required.
    (b) Submissions must include a detailed exposition of the evidence 
or arguments supporting the petition.
    (c) Petitions must be filed as soon as practicable, but in no event 
more than 30 days after issuance of decision or finding under Sec.  
414.37.


Sec.  414.45  Administrative law judge's recommended decision in safety 
element approval actions.

    (a) The Associate Administrator, who will make the final decision 
on the matter at issue, will review the recommended decision of the 
administrative law judge. The Associate Administrator will make such 
final decision within 30 days of issuance of the recommended decision.
    (b) The authority and responsibility to review and decide rests 
solely with the Associate Administrator and may not be delegated.

PART 415--LAUNCH LICENSE

0
19. The authority citation for part 415 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.

PART 415--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

0
20. Effective March 10, 2026, remove and reserve part 415.

0
21. Revise Sec.  415.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  415.1  Applicability and scope.

    (a) Applicability. This part applies to the following:
    (1) Licenses issued under this part before June 8, 2021; and
    (2) Licenses issued on or after June 8, 2021, if the FAA accepted 
the application under Sec.  413.11 of this chapter before that date.
    (b) Scope. This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a 
license to launch an expendable launch vehicle and post-licensing 
requirements with which a licensee must comply to remain licensed. 
Requirements for preparing a license application are in part 413 of 
this subchapter.

0
22. Add Sec.  415.2 to read as follows:


Sec.  415.2  Licenses issued under this part.

    (a) Definitions. For the purposes of this part, the definitions of 
Sec.  401.5 of this chapter apply.
    (b) Compliance with part 450 of this chapter. Operations under this 
part must comply with launch and reentry collision avoidance 
requirements in Sec.  450.169 of this chapter and critical asset 
protection requirements in Sec. Sec.  450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) of this 
chapter.

0
23. Amend Sec.  415.3 by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  415.3  Types of launch licenses.

* * * * *
    (c) Notwithstanding the duration for a license established in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, no license issued under this 
part will be valid after March 10, 2026.

0
24. Amend Sec.  415.35 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  415.35  Acceptable flight risk.

* * * * *
    (d) Operation. A launch vehicle must be operated in a manner that 
ensures that flight risks meet the criteria of paragraph (a) of this 
section and in accordance with collision avoidance requirements in 
Sec.  450.169 and critical asset protection requirements in Sec.  
450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4). An applicant must identify all launch 
operations and procedures that must be performed to ensure acceptable 
flight risk.

Appendix A to Part 415--[Removed and Reserved]

0
25. Remove and reserve appendix A to part 415.

PART 417--LAUNCH SAFETY

0
26. The authority citation for part 417 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.

PART 417--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

0
27. Effective March 10, 2026, remove and reserve part 417.

0
28. Revise Sec.  417.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  417.1  General information.

    (a) Scope. This part sets forth--
    (1) The responsibilities of a launch operator conducting a licensed 
launch of an expendable launch vehicle pursuant to a license issued 
under part 415 of this chapter; and
    (2) The requirements for maintaining a launch license obtained 
under part 415 of this chapter. Parts 413 and 415 of this chapter 
contain requirements for preparing a license application to conduct a 
launch, including information reviewed by the FAA to conduct a policy, 
safety, payload, and environmental review, and a payload determination
    (b) Applicability. (1) The administrative requirements for filing 
material with the FAA in subpart A of this part apply to all licensed 
launches from a Federal launch range or a non-Federal launch site, 
except where noted.
    (2) The safety requirements of subparts B through E of this part 
apply to all licensed launches of expendable launch vehicles. See 
paragraph (d) of this section for exceptions to this provision.
    (c) ``Meets intent'' certification. For a licensed launch from a 
Federal launch range, a launch operator need not demonstrate to the FAA 
that an alternative means of satisfying a requirement of this part 
provides an equivalent level of safety for a launch if written evidence 
demonstrates that a Federal launch range has, by the effective date of 
this part, granted a ``meets intent certification,'' including through 
``tailoring,'' that applies to the requirement and that launch. See 
paragraph (e) of this section for exceptions to this provision. Written 
evidence includes:
    (1) Range flight plan approval,
    (2) Missile system pre-launch safety package,
    (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages,
    (4) A tailored version of EWR 127-1,
    (5) Range email to the FAA stating that the MIC was approved, or
    (6) Operation approval.
    (d) Waiver. For a licensed launch from a Federal launch range, a 
requirement of this part does not apply to a launch if written evidence 
demonstrates that a Federal launch range has, by the effective date of 
this part, granted a waiver that allows noncompliance with the 
requirement for that launch. See paragraph (e) of this section for 
exceptions to this provision. Written evidence includes:
    (1) Range flight plan approval,
    (2) Missile system pre-launch safety package,
    (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages,
    (4) A tailored version of EWR 127-1,
    (5) Range email to the FAA stating that the waiver was approved, or
    (6) Operation approval.
    (e) Exceptions to Federal launch range meets intent certifications 
and waivers. Even if a licensed launch from a Federal launch range 
satisfies paragraph (c) or (d) of this section for a

[[Page 79716]]

requirement of this part, the requirement applies and a launch operator 
must satisfy the requirement, obtain FAA approval of any alternative, 
or obtain FAA approval for any further noncompliance if--
    (1) The launch operator modifies the launch vehicle's operation or 
safety characteristics;
    (2) The launch operator uses the launch vehicle, component, system, 
or subsystem in a new application;
    (3) The FAA or the launch operator determines that a previously 
unforeseen or newly discovered safety hazard exists that is a source of 
significant risk to public safety; or
    (4) The Federal launch range previously accepted a component, 
system, or subsystem, but did not then identify a noncompliance to a 
Federal launch range requirement.
    (f) Equivalent level of safety. The requirements of this part apply 
to a launch operator and the launch operator's launch unless the launch 
operator clearly and convincingly demonstrates that an alternative 
approach provides an equivalent level of safety.


Sec.  417.3  [Amended]

0
29. Amend Sec.  417.3 by removing the definitions for ``conjunction on 
launch'' and ``launch wait''.

0
30. Amend Sec.  417.11 by adding paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  417.11  Continuing accuracy of license application; application 
for modification of license.

* * * * *
    (f) The Administrator may determine that a modification to a 
license issued under this part must comply with the requirements in 
part 450 of this chapter. The Administrator will base the determination 
on the extent and complexity of the modification, whether the applicant 
proposes to modify multiple parts of the application, or if the 
application requires significant evaluation.

0
31. Amend Sec.  417.107 by adding paragraph (b)(5), and removing and 
reserving paragraph (e).
    The addition reads as follows:


Sec.  417.107  Flight safety.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) A launch operator may initiate flight of a launch vehicle only 
if all of the risks to the public satisfy the criteria in the critical 
asset protection requirements in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4).
* * * * *

0
32. Amend Sec.  417.113 by revising paragraphs (c)(1) introductory text 
and (c)(1)(iii) to read as follows:


Sec.  417.113  Launch safety rules.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) The flight-commit criteria must implement the flight safety 
analysis of subpart C of this part and collision avoidance requirements 
in Sec.  450.169 and critical asset protection requirements in Sec.  
450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4). These must include criteria for:
* * * * *
    (iii) Implementation of any launch wait in the launch window for 
the purpose of collision avoidance in accordance with collision 
avoidance requirements in Sec.  450.169.
* * * * *


Sec.  417.121  [Amended]

0
32. Amend Sec.  417.121 by removing and reserving paragraph (c).


Sec.  417.231  [Removed and Reserved.]

0
33. Remove and reserve Sec.  417.231.

Appendix A to Part 417--[Amended]

0
34. Amend appendix A to part 417 by removing and reserving section 
A417.31.

0
35. Amend appendix C to part 417 by revising paragraph (a) in section 
C417.1 and removing section C417.11.
    The revision reads as follows:

Appendix C to Part 417--Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and 
Products for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle Flown With a Wind 
Weighting Safety System

* * * * *

C417.1 General

    (a) This appendix contains methodologies for performing the 
flight safety analysis required for the launch of an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, 
except for the hazard area analysis required by Sec.  417.107, which 
is covered in appendix B of this part. This appendix includes 
methodologies for a trajectory analysis, wind weighting analysis, 
debris analysis, and debris risk analysis.
* * * * *

PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE

0
36. The authority citation for part 420 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


Sec.  420.5  [Amended]

0
37. Amend Sec.  420.5 by removing the definitions of ``Instantaneous 
impact point'', ``Launch site accident'', and ``Public''.

0
38. Amend Sec.  420.15 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  420.15  Information requirements.

* * * * *
    (b) Environmental. The FAA is responsible for complying with the 
procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive 
Orders prior to issuing a launch site license. An applicant must 
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such 
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential 
environmental effects associated with issuing a launch site license.
    (1) Environmental impact statement or environmental assessment. 
When directed by the FAA, an applicant must--
    (i) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
    (ii) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed 
consultant contractor; or
    (iii) Submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a 
previously submitted Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement when requested by the FAA.
    (2) Categorical exclusion. The FAA may determine that a categorical 
exclusion is appropriate upon receipt of supporting information from an 
applicant.
    (3) Environmental information. An application must include an 
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement, 
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation covering 
all planned licensed activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council 
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA.
* * * * *

0
39. Revise Sec.  420.51 to read as follows:


Sec.  420.51  Responsibilities--general.

    A licensee must operate its launch site in accordance with the 
representations in its application.

0
40. Amend Sec.  420.57 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  420.57  Notifications.

* * * * *
    (d) At least 2 days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, unless the 
Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  
404.15, the licensee must notify local officials and all owners of land 
adjacent to the launch site of the flight schedule.

0
41. Revise Sec.  420.59 to read as follows:

[[Page 79717]]

Sec.  420.59  Mishap plan.

    (a) General. A licensee must report, respond to, and investigate 
any event that meets either paragraph (1) or (5) of the definition of 
``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7 of this chapter. A licensee must submit a 
mishap plan that meets the requirements of Sec.  450.173(b) through 
(f).
    (b) Launch mishaps. A launch site operator's mishap plan must also 
contain procedures for participating in an investigation of a launch 
mishap for launches launched from the launch site.
    (c) Other agency procedures. Emergency response and investigation 
procedures developed in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.119 and 40 CFR part 
68 will satisfy the requirements of Sec.  450.173(d) and (e) to the 
extent that they include the elements required by Sec.  450.173(d) and 
(e).

0
42. Amend Sec.  420.61 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  420.61  Records.

* * * * *
    (b) For any event that meets any of paragraph (1), (5), or (8) of 
the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7 of this chapter, a licensee 
must preserve all records related to the event. Records must be 
retained until completion of any Federal investigation and the FAA 
advises the licensee that the records need not be retained.
* * * * *

PART 431--LAUNCH AND REENTRY OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV)

0
43. The authority citation for part 431 continue to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.

PART 431--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

0
44. Effective March 10, 2026, remove and reserve part 431.

0
45. Revise Sec.  431.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  431.1  General.

    (a) Applicability. This part applies to the following--
    (1) Licenses issued under this part before June 8, 2021; and
    (2) Licenses issued on or after June 8, 2021, if the FAA accepted 
the application under Sec.  413.11 of this chapter before that date.
    (b) Scope. This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a 
reusable launch vehicle (RLV) mission license and post-licensing 
requirements with which a licensee must comply to remain licensed. 
Requirements for preparing a license application are contained in part 
413 of this subchapter.
    (c) Equivalent level of safety. Each requirement of this part 
applies unless the applicant or licensee clearly and convincingly 
demonstrates that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level 
of safety to the requirement of this part.

0
46. Add Sec.  431.2 to read as follows:


Sec.  431.2  Licenses issued under this part.

    (a) Definitions. For the purposes of this subpart, the definitions 
of Sec.  401.5 of this chapter apply.
    (b) Compliance with part 450 of this chapter. Operations under this 
part must comply with launch and reentry collision avoidance 
requirements in Sec.  450.169 of this chapter and critical asset 
protection requirements in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) of this 
chapter.

0
47. Amend Sec.  431.3 by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  431.3  Types of reusable launch vehicle mission licenses.

* * * * *
    (c) Duration of license. Notwithstanding the duration for a license 
established in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, no license 
issued under this part will be valid after March 10, 2026.

0
48. Amend Sec.  431.43 by revising paragraph (a)(1) and removing and 
reserving paragraph (c)(1).
    The revision reads as follows:


Sec.  431.43   Reusable launch vehicle mission operational requirements 
and restrictions.

    (a) * * *
    (1) That ensure RLV mission risks do not exceed the criteria set 
forth in Sec. Sec.  431.35, 450.169, and in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) and 
(b)(4) for nominal and non-nominal operations;
* * * * *

0
49. Amend Sec.  431.73 by adding paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  431.73  Continuing accuracy of license application; application 
for modification of license.

* * * * *
    (f) The Administrator may determine that a modification to a 
license issued under this part must comply with the requirements in 
part 450 of this chapter. The Administrator will base the determination 
on the extent and complexity of the modification, whether the applicant 
proposes to modify multiple parts of the application, or if the 
application requires significant evaluation.

PART 433--LICENSE TO OPERATE A REENTRY SITE

0
50. The authority citation for part 433 will continue to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


0
51. Revise Sec.  433.7 to read as follows:


Sec.  433.7  Environmental.

    (a) General. The FAA is responsible for complying with the 
procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive 
Orders prior to issuing a reentry site license. An applicant must 
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such 
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential 
environmental effects associated with issuing a license for a reentry 
site.
    (b) Environmental impact statement or environmental assessment. 
When directed by the FAA, an applicant must--
    (1) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
    (2) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed 
consultant contractor; or
    (3) Submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a 
previously submitted Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement.
    (c) Categorical exclusion. The FAA may determine that a categorical 
exclusion is appropriate upon receipt of supporting information from an 
applicant.
    (d) Environmental information. An application must include an 
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement, 
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation covering 
all planned licensed activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council 
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA.


Sec.  433.9  [Removed]

0
52. Remove Sec.  433.9.

PART 435--REENTRY OF A REENTRY VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE LAUNCH 
VEHICLE (RLV)

0
53. The authority citation for part 435 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.

PART 435--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

0
54. Effective March 10, 2026, remove and reserve part 435.

0
55. Revise Sec.  435.1 to read as follows:


Sec.  435.1  General.

    (a) Applicability. This part applies to the following--

[[Page 79718]]

    (1) Licenses issued under this part before June 8, 2021; and
    (2) Licenses issued on or after June 8, 2021, if the FAA accepted 
the application under Sec.  413.11 of this chapter before that date.
    (b) Scope. This part prescribes requirements for obtaining a 
license to reenter a reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch 
vehicle (RLV), and post-licensing requirements with which a licensee 
must comply to remain licensed. Requirements for preparing a license 
application are contained in part 413 of this subchapter.
    (c) Equivalent level of safety. Each requirement of this part 
applies unless the applicant or licensee clearly and convincingly 
demonstrates that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level 
of safety to the requirement of this part.

0
56. Add Sec.  435.2 to read as follows:


Sec.  435.2  Licenses.

    (a) Definitions. For the purposes of this subpart, the definitions 
of Sec.  401.5 of this chapter apply.
    (b) Compliance with part 450 of this chapter. Operations under this 
part must comply with launch and reentry collision avoidance 
requirements in Sec.  450.169 and critical asset protection 
requirements in Sec.  450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4).

0
57. Amend Sec.  435.3 by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  435.3  Types of reentry licenses.

* * * * *
    (c) Duration of license. Notwithstanding the duration for a license 
established in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, no license 
issued under this part will be valid after March 10, 2026.

PART 437--EXPERIMENTAL PERMITS

0
58. The authority citation for part 437 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


Sec.  437.3  [Amended]

0
59. Amend Sec.  437.3 by removing the definitions for ``anomaly'' and 
``key flight-safety event''.

0
60. Amend Sec.  437.21 by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  437.21  General.

* * * * *
    (b) Other regulations--(1) Environmental--(i) General. The FAA is 
responsible for complying with the procedures and policies of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable 
environmental laws, regulations, and Executive Orders to consider and 
document the potential environmental effects associated with proposed 
reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. An applicant must 
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such 
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential 
environmental effects associated with proposed reusable suborbital 
rocket launches or reentries.
    (ii) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. 
When directed by the FAA, an applicant must--
    (A) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
    (B) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed 
consultant contractor; or
    (C) Submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a 
previously submitted Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement.
    (iii) Categorical exclusion. The FAA may determine that a 
categorical exclusion determination is appropriate upon receipt of 
supporting information from an applicant.
    (iv) Information requirements. An application must include an 
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement, 
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation covering 
all planned licensed activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council 
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA.
    (2) Financial responsibility. An applicant must provide the 
information required by part 3 of appendix A of part 440 for the FAA to 
conduct a maximum probable loss analysis.
    (3) Human space flight. An applicant proposing launch or reentry 
with flight crew or a space flight participant on board a reusable 
suborbital rocket must demonstrate compliance with Sec. Sec.  460.5, 
460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51, and 460.53 of this 
subchapter.
    (c) Use of a safety element approval. If an applicant proposes to 
use any reusable suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or 
personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety element approval under 
part 414 of this chapter, the FAA will not reevaluate that safety 
element to the extent its use is within its approved scope. As part of 
the application process, the FAA will evaluate the integration of that 
safety element into vehicle systems or operations.
* * * * *

0
61. Revise Sec.  437.41 to read as follows:


Sec.  437.41  Mishap plan.

    An applicant must submit a mishap plan that meets the requirements 
of Sec.  450.173 of this chapter.

0
62. Revise Sec.  437.65 to read as follows:


Sec.  437.65  Collision avoidance analysis.

    For a permitted flight with a planned maximum altitude greater than 
150 kilometers, a permittee must obtain a collision avoidance analysis 
in accordance with Sec.  450.169 of this chapter.


Sec.  437.75  [Removed and Reserved]

0
63. Remove and reserve Sec.  437.75.

0
64. Amend Sec.  437.87 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  437.87  Records.

* * * * *
    (b) For any event that meets any of paragraphs (1) through (3), 
(5), or (8) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7 of this 
chapter, a permittee must preserve all records related to the event. 
Records shall be retained until any Federal investigation is complete 
and the FAA advises the permittee that the records need not be 
retained.
* * * * *

0
65. Amend Sec.  437.89 by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text and 
(b) to read as follows:


Sec.  437.89  Pre-flight reporting.

    (a) Not later than 30 days before each flight or series of flights 
conducted under an experimental permit, unless the Administrator agrees 
to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15, a permittee 
must provide the FAA with the following information:
* * * * *
    (b) Not later than 15 days before each permitted flight planned to 
reach greater than 150 km altitude, unless the Administrator agrees to 
a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15, a permittee 
must provide the FAA its planned trajectory for a collision avoidance 
analysis.

PART 440--FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

0
66. The authority citation for part 440 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


0
67. Amend Sec.  440.3 by revising the introductory text and the 
definition for ``maximum probable loss (MPL)'' to read as follows:


Sec.  440.3  Definitions.

    Except as otherwise provided in this section, any term used in this 
part and defined in 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923, or in

[[Page 79719]]

Sec.  401.5 or Sec.  401.7 of this chapter shall have the meaning 
contained therein.
* * * * *
    Maximum probable loss (MPL) means the greatest dollar amount of 
loss for bodily injury or property damage that is reasonably expected 
to result from a licensed or permitted activity;
    (1) Losses to third parties, excluding Government personnel and 
other launch or reentry participants' employees involved in licensed or 
permitted activities and neighboring operations personnel, that are 
reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity are 
those that have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten 
million.
    (2) Losses to Government property and Government personnel involved 
in licensed or permitted activities and neighboring operations 
personnel that are reasonably expected to result from licensed or 
permitted activities are those that have a probability of occurrence of 
no less than one in one hundred thousand.
* * * * *


Sec.  440.3  [Amended]

0
68. Effective March 10, 2026, further amend Sec.  440.3 in the 
introductory text by removing `` in Sec. Sec.  401.5 or 401.7'' and 
add, in its place, ``in Sec.  401.7''.

0
69. Amend Sec.  440.15 by revising paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  440.15  Demonstration of compliance.

    (a) * * *
    (1) All reciprocal waiver of claims agreements required under Sec.  
440.17(c) must be submitted at least 30 days before the start of any 
licensed or permitted activity involving a customer, crew member, or 
space flight participant; unless the Administrator agrees to a 
different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15;
    (2) Evidence of insurance must be submitted at least 30 days before 
commencement of any licensed launch or permitted activity, and for 
licensed reentry no less than 30 days before commencement of launch 
activities involving the reentry licensee, unless the Administrator 
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15;
    (3) Evidence of financial responsibility in a form other than 
insurance, as provided under Sec.  440.9(f) must be submitted at least 
60 days before commencement of a licensed or permitted activity, unless 
the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance with 
Sec.  404.15; and
    (4) Evidence of renewal of insurance or other form of financial 
responsibility must be submitted at least 30 days in advance of its 
expiration date, unless the Administrator agrees to a different time 
frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15.
* * * * *

0
70. Add part 450 to read as follows:

PART 450--LAUNCH AND REENTRY LICENSE REQUIREMENTS

Sec.
Subpart A--General Information
450.1 Applicability.
450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator license.
450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator license.
450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator license.
450.9 Additional license terms and conditions.
450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator license.
450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle operator license.
Subpart B--Requirements to Obtain a Vehicle Operator License
450.31 General.
450.33 Incremental review and determinations.
450.35 Means of compliance.
450.37 Equivalent level of safety.
450.39 Use of safety element approval.
450.41 Policy review and approval.
450.43 Payload review and determination.
450.45 Safety review and approval.
450.47 Environmental review.
Subpart C--Safety Requirements

Safety Criteria

450.101 Safety criteria.

System Safety Program

450.103 System safety program.

Hazard Control Strategies

450.107 Hazard control strategies.
450.108 Flight abort.
450.109 Flight hazard analysis.
450.110 Physical containment.
450.111 Wind weighting.

Flight Safety Analyses

450.113 Flight safety analysis requirements--scope.
450.115 Flight safety analysis methods.
450.117 Trajectory analysis for normal flight.
450.119 Trajectory analysis for malfunction flight.
450.121 Debris analysis.
450.123 Population exposure analysis.
450.131 Probability of failure analysis.
450.133 Flight hazard area analysis.
450.135 Debris risk analysis.
450.137 Far-field overpressure blast effects analysis.
450.139 Toxic hazards for flight.

Prescribed Hazard Controls for Safety-Critical Hardware and Computing 
Systems

450.141 Computing systems.
450.143 Safety-critical system design, test, and documentation.
450.145 Highly reliable flight safety system.

Other Prescribed Hazard Controls

450.147 Agreements.
450.149 Safety-critical personnel qualifications.
450.151 Work shift and rest requirements.
450.153 Radio frequency management.
450.155 Readiness.
450.157 Communications.
450.159 Pre-flight procedures.
450.161 Control of hazard areas.
450.163 Lightning hazard mitigation.
450.165 Flight commit criteria.
450.167 Tracking.
450.169 Launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis 
requirements.
450.171 Safety at end of launch.
450.173 Mishap plan--reporting, response, and investigation 
requirements.
450.175 Test-induced damage.
450.177 Unique safety policies, requirements, and practices.

Ground Safety

450.179 Ground safety--general.
450.181 Coordination with a site operator.
450.183 Explosive site plan.
450.185 Ground hazard analysis.
450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations.
450.189 Ground safety prescribed hazard controls.
Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator License
450.201 Responsibility for public safety and safety of property.
450.203 Compliance.
450.205 Financial responsibility requirements.
450.207 Human spaceflight requirements.
450.209 Compliance monitoring.
450.211 Continuing accuracy of license application; application for 
modification of license.
450.213 Pre-flight reporting.
450.215 Post-flight reporting.
450.217 Registration of space objects.
450.219 Records.
Appendix A to Part 450--Collision Analysis Worksheet

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.

Subpart A--General Information


Sec.  450.1  Applicability.

    This part prescribes requirements for obtaining and maintaining a 
license to launch, reenter, or both launch and reenter, a launch or 
reentry vehicle.


Sec.  450.3  Scope of a vehicle operator license.

    (a) General. A vehicle operator license authorizes a licensee to 
conduct one or more launches or reentries using the same vehicle or 
family of vehicles. A vehicle operator license identifies the scope of 
authorization as defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section or 
as agreed to by the Administrator.
    (b) Scope of launch. A vehicle operator license authorizes launch, 
which includes the flight of a launch

[[Page 79720]]

vehicle and pre- and post-flight ground operations as follows:
    (1) Launch begins when hazardous pre-flight operations commence at 
a U.S. launch site that may pose a threat to the public. Hazardous pre-
flight operations that may pose a threat to the public include 
pressurizing or loading of propellants into the vehicle, operations 
involving a fueled launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to 
initiate flight, or any hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for 
flight. Hazardous pre-flight operations do not include the period 
between the end of the previous launch and launch vehicle reuse, when 
the vehicle is in a safe and dormant state.
    (2) At a non-U.S. launch site, launch begins at ignition or at the 
first movement that initiates flight, whichever occurs earlier.
    (3) Launch ends when any of the following events occur:
    (i) For an orbital launch of a vehicle without a reentry of the 
vehicle, launch ends after the licensee's last exercise of control over 
its vehicle on orbit, after vehicle component impact or landing on 
Earth, after activities necessary to return the vehicle or component to 
a safe condition on the ground after impact or landing, or after 
activities necessary to return the site to a safe condition, whichever 
occurs latest;
    (ii) For an orbital launch of a vehicle with a reentry of the 
vehicle, launch ends after deployment of all payloads, upon completion 
of the vehicle's first steady-state orbit if there is no payload 
deployment, after vehicle component impact or landing on Earth, after 
activities necessary to return the vehicle or component to a safe 
condition on the ground after impact or landing, or after activities 
necessary to return the site to a safe condition, whichever occurs 
latest;
    (iii) For a suborbital launch that includes a reentry, launch ends 
after reaching apogee;
    (iv) For a suborbital launch that does not include a reentry, 
launch ends after vehicle or vehicle component impact or landing on 
Earth, after activities necessary to return the vehicle or vehicle 
component to a safe condition on the ground after impact or landing, or 
after activities necessary to return the site to a safe condition, 
whichever occurs latest.
    (c) Scope of reentry. A vehicle operator license authorizes 
reentry. Reentry includes activities conducted in Earth orbit or outer 
space to determine reentry readiness and that are critical to ensuring 
public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry 
flight. Reentry also includes activities necessary to return the 
reentry vehicle, or vehicle component, to a safe condition on the 
ground after impact or landing.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must identify pre- and 
post-flight ground operations at a U.S. launch site sufficient for the 
Administrator to determine the scope of activities authorized under the 
license.


Sec.  450.5  Issuance of a vehicle operator license.

    (a) The FAA issues a vehicle operator license to an applicant who 
has obtained all approvals and determinations required under this part 
for a license.
    (b) A vehicle operator license authorizes a licensee to conduct 
launches or reentries, in accordance with the representations contained 
in the licensee's application, with subparts C and D of this part, and 
subject to the licensee's compliance with terms and conditions 
contained in license orders accompanying the license, including 
financial responsibility requirements.


Sec.  450.7  Duration of a vehicle operator license.

    A vehicle operator license is valid for the period of time 
determined by the Administrator as necessary to conduct the licensed 
activity but may not exceed 5 years from the issuance date.


Sec.  450.9  Additional license terms and conditions.

    The FAA may modify a vehicle operator license at any time by 
modifying or adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance 
with the Act and regulations.


Sec.  450.11  Transfer of a vehicle operator license.

    (a) Only the FAA may transfer a vehicle operator license.
    (b) Either the holder of a vehicle operator license or the 
prospective transferee may request a vehicle operator license transfer.
    (c) Both the holder and prospective transferee must agree to the 
transfer.
    (d) An applicant for transfer of a vehicle operator license must 
submit a license application in accordance with part 413 of this 
chapter and must meet the requirements of part 450 of this chapter.
    (e) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant that has 
obtained all of the approvals and determinations required under this 
part for a license. In conducting its reviews and issuing approvals and 
determinations, the FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made 
part of the record to support the initial licensing determination. The 
FAA may modify a license to reflect any changes necessary as a result 
of a license transfer.
    (f) The FAA will provide written notice of its determination to the 
person requesting the vehicle operator license transfer.


Sec.  450.13  Rights not conferred by a vehicle operator license.

    Issuance of a vehicle operator license does not relieve a licensee 
of its obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or 
regulation that may apply to its activities, nor does issuance confer 
any proprietary, property, or exclusive right in the use of any Federal 
launch or reentry site or related facilities, airspace, or outer space.

Subpart B--Requirements to Obtain a Vehicle Operator License


Sec.  450.31  General.

    (a) To obtain a vehicle operator license, an applicant must--
    (1) Submit a license application in accordance with the procedures 
in part 413 of this chapter;
    (2) Obtain a policy approval from the Administrator in accordance 
with Sec.  450.41;
    (3) Obtain a favorable payload determination from the Administrator 
in accordance with Sec.  450.43, if applicable;
    (4) Obtain a safety approval from the Administrator in accordance 
with Sec.  450.45;
    (5) Satisfy the environmental review requirements of Sec.  450.47; 
and
    (6) Provide the information required by appendix A of part 440 for 
the Administrator to conduct a maximum probable loss analysis for the 
applicable licensed operation.
    (b) An applicant may apply for the approvals and determinations in 
paragraphs (a)(2) through (6) of this section separately or all 
together in one complete application, using the application procedures 
contained in part 413 of this chapter.
    (c) An applicant may also apply for a safety approval in an 
incremental manner, in accordance with Sec.  450.33.
    (d) An applicant may reference materials previously provided as 
part of a license application in order to meet the application 
requirements of this part.


Sec.  450.33  Incremental review and determinations.

    An applicant may submit its application for a safety review in 
modules using an incremental approach approved by the Administrator.
    (a) An applicant must identify to the Administrator, prior to 
submitting an

[[Page 79721]]

application, whether it will submit a modular application for any 
approval or determination.
    (b) An applicant using an incremental approach must have the 
approach approved by the Administrator prior to submitting an 
application. In reviewing a proposed approach, the Administrator will 
consider the following:
    (1) Whether the modules can be reviewed independently; and
    (2) Whether the modules will be submitted in a workable 
chronological order.
    (c) The Administrator may make incremental determinations as part 
of this review process.


Sec.  450.35  Means of compliance.

    (a) Prior to application acceptance, a means of compliance must be 
accepted by the Administrator for the following:
    (1) Section 450.115(b)(1) regarding flight safety analyses;
    (2) Section 450.139(e)(1) regarding toxic hazards for flight;
    (3) Section 450.145(b) regarding highly-reliable flight safety 
system;
    (4) Section 450.163(a)(1) regarding lightning hazard mitigation; 
and
    (5) Section 450.187(e)(1) regarding toxic hazards mitigation for 
ground operations.
    (b) A person requesting acceptance of a proposed means of 
compliance outside a license application must submit the proposed means 
of compliance to the FAA in a form and manner acceptable to the 
Administrator.


Sec.  450.37  Equivalent level of safety.

    (a) An applicant must demonstrate compliance with each requirement 
of this part, unless the applicant clearly and convincingly 
demonstrates that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level 
of safety to the requirement of this part.
    (b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to Sec.  
450.101(a), (b), (c)(1) and (3), (d), (e)(1), and (g).


Sec.  450.39   Use of safety element approval.

    If an applicant proposes to use any vehicle, safety system, 
process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety 
element approval under part 414 of this chapter, the FAA will not 
reevaluate that safety element during a license application evaluation 
to the extent its use is within its approved scope.


Sec.  450.41  Policy review and approval.

    (a) General. The FAA issues a policy approval to an applicant 
unless the FAA determines that a proposed launch or reentry would 
jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or 
international obligations of the United States.
    (b) Interagency consultation. (1) The FAA consults with the 
Department of Defense to determine whether a license application 
presents any issues affecting U.S. national security.
    (2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine 
whether a license application presents any issues affecting U.S. 
foreign policy interests or international obligations.
    (3) The FAA consults with other Federal agencies, including the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address 
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section, associated with 
an applicant's proposal.
    (c) Issues during policy review. The FAA will advise an applicant, 
in writing, of any issue raised during a policy review that would 
impede issuance of a policy approval. The applicant may respond, in 
writing, or amend its license application as required by Sec.  413.17 
of this chapter.
    (d) Denial of policy approval. The FAA notifies an applicant, in 
writing, if it has denied policy approval for a license application. 
The notice states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The 
applicant may seek further review of the determination in accordance 
with Sec.  413.21 of this chapter.
    (e) Application requirements for policy review. In its license 
application, an applicant must--
    (1) Identify the model, type, and configuration of any vehicle 
proposed for launch or reentry by the applicant;
    (2) Describe the vehicle by characteristics that include individual 
stages, their dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and 
maximum thrust;
    (3) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant as follows:
    (i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, identify all foreign 
ownership;
    (ii) For a corporation, identify any foreign ownership interests of 
10 percent or more; and
    (iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, identify 
any participating foreign entities; and
    (4) Identify the proposed vehicle flight profile, including:
    (i) Launch or reentry site, including any contingency abort 
locations;
    (ii) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks 
and instantaneous impact points for the duration of the licensed 
activity, including any contingency abort profiles;
    (iii) Sequence of planned events or maneuvers during flight;
    (iv) Normal impact or landing areas for all mission hardware; and
    (v) For each orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final 
orbits of each vehicle upper stage and their estimated orbital 
lifetimes.


Sec.  450.43  Payload review and determination.

    (a) General. If applicable, the FAA issues a favorable payload 
determination for a launch or reentry to a license applicant or payload 
owner or operator if--
    (1) The applicant, payload owner, or payload operator has obtained 
all required licenses, authorizations, and permits; and
    (2) Its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public health and 
safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy 
interests, or international obligations of the United States.
    (b) Relationship to other executive agencies. The FAA does not make 
a determination under paragraph (a)(2) of this section for--
    (1) Those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the 
Federal Communications Commission or the Department of Commerce; or
    (2) Payloads owned or operated by the U.S. Government.
    (c) Classes of payloads. The FAA may review and issue findings 
regarding a proposed class of payload, including communications, remote 
sensing, or navigation. However, prior to a launch or reentry, each 
payload is subject to verification by the FAA that its launch or 
reentry would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of 
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or 
international obligations of the United States.
    (d) Payload owner or payload operator may apply. In addition to a 
launch or reentry operator, a payload owner or payload operator may 
request a payload review and determination.
    (e) Interagency consultation. The FAA consults with other agencies 
as follows:
    (1) The Department of Defense to determine whether launch or 
reentry of a proposed payload or payload class would present any issues 
affecting U.S. national security;
    (2) The Department of State to determine whether launch or reentry 
of a proposed payload or payload class would present any issues 
affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international obligations; 
or
    (3) Other Federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, authorized to address issues of public health and 
safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy 
interests, or international obligations of the United States,

[[Page 79722]]

associated with the launch or reentry of a proposed payload or payload 
class.
    (f) Issues during payload review. The FAA will advise a person 
requesting a payload determination, in writing, of any issue raised 
during a payload review that would impede issuance of a license to 
launch or reenter that payload or payload class. The person requesting 
payload review may respond, in writing, or amend its application as 
required by Sec.  413.17 of this chapter.
    (g) Denial of a payload determination. The FAA notifies an 
applicant, in writing, if it has denied a favorable payload 
determination. The notice states the reasons for the FAA's 
determination. The applicant may seek further review of the 
determination in accordance with Sec.  413.21 of this chapter.
    (h) Incorporation of payload determination in license application. 
A favorable payload determination issued for a payload or class of 
payload may be included by a license applicant as part of its 
application. However, any change in information provided under 
paragraph (i) of this section must be reported in accordance with Sec.  
413.17 of this chapter. The FAA determines whether a favorable payload 
determination remains valid in light of reported changes and may 
conduct an additional payload review.
    (i) Application requirements. A person requesting review of a 
particular payload or payload class must identify the following:
    (1) For launch of a payload:
    (i) Payload name or class of payload, and function;
    (ii) Description, including physical dimensions, weight, 
composition, and any hosted payloads;
    (iii) Payload owner and payload operator, if different from the 
person requesting payload review and determination;
    (iv) Any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator, as 
specified in Sec.  450.41(e)(3);
    (v) Hazardous materials as defined in Sec.  401.7 of this chapter, 
radioactive materials, and the amounts of each;
    (vi) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in 
combination with other materials found on the payload;
    (vii) For orbital launches, parameters for parking, transfer and 
final orbits, and approximate transit times to final orbit;
    (viii) Delivery point in flight at which the payload will no longer 
be under the licensee's control;
    (ix) Intended operations during the lifetime of the payload, 
including anticipated life span and any planned disposal;
    (x) Any encryption associated with data storage on the payload and 
transmissions to or from the payload; and
    (xi) Any other information necessary to make a determination based 
on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security 
or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United 
States.
    (2) For reentry of a payload:
    (i) Payload name or class of payload, and function;
    (ii) Physical characteristics, dimensions, and weight of the 
payload;
    (iii) Payload owner and payload operator, if different from the 
person requesting the payload review and determination;
    (iv) Type, amount, and container of hazardous materials and 
radioactive materials in the payload;
    (v) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in 
combination with other materials found on the payload or reentry 
vehicle during reentry; and
    (vi) Designated reentry site.


Sec.  450.45  Safety review and approval.

    (a) General. The FAA issues a safety approval to an applicant if it 
determines that an applicant can conduct launch or reentry without 
jeopardizing public health and safety and safety of property. A license 
applicant must satisfy the application requirements in this section and 
subpart C of this part.
    (b) Services or property provided by a Federal launch or reentry 
site. The FAA will accept any safety-related launch or reentry service 
or property provided by a Federal launch or reentry site or other 
Federal entity by contract, as long as the FAA determines that the 
launch or reentry services or property provided satisfy this part.
    (c) Issues during safety review. The FAA will advise an applicant, 
in writing, of any issues raised during a safety review that would 
impede issuance of a safety approval. The applicant may respond, in 
writing, or amend its license application as required by Sec.  413.17 
of this chapter.
    (d) Denial of a safety approval. The FAA notifies an applicant, in 
writing, if it has denied a safety approval for a license application. 
The notice states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The 
applicant may seek further review of the determination in accordance 
with Sec.  413.21 of this chapter.
    (e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the 
information required in the ``Application requirements'' paragraphs in 
individual sections in subpart C of this part, as well as the 
following:
    (1) General. An application must--
    (i) Contain a glossary of unique terms and acronyms used in 
alphabetical order;
    (ii) Contain a listing of all referenced material;
    (iii) Use equations and mathematical relationships derived from or 
referenced to a recognized standard or text, and define all algebraic 
parameters;
    (iv) Include the units of all numerical values provided; and
    (v) Include a legend or key that identifies all symbols used for 
any schematic diagrams.
    (2) Site description. An applicant must identify the proposed 
launch or reentry site, including contingency abort locations, and 
submit the following:
    (i) Boundaries of the site;
    (ii) Launch or landing point locations, including latitude and 
longitude;
    (iii) Identity of any site operator; and
    (iv) Identity of any facilities at the site that will be used for 
pre- or post-flight ground operations.
    (3) Vehicle description. An applicant must submit the following:
    (i) A written description of the vehicle or family of vehicles, 
including structural, thermal, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, and 
avionics and guidance systems used in each vehicle, and all 
propellants. The description must include a table specifying the type 
and quantities of all hazardous materials on each vehicle and must 
include propellants, explosives, and toxic materials; and
    (ii) A drawing of each vehicle that identifies:
    (A) Each stage, including strap-on motors;
    (B) Physical dimensions and weight;
    (C) Location of all safety-critical systems;
    (D) Location of all major vehicle control systems, propulsion 
systems, pressure vessels, and any other hardware that contains 
potential hazardous energy or hazardous material; and
    (E) For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, the location of the 
rocket's center of pressure in relation to its center of gravity for 
the entire flight profile.
    (4) Mission schedule. An applicant must submit a generic launch or 
reentry processing schedule that identifies any readiness activities, 
such as reviews and rehearsals, and each safety-critical pre-flight 
operation to be conducted. The mission schedule must also identify day 
of flight activities.
    (5) Human space flight. For a proposed launch or reentry with a 
human being on board a vehicle, an applicant must demonstrate 
compliance

[[Page 79723]]

with Sec. Sec.  460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51, 
and 460.53 of this chapter.
    (6) Radionuclides. The FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of 
any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis, and issue an approval if the 
FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health 
and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States. For any radionuclide on a launch 
or reentry vehicle, an applicant must--
    (i) Identify the type and quantity;
    (ii) Include a reference list of all documentation addressing the 
safety of its intended use; and
    (iii) Describe all approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
for pre-flight ground operations.
    (7) Additional material. The FAA may also request--
    (i) Any information incorporated by reference in the license 
application; and
    (ii) Additional products that allow the FAA to conduct an 
independent safety analysis.


Sec.  450.47  Environmental review.

    (a) General. The FAA is responsible for complying with the 
procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive 
Orders prior to issuing a launch or reentry license. An applicant must 
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such 
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential 
environmental effects associated with issuing a launch or reentry 
license consistent with paragraph (b) of this section.
    (b) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. 
When directed by the FAA, an applicant must--
    (1) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
    (2) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed 
consultant contractor; or
    (3) Submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a 
previously submitted Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement.
    (c) Categorical exclusion. The FAA may determine that a categorical 
exclusion is appropriate upon receipt of supporting information from an 
applicant.
    (d) Application requirements. An application must include an 
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement, 
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation, which 
should address compliance with any other applicable environmental laws, 
regulations, and Executive Orders covering all planned licensed 
activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council on Environmental 
Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA.

Subpart C--Safety Requirements

Safety Criteria


Sec.  450.101  Safety criteria.

    (a) Launch risk criteria. For any launch, an operator may initiate 
the flight of a launch vehicle only if all risks to the public satisfy 
the criteria in this paragraph (a). For an orbital launch, the criteria 
in this paragraph apply from liftoff through orbital insertion. For a 
suborbital launch, or a suborbital launch and reentry, the criteria in 
this paragraph apply from liftoff through final impact or landing.
    (1) Collective risk. The collective risk, measured as expected 
number of casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by 
impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field 
blast overpressure. Public risk due to any other hazard associated with 
the proposed flight of a launch vehicle will be determined by the 
Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
    (i) The risk to all members of the public, excluding persons in 
aircraft and neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed an 
expected number of 1 x 10-\4\ casualties.
    (ii) The risk to all neighboring operations personnel must not 
exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-\4\ casualties.
    (2) Individual risk. The individual risk, measured as probability 
of casualty (PC), consists of risk posed by impacting inert 
and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure. 
The FAA will determine whether to approve public risk due to any other 
hazard associated with the proposed flight of a launch vehicle on a 
case-by-case basis.
    (i) The risk to any individual member of the public, excluding 
neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed a probability of 
casualty of 1 x 10-\6\ per launch.
    (ii) The risk to any individual neighboring operations personnel 
must not exceed a probability of casualty of 1 x 10-\5\ per 
launch.
    (3) Aircraft risk. A launch operator must establish any aircraft 
hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability of impact with debris 
capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 x 
10-\6\.
    (4) Risk to critical assets. (i) The risk to critical assets, 
measured as the probability of loss of functionality, must not exceed 
the following probabilities:
    (A) For each critical asset, except for a critical payload, 1 x 
10-\3\ ; and
    (B) For each critical payload, 1 x 10-\4\.
    (ii) The Administrator will consult with relevant Federal agencies, 
and each agency will identify, for purposes of this part, any critical 
assets that the agency owns or otherwise depends on. For purposes of 
this part, the Administrator will accept any identification by the 
Secretary of Defense that an asset is critical to national security.
    (iii) The Administrator or Federal site operator will notify the 
licensee of any risk to critical assets above the risk criteria in 
paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section.
    (iv) The Administrator may determine, in consultation with relevant 
Federal agencies, that a more stringent probability is necessary to 
protect the national interests of the United States.
    (v) The risk criteria in paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section do not 
apply to property, facilities, or infrastructure supporting the launch 
that are within the public area distance, as defined in part 420, 
appendix E, tables E1 and E2 or associated formulae, of the vehicle's 
launch point.
    (b) Reentry risk criteria. For any reentry, an operator may 
initiate the deorbit of a vehicle only if all risks to the public 
satisfy the criteria in this paragraph (b). The following criteria 
apply to each reentry, other than a suborbital reentry, from the final 
health check prior to initiating deorbit through final impact or 
landing:
    (1) Collective risk. The collective risk, measured as expected 
number of casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by 
impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field 
blast overpressure. Public risk due to any other hazard associated with 
the proposed deorbit of a reentry vehicle will be determined by the 
Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
    (i) The risk to all members of the public, excluding persons in 
aircraft and neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed an 
expected number of 1 x 10-\4\ casualties.
    (ii) The risk to all neighboring operations personnel must not 
exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-\4\ casualties.
    (2) Individual risk. The individual risk, measured as probability 
of casualty (PC), consists of risk posed by impacting inert 
and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure. 
Public risk due to any other hazard associated with the proposed flight 
of a launch

[[Page 79724]]

vehicle will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
    (i) The risk to any individual member of the public, excluding 
neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed a probability of 
casualty of 1 x 10-\6\ per reentry.
    (ii) The risk to any individual neighboring operations personnel 
must not exceed a probability of casualty of 1 x 10-\5\ per 
reentry.
    (3) Aircraft risk. A reentry operator must establish any aircraft 
hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability of impact with debris 
capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 x 
10-\6\.
    (4) Risk to critical assets. (i) The risk to critical assets, 
measured as the probability of loss of functionality, must not exceed 
the following probabilities:
    (A) For each critical asset, except for a critical payload, 1 x 
10-\3\ ; and
    (B) For each critical payload, 1 x 10-\4\.
    (ii) The Administrator will consult with relevant Federal agencies, 
and each agency will identify, for purposes of this part, any critical 
assets that the agency owns or otherwise depends on. For purposes of 
this part, the Administrator will accept any identification by the 
Secretary of Defense that an asset is critical to national security.
    (iii) The Administrator or Federal site operator will notify the 
licensee of any risk to critical assets above the risk criteria in 
paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section.
    (iv) The Administrator may determine, in consultation with relevant 
Federal agencies, that a more stringent probability is necessary to 
protect the national interests of the United States.
    (c) High consequence event protection. An operator must protect 
against a high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase 
of flight by:
    (1) Using flight abort as a hazard control strategy in accordance 
with the requirements of Sec.  450.108;
    (2) Ensuring the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable failure 
mode, in any significant period of flight, is no greater than 1 x 
10-\3\ conditional expected casualties; or
    (3) Establishing the launch or reentry vehicle has sufficient 
demonstrated reliability as agreed to by the Administrator based on 
conditional expected casualties criteria during that phase of flight.
    (d) Disposal safety criteria. A launch operator must ensure that 
any disposal meets the criteria of paragraphs (b)(1) through (3) of 
this section, or targets a broad ocean area.
    (e) Protection of people and property on orbit. (1) A launch or 
reentry operator must prevent the collision between a launch or reentry 
vehicle stage or component and people or property on orbit, in 
accordance with the requirements in Sec.  450.169(a).
    (2) For any launch vehicle stage or component that reaches Earth 
orbit, a launch operator must prevent the creation of debris through 
the conversion of energy sources into energy that fragments the stage 
or component, in accordance with the requirements in Sec.  450.171.
    (f) Notification of planned impacts. For any launch, reentry, or 
disposal, an operator must notify the public of any region of land, 
sea, or air that contains, with 97 percent probability of containment, 
all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a 
casualty.
    (g) Validity of the analysis. For any analysis used to demonstrate 
compliance with this section, an operator must use accurate data and 
scientific principles and the analysis must be statistically valid. The 
method must produce results consistent with or more conservative than 
the results available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid 
benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.

System Safety Program


Sec.  450.103  System safety program.

    An operator must implement and document a system safety program 
throughout the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system that includes 
the following:
    (a) Safety organization. An operator must maintain a safety 
organization that has clearly defined lines of communication and 
approval authority for all public safety decisions. At a minimum, the 
safety organization must have the following positions:
    (1) Mission director. For each launch or reentry, an operator must 
designate a position responsible for the safe conduct of all licensed 
activities and authorized to provide final approval to proceed with 
licensed activities. This position is referred to as the mission 
director in this part.
    (2) Safety official. For each launch or reentry, an operator must 
designate a position with direct access to the mission director who 
is--
    (i) Responsible for communicating potential safety and 
noncompliance issues to the mission director; and
    (ii) Authorized to examine all aspects of the operator's ground and 
flight safety operations, and to independently monitor compliance with 
the operator's safety policies, safety procedures, and licensing 
requirements.
    (3) Addressing safety official concerns. The mission director must 
ensure that all of the safety official's concerns are addressed.
    (b) Hazard management. For hazard management:
    (1) An operator must implement methods to assess the system to 
ensure the validity of the hazard control strategy determination and 
any flight hazard or flight safety analysis throughout the lifecycle of 
the launch or reentry system;
    (2) An operator must implement methods for communicating and 
implementing any updates throughout the organization; and
    (3) Additionally, an operator required to conduct a flight hazard 
analysis must implement a process for tracking hazards, risks, 
mitigation measures, and verification activities.
    (c) Configuration management and control. An operator must--
    (1) Employ a process that tracks configurations of all safety-
critical systems and documentation related to the operation;
    (2) Ensure the use of correct and appropriate versions of systems 
and documentation tracked in paragraph (c)(1) of this section; and
    (3) Document the configurations and versions identified in 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section for each licensed activity.
    (d) Post-flight data review. An operator must employ a process for 
evaluating post-flight data to--
    (1) Ensure consistency between the assumptions used for the hazard 
control strategy determination, any flight hazard or flight safety 
analyses, and associated mitigation and hazard control measures;
    (2) Resolve any inconsistencies identified in paragraph (d)(1) of 
this section prior to the next flight of the vehicle;
    (3) Identify any anomaly that may impact any flight hazard 
analysis, flight safety analysis, or safety-critical system, or is 
otherwise material to public safety; and
    (4) Address any anomaly identified in paragraph (d)(3) of this 
section prior to the next flight as necessary to ensure public safety, 
including updates to any flight hazard analysis, flight safety 
analysis, or safety-critical system.
    (e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its 
application the following:
    (1) A description of the applicant's safety organization as 
required by paragraph (a) of this section, identifying the applicant's 
lines of communication and approval authority, both internally and 
externally, for all public safety

[[Page 79725]]

decisions and the provision of public safety services; and
    (2) A summary of the processes and products identified in the 
system safety program requirements in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 
this section.

Hazard Control Strategies


Sec.  450.107  Hazard control strategies.

    (a) General. To meet the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101(a), (b), 
or (c) for the flight, or any phase of flight, of a launch or reentry 
vehicle, an operator must use one or more of the hazard control 
strategies identified in Sec.  450.108 through Sec.  450.111.
    (b) Hazard control strategy determination. For each phase of flight 
during a launch or reentry, an operator must use a functional hazard 
analysis to determine a hazard control strategy or strategies that 
account for--
    (1) All functional failures associated with reasonably foreseeable 
hazardous events that have the capability to create a hazard to the 
public;
    (2) Safety-critical systems; and
    (3) A timeline of all safety-critical events.
    (c) Flight hazard analysis. An operator must conduct a flight 
hazard analysis in accordance with Sec.  450.109 of this part for the 
flight, or phase of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle if the 
public safety hazards cannot be mitigated adequately to meet the public 
risk criteria of Sec.  450.101(a), (b), and (c) using physical 
containment, wind weighting, or flight abort.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its 
application--
    (1) The results of the hazard control strategy determination, 
including--
    (i) All functional failures identified under paragraph (b)(1) of 
this section;
    (ii) The identification of all safety-critical systems; and
    (iii) A timeline of all safety-critical events.
    (2) A description of its hazard control strategy or strategies for 
each phase of flight.


Sec.  450.108  Flight abort.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to the use of flight abort 
as a hazard control strategy for the flight, or phase of flight, of a 
launch or reentry vehicle to meet the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101.
    (b) Flight safety system. An operator must use a flight safety 
system that:
    (1) Meets the requirements of Sec.  450.145 if the consequence of 
any reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any significant period of 
flight is greater than 1 x 10-\2\ conditional expected 
casualties in uncontrolled areas; or
    (2) Meets the requirements of Sec.  450.143 if the consequence of 
any reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any significant period of 
flight is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ 
conditional expected casualties for uncontrolled areas.
    (c) Flight safety limits objectives. An operator must determine and 
use flight safety limits that define when an operator must initiate 
flight abort for each of the following--
    (1) To ensure compliance with the safety criteria of Sec.  
450.101(a) and (b);
    (2) To prevent continued flight from increasing risk in 
uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is unable to achieve a useful 
mission;
    (3) To prevent the vehicle from entering a period of materially 
increased public exposure in uncontrolled areas, including before 
orbital insertion, if a critical vehicle parameter is outside its pre-
established expected range or indicates an inability to complete flight 
within the limits of a useful mission;
    (4) To prevent conditional expected casualties greater than 1 x 
10-\2\ in uncontrolled areas due to flight abort or due to 
flight outside the limits of a useful mission from any reasonably 
foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode in any significant period of 
flight; and
    (5) To prevent the vehicle state from reaching identified 
conditions that are anticipated to compromise the capability of the 
flight safety system if further flight has the potential to violate a 
flight safety limit.
    (6) In lieu of paragraphs (c)(2) and (4) of this section, to 
prevent debris capable of causing a casualty due to any hazard from 
affecting uncontrolled areas using a flight safety system that complies 
with Sec.  450.145.
    (d) Flight safety limits constraints. An operator must determine 
flight safety limits that--
    (1) Account for temporal and geometric extents on the Earth's 
surface of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle hazards under all 
reasonably foreseeable conditions during normal and malfunctioning 
flight;
    (2) Account for physics of hazard generation and transport 
including uncertainty;
    (3) Account for the potential to lose valid data necessary to 
evaluate the flight abort rules;
    (4) Account for the time delay, including uncertainties, between 
the violation of a flight abort rule and the time when the flight 
safety system is expected to activate;
    (5) Account in individual, collective, and conditional risk 
evaluations both for proper functioning of the flight safety system and 
failure of the flight safety system;
    (6) Are designed to avoid flight abort that results in increased 
collective risk to the public in uncontrolled areas, compared to 
continued flight; and
    (7) Ensure that any trajectory within the limits of a useful 
mission that is permitted to fly without abort would meet the 
collective risk criteria of Sec.  450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1) when analyzed 
as if it were the planned mission in accordance with Sec.  
450.213(b)(2).
    (e) End of flight abort. A flight does not need to be aborted to 
protect against high consequence events in uncontrolled areas beginning 
immediately after critical vehicle parameters are validated, if the 
vehicle is able to achieve a useful mission and the following 
conditions are met for the remainder of flight:
    (1) Flight abort would not materially decrease the risk from a high 
consequence event; and
    (2) There are no key flight safety events.
    (f) Flight abort rules. For each launch or reentry, an operator 
must establish and observe flight abort rules that govern the conduct 
of the launch or reentry as follows.
    (1) Vehicle data required to evaluate flight abort rules must be 
available to the flight safety system under all reasonably foreseeable 
conditions during normal and malfunctioning flight.
    (2) The flight safety system must abort flight:
    (i) When valid, real-time data indicate the vehicle has violated 
any flight safety limit developed in accordance with this section;
    (ii) When the vehicle state approaches identified conditions that 
are anticipated to compromise the capability of the flight safety 
system and further flight has the potential to violate a flight safety 
limit; and
    (iii) In accordance with methods used to satisfy (d)(3) of this 
section, if tracking data is invalid and further flight has the 
potential to violate a flight safety limit.
    (g) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its 
application the following:
    (1) A description of the methods used to demonstrate compliance 
with paragraph (c) of this section, including descriptions of how each 
analysis constraint in paragraph (d) of this section is satisfied in 
accordance with Sec.  450.115.
    (2) A description of how each flight safety limit and flight abort 
rule is evaluated and implemented during vehicle flight, including the 
quantitative

[[Page 79726]]

criteria that will be used, a description of any critical parameters, 
and how the values required in paragraphs (c)(3) and (e) of this 
section are identified;
    (3) A graphic depiction or series of depictions of flight safety 
limits for a representative mission together with the launch or landing 
point, all uncontrolled area boundaries, the nominal trajectory, 
extents of normal flight, and limits of a useful mission trajectories, 
with all trajectories in the same projection as each of the flight 
safety limits; and
    (4) A description of the vehicle data that will be available to 
evaluate flight abort rules under all reasonably foreseeable conditions 
during normal and malfunctioning flight.


Sec.  450.109  Flight hazard analysis.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to the use of a flight 
hazard analysis as a hazard control strategy to derive hazard controls 
for the flight, or phase of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle. 
Hazards associated with computing systems and software are further 
addressed in Sec.  450.141.
    (b) Analysis. A flight hazard analysis must identify, describe, and 
analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety resulting 
from the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. Each flight hazard 
analysis must--
    (1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards, and the 
corresponding failure mode for each hazard, associated with the launch 
or reentry system relevant to public safety, including those resulting 
from:
    (i) Vehicle operation, including staging and release;
    (ii) System, subsystem, and component failures or faults;
    (iii) Software operations;
    (iv) Environmental conditions;
    (v) Human factors;
    (vi) Design inadequacies;
    (vii) Procedure deficiencies;
    (viii) Functional and physical interfaces between subsystems, 
including any vehicle payload;
    (ix) Reuse of components or systems; and
    (x) Interactions of any of the above.
    (2) Assess each hazard's likelihood and severity.
    (3) Ensure that the likelihood of any hazardous condition that may 
cause death or serious injury to the public is extremely remote.
    (4) Identify and describe the risk elimination and mitigation 
measures required to satisfy paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (5) Document that the risk elimination and mitigation measures 
achieve the risk level of paragraph (b)(3) of this section through 
validation and verification. Verification includes:
    (i) Analysis;
    (ii) Test;
    (iii) Demonstration; or
    (iv) Inspection.
    (c) New Hazards. An operator must establish and document the 
criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards throughout the 
lifecycle of the launch or reentry system.
    (d) Completeness Prior to Flight. For every launch or reentry, the 
flight hazard analysis must be complete and all hazards must be 
mitigated to an acceptable level in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of 
this section.
    (e) Updates. An operator must continually update the flight hazard 
analysis throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system.
    (f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its 
application the following:
    (1) Flight hazard analysis products of paragraphs (b)(1) through 
(5) of this section, including data that verifies the risk elimination 
and mitigation measures resulting from the applicant's flight hazard 
analyses required by paragraph (b)(5) of this section; and
    (2) The criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards 
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system as required by 
paragraph (c) of this section.


Sec.  450.110  Physical containment.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to the use of physical 
containment as a hazard control strategy for the flight, or phase of 
flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle to meet the safety criteria of 
Sec.  450.101(a), (b), and (c).
    (b) Containment. To use physical containment as a hazard control 
strategy, an operator must--
    (1) Develop the flight hazard area in accordance with Sec.  
450.133;
    (2) Ensure that the launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy 
for any hazards associated with its flight to reach outside the flight 
hazard area;
    (3) Ensure the hazard area is clear of the public and critical 
assets; and
    (4) Apply other mitigation measures necessary to ensure no public 
or critical asset exposure to hazards, such as control of public access 
or wind placards.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its 
application the following:
    (1) A demonstration that the launch vehicle does not have 
sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach 
outside the flight hazard area developed in accordance with Sec.  
450.133; and
    (2) A description of the methods used to ensure that flight hazard 
areas are cleared of the public and critical assets.


Sec.  450.111  Wind weighting.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to the use of wind 
weighting as a hazard control strategy for the flight of an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle to meet the safety criteria of Sec.  
450.101(a), (b), and (c).
    (b) Wind weighting safety system. The flight of an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind weighting safety system must 
meet the following:
    (1) The launcher azimuth and elevation settings must be wind 
weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of 
flight to provide impact locations that will ensure compliance with the 
safety criteria in Sec.  450.101; and
    (2) An operator must use launcher azimuth and elevation angle 
settings that ensures the rocket will not fly in an unintended 
direction accounting for uncertainties in vehicle and launcher design 
and manufacturing, and atmospheric uncertainties.
    (c) Analysis. An operator must--
    (1) Establish flight commit criteria and other flight safety rules 
that control the risk to the public from potential adverse effects 
resulting from normal and malfunctioning flight;
    (2) Establish any wind constraints under which flight may occur; 
and
    (3) Conduct a wind weighting analysis that establishes the launcher 
azimuth and elevation settings that correct for the windcocking and 
wind-drift effects on the unguided suborbital launch vehicle.
    (d) Stability. An unguided suborbital launch vehicle, in all 
configurations, must be stable throughout each stage of powered flight.
    (e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its 
application the following:
    (1) A description of its wind weighting analysis methods, including 
its method and schedule of determining wind speed and wind direction 
for each altitude layer;
    (2) A description of its wind weighting safety system including all 
equipment used to perform the wind weighting analysis; and
    (3) A representative wind weighting analysis using actual or 
statistical winds for the launch area and samples of the output.

Flight Safety Analyses


Sec.  450.113  Flight safety analysis requirements--scope.

    (a) An operator must perform and document a flight safety analysis 
for all

[[Page 79727]]

phases of flight, except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, 
as follows--
    (1) For orbital launch, from liftoff through orbital insertion, and 
through all component impacts or landings;
    (2) For suborbital launch, from liftoff through all component 
impacts or landings;
    (3) For disposal, from the initiation of the deorbit through final 
impact; and
    (4) For reentry, from the initiation of the deorbit through all 
component impacts or landing.
    (b) An operator is not required to perform and document a flight 
safety analysis for a phase of flight if agreed to by the Administrator 
based on demonstrated reliability. An operator demonstrates reliability 
by using operational and flight history to show compliance with the 
risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a) and (b).


Sec.  450.115  Flight safety analysis methods.

    (a) Scope of the analysis. An operator's flight safety analysis 
method must account for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures 
of safety-critical systems during nominal and non-nominal launch or 
reentry that could jeopardize public safety.
    (b) Level of fidelity of the analysis. An operator's flight safety 
analysis method must have a level of fidelity sufficient to--
    (1) Demonstrate that any risk to the public satisfies the safety 
criteria of Sec.  450.101, including the use of mitigations, accounting 
for all known sources of uncertainty, using a means of compliance 
accepted by the Administrator; and
    (2) Identify the dominant source of each type of public risk with a 
criterion in Sec.  450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase of flight, 
source of hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or explosive debris), 
and failure mode.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit a 
description of the flight safety analysis methodology, including 
identification of:
    (1) The scientific principles and statistical methods used;
    (2) All assumptions and their justifications;
    (3) The rationale for the level of fidelity;
    (4) The evidence for validation and verification required by Sec.  
450.101(g);
    (5) The extent to which the benchmark conditions are comparable to 
the foreseeable conditions of the intended operations; and
    (6) The extent to which risk mitigations were accounted for in the 
analyses.


Sec.  450.117  Trajectory analysis for normal flight.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a trajectory 
analysis that establishes, for any phase of flight within the scope as 
provided by Sec.  450.113(a), the limits of a launch or reentry 
vehicle's normal flight as defined by the nominal trajectory, and the 
following sets of trajectories sufficient to characterize variability 
and uncertainty during normal flight:
    (1) A set of trajectories to characterize variability. This set 
must describe how the intended trajectory could vary due to conditions 
known prior to initiation of flight; and
    (2) A set of trajectories to characterize uncertainty. This set 
must describe how the actual trajectory could differ from the intended 
trajectory due to random uncertainties in all parameters with a 
significant influence on the vehicle's behavior throughout normal 
flight.
    (b) Trajectory model. A final trajectory analysis must use a six-
degree of freedom trajectory model to satisfy the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section.
    (c) Atmospheric effects. A trajectory analysis must account for 
atmospheric conditions that have an effect on the trajectory, including 
atmospheric profiles that are no less severe than the worst conditions 
under which flight might be attempted, and for uncertainty in the 
atmospheric conditions.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the 
following:
    (1) A description of the methods used to characterize the vehicle's 
flight behavior throughout normal flight, in accordance with Sec.  
450.115(c).
    (2) The quantitative input data, including uncertainties, used to 
model the vehicle's normal flight in six degrees of freedom.
    (3) The worst atmospheric conditions under which flight might be 
attempted, and a description of how the operator will evaluate the 
atmospheric conditions and uncertainty in the atmospheric conditions 
prior to initiating the operation;
    (4) Representative normal flight trajectory analysis outputs, 
including the position velocity, and orientation for each second of 
flight for--
    (i) The nominal trajectory;
    (ii) A set of trajectories that characterize variability in the 
intended trajectory based on conditions known prior to initiation of 
flight; and
    (iii) A set of trajectories that characterize how the actual 
trajectory could differ from the intended trajectory due to random 
uncertainties.


Sec.  450.119  Trajectory analysis for malfunction flight.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a trajectory 
analysis that establishes--
    (1) The vehicle's deviation capability in the event of a 
malfunction during flight,
    (2) The trajectory dispersion resulting from reasonably foreseeable 
malfunctions, and
    (3) For vehicles using flight abort as a hazard control strategy 
under Sec.  450.108, trajectory data or parameters that describe the 
limits of a useful mission. The FAA does not consider the collection of 
data related to a failure to be a useful mission.
    (b) Analysis constraints. A malfunction trajectory analysis must 
account for each cause of a malfunction flight, including software and 
hardware failures, for every period of normal flight. The analysis for 
each type of malfunction must have sufficient temporal and spatial 
resolution to establish flight safety limits, if any, and individual 
risk contours that are smooth and continuous. The analysis must account 
for--
    (1) The relative probability of occurrence of each malfunction;
    (2) The probability distribution of position and velocity of the 
vehicle when each malfunction trajectory will terminate due to vehicle 
breakup, ground impact, or orbital insertion along with the cause of 
termination and the state of the vehicle;
    (3) The parameters with a significant influence on a vehicle's 
flight behavior from the time a malfunction begins to cause a flight 
deviation until the time each malfunction trajectory will terminate due 
to vehicle breakup, ground impact, or orbital insertion; and
    (4) The potential for failure of the flight safety system, if any.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit--
    (1) A description of the methodology used to characterize the 
vehicle's flight behavior throughout malfunction flight, in accordance 
with Sec.  450.115(c).
    (2) A description of the methodology used to determine the limits 
of a useful mission, in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c).
    (3) A description of the input data used to characterize the 
vehicle's malfunction flight behavior, including:
    (i) A list of each cause of malfunction flight considered;
    (ii) A list of each type of malfunction flight for which 
malfunction flight behavior was characterized; and
    (iii) A quantitative description of the parameters, including 
uncertainties, with a significant influence on the

[[Page 79728]]

vehicle's malfunction behavior for each type of malfunction flight 
characterized.
    (4) Representative malfunction flight trajectory analysis outputs, 
including the position and velocity as a function of flight time for--
    (i) Each set of trajectories that characterizes a type of 
malfunction flight;
    (ii) The probability of each set of trajectories that characterizes 
a type of malfunction flight; and
    (iii) A set of trajectories that characterizes the limits of a 
useful mission as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section.


Sec.  450.121  Debris analysis.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include an analysis 
characterizing the hazardous debris generated from normal and 
malfunctioning vehicle flight as a function of vehicle flight sequence.
    (b) Vehicle impact and breakup analysis. A debris analysis must 
account for:
    (1) Each reasonably foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup and intact 
impact,
    (2) Vehicle structural characteristics and materials, and
    (3) Energetic effects during break-up or at impact.
    (c) Propagation of debris. A debris analysis must compute 
statistically valid debris impact probability distributions. The 
propagation of debris from each predicted breakup location to impact 
must account for--
    (1) All foreseeable forces that can influence any debris impact 
location; and
    (2) All foreseeable sources of impact dispersion, including, at a 
minimum:
    (i) The uncertainties in atmospheric conditions;
    (ii) Debris aerodynamic parameters, including uncertainties;
    (iii) Pre-breakup position and velocity, including uncertainties; 
and
    (iv) Breakup-imparted velocities, including uncertainties.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) A description of all scenarios that can lead to hazardous 
debris;
    (2) A description of the methods used to perform the vehicle impact 
and breakup analysis, in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c);
    (3) A description of the methods used to compute debris impact 
distributions, in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c);
    (4) A description of the atmospheric data used as input to the 
debris analysis; and
    (5) A quantitative description of the physical, aerodynamic, and 
harmful characteristics of hazardous debris.


Sec.  450.123  Population exposure analysis.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must account for the 
distribution of people for the entire region where there is a 
significant probability of impact of hazardous debris.
    (b) Constraints. The exposure analysis must--
    (1) Characterize the distribution of people both geographically and 
temporally;
    (2) Account for the distribution of people among structures and 
vehicle types;
    (3) Use reliable, accurate, and timely source data; and
    (4) Account for vulnerability of people to hazardous debris 
effects.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) A description of the methods used to develop the exposure input 
data in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c), and
    (2) Complete population exposure data, in tabular form.


Sec.  450.131  Probability of failure analysis.

    (a) General. For each hazard and phase of flight, a flight safety 
analysis for a launch or reentry must account for vehicle failure 
probability. The probability of failure must be consistent for all 
hazards and phases of flight.
    (1) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with fewer than two flights, the 
failure probability estimate must account for the outcome of all 
previous flights of vehicles developed and launched or reentered in 
similar circumstances.
    (2) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with two or more flights, 
vehicle failure probability estimates must account for the outcomes of 
all previous flights of the vehicle or vehicle stage in a statistically 
valid manner. The outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or 
vehicle stage must account for data on any mishap and anomaly.
    (b) Failure. For flight safety analysis purposes, a failure occurs 
when a vehicle does not complete any phase of normal flight or when any 
anomalous condition exhibits the potential for a stage or its debris to 
impact the Earth or reenter the atmosphere outside the normal 
trajectory envelope during the mission or any future mission of similar 
vehicle capability.
    (c) Previous flight. For flight safety analysis purposes--
    (1) The flight of a launch vehicle begins at a time in which a 
launch vehicle lifts off from the surface of the Earth; and
    (2) The flight of a reentry vehicle or deorbiting upper stage 
begins at a time in which a vehicle attempts to initiate a reentry.
    (d) Allocation. The vehicle failure probability estimate must be 
distributed across flight phases and failure modes. The distribution 
must be consistent with--
    (1) The data available from all previous flights of vehicles 
developed and launched or reentered in similar circumstances; and
    (2) Data from previous flights of vehicles, stages, or components 
developed and launched, reentered, flown, or tested by the subject 
vehicle developer or operator. Such data may include previous 
experience involving similar--
    (i) Vehicle, stage, or component design characteristics;
    (ii) Development and integration processes, including the extent of 
integrated system testing; and
    (iii) Level of experience of the vehicle operation and development 
team members.
    (e) Observed vs. conditional failure rate. Probability of failure 
allocation must account for significant differences in the observed 
failure rate and the conditional failure rate. A probability of failure 
analysis must use a constant conditional failure rate for each phase of 
flight, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different 
conditional failure rate for a particular vehicle, stage, or phase of 
flight.
    (f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) A description of the methods used in probability of failure 
analysis, in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c); and
    (2) A representative set of tabular data and graphs of the 
predicted failure rate and cumulative failure probability for each 
foreseeable failure mode.


Sec.  450.133  Flight hazard area analysis.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a flight hazard 
area analysis that identifies any region of land, sea, or air that must 
be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to control 
the risk to the public. The analysis must account for, at a minimum--
    (1) The regions of land, sea, and air potentially exposed to 
hazardous debris generated during normal flight events and all 
reasonably foreseeable failure modes;
    (2) Any hazard controls implemented to control risk from any 
hazard;
    (3) The limits of a launch or reentry vehicle's normal flight, 
including--
    (i) Atmospheric conditions that are no less severe than the worst 
atmospheric conditions under which flight might be attempted; and
    (ii) Uncertainty in the atmospheric conditions;
    (4) All hazardous debris;
    (5) Sources of debris dispersion in accordance with Sec.  
450.121(c); and

[[Page 79729]]

    (6) A probability of one for any planned debris hazards or planned 
impacts.
    (b) Waterborne vessel hazard areas. The flight hazard area analysis 
for waterborne vessels must determine the areas and durations for 
regions of water--
    (1) That are necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability of 
containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of 
causing a casualty to persons on waterborne vessels;
    (2) That are necessary to contain either where the probability of 
debris capable of causing a casualty impacting on or near a vessel 
would exceed 1 x 10-\5\, accounting for all relevant 
hazards, or where the individual probability of casualty for any person 
on board a vessel would exceed the individual risk criteria in Sec.  
450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and
    (3) Where reduced vessel traffic is necessary to meet the 
collective risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1).
    (c) Land hazard areas. The flight hazard area analysis for land 
must determine the durations and areas regions of land--
    (1) That are necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability of 
containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of 
causing a casualty to any person on land;
    (2) Where the individual probability of casualty for any person on 
land would exceed the individual risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a)(2) 
or (b)(2); and
    (3) Where reduced population is necessary to meet the collective 
risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1).
    (d) Airspace hazard volumes. The flight hazard area analysis for 
airspace must determine the durations and volumes for regions of air to 
be submitted to the FAA for approval--
    (1) That are necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability of 
containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of 
causing a casualty to persons on an aircraft; and
    (2) Where the probability of impact on an aircraft would exceed the 
aircraft risk criterion in Sec.  450.101(a)(3) or (b)(3).
    (e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) A description of the methodology to be used in the flight 
hazard area analysis in accordance with Sec.  450.115(c), including:
    (i) Classes of waterborne vessel and vulnerability criteria 
employed; and
    (ii) Classes of aircraft and vulnerability criteria employed.
    (2) Tabular data and graphs of the results of the flight hazard 
area analysis, including:
    (i) Geographical coordinates of all hazard areas that are 
representative of those to be published, in accordance with Sec.  
450.161, prior to any proposed operation;
    (ii) Representative 97 percent probability of containment contours 
for all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a 
casualty for all locations specified in paragraph (a) of this section;
    (iii) Representative individual probability of casualty contours 
for all locations specified in paragraph (a) of this section, including 
tabular data and graphs showing the hypothetical location of any member 
of the public that could be exposed to a probability of casualty of 1 x 
10-\5\ or greater for neighboring operations personnel, and 
1 x 10-\6\ or greater for other members of the public, given 
all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria;
    (iv) If applicable, representative 1 x 10-\5\ and 1 x 
10-\6\ probability of impact contours for all debris capable 
of causing a casualty to persons on a waterborne vessel regardless of 
location; and
    (v) Representative 1 x 10-\6\ and 1 x 10-\7\ 
probability of impact contours for all debris capable of causing a 
casualty to persons on an aircraft regardless of location.


Sec.  450.135  Debris risk analysis.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a debris risk 
analysis that demonstrates compliance with safety criteria in Sec.  
450.101, either--
    (1) Prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all 
foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria; or
    (2) During the countdown using the best available input data, 
including flight commit criteria and flight abort rules.
    (b) Casualty area and consequence analysis. A debris risk analysis 
must model the casualty area, and compute the predicted consequences of 
each reasonably foreseeable failure mode in any significant period of 
flight in terms of conditional expected casualties. The casualty area 
and consequence analysis must account for--
    (1) All relevant debris fragment characteristics and the 
characteristics of a representative person exposed to any potential 
debris hazard;
    (2) Statistically-valid debris impact probability distributions;
    (3) Any impact or effects of hazardous debris; and
    (4) The vulnerability of people to debris impact or effects, 
including:
    (i) Effects of buildings, ground vehicles, waterborne vessel, and 
aircraft upon the vulnerability of any occupants;
    (ii) Effect of atmospheric conditions on debris impact and effects;
    (iii) Impact speed and angle, accounting for motion of impacted 
vehicles;
    (iv) Uncertainty in input data, such as fragment impact parameters; 
and
    (v) Uncertainty in modeling methodology.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) A description of the methods used to demonstrate compliance 
with the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101, in accordance with Sec.  
450.115(c), including a description of how the operator will account 
for the conditions immediately prior to enabling the flight of a launch 
vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle, such as the final 
trajectory, atmospheric conditions, and the exposure of people;
    (2) A description of the atmospheric data used as input to the 
debris risk analysis;
    (3) The effective unsheltered casualty area for all fragment 
classes, assuming a representative impact vector;
    (4) The effective casualty area for all fragment classes for a 
representative type of building, ground vehicle, waterborne vessel, and 
aircraft, assuming a representative impact vector;
    (5) Collective and individual debris risk analysis outputs under 
representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions, 
including:
    (i) Total collective casualty expectation for the proposed 
operation;
    (ii) A list of the collective risk contribution for at least the 
top ten population centers and all centers with collective risk 
exceeding 1 percent of the collective risk criteria in Sec.  
450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1);
    (iii) A list of the maximum individual probability of casualty for 
the top ten population centers and all centers that exceed 10 percent 
of the individual risk criteria in Sec.  450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and
    (iv) A list of the conditional collective casualty expectation for 
each failure mode for each significant period of flight under 
representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions.


Sec.  450.137  Far-field overpressure blast effects analysis.

    (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a far-field 
overpressure blast effect analysis that demonstrates compliance with 
safety criteria in Sec.  450.101, either--
    (1) Prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all 
foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria; or
    (2) During the countdown using the best available input data, 
including flight commit criteria and flight abort rules.

[[Page 79730]]

    (b) Analysis constraints. The analysis must account for--
    (1) The explosive capability of the vehicle and hazardous debris at 
impact and at altitude;
    (2) The potential influence of meteorological conditions and 
terrain characteristics; and
    (3) The potential for broken windows due to peak incident 
overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties based on the 
characteristics of exposed windows and the population's susceptibility 
to injury, with considerations including, at a minimum, shelter types, 
window types, and the time of day of the proposed operation.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit a 
description of the far-field overpressure analysis, including all 
assumptions and justifications for the assumptions, analysis methods, 
input data, and results. At a minimum, the application must include:
    (1) A description of the population centers, terrain, building 
types, and window characteristics used as input to the far-field 
overpressure analysis;
    (2) A description of the methods used to compute the foreseeable 
explosive yield probability pairs, and the complete set of yield-
probability pairs, used as input to the far-field overpressure 
analysis;
    (3) A description of the methods used to compute peak incident 
overpressures as a function of distance from the explosion and 
prevailing meteorological conditions, including sample calculations for 
a representative range of the foreseeable meteorological conditions, 
yields, and population center locations;
    (4) A description of the methods used to compute the probability of 
window breakage, including tabular data and graphs for the probability 
of breakage as a function of the peak incident overpressure for a 
representative range of window types, building types, and yields 
accounted for;
    (5) A description of the methods used to compute the probability of 
casualty for a representative individual, including tabular data and 
graphs for the probability of casualty, as a function of location 
relative to the window and the peak incident overpressure for a 
representative range of window types, building types, and yields 
accounted for;
    (6) Tabular data and graphs showing the hypothetical location of 
any member of the public that could be exposed to a probability of 
casualty of 1 x 10-\5\ or greater for neighboring operations 
personnel, and 1 x 10-\6\ or greater for other members of 
the public, given foreseeable conditions;
    (7) The maximum expected casualties that could result from far-
field overpressure hazards given foreseeable conditions; and
    (8) A description of the meteorological measurements used as input 
to any real-time far-field overpressure analysis.


Sec.  450.139  Toxic hazards for flight.

    (a) Applicability. (1) Except as specified in paragraph (a)(2), 
this section applies to any launch or reentry vehicle, including all 
vehicle components and payloads, that use toxic propellants or other 
toxic chemicals.
    (2) No toxic release hazard analysis is required for kerosene-based 
fuels, unless the Administrator determines that an analysis is required 
to protect public safety.
    (b) General. An operator must--
    (1) Conduct a toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with 
paragraph (c) of this section;
    (2) Manage the risk of casualties that could arise from the 
exposure to toxic release through one of the following means:
    (i) Contain hazards caused by toxic release in accordance with 
paragraph (d) of this section; or
    (ii) Perform a toxic risk assessment, in accordance with paragraph 
(e) of this section, that protects the public in compliance with the 
safety criteria of Sec.  450.101, including toxic release hazards.
    (3) Establish flight commit criteria based on the results of its 
toxic release hazard analysis and toxic containment or toxic risk 
assessment for any necessary evacuation of the public from any toxic 
hazard area.
    (c) Toxic release hazard analysis. A toxic release hazard analysis 
must--
    (1) Account for any toxic release that could occur during nominal 
or non-nominal flight;
    (2) Include a worst-case release scenario analysis or a maximum-
credible release scenario analysis for each process that involves a 
toxic propellant or other chemical;
    (3) Determine if toxic release can occur based on an evaluation of 
the chemical compositions and quantities of propellants, other 
chemicals, vehicle materials, and projected combustion products, and 
the possible toxic release scenarios;
    (4) Account for both normal combustion products and any unreacted 
propellants and phase change or chemical derivatives of released 
substances; and
    (5) Account for any operational constraints and emergency 
procedures that provide protection from toxic release.
    (d) Toxic containment. An operator using toxic containment must 
manage the risk of any casualty from the exposure to toxic release 
either by--
    (1) Evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from any 
toxic hazard area in the event of a worst-case release or maximum-
credible release scenario; or
    (2) Employing meteorological constraints to limit an operation to 
times during which prevailing winds and other conditions ensure that 
any member of the public would not be exposed to toxic concentrations 
and durations greater than accepted toxic thresholds for acute casualty 
in the event of a worst-case release or maximum-credible release 
scenario.
    (e) Toxic risk assessment. An operator using toxic risk assessment 
must establish flight commit criteria that demonstrate compliance with 
the safety criteria of Sec.  450.101. A toxic risk assessment must--
    (1) Account for airborne concentration and duration thresholds of 
toxic propellants or other chemicals. For any toxic propellant, other 
chemicals, or combustion product, an operator must use airborne toxic 
concentration and duration thresholds identified in a means of 
compliance accepted by the Administrator;
    (2) Account for physical phenomena expected to influence any toxic 
concentration and duration in the area surrounding the potential 
release site;
    (3) Determine a toxic hazard area for the launch or reentry, 
surrounding the potential release site for each toxic propellant or 
other chemical based on the amount and toxicity of the propellant or 
other chemical, the exposure duration, and the meteorological 
conditions involved;
    (4) Account for all members of the public who may be exposed to the 
toxic release, including all members of the public on land and on any 
waterborne vessels, populated offshore structures, and aircraft that 
are not operated in direct support of the launch or reentry; and
    (5) Account for any risk mitigation measures applied in the risk 
assessment.
    (f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) The identity of toxic propellant, chemical, or combustion 
products or derivatives in the possible toxic release;
    (2) The applicant's selected airborne toxic concentration and 
duration thresholds;

[[Page 79731]]

    (3) The meteorological conditions for the atmospheric transport and 
buoyant cloud rise of any toxic release from its source to downwind 
receptor locations;
    (4) Characterization of the terrain, as input for modeling the 
atmospheric transport of a toxic release from its source to downwind 
receptor locations;
    (5) The identity of the toxic dispersion model used, and any other 
input data;
    (6) Representative results of an applicant's toxic dispersion 
modeling to predict concentrations and durations at selected downwind 
receptor locations, to determine the toxic hazard area for a released 
quantity of the toxic substance;
    (7) A toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with paragraph 
(c) of this section:
    (i) A description of the failure modes and associated relative 
probabilities for potential toxic release scenarios used in the risk 
evaluation; and
    (ii) The methodology and representative results of an applicant's 
determination of the worst-case or maximum-credible quantity of any 
toxic release that might occur during the flight of a vehicle;
    (8) In accordance with Sec.  450.139(b)(2),
    (i) A toxic containment in accordance with paragraph (d) of this 
section, identify the evacuation plans or meteorological constraints 
and associated launch commit criteria needed to ensure that the public 
will not be within a toxic hazard area in the event of a worst-case 
release or maximum-credible release scenario; or
    (ii) A toxic risk assessment in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section:
    (A) A demonstration that the safety criteria in Sec.  450.101 will 
be met;
    (B) The population characteristics in receptor locations that are 
identified by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas;
    (C) A description of any risk mitigations applied in the toxic risk 
assessment; and
    (D) A description of the population exposure input data used in 
accordance with Sec.  450.123.

Prescribed Hazard Controls for Safety-Critical Hardware and Computing 
Systems


Sec.  450.141  Computing systems.

    (a) Identification of computing system safety items. An operator 
must identify:
    (1) Any software or data that implements a capability that, by 
intended operation, unintended operation, or non-operation, can present 
a hazard to the public; and
    (2) The level of criticality of each computing system safety item 
identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, commensurate with its 
degree of control over hazards to the public and the severity of those 
hazards.
    (b) Safety requirements. An operator must develop safety 
requirements for each computing system safety item. In doing so, the 
operator must:
    (1) Identify and evaluate safety requirements for each computing 
system safety item;
    (2) Ensure the safety requirements are complete and correct;
    (3) Implement each safety requirement; and
    (4) Verify and validate the implementation of each safety 
requirement by using a method appropriate for the level of criticality 
of the computing system safety item. For each computing system safety 
item that is safety critical under Sec.  401.7, verification and 
validation must include testing by a test team independent of the 
development division or organization.
    (c) Development process. An operator must implement and document a 
development process for computing system safety items appropriate for 
the level of criticality of the computing system safety item. A 
development process must define:
    (1) Responsibilities for each task associated with a computing 
system safety item;
    (2) Processes for internal review and approval--including review 
that evaluates the implementation of all safety requirements--such that 
no person approves that person's own work;
    (3) Processes to ensure development personnel are trained, 
qualified, and capable of performing their role;
    (4) Processes that trace requirements to verification and 
validation evidence;
    (5) Processes for configuration management that specify the content 
of each released version of a computing system safety item;
    (6) Processes for testing that verify and validate all safety 
requirements to the extent required by paragraph (b)(4) of this 
section;
    (7) Reuse policies that verify and validate the safety requirements 
for reused computing system safety items; and
    (8) Third-party product use policies that verify and validate the 
safety requirements for any third-party product.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must:
    (1) Identify and describe all computing system safety items 
involved in the proposed operations;
    (2) Provide the safety requirements for each computing system 
safety item;
    (3) Provide documentation of the development processes that meets 
paragraph (c) of this section;
    (4) Provide evidence of the execution of the appropriate 
development process for each computing system safety item; and
    (5) Provide evidence of the implementation of each safety 
requirement.


Sec.  450.143  Safety-critical system design, test, and documentation.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to all safety-critical 
systems, except for--
    (1) Highly reliable flight safety systems covered under Sec.  
450.145; or
    (2) Safety-critical systems for which an operator demonstrates 
through its flight hazard analysis that the likelihood of any hazardous 
condition specifically associated with the system that may cause death 
or serious injury to the public is extremely remote, pursuant to Sec.  
450.109(b)(3).
    (b) Design. An operator must design safety-critical systems such 
that no credible fault can lead to increased risk to the public beyond 
nominal safety-critical system operation.
    (c) Qualification testing of design. An operator must functionally 
demonstrate the design of the vehicle's safety-critical systems at 
conditions beyond its predicted operating environments. The operator 
must select environmental test levels that ensure the design is 
sufficiently stressed to demonstrate that system performance is not 
degraded due to design tolerances, manufacturing variances, or 
uncertainties in the environment.
    (d) Acceptance of hardware. An operator must--
    (1) Functionally demonstrate any safety-critical system, while 
exposed to its predicted operating environments with margin, is free of 
defects, free of integration and workmanship errors, and ready for 
operational use; or
    (2) Combine in-process controls and a quality assurance process to 
ensure functional capability of any safety-critical system during its 
service life.
    (e) Lifecycle of safety-critical systems. (1) The predicted 
operating environments must be based on conditions predicted to be 
encountered in all phases of flight, recovery, and transportation.
    (2) An operator must monitor the flight environments experienced by 
safety-critical system components to the extent necessary to--
    (i) Validate the predicted operating environments; and
    (ii) Assess the actual component life remaining or adjust any 
inspection period.

[[Page 79732]]

    (f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit to the FAA 
the following as part of its application:
    (1) A list and description of each safety-critical system;
    (2) Drawings and schematics for each safety-critical system;
    (3) A summary of the analysis to determine the predicted operating 
environments and duration to be applied to qualification and acceptance 
testing covering the service life of any safety-critical system;
    (4) A description of any method used to validate the predicted 
operating environments;
    (5) A description of any instrumentation or inspection processes to 
monitor aging of any safety-critical system;
    (6) The criteria and procedures for disposal or refurbishment for 
service life extension of safety-critical system components; and
    (7) A description of the standards used in all phases of the 
lifecycle of each safety-critical system.


Sec.  450.145  Highly reliable flight safety system.

    (a) General. For each phase of flight for which an operator must 
implement flight abort to meet the requirement of Sec.  450.108(b)(1), 
the operator must use a highly reliable flight safety system on the 
launch or reentry vehicle, vehicle component, or payload with a design 
reliability in accordance with this section.
    (b) Reliability. A highly reliable flight safety system must, using 
a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator--
    (1) Have a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and 
commensurate design, analysis, and testing for the portion of the 
flight safety system onboard the vehicle; and
    (2) Have a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and 
commensurate design, analysis, and testing for the portion of the 
flight safety system not onboard the vehicle, if used.
    (c) Monitoring. An operator must monitor the flight environments 
experienced by any flight safety system component to the extent 
necessary to--
    (1) Validate the predicted operating environment; and
    (2) Assess the actual component life remaining or adjust any 
inspection period.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the 
information identified below, for any highly reliable flight safety 
system:
    (1) Flight safety system description. An applicant must describe 
the flight safety system and its operation in detail, including all 
components, component functions, and possible operational scenarios.
    (2) Flight safety system diagram. An applicant must submit a 
diagram that identifies all flight safety system subsystems and shows 
the interconnection of all the elements of the flight safety system. 
The diagram must include any subsystems used to implement flight abort 
both on and off the vehicle, including any subsystems used to make the 
decision to abort flight.
    (3) Flight safety system analyses. An applicant must submit any 
analyses and detailed analysis reports of all flight safety system 
subsystems necessary to calculate the reliability and confidence levels 
required by paragraph (a) of this section.
    (4) Tracking validation procedures. An applicant must document and 
submit the procedures for validating the accuracy of any vehicle 
tracking data utilized by the flight safety system to make the decision 
to abort flight.
    (5) Flight safety system test plans. An applicant must submit 
acceptance, qualification, and preflight test plans of any flight 
safety system, subsystems, and components. The test plans must include 
test procedures and test environments.
    (6) Monitoring plan. An applicant must submit a description of any 
method used to validate the predicted operating environments.

Other Prescribed Hazard Controls


Sec.  450.147  Agreements.

    (a) General. An operator must establish a written agreement with 
any entity that provides a service or property that meets a requirement 
in this part, including:
    (1) Launch and reentry site use agreements. A Federal launch or 
reentry site operator, a licensed launch or reentry site operator, or 
any other person that provides services or access to or use of property 
required to support the safe launch or reentry under this part;
    (2) Agreements for notices to mariners. Unless otherwise addressed 
in agreements with the site operator, for overflight of navigable 
water, the U.S. Coast Guard or other applicable maritime authority to 
establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to Mariners prior to 
a launch or reentry and other measures necessary to protect public 
health and safety;
    (3) Agreements for notices to airmen. Unless otherwise addressed in 
agreements with the site operator, the FAA Air Traffic Organization or 
other applicable air navigation authority to establish procedures for 
the issuance of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch or reentry, for 
closing of air routes during the respective launch and reentry windows, 
and for other measures necessary to protect public health and safety; 
and
    (4) Mishap response. Emergency response providers, including local 
government authorities, to satisfy the requirements of Sec.  450.173.
    (b) Roles and responsibilities. The agreements required in this 
section must clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of each 
party to support the safe launch or reentry under this part.
    (c) Effective date. The agreements required in this section must be 
in effect before a license can be issued, unless otherwise agreed to by 
the Administrator.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must--
    (1) Describe each agreement in this section; and
    (2) Provide a copy of any agreement, or portion thereof, to the FAA 
upon request.


Sec.  450.149  Safety-critical personnel qualifications.

    (a) General. An operator must ensure safety-critical personnel are 
trained, qualified, and capable of performing their safety-critical 
tasks, and that their training is current.
    (b) Application requirements. An applicant must--
    (1) Identify safety-critical tasks that require qualified 
personnel;
    (2) Provide internal training and currency requirements, completion 
standards, or any other means of demonstrating compliance with the 
requirements of this section; and
    (3) Describe the process for tracking training currency.


Sec.  450.151  Work shift and rest requirements.

    (a) General. For any launch or reentry, an operator must document 
and implement rest requirements that ensure safety-critical personnel 
are physically and mentally capable of performing all assigned tasks.
    (b) Work shifts and deviation approval process. An operator's rest 
requirements must address the following:
    (1) Duration of each work shift and the process for extending this 
shift, including the maximum allowable length of any extension;
    (2) Number of consecutive work shift days allowed before rest is 
required;
    (3) Minimum rest period required--

[[Page 79733]]

    (i) Between each work shift, including the period of rest required 
immediately before the flight countdown work shift; and
    (ii) After the maximum number of work shift days allowed; and
    (4) Approval process for any deviation from the rest requirements.
    (c) Application requirement. An applicant must submit rest rules 
that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section.


Sec.  450.153  Radio frequency management.

    (a) General. For any radio frequency used, an operator must--
    (1) Ensure radio frequency interference does not adversely affect 
performance of any flight safety system or safety-critical system; and
    (2) Coordinate use of radio frequencies with any site operator and 
any local and Federal authorities.
    (b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit procedures 
or other means to demonstrate compliance with the radio frequency 
requirements of this section.


Sec.  450.155  Readiness.

    (a) General. An operator must document and implement procedures to 
assess readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch or reentry 
vehicle. These procedures must address, at a minimum, the following:
    (1) Readiness of vehicle and launch, reentry, or landing site, 
including any contingency abort location;
    (2) Readiness of safety-critical personnel, systems, software, 
procedures, equipment, property, and services; and
    (3) Readiness to implement the mishap plan required by Sec.  
450.173.
    (b) Application requirements. An applicant must--
    (1) Demonstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraph (a) 
of this section through procedures that may include a readiness meeting 
close in time to flight; and
    (2) Describe the criteria for establishing readiness to proceed 
with the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle so that public safety is 
maintained.


Sec.  450.157  Communications.

    (a) An operator must implement communication procedures during the 
countdown and flight of a launch or reentry vehicle that--
    (1) Define the authority of personnel, by individual or position 
title, to issue ``hold/resume,'' ``go/no go,'' and abort commands;
    (2) Assign communication networks so that personnel identified in 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section have direct access to real-time, 
safety-critical information required to issue ``hold/resume,'' ``go/no 
go,'' and any abort commands; and
    (3) Implement a protocol for using defined radio telephone 
communications terminology.
    (b) An operator must ensure the currency of the communication 
procedures, and that all personnel are working with the approved 
version of the communication procedures.
    (c) An operator must record all safety-critical communications 
network channels that are used for voice, video, or data transmissions 
that support safety-critical systems during each countdown.


Sec.  450.159  Pre-flight procedures.

    (a) An operator must implement pre-flight procedures that--
    (1) Verify that each flight commit criterion is satisfied before 
flight is initiated; and
    (2) Ensure the operator can return the vehicle to a safe state 
after a countdown abort or delay.
    (b) An operator must ensure the currency of the pre-flight 
procedures, and that all personnel are working with the approved 
version of the pre-flight procedures.


Sec.  450.161  Control of hazard areas.

    (a) General. The operator must publicize, survey, control, or 
evacuate each flight hazard area identified in accordance with Sec.  
450.133 prior to initiating flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry 
of a reentry vehicle to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with 
Sec.  450.101.
    (b) Verification. The launch or reentry operator must perform 
surveillance sufficient to verify or update the assumptions, input 
data, and results of the flight safety analyses.
    (c) Publication. An operator must publicize warnings for each 
flight hazard area, except for regions of land, sea, or air under the 
control of the vehicle operator, site operator, or other controlling 
authority with which the operator has an agreement. If the operator 
relies on another entity to publicize these warnings, it must:
    (1) Determine whether the warnings have been issued; and
    (2) Notify the FAA if the warnings have not been issued so that the 
FAA can determine if the launch or reentry can be conducted in a manner 
that sufficiently protects the public. This notification must provide 
sufficient information to enable FAA to issue warnings to U.S. 
aircraft.
    (d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit--
    (1) A description of how the applicant will provide for day-of-
flight surveillance and control of flight hazard areas, if necessary, 
to ensure that the presence of any member of the public in or near a 
flight hazard area is consistent with flight commit criteria developed 
for each launch or reentry as required by Sec.  450.165(b);
    (2) A description of how the applicant will provide for any 
publication of flight hazard areas necessary to meet the requirements 
of this section; and
    (3) A description of how the applicant will establish flight commit 
criteria based on the results of its toxic release hazard analysis, 
toxic containment, or toxic risk assessment for any necessary 
evacuation of the public from any toxic hazard area.


Sec.  450.163  Lightning hazard mitigation.

    (a) Lightning hazard mitigation. An operator must--
    (1) Establish flight commit criteria that mitigate the potential 
for a launch or reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating a direct 
lightning strike, or encountering a nearby discharge, using a means of 
compliance accepted by the Administrator; or
    (2) Use a vehicle designed to protect safety-critical systems in 
the event of a direct lightning strike or nearby discharge.
    (b) Application requirements. (1) An applicant electing to comply 
with paragraph (a)(1) of this section must submit flight commit 
criteria that mitigate the potential for a launch or reentry vehicle 
intercepting or initiating a direct lightning strike, or encountering a 
nearby lightning discharge.
    (2) An applicant electing to comply with paragraph (a)(2) of this 
section must submit documentation providing evidence that the vehicle 
is designed to protect safety-critical systems against the effects of a 
direct lightning strike or nearby discharge.


Sec.  450.165  Flight commit criteria.

    (a) General. For each launch or reentry, an operator must establish 
and observe flight commit criteria that identify each condition 
necessary prior to flight to satisfy the requirements of Sec.  450.101, 
and must include:
    (1) Surveillance of any region of land, sea, or air in accordance 
with Sec.  450.161;
    (2) Monitoring of any meteorological condition necessary to--
    (i) Be consistent with any safety analysis required by this part; 
and
    (ii) If necessary in accordance with Sec.  450.163, mitigate the 
potential for a launch or reentry vehicle intercepting a lightning 
strike, or encountering a nearby discharge;

[[Page 79734]]

    (3) Implementation of any launch or reentry window closure in the 
launch or reentry window for the purpose of collision avoidance in 
accordance with Sec.  450.169;
    (4) Confirmation that any safety-critical system is ready for 
flight;
    (5) Confirmation from the FAA that the risk to critical assets 
satisfies the requirements of Sec.  450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4);
    (6) For any reentry vehicle, except a suborbital vehicle, 
monitoring by the operator or an onboard system that the status of 
safety-critical systems is healthy before enabling reentry flight, to 
assure the vehicle can reenter safely to Earth; and
    (7) Any other hazard controls derived from any safety analysis 
required by this part.
    (b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit a list of 
all flight commit criteria.


Sec.  450.167  Tracking.

    (a) General. During the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle, an 
operator must measure and record in real time the position and velocity 
of the vehicle. The system used to track the vehicle must provide data 
to predict the expected impact locations of all stages and components, 
and to obtain vehicle performance data for comparison with the pre-
flight performance predictions.
    (b) Application requirements. An applicant must identify and 
describe each method or system used to meet the tracking requirements 
of paragraph (a) of this section.


Sec.  450.169  Launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis 
requirements.

    (a) Criteria. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, 
for an orbital or suborbital launch or reentry, an operator must 
establish window closures needed to ensure that the launch or reentry 
vehicle, any jettisoned components, or payloads meet the following 
requirements with respect to orbiting objects, not including any object 
being launched or reentered.
    (1) For inhabitable objects, one of three criteria below must be 
met:
    (i) The probability of collision between the launching or 
reentering objects and any inhabitable object must not exceed 1 x 
10-\6\;
    (ii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain an 
ellipsoidal separation distance of 200 km in-track and 50 km cross-
track and radially from the inhabitable object; or
    (iii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain a spherical 
separation distance of 200 km from the inhabitable object.
    (2) For objects that are neither orbital debris nor inhabitable, 
one of the two criteria below must be met:
    (i) The probability of collision between the launching or 
reentering objects and any object must not exceed 1 x 
10-\5\; or
    (ii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain a spherical 
separation distance of 25 km from the object.
    (3) For all other known orbital debris identified by the FAA or 
other Federal Government entity as large objects with radar cross 
section greater than 1 m\2\ and medium objects with radar cross section 
0.1 m\2\ to 1 m\2\:
    (i) The probability of collision between the launching or 
reentering objects and any known orbital debris must not exceed 1 x 
10-\5\; or
    (ii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain a spherical 
separation distance of 2.5 km.
    (b) Screening time. A launch or reentry operator must ensure the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section are met as follows:
    (1) Through the entire segment of flight of a suborbital launch 
vehicle above 150 km;
    (2) For an orbital launch, during ascent from a minimum of 150 km 
to initial orbital insertion and for a minimum of 3 hours from liftoff;
    (3) For reentry, during descent from initial reentry burn to 150 km 
altitude; and
    (4) For disposal, during descent from initial disposal burn to 150 
km altitude.
    (c) Rendezvous. Planned rendezvous operations that occur within the 
screening time frame are not considered a violation of collision 
avoidance if the involved operators have pre-coordinated the rendezvous 
or close approach.
    (d) Exception. A launch collision avoidance analysis is not 
required for any launched object if the maximum planned altitude by 
that object is less than 150 km.
    (e) Analysis. Collision avoidance analysis must be obtained for 
each launch or reentry from a Federal entity identified by the FAA, or 
another entity agreed to by the Administrator.
    (1) An operator must use the results of the collision avoidance 
analysis to establish flight commit criteria for collision avoidance; 
and
    (2) The collision avoidance analysis must account for uncertainties 
associated with launch or reentry vehicle performance and timing, and 
ensure that each window closure incorporates all additional time 
periods associated with such uncertainties.
    (f) Timing and information required. An operator must prepare a 
collision avoidance analysis worksheet for each launch or reentry using 
a standardized format that contains the input data required by appendix 
A to this part, as follows:
    (1) Except as specified in paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, an operator must file the input data with an entity identified 
in paragraph (e) of this section and the FAA at least 7 days before the 
first attempt at the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a 
reentry vehicle.
    (i) Operators that have never received a launch or reentry 
conjunction assessment from the entity identified in paragraph (e) of 
this section, must file the input data at least 15 days in advance.
    (ii) The Administrator may agree to an alternative time frame in 
accordance with Sec.  404.15;
    (2) An operator must obtain a collision avoidance analysis 
performed by an entity identified in paragraph (e) of this section, no 
later than 3 hours before the beginning of a launch or reentry window; 
and
    (3) If an operator needs an updated collision avoidance analysis 
due to a launch or reentry delay, the operator must file the request 
with the entity identified in paragraph (e) of this section and the FAA 
at least 12 hours prior to the beginning of the new launch or reentry 
window.


Sec.  450.171  Safety at end of launch.

    (a) Orbital debris mitigation. An operator must ensure for any 
proposed launch that for all vehicle stages or components that reach 
Earth orbit--
    (1) There is no unplanned physical contact between the vehicle or 
any of its components and the payload after payload separation;
    (2) Debris generation does not result from the conversion of energy 
sources into energy that fragments the vehicle or its components. 
Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic energy; and
    (3) For all vehicle stages or components that are left in orbit, 
stored energy is removed by depleting residual fuel and leaving all 
fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, leaving all 
batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any remaining 
source of stored energy.
    (b) Application requirement. An applicant must demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements in paragraph (a) of this section.


Sec.  450.173  Mishap plan--reporting, response, and investigation 
requirements.

    (a) General. An operator must report, respond to, and investigate 
mishaps, as

[[Page 79735]]

defined in Sec.  401.7 of this chapter, in accordance with paragraphs 
(b) through (g) of this section using a plan or other written means.
    (b) Responsibilities. An operator must document--
    (1) Responsibilities for personnel assigned to implement the 
requirements of this section;
    (2) Reporting responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct 
investigations and for anyone retained by the operator to conduct or 
participate in investigations; and
    (3) Allocation of roles and responsibilities between the launch 
operator and any site operator for reporting, responding to, and 
investigating any mishap during ground activities at the site.
    (c) Mishap reporting requirements. An operator must--
    (1) Immediately notify the FAA Washington Operations Center in case 
of a mishap that involves a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 
49 CFR 830.2);
    (2) Notify within 24 hours the FAA Washington Operations Center in 
the case of a mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious injury 
(as defined in 49 CFR 830.2); and
    (3) Submit a written preliminary report to the FAA Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation within five days of any mishap. The 
preliminary report must include the following information, as 
applicable:
    (i) Date and time of the mishap;
    (ii) Description of the mishap and sequence of events leading to 
the mishap, to the extent known;
    (iii) Intended and actual location of the launch or reentry or 
other landing on Earth;
    (iv) Hazardous debris impact points, including those outside a 
planned landing site or designated hazard area;
    (v) Identification of the vehicle;
    (vi) Identification of any payload;
    (vii) Number and general description of any fatalities or injuries;
    (viii) Description and estimated costs of any property damage;
    (ix) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined in Sec.  
401.7 of this chapter, involved in the event, whether on the vehicle, 
any payload, or on the ground;
    (x) Action taken by any person to contain the consequences of the 
event;
    (xi) Weather conditions at the time of the event; and
    (xii) Potential consequences for other similar vehicles, systems, 
or operations.
    (d) Emergency response requirements. An operator must--
    (1) Activate emergency response services to protect the public and 
property following a mishap as necessary including, but not limited to:
    (i) Evacuating and rescuing members of the public, taking into 
account debris dispersion and toxic plumes; and
    (ii) Extinguishing fires;
    (2) Maintain existing hazard area surveillance and clearance as 
necessary to protect public safety;
    (3) Contain and minimize the consequences of a mishap, including:
    (i) Securing impact areas to ensure that no members of the public 
enter;
    (ii) Safely disposing of hazardous materials; and
    (iii) Controlling hazards at the site or impact areas.
    (4) Preserve data and physical evidence; and
    (5) Implement agreements with government authorities and emergency 
response services, as necessary, to satisfy the requirements of this 
section.
    (e) Mishap investigation requirements. In the event of a mishap, an 
operator must--
    (1) Investigate the root causes of the mishap; and
    (2) Report investigation results to the FAA.
    (f) Preventative measures. An operator must identify and implement 
preventive measures for avoiding recurrence of the mishap prior to the 
next flight, unless otherwise approved by the Administrator.
    (g) Mishap records. An operator must maintain records associated 
with the mishap in accordance with Sec.  450.219(b).
    (h) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the plan or 
other written means required by this section.


Sec.  450.175  Test-induced damage.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to license applicants or 
operators seeking an optional test-induced damage exception.
    (b) Coordination of potential test-induced damage. Test-induced 
damage is not a mishap if all of the following are true:
    (1) A license applicant or operator coordinates potential test-
induced damage with the FAA before the planned activity, and with 
sufficient time for the FAA to evaluate the operator's proposal during 
the application process or as a license modification;
    (2) The test-induced damage did not result in any of the following:
    (i) Serious injury or fatality (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2);
    (ii) Damage to property not associated with the licensed activity; 
or
    (iii) Hazardous debris leaving the pre-defined hazard area; and
    (3) The test-induced damage falls within the scope of activities 
coordinated with the FAA in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the 
following information--
    (1) Test objectives;
    (2) Test limits;
    (3) Expected outcomes;
    (4) Potential risks, including the applicant's best understanding 
of the uncertainties in environments, test limits, or system 
performance;
    (5) Applicable procedures;
    (6) Expected time and duration of the test; and
    (7) Additional information as required by the FAA to ensure 
protection of public health and safety, safety of property, and the 
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.


Sec.  450.177  Unique safety policies, requirements, and practices.

    (a) Unique hazards. An operator must review operations, system 
designs, analysis, and testing, and identify any unique hazards not 
otherwise addressed by this part. An operator must implement any unique 
safety policy, requirement, or practice needed to protect the public 
from the unique hazard.
    (b) Unique requirements. The FAA may identify and impose a unique 
policy, requirement, or practice as needed to protect the public health 
and safety.
    (c) Application requirements. An applicant must--
    (1) Identify any unique safety policy, requirement, or practice 
necessary in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, and 
demonstrate that each unique safety policy, requirement, or practice 
protects public health and safety.
    (2) Demonstrate compliance with each unique safety policy, 
requirement, or practice imposed by the FAA in accordance with 
paragraph (b) of this section.

Ground Safety


Sec.  450.179  Ground safety--general.

    (a) At a U.S. launch or reentry site, an operator must protect the 
public and property from adverse effects of hazardous operations and 
systems associated with--
    (1) Preparing a launch vehicle for flight;
    (2) Returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after 
landing, or after an aborted launch attempt; and
    (3) Returning a site to a safe condition.
    (b) An operator is not required to comply with Sec. Sec.  450.181 
through 450.189 of this part if:

[[Page 79736]]

    (1) The launch or reentry is being conducted from a Federal launch 
or reentry site;
    (2) The operator has a written agreement with the Federal launch or 
reentry site for the provision of ground safety services and oversight; 
and
    (3) The Administrator has determined that the Federal launch or 
reentry site's ground safety processes, requirements, and oversight are 
not inconsistent with the Secretary's statutory authority over 
commercial space activities.
    (c) In making the determination required by paragraph (b)(3) of 
this section, the Administrator will consider the nature and frequency 
of launch and reentry activities conducted from the Federal launch or 
reentry site, coordination between the FAA and the Federal launch or 
reentry site safety personnel, and the Administrator's knowledge of the 
Federal launch or reentry site's requirements.


Sec.  450.181  Coordination with a site operator.

    (a) General. For a launch or reentry conducted from or to a Federal 
launch or reentry site or a site licensed under part 420 or 433 of this 
chapter, an operator must coordinate with the site operator to--
    (1) Ensure public access is controlled where and when necessary to 
protect public safety;
    (2) Ensure launch or reentry operations are coordinated with other 
launch and reentry operators and other affected parties to prevent 
unsafe interference;
    (3) Designate any ground hazard area that affects the operations of 
a launch or reentry site; and
    (4) Ensure a prompt and effective response is undertaken in the 
event of a mishap that could impact the safety of the public and 
property.
    (b) Licensed site operator. For a launch or reentry conducted from 
or to a site licensed under part 420 or 433 of this chapter, an 
operator must also coordinate with the site operator to establish roles 
and responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and investigating 
any mishap during ground activities at the site.
    (c) Application requirement. An applicant must describe how it is 
coordinating with a Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator 
in compliance with this section.


Sec.  450.183  Explosive site plan.

    (a) Explosive siting requirements. For a launch or reentry 
conducted from or to a site exclusive to its own use, an operator must 
comply with the explosive siting requirements of Sec. Sec.  420.63, 
420.65, 420.66, 420.67, 420.69, and 420.70 of this chapter.
    (b) Application requirement. An applicant must submit an explosive 
site plan in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.


Sec.  450.185  Ground hazard analysis.

    An operator must perform and document a ground hazard analysis, and 
continue to maintain it throughout the lifecycle of the launch or 
reentry system. The analysis must--
    (a) Hazard identification. Identify system and operation hazards 
posed by the vehicle and ground hardware, including site and ground 
support equipment. Hazards identified must include the following:
    (1) System hazards, including:
    (i) Vehicle over-pressurization;
    (ii) Sudden energy release, including ordnance actuation;
    (iii) Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation;
    (iv) Fire or deflagration;
    (v) Radioactive materials;
    (vi) Toxic release;
    (vii) Cryogens;
    (viii) Electrical discharge; and
    (ix) Structural failure.
    (2) Operation hazards, including:
    (i) Propellant handling and loading;
    (ii) Transporting of vehicle or vehicle components;
    (iii) Vehicle testing; and
    (iv) Vehicle or system activation.
    (b) Hazard assessment. Assess each hazard's likelihood and 
severity.
    (c) Risk acceptability criteria. Ensure that the risk associated 
with each hazard meets the following criteria:
    (1) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death 
or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote; and
    (2) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major 
damage to property not associated with the launch or reentry must be 
remote.
    (d) Risk mitigation. Identify and describe the risk elimination and 
mitigation measures required to satisfy paragraph (c) of this section.
    (e) Validation and verification. Document that the risk elimination 
and mitigation measures achieve the risk levels of paragraph (c) of 
this section through validation and verification. Verification 
includes:
    (1) Analysis;
    (2) Test;
    (3) Demonstration; or
    (4) Inspection.
    (f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit--
    (1) A description of the methodology used to perform the ground 
hazard analysis;
    (2) A list of all systems and operations that may cause a hazard 
involving the vehicle or any payload; and
    (3) The ground hazard analysis products of paragraphs (a) through 
(e) of this section, including data that verifies the risk elimination 
and mitigation measures.


Sec.  450.187  Toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations.

    (a) Applicability. (1) Except as specified in paragraph (a)(2), 
this section applies to any launch or reentry vehicle, including all 
vehicle components and payloads, that use toxic propellants or other 
toxic chemicals.
    (2) No toxic release hazard analysis is required for kerosene-based 
fuels, unless the Administrator determines that an analysis is required 
to protect public safety.
    (b) General. An operator must--
    (1) Conduct a toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with 
paragraph (c) of this section;
    (2) Manage the risk of casualties that could arise from the 
exposure to toxic release through one of the following means:
    (i) Contain hazards caused by toxic release in accordance with 
paragraph (d) of this section; or
    (ii) Perform a toxic risk assessment, in accordance with paragraph 
(e) of this section, that demonstrates compliance with the risk 
criteria of Sec.  450.185(c).
    (3) Establish ground hazard controls based on the results of its 
toxic release hazard analysis and toxic containment or toxic risk 
assessment for any necessary evacuation of the public from any toxic 
hazard area.
    (c) Toxic release hazard analysis. A toxic release hazard analysis 
must--
    (1) Account for any toxic release that could occur during nominal 
or non-nominal launch or reentry ground operations;
    (2) Include a worst-case release scenario analysis or a maximum-
credible release scenario analysis for each process that involves a 
toxic propellant or other chemical;
    (3) Determine if toxic release can occur based on an evaluation of 
the chemical compositions and quantities of propellants, other 
chemicals, vehicle materials, and projected combustion products, and 
the possible toxic release scenarios;
    (4) Account for both normal combustion products and any unreacted 
propellants and phase change or chemical derivatives of released 
substances; and
    (5) Account for any operational constraints and emergency 
procedures

[[Page 79737]]

that provide protection from toxic release.
    (d) Toxic containment. An operator using toxic containment must 
manage the risk of casualty from the exposure to toxic release either 
by--
    (1) Evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from any 
toxic hazard area in the event of a worst-case release or maximum 
credible release scenario; or
    (2) Employing meteorological constraints to limit a ground 
operation to times during which prevailing winds and other conditions 
ensure that the public would not be exposed to toxic concentrations and 
durations greater than accepted toxic thresholds for acute casualty in 
the event of a worst-case release or maximum credible release scenario.
    (e) Toxic risk assessment. An operator using toxic risk assessment 
must manage the risk from any toxic release hazard and demonstrate 
compliance with the criteria in Sec.  450.185(c). A toxic risk 
assessment must--
    (1) Account for airborne concentration and duration thresholds of 
toxic propellants or other chemicals. For any toxic propellant, other 
chemicals, or combustion product, an operator must use airborne toxic 
concentration and duration thresholds identified in a means of 
compliance accepted by the Administrator;
    (2) Account for physical phenomena expected to influence any toxic 
concentration and duration in the area surrounding the potential 
release site;
    (3) Determine a toxic hazard area for each process surrounding the 
potential release site for each toxic propellant or other chemical 
based on the amount and toxicity of the propellant or other chemical, 
the exposure duration, and the meteorological conditions involved;
    (4) Account for all members of the public that may be exposed to 
the toxic release; and
    (5) Account for any risk mitigation measures applied in the risk 
assessment.
    (f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
    (1) The identity of the toxic propellant, chemical, or combustion 
products or derivatives in the possible toxic release;
    (2) The applicant's selected airborne toxic concentration and 
duration thresholds;
    (3) The meteorological conditions for the atmospheric transport and 
buoyant cloud rise of any toxic release from its source to downwind 
receptor locations;
    (4) Characterization of the terrain, as input for modeling the 
atmospheric transport of a toxic release from its source to downwind 
receptor locations;
    (5) The identity of the toxic dispersion model used, and any other 
input data;
    (6) Representative results of an applicant's toxic dispersion 
modeling to predict concentrations and durations at selected downwind 
receptor locations, to determine the toxic hazard area for a released 
quantity of the toxic substance;
    (7) For toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with paragraph 
(c) of this section:
    (i) A description of the failure modes and associated relative 
probabilities for potential toxic release scenarios used in the risk 
evaluation; and
    (ii) The methodology and representative results of an applicant's 
determination of the worst-case or maximum-credible quantity of any 
toxic release that might occur during ground operations;
    (8) For toxic containment in accordance with paragraph (d) of this 
section, identify the evacuation plans or meteorological constraints 
and associated ground hazard controls needed to ensure that the public 
will not be within any toxic hazard area in the event of a worst-case 
release or maximum credible release scenario.
    (9) For toxic risk assessment in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section:
    (i) A demonstration that the risk criteria in Sec.  450.185(c) will 
be met;
    (ii) The population characteristics in receptor locations that are 
identified by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas;
    (iii) A description of any risk mitigation measures applied in the 
toxic risk assessment; and
    (iv) A description of the population exposure input data used in 
accordance with Sec.  450.123.


Sec.  450.189  Ground safety prescribed hazard controls.

    (a) General. In addition to the hazard controls derived from an 
operator's ground hazard analysis and toxic hazard analysis, an 
operator must comply with paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section.
    (b) Protection of public on the site. An operator must document a 
process for protecting members of the public who enter any area under 
the control of a launch or reentry operator, including:
    (1) Procedures for identifying and tracking the public while on the 
site; and
    (2) Methods the operator uses to protect the public from hazards in 
accordance with the ground hazard analysis and toxic hazard analysis.
    (c) Countdown abort. Following a countdown abort or recycle 
operation, an operator must establish, maintain, and perform procedures 
for controlling hazards related to the vehicle and returning the 
vehicle, stages, or other flight hardware and site facilities to a safe 
condition. When a launch vehicle does not liftoff after a command to 
initiate flight was sent, an operator must--
    (1) Ensure that the vehicle and any payload are in a safe 
configuration;
    (2) Prohibit entry of the public into any identified hazard areas 
until the site is returned to a safe condition; and
    (3) Maintain and verify that any flight safety system remains 
operational until verification that the launch vehicle does not 
represent a risk of inadvertent flight.
    (d) Fire suppression. An operator must have reasonable precautions 
in place to report and control any fire caused by licensed activities.
    (e) Emergency procedures. An operator must have general emergency 
procedures that apply to any emergencies not covered by the mishap plan 
of Sec.  450.173 that may create a hazard to the public.
    (f) Application requirement. An applicant must submit the process 
for protecting members of the public who enter any area under the 
control of a launch or reentry operator in accordance with paragraph 
(b) of this section.

Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator License


Sec.  450.201  Responsibility for public safety and safety of property.

    A licensee is responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of 
property during the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry.


Sec.  450.203  Compliance.

    A licensee must conduct a licensed launch or reentry in accordance 
with representations made in its license application, the requirements 
of subparts C and D of this part, and the terms and conditions 
contained in the license. A licensee's failure to act in accordance 
with the representations made in the license application, the 
requirements of subparts C and D of this part, and the terms and 
conditions contained in the license, is sufficient basis for the 
revocation of a license or other appropriate enforcement action.


Sec.  450.205  Financial responsibility requirements.

    A licensee must comply with financial responsibility requirements 
of part 440 of this chapter and as specified in a license or license 
order.

[[Page 79738]]

Sec.  450.207  Human spaceflight requirements.

    A licensee conducting a launch or reentry with a human being on 
board the vehicle must comply with human spaceflight requirements of 
part 460 of this chapter as specified in a license or license order.


Sec.  450.209  Compliance monitoring.

    (a) A licensee must allow access by, and cooperate with, Federal 
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to 
observe any of its activities, or any of its contractors' or 
subcontractors' activities, associated with the conduct of a licensed 
launch or reentry.
    (b) For each licensed launch or reentry, a licensee must provide 
the FAA with a console for monitoring the progress of the countdown and 
communication on all channels of the countdown communications network, 
unless the licensee has another acceptable means. A licensee must also 
provide the FAA with the capability to communicate with the mission 
director designated by Sec.  450.103(a)(1).


Sec.  450.211  Continuing accuracy of license application; application 
for modification of license.

    (a) A licensee is responsible for the continuing accuracy of 
representations contained in its application for the entire term of the 
license.
    (b) After a license has been issued, a licensee must apply to the 
FAA for modification of the license if--
    (1) The licensee proposes to conduct a launch or reentry in a 
manner not authorized by the license; or
    (2) Any representation contained in the license application that is 
material to public health and safety or the safety of property is no 
longer accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's 
procedures governing the actual conduct of a launch or reentry. A 
change is material to public health and safety or the safety of 
property if it alters or affects--
    (i) The class of payload;
    (ii) The type of launch or reentry vehicle;
    (iii) The type or quantity of hazardous material;
    (iv) The flight trajectory;
    (v) The launch site or reentry site or other landing site; or
    (vi) Any system, policy, procedure, requirement, criteria, or 
standard that is safety critical.
    (c) An application to modify a license must be prepared and 
submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. If requested 
during the application process, the FAA may approve an alternate method 
for requesting license modifications. The licensee must indicate any 
part of its license or license application that would be changed or 
affected by a proposed modification.
    (d) Upon approval of a modification, the FAA issues either a 
written approval to the licensee or a license order amending the 
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added, 
or deleted. An approval has the full force and effect of a license 
order and is part of the licensing record.


Sec.  450.213  Pre-flight reporting.

    (a) Reporting method. A licensee must send the information in this 
section as an email attachment to [email protected], or other 
method as agreed to by the Administrator in the license.
    (b) Mission information. A licensee must submit to the FAA the 
following mission-specific information no less than 60 days before each 
mission conducted under the license, unless the Administrator agrees to 
a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15 in the license, 
except when the information was provided in the license application:
    (1) Payload information in accordance with Sec.  450.43(i); and
    (2) Planned mission information, including the vehicle, launch 
site, planned flight path, staging and impact locations, each payload 
delivery point, intended reentry or landing sites including any 
contingency abort location, and the location of any disposed launch or 
reentry vehicle stage or component that is deorbited.
    (c) Flight abort and flight safety analysis products. A licensee 
must submit to the FAA updated flight abort and flight safety analysis 
products, using methodologies previously approved by the FAA, for each 
mission no less than 30 days before flight, unless the Administrator 
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15 in the 
license.
    (1) A licensee is not required to submit the flight abort and 
flight safety analysis products if--
    (i) The analysis submitted in the license application satisfies all 
the requirements of this section; or
    (ii) The licensee demonstrated during the application process that 
the analysis does not need to be updated to account for mission-
specific factors.
    (2) If a licensee is required to submit the flight abort and flight 
safety analysis products, the licensee--
    (i) Must account for vehicle- and mission-specific input data;
    (ii) Must account for potential variations in input data that may 
affect any analysis product within the final 30 days before flight;
    (iii) Must submit the analysis products using the same format and 
organization used in its license application; and
    (iv) May not change an analysis product within the final 30 days 
before flight unless the licensee has a process, approved in the 
license, for making a change in that period as part of the licensee's 
flight safety analysis process.
    (d) Flight safety system test data. Any licensee that is required 
by Sec.  450.101(c) to use a flight safety system to protect public 
safety must submit to the FAA, or provide the FAA access to, any test 
reports, in accordance with approved flight safety system test plans, 
no less than 30 days before flight, unless the Administrator agrees to 
a different time frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15 in the license. 
These reports must include:
    (1) A summary of the system, subsystem, and component-level test 
results, including all test failures and corrective actions 
implemented;
    (2) A summary of test results demonstrating sufficient margin to 
predicted operating environments;
    (3) A comparison matrix of the actual qualification and acceptance 
test levels used for each component in each test compared against the 
predicted flight levels for each environment, including any test 
tolerances allowed for each test; and
    (4) A clear identification of any components qualified by 
similarity analysis or a combination of analysis and test.
    (e) Collision avoidance analysis. A licensee must submit to a 
Federal entity identified by the FAA and to the FAA the collision 
avoidance information in appendix A to part 450 in accordance with 
Sec.  450.169(f).
    (f) Launch or reentry schedule. A licensee must file a launch or 
reentry schedule that identifies each review, rehearsal, and safety-
critical operation. The schedule must be filed and updated in time to 
allow FAA personnel to participate in the reviews, rehearsals, and 
safety-critical operations.


Sec.  450.215  Post-flight reporting.

    (a) A licensee must submit to the FAA the information in paragraph 
(b) of this section no later than 90 days after a launch or reentry, 
unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance 
with Sec.  404.15 of this chapter.
    (b) A licensee must send the following information as an email 
attachment to [email protected], or other method as agreed to by 
the Administrator in the license:

[[Page 79739]]

    (1) Any anomaly that occurred during countdown or flight that is 
material to public health and safety and the safety of property;
    (2) Any corrective action implemented or to be implemented after 
the flight due to an anomaly or mishap;
    (3) The number of humans on board the vehicle;
    (4) The actual trajectory flown by the vehicle, if requested by the 
FAA; and
    (5) For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, the actual impact 
location of all impacting stages and impacting components, if requested 
by the FAA.


Sec.  450.217  Registration of space objects.

    (a) To assist the U.S. Government in implementing Article IV of the 
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
each licensee must submit to the FAA the information required by 
paragraph (b) of this section for all objects placed in space by a 
licensed launch, including a launch vehicle and any components, except 
any object owned and registered by the U.S. Government.
    (b) For each object that must be registered in accordance with this 
section, no later than 30 days following the conduct of a licensed 
launch, a licensee must file the following information:
    (1) The international designator of the space object;
    (2) Date and location of launch;
    (3) General function of the space object;
    (4) Final orbital parameters, including:
    (i) Nodal period;
    (ii) Inclination;
    (iii) Apogee;
    (iv) Perigee; and
    (5) Ownership, and country of ownership, of the space object.
    (c) A licensee must notify the FAA when it removes an object that 
it has previously placed in space.


Sec.  450.219  Records.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, a 
licensee must maintain for 3 years all records, data, and other 
material necessary to verify that a launch or reentry is conducted in 
accordance with representations contained in the licensee's 
application, the requirements of subparts C and D of this part, and the 
terms and conditions contained in the license.
    (b) For an event that meets any of paragraph (1) through (5) or 
paragraph (8) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7 of this 
chapter, a licensee must preserve all records related to the event. 
Records must be retained until completion of any Federal investigation 
and the FAA advises the licensee that the records need not be retained. 
The licensee must make all records required to be maintained under the 
regulations available to Federal officials for inspection and copying.

Appendix A to Part 450--Collision Analysis Worksheet

    (a) Launch or reentry information. An operator must file the 
following information:
    (1) Mission name. A mnemonic given to the launch vehicle/payload 
combination identifying the launch mission distinctly from all 
others;
    (2) Launch location. Launch site location in latitude and 
longitude;
    (3) Launch or reentry window. The launch or reentry window 
opening and closing times in Greenwich Mean Time (referred to as 
ZULU time) and the Julian dates for each scheduled launch or reentry 
attempts including primary and secondary launch or reentry dates;
    (4) Epoch. The epoch time, in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), of the 
expected launch vehicle liftoff time;
    (5) Segment number. A segment is defined as a launch vehicle 
stage or payload after the thrusting portion of its flight has 
ended. This includes the jettison or deployment of any stage or 
payload. For each segment, an operator must determine the orbital 
parameters;
    (6) Orbital parameters. An operator must identify the orbital 
parameters for all objects achieving orbit including the parameters 
for each segment after thrust ends;
    (7) Orbiting objects to evaluate. An operator must identify all 
orbiting object descriptions including object name, length, width, 
depth, diameter, and mass;
    (8) Time of powered flight and sequence of events. The elapsed 
time in hours, minutes, and seconds, from liftoff to passivation or 
disposal. The input data must include the time of powered flight for 
each stage or jettisoned component measured from liftoff; and
    (9) Point of contact. The person or office within an operator's 
organization that collects, analyzes, and distributes collision 
avoidance analysis results.
    (b) Collision avoidance analysis results transmission medium. An 
operator must identify the transmission medium, such as voice or 
email, for receiving results.
    (c) Deliverable schedule/need dates. An operator must identify 
the times before flight, referred to as ``L-times,'' for which the 
operator requests a collision avoidance analysis. The final 
collision avoidance analysis must be used to establish flight commit 
criteria for a launch.
    (d) Trajectory files. Individual position and velocity 
trajectory files, including:
    (1) The position coordinates in the Earth-Fixed Greenwich (EFG) 
coordinates system measured in kilometers and the EFG velocity 
components measured in kilometers per second, of each launch vehicle 
stage or payload starting below 150 km through screening time frame;
    (2) Radar cross section values for each individual file;
    (3) Position Covariance, if probability of impact analysis 
option is desired; and
    (4) Separate trajectory files identified by valid window time 
frames, if launch or reentry trajectory changes during launch or 
reentry window.
    (e) Screening. An operator must select spherical, ellipsoidal, 
or collision probability screening as defined in this paragraph for 
determining any conjunction:
    (1) Spherical screening. Spherical screening centers a sphere on 
each orbiting object's center-of-mass to determine any conjunction;
    (2) Ellipsoidal screening. Ellipsoidal screening utilizes an 
impact exclusion ellipsoid of revolution centered on the orbiting 
object's center-of-mass to determine any conjunction. An operator 
must provide input in the UVW coordinate system in kilometers. The 
operator must provide delta-U measured in the radial-track 
direction, delta-V measured in the in-track direction, and delta-W 
measured in the cross-track direction; or
    (3) Probability of Collision. Collision probability is 
calculated using position and velocity information with covariance 
in position.

PART 460--HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS

0
71. The authority citation for part 460 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.


0
72. Amend Sec.  460.45 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  460.45  Operator informing space flight participant of risk.

* * * * *
    (d) An operator must describe the safety record of its vehicle to 
each space flight participant as follows:
    (1) For licenses issued under part 450 of this chapter, the 
operator's safety record must cover any event that meets any of 
paragraph (1), (4), (5), or (8) of the definition of ``mishap'' in 
Sec.  401.7 that occurred during and after vehicle verification 
performed in accordance with Sec.  460.17, and include:
    (i) The number of vehicle flights;
    (ii) The number of events that meet any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), 
or (8) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7 of this chapter; 
and
    (iii) Whether any corrective actions were taken to resolve these 
mishaps.
    (2) For licenses issued under part 415, 431, or 435 of this 
chapter, the operator's safety record must cover launch and reentry 
accidents and human space flight incidents as defined by Sec.  401.5, 
that occurred during and after vehicle verification performed in 
accordance with Sec.  460.17, and include:
    (i) The number of vehicle flights;
    (ii) The number of accidents and human space flight incidents as 
defined by Sec.  401.5; and

[[Page 79740]]

    (iii) Whether any corrective actions were taken to resolve these 
accidents and human spaceflight incidents.
* * * * *

0
73. Effective March 10, 2026, further amend Sec.  460.45 by revising 
paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  460.45  Operator informing space flight participant of risk.

* * * * *
    (d) An operator must describe the safety record of its vehicle to 
each space flight participant. The operator's safety record must cover 
any event that meets any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), or (8) of the 
definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7 that occurred during and after 
vehicle verification performed in accordance with Sec.  460.17, and 
include:
    (1) The number of vehicle flights;
    (2) The number of events that meet any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), 
or (8) of the definition of ``mishap'' in section Sec.  401.7; and
    (3) Whether any corrective actions were taken to resolve these 
mishaps.
* * * * *

    Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 51 
U.S.C. Chapter 509 in Washington, DC, on September 30, 2020.
Steve Dickson,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2020-22042 Filed 12-2-20; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P