[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 178 (Monday, September 14, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56530-56534]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-17268]



[[Page 56530]]

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 64

[CG Docket No. 17-59; FCC 20-96; FRS 16971]


Advanced Methods To Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission adopts two safe harbors for 
voice service providers that block calls in certain situations, and 
adopts certain measures to ensure that erroneous blocking is quickly 
remedied. Specifically, the Commission adopts a safe harbor from 
liability under the Communications Act and the Commission's rules for 
terminating voice service providers that block calls on an opt-out 
basis based on reasonable analytics designed to identify unwanted 
calls, so long as those take into account information provided by 
caller ID authentication where available for a particular call. Second, 
the Commission adopts a safe harbor enabling voice service providers to 
block traffic from bad-actor upstream voice service providers that 
continue to allow unwanted calls to traverse their networks. Finally, 
the Commission requires that blocking providers furnish a single point 
of contact to resolve unintended or inadvertent blocking, and 
emphasizes that, when blocking, they should make all reasonable efforts 
to ensure that critical calls, such as those from Public Safety 
Answering Points (PSAPs), are not blocked and that they should never 
block calls to 911. These rules both respond to voice service providers 
that seek assurance that their good-faith blocking will not result in 
liability if they inadvertently block wanted calls and implement the 
call blocking provisions of the TRACED Act, and provide safeguards 
against erroneous blocking.

DATES: Effective October 14, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerusha Burnett, Consumer Policy 
Division, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, email at 
[email protected] or by phone at (202) 418-0526.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order, in CG Docket No. 17-59, FCC 20-96, adopted on July 16, 2020, 
and released on July 17, 2020. The Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking that was adopted concurrently with the Report and Order 
published July 31, 2020 at 85 FR 46063. The full text of document FCC 
20-96 is available for public inspection and copying via the 
Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). The full text of 
document FCC 20-96 and any subsequently filed documents in this matter 
may also be found by searching ECFS at: http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/ 
(insert CG Docket No. 17-59 into the Proceeding block). To request 
materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (Braille, 
large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email to 
[email protected], or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
(202) 418-0530 (voice).

Final Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

    The Report and Order does not contain any new or modified 
information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. It, therefore, does not contain any new 
or modified information collection burden for small business concerns 
with fewer than 25 employees, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork 
Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).

Congressional Review Act

    The Commission sent a copy of the Report and Order to Congress and 
the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional 
Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Synopsis

    1. With the Report and Order, the Commission takes specific and 
concrete steps to further protect consumers against unwanted calls. The 
Commission adopts a safe harbor from liability under the Communications 
Act and its rules for terminating voice service providers that block 
calls based on reasonable analytics designed to identify unwanted 
calls, so long as those take into account information provided by STIR/
SHAKEN (or, for non-IP based calls, any other effective call 
authentication framework that satisfies the Pallone-Thune Telephone 
Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement And Deterrence (TRACED) Act) when 
such information is available for a particular call. And the Commission 
establishes a second safe harbor enabling voice service providers to 
block traffic from bad-actor upstream voice service providers that 
continue to allow unwanted calls to traverse their networks. Finally, 
the Commission requires that blocking providers furnish a single point 
of contact to resolve unintended or inadvertent blocking, and 
emphasizes that, when blocking, they should make all reasonable efforts 
to ensure that critical calls, such as those from PSAPs, are not 
blocked and that they should never block calls to 911.

Safe Harbors

    2. Consistent with the TRACED Act and in light of the record 
garnered in response to the Commission's Call Blocking Declaratory 
Ruling and Further Notice, the Commission adopts two safe harbors from 
liability under the Communications Act and the Commission's rules for 
certain call blocking by voice service providers. The first is a call-
by-call safe harbor based on reasonable analytics including caller ID 
authentication information. The second safe harbor targets bad-actor 
upstream voice service providers who do not police their networks to 
minimize bad traffic after being notified of such traffic.
    3. Scope of Safe Harbor Protection. The safe harbors the Commission 
establishes here will protect blocking providers from liability arising 
from any obligations related to completing the call under the 
Communications Act and the Commission's rules.

Safe Harbor Based on Reasonable Analytics

    4. First, the Commission adopts a safe harbor from liability under 
the Communications Act and the Commission's rules for the unintended or 
inadvertent blocking of wanted calls where terminating voice service 
providers block based on reasonable analytics that include caller ID 
authentication information and the consumer is given the opportunity to 
opt out. Consistent with the Commission's statement in the Call 
Blocking Declaratory Ruling, published at 84 FR 29387, June 24, 2019, 
and Further Notice (NPRM), published at 84 FR 29478, June 24, 2019; and 
Congress' guidance in the TRACED Act, the Commission requires 
terminating voice service providers that take advantage of this safe 
harbor to offer these services without a line-item charge to consumers.
    5. Caller ID Authentication Requirement. To avail themselves of the 
safe harbor, terminating voice service providers must incorporate 
caller ID authentication information into their reasonable analytics 
programs. At this time, only the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication 
framework satisfies this requirement. As the Commission explains, 
however, should it later identify other effective caller ID 
authentication methods that would

[[Page 56531]]

satisfy the TRACED Act, including non-IP methods, those methods would 
also satisfy its requirements here.
    6. At a minimum, a terminating voice service provider seeking safe 
harbor protection must have deployed an effective caller ID 
authentication framework within their own network, accept caller ID 
authentication information transmitted by an upstream voice service 
provider, and incorporate that information into its analytics where 
that information is available. The terminating voice service provider 
may also rely on this safe harbor even when blocking calls where caller 
ID authentication information is not available, so long as it 
incorporates caller ID authentication information into its analytics 
wherever possible.
    7. In recognition of commenter concerns, and of the need to adapt 
to evolving threats, the Commission gives terminating voice service 
providers flexibility in how to incorporate authentication into their 
analytics. They may, for example, take into account the level of 
attestation, including looking at what level of attestation has 
historically been present where such data is available. The Commission 
reiterates that voice service providers must apply analytics reasonably 
in a non-discriminatory, competitively neutral manner.
    8. The TRACED Act acknowledges that voice service providers' 
ability to deploy STIR/SHAKEN varies because, in part, it is not 
designed to work on non-IP networks. As a result, this requirement 
means that terminating voice service providers with exclusively non-IP 
based networks will not be able to avail themselves of the safe harbor 
immediately. Should industry develop alternative caller ID 
authentication technologies that it later determines satisfy this 
requirement under the TRACED Act, those technologies would also be 
sufficient to claim the safe harbor. Further, the Commission recognizes 
that all terminating voice service providers are likely to receive 
calls from upstream voice service providers with non-IP networks. If a 
portion of the calls received by the terminating voice service provider 
are authenticated and the terminating voice service provider is 
verifying those calls and incorporating that information into a program 
of reasonable analytics, the safe harbor would still be available for 
the blocking of calls from non-IP networks. Limiting the safe harbor to 
authenticated calls could encourage bad actors to ensure that their 
calls originate or transit on non-IP networks, undermining the value of 
the safe harbor.

Safe Harbor for Blocking of Bad-Actor Providers

    9. The Commission clarifies that voice service providers may block 
calls from certain bad-actor upstream voice service providers and 
establishes a safe harbor from liability related to call completion 
obligations arising under the Communications Act and the Commission's 
rules for this blocking. Unlike the reasonable analytics safe harbor, 
the Commission focuses here on criteria that clearly indicate a 
particular upstream voice service provider is facilitating, or at a 
minimum shielding, parties originating illegal calls.
    10. Permitting Provider-Based Blocking. Until very recently, the 
Commission has only authorized call blocking for particular calls, not 
based on the provider. Here, the Commission clarifies that voice 
service providers are permitted to block calls from ``bad-actor'' 
upstream voice service providers. Specifically, the Commission makes 
clear that a voice service provider may block calls from an upstream 
voice service provider that, when notified that it is carrying bad 
traffic by the Commission, fails to effectively mitigate such traffic 
or fails to implement effective measures to prevent new and renewing 
customers from using its network to originate illegal calls. The 
notification from the Commission will be based on information obtained 
through traceback, likely in coordination with the Traceback 
Consortium. Failure of the bad-actor provider to sign calls may be an 
additional factor in this notification.
    11. Notification and Effective Mitigation Measures. If the 
Commission identifies illegal traffic on the network, it may notify the 
voice service provider that it is passing identified bad traffic and 
that specific calls are illegal. Upon receipt of this notification, the 
voice service provider should promptly investigate and, if necessary, 
prevent the illegal caller from continuing to use the network to place 
illegal calls. If the upstream voice service provider fails to take 
effective mitigation measures within 48 hours, a voice service provider 
may then, after notifying the Commission as discussed below, block 
calls from this bad-actor provider. Similarly, if the upstream voice 
service provider fails to implement effective measures to prevent new 
and renewing customers from using its network to originate illegal 
calls, a voice service provider may also block calls from this bad-
actor provider.
    12. A notified voice service provider should inform the Commission 
and the Traceback Consortium within 48 hours of steps it has taken to 
mitigate the illegal traffic. A voice service provider that is aware of 
the notice provided to an upstream voice service provider must consider 
whether the steps taken were sufficient to effectively mitigate the 
identified bad traffic. The Commission declines to mandate specific 
metrics to make this determination, but expects that they will 
generally involve a significant reduction in the traffic stemming from 
a particular illegal calling campaign or regarding calls from the 
particular upstream voice service provider. The voice service provider 
may meet this criterion if it determines, in good faith and upon a 
rational basis, that the upstream voice service provider has failed to 
effectively mitigate the illegal traffic. The Commission expects the 
voice service provider to inform the upstream voice service provider of 
that determination in order to give the upstream voice service provider 
another opportunity to take further mitigation steps. In addition, 
before taking any action to block calls of the upstream voice service 
provider, a voice service provider must provide the Commission with 
notice and a brief summary of its basis for making such a 
determination. By obtaining such information from both parties, the 
Commission will be in a position to monitor the actions of both parties 
prior to commencement of any blocking.
    13. A notified voice service provider should also inform the 
Commission and the Traceback Consortium within a reasonable period of 
time of the steps it takes to prevent new and renewing customers from 
originating illegal calls. Failure to provide this information within a 
reasonable time shall be equivalent to having failed to have effective 
measures in place for purposes of the safe harbor. Where upstream voice 
service providers disclose their measures, a voice service provider may 
in good faith assess whether the measures are effective based on 
objective criteria, such as whether customers can show a legitimate 
business need for those services. Again, before taking any action to 
block calls of the upstream voice service provider, a voice service 
provider must provide the Commission with notice and a brief summary of 
its basis for making such a determination.
    14. Risk of Legal Calls Being Blocked. The Commission finds that 
the benefits of this safe harbor outweigh the potential costs of 
blocking some legal calls in the process. Voice service providers are 
in the best position to detect and combat this problem. Accordingly, 
the Commission believes that enabling voice service providers to

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use all available technologies and methodologies at their disposal 
without fear of liability is crucial to combat illegal calls. This safe 
harbor encourages voice service providers to both mitigate bad traffic 
once they have actual notice of that traffic, and to take proactive 
steps to prevent their networks from being used to transmit illegal 
calls.

Protections Against Erroneous Blocking

    15. Protections for Critical Calls. The Commission requires that 
all voice service providers must make all reasonable efforts to ensure 
that calls from PSAPs and government outbound emergency numbers are not 
blocked.
    16. Calls to PSAPs via 911 are also extremely important and the 
Commission makes clear that they should never be blocked unless the 
voice service provider knows without a doubt that the calls are 
unlawful. Though some unwanted and illegal calls may reach 911 call 
centers, the Commission believes that 911 call centers themselves are 
best equipped to determine how to handle the calls they receive.
    17. Point of Contact for Blocking Disputes. The Commission requires 
that any voice service provider that blocks calls must designate a 
single point of contact for callers, as well as other voice service 
providers, to report blocking errors at no charge to callers or other 
voice service providers.
    18. Blocking providers must investigate and resolve these blocking 
disputes in a reasonable amount of time and at no cost to the caller, 
so long as the complaint is made in good faith. What amount of time is 
``reasonable'' may vary depending on the specific circumstances of the 
blocking and the resolution of the blocking dispute, and pending 
further developments in the record Blocking providers must also publish 
contact information clearly and conspicuously on their public-facing 
websites. The Commission further requires that when a caller makes a 
credible claim of erroneous blocking and the voice service provider 
determines that the calls should not have been blocked, a voice service 
provider must promptly cease blocking calls from that number unless 
circumstances change. Finally, because the TRACED Act requires that the 
establishment of a safe harbor be consistent with the Act's requirement 
of ``transparency and effective redress options,'' the Commission 
confirms that implementation of these redress mechanisms is a condition 
of obtaining the protections of the safe harbors it establishes in the 
Report and Order.
    19. Consistent with what the Commission permitted in June 2019, 
consumers may choose, either via opt in or opt out consent, to have 
their terminating voice service provider block categories of calls that 
may include legal calls. In these cases, terminating voice service 
providers are not obliged to cease blocking such calls merely because 
the caller claims they are legal. Rather, a terminating voice service 
provider's analysis should hinge on whether the disputed calls fit 
within the blocking categories to which their customers have consented.
    20. No Critical Calls List at this Time. The Commission declines to 
adopt a Critical Calls List at this time, in light of a record largely 
in opposition and in recognition that such a list would likely to do 
more harm than good. The Commission does not, however, foreclose the 
possibility of adopting such a list at a future point in time should 
circumstances change.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    21. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as 
amended, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated into the Declaratory Ruling and Further Notice. The 
Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the NPRM, 
including comment on the IRFA. The comments received are discussed 
below. The Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the 
RFA.

Need for, and Objectives of, the Order

    22. The Report and Order takes important steps in the fight against 
illegal robocalls by enabling terminating voice service providers to 
block certain calls before they reach consumers' phones while also 
requiring certain protections for lawful calls. The rules the 
Commission adopts today outline two safe harbors for terminating voice 
service providers that block calls in these circumstances. First, the 
Report and Order establishes a safe harbor for terminating voice 
service providers that block calls on a default, opt-out, basis based 
on reasonable analytics so long as those analytics include caller ID 
authentication information and the customer is given sufficient 
information to make an informed choice. Second, it establishes a safe 
harbor for voice service providers that block and then cease accepting 
all traffic from an upstream voice service provider that, when notified 
that it is carrying bad traffic by the Commission, fails to effectively 
mitigate such traffic or fails to implement effective measures to 
prevent new and renewing customers from using its network to originate 
illegal calls. The Report and Order also adopts rules to ensure that 
callers and other voice service providers can resolve potential 
erroneous blocking and to require all voice service providers to make 
all reasonable efforts to ensure that critical calls complete.
    23. Reasonable Analytics. The Report and Order provides a safe 
harbor from liability under the Communication Act and the Commission's 
rules for voice service providers that block calls based on reasonable 
analytics that must include Caller ID authentication information, so 
long as consumers are given a meaningful opportunity to opt out. This 
safe harbor builds on the blocking the Commission made clear was 
permitted under the Declaratory Ruling and Further Notice and adds the 
requirement that voice service provides incorporate Caller ID 
authentication information into their analytics programs.
    24. Bad Actor Providers. Additionally, the Report and Order 
establishes a safe harbor for terminating voice service providers that 
block calls from upstream voice service providers that, when notified 
that it is carrying bad traffic by the Commission, fails to effectively 
mitigate such traffic or fails to implement effective measures to 
prevent new and renewing customers from using its network to originate 
illegal calls. This safe harbor incentivizes bad-actor providers to 
better police their networks by raising the cost of passing bad 
traffic.
    25. Other Issues. The Report and Order clarifies that any 
terminating voice service provider that blocks calls must designate a 
single point of contact for callers to report blocking errors at no 
charge. It further makes clear that blocking providers must investigate 
and resolve these blocking disputes in a reasonable amount of time that 
is consistent with industry best practices. To avoid abuse, the Report 
and Order declines to mandate a Critical Calls List at this time. It 
does, however, make clear that the Commission expects all voice service 
providers will take all possible steps to ensure that calls from PSAPs 
and government outbound emergency numbers are not blocked. Finally, it 
makes clear that calls to 911 should never be blocked unless the voice 
service provider knows without a doubt that the calls are unlawful.

Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to 
the IRFA

    26. In the Declaratory Ruling and Further Notice, the Commission 
solicited comments on how to minimize the economic impact of the new 
rules

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on small business. The Commission received four comments either 
directly referencing the IRFA or addressing small business concerns. 
Two of these comments focused on concerns about the ability of small 
businesses to implement STIR/SHAKEN and how this would impact the safe 
harbors proposed in the Further Notice. The remaining two comments 
focused on small business challenge mechanism issues.
    27. SHAKEN/STIR. Both ITTA and Spoofcard raised concerns about safe 
harbors contingent on SHAKEN/STIR, noting that many small voice service 
providers have TDM networks and therefore will not be able to implement 
SHAKEN/STIR quickly. ITTA instead argues for a safe harbor for blocking 
based on reasonable analytics, while Spoofcard simply argues against 
blocking based solely on SHAKEN/STIR. The Commission recognizes that 
some small voice service providers will not be able to implement 
SHAKEN/STIR quickly. The first safe harbor the Commission adopts in the 
Report and Order does not prevent these voice service providers from 
blocking pursuant to the Declaratory Ruling. Additionally, as other 
effective Caller ID authentication technologies are developed, they may 
also satisfy the requirements of the first safe harbor. Finally, 
neither safe harbor the Commission adopts permits blocking solely on 
SHAKEN/STIR.
    28. Challenge Mechanisms. Capio highlighted the importance of a 
robust challenge mechanism for small businesses. Both Capio and CUNA 
called for this mechanism to be offered free of charge, with CUNA 
noting that this is particularly important for small businesses such as 
credit unions. In the Report and Order, the Commission requires 
terminating voice service providers to designate a single point of 
contact for resolving blocking disputes and make contact information 
clear and conspicuous on their public-facing websites. The Commission 
further requires terminating voice service providers to resolve 
disputes in a reasonable amount of time, noting that what is reasonable 
may vary on a case-by-case basis. Finally, the Commission requires that 
this be offered at no charge to callers.

Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration

    29. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended 
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not 
file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.

Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements for Small Entities

    30. The Report and Order makes clear that voice service providers 
may block calls in certain circumstances and provides safe harbors for 
that blocking. The Report and Order also adopts certain protections for 
lawful callers. These changes affect small and large companies equally 
and apply equally to all the classes of regulated entities identified 
above.
    31. Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements. The Report and Order 
establishes blocking safe harbors that will require terminating 
providers that choose to block to maintain certain records to ensure 
that their blocking is in compliance with the safe harbor. The specific 
records that a terminating provider would need to retain will depend on 
the particular safe harbor the terminating provider is relying on as 
well as their specific blocking program. Terminating providers that 
choose to block calls based on reasonable analytics including caller ID 
authentication information will need to maintain records on calls 
blocked, as well as opt-out decisions made by consumers. These records 
are necessary to ensure that opt-out requests are honored and to aid in 
resolving blocking disputes. Terminating providers that choose to block 
all calls from a bad-actor upstream provider will need to retain 
information relevant to that decision to ensure that all requirements 
were met prior to blocking and to help respond to blocking disputes. 
Originating, intermediate, and terminating providers will also need to 
communicate with other providers regarding traceback, illegal traffic, 
and measures to prevent new customers from originating illegal traffic.

Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    32. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its approach, which may 
include the following four alternatives, among others: (1) The 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities.
    33. The Commission considered feedback from the Declaratory Ruling 
and Further Notice in crafting the final order. The Commission 
evaluated the comments with the goal of removing regulatory roadblocks 
and giving industry the flexibility to block calls while still 
protecting the interests of lawful callers. For example, the rules the 
Commission adopts are permissive rather than mandatory, allowing small 
businesses to determine whether, and what type of, blocking is the 
correct approach for their network. A terminating provider may choose 
to block based on reasonable analytics, including caller ID 
authentication information, and benefit from that safe harbor. Should a 
terminating provider do so, they have flexibility to design their own 
reasonable analytics program and make that program either opt out or 
opt in. Alternatively, or in addition to that blocking, a terminating 
provider may choose to block all calls from an originating or 
intermediate provider that fails to meet the criteria the Commission 
lays out in the bad-actor provider safe harbor. The Commission 
recognizes small business concerns regarding the difficulty of 
deploying SHAKEN/STIR. Small businesses that cannot rapidly deploy 
SHAKEN/STIR have alternative blocking options, such as those from the 
Declaratory Ruling and Further Notice to ensure that they are not left 
behind. The Commission further took the concerns of small business into 
consideration in establishing the requirements to make challenging 
erroneous blocking simpler and at no cost to the caller.
    34. The Commission does not see a need to establish a special 
timetable for small entities to reach compliance with the modification 
to the rules. No small business has asked for a delay in implementing 
the rules. Small businesses may avoid compliance costs entirely by 
declining to block robocalls, or may delay implementation of call 
blocking indefinitely to allow for more time to come into compliance 
with the rules. Similarly, there are no design standards or performance 
standards to consider in this rulemaking.
    The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order, including 
this FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.

[[Page 56534]]

Ordering Clauses

    35. Pursuant to sections 4(i), 201, 202, 227, 227b, 251(e), 303(r), 
and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 
154(i), 201, 202, 227, 227b, 251(e), 303(r), and 403, the Report and 
Order is adopted and that part 64 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 
64.1200, is amended.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 64

    Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Telecommunications, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary, Office of the Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 part 64 as follows:

PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

0
1. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220, 222, 225, 
226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 262, 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 
616, 620, 1401-1473, unless otherwise noted; Pub. L. 115-141, Div. 
P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091.


0
2. Amend Sec.  64.1200 by
0
a. Adding paragraph (f)(17);
0
b. Revising paragraph (k) introductory text, paragraphs (k)(3) and (4) 
and adding paragraphs (k)(5) through (8).
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  64.1200   Delivery restrictions.

* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (17) The term effectively mitigate means identifying the source of 
the traffic and preventing that source from continuing to originate 
traffic of the same or similar nature.
* * * * *
    (k) Voice service providers may block calls so that they do not 
reach a called party as follows:
* * * * *
    (3) A terminating provider may block a voice call without liability 
under the Communications Act or the Commission's rules where:
    (i) Calls are blocked based on the use of reasonable analytics 
designed to identify unwanted calls;
    (ii) Those analytics include consideration of caller ID 
authentication information where available;
    (iii) A consumer may opt out of blocking and is provided with 
sufficient information to make an informed decision;
    (iv) All analytics are applied in a non-discriminatory, 
competitively neutral manner;
    (v) Blocking services are provided with no additional line-item 
charge to consumers; and
    (vi) The terminating provider provides, without charge to the 
caller, the redress requirements set forth in paragraph (k)(8) of this 
section.
    (4) A provider may block voice calls or cease to accept traffic 
from an originating or intermediate provider without liability under 
the Communications Act or the Commission's rules where the originating 
or intermediate provider, when notified by the Commission, fails to 
effectively mitigate illegal traffic within 48 hours or fails to 
implement effective measures to prevent new and renewing customers from 
using its network to originate illegal calls. Prior to initiating 
blocking, the provider shall provide the Commission with notice and a 
brief summary of the basis for its determination that the originating 
or intermediate provider meets one or more of these two conditions for 
blocking.
    (5) A provider may not block a voice call under paragraphs (k)(1) 
through (4) of this section if the call is an emergency call placed to 
911.
    (6) A provider may not block calls under paragraphs (k)(1) through 
(4) of this section unless that provider makes all reasonable efforts 
to ensure that calls from public safety answering points and government 
emergency numbers are not blocked.
    (7) For purposes of this section, a provider may rely on Caller ID 
information to determine the purported originating number without 
regard to whether the call, in fact originated from that number.
    (8) Any terminating provider blocking pursuant to this subsection 
must provide a single point of contact, readily available on the 
terminating provider's public-facing website, for handling call 
blocking error complaints and must resolve disputes within a reasonable 
time. When a caller makes a credible claim of erroneous blocking and 
the terminating provider determines that the calls should not have been 
blocked, the terminating provider must promptly cease blocking calls 
from that number unless circumstances change. The terminating provider 
may not impose any charge on callers for reporting, investigating, or 
resolving blocking error complaints.

[FR Doc. 2020-17268 Filed 9-11-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P