Electronic Comments

- Use the Commission’s internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
- Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR-CBOE–2020–099 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

- Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549–1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR–CBOE–2020–099. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–CBOE–2020–099, and should be submitted on or before November 12, 2020.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.

J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE National, Inc.; Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change To Establish Fees for the NYSE National Integrated Feed


I. Introduction

On February 3, 2020, NYSE National, Inc. (“NYSE National” or “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder, 2 a proposed rule change to establish fees for the NYSE National Integrated Feed. The proposed rule change was immediately effective upon filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act. 3 The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on February 20, 2020. 4 On April 1, 2020, the Division of Trading and Markets (“Division”), for the Commission pursuant to delegated authority, temporarily suspended the rule change and instituted proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed rule change. 5 On June 12, 2020, the Commission issued a request for information and additional comment on the proposed rule change. 6 On August 18, 2020, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, 7 the Division, for the Commission pursuant to delegated authority, designated a longer period within which to issue an order approving or disapproving the proposed rule change. 8 This order approves the proposed rule change.

II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change

NYSE National proposes to establish fees for the NYSE National Integrated Feed. 9 According to NYSE National, the NYSE National Integrated Feed is a NYSE National-only market data feed that provides vendors and subscribers on a real-time basis with a unified view of events, in sequence, as they appear on the NYSE National matching engine. 10 The NYSE National Integrated Feed includes depth-of-book order data, last sale data, security status updates (e.g., trade corrections and trading halts), and stock summary messages. 11 It also includes information about NYSE National’s best bid or offer at any given time. 12 NYSE National proposes the following fees for the NYSE National Integrated Feed:

- $2,500 per month access fee, which would be charged (once per firm) to any data recipient that receives a data feed of the NYSE National Integrated Feed; 13
- $1,500 per month redistribution fee, which would be charged (once per redistributor account) to any redistributor 14 of the NYSE National Integrated Feed;
- $10 per month professional per user fee and $1 per month non-professional per user fee, which would apply to each display device that has access to the NYSE National Integrated Feed; 15
- Non-display use 16 fees:

8 The fees became effective on February 3, 2020. Prior to February 3, 2020, NYSE National did not charge any fees for the NYSE National Integrated Feed. See Notice, supra note 4, at 9847.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 Data recipients that only use display devices to view NYSE National Integrated Feed data and do not separately receive a data feed would not be charged an access fee. See id. at 9848.
14 A redistributor would be a vendor or person that provides a real-time NYSE National market data product externally to a data recipient that is not its affiliate or wholly-owned subsidiary, or to any system that an external data recipient uses, irrespective of the means of transmission or access. See id.
15 See id.
16 Non-display use would mean accessing, processing, or consuming the NYSE National...
The access fees, professional user fees, and non-display fees would not apply to Federal agencies that subscribe to the products listed on the proposed fee schedule that includes such fees.21 Finally, first-time subscribers22 would be eligible for a free trial by contacting NYSE National and would not be charged the access fee, the non-display fee, any applicable professional and non-professional user fee, and the redistribution fee for one calendar month for each of the products listed on the proposed fee schedule.23 The free trial would be for the first full calendar month following the date a subscriber is approved to receive trial access to NYSE National market data.24 As proposed, NYSE National would provide the one-month free trial for a particular product to each subscriber only once.25

III. Discussion and Commission Findings

After careful review, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange.26 In particular, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,27 which requires that the rules of a national securities exchange provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members and issuers and other persons using its facilities; Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,28 which requires, among other things, that

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20 NYSE National states that the term “Federal agencies” as used in the proposed fee schedule would include all Federal agencies subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”), as well as any Federal agency not subject to FAR that has promulgated its own procurement rules. See id. NYSE National further states that all Federal agencies that subscribe to the NYSE National real-time proprietary market data products would continue to be required to execute the appropriate subscriber agreement, which includes, among other things, provisions against the redistribution of data. See id.

21 The proposed fee schedule lists NYSE National BBO, NYSE National Trades, and NYSE National Integrated Feed, and specifies that there would be no fees for NYSE National BBO and NYSE National Trades.

22 A first-time subscriber would be any firm that has not previously subscribed to a particular product listed on the proposed fee schedule. See Notice, supra note 4, at 9849.

23 See id.

24 See id. at 9849–50.

25 See id. at 9850.

26 In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has considered the proposed rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). See infra Sections III.A–C.


30 17 CFR 242.600(a).

31 NYSE National is an exclusive processor of securities information under the Act because it distributes on its own behalf information regarding its quotations and transactions. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(22)(B) (emphasis added) (defining “exclusive processor” to mean “any securities information processor or self-regulatory organization which, directly or indirectly, engages on an exclusive basis on behalf of any national securities exchange or registered securities association, or any national securities exchange or registered securities association which engages on an exclusive basis on its own behalf, in collecting, processing, or preparing for distribution or publication any information with respect to (i) transactions or quotations on or effected by means of any facility of such exchange or (ii) quotations distributed or published by means of any electronic system operated or controlled by such association”).

32 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (December 2, 2008), 73 FR 74770, 74781 (December 9, 2008) (“2008 ArcaBook Approval Order”) (approving proposed rule change to establish fees for a depth-of-book market data product). In 2010, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission’s 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order. The court held that focusing on whether competitive market forces constrained the exchange’s pricing decisions was an acceptable basis for assessing the fairness and reasonableness of the fees, but determined that the record did not factually support the conclusion that significant competitive forces limited the ability of NYSE Arca, Inc. (“NYSE Arca”) to set unfair or unreasonable prices. The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“NetCoalition II”) (“We conclude the SEC’s interpretation—that a market-based approach to evaluating whether NYSE Arca’s non-core data fees are ‘fair and reasonable’—is a permissible one.”).
Act or the rules thereunder.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{3} If an exchange cannot demonstrate that it was subject to significant competitive forces, it must "provide a substantial basis, other than competitive forces . . . demonstrating that the terms of the [fee] proposal are equitable, fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory."\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{4}

\textit{A. Substitution-Based Arguments}

In support of the proposed fees, NYSE National argues that the NYSE National Integrated Feed is sold in a competitive market.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{5} NYSE National asserts that exchanges compete with each other in selling proprietary market data products, as well as with consolidated data feeds (i.e., SIP feeds) and with data provided by ATSS.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{6} In addition, NYSE National states that NYSE National BBO (which includes best bid and offer information for NYSE National on a real-time basis) and NYSE National Trades (which includes NYSE National last sale information on a real-time basis) are used for the NYSE National Integrated Feed and constrain NYSE National's ability to charge supracompetitive prices for the feed.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{7}

In support of its claim, NYSE National states that, since the date of filing of SR–NYSENAT–2019–31 and before the proposed fees went into effect on February 3, 2020, five subscribers to the NYSE National Integrated Feed (i.e., nearly 9% of the prior subscriber base) have cancelled their subscriptions due to the imminent imposition of the fees.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, NYSE National states that a sixth customer informed NYSE National that if NYSE National is permitted to impose the fees, the customer would cancel its subscription to the NYSE National Integrated Feed and instead subscribe to the NYSE National BBO feed, which NYSE National states will remain available for free.\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{9}

In response to the proposal, one commenter argues that the NYSE National Integrated Feed is not subject to competitive forces because there are no available substitutes to NYSE National's depth-of-book product,\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{0} as the NYSE National Integrated Feed is the only source of depth-of-book information on NYSE National.\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{1} This commenter also argues that NYSE National makes an unpersuasive attempt to show elasticity of demand for the NYSE National Integrated Feed (i.e., in response to the fee increase, five of the 57 subscribers notified NYSE National of their intent to cancel their subscriptions before the fees went into effect, which the commenter considers to be a low proportion of subscribers).\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{2}

This commenter also argues that market data products are complementary because the ability of participants to evaluate the market, and therefore the utility and value of market data, increases with the addition of market data products from other exchanges.\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{3} Therefore, according to the commenter, exchanges have little incentive to reduce the prices for their own data because any theoretical increase in demand would be shared with other exchanges.\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{4} In addition, this commenter argues that other data feeds offered by NYSE National or other exchanges are not alternatives to the NYSE National Integrated Feed because only this feed provides depth-of-book information on NYSE National.\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{40} See letters from Ellen Greene, Managing Director, Equities, Ouster, and NetCoalition I, supra note 38, at 2. Specifically, the commenter states that the proposal does not meet the requirements of the Act. See also NetCoalition I, supra note 38, at 3.\textsuperscript{41} See also NetCoalition I, supra note 38, at 4.\textsuperscript{42} See NetCoalition I, supra note 38, at 5.\textsuperscript{43} See id. at 6.\textsuperscript{44} See id. at 7.\textsuperscript{45} See id. at 8.\textsuperscript{46} See id. at 9.\textsuperscript{47} See id. at 10.\textsuperscript{48} See id. at 11.\textsuperscript{49} See id. at 12.\textsuperscript{50} See id. at 13.\textsuperscript{51} See id. at 14.\textsuperscript{52} See id. at 15.\textsuperscript{53} See id. at 16.\textsuperscript{54} See id. at 17.\textsuperscript{55} See id. at 18.\textsuperscript{56} See id. at 19.\textsuperscript{57} See id. at 20.\textsuperscript{58} See id. at 21.\textsuperscript{59} See id. at 22.\textsuperscript{60} See id. at 23.\textsuperscript{61} See id. at 24.\textsuperscript{62} See id. at 25.\textsuperscript{63} See id. at 26.\textsuperscript{64} See id. at 27.\textsuperscript{65} See id. at 28.\textsuperscript{66} See id. at 29.\textsuperscript{67} See id. at 30.\textsuperscript{68} See id. at 31.\textsuperscript{69} See id. at 32.\textsuperscript{70} See id. at 33.\textsuperscript{71} See id. at 34.\textsuperscript{72} See id. at 35.
Similarly, another commenter questions whether third parties can compete with NYSE National in offering data related to activity on NYSE National. This commenter also questions NYSE National’s assertion that market participants have a meaningful ability to choose whether or not to connect to the NYSE National Integrated Feed and believes instead that many market participants must buy the feed. This commenter acknowledges that NYSE National provides the number of customers that discontinued using the NYSE National Integrated Feed in response to the proposed fees, but expresses concern that NYSE National has not provided any relevant information about these customers (e.g., why they subscribed to the NYSE National Integrated Feed in the first place; whether they were proprietary trading firms, agency brokers, or data vendors; and whether and how often they sent orders to NYSE National). This commenter also states that NYSE National should update and further elaborate on information about the remaining subscribers.

Finally, another commenter argues that other NYSE market data offerings and consolidated data cannot be considered to be competitors or substitutes that would constrain the pricing of the NYSE National Integrated Feed. This commenter similarly states that data from one exchange is not a substitute for data from other exchanges, and that an exchange’s depth-of-book data are unique to that exchange and cannot be obtained from any other source.

In response to the Commission’s Request for Comment and the comment letters received, NYSE National argues that the observation that some firms buy proprietary data from all exchanges is not sufficient to show that these products are complements, and that the concept of “monopolistic competition” does not apply to exchanges’ pricing of proprietary market data products because the Glosten Paper fails to address a key component of “monopolistic competition.” In addition, NYSE National disagrees with commenters’ assertions that customers are “required” to purchase the NYSE National Integrated Feed. NYSE National asserts that there is no regulatory mandate (e.g., best execution obligations) requiring any specific customers to purchase proprietary market data products from exchanges; rather, subscription to proprietary market data products is a business decision where individual market participants weigh the value of individual proprietary market data products to their individual business models and choose to invest in those products whose cost is justified by the expected benefits. According to NYSE National, the fact that some number of broker-dealers choose to buy certain data products in order to compete with other does not mean that the purchase of such products is “required.” In support of its arguments, NYSE National provides information regarding

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paying the fees in February and March 2020, citing the fees as their reason for cancelling, but ultimately did not pursue cancellation once the fee became free again in April 2020.67 NYSE National further states that an additional prospective customer “walked away” upon learning of the fees it would have to pay.68

As discussed below in this Section III.A., in light of NYSE National’s consistently low percentage of market share, the relatively small number of subscribers to the NYSE National Integrated Feed, and the sizeable portion of subscribers that terminated their subscriptions following the proposal of the fees, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. In particular, the Commission believes that NYSE National has provided sufficient information to demonstrate that it was subject to significant substitution-based competitive forces in setting the terms of its proposal for NYSE National Integrated Feed fees.69

In NetCoalition I, while vacating the Commission’s 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order, the D.C. Circuit stated that “the existence of a substitute does not necessarily preclude market power,” that “whether a market is competitive notwithstanding potential alternatives depends on factors such as the number of buyers who consider other products interchangeable and at what prices,” and that “[t]he inquiry into whether a market for a product is competitive . . . focuses on . . . the product’s elasticity of demand.”70 The court found that the Commission’s analysis of alternatives in the 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order did not reveal the number of potential users of the data or how they might react to a change in price.71 The court stated that there was no information regarding how many traders accessed NYSE Arca’s depth-of-book data during the period it was offered without charge (and thus how many traders might have been interested in paying for NYSE Arca’s depth-of-book data), or whether the traders who wanted depth-of-book data would have declined to purchase it if met with a supracompetitive price.72

With respect to the current proposal, NYSE National provides the information identified by the court in NetCoalition I as information needed to demonstrate whether an exchange is subject to significant competitive forces in pricing its market data. Specifically, NYSE National provides information regarding the number of potential users of the NYSE National Integrated Feed— in November 2019, prior to NYSE National’s first filing to adopt fees for the feed, when the fee was offered without charge, there were 57 subscribers to the feed.73 NYSE National also provides information regarding how potential users of the feed reacted to the introduction of the fees—six out of the 57 subscribers cancelled their subscriptions due to the proposed fees after they were first filed in December 2019, and two more subscribers requested cancellation of their subscriptions after paying the fees in February and March 2020, citing the fees as their reason for cancelling, but ultimately did not pursue cancellation once the fee became free again in April 2020.74 NYSE National also states that an additional prospective customer “walked away” upon learning of the fees it would have to pay.75

62 According to NYSE National, this data show that in December 2018 and June 2020: (1) Less than one-third of the firms subscribed to proprietary market data from all of the four NYSE Group exchanges; (2) approximately one-third of the firms subscribed to proprietary market data from only one of these four exchanges; and (3) 14.6% (in December 2018) and 12.8% (in June 2020) of the firms did not subscribe to any proprietary market data products from any of these four exchanges. See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 18; Rysman Paper II, supra note 56, at 10–11. This data also show that in December 2018 and June 2020: (1) Less than 20% of the firms subscribed to the Integrated Feeds from all of NYSE, NYSE American, NYSE Arca, and NYSE National; and (2) 66.0% (in December 2018) and 59.6% (in June 2020) of the firms did not subscribe to any Integrated Feed from any of these four exchanges. See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 18; Rysman Paper II, supra note 56, at 11–12.
63 See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 19.
64 See id.
65 See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66 See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 19–20. See also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, approximately 14% of the NYSE National Integrated Feed subscribers were willing to drop or did drop the feed in response to the proposed fees. Other information also shows that many market participants (including executing broker-dealers and other trading venues) do not subscribe to (i.e., have access to one or more substitutes for) the NYSE National Integrated Feed, even when the feed is offered without charge, which further demonstrates that NYSE National was subject to significant competitive forces in pricing the NYSE National Integrated Feed. In particular, many of the NYSE National member firms do not subscribe to the NYSE National Integrated Feed, even when it was available for free: NYSE National states that 28 out of 49 NYSE National member firms subscribed to the NYSE National Integrated Feed in February 2020 (when fees were charged for the feed) and 30 out of 48 NYSE National member firms subscribed to the NYSE National Integrated Feed in June 2020 (when the feed was again offered free of charge). In addition, NYSE National states that at least ten firms would have been subject to the Category 3 Non-Display Use fees at the time NYSE National first filed these fees with the Commission in December 2019. Given that, in December 2019, there were 12 equities exchanges (not including NYSE National) and 31 NMS Stock ATSs that had an effective Form ATS–N on file with the Commission that would be subject to the Category 3 Non-Display Use fees if they subscribed to the NYSE National Integrated Feed, it appears that more than three-quarters of trading platforms that would be subject to the Category 3 Non-Display Use fees have chosen not to subscribe to the NYSE National Integrated Feed. Moreover, a recent Commission decision on market data fees included an argument from The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC that approximately 100 trading firms pursue algorithmic trading strategies that may require all depth-of-book data from every exchange. However, given that there were only 57 subscribers to the NYSE National Integrated Feed when it was offered for free and six subscribers discontinued their subscriptions in response to the fees, it is likely that a significant number of firms that typically require exchange depth-of-book data products are using a substitute to the NYSE National Integrated Feed (and any substitute may include the option to forgo access to such proprietary data for certain firms).

As discussed above, the Commission’s market-based test considers “whether the exchange was subject to significant competitive forces in setting the terms of its proposal for [market data], including the level of any fees.” If an exchange meets this burden, the Commission will find that its fee rule is consistent with the Act unless “there is a substantial countervailing basis to find that the terms” of the rule violate the Act or the rules thereunder. The Commission has stated that it “believes that the existence of significant competition provides a substantial basis for finding that the terms of an exchange’s fee proposal are equitable, fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably or unfairly discriminatory.” With the current proposed rule change, because NYSE National has demonstrated that it was subject to significant competitive forces in setting the terms of its proposed fees, the Commission finds that the proposal is consistent with Sections 6(b)(4), 6(b)(5), and 6(b)(8) of the Act and Rule 603(a) of Regulation NMS.

The Commission notes that its finding is specific to the fees proposed by NYSE National and the information provided by NYSE National in connection with the current proposed rule change, and that any proposed rule change by any SRO will be considered based on the specific factual information before the Commission in the record at issue.

B. Platform Competition-Based Arguments

In support of its belief that the proposed fees are reasonable, NYSE National states that exchanges in general function as platforms between consumers of market data and consumers of trading services, and that overall competition between exchanges will limit their overall profitability. In securities in which the commenter claims NYSE National has a “significant market share,” average market share (for all trading, including regular trading hours, extended hours, and auctions) during the 27-month period from May 21, 2018 through July 23, 2020 was, in all cases, lower than what the commenter shows for the two months that it has indicated. See supra note 32–34 and accompanying text. 2008 ArcaBook Approval Order, supra note 32, at 74781. Id. 74781–82. In this regard, the Commission has also indicated that the availability of substitutes can impose competitive restraints to ensure that an exchange acts equitably, fairly, and reasonably. See id. at 74785.
connection with these arguments, NYSE National asserts that the introduction of the NYSE Integrated Feed in 2015 attracted more trading to NYSE by both subscribers and non-subscribers to the NYSE Integrated Feed, and concludes that overall competition between exchanges will limit exchanges’ overall profitability (not margins on any particular side of the platform). In addition, NYSE National argues that, due to the ready availability of substitutes and the low cost to move order flow to substitute trading venues, an exchange setting market data fees that are not at competitive levels would expect to quickly lose business to alternative platforms with more attractive pricing. NYSE National argues that subscribing to the NYSE National Integrated Feed is optional, that its customers may choose to discontinue using the feed once the proposed fees are effective, and that any customers who choose to discontinue using the feed may choose to shift order flow away from NYSE National. Similarly, NYSE National asserts that its market data pricing is constrained by the availability of numerous substitute platforms offering competing proprietary market data products and trading services.

In response to the proposal, one commenter argues that competition for order flow under the “platform theory” does not constrain the cost of market data, but instead results in “supra-monopoly” prices for market data products. This commenter also argues that an exchange has yet to show an increase (or decrease) in trading volume after reducing (or increasing) its price of market data, and that NYSE National does not state the anticipated impact on order flow from losing subscribers to the NYSE National Integrated Feed. In addition, this commenter argues that, because it believes competitive forces have not constrained the cost of market data, NYSE National should provide additional information on cost. Another commenter argues that regulatory requirements and commercial realities regarding transactions’ execution obligations preclude firms from diverting orders from an exchange to protest market data fees, and that “protests” and “threats” do not equate to competition. According to this commenter, abandoning an exchange with substantial volume means forgoing valuable trading opportunities and hurting execution quality. Moreover, this commenter maintains that NYSE National’s characterization of platform competition, and characterization of market data and transaction services as two sides of an exchange platform, are incorrect. This commenter argues that an exchange’s trading services and market data subscriptions are different services that are sold separately to different (albeit overlapping) customers at different times, they are not on opposite sides of the same transaction—the “key feature” of multisided platforms.

This commenter further argues that NYSE National has not substantiated the assertion that “traders base their decisions regarding where to execute trades based on the combined cost of execution and data services.” Lastly, this commenter argues that NYSE National’s interpretation of platform theory would lead to inconsistencies with the Act, as it would allow NYSE National to set supracompetitive depths-of-book data prices so long as it charged less for other services, whereas the Act requires data prices themselves to be fair and reasonable to protect investors and ensure that market data are widely disseminated.

Finally, another commenter objects to NYSE National’s platform-based arguments, stating that the supply and demand functions for order flow and market data are separate. This commenter also states that NYSE National does not provide any information about the costs of production for the NYSE National Integrated Feed and the expected revenue NYSE National projects to generate from the proposed fees.

In response to the Commission’s Request for Comment and the comment letters received, NYSE National reiterates that, under the market-based approach, it has already demonstrated that pricing for proprietary market data products such as the NYSE National Integrated Feed is constrained by competition among exchanges. In support of this argument, NYSE National references statements by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice for the merger of NYSE Euronext with Deutsche Börse AG from 2011, which stated that real-time proprietary market data products constitute a separate “relevant market” for antitrust purposes and that at that time there were four “major considerations constrain traders’ ability to shift order flow based on market data fees. See id.

101 See id. Further, this commenter states that even if a trader were somehow to shift all of its orders to a different exchange, this would not obviate the trader’s need to purchase market data from that exchange, as some traders purchase substantially all exchanges’ market data to optimize trading decisions. See id.

102 See id. at B–9.

103 See Healthy Markets Letter, supra note 50, at 9–10. See also SIFMA Letter III, supra note 40, at 3 (stating that market data fees are charged on a monthly basis and such fees are not one of the best execution factors used by broker-dealers when routing client orders).

104 See Healthy Markets Letter, supra note 50, at 9. In addition, this commenter states that NYSE National does not provide any information about the latency difference between the NYSE National Integrated Feed and the consolidated data feed or other methods of transmitting data. See id.


106 See id. at 8. In that vein, this commenter argues that NYSE National’s interpretation of platform theory incorrectly assumes that traders can readily shift orders to another exchange in response to market data fees and thereby lower their overall costs of trading, and that regulatory and business

forces, while charging “high” prices for data because exchanges’ data products are complements, resulting in “supra-monopoly” prices for such complementary products. See SIFMA Letter II, supra note 40, at 2–3 (citing Gloslen Paper, supra note 43).

107 See SIFMA Letter I, supra note 40, at 2. See also SIFMA Letter II, supra note 40, at 3 (stating that, despite a meaningful decrease in market share by NYSE Arca between May 2018 and December 2019, those exchanges did not respond by reducing the cost of their market data due to the loss of market share, and that the introduction of the NYSE National Integrated Feed fees would significantly increase the overall cost of market data for the NYSE exchanges when the overall market share for those exchanges collectively increased by only 6.34% between May 2018 and December 2019).

108 See SIFMA Letter I, supra note 40, at 2; SIFMA Letter II, supra note 40, at 4. See also Bloomberg Letter, supra note 54, at 5.

109 See id. The commenter states that if any firm unilaterally abandons a major exchange to protest market data fees, it would put itself at a significant competitive disadvantage. See id.

110 See id. at 7. This commenter believes that exchanges are two-sided platforms only insofar as they intermediate between liquidity providers and liquidity takers. See id. at 7.

See id. at 8.
competitors” in that market.\textsuperscript{106} NYSE National also argues that there is a high degree of fragmentation among trading venues and low barriers to entry.\textsuperscript{107} According to NYSE National, these factors demonstrate that the market for proprietary market data products is highly competitive, and that customers dissatisfied with exchanges’ pricing for market data products may respond by moving their order flow to a different venue, or even by establishing competing exchanges with different pricing models (e.g., BATS Exchange, Inc. (“BATS”), or MEMX LLC).\textsuperscript{108}

In addition, NYSE National reiterates that exchanges are platforms for market data and trading, that fierce competition for order flow on the trading side of the platform acts to discipline the pricing of market data on the other side of the platform, and that NYSE National is thereby constrained from pricing the NYSE National Integrated Feed at a supracompetitive price.\textsuperscript{109} NYSE National argues that the different timing of decisions for purchasing data and order routing is not inconsistent with trade executions and market data being joint products.\textsuperscript{110} NYSE National also argues that the Glosten paper provides no empirical analysis or data to support its conclusions that exchanges are not platforms and that exchanges’ proprietary market data products are complements offered by monopolistic competitors charging supracompetitive prices.\textsuperscript{111} NYSE National further states that conclusions about the existence of exchange-versus-exchange competition in the market for trading services and data are not dependent on any assessment of its costs to produce the NYSE National Integrated Feed, its return on that investment, or its profit margin.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, in response to the Commission’s Request for Comment, NYSE National argues that under NetCoalition I, an exchange does not have to provide both a cost-based analysis and a market-based approach to demonstrate that proposed fees are constrained by competition.\textsuperscript{113} According to NYSE National, it has provided ample evidence that pricing for the NYSE National Integrated Feed is constrained by competition.\textsuperscript{114} NYSE National also states that the cost data requested by the Commission to assess the presence of competition would not accurately reveal the profitability of NYSE National’s market data products for the following reasons: (1) Such accounting data do not always accurately reflect economic profitability and therefore can be unreliable for evaluating the competitiveness of an industry, especially where such costs are disaggregated and allocated across various units within a firm;\textsuperscript{115} (2) transaction services and market data are two sides of the same coin, and artificially dividing costs between these two products would result in data that are inaccurate and unreliable;\textsuperscript{116} and (3) NetCoalition I incorrectly assumed that in a competitive market, the price of a product approaches its marginal cost, and this theory has limited real-world application.\textsuperscript{117}

As discussed above, in light of NYSE National’s consistently low percentage of market share, the relatively small number of subscribers to the NYSE National Integrated Feed, and the sizeable portion of subscribers that terminated their subscriptions following the proposal of the fees, the Commission finds that the proposal is consistent with the Act. The Commission reaches that conclusion, however, without agreeing with or otherwise relying on the arguments made by NYSE National that exchanges function as platforms between consumers of market data and consumers of trading services, that overall competition between exchanges will limit their overall profitability, and that competition for order flow on the trading side of the platform acts to constrain the pricing of market data on the other side of the platform.

The Commission acknowledges that platform-based competition could potentially provide a basis for demonstrating significant competitive forces with regard to pricing market data. With respect to the current proposal, the Commission requested information in connection with NYSE National’s platform theory arguments in

\textsuperscript{106} See id. at 2, 5–6. The question posed in a proceeding under Section 7 of the Clayton Act is distinct from that necessary for the Commission to determine whether there is sufficient market competition to constrain the prices charged for the NYSE National Integrated Feed, such that fees are fair and reasonable under the Act.

\textsuperscript{107} See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 2, 6–9 (noting that today, equities trading is dispensed across 13 exchanges (with three additional exchanges expected to enter the market in 2020) and 31 ATSs and numerous broker-dealer internalizers and wholesalers, that no single exchange has more than 20% market share, and that NYSE National has less than 2% market share). See also Rysman Paper II, supra note 56, at 5 (stating that the NYSE exchanges’ share of U.S. equities trading is below thresholds considered indicative of substantial market power).

\textsuperscript{108} See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 9.

\textsuperscript{109} See id. at 2, 9–11 (reiterating conclusions from Rysman Paper I, supra note 89). NYSE National disagrees with a commenter’s view that exchanges are platforms insofar as they intermediate between liquidity providers and liquidity takers. See id. at 11 n.42. According to NYSE National, from an “economic perspective,” firms are platforms if they act as intermediaries between two or more sets of agents in a setting where the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an externality. See id.

\textsuperscript{110} NYSE National also states that platform theory does not assume that traders can readily shift orders to another exchange in response to market data fees and thereby lower their overall cost of trading. See id. Rather, firms can trade market data fees by choosing to purchase or not to purchase a particular data product, and such choices have implications for that firm’s order routing decisions. See id. In a subsequent comment letter, NYSE National provides a report that tests whether the introduction of certain market data fees by NYSE Arca, EDGX Exchange, Inc. (“EDGX”), and BATS affected the market share, and states that the introduction of these fees led to a decrease in the exchanges’ market share. See letter from Elizabeth K. King, Chief Regulatory Officer, ICE, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, NYSE, to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission, dated October 12, 2020 (introducing Jonathan Brogaard and James Brugler, Competition and Exchange Data Fees (October 2, 2020) (“Brogaard and Brugler Paper”)). NYSE National submitted the Brogaard and Brugler Paper less than four days before the date by which the Commission must approve or disapprove the proposed rule change, which does not allow sufficient time to meaningfully engage with the complex analysis in the paper. Thus, the paper has not been fully considered. The Commission staff reminded NYSE National of the option to withdraw the proposed rule change and resubmit with this issue appropriately reviewed. In any event, the Commission need not consider an argument premised on this study because the Commission concludes there is an adequate basis for approval without the study.

\textsuperscript{111} See id. at 15. See also Rysman Paper II, supra note 56, at 22 (stating that this type of mismatch in timescales is common on platforms, and if data are useful for deciding what exchange to route orders to, the data subscription decisions made each month can impact the order routing decisions made at high frequencies; that having additional trading on an exchange is not per se valuable so that a trader should be more willing to pay for it; and that therefore there are reasons to expect linkages running in both directions, from trading to data and from data to trading, despite the difference in timesframes).

\textsuperscript{112} See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 2, 14–16. Rysman Paper II also states that the “central implication of platform theory for the assessment of exchange proprietary data fees, that they cannot be considered independently of competition for order flow, does not depend on the size of a platform.” Rysman Paper II, supra note 56, at 23.

\textsuperscript{113} See NYSE National Letter I, supra note 56, at 11–12.

\textsuperscript{114} See id. at 2–4.

\textsuperscript{115} See id. at 12. NYSE National states that data regarding its costs are not kept in the disaggregated manner requested by the Commission, meaning that cost data would have to be imperfectly allocated across business lines. See id.

\textsuperscript{116} See id. at 12–13 (referencing a 2014 report prepared by Oxera for the European Commission, which: (1) Observed that where both products and trading services are joint products because it is not possible to provide transaction services without generating market data, and it is not possible to generate trade transaction or market depth data without also supplying an execution service; and (2) stated that with joint products, the production costs of the outputs cannot be separated (i.e., they are joint costs), and that the economic theory of reference for the economically efficient recovery of the costs of trading venues is at the level of combined transaction revenues and data revenues).

\textsuperscript{117} See id. at 13–14.
Indeed, other factors could have contributed to the decrease in NYSE National's market share. NYSE National argues that customers who are dissatisfied with the proposed fees may discontinue using the NYSE National Integrated Feed, and customers who do not continue using the feed may choose to shift order flow away from NYSE National (i.e., there are substitute exchange platforms to NYSE National). However, while NYSE National provides information regarding the number of subscribers who discontinued using the NYSE National Integrated Feed due to the proposed fees, NYSE National does not address whether and to what extent these customers also shifted order flow away from NYSE National. NYSE National also does not address whether the customers who continued using the NYSE National Integrated Feed shifted order flow away from NYSE National in response to the proposed fees and whether the shift in order flow would be sufficient to have a disciplining effect on market data prices.

Moreover, as discussed above, NYSE National states that it has observed a correlation between the increase in subscription fees and a decrease in NYSE National's transaction market share volume. However, NYSE National has not established a causal relationship between the increase in NYSE National Integrated Feed subscribers and the increase in NYSE National's transaction market share volume. Indeed, other factors could explain the increase in transaction market share volume. For example, during the relevant period, NYSE National's transaction fees were priced such that NYSE National experienced negative not capture, meaning the revenue from transaction fees was exceeded by transaction-based expenses, and NYSE National did not address whether these transaction fees may have been the driving cause behind its changes in market share.

Similarly, NYSE National does not explain why the correlation supports a conclusion that competition for order flow on NYSE National constrains the pricing of the NYSE National Integrated Feed.

In addition, as discussed above, NYSE National argues that the fragmentation of equities trading among trading venues and low barriers to entry demonstrate that the market for proprietary market data products is highly competitive, and that customers dissatisfied with exchanges' pricing for market data products may respond by moving their order flow to a different venue. However, NYSE National does not provide data to show that customers moving order flow away from an exchange because of changes in that exchange's market data fees has a sufficiently disciplinary effect on market data pricing (or explain why such data would be unnecessary).

Further, as discussed above, NYSE National argues that overall competition between exchanges will limit their overall profitability (and not margins on any particular side of the platform). However, NYSE National has not established that competition between exchanges has in fact limited its overall profitability (or explain why doing so would be unnecessary). Even though NYSE National argues that accounting data do not always accurately reflect economic profitability and therefore can be unreliable for evaluating the competitiveness of an exchange, NYSE National does not explain what information, other than accounting data, would appropriately demonstrate that its overall profitability is limited by competition with other exchanges.

C. Other Arguments and Comments

NYSE National argues that the proposed fees are equitably allocated and not unfairly discriminatory, and do not impose an unnecessary or discriminatory effect on certain exchanges.

136 See supra note 88, 90, and accompanying text.

135 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

134 See supra note 6, at 9856–58.

133 See supra note 6, at 9856–57.

132 See supra note 127.

131 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

130 See supra note 121.

129 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.


127 See Request for Comment, supra note 6, at 37127 (requesting information regarding profit margins, returns on assets, or other metrics that would indicate the presence of competition).

126 See Notice, supra note 4, at 9856–57. NYSE National argues that the professional and non-professional user fee structure has long been used by NYSE National to reduce the price of data for non-professional users and to make it more broadly available, and that the non-display fee structure results in subscribers with greater uses of the data paying higher fees and subscribers with fewer uses of the data paying lower fees. See id. at 9856–57.

125 In 2019, NYSE National collected $35,810,000 in transaction fees but incurred transaction-based expenses, exclusive of Section 31 fees, of $75,963,000. See Exhibit I Accompanying Amendment to Form 1 Registration Statement of NYSE National, Inc. (June 29, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2001/ 20012255/pdf/providingauditedfinancialstatementsforynyseenationalfortheyearendedDecember31,2019.

124 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

123 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

122 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

121 See supra note 89.

120 See supra note 124, 127, 130, 132, 134, 136, and accompanying text.

119 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

118 See Request for Comment, supra note 6, at 37126–28. See also infra notes 121, 124, 127, 130, 132, 134, 136, and accompanying text.


116 See supra note 64–67 and accompanying text.

115 See Request for Comment, supra note 6, at 37127 (requesting for time periods that would provide meaningful comparisons, information regarding trading volume for customers and firms on NYSE National). See also id. at 37127–28 (requesting analogous additional information with respect to NYSE National).

114 See supra note 121.

113 See supra note 89.

112 See Request for Comment, supra note 6, at 37127 (requesting “[a]n explanation of NYSE National’s characterization that market data and transaction services are the two sides of the exchange platform”).

111 See Request for Comment, supra note 6, at 37126–28. See also infra notes 121, 124, 127, 130, 132, 134, 136, and accompanying text.

110 See supra notes 91–93, 108, and accompanying text.
inappropriate burden on competition. In addition, NYSE National makes specific additional arguments with respect to the redistribution fee, the category 3 non-display fee, and the non-display use declaration late fee and the multiple data feed fee.

Commenters state their belief that NYSE National has not demonstrated that the proposed fees represent an equitable allocation of reasonable fees, do not permit unfair discrimination, and do not impose an unnecessary or inappropriate burden on competition.

As discussed above, the Commission finds that NYSE National was subject to significant competitive forces in setting fees for the NYSE National Integrated Feed. An analysis of the proposal and of the views of commenters does not provide a substantial countervailing basis to suggest that the proposed fees are not consistent with the Act. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is equitable, fair, reasonable, not unreasonably or unfairly discriminatory, and not an undue burden on competition, and is consistent with Sections 6(b)(4), 6(b)(5), and 6(b)(8) of the Act and Rule 603(a) of Regulation NMS.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange, and in particular, Sections 6(b)(4), 6(b)(5), and 6(b)(8) of the Act, and Rule 603(a) of Regulation NMS.

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, that the proposed rule change (SR–NYSENAT–2020–05) be, and hereby is, approved.

See id. at 9855–59.

See id. at 9864, 9865–57 (arguing that vendors that would be charged the proposed fee would profit by re-transmitting NYSE National’s market data to their customers and that the proposed fee would be charged on an equal basis to those vendors that choose to redistribute the feed).

See id. at 9855–58 (arguing that such use of data is directly in competition with NYSE National and NYSE National should be permitted to recoup some of its lost trading revenue by charging for the data that makes such competition possible).

See id. at 9865–58 (arguing that these fees would offset NYSE National’s administrative burdens and costs associated with incorrect billing, late payments, and tracking data usage locations).

See SIFMA Letter II, supra note 40, at 4; Bloomberg Letter, supra note 54, at 2; Healthy Markets Letter, supra note 50, at 8–9.

See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.

The Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.

J. Matthew DeLerf, Assistant Secretary.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 3, To Amend NYSE Arca Rule 8.201–E (Commodity-Based Trust Shares) and To Permit the Listing and Trading of Shares of the Wilshire wShares Enhanced Gold Trust Under Amended NYSE Arca Rule 8.201–E


I. Introduction

On June 30, 2020, NYSE Arca, Inc. (“NYSE Arca” or “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"). pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) and Rule 19b–4 thereunder, a proposed rule change to (1) Amend NYSE Arca Rule 8.201–E to (a) permit a trust to hold (i) a specified commodity or (ii) a specified commodity and cash; (b) permit a trust that holds a specified commodity deposited with the trust to issue and redeem shares for such commodity and/or cash; and (c) state that the term “commodity” is defined in Section 1a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act; and (2) list and trade shares of the Wilshire wShares Enhanced Gold Trust under NYSE Arca Rule 8.201–E, as proposed to be amended. The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on July 20, 2020.

On August 17, 2020, the Exchange filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change, and, on August 18, 2020, the Exchange withdrew Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change. On September 1, 2020, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, the Commission designated a longer period within which to approve the proposed rule change, or disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved. On September 21, 2020, the Exchange filed Amendment No. 2 to the proposed rule change. On September 10, 2020, the Exchange filed Amendment No. 3 to the proposed rule change. The Commission has received no comment letters on the proposal. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 3, from interested persons, and is approving the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 3, on an accelerated basis.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 3

In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and the Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose

The Exchange proposes (1) to amend NYSE Arca Rule 8.201–E (“Commodity-Based Trust Shares”) to permit a trust to hold (a) a specified commodity deposited with the Trust (defined below), or (b) a specified commodity and, in addition to such specific commodity, cash; (2) to list and trade shares (“Shares”) of the Wilshire wShares Enhanced Gold Trust (“Trust”) under NYSE Arca Rule 8.201–E as proposed to be amended; and (3) to amend Rule 8.201–E(i)(2) to state that...