[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 220 (Friday, November 13, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72650-72657]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25130]


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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 192 3167]


Zoom Video Communications, Inc.; Analysis To Aid Public Comment

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Proposed consent agreement; request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged 
violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices. The attached Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes both 
the allegations in the complaint and the terms of the consent order--
embodied in the consent agreement--that would settle these allegations.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before December 14, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file comments online or on paper by 
following the instructions in the Request for Comment part of the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. Please write ``Zoom Video 
Communications, Inc.; File No. 192 3167'' on your comment, and file 
your comment online at https://www.regulations.gov by following the 
instructions on the web-based form. If you prefer to file your comment 
on paper, mail your comment to the following address: Federal Trade 
Commission, Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 
CC-5610 (Annex D), Washington, DC 20580, or deliver your comment to the 
following address: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary, 
Constitution Center, 400 7th Street SW, 5th Floor, Suite 5610 (Annex 
D), Washington, DC 20024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Linda Holleran Kopp (202-326-2267), 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, 600 
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to Section 6(f) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 2.34, 16 CFR 2.34, 
notice is hereby given that the above-captioned consent agreement 
containing a consent order to cease and desist, having been filed with 
and accepted, subject to final approval, by the Commission, has been 
placed on the public record for a period of thirty (30) days. The 
following Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes the terms of the 
consent agreement and the allegations in the complaint. An electronic 
copy of the full text of the consent agreement package can be obtained 
from the FTC website at this web address: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/commission-actions.
    You can file a comment online or on paper. For the Commission to 
consider your comment, we must receive it on or before December 14, 
2020. Write ``Zoom Video Communications, Inc.; File No. 192 3167'' on 
your comment. Your comment--including your name and your state--will be 
placed on the public record of this proceeding, including, to the 
extent practicable, on the https://www.regulations.gov website.
    Due to the public health emergency in response to the COVID-19 
outbreak and the agency's heightened security screening, postal mail 
addressed to the Commission will be subject to delay. We strongly 
encourage you to submit your comments online through the https://www.regulations.gov website.
    If you prefer to file your comment on paper, write ``Zoom Video 
Communications, Inc.; File No. 192 3167'' on your comment and on the 
envelope, and mail your comment to the following address: Federal Trade 
Commission, Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 
CC-5610 (Annex D), Washington, DC 20580; or deliver your comment to the 
following address: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary, 
Constitution Center, 400 7th Street SW, 5th Floor, Suite 5610 (Annex 
D), Washington, DC 20024. If possible, submit your paper comment to the 
Commission by courier or overnight service.
    Because your comment will be placed on the publicly accessible 
website at https://www.regulations.gov, you are solely responsible for 
making sure your comment does not include any sensitive or confidential 
information. In particular, your comment should not include sensitive 
personal information, such as your or anyone else's Social Security 
number; date of birth; driver's license number or other state 
identification number, or foreign country equivalent; passport number; 
financial account number; or credit or debit card number. You are also 
solely responsible for making sure your comment does not include 
sensitive health information, such as medical records or other 
individually identifiable health information. In addition, your comment 
should not include any ``trade secret or any commercial or financial 
information which . . . is privileged or confidential''--as provided by 
Section 6(f) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 4.10(a)(2), 
16 CFR 4.10(a)(2)--including in particular competitively sensitive 
information such as costs, sales statistics, inventories, formulas, 
patterns, devices, manufacturing processes, or customer names.
    Comments containing material for which confidential treatment is 
requested must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled 
``Confidential,'' and must comply with FTC Rule 4.9(c). In particular, 
the written request for confidential treatment that accompanies the 
comment must include the factual and legal basis for the request, and 
must identify the specific portions of the comment to be withheld from 
the public record. See FTC Rule 4.9(c). Your comment will be kept 
confidential only if the General Counsel grants your request in 
accordance with the law and the public interest. Once your comment has 
been posted on the https://www.regulations.gov website--as legally 
required by FTC Rule 4.9(b)--we cannot redact or remove your comment 
from that website, unless you submit a confidentiality request that 
meets the requirements for such treatment under FTC Rule 4.9(c), and 
the General Counsel grants that request.
    Visit the FTC website at http://www.ftc.gov to read this Notice and 
the news release describing the proposed settlement. The FTC Act and 
other laws that the Commission administers permit the collection of 
public comments to consider and use in this proceeding, as appropriate. 
The Commission will consider all timely and responsive

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public comments that it receives on or before December 14, 2020. For 
information on the Commission's privacy policy, including routine uses 
permitted by the Privacy Act, see https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacy-policy.

Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment

    The Federal Trade Commission (``Commission'') has accepted, subject 
to final approval, an agreement containing a consent order from Zoom 
Video Communications, Inc. (``Zoom'').
    The proposed consent order (``proposed order'') has been placed on 
the public record for thirty (30) days for receipt of comments by 
interested persons. Comments received during this period will become 
part of the public record. After thirty (30) days, the Commission will 
again review the agreement and the comments received, and will decide 
whether it should withdraw from the agreement and take appropriate 
action or make final the agreement's proposed order.
    This matter involves Zoom, a videoconferencing platform provider 
that provides customers with videoconferencing services and various 
add-on services, such as cloud storage. Zoom's core product is the Zoom 
``Meeting,'' which is a platform for one-on-one and group 
videoconferences. Users can also, among other things, chat with others 
in Meetings, share their screens, and record videoconferences.
    In its proposed five-count complaint, the Commission alleges that 
Zoom violated Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. First, 
the proposed complaint alleges that Zoom misrepresented to users since 
at least June 2016 that they could secure all Meetings with end-to-end 
encryption. End-to-end encryption is a method of securing 
communications where an encrypted communication can only be deciphered 
by the communicating parties. No other person--not even the platform 
provider--can decrypt the communication because they do not possess the 
necessary cryptographic keys. Contrary to its representations to users, 
Zoom did not provide end-to-end encryption for all Meetings because 
Zoom's servers maintained the cryptographic keys that could allow Zoom 
to access the content of its customers' Meetings.
    Second, the proposed complaint alleges that Zoom misrepresented the 
level of encryption it used to secure communications between 
participants using Zoom's video conferencing service. Specifically, 
Zoom had claimed since at least June 2016 that it secured Meetings, in 
part, with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and using a 256-bit 
encryption key (``AES 256-bit encryption''). The 256-bit encryption key 
refers to the length of the key needed to decrypt the communication. 
Generally speaking, longer encryption keys provides more 
confidentiality protection than shorter keys because there are more 
possible key combinations, thereby making it harder to find the correct 
key and crack the encryption. Contrary to its representation to users, 
Zoom in fact secured its Meetings with AES with a 128-bit encryption 
key.
    Third, the proposed complaint alleges that Zoom misrepresented 
that, for users who opted to store recordings of their Zoom Meetings in 
Zoom's secure cloud storage (``Cloud Recordings''), Zoom would process 
and store such recordings in Zoom's cloud ``once the meeting has 
ended.'' Contrary to its representations to users, Zoom kept Cloud 
Recordings on Zoom's servers for up to 60 days, unencrypted, before 
transferring them to Zoom's secure cloud storage, where they are then 
stored encrypted.
    Fourth, the proposed complaint alleges that Zoom violated Section 5 
when it installed a local hosted web server (called ``ZoomOpener'') on 
3.8 million users' Mac computers. In July 2018, Zoom updated its 
application for Mac desktop computers by secretly deploying a web 
server onto users' computers. The ZoomOpener web server was designed to 
circumvent a security and privacy safeguard in Apple's Safari browser. 
Apple had updated its Safari browser to help defend its users from 
malicious actors and popular malware by requiring interaction with a 
dialogue box when a website or link attempts to launch an outside App. 
As a result of the new browser safeguard, users who clicked on a link 
to join a Zoom Meeting would receive an additional prompt that read, 
``Do you want to allow this page to open `zoom.us'?'' If the user 
selected ``Allow'', the browser would connect the user to the Meeting, 
while clicking ``Cancel'' would end the interaction and prevent the 
Zoom application from launching. The ZoomOpener web server was designed 
to avoid this extra prompt. It also remained on users' computers even 
after users deleted the Zoom application, and would automatically 
reinstall the Zoom app--without any user interaction--if the user 
clicked on a link to join a Zoom Meeting or visited a website that had 
a Zoom Meeting embedded in it.
    The proposed complaint alleges that it was an unfair act or 
practice for Zoom, without adequate notice or consent, to circumvent 
the Safari browser safeguard without implementing any measures to 
compensate for the circumvented privacy and security protections. The 
proposed complaint alleges that doing so caused or was likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers, that consumers could not reasonably 
avoid themselves, and that was not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition. Apple removed the ZoomOpener web 
server from users' computers through an automatic update in July 2019.
    Finally, the proposed complaint alleges Zoom violated Section 5 
when it represented that it was updating its Mac application to resolve 
minor bug fixes, but failed to disclose, or failed to disclose 
adequately, the material information that the update would deploy the 
ZoomOpener web server, that the web server would circumvent a Safari 
browser privacy and security safeguard, or that the web server would 
remain on users' computers even after they had uninstalled Zoom's Mac 
application.
    Part I of the proposed order prohibits Zoom from misrepresenting 
its privacy and security practices in the future. It prohibits, for 
example, misrepresentations about Zoom's collection, maintenance, use, 
deletion, or disclosure of Covered Information; the security features, 
or any feature that impacts a third-party security feature, included in 
any Meeting Service; or the extent to which Respondent otherwise 
maintains the privacy, security, confidentiality, or integrity of 
Covered Information. ``Covered Information'' means information from or 
about an individual.
    Part II of the proposed order requires Zoom to establish, 
implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security program 
that protects the security, confidentiality, and integrity of Covered 
Information. Among other things, Zoom must implement specific security 
safeguards, such as a security review for all new software, a 
vulnerability management program for its internal networks, security 
training for its employees, inventorying personal information stored in 
its systems and implementing data deletion policies, and other specific 
security measures, such as proper network segmentation and remote 
access authentication.
    Part III of the proposed order requires Zoom to obtain initial and 
biennial data security assessments for twenty years.
    Part IV of the agreement requires Zoom to disclose all material 
facts to the assessor and prohibits Respondent from

[[Page 72652]]

misrepresenting any fact material to the assessments required by Part 
III.
    Part V requires Zoom to submit an annual certification from a 
senior corporate manager (or senior officer responsible for its 
information security program) that it has implemented the requirements 
of the Order, and is not aware of any material noncompliance that has 
not been corrected or disclosed to the Commission.
    Part VI requires Zoom to submit a report to the Commission of its 
discovery of any Covered Incident. A ``Covered Incident'' is when any 
federal, state, or local law or regulation requires Zoom to notify any 
federal, state, or local government entity that information collected 
or received by Zoom from or about an individual consumer was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, accessed or acquired without 
authorization. Video and audio content are specifically included as a 
type of personal information that would trigger notification.
    Parts VII through X of the proposed order are reporting and 
compliance provisions. Part VII requires acknowledgement of the order 
and dissemination of the order now and in the future to persons with 
responsibilities relating to the subject matter of the order. Part VIII 
ensures notification to the FTC of changes in corporate status and 
mandates that the company submit an initial compliance report to the 
FTC. Part IX requires the company to create and retain certain 
documents relating to its compliance with the order. Part X mandates 
that the company make available to the FTC information or subsequent 
compliance reports, as requested.
    Part XI states that the proposed order will remain in effect for 20 
years, with certain exceptions.
    The purpose of this analysis is to aid public comment on the 
proposed order. It is not intended to constitute an official 
interpretation of the complaint or proposed order, or to modify in any 
way the proposed order's terms.

    By direction of the Commission, Commissioner Chopra and 
Commissioner Slaughter dissenting.
April J. Tabor,
Acting Secretary.

Majority Statement of Chairman Joseph J. Simons, Commissioner Noah 
Joshua Phillips, and Commissioner Christine S. Wilson

    At a time when millions of Americans are using videoconferencing 
services on a daily basis, the settlement that the Commission announces 
today ensures that Zoom will prioritize consumers' privacy and 
security. The Commission's complaint alleges that Zoom made 
misrepresentations regarding the strength of its security features and 
implemented a software update that circumvented a browser security 
feature. The proposed order provides immediate and important relief to 
consumers, addressing this conduct. The order requires that Zoom 
establish and implement a comprehensive security program that includes 
detailed and specific security measures. These obligations include 
reviews of all new software for common security vulnerabilities; 
quarterly scans of its internal network and prompt remediation of 
critical or severe vulnerabilities; and prohibitions against privacy 
and security misrepresentations.\1\ This order will enable the 
Commission to seek significant penalties for noncompliance. This 
settlement provides critical, and timely, relief.
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    \1\ Although the complaint does not allege privacy violations, 
the order includes targeted fencing in relief providing privacy 
protections to consumers. For example, it prohibits Zoom from 
misrepresenting its privacy practices, and requires Zoom to 
implement changes to its naming procedures for saving or storing 
recorded videoconference meetings, and to develop data deletion 
policies and procedures. These and other requirements serve to 
protect consumers' privacy as well as the security of their 
information and communications.
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    We are confident that the proposed relief appropriately addresses 
the conduct alleged in the complaint and is an effective, efficient 
resolution of this investigation. Our dissenting colleagues suggest 
additional areas for relief that likely would require protracted 
litigation to obtain. Given the effective relief this settlement 
provides, we see no need for that. Hundreds of millions of people use 
Zoom on a daily basis, often for free or through month-to-month 
contracts. We feel it is important to put in place measures to protect 
those users' privacy and security now, rather than expend scarce staff 
resources on speculative, potential relief that a Court would not 
likely grant, given the facts here.\2\ Our goal is a safe and secure 
Zoom that can continue to provide essential services to enable 
Americans to conduct business, engage in learning, participate in 
religious services, and stay connected. We applaud the FTC Staff for 
their professional and expeditious work to achieve this settlement in 
the midst of the pandemic. This case reflects the Commission's ongoing 
commitment to work on behalf of consumers to respond to the panoply of 
new challenges presented by COVID-19.
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    \2\ Our dissenting colleagues also argue that the settlement is 
insufficient because it does not require Zoom to notify consumers of 
its past misconduct. The conduct at issue was broadly publicized and 
we believe the Commission's press release and business and consumer 
education provide ample information for consumers to learn more.
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Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra

Summary

     When companies deploy deception, this harms customers and 
honest competitors, and it distorts the marketplace. This is 
particularly problematic when it comes to the digital economy.
     Zoom's alleged security failures warrant serious action. 
But the FTC's proposed settlement includes no help for affected 
parties, no money, and no other meaningful accountability.
     The FTC's status quo approach to privacy, security, and 
other data protection law violations is ineffective. However, 
Commissioners can take a series of concrete steps to change this.

Introduction

    Sometimes a new product becomes inextricably linked to the brand 
that made it popular. Kleenex, Band-Aids, and Frisbees are examples 
where the company became synonymous with the product.\1\ This is 
particularly true in the digital economy where products can improve the 
use and capability of technology to the point of transforming its role 
in everyday life. We use ``Google'' as a verb when referring to use of 
a search engine. We ``Uber'' when we need a ride across town. And now, 
we ``Zoom'' when referring to videoconferencing. If becoming a verb 
threatens a trademark, firms fight against it. If it means becoming the 
default product in a market, they fight for it. But, profiting through 
unlawful means must come with real consequences.
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    \1\ Mark Abadi, Taser, Xerox, Popsicle, and 31 more brands-
turned-household names, Business Insider (June 3, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-taser-xerox-brand-names-generic-words-2018-5.
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    Zoom (NASDAQ: ZM) did not invent web-based video conferencing. 
Indeed, there are many other players in the market. But Zoom succeeded 
in becoming the ``default'' for many businesses, both large and small, 
capturing a significant market share despite a crowded field. However, 
the allegations in the FTC's complaint raise questions whether Zoom's 
success--and the tens of billions of dollars of wealth created for its 
shareholders and executives in a short period of time--was advanced 
through fair play.\2\ In my

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view, the evidence suggests that deception helped to create this 
windfall.
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    \2\ Richard Waters, Zoom to cash in on pandemic success with 
apps and events, Financial Times (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f1731672-e965-48a1-9362-bab122fc9bf4.
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    With businesses, families, schools, and even governments using Zoom 
to share extremely sensitive information, the alleged security 
vulnerabilities of this video conferencing platform raise major 
concerns, including threats to our privacy \3\ and national 
security.\4\
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    \3\ In her voting statement, Commissioner Rebecca Kelly 
Slaughter details some of the key intersections between privacy and 
security.
    \4\ Sonam Sheth, Foreign intelligence operatives are reportedly 
using online platforms and video-conferencing apps like Zoom to spy 
on Americans, Business Insider (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/foreign-intelligence-agents-china-spying-on-americans-zoom-2020-4.
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    Today, the Federal Trade Commission has voted to propose a 
settlement with Zoom that follows an unfortunate FTC formula. The 
settlement provides no help for affected users. It does nothing for 
small businesses that relied on Zoom's data protection claims. And it 
does not require Zoom to pay a dime. The Commission must change course.

Deception Distorts Competition

    When companies need to act quickly to exploit an opportunity, 
deploying deception to steal users or sales from competing players is 
tantalizing. When video conferencing became a necessity for many 
businesses and families, existing players saw a potential gold mine. 
Even though we can all technically use multiple videoconferencing 
platforms as participants, a videoconferencing provider's monetization 
will largely be driven by how many businesses adopt its offering as 
their enterprise videoconferencing solution.\5\ FTC prohibitions on 
unfair or deceptive practices are supposed to temper the temptation to 
deceive customers.
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    \5\ Zoom Video Communications, Inc., Oct. 2019 Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q) (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1585521/000158552119000059/zm-20191031.htm.
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    Before the pandemic, Zoom primarily focused on business customers. 
Small and large businesses alike were looking for ways to connect with 
clients and business partners through video conferencing. Zoom competed 
with Microsoft's Skype, Microsoft's Teams, Cisco's WebEx, BlueJeans, 
and many other products. Comparison guides point out the different 
strong points of each service--from encryption to price.\6\ In the 
summer of 2019, Zoom had over 600,000 customers that paid fees to use 
Zoom's services.\7\ These customers were overwhelmingly small 
businesses.\8\
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    \6\ Kari Paul, Worried about Zoom's privacy problems? A guide to 
your video-conferencing options, The Guardian (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/08/zoom-privacy-video-chat-alternatives.
    \7\ Compl., In the Matter of Zoom Video Communications, Inc., 
Comm'n File No. 1923167 (Nov. 9, 2020).
    \8\ Id.
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    Small businesses often don't have employees dedicated to 
information security or even to information technology more broadly. 
That's why they rely on representations made by those they purchase 
software and services from. Many businesses want to ensure that any 
software application they use, including any video conferencing 
solution, comes with meaningful security standards. Zoom had to respond 
to this critical customer need if it was going to compete. Once the 
pandemic shut down workplaces across the country, businesses needed to 
find a reliable solution that was also secure. Many chose Zoom.\9\
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    \9\ Matt Torman, 5 Reasons Why Zoom Will Benefit Your Small 
Business, Zoom (Jan. 24, 2020), https://blog.zoom.us/zoom-video-communications-small-business-benefits/.
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    Zoom sold its customers on the idea that it was an easy-to-use 
service that took ``security seriously.'' However, when examining the 
company's engineering and product decisions, a different reality 
emerges. For example, as the complaint alleges, Zoom installed a web 
server onto users' computers, without permission, as an end-run that 
would circumvent a browser security feature--all to avoid an extra 
dialogue box.\10\ Zoom went further: Even if you managed to uninstall 
Zoom, it would not remove the web server.\11\ And that web server could 
secretly re-install Zoom, even without your permission.\12\ This is not 
just troubling conduct--this is what some have called ``malware-like'' 
behavior.\13\
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    \10\ Compl., supra note 7.
    \11\ David Murphy, Remove Zoom From Your Mac Right Now, 
LifeHacker (July 9, 2020), https://lifehacker.com/remove-zoom-from-your-mac-right-now-1836209383.
    \12\ Id.
    \13\ Jacob Kastrenakes, Zoom saw a huge increase in 
subscribers--and revenue--thanks to the pandemic, The Verge (June 2, 
2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/2/21277006/zoom-q1-2021-earnings-coronavirus-pandemic-work-from-home.
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    This fervent attention to detail--going to great lengths to avoid a 
single dialogue box--did not extend to the security features it touted 
in sales materials.\14\ The FTC's complaint details a litany of serious 
security allegations, from not using what is ``the commonly accepted 
definition'' of end-to-end encryption to being a year or more behind in 
patching software in its commercial environment.\15\
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    \14\ Compl., supra note 7.
    \15\ Michael Lee & Yael Grauer, Zoom Meetings Aren't End-to-End 
Encrypted, Despite Misleading Marketing, The Intercept (Mar. 31, 
2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/03/31/zoom-meeting-encryption/; 
Compl., supra note 7; Oded Gal, The Facts Around Zoom and Encryption 
for Meetings/Webinars, Zoom (Apr. 1, 2020), https://blog.zoom.us/facts-around-zoom-encryption-for-meetings-webinars/.
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Zoom's Windfall

    Zoom has ``cashed in'' on the pandemic.\16\ While Zoom doesn't 
publicly share its total number of users, the company has confirmed 
that it has nearly four times the number of customers with 10 or more 
employees than they had at this time a year ago.\17\ Their stock value 
has soared.\18\ Zoom's CEO, Eric Yuan, has increased his net worth by 
almost $16 billion since March, and is now one of the wealthiest 
individuals in America.\19\
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    \16\ Richard Waters, Zoom to cash in on pandemic success with 
apps and events, Financial Times (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f1731672-e965-48a1-9362-bab122fc9bf4.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Taylor Nicole Rogers, Meet Eric Yuan, the founder and CEO 
of Zoom, who has made over $12 billion since March and now ranks 
among the 400 richest people in America, Business Insider (Sep. 9, 
2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/meet-zoom-billionaire-eric-yuan-career-net-worth-life; Kerry A. Dolan et al., The Forbes 400: 
The Definitive Ranking of the Wealthiest Americans in 2020, Forbes 
(Sep. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/profile/eric-yuan/?list=forbes-400&sh=474b78c761bf.
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    Zoom can now use this new market penetration to increase 
monetization for users who currently do not pay any fees. With the 
pandemic-driven expansion, Zoom has announced that they're going to 
make a platform pivot and begin to offer an app marketplace and a paid 
events platform.\20\ Zoom disclosed to its investors how a shift to a 
``platform and sales model allow[s] us to turn a single non-paying user 
into a full enterprise deployment.'' \21\
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    \20\ Supra note 16.
    \21\ Zoom Video Communications, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form S-
1) (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585521/000095012318012479/filename1.htm.
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    Zoom stands ready to emerge as a tech titan. But we should all be 
questioning whether Zoom and other tech titans expanded their empires 
through deception.\22\ Zoom could have taken the time to ensure that 
its security was up to the right standards. But, in my view, Zoom saw 
the opportunity for massive growth by quickly leaping into the consumer 
market, allowing it to rapidly emerge as the new way to virtually 
celebrate birthdays and weddings and

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further solidify itself into our lives. But had Zoom followed the law, 
it might all be different.
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    \22\ Decision and Order, In the Matter of Google Inc., Comm'n 
File No. 1023136 (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf; 
Decision and Order, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., Comm'n File No. 
0923184 (July 27, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf.
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Status Quo Approach to Privacy and Security Settlements

    In matters like these, investigations should seek to uncover how 
customers were baited by any deception, how a company gained from any 
misconduct, and the motivations for this behavior. This approach can 
help shape an effective remedy. While deciding to resolve a matter 
through a settlement, regulators and enforcers must seek to help 
victims, take away gains, and fix underlying business incentives.
    Of course, all settlements involve tradeoffs, but like other FTC 
data protection settlements, the FTC's proposed settlement with Zoom 
accomplishes none of these objectives. This is particularly troubling 
given the nature of the alleged deception. Key features of the FTC's 
proposed settlement include:
    No help. Small businesses that purchased Zoom services or signed 
long-term contracts based on false representations are not even 
addressed in the Commission's order. They will not have the ability to 
be released from any contracts, seek refunds, or get credit toward 
future service. Similarly, Zoom's law-abiding competitors and other 
consumers affected by the alleged misconduct will not get anything to 
address how they were harmed.
    No notice. The targets of deception deserve the dignity of knowing 
that the product they were using did not use the security features that 
were advertised. Notice also provides information on whether or not 
users need to take any specific further actions to protect themselves 
or their place of business. This is especially critical in cases where 
individuals may not know if they are affected. In this matter, Zoom's 
technology was integrated into white label products that may not use 
Zoom's brand. Notice is also helpful when victims receive no 
restitution.
    No money. In my view, the evidence is clear that Zoom obtained 
substantial benefits through its alleged conduct. However, the 
resolution includes no monetary relief at all, despite existing FTC 
authority to seek it in settlements when conduct is dishonest or 
fraudulent. If the FTC was concerned about its ability to seek adequate 
monetary relief, it could have partnered with state law enforcers, many 
of whom can seek civil penalties for this same conduct.
    No fault. The Commission's order includes no findings of fact or 
liability. In other words, Zoom admits nothing and the Commission's 
investigation makes no significant conclusions. This will make it more 
difficult for affected parties to exercise any contractual rights or 
seek help through private actions.
    Earlier this year, after a number of security concerns emerged, the 
Attorney General of New York quickly took action, and Zoom signed a 
voluntary compliance agreement, which requires certain third-party 
reports and compliance with additional standards.\23\ The FTC's 
proposed settlement terms add some requirements to what Zoom has 
already agreed to with New York, largely involving additional 
independent monitoring and paperwork submissions. It is not clear to me 
that these new obligations are actually changing the way Zoom does 
business. In fact, Zoom may already be retaining third parties to 
assist with compliance as part of its contractual obligations with its 
largest customers.
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    \23\ Press Release, N.Y. Att'y Gen., Attorney General James 
Secures New Protections, Security Safeguards for All Zoom Users (May 
7, 2020), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorney-general-james-secures-new-protections-security-safeguards-all-zoom-users.
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Recommendations To Restore Credibility

    To protect the public and promote fair markets, the FTC must be a 
credible law enforcement agency, especially when it comes to large 
players in digital markets. Our recent law enforcement actions raise 
questions that warrant careful attention if we aspire to be an 
effective enforcer. Below are some of the tangible steps the Commission 
should pursue:
    1. Strengthen orders to emphasize more help for individual 
consumers and small businesses, rather than more paperwork.
    When consumers and small businesses are the targets of unlawful 
data protection practices, the FTC's status quo approach often involves 
requiring the company engaged in misconduct to follow the law in the 
future and submit periodic paperwork. In certain orders, the Commission 
requires the retention of a third-party assessor, which the company 
might already be doing.
    The FTC should focus its efforts on ensuring resolutions lead to 
meaningful help and assistance to affected consumers and small 
businesses. For example, the Commission could seek requirements that 
defendants respond to formal complaints and inquiries. This assists 
consumers while also allowing the Commission to track emerging harms 
and how the company is remediating them.
    Another way to help affected consumers and businesses is to order 
releases from any long-term contractual arrangements. When customers 
are baited with deceptive claims, it would be appropriate to allow them 
to be released from any contract lock-in or otherwise amend contractual 
terms to make customers whole. This would also help honest competitors 
regain some of the market share improperly diverted by deceptive 
conduct.
    The Commission should seek notices to affected parties, so that 
these individuals and businesses can determine whether they need to 
take any action and whether they want to continue to do business with a 
company that engaged in any wrongdoing.
    2. Investigate firms comprehensively across the FTC's mission.
    The FTC is a unique institution with legal authorities related to 
data protection, consumer protection, and competition, all under one 
roof, rather than divided up across multiple agencies. It is critical 
that the agency use its authority to deter unfair or deceptive conduct 
in conjunction with our authority to deter unfair methods of 
competition. The agency can do more to comprehensively use its 
authorities across its mission, particularly when unfair or deceptive 
practices can advance dominance in digital markets. When we do not, 
investigations may result in ineffective resolutions that fail to fix 
the underlying problems and may increase the likelihood of recidivism. 
The Commission may need to reorganize its offices and divisions to 
ensure investigations are comprehensive.
    3. Diversify the FTC's investigative teams to increase technical 
rigor.
    Engineers, designers, and other technical experts can offer major 
contributions to our investigative teams. Many of the cases previously 
pursued by the FTC were the result of press coverage from technical 
experts, especially security researchers. In fact, an independent 
researcher working in his private capacity was one of the first to 
discover a serious vulnerability in Zoom's product.\24\
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    \24\ The independent research solicited readers for 
contributions to assist with his work and pay off his student loans. 
Jonathan Leitschuh, Zoom Zero Day: 4+ Million Webcams & maybe an 
RCE? Just get them to visit your website!, InfoSec Write-Ups (July 
8, 2019), https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/zoom-zero-day-4-million-webcams-maybe-an-rce-just-get-them-to-visit-your-website-ac75c83f4ef5.
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    Many of our peer agencies around the world approach investigations 
with diverse, interdisciplinary teams. Unfortunately, the Commission 
has deprived our litigators and enforcement

[[Page 72655]]

attorneys of this needed expertise. The Commission should restore the 
role of the Chief Technologist and make a concerted effort to increase 
the proportion of technologists and others with technical knowledge in 
our investigative teams. If these individuals play meaningful 
leadership roles in our investigations, the agency can be much more 
effective.
    With these technical skills and leadership in place, the Commission 
could proactively review the dominant digital products and services 
rather than primarily following up on concerning media reports after 
sensitive information or access has been at risk.
    4. Restate existing legal precedent into clear rules of the road 
and trigger monetary remedies for violations.
    Markets benefit when there are simple, clear rules of the road. 
This allows honest businesses to know what is and is not permissible. 
This especially helps small businesses and startups. On the other hand, 
ambiguity helps large incumbents who can hire lawyers and lobbyists to 
sidestep their obligations. The FTC can promote fair markets by 
restating accepted legal precedent and past Commission experience 
through an agency rulemaking. These would create no new substantive 
obligations on market participants. But once restated and enforced, 
violations trigger significant monetary relief.
    Under the FTC Act, the Commission has a number of authorities to 
seek monetary relief. While one of these authorities, Section 13(b), is 
under considerable scrutiny in the courts, the Commission can also seek 
money by restating existing legal precedent through a rulemaking. When 
the Commission has issued prior orders for past misconduct in the 
market or there is other information indicating a widespread pattern of 
unfair or deceptive conduct, Section 18 of the FTC Act authorizes the 
Commission to define what constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice 
by rule. Violations of these rules can trigger liability for redress, 
damages, penalties, and more.
    Over the years, the Commission has finalized a substantial number 
of orders related to data protection, including privacy and data 
security. There have also been developments in case law in the courts. 
The Commission should consider restating this past precedent into a 
rule under Section 18 or other appropriate statutes to provide clear 
guidance and systematically deter unlawful data protection 
practices.\25\
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    \25\ Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the Report 
to Congress on Protecting Older Consumers, Comm'n File No. P144400 
(Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1581862/p144400choprastatementolderamericansrpt.pdf.
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    5. Demonstrate greater willingness to pursue administrative and 
federal court litigation.
    Congress intended for the FTC to serve as an expert agency that 
analyzes emerging business practices and determines whether they might 
be unfair or deceptive. Administrative litigation and final Commission 
orders can provide important guidance to the marketplace on the 
agency's analytical approach. It can also serve as the basis for 
triggering financial liability for other market actors, pursuant to the 
Commission's Penalty Offense Authority.\26\
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    \26\ See Rohit Chopra & Samuel A.A. Levine, The Case for 
Resurrecting the FTC Act's Penalty Offense Authority (Oct. 29, 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3721256.
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    Federal court litigation pursued by our staff has contributed to 
strong outcomes and important development of the law. For example, in 
2012, the FTC took action against Wyndham Hotels, a major hospitality 
chain the Commission charged with employing unfair data practices. 
Wyndham Hotels waged an aggressive defense, challenging the FTC's 
theories before the District Court and the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The court's ruling cemented the Commission's ability to target 
lax data security practices under existing law.
    The public benefits from the work of the FTC's talented 
investigators and litigators across the agency, and as Commissioners, 
we should have confidence that they can hold accountable even the 
largest players in the economy. But recently, when it comes to data 
protection, FTC Commissioners have rarely voted to authorize agency 
staff to sue national players for misconduct. We must do more to 
safeguard against any perception about the agency's unwillingness to 
litigate.
    6. Increase cooperation with international, federal, and state 
partners.
    When it comes to data protection abuses and other harmful practices 
by large technology firms, these concerns are increasingly global. The 
FTC can use its resources more effectively and obtain superior outcomes 
when it cooperates with other law enforcement partners.
    In the Ashley Madison matter, the FTC partnered with the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, and many state attorneys general. This action 
was the result of significant cooperation and ultimately led to a joint 
resolution.\27\ Unfortunately, this is too rare.
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    \27\ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Operators of 
AshleyMadison.com Settle FTC, State Charges Resulting From 2015 Data 
Breach that Exposed 36 Million Users' Profile Information (Dec. 14, 
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/operators-ashleymadisoncom-settle-ftc-state-charges-resulting.
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    The FTC can rely on key provisions of the U.S. SAFE WEB Act that 
allow the FTC to share information with foreign counterparts to combat 
deceptive or unfair practices that cross national borders. 
Domestically, agencies can form multistate working groups to combine 
resources and leverage a diverse set of legal authorities.
    In the matter before the Commission today, the conduct at issue 
might have also violated state laws. Additional liability triggered by 
these laws could have led to a resolution with a far superior outcome. 
Instead, other law enforcement agencies both at home and abroad will 
likely need to continue to scrutinize Zoom's practices, given the FTC's 
proposed resolution.
    In addition, the Commission needs to rethink its approach to 
enforcing privacy promises by large technology firms related to their 
participation in international agreements, such as the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield Framework. Zoom's conduct may have violated key aspects of the 
framework, and I believe the Commission should have taken action 
accordingly. The Commission should now fully cooperate with our 
international partners to ensure that they can proceed with appropriate 
sanctions.
    7. Determine whether third-party assessments are effective.
    A common provision in FTC orders requires the defendant to retain a 
third party to monitor compliance and the company's data protection 
protocols. However, it is unclear whether those assessments are truly 
effective when it comes to deterring or uncovering misconduct. For 
example, in the FTC's investigation of Facebook for compliance with its 
privacy obligations under a 2012 Commission order, the FTC alleged 
major violations of the order even though an independent third party, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC), was supposedly watching over the 
company's compliance.\28\
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    \28\ See Nitasha Tiku, Facebook's 2017 Privacy Audit Didn't 
Catch Cambridge Analytica, Wired (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-2017-privacy-audit-didnt-catch-cambridge-analytica/; See also Dissenting Statement of Commissioner 
Rohit Chopra In re Facebook, Inc., Comm'n File No. 1823109 (July 24, 
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1536911/chopra_dissenting_statement_on_facebook_7-24-19.pdf.

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[[Page 72656]]

    Additionally, the Commission's decision to not proactively make 
certain information about these third party reports public limits our 
ability to determine their effectiveness.\29\ If independent 
researchers and journalists--often the ones who originally discovered 
data protection failures in the first place--had access to these 
reports, companies and third-party monitors might take them more 
seriously, which would help to fulfill the intended purpose of their 
efforts.
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    \29\ Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra In the Matter of 
Uber Technologies, Inc., Comm'n File No. 1523054 (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1418195/152_3054_c-4662_uber_technologies_chopra_statement.pdf.
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Conclusion

    This year families have said their final goodbyes to loved ones 
over Zoom.\30\ Desperate parents have propped their children in front 
of screens for school and hoped that they won't fall too far 
behind.\31\ Small businesses have been turned upside down by our new 
way of life and have fought for a chance at survival by switching to 
doing business virtually.\32\ But when tech companies cheat, rather 
than compete, and then face no meaningful accountability, all of us 
suffer.
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    \30\ Sarah Zhang, The Pandemic Broke End-of-Life Care, The 
Atlantic (June 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/06/palliative-care-covid-19-icu/613072/.
    \31\ Heather Kelly, Kids used to love screen time. Then schools 
made Zoom mandatory all day long., Wash. Post (Sep. 4, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/04/screentime-school-distance/.
    \32\ Justin Lahart, Covid Is Crushing Small Businesses. That's 
Bad News for American Innovation., Wall Street J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-is-crushing-small-businesses-thats-bad-news-for-american-innovation-11602235804.
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    I am concerned that Zoom simply thought that the FTC's law 
enforcement inquiry wasn't serious. That's probably why the company 
didn't even bother to disclose the agency's inquiry to its 
investors.\33\ The company seemed to guess that the FTC wouldn't do 
anything to materially impact their business. Sadly, for the public, 
they guessed right. Given the company's approach, efforts to hold Zoom 
accountable by regulators and enforcers in the U.S. and abroad will 
clearly need to continue.
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    \33\ Zoom Video Communications, Inc., July 2020 Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q) (Sep. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1585521/000158552120000238/zm-20200731.htm. When publicly 
traded firms do not disclose to their investors that they are facing 
a federal law enforcement inquiry, this suggests that they do not 
believe the inquiry is material to their financial or operational 
performance.
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    Finally, the Federal Trade Commission has requested greater 
authority from Congress to protect Americans from abuse and misuse of 
personal data. But, actions like today's proposed settlement undermine 
these efforts. The agency must demonstrate that it is willing to use 
all of its existing tools to protect consumers and the market. Only 
then will the Commission be entrusted to take on more responsibilities.
    It is critical that we restore the agency's credibility deficit 
when it comes to oversight of the digital economy. This does not stem 
from a lack of authority or resources or capabilities from our staff--
it stems from the policy and enforcement approach of the Commission, 
and this needs to change.
    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter

    Most weekday mornings, my two elementary-age children log on to 
school through Zoom. Their faces, voices, and occasional silliness are 
all captured in the Zoom classroom. I try not to dwell on what might 
occasionally float through in the background of their camera or 
microphone, but, like many families, we've had moments in our home 
where we are very much live. After my older kids settle in for class, 
my own workday begins in earnest and typically involves a series of 
confidential discussions often made possible through a Zoom meeting. My 
experience is not unique: Zoom expanded from 10 million daily users 
last December to over 300 million daily participants this spring. 
Zoom's overnight expansion from a modest video conferencing company to 
a company providing critical infrastructure for business, government, 
education, and social connection raises important questions for the 
Commission's obligations to protect consumer security and privacy.
    Years before the global pandemic would make Zoom a household name, 
the company made decisions that threatened the security and privacy of 
its longstanding core business customers. Yet the Commission's proposed 
settlement provides no recourse for these paying customers. When Zoom's 
user base rapidly expanded, its failure to prioritize privacy and 
security suddenly posed a much more serious risk in terms of scope and 
scale. This proposed settlement, however, requires Zoom only to 
establish procedures designed to protect user security and fails to 
impose any requirements directly protecting user privacy. For a company 
offering services such as Zoom's, users must be able to trust that the 
company is committed to ensuring security and privacy alike.
    Because the proposed resolution fails to require Zoom to address 
privacy as well as security, and because it fails to require Zoom to 
take any steps to correct the deception we charge it perpetrated on its 
paying clients, I respectfully dissent.\1\
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    \1\ See Complaint ]] 16-33.
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Zoom's Practices

    As set forth in the Commission's complaint, Zoom engaged in a 
series of practices that undermined the security and privacy of its 
users. First, we allege Zoom made multiple misrepresentations about its 
use of encryption. As charged in the complaint, Zoom made false 
statements about its encryption being ``end-to-end,'' the level of 
encryption that it offered, and the time it took to store recorded 
meetings in an encrypted server.\1\
    Zoom's problematic conduct was not limited to deception. The 
complaint charges that beginning in July 2018, Zoom secretly and 
unfairly deployed a web server, called the ``ZoomOpener,'' to 
circumvent certain Apple privacy and security safeguards enjoyed by 
Safari browser users. Because of these safeguards, Safari users who 
clicked on a link to join a Zoom meeting would receive an additional 
prompt that read, ``Do you want to allow this page to open `zoom.us'?'' 
\2\ That is until, we allege, Zoom overrode this feature through its 
secret ZoomOpener, which bypassed the Safari safeguard to directly 
launch the Zoom App.\3\ The user was then automatically placed in the 
Zoom meeting, and, if the user had not changed her default video 
settings, her webcam was activated.\4\
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    \2\ Complaint ] 35. If the user selected ``Allow,'' the browser 
would connect the user to the Zoom meeting. Id. This safeguard was 
not specific to Zoom; Apple had designed its Safari browser to help 
defend its users from malicious actors and popular malware by 
requiring interaction with a dialogue box whenever any website or 
link attempted to launch an outside app. Id. at ] 34.
    \3\ Id. at ] 36.
    \4\ Id. at ] 37.
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    In addition to these unfair and deceptive practices, which the 
Commission charged as law violations, there has been extensive public 
reporting on several other Zoom practices that raised serious privacy 
concerns. For example, Zoom business customers who subscribed to a 
service called ``LinkedIn Sales Navigator'' had access to LinkedIn 
profile data about other users in a meeting--even when the other user 
wished to remain

[[Page 72657]]

anonymous.\5\ Additionally, Security researchers found that Zoom-
meeting video recordings saved on Zoom's cloud servers had a 
predictable URL structure and were thus easy to find and view.\6\ And 
of course there was widespread coverage of ``Zoom-bombing,'' in which 
uninvited users crashed Zoom meetings.\7\ Zoom took steps to address 
these vulnerabilities after they surfaced by changing naming 
conventions, permanently removing the LinkedIn Sales Navigator app,\8\ 
and requiring meeting passwords as the default setting for more Zoom 
users,\9\ but these problems suggest Zoom's approach to user privacy 
was fundamentally reactive rather than proactive.
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    \5\ See Aaron Krolik and Natasha Singer, A Feature on Zoom 
Secretly Displayed Data From People's LinkedIn Profiles, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/technology/zoom-linkedin-data.html. Zoom subsequently stated that it had disabled 
the feature.
    \6\ See Paul Wagenseil, Zoom security issues: Here's everything 
that's gone wrong (so far), Tom's Guide (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.tomsguide.com/news/zoom-security-privacy-woes.
    \7\ See Jay Peters, Zoom adds new security and privacy measures 
to prevent Zoombombing, The Verge (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/3/21207643/zoom-security-privacy-zoombombing-passwords-waiting-rooms-default.
    \8\ See Eric S. Yuan, A Message To Our Users, Zoom Blog (Apr. 1, 
2020), https://blog.zoom.us/a-message-to-our-users/.
    \9\ See Deepthi Jayarajan, Enhanced Password Capabilities for 
Zoom Meetings, Webinars & Cloud Recordings, Zoom Blog (Apr. 14, 
2020), https://blog.zoom.us/enhanced-password-capabilities-for-zoom-meetings-webinars-cloud-recordings/.
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Lack of Privacy Protections

    Too often we treat data security and privacy as distinct concerns 
that can be separately preserved. In reality, protecting a consumer's 
privacy and providing strong data security are closely intertwined, and 
when we solve only for one we fail to secure either. The Commission's 
proposed order resolving its allegations against Zoom requires the 
company to establish an information-security program and submit to 
related independent third-party assessments. These provisions strive to 
improve data-security practices at the company and to send a signal to 
others regarding the baseline for adequate data-security 
considerations. Nowhere, however, is consumer privacy even mentioned in 
these provisions. This omission reflects a failure by the majority to 
understand that the reason customers care about security measures in 
products like Zoom is that they value their privacy.
    Some might argue that sound data security practices should 
naturally guarantee consumer privacy. I disagree. Strong security is 
necessary for consumer privacy, but it does not guarantee its 
achievement. Zoom's launch of its ``ZoomOpener'' to undermine the Apple 
Safari browser protections is an instructive example. Zoom prioritized 
maintaining its one-click functionality for users over privacy and 
security protections offered by Apple. The Commission's proposed order 
tries to solve for this problem solely as a security issue and makes it 
difficult for Zoom to bypass third-party security features in the 
future. But the order does not address the core problem: Zoom's 
demonstrated inclination to prioritize some features, particularly ease 
of use, over privacy protections. Dumping Safari users automatically 
into a Zoom meeting, with their camera on, the first time they clicked 
on a link was not only a data-security failing--it was a privacy 
failing.
    Similarly, we often discuss data encryption as a security issue, 
which of course it is, but we should simultaneously be recognizing it 
as a privacy issue. When customers choose encrypted communications, it 
is because they value their privacy in the content of their 
conversations. Treating encryption failures as a security-only issue 
fails to recognize the important privacy implications.
    The FTC has approached privacy and security issues with related but 
distinct remedies: by imposing a comprehensive privacy program (as we 
did in FTC v. Uber) or by imposing a comprehensive information security 
program (as we did in FTC v. Equifax). This case provides a perfect 
example of a place where we ought to have required elements of both 
privacy and security programs. A more effective order would require 
Zoom to engage in a review of the risks to consumer privacy presented 
by its products and services, to implement procedures to routinely 
review such risks, and to build in privacy-risk mitigation before 
implementing any new or modified product, service, or practice. The 
Commission required this type of privacy-focused inquiry in the 
``Privacy Review Statement'' provisions of its order in the FTC v. 
Facebook matter.\10\ Privacy-focused provisions such as these should 
either be added to relevant data-privacy orders as a separate privacy 
program or review, or the Commission's information security programs 
should be modified to better integrate privacy and security.
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    \10\ To be clear, I am not suggesting that Zoom's conduct giving 
rise to this matter and Facebook's order violations are equivalents. 
Nor do the companies share similar business models. But in terms of 
the importance of consumer privacy, hundreds of millions of users 
are entrusting Zoom with some of their most sensitive interactions, 
and they are doing so from their homes.
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    When companies offer services with serious security and privacy 
implications for their users, the Commission must make sure that its 
orders address not only security but also privacy.

No Recourse for Customers

    As of July 2019, Zoom had approximately 600,000 paying customers, 
and approximately 88% of those customers were small businesses with ten 
or fewer employees.\11\ In securing these customers, the Commission 
charges that Zoom made express representations regarding its encryption 
offerings that were false. Yet, the proposed order does not require 
Zoom to take any steps to mitigate the impact of these statements we 
contend are false. Zoom is not required to offer redress, refunds, or 
even notice to its customers that material claims regarding the 
security of its services were false. This failure of the proposed 
settlement does a disservice to Zoom's customers, and substantially 
limits the deterrence value of the case.
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    \11\ Complaint ] 9.
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    Finally, I join Commissioner Chopra's call for the Commission to 
engage in critical reflection to strengthen our enforcement efforts 
regarding technology across the board--from investigation to 
resolution.\12\
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    \12\ Commissioner Chopra's dissenting statement sets forth an 
excellent list of Recommendations and Corrective Actions for the 
Commission to consider to improve the effectiveness of our 
enforcement efforts.

[FR Doc. 2020-25130 Filed 11-12-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-P