[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 178 (Monday, September 14, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56924-57016]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-16489]



[[Page 56923]]

Vol. 85

Monday,

No. 178

September 14, 2020

Part III





Commodity Futures Trading Commission





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17 CFR Part 23





Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain 
Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants; 
Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 178 / Monday, September 14, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 56924]]


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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 23

RIN 3038-AE84


Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and 
Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'' or 
``CFTC'') is adopting a final rule (``Final Rule'') addressing the 
cross-border application of certain swap provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (``CEA or ``Act''), as added by Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank 
Act''). The Final Rule addresses the cross-border application of the 
registration thresholds and certain requirements applicable to swap 
dealers (``SDs'') and major swap participants (``MSPs''), and 
establishes a formal process for requesting comparability 
determinations for such requirements from the Commission. The Final 
Rule adopts a risk-based approach that, consistent with the applicable 
section of the CEA, and with due consideration of international comity 
principles and the Commission's interest in focusing its authority on 
potential significant risks to the U.S. financial system, advances the 
goals of the Dodd-Frank Act's swap reforms, while fostering greater 
liquidity and competitive markets, promoting enhanced regulatory 
cooperation, and improving the global harmonization of swap regulation.

DATES: The Final Rule is effective November 13, 2020. Specific 
compliance dates are set forth in the Final Rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joshua Sterling, Director, (202) 418-
6056, [email protected]; Frank Fisanich, Chief Counsel, (202) 418-
5949, [email protected]; Amanda Olear, Deputy Director, (202) 418-
5283, [email protected]; Rajal Patel, Associate Director, 202-418-5261, 
[email protected]; Lauren Bennett, Special Counsel, 202-418-5290, 
[email protected]; Jacob Chachkin, Special Counsel, (202) 418-5496, 
[email protected]; or Owen Kopon, Special Counsel, [email protected], 
202-418-5360, Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight 
(``DSIO''), Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette 
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. Statutory Authority and Prior Commission Action
    B. Proposed Rule and Brief Summary of Comments Received
    C. Global Regulatory and Market Structure
    D. Interpretation of CEA Section 2(i)
     1. Proposed Rule and Discussion of Comments
     2. Final Interpretation
    E. Final Rule
II. Key Definitions
    A. Reliance on Representations--Generally
    B. U.S. Person, Non-U.S. Person, and United States
     1. Generally
     2. Prongs
     3. Principal Place of Business
     4. Exception for International Financial Institutions
     5. Reliance on Prior Representations
     6. Other
    C. Guarantee
     1. Proposed Rule
     2. Summary of Comments
     3. Final Rule
    D. Significant Risk Subsidiary, Significant Subsidiary, 
Subsidiary, Parent Entity, and U.S. GAAP
     1. Proposed Rule
     2. Summary of Comments
     3. Final Rule and Commission Response
    E. Foreign Branch and Swap Conducted Through a Foreign Branch
     1. Proposed Rule
     2. Summary of Comments
     3. Final Rule and Commission Response
    F. Swap Entity, U.S. Swap Entity, and Non-U.S. Swap Entity
    G. U.S. Branch
    H. Swap Conducted Through a U.S. Branch
     1. Proposed Rule
     2. Summary of Comments
     3. Final Rule--Swap Booked in a U.S. Branch
    I. Foreign-Based Swap and Foreign Counterparty
     1. Proposed Rule
     2. Summary of Comments
     3. Final Rule
III. Cross-Border Application of the Swap Dealer Registration 
Threshold
    A. U.S. Persons
    B. Non-U.S. Persons
     1. Swaps by a Significant Risk Subsidiary
     2. Swaps With a U.S. Person
     3. Guaranteed Swaps
    C. Aggregation Requirement
    D. Certain Exchange-Traded and Cleared Swaps
IV. Cross-Border Application of the Major Swap Participant 
Registration Tests
    A. U.S. Persons
    B. Non-U.S. Persons
     1. Swaps by a Significant Risk Subsidiary
     2. Swap Positions With a U.S. Person
     3. Guaranteed Swap Positions
    C. Attribution Requirement
    D. Certain Exchange-Traded and Cleared Swaps
V. ANE Transactions
    A. Background and Proposed Approach
    B. Summary of Comments
    C. Commission Determination
VI. Exceptions From Group B and Group C Requirements, Substituted 
Compliance for Group A and Group B Requirements, and Comparability 
Determinations
    A. Classification and Application of Certain Regulatory 
Requirements--Group A, Group B, and Group C Requirements
     1. Group A Requirements
     2. Group B Requirements
     3. Group C Requirements
    B. Exceptions From Group B and Group C Requirements
     1. Proposed Exceptions, Generally
     2. Exchange-Traded Exception
     3. Foreign Swap Group C Exception
     4. Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception
     5. Non-U.S. Swap Entity Group B Exception
    C. Substituted Compliance
     1. Proposed Rule
     2. Summary of Comments
     3. Final Rule
    D. Comparability Determinations
     1. Standard of Review
     2. Supervision of Swap Entities Relying on Substituted 
Compliance
     3. Effect on Existing Comparability Determinations
     4. Eligibility Requirements
     5. Submission Requirements
VII. Recordkeeping
VIII. Other Comments
IX. Compliance Dates and Transition Issues
    A. Summary of Comments
    B. Commission Determination
X. Related Matters
    A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act
    C. Cost-Benefit Considerations
    1. Benefits
    2. Assessment Costs
    3. Cross-Border Application of the SD Registration Threshold
    4. Cross-Border Application of the MSP Registration Thresholds
    5. Monitoring Costs
    6. Registration Costs
    7. Programmatic Costs
    8. Exceptions From Group B and Group C Requirements, 
Availability of Substituted Compliance, and Comparability 
Determinations
    9. Recordkeeping
    10. Alternatives Considered
    11. Section 15(a) Factors
    D. Antitrust Laws
XI. Preamble Summary Tables
    A. Table A--Cross-Border Application of the SD De Minimis 
Threshold
    B. Table B--Cross-Border Application of the MSP Threshold
    C. Table C--Cross-Border Application of the Group B Requirements 
in Consideration of Related Exceptions and Substituted Compliance
    D. Table D--Cross-Border Application of the Group C Requirements 
in Consideration of Related Exceptions

[[Page 56925]]

I. Background

A. Statutory Authority and Prior Commission Action

    In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act \1\ amended the CEA \2\ to, among other 
things, establish a new regulatory framework for swaps. Added in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to 
reduce systemic risk, increase transparency, and promote market 
integrity within the financial system. Given the global nature of the 
swap market, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding section 2(i) 
to provide that the swap provisions of the CEA enacted by Title VII of 
the Dodd-Frank Act (``Title VII''), including any rule prescribed or 
regulation promulgated under the CEA, shall not apply to activities 
outside the United States (``U.S.'') unless those activities have a 
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, 
commerce of the United States, or they contravene Commission rules or 
regulations as are necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of the 
swap provisions of the CEA enacted under Title VII.\3\
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    \1\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    \2\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
    \3\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
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    In May 2012, the CFTC and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``SEC'') jointly issued an adopting release that, among other things, 
further defined and provided registration thresholds for SDs and MSPs 
in Sec.  1.3 of the CFTC's regulations (``Entities Rule'').\4\
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    \4\ See 17 CFR 1.3; ``Swap dealer'' and ``Major swap 
participant''; Further Definition of ``Swap Dealer,'' ``Security-
Based Swap Dealer,'' ``Major Swap Participant,'' ``Major Security-
Based Swap Participant'' and ``Eligible Contract Participant,'' 77 
FR 30596 (May 23, 2012). Commission regulations referred to herein 
are found at 17 CFR chapter I.
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    In July 2013, the Commission published interpretive guidance and a 
policy statement regarding the cross-border application of certain swap 
provisions of the CEA (``Guidance'').\5\ The Guidance included the 
Commission's interpretation of the ``direct and significant'' prong of 
section 2(i) of the CEA.\6\ In addition, the Guidance established a 
general, non-binding framework for the cross-border application of many 
substantive Dodd-Frank Act requirements, including registration and 
business conduct requirements for SDs and MSPs, as well as a process 
for making substituted compliance determinations. Given the complex and 
dynamic nature of the global swap market, the Guidance was intended to 
be a flexible and efficient way to provide the Commission's views on 
cross-border issues raised by market participants, allowing the 
Commission to adapt in response to changes in the global regulatory and 
market landscape.\7\ The Commission accordingly stated that it would 
review and modify its cross-border policies as the global swap market 
continued to evolve and consider codifying the cross-border application 
of the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions in future rulemakings, as 
appropriate.\8\ At the time that it adopted the Guidance, the 
Commission was tasked with regulating a market that grew to a global 
scale without any meaningful regulation in the United States or 
overseas, and the United States was the first member country of the 
Group of 20 (``G20'') to adopt most of the swap reforms agreed to at 
the G20 Pittsburgh Summit in 2009.\9\ Developing a regulatory framework 
to fit that market necessarily requires adapting and responding to 
changes in the global market, including developments resulting from 
requirements imposed on market participants under the Dodd-Frank Act 
and the Commission's implementing regulations in the U.S., as well as 
those that have been imposed by non-U.S. regulatory authorities since 
the Guidance was issued.
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    \5\ See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 26, 
2013).
    \6\ Id. at 45297-45301. The Commission is now restating this 
interpretation, as discussed in section I.D.2 infra.
    \7\ Id. at 45297 n.39.
    \8\ See id.
    \9\ See G20 Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, A 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth (Sep. 24-25, 
2009), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
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    On November 14, 2013, DSIO issued a staff advisory (``ANE Staff 
Advisory'') stating that a non-U.S. SD that regularly uses personnel or 
agents located in the United States to arrange, negotiate, or execute a 
swap with a non-U.S. person (``ANE Transactions'') would generally be 
required to comply with ``Transaction-Level Requirements,'' as the term 
was used in the Guidance (discussed in section V.A).\10\ On November 
26, 2013, Commission staff issued certain no-action relief to non-U.S. 
SDs registered with the Commission from these requirements in 
connection with ANE Transactions (``ANE No-Action Relief'').\11\ In 
January 2014, the Commission published a request for comment on all 
aspects of the ANE Staff Advisory (``ANE Request for Comment'').\12\
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    \10\ See CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69, Applicability of 
Transaction-Level Requirements to Activity in the United States 
(Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-69.pdf. All Commission staff 
letters are available at https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/CFTCStaffLetters/index.htm.
    \11\ CFTC Staff Letter No. 13-71, No-Action Relief: Certain 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-U.S. Swap Dealers (Nov. 26, 
2013), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/13-71/download. 
Commission staff subsequently extended this relief in CFTC Letter 
Nos. 14-01, 14-74, 14-140, 15-48, 16-64, and 17-36.
    \12\ Request for Comment on Application of Commission 
Regulations to Swaps Between Non-U.S. Swap Dealers and Non-U.S. 
Counterparties Involving Personnel or Agents of the Non-U.S. Swap 
Dealers Located in the United States, 79 FR 1347, 1348-49 (Jan. 8, 
2014).
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    In May 2016, the Commission issued a final rule on the cross-border 
application of the Commission's margin requirements for uncleared swaps 
(``Cross-Border Margin Rule'').\13\ Among other things, the Cross-
Border Margin Rule addressed the availability of substituted compliance 
by outlining the circumstances under which certain SDs and MSPs could 
satisfy the Commission's margin requirements for uncleared swaps by 
complying with comparable foreign margin requirements. The Cross-Border 
Margin Rule also established a framework by which the Commission 
assesses whether a foreign jurisdiction's margin requirements are 
comparable.
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    \13\ Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers 
and Major Swap Participants--Cross-Border Application of the Margin 
Requirements, 81 FR 34818 (May 31, 2016).
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    In October 2016, the Commission proposed regulations regarding the 
cross-border application of certain requirements under the Dodd-Frank 
Act regulatory framework for SDs and MSPs (``2016 Proposal'').\14\ The 
2016 Proposal incorporated various aspects of the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule and addressed when U.S. and non-U.S. persons, such as foreign 
consolidated subsidiaries (``FCSs'') and non-U.S. persons whose swap 
obligations are guaranteed by a U.S. person, would be required to 
include swaps or swap positions in their SD or MSP registration 
threshold calculations, respectively.\15\ The 2016 Proposal also 
addressed the extent to which SDs and MSPs would be required to comply 
with the Commission's business conduct standards governing their 
conduct with swap counterparties (``external business conduct 
standards'') in cross-border

[[Page 56926]]

transactions.\16\ In addition, the 2016 Proposal addressed ANE 
Transactions, including the types of activities that would constitute 
arranging, negotiating, and executing within the context of the 2016 
Proposal, the treatment of such transactions with respect to the SD 
registration threshold, and the application of external business 
conduct standards with respect to such transactions.\17\
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    \14\ Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and 
External Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 71946 (proposed Oct. 18, 2016).
    \15\ Id. at 71947. As noted above, the SD and MSP registration 
thresholds are codified in the definitions of those terms at 17 CFR 
1.3.
    \16\ Id. The Commission's external business conduct standards 
are codified in 17 CFR part 23, subpart H (17 CFR 23.400 through 
23.451).
    \17\ 2016 Proposal, 81 FR at 71947.
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B. Proposed Rule and Brief Summary of Comments Received

    In January 2020, the Commission published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (``Proposed Rule''), which proposed to: (1) Address the 
cross-border application of the registration thresholds and certain 
requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs; and (2) establish a formal 
process for requesting comparability determinations for such 
requirements from the Commission.\18\ In the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission also withdrew the 2016 Proposal, stating that the Proposed 
Rule reflected the Commission's current views on the matters addressed 
in the 2016 Proposal, which had evolved since the 2016 Proposal as a 
result of market and regulatory developments in the swap markets and in 
the interest of international comity.\19\ The Commission requested 
comments generally on all aspects of the Proposed Rule and on many 
specific questions.
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    \18\ Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and 
Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 85 FR 952 (proposed Jan. 8, 2020).
    \19\ Id. at 954.
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    The Commission received 18 relevant comment letters.\20\ Though AFR 
and IATP did not support the Commission adopting the Proposed Rule in 
its entirety, most commenters were supportive of the Proposed Rule, 
generally, or supportive of specific elements of the Proposed Rule. 
However, many of these commenters suggested modifications to portions 
of the Proposed Rule, which are discussed in the relevant sections 
discussing the Final Rule below. In addition, several commenters 
requested Commission action beyond the scope of the Proposed Rule.\21\ 
Further, IIB/SIFMA requested that the Commission re-visit in the Final 
Rule the applicability of the Commission's cross-border uncleared swap 
margin requirements that were addressed in the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule. The Commission addressed those requirements in the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule, did not propose modifying them in the Proposed Rule, and 
therefore is not making any changes to the Cross-Border Margin Rule in 
this Final Rule.
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    \20\ The Commission received comments from Alternative 
Investment Management Association (``AIMA''); Americans for 
Financial Reform Education Fund (``AFR''); Associated Foreign 
Exchange, Inc. & GPS Capital Markets, Inc. (``AFEX/GPS''); Chris 
Barnard (``Barnard''); Better Markets, Inc. (``Better Markets''); 
BGC Partners & Tradition America Holdings, Inc. (``BGC/Tradition''); 
Chatham Financial (``Chatham''); Citadel (``Citadel''); Commercial 
Energy Working Group (``Working Group''); Credit Suisse (``CS''); 
Futures Industry Association (``FIA''); Japan Financial Markets 
Council & International Bankers Association of Japan (``JFMC/
IBAJ''); Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (``IATP''); 
Institute of International Bankers & Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (``IIB/SIFMA''); International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (``ISDA''); Japanese Bankers Association 
(``JBA''); Japan Securities Clearing Corporation (``JSCC''); and 
State Street Corporation (``State Street''). The Commission also 
received letters from PT Arba Sinar Jaya, Robert Ware (UIUC), and 
William Harrington that were not relevant to the Proposed Rule. All 
comments on the Proposed Rule are available at https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=3067.
    \21\ See infra section VIII for a discussion of these comments.
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C. Global Regulatory and Market Structure

    As noted in the Proposed Rule, the regulatory landscape is far 
different now than it was when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in 
2010.\22\ When the CFTC published the Guidance in 2013, very few 
jurisdictions had made significant progress in implementing the global 
swap reforms to which the G20 leaders agreed at the Pittsburgh G20 
Summit. Today, however, as a result of the cumulative implementation 
efforts by regulators throughout the world, significant progress has 
been made in the world's primary swap trading jurisdictions to 
implement the G20 commitments.\23\ Since the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act, regulators in a number of large developed markets have 
adopted regulatory regimes that are designed to mitigate systemic risks 
associated with a global swap market. These regimes include central 
clearing requirements, margin requirements for non-centrally cleared 
derivatives, and other risk mitigation requirements.\24\
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    \22\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 954-955.
    \23\ See, e.g., Financial Stability Board (``FSB''), OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms: 2019 Progress Report on Implementation 
(Oct. 15, 2019) (``2019 FSB Progress Report''), available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P151019.pdf; FSB, Implementation and 
Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms: Fourth Annual 
Report (Nov. 28, 2018), available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P281118-1.pdf.
    \24\ For example, at the end of September 2019, 16 FSB member 
jurisdictions had comprehensive swap margin requirements in force. 
See 2019 FSB Progress Report, at 2.
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    Many swaps involve at least one counterparty that is located in the 
United States or another jurisdiction that has adopted comprehensive 
swap regulations.\25\ Conflicting and duplicative requirements between 
U.S. and foreign regimes can contribute to potential market 
inefficiencies and regulatory arbitrage, as well as competitive 
disparities that undermine the relative positions of U.S. SDs and their 
counterparties. This may result in market fragmentation, which can lead 
to significant inefficiencies that result in additional costs to end-
users and other market participants. Market fragmentation can also 
reduce the capacity of financial firms to serve both domestic and 
international customers.\26\ The Final Rule supports a cross-border 
framework that promotes the integrity, resilience, and vibrancy of the 
swap market while furthering the important policy goals of the Dodd-
Frank Act. In that regard, it is important to consider how market 
practices have evolved since the publication of the Guidance. As 
certain market participants may have conformed their practices to the 
Guidance, the Final Rule will ideally cause limited additional costs 
and burdens for these market participants, while supporting the 
continued operation of markets that are much more comprehensively 
regulated than they were before the Dodd-Frank Act and the actions of 
governments worldwide taken in response to the Pittsburgh G20 Summit.
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    \25\ See, e.g., 2019 FSB Progress Report; Bank of International 
Settlements (``BIS''), Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange and Over-the-counter Derivatives Markets in 2019 (Sep. 16, 
2019), available at https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx19.htm.
    \26\ See, e.g., Institute of International Finance, Addressing 
Market Fragmentation: The Need for Enhanced Global Regulatory 
Cooperation (Jan. 2019), available at https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/IIF%20FSB%20Fragmentation%20Report.pdf.
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    The approach described below is informed by the Commission's 
understanding of current market practices of global financial 
institutions under the Guidance. For business and regulatory reasons, a 
financial group that is active in the swap market often operates in 
multiple market centers around the world and carries out swap activity 
with geographically-diverse counterparties using a number of different 
operational structures.\27\

[[Page 56927]]

Financial groups often prefer to operate their swap dealing businesses 
and manage their swap portfolios in the jurisdiction where the swaps 
and the underlying assets have the deepest and most liquid markets. In 
operating their swap dealing businesses in these market centers, 
financial groups seek to take advantage of expertise in products traded 
in those centers and obtain access to greater liquidity. These 
arrangements permit them to price products more efficiently and compete 
more effectively in the global swap market, including in jurisdictions 
different from the market center in which the swap is traded.
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    \27\ See BIS, Committee on the Global Financial System, No. 46, 
The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for 
access to central counterparties in OTC derivatives markets, at 1 
(Nov. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs46.pdf 
(stating that ``[t]he configuration of access must take account of 
the globalised nature of the market, in which a significant 
proportion of OTC derivatives trading is undertaken across 
borders'').
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    In this sense, a global financial enterprise effectively operates 
as a single business, with a highly integrated network of business 
lines and services conducted through various branches or affiliated 
legal entities that are under the control of the parent entity.\28\ 
Branches and affiliates in a global financial enterprise are highly 
interdependent, with separate entities in the group providing financial 
or credit support to each other, such as in the form of a guarantee or 
the ability to transfer risk through inter-affiliate trades or other 
offsetting transactions. Even in the absence of an explicit arrangement 
or guarantee, a parent entity may, for reputational or other reasons, 
choose to assume the risk incurred by its affiliates located overseas. 
Swaps are also traded by an entity in one jurisdiction, but booked and 
risk-managed by an affiliate in another jurisdiction. The Final Rule 
recognizes that these and similar arrangements among global financial 
enterprises create channels through which swap-related risks can have a 
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, 
commerce of the United States.
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    \28\ The largest U.S. banks have thousands of affiliated global 
entities, as shown in data from the National Information Center 
(``NIC''), a repository of financial data and institutional 
characteristics of banks and other institutions for which the 
Federal Reserve Board has a supervisory, regulatory, or research 
interest. See NIC, available at https://www.ffiec.gov/npw.
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D. Interpretation of CEA Section 2(i)

1. Proposed Rule and Discussion of Comments
    The Proposed Rule set forth the Commission's interpretation of CEA 
section 2(i), which mirrored the approach that the Commission took in 
the Guidance.
    Several commenters provided their views on the Commission's 
interpretation of CEA section 2(i). Better Markets agreed with the 
Commission's description of the Commission's authority to regulate 
swaps activities outside of the United States, recognizing that CEA 
section 2(i)'s mandatory exclusion of only certain, limited non-U.S. 
activities (i.e., those that do not have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce) evidences 
clear congressional intent to preserve jurisdiction with respect to 
others. Better Markets stated its belief that this reflects an intent 
to ensure U.S. law broadly applies to non-U.S. activities having 
requisite U.S. connections or effects. Better Markets argued, however, 
that the Commission does not have the discretion to determine whether 
and when to apply U.S. regulatory requirements based on vague 
principles of international comity, stating that the Commission has not 
cited a legally valid basis for its repeated reliance on international 
comity, where it simultaneously acknowledges direct and significant 
risks to the U.S. financial system.
    BGC/Tradition supported the Commission's analysis related to CEA 
section 2(i) and what constitutes ``direct and significant.'' 
Specifically, BGC/Tradition agreed that the appropriate approach is 
``to apply the swap provisions of the CEA to activities outside the 
United States that have either: (1) A direct and significant effect on 
U.S. commerce; or, in the alternative, (2) a direct and significant 
connection with activities in U.S. commerce, and through such 
connection present the type of risks to the U.S. financial system and 
markets that Title VII directed the Commission to address.''
    IIB/SIFMA discussed the Commission's interpretation of ``direct'' 
in CEA section 2(i) and argued that the Commission should have followed 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the ``direct effect'' test found 
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which the Court has 
interpreted to be satisfied only by conduct abroad that has ``an 
immediate consequence'' in the United States.\29\ IIB/SIFMA argued that 
a case cited by the Commission as a factor in its interpretation, the 
Seventh Circuit en banc decision in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 
was based on considerations that are relevant to the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (``FTAIA''),\30\--but not section 
2(i)--namely that (a) because the FTAIA includes the word 
``foreseeable'' along with ``direct,'' the word ``direct'' should be 
interpreted as part of an integrated phrase that includes 
``foreseeable'' effects, and (b) the FTAIA already addresses foreign 
conduct that has an immediate consequence in the United States through 
its separate provision for import commerce.\31\ But, IIB/SIFMA argued, 
CEA section 2(i) does not include the word ``foreseeable,'' nor does it 
include any other provisions addressing foreign conduct that have an 
immediate consequence within the United States, so the Minn-Chem 
Court's reasoning does not support the Commission's decision to 
discount the Supreme Court's interpretation of the word ``direct'' in 
Weltover.
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    \29\ See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 
(1992).
    \30\ 15 U.S.C. 6a.
    \31\ See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th 
Cir. 2012).
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    IATP argued that the Commission did not provide a sufficient 
``international comity'' argument to justify deviating from the plain 
meaning of ``direct,'' nor a sufficient argument to rely on FTAIA case 
law to interpret ``direct.'' IATP stated its belief that the 
Commission's reliance on cross-border anti-trust trade law to interpret 
its statutory authority under CEA section 2(i) is an inconsistent and 
unreliable foundation for a rule that proposes no measures to prevent 
or discipline SDs' unreasonable restraint of trade. IATP recommended 
that the Commission abandon its ``restatement'' of its CEA section 2(i) 
authority and rely on a plain reading of CEA section 2(i).
    In response to Better Markets' contention that the Commission does 
not have the discretion to determine whether and when to apply U.S. 
regulatory requirements based on principles of international comity 
where it simultaneously acknowledges direct and significant risks to 
the U.S. financial system, the Commission has followed the Restatement 
of Foreign Relations law in striving to minimize conflicts with the 
laws of other jurisdictions while seeking, pursuant to CEA section 
2(i), to apply the swaps requirements of Title VII to activities 
outside the United States that have a direct and significant connection 
with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce. The Commission has 
determined that the rule appropriately accounts for these competing 
interests, ensuring that the Commission can discharge its 
responsibilities to protect the U.S. markets, market participants, and 
financial system, consistent with international comity, as set forth in 
the Restatement.
    With respect to IIB/SIFMA's contention that the Commission erred in 
its interpretation of the meaning of ``direct'' in CEA section 2(i), 
IIB/SIFMA incorrectly asserted that the

[[Page 56928]]

Commission relied on the Seventh Circuit en banc decision in Minn-Chem, 
Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. Rather, the Commission was clear that its 
interpretation of CEA section 2(i) is not reliant on the reasoning of 
any individual judicial decision, but instead is drawn from a holistic 
understanding of both the statutory text and legal analysis applied by 
courts to analogous statutes and circumstances, specifically noting 
that the Commission's interpretation of CEA section 2(i) is not solely 
dependent on one's view of the Seventh Circuit's Minn-Chem 
decision,\32\ but informed by its overall understanding of the relevant 
legal principles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 956.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission disagrees with IATP's advice that the 
Commission should abandon its interpretation of CEA section 2(i) and 
proceed with a ``plain reading'' of the statute. The Commission 
believes that IATP's assertion that the extraterritorial provisions of 
FTAIA and the case law construing such provisions are not relevant to 
CEA section 2(i) because the rule is not concerned with the regulation 
of anti-competitive behavior misconstrues the use that the Commission's 
interpretation has made of the Federal case law construing the meaning 
of the word ``direct'' in CEA section 2(i).\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See infra notes 41-51, and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Final Interpretation
    In light of the foregoing, the Commission is restating its 
interpretation of section 2(i) of the CEA with its adoption of the 
Final Rule in substantially the same form as appeared in the Proposed 
Rule.
    CEA section 2(i) provides that the swap provisions of Title VII 
shall not apply to activities outside the United States unless those 
activities--
     Have a direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States; or
     Contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe or promulgate as are necessary or appropriate to prevent the 
evasion of any provision of the CEA that was enacted by the Dodd-Frank 
Act.
    The Commission believes that section 2(i) provides it express 
authority over swap activities outside the United States when certain 
conditions are met, but it does not require the Commission to extend 
its reach to the outer bounds of that authorization. Rather, in 
exercising its authority with respect to swap activities outside the 
United States, the Commission will be guided by international comity 
principles and will focus its authority on potential significant risks 
to the U.S. financial system.
(i) Statutory Analysis
    In interpreting the phrase ``direct and significant,'' the 
Commission has examined the plain language of the statutory provision, 
similar language in other statutes with cross-border application, and 
the legislative history of section 2(i).
    The statutory language in CEA section 2(i) is structured similarly 
to the statutory language in the FTAIA,\34\ which provides the standard 
for the cross-border application of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(``Sherman Act'').\35\ The FTAIA, like CEA section 2(i), excludes 
certain non-U.S. commercial transactions from the reach of U.S. law. 
Specifically, the FTAIA provides that the antitrust provisions of the 
Sherman Act shall not apply to anti-competitive conduct involving trade 
or commerce with foreign nations.\36\ However, like paragraph (1) of 
CEA section 2(i), the FTAIA also creates exceptions to the general 
exclusionary rule and thus brings back within antitrust coverage any 
conduct that: (1) Has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect on U.S. commerce; \37\ and (2) such effect gives rise to a 
Sherman Act claim.\38\ In F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that ``this technical language initially 
lays down a general rule placing all (nonimport) activity involving 
foreign commerce outside the Sherman Act's reach. It then brings such 
conduct back within the Sherman Act's reach provided that the conduct 
both (1) sufficiently affects American commerce, i.e., it has a 
`direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' on American 
domestic, import, or (certain) export commerce, and (2) has an effect 
of a kind that antitrust law considers harmful, i.e., the `effect' must 
`giv[e] rise to a [Sherman Act] claim.' '' \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ 15 U.S.C. 6a.
    \35\ 15 U.S.C. 1-7.
    \36\ 15 U.S.C. 6a.
    \37\ 15 U.S.C. 6a(1).
    \38\ 15 U.S.C. 6a(2).
    \39\ 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004) (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is appropriate, therefore, to read section 2(i) of the CEA as a 
clear expression of congressional intent that the swap provisions of 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act apply to activities beyond the borders 
of the United States when certain circumstances are present.\40\ These 
circumstances include, pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 2(i), when 
activities outside the United States meet the statutory test of having 
a ``direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on,'' U.S. commerce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F.Supp.3d 373, 425-26 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(``The plain text of this provision `clearly expresse[s]' Congress's 
`affirmative intention' to give extraterritorial effect to Title 
VII's statutory requirements, as well as to the Title VII rules or 
regulations prescribed by the CFTC, whenever the provision's 
jurisdictional nexus is satisfied.''). See also Prime Int'l Trading, 
Ltd. v. BP P.L.C., 937 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that 
``Section 2(i) contains, on its face, a `clear statement,' Morrison, 
561 U.S. at 265, 130 S.Ct. 2869, of extraterritorial application'' 
and describing it as ``an enumerated extraterritorial command'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An examination of the language in the FTAIA, however, does not 
provide an unambiguous roadmap for the Commission in interpreting 
section 2(i) of the CEA because there are both similarities, and a 
number of significant differences, between the language in CEA section 
2(i) and the language in the FTAIA. Further, the Supreme Court has not 
provided definitive guidance as to the meaning of the direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable test in the FTAIA, and the 
lower courts have interpreted the individual terms in the FTAIA 
differently.
    Although a number of courts have interpreted the various terms in 
the FTAIA, only the term ``direct'' appears in both CEA section 2(i) 
and the FTAIA.\41\ Relying upon the Supreme Court's definition of the 
term ``direct'' in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (``FSIA''),\42\ 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed the term 
``direct'' in the FTAIA as requiring a ``relationship of logical 
causation,'' \43\ such that ``an effect is `direct' if it follows as an 
immediate consequence of the defendant's activity.'' \44\ However, in 
an en banc decision, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that ``the Ninth Circuit jumped 
too quickly on the assumption that the FSIA and the FTAIA use the word 
`direct' in the same way.'' \45\ After examining the text of the FTAIA 
as well as its history and

[[Page 56929]]

purpose, the Seventh Circuit found persuasive the ``other school of 
thought [that] has been articulated by the Department of Justice's 
Antitrust Division, which takes the position that, for FTAIA purposes, 
the term `direct' means only `a reasonably proximate causal nexus.' '' 
\46\ The Seventh Circuit rejected interpretations of the term 
``direct'' that included any requirement that the consequences be 
foreseeable, substantial, or immediate.\47\ In 2014, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the reasoning of the Seventh 
Circuit in the Minn-Chem decision.\48\ That said, the Commission would 
like to make clear that its interpretation of CEA section 2(i) is not 
reliant on the reasoning of any individual judicial decision, but 
instead is drawn from a holistic understanding of both the statutory 
text and legal analysis applied by courts to analogous statutes and 
circumstances. In short, as the discussion below will illustrate, the 
Commission's interpretation of section 2(i) is not solely dependent on 
one's view of the Seventh Circuit's Minn-Chem decision, but informed by 
its overall understanding of the relevant legal principles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45299.
    \42\ See 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2).
    \43\ United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 693 
(9th Cir. 2004). ``As a threshold matter, many courts have debated 
whether the FTAIA established a new jurisdictional standard or 
merely codified the standard applied in [United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)] and its progeny. Several 
courts have raised this question without answering it. The Supreme 
Court did as much in [Harford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764 (1993)].'' Id. at 678.
    \44\ Id. at 692-93, quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (providing that, pursuant to the 
FSIA, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), immunity does not extend to commercial 
conduct outside the United States that ``causes a direct effect in 
the United States'').
    \45\ Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
    \46\ Id.
    \47\ Id. at 856-57.
    \48\ Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., 753 F.3d 
395, 406-08 (2d Cir. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other terms in the FTAIA differ from the terms used in section 2(i) 
of the CEA. First, the FTAIA test explicitly requires that the effect 
on U.S. commerce be a ``reasonably foreseeable'' result of the 
conduct,\49\ whereas section 2(i) of the CEA, by contrast, does not 
provide that the effect on U.S. commerce must be foreseeable. Second, 
whereas the FTAIA solely relies on the ``effects'' on U.S. commerce to 
determine cross-border application of the Sherman Act, section 2(i) of 
the CEA refers to both ``effect'' and ``connection.'' ``The FTAIA says 
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign `conduct' with a certain kind 
of harmful domestic effect.'' \50\ Section 2(i), by contrast, applies 
more broadly--not only to particular instances of conduct that have an 
effect on U.S. commerce, but also to activities that have a direct and 
significant ``connection with activities in'' U.S. commerce. Unlike the 
FTAIA, section 2(i) applies the swap provisions of the CEA to 
activities outside the United States that have the requisite connection 
with activities in U.S. commerce, regardless of whether a ``harmful 
domestic effect'' has occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See, e.g., Animal Sciences Products. v. China Minmetals 
Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2011) (``[T]he FTAIA's `reasonably 
foreseeable' language imposes an objective standard: the requisite 
`direct' and `substantial' effect must have been `foreseeable' to an 
objectively reasonable person.'').
    \50\ Hoffman-LaRoche, 452 U.S. at 173.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the foregoing textual analysis of the relevant statutory 
language indicates, section 2(i) differs from its analogue in the 
antitrust laws. Congress delineated the cross-border scope of the 
Sherman Act in section 6a of the FTAIA as applying to conduct that has 
a ``direct,'' ``substantial,'' and ``reasonably foreseeable'' 
``effect'' on U.S. commerce. In section 2(i), on the other hand, 
Congress did not include a requirement that the effects or connections 
of the activities outside the United States be ``reasonably 
foreseeable'' for the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions to apply. Further, 
Congress included language in section 2(i) to apply the Dodd-Frank Act 
swap provisions in circumstances in which there is a direct and 
significant connection with activities in U.S. commerce, regardless of 
whether there is an effect on U.S. commerce. The different words that 
Congress used in paragraph (1) of section 2(i), as compared to its 
closest statutory analogue in section 6a of the FTAIA, inform the 
Commission in construing the boundaries of its cross-border authority 
over swap activities under the CEA.\51\ Accordingly, the Commission 
believes it is appropriate to interpret section 2(i) such that it 
applies to activities outside the United States in circumstances in 
addition to those that would be reached under the FTAIA standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ The provision that ultimately became section 722(d) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was added during consideration of the legislation in 
the House of Representatives. See 155 Cong. Rec. H14685 (Dec. 10, 
2009). The version of what became Title VII that was reported by the 
House Agriculture Committee and the House Financial Services 
Committee did not include any provision addressing cross-border 
application. See 155 Cong. Rec. H14549 (Dec. 10, 2009). The 
Commission finds it significant that, in adding the cross-border 
provision before final passage, the House did so in terms that, as 
discussed in text, were different from, and broader than, the terms 
used in the analogous provision of the FTAIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of the principal rationales for the Dodd-Frank Act was the need 
for a comprehensive scheme of systemic risk regulation. More 
particularly, a primary purpose of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act is 
to address risk to the U.S. financial system created by 
interconnections in the swap market.\52\ Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act gave the Commission new and broad authority to regulate the swap 
market to address and mitigate risks arising from swap activities that 
could adversely affect the resiliency of the financial system in the 
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Cf. 156 Cong. Rec. S5818 (July 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Lincoln) (``In 2008, our Nation's economy was on the brink of 
collapse. America was being held captive by a financial system that 
was so interconnected, so large, and so irresponsible that our 
economy and our way of life were about to be destroyed.''), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-14/pdf/CREC-2010-07-14.pdf; 156 Cong. Rec. S5888 (July 15, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Shaheen) (``We need to put in place reforms to stop Wall Street 
firms from growing so big and so interconnected that they can 
threaten our entire economy.''), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-15/pdf/CREC-2010-07-15-senate.pdf; 156 Cong. 
Rec. S5905 (July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Stabenow) (``For too 
long the over-the-counter derivatives market has been unregulated, 
transferring risk between firms and creating a web of fragility in a 
system where entities became too interconnected to fail.''), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-15/pdf/CREC-2010-07-15-senate.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In global markets, the source of such risk is not confined to 
activities within U.S. borders. Due to the interconnectedness between 
firms, traders, and markets in the U.S. and abroad, a firm's failure, 
or trading losses overseas, can quickly spill over to the United States 
and affect activities in U.S. commerce and the stability of the U.S. 
financial system. Accordingly, Congress explicitly provided for cross-
border application of Title VII to activities outside the United States 
that pose risks to the U.S. financial system.\53\ Therefore, the 
Commission construes section 2(i) to apply the swap provisions of the 
CEA to activities outside the United States that have either: (1) A 
direct and significant effect on U.S. commerce; or, in the alternative, 
(2) a direct and significant connection with activities in U.S. 
commerce, and through such connection present the

[[Page 56930]]

type of risks to the U.S. financial system and markets that Title VII 
directed the Commission to address. The Commission interprets section 
2(i) in a manner consistent with the overall goal of the Dodd-Frank Act 
to reduce risks to the resiliency and integrity of the U.S. financial 
system arising from swap market activities.\54\ Consistent with this 
interpretation, the Commission interprets the term ``direct'' in 
section 2(i) to require a reasonably proximate causal nexus, and not to 
require foreseeability, substantiality, or immediacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ The legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act shows that in 
the fall of 2009, neither the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 
Act of 2009, H.R. 3795, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), reported by 
the Financial Services Committee chaired by Rep. Barney Frank, nor 
the Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, 
H.R. 977, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), reported by the Agriculture 
Committee chaired by Rep. Collin Peterson, included a general 
territoriality limitation that would have restricted Commission 
regulation of transactions between two foreign persons located 
outside of the United States. During the House Financial Services 
Committee markup on October 14, 2009, Rep. Spencer Bachus offered an 
amendment that would have restricted the jurisdiction of the 
Commission over swaps between non-U.S. resident persons transacted 
without the use of the mails or any other means or instrumentality 
of interstate commerce. Chairman Frank opposed the amendment, noting 
that there may well be cases where non-U.S. residents are engaging 
in transactions that have an effect on the United States and that 
are insufficiently regulated internationally and that he would not 
want to prevent U.S. regulators from stepping in. Chairman Frank 
expressed his commitment to work with Rep. Bachus going forward, and 
Rep. Bachus withdrew the amendment. See H. Fin. Serv. Comm. Mark Up 
on Discussion Draft of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act 
of 2009, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 14, 2009) (statements of Rep. 
Bachus and Rep. Frank), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=231922.
    \54\ The Commission also notes that the Supreme Court has 
indicated that the FTAIA may be interpreted more broadly when the 
government is seeking to protect the public from anticompetitive 
conduct than when a private plaintiff brings suit. See Hoffman-
LaRoche, 452 U.S. at 170 (``A Government plaintiff, unlike a private 
plaintiff, must seek to obtain the relief necessary to protect the 
public from further anticompetitive conduct and to redress 
anticompetitive harm. And a Government plaintiff has legal authority 
broad enough to allow it to carry out its mission.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Commission does not interpret section 2(i) to require 
a transaction-by-transaction determination that a specific swap outside 
the United States has a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States to apply the 
swap provisions of the CEA to such transaction. Rather, it is the 
connection of swap activities, viewed as a class or in the aggregate, 
to activities in commerce of the United States that must be assessed to 
determine whether application of the CEA swap provisions is 
warranted.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ The Commission believes this interpretation is supported by 
Congress's use of the plural term ``activities'' in CEA section 
2(i), rather than the singular term ``activity.'' The Commission 
believes it is reasonable to interpret the use of the plural term 
``activities'' in section 2(i) to require not that each particular 
activity have the requisite connection with U.S. commerce, but 
rather that such activities in the aggregate, or a class of 
activity, have the requisite nexus with U.S. commerce. This 
interpretation is consistent with the overall objectives of Title 
VII, as described above. Further, the Commission believes that a 
swap-by-swap approach to jurisdiction would be ``too complex to 
prove workable.'' See Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar interpretations of other federal statutes regulating 
interstate commerce support the Commission's interpretation here. For 
example, the Supreme Court has long supported a similar ``aggregate 
effects'' approach when analyzing the reach of U.S. authority under the 
Commerce Clause.\56\ The Court phrased the holding in the seminal 
``aggregate effects'' decision, Wickard v. Filburn,\57\ in this way: 
``[The farmer's] decision, when considered in the aggregate along with 
similar decisions of others, would have had a substantial effect on the 
interstate market for wheat.'' \58\ In another relevant decision, 
Gonzales v. Raich,\59\ the Court adopted similar reasoning to uphold 
the application of the Controlled Substances Act \60\ to prohibit the 
intrastate use of medical marijuana for medicinal purposes. In Raich, 
the Court held that Congress could regulate purely intrastate activity 
if the failure to do so would ``leave a gaping hole'' in the federal 
regulatory structure. These cases support the Commission's cross-border 
authority over swap activities that as a class, or in the aggregate, 
have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on, U.S. commerce--whether or not an individual swap may satisfy the 
statutory standard.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 
(2012).
    \57\ 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
    \58\ 567 U.S. at 552-53. At issue in Wickard was the regulation 
of a farmer's production and use of wheat even though the wheat was 
``not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption 
on the farm.'' 317 U.S. at 118. The Supreme Court upheld the 
application of the regulation, stating that although the farmer's 
``own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by 
itself,'' the federal regulation could be applied when his 
contribution ``taken together with that of many others similarly 
situated, is far from trivial.'' Id. at 128-29. The Court also 
stated it had ``no doubt that Congress may properly have considered 
that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the 
scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating 
and obstructing its purpose . . ..'' Id.
    \59\ 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
    \60\ 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
    \61\ In Sebelius, the Court stated in dicta, ``Where the class 
of activities is regulated, and that class is within the reach of 
federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, 
individual instances of the class.'' 567 U.S. at 551 (quoting Perez 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)). See also Taylor v. 
U.S.136 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2016) (``[A]ctivities . . . that 
``substantially affect'' commerce . . . may be regulated so long as 
they substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, even 
if their individual impact on interstate commerce is minimal.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Principles of International Comity
    Principles of international comity counsel the government in one 
country to act reasonably in exercising its jurisdiction with respect 
to activity that takes place in another country. Statutes should be 
construed to ``avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign 
authority of other nations.'' \62\ This rule of construction ``reflects 
customary principles of international law'' and ``helps the potentially 
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony--a 
harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial 
world.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164.
    \63\ Id. at 165.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States,\64\ together with the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States \65\ (collectively, the ``Restatement''), 
states that a country has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to 
``conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory.'' \66\ The Restatement also 
counsels that even where a country has a basis for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it should not prescribe law with respect to a person or 
activity in another country when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Restatement (Third) section 402 cmt. d (1987).
    \65\ Julian Ku, American Law Institute Approves First Portions 
of Restatement on Foreign Relations Law (Fourth), OpinioJuris.com, 
May 22, 2017, http://opiniojuris.org/2017/05/22/american-law-institute-approves-first-portions-of-restatement-on-foreign-relations-law-fourth/; Jennifer Morinigo, U.S. Foreign Relations 
Law, Jurisdiction Approved, ALI Adviser, May 22, 2017, http://www.thealiadviser.org/us-foreign-relations-law/jurisdiction-approved/; Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law Intro. 
(Westlaw 2018) (explaining that ``this is only a partial revision'' 
of the Third Restatement).
    \66\ Restatement (Fourth) section 409 (Westlaw 2018).
    \67\ Restatement (Fourth) section 405 cmt. a (Westlaw 2018); see 
id. at section 407 Reporters' Note 3 (``Reasonableness, in the sense 
of showing a genuine connection, is an important touchstone for 
determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is permissible under 
international law.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a general matter, the Fourth Restatement indicates that the 
concept of reasonableness as it relates to foreign relations law is ``a 
principle of statutory interpretation'' that ``operates in conjunction 
with other principles of statutory interpretation.'' \68\ More 
specifically, the Fourth Restatement characterizes the inquiry into the 
reasonableness of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction as an 
examination into whether ``a genuine connection exists between the 
state seeking to regulate and the persons, property, or conduct being 
regulated.'' \69\ The Restatement explicitly indicates that the 
``genuine connection'' between the state and the person, property, or 
conduct to be regulated can derive from the effects of the particular 
conduct or activities in question.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Id. at section 405 cmt. a.
    \69\ Id. at section 407 cmt. a; see id. at section 407 
Reporters' Note 3.
    \70\ Id. at section 407.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the Restatement, the Commission has carefully 
considered, among other things, the level of the foreign jurisdiction's 
supervisory interests over the subject activity and the extent to which 
the activity takes place within the foreign territory. In doing so, the 
Commission has strived to

[[Page 56931]]

minimize conflicts with the laws of other jurisdictions while seeking, 
pursuant to section 2(i), to apply the swaps requirements of Title VII 
to activities outside the United States that have a direct and 
significant connection with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce.
    The Commission believes the Final Rule appropriately accounts for 
these competing interests, ensuring that the Commission can discharge 
its responsibilities to protect the U.S. markets, market participants, 
and financial system, consistent with international comity, as set 
forth in the Restatement. Of particular relevance is the Commission's 
approach to substituted compliance in the Final Rule, which mitigates 
burdens associated with potentially conflicting foreign laws and 
regulations in light of the supervisory interests of foreign regulators 
in entities domiciled and operating in their own jurisdictions.

E. Final Rule

    The Final Rule identifies which cross-border swaps or swap 
positions a person will need to consider when determining whether it 
needs to register with the Commission as an SD or MSP, as well as 
related classifications of swap market participants and swaps (e.g., 
U.S. person, foreign branch, swap conducted through a foreign 
branch).\71\ Further, the Commission is adopting several tailored 
exceptions from, and a substituted compliance process for, certain 
regulations applicable to registered SDs and MSPs. The Final Rule also 
creates a framework for comparability determinations for such 
regulations that emphasizes a holistic, outcomes-based approach that is 
grounded in principles of international comity. Finally, the Final Rule 
requires SDs and MSPs to create a record of their compliance with the 
Final Rule and to retain such records in accordance with Sec.  
23.203.\72\ The Final Rule supersedes the Commission's policy views as 
set forth in the Guidance with respect to its interpretation and 
application of section 2(i) of the CEA and the swap provisions 
addressed in the Final Rule.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ There were no MSPs registered with the Commission as of the 
date of the Final Rule.
    \72\ See Final Sec.  23.23(h)(1).
    \73\ See infra section V for a discussion of certain swap 
provisions not addressed in the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters provided their views on the Proposed Rule 
generally. AFR and IATP both argued that, in sum, the Proposed Rule 
would fatally weaken the implementation of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and its application to CFTC-regulated derivatives markets, and 
urged the Commission to step back from the course outlined in the 
Proposed Rule and restore elements of the Guidance and the 2016 
Proposal that, they maintained, offered better oversight of derivatives 
markets. The Commission has considered these comments but believes that 
the Final Rule generally reflects the approach outlined by the 
Commission in the Guidance, and has determined that it takes account of 
conflicts with the laws of other jurisdictions when applying the swaps 
requirements of Title VII to activities outside the United States that 
have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on, U.S. commerce, permitting the Commission to discharge its 
responsibilities to protect the U.S. markets, market participants, and 
financial system, consistent with international comity.
    More specifically, the Final Rule takes into account the 
Commission's experience implementing the Dodd-Frank Act reforms, 
including its experience with the Guidance and the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule, comments submitted in connection with the ANE Request for Comment 
and the Proposed Rule, as well as discussions that the Commission and 
its staff have had with market participants,\74\ other domestic \75\ 
and foreign regulators, and other interested parties. It is essential 
that a cross-border framework recognize the global nature of the swap 
market and the supervisory interests of foreign regulators with respect 
to entities and transactions covered by the Commission's swap regime. 
In determining the extent to which the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions 
addressed by the Final Rule apply to activities outside the United 
States, the Commission has strived to protect U.S. interests as 
contemplated by Congress in Title VII, and minimize conflicts with the 
laws of other jurisdictions. The Commission has carefully considered, 
among other things, the level of a home jurisdiction's supervisory 
interests over the subject activity and the extent to which the 
activity takes place within the home country's territory.\76\ At the 
same time, the Commission has also considered the potential for cross-
border activities to have a significant connection with activities in, 
or effect on, commerce of the United States, as well as the global, 
highly integrated nature of today's swap markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Summaries of such discussions with market participants are 
included in the relevant public comment file, available on the 
Commission's website at https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=3067.
    \75\ The Commission has consulted with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (``SEC'') and prudential regulators regarding 
the Final Rule, as required by section 712(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act for the purposes of assuring regulatory consistency and 
comparability, to the extent possible. Dodd-Frank Act, section 
712(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. 8302(a)(1). SEC staff was consulted to increase 
understanding of each other's regulatory approaches and to harmonize 
the cross-border approaches of the two agencies to the extent 
possible, consistent with their respective statutory mandates. As 
noted in the Entities Rule, the CFTC and SEC intended to address the 
cross-border application of Title VII in separate releases. See 
Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30628 n.407.
    \76\ The terms ``home jurisdiction'' or ``home country'' are 
used interchangeably in this release and refer to the jurisdiction 
in which the person or entity is established, including the European 
Union.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To fulfill the purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act swap reforms, the 
Commission's supervisory oversight cannot be confined to activities 
strictly within the territory of the United States. Rather, the 
Commission will exercise its supervisory authority outside the United 
States in order to reduce risk to the resiliency and integrity of the 
U.S. financial system.\77\ The Commission will also strive to show 
deference to non-U.S. regulation when such regulation achieves 
comparable outcomes to mitigate unnecessary conflict with effective 
non-U.S. regulatory frameworks and limits fragmentation of the global 
marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See supra section I.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has also sought to target those classes of entities 
whose activities--due to the nature of their relationship with a U.S. 
person or U.S. commerce--most clearly present the risks addressed by 
the Dodd-Frank Act provisions, and related regulations covered by the 
Final Rule. The Final Rule is designed to limit opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage by applying the registration thresholds in a 
consistent manner to differing organizational structures that serve 
similar economic functions or have similar economic effects. At the 
same time, the Commission is mindful of the effect of its choices on 
market efficiency and competition, as well as the importance of 
international comity when exercising the Commission's authority. The 
Commission believes that the Final Rule reflects a measured approach 
that advances the goals underlying SD and MSP regulation, consistent 
with the Commission's statutory authority, while mitigating market 
distortions and inefficiencies, and avoiding fragmentation.

II. Key Definitions

    The Commission is adopting definitions for certain terms for the 
purpose of applying the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions addressed by the 
Final Rule to cross-border transactions. Certain of these definitions 
are relevant

[[Page 56932]]

in assessing whether a person's activities have the requisite ``direct 
and significant'' connection with activities in, or effect on, U.S. 
commerce within the meaning of CEA section 2(i). Specifically, the 
definitions are relevant in determining whether certain swaps or swap 
positions need to be counted toward a person's SD or MSP threshold and 
in addressing the cross-border application of certain Dodd-Frank Act 
requirements (as discussed below in sections III through VII).

A. Reliance on Representations--Generally

    The Commission acknowledges that the information necessary for a 
swap counterparty to accurately assess whether its counterparty or a 
specific swap meets one or more of the definitions discussed below may 
be unavailable, or available only through overly burdensome due 
diligence. For this reason, the Commission believes that a market 
participant should generally be permitted to reasonably rely on written 
counterparty representations in each of these respects.\78\ Therefore, 
the Commission proposed that a person may rely on a written 
representation from its counterparty that the counterparty does or does 
not satisfy the criteria for one or more of the definitions below, 
unless such person knows or has reason to know that the representation 
is not accurate.\79\ AFEX/GPS supported the proposed written 
representation language and noted that it would facilitate compliance 
with the rules.
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    \78\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 958-59; Cross-Border Margin Rule, 
81 FR at 34827; Guidance, 78 FR at 45315.
    \79\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 958-59, 
1002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is adopting the ``reliance on representations'' 
language as proposed.\80\ For the purposes of this rule, a person would 
have reason to know the representation is not accurate if a reasonable 
person should know, under all of the facts of which the person is 
aware, that it is not accurate. This language is consistent with: (1) 
The reliance standard articulated in the Commission's external business 
conduct rules; \81\ (2) the Commission's approach in the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule; \82\ and (3) the reliance standard articulated in the 
``U.S. person'' and ``transaction conducted through a foreign branch'' 
definitions adopted by the SEC in its rule addressing the regulation of 
cross-border securities-based swap activities (``SEC Cross-Border 
Rule'').\83\ A number of commenters also specifically addressed 
reliance on representations obtained under the Cross-Border Margin Rule 
or the Guidance for the ``U.S. person'' and ``Guarantee'' definitions. 
These comments are addressed below in sections II.B.5 and II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Final Sec.  23.23(a).
    \81\ See 17 CFR 23.402(d).
    \82\ See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34827.
    \83\ See 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(3)(ii) & (4)(iv); Application of 
``Security-Based Swap Dealer'' and ``Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant'' Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap 
Activities; Republication, 79 FR 47278, 47313 (Aug. 12, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. U.S. Person, Non-U.S. Person, and United States

1. Generally
(i) Proposed Rule
    As discussed in more detail below, the Commission proposed defining 
``U.S. person'' consistent with the definition of ``U.S. person'' in 
the SEC Cross-Border Rule.\84\ The proposed definition of ``U.S. 
person'' was also consistent with the Commission's statutory mandate 
under the CEA, and in this regard was largely consistent with the 
definition of ``U.S. person'' in the Cross-Border Margin Rule.\85\ 
Specifically, the Commission proposed to define ``U.S. person'' as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959-
63, 1003. See 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4); SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR 
at 47303-13.
    \85\ See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10); Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR 
at 34821-24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) A natural person resident in the United States;
    (2) A partnership, corporation, trust, investment vehicle, or other 
legal person organized, incorporated, or established under the laws of 
the United States or having its principal place of business in the 
United States;
    (3) An account (whether discretionary or non-discretionary) of a 
U.S. person; or
    (4) An estate of a decedent who was a resident of the United States 
at the time of death.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(i); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
959-63, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in the Cross-Border Margin Rule,\87\ and consistent with 
the SEC \88\ definition of ``U.S. person,'' proposed Sec.  
23.23(a)(22)(ii) provided that the principal place of business means 
the location from which the officers, partners, or managers of the 
legal person primarily direct, control, and coordinate the activities 
of the legal person. Consistent with the SEC, the Commission noted that 
the principal place of business for a collective investment vehicle 
(``CIV'') would be in the United States if the senior personnel 
responsible for the implementation of the CIV's investment strategy are 
located in the United States, depending on the facts and circumstances 
that are relevant to determining the center of direction, control, and 
coordination of the CIV.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34823.
    \88\ 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4)(ii).
    \89\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(ii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
960, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, in consideration of the discretionary and appropriate 
exercise of international comity-based doctrines, proposed Sec.  
23.23(a)(22)(iii) stated that the term ``U.S. person'' would not 
include certain international financial institutions.\90\ Specifically, 
consistent with the SEC's definition,\91\ the term U.S. person would 
not include the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the United 
Nations, and their agencies and pension plans, and any other similar 
international organizations, their agencies, and pension plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(iii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
961-62, 1003.
    \91\ 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, to provide certainty to market participants, proposed 
Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(iv) permitted reliance, until December 31, 2025, on 
any U.S. person-related representations that were obtained to comply 
with the Cross-Border Margin Rule.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(iv); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
962, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    In general, AIMA, AFEX/GPS, Barnard, Chatham, CS, IIB/SIFMA, JFMC/
IBAJ, JBA, JSCC, and State Street supported the proposed ``U.S. 
person'' definition, while IATP generally opposed the proposed 
definition. Additional comments and suggestions are discussed below.
    AIMA, Barnard,\93\ Chatham, CS, IIB/SIFMA, JFMC/IBAJ, JSCC, and 
State Street generally supported the Commission's view that aligning 
with the SEC's definition of ``U.S. person'' provided consistency to 
market participants, noting that the harmonized definition would: (1) 
Provide a consistent approach from operational and compliance 
perspectives; (2) help avoid undue regulatory complexity for purposes 
of firms' swaps and security-based swaps businesses; and/or (3) 
simplify market practice and reduce complexity. AFEX/GPS, Chatham, CS, 
JFMC/IBAJ, JSCC, and State Street generally stated that the simpler and

[[Page 56933]]

streamlined prongs in the proposed ``U.S. person'' definition allowed 
for more straightforward application of the definition as compared to 
the Guidance. Chatham also noted that the proposed definition of ``U.S. 
person'' establishes a significant nexus to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ However, as noted below, Barnard expressed concern 
regarding other proposed definitions and treatments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FIA recommended that the Commission explicitly state that the scope 
of the proposed definition of a ``U.S. person'' would not extend to 
provisions of the CEA governing futures commission merchants (``FCMs'') 
with respect to both: (1) Exchange-traded futures, whether executed on 
a designated contract market or a foreign board of trade; and (2) 
cleared swaps.
    IATP suggested restoring the ``U.S. person'' definition from the 
Guidance and 2016 Proposal. IATP argued that the SEC definition applies 
to the relatively small universe of security-based swaps, and 
therefore, the Commission should adopt the ``U.S. person'' and other 
definitions from the 2016 Proposal for the much larger universe of 
physical and financial commodity swaps the Commission is authorized to 
regulate. IATP also asserted that adopting the SEC definition for 
harmonization purposes was not necessary because SDs and MSPs should 
have the personnel and information technology resources to comply 
effectively with reporting and recordkeeping of swaps and security-
based swaps. Further, any reduced efficiency would be compensated for 
by having the ``U.S. person'' definition apply not only to enumerated 
entities but to a non-exhaustive listing that anticipates the creation 
of new legal entities engaged in swaps activities.
(iii) Final Rule
    As discussed in more detail below, the Commission is adopting the 
``U.S. person'' definition as proposed, with certain 
clarifications.\94\ In response to IATP, the Commission continues to be 
of the view that harmonization of the ``U.S. person'' definition with 
the SEC is the appropriate approach given that it is straightforward to 
apply compared to the Guidance definition, and will capture 
substantially the same types of entities as the ``U.S. person'' 
definition in the Cross-Border Margin Rule.\95\ In addition, 
harmonizing with the definition in the SEC Cross-Border Rule is not 
only consistent with section 2(i) of the CEA,\96\ but is also expected 
to reduce undue compliance costs for market participants. Therefore, as 
noted by several commenters, the definition will reduce complexity for 
entities that are participants in the swaps and security-based swaps 
markets and may register both as SDs with the Commission and as 
security-based swap dealers with the SEC. The Commission is also of the 
view that the ``U.S. person'' definition in the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule largely encompasses the same universe of persons as the definition 
used in the SEC Cross-Border Rule and the Final Rule.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23). Note that due to renumbering, the 
paragraph references for the definitions in Sec.  23.23(a) of the 
Final Rule vary from the paragraph references in the Proposed Rule.
    \95\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959.
    \96\ Harmonizing the Commission's definition of ``U.S. person'' 
with the definition in the SEC Cross-Border Rule also is consistent 
with the dictate in section 712(a)(7) of the Dodd-Frank Act that the 
CFTC and SEC ``treat functionally or economically similar'' SDs, 
MSPs, security-based swap dealers, and major security-based swap 
participants ``in a similar manner.'' Dodd-Frank Act, section 
712(a)(7)(A); 15 U.S.C. 8307(a)(7)(A). See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
959.
    \97\ See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824. The Final 
Rule defines ``U.S. person'' in a manner that is substantially 
similar to the definition used by the SEC in the context of cross-
border regulation of security-based swaps. Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
959.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to FIA, pursuant to Sec.  23.23(a), ``U.S. person'' 
only has the meaning in the definition for the purposes of Sec.  23.23. 
However, to be clear that the definition of ``U.S. person'' is only 
applicable for purposes of the Final Rule, the rule now includes the 
word ``solely'' and reads ``Solely for purposes of this section . . . 
.''
    Generally, the Commission believes that the definition offers a 
clear, objective basis for determining which individuals or entities 
should be identified as U.S. persons for purposes of the swap 
requirements addressed by the Final Rule. Specifically, the various 
prongs, as discussed in more detail below, are intended to identify 
persons whose activities have a significant nexus to the United States 
by virtue of their organization or domicile in the United States.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the Commission is adopting as proposed the 
definitions for ``non-U.S. person,'' ``United States,'' and ``U.S.'' 
The term ``non-U.S. person'' means any person that is not a U.S. 
person.\99\ Further, the Final Rule defines ``United States'' and 
``U.S.'' as the United States of America, its territories and 
possessions, any State of the United States, and the District of 
Columbia.\100\ The Commission did not receive any comments regarding 
these definitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(10).
    \100\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(20).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Prongs
    As the Commission noted in the Proposed Rule, paragraph (i) of the 
``U.S. person'' definition identifies certain persons as a ``U.S. 
person'' by virtue of their domicile or organization within the United 
States.\101\ The Commission has traditionally looked to where legal 
entities are organized or incorporated (or in the case of natural 
persons, where they reside) to determine whether they are U.S. 
persons.\102\ In the Commission's view, these persons--by virtue of 
their decision to organize or locate in the United States and because 
they are likely to have significant financial and legal relationships 
in the United States--are appropriately included within the definition 
of ``U.S. person.'' \103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959.
    \102\ Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34823; Proposed Rule, 
85 FR at 959. See also 17 CFR 4.7(a)(1)(iv) (defining ``Non-United 
States person'' for purposes of part 4 of the Commission regulations 
relating to commodity pool operators (``CPOs'')).
    \103\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(i) Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(A) and (B)
    Paragraphs (i)(A) and (B) of the ``U.S. person'' definition 
generally incorporate a ``territorial'' concept of a U.S. person.\104\ 
That is, these are natural persons and legal entities that are 
physically located or incorporated within U.S. territory, and thus are 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Further, the Commission 
generally considers swap activities where such persons are 
counterparties, as a class and in the aggregate, as satisfying the 
``direct and significant'' test under CEA section 2(i). Consistent with 
the ``U.S. person'' definition in the Cross-Border Margin Rule \105\ 
and the SEC Cross-Border Rule,\106\ the definition encompasses both 
foreign and domestic branches of an entity. As discussed below, a 
branch does not have a legal identity apart from its principal 
entity.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ Id.
    \105\ See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10)(iii) (U.S. person includes a 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business or 
other trust, association, joint-stock company, fund or any form of 
entity similar to any of the foregoing (other than an entity 
described in paragraph (a)(10)(iv) or (v) of this section) (a legal 
entity), in each case that is organized or incorporated under the 
laws of the United States or that has its principal place of 
business in the United States, including any branch of such legal 
entity) (emphasis added).
    \106\ See SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47308 (``[T]he final 
definition determines a legal person's status at the entity level 
and thus applies to the entire legal person, including any foreign 
operations that are part of the U.S. legal person. Consistent with 
this approach, a foreign branch, agency, or office of a U.S. person 
is treated as part of a U.S. person, as it lacks the legal 
independence to be considered a non-U.S. person for purposes of 
Title VII even if its head office is physically located within the 
United States.'').
    \107\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 56934]]

    The first prong of the proposed definition stated that a natural 
person resident in the United States would be considered a U.S. person. 
No comments were received regarding the first prong of the ``U.S. 
person'' definition and the Commission is adopting it as proposed.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second prong of the proposed definition stated that a 
partnership, corporation, trust, investment vehicle, or other legal 
person organized, incorporated, or established under the laws of the 
United States or having its principal place of business in the United 
States would be considered a U.S. person. In the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission stated that the second prong of the definition would subsume 
the pension fund and trust prongs of the ``U.S. person'' definition in 
the Cross-Border Margin Rule.\109\ No comments were received regarding 
this aspect of the Proposed Rule and the Commission is adopting it as 
proposed.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959-60. See 17 CFR 
23.160(a)(10)(iv) and (v).
    \110\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the Commission is of the view that, as adopted, Sec.  
23.23(a)(23)(i)(B) includes in the definition of the term ``U.S. 
person'' pension plans for the employees, officers, or principals of a 
legal entity described in Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(B), which is a separate 
prong in the Cross-Border Margin Rule.\111\ Although the SEC Cross-
Border Rule directly addresses pension funds only in the context of 
international financial institutions, discussed below, the Commission 
believes it is important to clarify that pension funds in other 
contexts could meet the requirements of Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(B).\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10)(iv).
    \112\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(B) subsumes the trust prong of 
the ``U.S. person'' definition in the Cross-Border Margin Rule.\113\ 
With respect to trusts addressed in Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(B), the 
Commission expects that its approach is consistent with the manner in 
which trusts are treated for other purposes under the law. The 
Commission has considered that each trust is governed by the laws of a 
particular jurisdiction, which may depend on steps taken when the trust 
was created or other circumstances surrounding the trust. The 
Commission believes that if a trust is governed by U.S. law (i.e., the 
law of a state or other jurisdiction in the United States), then it is 
generally reasonable to treat the trust as a U.S. person for purposes 
of the Final Rule. Another relevant element in this regard is whether a 
court within the United States is able to exercise primary supervision 
over the administration of the trust. The Commission expects that this 
aspect of the definition generally aligns the treatment of the trust 
for purposes of the Final Rule with how the trust is treated for other 
legal purposes. For example, the Commission expects that if a person 
could bring suit against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty in a 
U.S. court (and, as noted above, the trust is governed by U.S. law), 
then treating the trust as a U.S. person is generally consistent with 
its treatment for other purposes.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10)(v).
    \114\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 959-60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(D)
    Under the fourth prong of the proposed definition, an estate of a 
decedent who was a resident of the United States at the time of death 
would be included in the definition of ``U.S. person.'' No comments 
were received regarding this aspect of the Proposed Rule and the 
Commission is adopting it as proposed.\115\ With respect to Sec.  
23.23(a)(23)(i)(D), the Commission believes that the swaps of a 
decedent's estate should generally be treated the same as the swaps 
entered into by the decedent during their life.\116\ If the decedent 
was a party to any swaps at the time of death, then those swaps should 
generally continue to be treated in the same way after the decedent's 
death, at which time the swaps would most likely pass to the decedent's 
estate. Also, the Commission expects that this prong will be 
predictable and straightforward to apply for natural persons planning 
for how their swaps will be treated after death, for executors and 
administrators of estates, and for the swap counterparties to natural 
persons and estates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(D).
    \116\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(C)
    The third prong of the definition, the ``account'' prong, was 
proposed to ensure that persons described in prongs (A), (B), and (D) 
of the definition would be treated as U.S. persons even if they use 
discretionary or non-discretionary accounts to enter into swaps, 
irrespective of whether the person at which the account is held or 
maintained is a U.S. person.\117\ Consistent with the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule, the Commission stated that this prong would apply for 
individual or joint accounts.\118\ IIB/SIFMA recommended that, 
consistent with the SEC, the Commission clarify that under the 
``account'' prong of the definition, an account's U.S. person status 
should depend on whether any U.S.-person owner of the account actually 
incurs obligations under the swap in question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ Id.
    \118\ Id. See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10)(vii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is adopting this aspect of the U.S. person 
definition as proposed, with a clarification.\119\ In response to the 
IIB/SIFMA comment, the Commission is clarifying that an account's U.S. 
person status depends on whether any U.S. person owner of the account 
actually incurs obligations under the swap in question. Consistent with 
the SEC Cross-Border Rule, where an account is owned by both U.S. 
persons and non-U.S. persons, the U.S.-person status of the account, as 
a general matter, turns on whether any U.S.-person owner of the account 
incurs obligations under the swap.\120\ Neither the status of the 
fiduciary or other person managing the account, nor the discretionary 
or non-discretionary nature of the account, nor the status of the 
person at which the account is held or maintained, are relevant in 
determining the account's U.S.-person status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(C).
    \120\ See SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47312.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iv) Exclusion of Unlimited U.S. Responsibility Prong
    Unlike the Cross-Border Margin Rule, the proposed definition of 
``U.S. person'' did not include certain legal entities that are owned 
by one or more U.S. person(s) and for which such person(s) bear 
unlimited responsibility for the obligations and liabilities of the 
legal entity (``unlimited U.S. responsibility'' prong).\121\ The 
Commission invited comment on whether it should include an unlimited 
U.S. responsibility prong in the definition of ``U.S. person,'' and if 
not, whether it should revise its interpretation of ``guarantee'' in a 
manner consistent with the SEC such that persons that would have been 
considered U.S. persons pursuant to an unlimited U.S. responsibility 
prong would instead be considered entities with guarantees from a U.S. 
person.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961. See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10)(vi); 
Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34823-34824. See also Guidance, 
78 FR at 45312-13 (discussing the unlimited U.S. responsibility 
prong for purposes of the Guidance).
    \122\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 969.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Chatham and IIB/SIFMA agreed that the Commission should not include 
an unlimited U.S. responsibility prong in the ``U.S. Person'' 
definition, noting that

[[Page 56935]]

the persons that would be captured under the prong are corporate 
structures that are not commonly in use in the marketplace (e.g., 
unlimited liability corporations, general partnerships, and sole 
proprietorships). IIB/SIFMA added that to the extent a firm uses this 
structure, the Commission can sufficiently address the resulting risks 
to the United States by treating the firm as having a guarantee from a 
U.S. person, as the SEC does.
    The Commission is adopting as proposed a definition of ``U.S. 
person'' that does not include an unlimited U.S. responsibility prong. 
Although this corporate structure may exist in some limited form, the 
Commission does not believe that justifies the cost of classification 
as a ``U.S. person.'' This prong was designed to capture persons that 
could give rise to risk to the U.S. financial system in the same manner 
as with non-U.S. persons whose swap transactions are subject to 
explicit financial support arrangements from U.S. persons.\123\ Rather 
than including this prong in its ``U.S. person'' definition, the SEC 
took the view that when a non-U.S. person's counterparty has recourse 
to a U.S. person for the performance of the non-U.S. person's 
obligations under a security-based swap by virtue of the U.S. person's 
unlimited responsibility for the non-U.S. person, the non-U.S. person 
would be required to include the security-based swap in its security-
based swap dealer (if it is a dealing security-based swap) and major 
security-based swap participant threshold calculations as a 
guarantee.\124\ Therefore, as discussed below with respect to the 
definition of ``guarantee,'' the Commission is clarifying that legal 
entities that are owned by one or more U.S. person(s) and for which 
such person(s) bear unlimited responsibility for the obligations and 
liabilities will be considered as having a guarantee from a U.S. 
person, similar to the approach in the SEC Cross-Border Rule. The 
CFTC's anti-evasion rules address concerns that persons may structure 
transactions to avoid classification as a U.S. person.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Id. at 960-961.
    \124\ SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47308 n.255, 47316-47317.
    \125\ See 17 CFR 1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The treatment of the unlimited U.S. liability prong in the Final 
Rule does not affect an entity's obligations with respect to the Cross-
Border Margin Rule. To the extent that entities are considered U.S. 
persons for purposes of the Cross-Border Margin Rule as a result of the 
unlimited U.S. liability prong, the Commission believes that the 
different purpose of the registration-related rules justifies this 
potentially different treatment.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(v) Exclusion of Collective Investment Vehicle Prong
    Consistent with the definition of ``U.S. person'' in the Cross-
Border Margin Rule and the SEC Cross-Border Rule, the proposed 
definition did not include a commodity pool, pooled account, investment 
fund, or other CIV that is majority-owned by one or more U.S. 
persons.\127\ This prong was included in the Guidance definition. The 
Commission invited comment on whether it is appropriate that commodity 
pools, pooled accounts, investment funds, or other CIVs that are 
majority-owned by U.S. persons would not be included in the proposed 
definition of ``U.S. person.'' \128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Id. See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824; SEC 
Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47311, 47337.
    \128\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 969.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AIMA, Chatham, IIB/SIFMA, JFMC/IBAJ,\129\ JBA, and State Street 
supported not including this prong in the ``U.S. person'' definition. 
They generally noted that there are practical difficulties in tracking 
the beneficial ownership in CIVs, and therefore, including a CIV prong 
would increase the complexity of the ``U.S. person'' definition. AIMA 
stated that this could necessitate conservative assumptions being made 
to avoid the risk of breaching regulatory requirements that depend on 
the status of investors in the vehicle. JBA noted that non-U.S. persons 
may choose not to enter into transactions with CIVs in which U.S. 
persons are involved to avoid the practical burdens of identifying and 
tracking the beneficial ownership of funds in real-time and the 
excessive cost arising from the registration threshold calculations. 
JFMC/IBAJ elaborated that ownership composition can change throughout 
the life of the vehicle due to redemptions and additional investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ JFMC/IBAJ also requested that conforming amendments be 
made to the ``U.S. person'' definition under the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule. However, this comment is outside of the scope of the Final 
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AIMA, Chatham, and State Street also noted that there are limited 
benefits to including a requirement to ``look-through'' non-U.S. CIVs 
to identify and track U.S. beneficial owners of such vehicles. AIMA 
stated that it is reasonable to assume that the potential investment 
losses to which U.S. investors in CIVs are exposed are limited to their 
initial capital investment. Chatham stated that the composition of a 
CIV's beneficial owners is not likely to have a significant bearing on 
the degree of risk that the CIV's swap activity poses to the U.S. 
financial system, noting that CIVs organized or having a principal 
place of business in the U.S. would be under the Commission's 
authority, and majority-owned CIVs may be subject to margin 
requirements in foreign jurisdictions.
    AIMA added that the definition of ``U.S. person'' in the Guidance 
is problematic for certain funds managed by investment managers because 
they are subject to European rules on clearing, margining, and risk 
mitigation.
    After consideration of the comments, and consistent with the 
definition of ``U.S. person'' in the Cross-Border Margin Rule and the 
SEC Cross-Border Rule, the Commission is adopting as proposed a ``U.S. 
person'' definition that does not include a commodity pool, pooled 
account, investment fund, or other CIV that is majority-owned by one or 
more U.S. persons.\130\ Similar to the SEC, the Commission is of the 
view that including majority-owned CIVs within the definition of ``U.S. 
person'' for the purposes of the Final Rule would likely cause more 
CIVs to incur additional programmatic costs associated with the 
relevant Title VII requirements and ongoing assessments, while not 
significantly increasing programmatic benefits given that the 
composition of a CIV's beneficial owners is not likely to have 
significant bearing on the degree of risk that the CIV's swap activity 
poses to the U.S. financial system.\131\ Although many of these CIVs 
have U.S. participants that could be adversely affected in the event of 
a counterparty default, systemic risk concerns are mitigated to the 
extent these CIVs are subject to margin requirements in foreign 
jurisdictions. In addition, the exposure of participants to losses in 
CIVs is typically limited to their investment amount, and it is 
unlikely that a participant in a CIV would make counterparties whole in 
the event of a default.\132\ Further, the Commission continues to 
believe that identifying and tracking a CIV's beneficial ownership may 
pose a significant challenge, particularly in certain circumstances 
such as fund-of-funds or master-feeder structures.\133\ Therefore, 
although the U.S. participants in such CIVs may be adversely affected 
in the event of a counterparty default, the Commission has determined 
that the majority-

[[Page 56936]]

ownership test should not be included in the definition of ``U.S. 
person.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824; SEC Cross-
Border Rule, 79 FR at 47311, 47337.
    \131\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961. See SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 
FR at 47337.
    \132\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961; SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR 
at 47311.
    \133\ See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A CIV fitting within the majority U.S. ownership prong may also be 
a U.S. person within the scope of Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(i)(B) of the Final 
Rule (entities organized or having a principal place of business in the 
United States). As the Commission clarified in the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule, whether a pool, fund, or other CIV is publicly offered only to 
non-U.S. persons and not offered to U.S. persons is not relevant in 
determining whether it falls within the scope of the ``U.S. person'' 
definition.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Id. at 34824 n.62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(vi) Exclusion of Catch-All Prong
    Unlike the non-exhaustive ``U.S. person'' definition provided in 
the Guidance,\135\ the Commission proposed that the definition of 
``U.S. person'' be limited to persons enumerated in the rule, 
consistent with the Cross-Border Margin Rule and the SEC Cross-Border 
Rule.\136\ The Commission invited comment on whether the ``U.S. 
person'' definition should include a catch-all provision.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45316.
    \136\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961. See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10); 17 
CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4); Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824.
    \137\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 969.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AFEX/GPS, Chatham, IIB/SIFMA, and JBA supported elimination of the 
``include, but not limited to'' language from the Guidance. AFEX/GPS 
stated that this approach should help facilitate compliance with 
Commission rules. Chatham stated that the catch-all prong works against 
the core purposes of the cross-border rules, to enhance regulatory 
cooperation and transparency. IIB/SIFMA stated that market participants 
have lacked any practical way to delineate the scope of that catch-all 
phrase, leading to legal uncertainty. JBA stated that the provision is 
difficult to interpret and leads to uncertainty, and potentially 
reduced transactions by market participants, leading to increased 
bifurcation in the market.
    The Commission is adopting this aspect of the ``U.S. person'' 
definition as proposed.\138\ Unlike the non-exhaustive ``U.S. person'' 
definition provided in the Guidance, the definition of ``U.S. person'' 
is limited to persons enumerated in the rule, consistent with the 
Cross-Border Margin Rule and the SEC Cross-Border Rule.\139\ The 
Commission believes that the prongs adopted in the Final Rule capture 
those persons with sufficient jurisdictional nexus to the U.S. 
financial system and commerce in the United States that they should be 
categorized as ``U.S. persons.'' \140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ Id. at 961.
    \139\ See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(10); 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4); Cross-
Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824; Guidance, 78 FR at 45316 
(discussing the inclusion of the prefatory phrase ``include, but not 
be limited to'' in the interpretation of ``U.S. person'' in the 
Guidance).
    \140\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Principal Place of Business
    The Commission proposed to define ``principal place of business'' 
as the location from which the officers, partners, or managers of the 
legal person primarily direct, control, and coordinate the activities 
of the legal person, consistent with the SEC definition of ``U.S. 
person.'' \141\ Additionally, with respect to a CIV, the Proposed Rule 
stated that this location is the office from which the manager of the 
CIV primarily directs, controls, and coordinates the investment 
activities of the CIV, and noted that activities such as formation of 
the CIV, absent an ongoing role by the person performing those 
activities in directing, controlling, and coordinating the investment 
activities of the CIV, generally would not be as indicative of 
activities, financial and legal relationships, and risks within the 
United States of the type that Title VII is intended to address as the 
location of a CIV manager.\142\ The Commission invited comment on 
whether, when determining the principal place of business for a CIV, 
the Commission should consider including as a factor whether the senior 
personnel responsible for the formation and promotion of the CIV are 
located in the United States, similar to the approach in the Cross-
Border Margin Rule.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(ii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
960, 1003. See 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4)(ii).
    \142\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 960.
    \143\ Id. at 969.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AIMA supported the proposed definition of ``principal place of 
business'' and stated that there are more relevant indicia of U.S. 
nexus than the activities of forming and promoting a CIV, such as the 
location of staff who control the investment activities of the CIV. 
Similarly, IIB/SIFMA supported adopting the SEC's ``principal place of 
business'' test for CIVs because it better captures business reality by 
focusing more on investment strategy rather than the location of 
promoters who do not have an ongoing responsibility for the vehicle.
    The Commission is adopting the ``principal place of business'' 
aspect of the ``U.S. person'' definition as proposed.\144\ As noted in 
the Cross-Border Margin Rule,\145\ and consistent with the SEC 
definition of ``U.S. person,'' \146\ Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(ii) provides 
that the principal place of business means the location from which the 
officers, partners, or managers of the legal person primarily direct, 
control, and coordinate the activities of the legal person. With the 
exception of externally managed entities, as discussed below, the 
Commission is of the view that for most entities, the location of these 
officers, partners, or managers generally corresponds to the location 
of the person's headquarters or main office. However, the Commission 
believes that a definition that focuses exclusively on whether a legal 
person is organized, incorporated, or established in the United States 
could encourage some entities to move their place of incorporation to a 
non-U.S. jurisdiction to avoid complying with the relevant Dodd-Frank 
Act requirements, while maintaining their principal place of business--
and therefore, risks arising from their swap transactions--in the 
United States. Moreover, a ``U.S. person'' definition that does not 
include a ``principal place of business'' element could result in 
certain entities falling outside the scope of the relevant Dodd-Frank 
Act-related requirements, even though the nature of their legal and 
financial relationships in the United States is, as a general matter, 
indistinguishable from that of entities incorporated, organized, or 
established in the United States. Therefore, the Commission is of the 
view that it is appropriate to treat such entities as U.S. persons for 
purposes of the Final Rule.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(ii).
    \145\ Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34823.
    \146\ 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4)(ii).
    \147\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 960; SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 
FR at 47309.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, determining the principal place of business of a CIV, such 
as an investment fund or commodity pool, may require consideration of 
additional factors beyond those applicable to operating companies.\148\ 
The Commission interprets that, for an externally managed investment 
vehicle, this location is the office from which the manager of the 
vehicle primarily directs, controls, and coordinates the investment 
activities of the vehicle.\149\ This interpretation is consistent with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, which described 
a corporation's principal place of business, for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction, as the ``place where the corporation's high level 
officers direct, control, and coordinate the

[[Page 56937]]

corporation's activities.'' \150\ In the case of a CIV, the senior 
personnel that direct, control, and coordinate a CIV's activities are 
generally not the named directors or officers of the CIV, but rather 
persons employed by the CIV's investment advisor or promoter, or in the 
case of a commodity pool, its CPO. Therefore, consistent with the SEC 
Cross-Border Rule,\151\ when a primary manager is responsible for 
directing, controlling, and coordinating the overall activity of a CIV, 
the CIV's principal place of business under the Final Rule is the 
location from which the manager carries out those responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 960.
    \149\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(ii).
    \150\ 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010). See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 960; 
Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34823.
    \151\ See SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47310-47311.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Cross-Border Margin Rule,\152\ the Commission generally 
considers the principal place of business of a CIV to be in the United 
States if the senior personnel responsible for either: (1) The 
formation and promotion of the CIV; or (2) the implementation of the 
CIV's investment strategy are located in the United States, depending 
on the facts and circumstances that are relevant to determining the 
center of direction, control, and coordination of the CIV. Although the 
second prong is consistent with the approach discussed above, the 
Commission does not believe that activities such as formation of the 
CIV, absent an ongoing role by the person performing those activities 
in directing, controlling, and coordinating the investment activities 
of the CIV, generally will be as indicative of activities, financial 
and legal relationships, and risks within the United States of the type 
that Title VII is intended to address as the location of a CIV 
manager.\153\ The Commission may also consider amending the ``U.S. 
person'' definition in the Cross-Border Margin Rule in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34823.
    \153\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Exception for International Financial Institutions
    The Commission proposed that, in consideration of the discretionary 
and appropriate exercise of international comity-based doctrines, the 
term ``U.S. person'' would not include certain multilateral and other 
international financial institutions.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(iii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
961-962, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA supported the proposed exception for certain 
international financial institutions, noting that the Commission has 
routinely recognized the special status afforded these institutions 
under the traditions of the international system by effectively 
treating them as non-U.S. persons for most purposes, and it is 
therefore appropriate for the Commission to codify this treatment 
through this exception. IIB/SIFMA also stated that the catch-all for 
``similar international organizations'' appropriately addresses the 
international comity considerations that underlie this exception.
    The Commission is adopting this aspect of the ``U.S. person'' 
definition as proposed, with a technical modification as discussed 
below.\155\ Consistent with the SEC's definition,\156\ the term ``U.S. 
person'' does not include the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African 
Development Bank, the United Nations, and their agencies and pension 
plans, and any other similar international organizations, and their 
agencies and pension plans. The Commission believes that although such 
foreign entities are not necessarily immune from U.S. jurisdiction for 
commercial activities undertaken with U.S. counterparties or in U.S. 
markets, the sovereign or international status of such international 
financial institutions that themselves participate in the swap markets 
in a commercial manner is relevant in determining whether such entities 
should be treated as U.S. persons, regardless of whether any of the 
prongs of the definition apply.\157\ There is nothing in the text or 
history of the swap-related provisions of Title VII to suggest that 
Congress intended to deviate from the traditions of the international 
system by including such international financial institutions within 
the definitions of the term ``U.S. person.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(iii).
    \156\ See 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(4)(iii).
    \157\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 961-962. See, e.g., Entities Rule, 
77 FR at 30692-30693 (discussing the application of the ``swap 
dealer'' and ``major swap participant'' definitions to foreign 
governments, foreign central banks, and international financial 
institutions). See also Guidance, 78 FR at 45353 n.531.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the Entities Rule and the Guidance, the Commission 
interprets the term ``international financial institutions'' to include 
the ``international financial institutions'' that are defined in 22 
U.S.C. 262r(c)(2) and institutions defined as ``multilateral 
development banks'' in the European Union's regulation on ``OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories.'' \158\ 
Reference to 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2) and the European Union definition is 
consistent with Commission precedent in the Entities Rule.\159\ Both of 
those definitions identify many of the entities for which discretionary 
and appropriate exercise of international comity-based doctrines is 
appropriate with respect to the ``U.S. person'' definition.\160\ This 
prong also includes institutions identified in CFTC Staff Letters 17-34 
\161\ and 18-13.\162\ In CFTC Staff Letter 17-34, Commission staff 
provided relief from CFTC margin requirements to swaps between SDs and 
the European Stability Mechanism (``ESM''),\163\ and in CFTC Staff 
Letter

[[Page 56938]]

18-13, Commission staff identified the North American Development Bank 
(``NADB'') as an additional entity that should be considered an 
international financial institution for purposes of applying the SD and 
MSP definitions.\164\ Interpreting the definition to include the two 
entities identified in CFTC Staff Letters 17-34 and 18-13 is consistent 
with the discretionary and appropriate exercise of international comity 
because the status of both entities is similar to that of the other 
international financial institutions identified in the Entities Rule. 
Consistent with the SEC definition of ``U.S. person,'' the Final Rule 
lists specific international financial institutions but also provides a 
catch-all for ``any other similar international organizations, and 
their agencies and pension plans.'' As a technical edit, the Commission 
notes that the catch-all for international financial institutions in 
the Final Rule now includes ``and'' in the clause ``and their agencies 
and pension plans.'' The catch-all provision extends to any of the 
entities discussed above that are not explicitly listed in the Final 
Rule.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on OTC Derivative Transactions, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories, Article 1(5(a)) (July 4, 
2012), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012R0648. Article 1(5(a)) references Section 4.2 of 
Part 1 of Annex VI to Directive 2006/48/EC, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0048.
    \159\ Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30692 n.1180. The Guidance 
referenced the Entities Rule's interpretation as well. Guidance, 78 
FR at 45353 n.531.
    \160\ The definitions overlap but together include the 
following: The International Monetary Fund, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, International 
Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 
African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Asian 
Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Bank for Economic 
Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Inter-American Investment Corporation, Council of Europe Development 
Bank, Nordic Investment Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, European 
Investment Bank and European Investment Fund. Note that the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
International Development Association, the International Finance 
Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency are 
parts of the World Bank Group.
    \161\ See CFTC Staff Letter No. 17-34, Commission Regulations 
23.150-159, 161: No-Action Position with Respect to Uncleared Swaps 
with the European Stability Mechanism (Jul, 24, 2017), available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/17-34.pdf. See also CFTC Staff 
Letter No. 19-22, Commission Regulations 23.150-159, 23.161: Revised 
No-Action Position with Respect to Uncleared Swaps with the European 
Stability Mechanism (Oct. 16, 2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-22/download.
    \162\ See CFTC Staff Letter No. 18-13, No-Action Position: 
Relief for Certain Non-U.S. Persons from Including Swaps with 
International Financial Institutions in Determining Swap Dealer and 
Major Swap Participant Status (May 16, 2018), available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/csl/pdfs/18/18-13.pdf.
    \163\ See CFTC Staff Letter No. 17-34. In addition, in May 2020, 
the Commission adopted an amendment to Sec.  23.151 to exclude ESM 
from the definition of ``financial end user,'' which will have the 
effect of excluding swaps between certain SDs and ESM from the 
Commission's uncleared swap margin requirements. See Margin 
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 85 FR 27674 (May 11, 2020).
    \164\ See CFTC Staff Letter 18-13. See also CFTC Staff Letter 
17-59 (Nov. 17, 2017) (providing no-action relief to NADB from the 
swap clearing requirement of section 2(h)(1) of the CEA), available 
at https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/%40lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/17-59.pdf.
    \165\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Reliance on Prior Representations
    As noted above in section II.A, the Final Rule states that a person 
may rely on a written representation from its counterparty that the 
counterparty does or does not satisfy the criteria for one or more of 
the definitions, unless such person knows or has reason to know that 
the representation is not accurate.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ Final Sec.  23.23(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, with respect to the ``U.S. person'' definition, to provide 
certainty to market participants, the Commission proposed to permit 
reliance, until December 31, 2025, on any U.S. person-related 
representations that were obtained to comply with the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule.\167\ The Commission also stated that any person designated 
as a ``U.S. person'' under the Proposed Rule would also be a ``U.S. 
person'' under the Guidance, and therefore, market participants would 
also be able to rely on representations previously obtained under the 
``U.S. person'' definition in the Guidance.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(22)(iv); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
962, 1003.
    \168\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA and State Street recommended that the reliance on U.S. 
person representations made with respect to the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule should be permitted on a permanent basis. State Street asserted 
that permanent relief raises no new policy considerations, eliminates a 
``cliff effect'' in 2025, and eliminates the potential need for market 
participants to seek Commission extension of the 2025 deadline should 
circumstances arise where seeking new representations is impractical or 
unduly burdensome. Additionally, IIB/SIFMA, ISDA, JFMC/IBAJ, and State 
Street stated that reliance should explicitly be permitted with respect 
to representations made pursuant to the Guidance. JFMC/IBAJ stated that 
this would be appropriate given the compliance burdens associated with 
obtaining representations. State Street noted that the Commission would 
increase clarity and market efficiency by explicitly providing for 
Guidance-related representations in final rule text.
    In response to these comments, the Commission notes that it 
proposed temporary reliance on prior representations in the Proposed 
Rule because it assumed that SDs and MSPs somewhat routinely amend swap 
trading relationship documentation and thus updated representations 
based on the proposed U.S. person definition could be obtained in the 
course of these routine amendments. Permitting temporary reliance to 
facilitate this method of updating representations is less burdensome 
and more cost efficient than requiring all affected SDs and MSPs to 
update representations within a relatively brief compliance period. The 
Commission has determined that permanent reliance on representations 
obtained under the Guidance or the Cross-Border Margin Rule would be 
contrary to good recordkeeping practices, particularly for dormant 
relationships, which require updated representations within a set time 
period. Additionally, there are a variety of circumstances that 
routinely lead SDs and MSPs to amend counterparty trading relationship 
documentation, such as address changes, payment detail updates, ISDA 
definition changes, and LIBOR amendments.
    To relieve concerns that the December 31, 2025 deadline is 
burdensome, the Commission is adopting an approximately seven year time 
limit, until December 31, 2027, for reliance on ``U.S. person'' 
representations made pursuant to the Cross-Border Margin Rule, instead 
of the five year limit that was proposed.\169\ Thus, for those 
counterparties for whom a person has already obtained U.S. person-
related representations under the Cross-Border Margin Rule, U.S. 
person-related representations under the Final Rule will only be 
required from those counterparties with whom swaps are entered after 
December 31, 2027. Nevertheless, best practice is to obtain updated 
representations as soon as practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission has adjusted the rule text of Sec.  
23.23(a)(23)(iv) to clarify that reliance is only permitted for 
representations obtained prior to the effective date of the Final 
Rule.\170\ Persons should not be permitted to rely on representations 
obtained pursuant to the Cross-Border Margin Rule after the effective 
date of the Final Rule when such persons could have also obtained 
representations pursuant to the Final Rule contemporaneously therewith.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(iv)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission reiterates that it believes that any person 
designated as a ``U.S. person'' under the Final Rule is also a ``U.S. 
person'' under the Guidance definition, as the Final Rule's definition 
is narrower in scope. Therefore, the Commission is of the view that 
market participants may also rely on representations previously 
obtained using the ``U.S. person'' definition in the Guidance.\171\ A 
representation obtained under the Guidance should not be relied on 
permanently, and new representations should be obtained as soon as 
practicable, but in the Commission's view it would not be appropriate 
to rely on representations under the Guidance after the December 31, 
2027 deadline for similar representations made under the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule. Thus, for those counterparties for whom a person has 
already obtained U.S. person-related representations under the 
Guidance, U.S. person-related representations under the Final Rule will 
only be required from those counterparties with whom swaps are entered 
after December 31, 2027.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters, the Commission has determined to add 
rule text permitting reliance on representations obtained under the 
Guidance.\172\ The Commission understands that while the Guidance is 
non-binding, many market participants have chosen to develop policies 
and practices that take into account the views expressed therein, 
including expending time and resources to classify counterparties in 
accordance with the interpretation of the term ``U.S. person''

[[Page 56939]]

as set forth in the Guidance. Adding rule text permitting reliance on 
representations obtained under the Guidance recognizes, and should 
reduce, the practical burdens of compliance with the Final Rule by 
enhancing regulatory certainty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(iv)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the rule text of Sec.  23.23(a)(23)(iv)(B) clarifies that 
reliance is only permitted for representations obtained prior to the 
effective date of the Final Rule. As with U.S. person-related 
representations obtained pursuant to the Cross-Border Margin Rule, 
persons should not be permitted to rely on representations obtained 
pursuant to the Guidance after the effective date of the Final Rule 
when such persons could have also obtained representations pursuant to 
the Final Rule contemporaneously therewith.
6. Other
    The Commission considers the following comments in connection with 
the proposed ``U.S. person'' definition beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking and is not addressing them in the Final Rule. However, the 
Commission takes these comments under advisement for any relevant 
future Commission action.
    AIMA encouraged the CFTC to use the proposed ``U.S. person'' 
definition universally across all Title VII requirements and the CEA, 
including in part 4 for CPOs, commodity pools, and commodity trading 
advisors (``CTAs''). CS encouraged further harmonization of the ``U.S. 
person'' definition, to the extent possible, within the context of SD 
activity, including the CFTC's capital and margin rules. IIB/SIFMA 
recommended making conforming changes to the ``U.S. person'' definition 
under the Cross-Border Margin Rule to avoid the confusion that will 
arise from using different definitions of the same term in a single, 
comprehensive regulatory regime. Finally, JFMC/IBAJ and JSCC requested 
that the Commission specify that the ``U.S. person'' definition would 
also apply to, and supersede, the definition referenced in the CFTC's 
Orders of Exemption from Registration granted to the Japan Securities 
Clearing Corporation.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ See Amended Order of Exemption from Registration issued 
for JSCC (May 15, 2017), available at https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/jsccdcoexemptamdorder5-15-17.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Guarantee

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed defining ``guarantee'' as an arrangement, 
pursuant to which one party to a swap has rights of recourse against a 
guarantor, with respect to its counterparty's obligations under the 
swap.\174\ For these purposes, a party to a swap would have rights of 
recourse against a guarantor if the party has a conditional or 
unconditional legally enforceable right to receive or otherwise 
collect, in whole or in part, payments from the guarantor with respect 
to its counterparty's obligations under the swap. Also, the term 
``guarantee'' would encompass any arrangement pursuant to which the 
guarantor itself has a conditional or unconditional legally enforceable 
right to receive or otherwise collect, in whole or in part, payments 
from any other guarantor with respect to the counterparty's obligations 
under the swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(8); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 963-
64, 1002-03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of Comments
    In general, AFEX/GPS, Chatham, IIB/SIFMA, and JFMC/IBAJ supported 
the proposed ``guarantee'' definition, while AFR, Barnard, and Better 
Markets opposed the proposed definition.
    AFEX/GPS, Chatham, and JFMC/IBAJ supported the consistency of the 
proposed definition with the definition in the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule. JFMC/IBAJ also supported the consistency with the SEC Cross-
Border Rule. AFEX/GPS and Chatham noted that the consistency would make 
the definition more workable.
    AFEX/GPS stated that using the broad and vague definition of 
guarantee in the Guidance, which includes consideration of ``facts and 
circumstances'' and a non-exclusive list of examples, would not be 
appropriate, while the proposed definition would be objective and 
should facilitate compliance without sacrificing concerns about 
systemic risk flowing back to the United States. Chatham stated that 
the proposed definition would provide greater legal certainty around 
what is considered to be a guarantee and focuses the Commission's 
authority on potential significant risks to the U.S. financial system. 
IIB/SIFMA noted that the proposed definition would promote legal 
certainty by establishing a clearer test for when a non-U.S. person is 
considered to have financial support from a U.S. person, eliminating 
coverage of certain risk-shifting arrangements (e.g., keepwells and 
liquidity puts) that do not provide a non-U.S. person's counterparty 
with recourse against a U.S. guarantor. IIB/SIFMA added that to the 
extent a firm uses the unlimited U.S. responsibility structure 
(discussed in section II.B.2.iv above), the Commission could 
sufficiently address the resulting risks to the United States by 
treating the firm as having a guarantee from a U.S. person, as the SEC 
does, rather than considering such an entity a U.S. person. JFMC/IBAJ 
stated that the definition under the Guidance introduced compliance 
challenges to market participants globally, including difficulties in 
confirming or obtaining representations from counterparties regarding 
whether certain arrangements, particularly purely internal arrangements 
within a counterparty's corporate group, constituted a ``guarantee.'' 
JFMC/IBAJ also supported the clarification that a non-U.S. person would 
be considered a ``guaranteed entity,'' as described below, only with 
respect to swaps that are guaranteed by a U.S. person.
    ISDA, IIB/SIFMA, JFMC/IBAJ, and State Street also recommended that 
the Commission permit reliance on guarantee-related representations 
received pursuant to the Cross-Border Margin Rule and Guidance, 
analogous to the Proposed Rule and related comments with respect to the 
``U.S. person'' definition, discussed above. IIB/SIFMA and State Street 
stated that such reliance should not be time limited.
    AFR asserted that the narrower definition of guarantee, as compared 
to the Guidance, would permit numerous informal or even formal forms of 
guarantees between U.S. parent corporations and their subsidiaries to 
escape the definition. Barnard stated that the narrower definition 
would allow significant risk to be transferred back to the U.S. 
financial system over time. Barnard noted that economic implications 
are just as important as legal considerations, as confirmed and 
intended by CEA section 2(i)(1). Similarly, Better Markets recommended 
that the Commission revise its proposed definition of ``guarantee'' to 
include all forms of U.S. financial support used to facilitate dealing 
through non-U.S. affiliates because financial arrangements posing 
potential risks to U.S. persons and the U.S. financial system include 
more than solely contractual guarantees contained in swap trading 
relationship documentation between non-U.S. counterparties.
    Better Markets added that a narrower definition of ``guarantee'' 
would elevate form over substance and have possible significant adverse 
effects on the U.S. financial system. Better Markets did not agree that 
a definition posing possible significant adverse effects on the U.S. 
financial system nevertheless should be adopted, merely because the 
proposed ``guarantee'' definition mirrors the definition in the Cross-
Border Margin

[[Page 56940]]

Rule and therefore would not demand ``a separate independent 
assessment.'' Better Markets asserted that it is neither a valid 
statutory purpose nor a benefit that outweighs, or even reasonably 
approximates, its costs. Better Markets added that CEA section 5(b) and 
related provisions make clear that the CFTC's core statutory policy 
objectives are to protect the safety and soundness of SDs, prevent 
disruptions to the integrity of derivatives markets, ensure the 
financial integrity of swaps transactions and the avoidance of systemic 
risk, and preserve the stability of the U.S. financial system.
    Better Markets also stated that the CFTC's use of the margin-
related ``guarantee'' definition is not appropriate. Its view was that 
margin requirements on uncleared swaps are market and credit risk 
mitigants that are imposed on specific portfolios of derivatives with 
specific counterparties, while the proposed definition would address 
broader systemic risk reduction and other policy objectives, including 
statutory concerns about the evasion of U.S. law through legal entity 
booking strategies. Further, Better Markets asserted that the narrower 
definition would increase risks to U.S. persons, because the definition 
would result in fewer swaps transactions being treated as 
``guaranteed,'' opening a loophole for dealing conducted through 
unregistered affiliates of U.S. banks that nevertheless benefit from 
direct U.S. financial support.
3. Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments received, the Commission 
is adopting the definition of ``guarantee'' as proposed, with certain 
modifications and clarifications as discussed below.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the Cross-Border Margin Rule, the term 
``guarantee'' applies regardless of whether the right of recourse is 
conditioned upon the non-U.S. person's insolvency or failure to meet 
its obligations under the relevant swap, and regardless of whether the 
counterparty seeking to enforce the guarantee is required to make a 
demand for payment or performance from the non-U.S. person before 
proceeding against the U.S. guarantor.\176\ The terms of the guarantee 
need not necessarily be included within the swap documentation or even 
otherwise reduced to writing, provided that, under the laws of the 
relevant jurisdiction, a swap counterparty has a conditional or 
unconditional legally enforceable right, in whole or in part, to 
receive payments from, or otherwise collect from, the U.S. person in 
connection with the non-U.S. person's obligations under the swap. For 
purposes of the Final Rule, the Commission generally considers swap 
activities involving guarantees from U.S. persons to satisfy the 
``direct and significant'' test under CEA section 2(i).\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 963-64. See 17 CFR 23.160(a)(2); 
Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34825.
    \177\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, in contrast to the Cross-Border Margin Rule and the 
Proposed Rule, but consistent with the recommendation by IIB/SIFMA, the 
Commission is interpreting ``guarantee'' in a manner similar to the 
SEC, specifically with respect to the unlimited U.S. responsibility 
prong. Similar to the SEC, when a non-U.S. person's counterparty has 
recourse to a U.S. person for the performance of the non-U.S. person's 
obligations under a swap by virtue of the U.S. person's unlimited 
responsibility for the non-U.S. person, such an arrangement is 
considered a guarantee, and as discussed in sections III.B.3.i and 
IV.B.3.i below, the non-U.S. person is required to include the swap in 
its SD and MSP threshold calculations, respectively.\178\ As noted 
above, the Commission is not including the unlimited U.S. 
responsibility prong in the ``U.S. person'' definition, but interprets 
such relationships as guarantees to ensure they are appropriately 
covered by the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ See SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47316-47317, 47344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The term ``guarantee'' also encompasses any arrangement pursuant to 
which the counterparty to the swap has rights of recourse, regardless 
of the form of the arrangement, against at least one U.S. person 
(either individually, jointly, and/or severally with others) for the 
non-U.S. person's obligations under the swap. This addresses concerns 
that swaps could be structured such that they would not count toward a 
non-U.S. person's threshold calculations. For example, consider a swap 
between two non-U.S. persons (``Party A'' and ``Party B''), where Party 
B's obligations to Party A under the swap are guaranteed by a non-U.S. 
affiliate (``Party C''), and where Party C's obligations under the 
guarantee are further guaranteed by a U.S. parent entity (``Parent 
D''). The definition of ``guarantee'' deems a guarantee to exist 
between Party B and Parent D with respect to Party B's obligations 
under the swap with Party A.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 963. See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 
81 FR at 34825.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's definition of guarantee is not affected by whether 
the U.S. guarantor is an affiliate of the non-U.S. person because, 
regardless of affiliation, the swap counterparty has a conditional or 
unconditional legally enforceable right, in whole or in part, to 
receive payments from, or otherwise collect from, the U.S. person in 
connection with the non-U.S. person's obligations.
    Also, the ``guarantee'' definition does not apply when a non-U.S. 
person has a right to be compensated by a U.S. person with respect to 
the non-U.S. person's own obligations under the swap. For example, 
consider a swap between two non-U.S. persons (``Party E'' and ``Party 
F''), where Party E enters into a back-to-back swap with a U.S. person 
(``Party G''), or enters into an agreement with Party G to be 
compensated for any payments made by Party E under the swap in return 
for passing along any payments received. In such an arrangement, a 
guarantee does not exist because Party F does not have a right to 
collect payments from Party G with respect to Party E's obligations 
under the swap (assuming no other agreements exist).\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 963. See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 
81 FR at 34825.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the Cross-Border Margin Rule, the definition of 
``guarantee'' in the Final Rule is narrower in scope than the one used 
in the Guidance.\181\ Under the Guidance, the Commission advised that 
it would interpret the term ``guarantee'' generally to include not only 
traditional guarantees of payment or performance of the related swaps, 
but also other formal arrangements that, in view of all the facts and 
circumstances, support the non-U.S. person's ability to pay or perform 
its swap obligations. The Commission stated that it believed that it 
was necessary to interpret the term ``guarantee'' to include the 
different financial arrangements and structures that transfer risk 
directly back to the United States.\182\ The Commission is aware that 
many other types of financial arrangements or support, other than a 
guarantee as defined in the Final Rule, may be provided by a U.S. 
person to a non-U.S. person (e.g., keepwells and liquidity puts, 
certain types of indemnity agreements, master trust agreements, 
liability or loss transfer or sharing agreements). The Commission 
understands that these other financial arrangements or support transfer 
risk directly back to the U.S. financial system, with possible adverse 
effects, in a manner similar to a guarantee with a

[[Page 56941]]

direct recourse to a U.S. person. However, the Commission has 
determined that a narrower definition of guarantee than that in the 
Guidance achieves a more workable framework for non-U.S. persons, 
particularly because the Final Rule's definition of ``guarantee'' is 
consistent with the Cross-Border Margin Rule, and therefore does not 
require a separate independent assessment, without undermining the 
protection of U.S. persons and the U.S. financial system. The 
Commission is sympathetic to comments regarding, and is independently 
aware of, the difficulty in confirming or obtaining representations 
from counterparties regarding whether certain arrangements, 
particularly purely internal arrangements within a counterparty's 
corporate group, constitute a ``guarantee.'' However, such difficulty 
does not extend to classifying as guarantees arrangements that provide 
a non-U.S. person's counterparty with recourse to a U.S. person for the 
performance of the non-U.S. person's obligations under a swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34824.
    \182\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A broad definition of guarantee, as recommended by AFR, Barnard, 
and Better Markets, would make it difficult for certain entities to 
determine whether their counterparty is guaranteed or not. General 
consistency with the Cross-Border Margin Rule definition means no 
additional burden for market participants. Additionally, though the 
definition of ``guarantee'' in the Guidance was broader, having a 
specific standard in a rule is preferable to an open-ended 
interpretation. The Commission recognizes that the definition of 
``guarantee'' could lead to certain entities counting fewer swaps 
towards their SD or MSP thresholds or qualify additional counterparties 
for exceptions to certain regulatory requirements as compared to the 
definition in the Guidance. However, such concerns could be mitigated 
to the extent such non-U.S. persons meet the definition of a 
``significant risk subsidiary,'' and thus, as discussed below, are 
required to count certain swaps or swap positions toward their SD or 
MSP registration thresholds. In this way, non-U.S. persons receiving 
support from a U.S. person and representing a significant risk to the 
U.S. financial system are captured by the Final Rule. Accordingly, the 
Final Rule achieves the dual goals of protecting the U.S. markets and 
promoting a workable cross-border framework.
    In response to comments, the Commission is adopting language in the 
``guarantee'' definition that is parallel to the language for ``U.S. 
persons,'' allowing persons to rely on counterparty representations 
with respect to a counterparty's ``guarantee'' status obtained pursuant 
to the Cross-Border Margin Rule. As discussed above, permitting 
temporary reliance to facilitate this method of updating 
representations is less burdensome and more cost efficient than 
requiring all affected SDs to update representations within a 
relatively brief compliance period. However, permanent reliance on 
representations obtained under the Guidance or the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule would be inconsistent with good recordkeeping practices, 
particularly for dormant relationships, thus, the Commission has 
determined to require an updated representation within a set time 
period. The Commission is thus adopting an approximately seven year 
time limit, until December 31, 2027, on counterparty representations 
with respect to a counterparty's ``guarantee'' status obtained pursuant 
to the Cross-Border Margin Rule, the same as is permitted for reliance 
on the ``U.S. person'' representations. Thus, for those counterparties 
for whom a person has already obtained guarantee-related 
representations under the Cross-Border Margin Rule, guarantee-related 
representations under the Final Rule will only be required from those 
counterparties with whom swaps are entered after December 31, 2027. 
Nevertheless, best practice is to obtain updated representations as 
soon as practicable.
    In addition, the Commission has adjusted the rule text of Sec.  
23.23(a)(9) to clarify that reliance is only permitted for 
representations obtained prior to the effective date of the Final 
Rule.\183\ Persons should not be permitted to rely on representations 
obtained pursuant to the Cross-Border Margin Rule after the effective 
date of the Final Rule when such persons could have also obtained 
representations pursuant to the Final Rule contemporaneously therewith.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(9)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that any ``guarantee'' related 
representation received under the Guidance definition would also apply 
under the Final Rule, as the Final Rule's definition is generally 
narrower in scope. Therefore, the Commission is of the view that market 
participants may also rely on representations previously obtained using 
the ``guarantee'' definition in the Guidance.\184\ Nevertheless, a 
representation obtained under the Guidance should not be relied on 
permanently and should be obtained as soon as practicable, but in the 
Commission's view it would not be appropriate to rely on 
representations under the Guidance after the December 31, 2027 deadline 
for similar representations made under the Cross-Border Margin Rule. 
Thus, for those counterparties for whom a person has already obtained 
guarantee-related representations under the Guidance, guarantee-related 
representations under the Final Rule will only be required from those 
counterparties with whom swaps are entered after December 31, 2027.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ An SD or MSP may not rely on a representation obtained for 
purposes of the Guidance that a counterparty's swaps are not 
guaranteed by a U.S. person if the SD or MSP has classified the 
counterparty as a U.S. person under the unlimited U.S. 
responsibility prong of the U.S. person definition in the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to commenters, the Commission has determined to add 
rule text permitting reliance on representations obtained under the 
Guidance.\185\ The Commission understands that while the Guidance is 
non-binding, many market participants have chosen to develop policies 
and practices that take into account the views expressed therein, 
including expending time and resources to classify counterparties in 
accordance with the interpretation of the term ``guarantee'' as set 
forth in the Guidance. Adding rule text permitting reliance on 
representations obtained under the Guidance recognizes, and should 
reduce, the practical burdens of compliance with the Final Rule by 
enhancing regulatory certainty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(9)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the rule text of Sec.  23.23(a)(9)(ii) clarifies that 
reliance is only permitted for representations obtained prior to the 
effective date of the Final Rule. As with guarantee-related 
representations obtained pursuant to the Cross-Border Margin Rule, 
persons should not be permitted to rely on representations obtained 
pursuant to the Guidance after the effective date of the Final Rule 
when such persons could have also obtained representations pursuant to 
the Final Rule contemporaneously therewith.
    For ease of understanding, the discussion in this release uses the 
term ``Guaranteed Entity'' to refer to a non-U.S. person whose swaps 
are guaranteed by a U.S. person, but only with respect to the swaps 
that are so guaranteed. Thus, a non-U.S. person may be a Guaranteed 
Entity with respect to its swaps with certain counterparties because 
the non-U.S. person's swaps with those counterparties are guaranteed, 
but would not be a Guaranteed Entity with respect to its

[[Page 56942]]

swaps with other counterparties if the non-U.S. person's swaps with the 
other counterparties are not guaranteed by a U.S. person. In other 
words, depending on the nature of the trading relationship, a single 
entity could be a Guaranteed Entity with respect to some of its swaps, 
but not others.
    Additionally, this release uses the term ``Other Non-U.S. Person'' 
to refer to a non-U.S. person that is neither a Guaranteed Entity nor a 
significant risk subsidiary (as defined below).\186\ Depending on an 
entity's corporate structure and financial relationships, a single 
entity could be both a Guaranteed Entity and a significant risk 
subsidiary and, as noted above, it may be a Guaranteed Entity for 
certain of its swaps and an Other Non-U.S. Person for others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ Note that an Other Non-U.S. Person can include a 
registered SD or MSP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Significant Risk Subsidiary, Significant Subsidiary, Subsidiary, 
Parent Entity, and U.S. GAAP

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed a new category of entity termed a 
significant risk subsidiary (``SRS''). Under the Proposed Rule, a non-
U.S. person would be considered an SRS if: (1) The non-U.S. person is a 
``significant subsidiary'' of an ``ultimate U.S. parent entity,'' as 
those terms were proposed to be defined; (2) the ``ultimate U.S. parent 
entity'' has more than $50 billion in global consolidated assets, as 
determined in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (``GAAP'') at the end of the most recently completed fiscal 
year; and (3) the non-U.S. person is not subject to either: (a) 
Consolidated supervision and regulation by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (``Federal Reserve Board'') as a subsidiary 
of a U.S. bank holding company (``BHC''); or (b) capital standards and 
oversight by the non-U.S. person's home country regulator that are 
consistent with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's 
``International Regulatory Framework for Banks'' (``Basel III'') and 
margin requirements for uncleared swaps in a jurisdiction for which the 
Commission has issued a comparability determination (``CFTC Margin 
Determination'') with respect to uncleared swap margin 
requirements.\187\ If an entity is determined to be an SRS, the 
Commission proposed to apply certain regulations to the entity in the 
same manner as a U.S. person in some instances, for example in the 
application of the SD and MSP registration threshold calculations, and 
in the same manner as a Guaranteed Entity in other instances, for 
example in the application of group B and C requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \187\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 964-968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to conduit affiliates, the Guidance included a 
discussion of factors that would be taken into account when determining 
whether an entity was a conduit affiliate of a U.S. person. The 
Proposed Rule stated that this concept was not being included in the 
proposed regulations because the concerns posed by a conduit affiliate 
were intended to be addressed through the proposed definition and 
regulation of SRSs.
2. Summary of Comments
    In the Proposed Rule, the Commission asked whether it should use 
the concept of a conduit affiliate, as was done in the Guidance, in 
order to harmonize with the SEC.\188\ AEFX/GPS, Chatham, JFMC/IBAJ, and 
IIB/SIFMA all stated that they prefer the SRS entity definition to the 
use of the conduit affiliate concept from the Guidance. AFEX/GPS, 
Chatham, and IIB/SIFMA stated that the objective criteria in the SRS 
definition are preferable to the conduit affiliate concept in the 
Guidance, which is more difficult to apply. JFMC/IBAJ and IIB/SIFMA 
also commented that the SRS definition is an improvement over the FCS 
concept previously proposed in the 2016 Proposal because the SRS 
definition excludes those subsidiaries that are not significant to 
their parent entities. Better Markets stated that the proposed SRS 
definition does not address the avoidance and evasion risks addressed 
by the conduit affiliate concept in the Guidance. IATP suggested that 
the previously proposed FCS concept be retained in place of the SRS 
definition. JBA stated that market participants have already assessed, 
under the Guidance, whether their activities are subject to the swap 
rules based on the attributes of their counterparties and requiring 
them to re-assess will create significant burdens on market 
participants. ISDA suggested that with respect to SRSs, entities should 
be permitted to rely on counterparty representations pertaining to 
conduit affiliates as described in the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 969-970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CS and IIB/SIFMA stated that the exclusion for subsidiaries of BHCs 
in the SRS definition should be expanded to include those entities that 
are subsidiaries of intermediate holding companies (``IHCs''). These 
commenters noted that IHCs are subject to prudential regulation, 
including Basel III capital requirements, stress testing, liquidity, 
and risk management requirements.
    JFMC/IBAJ and IIB/SIFMA suggested that accounting consolidation 
does not create a sufficient jurisdictional nexus to the United States 
because there is no requirement that the U.S. entity be directly liable 
for the foreign subsidiary's swaps. These commenters stated that if the 
SRS definition is nevertheless retained then the proposed significance 
tests should also be retained. IIB/SIFMA and the Working Group stated 
that the definition of ultimate U.S. parent entity should be limited to 
those groups of entities where the top-tier ultimate parent company is 
a U.S. person.
    With respect to the exception in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i) for 
subsidiaries of BHCs, AFR and Better Markets stated that the Commission 
should eliminate this exception because deference to the prudential 
regulators in this way is not justified. AFR noted the failure of 
prudential supervision of banks to adequately address derivatives 
markets risks prior to the 2008 financial crisis. IATP, AFR, and 
Barnard stated that the broad exemptions would exclude almost all 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and be a significant reduction 
in the application of the Commission's swap regulations. Better Markets 
stated that the Commission does not have the discretion to determine 
whether and when to apply U.S. regulatory requirements based on 
principles of international comity when there is a direct and 
significant risk to U.S. BHCs and the U.S. financial system.
    Better Markets suggested that if the SRS definition is retained 
then there should be two additional significance tests added to those 
in Sec.  23.23(a)(14). This commenter proposed that if an entity were 
to meet a risk transfer test, measuring the notional amount of swaps 
that are back-to-backed with U.S. entities, or a risk acceptance test, 
measuring the trading activity of the subsidiary over a three month 
time period, then the entity would be considered a significant 
subsidiary.
    The Working Group suggested that the proposed SRS definition should 
be modified to limit the applicability to only those entities that 
qualify as financial entities because the systemic risk associated with 
non-financial entities is mitigated because their activities primarily 
take place outside of the financial system. The Working Group agreed 
with the Commission's proposal to exclude from the SRS definition those 
entities that are subject to oversight by the non-U.S. person's home 
country regulator and capital

[[Page 56943]]

standards consistent with Basel III. However, the commenter added that 
to the extent a regulator has exempted a particular type of entity from 
capital requirements otherwise consistent with Basel III, the CFTC 
should defer to such exemption and consider such entity as subject to 
comparable capital requirements.
3. Final Rule and Commission Response
    The Commission is adopting the SRS definition as proposed, with two 
modifications as discussed below. First, the Final Rule adds IHCs to 
the exclusion in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i) for those companies that are 
subject to consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal 
Reserve Board. Second, with respect to the carve-out in Sec.  
23.23(a)(13)(ii), the Final Rule makes a clarifying revision to the 
margin requirements aspect of that provision.
(i) Non-U.S. Persons With U.S. Parent Entities
    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, in addition to the U.S. persons 
described above in section II.B, the Commission understands that U.S. 
persons may organize the operations of their businesses through the use 
of one or more subsidiaries that are organized and operated outside the 
United States.\189\ Through consolidation, non-U.S. subsidiaries of 
U.S. persons may permit U.S. persons to accrue risk through the swap 
activities of their non-U.S. subsidiaries. This risk, in the aggregate, 
may have a significant effect on the U.S. financial system. Therefore, 
the Commission may subject consolidated non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. 
persons to Commission regulation due to their direct and significant 
relationship to their U.S. parent entities. Further, consolidated non-
U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. parent entities present a greater supervisory 
interest to the CFTC, relative to Other Non-U.S. Persons.\190\ 
Moreover, because U.S. persons have regulatory obligations under the 
CEA that Other Non-U.S. Persons may not have, consolidated non-U.S. 
subsidiaries of U.S. parent entities present a greater supervisory 
interest to the CFTC relative to Other Non-U.S. Persons due to the 
Commission's interest in preventing the evasion of obligations under 
the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 964.
    \190\ This release uses the term ``Other Non-U.S. Person'' to 
refer to a non-U.S. person that is neither a Guaranteed Entity nor 
an SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to the consolidation requirements of U.S. GAAP, the 
financial statements of a U.S. parent entity reflect the financial 
position and results of operations of that parent entity, together with 
the network of branches and subsidiaries in which the U.S. parent 
entity has a controlling interest, including non-U.S. subsidiaries, 
which is an indication of connection and potential risk to the U.S. 
parent entity. Consolidation under U.S. GAAP is predicated on the 
financial control of the reporting entity. Therefore, an entity within 
a financial group that is consolidated with its parent entity for 
accounting purposes in accordance with U.S. GAAP is subject to the 
financial control of that parent entity. By virtue of consolidation 
then, a non-U.S. subsidiary's swap activity creates direct risk to the 
U.S. parent.\191\ That is, as a result of consolidation and financial 
control, the financial position, operating results, and statement of 
cash flows of a non-U.S. subsidiary are included in the financial 
statements of its U.S. parent and therefore affect the financial 
condition, risk profile, and market value of the parent. Because of 
that relationship, risks taken by a non-U.S. subsidiary can have a 
direct effect on the U.S. parent entity. Furthermore, a non-U.S. 
subsidiary's counterparties may generally look to both the subsidiary 
and its U.S. parent for fulfillment of the subsidiary's obligations 
under a swap, even without any explicit guarantee. In many cases, 
counterparties would not enter into the transaction with the subsidiary 
(or would not do so on the same terms), and the subsidiary would not be 
able to engage in a swap business, absent this close relationship with 
a parent entity. In addition, a non-U.S. subsidiary may enter into 
offsetting swaps or other arrangements with its U.S. parent entity or 
other affiliate(s) to transfer the risks and benefits of swaps with 
non-U.S. persons to its U.S. affiliates, which could also lead to risk 
for the U.S. parent entity. Because such swap activities may have a 
direct effect on the financial position, risk profile, and market value 
of a U.S. parent entity, they can lead to spill-over effects on the 
U.S. financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 964.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA and JFMC/IBAJ stated that there is no legal basis to 
apply swap regulations based on accounting consolidation. The 
Commission continues to believe, as it stated in its Cross-Border 
Margin Rule, by virtue of an entity having its financial statements 
consolidated with those of its U.S. ultimate parent, the financial 
position, operating results, and statement of cash flows of the entity 
are included in the financial statements of its U.S. ultimate parent 
entity and therefore affect the financial position, risk profile, and 
market value of the U.S. ultimate parent. Because of the entity's 
direct relationship with, and the possible negative effect of its swap 
activities on, its U.S. ultimate parent entity and the U.S. financial 
system, the entity raises greater supervisory concern in the United 
States relative to other non-U.S. swap entities.\192\ Accordingly, it 
is appropriate to apply certain swap regulations to certain entities 
that have financial statements consolidated with U.S. parent entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ See Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34827.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the principles of international comity militate against 
applying the Commission's swap regulations to all non-U.S. subsidiaries 
of U.S. parent entities. Rather, it is consistent with such principles 
to apply a risk-based approach to determining which of such entities 
should be required to comply with the Commission's swap requirements. 
The Commission's approach in the Final Rule, as discussed further below 
with respect to the exclusion for subsidiaries of BHCs and IHCs, makes 
that determination in a manner that accounts for the risk that non-U.S. 
subsidiaries may pose to the U.S. financial system and the ability of 
large global entities to operate efficiently outside the United States. 
The Commission's risk-based approach is embodied in the definition of 
an SRS, which, as discussed above, captures entities whose obligations 
under swaps may not be guaranteed by U.S. persons, but nonetheless 
raise particular supervisory concerns in the United States due to the 
possible negative effect on their ultimate U.S. parent entities and 
thus the U.S. financial system.
(ii) Preliminary Definitions
    For purposes of the SRS definition, the term ``subsidiary'' means 
an affiliate of a person controlled by such person directly, or 
indirectly through one or more intermediaries.\193\ The definition of 
``subsidiary'' has been revised in the Final Rule for clarity. For 
purposes of this definition, an affiliate of, or a person affiliated 
with, a specific person is a person that directly, or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or 
is under common control with, the person specified.\194\ In the Final 
Rule, the definition of ``affiliate'' has been moved out of the 
definition of ``subsidiary'' and into its own definition for added 
clarity, since the term ``affiliate'' is relevant for other provisions 
of the Final Rule, as

[[Page 56944]]

discussed in this release. The term ``control,'' including controlling, 
controlled by, and under common control with, means the possession, 
direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of 
the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership 
of voting shares, by contract, or otherwise.\195\ The definition of 
``control'' is also relevant to other provisions of the Final Rule, as 
discussed in this release. The definitions of subsidiary, affiliate, 
and control are substantially similar to the definitions found in SEC 
Regulation S-X.\196\ Further, under the Final Rule, the term ``parent 
entity'' means any entity in a consolidated group that has one or more 
subsidiaries in which the entity has a controlling interest, in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP.\197\ U.S. GAAP is defined in the Final Rule 
as U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.\198\
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    \193\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(15).
    \194\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(1).
    \195\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(2).
    \196\ See 17 CFR 210.1-02. Regulation S-X generally covers the 
form and content requirements for financial statements.
    \197\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(12).
    \198\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notably, a U.S. parent entity for purposes of the definition of SRS 
need not be a non-U.S. subsidiary's ultimate parent entity. The SRS 
definition encompasses U.S. parent entities that may be intermediate 
entities in a consolidated corporate family with an ultimate parent 
entity located outside the U.S. To differentiate between multiple 
possible U.S. parent entities, the Final Rule defines an ``ultimate 
U.S. parent entity'' for purposes of the significant subsidiary test. A 
non-U.S. person's ``ultimate U.S. parent entity'' is the U.S. parent 
entity that is not a subsidiary of any other U.S. parent entity.\199\ 
Risk of a non-U.S. subsidiary that flows to its U.S. parent entity may 
not flow back out of the U.S. to a non-U.S. ultimate or intermediate 
parent entity. Because the risk may ultimately stop in the United 
States, the Commission is basing the SRS definition on whether a non-
U.S. person has any U.S. parent entity, subject to certain risk-based 
thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA and the Working Group stated that the SRS definition 
should be limited to subsidiaries that have a ``top-tier'' U.S. person 
parent entity, rather than including subsidiaries that have a U.S. 
parent entity that may not be the ultimate parent entity. The 
Commission is including subsidiaries that have non-``top-tier'' U.S. 
parent entities because the risk that the subsidiary poses may be 
consolidated in the United States. The Final Rule treats all 
subsidiaries of U.S. parent entities equally, regardless of where the 
U.S. parent entity sits in the corporate structure.
(iii) Significant Risk Subsidiaries
    In addition to the definitions discussed above, whether an entity 
is an SRS depends on the size of its ultimate U.S. parent entity, the 
significance of the subsidiary to its ultimate U.S. parent entity, and 
the regulatory oversight of its ultimate U.S. parent entity or the 
regulatory oversight of the non-U.S. subsidiary in the jurisdiction in 
which it is regulated.
    Under the Final Rule, the ultimate U.S. parent entity must exceed a 
$50 billion consolidated asset threshold.\200\ The Commission is 
adopting the $50 billion threshold after considering both the 
Commission's interest in adequately overseeing those non-U.S. persons 
that may have a significant effect on their ultimate U.S. parent 
entity--and, by extension--the U.S. financial system, and also its 
interest in avoiding unnecessary burdens on those non-U.S. persons that 
would not have such an effect.\201\ The $50 billion threshold limits 
the burden of the SRS definition to only those entities whose ultimate 
U.S. parent entity may pose a systemic risk to the U.S. financial 
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(13).
    \201\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 965.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, before a non-U.S. subsidiary of an ultimate U.S. 
parent entity that meets the $50 billion consolidated asset threshold 
is an SRS, the subsidiary needs to constitute a significant part of its 
ultimate U.S. parent entity. This concept of a ``significant 
subsidiary'' borrows from the SEC's definition of ``significant 
subsidiary'' in Regulation S-X, as well as the Federal Reserve Board in 
its financial statement filing requirements for foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. banking organizations.\202\ The Commission is focusing on only 
those subsidiaries that are significant to their ultimate U.S. parent 
entities, in order to capture those subsidiaries that have a 
significant effect on their large ultimate U.S. parent entities. To 
provide certainty to market participants as to what constitutes a 
significant subsidiary, the Final Rule includes a set of quantitative 
significance tests. Although not identical, the SEC includes similar 
revenue and asset significance tests in its definition of significant 
subsidiary in Regulation S-X.\203\ In this case, in order to determine 
whether a subsidiary meets such significance, the Final Rule measures 
the significance of a subsidiary's equity capital, revenue, and assets 
relative to its ultimate U.S. parent entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ See e.g., Instructions for Preparation of Financial 
Statements of Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Banking Organizations FR 
2314 and FR 2314S, at GEN-2 (Sept. 2016), available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_2314_
FR_2314S20190331_i.pdf (``FR 2314 and FR 2314S Instructions'') 
(identifying equity capital significance test applicable to 
subsidiaries). See also SEC rule 210.1-02(w), 17 CFR 210.1-02(w) 
(identifying asset and income significance tests applicable in 
definition of significant subsidiaries).
    \203\ 17 CFR 210.1-02(w)(1)-(3) (setting out a ten percent 
significance threshold with respect to total assets and income).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Final Rule, the term ``significant subsidiary'' means a 
subsidiary, including its own subsidiaries, where: (1) The three year 
rolling average of the subsidiary's equity capital is equal to or 
greater than five percent of the three year rolling average of its 
ultimate U.S. parent entity's consolidated equity capital, as 
determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP at the end of the most recently 
completed fiscal year (the ``equity capital significance test''); (2) 
the three year rolling average of the subsidiary's revenue is equal to 
or greater than ten percent of the three year rolling average of its 
ultimate U.S. parent entity's consolidated revenue, as determined in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP at the end of the most recently completed 
fiscal year (the ``revenue significance test''); or (3) the three year 
rolling average of the subsidiary's assets is equal to or greater than 
ten percent of the three year rolling average of its ultimate U.S. 
parent entity's consolidated assets, as determined in accordance with 
U.S. GAAP at the end of the most recently completed fiscal year (the 
``asset significance test'').\204\ For the equity capital significance 
test, equity capital includes perpetual preferred stock, common stock, 
capital surplus, retained earnings, accumulated other comprehensive 
income, and other equity capital components and is calculated in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule results in an entity being a significant subsidiary 
only if it passes at least one of these significance tests. The equity 
capital test is used to measure a subsidiary's significance to its 
ultimate U.S. parent entity and is used in the context of financial 
statement reporting of foreign subsidiaries.\205\ If a subsidiary 
constitutes more than ten percent of its ultimate U.S. parent entity's 
assets or revenues, it is of significant importance to its ultimate 
U.S. parent entity such that swap activity by the subsidiary may

[[Page 56945]]

have a material effect on its ultimate U.S. parent entity and, 
consequently, the U.S. financial system. The Commission is using a 
three year rolling average throughout its significance tests in order 
to mitigate the potential for frequent changes in an entity's SRS 
status based on fluctuations in its share of equity capital, revenue, 
or assets of its ultimate U.S. parent entity. If a subsidiary satisfies 
any one of the three significance tests, then it is of sufficient 
significance to its ultimate U.S. parent entity, which under Sec.  
23.23(a)(13) has consolidated assets of more than $50 billion, to 
warrant the application of requirements addressed by the Final Rule if 
such subsidiary otherwise meets the definition of SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ See FR 2314 and FR 2314S Instructions, at Gen-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, Better Markets suggested that the Commission add 
two activity-based tests to the proposed significant subsidiary 
definition: A risk transfer test and a risk acceptance test. The 
Commission declines to include these two tests because they do not 
consider the risk to the broader financial system of the entities that 
are potentially captured by the Final Rule. Better Markets' proposed 
tests are activity-based, rather than risk-based, whereas the 
Commission has determined to apply swap requirements to foreign 
entities using a risk-based test. Better Markets' proposed tests would 
set thresholds above which an entity would be deemed to be significant 
subsidiaries, however these tests do not provide any measure that is 
relative to the parent entity. Such notional-based thresholds may be a 
measure of activity, but they are not a measure of risk that a 
subsidiary poses to a parent entity.\206\ The significance tests 
adopted here to identify SRSs include those entities that meet the 
commenters' proposed tests to the extent those entities pose what the 
Commission considers a significant risk to the financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ The Commission also has noted in the past that such 
notional amount-based thresholds are not measures of the exposure or 
risk of particular swap positions. See Entities Rule, 77 FR at 
30630.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iv) Exclusions From the Definition of SRS
    As indicated above, under the Final Rule, a non-U.S. person will 
not be an SRS to the extent the entity is subject to prudential 
regulation as a subsidiary of a U.S. BHC or IHC, or is subject to 
comparable capital and margin standards.\207\ An entity that meets 
either of those two exceptions, in the Commission's view, is subject to 
a level of regulatory oversight that is sufficiently comparable to the 
Dodd-Frank Act swap regime with respect to prudential oversight. Non-
U.S. subsidiaries that are part of BHCs are already subject to 
consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve 
Board,\208\ including with respect to capital and risk management 
requirements, and therefore their swap activity poses less risk to the 
financial position and risk profile of the ultimate U.S. parent entity, 
and thus less risk to the U.S. financial system than the swap activity 
of a non-U.S. subsidiary of an ultimate U.S. parent entity that is not 
a BHC.\209\ In this case, deference to the foreign regulatory regime is 
appropriate because the swap activity is occurring within an 
organization that is under the umbrella of U.S. prudential regulation 
with certain regulatory protections already in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i)-(ii).
    \208\ See e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, section 2100.0.1 
Foreign Operations of U.S. Banking Organizations, available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/bhc.pdf (``The 
Federal Reserve has broad discretionary powers to regulate the 
foreign activities of member banks and [BHCs] so that, in financing 
U.S. trade and investments abroad, these U.S. banking organizations 
can be competitive with institutions of the host country without 
compromising the safety and soundness of their U.S. operations.''); 
FR 2314 and FR 2314S Instructions, at GEN 2.
    \209\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The exclusion from the SRS definition for subsidiaries of IHCs is 
being added to the Final Rule in response to comments. IHCs are subject 
to prudential standards of the Federal Reserve Board that are similar 
to those that apply to BHCs. In general, IHCs and BHCs of similar size 
are subject to similar liquidity, risk management, stress testing, and 
credit limit standards.\210\ Therefore, for the same risk-based reasons 
that the Commission proposed to exclude subsidiaries of BHCs from the 
definition of SRS,\211\ the Commission is expanding the SRS exclusion 
to include subsidiaries of both BHCs and IHCs in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ See e.g., Prudential Standards for Large Bank Holding 
Companies, Savings and Loan Holding Companies, and Foreign Banking 
Organizations, 84 FR 59032 (Nov. 2019).
    \211\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments from AFR and Better Markets that the 
Commission should not defer to the prudential regulators with respect 
to the regulation of derivative market activity of BHCs and those 
entities subject to the required non-U.S. capital and margin regimes, 
under the Guidance, absent a guarantee, the Commission had generally 
not expected these entities to count their swaps or swap positions with 
non-US persons towards the SD or MSP thresholds or, if registered as 
swap entities, comply with Transaction-Level Requirements (discussed in 
section VI below) when transacting with non-U.S. persons that were not 
guaranteed by a U.S. person nor acting as conduit affiliates. Thus, the 
deference to U.S. and non-U.S. prudential regulators in the Final Rule 
maintains the status quo of the last seven years rather than 
representing a relinquishment of existing regulatory oversight by the 
Commission. Moreover, the SRS definition does not defer to prudential 
regulators to regulate derivatives market activity, which is carried on 
by the foreign subsidiary, but rather defers to the role of prudential 
regulation in the consolidated oversight of prudential risk in 
evaluating the extent to which the Commission should expand its 
oversight of non-U.S. entities that are not guaranteed by a U.S. person 
beyond the Guidance. For the reasons noted above, the Commission has 
determined not to apply the Final Rule on the basis of accounting 
consolidation alone, but rather, in exercising its oversight of non-
U.S. entities, has taken a risk-based approach to determining which 
foreign subsidiaries present a significant risk to their ultimate U.S. 
parent and thus to the U.S. financial system. The Commission thus has 
determined that because the risk presented by foreign subsidiaries that 
are consolidated with a BHC or IHC, or are subject to the specified 
prudential regulation in their local jurisdiction, is already being 
adequately monitored, such foreign subsidiaries should not also be 
subject to the Commission's oversight.
    With respect to the BHC exception, Better Markets suggested that 
the Commission does not have the legal discretion to defer to 
prudential regulators because of the requirements in CEA section 2(i). 
As the Commission stated in the Proposed Rule, CEA section 2(i) does 
not require the Commission to extend its reach to the outer bounds of 
the authorization provided in CEA section 2(i).\212\ In determining how 
to exercise its authority, the Commission stated that it will be guided 
by principles of international comity and will focus its authority on 
potential significant risks to the U.S. financial system. The 
Commission noted that the Restatement also provides that even where a 
country has a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, it should not 
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity in another country 
when the exercise of

[[Page 56946]]

such jurisdiction is unreasonable.\213\ In the context of the SRS 
definition, the risk-based approach to limiting the application of the 
Commission's requirements extraterritorially focuses its requirements 
on those entities that pose significant risk to the U.S. financial 
system, as discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ Id. at 955.
    \213\ Id. at 957.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, in the case of entities that are subject to capital 
standards and oversight by their home country regulators that are 
consistent with Basel III and subject to a CFTC Margin Determination, 
the Commission will defer to the home country regulator.\214\ In cases 
where entities are subject to capital standards and oversight by home 
country regulators that are consistent with Basel III and subject to a 
CFTC Margin Determination, the potential risk that the entity might 
pose to the U.S. financial system is adequately addressed through these 
home country capital and margin requirements. Further, such an approach 
is consistent with the Commission's historical commitment to show 
deference to non-U.S. regulators whose requirements are comparable to 
the CFTC's requirements. To make clear that the CFTC Margin 
Determination must be a positive determination of comparability, the 
provision in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(ii) has been modified to read ``and 
margin requirements for uncleared swaps in a jurisdiction that the 
Commission has found comparable pursuant to a published comparability 
determination with respect to uncleared swap margin requirements.'' For 
margin purposes, the Commission has issued a number of determinations 
that entities can look to in order to determine if they satisfy this 
aspect of the exception.\215\ For capital standards and oversight 
consistent with Basel III, entities should look to whether the BIS has 
determined the jurisdiction is in compliance as of the relevant Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision deadline set forth in its most recent 
progress report.\216\ The Commission is excluding these entities from 
the definition of SRS, in large part, because the swaps entered into by 
such entities are already subject to significant regulation, either by 
the Federal Reserve Board or by the entity's home country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(ii).
    \215\ See Comparability Determination for Japan: Margin 
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 81 FR 63376 (Sep. 15, 2016); Comparability 
Determination for the European Union: Margin Requirements for 
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 82 FR 
48394 (Oct. 13, 2017) (``Margin Comparability Determination for the 
European Union''); Amendment to Comparability Determination for 
Japan: Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 84 FR 12074 (Apr. 1, 2019); Comparability 
Determination for Australia: Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps 
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 84 FR 12908 (Apr. 3, 
2019). Further, on April 5, 2019, DSIO and the Division of Market 
Oversight (``DMO'') issued a letter jointly to provide time-limited 
no-action relief in connection with, among other things, the Margin 
Comparability Determination for the European Union, in order to 
account for the anticipated withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 
the European Union. See CFTC Staff Letter 19-08, No-Action Relief in 
Connection With Certain Previously Granted Commission Determinations 
and Exemptions, in Order to Account for the Anticipated Withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom From the European Union (Apr. 5, 2019), 
available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-08/download.
    \216\ The most current report was issued in July 2020. Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Eighteenth progress report on 
adoption of the Basel regulatory framework (July 2020), available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d506.pdf. Current and historical 
reports are available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_reports.htm?m=3%7C14%7C656%7C59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Working Group suggested that where a jurisdiction has capital 
and margin requirements consistent with Basel III requirements, but 
certain entities located in that jurisdiction are exempted from those 
requirements, such entities should nonetheless be considered as subject 
to sufficient capital and margin requirements for the purpose of the 
proposed SRS exclusion. The Commission is declining to adopt this 
suggestion here, but it may warrant further consideration in the 
future. It is not clear whether a foreign jurisdiction's exemption from 
capital and margin requirements would be based on a risk assessment of 
the exempted entities, whether such exemptions are granted on a case-
by-case basis or provided to entire classes or categories, or whether 
such exemptions are based on deference to some other form of prudential 
regulation. Under the Final Rule, where an entity is exempt from a 
country's capital and margin requirements, such an entity will not be 
considered to be subject to sufficient capital and margin requirements 
for the purpose of the SRS exclusion. As noted above, if a non-U.S. 
subsidiary of an ultimate U.S. parent entity does not fall into either 
of the exceptions in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i) through (ii), the Final Rule 
classifies the subsidiary as a SRS only if its ultimate U.S. parent 
entity has more than $50 billion in global consolidated assets and if 
the subsidiary meets the definition of a significant subsidiary, set 
forth in Sec.  23.23(a)(14).
    With respect to the Working Group comment that the SRS definition 
should not apply to non-financial entities, the Commission has 
determined to apply the SRS definition to those non-financial entities 
that satisfy the risk-based tests contained in the definition. Those 
entities are not subject to prudential regulation and are, by 
definition, significant subsidiaries of large U.S. parent entities that 
may pose a risk to the U.S. financial system, and therefore the 
Commission believes that such entities should not be excluded from the 
SRS definition. Accordingly, the Commission is not adding an exception 
for non-financial entities to the SRS definition. However, Other Non-
U.S. Person counterparties to SRSs are not required to include such 
swaps in either their SD or MSP registration threshold calculations, as 
discussed below. The Commission has also determined for the Final Rule 
that non-U.S. swap entities that are neither SRSs nor Guaranteed 
Entities are not required to comply with the group B and group C 
requirements (as defined in section VI.A.2 and VI.A.3 below) when 
entering into foreign-based swaps with certain foreign counterparties, 
including SRSs that are neither swap entities nor Guaranteed Entities 
(``SRS End Users'').\217\ This application of the Final Rule should 
assuage the commenter's concerns about the effect SRS status will have 
on the swap trading relationships of a non-financial entity that is an 
SRS but does not engage in swap dealing or meet the definition of MSP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ See infra section VI.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to Better Markets' comment that the SRS definition does 
not address evasion and avoidance concerns that are addressed by the 
conduit affiliate concept, the Commission believes that the SRS 
definition adequately addresses those concerns within a risk-based 
framework. The Commission believes that to the extent an off-shore 
entity is entering into transactions with non-U.S. entities and 
subsequently back-to-backing those transactions to a U.S. entity, it is 
appropriate to subject such an entity to certain of the Commission's 
swap requirements if that entity meets the definition of an SRS and is 
consequently a significant subsidiary of a U.S. parent entity that is 
significant to the U.S. financial system. This approach is a risk-based 
assessment rather than merely a structural or activity-based 
assessment. Without this risk-based approach, the SD de minimis 
threshold, which is a strictly activity-based test (i.e., a test based 
on the aggregate gross notional amount of dealing activity), becomes 
the de facto risk test of when an entity would be subject to the 
Commission's swap requirements as an SD. The Commission continues to 
believe that the risk-based SRS test is better-suited to make such a 
determination.

[[Page 56947]]

(v) Counterparty Status and Representations
    The Commission acknowledges comments that the implementation of the 
SRS definition may require entities to reevaluate the status of their 
counterparties. The Commission understands that SDs may have to re-
document whether their counterparties are SRS entities and that this 
could require, for example, a new industry protocol, which may be an 
additional burden resulting from the adoption of this rule. The 
potential burden of this re-assessment of counterparties is considered 
in the cost-benefit considerations section of this adopting release.
    Regarding the ISDA comment that the Commission should permit swap 
entities to rely on representations obtained under the Guidance with 
respect to the status of counterparties as conduit affiliates, the 
Commission responds that the representations made by counterparties 
with respect to the conduit affiliate concept in the Guidance are not 
applicable to the SRS definition. Because the definition of an SRS is 
new and substantially differs from the conduit affiliate concept, such 
conduit affiliate representations do not capture all counterparties 
that may be SRSs and may capture entities that fall within the conduit 
affiliate concept but are excluded from the definition of SRS.

E. Foreign Branch and Swap Conducted Through a Foreign Branch

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that the term ``foreign branch'' would mean 
an office of a U.S. person that is a bank that: (1) Is located outside 
the United States; (2) operates for valid business reasons; (3) 
maintains accounts independently of the home office and of the accounts 
of other foreign branches, with the profit or loss accrued at each 
branch determined as a separate item for each foreign branch; and (4) 
is engaged in the business of banking or finance and is subject to 
substantive regulation in banking or financing in the jurisdiction 
where it is located.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(2). See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
966-968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposed that the term ``swap conducted through 
a foreign branch'' would mean a swap entered into by a foreign branch 
where: (1) The foreign branch or another foreign branch is the office 
through which the U.S. person makes and receives payments and 
deliveries under the swap pursuant to a master netting or similar 
trading agreement, and the documentation of the swap specifies that the 
office for the U.S. person is such foreign branch; (2) the swap is 
entered into by such foreign branch in its normal course of business; 
and (3) the swap is reflected in the local accounts of the foreign 
branch.\219\ In the Proposed Rule, the Commission stated that the 
second prong of the definition (whether the swap is entered into by 
such foreign branch in the normal course of business) is intended as an 
anti-evasion measure to prevent a U.S. bank from simply routing swaps 
for booking in a foreign branch so that the swap would be treated as a 
swap conducted through a foreign branch for purposes of the SD and MSP 
registration thresholds or for purposes of certain regulatory 
requirements applicable to registered SDs or MSPs. To satisfy this 
prong, the Commission proposed that it must be the normal course of 
business for employees located in the branch (or another foreign branch 
of the U.S. bank) to enter into the type of swap in question. The 
Commission stated that this requirement would not prevent personnel of 
the U.S. bank located in the U.S. from participating in the negotiation 
or execution of the swap so long as the swaps that are booked in the 
foreign branch are primarily entered into by personnel located in the 
branch (or another foreign branch of the U.S. bank).\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(16). See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
966-968.
    \220\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of Comments
    While IIB/SIFMA and JFMC/IBAJ supported the proposed definition of 
``foreign branch,'' noting that it was consistent with the definition 
given to the term in the Guidance, Better Markets recommended that the 
definition include a requirement that the foreign branch be operated 
pursuant to U.S. banking laws and regulations and in compliance with 
applicable restrictions. Better Markets stated that the addition of 
this prong adds no additional burden and ensures a foreign branch 
cannot be established outside of the considered restrictions and 
substantive requirements of U.S. law.
    With respect to the proposed definition of a ``swap conducted 
through a foreign branch,'' Better Markets recommended that the 
Commission require that the swap be arranged, negotiated, and executed 
on behalf of the foreign branch solely by persons located outside the 
United States, rather than permit personnel of the U.S. bank located in 
the U.S. to participate in the negotiation or execution of a swap so 
long as the swaps that are booked in the foreign branch are primarily 
entered into by personnel located in the branch (or another foreign 
branch of the U.S. bank). Better Markets believes that this formulation 
defers too significantly to the foreign branches themselves to decide 
whether the ``primarily'' restriction has been met, and, instead 
recommends that the Commission adopt a foreign branch booking 
restriction that harmonizes with the SEC's approach. Better Markets 
argues that such restriction is necessary because foreign branches 
remain part of the U.S. person in the most critical, risk-related 
respects.
    IIB/SIFMA and JFMC/IBAJ, on the other hand, supported the proposed 
definition, noting that a requirement that the personnel agreeing to a 
swap be located in the foreign branch is not necessary because the 
location of a U.S. bank's employees in connection with a particular 
swap does not determine whether that swap presents risks to the United 
States. IIB/SIFMA further argued that because foreign branches of a 
U.S. bank are generally subject to foreign rules when transacting with 
non-U.S. counterparties regardless of whether the bank's U.S. personnel 
are involved, applying additional U.S. rules to swaps with non-U.S. 
counterparties based on the involvement of U.S. personnel causes market 
distortions by discouraging non-U.S. counterparties from interacting 
with U.S. personnel. IIB/SIFMA stated further that since 2013 many U.S. 
banks have had to rearrange their front office coverage of non-U.S. 
counterparties in order to address this concern and adoption of the 
proposed definition would help to reverse this damaging trend.
3. Final Rule and Commission Response
    Having considered the foregoing comments, the Commission has 
determined to adopt the definitions of ``foreign branch'' and ``swap 
conducted through a foreign branch'' as proposed.\221\ Regarding Better 
Markets' recommendation that a fifth prong be added to the definition 
of ``foreign branch'' to more closely align the definition with the 
definitions used by the prudential regulators, as noted below, the 
definition of ``foreign branch'' proposed by the Commission is 
consistent with the definitions of ``foreign branch'' in the 
regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency

[[Page 56948]]

(``OCC''), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(``FDIC'').\222\
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    \221\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(2) and (16).
    \222\ See infra notes 226- 228, and accompanying text.
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    Regarding Better Markets' comment that a foreign branch should be 
treated as a U.S. person unless the employees negotiating and agreeing 
to the terms of the swap are exclusively located in a foreign branch, 
the Commission responds that such a prescriptive limitation is not 
required to prevent evasion of the Commission's swap requirements 
through booking strategies. By requiring swaps to be entered into by a 
foreign branch in its normal course of business, primarily by personnel 
located in the foreign branch, the definition proposed by the 
Commission provides a workable standard of review that will permit the 
Commission to detect evasive booking strategies while not discouraging 
non-U.S. counterparties from interacting with U.S. personnel.
    The Commission is adopting the factors listed in the proposed 
definition of ``foreign branch'' for determining when an entity is 
considered a foreign branch for purposes of the Final Rule.\223\ The 
requirement that the foreign branch be located outside of the United 
States is consistent with the stated goal of identifying certain swap 
activity that is not conducted within the United States. The 
requirements that the foreign branch maintain accounts independent of 
the U.S. entity,\224\ operate for valid business reasons, and be 
engaged in the business of banking or finance and be subject to 
substantive banking or financing regulation in its non-U.S. 
jurisdiction will prevent an entity from setting up shell operations 
outside the United States in a jurisdiction without substantive banking 
or financial regulation in order to evade Dodd-Frank Act requirements 
and CFTC regulations.\225\ This definition incorporates concepts from 
the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation K,\226\ the FDIC's international 
banking regulation,\227\ and the OCC's ``foreign branch'' 
definition.\228\
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    \223\ As discussed in sections III.B.2 and IV.B.2, infra, the 
Final Rule does not require an Other Non-U.S. Person to count toward 
its SD and MSP threshold calculations swaps conducted through a 
foreign branch of a registered U.S. SD.
    \224\ The Commission notes that national banks operating foreign 
branches are required under section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act 
(``FRA'') to conduct the accounts of each foreign branch 
independently of the accounts of other foreign branches established 
by it and of its home office, and are required at the end of each 
fiscal period to transfer to their general ledgers the profit or 
loss accrued at each branch as a separate item. 12 U.S.C. 604. The 
FRA is codified at 12 U.S.C. 221 et seq.
    \225\ As discussed below, the Commission is concerned that the 
material terms of a swap would be negotiated or agreed to by 
employees of the U.S. bank that are located in the United States and 
then be routed to a foreign branch so that the swap would be treated 
as a swap with the foreign branch for purposes of the SD and MSP 
registration thresholds or for purposes of certain regulatory 
requirements applicable to registered SDs or MSPs.
    \226\ Regulation K is a regulation issued by the Federal Reserve 
Board under the authority of the FRA; the Bank Holding Company Act 
of 1956 (``BHC Act'') (12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.); and the 
International Banking Act of 1978 (``IBA'') (12 U.S.C. 3101 et 
seq.). Regulation K sets forth rules governing the international and 
foreign activities of U.S. banking organizations, including 
procedures for establishing foreign branches to engage in 
international banking. 12 CFR part 211. Under Regulation K, a 
``foreign branch'' is defined as ``an office of an organization 
(other than a representative office) that is located outside the 
country in which the organization is legally established and at 
which a banking or financing business is conducted.'' 12 CFR 
211.2(k).
    \227\ 12 CFR part 347 is a regulation issued by the FDIC under 
the authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 
1828(d)(2)), which sets forth rules governing the operation of 
foreign branches of insured state nonmember banks. Under 12 CFR 
347.102(j), a ``foreign branch'' is defined as an office or place of 
business located outside the United States, its territories, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, or the Virgin Islands, at which banking operations are 
conducted, but does not include a representative office.
    \228\ 12 CFR 28.2 (defining ``foreign branch'' as an office of a 
national bank (other than a representative office) that is located 
outside the United States at which banking or financing business is 
conducted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The definition of ``foreign branch'' in the Final Rule is also 
consistent with the SEC's approach, which, for purposes of security-
based swap dealer regulation, defines a foreign branch as any branch of 
a U.S. bank that: (1) Is located outside the United States; (2) 
operates for valid business reasons; and (3) is engaged in the business 
of banking and is subject to substantive banking regulation in the 
jurisdiction where located.\229\ The Commission's intention is to 
ensure that the definition provides sufficient clarity as to what 
constitutes a ``foreign branch''--specifically, an office outside of 
the U.S. that has independent accounts from the home office and other 
branches--while striving for greater regulatory harmony with the SEC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ See 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(2).
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    A foreign branch does not include an affiliate of a U.S. bank that 
is incorporated or organized as a separate legal entity.\230\ For 
similar reasons, the Commission declines in the Final Rule to recognize 
foreign branches of U.S. persons separately from their U.S. principal 
for purposes of registration.\231\ That is, if the foreign branch 
engages in swap activity in excess of the relevant SD or MSP 
registration thresholds, as discussed further below, the U.S. person 
would be required to register, and the registration would encompass the 
foreign branch. However, upon consideration of principles of 
international comity and the factors set forth in the Restatement, 
rather than broadly excluding foreign branches from the ``U.S. person'' 
definition, the Commission is calibrating the requirements for counting 
certain swaps entered into through a foreign branch, as described in 
sections III.B.2 and IV.B.2, and calibrating the requirements otherwise 
applicable to foreign branches of a registered U.S. SD, as discussed in 
section VI. One of the benefits, as discussed below, will be to enable 
foreign branches of U.S. banks to have greater access to foreign 
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ This is similar to the approach described in the Guidance. 
See Guidance, 78 FR at 45328-45329.
    \231\ This is similar to the approach described in the Guidance. 
See id. at 45315, 45328-45329.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The definition of ``swap conducted through a foreign branch'' 
identifies the type of swap activity for which the foreign branch 
performs key dealing functions outside the United States. Because a 
foreign branch of a U.S. bank is not a separate legal entity, the first 
prong of the definition clarifies that the foreign branch must be the 
office of the U.S. bank through which payments and deliveries under the 
swap are made. This approach is consistent with the standard ISDA 
Master Agreement, which requires that each party specify an ``office'' 
for each swap, which is generally where a party ``books'' a swap and/or 
the office through which the party makes and receives payments and 
deliveries.\232\
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    \232\ The ISDA Master Agreement defines ``office'' as a branch 
or office of a party, which may be such party's head or home office. 
See 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, available at https://www.isda.org/book/2002-isda-master-agreement-english/library.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second prong of the definition (whether the swap is entered 
into by such foreign branch in the normal course of business) is 
intended as an anti-evasion measure to prevent a U.S. bank from simply 
routing swaps for booking in a foreign branch so that the swap would be 
treated as a swap conducted through a foreign branch for purposes of 
the SD and MSP registration thresholds or for purposes of certain 
regulatory requirements applicable to registered SDs or MSPs. To 
satisfy this prong, it must be the normal course of business for 
employees located in the branch (or another foreign branch of the U.S. 
bank) to enter into the type of swap in question. This requirement 
should not prevent personnel of the U.S. bank located in the U.S. from 
participating in the negotiation or execution of the swap so long as 
the swaps that are booked in the foreign branch are primarily entered 
into by personnel located in the branch (or another foreign branch of 
the U.S. bank). As noted above, the Commission

[[Page 56949]]

believes this is a workable standard of review that will permit the 
Commission to detect evasive booking strategies by examining the types 
of swaps booked in the foreign branch and determining whether any type 
of swap is primarily entered into by personnel located in the United 
States.
    With respect to the third prong, where a swap is with the foreign 
branch of a U.S. bank, it generally would be reflected in the foreign 
branch's accounts.

F. Swap Entity, U.S. Swap Entity, and Non-U.S. Swap Entity

    The Commission proposed that the term ``swap entity'' would mean a 
person that is registered with the Commission as a SD or MSP pursuant 
to the CEA.\233\ In addition, the Commission proposed to define ``U.S. 
swap entity'' as a swap entity that is a U.S. person, and ``non-U.S. 
swap entity'' as a swap entity that is not a U.S swap entity.\234\
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    \233\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(15); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
968, 1003.
    \234\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(10) and (23); Proposed Rule, 
85 FR at 968, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission did not receive any comments on these proposed 
definitions, and is adopting them as proposed.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(11), (18), and (24).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. U.S. Branch

    The Commission proposed that the term ``U.S. branch'' would mean a 
branch or agency of a non-U.S. banking organization where such branch 
or agency: (1) Is located in the United States; (2) maintains accounts 
independently of the home office and other U.S. branches, with the 
profit or loss accrued at each branch determined as a separate item for 
each U.S. branch; and (3) engages in the business of banking and is 
subject to substantive banking regulation in the state or district 
where located.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(20); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
968, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The only comment the Commission received on this definition was 
from JFMC/IBAJ, stating that they generally supported the proposed new 
definition, as they believe it provides a clear and objective standard 
and provides market participants with legal certainty. Thus, the 
Commission is adopting the definition of ``U.S. branch'' as 
proposed.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Swap Conducted Through a U.S. Branch

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that the term ``swap conducted through a 
U.S. branch'' would mean a swap entered into by a U.S. branch where: 
(1) The U.S. branch is the office through which the non-U.S. person 
makes and receives payments and deliveries under the swap pursuant to a 
master netting or similar trading agreement, and the documentation of 
the swap specifies that the office for the non-U.S. person is such U.S. 
branch; or (2) the swap is reflected in the local accounts of the U.S. 
branch.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(17); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
968, 1003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of Comments
    The same as for the definition of ``U.S. branch'' above, JFMC/IBAJ 
generally supported the proposed definition of ``swap conducted through 
a U.S. branch,'' as they believe it provides a clear and objective 
standard and provides market participants with legal certainty. 
However, JFMC/IBAJ, CS, and IIB/SIFMA asked the Commission to conform 
the definition to the definition of ``swap conducted through a foreign 
branch'' by (1) including a ``normal course of business'' prong, and 
(2) applying the definition conjunctively rather than disjunctively. 
JFMC/IBAJ stated that they see no policy rationale or countervailing 
policy benefit of these inconsistencies. CS agreed, stating that, as a 
matter of policy, it encourages the CFTC to provide consistent 
flexibility for U.S. branches and foreign branches. IIB/SIFMA stated 
that, in accordance with principles of international comity, the 
Commission should instead take a balanced and symmetric approach to 
recognizing when home versus host country regulators have an interest 
in applying their rules and that the Proposed Rule offers no 
justification for this asymmetric approach. ISDA also requested that 
the Commission apply the definition conjunctively, stating that only 
when a swap is booked at a particular entity can it be considered a 
swap transaction that is attributed to such an entity.
3. Final Rule--Swap Booked in a U.S. Branch
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the definition with certain modifications reflected in the 
rule text in this release.\239\ The Commission is removing the first 
prong of the definition such that the only relevant factor is whether 
the swap is reflected in the local accounts of the U.S. branch, meaning 
swaps for which the U.S. branch holds the risks and rewards, with the 
swap being accounted for as an obligation of the branch on the balance 
sheet of the U.S. branch under applicable accounting standards \240\ 
and under regulatory reporting requirements \241\ (i.e., the swap is 
``booked'' in the U.S. branch). This standard captures activity of non-
U.S. banking organizations taking place in their U.S. branches that 
should be treated as taking place in the United States to prevent 
evasion of CFTC rules by such organizations. As discussed in the 
Proposed Rule, in the case of the swap activities of the U.S. branches 
of non-U.S. banking organizations, the Commission has determined that 
the location of personnel involved in arranging, negotiating, and 
execution activities will not be relevant for application of the Final 
Rule.\242\ For this reason, the Commission had intended in the Proposed 
Rule only to reach swaps that are booked in the United States under the 
definition of ``swap conducted through a U.S. branch.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(16).
    \240\ Or would be accounted for on its balance sheet under 
applicable accounting standards if the U.S. branch were a separate 
legal entity.
    \241\ For example, the swap is included in the non-U.S. person's 
Report of Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of 
Foreign Banks published by the Federal Financial Institution 
Examinations Council (FFIEC 002).
    \242\ See infra section V; Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 978.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission now understands that a U.S. branch may be listed as 
the office through which a non-U.S. person makes and receives 
deliveries under a swap or as the office identified in the master, 
netting, or similar trading agreement without the swap being booked in 
a U.S. branch. Commenters explained, for example, that the U.S. branch 
is often listed for payments and deliveries for swaps denominated in 
U.S. Dollars even where the risk/benefit of the swap resides outside 
the United States.
    Further, to emphasize that booking is the focus of the definition, 
the Commission is changing the term from ``swap conducted through a 
U.S. branch'' to ``swap booked in a U.S. branch'' (and, accordingly, 
revising the definitions of ``foreign-based swap'' and ``foreign 
counterparty'' below to reflect this change in terminology).
    In response to comments objecting to the differences in the 
proposed definitions of ``swap conducted through a foreign branch'' and 
``swap conducted through a U.S. branch,'' the Commission

[[Page 56950]]

is retaining these differences because, as a general matter, U.S. swap 
entities should be subject to all of the Commission's Title VII 
requirements set forth in the Final Rule. Because classifying a swap as 
a ``swap conducted through a foreign branch'' makes a U.S. swap entity 
eligible for certain exceptions from these requirements and substituted 
compliance for the swap under the Final Rule, merely booking a swap in 
the foreign branch is not sufficient for a U.S. swap entity to qualify 
for these exceptions and substituted compliance. Rather, the U.S. swap 
entity is required also to show that the swap is a transaction of a 
type that is endemic to the foreign market (i.e., that it is a type of 
transaction entered into by personnel in the foreign branch in the 
normal course of the business of the branch, rather than a transaction 
more normally entered into in a different location and merely booked in 
the foreign branch to evade CFTC regulatory requirements). Hence, as 
discussed above, the Commission is including a ``normal course of 
business'' prong in the definition of ``a swap conducted through a 
foreign branch'' and requiring that all three prongs of the definition 
be satisfied.
    As noted in the Proposed Rule and consistent with the Commission's 
approach to foreign branches, a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. banking 
organization does not include a U.S. affiliate of the organization that 
is incorporated or organized as a separate legal entity. Also 
consistent with this approach, the Commission declines in the Final 
Rule to recognize U.S. branches of non-U.S. banking organization 
separately from their non-U.S. principal for purposes of registration.

I. Foreign-Based Swap and Foreign Counterparty

1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that the term ``foreign-based swap'' would 
mean: (1) A swap by a non-U.S. swap entity, except for a swap conducted 
through a U.S. branch; or (2) a swap conducted through a foreign 
branch.\243\ Further, the term ``foreign counterparty'' would mean: (1) 
A non-U.S. person, except with respect to a swap conducted through a 
U.S. branch of that non-U.S. person; or (2) a foreign branch where it 
enters into a swap in a manner that satisfies the definition of a swap 
conducted through a foreign branch.\244\ Under the Proposed Rule, 
together with the proposed defined terms ``foreign branch,'' ``swap 
conducted through a foreign branch,'' ``U.S. branch,'' and ``swap 
conducted through a U.S. branch,'' these terms were to be used to 
determine which swaps would be foreign swaps of non-U.S. swap entities 
and foreign branches of U.S. swap entities, for which certain relief 
from Commission requirements would be available under the Proposed 
Rule, and which swaps would be treated as domestic swaps not eligible 
for such relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(a)(4); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
968-969, 1002.
    \244\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of Comments
    AIMA was supportive of the definition of ``foreign counterparty'' 
and, in particular, its application to CIVs. However, JFMC/IBAJ 
requested that the Commission expand the definition of ``foreign-based 
swap'' and ``foreign counterparty'' under the proposed exceptions from 
the group B and C requirements (described in sections VI.A.2 and VI.A.3 
below) to cover swaps conducted through the U.S. branch of a non-U.S. 
swap entity. JFMC/IBAJ stated that these are swap trades between two 
non-U.S. persons and thus should be governed by the home country 
regulation of the non-U.S. persons according to principles of 
international comity, and that there is no material importation of risk 
to the U.S. financial system and hence a lack of sufficient 
jurisdictional nexus for purposes of CEA section 2(i). JBA similarly 
requested that, generally, swap requirements not apply to U.S. branches 
in a different manner than the related non-U.S person.
3. Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the definitions of ``foreign-based swap'' and ``foreign 
counterparty'' as proposed, with a minor technical modification 
included in the rule text in this release.\245\ Specifically, to 
reflect that the term ``swap conducted through a U.S. branch'' is being 
replaced with the term ``swap booked in a U.S. branch,'' each of the 
definitions of ``foreign-based swap'' and ``foreign counterparty'' is 
being revised to replace the term ``swap conducted through a U.S. 
branch'' with the term ``swap booked in a U.S. branch.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(4) and (5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When a swap is booked in a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap entity, 
that swap is part of the U.S. swap market, and, accordingly, the group 
B and group C requirements (described in sections VI.A.2 and VI.A.3 
below) should generally apply.\246\ Therefore, the Commission has 
determined to carve out a swap booked in a U.S. branch from the 
definitions of ``foreign-based swap'' and ``foreign counterparty.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \246\ The Commission notes that swap activities of the U.S. 
branches of non-U.S. banking organizations take place inside the 
United States and, thus, section 2(i)'s applicability (i.e., to 
activities ``outside the U.S.'') is not implicated. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in sections VI.B and VI.C, infra, the Commission has 
determined under the Final Rule to provide certain exceptions from 
application of the group C requirements and the availability of 
substituted compliance for the group B requirements for certain 
swaps booked in the U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, the Commission is using the 
terms ``foreign-based swap'' and ``foreign counterparty'' to identify 
the types of swaps that are eligible for certain relief, consistent 
with section 2(i) of the CEA, in order that swaps that demonstrate 
sufficient indicia of being domestic generally remain subject to the 
Commission's requirements under the Final Rule, notwithstanding that 
the swap is entered into by a non-U.S. swap entity or a foreign branch 
of a U.S. swap entity. Otherwise, an entity or branch might simply be 
established outside of the United States to evade Dodd-Frank Act 
requirements and CFTC regulations.
    As the Commission has previously stated, it has a strong 
supervisory interest in regulating swap activities that occur in the 
United States.\247\ However, consistent with section 2(i) of the CEA, 
foreign swaps of non-U.S. swap entities and foreign branches of U.S. 
swap entities should be eligible for relief from certain of the 
Commission's requirements. Accordingly, certain exceptions from the 
group B and group C requirements and portions of the Commission's 
substituted compliance regime (discussed below in sections VI.B and 
VI.C), are designed to apply only to certain foreign swaps of non-U.S. 
swap entities and foreign branches of U.S. swap entities that the 
Commission believes should be treated as occurring outside the United 
States. Specifically, these provisions are applicable only to a swap by 
a non-U.S. swap entity--except for a swap booked in a U.S. branch--and 
a swap conducted through a foreign branch such that it satisfies the 
definition of a ``foreign-based swap'' above. They are generally not 
applicable to swaps of non-U.S. swap entities that are booked in a U.S. 
branch of that swap entity, and swaps of foreign branches of U.S. swap 
entities where the foreign branch does not enter into the swaps in a 
manner that satisfies the definition of a swap conducted through a 
foreign branch, because the

[[Page 56951]]

entrance into a swap by a U.S. swap entity (through its foreign branch) 
or a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap entity under these circumstances, 
demonstrates sufficient indicia of being a domestic swap to be treated 
as such for purposes of the Final Rule. Similarly, in certain cases, 
the availability of an exception or substituted compliance for a swap 
depends on whether the counterparty to such a swap qualifies as a 
``foreign counterparty'' under the Final Rule. The Commission is 
establishing this requirement to ensure that foreign-based swaps of 
swap entities in which their counterparties demonstrate sufficient 
indicia of being domestic and, thus, trigger the Commission's 
supervisory interest in domestic swaps, remain subject to the 
Commission requirements under the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45350, n.513.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's approach in the Final Rule to limit certain relief 
for U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities is parallel to the 
Commission's approach in the Final Rule to provide certain exceptions 
from Commission requirements or substituted compliance for certain 
transactions of foreign branches of U.S. swap entities to take into 
account the supervisory interest of local regulators, as discussed 
below in section VI.

III. Cross-Border Application of the Swap Dealer Registration Threshold

    CEA section 1a(49) defines the term ``swap dealer'' to include any 
person that: (1) Holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (2) makes a 
market in swaps; (3) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as 
an ordinary course of business for its own account; or (4) engages in 
any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the trade as a 
dealer or market maker in swaps (collectively referred to as ``swap 
dealing,'' ``swap dealing activity,'' or ``dealing activity'').\248\ 
The statute also requires the Commission to promulgate regulations to 
establish factors with respect to the making of a determination to 
exempt from designation as an SD an entity engaged in a de minimis 
quantity of swap dealing.\249\
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    \248\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(49)(A). In general, a person that satisfies 
any one of these prongs is deemed to be engaged in swap dealing 
activity.
    \249\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(49)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with CEA section 1a(49), the Commission issued the 
Entities Rule,\250\ which, among other things, further defined the term 
``swap dealer'' and excluded from designation as an SD any entity that 
engages in a de minimis quantity of swap dealing with or on behalf of 
its customers.\251\ Specifically, the definition of ``swap dealer'' in 
Sec.  1.3 provides that a person shall not be deemed to be an SD as a 
result of its swap dealing activity involving counterparties unless, 
during the preceding 12 months, the aggregate gross notional amount of 
the swaps connected with those dealing activities exceeds the de 
minimis threshold.\252\ Paragraph (4) of that definition further 
requires that, in determining whether its swap dealing activity exceeds 
the de minimis threshold, a person must include the aggregate gross 
notional amount of the swaps connected with the dealing activities of 
its affiliates under common control.\253\ For purposes of the 
Commission's interpretation of the aggregation requirement in the 
cross-border context as set forth in this release, the Commission 
construes ``affiliates under common control'' by reference to the 
Entities Rule, which defined control as the possession, direct or 
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of 
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.\254\ Accordingly, any 
reference in the Commission's aggregation interpretation to 
``affiliates under common control'' with a person includes affiliates 
that are controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such 
person.
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    \250\ Entities Rule, 77 FR 30596.
    \251\ 17 CFR 1.3, Swap dealer, paragraph (4); Entities Rule, 77 
FR 30596.
    \252\ 17 CFR 1.3, Swap dealer, paragraph (4)(i)(A). The de 
minimis threshold is set at $8 billion, except with regard to swaps 
with special entities for which the threshold is $25 million. See 
id., paragraphs (4)(i)(A)-(B). See generally De Minimis Exception to 
the Swap Dealer Definition, 83 FR 56666 (Nov. 13, 2018).
    \253\ 17 CFR 1.3, Swap dealer, paragraph (4)(i)(A).
    \254\ See Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30631 n.437.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is now adopting rules to address how the de minimis 
threshold should apply to the cross-border swap dealing transactions of 
U.S. and non-U.S. persons. Specifically, the Final Rule identifies when 
a potential SD's cross-border dealing activities should be included in 
its de minimis threshold calculation and when they may properly be 
excluded. As discussed below, whether a potential SD includes a 
particular swap in its de minimis threshold calculation depends on how 
the entity and its counterparty are classified (e.g., U.S. person, SRS, 
etc.) and, in some cases, the jurisdiction in which a non-U.S. person 
is regulated.

A. U.S. Persons

    The Commission is adopting, as proposed and consistent with the 
Guidance, the requirement that a U.S. person include all of its swap 
dealing transactions in its de minimis threshold calculation without 
exception.\255\ The Commission did not receive comments regarding this 
requirement. As discussed in section II.B above, the term ``U.S. 
person'' encompasses a person that, by virtue of being domiciled, 
organized, or having its principal place of business in the United 
States, raises the concerns intended to be addressed by the Dodd-Frank 
Act, regardless of the U.S. person status of its counterparty. In 
addition, a person's status as a U.S. person is determined at the 
entity level and, thus, a U.S. person includes the swap dealing 
activity of operations that are part of the same legal person, 
including those of its foreign branches. Therefore, a U.S. person 
includes in its SD de minimis threshold calculation dealing swaps 
entered into by a foreign branch of the U.S. person.\256\
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    \255\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(1). See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 970-
971, 1004; Guidance, 78 FR at 45326.
    \256\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 970-971. This approach mirrors the 
SEC's approach in its cross-border rule. See 17 CFR 240.3a71-
3(b)(1)(i); SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47302, 47371.
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B. Non-U.S. Persons

    Under the Final Rule, as discussed in more detail below, whether a 
non-U.S. person needs to include a swap in its de minimis threshold 
calculation depends on the non-U.S. person's status, the status of its 
counterparty, and, in some cases, the jurisdiction in which the non-
U.S. person is regulated. Specifically, the Final Rule requires a 
person that is a Guaranteed Entity or an SRS to count all of its 
dealing swaps towards the de minimis threshold.\257\ In addition, an 
Other Non-U.S. Person is required to count dealing swaps with a U.S. 
person toward its de minimis threshold calculation, except for swaps 
conducted through a foreign branch of a registered U.S. SD.\258\ 
Further, subject to certain exceptions, the Final Rule requires an

[[Page 56952]]

Other Non-U.S. Person to count dealing swaps toward its de minimis 
threshold calculation if the counterparty to such swaps is a Guaranteed 
Entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ As discussed in section II.C, supra, for purposes of this 
release and ease of reading, a non-U.S. person whose obligations 
under a swap are subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person is being 
referred to as a ``Guaranteed Entity.'' A non-U.S. person may be a 
Guaranteed Entity with respect to certain swaps and not others 
(including, e.g., where the non-U.S. person is guaranteed only with 
respect to its swaps with certain counterparties). Thus, a non-U.S. 
person could be a Guaranteed Entity or an Other Non-U.S. Person, 
depending on the specific swap.
    \258\ As stated, ``swap conducted through a foreign branch'' 
means a swap entered into by a foreign branch where: (1) The foreign 
branch or another foreign branch is the office through which the 
U.S. person makes and receives payments and deliveries under the 
swap pursuant to a master netting or similar trading agreement, and 
the documentation of the swap specifies that the office for the U.S. 
person is such foreign branch; (2) the swap is entered into by such 
foreign branch in its normal course of business; and (3) the swap is 
reflected in the local accounts of the foreign branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Swaps by a Significant Risk Subsidiary
    The Commission proposed to require an SRS to include all of its 
dealing swaps in its de minimis threshold calculation without 
exception.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(b)(1); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 971, 
1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA stated that, generally, the Commission should not require 
a non-U.S. person, whether or not it is an SRS or other FCS, to include 
dealing swaps with a non-U.S. person in its SD de minimis threshold 
calculation when the risk of such swaps is transferred to an 
affiliated, registered U.S. SD. In such a situation, IIB/SIFMA asserted 
that there is no significant potential for risk to the United States or 
evasion of the Dodd-Frank Act because the Commission already can 
exercise appropriate regulatory oversight through direct regulation of 
the registered SD, which is subject to Dodd-Frank Act provisions such 
as risk management requirements and Commission or prudential regulator 
margin and capital requirements. IIB/SIFMA argued that this 
consideration underlies the Commission's decision to exclude affiliates 
of a registered SD from the ``conduit affiliate'' definition in the 
Guidance, as well as the similar approach taken by the SEC in its 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    After considering this comment, the Commission is adopting this 
requirement as proposed.\260\ As discussed in section II.D above, the 
SRS test identifies a person that, by virtue of being a significant 
subsidiary of a U.S. person, and not being subject to prudential 
supervision as a subsidiary of a BHC or IHC, or subject to comparable 
capital and margin rules, raises the concerns intended to be addressed 
by the Dodd-Frank Act requirements addressed by the Final Rule, 
regardless of the status of its counterparty as a U.S. person or non-
U.S. person. The Commission believes that treating an SRS differently 
from a U.S. person could create a substantial regulatory loophole, 
incentivizing U.S. persons to conduct their dealing business with non-
U.S. persons through SRSs to avoid application of the Dodd-Frank Act SD 
requirements. Allowing swaps entered into by SRSs, which have the 
potential to affect the ultimate U.S. parent entity and U.S. commerce, 
to be treated differently depending on how the parties structure their 
transactions could undermine the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act 
swaps provisions and related Commission regulations addressed by the 
Final Rule. Applying the same standard to similar transactions helps to 
limit those incentives and regulatory implications. Because the SRS 
definition is a risk-based test, the Commission has determined not to 
include a carve-out for back-to-back swaps to SDs, as was provided in 
the Guidance for conduit affiliates. Additionally, the SRS definition, 
as adopted in the Final Rule, already includes a carve-out for 
affiliates of BHCs and IHCs. This approach allows for streamlined 
application of the rule, and the comment letters have not identified 
specific downsides to this approach.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(1).
    \261\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a person's status as an SRS is determined at the 
entity level and, thus, an SRS is required to include in its SD de 
minimis threshold calculation the dealing swaps of its operations that 
are part of the same legal person, including those of its 
branches.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Proposed Rule also provided that an Other Non-U.S. Person would 
not be required to count a dealing swap with an SRS toward its de 
minimis threshold calculation, unless the SRS was also a Guaranteed 
Entity (and no exception applied).\263\ JFMC/IBAJ supported this 
approach, while JBA asserted that an Other Non-U.S. Person should not 
have to count a swap entered into with a non-U.S. person in any 
circumstance. As noted above, an SRS is required to count all of its 
dealing swaps. However, the Commission continues to believe that where 
an Other Non-U.S. Person is entering into a dealing swap with an SRS, 
requiring the Other Non-U.S. Person to count the swap towards its de 
minimis threshold could cause the Other Non-U.S. Person to stop 
engaging in swap activities with SRSs. Though an SRS is required to 
count all of its dealing swaps, for the reasons stated above, the 
Commission believes that it is important to ensure that SRSs, 
particularly ones that are a commercial or non-financial entity that do 
not engage in swap dealing activities, continue to have access to swap 
liquidity from Other Non-U.S. Persons for hedging or other non-dealing 
purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Swaps With a U.S. Person
    Consistent with the Guidance, the Commission proposed to require a 
non-U.S. person to count all dealing swaps with a counterparty that is 
a U.S. person toward its de minimis threshold calculation, except for 
swaps with a counterparty that is a foreign branch of a registered U.S. 
SD if such swaps meet the definition of being ``conducted through a 
foreign branch'' of such registered SD.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(i); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
971-972, 1004. See Guidance, 78 FR at 45323-45324.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA, JFMC/IBAJ, and JBA supported allowing an Other Non-U.S. 
Person to exclude swap dealing transactions conducted through a foreign 
branch of a registered SD counterparty. IIB/SIFMA agreed that the 
Commission's regulatory interest in these swaps is not sufficient to 
warrant a competitive disadvantage for foreign branches of U.S. SDs, 
especially considering that other Dodd-Frank Act requirements, such as 
margin, mitigate the risk of these swaps to the U.S. SD. Additionally, 
IIB/SIFMA stated that the exclusion helps prevent market fragmentation 
by enabling Other Non-U.S. Persons to access liquidity provided by U.S. 
SDs through their foreign branches. On the other hand, AFR asserted 
that the Proposed Rule would allow branches of U.S. persons, which are 
actually formally and legally part of the parent U.S. organization, to 
effectively act as non-U.S. persons.
    After considering the comments, the Commission is adopting this 
aspect of the cross-border application of the SD registration threshold 
as proposed.\265\ As discussed in section II.B, the term ``U.S. 
person'' encompasses persons that inherently raise the concerns 
intended to be addressed by the Dodd-Frank Act regardless of the U.S. 
person status of their counterparty. In the event of a default or 
insolvency of a non-U.S. SD, the SD's U.S. counterparties could be 
adversely affected. A credit event, including funding and liquidity 
problems, downgrades, default, or insolvency at a non-U.S. SD could 
therefore have a direct and significant adverse effect on its U.S. 
counterparties, which could in turn create the risk of disruptions to 
the U.S. financial system.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(i).
    \266\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 971-972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Allowing a non-U.S. person to exclude swaps conducted through a 
foreign branch of a registered SD counterparty from its de minimis 
threshold calculation is consistent with the Guidance.\267\ In response 
to AFR's comment that the Proposed Rule allows foreign branches of U.S. 
persons to effectively act as non-U.S. persons, the

[[Page 56953]]

Commission continues to believe that its regulatory interest in these 
swaps is not sufficient to warrant creating a potential competitive 
disadvantage for foreign branches of U.S. SDs with respect to their 
foreign entity competitors by requiring non-U.S. persons to count 
trades with them toward their de minimis threshold calculations. In 
this regard, a swap conducted through a foreign branch of a registered 
SD triggers certain Dodd-Frank Act transactional requirements (or 
comparable requirements), particularly margin requirements, and thus, 
such swap activity is not conducted fully outside the Dodd-Frank Act 
regime. Moreover, in addition to certain Dodd-Frank Act requirements 
that apply to such swaps, other foreign regulatory requirements may 
also apply similar transactional requirements to the transactions.\268\ 
Accordingly, the Commission believes that it is appropriate and 
consistent with section 2(i) of the CEA to allow non-U.S. persons to 
exclude from their de minimis calculation any swap dealing transactions 
conducted through a foreign branch of a registered SD counterparty. 
However, this exception does not apply to Guaranteed Entities 
(discussed below) or SRSs (discussed above), who have to count all of 
their dealing swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ Id. See Guidance, 78 FR at 45323-45324.
    \268\ As noted in section I.C, supra, significant and 
substantial progress has been made in the world's primary swaps 
trading jurisdictions to implement the G20 swaps reform commitments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also requested comment on whether it would be 
appropriate to require a U.S. branch to include in its SD de minimis 
threshold calculation all of its swap dealing transactions, as if they 
were swaps entered into by a U.S. person, and whether it would be 
appropriate to require an Other Non-U.S. Person to include in its SD de 
minimis threshold calculation dealing swaps conducted through a U.S. 
branch of its counterparty.\269\ IIB/SIFMA supported not requiring a 
U.S. branch of a non-U.S. banking organization to include all of its 
swap dealing transactions in its SD de minimis threshold calculation as 
if they were swaps entered into by a U.S. person or to require an Other 
Non-U.S. Person to include in its SD de minimis threshold calculation 
dealing swaps conducted through such a branch of its counterparty. IIB/
SIFMA stated that swaps between a U.S. branch and an Other Non-U.S. 
Person do not present risks to the United States that would justify 
applying the Commission's SD requirements. JBA also stated that Other 
Non-U.S. Persons should not have to count swaps conducted through a 
U.S. branch of a counterparty since such an approach may lead to Other 
Non-U.S. Persons decreasing activity with U.S. branches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 973. See discussion of the 
modification of the definition of a ``swap conducted through a U.S. 
branch'' to be a ``swap booked in a U.S. branch'' in section II.H.3, 
supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Having considered the foregoing comments, in this Final Rule, the 
Commission is not requiring a U.S. branch of an Other Non-U.S. Person 
to count all of its swap dealing transactions in its SD threshold 
calculation, as if they were swaps entered into by a U.S. person. 
Rather, a U.S. branch is required to count swaps pursuant to the 
requirements for Other Non-U.S. Persons (e.g., count swaps with U.S. 
persons, Guaranteed Entities subject to certain exceptions, etc.). 
Additionally, an Other Non-U.S. Person is not required to include in 
its SD de minimis threshold calculation dealing swaps booked in a U.S. 
branch of a counterparty, unless that swap has to be counted pursuant 
to other requirements of this Final Rule.
3. Guaranteed Swaps
(i) Swaps Entered Into by a Guaranteed Entity
    In an approach that is generally consistent with the Guidance, the 
Commission proposed to require a non-U.S. person to include in its de 
minimis threshold calculation swap dealing transactions where its 
obligations under the swaps are guaranteed by a U.S. person.\270\ No 
comments were received regarding this aspect of the Proposed Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(ii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
972, 1004. The Guidance stated that where a non-U.S. affiliate of a 
U.S. person has its swap dealing obligations with non-U.S. persons 
guaranteed by a U.S. person, the guaranteed affiliate generally 
would be required to count those swap dealing transactions with non-
U.S. persons (in addition to its swap dealing transactions with U.S. 
persons) for purposes of determining whether the affiliate exceeds a 
de minimis amount of swap dealing activity and must register as an 
SD. Guidance, 78 FR at 45312-45313. As discussed above, the Final 
Rule does not require that the guarantor be an affiliate of the 
guaranteed person for that person to be a Guaranteed Entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is adopting this requirement as proposed,\271\ 
because the swap obligations of a Guaranteed Entity are identical, in 
relevant aspects, to a swap entered into directly by a U.S. person. As 
a result of the guarantee, the U.S. guarantor generally bears risk 
arising out of the swap as if it had entered into the swap directly. 
The U.S. guarantor's financial resources in turn enable the Guaranteed 
Entity to engage in dealing activity, because the Guaranteed Entity's 
counterparties will look to both the Guaranteed Entity and its U.S. 
guarantor to ensure performance of the swap. Absent the guarantee from 
the U.S. person, a counterparty may choose not to enter into the swap 
or may not do so on the same terms. In this way, the Guaranteed Entity 
and the U.S. guarantor effectively act together to engage in the 
dealing activity.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(ii).
    \272\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972. This view is consistent with 
the SEC's approach in its cross-border rule. See SEC Cross-Border 
Rule, 79 FR at 47289.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, treating a Guaranteed Entity differently from a U.S. 
person could create a substantial regulatory loophole, incentivizing 
U.S. persons to conduct their dealing business with non-U.S. persons 
through non-U.S. affiliates, with a U.S. guarantee, to avoid 
application of the Dodd-Frank Act SD requirements. Allowing 
transactions that have a similar economic reality with respect to U.S. 
commerce to be treated differently depending on how the parties 
structure their transactions could undermine the effectiveness of the 
Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions and related Commission regulations 
addressed by the Final Rule. Applying the same standard to similar 
transactions helps to limit those incentives and regulatory 
implications.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Swaps Entered Into With a Guaranteed Entity
    The Commission also proposed to require a non-U.S. person to count 
dealing swaps with a Guaranteed Entity in its SD de minimis threshold 
calculation, except when: (1) The Guaranteed Entity is registered as an 
SD; or (2) the Guaranteed Entity's swaps are subject to a guarantee by 
a U.S. person that is a non-financial entity.\274\ The Commission also 
invited comment on whether it should the follow the SEC's approach, 
which does not require a non-U.S. person that is not guaranteed by a 
U.S. person to count dealing swaps with a Guaranteed Entity.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(iii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
973, 1004.
    \275\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 974. The SEC noted that ``concerns 
regarding the risk posed to the United States by such security-based 
swaps, and regarding the potential use of such guaranteed affiliates 
to evade the Dodd-Frank Act . . . are addressed by the requirement 
that guaranteed affiliates count their own dealing activity against 
the de minimis thresholds when the counterparty has recourse to a 
U.S. person.'' SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA, ISDA, JFMC/IBAJ, and JBA recommended that the Commission 
further conform this provision with the Guidance by expanding the 
exceptions to also cover a Guaranteed Entity that engages in de minimis 
swap dealing activity and is affiliated with a

[[Page 56954]]

registered SD. IIB/SIFMA and ISDA noted that the Commission's 
regulatory concerns are addressed because the Guaranteed Entity would 
already be required to count the swap towards its de minimis threshold. 
IIB/SIFMA, ISDA, and JFMC/IBAJ noted that absent this exception, Other 
Non-U.S. Persons may choose not to trade with Guaranteed Entities, 
leading to increased market fragmentation or competitive disadvantages. 
JFMC/IBAJ also stated that there has been no material change in the 
swaps market since issuance of the Guidance warranting removing this 
exception. JBA commented that Other Non-U.S. Persons should not have to 
count swaps where the non-U.S. counterparty transfers risks to an 
affiliated U.S. SD because of the burdens associated with such an 
approach, and the limited risks arising from transactions between two 
non-U.S. persons. JBA also recommended that the CFTC follow the SEC 
approach and not require a non-U.S. person to count a swap with a 
Guaranteed Entity because it is burdensome to assess whether a 
guarantee exists.
    Consistent with the Guidance, the Commission is adopting, as 
proposed, the requirement that a non-U.S. person must count dealing 
swaps with a Guaranteed Entity in its SD de minimis threshold 
calculation, except when: (1) The Guaranteed Entity is registered as an 
SD; or (2) the Guaranteed Entity's swaps are subject to a guarantee by 
a U.S. person that is a non-financial entity.\276\ Additionally, after 
carefully considering the comments, and to maintain consistency with 
the Guidance, the Commission is also adopting an exception that allows 
a non-U.S. person to exclude from its de minimis calculation swaps 
entered into with a Guaranteed Entity that is itself below the de 
minimis threshold and is affiliated with a registered SD.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(iii)(A) and (B). See Guidance, 78 
FR at 45324.
    \277\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(iii)(C). See Guidance, 78 FR at 
45324.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The guarantee of a swap is an integral part of the swap and, as 
discussed above, counterparties may not be willing to enter into a swap 
with a Guaranteed Entity in the absence of the guarantee. The 
Commission recognizes that, given the highly integrated corporate 
structures of global financial enterprises described above, financial 
groups may elect to conduct their swap dealing activity in a number of 
different ways, including through a U.S. person or through a non-U.S. 
affiliate that benefits from a guarantee from a U.S. person. Therefore, 
in order to avoid creating a regulatory loophole, swaps of a non-U.S. 
person with a Guaranteed Entity should receive the same treatment as 
swaps with a U.S. person. The exceptions are intended to address those 
situations where the risk of the swap between the non-U.S. person and 
the Guaranteed Entity is otherwise managed under the Dodd-Frank Act 
swap regime or is primarily outside the U.S. financial industry.\278\ 
JBA supported the SEC's approach, which, as noted, does not require a 
non-U.S. person that is not a conduit affiliate or guaranteed by a U.S. 
person to count dealing swaps with any guaranteed entity toward its de 
minimis threshold in any case.\279\ Given the broader global scope of 
the swaps market regulated under the Commission's swap regime versus 
the relatively more limited U.S.-focused scope of the security-based 
swap market regulated under the SEC's security-based swap regime, the 
Commission has determined to treat swaps with Guaranteed Entities 
differently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972.
    \279\ SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 FR at 47322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where an Other Non-U.S. Person enters into swap dealing 
transactions with a Guaranteed Entity that is a registered SD, the 
Commission will permit the non-U.S. person not to count its dealing 
transactions with the Guaranteed Entity against the non-U.S. person's 
de minimis threshold for two principal reasons. First, requiring the 
non-U.S. person to count such swaps may incentivize them to not engage 
in dealing activity with Guaranteed Entities, thereby contributing to 
market fragmentation and competitive disadvantages for entities wishing 
to access foreign markets. Second, one counterparty to the swap is a 
registered SD, and therefore is subject to comprehensive swap 
regulation under the oversight of the Commission.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, an Other Non-U.S. Person need not include in its de 
minimis threshold calculation its swap dealing transactions with a 
Guaranteed Entity where the Guaranteed Entity is guaranteed by a non-
financial entity. In these circumstances, systemic risk to U.S. 
financial markets is mitigated because the U.S. guarantor is a non-
financial entity whose primary business activities are not related to 
financial products and such activities primarily occur outside the U.S. 
financial sector.\281\ For purposes of the Final Rule, the Commission 
interprets ``non-financial entity'' to mean a counterparty that is not 
an SD, an MSP, or a financial end-user (as defined in the SD and MSP 
margin rule in Sec.  23.151).\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ Moreover, the SRS definition includes those non-financial 
U.S. parent entities that meet the risk-based thresholds set out in 
section II.D, supra.
    \282\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, as discussed, the Commission requested comment on whether 
it should expand the exception to not require a non-U.S. person that is 
not a Guaranteed Entity to count dealing swaps with a Guaranteed 
Entity, consistent with the SEC. IIB/SIFMA, ISDA, JFMC/IBAJ, and JBA 
requested a narrower version of this exception, noting that the 
Guidance allowed a non-U.S. person to exclude from its de minimis 
calculation swaps entered into with a Guaranteed Entity that is itself 
below the de minimis threshold and is affiliated with a registered SD. 
The Guidance reflected the Commission's view that when the aggregate 
level of swap dealing by a non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed 
affiliate, considering both swaps with U.S. persons and swaps with 
unregistered guaranteed affiliates, exceeds the de minimis level of 
swap dealing, the non-U.S. person's swap dealing transactions have the 
requisite direct and significant connection with activities in, or 
effect on, commerce of the United States.\283\ The Commission believes, 
however, that where the counterparty to a swap is a Guaranteed Entity 
and is not a registered SD, the Commission's regulatory concerns, such 
as systemic risk to U.S. financial markets, are addressed because the 
Guaranteed Entity engages in a level of swap dealing below the de 
minimis threshold and is part of an affiliated group with an SD.\284\ 
Risk to the Guaranteed Entity should be mitigated by the SD's risk 
management program, which under Commission rules must take account of 
risks posed by affiliates and must be integrated into risk management 
at the consolidated entity level.\285\ Including this exception also 
addresses concern that its elimination would discourage Other Non-U.S. 
Persons from entering into swaps with Guaranteed Entities, creating 
competitive disadvantages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45324.
    \284\ Id.
    \285\ 17 CFR 23.600(c)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Aggregation Requirement

    Paragraph (4) of the SD definition in Sec.  1.3 requires that, in 
determining whether its swap dealing transactions exceed the de minimis 
threshold, a person must include the aggregate notional amount of any 
swap dealing transactions entered into by its affiliates

[[Page 56955]]

under common control.\286\ Consistent with CEA section 2(i), the 
Commission interprets this aggregation requirement in a manner that 
applies the same aggregation principles to all affiliates in a 
corporate group, whether they are U.S. or non-U.S. persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ 17 CFR 1.3, Swap dealer, paragraph (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, consistent with the Guidance, the Commission proposed 
to require a potential SD, whether a U.S. or non-U.S. person, to 
aggregate all swaps connected with its dealing activity with those of 
persons controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the 
potential SD to the extent that these affiliated persons are themselves 
required to include those swaps in their own de minimis threshold 
calculations, unless the affiliated person is itself a registered 
SD.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972-973; Guidance, 78 FR at 45323.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Better Markets supported the proposed aggregation requirement 
because it would prevent structuring to avoid or evade the de minimis 
threshold. As discussed above in connection with the definition of 
``significant risk subsidiary,'' AFR stated that it would be simple for 
large international banks and other significant actors to conduct 
dealing through foreign subsidiaries that need not be counted toward de 
minimis thresholds at the subsidiary level. AFR claimed that the 
aggregation provision is negated by the fact that affiliates which are 
not SRSs would not have to count non-guaranteed swaps with other non-
U.S., non-SRS persons toward their own de minimis calculations. In this 
way, it argued that the weakness of the other definitions in the 
Proposed Rule affects the calculation of the de minimis registration 
thresholds.
    Having considered these comments, the Commission is adopting this 
interpretation of the cross-border application of the SD registration 
threshold as proposed, and consistent with the Guidance.\288\ Stated in 
general terms, the Commission's approach allows both U.S. persons and 
non-U.S. persons in an affiliated group to engage in swap dealing 
activity up to the de minimis threshold. When the affiliated group 
meets the de minimis threshold in the aggregate, one or more 
affiliate(s) (a U.S. affiliate or a non-U.S. affiliate) have to 
register as an SD so that the relevant swap dealing activity of the 
unregistered affiliates remains below the threshold. The Commission 
recognizes the borderless nature of swap dealing activities, in which a 
dealer may conduct swap dealing business through its various affiliates 
in different jurisdictions, and believes that its approach addresses 
the concern that an affiliated group of U.S. and non-U.S. persons 
engaged in swap dealing transactions with a significant connection to 
the United States may not be required to register solely because such 
swap dealing activities are divided among affiliates that all 
individually fall below the de minimis threshold. The Commission's 
approach ensures that the aggregate gross notional amount of applicable 
swap dealing transactions of all such unregistered U.S. and non-U.S. 
affiliates does not exceed the de minimis level.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \288\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972-973; Guidance, 78 FR at 45323.
    \289\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 972-973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to AFR's comment, pursuant to the status quo under the 
aggregation policy set forth in the Guidance, foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. persons (that are not ``conduit affiliates'' as described in the 
Guidance) have not counted non-guaranteed swaps with other non-U.S. 
persons toward their de minimis calculations and U.S. person parent 
entities have therefore not aggregated such swaps with their own or 
their affiliates' de minimis calculations. Thus, the new SRS category 
expands the swaps included by the aggregation requirement rather than 
``negating the aggregation provision'' as claimed by AFR.

D. Certain Exchange-Traded and Cleared Swaps

    The Commission proposed, in an approach that is generally 
consistent with the Guidance, to allow an Other Non-U.S. Person to 
exclude from its de minimis threshold calculation any swap that it 
anonymously enters into on a designated contract market (``DCM''), a 
swap execution facility (``SEF'') that is registered with the 
Commission or exempted by the Commission from SEF registration pursuant 
to section 5h(g) of the CEA, or a foreign board of trade (``FBOT'') 
that is registered with the Commission pursuant to part 48 of its 
regulations,\290\ if such swap is also cleared through a registered or 
exempt derivatives clearing organization (``DCO'').\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ The Commission considers the exception described herein 
also to apply with respect to an FBOT that provides direct access to 
its order entry and trade matching system from within the U.S. 
pursuant to no-action relief issued by Commission staff.
    \291\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(d); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 973, 
1004. See Guidance, 78 FR at 45325.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA recommended that this exception be expanded to cover 
swaps executed anonymously by an Other Non-U.S. Person on a non-U.S. 
trading venue and cleared by a non-U.S. clearing organization, 
regardless of whether the trading venue and clearing organization are 
registered or exempt from registration with the Commission. IIB/SIFMA 
stated that: (1) With such trades, the Other Non-U.S. Person cannot 
determine whether the swaps would count towards the SD de minimis 
threshold; (2) even if the Other Non-U.S. Person was registered as an 
SD, the swaps generally would not be subject to the Commission's 
external business conduct rules; and (3) a non-U.S. clearing 
organization becomes the counterparty to the Other Non-U.S. Person, and 
therefore the swaps do not present risk to the U.S. that would justify 
application of the Commission's risk mitigation rules. IIB/SIFMA stated 
that if the Other Non-U.S. Person's original counterparty was a U.S. 
person, the Commission's SEF and DCO registration requirements would 
independently require the trading venue and clearing organization to 
register with the Commission or obtain an exemption from registration 
and, therefore, it is not necessary for the Commission to limit this 
exception in a manner that would indirectly expand the SEF and DCO 
registration requirements to non-U.S. trading venues and clearing 
organizations with Other Non-U.S. Person participants.
    Similarly, JFMC/IBAJ generally supported the exception, but also 
requested that the Commission not require the clearing organization or 
trading venue to be registered or exempt from registration with the 
CFTC because, in their view, the same policy rationale of exempting 
cleared swaps executed anonymously on a SEF or DCM applies to swaps 
executed on non-U.S. trading venues or clearing organizations operating 
without a CFTC registration or exemption. JFMC/IBAJ also recommended 
that the scope be expanded to include cleared swaps executed 
bilaterally outside a trading venue. JBA generally supported the 
proposal but also recommended that the exclusion be available for all 
cleared swaps, regardless of whether they are anonymously entered into 
on a DCM, registered or exempt SEF, or an FBOT, because risk to the 
U.S. would be limited after the swap is cleared. JSCC recommended that 
a non-U.S. person should be able to exclude swaps entered into with a 
U.S. person from the de minimis threshold calculation, if the swap is 
cleared with a registered DCO or exempt DCO because any non-U.S. 
person-related risk arising from the

[[Page 56956]]

swap will be replaced and instead managed by the DCO.
    Better Markets stated that the exception must be amended to limit 
the exclusion to DCO-cleared, anonymously SEF or DCM-executed swaps in 
which neither counterparty is subsequently disclosed through the 
practice of post-trade name give-up. Additionally, Better Markets 
objected to the expansion of the exchange-trading exclusion for any 
swaps anonymously executed or cleared through an exempted intermediary.
    Having considered these comments, the Commission is adopting this 
exception as proposed.\292\ When a non-U.S. person enters into a swap 
that is executed anonymously on a registered or exempt SEF, DCM, or 
registered FBOT, the Commission recognizes that the non-U.S. person 
does not have the necessary information about its counterparty to 
determine whether the swap should be included in its SD de minimis 
threshold calculation. The Commission therefore has determined that in 
this case the swap should be excluded altogether due to these practical 
difficulties.\293\ However, the exception is limited to Other Non-U.S. 
Persons since, as discussed, Guaranteed Entities and SRSs have to count 
all of their dealing swaps towards the threshold, so the practical 
obstacles that would challenge Other Non-U.S. Persons are not relevant 
for Guaranteed Entities and SRSs.
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    \292\ Final Sec.  23.23(d).
    \293\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 973. Additionally, as the 
Commission has clarified in the past, when a non-U.S. person clears 
a swap through a registered or exempt DCO, such non-U.S. person 
would not have to include the resulting swap (i.e., the novated 
swap) in its de minimis threshold calculation. See, e.g., 2016 
Proposal, 81 FR at 71957 n.88. A swap that is submitted for clearing 
is extinguished upon novation and replaced by new swap(s) that 
result from novation. See 17 CFR 39.12(b)(6). See also Derivatives 
Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 FR 
69334, 69361 (Nov. 8, 2011). Where a swap is created by virtue of 
novation, such swap does not implicate swap dealing, and therefore 
it would not be appropriate to include such swaps in determining 
whether a non-U.S. person should register as an SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule expands the exception as it appeared in the Guidance 
to include SEFs and DCOs that are exempt from registration under the 
CEA, and also states that SRSs do not qualify for this exception. The 
CEA provides that the Commission may grant an exemption from 
registration if it finds that a foreign SEF or DCO is subject to 
comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation by the appropriate 
governmental authorities in the SEF or DCO's home country.\294\ The 
Commission believes that the policy rationale for providing relief to 
swaps anonymously executed on a SEF, DCM, or FBOT and then cleared also 
extends to swaps executed on a foreign SEF and/or cleared through a 
foreign DCO that has been granted an exemption from registration. As 
noted, the foreign SEF or DCO is subject to comprehensive regulation 
that is comparable to that applicable to registered SEFs and DCOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ See CEA sections 5h(g) for the SEF exemption provision and 
5b(h) for the DCO exemption provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has determined not to expand at this time the 
exception to allow an Other Non-U.S. Person to exclude swaps executed 
anonymously on an exchange and which are subsequently cleared, 
regardless of whether the exchange and clearing organization are 
registered or exempt from registration with the Commission. Commenters 
argued that if the Other Non-U.S. Person's original counterparty was a 
U.S. person, the Commission's SEF and DCO registration requirements 
would independently require the trading venue and clearing organization 
to register with the Commission or obtain an exemption from 
registration. While guidance from DMO has suggested that this might be 
the case with respect to SEFs and DCMs,\295\ the Commission has not 
taken a formal position on whether registration of a SEF or DCM is 
required where a U.S. person participates on the trading facility, and 
has stated that it will do so in the future.\296\ The Commission may 
consider expanding the exception pending other amendments to the SEF/
DCO regulations and registration requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ Division of Market Oversight Guidance on Application of 
Certain Commission Regulations to Swap Execution Facilities, at 2 
n.8 (Nov. 15, 2013) (``[DMO] expects that a multilateral swaps 
trading platform located outside the United States that provides 
U.S. persons . . . with the ability to trade or execute swaps on or 
pursuant to the rules of the platform, either directly or indirectly 
through an intermediary, will register as a SEF or DCM.'').
    \296\ See Swap Execution Facilities and Trade Execution 
Requirement, 83 FR 61946, 61961 n.106 (``[T]he Commission learned 
that many foreign multilateral swaps trading facilities prohibited 
U.S. persons and U.S-located persons from accessing their facilities 
due to the uncertainty that the guidance created with respect to SEF 
registration. The Commission understands that these prohibitions 
reflect concerns that U.S. persons and U.S.-located persons 
accessing their facilities would trigger the SEF registration 
requirement. . . . [T]he Commission expects to address the 
application of CEA section 2(i) to foreign multilateral swaps 
trading facilities, including foreign swaps broking entities, in the 
future.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments that anonymity should not be required, the 
Commission proposed this exception (and included it in the Guidance) 
because when a trade is entered into anonymously on an exchange, the 
non-U.S. person would not have the necessary information about its 
counterparty to determine whether the swap should be included in its de 
minimis threshold calculation.\297\ Therefore, these practical 
difficulties justify the exclusion of the swap altogether. However, if 
the identity of the counterparty is known to be a U.S. person, then the 
Other Non-U.S. Person should be seen to be participating in the U.S. 
swap market. Thus, the Commission has determined that such a non-U.S. 
person should count such swaps towards its de minimis threshold as 
otherwise required. Where the U.S. person status of a counterparty is 
known to the non-U.S. person, the Commission sees no reason to treat a 
cleared swap differently in the cross-border context than such swap is 
treated in the domestic U.S. context where cleared swaps entered into 
in a dealing capacity, whether executed anonymously or otherwise, count 
toward the SD de minimis threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 973; Guidance, 78 FR 45325.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Cross-Border Application of the Major Swap Participant Registration 
Tests

    CEA section 1a(33) defines the term ``major swap participant'' to 
include persons that are not SDs but that nevertheless pose a high 
degree of risk to the U.S. financial system by virtue of the 
``substantial'' nature of their swap positions.\298\ In accordance with 
the Dodd-Frank Act and CEA section 1a(33)(B), the Commission adopted 
rules further defining ``major swap participant'' and providing that a 
person shall not be deemed an MSP unless its swap positions exceed one 
of several thresholds.\299\ The thresholds were designed to take into 
account default-related credit risk, the risk of multiple market 
participants failing close in time, and the risk posed by a market 
participant's swap positions on an aggregate level.\300\ The Commission 
also adopted interpretive guidance stating

[[Page 56957]]

that, for purposes of the MSP analysis, an entity's swap positions are 
attributable to a parent, other affiliate, or guarantor to the extent 
that the counterparty has recourse to the parent, other affiliate, or 
guarantor and the parent or guarantor is not subject to capital 
regulation by the Commission, SEC, or a prudential regulator 
(``attribution requirement'').\301\
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    \298\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(33)(A) (defining ``major swap participant'' to 
mean any person that is not an SD and either: (1) Maintains a 
substantial position in swaps for any of the major swap categories, 
subject to certain exclusions; (2) whose outstanding swaps create 
substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious effects on 
the U.S. financial system; or (3) is a highly leveraged financial 
entity that is not subject to prudential capital requirements and 
that maintains a substantial position in swaps for any of the major 
swap categories).
    \299\ 17 CFR 1.3, Major swap participant, paragraph (1). See 
generally Entities Rule, 77 FR 30596.
    \300\ Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30666 (discussing the guiding 
principles behind the Commission's definition of ``substantial 
position'' in 17 CFR 1.3); id. at 30683 (noting that the 
Commission's definition of ``substantial counterparty exposure'' in 
17 CFR 1.3 is founded on similar principles as its definition of 
``substantial position'').
    \301\ Id. at 30689.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is now adopting rules to address the cross-border 
application of the MSP thresholds to the swap positions of U.S. and 
non-U.S. persons.\302\ Applying CEA section 2(i) and principles of 
international comity, the Final Rule identifies when a potential MSP's 
cross-border swap positions apply toward the MSP thresholds and when 
they may be properly excluded. As discussed below, whether a potential 
MSP includes a particular swap in its MSP threshold calculations 
depends on how the entity and its counterparty are classified (e.g., 
U.S. person, SRS, etc.) and, in some cases, the jurisdiction in which a 
non-U.S. person is regulated.\303\ The Final Rule's approach for the 
cross-border application of the MSP thresholds is similar to the 
approach described above for the SD threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ Final Sec.  23.23(c).
    \303\ As indicated above, for purposes of the Final Rule, an 
``Other Non-U.S. Person'' refers to a non-U.S. person that is 
neither a Guaranteed Entity nor an SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. U.S. Persons

    The Commission is adopting, as proposed, the requirement that a 
U.S. person include all of its swap positions in its MSP registration 
threshold calculations without exception.\304\ The Commission did not 
receive comments regarding this requirement. As discussed in the 
context of the Final Rule's approach to applying the SD de minimis 
registration threshold, by virtue of it being domiciled or organized in 
the United States, or the inherent nature of its connection to the 
United States, all of a U.S. person's activities have a significant 
nexus to U.S. markets, giving the Commission a particularly strong 
regulatory interest in its swap activities.\305\ Accordingly, the 
Commission believes that all of a U.S. person's swap positions, 
regardless of where they occur or the U.S. person status of the 
counterparty, should apply toward the MSP thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(1); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 974, 
1004.
    \305\ See supra section III.A; Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Non-U.S. Persons

    Under the Final Rule, as discussed in more detail below, whether a 
non-U.S. person includes a swap position in its MSP threshold 
calculations depends on its status, the status of its counterparty, or 
the characteristics of the swap. Specifically, the Final Rule requires 
a person that is a Guaranteed Entity or an SRS to count all of its swap 
positions. In addition, an Other Non-U.S. Person is required to count 
all swap positions with a U.S. person, except for swaps conducted 
through a foreign branch of a registered U.S. SD. Subject to an 
exception, the Final Rule also requires an Other Non-U.S. Person to 
count all swap positions if the counterparty to such swaps is a 
Guaranteed Entity.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \306\ As discussed in sections II.C and III.B, supra, for 
purposes of this release and ease of reading, such a non-U.S. person 
whose obligations under the swaps are subject to a guarantee by a 
U.S. person is being referred to as a ``Guaranteed Entity.'' 
Depending on the characteristics of the swap, a non-U.S. person may 
be a Guaranteed Entity with respect to swaps with certain 
counterparties, but not be deemed a Guaranteed Entity with respect 
to swaps with other counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Swaps by a Significant Risk Subsidiary
    The Commission proposed to require an SRS to include all of its 
swap positions in its MSP threshold calculations.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(c)(1); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 974-
975, 1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA recommended that the Commission not adopt the proposal, 
asserting that absent a guarantee or other form of direct risk transfer 
to a U.S. person, a foreign subsidiary does not present sufficiently 
``direct'' risk to the United States to justify extraterritorial 
application of the MSP registration requirement under section 2(i). 
IIB/SIFMA stated that permitting foreign subsidiaries to transact in 
swaps without registering as MSPs also would not create a substantial 
regulatory loophole, as there is no evidence of sufficiently 
substantial non-dealing swap activity occurring in foreign subsidiaries 
at present when SRSs are not subject to MSP registration (just as there 
are no U.S. persons currently registered as MSPs).
    After considering the comment, the Commission is adopting this 
aspect of the cross-border application of the MSP registration 
thresholds as proposed.\308\ As noted in section II.D, the term SRS 
encompasses a person that, by virtue of being a significant subsidiary 
of a U.S. person, and not being subject to prudential supervision as a 
subsidiary of a BHC or IHC or subject to comparable capital and margin 
rules, raises the concerns intended to be addressed by the Dodd-Frank 
Act requirements addressed by the Final Rule, regardless of the U.S. 
person status of its counterparty. Further, the Commission believes 
that treating an SRS differently from a U.S. person could create a 
substantial regulatory loophole by incentivizing U.S. persons to 
conduct their swap business with non-U.S. persons through SRSs to avoid 
application of the Dodd-Frank Act MSP requirements. Allowing swaps 
entered into by SRSs, which have the potential to affect the ultimate 
U.S. parent entity and U.S. commerce, to be treated differently 
depending on how the parties structure their transactions could 
undermine the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions and 
related Commission regulations addressed by the Final Rule. Applying 
the same standard to similar swap positions helps to limit those 
incentives and regulatory implications.\309\ Additionally, the SRS 
definition already includes a carve-out for affiliates of U.S. BHCs and 
IHCs. This approach allows for streamlined application of the rule, and 
the comment letters have not identified specific problems caused by 
applying the same standard to similar swap positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \308\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(1).
    \309\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 974-975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a person's status as an SRS is determined at the 
entity level and, thus, an SRS is required to include in its MSP 
threshold calculations the swap positions of its operations that are 
part of the same legal person, including those of its branches.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \310\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For added clarity, the Commission also notes that an Other Non-U.S. 
Person is not be required to include swap positions entered into with 
an SRS in its MSP threshold calculations, unless the SRS is also a 
Guaranteed Entity and no other exception applies.
2. Swap Positions With a U.S. Person
    The Commission proposed to require an Other Non-U.S. Person to 
count toward its MSP registration thresholds swap positions where the 
counterparty is a U.S. person, other than swaps with a foreign branch 
of a registered U.S. SD if such swaps are conducted through a foreign 
branch of such registered SD.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \311\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(i); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
975, 1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA supported this approach, stating that it is consistent 
with the Guidance, except that it does not require that swaps with a 
foreign branch of a registered SD be subject to daily variation margin 
in order to be excluded from an Other Non-U.S. Person's MSP

[[Page 56958]]

registration thresholds. IIB/SIFMA noted that this was appropriate 
because the Dodd-Frank Act's margin requirements independently impose 
variation margin requirements on SDs where appropriate. Further, they 
stated that the change removes the complexity of non-U.S. persons 
having to determine their own ``financial entity'' status in order to 
evaluate whether variation margin was required now that the uncleared 
swap margin rules use a slightly different ``financial end user'' 
definition.
    After considering this comment, the Commission is adopting this 
aspect of the cross-border application of the MSP registration 
thresholds as proposed.\312\ Generally, a potential MSP must include in 
its MSP threshold calculations any swap position with a U.S. person. As 
discussed above, the term ``U.S. person'' encompasses persons that 
inherently raise the concerns intended to be addressed by the Dodd-
Frank Act, regardless of the U.S. person status of their counterparty. 
The default or insolvency of the non-U.S. person would have a direct 
and significant adverse effect on a U.S. person and, by virtue of the 
U.S. person's significant nexus to the U.S. financial system, 
potentially could result in adverse effects or disruption to the U.S. 
financial system as a whole, particularly if the non-U.S. person's swap 
positions are substantial enough to exceed an MSP registration 
threshold.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(i).
    \313\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule's approach in allowing a non-U.S. person to exclude 
swap positions conducted through a foreign branch of a registered SD 
counterparty is consistent with the approach described in section 
III.B.2 for cross-border treatment with respect to SDs.\314\ In this 
regard, a swap conducted through a foreign branch of a registered SD 
triggers certain Dodd-Frank Act transactional requirements (or 
comparable requirements), particularly margin requirements, and 
therefore mitigates concern that this exclusion could be used to engage 
in swap activities outside the Dodd-Frank Act regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that it is appropriate 
and consistent with section 2(i) of the CEA to allow a non-U.S. person, 
which is not a Guaranteed Entity or SRS, to exclude from its MSP 
threshold calculations any swaps conducted through a foreign branch of 
a registered SD counterparty. The Commission recognizes that the 
Guidance provided that such swaps would need to be cleared or that the 
documentation of the swaps would have to require the foreign branch to 
collect daily variation margin, with no threshold, on its swaps with 
such non-U.S. person.\315\ The Final Rule does not include such a 
requirement because the foreign branch of the registered SD is 
nevertheless required to post and collect margin, as required by the SD 
margin rules. In addition, a non-U.S. person's swaps conducted through 
a foreign branch of a registered SD counterparty must be addressed in 
the SD's risk management program. Such program must account for, among 
other things, overall credit exposures to non-U.S. persons.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \315\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45324-45325.
    \316\ See 17 CFR 23.600(c)(4)(ii), requiring registered SDs and 
MSPs to have credit risk policies and procedures that account for 
daily measurement of overall credit exposure to comply with 
counterparty credit limits, and monitoring and reporting of 
violations of counterparty credit limits performed by personnel that 
are independent of the business trading unit. See also 17 CFR 
23.600(c)(1)(i), requiring the senior management and the governing 
body of each SD and MSP to review and approve credit risk tolerance 
limits for the SD or MSP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to a request for comment,\317\ IIB/SIFMA supported not 
requiring a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. banking organization to include 
all of its swap positions in its MSP calculation as if they were swaps 
entered into by a U.S. person or to require an Other Non-U.S. Person to 
include in its MSP calculation dealing swaps conducted through such a 
branch. IIB/SIFMA stated that swaps between a U.S. branch and an Other 
Non-U.S. Person do not present risks to the United States that would 
justify applying the Commission's MSP requirements. Consistent with the 
Proposed Rule, the Commission has determined not to require a U.S. 
branch to include swaps with Other Non-U.S. Persons in its MSP 
threshold calculations as if they were swaps entered into by a U.S. 
person. Similarly, the Final Rule does not require an Other Non-U.S. 
Person to include in its MSP calculation dealing swaps booked in a U.S. 
branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \317\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Guaranteed Swap Positions
(i) Swap Positions Entered Into by a Guaranteed Entity
    The Commission proposed to require a non-U.S. person to include in 
its MSP calculation each swap position with respect to which it is a 
Guaranteed Entity.\318\ No comments were received regarding this aspect 
of the Proposed Rule, and the Commission is adopting this aspect of the 
cross-border application of the MSP registration thresholds as 
proposed.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \318\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(ii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
975, 1004.
    \319\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As explained in the context of the SD de minimis threshold 
calculation, the Commission believes that the swap positions of a 
Guaranteed Entity are identical, in relevant aspects, to those entered 
into directly by a U.S. person and thus present similar risks to the 
stability of the U.S. financial system or of U.S. entities.\320\ As a 
result of the guarantee, the U.S. guarantor generally bears risk 
arising out of the swap as if it had entered into the swap directly. 
Absent the guarantee from the U.S. person, a counterparty may choose 
not to enter into the swap or may not do so on the same terms. Treating 
Guaranteed Entities differently from U.S. persons could also create a 
substantial regulatory loophole, allowing transactions that have a 
similar connection to or effect on U.S. commerce to be treated 
differently depending on how the parties are structured and thereby 
undermining the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions and 
related Commission regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \320\ See supra section III.B.3.i; Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Swaps Positions Entered Into With a Guaranteed Entity
    The Commission also proposed to require an Other Non-U.S. Person to 
count toward its MSP registration thresholds swap positions with a 
counterparty that is a Guaranteed Entity, except when the counterparty 
is registered as an SD.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \321\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(iii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
975-976, 1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA supported this approach, stating that it is consistent 
with the Guidance, except that it does not require that swaps with a 
Guaranteed Entity be subject to daily variation margin in order to be 
excluded from an Other Non-U.S. Person's MSP registration thresholds. 
IIB/SIFMA noted that this was appropriate because the Dodd-Frank Act's 
margin requirements independently impose variation margin requirements 
on SDs where appropriate. Further, they stated that the change removes 
the complexity of non-U.S. persons having to determine their own 
``financial entity'' status in order to evaluate whether variation 
margin was required now that the uncleared swap margin rules use a 
slightly different ``financial end user'' definition.
    The Commission is adopting as proposed the requirement that a non-
U.S. person must count swap positions

[[Page 56959]]

with a Guaranteed Entity counterparty, except when the counterparty is 
registered as an SD.\322\ The guarantee of a swap is an integral part 
of the swap and, as discussed above, counterparties may not be willing 
to enter into a swap with a Guaranteed Entity in the absence of the 
guarantee. The Commission also recognizes that, given the highly 
integrated corporate structures of global financial enterprises, 
financial groups may elect to conduct their swap activity in a number 
of different ways, including through a U.S. person or through a non-
U.S. affiliate that benefits from a guarantee from a U.S. person. 
Therefore, in order to avoid creating a substantial regulatory 
loophole, the Commission has determined that swap positions of a non-
U.S. person with a counterparty whose obligations under the swaps are 
guaranteed by a U.S. person must receive the same treatment as swap 
positions with a U.S. person.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(iii). The MSP provision does not 
include an exception for swap positions with non-U.S. persons 
guaranteed by a non-financial entity, or for swap positions with a 
Guaranteed Entity where such Guaranteed Entity is itself below the 
SD de minimis threshold under paragraph (4)(i) of the ``swap 
dealer'' definition in Sec.  1.3 and is affiliated with a registered 
SD, similar to the carve-outs in the SD provision. See Final Sec.  
23.23(b)(2)(iii)(B) and (C); supra section III.B.3.ii.
    \323\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 975-976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, similar to the discussion regarding SDs in section 
III.B.3.ii, where an Other Non-U.S. Person enters into a swap with a 
Guaranteed Entity that is a registered SD, it is appropriate to permit 
the non-U.S. person not to count its swap position with the Guaranteed 
Entity against the non-U.S. person's MSP thresholds, because one 
counterparty to the swap is a registered SD subject to comprehensive 
swap regulation and operating under the oversight of the Commission. 
For example, the swap position must be addressed in the SD's risk 
management program and account for, among other things, overall credit 
exposures to non-U.S. persons.\324\ In addition, a non-U.S. person's 
swap positions with a Guaranteed Entity that is an SD are included in 
exposure calculations and attributed to the U.S. guarantor for purposes 
of determining whether the U.S. guarantor's swap exposures are 
systemically important on a portfolio basis and therefore require the 
protections provided by MSP registration. Therefore, in these 
circumstances, the Commission has determined that the non-U.S. person 
need not count such a swap position toward its MSP thresholds.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \324\ See 17 CFR 23.600(c)(4)(ii). See also 17 CFR 
23.600(c)(1)(i).
    \325\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 975-976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Attribution Requirement

    In the Entities Rule, the Commission and the SEC provided a joint 
interpretation that an entity's swap positions in general are 
attributed to a parent, other affiliate, or guarantor for purposes of 
the MSP analysis to the extent that the counterparties to those 
positions have recourse to the parent, other affiliate, or guarantor in 
connection with the position, such that no attribution is required in 
the absence of recourse.\326\ Even in the presence of recourse, 
however, attribution of a person's swap positions to a parent, other 
affiliate, or guarantor is not necessary if the person is already 
subject to capital regulation by the Commission or the SEC or is a U.S. 
entity regulated as a bank in the United States (and is therefore 
subject to capital regulation by a prudential regulator).\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30689.
    \327\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposed to address the cross-border application of 
the attribution requirement in a manner consistent with the Entities 
Rule and CEA section 2(i) and generally comparable to the approach 
adopted by the SEC.\328\ Specifically, the Commission stated that the 
swap positions of an entity, whether a U.S. or non-U.S. person, should 
not be attributed to a parent, other affiliate, or guarantor for 
purposes of the MSP analysis in the absence of a guarantee. The 
Commission stated that even in the presence of a guarantee, attribution 
would not be required if the entity that entered into the swap directly 
is subject to capital regulation by the Commission or the SEC or is 
regulated as a bank in the United States.\329\ Additionally, the 
Commission invited comment on whether it should modify its 
interpretation with regard to the attribution requirement to provide 
that attribution of a person's swap positions to a parent, other 
affiliate, or guarantor would not be required if the person is subject 
to capital standards that are comparable to and as comprehensive as the 
capital regulations and oversight by the Commission, SEC, or a U.S. 
prudential regulator.\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 976. See SEC Cross-Border Rule, 79 
FR at 47346-47348.
    \329\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 976.
    \330\ Id. at 977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA stated that the Guidance clarified that the exception for 
entities subject to capital regulation also includes entities subject 
to non-U.S. capital standards that are comparable to, and as 
comprehensive as, the capital regulations and oversight by the 
Commission, SEC, or a U.S. prudential regulator (i.e., Basel compliant 
capital standards and oversight by a G20 prudential supervisor). 
Therefore, IIB/SIFMA recommended that the attribution requirement in 
the MSP threshold context should exclude entities subject to Basel 
compliant capital standards and oversight by a G20 prudential 
supervisor, as those entities should pose no higher risk than entities 
subject to capital regulation by the Commission, SEC, or a prudential 
regulator.
    The Commission is adopting the interpretation of the attribution 
requirement as discussed in the Proposed Rule, with a clarification. 
The Commission has determined that, in addition to entities that are 
subject to capital regulation by the Commission, SEC, or U.S. 
prudential regulators, the attribution requirement in the MSP threshold 
context also excludes entities subject to Basel compliant capital 
standards and oversight by a G20 prudential supervisor. As noted by 
IIB/SIFMA in response to a request for comment, this approach is 
consistent with the Guidance, and is recommended because those entities 
pose no higher risk than entities subject to capital regulation by the 
Commission, SEC, or a prudential regulator. The Commission has further 
determined that the swap positions of an entity that is required to 
register as an MSP, or whose MSP registration is pending, are not 
subject to the attribution requirement.
    Generally, if a guarantee is present, however, and the entity being 
guaranteed is not subject to capital regulation (as described above), 
whether the attribution requirement applies depends on the U.S. person 
status of the person to whom there is recourse under the guarantee 
(i.e., the U.S. person status of the guarantor). Specifically, a U.S. 
person guarantor attributes to itself any swap position of an entity 
subject to a guarantee, whether a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person, for 
which the counterparty to the swap has recourse against that U.S. 
person guarantor. The Commission finds that when a U.S. person acts as 
a guarantor of a swap position, the guarantee creates risk within the 
United States of the type that MSP regulation is intended to address, 
regardless of the U.S. person status of the entity subject to a 
guarantee or its counterparty.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \331\ Id. at 976. See Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30689 (attribution 
is intended to reflect the risk posed to the U.S. financial system 
when a counterparty to a position has recourse against a U.S. 
person).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A non-U.S. person attributes to itself any swap position of an 
entity for which the counterparty to the swap has

[[Page 56960]]

recourse against the non-U.S. person unless all relevant persons (i.e., 
the non-U.S. person guarantor, the entity whose swap positions are 
guaranteed, and its counterparty) are non-U.S. persons that are not 
Guaranteed Entities.\332\ In this regard, the Commission finds that 
when a non-U.S. person provides a guarantee with respect to the swap 
position of a particular entity, the economic reality of the swap 
position is substantially identical, in relevant respects, to a 
position entered into directly by the non-U.S. person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ As noted above, the term Guaranteed Entity is limited to 
entities that are guaranteed by a U.S. person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission believes that entities subject to a 
guarantee are able to enter into significantly more swap positions (and 
take on significantly more risk) as a result of the guarantee than they 
can otherwise, amplifying the risk of the non-U.S. person guarantor's 
inability to carry out its obligations under the guarantee. Given the 
types of risk that MSP regulation is intended to address, the 
Commission has a strong regulatory interest in ensuring that the 
attribution requirement applies to non-U.S. persons that provide 
guarantees to U.S. persons and Guaranteed Entities. Accordingly, the 
Commission has determined that a non-U.S. person must attribute to 
itself the swap positions of any entity for which it provides a 
guarantee unless it, the entity subject to the guarantee, and its 
counterparty are all non-U.S. persons that are not Guaranteed Entities.

D. Certain Exchange-Traded and Cleared Swaps

    Consistent with its approach for SDs, the Commission proposed to 
allow a non-U.S. person that is not a Guaranteed Entity or an SRS to 
exclude from its MSP calculation any swap position that it anonymously 
enters into on a DCM, a registered SEF or a SEF exempted from 
registration by the Commission pursuant to section 5h(g) of the CEA, or 
an FBOT registered with the Commission pursuant to part 48 of its 
regulations,\333\ if such swap is also cleared through a registered or 
exempt DCO.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \333\ The Commission considers the exception described herein 
also to apply with respect to an FBOT that provides direct access to 
its order entry and trade matching system from within the U.S. 
pursuant to no-action relief issued by Commission staff.
    \334\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(d); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 976, 
1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section III.D in connection with the cross-border 
application of the SD registration threshold, as compared to the 
Proposed Rule, IIB/SIFMA, JFMC/IBAJ, JBA, and JSCC advocated for 
expansion of this exception, while Better Markets stated that the 
proposed exception should be narrowed.
    Consistent with the cross-border application of the SD registration 
threshold, the Commission is adopting this exception as proposed.\335\ 
When a non-U.S. person enters into a swap position that is executed 
anonymously on a registered or exempt SEF, DCM, or registered FBOT, the 
Commission recognizes that the non-U.S. person does not have the 
necessary information about its counterparty to determine whether the 
swap position should be included in its MSP calculation. The Commission 
has determined that in this case the swap position should be excluded 
altogether due to these practical difficulties.\336\ However, the 
exception is limited to Other Non-U.S. Persons since, as discussed, 
Guaranteed Entities and SRSs have to count all of their swap positions 
towards the threshold, so the practical obstacles that would challenge 
Other Non-U.S. Persons are not relevant for Guaranteed Entities and 
SRSs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ Final Sec.  23.23(d).
    \336\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule expands the exception as it appeared in the Guidance 
to include SEFs and DCOs that are exempt from registration under the 
CEA, and also states that SRSs do not qualify for this exception. The 
CEA provides that the Commission may grant an exemption from 
registration if it finds that a foreign SEF or DCO is subject to 
comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation by the appropriate 
governmental authorities in the SEF or DCO's home country.\337\ The 
policy rationale for providing relief to swap positions anonymously 
executed on a SEF, DCM, or FBOT and then cleared also extends to swaps 
executed on a foreign SEF and/or cleared through a foreign DCO that has 
been granted an exemption from registration. As noted, the foreign SEF 
or DCO is subject to comprehensive regulation that is comparable to 
that applicable to registered SEFs and DCOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ See CEA sections 5h(g) for the SEF exemption provision and 
5b(h) for the DCO exemption provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is not at this time expanding the exception to allow 
an Other Non-U.S. Person to exclude swap positions executed anonymously 
on an exchange and which are subsequently cleared, regardless of 
whether the exchange and clearing organization are registered or exempt 
from registration with the Commission. Commenters argued that if the 
Other Non-U.S. Person's original counterparty was a U.S. person, the 
Commission's SEF and DCO registration requirements would independently 
require the trading venue and clearing organization to register with 
the Commission or obtain an exemption from registration. While guidance 
from DMO has suggested that this might be the case with respect to SEFs 
and DCMs,\338\ the Commission has not taken a formal position on 
whether registration of a SEF or DCM is required where a U.S. person 
participates on the trading facility, and has stated that it will do so 
in the future.\339\ The Commission may consider expanding the exception 
pending other amendments to the SEF/DCO regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ Division of Market Oversight Guidance on Application of 
Certain Commission Regulations to Swap Execution Facilities, at 2 
n.8 (Nov. 15, 2013) (``[DMO] expects that a multilateral swaps 
trading platform located outside the United States that provides 
U.S. persons . . . with the ability to trade or execute swaps on or 
pursuant to the rules of the platform, either directly or indirectly 
through an intermediary, will register as a SEF or DCM.'').
    \339\ See Swap Execution Facilities and Trade Execution 
Requirement, 83 FR 61946, 61961 n.106 (``[T]he Commission learned 
that many foreign multilateral swaps trading facilities prohibited 
U.S. persons and U.S-located persons from accessing their facilities 
due to the uncertainty that the guidance created with respect to SEF 
registration. The Commission understands that these prohibitions 
reflect concerns that U.S. persons and U.S.-located persons 
accessing their facilities would trigger the SEF registration 
requirement. . . . [T]he Commission expects to address the 
application of CEA section 2(i) to foreign multilateral swaps 
trading facilities, including foreign swaps broking entities, in the 
future.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments that anonymity should not be required, the 
Commission proposed this exception (and included it in the Guidance) 
because when a trade is entered into anonymously on an exchange, the 
non-U.S. person would not have the necessary information about its 
counterparty to determine whether the swap position should be included 
in its MSP calculation.\340\ Therefore, these practical difficulties 
justify exclusion of the swap position altogether. However, if the 
identity of the counterparty is known to be a U.S. person, then the 
Other Non-U.S. Person should be seen to be participating in the U.S. 
swap market. Thus, the Commission has determined that such a non-U.S. 
person should count such swap positions towards its MSP calculation as 
otherwise required. As stated above, where the U.S. person status of a 
counterparty is known to the non-U.S. person, the Commission sees no 
reason to treat a cleared swap differently in the cross-border context 
than such swap

[[Page 56961]]

position is treated in the domestic U.S. context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 976; Guidance, 78 FR 45325.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. ANE Transactions

A. Background and Proposed Approach

    The ANE Staff Advisory provided that a non-U.S. SD would generally 
be required to comply with Transaction-Level Requirements (as that term 
was used in the Guidance) when entering into ANE Transactions.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ See ANE Staff Advisory. The ANE Staff Advisory represented 
the views of DSIO only, and not necessarily those of the Commission 
or any other office or division thereof. As discussed in section 
VI.A, infra, the Transaction-Level Requirements are: (1) Required 
clearing and swap processing; (2) margining (and segregation) for 
uncleared swaps; (3) mandatory trade execution; (4) swap trading 
relationship documentation; (5) portfolio reconciliation and 
compression; (6) real-time public reporting; (7) trade confirmation; 
(8) daily trading records; and (9) external business conduct 
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposed Rule the Commission stated that, based on the 
Commission's consideration of its experience under the Guidance, the 
comments it had received pursuant to the ANE Request for Comment,\342\ 
respect for international comity, and the Commission's desire to focus 
its authority on potential significant risks to the U.S. financial 
system, the Commission had determined that ANE Transactions will not be 
considered a relevant factor for purposes of applying the Proposed 
Rule.\343\ Therefore, under the Proposed Rule, all foreign-based swaps 
entered into between a non-U.S. swap entity and a non-U.S. person would 
be treated the same regardless of whether the swap is an ANE 
Transaction. The Commission further noted that, to the extent the 
Proposed Rule is finalized, this treatment would effectively supersede 
the ANE Staff Advisory with respect to the application of the group B 
and C requirements (discussed in sections VI.A.2 and VI.A.3 below) to 
ANE Transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \342\ In the January 2014 ANE Request for Comment, the 
Commission requested comments on all aspects of the ANE Staff 
Advisory, including: (1) The scope and meaning of the phrase 
``regularly arranging, negotiating, or executing'' and what 
characteristics or factors distinguish ``core, front-office'' 
activity from other activities; and (2) whether the Commission 
should adopt the ANE Staff Advisory as Commission policy, in whole 
or in part.
    \343\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 977-979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to its experience, the Commission noted that the ANE 
No-Action Relief, which went into effect immediately after issuance of 
the ANE Staff Advisory, generally relieved non-U.S. swap entities from 
the obligation to comply with most Transaction-Level Requirements when 
entering into swaps with most non-U.S. persons.\344\ The Commission 
also noted that in the intervening period, the Commission had not found 
a negative effect on either its ability to effectively oversee non-U.S. 
swap entities, or the integrity and transparency of U.S. derivatives 
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ Specifically, non-U.S. persons that are neither guaranteed 
nor conduit affiliates, as described in the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Noting its interest in international comity, the Commission 
observed that ANE Transactions involve swaps between non-U.S. persons, 
and thus the Commission considered whether the U.S. aspect of ANE 
Transactions should override its general view that such transactions 
should qualify for the same relief provided under the Proposed Rule 
(and the Guidance) for swaps between certain non-U.S. persons (e.g., an 
exception from compliance with Transaction-Level Requirements under the 
Guidance and group B and C requirements under the Proposed Rule, as 
discussed below). The Commission expressly recognized that a person 
that, in connection with its dealing activity, engages in market-facing 
activity using personnel located in the United States is conducting a 
substantial aspect of its dealing business in the United States. But, 
because the transactions involve two non-U.S. persons, and the 
financial risk of the transactions lies outside the United States, the 
Commission considered the extent to which the underlying regulatory 
objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act would be advanced in light of other 
policy considerations, including undue market distortions and 
international comity, when making a determination of the extent to 
which the Dodd-Frank Act swap requirements would apply to ANE 
Transactions.
    The Commission noted that the consequences of not applying the 
Dodd-Frank Act swap requirements would be mitigated in two respects. 
First, persons engaging in any aspect of swap transactions within the 
U.S. remain subject to the CEA and Commission regulations prohibiting 
the employment, or attempted employment, of manipulative, fraudulent, 
or deceptive devices, such as section 6(c)(1) of the CEA,\345\ and 
Sec.  180.1.\346\ The Commission thus would retain anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation authority, and would continue to monitor the trading 
practices of non-U.S. persons that occur within the territory of the 
United States in order to enforce a high standard of customer 
protection and market integrity. Even where a swap is entered into by 
two non-U.S. persons, the United States has a significant interest in 
deterring fraudulent or manipulative conduct occurring within its 
borders and cannot be a haven for such activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \345\ 7 U.S.C. 9(1).
    \346\ 17 CFR 180.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, with respect to more specific regulation of swap dealing in 
accordance with the Commission's swap regime, the Commission noted 
that, in most cases, non-U.S. persons entering into ANE Transactions 
would be subject to regulation and oversight in their home 
jurisdictions similar to the Commission's Transaction-Level 
Requirements as most of the major swap trading centers have implemented 
similar risk mitigation requirements.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ See 2019 FSB Progress Report, Table M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to market distortion, the Commission gave weight to 
comments submitted in response to the ANE Request for Comment, who 
argued that application of Transaction-Level Requirements to ANE 
Transactions would cause non-U.S. SDs to relocate personnel to other 
countries (or otherwise terminate agency contracts with U.S.-based 
agents) in order to avoid Dodd-Frank Act swap regulation or to have to 
interpret and apply what the commenters considered a challenging ANE 
analysis, thereby potentially increasing market fragmentation.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \348\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also gave weight to the regulatory interests of the 
home jurisdictions of non-U.S. persons engaged in ANE Transactions. 
Because the risk of the resulting swaps lies in those home countries 
and not the U.S. financial system, the Commission recognized that, with 
the exception of enforcing the prohibition on fraudulent or 
manipulative conduct taking place in the United States, non-U.S. 
regulators will have a greater incentive to regulate the swap dealing 
activities of such non-U.S. persons--such as, for example, with respect 
to business conduct standards with counterparties, appropriate 
documentation, and recordkeeping. In these circumstances, where the 
risk lies outside the U.S. financial system, the Commission recognized 
the greater supervisory interest of the authorities in the home 
jurisdictions of the non-U.S. persons. The Commission also noted that 
no major swap regulatory jurisdiction applies its regulatory regime to 
U.S. entities engaging in ANE Transactions within its territory.
    In light of the foregoing, the Commission determined that the 
mitigating effect of the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority 
retained by

[[Page 56962]]

the Commission and the prevalence of applicable regulatory requirements 
similar to the Commission's own, the likelihood of market fragmentation 
and disruption, the Commission's respect for the regulatory interests 
of the foreign jurisdictions where the actual financial risks of ANE 
Transactions primarily lie in accordance with the principles of 
international comity, and the awareness that application of its swap 
requirements in the ANE context would make the Commission an outlier 
among the major swap regulatory jurisdictions, outweighed the 
Commission's regulatory interest in applying its swap requirements to 
ANE Transactions differently than such were otherwise proposed to be 
applied to swaps between Other Non-U.S. Persons. The Commission invited 
comment on all aspects of the proposed treatment of ANE Transactions.

B. Summary of Comments

    Neither Better Markets nor AFR supported the Commission's 
determination to disregard ANE Transactions and commented that the 
Commission should not permit U.S.-located personnel to arrange, 
negotiate, or execute swaps on behalf of the non-U.S. affiliates of 
U.S. BHCs (and others) without being subject to the full panoply of 
U.S. regulations. Better Markets stated its belief that any such policy 
facilitates avoidance, if not evasion, and regulatory arbitrage. Better 
Markets specifically disputed the Commission's contention in the 
Proposed Rule that ``the financial risk of the [ANE] transactions 
[only] lie outside of the United States,'' which Better Markets 
contends is demonstrably untrue and conflicts with the Commission's own 
views elsewhere in the Proposed Rule, presumably referring to the 
proposed treatment of swaps of non-U.S. persons with Guaranteed 
Entities and SRSs, which are also non-U.S. persons that the Commission 
nevertheless proposed generally would be subject to certain Dodd-Frank 
Act requirements.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \349\ As discussed below, the Final Rule excepts certain 
transactions with ``SRS End-Users'' from the Group B requirements, 
excepts certain transactions with Guaranteed Entities and SRSs from 
the Group C requirements, and provides a limited exception from the 
Group B requirements for transactions entered into by Guaranteed 
Entities and SRSs that are swap entities with certain non-U.S. 
persons. See infra sections VI.B.3 and VI.B.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, AIMA, Chatham Financial, CS, IIB/SIFMA, ISDA, 
and JFMC/IBAJ supported the Commission's decision in the Proposed Rule 
to only apply anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules to ANE 
Transactions, agreeing in various respects with the Commission's 
analysis that:
    1. ANE Transactions do not present direct financial risk to the 
United States;
    2. The Commission's anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules that 
would remain applicable would mitigate potential concerns associated 
with any potential misconduct occurring in connection with ANE 
Transactions and any other conduct subject to the jurisdiction of the 
CEA;
    3. Most ANE Transactions are expected to be subject to foreign 
regulatory requirements similar to the Commission's own, unlike at the 
time of the adoption of the Guidance; and
    4. Applying the Commission's rules to ANE Transactions would likely 
result in disruptive and unnecessary market fragmentation as 
transactions ordinarily arranged, negotiated, or executed by U.S. 
personnel would shift to non-U.S. locations, resulting in decreased 
Commission oversight.
    Commenting on specific aspects of the Commission's proposed 
treatment of ANE Transactions, AIMA encouraged the CFTC to adopt the 
SEC's approach and require counting of ANE Transactions toward the SD 
registration threshold and to apply reporting requirements to ensure 
that a baseline level of transparency is maintained.
    IIB/SIFMA recognized that the Proposed Rule's approach to ANE 
Transactions would deviate from that taken by the SEC, but argued that 
this deviation is justified. They argued that the relationship of the 
security-based swap market to the cash securities markets, and 
Congress's decision to define security-based swaps as ``securities,'' 
presents some justification for the SEC to apply a test for use of U.S. 
jurisdictional means to conduct security-based swap business that is 
similar to the test that applies in connection with existing, pre-Dodd-
Frank Act securities broker-dealer regulation, while no similar 
justification applies in connection with swaps regulation by the 
Commission, as the swaps market generally trades independently of the 
U.S. futures market, and Congress did not define swaps to be a type of 
futures contract.
    IIB/SIFMA, CS, JFMC/IBAJ, and ISDA also commented on the continuing 
viability of the ANE Staff Advisory. These commenters stated that, 
currently, ANE Transactions are subject to the ANE Staff Advisory and 
related ANE No-Action Relief, noting that, if adopted, the Proposed 
Rule would supersede the ANE Staff Advisory, but only with respect to 
those requirements covered by the Proposed Rule. These commenters noted 
that certain other Commission requirements--mandatory clearing, 
mandatory trade execution, and real-time public reporting--would remain 
subject to the ANE Staff Advisory and related ANE No-Action Relief, 
pending further Commission action. To achieve a coherent, Commission-
driven ANE Transaction policy, these commenters all requested that the 
Commission immediately direct staff to withdraw the ANE Staff Advisory 
(which, in their view, would render the ANE No-Action Relief moot).
    ISDA noted that the ANE No-Action Relief was issued two weeks after 
the ANE Staff Advisory and that market participants have operated under 
this relief for almost seven years. ISDA argued that, during this time, 
to ISDA's knowledge, there have been no regulatory concerns associated 
with these transactions that would warrant a change in course. Thus, 
should the Commission decide to switch gears and apply clearing, 
trading, and real-time reporting requirements to ANE Transactions, 
market participants would incur significant compliance costs without 
commensurate benefit to the Commission's regulatory oversight.
    Although Citadel agreed that the Commission should apply its 
jurisdiction over ANE Transactions in a targeted manner, taking into 
account principles of international comity, as well as its supervisory 
interests and statutory objectives, Citadel argued that because the 
Commission's relevant statutory objectives include not only mitigating 
systemic risk, but also increasing transparency, competition, and 
market integrity, the Commission should, at a minimum, apply regulatory 
and public reporting requirements to ANE Transactions. AIMA also 
encouraged the Commission to apply reporting requirements to ensure 
that a baseline level of transparency is maintained. Citadel stated 
that application of reporting requirements to these transactions would 
enable the Commission to better monitor for disruptive trading 
practices and provide the necessary data regarding overall market 
trading activity to allow the Commission to evaluate market trends and 
accurately assess the effect of other reforms implemented in the swaps 
market.
    Stating that ANE Transactions could account for a material portion 
of total swap dealing activity in the United States, Citadel claimed 
that market transparency in EUR interest rate swaps for U.S. investors 
has been greatly reduced based on data showing that, following issuance 
of the ANE No-Action Relief, interdealer trading activity in EUR 
interest rate swaps

[[Page 56963]]

began to be booked almost exclusively to non-U.S. entities, a fact 
pattern that Citadel believes is ``consistent with (although not direct 
proof of) swap dealers strategically choosing the location of the desk 
executing a particular trade in order to avoid trading in a more 
transparent and competitive setting.'' Citadel further noted that 
applying regulatory and public reporting requirements to ANE 
Transactions would be consistent with the SEC's approach.

C. Commission Determination

    Having considered the comments received, the Commission's 
consideration of its experience under the Guidance, respect for 
international comity, and the Commission's desire to focus its 
authority on potential significant risks to the U.S. financial system, 
the Commission has determined that, consistent with its rationale 
expressed in the Proposed Rule summarized above, ANE Transactions will 
not be considered a relevant factor for purposes of applying the Final 
Rule.
    Regarding the many comments and suggestions received regarding 
whether the Commission should withdraw the ANE Staff Advisory and 
related ANE No-Action Relief and extend its proposed treatment of ANE 
Transactions to requirements in addition to the group B and group C 
requirements, in 2014, subsequent to the publication of the ANE Staff 
Advisory, the Commission, citing the complex legal and policy issues 
raised by the statements in the ANE Staff Advisory, requested comments 
on whether the Transaction-Level Requirements should apply to swap 
transactions between certain non-U.S. SDs and non-U.S. counterparties 
that are ``arranged, negotiated, or executed'' by the SDs' personnel or 
agents located in the United States.\350\ The Commission did not 
follow-up on the request for comment. In this rulemaking, the 
Commission is addressing the issue with respect to the group B and 
group C requirements; the Commission intends to address the issue with 
respect to the remaining Transaction-Level Requirements (the 
``Unaddressed TLRs'') in connection with future cross-border 
rulemakings relating to such requirements. Until such time, the 
Commission will not consider, as a matter of policy, a non-U.S. swap 
entity's use of their personnel or agents located in the United States 
to ``arrange, negotiate, or execute'' swap transactions with non-U.S. 
counterparties for purposes of determining whether Unaddressed TLRs 
apply to such transactions. As part of any such rulemaking, the 
Commission expects to first engage in fact-finding to determine the 
extent to which ANE Transactions raise policy concerns that are not 
otherwise addressed by the CEA or Commission regulations. In this 
connection, DSIO is withdrawing the ANE Staff Advisory and, together 
with the Division of Clearing and Risk and DMO, is withdrawing the ANE 
No-Action Relief and granting certain non-U.S. SDs no-action relief 
with respect to the applicability of the Unaddressed TLRs to their 
transactions with non-U.S. counterparties that are arranged, 
negotiated, or executed in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ See ANE Request for Comment, supra note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission will take AIMA and Citadel's comments regarding the 
advisability of applying the Commission's regulatory and real-time 
reporting requirements to ANE Transactions under advisement when 
considering the cross-border application of those requirements in a 
future rulemaking.
    With respect to AFR and Better Markets' contentions that the 
Commission should not permit derivatives dealers located within the 
U.S. to engage in transactions using U.S. personnel on U.S. soil 
without being subject to U.S. law, the Proposed Rule clearly stated 
that the Commission recognized that a person that, in connection with 
its dealing activity, engages in market-facing activity using personnel 
located in the United States is conducting a substantial aspect of its 
dealing business in the United States and is subject to U.S. law. But, 
because the transactions involve two non-U.S. persons, and the 
financial risk of the transactions lies primarily outside the United 
States, the Commission also recognized that it must consider the extent 
to which the underlying regulatory objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act 
would be advanced in light of other policy considerations, including 
undue market distortions and international comity, when making a 
determination of the extent to which the Dodd-Frank Act swap 
requirements should apply to ANE Transactions.
    With respect to AIMA's comment encouraging the CFTC to adopt the 
SEC's approach with respect to ANE Transactions by requiring counting 
of ANE Transactions toward the SD registration threshold, the 
Commission sees little value in requiring counting of ANE Transactions 
when, if such counting resulted in SD registration, such ANE 
Transactions would not be subject to most of the SD requirements. ANE 
Transactions by definition are swaps between non-U.S. persons, the risk 
of which lies primarily outside of the U.S., and which, in accordance 
with the Commission's determination above and the regulatory exceptions 
discussed immediately below, are generally excepted from the group B 
and C requirements.

VI. Exceptions From Group B and Group C Requirements, Substituted 
Compliance for Group A and Group B Requirements, and Comparability 
Determinations

    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and Commission regulations thereunder establish a broad range of 
requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs, including requirements 
regarding risk management and internal and external business 
conduct.\351\ These requirements are designed to reduce systemic risk, 
increase counterparty protections, and increase market efficiency, 
orderliness, and transparency.\352\ Consistent with the Guidance,\353\ 
SDs and MSPs (whether or not U.S. persons) are subject to all of the 
Commission regulations described below by virtue of their status as 
Commission registrants. Put differently, the Commission's view is that 
if an entity is required to register as an SD or MSP under the 
Commission's interpretation of section 2(i) of the CEA, then such 
entity should be subject to these regulations with respect to all of 
its swap activities. As explained further below, such an approach is 
necessary because of the important role that the SD and MSP 
requirements play in the proper operation of a registrant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 979-980.
    \352\ See, e.g., Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30629, 30703.
    \353\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45342. The Commission notes that 
while the Guidance states that all swap entities (wherever located) 
are subject to all of the CFTC's Title VII requirements, the 
Guidance went on to describe how and when the Commission would 
expect swap entities to comply with specific requirements and when 
substituted compliance would be available under its non-binding 
framework.
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    However, consistent with section 2(i) of the CEA, in the interest 
of international comity, and for other reasons discussed in this 
release, the Commission is providing exceptions from, and a substituted 
compliance process for, certain regulations applicable to registered 
SDs and MSPs, as appropriate.\354\ Further, the Final

[[Page 56964]]

Rule creates a framework for comparability determinations that 
emphasizes a holistic, outcomes-based approach that is grounded in 
principles of international comity.
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    \354\ As noted in the Proposed Rule, the Commission intends to 
separately address the cross-border application of Title VII 
requirements not addressed in the Final Rule (e.g., capital 
adequacy, clearing and swap processing, mandatory trade execution, 
swap data repository reporting, large trader reporting, and real-
time public reporting) (hereinafter, the ``Unaddressed 
Requirements''). In that regard, the Commission notes that it 
adopted capital adequacy and related financial reporting 
requirements for SDs and MSPs at its open meeting on July 22, 2020.
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A. Classification and Application of Certain Regulatory Requirements--
Group A, Group B, and Group C Requirements

    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, the Guidance applied a 
bifurcated approach to the classification of certain regulatory 
requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs, based on whether the 
requirement applies to the firm as a whole (``Entity-Level 
Requirement'' or ``ELR'') or to the individual swap or trading 
relationship (``Transaction-Level Requirement'' or ``TLR'').\355\
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    \355\ See, e.g., Guidance, 78 FR at 45331.
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    The Guidance categorized the following regulatory requirements as 
ELRs: (1) Capital adequacy; (2) chief compliance officer (``CCO''); (3) 
risk management; (4) swap data recordkeeping; (5) swap data repository 
(``SDR'') reporting; and (6) large trader reporting.\356\ The Guidance 
further divided ELRs into two subcategories.\357\ The first category of 
ELRs includes: (1) Capital adequacy; (2) CCO; (3) risk management; and 
(4) certain swap data recordkeeping requirements \358\ (``First 
Category ELRs'').\359\ The second category of ELRs includes: (1) SDR 
reporting; (2) certain aspects of swap data recordkeeping relating to 
complaints and marketing and sales materials under Sec.  23.201(b)(3) 
and (4); and (3) large trader reporting (``Second Category 
ELRs'').\360\
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    \356\ See, e.g., id.
    \357\ See, e.g., id.
    \358\ Swap data recordkeeping under 17 CFR 23.201 and 23.203 
(except certain aspects of swap data recordkeeping relating to 
complaints and sales materials).
    \359\ See, e.g., Guidance, 78 FR at 45331.
    \360\ See, e.g., id.
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    The Guidance categorized the following regulatory requirements as 
TLRs: (1) Required clearing and swap processing; (2) margin (and 
segregation) for uncleared swaps; (3) mandatory trade execution; (4) 
swap trading relationship documentation; (5) portfolio reconciliation 
and compression; (6) real-time public reporting; (7) trade 
confirmation; (8) daily trading records; and (9) external business 
conduct standards.\361\ As with the ELRs, the Guidance similarly 
subdivided TLRs into two subcategories.\362\ The Commission determined 
that all TLRs, other than external business conduct standards, address 
risk mitigation and market transparency.\363\ Accordingly, under the 
Guidance, all TLRs except external business conduct standards are 
classified as ``Category A TLRs,'' whereas external business conduct 
standards are classified as ``Category B TLRs.'' \364\ Under the 
Guidance, generally, whether a specific Commission requirement applies 
to a swap entity and a swap and whether substituted compliance is 
available depends on the classification of the requirement as an ELR or 
TLR and the sub-classification of each and the type of swap entity and, 
in certain cases, the counterparty to a specific swap.\365\
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    \361\ See, e.g., id. at 45333.
    \362\ See, e.g., id.
    \363\ See, e.g., id.
    \364\ See, e.g., id.
    \365\ See, e.g., id. at 45337-45338.
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    To avoid confusion that may have arisen from using the ELR/TLR 
classification in the Proposed Rule, given that the Proposed Rule did 
not address the same set of Commission regulations as the Guidance, the 
Commission proposed to classify certain of its regulations as group A, 
group B, and group C requirements for purposes of determining the 
availability of certain exceptions from, and/or substituted compliance 
for, such regulations. The Commission requested comment on the group A, 
group B, and group C requirement classifications and on whether any 
modifications should be made to the set of requirements in such 
groups.\366\
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    \366\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 982.
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    The Commission received several comments on its proposed use of the 
group A, group B, and group C requirements classifications. IIB/SIFMA 
and JFMC/IBAJ generally supported the Proposed Rule's classification of 
swap entity requirements. However, IIB/SIFMA requested that the 
Commission expand and clarify such categorization in certain respects 
(discussed in the relevant sections below) to align the cross-border 
application of the Commission's requirements with the policy objectives 
for those requirements. AIMA stated its belief that any swap involving 
a non-U.S. person (even where its counterparty is a U.S. person) should 
also be able to use substituted compliance and encouraged the CFTC to 
review the group B and group C requirements with this approach in mind, 
but did not provide any specific recommended changes to those 
classifications. IATP stated that it was not clear which set of 
regulations were covered by the Proposed Rule that are not covered by 
the Guidance and that, without a comparative summary of the different 
set of regulations covered by each, there is no grounds to judge 
readily why the Commission proposed to abandon the readily understood 
``entity level'' and ``transaction level'' requirement classifications 
to compare for granting substituted compliance to foreign regulatory 
regimes.
    After considering the comments, the Commission continues to believe 
that classifying certain of its regulations as group A, group B, and 
group C requirements is appropriate and helpful for purposes of 
determining the availability of certain exceptions from, and/or 
substituted compliance for, such regulations.\367\ The proposed and 
final group A, group B, and group C requirements are discussed below.
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    \367\ With respect to AIMA's comment, the Commission notes that 
the Proposed Rule provided a summary of all of the requirements 
addressed by the Guidance and which requirements were addressed in 
the Proposed Rule.
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1. Group A Requirements
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that the group A requirements would 
include: (1) CCO; (2) risk management; (3) swap data recordkeeping; and 
(4) antitrust considerations. Specifically, under the Proposed Rule, 
the group A requirements consisted of the requirements set forth in 
Sec. Sec.  3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 23.603, 23.605, 
23.606, 23.607, and 23.609.\368\ As discussed in the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission believes that the group A requirements would be impractical 
to apply only to specific transactions or counterparty relationships 
and are most effective when applied consistently across the entire 
enterprise, noting that they ensure that swap entities implement and 
maintain a comprehensive and robust system of internal controls to 
ensure the financial integrity of the firm, and, in turn, the 
protection of the financial system. Further, the Commission noted that, 
together with other Commission requirements, the proposed group A 
requirements constitute an important line of defense against financial, 
operational, and compliance risks that could lead to a firm's default; 
and, further, that requiring swap entities to rigorously monitor and 
address the risks they incur as part of their day-to-day businesses 
lowers the registrants' risk of default--and ultimately protects the 
public and the financial system. For this reason, the Commission stated 
that it

[[Page 56965]]

has strong supervisory interests in ensuring that swap entities 
(whether domestic or foreign) are subject to the group A requirements 
or comparably rigorous standards.\369\
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    \368\ 17 CFR 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 
23.603, 23.605, 23.606, 23.607, and 23.609.
    \369\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 980-981.
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    Each of the proposed group A requirements is discussed in more 
detail below.
(a) Chief Compliance Officer
    Section 4s(k) of the CEA requires that each SD and MSP designate an 
individual to serve as its CCO and specifies certain duties of the 
CCO.\370\ Pursuant to section 4s(k), the Commission adopted Sec.  
3.3,\371\ which requires SDs and MSPs to designate a CCO responsible 
for administering the firm's compliance policies and procedures, 
reporting directly to the board of directors or a senior officer of the 
SD or MSP, as well as preparing and filing with the Commission a 
certified annual report discussing the registrant's compliance policies 
and activities. The CCO function is an integral element of a firm's 
risk management and oversight, as well as the Commission's effort to 
foster a strong culture of compliance within SDs and MSPs.
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    \370\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(k).
    \371\ 17 CFR 3.3. See Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant 
Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rules; Futures Commission 
Merchant and Introducing Broker Conflicts of Interest Rules; Chief 
Compliance Officer Rules for Swap Dealers, Major Swap Participants, 
and Futures Commission Merchants, 77 FR 20128 (Apr. 3, 2012) 
(``Final SD and MSP Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rule''). In 
2018, the Commission adopted amendments to the CCO requirements. See 
Chief Compliance Officer Duties and Annual Report Requirements for 
Futures Commission Merchants, Swap Dealers, and Major Swap 
Participants, 83 FR 43510 (Aug. 27, 2018).
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(b) Risk Management
    Section 4s(j) of the CEA requires each SD and MSP to establish 
internal policies and procedures designed to, among other things, 
address risk management, monitor compliance with position limits, 
prevent conflicts of interest, and promote diligent supervision, as 
well as maintain business continuity and disaster recovery 
programs.\372\ The Commission implemented these provisions in 
Sec. Sec.  23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606.\373\ The 
Commission also adopted Sec.  23.609,\374\ which requires certain risk 
management procedures for SDs or MSPs that are clearing members of a 
DCO.\375\ Collectively, these requirements help to establish a 
comprehensive internal risk management program for SDs and MSPs, which 
is critical to effective systemic risk management for the overall swap 
market.
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    \372\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(j).
    \373\ 17 CFR 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606. 
See Final SD and MSP Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rule, 77 
FR 20128 (addressing rules related to risk management programs, 
monitoring of position limits, diligent supervision, business 
continuity and disaster recovery, conflicts of interest policies and 
procedures, and general information availability).
    \374\ 17 CFR 23.609.
    \375\ See Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance 
for Clearing, and Clearing Member Risk Management, 77 FR 21278 (Apr. 
9, 2012).
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(c) Swap Data Recordkeeping
    CEA section 4s(f)(1)(B) requires SDs and MSPs to keep books and 
records for all activities related to their swap business.\376\ 
Sections 4s(g)(1) and (4) require SDs and MSPs to maintain trading 
records for each swap and all related records, as well as a complete 
audit trail for comprehensive trade reconstructions.\377\ Additionally, 
CEA section 4s(f)(1) requires SDs and MSPs to ``make such reports as 
are required by the Commission by rule or regulation regarding the 
transactions and positions and financial condition of'' the registered 
SD or MSP.\378\ Further, CEA section 4s(h) requires SDs and MSPs to 
``conform with such business conduct standards . . . as may be 
prescribed by the Commission by rule or regulation.'' \379\
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    \376\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(f)(1)(B).
    \377\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(g)(1) and (4).
    \378\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(f)(1).
    \379\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(h)(1). See 7 U.S.C. 6s(h)(3).
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    Pursuant to these provisions, the Commission promulgated final 
rules that set forth certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
for SDs and MSPs.\380\ Specifically, Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 \381\ 
require SDs and MSPs to keep records including complete transaction and 
position information for all swap activities (e.g., documentation on 
which trade information is originally recorded). In particular, Sec.  
23.201 states that each SD and MSP shall keep full, complete, and 
systematic records of all activities related to its business as a SD or 
MSP.\382\ Such records must include, among other things, a record of 
each complaint received by the SD or MSP concerning any partner, 
member, officer, employee, or agent,\383\ as well as all marketing and 
sales presentations, advertisements, literature, and 
communications.\384\ Commission regulation 23.203 \385\ requires, among 
other things, that records (other than swap data reported in accordance 
with part 45 of the Commission's regulations \386\) be maintained in 
accordance with Sec.  1.31.\387\ Commission regulation 1.31 requires 
that records relating to swaps be maintained for specific durations, 
including that records of swaps be maintained for a minimum of five 
years and as much as the life of the swap plus five years, and that 
most records be ``readily accessible'' for the entire recordkeeping 
period.\388\
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    \380\ See Final SD and MSP Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties 
Rule, 77 FR 20128.
    \381\ 17 CFR 23.201 and 203.
    \382\ 17 CFR 23.201(b).
    \383\ 17 CFR 23.201(b)(3)(i).
    \384\ 17 CFR 23.201(b)(4).
    \385\ 17 CFR 23.203.
    \386\ 17 CFR 45.
    \387\ 17 CFR 1.31.
    \388\ 17 CFR 1.31(b).
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(d) Antitrust Considerations
    Section 4s(j)(6) of the CEA prohibits an SD or MSP from adopting 
any process or taking any action that results in any unreasonable 
restraint of trade or imposes any material anticompetitive burden on 
trading or clearing, unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the 
purposes of the CEA.\389\ The Commission promulgated this requirement 
in Sec.  23.607(a) \390\ and also adopted Sec.  23.607(b), which 
requires SDs and MSPs to adopt policies and procedures to prevent 
actions that result in unreasonable restraints of trade or impose any 
material anticompetitive burden on trading or clearing.\391\
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    \389\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(j)(6).
    \390\ 17 CFR 23.607(a).
    \391\ 17 CFR 23.607(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    JFMC/IBAJ and IIB/SIFMA were supportive of the streamlining of the 
Commission's recordkeeping requirements under Sec.  23.201 as group A 
requirements (which the Guidance separated into two different 
subcategories). JFMC/IBAJ also requested the Commission explicitly 
categorize Sec.  1.31 as a group A requirement in furtherance of the 
goal of providing legal certainty and streamlining recordkeeping 
requirements. IIB/SIFMA requested that the Commission include 
Sec. Sec.  1.31 and 45.2 as group A requirements, which they stated 
would be consistent with categorizing Sec.  23.203 as a group A 
requirement. IIB/SIFMA also was supportive of including the 
Commission's antitrust rules (which were not addressed by the Guidance) 
as a group A requirement.
(iii) Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the proposed group A requirements and adding Sec.  45.2(a) to 
the group A requirements to the extent it duplicates Sec.  23.201, as 
shown in the rule text in

[[Page 56966]]

this release.\392\ The Commission is making this addition to clarify 
that, to the extent the same substantive recordkeeping requirement is 
included in both Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 45.2(a),\393\ each is a group A 
requirement for which substituted compliance may be available, as 
discussed in section VI.C below.\394\
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    \392\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(6).
    \393\ Commission regulation 23.201 requires, in relevant part, 
that each SD and MSP keep full, complete, and systematic records, 
together with all pertinent data and memoranda, of all its swaps 
activities and its activities related to its business as a SD or 
MSP. Commission regulation 45.2(a) requires, in relevant part, that 
each SD and MSP subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission shall 
keep full, complete, and systematic records, together with all 
pertinent data and memoranda, of all activities relating to the 
business of such entity or person with respect to swaps, as 
prescribed by the Commission.
    \394\ Similarly, the Commission will view any previously issued 
comparability determination that allows substituted compliance for 
Sec.  23.201 to also allow for substituted compliance with Sec.  
45.2(a) to the extent it duplicates Sec.  23.201.
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    Regarding the comments to include Sec.  1.31 as a group A 
requirement, Sec.  1.31 is a general requirement providing maintenance 
and access requirements for many regulatory records, and not only those 
required under the group A requirements. Further, to the extent an SD/
MSP receives substituted compliance for a group A requirement, such as 
Sec.  23.203, that incorporates Sec.  1.31's recordkeeping requirements 
for certain regulatory records, the Commission's view is that Sec.  
1.31 would also not apply to such regulatory records. Therefore, the 
Commission is declining to include Sec.  1.31 as a group A requirement.
2. Group B Requirements
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that the group B requirements would 
include: (1) Swap trading relationship documentation; (2) portfolio 
reconciliation and compression; (3) trade confirmation; and (4) daily 
trading records. Specifically, under the Proposed Rule, the group B 
requirements consist of the requirements set forth in Sec. Sec.  
23.202, 23.501, 23.502, 23.503, and 23.504.\395\ As discussed in the 
Proposed Rule, the group B requirements relate to risk mitigation and 
the maintenance of good recordkeeping and business practices.\396\ The 
Commission stated that, unlike for the group A requirements, it 
believes that the group B requirements can practically be applied on a 
bifurcated basis between domestic and foreign transactions or 
counterparty relationships and, thus, do not need to be applied 
uniformly across an entire enterprise. Therefore, the Commission stated 
that it can have greater flexibility with respect to the application of 
these requirements to non-U.S. swap entities and foreign branches of 
U.S. swap entities.\397\
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    \395\ 17 CFR 23.202, 23.501, 23.502, 23.503, and 23.504.
    \396\ See, e.g., Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Risk Mitigation 
Standards for Non-Centrally Cleared OTC Derivatives, IOSCO Doc. 
FR01/2015 (Jan. 28, 2015) (``IOSCO Risk Management Standards''), 
available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD469.pdf (discussing, among other things, the objectives and 
benefits of trading relationship documentation, trade confirmation, 
reconciliation, and portfolio compression requirements). In 
addition, the group B requirements also provide customer protection 
and market transparency benefits.
    \397\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 981-982.
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    Each of the proposed group B requirements is discussed in more 
detail below.
(a) Swap Trading Relationship Documentation
    CEA section 4s(i) requires each SD and MSP to conform to Commission 
standards for the timely and accurate confirmation, processing, 
netting, documentation, and valuation of swaps.\398\ Pursuant to 
section 4s(i), the Commission adopted, among other regulations, Sec.  
23.504.\399\ Regulation 23.504(a) requires SDs and MSPs to ``establish, 
maintain and follow written policies and procedures'' to ensure that 
the SD or MSP executes written swap trading relationship documentation, 
and Sec.  23.504(c) requires that documentation policies and procedures 
be audited periodically by an independent auditor to identify material 
weaknesses.\400\ Under Sec.  23.504(b), the swap trading relationship 
documentation must include, among other things: (1) All terms governing 
the trading relationship between the SD or MSP and its counterparty; 
(2) credit support arrangements; (3) investment and re-hypothecation 
terms for assets used as margin for uncleared swaps; and (4) custodial 
arrangements.\401\ Swap documentation standards facilitate sound risk 
management and may promote standardization of documents and 
transactions, which are key conditions for central clearing, and lead 
to other operational efficiencies, including improved valuation.
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    \398\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(i).
    \399\ 17 CFR 23.504. See Confirmation, Portfolio Reconciliation, 
Portfolio Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship Documentation 
Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 FR 
55904 (Sept. 11, 2012) (``Final Confirmation, Risk Mitigation, and 
Documentation Rules'').
    \400\ 17 CFR 23.504(a)(2) and (c).
    \401\ 17 CFR 23.504(b).
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(b) Portfolio Reconciliation and Compression
    CEA section 4s(i) directs the Commission to prescribe regulations 
for the timely and accurate processing and netting of all swaps entered 
into by SDs and MSPs.\402\ Pursuant to CEA section 4s(i), the 
Commission adopted Sec. Sec.  23.502 and 23.503,\403\ which require SDs 
and MSPs to perform portfolio reconciliation and compression for their 
swaps.\404\ Portfolio reconciliation is a post-execution risk 
management tool designed to ensure accurate confirmation of a swap's 
terms and to identify and resolve any discrepancies between 
counterparties regarding the valuation of the swap. Portfolio 
compression is a post-trade processing and netting mechanism that is 
intended to ensure timely, accurate processing and netting of 
swaps.\405\ Further, Sec.  23.503 requires all SDs and MSPs to 
establish policies and procedures for terminating fully offsetting 
uncleared swaps, when appropriate, and periodically participating in 
bilateral and/or multilateral portfolio compression exercises for 
uncleared swaps with other SDs or MSPs or through a third party.\406\ 
The rule also requires policies and procedures for engaging in such 
exercises for uncleared swaps with non-SDs and non-MSPs upon 
request.\407\
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    \402\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(i).
    \403\ 17 CFR 23.502 and 503. See Final Confirmation, Risk 
Mitigation, and Documentation Rules, 77 FR 55904.
    \404\ See 17 CFR 23.502 and 503.
    \405\ For example, the reduced transaction count may decrease 
operational risk as there are fewer trades to maintain, process, and 
settle.
    \406\ See 17 CFR 23.503(a).
    \407\ 17 CFR 23.503(b).
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(c) Trade Confirmation
    Section 4s(i) of the CEA requires that each SD and MSP must comply 
with the Commission's regulations prescribing timely and accurate 
confirmation of swaps.\408\ The Commission adopted Sec.  23.501,\409\ 
which requires, among other things, timely and accurate confirmation of 
swap transactions (which includes execution, termination, assignment, 
novation, exchange, transfer, amendment, conveyance, or extinguishing 
of rights or obligations of a swap) among SDs and MSPs by the end of 
the first business day following the day of execution.\410\ Timely and 
accurate confirmation of swaps--together with portfolio reconciliation 
and compression--is an important post-

[[Page 56967]]

trade processing mechanism for reducing risks and improving operational 
efficiency.\411\
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    \408\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(i).
    \409\ 17 CFR 23.501. See Final Confirmation, Risk Mitigation, 
and Documentation Rules, 77 FR 55904.
    \410\ 17 CFR 23.501(a)(1).
    \411\ Additionally, the Commission notes that Sec.  23.504(b)(2) 
requires that the swap trading relationship documentation of SDs and 
MSPs must include all confirmations of swap transactions. 17 CFR 
23.504(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(d) Daily Trading Records
    Pursuant to CEA section 4s(g),\412\ the Commission adopted Sec.  
23.202,\413\ which requires SDs and MSPs to maintain daily trading 
records, including records of trade information related to pre-
execution, execution, and post-execution data that is needed to conduct 
a comprehensive and accurate trade reconstruction for each swap. The 
regulation also requires that records be kept of cash or forward 
transactions used to hedge, mitigate the risk of, or offset any swap 
held by the SD or MSP.\414\ Accurate and timely records regarding all 
phases of a swap transaction can serve to greatly enhance a firm's 
internal supervision, as well as the Commission's ability to detect and 
address market or regulatory abuses or evasion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \412\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(g).
    \413\ 17 CFR 23.202. See Final SD and MSP Recordkeeping, 
Reporting, and Duties Rule, 77 FR 20128.
    \414\ 17 CFR 23.202(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    IIB/SIFMA stated that they support the Commission's proposed 
categorization of the group B requirements, but requested that the 
Commission recategorize its pre-execution daily trading records 
requirements under Sec.  23.202 as group C requirements instead of 
group B requirements. IIB/SIFMA asserted that pre-execution information 
generally has no nexus to the risk management of the swap entity or to 
the Commission's risk mitigation rules and instead relate to a swap 
entity's sales practices.
(iii) Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the group B requirements as proposed.\415\ With respect to the 
request to make pre-execution trading records requirements a group C 
requirement, accurate and timely records regarding all phases of a swap 
transaction (including pre-execution trading records) can serve to 
greatly enhance a firm's internal supervision, as well as the 
Commission's ability to detect and address market or regulatory abuses 
or evasion. Because these records relate to market integrity (and not 
only customer protection), the Commission believes the pre-execution 
trading records requirements should continue to be group B requirements 
and not be eligible for the exceptions the Final Rule provides from the 
group C requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \415\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Group C Requirements
(i) Proposed Rule
    Pursuant to CEA section 4s(h),\416\ the Commission adopted external 
business conduct rules, which establish certain additional business 
conduct standards governing the conduct of SDs and MSPs in dealing with 
their swap counterparties.\417\ The Commission proposed that the group 
C requirements would consist of these rules, which are set forth in 
Sec. Sec.  23.400 through 23.451.\418\ As discussed in the Proposed 
Rule, broadly speaking, these rules are designed to enhance 
counterparty protections by establishing robust requirements regarding 
SDs' and MSPs' conduct with their counterparties. Under these rules, 
SDs and MSPs are required to, among other things, conduct due diligence 
on their counterparties to verify eligibility to trade (including 
eligible contract participant (``ECP'') status), refrain from engaging 
in abusive market practices, provide disclosure of material information 
about the swap to their counterparties, provide a daily mid-market mark 
for uncleared swaps, and, when recommending a swap to a counterparty, 
make a determination as to the suitability of the swap for the 
counterparty based on reasonable diligence concerning the counterparty.
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    \416\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(h).
    \417\ See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 FR 9734 (Feb. 17, 2012).
    \418\ 17 CFR 23.400-23.451.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the Commission discussed in the Proposed Rule, the group C 
requirements have a more attenuated link to, and are therefore 
distinguishable from, systemic and market-oriented protections in the 
group A and group B requirements. Additionally, the Commission noted 
its belief that the foreign jurisdictions in which non-U.S. persons and 
foreign branches of U.S. swap entities are located are likely to have a 
significant interest in the type of business conduct standards that 
would be applicable to transactions with such non-U.S. persons and 
foreign branches within their jurisdiction, and, consistent with 
section 2(i) of the CEA and in the interest of international comity, it 
is generally appropriate to defer to such jurisdictions in applying, or 
not applying, such standards to foreign-based swaps with foreign 
counterparties.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \419\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    IIB/SIFMA supported the Proposed Rule's categorization of the 
Commission's external business conduct standards as group C 
requirements because the approach is consistent with the Guidance, and 
these requirements focus on counterparty protection. However, IIB/SIFMA 
requested that the Commission add its rules for elective initial margin 
segregation to the list of group C requirements.\420\ They argued that 
these rules found in part 23, subpart L (Sec. Sec.  23.700-23.704) 
(``Subpart L''),\421\ like the proposed group C requirements, are 
largely focused on customer protection rather than risk mitigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ As noted in the discussion of the group B requirements, 
IIB/SIFMA also requested that the Commission recategorize pre-
execution daily trading records rules as group C requirements (not 
group B requirements).
    \421\ 17 CFR part 23, subpart L.
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(iii) Final Rule
    After careful consideration of the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the group C requirements as proposed and adding the 
requirements of Subpart L as group C requirements, as shown in the rule 
text in this release.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \422\ Final Sec.  23.23(a)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 724(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to add section 
4s(l),\423\ which addresses segregation of initial margin held as 
collateral in uncleared swap transactions (i.e., swaps not submitted 
for clearing on a DCO). Section 4s(l) was implemented in Subpart L, 
which imposes requirements on SDs and MSPs with respect to the 
treatment of collateral posted by their counterparties to margin, 
guarantee, or secure certain uncleared swaps.\424\ Specifically, Sec.  
23.701 requires, except in those circumstances where segregation is 
mandatory under the Margin Rules,

[[Page 56968]]

that a SD/MSP provide notice to its counterparty of its right to have 
Initial Margin (``IM'') \425\ provided by it to the SD/MSP segregated 
in accordance with Sec. Sec.  23.702 and 23.703.\426\ Commission 
regulations 23.702 and 23.703 provide requirements for segregation and 
investment of IM where the counterparty elects such segregation,\427\ 
and Sec.  23.704 requires that each SD/MSP report quarterly to each 
counterparty that does not choose to require IM segregation that the 
back office procedures of the SD/MSP relating to margin and collateral 
requirements are in compliance with the agreement of the 
counterparties.\428\
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    \423\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(l).
    \424\ Protection of Collateral of Counterparties to Uncleared 
Swaps; Treatment of Securities in a Portfolio Margining Account in a 
Commodity Broker Bankruptcy, 78 FR 66621 (Nov. 2013). The Commission 
later amended Subpart L in light of the Commission's adoption of 
subpart E of part 23 (Capital and Margin Requirements for Swap 
Dealers and Major Swap Participants) in January 2016 and the 
prudential regulators' adoption of similar rules in November 2015 
(together, ``Margin Rules''), which, among other things, established 
initial margin requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs. As a result, 
Subpart L's segregation requirements apply only when the Margin 
Rules' segregation requirements do not. Further, the Commission 
understands that counterparties have elected segregation under 
Subpart L very rarely. See, e.g., Segregation of Assets Held as 
Collateral in Uncleared Swap Transactions, 84 FR 12894 (Apr. 2019).
    \425\ ``Initial Margin'' is defined in Sec.  23.700 for purposes 
of Subpart L as money, securities, or property posted by a party to 
a swap as performance bond to cover potential future exposures 
arising from changes in the market value of the position. 17 CFR 
23.700.
    \426\ 17 CFR 23.701.
    \427\ 17 CFR 23.702 and 703.
    \428\ 17 CFR 23.704.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission agrees with IIB/SIFMA that these requirements are 
focused on customer protection rather than risk mitigation and are 
appropriately included as group C requirements. In this regard, the 
Commission notes, specifically, that Subpart L leaves to the discretion 
of the counterparty to the SD/MSP whether IM is segregated, rather than 
mandating its segregation, and has largely been superseded by the 
Margin Rules, which specifically address systemic risk in relation to 
margin for uncleared swaps.

B. Exceptions From Group B and Group C Requirements

1. Proposed Exceptions, Generally
(i) Proposed Rule
    Consistent with section 2(i) of the CEA, the Commission proposed 
four exceptions from certain Commission regulations for foreign-based 
swaps in the Proposed Rule.\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \429\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 982-984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the Commission proposed an exception from certain group B 
and C requirements for certain anonymous, exchange-traded, and cleared 
foreign-based swaps (``Exchange-Traded Exception'').
    Second, the Commission proposed an exception from the group C 
requirements for certain foreign-based swaps with foreign 
counterparties (``Foreign Swap Group C Exception'').
    Third, the Commission proposed an exception from the group B 
requirements for certain foreign-based swaps of foreign branches of 
U.S. swap entities with certain foreign counterparties, subject to 
certain limitations, including a quarterly cap on the amount of such 
swaps (``Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception'').\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \430\ This exception was defined as the ``Foreign Branch Group B 
Exception'' in the Proposed Rule. The Commission is adding the word 
``Limited'' to the beginning of the defined term, to reflect the 
conditions that apply to the use of the exception, including the cap 
on its use in a calendar quarter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the Commission proposed an exception from the group B 
requirements for the foreign-based swaps of certain non-U.S. swap 
entities with certain foreign counterparties (``Non-U.S. Swap Entity 
Group B Exception'').
    While these exceptions each have different eligibility 
requirements, a common requirement is that they would be available only 
to foreign-based swaps,\431\ as other swaps would be treated as 
domestic swaps for purposes of applying the group B and group C 
requirements and, therefore, would not be eligible for the above 
exceptions. Further, swap entities that avail themselves of these 
exceptions for their foreign-based swaps would be required to comply 
with the applicable laws of the foreign jurisdiction(s) to which they 
are subject, rather than the relevant Commission requirements, for such 
swaps; however, notwithstanding these exceptions, swap entities would 
remain subject to the CEA and Commission regulations not covered by the 
exceptions, including the prohibition on the employment, or attempted 
employment, of manipulative and deceptive devices in Sec.  180.1.\432\ 
The Commission also would expect swap entities to address any 
significant risk that may arise as a result of the utilization of one 
or more exceptions in their risk management programs required pursuant 
to Sec.  23.600.\433\
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    \431\ As discussed in section II.I, supra, a foreign-based swap 
means: (1) A swap by a non-U.S. swap entity, except for a swap 
booked in a U.S. branch; or (2) A swap conducted through a foreign 
branch.
    \432\ 17 CFR 180.1.
    \433\ 17 CFR 23.600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requested comments on whether, in light of the 
Commission's supervisory interests, the proposed exceptions were 
appropriate or whether they should be broadened or narrowed.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \434\ Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    JFMC/IBAJ generally supported the proposed exceptions to the 
application of group B and C requirements under the Proposed Rule, 
stating that they believe the exceptions generally strike the right 
balance in protecting the integrity, safety, and soundness of the U.S. 
financial system while recognizing the principles of international 
comity. ISDA stated that it supported the Commission's intent to place 
non-U.S. swap entities (that are Other Non-U.S. Persons) and foreign 
branches of U.S. swap entities on equal footing with respect to the 
cross-border application of certain CFTC requirements, noting that 
foreign branches of U.S. swap entities are subject to the laws of the 
foreign jurisdictions in which they operate and, thus, imposing U.S. 
requirements on these entities results in duplicative regulation--
increasing compliance costs, complexity, and inefficiencies. However, 
JFMC/IBAJ, ISDA, and IIB/SIFMA requested that the Commission expand and 
clarify the Proposed Rule's exceptions in certain specific respects, 
which are discussed in the relevant sections below. AFR asserted that 
the Proposed Rule would allow branches of U.S. persons, which are 
actually formally and legally part of the parent U.S. organization, to 
effectively act as non-U.S. persons.\435\ IATP stated that it only 
understands the Exchange-Traded Exception and did not comment on the 
other proposed exceptions. Its comment on the proposed Exchange-Traded 
Exception is discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \435\ The Commission disagrees with this assertion. For example, 
under the Proposed Rule, group B requirements apply more broadly to 
foreign branches than to non-U.S. persons due to the limited scope 
of the Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception as compared to the 
Non-U.S. Swap Entity Group B Exception (each discussed below), and 
foreign branches (as a part of a U.S. person) are not eligible for 
substituted compliance for the group A requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Exchange-Traded Exception
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that, with respect to its foreign-based 
swaps, each non-U.S. swap entity and foreign branch of a U.S. swap 
entity would be excepted from the group B requirements (other than the 
daily trading records requirements in Sec. Sec.  23.202(a) through 
23.202(a)(1) \436\) and the group C requirements with respect to any 
swap entered into on a DCM, a registered SEF or a SEF exempted from 
registration by the Commission pursuant to section 5h(g) of the CEA, or 
an FBOT registered with the Commission pursuant to part 48 of its 
regulations \437\ where, in each case, the swap is cleared through a 
registered DCO or a clearing organization that has been exempted from 
registration by the Commission

[[Page 56969]]

pursuant to section 5b(h) of the CEA, and the swap entity does not know 
the identity of the counterparty to the swap prior to execution.\438\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \436\ 17 CFR 23.202(a) through (a)(1).
    \437\ The Commission stated that it would consider the proposed 
exception also to apply with respect to an FBOT that provides direct 
access to its order entry and trade matching system from within the 
U.S. pursuant to no-action relief issued by Commission staff.
    \438\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 982-983. This approach is 
similar to the Guidance. See Guidance, 78 FR at 45351-45352 and 
45360-45361.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the group B trade confirmation requirement, the 
Commission noted that where a cleared swap is executed anonymously on a 
DCM or SEF (as discussed above), independent requirements that apply to 
DCM and SEF transactions pursuant to the Commission's regulations 
should ensure that these requirements are met.\439\ And, for a 
combination of reasons, including the fact that a registered FBOT is 
analogous to a DCM and is expected to be subject to comprehensive 
supervision and regulation in its home country,\440\ and the fact that 
the swap will be cleared, the Commission believes that the Commission's 
trade confirmation requirements should not apply to foreign-based swaps 
that meet the requirements of the exception and are traded on 
registered FBOTs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \439\ See 17 CFR 23.501(a)(4)(i) and 37.6(b).
    \440\ See 17 CFR 48.5(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of the remaining group B requirements, the Commission noted that 
the portfolio reconciliation and compression and swap trading 
relationship documentation requirements would not apply to the cleared 
DCM, SEF, or FBOT transactions described above because the Commission 
regulations that establish those requirements make clear that they do 
not apply to cleared transactions.\441\ For the last group B 
requirement--the daily trading records requirement \442\--the 
Commission stated that it believes that, as a matter of international 
comity and recognizing the supervisory interests of foreign regulators 
who may have their own trading records requirements, it is appropriate 
to except such foreign-based swaps from certain of the Commission's 
daily trading records requirements. However, the Commission stated that 
the requirements of Sec.  23.202(a) through (a)(1) should continue to 
apply, as all swap entities should be required to maintain, among other 
things, sufficient records to conduct a comprehensive and accurate 
trade reconstruction for each swap. The Commission noted that, in 
particular, for certain pre-execution trade information under Sec.  
23.202(a)(1),\443\ the swap entity may be the best, or only, source for 
such records, and for this reason, paragraphs (a) through (a)(1) of 
Sec.  23.202 are carved out from the group B requirements in the 
proposed exception.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \441\ See 17 CFR 23.502(d), 23.503(c), 23.504(a)(1)(iii).
    \442\ See 17 CFR 23.202.
    \443\ See 17 CFR 23.202(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the Commission noted that, given that this exception 
is predicated on anonymity, many of the group C requirements would be 
inapplicable.\444\ Further, because the Commission believes a 
registered FBOT is analogous to a DCM for these purposes and is 
expected to be subject to comprehensive supervision and regulation in 
its home country, and because a SEF that is exempted from registration 
by the Commission pursuant to section 5h(g) of the CEA must be subject 
to supervision and regulation that is comparable to that to which 
Commission-registered SEFs are subject, the Commission also proposed 
that these group C requirements would not be applicable where such a 
swap is executed anonymously on a registered FBOT, or a SEF that has 
been exempted from registration with the Commission pursuant to section 
5h(g) of the CEA, and cleared. In the interest of international comity 
and because the proposed exception requires that the swap be exchange-
traded and cleared, the Commission proposed that foreign-based swaps 
would also be excepted from the remaining group C requirements in these 
circumstances. The Commission noted that it expects that the 
requirements that the swaps be exchange-traded and cleared will 
generally limit swaps that benefit from the exception to standardized 
and commonly-traded, foreign-based swaps, for which the Commission 
believes application of the remaining group C requirements is not 
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \444\ See 17 CFR 23.402(b)-(c), 23.430(e), 23.431(c), 23.450(h), 
23.451(b)(2)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    IIB/SIFMA requested that the Commission expand the exception to 
apply to all anonymous cleared swaps (whether or not the trading venue 
and clearing organization are registered or exempt from registration 
with the Commission), in light of the risk mitigating effects of 
central clearing and the regulatory compliance and market integrity 
protections of trading anonymously on a regulated platform. They stated 
that it is not necessary for the Commission to limit this exception for 
anonymous cleared swaps in a manner that would indirectly expand the 
SEF and DCO registration requirements to non-U.S. trading venues and 
clearing organizations with non-U.S. swap entity participants. Further, 
they asserted that if the counterparty to a swap was a U.S. person, the 
Commission's SEF and DCO registration requirements would independently 
require the trading venue and clearing organization to register with 
the Commission or obtain an exemption from registration. Additionally, 
IIB/SIFMA requested the exception be made available to U.S. swap 
entities, as well, except for daily trading records rules, arguing that 
the interposition of clearing organizations reduces risk to the United 
States, thereby obviating the need to apply the risk mitigation rules 
(where applicable). They also noted that SEFs provide market 
participants with the regulatory compliance protections associated with 
centralized trading and that many group C requirements already do not 
apply to a swap entity in connection with swaps executed anonymously, 
regardless of the U.S. person status of the swap entity.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \445\ In addition to noting the exceptions in the regulations 
themselves, IIB/SIFMA reference the relief provided by Staff Letter 
13-70 for intended to be cleared swaps (``Staff ITBC Letter'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ISDA was supportive of the proposed exception, but requested that 
it be extended to cover: (1) All relevant group B and C requirements; 
and (2) U.S. and non-U.S. entities' transactions that are SEF- (or 
exempt SEF-) executed and cleared at a DCO, exempt DCO, or 
clearinghouse subject to CFTC no-action relief, regardless of whether 
they are anonymously executed. ISDA noted that one of the regulatory 
benefits of SEF trading is that market participants receive the 
necessary regulatory compliance protections associated with centralized 
trading, and that, as self-regulatory organizations, SEFs (and exempt 
SEFs) are expected to keep daily trading records and audit trails of 
each transaction executed on their platforms, so it makes sense to 
allow counterparties not to comply with group B requirements when 
executing trades on SEFs (or exempt SEFs), and restricting this 
exemption to a particular method of execution on a SEF does not serve 
any regulatory purpose. Moreover, ISDA argued that imposing CFTC 
external business conduct standards to centrally-executed and cleared 
trades also creates redundancies, as counterparties that trade on SEFs 
(or exempt SEFs) receive necessary disclosures as part of the 
onboarding process and regulatory required pre-trade credit checks 
ensure that counterparties have sufficient credit to execute 
transactions.
    IATP stated that the biggest exception, in terms of the notional 
amount of swaps and the number of group B and C requirements that would 
be exempted

[[Page 56970]]

from compliance, is the Exchange-Traded Exception, and that this 
exception would comport generally with G20 reform objectives to 
centrally clear swaps and trade them anonymously (preferably post-trade 
as well as pre-trade) on regulated exchanges. However, IATP objected to 
the granting of the exception for foreign SEFs and clearing 
organizations that have not qualified for registration with the 
Commission, but have been granted exemptions from registration, 
presumably in the interest of international comity, noting that if the 
Exchange-Traded Exception results in disapplication of Commission 
requirements to customized foreign affiliate swaps traded and cleared 
on exempted entities, the risks to U.S. ultimate parents could be most 
unexpected.
(iii) Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the exception as proposed.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \446\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(1)(i). The Commission notes that the 
addition of the Subpart L requirements to the group C requirements 
under the Final Rule will not substantively expand the Exchange-
Traded Exception as the Subpart L requirements do not apply to swaps 
cleared by a DCO. Also, as stated in the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission considers the exception also to apply with respect to an 
FBOT that provides direct access to its order entry and trade 
matching system from within the U.S. pursuant to no-action relief 
issued by Commission staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding requests to expand the exception to include all anonymous 
foreign-based swaps entered into on an exchange and which are 
subsequently cleared, regardless of whether the exchange and clearing 
organization are registered or exempt from registration with the 
Commission, or to include swaps that are cleared on a DCO that has 
received staff no-action relief from registration requirements, the 
Commission is declining to expand the exception. As noted in the 
Proposed Rule, the exception is based, in part, on the swaps eligible 
for it being subject to independent requirements that apply to 
transactions on a DCM or registered SEF pursuant to Commission 
regulations or, with respect to exempt SEFs and registered FBOTs, to 
comprehensive supervision and regulation in their home countries. 
Similarly, the Commission believes that limiting the exception to DCOs 
that are registered or exempt provides assurance that the DCOs clearing 
swaps eligible for the exception will be subject to comprehensive 
supervision and regulation. Further, as explained above, the Commission 
does not find persuasive IIB/SIFMA's argument that if the counterparty 
to a foreign-based swap is a U.S. person, other Commission rules 
require that the trade be executed on a registered or exempt SEF and 
cleared through a registered or exempt DCO.\447\ The Commission will 
consider expanding the exception pending other amendments to the SEF/
DCO regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \447\ See supra sections III.D and IV.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the request not to require that eligible foreign-based 
swaps be anonymous, the Commission declines to expand the exception in 
this manner. The other exceptions in the Final Rule provide relief 
where appropriate for foreign-based swaps where the counterparty is 
known, and this limited exception, as in the Guidance, is only meant to 
provide relief from certain of the group B and group C requirements 
where the counterparty is unknown and, thus, it would be impractical to 
comply with such requirements.
    Regarding the request to allow U.S. swap entities (other than their 
foreign branches) to utilize the exception, the Commission declines to 
expand the exception in this manner. The Commission is of the view, 
consistent with the Guidance, that where a U.S. swap entity (other than 
its foreign branch) enters into a swap, that swap is part of the U.S. 
swap market. And, accordingly, the group B and group C requirements 
should generally apply fully to such swap entity. \448\ In addition, 
the Commission is generally of the view that the Final Rule is not the 
appropriate place to make changes to the regulation of the U.S. swap 
market. Expanding the exception to cover swaps in the U.S. swaps market 
would require amendments to the underlying group B and group C 
requirements that apply to all covered swaps rather than creating a 
limited exception to them for certain foreign swaps. However, as 
comments were supportive of extending the exception to U.S. swap 
entities, the Commission will continue to analyze this issue and take 
these comments into consideration when next considering changes to the 
group B and group C requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \448\ The Commission notes that, as referenced by IIB/SIFMA and 
subject to certain specified conditions, the Staff ITBC Letter 
provides relief to all swap entities from certain of the group B and 
group C requirements for intended to be cleared swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the request to include pre-execution trading 
records (i.e., by revising the exception to apply to all group B 
requirements), the Commission declines to expand the exception in this 
manner. Excluding pre-execution trading records requirements is 
consistent with the Guidance and, as noted in the Proposed Rule, these 
requirements should continue to apply, as all swap entities should be 
required to maintain, among other things, sufficient records to conduct 
a comprehensive and accurate trade reconstruction for each swap, and 
the swap entity may be the best, or only, source for pre-execution 
trading records.
3. Foreign Swap Group C Exception
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that each non-U.S. swap entity and foreign 
branch of a U.S. swap entity would be excepted from the group C 
requirements with respect to its foreign-based swaps with a foreign 
counterparty.\449\ The Commission noted that such swaps would not 
include as a party a U.S. person (other than a foreign branch where the 
swap is conducted through such foreign branch) or be conducted through 
a U.S. branch,\450\ and, given that the group C requirements are 
intended to promote counterparty protections in the context of local 
market sales practices, foreign regulators may have a relatively 
stronger supervisory interest than the Commission in regulating such 
swaps in relation to the group C requirements. Accordingly, the 
Commission stated that it believed applying the group C requirements to 
these transactions may not be warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \449\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 983-984. This approach is 
similar to the Guidance. See Guidance, 78 FR at 45360-45361. As used 
herein, the term swap includes transactions in swaps as well as 
swaps that are offered but not entered into, as applicable.
    \450\ See discussion of the modification of the definition of a 
``swap conducted through a U.S. branch'' to be a ``swap booked in a 
U.S. branch'' in section II.H.3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission noted that, just as the Commission has a strong 
supervisory interest in regulating and enforcing the group C 
requirements associated with swaps taking place in the United States, 
foreign regulators would have a similar interest in overseeing sales 
practices for swaps occurring within their jurisdictions. Further, 
given the scope of section 2(i) of the CEA with respect to the 
Commission's regulation of swap activities outside the United States, 
the Commission stated that it believes imposing its group C 
requirements on a foreign-based swap between a non-U.S. swap entity or 
foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity, on one hand, and a foreign 
counterparty, on the other, is generally not necessary to advance the 
customer protection goals of the Dodd-Frank Act embodied in the group C 
requirements.

[[Page 56971]]

    By contrast, the Commission stated that whenever a swap involves at 
least one party that is a U.S. person (other than a foreign branch 
where the swap is conducted through such foreign branch) or is a swap 
conducted through a U.S. branch, the Commission believes it has a 
strong supervisory interest in regulating and enforcing the group C 
requirements, as a major purpose of Title VII is to control the 
potential harm to U.S. markets that can arise from risks that are 
magnified or transferred between parties via swaps. Therefore, the 
Commission concluded that exercise of U.S. jurisdiction with respect to 
the group C requirements over such swaps is reasonable because of the 
strong U.S. interest in minimizing the potential risks that may flow to 
the U.S. economy as a result of such swaps.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ See supra section I.D.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    ISDA stated that it fully agrees with the Commission that there is 
no policy benefit in subjecting non-U.S. market participants to the 
CFTC's extensive customer protection regime,\452\ and therefore, 
believes that these rules should be left within the remit of home 
country regulators. Further, ISDA stated that it agrees that foreign 
branch ANE Transactions should not be subject to group C 
Requirements.\453\ IIB/SIFMA also supported the proposed exception. 
However, ISDA and IIB/SIFMA requested specific changes to the 
underlying group C requirements, including that certain of the group C 
requirements apply only on an ``opt-in'' basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \452\ As explained more fully below, the Commission notes that 
it did not make such a statement in the Proposed Rule.
    \453\ As explained more fully below, this statement does not 
wholly comport with the Commission's position as set forth in the 
Proposed Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, ISDA stated that non-U.S. persons should be allowed 
to opt-in to receiving external business conduct disclosures from U.S. 
persons. Under ISDA's proposed alternative, unless a non-U.S. client 
chooses to ``opt-in'' into the full spectrum of the CFTC requirements, 
U.S swap entities and U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities would 
only have the obligation to provide disclosures related to: (1) 
Prohibition on fraud, manipulation, and other abusive practices; (2) 
verification of ECP status; (3) material risks, excluding requirements 
to provide daily mark and scenario analysis; (4) fair dealing 
communications; and (5) brief descriptions of other external business 
conduct disclosures, including the option to opt-in to receiving such 
disclosures.
    IIB/SIFMA similarly requested that, to better balance counterparty 
protection interests against the market fragmentation that results when 
swap entities ask their non-U.S. counterparties to enter into 
documentation designed to satisfy U.S. legal requirements, the 
Commission refine how the group C requirements apply to all swaps 
entered into by U.S. swap entities and U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap 
entities when they transact with non-U.S. counterparties, including 
swaps entered into by U.S. swap entities in the United States. IIB/
SIFMA argued that, because the business conduct requirements are 
designed to provide customer protection rather than to mitigate risk to 
the United States, the Commission has a limited regulatory interest in 
mandating full application of its customer protection requirements to 
all swap transactions between swap entities and their non-U.S. 
counterparties. Further, IIB/SIFMA asserted that, in other contexts, 
the Commission has recognized that non-U.S persons do not generally 
implicate U.S. investor protection concerns (e.g., in its CPO and CTA 
rules). They proposed that only the following requirements would apply 
to a U.S. swap entity (including its U.S. branches or when it otherwise 
trades in the United States) or U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap entity 
when it trades with a non-U.S. counterparty unless otherwise opted into 
by a non-U.S. person counterparty: (1) The prohibition on fraud, 
manipulation, and other abusive practices (but not additional 
confidentiality requirements under Sec.  23.410(c)); (2) verification 
of ECP status (although in their view such verification should not 
require a written representation regarding a specific prong of the ECP 
definition, as it does for U.S. persons); (3) disclosure of material 
risks (but not scenario analysis under Sec.  23.431(b)), material 
characteristics and economic terms, and material conflicts of interest 
and incentives (but not pre-trade mid-market marks under Sec.  
23.431(a)(3)(i)), without requiring the counterparty to agree in 
writing to the manner of disclosure as under Sec.  23.402(e) and (f); 
(4) fair and balanced communications; and (5) a one-time notification 
prior to entering into a new trading relationship with a non-U.S. 
counterparty that the non-U.S. counterparty may opt in to the 
additional customer protections provided by the remaining external 
business conduct rules along with a summary description of those rules. 
Further, IIB/SIFMA requested that the Commission clarify that non-U.S. 
persons are not ``Special Entities'' (as defined in CEA section 
4s(h)(2)(C) and Sec.  23.401(c)), considering that Congress was not 
seeking to protect foreign pension plans and endowments.
(iii) Final Rule--Foreign Swap Group C Exception and U.S. Branch Group 
C Exception
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the exception as proposed.\454\ The Commission recognizes 
that, although the exception is being adopted as proposed, the scope of 
the exception is being expanded because the Subpart L requirements have 
been added to the group C requirements under the Final Rule. For the 
reasons discussed in section VI.A.3, the Commission believes that the 
Subpart L requirements are appropriately classified as group C 
requirements and, thus, the expansion of the exception in this manner 
is appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \454\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, based on the comments received, the Commission is 
adopting an additional exception from the group C requirements for 
certain swaps of U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities (``U.S. Branch 
Group C Exception''), as shown in the rule text in this release.\455\ 
Specifically, under the U.S. Branch Group C Exception, a non-U.S. swap 
entity is excepted from the group C requirements with respect to any 
swap booked in a U.S. branch with a foreign counterparty that is 
neither a foreign branch nor a Guaranteed Entity. The Commission is 
adopting this exception because, although the swaps benefiting from the 
exception are part of the U.S. swap market, the Commission believes 
that foreign regulators have a stronger interest in such swaps with 
respect to the group C requirements--which relate to counterparty 
protection rather than risk mitigation--because they are between a non-
U.S. swap entity (by definition, a non-U.S. person) and certain foreign 
counterparties that have a limited nexus to the United States (i.e., 
non-U.S. persons, including SRSs that are not Guaranteed Entities). The 
Commission is not providing this exception to swaps booked in a U.S. 
branch of a non-U.S. swap entity with a foreign branch of a U.S. swap 
entity, Guaranteed Entity, or U.S. branch counterparty (where, for the 
U.S. branch, the swap is booked in the U.S. branch of the 
counterparty). A foreign branch (which is, by definition, a part of 
U.S. person), a Guaranteed Entity, and a U.S. branch counterparty have 
a closer nexus to the United States, and,

[[Page 56972]]

thus, the Commission believes that the group C requirements should 
continue to apply to swaps with such counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \455\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the requests to change the application of some or all of 
the group C requirements to swaps entered into by U.S. swap entities 
and U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities when they transact with 
non-U.S. counterparties such that certain of the requirements would 
apply only where non-US counterparties ``opt-in'' to such treatment, 
the Commission is of the view that where a U.S. swap entity (other than 
its foreign branch) enters into a swap or where a swap is booked in a 
U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap entity, those swaps are part of the U.S. 
swap market, and, accordingly, other than as provided in the U.S. 
Branch Group C Exception, the group C requirements should generally 
apply fully to such swap entities, regardless of the U.S. person status 
of its counterparty.
    In response to IIB/SIFMA's comment that adopting their requested 
change is in line with the Commission's recognition in the CPO/CTA 
context that non-U.S persons do not generally implicate U.S. investor 
protection concerns, the Commission has never stated that U.S.-based 
CPOs/CTAs do not need to register or comply with the Commission's 
applicable rules. Rather, under Sec.  3.10(c)(3), a foreign person is 
not required to register as a CPO/CTA (or comply with most Commission 
regulations) in connection with commodity interest transactions on 
behalf of persons located outside the United States that are submitted 
for clearing through a registered futures commission merchant. 
Moreover, a CPO/CTA advising a customer on the investment of their 
funds or managing such investment is in a fundamentally different 
position than a swap entity that is acting as a counterparty under a 
swap. In addition, as noted above, the Commission is of the view that, 
generally, the Final Rule is not the appropriate place to make changes 
to the regulation of the U.S. swap market. Making the group C 
requirements an ``opt-in'' regime would require changing the underlying 
group C requirements that apply to all covered swaps rather than 
creating a limited exception to them for certain foreign swaps.
    On the request of IIB/SIFMA that the Commission ``clarify'' that 
non-U.S. persons are not Special Entities because ``Congress was not 
seeking to protect foreign pension plans and endowments,'' the 
Commission received similar comments when it adopted the definition of 
``Special Entity'' in its final rule on external business conduct 
standards for swap entities and addressed them in that rulemaking.\456\ 
First, the Commission, in interpreting the CEA, refined the definition 
of ``Special Entity'' to remove, among other things, certain foreign 
employee benefit plans from the scope of the definition.\457\ Second, 
the Commission expressly addressed foreign endowments potentially being 
classified as Special Entities, saying that because ``the statute does 
not distinguish between foreign and domestic counterparties in Section 
4s(h) . . . the Commission has determined that prong (v) of Section 
4s(h)(2)(C) and Sec.  23.401(c)(5) [the endowment prongs of the 
definitions] will apply to any endowment, whether foreign or 
domestic.'' \458\ Therefore, the Commission is declining to provide the 
clarification that IIB/SIFMA requested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \456\ Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants With Counterparties, 77 FR 9733, 9774-75 (Feb. 2012).
    \457\ Id. at 9776.
    \458\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding ISDA's statement that it fully agrees with the Commission 
that there is no policy benefit in subjecting non-U.S. market 
participants to the CFTC's extensive customer protection regime and, 
therefore, believes that these rules should be left within the remit of 
home country regulators, this statement does not wholly comport with 
the Commission's position as set forth in the Proposed Rule. Rather, 
the Commission proposed that only certain foreign-based swaps meeting 
the eligibility criteria for the exception would be excepted from the 
group C requirements. ISDA also stated that it agrees that foreign 
branch ANE Transactions should not be subject to group C Requirements. 
The Commission notes that this would only be true to the extent the 
swap is conducted through the relevant foreign branch or branches, 
which would require, among other things, that the swap be entered into 
by each relevant foreign branch in its normal course of business. To 
satisfy this prong, it must be the normal course of business for 
employees located in the branch (or another foreign branch of the U.S. 
bank) to enter into the type of swap in question. Under the Final Rule 
(and as proposed), where the swap is primarily entered into by 
personnel not located in a foreign branch of the U.S. bank, this 
requirement would not be satisfied.
4. Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed that each foreign branch of a U.S. swap 
entity would be excepted from the group B requirements with respect to 
any foreign-based swap with a foreign counterparty that is an Other 
Non-U.S. Person, subject to certain limitations.\459\ Specifically, 
under the Proposed Rule: (1) The exception would not be available with 
respect to any group B requirement for which substituted compliance 
(discussed in section VI.C below) is available for the relevant swap; 
and (2) in any calendar quarter, the aggregate gross notional amount of 
swaps conducted by a swap entity in reliance on the exception may not 
exceed five percent of the aggregate gross notional amount of all its 
swaps in that calendar quarter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \459\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 984. This is similar to a 
limited exception for transactions by foreign branches in certain 
specified jurisdictions in the Guidance. See Guidance, 78 FR at 
45351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, the Commission proposed the 
Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception to allow the foreign branches 
of U.S. swap entities to continue to access swap markets for which 
substituted compliance may not be available under limited 
circumstances.\460\ The Commission stated that it believes the Limited 
Foreign Branch Group B Exception is appropriate because U.S. swap 
entities' activities through foreign branches in these markets, though 
not significant in volume in many cases, may nevertheless be an 
integral element of a U.S. swap entity's global business. Additionally, 
although not the Commission's main purpose, the Commission noted that 
it endeavors to preserve liquidity in the emerging markets in which it 
expects this exception to be utilized, which may further encourage the 
global use and development of swap markets. Further, because of the 
proposed five percent cap on the use of the exception, the Commission 
stated that it preliminarily believed that the swap activity that would 
be excepted from the group B requirements would not raise significant 
supervisory concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \460\ As noted above, under the Proposed Rule, where substituted 
compliance is available for a particular group B requirement and 
swap, the exception would not be available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    IIB/SIFMA generally supported this exception, but requested that 
the Commission clarify that: (1) The exception applies on a swap-by-
swap,

[[Page 56973]]

requirement-by-requirement basis; (2) that it is optional for a U.S. 
swap entity to rely on the exception for any given swap; and (3) that 
the five percent notional amount cap would only cover transactions 
entered into ``in reliance on'' the exception, not all swaps eligible 
for the exception. In a subsequent discussion with Commission staff, 
IIB/SIFMA further clarified their request that the exception should 
apply on a ``requirement-by-requirement basis'' to mean that the 
exception should have a separate five percent gross notional amount cap 
applicable to each requirement, rather than a single five percent gross 
notional amount cap where any swap that relied on the exception for any 
group B requirement would count towards the cap. State Street also 
supported the proposed exception; however, it requested that the 
Commission provide further guidance on the calculation of the notional 
amount cap.
    IIB/SIFMA also asked that, consistent with its other requests, the 
exception be available when a foreign branch transacts with an SRS that 
is not a swap entity or with a U.S. branch of a foreign bank. With 
respect to such an entity, IIB/SIFMA noted that the group B 
requirements indirectly regulate the end user (i.e., non-swap entity) 
counterparties of swap entities by requiring them to execute 
documentation and engage in portfolio reconciliation and compression 
exercises, when they trade with swap entities subject to the 
requirements. IIB/SIFMA asserted that many more end users will qualify 
as SRSs than swap entities under the proposed definition because, 
unlike swap entities, commercial and non-financial end users generally 
will not qualify for the exclusions from the SRS definition and that, 
as a result, significant foreign subsidiaries of large U.S. 
multinational companies would find themselves subject to group B 
requirements when they trade with non-U.S. swap entities. IIB/SIFMA 
noted that the indirect application of the group B requirements would 
pose particular problems for significant subsidiaries doing business in 
emerging market jurisdictions that have not yet adopted comparable 
rules to the group B requirements because swap entities' operations in 
those jurisdictions might not be set up to apply the group B 
requirements to trading with those subsidiaries, and that this could 
cause those subsidiaries to lose access to key interest or currency 
hedging products and face increased hedging and risk management costs 
relative to their foreign competitors. IIB/SIFMA also stated that 
subjecting an SRS that is not a swap entity to group B requirements 
would impose undue costs on non-U.S. swap entities, noting that because 
the SRS test depends on a non-U.S. counterparty's internal 
organizational structure and financial metrics, it generally would not 
be possible for a swap entity to determine whether its non-U.S. 
counterparty is an SRS without obtaining an affirmative representation 
and, because it would be difficult for a swap entity categorically to 
rule out any class of non-U.S. counterparties from being an SRS, swap 
entities would be forced to obtain relevant representations from nearly 
their entire global client bases.
    Further, IIB/SIFMA noted that any credit or legal risks arising 
from swaps conducted in reliance on the exception should already be 
addressed through existing provisions of Sec.  23.600 and, accordingly, 
they assume the Proposed Rule was not meant to imply some additional 
risk management program requirement in connection with reliance on the 
exception.
    JBA asked that the Commission review the Proposed Rule from the 
perspective of ensuring symmetric application of requirements between 
U.S. swap entities and non-U.S. swap entities. Specifically, JBA 
requested that an exception consistent with the Limited Foreign Branch 
Group B Exception should be applicable to the non-U.S. swap entities 
even when their counterparty is a foreign branch of a U.S. person. As 
an example, JBA stated that when the Seoul branch of a U.S. bank that 
is registered as an SD enters into a swap with the Tokyo headquarters 
of a Japanese bank that is registered as an SD, the U.S. bank SD may 
rely on the Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception, whereas the 
Japanese bank SD may not rely on an exception from the group B 
requirements.
    ISDA stated that it agrees that foreign branch ANE Transactions 
should not be subject to group B requirements where substituted 
compliance is available.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \461\ As discussed more fully below, this statement is not an 
accurate description of the Proposed Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the exception with certain modifications, as shown in the rule 
text in this release.\462\ Specifically, the Commission is: (1) 
Adjusting the exception such that it is not available for swaps between 
swap entities; (2) broadening the exception to apply to foreign-based 
swaps with an SRS End User; and (3) making some minor technical changes 
to the text of the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \462\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that a swap between the foreign branch of a 
U.S. swap entity and a non-U.S. swap entity should generally be subject 
to the group B requirements. Where both parties to a swap are swap 
entities, the rationale for the Limited Foreign Branch Group B 
Exception is not present. As discussed in the Proposed Rule and the 
Guidance, as well as above, the exception is designed to allow the 
foreign branches of U.S. swap entities to continue to access swap 
markets for which substituted compliance may not be available under 
limited circumstances (a) because U.S. swap entities' activities 
through foreign branches in these markets, though not significant in 
volume in many cases, may nevertheless be an integral element of a U.S. 
swap entity's global business, and (b) to preserve liquidity in the 
emerging markets in which it expects this exception to be utilized. 
Where both parties to a swap are registered swap entities, the 
Commission sees no impediment to compliance with the group B 
requirements.
    With respect to SRS End Users, the Commission acknowledges that 
applying the group B requirements to a swap entity's swaps indirectly 
affects their counterparties, including SRS End User counterparties, by 
requiring them to execute documentation (e.g., compliant swap trading 
relationship documentation), and engage in portfolio reconciliation and 
compression exercises as a condition to entering into swaps with swap 
entity counterparties. As noted by IIB/SIFMA, requiring compliance with 
these obligations may cause counterparties, including SRS End Users, to 
face increased costs relative to their competitors not affected by the 
application of the group B requirements (e.g., for legal fees or as a 
result of costs being passed on to them by their swap entity 
counterparties), and/or to potentially lose access to key interest or 
currency hedging products. Also, the Commission recognizes that, as 
IIB/SIFMA notes, because the SRS test depends on a non-U.S. 
counterparty's internal organizational structure and financial metrics 
and it would be difficult to rule out any category of non-U.S. 
counterparties as being an SRS, the proposed application of group B 
requirements to all SRSs may cause swap entities to obtain SRS 
representations from nearly their entire non-U.S. client bases, 
potentially increasing costs for all of these clients.

[[Page 56974]]

    Taking this into account and the Commission's belief that it is 
important to ensure that an SRS, particularly a commercial or non-
financial entity, continues to have access to swap liquidity for 
hedging or other non-dealing purposes, the Commission is expanding the 
exception only to SRS End Users (and not to SRSs that are swap entities 
(``SRS Swap Entities'') or Guaranteed Entities). The Commission 
believes that an SRS End User does not pose as significant a risk to 
the United States as an SRS Swap Entity or a Guaranteed Entity, because 
an SRS End User: (1) Has a less direct connection to the United States 
than a Guaranteed Entity; and (2) has been involved, at most, in only a 
de minimis amount of swap dealing activity, or has swap positions below 
the MSP thresholds, such that it is not required to register as an SD 
or MSP, respectively. In addition, because the SRS category was first 
considered in the Proposed Rule, unlike for Guaranteed Entities, there 
is no precedent in the Guidance to apply the group B requirements to 
all SRSs as originally proposed. Moreover, treating SRSs End Users and 
Guaranteed Entities differently under the exception is consistent with 
the differences in swap counting requirements under the Final 
Rule.\463\ For example, an Other Non-U.S. Person is generally not 
required to count a dealing swap with an SRS toward its de minimis 
threshold calculation for SD registration, whereas an Other Non-U.S. 
Person is (absent certain exceptions) generally required to count its 
dealing swaps with a Guaranteed Entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \463\ See discussion of counting requirements of swaps with SRSs 
in sections III.B.1 and IV.B.1, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, in response to commenters requesting further guidance 
on the application of the exception, the Commission is clarifying that 
the five percent gross notional amount cap applies only to swaps 
entered into in reliance on the exception. This does not include 
situations where a foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity complies with 
all of the group B requirements, either directly or through substituted 
compliance, with respect to a swap that is eligible for the exception. 
In such situation, though the swap is eligible for the exception for 
the requirements not addressed by substituted compliance, it does not 
count toward the five percent gross notional amount cap for swaps 
entered into in reliance on the exception because compliance with the 
applicable group B requirements was achieved. On the other hand, where 
a foreign branch relies on the exception with respect to any group B 
requirement for a swap, the notional amount of that swap counts toward 
the five percent gross notional amount cap for the relevant calendar 
quarter. The Commission is declining to expand the five percent cap as 
requested by IIB/SIFMA such that there would be a separate five percent 
gross notional amount cap for each group B requirement, because it 
believes such an exception would potentially allow a much greater 
percentage of swaps by notional amount to be eligible for the 
exception, and it would be difficult for a swap entity to track and for 
the Commission and the National Futures Association (``NFA'') to 
monitor compliance with such a standard. Accordingly, the five percent 
cap applies on a swap-by-swap basis, but does not apply on a 
requirement-by-requirement basis such that a foreign branch may rely on 
the exception for greater than five percent of its swaps by gross 
notional amount in any calendar quarter.
    Regarding the request to expand the exception to make it available 
to swaps of a foreign branch with U.S. branches of foreign banks, the 
Commission does not believe that such an expansion is appropriate. As 
noted above, the exception is designed to allow the foreign branches of 
U.S. swap entities to continue to access swap markets for which 
substituted compliance may not be available under limited 
circumstances. It is not designed to allow foreign branches to transact 
with U.S. branches of non-U.S. banking organizations without complying 
with the group B requirements. A foreign branch of a U.S. bank is a 
U.S. person, and, as noted above, the Commission is of the view that 
where a swap is booked in a U.S. branch, that swap is part of the U.S. 
swap market. Accordingly, the Commission retains a supervisory interest 
in swaps between a foreign branch and a U.S. branch such that the group 
B requirements should generally apply to such swaps.
    Regarding ISDA's statement that it agrees that foreign branch ANE 
Transactions should not be subject to group B requirements where 
substituted compliance is available, the Commission notes that this 
statement is not accurate as the Limited Foreign Branch Group B 
Exception does not apply where substituted compliance is available. 
Also, as discussed above, even where substituted compliance is not 
available, this statement would only be true to the extent the swap is 
conducted through the relevant foreign branch or branches, which would 
require, among other things, that the swap be entered into by each 
relevant foreign branch in its normal course of business. To satisfy 
this prong, it must be the normal course of business for employees 
located in the branch (or another foreign branch of the U.S. bank) to 
enter into the type of swap in question. Under the Final Rule (and as 
proposed), where the swap is primarily entered into by personnel not 
located in a foreign branch of the U.S. bank, this requirement would 
not be satisfied.
    Further, in line with IIB/SIFMA's comment, the Commission confirms 
that its stated expectation that swap entities will address any 
significant risk that may arise as a result of the utilization of one 
or more exceptions in their risk management programs required pursuant 
to Sec.  23.600 is not meant to imply an additional risk management 
program requirement, but rather to remind swap entities of their 
obligations under Sec.  23.600.
5. Non-U.S. Swap Entity Group B Exception
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission also proposed that each non-U.S. swap entity that is 
an Other Non-U.S. Person would be excepted from the group B 
requirements with respect to any foreign-based swap with a foreign 
counterparty that is also an Other Non-U.S. Person.\464\ The Commission 
stated that, in these circumstances, where no party to the foreign-
based swap is a U.S. person, a Guaranteed Entity, or an SRS, and, the 
particular swap is not conducted through a U.S. branch \465\ of a 
party, notwithstanding that one or both parties to such swap may be a 
swap entity, the Commission believes that foreign regulators may have a 
relatively stronger supervisory interest in regulating such swaps with 
respect to the subject matter covered by the group B requirements, and 
that, in the interest of international comity, applying the group B 
requirements to these foreign-based swaps is not warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \464\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 984. This approach is similar 
to the Guidance; however, the Commission notes that the Proposed 
Rule limited the non-U.S. swap entities eligible for this exception 
to those that are Other Non-U.S. Persons, and the Guidance did not 
contain a similar limitation. See Guidance, 78 FR at 45352-45353.
    \465\ See discussion of the modification of the definition of a 
``swap conducted through a U.S. branch'' to be a ``swap booked in a 
U.S. branch'' in section II.H.3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission noted that, generally, it would expect that swap 
entities that rely on this exception are subject to risk mitigation 
standards in the foreign jurisdictions in which they reside similar to 
those included in the group B requirements, as most

[[Page 56975]]

jurisdictions surveyed by the FSB in respect of their swaps trading 
have implemented such standards.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \466\ See 2019 FSB Progress Report, Table M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    IIB/SIFMA agreed with the Commission that foreign regulators have a 
stronger supervisory interest in these swaps than the Commission in 
regards to the risk mitigation matters covered by the group B 
requirements, but recommended that the Commission expand the proposed 
exception by: (1) Applying the exception to swaps with an SRS that is 
not a swap entity, so as to avoid inappropriately burdening the foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations and their 
counterparties (as discussed in section VI.B.4 above); (2) conforming 
the treatment of a non-U.S. swap entity that either is an SRS Swap 
Entity or benefits from a U.S. guarantee for the relevant swap 
(``Guaranteed Swap Entity'') to the Guidance \467\ (or, at a minimum, 
adopting an exception for de minimis trading by these entities in 
jurisdictions not eligible for substituted compliance similar to the 
Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception where, for SRS Swap Entities, 
the five percent notional amount cap would apply at the level of the 
ultimate U.S. parent entity), so as to minimize the competitive 
disadvantages faced by such swap entities and their counterparties when 
they are subject to U.S. rules extraterritorially; and (3) permitting a 
U.S. branch to rely on the exception when it trades with a non-U.S. 
person that is neither a Guaranteed Entity nor another U.S. branch, 
which, in their view, would appropriately recognize that such swaps do 
not present risks to the United States, are generally unnecessary due 
to home country regulation, and align the scope of the exception to be 
consistent with analogous EU rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \467\ The Commission notes that SRSs were not contemplated by 
the Guidance, so the Commission assumes that the comment requested 
that the Commission conform the treatment of SRSs to conduit 
affiliates under the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    JFMC/IBAJ similarly requested that the Commission exclude 
transactions between a Guaranteed Swap Entity or an SRS Swap Entity and 
an Other Non-U.S. Person from the application of group B requirements, 
stating that these requirements would not apply to such transactions 
under the Guidance and they see no justification for the change in 
Commission policy. They argued that the expanded extraterritorial 
application will indirectly impose regulatory compliance burdens on 
Japanese market participants, most of which are Other Non-U.S. Persons, 
when trading swaps with Guaranteed Swap Entities, especially where a 
Guaranteed Swap Entity cannot rely on substituted compliance with local 
Japanese regulations to satisfy group B requirements, and that Japanese 
market participants will likely refrain from trading swaps with a 
Guaranteed Swap Entity to avoid the indirect imposition of the 
Commission's swaps regulations and the costs associated therewith. They 
noted that this may diminish the ability of U.S.-headquartered firms to 
compete or access liquidity in the Japanese swaps market, which could 
result in fragmented global swaps markets comprised of small and 
disconnected liquidity pools, leading to exacerbation of systemic risk.
    ISDA requested that, in line with the Proposed Rule's intent to 
give deference to home country regulators where there are applicable 
foreign regulatory requirements, the Commission not apply the proposed 
group B requirements to transactions between: (1) U.S. branches of non-
U.S. swap entities and Other Non-U.S. Persons; and (2) Guaranteed 
Entities and Other Non-U.S. Persons, supporting the position and 
rationale of IIB/SIFMA on this topic. ISDA noted that the Commission 
has set a precedent for taking this approach by providing an exemption 
in the Guidance to Guaranteed Entities from compliance with group B 
requirements when transacting with Other Non-U.S. Persons.\468\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \468\ The Commission assumes that ISDA was referring to non-U.S. 
Persons that are not a guaranteed or conduit affiliate of a U.S. 
Person (each as defined or described in the Guidance), as the term 
``Other Non-U.S. Person'' is not used in the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Final Rule--Non-U.S. Swap Entity Group B Exception and Limited 
Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity Group B Exception
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the Non-U.S. Swap Entity Group B Exception with certain 
modifications, as shown in the rule text in this release.\469\ 
Specifically, for the same reasons that the Commission is expanding the 
Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception to include swaps with SRS End 
Users,\470\ the Commission is also expanding the Non-U.S. Swap Entity 
Group B Exception to include swaps with SRS End Users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \469\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(3).
    \470\ See supra section VI.B.4.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, based on the comments received, the Commission is 
adopting an additional limited exception from the group B requirements 
similar to the Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception in the Final 
Rule (discussed above), for trading by an SRS Swap Entity or a 
Guaranteed Swap Entity, on the one hand, and certain non-U.S. persons, 
on the other (``Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity Group B 
Exception''), as shown in the rule text in this release.\471\ As 
commenters noted, under the Guidance, a Guaranteed Swap Entity or a 
non-U.S. swap entity that was a conduit affiliate would not have been 
expected to comply with the group B requirements when transacting with 
a non-U.S. person that was not a conduit or guaranteed affiliate, so 
the Proposed Rule deviated from the Guidance and would have 
disadvantaged SRS Swap Entities and Guaranteed Swap Entities relative 
to foreign branches of U.S. swap entities in the application of the 
group B requirements. Thus, the Commission believes a limited exception 
is warranted because, as a policy matter, it has determined that 
Guaranteed Swap Entities and SRS Swap Entities (who, by definition, are 
non-U.S. persons) should not be subject to stricter application of the 
group B requirements than foreign branches of U.S swap entities (who 
are U.S. persons). Under the Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity 
Group B Exception, each Guaranteed Swap Entity and SRS Swap Entity is 
excepted from the group B requirements, with respect to any foreign-
based swap with a foreign counterparty (other than a foreign branch) 
that is neither a swap entity \472\ nor a Guaranteed Entity, subject to 
certain conditions. Specifically, (1) the exception is not available 
with respect to any group B requirement if the requirement as 
applicable to the swap is eligible for substituted compliance pursuant 
to a comparability determination issued by the Commission prior to the 
execution of the swap (discussed in sections VI.C and VI.D below); and 
(2) in any calendar quarter, the aggregate gross notional amount of 
swaps conducted by an SRS Swap Entity or a Guaranteed Swap Entity in 
reliance on this exception aggregated with the gross notional amount of 
swaps conducted by all affiliated SRS Swap Entities and Guaranteed Swap 
Entities in reliance on

[[Page 56976]]

this exception does not exceed five percent of the aggregate gross 
notional amount of all swaps entered into by the SRS Swap Entity or a 
Guaranteed Swap Entity and all affiliated swap entities.\473\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \471\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(5). As noted above, the Commission, 
generally, expects that swap entities that rely on this exception 
are subject to risk mitigation standards in the foreign 
jurisdictions in which they reside similar to those included in the 
group B requirements, as most jurisdictions surveyed by the FSB in 
respect of their swaps trading have implemented such standards. See 
2019 FSB Progress Report, Table M.
    \472\ As discussed above, the Commission is also excluding swaps 
with a swap entity counterparty from the Limited Foreign Branch 
Group B Exception.
    \473\ Final Sec.  23.23(e)(5)(i) and (ii). As described above 
for the Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception, a swap entered 
into by a SRS Swap Entity or Guaranteed Swap Entity will only count 
toward the gross notional amount cap where it is entered into in 
reliance on the Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity Group B 
Exception.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the request to dis-apply fully the group B 
requirements to swaps between an SRS Swap Entity or Guaranteed Swap 
Entity, on the one hand, and an Other Non-U.S. Person on the other, the 
Commission believes that the group B requirements should generally 
continue to apply to these swaps, as these requirements relate to risk 
mitigation, and SRS Swap Entities and Guaranteed Swap Entities may pose 
significant risk to the United States. Other than the Limited Foreign 
Branch Group B Exception, this matches the treatment of swaps between a 
foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity and an Other Non-U.S. Person under 
the Proposed Rule. Therefore, it is the Commission's view that 
providing the Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity Group B 
Exception (discussed above) to put these entities on a substantially 
similar footing as such foreign branches under the group B requirements 
under the Final Rule is the better approach.
    Regarding the requests to expand the exception to include 
transactions between U.S. branches and certain non-U.S. persons, the 
Commission declines such an expansion. As noted above, the Commission 
believes that where a swap is booked in a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. 
swap entity, that swap is part of the U.S. swap market, and, 
accordingly, the group B requirements should generally apply.

C. Substituted Compliance

    As discussed in the Proposed Rule, substituted compliance is a 
fundamental component of the Commission's cross-border framework.\474\ 
It is intended to promote the benefits of integrated global markets by 
reducing the degree to which market participants will be subject to 
duplicative regulations. Substituted compliance also fosters 
international harmonization by encouraging U.S. and foreign regulators 
to adopt consistent and comparable regulatory regimes that can result 
in deference to each other's regime. Substituted compliance, therefore, 
also is consistent with the directive of Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act 
that the Commission ``coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on 
the establishment of consistent international standards with respect to 
the regulation'' of swaps and swap entities.\475\ When properly 
calibrated, substituted compliance promotes open, transparent, and 
competitive markets without compromising market integrity. On the other 
hand, if construed too broadly, substituted compliance could defer 
important regulatory interests to foreign regulators that have not 
implemented comparably robust regulatory frameworks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \474\ For example, in addition to the Guidance, the Commission 
has provided substituted compliance with respect to foreign futures 
and options transactions (see, e.g., Foreign Futures and Options 
Transactions, 67 FR 30785 (May 8, 2002); Foreign Futures and Options 
Transactions, 71 FR 6759 (Feb. 9, 2006)); and margin for uncleared 
swaps (see Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR 34818).
    \475\ See Dodd-Frank Act, section 752(a); 15 U.S.C. 8325.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has determined that, in order to achieve the 
important policy goals of the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. swap entities 
(excluding their foreign branches) must be fully subject to the Dodd-
Frank Act requirements addressed by the Final Rule, without regard to 
whether their counterparty is a U.S. or non-U.S. person. Given that 
such firms are U.S. persons conducting their business within the United 
States, their activities inherently have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce. However, 
the Commission recognizes that, in certain circumstances, non-U.S. swap 
entities' and foreign branches' swaps with non-U.S. persons have a more 
attenuated nexus to U.S. commerce. Further, the Commission acknowledges 
that foreign jurisdictions also have a supervisory interest in such 
swaps. The Commission therefore believes that substituted compliance is 
appropriate for non-U.S. swap entities and foreign branches of U.S. 
swap entities in certain circumstances.
    In light of the interconnectedness of the global swap market and 
consistent with CEA section 2(i) and principles of international 
comity, the Commission is implementing a substituted compliance regime 
with respect to the group A and group B requirements that builds upon 
the Commission's prior substituted compliance framework and aims to 
promote diverse markets without compromising the central tenets of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. As discussed below, the Final Rule outlines the 
circumstances in which a non-U.S. swap entity or foreign branch of a 
U.S. swap entity is permitted to comply with the group A and/or group B 
requirements by complying with comparable standards in its home 
jurisdiction.
1. Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed to permit a non-U.S. swap entity to avail 
itself of substituted compliance with respect to the group A 
requirements on an entity-wide basis.\476\ The Commission also proposed 
to permit a non-U.S. swap entity or a foreign branch of a U.S. swap 
entity to avail itself of substituted compliance with respect to the 
group B requirements for its foreign-based swaps with foreign 
counterparties.\477\ The Commission did not propose to permit 
substituted compliance for the group C requirements, where broader 
exceptions for swaps with foreign counterparties would be available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \476\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(f)(1); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
985.
    \477\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(f)(2); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
985.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of Comments
    Chatham, JFMC/IBAJ, and BGC/Tradition generally supported the 
Proposed Rule's approach to substituted compliance, stating that it is 
consistent with the principles of international comity. The Commission 
also received two comments requesting that the Commission expand the 
proposed scope of substituted compliance. Specifically, AIMA stated 
that the Commission should expand the availability of substituted 
compliance by making it available to cross-border transactions as far 
as possible, including any swap involving a non-U.S. person, even swaps 
with U.S. persons. AIMA stated that the Commission's supervisory 
interest in the swap activities of U.S. persons should not prelude the 
availability of substituted compliance for U.S. persons. AIMA also 
supported a universal, entity-wide approach to substituted compliance, 
whereby substituted compliance would be fully available for cross-
border transactions.
    In addition, IIB/SIFMA stated that the Commission should expand the 
availability of substituted compliance for the group B requirements to: 
(1) All swaps entered into by a non-U.S. swap entity or foreign branch, 
including swaps with U.S. persons; and (2) swaps conducted through a 
U.S. branch.\478\ IIB/SIFMA further requested that the Commission make 
substituted compliance available for the group C requirements where 
such requirements apply. IIB/SIFMA noted that the SEC permits 
substituted compliance for U.S.-facing transactions with respect to its 
external business conduct standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \478\ See discussion of the modification of the definition of a 
``swap conducted through a U.S. branch'' to be a ``swap booked in a 
U.S. branch'' in section II.H.3, supra.

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[[Page 56977]]

3. Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the scope of substituted compliance largely as proposed. The 
Commission continues to believe that the group A requirements, which 
relate to compliance programs, risk management, and swap data 
recordkeeping, cannot be effectively applied on a fragmented 
jurisdictional basis. Accordingly, it is not practical to limit 
substituted compliance for the group A requirements to only those 
transactions involving non-U.S. persons. Therefore, in furtherance of 
international comity, the Final Rule permits a non-U.S. swap entity, 
subject to the terms of the relevant comparability determination, to 
satisfy any applicable group A requirement on an entity-wide basis by 
complying with the applicable standards of a foreign jurisdiction.\479\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \479\ Final Sec.  23.23(f)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unlike the group A requirements, the group B requirements, which 
relate to counterparty relationship documentation, portfolio 
reconciliation and compression, trade confirmation, and daily trading 
records, are more closely tied to local market conventions and can be 
effectively implemented on a transaction-by-transaction or relationship 
basis. As noted above, the Commission believes that Congress intended 
for the Dodd-Frank Act to apply fully to U.S. persons (other than their 
foreign branches) with no substituted compliance available; therefore, 
an expansion of substituted compliance for the group B requirements for 
U.S. persons is not appropriate. However, in light of the comments 
received, the Commission has reconsidered the availability of 
substituted compliance for U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities. In 
the Proposed Rule, the Commission treated a swap conducted through a 
U.S. branch \480\ in the same manner as a swap of a U.S. swap entity 
for the purposes of substituted compliance. The Commission 
acknowledges, however, that a swap booked in a U.S. branch of a non-
U.S. swap entity with a foreign counterparty that is neither a foreign 
branch nor a Guaranteed Entity has a comparatively smaller nexus to 
U.S. commerce than a swap booked in a U.S. branch with a U.S. person, 
Guaranteed Entity, or another U.S. branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \480\ See discussion of the modification of the definition of a 
``swap conducted through a U.S. branch'' to be a ``swap booked in a 
U.S. branch'' in section II.H.3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, subject to the terms of the relevant comparability 
determination, the Final Rule permits a non-U.S. swap entity or foreign 
branch of a U.S. swap entity to avail itself of substituted compliance 
for the group B requirements in certain circumstances, depending on the 
nature of its counterparty. Specifically, given the Commission's 
interest in promoting international comity and market liquidity, the 
Final Rule allows a non-U.S. swap entity or foreign branch of a U.S. 
swap entity, subject to the terms of the relevant comparability 
determination, to satisfy any applicable group B requirement for a 
foreign-based swap with a foreign counterparty by complying with the 
applicable standards of a foreign jurisdiction.\481\ Further, the Final 
Rule allows a non-U.S. swap entity, subject to the terms of the 
relevant comparability determination, to satisfy any applicable group B 
requirement for any swap booked in a U.S. branch with a foreign 
counterparty that is neither a foreign branch nor a Guaranteed Entity 
by complying with the applicable standards of a foreign 
jurisdiction.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \481\ Final Sec.  23.23(f)(2). Thus, substituted compliance is 
not available for a swap booked in the U.S. branch of a non-U.S. 
swap entity entered into with a foreign branch of a U.S. swap 
entity.
    \482\ Final Sec.  23.23(f)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is also modifying the text of Sec.  23.23(f)(1) and 
(2) as shown in the rule text in this release (and including rule text 
in Sec.  23.23(f)(3)) to clarify that substituted compliance is only 
available to a non-U.S swap entity or foreign branch of a U.S. swap 
entity to the extent permitted by, and subject to any conditions 
specified in, a comparability determination, and only where it complies 
with the standards of a foreign jurisdiction applicable to it, as 
opposed to other foreign standards to which it is not subject.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \483\ Final Sec.  23.23(f)(1) through (3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the group C requirements, the Commission reiterates 
its longstanding position that it has a strong supervisory interest in 
ensuring that the counterparty protections of the group C requirements 
generally apply to swaps with U.S. persons with no substituted 
compliance available.

D. Comparability Determinations

    The Commission is also implementing a process pursuant to which it 
will, in connection with certain requirements addressed by the Final 
Rule, conduct comparability determinations regarding a foreign 
jurisdiction's regulation of swap entities. This approach builds upon 
the Commission's prior substituted compliance regime and aims to 
promote international comity and market liquidity without compromising 
the Commission's interests in reducing systemic risk, increasing market 
transparency, enhancing market integrity, and promoting counterparty 
protections. Specifically, the Final Rule outlines procedures for 
initiating comparability determinations, including eligibility and 
submission requirements, with respect to certain requirements addressed 
by the Final Rule. The Final Rule also establishes a standard of review 
that the Commission will apply to such comparability determinations 
that emphasizes a holistic, outcomes-based approach. The Final Rule 
does not affect the effectiveness of any existing Commission 
comparability determinations that were issued consistent with the 
Guidance, which will remain effective pursuant to their terms.\484\ The 
Commission may, however, reevaluate prior comparability determinations 
in due course pursuant to the terms of the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \484\ See, e.g., Comparability Determination for Australia: 
Certain Entity-Level Requirements, 78 FR 78864 (Dec. 27, 2013); 
Comparability Determination for Canada: Certain Entity-Level 
Requirements, 78 FR 78839 (Dec. 27, 2013); Comparability 
Determination for the European Union: Certain Entity-Level 
Requirements, 78 FR 78923 (Dec. 27, 2013); Comparability 
Determination for Hong Kong: Certain Entity-Level Requirements, 78 
FR 78852 (Dec. 27, 2013); Comparability Determination for Japan: 
Certain Entity-Level Requirements, 78 FR 78910 (Dec. 27, 2013); 
Comparability Determination for Switzerland: Certain Entity-Level 
Requirements, 78 FR 78899 (Dec. 27, 2013); Comparability 
Determination for the European Union: Certain Transaction-Level 
Requirements, 78 FR 78878 (Dec. 27, 2013); Comparability 
Determination for Japan: Certain Transaction-Level Requirements, 78 
FR 78890 (Dec. 27, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the Final Rule permits a non-U.S. swap entity 
or foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity to comply with a foreign 
jurisdiction's swap standards in lieu of the Commission's corresponding 
requirements in certain cases, provided that the Commission determines 
that such foreign standards are comparable to the Commission's 
requirements. All swap entities, regardless of whether they rely on 
such a comparability determination, will remain subject to the 
Commission's examination and enforcement authority.\485\ Accordingly, 
if a swap entity fails to comply with a foreign jurisdiction's relevant 
standards, or the terms of the applicable comparability determination, 
the Commission may initiate an action for a violation of the 
Commission's corresponding requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \485\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(5). The Commission notes that NFA has 
certain delegated authority with respect to SDs and MSPs. 
Additionally, all registered SDs and MSPs are required to be members 
of the NFA and are subject to examination by the NFA.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 56978]]

1. Standard of Review
(i) Proposed Rule
    The Commission proposed a flexible outcomes-based approach that 
emphasized comparable regulatory outcomes over identical regulatory 
approaches. Specifically, the Commission proposed a standard of review 
that was designed to allow the Commission to consider all relevant 
elements of a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory regime, thereby 
permitting the Commission to tailor its assessment to a broad range of 
foreign regulatory approaches.\486\ Accordingly, pursuant to the 
Proposed Rule, a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory regime did not need 
to be identical to the relevant Commission requirements, so long as 
both regulatory frameworks are comparable in terms of holistic outcome. 
The Proposed Rule permitted the Commission to consider any factor it 
deems appropriate when assessing comparability.\487\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \486\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(g)(4); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
986-987.
    \487\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Summary of Comments
    The Commission received five comments that generally supported the 
proposed standard of review. However, of those commenters, JFMC/IBAJ 
and ISDA stated that the Commission should not consider whether a 
foreign jurisdiction has issued a reciprocal comparability 
determination in its assessment.
    Further, the Commission received four comments opposing the 
proposed standard of review. Specifically, AFR, Better Markets, 
Citadel, and IATP stated that the proposed standard provides the 
Commission with overly-broad discretion that undermines objectivity in 
the assessment process. Citadel contended that the proposed standard 
may harm U.S. investors as a result of an overall reduction in market 
transparency and liquidity if trading activity is permitted to migrate 
to less transparent jurisdictions as a result of inaccurate 
comparability determinations.
    IATP stated that the Commission should not base comparability on a 
foreign jurisdiction's supervisory guidelines or voluntary standards. 
IATP stated that if a foreign jurisdiction lacks a standard that 
compares to a Commission requirement, the Commission should issue a 
more limited comparability determination until such time as the foreign 
jurisdiction has published a standard that would result in a regulatory 
outcome comparable to the Commission's requirements. IATP also stated 
that regulatory deference to jurisdictions whose rules the Commission 
finds to produce regulatory outcomes comparable to those of the 
Commission must not be vague, unconditional, nor of indefinite 
duration. IATP noted that during market events or credit events, or in 
the event of swaps trading data anomalies, the Commission must retain 
the means to verify that the foreign affiliate swaps trading of U.S. 
parents does not result in losses that the U.S. parent must guarantee, 
either as a matter of law or a matter of market practice.
    Citadel also recommended that the Commission provide an opportunity 
for public comment prior to finalizing a comparability determination to 
ensure that all relevant costs and benefits are considered.
(iii) Final Rule
    After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is 
adopting the standard of review as proposed, with certain modifications 
as shown in the rule text in this release.\488\ Specifically, the 
Commission is making some technical changes to the standard of review 
to clarify, as stated in the Proposed Rule \489\ and discussed below, 
that the Commission may issue a comparability determination based on 
its determination that some or all of the relevant foreign 
jurisdiction's standards would result in outcomes comparable to those 
of the Commission's corresponding requirements or group of 
requirements.\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \488\ Sec.  23.23(g)(4).
    \489\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 986.
    \490\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that this standard of review appropriately 
reflects a flexible, outcomes-based approach that emphasizes comparable 
regulatory outcomes over identical regulatory approaches. Accordingly, 
pursuant to the Final Rule, the Commission may consider any factor it 
deems appropriate in assessing comparability, which may include: (1) 
The scope and objectives of the relevant foreign jurisdiction's 
regulatory standards; (2) whether, despite differences, a foreign 
jurisdiction's regulatory standards achieve comparable regulatory 
outcomes to the Commission's corresponding requirements; (3) the 
ability of the relevant regulatory authority or authorities to 
supervise and enforce compliance with the relevant foreign 
jurisdiction's regulatory standards; and (4) whether the relevant 
foreign jurisdiction's regulatory authorities have entered into a 
memorandum of understanding or similar cooperative arrangement with the 
Commission regarding the oversight of swap entities.\491\ In assessing 
comparability, the Commission need not find that a foreign jurisdiction 
has a comparable regulatory standard that corresponds to each group A 
or group B requirement. Rather, the Commission may find a foreign 
jurisdiction's standards comparable if, viewed holistically, the 
foreign jurisdiction's standards achieve a regulatory outcome that 
adequately serves the same regulatory purpose as the group A or group B 
requirements as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \491\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, given that some foreign jurisdictions may implement 
prudential supervisory guidelines in the regulation of swaps, the Final 
Rule allows the Commission to base comparability on a foreign 
jurisdiction's regulatory standards, rather than regulatory 
requirements. The Guidance similarly provided that the Commission has 
broad discretion to consider ``all relevant factors'' in assessing 
comparability, in addition to a non-exhaustive list of elements of 
comparability.\492\ However, this standard of review is broader than 
the Guidance in that it explicitly allows the Commission to consider a 
foreign jurisdiction's regulatory standards (as opposed to regulatory 
requirements) comparable to the CEA and Commission regulations, as 
experience has demonstrated that such standards are often implemented 
in a similar manner as the Commission's swaps regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \492\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45353.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although, when assessed against the relevant Commission 
requirements, the Commission may find comparability with respect to 
some, but not all, of a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory standards, it 
may also make a holistic finding of comparability that considers the 
broader context of a foreign jurisdiction's related regulatory 
standards. Accordingly, a comparability determination need not contain 
a standalone assessment of comparability for each relevant regulatory 
requirement, so long as it clearly indicates the scope of regulatory 
requirements that are covered by the determination. Further, the 
Commission may impose any terms and conditions on a comparability 
determination that it deems appropriate.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \493\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule adopts many of the Commission's existing practices 
with respect to comparability determinations, and does not reflect a 
significant change in policy. Accordingly, the phrasing of

[[Page 56979]]

the standard of review is primarily intended to clarify, rather than 
change, the standard of review articulated in the Guidance. Reciprocity 
is only one of many non-determinative factors that the Commission may 
consider when assessing comparability. However, absence of a reciprocal 
comparability determination would not preclude a finding of 
comparability on the part of the Commission. Further, the Commission 
may, at its own discretion, seek public comment on any comparability 
determination issued pursuant to the Final Rule.
2. Supervision of Swap Entities Relying on Substituted Compliance
    The Commission proposed to retain its examination and enforcement 
authority with respect to all swap entities relying on substituted 
compliance.\494\ Accordingly, if a swap entity failed to comply with a 
foreign jurisdiction's relevant standards, or the terms of an 
applicable comparability determination, the Commission could initiate 
an action for a violation of the Commission's corresponding 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \494\ See Proposed Sec.  23.23(g)(5); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
986. The Commission notes that it similarly retained its examination 
and enforcement authority in comparability determinations that were 
issued pursuant to the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IIB/SIFMA requested that the Commission state that it and NFA would 
not independently examine for or otherwise assess whether a swap entity 
is complying with foreign standards, but would instead look to the 
relevant foreign regulatory authority to conduct such examinations or 
assessments. IIB/SIFMA contended that the Commission and NFA lack the 
subject-matter expertise to interpret and apply foreign laws.
    After carefully considering IIB/SIFMA's comment, the Commission is 
adopting this aspect of the rule as proposed.\495\ In considering IIB/
SIFMA's comment, and the broader issue of the Commission's supervision 
of non-U.S. swap entities, the Commission notes the various 
manifestations of international comity, deference, and supervisory 
cooperation presently taking place in the examination practices of the 
Commission and NFA. As a preliminary matter, the Commission's and NFA's 
examinations of non-U.S. swap entities occur with appropriate notice 
and consultation with the relevant foreign authority in the foreign 
jurisdiction that has primary oversight of the non-U.S swap entity. The 
Commission continues to be open to further ways to cooperate with such 
authorities in the supervision of non-U.S. swap entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \495\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the Commission generally relies upon the relevant foreign 
regulator's oversight of a non-U.S. swap entity in relation to the 
application of a foreign jurisdiction's standards where a non-U.S. swap 
entity complies with such standards pursuant to a comparability 
determination issued by the Commission. To briefly recount these 
instances, a foreign swap entity may demonstrate compliance with a 
Commission requirement in group A through substituted compliance (i.e., 
complying with comparable standards in its home jurisdiction that the 
Commission has determined to be comparable), regardless of whether the 
transactions involve a U.S. person.\496\ Given the Commission's 
interest in promoting international comity and market liquidity, the 
Final Rule allows a non-U.S. swap entity (unless booking a transaction 
in a U.S. branch or Guaranteed Entity), or a U.S. swap entity 
transacting through a foreign branch, to avail itself of substituted 
compliance with respect to the group B requirements for swaps with 
foreign counterparties. Further, the Final Rule allows a non-U.S. swap 
entity, subject to the terms of the relevant comparability 
determination, to satisfy any applicable group B requirement for any 
swap booked in a U.S. branch with a foreign counterparty that is 
neither a foreign branch nor a Guaranteed Entity by complying with an 
applicable corresponding standard of a foreign jurisdiction. With 
regard to the group C requirements, the Commission considers that it is 
generally appropriate to defer to foreign jurisdictions and thus 
provides an exception from application of the business conduct 
standards to foreign-based swaps with foreign counterparties. The 
Commission has also noted above certain exceptions from the group B 
requirements in the Final Rule for certain foreign-based swaps; non-
U.S. swap entities that avail themselves of these exceptions for their 
eligible swaps would only be required to comply with the applicable 
laws of the foreign jurisdiction(s) to which they are subject, rather 
than the relevant Commission requirements, for such swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \496\ Moreover, to the extent a foreign swap entity receives 
substituted compliance for a group A requirement that incorporates 
Sec.  1.31's recordkeeping requirements for certain regulatory 
records, Sec.  1.31 would also not apply to such regulatory records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to exams of non-U.S. swap entities and access to their 
books and records by the Commission and NFA, the general focus is on 
assessing compliance with any of the Commission's group A requirements 
for which substituted compliance is not found, group B requirements for 
transactions involving a U.S. person, and group C requirements as to 
transactions where the counterparty customer is in the U.S. Both the 
Commission and NFA retain examination and enforcement authority over 
swap entities to assess compliance with any Commission requirements in 
appropriate circumstances.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \497\ A non-U.S. swap entity remains subject to the Commission's 
anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority, which may entail access 
to books and records covering transactions and/or activities not 
involving a U.S. person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Effect on Existing Comparability Determinations
    In the Proposed Rule, the Commission stated that this rulemaking 
would not have any impact on the effectiveness of existing Commission 
comparability determinations that were issued consistent with the 
Guidance, which would remain effective pursuant to their terms.\498\ 
Three commenters requested that the Commission revisit prior 
comparability determinations in light of this rulemaking. Specifically, 
ISDA stated that the Commission should recalibrate existing 
comparability determinations with the aim of issuing holistic, 
outcomes-based substituted compliance and clarify in the meantime that 
existing determinations would continue to be valid under the 
Commission's new cross-border framework. Further, IIB/SIFMA and JFMC/
IBAJ requested that the Commission amend its previously-issued 
comparability determinations for Australia, Canada, the EU, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Switzerland to include Sec.  23.607 (antitrust 
requirements), which the Commission is adding to the scope of the group 
A requirements. The Commission has carefully considered these comments 
and is adopting this aspect of the rule as proposed. The Commission 
will consider applications to amend existing comparability 
determinations in due course. However, the Commission will view any 
previously issued comparability determination that allows for 
substituted compliance for Sec.  23.201 to also allow for substituted 
compliance with Sec.  45.2(a) to the extent it duplicates Sec.  23.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \498\ See Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Eligibility Requirements
    The Proposed Rule outlined eligibility requirements to allow a 
comparability determination to be initiated by the Commission itself or 
certain outside

[[Page 56980]]

parties, including: (1) Swap entities that are eligible for substituted 
compliance; (2) trade associations whose members are such swap 
entities; or (3) foreign regulatory authorities that have direct 
supervisory authority over such swap entities and are responsible for 
administering the relevant swap standards in the foreign 
jurisdiction.\499\ The Commission did not receive any comments 
regarding eligibility, and is therefore adopting this aspect of the 
rule as proposed.\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \499\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(g)(2); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 987.
    \500\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Submission Requirements
    The Proposed Rule also outlined submission requirements in 
connection with a comparability determination with respect to some or 
all of the group A and group B requirements. Specifically, the Proposed 
Rule stated that applicants would be required to furnish certain 
information to the Commission that provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the foreign jurisdiction's relevant swap standards, 
including how they might differ from the corresponding requirements in 
the CEA and Commission regulations.\501\ Further, the Proposed Rule 
stated that applicants would be expected to provide an explanation as 
to how any such differences may nonetheless achieve comparable outcomes 
to the Commission's attendant regulatory requirements.\502\ The 
Commission did not receive any comments regarding submission 
requirements, and is therefore adopting this aspect of the rule 
substantially as proposed and shown in the rule text in this 
release.\503\ Specifically, to provide the Commission additional 
information to use in making its comparability determinations, the 
Commission is revising Sec.  23.23(g)(3)(ii) to require that the 
submission address how the relevant foreign jurisdiction's standards 
address the elements or goals of the Commission's corresponding 
requirements or group of requirements.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \501\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(g)(3); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 987.
    \502\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(g)(3)(iii); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 
987.
    \503\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(3).
    \504\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(3)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Recordkeeping

    The Commission proposed to require a SD or MSP to create a record 
of its compliance with all provisions of the Proposed Rule, and retain 
those records in accordance with Sec.  23.203.\505\ The Commission 
received no comments on this provision. The Commission is therefore 
adopting this provision as proposed.\506\ The Commission reiterates 
that registrants' records are a fundamental element of an entity's 
compliance program, as well as the Commission's oversight function. 
Accordingly, such records should be sufficiently detailed to allow 
compliance officers and regulators to assess compliance with the Final 
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ Proposed Sec.  23.23(h); Proposed Rule, 85 FR at 987.
    \506\ Final Sec.  23.23(h)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Other Comments

    The Commission received several comments that it considers beyond 
the scope of this rulemaking.
    BGC/Tradition, IIB/SIFMA, and ISDA requested that the Commission 
include certain of the Unaddressed Requirements as group A 
requirements, group B requirements, and group C requirements.
    ISDA requested that the Commission take a number of actions 
regarding the cross-border application of regulatory reporting 
requirements prior to finalizing the Proposed Rule. These included 
codifying an SDR reporting obligation no-action letter (CFTC Staff 
Letter 17-64),\507\ providing substituted compliance for SDR reporting 
obligations for certain transactions, eliminating the Commission's 
large trader reporting requirements with respect to certain cross-
border transactions, and revisiting the group C requirements in their 
entirety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \507\ CS also requested codification of CFTC Staff Letter 17-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    State Street recommended that the Commission address fragmentation 
of global non-deliverable forward liquidity pools created by Commission 
rulemaking and guidance in future Commission rulemaking.
    JBA requested guidance on how swap requirements will apply to a 
non-U.S. person that is not a swap entity similar to Appendix F of the 
Guidance.
    BGC/Tradition requested that the Commission confirm that non-U.S. 
introducing brokers (``IBs'') engaged in soliciting or accepting swap 
orders from customers, including U.S. person SDs, may comply with the 
applicable rules in the relevant non-U.S. jurisdictions without 
duplicative regulatory liability under the CEA and Commission 
regulations. BGC/Tradition requests that the CFTC provide guidance on 
how these foreign operations may avail themselves of relief through 
substituted compliance or another form of mutual recognition.
    As noted above, these comments are beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking. Although not addressed in this rulemaking, the Commission 
appreciates the information provided by commenters and will take the 
requests and suggestions under advisement in the context of any 
relevant future Commission action.

IX. Compliance Dates and Transition Issues

A. Summary of Comments

    IIB/SIFMA commented that, if adopted, the Proposed Rule would bring 
significant changes to portions of the Commission's cross-border 
framework and thus, the Commission should consider making the following 
clarifications and conforming changes to ensure an orderly transition 
process:
    1. The Commission should clarify that any no-action relief or 
guidance that applies to the requirements not addressed in the Proposed 
Rule will remain effective, and that any no-action letter or guidance 
not specifically revoked by the Proposed Rule remains in effect.
    2. If the Commission plans to amend or revoke any applicable 
letters, guidance, or other relief not specifically addressed in the 
Proposed Rule, the Commission should only do so following adequate 
notice and opportunity for comment.
    3. The Commission should grandfather transactions entered into 
prior to the compliance date of any final cross-border rules adopted by 
the Commission.
    4. The Commission should continue the codification exercise 
reflected by the Proposed Rule further by codifying the cross-border 
application of the Unaddressed Requirements.
    5. The Commission should delay the compliance date for the changes 
set forth in the Proposed Rule until it has codified the cross-border 
application of the swap-related requirements not covered by the 
Proposed Rule. Until that time, market participants could continue to 
follow the Guidance.
    JBA requested that the Commission clarify as soon as possible the 
cross-border treatment of other requirements not addressed in the 
Proposed Rule, and consider harmonizing the timing of application of 
all requirements such that they are applied simultaneously.

B. Commission Determination

    As requested by IIB/SIFMA, the Commission hereby clarifies that any 
no-action relief or guidance that applies to the Unaddressed 
Requirements will remain effective, and that any no-action

[[Page 56981]]

letter or guidance not specifically revoked remains in effect.\508\
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    \508\ As noted in section V, supra, the ANE Staff Advisory and 
related ANE No-Action Relief has been withdrawn contemporaneously 
with promulgation of the Final Rule, while Commission staff has 
provided new no-action relief concerning the Unaddressed TLRs in the 
context of ANE Transactions.
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    Regarding the scope of application of the Final Rule, as requested 
by commenters the Commission has provided in the Final Rule that it 
will only apply to swaps entered into on or after the specified 
compliance date.
    The effective date of the Final Rule will be the date that is 60 
days after publication of the Final Rule in the Federal Register.
    The Commission has provided under paragraph (h) of the Final Rule 
that the exceptions provided in paragraph (e) of the Final Rule will be 
effective upon the effective date of the rule, provided that SDs and 
MSPs comply with the recordkeeping requirements set forth in paragraph 
(h)(1) of the Final Rule.
    Otherwise, affected market participants must comply with Sec.  
23.23 on or before September 14, 2021. Given the similarity of the 
Final Rule to the Guidance with which market participants have been 
familiar since 2013, the Commission believes that a compliance period 
of one year is adequate for market participants to come into 
compliance, especially given that the Final Rule permits reliance on 
representations received from counterparties pursuant to the Cross-
Border Margin Rule and the Guidance for many aspects of the Final Rule.

X. Related Matters

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires that agencies 
consider whether the regulations they propose will have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.\509\ In the 
Proposed Rule, the Commission certified that the Proposed Rule would 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The Commission received no comments with respect to the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \509\ See 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission previously established definitions of ``small 
entities'' to be used in evaluating the impact of its regulations on 
small entities in accordance with the RFA.\510\ The Final Rule 
addresses when U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons are required to 
include their cross-border swap dealing transactions or swap positions 
in their SD or MSP registration threshold calculations, 
respectively,\511\ and the extent to which SDs or MSPs are required to 
comply with certain of the Commission's regulations in connection with 
their cross-border swap transactions or swap positions.\512\
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    \510\ See Policy Statement and Establishment of Definitions of 
``Small Entities'' for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
47 FR 18618 (Apr. 30, 1982) (finding that DCMs, FCMs, CPOs, and 
large traders are not small entities for RFA purposes).
    \511\ Final Sec.  23.23(b) through (d).
    \512\ Final Sec.  23.23(e) through (g).
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    The Commission previously determined that SDs and MSPs are not 
small entities for purposes of the RFA.\513\ The Commission believes, 
based on its information about the swap market and its market 
participants, that: (1) The types of entities that may engage in more 
than a de minimis amount of swap dealing activity such that they would 
be required to register as an SD--which generally would be large 
financial institutions or other large entities--would not be ``small 
entities'' for purposes of the RFA, and (2) the types of entities that 
may have swap positions such that they would be required to register as 
an MSP would not be ``small entities'' for purposes of the RFA. Thus, 
to the extent such entities are large financial institutions or other 
large entities that would be required to register as SDs or MSPs with 
the Commission by virtue of their cross-border swap dealing 
transactions and swap positions, they would not be considered small 
entities.\514\
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    \513\ See Entities Rule, 77 FR at 30701; Registration of Swap 
Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 FR 2613, 2620 (Jan. 19, 
2012) (noting that like FCMs, SDs will be subject to minimum capital 
requirements, and are expected to be comprised of large firms, and 
that MSPs should not be considered to be small entities for 
essentially the same reasons that it previously had determined large 
traders not to be small entities).
    \514\ The SBA's Small Business Size Regulations, codified at 13 
CFR 121.201, identifies (through North American Industry 
Classification System codes) a small business size standard of $38.5 
million or less in annual receipts for Sector 52, Subsector 523--
Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and 
Related Activities. Entities that are affected by the Final Rule are 
generally large financial institutions or other large entities that 
are required to include their cross-border dealing transactions or 
swap positions toward the SD and MSP registration thresholds, 
respectively, as specified in the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that there are any affected small entities under the 
Final Rule, they would need to assess how they are classified under the 
Final Rule (i.e., U.S. person, SRS, Guaranteed Entity, and Other Non-
U.S. Person) and monitor their swap activities in order to determine 
whether they are required to register as an SD or MSP under the Final 
Rule. The Commission believes that, with the adoption of the Final 
Rule, market participants will only incur incremental costs, which are 
expected to be small, in modifying their existing systems and policies 
and procedures resulting from changes to the status quo made by the 
Final Rule.\515\
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    \515\ The Final Rule addresses the cross-border application of 
the registration and certain other regulations. The Final Rule does 
not change such regulations.
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    Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Commission finds that 
there will not be a substantial number of small entities impacted by 
the Final Rule. Therefore, the Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, 
hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that the Final Rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \516\ imposes certain 
requirements on Federal agencies, including the Commission, in 
connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of 
information, as defined by the PRA. The Final Rule provides for the 
cross-border application of the SD and MSP registration thresholds and 
the group A, group B, and group C requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \516\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission regulations 23.23(b) and (c), which address the cross-
border application of the SD and MSP registration thresholds, 
respectively, potentially could lead to non-U.S. persons that are 
currently not registered as SDs or MSPs to exceed the relevant 
registration thresholds, therefore requiring the non-U.S. persons to 
register as SDs or MSPs. However, the Commission believes that the 
Final Rule will not result in any new registered SDs or MSPs or the 
deregistration of registered SDs,\517\ and therefore, it does not 
believe an amendment to any existing collection of information is 
necessary as a result of Sec.  23.23(b) and (c). Specifically, the 
Commission does not believe the Final Rule will change the number of 
respondents under the existing collection of information, 
``Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,'' Office of 
Management and Budget (``OMB'') Control No. 3038-0072.
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    \517\ There are not currently any registered MSPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, Sec.  23.23(h)(1) contains collection of information 
requirements within the meaning of the PRA as it requires that swap 
entities create a record of their compliance with Sec.  23.23 and 
retain records in accordance with Sec.  23.203; however, the Commission 
believes that records suitable to demonstrate compliance are already 
required to be created and maintained under the collections related to 
the

[[Page 56982]]

Commission's swap entity registration, and group B and group C 
requirements. Specifically, existing collections of information, 
``Confirmation, Portfolio Reconciliation, and Portfolio Compression 
Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,'' OMB 
Control No. 3038-0068; ``Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants,'' OMB Control No. 3038-0072; ``Swap Dealer and Major Swap 
Participant Conflicts of Interest and Business Conduct Standards with 
Counterparties,'' OMB Control No. 3038-0079; ``Confirmation, Portfolio 
Reconciliation, Portfolio Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship 
Documentation Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants,'' OMB Control No. 3038-0083; ``Reporting, Recordkeeping, 
and Daily Trading Records Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major 
Participants,'' OMB Control No. 3038-0087; and ``Confirmation, 
Portfolio Reconciliation, Portfolio Compression, and Swap Trading 
Relationship Documentation Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants,'' OMB Control No. 3038-0088 relate to these 
requirements.\518\ Accordingly, the Commission is not submitting to OMB 
an information collection request to create a new information 
collection in relation to Sec.  23.23(h)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \518\ To the extent a swap entity avails itself of an exception 
from a group B or group C requirement under the Final Rule and, 
thus, is no longer required to comply with the relevant group B and/
or group C requirements and related paperwork burdens, the 
Commission expects the paperwork burden related to that exception 
would be less than that of the corresponding requirement(s). 
However, in an effort to be conservative, because the Commission 
does not know how many swap entities will choose to avail themselves 
of the exceptions and for how many foreign-based swaps, the 
Commission is not changing the burden of its related collections to 
reflect the availability of such exceptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final Sec.  23.23(g) results in collection of information 
requirements within the meaning of the PRA, as discussed below. The 
Final Rule contains collections of information for which the Commission 
has not previously received control numbers from the OMB. Responses to 
this collection of information are required to obtain or retain 
benefits. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not 
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays 
a currently valid control number. The Commission has submitted to OMB 
an information collection request to create a new information 
collection under OMB control number 3038-0072 (Registration of Swap 
Dealers and Major Swap Participants) for the collections contained in 
the Final Rule.
    As discussed in section VI.C above, the Commission is permitting a 
non-U.S. swap entity or foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity to comply 
with a foreign jurisdiction's swap standards in lieu of the 
Commission's corresponding group A and group B requirements in certain 
cases, provided that the Commission determines that such foreign 
standards are comparable to the Commission's requirements. Commission 
regulation 23.23(g) implements a process pursuant to which the 
Commission will conduct these comparability determinations, including 
outlining procedures for initiating such determinations. As discussed 
in section VI.D above, a comparability determination could be requested 
by swap entities that are eligible for substituted compliance, their 
trade associations, and foreign regulatory authorities meeting certain 
requirements.\519\ Applicants seeking a comparability determination are 
required to furnish certain information to the Commission that provides 
a comprehensive explanation of the foreign jurisdiction's relevant swap 
standards, including how they might differ from the corresponding 
requirements in the CEA and Commission regulations and how, 
notwithstanding such differences, the foreign jurisdiction's swap 
standards achieve comparable outcomes to those of the Commission.\520\ 
The information collection is necessary for the Commission to consider 
whether the foreign jurisdiction's relevant swap standards are 
comparable to the Commission's requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \519\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(2).
    \520\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Though under the Final Rule many entities are eligible to request a 
comparability determination,\521\ the Commission expects to receive far 
fewer requests because once a comparability determination is made for a 
jurisdiction it applies for all entities or transactions in that 
jurisdiction to the extent provided in the Commission's determination. 
Further, the Commission has already issued comparability determinations 
under the Guidance for certain of the Commission's requirements for 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Switzerland,\522\ and the effectiveness of those determinations is not 
affected by the Final Rule. Nevertheless, in an effort to be 
conservative in its estimate for purposes of the PRA, the Commission 
estimates that it will receive a request for a comparability 
determination in relation to five (5) jurisdictions per year under the 
Final Rule. Further, based on the Commission's experience in issuing 
comparability determinations, the Commission estimates that each 
request would impose an average of 40 burden hours, for an aggregate 
estimated hour burden of 200 hours. Accordingly, the changes are 
estimated to result in an increase to the current burden estimates of 
OMB control number 3038-0072 by 5 in the number of submissions and 200 
burden hours.
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    \521\ Currently, there are approximately 108 swap entities 
provisionally registered with the Commission, many of which may be 
eligible to apply for a comparability determination as a non-U.S. 
swap entity or a foreign branch. Additionally, a trade association, 
whose members include swap entities, and certain foreign regulators 
may also apply for a comparability determination.
    \522\ See supra notes 215 and 484.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The frequency of responses and total new burden associated with OMB 
control number 3038-0072, in the aggregate, reflecting the new burden 
associated with all the amendments made by the Final Rule and current 
burden not affected by this Final Rule,\523\ is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \523\ The numbers below reflect the current burden for two 
separate information collections that are not affected by this 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated annual number of respondents: 770.
    Estimated aggregate annual burden hours per respondent: 1.13 hours.
    Estimated aggregate annual burden hours for all respondents: 872.
    Frequency of responses: As needed.
    Information Collection Comments. In the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission requested comments on the information collection 
requirements discussed above, including, without limitation, on the 
Commission's discussion of the estimated burden of the collection of 
information requirements in proposed Sec.  23.23(h) (Sec.  23.23(h)(1) 
in the Final Rule). The Commission did not receive any such comments.

C. Cost-Benefit Considerations

    As detailed above, the Commission is adopting rules that define 
certain key terms for purposes of certain Dodd-Frank Act swap 
provisions and that address the cross-border application of the SD and 
MSP registration thresholds and the Commission's group A, group B, and 
group C requirements.
    Since issuing the Proposed Rule, the baseline against which the 
costs and benefits of the Final Rule are considered is unchanged and 
is, in principle, current law: In other words, applicable Dodd-Frank 
Act swap provisions in the CEA and regulations promulgated by the 
Commission to date, as made applicable to cross-border transactions by 
Congress in CEA section 2(i), in the absence of a

[[Page 56983]]

Commission rule establishing more precisely the application of that 
provision in particular situations. However, in practice, use of this 
baseline poses important challenges, for a number of reasons.
    First, there are intrinsic difficulties in sorting out costs and 
benefits of the Final Rule from costs and benefits intrinsic to the 
application of Dodd-Frank Act requirements to cross-border transactions 
directly pursuant to section 2(i), given that the statute sets forth 
general principles for the cross-border application of Dodd-Frank Act 
swap requirements but does not attempt to address particular business 
situations in detail.
    Second, the Guidance established a general, non-binding framework 
for the cross-border application of many substantive Dodd-Frank Act 
requirements. In doing so, the Guidance considered, among other 
factors, the regulatory objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act and principles 
of international comity. As is apparent from the text of the Final Rule 
and the discussion in this preamble, the Final Rule is in certain 
respects consistent with the Guidance. The Commission understands that 
while the Guidance is non-binding, many market participants have 
developed policies and practices that take into account the views 
expressed therein. At the same time, some market participants may 
currently apply CEA section 2(i), the regulatory objectives of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and principles of international comity in ways that 
vary from the Guidance, for example because of circumstances not 
contemplated by the general, non-binding framework in the Guidance.
    Third, in addition to the Guidance, the Commission has issued 
comparability determinations finding that certain provisions of the 
laws and regulations of other jurisdictions are comparable in outcome 
to certain requirements under the CEA and regulations thereunder.\524\ 
In general, under these determinations, a market participant that 
complies with the specified provisions of the other jurisdiction would 
also be deemed to be in compliance with Commission regulations, subject 
to certain conditions.\525\
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    \524\ See supra notes 215 and 484.
    \525\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the Commission staff has issued several interpretive and 
no-action letters that are relevant to cross-border issues.\526\ As 
with the Guidance, the Commission recognizes that many market 
participants have relied on these staff letters in framing their 
business practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \526\ See, e.g., CFTC Letter No. 13-64, No-Action Relief: 
Certain Swaps by Non-U.S. Persons that are Not Guaranteed or Conduit 
Affiliates of a U.S. Person Not to be Considered in Calculating 
Aggregate Gross Notional Amount for Purposes of Swap Dealer De 
Minimis Exception (Oct. 17, 2013), available at https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-64.pdf; ANE Staff Advisory; ANE No-Action Relief; CFTC Staff Letter 
No. 18-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fifth, as noted above, the international regulatory landscape is 
far different now than it was when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in 
2010.\527\ Even in 2013, when the CFTC published the Guidance, very few 
jurisdictions had made significant progress in implementing the global 
swap reforms that were agreed to by the G20 leaders at the Pittsburgh 
G20 Summit. Today, however, as a result of cumulative implementation 
efforts by regulators throughout the world, substantial progress has 
been made in the world's primary swap trading jurisdictions to 
implement the G20 commitments. For these reasons, the actual costs and 
benefits of the Final Rule that are experienced by a particular market 
participant may vary depending on the jurisdictions in which the market 
participant is active and when the market participant took steps to 
comply with various legal requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \527\ See supra section I.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because of these complicating factors, as well as limitations on 
available information, the Commission believes that a direct comparison 
of the costs and benefits of the Final Rule with those of a 
hypothetical cross-border regime based directly on section 2(i)--while 
theoretically the ideal approach--is infeasible in practice. As a 
further complication, the Commission recognizes that the Final Rule's 
costs and benefits would exist, regardless of whether a market 
participant: (1) First realized some of those costs and benefits when 
it conformed its business practices to provisions of the Guidance or 
Commission staff action that will be binding legal requirements under 
the Final Rule; (2) does so now for the first time; or (3) did so in 
stages as international requirements evolved.
    In light of these considerations and given that there were no 
public comments regarding the baseline outlined in the Proposed Rule, 
the Commission has considered costs and benefits by focusing primarily 
on two types of information and analysis.
    First, the Commission compared the Final Rule with current business 
practices, with the understanding that many market participants are now 
conducting business taking into account, among other things, the 
Guidance, applicable CFTC staff letters, and existing comparability 
determinations. This approach, for example, included a comparison of 
the expected costs and benefits of conducting business under the Final 
Rule with those of conducting business in conformance with analogous 
provisions of the Guidance. In effect, this analysis included an 
examination of new costs and benefits that will result from the Final 
Rule for market participants that are currently following the relevant 
Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions and regulations thereunder, the 
Guidance, the comparability determinations, the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule, and applicable staff letters. This is referred to as ``Baseline 
A.''
    Second, to the extent feasible, the Commission considered relevant 
information on costs and benefits that market participants have 
incurred to date in complying with the Dodd-Frank Act in cross-border 
transactions of the type that will be affected by the Final Rule, 
absent the Guidance. This second form of analysis is, to some extent, 
over-inclusive in that it is likely to capture some costs and benefits 
that flow directly from Congress's enactment of section 2(i) of the CEA 
or that otherwise are not strictly attributable to the Final Rule. 
However, since a theoretically perfect baseline for consideration of 
costs and benefits does not appear feasible, this second form of 
analysis helps ensure that costs and benefits of the Final Rules are 
considered as fully as possible. This is referred to as ``Baseline B.''
    The Commission requested comments regarding all aspects of the 
baselines applied in this consideration of costs and benefits, 
including a discussion of any variances or different circumstances 
commenters have experienced that affect the baseline for those 
commenters. While no commenters questioned the Commission's defined 
baseline, the Commission received a few cost-benefit related comments 
that are addressed in the relevant sections of this discussion.
    The costs associated with the key elements of the Commission's 
cross-border approach to the SD and MSP registration thresholds--
requiring market participants to classify themselves as U.S. persons, 
Guaranteed Entities, or SRSs \528\ and to apply the rules accordingly--
fall into a few categories. Market participants will incur costs 
determining which category of market participant they and their 
counterparties fall into (``assessment

[[Page 56984]]

costs''), tracking their swap activities or positions to determine 
whether they should be included in their registration threshold 
calculations (``monitoring costs''), and, to the degree that their 
activities or positions exceed the relevant threshold, registering with 
the Commission as an SD or MSP (``registration costs'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \528\ Final Sec.  23.23(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Entities required to register as SDs or MSPs as a result of the 
Final Rule will also incur costs associated with complying with the 
relevant Dodd-Frank Act requirements applicable to registrants, such as 
the capital, margin, and business conduct requirements (``programmatic 
costs'').\529\ While only new registrants will assume these 
programmatic costs for the first time, the obligations of entities that 
are already registered as SDs may also change in the future as an 
indirect consequence of the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \529\ The Commission's discussion of programmatic costs and 
registration costs does not address MSPs. No entities are currently 
registered as MSPs, and the Commission does not expect that this 
status quo will change as a result of the Final Rule being adopted 
given the general similarities between the Final Rule's approach to 
the MSP registration threshold calculations and the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing the Final Rule, the Commission took into account the 
potential for creating or accentuating competitive disparities between 
market participants, which could contribute to market deficiencies, 
including market fragmentation or decreased liquidity, as more fully 
discussed below. Notably, competitive disparities may arise between 
U.S.-based financial groups and non-U.S. based financial groups as a 
result of differences in how the SD and MSP registration thresholds 
apply to the various classifications of market participants. For 
instance, an SRS must count all dealing swaps toward its SD de minimis 
calculation. Therefore, SRSs are more likely to trigger the SD 
registration threshold relative to Other Non-U.S. Persons, and may 
therefore be at a competitive disadvantage compared to Other Non-U.S. 
Persons when trading with non-U.S. persons, as non-U.S. persons may 
prefer to trade with non-registrants in order to avoid application of 
the Dodd-Frank Act swap regime.\530\ On the other hand, certain 
counterparties may prefer to enter into swaps with SDs and MSPs that 
are subject to the robust requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \530\ Dodd-Frank Act swap requirements may impose significant 
direct costs on participants falling within the SD or MSP 
definitions that are not borne by other market participants, 
including costs related to capital and margin requirements and 
business conduct requirements. To the extent that foreign 
jurisdictions adopt comparable requirements, these costs would be 
mitigated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other factors also create inherent challenges associated with 
attempting to assess costs and benefits of the Final Rule. To avoid the 
prospect of being regulated as an SD or MSP, or otherwise falling 
within the Dodd-Frank Act swap regime, some market participants may 
restructure their businesses or take other steps (e.g., limiting their 
counterparties to Other Non-U.S. Persons) to avoid exceeding the 
relevant registration thresholds. The degree of comparability between 
the approaches adopted by the Commission and foreign jurisdictions and 
the potential availability of substituted compliance, whereby a market 
participant may comply with certain Dodd-Frank Act SD or MSP 
requirements by complying with a comparable requirement of a foreign 
financial regulator, may also affect the competitive effect of the 
Final Rule. The Commission expects that such effects will be mitigated 
as the Commission continues to work with foreign and domestic 
regulators to achieve international harmonization and cooperation.
    In the sections that follow, the Commission discusses the costs and 
benefits associated with the Final Rule.\531\ Section 1 discusses the 
main benefits of the Final Rule. Section 2 begins by addressing the 
assessment costs associated with the Final Rule, which derive in part 
from the defined terms used in the Final Rule (e.g., the definitions of 
``U.S. person,'' ``significant risk subsidiary,'' and ``guarantee''). 
Sections 3 and 4 consider the costs and benefits associated with the 
Final Rule's determinations regarding how each classification of market 
participants applies to the SD and MSP registration thresholds, 
respectively. Sections 5, 6, and 7 address the monitoring, 
registration, and programmatic costs associated with the Final Rule's 
cross-border approach to the SD (and, as appropriate, MSP) registration 
thresholds, respectively. Section 8 addresses the costs and benefits 
associated with the Final Rule's exceptions from, and available 
substituted compliance for, the group A, group B, and group C 
requirements, as well as comparability determinations. Section 9 
addresses the costs associated with the Final Rule's recordkeeping 
requirements. Section 10 discusses the factors established in section 
15(a) of the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \531\ The Commission endeavors to assess the expected costs and 
benefits of its rules in quantitative terms where possible. Where 
estimation or quantification is not feasible, the Commission 
provides its discussion in qualitative terms. Given a general lack 
of relevant data, the Commission's analysis in the Final Rule is 
generally provided in qualitative terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Benefits
    The main benefits of the Final Rule are two-fold: (1) Legal 
certainty; and (2) creating and continuing to maintain a harmonized 
regulatory framework internationally that shows deference to other 
countries' laws and regulations when such laws and regulations achieve 
comparable outcomes, a construct known as comity. The clarity of the 
Final Rule makes it easier for market participants to comply with the 
Commission's regulations, to conduct business in a well-organized, 
efficient way, and to re-allocate resources from compliance to other 
areas, such as productivity, business development, and innovation.
    Congress directed the Commission in the Dodd-Frank Act to 
``coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment 
of consistent international standards with respect to the regulation'' 
of swaps and SDs and MSPs.\532\ In doing so, the Commission is acting 
in the public interest and employing comity as one of the 
justifications for the choices the Commission is making in the Final 
Rule. For example, the provision of substituted compliance in the Final 
Rule allows some market participants to elect a regulatory jurisdiction 
that best suits their needs. Accordingly, some market participants may 
choose the U.S. as a jurisdiction in which to register and operate to 
achieve benefits such as robust SD requirements, third-party custodial 
arrangements, transparent exchanges, and bankruptcy regimes that have 
strong property rights and tend to lead to assets being recovered 
sooner than some other regimes. Therefore, the Commission believes that 
substituted compliance may lead to more effective regulation over time 
as regulators are incentivized to have their jurisdiction be chosen 
over other jurisdictions, and to modify ineffective or inefficient 
regulation as needed to adapt to market innovations and other changes 
that occur over time. The Commission recognizes, however, that such 
provision may present an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, which 
could undermine the fundamental principles of the reduction of systemic 
risk and the promotion of market integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \532\ See Dodd-Frank Act, section 752(a); 15 U.S.C. 8325.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Assessment Costs
    As discussed above, in applying the Final Rule's cross-border 
approach to the SD and MSP registration thresholds,

[[Page 56985]]

market participants are required to first classify themselves as a U.S. 
person, an SRS, a Guaranteed Entity, or an Other Non-U.S. Person.
    With respect to Baseline A, the Commission expects that the costs 
to affected market participants of assessing which classification they 
fall into will generally be small and incremental. In most cases, the 
Commission believes an entity will have performed an initial 
determination or assessment of its status under either the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule (which uses substantially similar definitions of ``U.S. 
person'' and ``guarantee'') or the Guidance (which interprets ``U.S. 
person'' in a manner that is similar but not identical to the Final 
Rule's definition of ``U.S. person''). Harmonizing the ``U.S. person'' 
definition in the Final Rule with the definition in the SEC Cross-
Border Rule is also expected to reduce undue compliance costs for 
market participants. Additionally, the Final Rule allows market 
participants to rely on representations from their counterparties with 
regard to their classifications.\533\ However, the Commission 
acknowledges that swap entities will have to modify their existing 
operations to accommodate the new concept of an SRS. Specifically, 
market participants must determine whether they qualify as SRSs. 
Further, in order to rely on certain exceptions outlined in the Final 
Rule, swap entities must ascertain whether they or their counterparty 
qualify as an SRS.
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    \533\ The Commission believes that these assessment costs for 
the most part have already been incurred by potential SDs and MSPs 
as a result of adopting policies and procedures under the Guidance 
and Cross-Border Margin Rule (which had similar classifications), 
both of which permitted counterparty representations. See Guidance, 
78 FR at 45315; Cross-Border Margin Rule, 81 FR at 34827.
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    With respect to Baseline B, wherein only certain market 
participants have previously determined their status under the similar, 
but not identical, Cross-Border Margin Rule (and not the Guidance), the 
Commission believes that their assessment costs will nonetheless be 
small as a result of the Final Rule's reliance on clear, objective 
definitions of the terms ``U.S. person,'' ``significant risk 
subsidiary,'' and ``guarantee.'' Further, with respect to the 
determination of whether a market participant falls within the 
``significant risk subsidiary'' definition,\534\ the Commission 
believes that assessment costs are small as the definition relies, in 
part, on a familiar consolidation test already used by affected market 
participants in preparing their financial statements under U.S. GAAP. 
Further, only those market participants with an ultimate U.S. parent 
entity that has more than $50 billion in global consolidated assets and 
that do not fall into one of the exceptions in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i) or 
(ii) of the Final Rule must consider if they are an SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \534\ The ``substantial risk subsidiary'' definition is 
discussed further in section II.D, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the Final Rule primarily relies on the definition of 
``guarantee'' provided in the Cross-Border Margin Rule, which is 
limited to arrangements in which one party to a swap has rights of 
recourse against a guarantor with respect to its counterparty's 
obligations under the swap.\535\ The Final Rule also incorporates the 
concept of an entity with unlimited U.S. responsibility into the 
guarantee definition; however, the Commission is of the view that the 
corporate structure that this prong is designed to capture is not one 
that is commonly in use in the marketplace. Therefore, although non-
U.S. persons must determine whether they are Guaranteed Entities with 
respect to the relevant swap on a swap-by-swap basis for purposes of 
the SD and MSP registration calculations, the Commission believes that 
this information is already known by non-U.S. persons.\536\ 
Accordingly, with respect to both baselines, the Commission believes 
that the costs associated with assessing whether an entity or its 
counterparty is a Guaranteed Entity is small and incremental.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \535\ See supra section II.C.
    \536\ Because a guarantee has a significant effect on pricing 
terms and on recourse in the event of a counterparty default, the 
Commission believes that the guarantee would already be in existence 
and that a non-U.S. person therefore would have knowledge of its 
existence before entering into a swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Better Markets commented that the proposed definition of 
``guarantee,'' which was narrower than that in the Guidance, would 
increase systemic risk and hinder other public interest objectives by 
possibly excluding certain arrangements that may import risk into the 
United States. In the Proposed Rule, the Commission stated that the 
alignment of the definitions of ``guarantee'' in this rulemaking and 
the Cross-Border Margin Rule would benefit market participants to the 
extent that they would not be required to make a separate independent 
assessment of a counterparty's guarantee status. Better Markets stated 
that this benefit to market participants does not outweigh or 
reasonably approximate the potential costs to the underlying policy 
objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act, including promoting the safety and 
soundness of SDs, preventing disruptions to the derivatives markets, 
ensuring the financial integrity of swaps transactions and the 
avoidance of systemic risk, and preserving the stability of the U.S. 
financial system. The Commission has carefully considered the attendant 
costs and benefits of narrowing the definition of ``guarantee'' from 
the Guidance, and continues to believe, however, that the alignment of 
the ``guarantee'' definitions in this Final Rule and the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule serves to reduce costs to market participants without 
sacrificing the attendant policy goals of the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
Commission will continue to monitor arrangements that were previously 
considered guarantees that could shift risk back to the U.S. swap 
market, in general, and take appropriate action as warranted in the 
future.
3. Cross-Border Application of the SD Registration Threshold
(i) U.S. Persons, Guaranteed Entities, and SRSs
    Under the Final Rule, a U.S. person must include all of its swap 
dealing transactions in its de minimis calculation, without 
exception.\537\ As discussed above, that includes any swap dealing 
transactions conducted through a U.S. person's foreign branch, as such 
swaps are directly attributed to, and therefore affect, the U.S. 
person. Given that this requirement mirrors the Guidance in this 
respect, the Commission believes that the Final Rule will have a 
negligible effect on the status quo with regard to the number of 
registered or potential U.S. SDs, as measured against Baseline A.\538\ 
With respect to Baseline B, all U.S. persons would have included all of 
their transactions in their de minimis calculation, even absent the 
Guidance, pursuant to paragraph (4) of the SD definition.\539\ However, 
the Commission acknowledges that, absent the Guidance, some U.S. 
persons may not have interpreted CEA section 2(i) to require them to 
include swap dealing transactions conducted through their foreign 
branches in their de minimis calculation. Accordingly, with respect

[[Page 56986]]

to Baseline B, the Commission expects that some U.S. persons may incur 
some incremental costs as a result of having to count swaps conducted 
through their foreign branches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \537\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(1).
    \538\ The Commission is not estimating the number of new U.S. 
SDs, as the methodology for including swaps in a U.S. person's SD 
registration calculation does not diverge from the approach included 
in the Guidance (i.e., a U.S. person must include all of its swap 
dealing transactions in its de minimis threshold calculation). 
Further, the Commission does not expect a change in the number of 
SDs will result from the Final Rule's definition of U.S. person and 
therefore assumes that no additional entities will register as U.S. 
SDs, and no existing U.S.-SD registrants will deregister as a result 
of the Final Rule.
    \539\ See 17 CFR 1.3, Swap dealer, paragraph (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule also requires Guaranteed Entities to include all of 
their swap dealing transactions in their de minimis threshold 
calculation without exception.\540\ This approach, which recognizes 
that a Guaranteed Entity's swap dealing transactions may have the same 
potential to affect the U.S. financial system as a U.S. person's 
dealing transactions, closely parallels the approach taken in the 
Guidance with respect to the treatment of the swaps of ``guaranteed 
affiliates.'' \541\ Given that the Final Rule establishes a more 
limited definition of ``guarantee'' as compared to the Guidance, and a 
similar definition of guarantee as compared to the Cross-Border Margin 
Rule, the Commission does not expect that the Final Rule will cause 
more Guaranteed Entities to register with the Commission. Accordingly, 
the Commission believes that, in this respect, any increase in costs 
associated with the Final Rule, with respect to Baselines A and B, will 
be small.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \540\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(2)(ii).
    \541\ While the Final Rule and the Guidance treat swaps 
involving Guaranteed Entities in a similar manner, they have 
different definitions of the term ``guarantee.'' Under the Guidance, 
a ``guaranteed affiliate'' would generally include all swap dealing 
activities in its de minimis threshold calculation without 
exception. The Guidance interpreted ``guarantee'' to generally 
include ``not only traditional guarantees of payment or performance 
of the related swaps, but also other formal arrangements that, in 
view of all the facts and circumstances, support the non-U.S. 
person's ability to pay or perform its swap obligations with respect 
to its swaps.'' See Guidance, 78 FR at 45320. In contrast, the term 
``guarantee'' in the Final Rule has the same meaning as defined in 
Sec.  23.160(a)(2) (cross-border application of the Commission's 
margin requirements for uncleared swaps), except that application of 
the definition of ``guarantee'' in the Final Rule is not limited to 
uncleared swaps, and also now incorporates the concept of 
``unlimited U.S. responsibility.'' See supra section II.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Final Rule, an SRS must include all swap dealing 
transactions in its de minimis threshold calculation.\542\ Given that 
the concept of an SRS was not included in the Guidance or the Cross-
Border Margin Rule, the Commission believes that this aspect of the 
Final Rule will have a similar effect on market participants when 
measured against Baseline A and Baseline B. Under the Guidance, an SRS 
would likely have been categorized as either a conduit affiliate (which 
would have been required to count all dealing swaps towards its de 
minimis threshold calculation) or a non-U.S. person that is neither a 
conduit affiliate nor a guaranteed affiliate (which would have been 
required to count only a subset of its dealing swaps towards its de 
minimis threshold calculation). Accordingly, under the Final Rule, 
there may be some SRSs that will have to count more swaps towards their 
de minimis threshold calculation than would have been required under 
the Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \542\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, as noted in sections II.D and III.B.1, the Commission 
believes that it is appropriate to distinguish SRSs from Other Non-U.S. 
Persons in determining the cross-border application of the SD de 
minimis threshold to such entities. As discussed above, SRSs, as a 
class of entities, present a greater supervisory interest to the CFTC 
relative to Other Non-U.S. Persons, due to the nature and extent of 
their relationships with their ultimate U.S. parent entities. Of the 61 
non-U.S. SDs that were provisionally registered with the Commission as 
of July 2020, the Commission believes that few, if any, will be 
classified as SRSs pursuant to the Final Rule. With respect to Baseline 
A, any potential SRSs would have likely classified themselves as a 
conduit affiliate or a non-U.S. person that is neither a conduit 
affiliate nor a guaranteed affiliate pursuant to the Guidance. 
Accordingly, some may incur incremental costs associated with assessing 
and implementing the additional counting requirements for SRSs. With 
respect to Baseline B, the Commission believes that most potential SRSs 
would have interpreted section 2(i) so as to require them to count 
their dealing swaps with U.S. persons, but acknowledges that some may 
not have interpreted section 2(i) so as to require them to count swaps 
with non-U.S. persons toward their de minimis calculation. Accordingly, 
such non-U.S. persons will incur the incremental costs associated with 
the additional SRS counting requirements contained in the Final Rule. 
The Commission believes that the SRS de minimis calculation 
requirements will prevent regulatory arbitrage by ensuring that certain 
entities do not simply book swaps through a non-U.S. affiliate to avoid 
CFTC registration. Accordingly, the Commission believes that such 
provisions will benefit the swap market by ensuring that the Dodd-Frank 
Act swap provisions addressed by the Final Rule are applied 
specifically to entities whose activities, in the aggregate, have a 
direct and significant connection to, and effect on, U.S. commerce.
(ii) Other Non-U.S. Persons
    Under the Final Rule, non-U.S. persons that are neither Guaranteed 
Entities nor SRSs are required to include in their de minimis threshold 
calculations swap dealing activities with U.S. persons (other than 
swaps conducted through a foreign branch of a registered SD) and 
certain swaps with Guaranteed Entities.\543\ The Final Rule does not, 
however, require Other Non-U.S. Persons to include swap dealing 
transactions with: (1) Guaranteed Entities that are SDs; (2) Guaranteed 
Entities that are affiliated with an SD and are also below the de 
minimis threshold; (3) Guaranteed Entities that are guaranteed by a 
non-financial entity; (3) SRSs (other than SRSs that are also 
Guaranteed Entities and no other exception applies); or (4) Other Non-
U.S. Persons. Additionally, Other Non-U.S. Persons are not required to 
include in their de minimis calculation any transaction that is 
executed anonymously on a DCM, registered or exempt SEF, or registered 
FBOT, and cleared through a registered or exempt DCO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \543\ Final Sec.  23.23(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that requiring all non-U.S. persons to 
include their swap dealing transactions with U.S. persons in their de 
minimis calculations is necessary to advance the goals of the Dodd-
Frank Act SD registration regime, which focuses on U.S. market 
participants and the U.S. market. As discussed above, the Commission 
believes it is appropriate to allow Other Non-U.S. Persons to exclude 
swaps conducted through a foreign branch of a registered SD because, 
generally, such swaps would be subject to Dodd-Frank Act transactional 
requirements and, therefore, will not evade the Dodd-Frank Act regime.
    Given that these requirements are consistent with the Guidance in 
most respects, the Commission believes that the Final Rule will have a 
negligible effect on Other Non-U.S. Persons, as measured against 
Baseline A. With respect to Baseline B, the Commission believes that 
most non-U.S. persons would have interpreted CEA section 2(i) to 
require them to count their dealing swaps with U.S. persons, but 
acknowledges that some non-U.S. persons may not have interpreted 2(i) 
so as to require them to count such swaps with non-U.S. persons toward 
their de minimis calculation. Accordingly, such non-U.S. persons will 
incur the incremental costs associated with the counting requirements 
for Other Non-U.S. Persons contained in the Final Rule.
    The Commission recognizes that the Final Rule's cross-border 
approach to

[[Page 56987]]

the de minimis threshold calculation could contribute to competitive 
disparities arising between U.S.-based financial groups and non-U.S. 
based financial groups. Potential SDs that are U.S. persons, SRSs, or 
Guaranteed Entities will be required to include all of their swap 
dealing transactions in their de minimis threshold calculations. In 
contrast, Other Non-U.S. Persons will be permitted to exclude certain 
dealing transactions from their de minimis calculations. As a result, 
Guaranteed Entities and SRSs may be at a competitive disadvantage, as 
more of their swap activity will apply toward the de minimis threshold 
(and thereby trigger SD registration) relative to Other Non-U.S. 
Persons.\544\ While the Commission does not believe that any additional 
Other Non-U.S. Persons will be required to register as a SD under the 
Final Rule, the Commission acknowledges that to the extent that one 
does, its non-U.S. person counterparties (clients and dealers) may 
possibly cease transacting with it in order to operate outside the 
Dodd-Frank Act swap regime.\545\ Additionally, unregistered non-U.S. 
dealers may be able to offer swaps on more favorable terms to non-U.S. 
persons than their registered competitors because they are not required 
to incur the costs associated with CFTC registration.\546\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \544\ On the other hand, as noted above, the Commission 
acknowledges that some market participants may prefer to enter into 
swaps with counterparties that are subject to the swaps provisions 
adopted pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. Further, Guaranteed Entities 
and SRSs may enjoy other competitive advantages due to the support 
of their guarantor or ultimate U.S. parent entity.
    \545\ Additionally, some unregistered dealers may opt to 
withdraw from the market, thereby contracting the number of dealers 
competing in the swaps market, which may have an adverse effect on 
competition and liquidity.
    \546\ These non-U.S. dealers also may be able to offer swaps on 
more favorable terms to U.S. persons, giving them a competitive 
advantage over U.S. competitors with respect to U.S. counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, however, the Commission believes that these 
competitive disparities will be mitigated to the extent that foreign 
jurisdictions impose comparable requirements. Given that the Commission 
has found many foreign jurisdictions comparable with respect to various 
aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act swap requirements, the Commission 
believes that such competitive disparities will be negligible.\547\ 
Further, as discussed below, the Commission is adopting a flexible 
standard of review for comparability determinations relating to the 
group A and group B requirements that will be issued pursuant to the 
Final Rule, which will serve to further mitigate any competitive 
disparities arising out of disparate regulatory regimes. Finally, the 
Commission reiterates its belief that the cross-border approach to the 
SD registration threshold taken in the Final Rule is appropriately 
tailored to further the policy objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act while 
mitigating unnecessary burdens and disruption to market practices to 
the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \547\ See supra notes 215 and 484.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Aggregation Requirement
    The Final Rule also addresses the cross-border application of the 
aggregation requirement in a manner consistent with the Entities Rule 
and CEA section 2(i). Specifically, paragraph (4) of the SD definition 
in Sec.  1.3 requires that, in determining whether its swap dealing 
transactions exceed the de minimis threshold, a person must include the 
aggregate notional amount of any swap dealing transactions entered into 
by its affiliates under common control. Consistent with CEA section 
2(i), the Commission interprets this aggregation requirement in a 
manner that applies the same aggregation principles to all affiliates 
in a corporate group, whether they are U.S. or non-U.S. persons. In 
general, the Commission's approach allows both U.S. persons and non-
U.S. persons in an affiliated group to engage in swap dealing activity 
up to the de minimis threshold. When the affiliated group meets the de 
minimis threshold in the aggregate, one or more affiliate(s) (a U.S. 
affiliate or a non-U.S. affiliate) have to register as an SD so that 
the relevant swap dealing activity of the unregistered affiliates 
remains below the threshold. The Commission's approach ensures that the 
aggregate gross notional amount of applicable swap dealing transactions 
of all such unregistered U.S. and non-U.S. affiliates does not exceed 
the de minimis level.
    Given that this approach is consistent with the Guidance, the 
Commission believes that market participants will only incur 
incremental costs with respect to Baseline A in modifying their 
existing systems and policies and procedures in response to the Final 
Rule. Absent the Guidance, the Commission believes that most market 
participants would have relied on the interpretation of the aggregation 
requirement in the Entities Rule, which is similar to the approach set 
forth in the Final Rule. Accordingly, with respect to Baseline B, the 
Commission believes that market participants will only incur 
incremental costs in modifying their existing systems and policies and 
procedures in response to the Final Rule.
4. Cross-Border Application of the MSP Registration Thresholds
(i) U.S. Persons, Guaranteed Entities, and SRSs
    The Final Rule's approach to the cross-border application of the 
MSP registration thresholds closely mirrors the approach for the SD 
registration threshold. Under the Final Rule, a U.S. person must 
include all of its swap positions in its MSP thresholds, without 
exception.\548\ As discussed above, that includes any swap conducted 
through a U.S. person's foreign branch, as such swaps are directly 
attributed to, and therefore affect, the U.S. person. Given that this 
requirement is consistent with the Guidance in this respect, the 
Commission believes that the Final Rule will have a minimal effect on 
the status quo with regard to the number of potential U.S. MSPs, as 
measured against Baseline A. With respect to Baseline B, all of a U.S. 
person's swap positions would apply toward the MSP threshold 
calculations, even absent the Guidance, pursuant to paragraph (6) of 
the MSP definition.\549\ However, the Commission acknowledges that, 
absent the Guidance, some U.S. persons may not have interpreted CEA 
section 2(i) to require them to include swaps conducted through their 
foreign branches in their MSP threshold calculations. Accordingly, with 
respect to Baseline B, the Commission expects that some U.S. persons 
may incur incremental costs as a result of having to count swaps 
conducted through their foreign branches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \548\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(1).
    \549\ 17 CFR 1.3, Major swap participant, paragraph (6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule also requires Guaranteed Entities to include all of 
their swap positions in their MSP threshold calculations without 
exception.\550\ This approach, which recognizes that such swap 
transactions may have the same potential to affect the U.S. financial 
system as a U.S. person's swap positions, closely parallels the 
approach taken in the Guidance with respect to ``conduit affiliates'' 
and ``guaranteed affiliates.'' \551\ The Commission believes that few, 
if any, additional MSPs will qualify as Guaranteed Entities pursuant to 
the Final Rule, as compared to Baseline A. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes that, in this

[[Page 56988]]

respect, any increase in costs associated with the Final Rule will be 
small.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \550\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(2)(ii).
    \551\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45319-45320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Final Rule, an SRS must also include all of its swap 
positions in its MSP threshold calculations.\552\ Under the Guidance, 
an SRS would likely have been categorized as either a conduit affiliate 
(which would have been required to count all its swap positions towards 
its MSP threshold calculations) or a non-U.S. person that is neither a 
conduit affiliate nor a guaranteed affiliate (which would have been 
required to count only a subset of its swap positions towards its MSP 
threshold calculations). Unlike an Other Non-U.S. Person, SRSs will 
additionally be required to include in their MSP threshold calculations 
any transaction that is executed anonymously on a DCM, registered or 
exempt SEF, or registered FBOT, and cleared through a registered or 
exempt DCO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \552\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in sections II.D and IV.B.1, the Commission believes that 
it is appropriate to distinguish SRSs from Other Non-U.S. Persons in 
determining the cross-border application of the MSP thresholds to such 
entities, as well as with respect to the Dodd-Frank Act swap provisions 
addressed by the Final Rule more generally. As discussed above, SRSs, 
as a class of entities, present a greater supervisory interest to the 
CFTC relative to Other Non-U.S. Persons, due to the nature and extent 
of the their relationships with their ultimate U.S. parent entities. 
Therefore, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to require 
SRSs to include more of their swap positions in their MSP threshold 
calculations than Other Non-U.S. Persons do. Additionally, allowing an 
SRS to exclude all of its non-U.S. swap positions from its calculation 
could incentivize U.S. financial groups to book their non-U.S. 
positions into a non-U.S. subsidiary to avoid MSP registration 
requirements.
    Given that this requirement was not included in the Guidance or the 
Cross-Border Margin Rule, the Commission believes that this aspect of 
the Final Rule will have a similar effect on market participants when 
measured against Baseline A and Baseline B. The Commission notes that 
there are no MSPs registered with the Commission, and expects that few 
entities will be required to undertake an assessment to determine 
whether they would qualify as an MSP under the Final Rule. Any such 
entities would likely have classified themselves as a non-U.S. person 
that is neither a conduit affiliate nor a guaranteed affiliate pursuant 
to the Guidance. Accordingly, they may incur incremental costs 
associated with assessing and implementing the additional counting 
requirements for SRSs. With respect to Baseline B, the Commission 
believes that most potential SRSs would have interpreted CEA section 
2(i) to require them to count their swap positions with U.S. persons, 
but acknowledges that some may not have interpreted CEA section 2(i) so 
as to require them to count swap positions with non-U.S. persons toward 
their MSP threshold calculations. Accordingly, such SRSs will incur the 
incremental costs associated with the additional SRS counting 
requirements contained in the Final Rule. The Commission believes that 
these SRS calculation requirements will mitigate regulatory arbitrage 
by ensuring that U.S. entities do not simply book swaps through an SRS 
affiliate to avoid CFTC registration. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes that such provisions will benefit the swap market by ensuring 
that the Dodd-Frank Act swap requirements that are addressed by the 
Final Rule are applied to entities whose activities have a direct and 
significant connection to, or effect on, U.S. commerce.
(ii) Other Non-U.S. Persons
    Under the Final Rule, Other Non-U.S. Persons are required to 
include in their MSP calculations swap positions with U.S. persons 
(other than swaps conducted through a foreign branch of a registered 
SD) and certain swaps with Guaranteed Entities.\553\ The Final Rule 
does not, however, require Other Non-U.S. Persons to include swap 
positions with a Guaranteed Entity that is an SD, SRSs (other than SRSs 
that are also Guaranteed Entities and no other exception applies), or 
Other Non-U.S. Persons. Additionally, Other Non-U.S. Persons will not 
be required to include in their MSP threshold calculations any 
transaction that is executed anonymously on a DCM, a registered or 
exempt SEF, or registered FBOT, and cleared through a registered or 
exempt DCO.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \553\ Final Sec.  23.23(c)(2).
    \554\ Final Sec.  23.23(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that these requirements are consistent with the Guidance in 
most respects, the Commission believes that the Final Rule will have a 
minimal effect on Other Non-U.S. Persons, as measured against Baseline 
A. With respect to Baseline B, the Commission believes that most non-
U.S. persons would have interpreted CEA section 2(i) to require them to 
count their swap positions with U.S. persons, but acknowledges that 
some non-U.S. persons may not have interpreted CEA section 2(i) so as 
to require them to count swaps with non-U.S. persons toward their MSP 
threshold calculations. Accordingly, such non-U.S. persons will incur 
the incremental costs associated with the counting requirements for 
Other Non-U.S. Persons contained in the Final Rule.
    The Commission recognizes that the Final Rule's cross-border 
approach to the MSP threshold calculations could contribute to 
competitive disparities arising between U.S.-based financial groups and 
non-U.S. based financial groups. Potential MSPs that are U.S. persons, 
SRSs, or Guaranteed Entities will be required to include all of their 
swap positions. In contrast, Other Non-U.S. Persons will be permitted 
to exclude certain swap positions from their MSP threshold 
calculations. As a result, SRSs and Guaranteed Entities may be at a 
competitive disadvantage, as more of their swap activity will apply 
toward the MSP calculation and trigger MSP registration relative to 
Other Non-U.S. Persons. While the Commission does not believe that any 
additional Other Non-U.S. Persons will be required to register as MSPs 
under the Final Rule, the Commission acknowledges that to the extent 
that a currently unregistered non-U.S. person is required to register 
as an MSP under the Final Rule, its non-U.S. person counterparties may 
possibly cease transacting with it in order to operate outside the 
Dodd-Frank Act swap regime.\555\ Additionally, unregistered non-U.S. 
persons may be able to enter into swaps on more favorable terms to non-
U.S. persons than their registered competitors because they are not 
required to incur the costs associated with CFTC registration.\556\ As 
noted above, however, the Commission believes that these competitive 
disparities will be mitigated to the extent that foreign jurisdictions 
impose comparable requirements. Further, the Commission reiterates its 
belief that the cross-border approach to the MSP registration 
thresholds taken in the Final Rule aims to further the policy 
objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act while mitigating unnecessary burdens 
and disruption to market practices to the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \555\ Additionally, some unregistered swap market participants 
may opt to withdraw from the market, thereby contracting the number 
of competitors in the swaps market, which may have an effect on 
competition and liquidity.
    \556\ These non-U.S. market participants also may be able to 
offer swaps on more favorable terms to U.S. persons, giving them a 
competitive advantage over U.S. competitors with respect to U.S. 
counterparties.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 56989]]

(iii) Attribution Requirement
    The Final Rule also addresses the cross-border application of the 
attribution requirement in a manner consistent with the Entities Rule 
and CEA section 2(i) and generally comparable to the approach adopted 
by the SEC. Specifically, the swap positions of an entity, whether a 
U.S. or non-U.S. person, should not be attributed to a parent, other 
affiliate, or guarantor for purposes of the MSP analysis in the absence 
of a guarantee. Even in the presence of a guarantee, attribution is not 
required if the entity that enters into the swap directly is subject to 
capital regulation by the Commission or the SEC, is regulated as a bank 
in the United States, or is subject to Basel compliant capital 
standards and oversight by a G20 prudential supervisor. The Final Rule 
also clarifies that the swap positions of an entity that is required to 
register as an MSP, or whose MSP registration is pending, is not 
subject to the attribution requirement. Given that this approach is 
largely consistent with the Guidance, with certain caveats, the 
Commission believes that market participants will only incur 
incremental costs with respect to Baseline A in modifying their 
existing systems and policies and procedures in response to the Final 
Rule. Absent the Guidance, the Commission believes that most market 
participants would have relied on the interpretation of the attribution 
requirement in the Entities Rule, which is similar to the approach set 
forth in the Final Rule. Accordingly, with respect to Baseline B, the 
Commission believes that market participants will only incur 
incremental costs in modifying their existing systems and policies and 
procedures in response to the Final Rule. In addition, the Commission 
believes that consistency with the approach in the SEC Cross-Border 
Rule will reduce compliance costs for market participants.
5. Monitoring Costs
    Under the Final Rule, market participants must continue to monitor 
their swap activities in order to determine whether they are, or 
continue to be, required to register as an SD or MSP. With respect to 
Baseline A, the Commission believes that market participants have 
developed policies and practices consistent with the cross-border 
approach to the SD and MSP registration thresholds expressed in the 
Guidance. Therefore, the Commission believes that market participants 
will only incur incremental costs in modifying their existing systems 
and policies and procedures in response to the Final Rule (e.g., 
determining which swap activities or positions are required to be 
included in the registration threshold calculations).\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \557\ Although the cross-border approach to the MSP registration 
threshold calculations in the Final Rule is not identical to the 
approach included in the Guidance (see supra section IV.B), the 
Commission believes that any resulting increase in monitoring costs 
resulting from the adoption of the Final Rule will be incremental 
and de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, with respect to the SD registration threshold, SRSs 
may have adopted policies and practices in line with the Guidance's 
approach to non-U.S. persons that are not guaranteed or conduit 
affiliates and therefore may only be currently counting (or be 
provisionally registered by virtue of) their swap dealing transactions 
with U.S. persons, other than foreign branches of U.S. SDs. Although an 
SRS will be required under the Final Rule to include all dealing swaps 
in its de minimis calculation, the Commission believes that any 
increase in monitoring costs for SRSs will be negligible, both 
initially and on an ongoing basis, because they already have systems 
that track swap dealing transactions with certain counterparties in 
place, which includes an assessment of their counterparties' 
status.\558\ The Commission expects that any adjustments made to these 
systems in response to the Final Rule will be minor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \558\ See supra section X.C.2, for a discussion of assessment 
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to Baseline B, the Commission believes that, absent 
the Guidance, most market participants would have interpreted CEA 
section 2(i) to require them, at a minimum, to monitor their swap 
activities with U.S. persons to determine whether they are, or continue 
to be, required to register as an SD or MSP. Accordingly, such persons 
will incur the incremental costs in modifying their existing systems 
and policies and procedures in response to the Final Rule to monitor 
their swap activity with certain non-U.S. persons. To the extent that 
market participants did not interpret CEA section 2(i) in such manner, 
they will incur more substantial costs in implementing such monitoring 
activities.
6. Registration Costs
    With respect to Baseline A, the Commission believes that few, if 
any, additional non-U.S. persons will be required to register as an SD 
pursuant to the Final Rule. With respect to Baseline B, the Commission 
acknowledges that, absent the Guidance, some non-U.S. persons may not 
have interpreted CEA section 2(i) so as to require them to register 
with the Commission. Accordingly, a subset of such entities could be 
required to register with the Commission pursuant to the Final Rule.
    The Commission acknowledges that if a market participant is 
required to register, it will incur registration costs. The Commission 
previously estimated registration costs in its rulemaking on 
registration of SDs; \559\ however, the costs that may be incurred 
should be mitigated to the extent that any new SDs are affiliated with 
an existing SD, as most of these costs have already been realized by 
the consolidated group. While the Commission cannot anticipate the 
extent to which any potential new registrants will be affiliated with 
existing SDs, it notes that most current registrants are part of a 
consolidated group. The Commission has not included any discussion of 
registration costs for MSPs because it believes that few, if any, 
market participants will be required to register as an MSP under the 
Final Rule, as noted above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \559\ See Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 77 FR at 2623-2625.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Programmatic Costs
    With respect to Baseline A, as noted above, the Commission believes 
that few, if any, additional non-U.S. persons will be required to 
register as an SD under the Final Rule. With respect to Baseline B, the 
Commission acknowledges that, absent the Guidance, some non-U.S. 
persons may not have interpreted CEA section 2(i) so as to require them 
to register with the Commission. Accordingly, a subset of such entities 
could be required to register with the Commission pursuant to the Final 
Rule.
    To the extent that the Final Rule acts as a ``gating'' rule by 
affecting which entities engaged in cross-border swap activities must 
comply with the SD requirements, the Final Rule will result in 
increased costs for particular entities that otherwise would not 
register as an SD and comply with the swap requirements.\560\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \560\ As noted above, the Commission believes that few (if any) 
market participants will be required to register as an MSP under the 
Final Rule, and therefore it has not included a separate discussion 
of programmatic costs for registered MSPs in this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Exceptions From Group B and Group C Requirements, Availability of 
Substituted Compliance, and Comparability Determinations
    As discussed in section VI above, the Commission, consistent with 
section 2(i) of the CEA, is adopting exceptions

[[Page 56990]]

from, and substituted compliance for, certain group A, group B, and 
group C requirements applicable to swap entities, as well as the 
creation of a framework for comparability determinations.
(i) Exceptions
    Specifically, as discussed above in section VI, the Final Rule 
includes: (1) The Exchange-Traded Exception from certain group B and 
group C requirements for certain anonymously executed, exchange-traded, 
and cleared foreign-based swaps; (2) the Foreign Swap Group C Exception 
for certain foreign-based swaps with foreign counterparties; (3) the 
U.S. Branch Group C Exception, for swaps booked in a U.S. branch with 
certain foreign counterparties; (4) the Limited Foreign Branch Group B 
Exception for certain foreign-based swaps of foreign branches of U.S. 
swap entities with certain foreign counterparties; (5) the Non-U.S. 
Swap Entity Group B Exception for foreign-based swaps of non-U.S. swap 
entities that are Other Non-U.S. Persons with certain foreign 
counterparties; and (6) the Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity 
Group B Exception for certain foreign-based swaps of SRS Swap Entities 
and Guaranteed Swap Entities with certain foreign counterparties.
    Under the Final Rule, U.S. swap entities (other than their foreign 
branches) are not excepted from, or eligible for substituted compliance 
for, the Commission's group A, group B, and group C requirements. These 
requirements apply fully to registered SDs and MSPs that are U.S. 
persons because their swap activities are particularly likely to affect 
the integrity of the swap market in the United States and raise 
concerns about the protection of participants in those markets. With 
respect to both baselines, the Commission does not expect that this 
will impose any additional costs on market participants given that the 
Commission's relevant business conduct requirements already apply to 
U.S. SDs and MSPs pursuant to existing Commission regulations.
    Pursuant to the Exchange-Traded Exception, non-U.S. swap entities 
and foreign branches of non-U.S. swap entities are generally excepted 
from most of the group B and group C requirements with respect to their 
foreign-based swaps that are executed anonymously on a DCM, a 
registered or exempt SEF, or registered FBOT, and cleared through a 
registered or exempt DCO.
    Further, pursuant to the Foreign Swap Group C Exception, non-U.S. 
swap entities and foreign branches of U.S. swap entities are excepted 
from the group C requirements with respect to their foreign-based swaps 
with foreign counterparties.
    Under the U.S. Branch Group C Exception, a non-U.S. swap entity is 
excepted from the group C requirements with respect to any swap booked 
in a U.S. branch with a foreign counterparty that is neither a foreign 
branch nor a Guaranteed Entity.
    Pursuant to the Limited Foreign Branch Group B Exception, foreign 
branches of U.S. swap entities are excepted from the group B 
requirements, with respect to any foreign-based swap with a foreign 
counterparty that is an SRS End User or an Other Non-U.S. Person that 
is not a swap entity, subject to certain conditions: Specifically, (1) 
a group B requirement is not eligible for the exception if the 
requirement, as applicable to the swap, is eligible for substituted 
compliance pursuant to a comparability determination issued by the 
Commission prior to the execution of the swap; and (2) in any calendar 
quarter, the aggregate gross notional amount of swaps conducted by a 
swap entity in reliance on this exception does not exceed five percent 
of the aggregate gross notional amount of all its swaps.
    In addition, pursuant to the Non-U.S. Swap Entity Group B 
Exception, non-U.S. swap entities that are Other Non-U.S. Persons are 
excepted from the group B requirements with respect to any foreign-
based swap with a foreign counterparty that is an SRS End User or Other 
Non-U.S. Person.
    Finally, pursuant to the Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity 
Group B Exception, each Guaranteed Swap Entity and SRS Swap Entity is 
excepted from the group B requirements, with respect to any foreign-
based swap with a foreign counterparty that is an SRS End User or an 
Other Non-U.S. Person that is not a swap entity, subject to certain 
conditions. Specifically, under the Final Rule: (1) The exception is 
not available with respect to any group B requirement if the 
requirement as applicable to the swap is eligible for substituted 
compliance pursuant to a comparability determination issued by the 
Commission prior to the execution of the swap; and (2) in any calendar 
quarter, the aggregate gross notional amount of swaps conducted by an 
SRS Swap Entity or a Guaranteed Swap Entity in reliance on this 
exception aggregated with the gross notional amount of swaps conducted 
by all affiliated SRS Swap Entities and Guaranteed Swap Entities in 
reliance on this exception does not exceed five percent of the 
aggregate gross notional amount of all swaps entered into by the SRS 
Swap Entity or a Guaranteed Swap Entity and all affiliated swap 
entities.
    The Commission acknowledges that the group B requirements may apply 
more broadly to swaps between non-U.S. persons than as contemplated in 
the Guidance. For example, the Final Rule generally requires non-U.S. 
swap entities that are Guaranteed Entities or SRSs to comply with the 
group B requirements for swaps with Other Non-U.S. Persons, whereas the 
Guidance stated that all non-U.S. swap entities (other than their U.S. 
branches) were excluded from the group B requirements with respect to 
swaps with a non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed or conduit 
affiliate.\561\ However, the Commission believes that the exceptions 
from the group B requirements in the Final Rule, coupled with the 
availability of substituted compliance, will help to alleviate any 
additional burdens that may arise from such application. Further, the 
group C requirements have been expanded to include Subpart L, which 
consequently expands the scope of certain of the exceptions from the 
group C requirements under the Final Rule. Notwithstanding the 
availability of these exceptions and substituted compliance, the 
Commission acknowledges that some non-U.S. swap entities may incur 
costs to the extent that a comparability determination has not yet been 
issued for certain jurisdictions. Further, the Commission expects that 
swap entities that avail themselves of the exceptions will be able to 
reduce their costs of compliance with respect to the excepted 
requirements (which, to the extent they are similar to requirements in 
the jurisdiction in which they are based, may be potentially 
duplicative or conflicting). Swap entities are not required to take any 
additional action to avail themselves of these exceptions (e.g., 
notification to the Commission) that would cause them to incur 
additional costs. The Commission recognizes that the exceptions (and 
the inherent cost savings) may give certain swap entities a competitive 
advantage with respect to swaps that meet the requirements of the 
exception.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \561\ The group B requirements were categorized as Category A 
transaction-level requirements under the Guidance.
    \562\ The degree of competitive disparity will depend on the 
degree of disparity between the Commission's requirements and that 
of the relevant foreign jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission nonetheless believes that it is appropriate to 
tailor the application of the group B and group C

[[Page 56991]]

requirements in the cross-border context, consistent with section 2(i) 
of the CEA and international comity principles, by providing the 
exceptions in the Final Rule. In doing so, the Commission is aiming to 
reduce market fragmentation which may result by applying certain 
duplicative swap requirements in non-U.S. markets, which are often 
subject to robust foreign regulation. Other than the U.S. Branch Group 
C Exception, the exceptions in the Final Rule are largely similar to 
those provided in the Guidance. Therefore, the Commission does not 
expect that the exceptions in the Final Rule will, in the aggregate, 
have a significant effect on the costs of, and benefits to, swap 
entities.
(ii) Substituted Compliance
    As described in section VI.C, the extent to which substituted 
compliance is available under the Final Rule depends on the 
classification of the swap entity or branch and, in certain cases the 
counterparty, to a particular swap. The Commission recognizes that the 
decision to offer substituted compliance carries certain trade-offs. 
Given the global and highly-interconnected nature of the swap market, 
where risk is not bound by national borders, market participants are 
likely to be subject to the regulatory interest of more than one 
jurisdiction. Allowing compliance with foreign swap standards as an 
alternative to compliance with the Commission's requirements can 
therefore reduce the application of duplicative or conflicting 
requirements, resulting in lower compliance costs and potentially 
facilitating a more efficient regulatory framework over time. 
Substituted compliance also helps preserve the benefits of an 
integrated, global swap market by fostering and advancing efforts among 
U.S. and foreign regulators to collaborate in establishing robust 
regulatory standards. If substituted compliance is not properly 
implemented, however, the Commission's swap regime could lose some of 
its effectiveness. Accordingly, the ultimate costs and benefits of 
substituted compliance are affected by the standard under which it is 
granted and the extent to which it is applied. The Commission was 
mindful of this dynamic in structuring a substituted compliance regime 
for the group A and group B requirements and has determined that the 
Final Rule will enhance market efficiency and foster global 
coordination of these requirements while ensuring that swap entities 
(wherever located) are subject to comparable regulation.
    The Commission also understands that by not offering substituted 
compliance equally to all swap entities, the Final Rule could lead to 
certain competitive disparities between swap entities. For example, to 
the extent that a non-U.S. swap entity can rely on substituted 
compliance that is not available to a U.S. swap entity, it may enjoy 
certain cost advantages (e.g., avoiding the costs of potentially 
duplicative or inconsistent regulation). The non-U.S. swap entity may 
then be able to pass on these cost savings to its counterparties in the 
form of better pricing or some other benefit. U.S. swap entities, on 
the other hand, could, depending on the extent to which foreign swap 
requirements apply, be subject to both U.S. and foreign requirements, 
and therefore be at a competitive disadvantage. Counterparties may also 
be incentivized to transact with swap entities that are offered 
substituted compliance in order to avoid being subject to duplicative 
or conflicting swap requirements, which could lead to increased market 
deficiencies.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \563\ The Commission recognizes that its substituted compliance 
framework may impose certain initial operational costs, as in 
certain cases swap entities will be required to determine the status 
of their counterparties in order to determine the extent to which 
substituted compliance is available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, the Commission does not believe it is appropriate to 
make substituted compliance broadly available to all swap entities 
because it needs to protect market participants and the public. As 
discussed above, the Commission has a strong supervisory interest in 
the swap activity of all swap entities, including non-U.S. swap 
entities, by virtue of their registration with the Commission. Further, 
U.S. swap entities are particularly key swap market participants, and 
their safety and soundness is critical to a well-functioning U.S. swap 
market and the stability of the U.S. financial system. The Commission 
believes that losses arising from the default of a U.S. entity are more 
likely to be borne by other U.S. entities (including parent companies); 
therefore, a U.S. entity's risk to the U.S. financial system is more 
acute than that of a similarly situated non-U.S. entity. Accordingly, 
in light of the Commission's supervisory interest in the activities of 
U.S. persons and its statutory obligation to ensure the safety and 
soundness of swap entities and the U.S. swap market, the Commission 
believes that it is generally not appropriate for substituted 
compliance to be available to U.S. swap entities for purposes of the 
Final Rule. With respect to non-U.S. swap entities, however, the 
Commission believes that, in the interest of international comity, 
making substituted compliance generally available for the requirements 
discussed in the Final Rule is appropriate.
    IATP stated that the Commission should not make the costs of 
complying with, or economic benefits from, substituted compliance a 
decision criterion for comparability determinations, and that 
participation in U.S. markets is a privilege with consequent costs and 
benefits. Such costs and benefits drive the underlying policy of the 
substituted compliance regime as discussed in this Final Rule, rather 
than the decision-making that accompanies an individual comparability 
determination assessment.
(iii) Comparability Determinations
    As noted in section VI.D above, under the Final Rule, a 
comparability determination may be requested by: (1) Eligible swap 
entities; (2) trade associations whose members are eligible swap 
entities; or (3) foreign regulatory authorities that have direct 
supervisory authority over eligible swap entities and are responsible 
for administering the relevant foreign jurisdiction's swap 
requirements.\564\ Once a comparability determination is made for a 
jurisdiction, it applies for all entities or transactions in that 
jurisdiction to the extent provided in the determination, as approved 
by the Commission.\565\ Accordingly, given that the Final Rule will 
have no effect on any existing comparability determinations, swap 
entities may continue to rely on such determinations with no effect on 
the costs or benefits of such reliance. To the extent that an entity 
wishes to request a new comparability determination pursuant to the 
Final Rule, it will incur costs associated with the preparation and 
filing of a submission request. However, the Commission anticipates 
that a person would not elect to incur the costs of submitting a 
request for a comparability determination unless such costs were 
exceeded by the cost savings associated with substituted compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \564\ Final Sec.  23.23(g)(2).
    \565\ Final Sec.  23.23(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule includes a standard of review that allows for a 
holistic, outcomes-based approach that enables the Commission to 
consider any factor it deems relevant in assessing comparability. 
Further, in determining whether a foreign regulatory standard is 
comparable to a corresponding Commission requirement, the Final Rule

[[Page 56992]]

allows the Commission to consider the broader context of a foreign 
jurisdiction's related regulatory requirements. Allowing for a 
comparability determination to be made based on comparable outcomes, 
notwithstanding potential differences in foreign jurisdictions' 
relevant standards, helps to ensure that substituted compliance is made 
available to the fullest extent possible. While the Commission 
recognizes that, to the extent that a foreign swap regime is not deemed 
comparable in all respects, swap entities eligible for substituted 
compliance may incur costs from being required to comply with more than 
one set of specified swap requirements, the Commission believes that 
this approach is preferable to an all-or-nothing approach, in which 
market participants may be forced to comply with both regimes in their 
entirety.
9. Recordkeeping
    The Final Rule also requires swap entities to create and retain 
records of their compliance with the Final Rule.\566\ Given that swap 
entities are already subject to robust recordkeeping requirements, the 
Commission believes that swap entities will only incur incremental 
costs, which are expected to be minor, in modifying their existing 
systems and policies and procedures resulting from changes to the 
status quo made by the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \566\ Final Sec.  23.23(h)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Alternatives Considered
    The Commission carefully considered several alternatives to various 
provisions of the Final Rule. In determining whether to accept or 
reject each alternative, the Commission considered the potential costs 
and benefits associated with each alternative.
    For example, the Commission considered Better Markets' suggestion 
that the Commission add two additional tests to determine whether an 
entity is a significant subsidiary. Better Markets proposed that if an 
entity were to meet a risk transfer test, measuring the notional amount 
of swaps that are back-to-backed with U.S. entities, or a risk 
acceptance test, measuring the trading activity of the subsidiary over 
a three month time period, then the entity should be considered a 
significant subsidiary. The Commission declined to include these two 
tests because these activity-based tests do not provide a measure of 
risk that a subsidiary poses to a parent entity, and thus would 
potentially subject a greater number of entities to certain Commission 
regulations without providing a significant reduction in systemic risk.
    Similarly, the Commission considered IIB/SIFMA's comment that the 
application of the group B requirements to swaps of Guaranteed Swap 
Entities and SRS Swap Entities should conform to the Guidance, so as to 
reduce the competitive disadvantages faced by such swap entities and 
their counterparties when they are subject to U.S. rules 
extraterritorially. The Commission declined to adopt this alternative, 
citing the fact that the group B requirements relate to risk 
mitigation, and SRS Swap Entities and Guaranteed Swap Entities may pose 
significant risk to the United States. However, the Commission 
acknowledged the potential competitive disadvantages that such 
application may pose to Guaranteed Swap Entities and SRS Swap Entities 
(as opposed to foreign branches of U.S. swap entities), and therefore 
also adopted the Limited Swap Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity Group B 
Exception in an effort to reduce potential burdens to such entities 
without sacrificing the important risk mitigation goals associated with 
the group B requirements.
    On the other hand, the Commission adopted certain alternatives to 
elements of the Proposed Rule. For example, CS and IIB/SIFMA stated 
that the exclusion for subsidiaries of BHCs in the SRS definition 
should be expanded to include those entities that are subsidiaries of 
IHCs. These commenters noted that IHCs are subject to prudential 
regulation, including Basel III capital requirements, stress testing, 
liquidity, and risk management requirements. The Commission determined 
that IHCs are subject to prudential standards by the Federal Reserve 
Board that are similar to those to which BHCs are subject. In general, 
IHCs and BHCs of similar size are subject to similar liquidity, risk 
management, stress testing, and credit limit standards. Therefore, for 
the same risk-based reasons that the Commission proposed to exclude 
subsidiaries of BHCs from the definition of SRS, the Commission is 
expanding the SRS exclusion to include subsidiaries of both BHCs and 
IHCs in Sec.  23.23(a)(13)(i).
    The Commission is also adopting an alternative raised by IIB/SIFMA, 
who recommended that the Commission expand the proposed Non-U.S. Swap 
Entity Group B Exception and the Limited Foreign Branch Group B 
Exception by applying the exceptions to swaps with an SRS that is not a 
swap entity, so as to avoid inappropriately burdening the foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations and their 
counterparties. In doing so, the Commission acknowledges that applying 
the group B requirements to a swap entity's swaps indirectly affects 
their counterparties, including SRS End User counterparties, by 
requiring them to execute documentation (e.g., compliant swap trading 
relationship documentation), and engage in portfolio reconciliation and 
compression exercises as a condition to entering into swaps with swap 
entity counterparties. Accordingly, mandating compliance with these 
obligations may cause counterparties, including SRS End Users, to face 
increased costs relative to their competitors not affected by the 
application of the group B requirements (e.g., for legal fees or as a 
result of costs being passed on to them by their swap entity 
counterparties) and/or to potentially lose access to key interest rate 
or currency hedging products. Also, because the SRS test depends on a 
non-U.S. counterparty's internal organizational structure and financial 
metrics and it would be difficult to rule out any category of non-U.S. 
counterparties as being an SRS, the proposed application of group B 
requirements to all SRSs may cause swap entities to obtain SRS 
representations from nearly their entire non-U.S. client bases, 
potentially increasing costs for all of these clients.
    In light of the importance of ensuring that an SRS, particularly a 
commercial or non-financial entity, continues to have access to swap 
liquidity for hedging or other non-dealing purposes, the Commission 
expanded the exceptions to apply to SRS End Users. The Commission noted 
that an SRS End User does not pose as significant a risk to the United 
States as an SRS Swap Entity or a Guaranteed Entity, because an SRS End 
User: (1) Has a less direct connection to the United States than a 
Guaranteed Entity; and (2) has been involved, at most, in only a de 
minimis amount of swap dealing activity, or has swap positions below 
the MSP thresholds, such that it is not required to register as a SD or 
MSP, respectively.
    The Commission considered several other alternatives to the Final 
Rule, which are discussed in detail throughout this release.\567\ In 
each instance, the Commission considered the costs and burdens of the 
Final Rule and the regulatory benefits that the Final Rule seeks to 
achieve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \567\ See supra sections II-VI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. Section 15(a) Factors
    Section 15(a) of the CEA \568\ requires the Commission to consider 
the costs and benefits of its actions before

[[Page 56993]]

promulgating a regulation under the CEA or issuing certain orders. 
Section 15(a) further specifies that the costs and benefits shall be 
evaluated in light of five broad areas of market and public concern: 
(1) Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price 
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public 
interest considerations. The Commission considers the costs and 
benefits resulting from its discretionary determinations with respect 
to the section 15(a) factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \568\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(i) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    The Commission believes the Final Rule will support protection of 
market participants and the public. By focusing on and capturing swap 
dealing transactions and swap positions involving U.S. persons, SRSs, 
and Guaranteed Entities, the Final Rule's approach to the cross-border 
application of the SD and MSP registration threshold calculations works 
to ensure that, consistent with CEA section 2(i) and the policy 
objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act, significant participants in the U.S. 
market are subject to these requirements. The cross-border approach to 
the group A, group B, and group C requirements similarly ensures that 
these requirements apply to swap activities that are particularly 
likely to affect the integrity of, and raise concerns about, the 
protection of participants in the U.S. market while, consistent with 
principles of international comity, recognizing the supervisory 
interests of the relevant foreign jurisdictions in applying their own 
requirements to transactions involving non-U.S. swap entities and 
foreign branches of U.S. swap entities with non-U.S. persons and 
foreign branches of U.S. swap entities.
(ii) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the 
Markets
    To the extent that the Final Rule leads additional entities to 
register as SDs or MSPs, the Commission believes that the Final Rule 
will enhance the financial integrity of the markets by bringing 
significant U.S. swap market participants under Commission oversight, 
which may reduce market disruptions and foster confidence and 
transparency in the U.S. market. The Commission recognizes that the 
Final Rule's cross-border approach to the SD and MSP registration 
thresholds may create competitive disparities among market 
participants, based on the degree of their connection to the United 
States, that could contribute to market deficiencies, including market 
fragmentation and decreased liquidity, as certain market participants 
may reduce their exposure to the U.S. market. As a result of reduced 
liquidity, counterparties may pay higher prices, in terms of bid-ask 
spreads. Such competitive effects and market deficiencies may, however, 
be mitigated by global efforts to harmonize approaches to swap 
regulation and by the large inter-dealer market, which may link the 
fragmented markets and enhance liquidity in the overall market. The 
Commission believes that the Final Rule's approach is necessary and 
appropriately tailored to ensure that the purposes of the Dodd-Frank 
Act swap regime and its registration requirements are advanced while 
still establishing a workable approach that recognizes foreign 
regulatory interests and reduces competitive disparities and market 
deficiencies to the extent possible. The Commission further believes 
that the Final Rule's cross-border approach to the group A, group B, 
and group C requirements will promote the financial integrity of the 
markets by fostering transparency and confidence in the significant 
participants in the U.S. swap markets.
(iii) Price Discovery
    The Commission recognizes that the Final Rule's approach to the 
cross-border application of the SD and MSP registration thresholds and 
group A, group B, and group C requirements could have an effect on 
liquidity, which may in turn influence price discovery. As liquidity in 
the swap market is lessened and fewer dealers compete against one 
another, bid-ask spreads (cost of swap and cost to hedge) may widen and 
the ability to observe an accurate price of a swap may be hindered. 
However, as noted above, these negative effects will be mitigated as 
jurisdictions harmonize their swap regimes and global financial 
institutions continue to manage their swap books (i.e., moving risk 
with little or no cost, across an institution to market centers, where 
there is the greatest liquidity). The Commission does not believe that 
the Final Rule's approach to the group A, group B, and group C 
requirements will have a noticeable effect on price discovery.
(iv) Sound Risk Management Practices
    The Commission believes that the Final Rule's approach could 
promote the development of sound risk management practices by ensuring 
that significant participants in the U.S. market are subject to 
Commission oversight (via registration), including in particular 
important counterparty disclosure and recordkeeping requirements that 
will encourage policies and practices that promote fair dealing while 
discouraging abusive practices in U.S. markets. On the other hand, to 
the extent that a registered SD or MSP relies on the exceptions in the 
Final Rule, and is located in a jurisdiction that does not have 
comparable swap requirements, the Final Rule could lead to weaker risk 
management practices for such entities.
(v) Other Public Interest Considerations
    The Commission believes that the Final Rule is consistent with 
principles of international comity. The Commission has carefully 
considered, among other things, the level of foreign jurisdictions' 
supervisory interests over the subject activity and the extent to which 
the activity takes place within a particular foreign territory. In 
doing so, the Commission has strived to minimize conflicts with the 
laws of other jurisdictions while seeking, pursuant to section 2(i), to 
apply the swaps requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act to activities 
outside the United States that have a direct and significant connection 
with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce.
    The Commission believes the Final Rule appropriately accounts for 
these competing interests, ensuring that the Commission can discharge 
its responsibilities to protect the U.S. markets, market participants, 
and financial system, consistent with international comity. Of 
particular relevance is the Commission's approach to substituted 
compliance in the Final Rule, which mitigates burdens associated with 
potentially duplicative foreign laws and regulations in light of the 
supervisory interests of foreign regulators in entities domiciled and 
operating in their own jurisdictions.

D. Antitrust Laws

    Section 15(b) of the CEA requires the Commission to take into 
consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws 
and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achieving the 
objectives of the CEA, as well as the policies and purposes of the CEA, 
in issuing any order or adopting any Commission rule or regulation 
(including any exemption under section 4(c) or 4c(b)), or in requiring 
or approving any bylaw, rule, or regulation of a contract market or 
registered futures association established pursuant to section 17 of 
the CEA.\569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \569\ 7 U.S.C. 19(b).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 56994]]

    The Commission believes that the public interest to be protected by 
the antitrust laws is generally to protect competition. The Commission 
requested and did not receive any comments on whether the Proposed Rule 
implicated any other specific public interest to be protected by the 
antitrust laws.
    The Commission has considered the Final Rule to determine whether 
it is anticompetitive and has identified no significant discretionary 
anticompetitive effects.\570\ The Commission requested and did not 
receive any comments on whether the Proposed Rule was anticompetitive 
and, if it was, what the anticompetitive effects are.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \570\ The Final Rule is being adopted pursuant to the direction 
of Congress in section 2(i) of the CEA, as discussed in section I.D, 
that the swap provisions of the CEA enacted by Title VII of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, including any rule prescribed or regulation 
promulgated under the CEA, shall not apply to activities outside the 
United States unless those activities have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United 
States, or they contravene Commission rules or regulations as are 
necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of the swap provisions 
of the CEA enacted under Title VII. As discussed above, the degree 
of any competitive disparity will depend on the degree of disparity 
between the Commission's requirements and that of the relevant 
foreign jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the Commission has determined that the Final Rule is not 
anticompetitive and has no significant discretionary anticompetitive 
effects and received no comments on its determination on the Proposed 
Rule, the Commission has not identified any less anticompetitive means 
of achieving the purposes of the CEA.

XI. Preamble Summary Tables

A. Table A--Cross-Border Application of the SD De Minimis Threshold

    Table A should be read in conjunction with the text of the Final 
Rule.
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14SE20.000

B. Table B--Cross-Border Application of the MSP Threshold

    Table B should be read in conjunction with the text of the Final 
Rule.

[[Page 56995]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14SE20.001

C. Table C--Cross-Border Application of the Group B Requirements in 
Consideration of Related Exceptions and Substituted Compliance

    Table C \571\ should be read in conjunction with the text of the 
Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \571\ As discussed in section VI.A.2, supra, the group B 
requirements are set forth in Sec. Sec.  23.202, 23.501, 23.502, 
23.503, and 23.504 and relate to (1) swap trading relationship 
documentation; (2) portfolio reconciliation and compression; (3) 
trade confirmation; and (4) daily trading records. Exceptions from 
the group B requirements are discussed in sections VI.B.2, VI.B.4, 
and VI.B.5, supra. Substituted compliance for the group B 
requirements is discussed in section VI.C, supra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 56996]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14SE20.002

D. Table D--Cross-Border Application of the Group C Requirements in 
Consideration of Related Exceptions

    Table D \572\ should be read in conjunction with the text of the 
Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \572\ As discussed in section VI.A.3, supra, the group C 
requirements are set forth in Sec. Sec.  23.400 through 23.451 and 
23.700 through 23.704 and relate to certain business conduct 
standards governing the conduct of SDs and MSPs in dealing with 
their swap counterparties, and the segregation of assets held as 
collateral in certain uncleared swaps. Exceptions from the group C 
requirements are discussed in sections VI.B.2 and VI.B.3, supra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 56997]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14SE20.003

BILLING CODE 6351-01-C

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 23

    Business conduct standards, Counterparties, Cross-border, 
Definitions, De minimis exception, Major swap participants, Swaps, Swap 
Dealers.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR part 23 as follows:

PART 23--SWAP DEALERS AND MAJOR SWAP PARTICIPANTS

0
1. The authority citation for part 23 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6b, 6b-1, 6c, 6p, 6r, 6s, 6t, 
9, 9a, 12, 12a, 13b, 13c, 16a, 18, 19, 21.

    Section 23.160 also issued under 7 U.S.C. 2(i); Sec. 721(b), 
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1641 (2010).


0
2. Add Sec.  23.23 to read as follows:


Sec.  23.23   Cross-border application.

    (a) Definitions. Solely for purposes of this section the terms 
listed in this paragraph (a) have the meanings set forth in paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (24) of this section. A person may rely on a written 
representation from its counterparty that the counterparty does or does 
not satisfy the criteria for one or more of the definitions listed in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (24) of this section, unless such person 
knows or has reason to know that the representation is not accurate; 
for the purposes of this rule a person would have reason to know the 
representation is not accurate if a reasonable person should know, 
under all of the facts of which the person is aware, that it is not 
accurate.
    (1) An affiliate of, or a person affiliated with a specific person, 
means a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common 
control with, the person specified.
    (2) Control including the terms controlling, controlled by, and 
under common control with, means the possession, direct or indirect, of 
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and 
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting shares, 
by contract, or otherwise.
    (3) Foreign branch means any office of a U.S. bank that:
    (i) Is located outside the United States;
    (ii) Operates for valid business reasons;
    (iii) Maintains accounts independently of the home office and of 
the accounts of other foreign branches, with the profit or loss accrued 
at each branch determined as a separate item for each foreign branch; 
and
    (iv) Is engaged in the business of banking and is subject to 
substantive regulation in banking or financing in the jurisdiction 
where it is located.
    (4) Foreign-based swap means:
    (i) A swap by a non-U.S. swap entity, except for a swap booked in a 
U.S. branch; or
    (ii) A swap conducted through a foreign branch.
    (5) Foreign counterparty means:
    (i) A non-U.S. person, except with respect to a swap booked in a 
U.S. branch of that non-U.S. person; or
    (ii) A foreign branch where it enters into a swap in a manner that 
satisfies the definition of a swap conducted through a foreign branch.
    (6) Group A requirements mean the requirements set forth in Sec.  
3.3 of this chapter, Sec. Sec.  23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 
23.603, 23.605, 23.606, 23.607, 23.609 and, to the extent it duplicates 
Sec.  23.201, Sec.  45.2(a) of this chapter.

[[Page 56998]]

    (7) Group B requirements mean the requirements set forth in 
Sec. Sec.  23.202 and 23.501 through 23.504.
    (8) Group C requirements mean the requirements set forth in 
Sec. Sec.  23.400 through 23.451 and 23.700 through 23.704.
    (9) Guarantee means an arrangement pursuant to which one party to a 
swap has rights of recourse against a guarantor, with respect to its 
counterparty's obligations under the swap. For these purposes, a party 
to a swap has rights of recourse against a guarantor if the party has a 
conditional or unconditional legally enforceable right to receive or 
otherwise collect, in whole or in part, payments from the guarantor 
with respect to its counterparty's obligations under the swap. In 
addition, in the case of any arrangement pursuant to which the 
guarantor has a conditional or unconditional legally enforceable right 
to receive or otherwise collect, in whole or in part, payments from any 
other guarantor with respect to the counterparty's obligations under 
the swap, such arrangement will be deemed a guarantee of the 
counterparty's obligations under the swap by the other guarantor. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, until December 31, 2027, a person may 
continue to classify counterparties based on:
    (i) Representations that were made pursuant to the ``guarantee'' 
definition in Sec.  23.160(a)(2) prior to the effective date of this 
section; or
    (ii) Representations made pursuant to the interpretation of the 
term ``guarantee'' in the Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement 
Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 
26, 2013), prior to the effective date of this section.
    (10) Non-U.S. person means any person that is not a U.S. person.
    (11) Non-U.S. swap entity means a swap entity that is not a U.S. 
swap entity.
    (12) Parent entity means any entity in a consolidated group that 
has one or more subsidiaries in which the entity has a controlling 
interest, as determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP.
    (13) Significant risk subsidiary means any non-U.S. significant 
subsidiary of an ultimate U.S. parent entity where the ultimate U.S. 
parent entity has more than $50 billion in global consolidated assets, 
as determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP at the end of the most 
recently completed fiscal year, but excluding non-U.S. subsidiaries 
that are:
    (i) Subject to consolidated supervision and regulation by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as a subsidiary of a U.S. 
bank holding company or an intermediate holding company; or
    (ii) Subject to capital standards and oversight by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor that are consistent with the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision's ``International Regulatory Framework for Banks'' 
and subject to margin requirements for uncleared swaps in a 
jurisdiction that the Commission has found comparable pursuant to a 
published comparability determination with respect to uncleared swap 
margin requirements.
    (14) Significant subsidiary means a subsidiary, including its 
subsidiaries, which meets any of the following conditions:
    (i) The three year rolling average of the subsidiary's equity 
capital is equal to or greater than five percent of the three year 
rolling average of the ultimate U.S. parent entity's consolidated 
equity capital, as determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP as of the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year;
    (ii) The three year rolling average of the subsidiary's total 
revenue is equal to or greater than ten percent of the three year 
rolling average of the ultimate U.S. parent entity's total consolidated 
revenue, as determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP as of the end of 
the most recently completed fiscal year; or
    (iii) The three year rolling average of the subsidiary's total 
assets is equal to or greater than ten percent of the three year 
rolling average of the ultimate U.S. parent entity's total consolidated 
assets, as determined in accordance with U.S. GAAP as of the end of the 
most recently completed fiscal year.
    (15) Subsidiary means an affiliate of a person controlled by such 
person directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries.
    (16) Swap booked in a U.S. branch means a swap entered into by a 
U.S. branch where the swap is reflected in the local accounts of the 
U.S. branch.
    (17) Swap conducted through a foreign branch means a swap entered 
into by a foreign branch where:
    (i) The foreign branch or another foreign branch is the office 
through which the U.S. person makes and receives payments and 
deliveries under the swap pursuant to a master netting or similar 
trading agreement, and the documentation of the swap specifies that the 
office for the U.S. person is such foreign branch;
    (ii) The swap is entered into by such foreign branch in its normal 
course of business; and
    (iii) The swap is reflected in the local accounts of the foreign 
branch.
    (18) Swap entity means a person that is registered with the 
Commission as a swap dealer or major swap participant pursuant to the 
Act.
    (19) Ultimate U.S. parent entity means the U.S. parent entity that 
is not a subsidiary of any other U.S. parent entity.
    (20) United States and U.S. means the United States of America, its 
territories and possessions, any State of the United States, and the 
District of Columbia.
    (21) U.S. branch means a branch or agency of a non-U.S. banking 
organization where such branch or agency:
    (i) Is located in the United States;
    (ii) Maintains accounts independently of the home office and other 
U.S. branches, with the profit or loss accrued at each branch 
determined as a separate item for each U.S. branch; and
    (iii) Engages in the business of banking and is subject to 
substantive banking regulation in the state or district where located.
    (22) U.S. GAAP means U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.
    (23) U.S. person:
    (i) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(23)(iii) of this section, 
U.S. person means any person that is:
    (A) A natural person resident in the United States;
    (B) A partnership, corporation, trust, investment vehicle, or other 
legal person organized, incorporated, or established under the laws of 
the United States or having its principal place of business in the 
United States;
    (C) An account (whether discretionary or non-discretionary) of a 
U.S. person; or
    (D) An estate of a decedent who was a resident of the United States 
at the time of death.
    (ii) For purposes of this section, principal place of business 
means the location from which the officers, partners, or managers of 
the legal person primarily direct, control, and coordinate the 
activities of the legal person. With respect to an externally managed 
investment vehicle, this location is the office from which the manager 
of the vehicle primarily directs, controls, and coordinates the 
investment activities of the vehicle.
    (iii) The term U.S. person does not include the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations, and their 
agencies and pension plans, and any other similar international 
organizations, and their agencies and pension plans.

[[Page 56999]]

    (iv) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(23)(i) of this section, until 
December 31, 2027, a person may continue to classify counterparties as 
U.S. persons based on:
    (A) Representations made pursuant to the ``U.S. person'' definition 
in Sec.  23.160(a)(10) prior to the effective date of this section; or
    (B) Representations made pursuant to the interpretation of the term 
``U.S. person'' in the Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement 
Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 
26, 2013), prior to the effective date of this section.
    (24) U.S. swap entity means a swap entity that is a U.S. person.
    (b) Cross-border application of swap dealer de minimis registration 
threshold calculation. For purposes of determining whether an entity 
engages in more than a de minimis quantity of swap dealing activity 
under paragraph (4)(i) of the swap dealer definition in Sec.  1.3 of 
this chapter, a person shall include the following swaps (subject to 
paragraph (d) of this section and paragraph (6) of the swap dealer 
definition in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter):
    (1) If such person is a U.S. person or a significant risk 
subsidiary, all swaps connected with the dealing activity in which such 
person engages.
    (2) If such person is a non-U.S. person (other than a significant 
risk subsidiary), all of the following swaps connected with the dealing 
activity in which such person engages:
    (i) Swaps with a counterparty that is a U.S. person, other than 
swaps conducted through a foreign branch of a registered swap dealer.
    (ii) Swaps where the obligations of such person under the swaps are 
subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person.
    (iii) Swaps with a counterparty that is a non-U.S. person where the 
counterparty's obligations under the swaps are subject to a guarantee 
by a U.S. person, except when:
    (A) The counterparty is registered as a swap dealer; or
    (B) The counterparty's swaps are subject to a guarantee by a U.S. 
person that is a non-financial entity; or
    (C) The counterparty is itself below the swap dealer de minimis 
threshold under paragraph (4)(i) of the swap dealer definition in Sec.  
1.3, and is affiliated with a registered swap dealer.
    (c) Cross-border application of major swap participant tests. For 
purposes of determining a person's status as a major swap participant, 
as defined in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter, a person shall include the 
following swap positions (subject to paragraph (d) of this section and 
the major swap participant definition in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter):
    (1) If such person is a U.S. person or a significant risk 
subsidiary, all swap positions that are entered into by the person.
    (2) If such person is a non-U.S. person (other than a significant 
risk subsidiary), all of the following swap positions of such person:
    (i) Swap positions where the counterparty is a U.S. person, other 
than swaps conducted through a foreign branch of a registered swap 
dealer.
    (ii) Swap positions where the obligations of such person under the 
swaps are subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person.
    (iii) Swap positions with a counterparty that is a non-U.S. person 
where the counterparty's obligations under the swaps are subject to a 
guarantee by a U.S. person, except when the counterparty is registered 
as a swap dealer.
    (d) Exception from counting for certain exchange-traded and cleared 
swaps. Notwithstanding any other provision of Sec.  23.23, for purposes 
of determining whether a non-U.S. person (other than a significant risk 
subsidiary or a non-U.S. person whose performance under the swap is 
subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person) engages in more than a de 
minimis quantity of swap dealing activity under paragraph (4)(i) of the 
swap dealer definition in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter or for determining 
the non-U.S. person's status as a major swap participant as defined in 
Sec.  1.3 of this chapter, such non-U.S. person does not need to count 
any swaps or swap positions, as applicable, that are entered into by 
such non-U.S. person on a designated contract market, a registered swap 
execution facility or a swap execution facility exempted from 
registration by the Commission pursuant to section 5h(g) of the Act, or 
a registered foreign board of trade, and cleared through a registered 
derivatives clearing organization or a clearing organization that has 
been exempted from registration by the Commission pursuant to section 
5b(h) of the Act, where the non-U.S. person does not know the identity 
of the counterparty to the swap prior to execution.
    (e) Exceptions from certain swap requirements for certain foreign 
swaps. (1) With respect to its foreign-based swaps, each non-U.S. swap 
entity and foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity shall be excepted from:
    (i) The group B requirements (other than Sec.  23.202(a) 
introductory text and (a)(1)) and the group C requirements with respect 
to any swap--
    (A) Entered into on a designated contract market, a registered swap 
execution facility or a swap execution facility exempted from 
registration by the Commission pursuant to section 5h(g) of the Act, or 
a registered foreign board of trade;
    (B) Cleared through a registered derivatives clearing organization 
or a clearing organization that has been exempted from registration by 
the Commission pursuant to section 5b(h) of the Act; and
    (C) Where the swap entity does not know the identity of the 
counterparty to the swap prior to execution; and
    (ii) The group C requirements with respect to any swap with a 
foreign counterparty.
    (2) A non-U.S. swap entity shall be excepted from the group C 
requirements with respect to any swap booked in a U.S. branch with a 
foreign counterparty that is neither a foreign branch nor a person 
whose performance under the swap is subject to a guarantee by a U.S. 
person.
    (3) With respect to its foreign-based swaps, each non-U.S. swap 
entity that is neither a significant risk subsidiary nor a person whose 
performance under the swap is subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person 
shall be excepted from the group B requirements with respect to any 
swap with a foreign counterparty (other than a foreign branch) that is 
neither--
    (i) A significant risk subsidiary that is a swap entity nor
    (ii) A person whose performance under the swap is subject to a 
guarantee by a U.S. person.
    (4) With respect to its foreign-based swaps, each foreign branch of 
a U.S. swap entity shall be excepted from the group B requirements with 
respect to any swap with a foreign counterparty (other than a foreign 
branch) that is neither a swap entity nor a person whose performance 
under the swap is subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person, subject to 
the following conditions:
    (i) A group B requirement is not eligible for the exception if the 
requirement, as applicable to the swap, is eligible for substituted 
compliance pursuant to a comparability determination issued by the 
Commission prior to the execution of the swap; and
    (ii) In any calendar quarter, the aggregate gross notional amount 
of swaps conducted by a swap entity in reliance on this exception does 
not exceed five percent (5%) of the aggregate gross notional amount of 
all its swaps.
    (5) With respect to its foreign-based swaps, each non-U.S. swap 
entity that is a significant risk subsidiary (an ``SRS

[[Page 57000]]

SE'') or a person whose performance under the swap is subject to a 
guarantee by a U.S. person (a ``Guaranteed SE'') shall be excepted from 
the group B requirements with respect to any swap with a foreign 
counterparty (other than a foreign branch) that is neither a swap 
entity nor a person whose performance under the swap is subject to a 
guarantee by a U.S. person, subject to the following conditions:
    (i) A group B requirement is not eligible for the exception if the 
requirement, as applicable to the swap, is eligible for substituted 
compliance pursuant to a comparability determination issued by the 
Commission prior to the execution of the swap; and
    (ii) In any calendar quarter, the aggregate gross notional amount 
of swaps conducted by an SRS SE or a Guaranteed SE in reliance on this 
exception aggregated with the gross notional amount of swaps conducted 
by all affiliated SRS SEs and Guaranteed SEs in reliance on this 
exception does not exceed five percent (5%) of the aggregate gross 
notional amount of all swaps entered into by the SRS SE or Guaranteed 
SE and all affiliated swap entities.
    (f) Substituted Compliance. (1) A non-U.S. swap entity may satisfy 
any applicable group A requirement by complying with the applicable 
standards of a foreign jurisdiction to the extent permitted by, and 
subject to any conditions specified in, a comparability determination 
issued by the Commission under paragraph (g) of this section;
    (2) With respect to its foreign-based swaps, a non-U.S. swap entity 
or foreign branch of a U.S. swap entity may satisfy any applicable 
group B requirement for a swap with a foreign counterparty by complying 
with the applicable standards of a foreign jurisdiction to the extent 
permitted by, and subject to any conditions specified in, a 
comparability determination issued by the Commission under paragraph 
(g) of this section; and
    (3) A non-U.S. swap entity may satisfy any applicable group B 
requirement for any swap booked in a U.S. branch with a foreign 
counterparty that is neither a foreign branch nor a person whose 
performance under the swap is subject to a guarantee by a U.S. person 
by complying with the applicable standards of a foreign jurisdiction to 
the extent permitted by, and subject to any conditions specified in, a 
comparability determination issued by the Commission under paragraph 
(g) of this section.
    (g) Comparability determinations. (1) The Commission may issue 
comparability determinations under this section on its own initiative.
    (2) Eligibility requirements. The following persons may, either 
individually or collectively, request a comparability determination 
with respect to some or all of the group A requirements and group B 
requirements:
    (i) A swap entity that is eligible, in whole or in part, for 
substituted compliance under this section or a trade association or 
other similar group on behalf of its members who are such swap 
entities; or
    (ii) A foreign regulatory authority that has direct supervisory 
authority over one or more swap entities subject to the group A 
requirements and/or group B requirements and that is responsible for 
administering the relevant foreign jurisdiction's swap standards.
    (3) Submission requirements. Persons requesting a comparability 
determination pursuant to this section shall electronically provide the 
Commission:
    (i) A description of the objectives of the relevant foreign 
jurisdiction's standards and the products and entities subject to such 
standards;
    (ii) A description of how the relevant foreign jurisdiction's 
standards address, at minimum, the elements or goals of the 
Commission's corresponding requirements or group of requirements. Such 
description should identify the specific legal and regulatory 
provisions that correspond to each element or goal and, if necessary, 
whether the relevant foreign jurisdiction's standards do not address a 
particular element or goal;
    (iii) A description of the differences between the relevant foreign 
jurisdiction's standards and the Commission's corresponding 
requirements, and an explanation regarding how such differing 
approaches achieve comparable outcomes;
    (iv) A description of the ability of the relevant foreign 
regulatory authority or authorities to supervise and enforce compliance 
with the relevant foreign jurisdiction's standards. Such description 
should discuss the powers of the foreign regulatory authority or 
authorities to supervise, investigate, and discipline entities for 
compliance with the standards and the ongoing efforts of the regulatory 
authority or authorities to detect and deter violations of, and ensure 
compliance with, the standards;
    (v) Copies of the foreign jurisdiction's relevant standards 
(including an English translation of any foreign language document); 
and
    (vi) Any other information and documentation that the Commission 
deems appropriate.
    (4) Standard of review. The Commission may issue a comparability 
determination pursuant to this section to the extent that it determines 
that some or all of the relevant foreign jurisdiction's standards are 
comparable to the Commission's corresponding requirements or group of 
requirements, or would result in comparable outcomes as the 
Commission's corresponding requirements or group of requirements, after 
taking into account such factors as the Commission determines are 
appropriate, which may include:
    (i) The scope and objectives of the relevant foreign jurisdiction's 
standards;
    (ii) Whether the relevant foreign jurisdiction's standards achieve 
comparable outcomes to the Commission's corresponding requirements;
    (iii) The ability of the relevant regulatory authority or 
authorities to supervise and enforce compliance with the relevant 
foreign jurisdiction's standards; and
    (iv) Whether the relevant regulatory authority or authorities has 
entered into a memorandum of understanding or other arrangement with 
the Commission addressing information sharing, oversight, examination, 
and supervision of swap entities relying on such comparability 
determination.
    (5) Reliance. Any swap entity that, in accordance with a 
comparability determination issued under this section, complies with a 
foreign jurisdiction's standards, would be deemed to be in compliance 
with the Commission's corresponding requirements. Accordingly, if a 
swap entity has failed to comply with the foreign jurisdiction's 
standards or a comparability determination, the Commission may initiate 
an action for a violation of the Commission's corresponding 
requirements. All swap entities, regardless of whether they rely on a 
comparability determination, remain subject to the Commission's 
examination and enforcement authority.
    (6) Discretion and Conditions. The Commission may issue or decline 
to issue comparability determinations under this section in its sole 
discretion. In issuing such a comparability determination, the 
Commission may impose any terms and conditions it deems appropriate.
    (7) Modifications. The Commission reserves the right to further 
condition, modify, suspend, terminate, or otherwise restrict a 
comparability determination issued under this section in the 
Commission's discretion.

[[Page 57001]]

    (8) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates to the 
Director of the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, or 
such other employee or employees as the Director may designate from 
time to time, the authority to request information and/or documentation 
in connection with the Commission's issuance of a comparability 
determination under this section.
    (h) Records, scope of application, effective and compliance dates--
(1) Records. Swap dealers and major swap participants shall create a 
record of their compliance with this section and shall retain records 
in accordance with Sec.  23.203.
    (2) Scope of Application. The requirements of this section shall 
not apply to swaps executed prior to September 14, 2021.
    (3) Effective date and compliance date. (i) This section shall be 
effective on the date that is 60 days following its publication in the 
Federal Register.
    (ii) Provided that swap dealers and major swap participants comply 
with the recordkeeping requirements in paragraph (h)(1) of this 
section, the exceptions in paragraph (e) of this section are effective 
upon the effective date of the rule.
    (iii) Swap dealers and major swap participants must comply with the 
requirements of this section no later than September 14, 2021.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 24, 2020, by the Commission.
Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.

    Note:  The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendices to Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds 
and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants--Commission Voting Summary, Chairman's Statement, and 
Commissioners' Statements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Quintenz and 
Stump voted in the affirmative. Commissioners Behnam and Berkovitz 
voted in the negative.

Appendix 2--Supporting Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert

    President John Adams once warned: ``Great is the guilt of 
unnecessary war.'' \1\ While he was obviously referring to military 
conflicts, his admonition applies to conflicts among nations more 
generally. Financial regulation has not been exempt from 
international discord. And in recent years, the CFTC's own cross-
border guidance on swaps has caused concerns about a regulatory arms 
race and the balkanization of global financial markets. Consider the 
following entreaties by our overseas allies and regulatory 
counterparts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, 19 May 1794 
[electronic edition]. Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive, 
Massachusetts Historical Society, http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``At a time of highly fragile economic growth, we believe that 
it is critical to avoid taking steps that risk withdrawal from 
global financial markets into inevitably less efficient regional or 
national markets.''

--Letter from the Finance Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, 
Japan, and the European Commission to CFTC Chairman regarding the 
CFTC's cross-border guidance (Oct. 17, 2012)

    ``We believe a failure to address [our] concerns could have 
unintended consequences, including increasing market fragmentation 
and, potentially, systemic risk in these markets, as well as unduly 
increasing the compliance burden on industry and regulators.''

--Letter from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Securities and 
Futures Commission of Hong Kong to CFTC Chairman regarding the 
CFTC's cross-border guidance (Aug. 27, 2012)

    ``. . . [U]sing personnel or agents located in the U.S. would 
not be a sufficient criterion supporting the duplication of 
applicable sets of rules to transactions [between non-U.S. persons,] 
and [we] ask you to consider not directly applying rules on this 
basis.''

--Letter from Steven Maijoor, Chair, European Securities and Markets 
Authority to Acting CFTC Chairman regarding the CFTC staff's ``ANE 
Advisory,'' No. 13-69 (Mar. 13, 2014)

    I will leave it to others to debate whether the international 
discord caused by the CFTC's cross-border guidance \2\ and related 
staff advisory \3\ was ``necessary'' at the time it was introduced. 
Far more constructive is for us to ask whether it is necessary 
today. For me, there is but one conclusion: Because nearly all G20 
jurisdictions have adopted similar swaps regulations pursuant to the 
Pittsburgh Accords,\4\ it is unnecessary for the CFTC to be the 
world's policeman for all swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 
2013) (``2013 Guidance''), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf.
    \3\ CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69 (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.cftc.gov/node/212831.
    \4\ Financial Stability Board, Annual Report on Implementation 
and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms 3 (Oct. 16, 
2019) (showing that a very large majority of FSB jurisdictions have 
implemented the G20 priority reforms for over-the-counter 
derivatives).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On this basis, I am pleased to support the Commission's final 
rule on the cross-border application of registration thresholds and 
certain requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants 
(``swap entities''). This final rule provides critically needed 
regulatory certainty to the global swaps markets. And I believe it 
properly balances protection of our national interests with 
appropriate deference to international counterparts.

Need for Rule-Based Finality

    As noted above, the Commission's 2013 Guidance left much to be 
desired by both our market participants and our regulatory 
colleagues overseas. The action was taken outside the standard 
rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act,\5\ so was 
merely ``guidance'' that is not technically enforceable. But because 
market participants as a practical matter followed it nonetheless, 
it had a sweeping impact on the global swaps markets. Over the 
intervening years, a patchwork of staff advisories and no-action 
letters has supplemented the 2013 Guidance. With almost seven years 
of experience, it is high time for the Commission to bring finality 
to the issues the 2013 Guidance and its progeny sought to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Congressional Mandate

    We call this final rule a ``cross-border'' rule, and in certain 
respects it is. For example, the rule addresses when non-U.S. 
persons must count dealing swaps with U.S. persons, including 
foreign branches of American banks, toward the de minimis threshold 
in our swap dealer definition. More fundamentally, however, the rule 
answers a basic question: What swap dealing activity outside the 
United States should trigger CFTC registration and other 
requirements?
    To answer this question, we must turn to section 2(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA''),\6\ a provision Congress added in 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 2(i) provides that the CEA 
does not apply to swaps activities outside the United States except 
in two circumstances: (1) Where activities have a ``direct and 
significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of 
the United States'' or (2) where they run afoul of the Commission's 
rules or regulations that prevent evasion of Title VII. Section 2(i) 
evidences Congress's clear intent for the U.S. swaps regulatory 
regime to stop at the water's edge, except where foreign activities 
either are closely and meaningfully related to U.S. markets or are 
vehicles to evade our laws and regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I believe the final rule we issue today is a levelheaded 
approach to the exterritorial application of our swap dealer 
registration regime and related requirements, and it fully 
implements the congressional mandate in section 2(i). At the same 
time, it acknowledges the important role played by the CFTC's 
domestic and international counterparts in regulating parts of the 
global swaps markets. In short, the final rule employs neither a 
full-throated ``intergalactic commerce clause'' \7\ nor an 
isolationist

[[Page 57002]]

mentality. It is thoughtful and balanced, and it will avoid future 
unnecessary conflicts among regulators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Commissioner Jill E. Sommers, Statement of Concurrence: (1) 
Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, Proposed Interpretive Guidance and Policy 
Statement; (2) Notice of Proposed Exemptive Order and Request for 
Comment Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (June 29, 
2012), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/sommersstatement062912 (noting that ``staff had been guided by what 
could only be called the `Intergalactic Commerce Clause' of the 
United States Constitution, in that every single swap a U.S. person 
enters into, no matter what the swap or where it was transacted, was 
stated to have a direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Guiding Principles for Regulating Foreign Activities

    As I have stated before,\8\ I am guided by three additional 
principles in considering the extent to which the CFTC should make 
use of our extraterritorial powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Statement of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert in Support of the 
Cross-Border Swaps Proposal (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement121819.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Protect the National Interest

    An important role of the CFTC is to protect and advance the 
interests of the United States. In this regard, Congress provided 
the CFTC with explicit extraterritorial power to safeguard the U.S. 
financial system where swaps activities are concerned.
    It is incumbent upon us to guard against risks created outside 
the United States flowing back into our country. But our focus 
cannot be on all risks. Congress made that clear in section 2(i). It 
would be a markedly poor use of American taxpayers' dollars to 
regulate swaps activities in far-flung lands simply to prevent every 
risk that might have a nexus to the United States. It would also 
divert the CFTC from channeling our resources where they matter the 
most: To our own markets and participants. The rule therefore 
focuses on instances where material risks from abroad are most 
likely to come back to the United States and where no one but the 
CFTC is responsible for those risks.
    Hence, guarantees of offshore swaps by U.S. parent companies are 
counted toward our registration requirements because that risk is 
effectively underwritten and borne in the United States. The same is 
true with the concept of a ``significant risk subsidiary'' 
(``SRS''). As explained in the rule, an SRS is a large non-U.S. 
subsidiary of a large U.S. company that deals in swaps outside the 
United States but (1) is not subject to comparable capital and 
margin requirements in its home country, and (2) is not a subsidiary 
of a holding company subject to consolidated supervision by an 
American regulator, namely the Federal Reserve Board. Our final 
cross-border rule requires an SRS to register as a swap dealer or 
major swap participant with the CFTC if the SRS exceeds the same 
registration thresholds as a U.S. firm operating within the United 
States. The national interest demands it.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The SRS concept is designed to address a potential situation 
where a U.S. entity establishes an offshore subsidiary to conduct 
its swap dealing business without an explicit guarantee on the swaps 
in order to avoid U.S. regulation. For example, the U.S.-regulated 
insurance company American International Group (``AIG'') nearly 
failed as a result of risk incurred by the London swap trading 
operations of its subsidiary AIG Financial Products. See, e.g., 
Congressional Oversight Panel, June Oversight Report, The AIG 
Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government's Exit Strategy 
(June 10, 2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf. If the Commission did not regulate SRSs, an 
AIG-type entity could establish a non-U.S. affiliate to conduct its 
swaps dealing business, and, so long as it did not explicitly 
guarantee the swaps, it would avoid application of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and bring risk created offshore back into the United States 
without appropriate regulatory safeguards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Follow Kant's Categorical Imperative

    As I said when we proposed this rule, I believe cross-border 
rulemaking should follow Kant's ``categorical imperative'': We 
should act according to the maxim that we wish all other rational 
people to follow, as if it were a universal law.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ ``Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the 
same time, will that it should become a universal law.'' Immanuel 
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) [1993], 
translated by James W. Ellington (3rd ed.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    What I take from that is that we should ourselves establish a 
regulatory regime that we believe should be the global convention. 
How would this work? Let me start by explaining how it would not 
work. If we impose our regulations on non-U.S. persons whenever they 
have a remote nexus to the United States, then we should be willing 
for all other jurisdictions to do the same. The end result would be 
absurdity, with everyone trying to regulate everyone else. And the 
duplicative and overlapping regulations would inevitably lead to 
fragmentation in the global swaps markets--itself a potential source 
of systemic risk.\11\ Instead, we should adopt a framework that 
applies CFTC regulations outside the United States only when it 
addresses one or more important risks to our markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See Financial Stability Board, Annual Report on 
Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms 3 
(Oct. 16, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, we should afford comity to other regulators who 
have adopted comparable regulations, just as we expect them to do 
for us. This is especially important when we evaluate whether 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies could pose a 
significant risk to our financial system. The categorical imperative 
leads us to an unavoidable result: We should not impose our 
regulations on the non-U.S. activities of non-U.S. companies in 
those jurisdictions that have comparable capital and margin 
requirements to our own.\12\ By the same token, when U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign companies operate within our borders, we 
expect them to follow our laws and regulations and not simply comply 
with rules from their home country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See, e.g., Comments of the European Commission in respect 
of CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69 regarding the applicability of 
certain CFTC regulations to the activity in the United States of 
swap dealers and major swap participants established in 
jurisdictions other than the United States (Mar. 10, 2014), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=59781&SearchText= (``In order to ensure that 
cross-border activity is not inhibited by the application of 
inconsistent, conflicting or duplicative rules, regulators must work 
together to provide for the application of one set of comparable 
rules, where our rules achieve the same outcomes. Rules should 
therefore include the possibility to defer to those of the host 
regulator in most cases.''); FSB Fragmentation Report, supra note 
11, at 8 (noting that the G20 ``has agreed that jurisdictions and 
regulators should be able to defer to each other when it is 
justified by the quality of their respective regulatory and 
enforcement regimes, based on similar outcomes in a non-
discriminatory way, paying due respect to home country regulation 
regimes'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Charity, it is often said, begins at home. The categorical 
imperative further compels us to avoid duplicating the work of other 
American regulators. If a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. financial 
institution is subject to consolidated regulation and supervision by 
the Federal Reserve Board, then we should defer to our domestic 
counterparts on questions of dealing activity outside the United 
States. The Federal Reserve Board has extensive regulatory and 
supervisory tools to ensure a holding company is prudent in its 
risk-taking at home and abroad.\13\ The CFTC instead should focus on 
regulating dealing activity within the United States or with U.S. 
persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ For example, the Federal Reserve Board requires all foreign 
branches and subsidiaries ``to ensure that their operations conform 
to high standards of banking and financial prudence.'' 12 CFR 
211.13(a)(1). Furthermore, they are subject to examinations on 
compliance. See Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, Section 
3550.0.9 (``The procedures involved in examining foreign 
subsidiaries of domestic bank holding companies are generally the 
same as those used in examining domestic subsidiaries engaged in 
similar activities.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Pursue SEC Harmonization Where Appropriate

    As I said in connection with our proposal of this rule, I find 
it surreal that the SEC and the CFTC, two federal agencies that 
regulate similar products pursuant to the same title of the same 
statute--with an explicit mandate to ``consult and coordinate'' with 
each other--have not agreed until today on how to define ``U.S. 
person.'' This failure to coordinate has unnecessarily increased 
operational and compliance costs for market participants.\14\ I am 
pleased that this final rule uses the same definition of ``U.S. 
person'' as the SEC's cross-border rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See, e.g., Futures Industry Association Letter re: 
Harmonization of SEC and CFTC Regulatory Frameworks (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://fia.org/articles/fia-offers-recommendations-cftc-and-sec-harmonization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To be sure, as my colleagues have said on several occasions, we 
should not harmonize with the SEC merely for the sake of 
harmonization.\15\ We should do so only if it

[[Page 57003]]

is sensible. In the first instance, we must determine whether 
Congress has explicitly asked us to do something different or 
implicitly did so by giving us a different statutory mandate. We 
must also consider whether differences in our respective products or 
markets warrant a divergent approach. Just as today's final rule 
takes steps toward harmonization, it also diverges where 
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. 
Berkovitz, Rulemaking to Provide Exemptive Relief for Family Office 
CPOs: Customer Protection Should be More Important than Relief for 
Billionaires (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement112519 (``The Commission 
eliminates the notice requirement largely on the basis that this 
will harmonize the Commission's regulations with those of the SEC. 
Harmonization for harmonization's sake is not a rational basis for 
agency action.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The approach we have taken with respect to ``ANE Transactions'' 
is deliberately different than the SEC's.\16\ ANE Transactions are 
swap (or security-based swap) transactions between two non-U.S. 
persons that are ``arranged, negotiated, or executed'' by their 
personnel or agents located in the United States, but booked to 
entities outside America. While some or all of the front-end sales 
activity takes place in the United States, the financial risk of the 
transactions resides overseas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rules and 
Guidance on Cross-Border Application of Certain Security-Based Swap 
Requirements, 85 FR 6270, 6272 (Feb. 4, 2020) (stating that ``the 
[SEC] continues to believe the `arranged, negotiated, or executed' 
criteria form an appropriate basis for applying Title VII 
requirements in the cross-border context'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Here, key differences in the markets for swaps and security-
based swaps are dispositive. The swaps market is far more global 
than the security-based swaps market. While commodities such as gold 
and oil are traded throughout the world, equity and debt securities 
trade predominantly in the jurisdictions where they were issued. For 
this reason, security-based swaps are inextricably tied to the 
underlying security, and vice versa. This is particularly the case 
with single-name credit default swaps, where the arranging, 
negotiating, or execution is typically done in the United States 
because the underlying reference entity is a U.S. company. More 
generally, security-based swaps can affect the price and liquidity 
of the underlying security, so the SEC has a legitimate interest in 
regulating transactions in those instruments. By contrast, because 
commodities are traded globally, there is less need for the CFTC to 
apply its swaps rules to ANE Transactions.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Under the final rule, persons engaging in any aspect of 
swap transactions within the United States remain subject to the CEA 
provisions and Commission regulations prohibiting the employment, or 
attempted employment, of manipulative, fraudulent, or deceptive 
devices, such as section 6(c)(1) of the CEA (7 U.S.C. 9(1)) and 
Commission regulation 180.1 (17 CFR 180.1). The Commission thus 
would retain anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority, and would 
continue to monitor the trading practices of non-U.S. persons that 
occur within the territory of the United States in order to enforce 
a high standard of customer protection and market integrity. Even 
where a swap is entered into by two non-U.S. persons, we have a 
significant interest in deterring fraudulent or manipulative conduct 
occurring within our borders, and we cannot let our country be a 
haven for such activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, as noted above, Congress directed the CFTC to regulate 
foreign swaps activities outside the United States that have a 
``direct and significant'' connection to our financial system. 
Congress did not give a similar mandate to the SEC. As a result, the 
SEC has not crafted its cross-border rule to extend to an SRS 
engaged in security-based swap dealing activity offshore that may 
pose a systemic risk to our financial system. Our rule does with 
respect to swaps, aiming to protect American taxpayers from another 
Enron conducting its swaps activities through a major foreign 
subsidiary without CFTC oversight.
    The final rule addresses Transaction-Level Requirements 
applicable to swap entities (specifically, the Group B and Group C 
requirements), but does not cover other Transaction-Level 
Requirements, such as the reporting, clearing, and trade execution 
requirements. The Commission intends to address these remaining 
Transaction-Level Requirements (the ``Unaddressed TLRs'') in 
connection with future cross-border rulemakings. Until such time, 
the Commission will not consider, as a matter of policy, a non-U.S. 
swap entity's use of their personnel or agents located in the United 
States to ``arrange, negotiate, or execute'' swap transactions with 
non-U.S. counterparties for purposes of determining whether 
Unaddressed TLRs apply to such transactions.
    In connection with the final rule, DSIO has withdrawn Staff 
Advisory No. 13-69,\18\ and, together with the Division of Clearing 
and Risk and the Division of Market Oversight, granted certain non-
U.S. swap dealers no-action relief with respect to the applicability 
of the Unaddressed TLRs to their transactions with non-U.S. 
counterparties that are arranged, negotiated, or executed in the 
United States. In Staff Advisory 13-69, the CFTC's staff applied 
Transaction-Level Requirements to ANE Transactions, without the 
Commission engaging in notice and comment rulemaking to determine 
whether such an application is appropriate. Going forward, I fully 
expect that the Commission will first conduct fact-finding to 
determine the extent to which ANE Transactions raise policy concerns 
that are not otherwise addressed by the CEA or our regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69 (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-69.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Refinements to the Proposed Rule

    In response to public comment, and consistent with the guiding 
principles described above, the final rule includes a number of 
refinements from the proposal issued last December. I will leave it 
to our extremely knowledgeable staff to outline all the changes in 
detail, but I will highlight some of the key refinements here. These 
principally concern the treatment of SRSs and U.S. branches of 
foreign swap entities.

1. Significant Risk Subsidiaries

    As noted, the SRS concept is not intended to reach subsidiaries 
of holding companies that are subject to consolidated supervision by 
the Federal Reserve Board. The final rule recognizes that 
intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations 
under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY are subject to such 
consolidated supervision, and to enhanced capital, liquidity, risk-
management, and stress-testing requirements. Accordingly, foreign 
subsidiaries of intermediate holding companies are excluded from the 
SRS definition under the final rule.
    In addition, the final rule recognizes that certain SRSs may act 
as ``customers'' or ``end users'' in the global swaps markets, 
engaging in only a de minimis level of swap dealing or no dealing 
activity at all. Consistent with the principle of focusing on risk 
to the United States, the ``Group B'' category of risk-mitigating 
regulatory requirements will not apply to swaps between a non-U.S. 
swap entity and an SRS that is simply an end user.\19\ This approach 
will help preserve end users' access to liquidity in foreign 
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ This exception applies only to ``Other Non-U.S. Person'' 
swap entities, i.e., non-U.S. swap entities that are neither an SRS 
nor an entity subject to a U.S. person guarantee (``guaranteed 
entity''). A non-U.S. swap entity that is an SRS or guaranteed 
entity would need to rely on the limited Group B exception discussed 
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For similar reasons, the final rule also provides a limited 
exception from the Group B requirements for a swap entity that is an 
SRS or a guaranteed entity--to the extent that swap entity's 
counterparty is an SRS end user or an Other Non-U.S. Person that is 
not a swap entity. In addition, the final rule clarifies that a non-
U.S. person that is not itself an SRS or a guaranteed entity need 
not count swaps with an SRS toward its swap dealer de minimis 
threshold, unless that SRS is a guaranteed entity.
    I believe these adjustments to the proposed SRS regime will 
further serve to channel our regulatory resources, while offering 
appropriate deference to our domestic and foreign regulatory 
counterparts.

2. U.S. Branches

    The final rule also includes two key changes to the treatment of 
U.S. branches of foreign swap entities. First, it expands the 
availability of substituted compliance for the Group B requirements 
to include swaps between such a U.S. branch, on the one hand, and an 
SRS or Other Non-U.S. Person, on the other.\20\ And second, it 
creates a new exception from the ``Group C'' external business 
conduct standards for swaps between U.S. branches and foreign 
counterparties (other than guaranteed entities and foreign branches 
of U.S. swap entities). These changes recognize that U.S. branches, 
though located on U.S. soil, are part of a non-U.S. legal entity. 
Accordingly, while such branches should be subject to certain risk-
mitigating regulations, they should not be subject to the full 
panoply of requirements applicable to true U.S. persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ This expansion of substituted compliance does not apply to 
swaps between two U.S. branches of non-U.S. swap entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion

    In sum, the final rule before us today provides a critical 
measure of regulatory certainty for the global swaps markets. I 
believe the rule is also a sensible and principled approach to 
addressing when foreign transactions should fall within the CFTC's 
swap entity registration and related requirements.
    I have noted before President Eisenhower's observation that 
``The world must learn to

[[Page 57004]]

work together, or finally it will not work at all.'' I sincerely 
hope our domestic and international counterparts will view today's 
action as a positive step toward further cooperation to provide 
sound regulation to the global swaps markets.

Appendix 3--Supporting Statement of Commissioner Brian Quintenz

    I am very pleased to support today's final rule interpreting 
Congress' statutory directive that the Commission may only regulate 
those foreign activities that ``have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on commerce, of the United 
States.'' \1\ As I noted when I supported the proposal last 
December, Congress deliberately placed a clear and strong limitation 
on the CFTC's extraterritorial reach, recognizing the need for 
international comity and deference in a global swaps market.\2\ 
Today's rule provides important safeguards to the US financial 
markets in delineating which cross-border swap activity must be 
counted towards potential registration with the Commission, and 
which transactions should be subject to the CFTC's business conduct 
requirements for swap dealers (SDs) and major swap participants 
(MSPs). At the same time, the final rule appropriately defers to 
foreign regulatory regimes to avoid duplicative regulation and 
disadvantaging U.S. institutions acting in foreign markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Sec. 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act.
    \2\ Supporting Statement of Commissioner Brian Quintenz 
Regarding Proposed Rule: Cross-Border Application of the 
Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to SDs 
and MSPs, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/quintenzstatement121819b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Today's rule achieves the goals for cross-border regulation that 
I articulated in a speech before the ISDA Annual Japan Conference in 
October of last year.\3\ I stated that each jurisdiction's 
recognition of, and deference to, the sovereignty of other 
jurisdictions is crucial in avoiding market fragmentation that poses 
serious risks to the liquidity and health of the derivatives 
markets. This rule properly grants deference to other jurisdictions 
by limiting the extent to which non-US counterparties must comply 
with significant aspects of the CFTC's regulatory framework for SDs 
and MSPs and by providing market participants with the opportunity 
to comply with local laws that the Commission has deemed comparable 
to the CFTC's regulations (``substituted compliance'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Remarks of CFTC Commissioner Brian Quintenz at 2019 ISDA 
Annual Japan Conference, ``Significant's Significance,'' https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Substituted Compliance

    As I noted with respect to the proposal, substituted compliance 
is the lynchpin of a global swaps market, and the absence of 
regulatory deference has been the fracturing sound we hear when the 
global swaps market fragments. The final rule provides a framework 
for substituted compliance with respect to two sets of regulations, 
``group A'' entity-level requirements, such as conflicts of interest 
policies and a risk management program, and ``group B'' transaction-
level requirements, such as daily trading records, confirmation, and 
portfolio reconciliation. While the Commission has issued 
substituted compliance determinations for entity-level requirements 
in six jurisdictions and for transaction-level requirements in two 
jurisdictions, they all contain exceptions for particular provisions 
of the Commission's regulations, and one of the transaction-level 
determinations partially addresses only two of the five regulations 
in group B.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ The determinations are available at, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/CDSCP/index.htm. The transaction-level 
determination partially addressing only two of the group B 
regulations is for Japan, 78 FR 78890 (Dec. 27, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Today's rule provides for a flexible, outcomes-based framework 
for future comparability determinations that will assess the goals 
of the Commission's regulations against the standards of its foreign 
counterparts' regimes, instead of directing the Commission to focus 
on a rigid line-by-line or even regulation-by-regulation 
comparison.\5\ More specifically, and a primary reason for my 
support of this final rule, under this new framework, the Commission 
can compare the goals of its regulations to the outcomes of foreign 
regulations on an entire group-wide basis, so that the standards of 
a foreign regime will be considered holistically compared to the 
goals of all the Commission's either group A or group B 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Regulation 23.23(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, this final rule allows the Commission to 
proactively assess and issue comparability determinations without 
waiting for a request from a jurisdiction. I recognize that several 
G-20 jurisdictions have made significant progress in the area of 
issuing transaction-level requirements, as evidenced by a recent 
report by the Financial Stability Board (FSB).\6\ I hope that the 
Commission will soon issue additional substituted compliance 
determinations in order that foreign firms registered as SDs with 
the Commission, as well as foreign branches of US SDs, can gain the 
efficiencies of complying with local laws for many of their 
transactions with non-US persons.\7\ Ideally, future determinations 
will provide for comprehensive, holistic substituted compliance in a 
particular jurisdiction for all transaction-level requirements in 
the CFTC's group B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: 2019 Progress Report on 
Implementation (Oct. 15, 2019), Table M, https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P151019.pdf.
    \7\ The availability of substituted compliance, depending on the 
status of the counterparty, is provided for in regulation 
23.23(f)(1) with respect to group A regulations and in 23.23(f)(2) 
through (3) with respect to group B regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ANE

    Today's rule properly eliminates the possibility that a non-US 
SD be required to follow many of the CFTC's transaction-level 
requirements for a swap opposite a non-US counterparty if US-based 
personnel of that SD ``arrange, negotiate, or execute'' (ANE) the 
swap. This action brings to a close almost seven years of 
uncertainty, beginning with the misguided DSIO Advisory of November 
2013.\8\ I note that the staff's no-action letter issued this week 
suspends enforcement of ANE with respect to transaction-level 
requirements not covered by today's rule, specifically in the areas 
of real-time reporting of swaps to data repositories and the 
clearing and trade execution requirements, pending future Commission 
rulemakings that address these rules in a cross-border context. I 
expect the Commission will issue such rules in the near future in 
order to provide the marketplace with legal certainty in these areas 
and formally dispense with the ANE construct, just as it has with 
respect to the requirements addressed today. I believe strongly that 
ANE has no place with respect to real-time reporting, the clearing 
requirement, or the trade execution requirement, just like it has no 
place with respect to the business conduct regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ CFTC Staff Advisory 13-69 (Nov. 14, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

US Guarantees and SRS

    Another important element of today's rule is that it only 
requires two, clearly defined classes of non-US entities to count 
all of their swaps towards the Commission's SD and MSP registration 
thresholds, and to generally comply with the Commission's SD and MSP 
rules if registered. The first is an entity whose obligations to a 
swap are guaranteed by a US person, under a standard consistent with 
the Commission's cross-border rule for uncleared swap margin 
requirements.\9\ The second is an entity deemed a ``significant risk 
subsidiary'' (SRS) of a US firm. It is very important that 
subsidiaries of US bank holding companies, including intermediate 
subsidiaries, are carved out from the SRS definition. Those firms 
are subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board, and, 
therefore, it does not make sense for the CFTC to deploy its 
precious resources to regulating those entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Regulation 23.160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Helping US SDs' Foreign Branches Compete

    Today's rule properly makes substituted compliance available for 
group B requirements to a foreign branch of a US SD similarly to how 
substituted compliance is available for many non-US SDs registered 
with the Commission. I expect that this will help these branches 
compete with local institutions in that they will be subject to the 
same rules. For example, the Commission has already granted 
substituted compliance to EU regulations with respect to certain 
group B regulations.\10\ As a result, both the EU branch of a US 
firm registered with the Commission as an SD and an EU firm 
registered as an SD could comply with many of the same EU rules for 
swaps with a US person or with a non-US person that is either US-
guaranteed or an SRS registered as an SD or MSP (``swap entity 
SRS''). Moreover, under the ``limited foreign branch group B 
exception,'' the foreign branch of a US firm would be excused from 
complying with any group B rules, subject to a 5% notional cap, for 
a swap with a non-US person that is neither US guaranteed nor a swap 
entity SRS. However, if substituted compliance has been provided in 
a jurisdiction, then instead of

[[Page 57005]]

being excused from the group B rules for those swaps, the foreign 
branch would have to comply with the local rules. Due to the fact 
that neither of the transaction-level determinations granted 
comparability for all of the group B requirements, with respect to 
those requirements not subject to a substituted compliance 
determination, the foreign branch may either comply with CFTC 
regulations or count the notional value of the swap towards its 5% 
limited group B exception. Clearly, the rules favor the possibility 
of substituted compliance, pursuant to which a foreign branch of a 
US firm would have no limitation in following local rules. I believe 
that group-wide comparability determinations, without any 
exceptions, would simplify this situation and make more consistent 
the treatment of US dealer's foreign branches and their local 
competitors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 78 FR 78878 (Dec. 27, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In conclusion, I am very pleased to have been a part of the 
Commission that accomplished this major milestone in a long road of 
issuing final regulations in the area of cross-border swaps 
oversight. I would like to thank the staff of the Division of Swap 
Dealer and Intermediary Oversight for all of their work in 
completing this final rule and to Chairman Tarbert for his 
leadership on this important issue.

Appendix 4--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rostin Behnam 
Introduction and Overview

    Today, by approving a final rule addressing the cross-border 
application of the registration thresholds and certain requirements 
applicable to swap dealers (``SDs'') and major swap participants 
(``MSPs'') (the ``Final Rule''), the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (``CFTC'' or ``Commission'') overlooks Dodd-Frank Act \1\ 
purposes, Congressional mandates thereunder, an opinion of the DC 
District Court,\2\ and multiple comments raising significant 
concerns. The Commission instead relies on broad deference that 
opens a gaping hole \3\ in the federal regulatory structure. I 
cannot support a decision to jettison a cross-border regime that has 
not proven unreasonable, inflexible, or ineffective in favor of an 
approach that fails to address the most critical concerns that the 
Dodd-Frank Act directed the CFTC to address in favor of ``more 
workable'' \4\ solutions. As the Final Rule opts to address the 
conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who 
are advantaged by it \5\ by usurping Congressional (and 
congressionally delegated) authority to rethink section 2(i) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'' or ``Act'') via prescriptive rules, 
I must respectfully dissent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (``Dodd-Frank Act'').
    \2\ SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F.Supp.3d 373 (D.D.C. 2014).
    \3\ See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (relied 
on by the Commission in the Final Rule at 1.D.2.(i) and in the 
Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swaps Regulations, 78 FR 45292, 45300 (Jul. 26, 2013) 
(``Guidance'') to support its interpretation of the Commission's 
cross-border authority over swap activities that as a class, or in 
the aggregate, have a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce--whether or not an 
individual swap may satisfy the statutory standard.).
    \4\ See, e.g., Final Rule at II.C.3.
    \5\ See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Almost ten years ago to the day, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as a legislative 
response to the 2008 financial crisis. Driven by a series of 
systemic failures, the crisis laid bare that the essentially 
unregulated and unmonitored over-the-counter derivatives or 
``swaps'' markets were not the bastions of efficiency, stability, 
and resiliency they were thought to be.\6\ Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act gave the Commission new and broad authority to regulate 
the swaps market to address and mitigate risks arising from swap 
activities.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 385-86 (citing Inv. Co. Inst. v. 
CFTC, 891 F.Supp.2d 162, 171, 173 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd, 720 F.3d 370 
(D.C. Cir. 2013)).
    \7\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45299.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although much of the over-the-counter derivatives market's 
contributions to the 2008 financial crisis completed their journey 
within the continental U.S., the risk originated in foreign 
jurisdictions.\8\ Accordingly, Congress provided in CEA section 2(i) 
that the provisions of Title VII, as well as any rules or 
regulations issued by the CFTC, apply to cross-border activities 
when certain conditions are met.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45293-45295; see also SIFMA, 67 
F.Supp.3d at 387-88 (describing the ``several poster children for 
the 2008 financial crisis'' that demonstrate the impact that 
overseas over-the-counter derivatives swaps trading can have on a 
U.S. parent corporation).
    \9\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The D.C. District Court recognized that ``Section 2(i) operates 
independently, without the need for implementing regulations, and 
that the CFTC is well within its discretion to proceed by case-by-
case adjudications, rather than rulemaking, when applying Section 
2(i)'s jurisdictional nexus.'' \10\ The D.C. District Court also 
found that, because the Commission was ``not required to issue any 
rules (let alone binding rules) regarding its intended enforcement 
policies pursuant to Section 2(i),'' the CFTC's decision to issue 
the Guidance as a non-binding policy statement benefits market 
participants.\11\ To the extent the CFTC interpreted the meaning of 
CEA section 2(i) in its 2013 cross-border Guidance, an 
interpretation carried forward in the Final Rule today (and in its 
proposal), such interpretation is permissibly drawn linguistically 
from the statute and, regardless, cannot substantively change the 
legislative reach of section 2(i) or the Title VII regime.\12\ In 
this regard, the interpretation reinforces the direct meaning of CEA 
section (2)(i)'s grant of authority--without implementing 
regulations--to enforce the Title VII rules extraterritorially 
whenever activities ``have a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.'' \13\ 
Putting aside the anti-evasion prong in CEA section 2(i)(2), it 
remains that CEA section 2(i) applies the swaps provisions of the 
CEA to certain activities, viewed in the class or aggregate, outside 
the United States, that meet either of two jurisdictional nexuses: 
(1) A direct and significant effect on U.S. commerce; or (2) a 
direct and significant connection with activities in U.S. commerce, 
and through such connection, present the type of risks to the U.S. 
financial system and markets that Title VII directed the Commission 
to address.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 423-25, 427; (``Although many 
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly require implementing 
regulations, Section 2(i) does not.'').
    \11\ Id. at 423 (citation omitted).
    \12\ Id. at 424.
    \13\ Id. at 426.
    \14\ See Proposal at C.1.; Guidance, 78 FR at 45292, 45300; see 
also SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 424-25, 428 n. 31 (finding that Congress 
addressed issue of determining which entities and activities are 
covered by Title VII regulations, ``For Congress already addressed 
this `important' issue by defining the scope of the Title VII Rules' 
extraterritorial applications in the statute itself.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Dodd-Frank Act's derivatives reforms contemplate that an 
individual entity's systemic riskiness is a product of the 
interrelations among its various activities and risk-management 
practices. As a result, the post-crisis reforms target the activity 
of derivatives trading as a means to reach those entities that 
conduct the trading.\15\ As the Commission has acknowledged, 
``Neither the statutory definition of `swap dealer' nor the 
Commission's further definition of that term turns solely on risk to 
the U.S. financial system.'' \16\ And to that end, ``[T]he 
Commission does not believe that the location of counterparty credit 
risk associated with a dealing swap--which . . . is easily and often 
frequently moved across the globe--should be determinative of 
whether a person's dealing activity falls within the scope of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.'' \17\ By adopting an overarching risk-based 
approach to cross-border regulation today, the Commission 
jeopardizes the integrity and soundness of the markets it regulates. 
The Final Rule acknowledges that systemic risk may derive from the 
activities of entities that do not individually generate the kind of 
risk that

[[Page 57006]]

would subject them to systemic risk-based regulation, but then 
chooses not to address that very risk. When the CFTC focuses its 
regulatory oversight only on individually systemically significant 
entities, it unavoidably leaves risky activities unregulated that 
due to the interconnectedness of global markets individually, and in 
the aggregate, can and likely will negatively impact U.S. 
markets.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See Jeremy Kress et al., Regulating Entities and 
Activities: Complimentary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1455, 1459-60, 1462 (Sept. 2019).
    \16\ Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and 
External Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 71946, 71952 (Oct. 18, 2016) (``2016 
Proposal''); see also Further Definition of ``Swap Dealer,'' 
``Security-Based Swap Dealer,'' ``Major Swap Participant,'' ``Major 
Security-Based Swap Participant'' and ``Eligible Contract 
Participant,'' 77 FR 30596, 30597-98 (May 23, 2012) (``SD Definition 
Adopting Release'') (explaining how the Dodd-Frank Act definitions 
of ``swap dealer'' and ``security-based swap dealer'' focus on 
whether a person engages in particular types of activities involving 
swaps or security based swaps); id. at 30757 (In response to 
questions as to whether the swap dealer definition should 
appropriately be activities-based or relate to how an entity is 
classified, Chairman Gensler clarified that, ``The final rule is 
consistent with Congressional intent that we take an activities-
based approach.'').
    \17\ 2016 Proposal, 81 FR at 71952.
    \18\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45300 (consistent with relevant case 
law and the purpose of Title VII to protect the U.S. financial 
system from the build-up of systemic risks, under CEA section 2(i), 
the Commission must assess the connection of swap activities, viewed 
as a class or in the aggregate, to activities in commerce of the 
United States to determine whether application of the CEA swaps 
provisions is warranted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, Congress embedded a risk-based approach, appropriate 
to the Commission's mandate, within the Dodd-Frank Act's swap dealer 
definition by instructing the Commission to exempt from designation 
as a dealer a person that ``engages in a de minimis quantity of swap 
dealing in connection with transactions with or on behalf of its 
customers'' and providing that an insured depository institution is 
not to be considered a swap dealer ``to the extent it offers to 
enter into a swap with a customer in connection with originating a 
loan with that customer.'' \19\ The swap dealer definition further 
provides that a person may be designated as a dealer for one or more 
types, classes or categories of swaps or activities without being 
designated a dealer for other types, classes, or categories of swaps 
or activities,\20\ further indicating that the type and level of 
risk a particular person's activities present are the guiding factor 
in determining whether they may be required to register with the 
Commission as an SD and comply with the requirements of Title VII. 
The Commission seems to have lost sight of the fact that the 
activity of swap dealing itself presents the type of risk addressed 
by Title VII.\21\ The Commission's ability to establish a threshold 
amount of such activity that warrants direct oversight via 
registration does not diminish this underlying trait, which is not 
binary, but a measure of the scale of risk. Risk is simply in the 
DNA of an SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See CEA section 1a(49)(C) through (D), 7 U.S.C. 1a(49)(C) 
through (D).
    \20\ See CEA section 1a(49)(B), 7 U.S.C. 1a(49)(B).
    \21\ See Final Rule at II.D.3.(iv) (identifying the SD de 
minimis threshold as ``a strictly activity-based test (i.e., a test 
based on the aggregate gross notional amount of dealing activity).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As recognized by the Commission, requiring registration and 
compliance with the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act reduces risk 
and enhances operational standards and fair dealing in the swaps 
markets.\22\ To the extent the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to reduce 
systemic risk to the financial system, the CFTC's role is to 
individually utilize its expertise in addressing risk to the 
financial system created by interconnections in the swaps market as 
a market conduct regulator through supervisory oversight of SDs and 
MSPs,\23\ and to contribute as a voting member in support of the 
broader systemic risk oversight carried out by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (``FSOC'').\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See SD Definition Adopting Release, 77 FR at 30599.
    \23\ See Press Release Number 8033-19, CFTC, CFTC Orders Six 
Financial Institutions to Pay Total of More Than $6 Million for 
Reporting Failures (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8033-19 (``The Commission's swap-dealer risk 
management rules are designed to monitor and regulate the systemic 
risk endemic to the swaps marke.t''); see also, Authority to Require 
Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 
84 FR 71740, 71744 (Dec. 30, 2019) (explaining that the activities-
based approach to identifying, assessing, and addressing potential 
risks and threats to U.S. financial stability reflects two 
priorities, one of which is ``allowing relevant financial regulatory 
agencies, which generally possess greater information and expertise 
with respect to company, product, and market risks, to address 
potential risks, rather than subjecting companies to new regulatory 
authorities.'').
    \24\ Among other things, the FSOC is authorized to ``issue 
recommendations to the primary financial regulatory agencies to 
apply new or heightened standards and safeguards.'' Dodd-Frank Act 
section 120, 124 Stat. at 1408-1410.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since 2013, when the Commission announced its first cross-border 
approach in flexible guidance as a non-binding policy statement,\25\ 
the Commission has understood that the global scale of the swap 
markets and domestic scale of regulation poses significant 
challenges for regulators and market participants.\26\ I dissented 
from the December 2019 proposal for the Final Rule the Commission 
considers today.\27\ Like the Final Rule, the Proposal suggested 
that we can resolve all complexities in one fell swoop if we alter 
our lens, abandon our longstanding and literal interpretation of CEA 
section 2(i), and limit ourselves to the purely risk-based approach 
described therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ See Guidance, 78 FR at 45292.
    \26\ See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Legal Ordering and 
Regulatory Conflict: Lessons from the Regulation of Cross Border 
Derivatives, 1 U.C. Irvine J. Int'l Transnat'l & Comp. L. 91, 92 
(2016).
    \27\ See Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds 
and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 85 FR 952, 1008 (proposed Jan. 8, 2020) (the 
``Proposal'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Today's action ignores that, ``It is the essence of regulation 
that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest of the 
regulated and that the advantages from the regulation commonly fall 
to others.'' \28\ The Final Rule is essentially the Proposal with a 
more clearly articulated intention to rethink the Commission's 
mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act to seize the status of primary 
significant risk regulator--a position the Commission was neither 
delegated to assume nor provided the resources to occupy--so as to 
limit the application of Title VII. Like the Proposal, the Final 
Rule acknowledges the likelihood that the chosen course will result 
in increased risks of the kind Title VII directs us to address 
flowing into the U.S., or even originating in the U.S. via ANE 
activities, and then states a belief that the chosen approach is 
either ``adequate'' \29\ or of no moment because our focus on 
significant participants in the U.S. market should ensure the 
appropriate persons are subject to Commission oversight via 
registration, even if, ``to the extent that a registered SD or MSP 
relies on the exceptions in the Final Rule, and is located in a 
jurisdiction that does not have comparable swap requirements, the 
Final Rule could lead to weaker risk management practices for such 
entities.''.\30\ This approach boils down to: ad hoc harmonizing 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''); de facto 
delegating to the U.S. prudential regulators; or deferring to a 
foreign jurisdiction under a banner of comity without ever 
explaining how the application of the swap dealer de minimis 
registration threshold is unreasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111.
    \29\ See, e.g., Final Rule at II.D.3.(iii)-(iv).
    \30\ Final Rule at X.C.11.(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In various statements throughout the preamble, the Commission 
subtly--and not so subtly--promotes its emergent ``desire to focus 
its authority on potential significant risks to the U.S. financial 
system.'' \31\ In one glaring instance, the Commission responds to a 
very clear comment on the weakness of the SRS definition in terms of 
addressing evasion and avoidance concerns by eviscerating Congress's 
very carefully crafted SD definition, stating, ``[w]ithout this 
risk-based approach [SRS], the SD de minimis threshold, which is a 
strictly activity-based test (i.e., a test based on the aggregate 
gross notional amount of dealing activity), becomes the de facto 
risk test of when an entity would be subject to the Commission's 
swap requirements as an SD.'' \32\ In the past several years, I have 
noted the Commission's eagerness to bypass clear Congressional 
intent in order to address longstanding concerns with Dodd-Frank Act 
implementation.\33\ Indeed, the Commission has at times made a 
concerted effort to avoid targeted amendments in favor of sweeping 
changes to the regulation of swap dealers without regard for the 
long term consequences of its fickle interpretation of the law and 
analysis of risk.\34\ I have grave concerns that the Final Rule's 
motive in commandeering the role of systemic risk regulator is to 
provide certainty to entities that they will have sufficient paths 
in the future to avoid registration with the Commission, and thus 
fly under the radar of the FSOC and the entire Title VII regime. As 
the DC District Court noted, the Commission cannot second-guess 
Congress' decision that Title VII apply extraterritorially.\35\ In 
layering its new approach over the CEA section 2(i) analysis, the 
Commission does just that.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See Final Rule at V.C.
    \32\ See Final Rule at II.D.3.(iv).
    \33\ See, e.g., De Minimis Exception to the Swap Dealer 
Definition--Swaps Entered into by Insured Depository Institutions in 
Connection With Loans to Customers, 84 FR 12450, 12468-12471 (Apr. 
1, 2019).
    \34\ See, e.g., id.; Segregation of Assets Held as Collateral in 
Uncleared Swap Transactions, 84 FR 12894, 12906 (Apr. 3, 2019); De 
Minimis Exception to the Swap Dealer Definition, 83 FR 27444 
(proposed June 12, 2018).
    \35\ SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 432.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    My dissent to the Proposal expounded at length on concerns with 
the Commission's ``new approach,'' which seeks to improve upon and 
clarify the Guidance while reallocating responsibilities in a manner 
that

[[Page 57007]]

is ill-conceived given that we are just 10 years past one crisis, 
and currently navigating a global pandemic. Accordingly, I will not 
reiterate my earlier points, but incorporate by reference my prior 
dissent,\36\ which is still on point save for a comment I made on 
the ``unlimited U.S. responsibility prong'' to the U.S. person 
definition, which has been addressed, and I thank staff for 
addressing my concern.\37\ I will, however, take the opportunity 
here to focus on how the Commission's approach to the cross-border 
application of the SD registration threshold in the Final Rule 
amounts to a re-write of the Dodd-Frank Act, as exemplified by the 
``significant risk subsidiary'' or ``SRS'' definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See 85 FR at 1009-1013.
    \37\ Id. at 1011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission Does Not Have a Blank Check

    By codifying a purely and defined risk-based approach to its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, exempting from the CFTC's regulatory 
oversight all entities but those which individually pose systemic 
risk to the U.S. financial system, the CFTC abdicates its 
Congressionally-mandated responsibility under CEA section 2(i) to 
regulate activities outside of the United States that meet one of 
the aforementioned jurisdictional nexuses.\38\ The Final Rule today 
defies Congress' clear intent in enacting CEA section 2(i), 
improperly elevates comity over adhesion to the CFTC's mandate, and 
increases the riskiness of global swap markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress demonstrated its ability to discern between purely 
systemic risk-based and activities-based regulation when it 
designated authority to the CFTC. It directed the Commission to 
develop a metric to analyze which entities pose enough risk to 
require SD registration, creating an exception to the registration 
requirement for entities engaged in only a de minimis quantity of 
swap dealing.\39\ It is telling that the CEA does not, under section 
2(i), direct the CFTC to develop a similar threshold measurement to 
evaluate whether foreign entities singularly pose systemic risk to 
U.S. commerce. The lack of a comparable exception in CEA section 
2(i) indicates that Congress intended to do exactly what the plain 
language of CEA section 2(i) suggests--require that the CFTC oversee 
activities outside of the U.S. that pose risk to U.S. commerce (not 
individual persons or entities). \40\ Furthermore, nothing in the 
swap dealer definition or CEA section 2(i) expresses that we should 
defer to prudential regulators, whether U.S. or foreign; 
prudentially-regulated entities may be required to register as swap 
dealers with the CFTC.\41\ If the Congress believed that prudential 
regulation could sufficiently mitigate risk to the U.S. financial 
system, it would have chosen to delegate this function to the U.S. 
prudential regulators. Congress instead chose to enact a 
registration requirement in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Ultimately, the introduction of the concept of an ``SRS'' and 
accompanying exemptions for: (1) Entities with parents that have 
less than $50 billion in consolidated assets, and for entities that 
are already (2) prudentially regulated or (3) subject to comparable 
foreign regulation, is impermissible under CEA section 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See CEA section 1a(49)(D); 7 U.S.C. 1a(49)(D).
    \40\ Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 
(9th Cir. 2005) (``The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius `as applied to statutory interpretation creates a 
presumption that when a statute designates certain persons, things, 
or manners of operation, all omissions should be understood as 
exclusions.''' (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 
(9th Cir. 1991)).
    \41\ See also CEA section 4s(c), 7 U.S.C. 4s(c) (requiring any 
person that is required to register as a swap dealer or major swap 
participant to register with the Commission, ``regardless of whether 
the person also is a depository institution or is registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Whether or not we agree with Congress, the CFTC is not free to 
rewrite the statute and enact rules that contravene our mandate. 
Agencies may not act like they have a ``blank check'' to proffer 
legislative rules outside of their delegated authority; \42\ 
regulators have to take directives from their governing statute and 
not second-guess Congress.\43\ Thus, the CFTC is not free to 
disregard its mandate in the pursuit of other objectives--such as 
comity, deference, adequacy, workability, or an inexplicable desire 
to act solely like a prudential regulator--no matter how laudable 
some of those objectives might be.\44\ The Commission today dodges 
the responsibility with which it was entrusted in the wake of a 
crisis, impermissibly rewriting the Dodd-Frank Act to pass the buck 
to prudential regulators and our international counterparts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Neomi Rao, Address at the Brookings Institution: What's 
next for Trump's regulatory agenda: A conversation with OIRA 
Administrator Neomi Rao (Jan. 26, 2018), Transcript at 10 (``. . 
.agencies should not act as though they have a blank check from 
Congress to make law.''), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/es_20180126_oira_transcript.pdf.
    \43\ See SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 432 (finding that the CFTC 
``could not have second-guessed Congress decision'' that Title VII 
rules apply extraterritorially).
    \44\ BP W. Coast Prods., LLC v. FERC, 374 F.3d 1263 (DC Cir. 
2004) (Congressional mandates to agencies to carry out ``specific 
statutory directives define[ing] the relevant functions of [the 
agency] in a particular area.'' Such a mandate does not create for 
the agency ``a roving commission'' to achieve those or ``any other 
laudable goal.'' (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1084 (DC 
Cir. 2001)); see also Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 
F.2d 1486, 1500 (DCC. 1984) (``Agency decisionmaking, of course, 
must be more than `reasoned' in light of the record. It must also be 
true to the Congressional mandate from which it derives 
authority.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CFTC's implementation of the Final Rule's purely risk-based 
approach to regulating global swaps is neither allowable under Title 
VII, nor is it wise. Our current Chairman, in fulfilling his role as 
the CFTC's representative on the FSOC, when supporting guidance 
signifying that the FSOC would adopt an activities-based approach to 
determining risks to financial stability, stated that an entity-
based approach, ``inevitably leads to a `whack-a-mole' scenario in 
which risky activities are transferred out of highly-regulated 
entities and into less-regulated ones.'' \45\ Given the 
conglomeration of exceptions built into the Final Rule's definitions 
of ``guarantee,'' and ``SRS,'' and its determination regarding ``ANE 
Transactions,'' it is hard to see how this transfer of risk to less-
regulated entities--which still pose risk in the aggregate to U.S. 
markets--will not come to pass, inevitably leaving gaps in the 
CFTC's ability to oversee the activities it regulates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Heath P. Tarbert, Chairman, CFTC, Statement on the New 
Activities-Based Approach to Systemic Risk (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/tarbertstatement120619.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to our cooperation with foreign counterparts, I 
firmly believe that the CFTC should work diligently to coordinate 
oversight and elevate principles of international comity as we 
develop our cross-border approach--but not when doing so requires us 
to abdicate our mandate. To that end, I generally support the Final 
Rule's application of substituted compliance even if I do not fully 
agree with entity categorizations via the definitions. I also 
generally support the CFTC's deference to foreign regulators when it 
makes sound comparability determinations. To the extent the Final 
Rule grants somewhat indeterminate discretion to the CFTC to depart 
from an objective evaluation in making such determinations, as noted 
by several commenters,\46\ I will remain vigilant when participating 
in such Commission action and be mindful of potential for slippage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See Proposal at VI.D.1.(ii.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I remain concerned that the Final Rule, like the Proposal, makes 
vague references to ``comity'' to justify our resistance to 
regulating overseas activities that pose risk to U.S. markets. I 
agree that making substituted compliance available to foreign 
entities or subsidiaries, via sound comparability determinations, is 
appropriately deferential to principles of international comity. 
Nevertheless, we should only use comity to justify rulemaking when 
there is ambiguity in the governing statute,\47\ or when our 
requirements unreasonably interfere with those of our international 
counterparts \48\--neither of which is overtly true regarding our 
statutory obligation under CEA sections 4s(a) and (c) \49\ to 
register SDs and MSPs based on

[[Page 57008]]

their swap activities. Registration is a critical first step in 
determining whether a non-U.S. entity is engaged in activities 
covered under 2(i), and must not be disregarded for the sake of 
comity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Michael Greenberger, Too Big to Fail--U.S. Banks' 
Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an 
``At Will'' Nullification of Dodd-Frank's Regulation of the Multi-
Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market, 14 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 197, 
367 (2019) (``There is no legal precedent extant that defines 
`international comity' as giving authority to a U.S. administrative 
agency to weaken unilaterally the otherwise clear Congressional 
statutory language or intent that the statute must be applied 
extraterritorially.'')
    \48\ See Proposal, 85 FR at 957; Final Rule at II.D.3.(iv); 
Aaron D. Simowitz, The Extraterritoriality Formalisms, 51 Conn. L. 
Rev. 375, 405-6 and n. 205 (2019) (describing the principle of 
``prescriptive comity'' in the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign 
Relations Law and recognizing that ``Interference with the sovereign 
authority of foreign states may be reasonable if such application 
would serve the legitimate interests of the United States.'' (citing 
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law Sec.  405 cmt. (Am. 
Law. Inst. 2018)).
    \49\ CEA section 4s(a), (c), 7 U.S.C. 4s(a), (c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is also pertinent to note here that by prioritizing comity 
and refusing to appropriately retain jurisdiction, at least to some 
degree, over transactions that are arranged, negotiated, or executed 
in the United States by non-U.S. SDs with non-U.S. counterparties 
(``ANE Transactions''), the Commission's abdication of 
Congressionally-mandated responsibility extends beyond CEA section 
2(i). There is no need to even address whether these transactions 
have a ``direct and substantial'' impact on U.S. commerce, because 
they occur in the United States and accordingly fall squarely within 
the regulatory purview of the CFTC.\50\ Ignoring all ANE 
Transactions invites entities to evade U.S. law, even as they avail 
themselves of the benefits of U.S. markets by residing in the U.S. 
and using U.S. personnel, as they can administratively treat 
transactions as booked in a foreign subsidiary based on the 
conclusion that any relevant risk has been shipped off. I am 
concerned that the CFTC is improperly fixating on comity at the 
expense of not only its mandate, but also at the expense of 
developing sound regulation that increases transparency, 
competition, and market integrity. The Final Rule brushes past 
concerns raised by a market participant that exempting ANE 
transactions from reporting requirements gives non-U.S. entities an 
advantage over U.S. SDs and jeopardizes the intended benefits of the 
CFTC's public reporting regime.\51\ I am concerned by the 
Commission's response to the comment,\52\ and I struggle to 
understand why any U.S. regulator would implement a rule that defies 
its statutory mandate, subjects U.S. entities to a competitive 
disadvantage relative to its foreign counterparts, and reduces U.S. 
investors' transparency into the markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See SIFMA, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 426 (''Section 2(i)'s 
``technical language initially lays down a general rule placing all 
[swap] activity'' occurring outside of the United States beyond 
Title VII's reach. But it then expressly brings such swap activities 
``back within'' Title VII's purview). ANE Transactions should not be 
a part of the initial exemption step required by section 2(i), 
because they do not occur outside of the United States.
    \51\ See Proposal at V. B.-C.; Citadel, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and 
Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants (Mar. 9, 2020), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=62376.
    \52\ See SIFMA, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 429 (An agency ```need not 
address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner to 
those that raise significant problems.' ''(citing Covad Commc'ns Co. 
v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Reytblatt v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SRS: This Is the Way

    In my dissent to the Proposal, I identified SRS as the most 
elaborate departure from both the Commission's interpretation of CEA 
section 2(i) and from our mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act, in its 
elimination of a large cross-section of non-U.S. subsidiaries of 
U.S. parent entities from having to count their swap dealing 
activities toward the relevant SD or MSP registration threshold 
calculations.\53\ The SRS replaces the conduit affiliate concept 
from the Guidance, which, although broader, served to (1) 
appropriately define the universe of entities whose risks related to 
swap activities may accrue and have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce, and (2) 
harmonize with the SEC's cross-border application of the de minimis 
threshold relevant to security-based swap dealing activity.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 85 FR at 1012; see also Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz, 85 FR at 1015 (describing the SRS 
construct as ``an empty set.'').
    \54\ See 17 CFR 240.3a71-3(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite a clear split among Commissioners and commenters, the 
Commission has determined to move forward with the SRS, which 
creates broad exceptions that could exclude large amounts of the 
swap dealing activities by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. entities 
from counting towards the SD and MSP registration threshold 
calculations and therefore, ultimately exclude them from the 
Commission's oversight and application of the swap dealer 
regulations. In support of its determination, the Commission 
rehashes and repeats the argument that SRS ``embodies'' the 
Commission's purely risk-based approach.\55\ If ``this is the way,'' 
\56\ then I am afraid our new approach may not account--perhaps at 
all--for the risk that Congress and the Dodd-Frank Act directed the 
Commission to oversee. If Congress had wanted the Commission to 
focus its cross-border authority solely on systemically significant 
non-bank entities, it would have been explicit, and refrained from 
using language in CEA section 2(i) that was so embedded in common 
law.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See Final Rule at II.C. 3.(iii) (in declining to 
incorporate risk transfer and risk acceptance test into the 
``significant subsidiary'' definition, the Commission finds that 
such activity-based tests are inconsistent with the Commission's 
determination to apply swap requirements to foreign entities using a 
risk-based test to isolate entities that the Commission considers to 
pose a significant risk to the financial system based solely on 
their significance in terms of their balance sheet size relative to 
the parent entity).
    \56\ ``This is the way'' is identified as a Mandalorian mantra 
and cultural meme associated with keeping members of the group on 
the same wavelength without any question at all. See Evan Romano, 
What `This Is the Way' Explains About the Mandalorians in The 
Mandalorian, Men'sHealth (Nov. 22, 2019).
    \57\ See, e.g. Proposal at I.C.1.; Guidance 81 FR at 45298-
45300; see SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 427 (``Congress modeled Section 
2(i) on other statutes with extraterritorial reach that operate 
without implementing regulations.'' (citations omitted)); see Larry 
M. Eig, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: 
General Principles and Recent Trends 20 (2014) (Congress is presumed 
to legislate with knowledge of existing common law.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In excluding subsidiaries of bank holding companies and 
intermediate holding companies from the SRS definition, the 
Commission defers to the ``role of prudential regulation in the 
consolidated oversight of prudential risk,'' again relying on ``the 
risk-based approach to determining which foreign subsidiaries 
present a significant risk to their ultimate U.S. parent and thus to 
the financial system.'' \58\ In presuming that prudential oversight 
provides ``sufficient'' comparable oversight to that prescribed by 
Title VII, the Commission entirely ignores that history weighs 
against such a presumption \59\ and Congress acted accordingly.\60\ 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC is the ``primary financial 
regulatory agency'' for swap dealers.\61\ CEA section 4s(c) \62\ 
provides that any person that is required to be registered as an SD 
or MSP shall register with the CFTC regardless of whether the person 
also is a depository institution (i.e., any bank or savings 
association) or is registered with the SEC as a security-based swap 
dealer. Moreover, to the extent SDs or MSPs have a prudential 
regulator, Title VII recognizes that such SDs/MSPs are to comply 
with capital and margin requirements established by their respective 
prudential regulators.\63\ However, it explicitly does not recognize 
prudential regulation as a substitute for SD/MSP regulatory 
oversight by the Commission.\64\
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    \58\ Notably, the Commission determined to use the $50 billion 
threshold for the ultimate parent entity of an SRS because the FSOC 
initially used a $50 billion total consolidated assets quantitative 
test as one threshold to apply to nonbank financial entities for 
purposes of designated nonbank financial companies as ``systemically 
important financial institutions'' (``SIFIs''). See Proposal, 85 FR 
at 965 n.134. The FSOC recently voted to remove the $50 billion 
threshold because, among other things, it was ``not compatible with 
the prioritization of an activities-based approach'' to addressing 
risks to financial stability. Id.; see also FSOC Interpretive 
Guidance, 84 FR at 71742.
    \59\ See, e.g., Guidance, 78 FR at 45294; Proposal, 85 FR at 
1013-1015.
    \60\ Id.
    \61\ Dodd-Frank Act, Public Law 111-203 section 2(12)(C)(viii), 
124 Stat. 1389.
    \62\ CEA section 4s(c), 7 U.S.C. 4s(c).
    \63\ CEA section 4s(e)(2)(A), 7 U.S.C. 4s(e)(2)(A)
    \64\ See Eig, supra note 57 at 16-17 (``where Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.'' (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United 
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1933))).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Again, I believe that our cross-border approach must absolutely 
align with principles of international comity and that our rules and 
supervisory approach should harmonize and work in tandem with 
prudential regulation. However, I do not believe that the SRS 
definition is reasonable or consistent with the SD definition or CEA 
section 2(i), due to its deference to the role of prudential 
regulation in the consolidated oversight of prudential risk to carve 
out consideration of swap dealing activities of non-U.S. entities 
(that are not guaranteed by a U.S. person) for purposes of SD 
registration and Commission oversight.
    The Final Rule would suggest that our consideration of the 
activities of non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. entities is an 
``expansion'' of the Commission's oversight.\65\ I disagree. The 
post-2010 crisis reforms require intensive oversight of entities 
engaged in swaps activities throughout the world. The Commission 
must retain in full

[[Page 57009]]

its oversight and regulatory responsibilities over entities whose 
activities have a direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, U.S. commerce. To do that effectively, we must be 
able to apply the SD definition and de minimis threshold to the web 
of interconnections through which risk travels, not simply rely on 
bright line balance sheet box checking to wholesale elimination of 
non-U.S. subsidiaries from our scope of consideration. As I stated 
in my prior dissent, without a more concrete understanding as to 
whether SRS is truly superior to the conduit affiliate \66\ concept 
currently outlined in the Guidance and presumably similar to the 
SEC's own approach, it is difficult to get behind a policy that 
would bring risk into the U.S. of the very type CEA Section 2(i) 
seeks to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Final Rule at II. D. 3. (iv).
    \66\ See, e.g., 85 FR at 1012 (noting the Proposal's lack of 
explaining whether and how the conduit affiliate concept failed to 
achieve its purpose, is no longer relevant, resulted in loss of 
liquidity or market fragmentation, proved unworkable, etc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Complexity and Burden Should Not Direct the Outcomes

    I continue to have reservations regarding the Commission's 
determination to discard the Guidance and the use of agency guidance 
and non-binding policy statements in favor of prescriptive 
rules.\67\ As I noted with regard to the Proposal, while the 
Guidance is complex, it is no more complex than this Final Rule. 
Complexity is the hallmark of the regulation of cross-border 
derivatives, and ``merely reflects the complexity of swaps markets, 
swaps transactions, and the corporate structures of the market 
participants that the CFTC regulates.'' \68\ I am especially 
concerned that the Commission is acting in haste to nail down hard 
and fast rules while many pieces in the global regulatory puzzle are 
still in flux.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Id. at 1010.
    \68\ SIFMA, 67 F.Supp.3d at 419-20 (``Indeed, the complexity of 
a regulatory issue is one reason an agency might choose to issue a 
non-binding policy statement rather than a rigid `hard and fast 
rule.' '' (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-203 
(1947))).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters refrained from weighing in on the virtues of 
retaining the Guidance--or agency guidance generally. The Proposal 
garnered just 18 relevant comment letters.\69\ It is difficult to 
determine why, but perhaps market participants have followed the 
Guidance and utilized their expertise in reviewing the overall 
statutory scheme and the straightforward language of CEA section 
2(i) to come into compliance with Title VII either directly or via 
substituted compliance and have not found it prohibitive to do 
so.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Comments to the Proposal are available at https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=3067. Of note, 
the proposal to the Guidance received approximately 290 comment 
letters. Guidance, 78 FR at 45295. The 2016 Proposal received 
approximately 29 substantive comment letters, available at https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1752.
    \70\ Indeed, the DC District Court concluded that the CFTC need 
not address every facet of the overall regulatory scheme and can 
rely on regulated market participants to reference other controlling 
statutes and regulations to address issues left unresolved by a 
given Title VII rule. See SIFMA, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 428 n.31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the Proposal, the Final Rule prides its alteration of 
various definitions such as ``U.S. person'' and ``guarantee,'' the 
substitution of SRS for conduit affiliates, and the abandonment of 
ANE Transactions, as burden and/or cost reducing (or, ``more 
workable''). Unfortunately, I believe the Commission in some 
instances has not fully evaluated the true weight of the burdens, 
and in other instances, not fully measured those burdens against the 
goals of Title VII and the benefits of the overall intent of CEA 
section 2(i).
    A straightforward example is the Commission's determination to 
increase the proposed five-year time limits for reliance on 
representations regarding U.S. person and guarantee status to seven 
years to appease commenters who asked for perpetual reliance on 
previously obtained representations.\71\ There is no indication that 
the Commission considered anything but providing market participants 
more time, in spite of recognizing that best practice would be to 
obtain updated representations as soon as practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See Final Rule at II.B.5. and C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A more concerning example is the Commission's decision to move 
forward with a narrower definition of ``guarantee'' than that 
outlined in the Guidance, despite recognizing that it could lead to 
entities counting fewer swaps towards their de minimis registration 
threshold or ``qualify additional counterparties for exceptions to 
certain regulatory requirements as compared to the definition in the 
Guidance.'' \72\ The Commission did not address the commenter who 
also pointed out that the narrower definition would allow 
significant risk to be transferred back to the U.S. financial system 
over time noting that, ``economic implications are just as important 
as legal considerations, as confirmed and intended by CEA section 
2(i)(1).\73\ Instead, the Final Rule offers the possibility that the 
SRS definition would capture some non-U.S. persons, returning to the 
mantra that in this way we focus on those entities that represent 
``material risk to the U.S. financial system,'' through something 
``workable.'' \74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See Final Rule at II.C.2. and 3.
    \73\ Id.
    \74\ See Final Rule at II.C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion

    Before I conclude, I would like to take a moment to thank staff 
from the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight for 
their presentations, tireless work on this rulemaking, and frequent 
engagement with my office over the last few weeks leading up to 
today's open meeting. Like all of the CFTC's work, today's 
discussion would not have been possible without the expertise and 
commitment of our dedicated staff.
    As the Commission wraps up its scheduled work, before a brief 
summer respite, particularly on this 10th anniversary week of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, our work yesterday and today, although some may like 
to think it, is not the culmination of years of work towards 
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act. In fact, the Commission acted 
promptly in issuing the cross-border 2013 Guidance, only a few years 
after bill passage and in the throes of dozens of other equally 
important Title VII rulemakings.
    This week's exercise is a retrenchment of sound derivatives 
policy that provided the CFTC the tools necessary to monitor swap 
markets and protect the U.S. financial system and American 
taxpayers, and most importantly was steadfast to clearly articulated 
Congressional intent. There is always room for improvement, 
tweaking, and evolving--I have said as much, many times since 
becoming a Commissioner.
    But, unfortunately, during this week that we should be lifting 
up the merits of financial reform, especially given the role post-
crisis reforms played in absorbing massive shocks during the worst 
of the Covid-19 pandemic just a few months ago, we are turning back 
the clock to a previous era that proved to be inadequate to meeting 
our core responsibilities.

Appendix 5--Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump Overview

    When we met together in person late last year to consider 
proposing cross-border rules with respect to registration thresholds 
and regulatory requirements applicable to swap dealers and major 
swap participants (the ``Proposal''),\1\ I stressed that because we 
were proposing to replace the Commission's 2013 cross-border 
guidance (the ``Guidance'') \2\ with binding and enforceable rules, 
those rules must be clear, sensible, and workable.\3\ In supporting 
the Proposal at the time, I concluded that the proposed rules met 
those standards. And I have not seen anything in the many thoughtful 
comment letters we received that causes me to doubt that conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ There are no registered major swap participants at this 
time. Accordingly, for convenience, this Statement generally will 
refer only to swap dealers, and not to major swap participants.
    \2\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 
2013).
    \3\ Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump Regarding Proposed 
Rule: Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and 
Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants (December 18, 2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/stumpstatement121819.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rules that are before us today, as we meet remotely 
several months later, are largely the same as those we proposed. But 
based on public input: (1) In several places, we are providing 
clarifications requested by market participants; \4\ (2) in a few 
places where the proposal deviated from the Guidance, we have been 
persuaded that the Guidance got it right, and thus are returning to 
the Guidance approach; \5\ and (3) in still

[[Page 57010]]

other places, we are incorporating suggestions made by 
commenters.\6\ As a result, the final rules build and improve upon 
the foundation laid by the Proposal. They, too, are clear, sensible, 
and workable, and I am pleased to support them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ E.g., clarification that in addition to entities that are 
subject to capital regulation by the CFTC, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``SEC''), or U.S. prudential regulators, the attribution 
requirement in connection with the major swap participant 
registration threshold also excludes entities subject to Basel-
compliant capital standards and oversight by a G-20 prudential 
supervisor.
    \5\ E.g., addition of a provision that was in the Guidance, but 
not in the Proposal, whereby a non-U.S. person does not have to 
count in its de minimis swap dealer registration calculation swaps 
entered into with an entity whose swap obligations are guaranteed by 
a U.S. person if the guaranteed entity is itself below the de 
minimis threshold and is affiliated with a registered swap dealer.
    \6\ E.g.: (1) While the Proposal removed the prong of the ``U.S. 
person'' definition in the Guidance that included a legal entity 
that is majority-owned by one or more U.S. person(s) in which such 
person(s) ``bears unlimited responsibility for the obligations and 
liabilities'' of the legal entity, the final rules add such a 
circumstance to the definition of a ``guarantee;'' and (2) while the 
Proposal excepted certain subsidiaries of bank holding companies 
from the definition of a ``significant risk subsidiary,'' the final 
rules also except certain subsidiaries of intermediate holding 
companies in the same circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I do not plan to summarize here the changes to the Proposal that 
are encompassed within the final rules. To those not steeped in the 
minutiae of de minimis swap dealer registration calculations and 
entity- and transaction-level requirements under the Guidance,\7\ 
such a summary can become somewhat mind-numbing. Instead, I would 
like to place today's cross-border rulemaking in context, and 
explain my support from a broader perspective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The final rules replace the Guidance's classification of 
requirements imposed on registered swap dealers under the 
Commission's rules as entity- and transaction-level requirements 
with a similar (but not identical) classification into group A, 
group B, and group C requirements (discussed further below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 2(i) and Codifying the Guidance

    We begin, as we must, with the terms of the statute--Section 
2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA''), which was added by the 
Dodd-Frank Act.\8\ Given the importance of this topic, please 
indulge my reiterating a few points that I made about the Proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (``Dodd-Frank'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 2(i) limits the international reach of CFTC swap 
regulations by affirmatively stating that they ``shall not apply to 
activities outside the United States unless those activities . . . 
have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or 
effect on, commerce of the United States.'' \9\ A common-sense 
reading of this section is that there is a limited extraterritorial 
reach to the Dodd-Frank swap requirements, and to stretch them 
beyond the stated statutory criteria impermissibly infringes upon 
the rule sets of other nations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ CEA Section 2(i), 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    That is, the plainly stated congressional intent is to start 
with US law not applying beyond our borders, and then continue to 
the limited conditions where extraterritoriality would be deemed 
appropriate. The law does not say that CFTC rules govern derivatives 
market activities around the world if there is any linkage or tie to 
the United States and should not be interpreted and abused as such.
    In adopting rules setting out how we will apply Section 2(i) to 
the registration thresholds and regulatory requirements relevant to 
the cross-border activities of swap dealers, we are not writing on a 
blank canvas. The Guidance has been in place for seven years now, 
and although it is non-binding,\10\ market participants (both those 
that have registered and those that have had to determine whether 
they are required to register) have devoted a tremendous amount of 
human and financial resources to conform to its complicated 
contours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp.3d 373 (D.D.C. 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Faced with that reality, although I was not a fan of the 
Guidance when it was issued,\11\ I agree that it is appropriate to 
codify its basic elements into our rule set rather than start from 
scratch. And that is what the final rules before us today will do. 
The final rules codify many elements of the Guidance, while updating 
a few provisions to reflect current realities and incorporating some 
improvements based on our experience during the intervening 
years.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ When the CFTC was considering the Guidance, I shared the 
view vividly articulated by then-Commissioner Jill Sommers that the 
Guidance, as it had been proposed, reflected ``what could only be 
called the `Intergalactic Commerce Clause' of the United States 
Constitution . . .'' See Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps 
Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 FR 41214, 41239 
(proposed July 12, 2012) (Statement of Commissioner Sommers).
    \12\ Several commenters asked the Commission to take the 
opportunity of this rulemaking to significantly alter the Guidance 
approach to the cross-border activities of swap dealers in various 
respects. As noted, we have determined to codify, rather than 
reconstruct, most of the decisions that underlie the Guidance 
(although we have made some adjustments as discussed herein). While 
maintaining the status quo under the Guidance may deny affected 
market participants results they wish for, it does not require them 
to give up what they have had for the past seven years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Much has been made of statements in the Proposal, which are 
carried over into today's release, that the focus of the 
Commission's analysis under Section 2(i) is on risk to the U.S. 
financial system. But this, too, is essentially a codification of 
the approach taken in the Guidance. While I do not often quote then-
Chairman Gary Gensler, I note that in his Statement supporting the 
adoption of the Guidance, he said:
    There's no question to me, at least, that the words of Dodd-
Frank addressed this (i.e., risk importation) when they said that a 
direct and significant connection with activities and/or effect on 
commerce in the United States covers these risks that may come back 
to us.
    I want to publicly thank Chairman Barney Frank along with 
Spencer Bachus, Frank Lucas, and Collin Peterson, and their staffs 
for reaching out to the CFTC and the public to ask how to best 
address offshore risks that could wash back to our economy in Dodd- 
Frank.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45371 (Statement of Chairman Gary 
Gensler).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Implementing our statutory cross-border mandate through a risk-
based analysis that focuses on the pertinent issue of risk to the US 
financial system is a sensible approach, which I endorse.
    For those who maintain that the final rules take too narrow a 
view of the Commission's extraterritorial reach with respect to swap 
dealers, I note the truly remarkable fact that today, with the 
Guidance in effect, approximately half of the over 100 swap dealers 
currently registered with the CFTC are located outside the United 
States.\14\ This percentage has stayed relatively constant since the 
CFTC's swap dealer registration regime ``went live'' at the end of 
2012. Registered non-US swap dealers are located across the globe--
in North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See National Futures Association Membership and Directories 
(data as of July 22, 2020), available at https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/membership-and-directories.html#SDRegistry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other words, although it is non-binding, the Commission's 
Guidance appears to have brought a substantial portion of global 
swap dealing activity into the Commission's swap dealer regulatory 
regime. And the record before us is devoid of evidence suggesting 
that the number of registered non-US swap dealers is seriously over- 
or under-inclusive. Given the extent to which the final rules codify 
the Guidance, a significant change in that number is unlikely.
    Because the final rules essentially codify the Guidance, and 
because I support the final rules for the reasons explained herein, 
I accept the interpretation of CEA Section 2(i) stated in the 
Guidance and the final rules in the limited context of registration 
thresholds and regulatory requirements applicable to swap dealers. 
To codify the Guidance while revising the foundation on which it was 
based would only generate confusion--as opposed to the clarity that 
I hope this rulemaking will bring to one aspect of our cross-border 
work.
    But the analysis of, in Mr. Gensler's words, ``offshore risks 
that could wash back to our economy'' may well differ in the context 
of other Dodd-Frank requirements. As we proceed with other aspects 
of our cross-border work--in areas such as clearing, trade 
execution, and reporting--rigorous analysis of the Section 2(i) test 
for each rule we adopt is necessary to ensure that the law is 
followed both to the letter and in spirit.

Clear, Sensible, and Workable Rules

    Transitioning from the interpretation of Section 2(i) to the 
rules before us, some have questioned why we are adopting rules in 
the first place. While it is true that Section 2(i), unlike other 
provisions in Dodd-Frank, does not require the Commission to adopt 
implementing rules, I believe it is good government to do so. 
Guidance has its place, of course. Given the nascent state of post-
Pittsburgh derivatives reforms in 2013, reliance on guidance made 
sense at the time. But I have spoken before of the benefits of 
codifying interpretations issued by our staff where appropriate,\15\ 
and those benefits accrue in equal measure to the codification

[[Page 57011]]

of Commission guidance. Replacing the prior Guidance with rules that 
reflect current realities and are based on experience developed 
during the past seven years provides certainty to the marketplace 
and a shared understanding of the ``rules of the road.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump Regarding 
Amending Rule 3.10(c)(3)--Exemption from Registration for Foreign 
Persons Acting as Commodity Pool Operators on Behalf of Offshore 
Commodity Pools (May 28, 2020) (``Commissioner Stump Part 3 
Statement''), available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/stumpstatement052820.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some may argue that in those few places where the rules of the 
road that we are adopting today depart from the Guidance, the 
Commission has retreated with respect to the extraterritorial 
application of its swap regulatory regime. As I shall discuss, 
however, such criticisms fail to take account of other, equally 
important, considerations relevant to the exercise of our rulemaking 
authority: (1) The aforementioned need for clear, sensible, and 
workable rules; and (2) appropriate deference to comparable regimes 
of our international regulatory colleagues.

Definition of a ``Guarantee''

    For example, the release accompanying the final rules 
acknowledges that the definition of a ``guarantee'' that we are 
adopting today is narrower than that in the Guidance. The final 
rules define a ``guarantee'' as an arrangement in which one party to 
a swap has rights of recourse against a guarantor with respect to 
its counterparty's obligations under the swap, with ``rights of 
recourse'' meaning a legally enforceable right to collect payments 
from the guarantor. By contrast, the Guidance interpreted a 
``guarantee'' to include not only the foregoing, ``but also other 
formal arrangements that, in view of all the facts and 
circumstances, support the non-U.S. person's ability to pay or 
perform its swap obligations with respect to its swaps.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45320 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The concept of a guarantee is important to our cross-border 
rules for swap dealers in part because a guarantee of a non-U.S. 
person's swap obligations by a US person can require the non-US 
person--or its non-US counterparty--to count the swap towards its de 
minimis swap dealer registration threshold. But when the 
determination of whether an entity must register with the CFTC 
depends on whether the entity's or its counterparty's obligations 
under a swap are guaranteed by a U.S. person, the meaning of the 
term ``guarantee'' cannot be left to a review of ``all the facts and 
circumstances.''
    A rule in which non-US persons must try to determine, or obtain 
representations from non-U.S. counterparties regarding, whether the 
CFTC might subsequently conclude that a particular arrangement 
satisfies an open-ended definition of a ``guarantee'' is not a 
workable rule. By contrast, the definition of a ``guarantee'' in the 
final rules, which is based on concepts of legal recourse and a 
legally enforceable right to recover, is clear and workable. Some 
may downplay the importance of ``workability'' in Commission 
rulemakings, but no matter how well-intentioned a rule may be, if it 
is not workable, it cannot deliver on its intended purpose.

Significant Risk Subsidiaries

    Some commenters objected that the definition of a ``significant 
risk subsidiary'' inappropriately substitutes oversight by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the ``FRB''), and/or 
foreign regulatory authorities, for the Commission's regulation of 
derivatives market activity overseas. A significant risk subsidiary, 
or ``SRS,'' is a non-U.S. ``significant subsidiary'' (based on 
varioU.S. numerical metrics set out in the final rules) of an 
ultimate U.S. parent entity that has more than $50 billion in global 
consolidated assets. Excluded from the definition, however, are non-
U.S. subsidiaries that are subject to either: (1) Consolidated 
supervision and regulation by the FRB as a subsidiary of a U.S. bank 
holding company (``BHC'') or intermediate holding company (``IHC''); 
or (2) capital standards and oversight by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor that are consistent with Basel requirements and 
subject to margin requirements for uncleared swaps in a jurisdiction 
for which the Commission has issued a margin comparability 
determination. It is these exclusions that commenters have cited as 
a concern.
    To this, there are three responses. First, as discussed above, 
in exercising the Commission's oversight responsibilities with 
respect to an SRS (which, again, is a non-U.S. subsidiary), we look 
to the risk that such a subsidiary poses to its ultimate parent in 
the United States, and thus to the U.S. financial system. It is not 
that we are replacing our oversight responsibilities with those of 
the FRB or foreign regulators. Rather, it is that we have determined 
that the risk presented by foreign subsidiaries consolidated with a 
BHC or IHC, or subject to regulation as specified in the SRS 
definition in their home country, is already being adequately 
monitored and thus does not warrant an additional layer of 
regulation by the CFTC.
    Second, we must compare the SRS definition in the final rules to 
what it replaces in the Guidance: The ``conduit affiliate.'' The 
Guidance did not actually define a conduit affiliate, but rather 
described it in terms of certain ``factors.'' The most critical 
factor, but unfortunately also the most amorphous, was the last one, 
which asked whether ``the non-U.S. person in the regular course of 
business, engages in swaps with non-U.S. third-party(ies) for the 
purpose of hedging or mitigating risks faced by, or to take 
positions on behalf of, its U.S. affiliate(s), and enters into 
offsetting swaps or other arrangements with its U.S. affiliate(s) in 
order to transfer the risks and benefits of such swaps with third-
party(ies) to its U.S. affiliates.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Guidance, 78 FR at 45318 n.258 and 45359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the definition of a ``guarantee,'' I make no apologies 
for supporting the workable definition of an SRS in the final rules, 
which is based on objective and observable metrics, as compared to 
the ambiguous description of a conduit affiliate set forth in the 
Guidance. We owe the global swaps market the certainty that can only 
come from clarity in our rules, and the definition of an SRS in the 
final rules fits the bill.
    Third, the record before us does not afford any basis on which 
to conclude that the definition of an SRS in the final rules will 
lead to any less robust Commission oversight of the cross-border 
swap activities of swap dealers than does the vague description of a 
conduit affiliate in the Guidance. We have no evidence that the 
number of non-U.S. entities that have waded through the multi-
faceted conduit affiliate description in the Guidance and concluded 
that they were a conduit affiliate, but would conclude that they are 
not an SRS under the definition in the final rules, is significant--
or even material. If experience going forward proves otherwise, the 
Commission can always amend the SRS definition accordingly. But 
absent such evidence, hypothetical concerns are an insufficient 
basis on which to reject the clear and workable SRS definition in 
the final rules.

ANE Transactions, Exceptions to Regulatory Requirements, and 
Substituted Compliance

    Finally, some may see a retreat from the Guidance in the 
Commission's determinations: (1) Not to apply its group A, group B, 
or group C requirements \18\ to swaps of a non-U.S. swap dealer with 
a non-U.S. counterparty where the non-U.S. swap dealer uses 
personnel or agents in the United States to arrange, negotiate, or 
execute the swaps (``ANE transactions''); (2) to except certain 
foreign-based swaps from the group B and group C requirements; and 
(3) to expand the availability of substituted compliance to 
encompass group B requirements for swaps between a U.S. branch of a 
non-U.S. swap dealer and certain non-U.S. counterparties. I 
respectfully disagree.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Under the final rules: (1) Group A requirements for swap 
dealers generally relate to the Chief Compliance Officer 
requirement, risk management, swap data recordkeeping, and antitrust 
considerations; (2) group B requirements for swap dealers generally 
relate to swap trading relationship documentation, portfolio 
reconciliation and compression, trade confirmation, and daily 
trading records; and (3) group C requirements for swap dealers 
generally relate to external business conduct rules, including 
voluntary initial margin segregation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the notion that the CFTC's swap regulatory regime should 
apply to ANE transactions was not stated in the Commission's 
Guidance; rather, it was stated in a staff Advisory published after 
the Guidance was adopted. The Commission has never endorsed that 
staff view, and it has never taken effect.\19\ Second, the 
exceptions from swap dealer requirements that apply to the swaps of 
non-U.S. swap dealers with non-U.S. persons, again, generally codify

[[Page 57012]]

exceptions that were included in the Guidance, too.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Today's release acknowledges that the policy the Commission 
is adopting with respect to the applicability of CFTC requirements 
to non-U.S. swap dealers' ANE transactions differs from that taken 
by the SEC. But as has often been said, harmonization with the SEC, 
while an important goal and one that Congress supported in Dodd-
Frank, should not be undertaken simply for harmonization's own sake. 
Here, the Commission has determined that, in light of Congress' 
decision to define security-based swaps as ``securities'' in Dodd-
Frank, harmonization with the SEC's determination to apply its 
existing, pre-Dodd-Frank securities broker-dealer regulation to ANE 
transactions in security-based swaps is not appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To be sure, based on input we received in the comments, the 
final rules include two exceptions to swap dealer regulatory 
requirements that were not included in the Proposal. Yet, to take 
one as an example, today's release explains that the ``Limited Swap 
Entity SRS/Guaranteed Entity Group B Exception'' is: (1) Tailored to 
placing foreign swap dealer subsidiaries of U.S. firms on the same 
footing as foreign branches of U.S. swap dealers; (2) consistent 
with an exception in the Guidance that was not carried forward in 
the Proposal; \20\ and (3) limited in terms of the amount of swaps 
that can be entered into in reliance on the exception, and 
unavailable if the parties can rely on substituted compliance 
instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The release explains that under the Guidance, a non-U.S. 
person that was guaranteed by a U.S. person or a conduit affiliate 
would not have been expected to comply with group B requirements 
when transacting with a non-U.S. counterparty that also was not 
guaranteed by a U.S. person or a conduit affiliate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    But what is critically important for the treatment of ANE 
transactions, the exceptions to certain regulatory requirements, and 
substituted compliance in the final rules is to keep in mind the 
scenario at issue: Although in some instances activity with respect 
to the swap may occur in the United States, the swaps involve non-
U.S. swap dealers (or foreign branches of U.S. swap dealers) and a 
non-U.S. counterparty (or a foreign branch of a U.S. person) and, 
therefore, will also be subject to regulation in another 
jurisdiction. Where the regulatory interest of that other 
jurisdiction is paramount, the CFTC should appropriately defer, just 
as where the Commission's regulatory interest is paramount, we 
expect other foreign jurisdictions to defer to our regulation. As I 
stated in connection with a recent Open Meeting that also addressed 
cross-border issues:
    [T]he Commission's historical commitment to appropriate 
deference to our international regulatory colleagues (which also is 
sometimes referred to as mutual recognition), `is a demonstration of 
international comity--an expression of mutual respect for the 
important interests of foreign sovereigns.' This deference also 
reflects the shared goals of global authorities seeking to achieve 
the most effectively regulated markets through coordination rather 
than duplication.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See Commissioner Stump Part 3 Statement, n.15, supra 
(footnote omitted).

    The Commission's historical commitment to mutual recognition is 
in keeping with principles of international comity. In reviewing the 
comment letters, frankly, there sometimes seems to be a sense that 
``international comity'' is simply a buzzword the Commission invokes 
to justify what critics believe is an improper easing of its 
regulation of cross-border activity. I emphatically reject the 
notion that appropriate deference to international regulatory 
authorities weakens oversight or protections of our markets, market 
participants, or financial system. To the contrary, our reliance on 
international comity is deeply rooted in several sources.
    First, as discussed in greater detail in the release, the 
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
counsels that even where a country has a basis for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it should not prescribe law with respect to a person 
or activity in another country when the exercise of such 
jurisdiction is unreasonable.\22\ This doctrine of reasonableness is 
``a principle of statutory interpretation'' \23\ that has been 
recognized in Supreme Court case law.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Restatement (Fourth) section 405 cmt. A (Westlaw 2018).
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ See F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 
155, 164 (2004) (statutes should be construed to ``avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, Congress in Dodd-Frank specifically directed the 
Commission, ``[i]n order to promote effective and consistent global 
regulation of swaps,'' to ``consult and coordinate with foreign 
regulatory authorities on the establishment of consistent 
international standards with respect to the regulation . . . of 
swaps [and] swap entities . . .'' \25\ Congress recognized that 
global swap markets cannot function absent consistent international 
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Dodd-Frank, Section 752(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, as I have previously observed on multiple occasions, when 
the G-20 leaders met in Pittsburgh in the midst of the financial 
crisis in 2009, they, too, recognized that due to the global nature 
of the derivatives markets, designing a workable solution, though 
complicated, demands coordinated policies and cooperation.\26\ To do 
otherwise would ignore the reality that modern markets are not bound 
by jurisdictional borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See Leaders' Statement from the 2009 G-20 Summit in 
Pittsburgh, Pa. (``G-20 Pittsburgh Leaders' Statement'') at 7 (Sept. 
24-25, 2009) (``We are committed to take action at the national and 
international level to raise standards together so that our national 
authorities implement global standards consistently in a way that 
ensures a level playing field and avoids fragmentation of markets, 
protectionism, and regulatory arbitrage''), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    And fourth, this Commission historically has been a global 
leader in its commitment to applying principles of international 
comity, in the form of mutual recognition, in a variety of contexts. 
That commitment is reflected in the Commission's Part 30 rules,\27\ 
which apply to foreign firms ``with respect to the offer and sale of 
foreign futures and options to U.S. customers and are designed to 
ensure that such products offered and sold in the U.S. are subject 
to regulatory safeguards comparable to those applicable to 
transactions entered into on designated contract markets.'' \28\ It 
also is reflected in our approach (initially through staff no-action 
relief, and later through registration after Dodd-Frank) to foreign 
boards of trade (``FBOTs'') offering US participants ``direct 
access'' to enter trades directly into the FBOT's order entry and 
trade matching systems.\29\ And just recently, it was reflected in 
the Commission's proposal to amend Rule 3.10(c)(3) to permit non-US 
commodity pool operators to claim exemption from CFTC registration 
for offshore commodity pools with no US participants on a pool-by-
pool basis.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ 17 CFR part 30.
    \28\ Foreign Futures and Options Transactions, 85 FR 15359, 
15360 (March 18, 2020).
    \29\ See Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump Regarding 
Foreign Board of Trade Registration Applications of Euronext 
Amsterdam, Euronext Paris, and European Energy Exchange (November 5, 
2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/stumpstatement110519.
    \30\ Exemption From Registration for Certain Foreign Persons 
Acting as Commodity Pool Operators of Offshore Commodity Pools, 85 
FR 35820 (June 12, 2020); see also Commissioner Stump Part 3 
Statement, n.15, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When the Commission issued the Guidance in 2013, only a few 
derivatives reforms had been adopted in a few other jurisdictions. 
How things have changed since then. Many of our fellow regulators in 
the world's major financial centers have implemented reforms 
governing the conduct of swap dealers commensurate to our own, and 
extensive strides have been made (and continue to be made) towards 
international harmonization--thereby aligning our regulatory 
principles, just as the G-20 envisioned. As a result, most swaps 
involving non-U.S. counterparties today are expected to be subject 
to foreign regulatory requirements similar to the Commission's own, 
unlike at the time the Guidance was adopted.\31\ Further, our 
deference to the comprehensive swap regulation of our international 
colleagues has been demonstrated by the fact that since the Guidance 
was issued, the CFTC has issued 11 comparability determinations 
regarding the regulation of swap dealers in the European Union, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, and Switzerland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ As recounted in the release, CEA Section 2(i) has its 
origins in an amendment that Rep. Spencer Bachus offered during the 
House Financial Services Committee markup on October 14, 2009, that 
would have restricted the Commission's jurisdiction over swaps 
between non-U.S. resident persons. Chairman Frank opposed the 
amendment, noting that there may well be cases where non-U.S. 
residents are engaging in transactions that have an effect on the 
United States and that are insufficiently regulated internationally 
and that he would not want to prevent U.S. regulators from stepping 
in. Chairman Frank expressed his commitment to work with Rep. Bachus 
going forward, Rep. Bachus withdrew the amendment, and eventually 
Section 2(i) was included in Dodd-Frank. See H. Fin. Serv. Comm. 
Mark Up on Discussion Draft of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Markets Act of 2009, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 14, 2009) 
(statements of Rep. Bachus and Rep. Frank). For the reasons 
discussed in text, the prospect of swaps between non-U.S. 
counterparties being insufficiently regulated internationally is far 
less today than it was when the extraterritoriality of the CFTC's 
jurisdiction over swaps was being debated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, regulation of global swap markets that imposes overlapping 
and duplicative requirements on swap dealers and their cross-border 
activities by multiple regulators is inconsistent with: (1) 
Principles of statutory interpretation; (2) Congress' direction to 
the Commission; (3) the vision of the G-20 Leaders at the Pittsburgh 
Summit; and (4) the Commission's own longstanding commitment to 
international comity through mutual recognition of foreign 
regulatory regimes. In a word: It is not workable.

[[Page 57013]]

Conclusion

    In conclusion, I support codifying our prior cross-border 
Guidance into enforceable rules. I believe that the final rules 
before us today are clear, sensible, and workable, and that they 
appropriately apply the Commission's regulations to the cross-border 
activities of swap dealers. They improve upon the Guidance based on 
our experience in administering the Dodd-Frank swap regulatory 
regime over the past several years, and they recognize the current 
state of global regulation of globally interconnected derivatives 
markets by carrying on this agency's established tradition of mutual 
recognition and substituted compliance.
    I therefore support the final cross-border rules for swap 
dealers before us today. I want to very much thank the staff of the 
Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, the General 
Counsel's Office, and the Chief Economist's Office for their efforts 
in preparing this rulemaking. I am particularly appreciative of the 
time that the staff devoted to answering our diverse questions--
always in a thoughtful and comprehensive manner--and reviewing and 
addressing the various comments and requests from me and my team.

Appendix 6--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz 
Introduction

    I dissent from today's final cross-border swap rulemaking (the 
``Final Rule''). As described by the Chairman, this Final Rule will 
``pare[] back our extraterritorial application of our swap dealer 
regime.'' \1\ Over the past seven years, the current cross-border 
regime has helped protect the U.S. financial system from risky 
overseas swap activity. The Commission should not be paring back 
these protections for the American financial system, particularly 
now, during a global pandemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Kadhim Shubber, Financial Times, U.S. regulator investigates 
oil fund disclosures (July 15, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/1e689137-2d1f-4393-a18f-fe0da02141cc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule will permit U.S. swap dealers to book their swaps 
with non-U.S. persons in offshore affiliates, thereby avoiding the 
CFTC's swap regulations, even when they conduct those swap 
activities from within the United States and the U.S. parent retains 
the risks from those swap activities. The structure of the Final 
Rule practically invites multinational U.S. banks and hedge funds to 
book their swaps in offshore affiliates to avoid our swap dealer 
regulations. This will permit risks to flow back into the United 
States with none of the intended regulatory protections.
    The Commission defends its retreat by citing principles of 
international comity and asserting that compliance with the laws of 
another jurisdiction in lieu of the CFTC's requirements will be 
permitted only when the CFTC finds that the laws of the other 
jurisdiction are ``comparable'' to those of the CFTC. The Final 
Rule, however, establishes a weak and vague standard for determining 
when the swap regulations of another jurisdiction are comparable. 
Further, the Final Rule even permits substituted compliance where 
the swap activity occurs within the United States--such as for swaps 
between a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap dealer and another non-U.S. 
person, even if those swaps are negotiated and booked in the United 
States. The Commission is not permitted to defer to regulators in 
other jurisdictions when the swap activity is conducted within the 
United States, nor should it do so even if such deference were 
permitted.
    As I noted in my dissent on the proposed rule, experience has 
taught us that while finance may be global, global financial rescues 
are American. We should not loosely outsource the protection of the 
U.S. financial system and American taxpayers to foreign regulators 
that are unaccountable to the American people.

Less Regulation of U.S. Persons Conducting Swap Activities Outside the 
U.S.

    In the Final Rule, the Commission acknowledges that cross-border 
swaps activities can have a ``direct and significant'' connection 
with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce. The Final Rule, 
however, removes several key protections in the 2013 Cross-Border 
Guidance (``Guidance'') \2\ that mitigated the risks arising from 
such cross-border activities.\3\ The Final Rule narrows the 
definition of ``guarantee'' in a legalistic manner, permitting banks 
to craft financing arrangements for their overseas swap activities 
that bring risks back into the U.S. parent organization without 
triggering the application of Dodd-Frank requirements for those 
activities. The Final Rule also discards the Guidance's firewalls 
that were designed to prevent banks from evading Dodd-Frank 
requirements by using foreign affiliates as the front office for 
swaps with non-U.S. persons while bringing the risk from those swaps 
back to the U.S. home office through back-to-back internal swaps 
(``affiliate conduits'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292, 45298-45301 
(July 26, 2013).
    \3\ The preamble to the final rule observes (Sec. I.C.):
    In this sense, a global financial enterprise effectively 
operates as a single business, with a highly integrated network of 
business lines and services conducted through various branches or 
affiliated legal entities that are under the control of the parent 
entity. [footnote omitted]. Branches and affiliates in a global 
financial enterprise are highly interdependent, with separate 
entities in the group providing financial or credit support to each 
other, such as in the form of a guarantee or the ability to transfer 
risk through inter-affiliate trades or other offsetting 
transactions. Even in the absence of an explicit arrangement or 
guarantee, a parent entity may, for reputational or other reasons, 
choose to assume the risk incurred by its affiliates, branches, or 
offices located overseas. Swaps are also traded by an entity in one 
jurisdiction, but booked and risk-managed by an affiliate in another 
jurisdiction. The Final Rule recognizes that these and similar 
arrangements among global financial enterprises create channels 
through which swap-related risks can have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United 
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule creates a new category of entities--the SRS--
supposedly to capture the risks arising from the swap activities of 
very large foreign affiliates of U.S. firms. But the Commission 
admits that this new category likely will include ``few, if any'' 
entities.\4\ Most likely, therefore, the SRS construct will provide 
no protections to the financial system from the swap activities of 
overseas affiliates of U.S. entities that bring risks to their U.S. 
parents and to the U.S. financial system. Each of these significant 
deficiencies is discussed in greater detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Final Rule release, Sec. X.C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Swap activity outside the U.S. guaranteed by a U.S. Person. The 
Guidance provided that when a swap of a non-U.S. person is 
guaranteed by a U.S. person, then the Dodd-Frank requirements 
regarding swap dealer registration and many of the attendant swap 
dealer regulations would apply to that non-U.S. person in the same 
manner as they would apply to a U.S. person. This is because a swap 
conducted by a non-U.S. person guaranteed by a U.S. person poses 
essentially the same risks to the U.S. financial system as a swap 
conducted by a U.S. person.\5\ The Guidance adopted a functional 
rather than literal approach to the term ``guarantee'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ ``The Commission believes that swap activities outside the 
U.S. that are guaranteed by U.S. persons would generally have a 
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, 
U.S. commerce in a similar manner as the underlying swap would 
generally have a direct and significant connection with activities 
in, and effect on, U.S. commerce if the guaranteed counterparty to 
the underlying swap were a U.S. person.'' Cross-Border Guidance, 78 
FR at 45319.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also is affirming that, for purposes of this 
Guidance, the Commission would interpret the term ``guarantee'' 
generally to include not only traditional guarantees of payment or 
performance of the related swaps, but also other formal arrangements 
that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, support the non-
U.S. person's ability to pay or perform its swap obligations with 
respect to its swaps. The Commission believes that it is necessary 
to interpret the term ``guarantee'' to include the different 
financial arrangements and structures that transfer risk directly 
back to the United States. In this regard, it is the substance, 
rather than the form, of the arrangement that determines whether the 
arrangement should be considered a guarantee for purposes of the 
application of section 2(i).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Id. at 45320 (footnotes omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule, however, adopts a narrow, legalistic definition 
of guarantee: ``Guarantee means an arrangement pursuant to which one 
party to a swap has rights of recourse against a guarantor, with 
respect to its counterparty's obligations under the swap.'' \7\ The 
Commission recognizes that this definition is ``narrower'' than the 
definition in the Guidance, and that this narrower definition could 
result in increased risk to the U.S. financial system.\8\ The 
Commission further acknowledges that this narrower definition 
``could lead to certain entities counting fewer

[[Page 57014]]

swaps towards their de minimis threshold or qualify additional 
counterparties for exceptions to certain regulatory requirements as 
compared to the definition in the Guidance.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Final Rule release, Section 23.23(a)(9).
    \8\ The Commission states that arrangements that would meet the 
broader definition in the Guidance, but are not within the narrower 
scope of the Final Rule, ``transfer risk directly back to the U.S. 
financial system, with possible adverse effects, in a manner similar 
to a guarantee with direct recourse to a U.S. person.'' Final Rule 
release, Sec. II.C.3.
    \9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission asserts, however, that the narrower definition is 
``more workable'' because it is consistent with the definition of 
guarantee in the Cross-Border Margin Rule, and therefore will not 
require an ``independent assessment.'' \10\ The Commission presents 
no evidence, however, as to why the current definition, which has 
now been in place for seven years, is not ``workable,'' or why 
multinational financial institutions that trade hundreds of 
billions, and even trillions, of dollars of swaps on a daily basis 
are not capable of determining whether their overseas affiliates are 
guaranteed by a U.S. person. A global financial institution that 
cannot readily determine or represent whether or not the risks from 
its overseas swaps are guaranteed by one of its U.S. entities should 
not be a global financial institution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Affiliate conduits. The Guidance also applied the Dodd-Frank 
swap dealer registration requirements, and many of the attendant 
swap dealer regulations, to the swap activities of ``affiliate 
conduits'' \11\ of U.S. persons in the same manner as it applies to 
U.S. persons. Under the Guidance, a key factor in determining 
whether a non-U.S. person would be considered to be an affiliate 
conduit of a U.S. person is whether the non-U.S. person regularly 
enters into swaps with non-U.S. counterparties and then enters into 
``offsetting swaps or other arrangements with its U.S. affiliate(s) 
in order to transfer the risks and benefits of such swaps with third 
parties to its U.S. affiliates.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The term ``affiliate conduit'' and ``conduit affiliate'' 
are used interchangeably. See, e.g., Cross-Border Guidance, 78 FR at 
45319.
    \12\ The Commission explained, ``the Commission believes that 
swap activities outside the United States of an affiliate conduit 
would generally have a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce in a similar manner as 
would be the case if the affiliate conduit's U.S. affiliates entered 
into the swaps directly.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The affiliate conduit provisions in the Guidance were designed 
to prevent U.S. entities from booking those swaps in their non-U.S. 
affiliates to escape the CFTC's Dodd-Frank requirements that would 
otherwise apply to the entity's swap activity in the United States. 
The risks and benefits of those swaps booked offshore could then be 
transferred back to the U.S. with back-to-back internal swaps 
between the U.S. parent and its non-U.S. affiliate. Ultimately, risk 
from the swap would reside on the books of the U.S. entity. Through 
this back-to-back process, the U.S. entity could still conduct the 
swap activity, and bear the risk of the swaps, yet would avoid the 
application of CFTC requirements that would apply had the swap been 
booked directly in the U.S. entity.
    The Final Rule does not include any comparable provisions to 
prevent the use of affiliate conduits to avoid CFTC regulation. This 
is an invitation to abuse and to risk for the U.S. financial system.
    Significant risk subsidiary (SRS). The Final Rule adopts a new 
construct--the ``significant risk subsidiary''--to supposedly 
encompass overseas affiliates of U.S. entities whose swap activities 
pose significant risks to the U.S. financial system. An SRS is 
defined as any non-U.S. ``significant subsidiary'' of an ultimate 
U.S. parent entity where that ultimate parent has more than $50 
billion in global consolidated assets. An entity is a ``significant 
subsidiary'' if it has a sufficient size relative to its parent, 
measured in terms of percentage of either revenue, equity capital, 
or total assets.\13\ However, the definition then excludes non-U.S. 
subsidiaries that are either (i) prudentially regulated by the 
Federal Reserve; or (ii) prudentially regulated by the entity's home 
country prudential regulator whose regulations are consistent with 
the Basel Committee's capital standards, and subject to comparable 
margin requirements for uncleared swaps in its home country. An 
entity that survives the gantlet of thresholds and exclusions to be 
considered an SRS would then be subject to the same registration 
requirements as a U.S. person, and many of the same regulatory 
requirements that apply to U.S. swap dealers. That outcome, however, 
is very unlikely. The threshold criteria to be a ``significant 
subsidiary'' are high, and because entities that meet these high 
thresholds are typically affiliated with prudentially-regulated 
banks, it is likely they will be excluded from the SRS definition. 
It therefore is improbable that any entities will fall into the SRS 
category. The Cost-Benefit Considerations in the notice of proposed 
rulemaking for the Final Rule concede that ``few, if any'' entities 
would fall within its ambit.\14\
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    \13\ The Final Rule release asserts that the criteria for 
qualifying as a ``significant subsidiary'' are risk-based. The 
relative financial measures of revenue, equity capital, and total 
assets, however, are not related to the risks presented by the 
subsidiary's swap activity. These criteria have nothing at all to do 
with swaps and in no way a measure or reflect the risks posed by the 
subsidiary's swap activities.
    \14\ ``Of the 61 non-U.S. SDs that were provisionally registered 
with the Commission in June 2020, the Commission believes that few, 
if any, will be classified as SRSs pursuant to the Final Rule.'' 
Final Rule release, Sec. X.C.3.
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    Furthermore, the criteria apply to each subsidiary separately. 
If an institution has a subsidiary that is approaching the high 
thresholds set in the Final Rule, it can incorporate another non-
U.S. subsidiary and conduct swap dealing activity out of that entity 
to avoid SRS designation for any of its subsidiaries.
    One commenter noted that the qualifications only indirectly 
address the significance of the subsidiary and suggested the test be 
modified to assess the extent to which swap risk is accepted by a 
non-U.S. subsidiary or transferred back to the subsidiary's U.S. 
affiliates.\15\ The Commission characterized the suggested test as 
an activity-based test and rejected the commenter's proposed fix. On 
the other hand, when other commenters noted that subsidiaries that 
do not engage in any swap dealing activity would potentially be 
captured by the SRS qualifications--because the qualifications have 
nothing to do with swaps--the Commission modified the Final Rule 
with an activity-based end-user test to exempt those entities from 
the SRS category.
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    \15\ Better Markets, Comment Letter, Cross-Border Application of 
the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to 
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, at 17 (Mar. 9, 2020); 
available at https://comments.cftc.gov/Handlers/PdfHandler.ashx?id=29136.
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    Under the Final Rule, a significant subsidiary that is regulated 
by U.S. or foreign banking regulators is excluded from the SRS 
category. ``The Commission is excluding these entities from the 
definition of SRS, in large part, because the swaps entered into by 
such entities are already subject to significant regulation, either 
by the Federal Reserve Board or by the entity's home country.'' \16\
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    \16\ Final Rule release, Sec. II.D.3.iv.
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    Here the Commission forgets the lessons of the 2008 financial 
crisis and ignores the mandate of Congress. Following the financial 
crisis--and as a result of the lessons learned during the crisis--
Congress subjected the swaps markets to both prudential and market 
regulation. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which 
spectacularly failed to prevent the build-up of catastrophic 
systemic risks within the financial system leading to the 2008 
financial crisis, was based on the premise that market regulation is 
unnecessary to protect against systemic risks for financial entities 
that are subject to prudential regulation.\17\ Events taught us, 
however, that prudential regulation alone was insufficient to 
prevent the build-up of those risks to the financial system. 
Following the crisis, Congress mandated both prudential regulation 
and market regulation for banks conducting swap activities. The 
safeguards and protections to the financial system afforded under 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act were to be applied regardless of the 
extent of prudential regulation. The prudential regulation in a non-
U.S. jurisdiction of an affiliate of a U.S. swap dealer whose swaps 
risks are transferred back into the U.S. is not an adequate 
substitute for the protections mandated by Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
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    \17\ For a more detailed discussion of the financial firm 
failures involving cross border activity and related U.S. government 
and bail outs, see my dissenting statement to the Proposed Cross-
border swap regulations (Dec. 18, 2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement121819b.
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    The Commission does not dispute that the Final Rule will allow 
affiliates currently subjected to the Guidance provisions regarding 
guarantees and affiliate conduits affiliates to operate free of CFTC 
swap regulations. The Commission also acknowledges that the 
activities of these entities may pose risks to the U.S. financial 
system.\18\ Not only will the Final Rule permit

[[Page 57015]]

risks to flow into the U.S., but it will provide an incentive for 
U.S. banks to move their swap activities into these foreign 
affiliates, where they can conduct the same activities but be free 
from the CFTC's regulations.
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    \18\ ``The Commission is aware that many other types of 
financial arrangements or support, other than a guarantee as defined 
in the Final Rule, may be provided by a U.S. person to a non-U.S. 
person (e.g., keepwells and liquidity puts, certain types of 
indemnity agreements, master trust agreements, liability or loss 
transfer or sharing agreements). The Commission understands that 
these other financial arrangements or support transfer risk directly 
back to the U.S. financial system, with possible adverse effects, in 
a manner similar to a guarantee with a direct recourse to a U.S. 
person.'' Final Rule release, Sec.II.C.3. See also Final Rule 
release, Sec. II.D.3 (recognition that conduit affiliate structures 
may present significant risks to the U.S. financial system but 
determination not to apply de minimis registration threshold to a 
non-U.S. affiliates that is not an SRS).
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Less Regulation of Swap Activity in the U.S.

    ANE Swaps. In 2013, the CFTC issued a Staff Advisory addressing 
the applicability of the ``Transaction-Level Requirements'' to non-
U.S. swap dealers that use persons in the U.S. to facilitate swap 
transactions with other non-U.S. persons. The CFTC staff observed 
that ``persons regularly arranging, negotiating, or executing swaps 
for or on behalf of an SD [swap dealer] are performing core, front-
office activities of that SD's dealing business,'' and declared that 
``the Commission has a strong supervisory interest in swap dealing 
activities that occur within the United States, regardless of the 
status of the counterparties.'' \19\ The CFTC staff advised that a 
non-U.S. swap dealer ``regularly using personnel or agents located 
in the U.S. to arrange, negotiate, or execute [``ANE''] a swap with 
a non-U.S. person generally would be required to comply with the 
Transaction-Level Requirements.'' \20\
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    \19\ CFTC Staff Advisory 13-69, Division of Swap Dealer and 
Intermediary Oversight Advisory, Applicability of Transaction Level 
Requirements to Activity in the United States (Nov. 14, 2013), 
available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/13-69/download.
    \20\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Staff Advisory prompted an outcry from non-U.S. swap 
dealers, including wholly-owned non-U.S. affiliates of U.S. 
financial institutions, who objected to the CFTC's imposition of its 
clearing, trade execution, reporting, and business conduct standards 
on their swaps with other non-U.S. persons. Non-U.S. dealers argued 
that the risks from these swap activities resided primarily in the 
home country, and warned that they may remove their swap dealing 
business from the U.S. if these requirements applied. Shortly 
thereafter, the CFTC staff provided no-action relief from the 
application of the Staff Advisory,\21\ and the Commission issued a 
Request for Comment on whether the Commission should adopt the Staff 
Advisory, in whole or in part.\22\
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    \21\ CFTC No-Action Letter No. 13-71, Certain Transaction-Level 
Requirements for Non-U.S. Swap Dealers (Nov. 26, 2013), available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/csl/13-71/download. This no-action relief has 
been extended multiple times and will continue in effect until the 
Final Rule becomes effective. Concurrent with the issuance of the 
Final Rule, the CFTC staff is extending this no-action relief for 
transaction-level requirements not addressed by the Final Rule 
(which includes requirements relating to clearing, trade-execution, 
and real-time public reporting). At the same time, the staff is 
withdrawing the 2013 Staff Advisory as it applies to all 
transaction-level requirements, including requirements not addressed 
in the Final Rule. In conjunction with the Commission's 
consideration of the Final Rule, both of these staff actions were 
presented to the Commission in a single package under the ``Absent 
Objection'' process, with any objections due the day before the 
Commission is scheduled to vote on the Final Rule. Although I would 
support the extension of this no-action relief for such transactions 
not covered by this rulemaking, were it issued separately, I cannot 
support, in conjunction with this rulemaking, the withdrawal of the 
ANE advisory for transactions not covered by the Final Rule. The 
withdrawal of the Staff Advisory for transactions not covered by the 
rulemaking is being taken in response to selected comments received 
as part of the rulemaking, yet the public was not afforded notice 
and opportunity for comment as to the manner in which the Commission 
should address transaction-level requirements not within the scope 
of the rulemaking. It would have been just as workable for market 
participants to provide the no-action relief while maintaining the 
Staff Advisory. Accordingly, I have objected to the ``Absent 
Objection'' package presented to the Commission that included both 
the withdrawal of the Staff Advisory and the extension of no-action 
relief for transactions not covered by the Final Rule.
    \22\ Request for Comment on Application of Commission 
Regulations to Swaps Between Non-U.S. Swap Dealers and Non-U.S. 
Counterparties Involving Personnel or Agents of the Non-U.S. Swap 
Dealers Located in the United States, 79 FR 1347 (Jan. 8, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Final Rule discards the ANE concept entirely. ``ANE 
transactions will not be considered a relevant factor for purposes 
of applying the Final Rule.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Final Rule release, Sec. V.C. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``SEC'') requires a non-U.S. person to include ANE 
transactions in determining whether the amount of its swap dealing 
activity exceeds the de minimis threshold for registration. Cross-
Border Application of Certain Security-Based Swap Requirements, 85 
FR 6270, 6272 (Feb. 4, 2020), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/04/2019-27760/cross-border-application-of-certain-security-based-swap-requirements. The 
preamble to the Final Rule includes many statements regarding the 
importance of ``harmonization'' with the SEC rules. However, on this 
issue, which imposes a more stringent result for potential swap 
dealers, the Commission has decided not to harmonize with the SEC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ability of non-U.S. persons to use personnel within the 
U.S., without limitation, to conduct their swap activities with 
other non-U.S. persons without CFTC regulation or oversight could 
have a variety of detrimental consequences. Foremost among these is 
the possibility, perhaps even likelihood, that U.S. swap dealers 
will move the booking of their swaps with non-U.S. persons 
(including non-U.S. affiliates of other U.S. firms) into their own 
non-U.S. affiliates, while maintaining the U.S. location of the 
personnel conducting the swap business, in order to avoid the 
application of the Dodd-Frank requirements to those transactions. In 
fact, Citadel noted in its comments on the proposed rule that this 
may be happening already. Citadel stated that ``market transparency 
in EUR interest rate swaps for U.S. investors has been greatly 
reduced based on data showing that, following issuance of the ANE 
No-Action Relief, interdealer trading activity in EUR interest rate 
swaps began to be booked almost exclusively to non-U.S. entities, a 
fact pattern that Citadel believes is 'consistent with (although not 
direct proof of) swap dealers strategically choosing the location of 
the desk executing a particular trade in order to avoid trading in a 
more transparent and competitive setting.' '' \24\
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    \24\ Final Rule release, Sec. V.C. In support of this assertion, 
Citadel cites Evangelos Benos, Richard Payne and Michalis Vasios, 
Bank of England Staff Working Paper (No. 580), Centralized trading, 
transparency and interest rate swap market liquidity: Evidence from 
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act (May 2018), available at: 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2018/centralized-trading-transparency-and-interest-rate-swap-market-liquidity-update. In addition to the language quoted by Citadel, 
this study concluded:
    Additionally, we find that, for the EUR-denominated swap market, 
the bulk of interdealer trading previously executed between U.S. and 
non-U.S. trading desks is now largely executed by the non-U.S. 
(mostly European) trading desks of the same institutions (i.e. banks 
have shifted inter-dealer trading of their EUR swap positions from 
their U.S. desks to their European desks). We interpret this as an 
indication that swap dealers wish to avoid being captured by the SEF 
trading mandate and the associated impartial access requirements. 
Migrating the EUR inter-dealer volume off-SEFs enables dealers to 
choose who to trade with and (more importantly) who not to trade 
with. This might allow them to erect barriers to potential entrants 
to the dealing community. Thus this fragmentation of the global 
market may be interpreted as dealers trying to retain market power, 
where possible. Importantly, we find no evidence that customers in 
EUR swap markets try to avoid SEF trading and the improved liquidity 
it delivers.
    Id. at 31-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If more than one U.S. swap dealer were to employ this strategy, 
the result could be that swap activity between two U.S. swap dealers 
that currently takes place within the U.S. and is fully subject to 
the CFTC's swap regulations might then be booked in two non-U.S. 
affiliates outside the United States. So long as the U.S. parents do 
not provide explicit guarantees for the swaps of the 
subsidiaries,\25\ the trading between these subsidiaries would not 
count toward the dealer registration threshold. Furthermore, even if 
one of those non-U.S. entities were a registered swap dealer, the 
trading would not be subject to any CFTC transaction-level 
requirements, even though the risk from those transactions is 
ultimately borne by the U.S. parent through consolidated accounting, 
and U.S. personnel would be negotiating those transactions.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Even in the absence of an explicit guarantee or other 
financial support, there is likely an expectation that the U.S. 
parent will ensure the subsidiary has sufficient funds to pay its 
swap obligations. The U.S. parent has substantial reputation risk if 
its subsidiaries start defaulting on their swaps. The expansive 
definition of ``guarantee'' in the Guidance is perhaps one reason 
that U.S. banks that withdrew the explicit guarantees provided their 
affiliates have not yet attempted to withdraw their swap dealer 
registration. Further regulatory uncertainty about the viability of 
de-registering may have arisen from the cross-border rule proposed 
by the Commission in 2016 that would have treated non-U.S. 
affiliates that were consolidated subsidiaries of U.S. persons as 
U.S. persons.
    \26\ This strategy would be less effective if either of the non-
U.S. affiliates were an SRS. However, as described above, it is 
likely that ``few, if any,'' non-U.S. affiliates will be captured 
within this definition particularly affiliates of prudentially 
regulated banks, which are excepted out of the definition 
altogether.

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[[Page 57016]]

    U.S. banks already conduct a significant amount of inter-bank 
business through their non-U.S. affiliates. Data from swap data 
repositories shows that U.S. bank swap dealers commonly book swaps 
with each other through their respective non-U.S. subsidiaries. For 
a recent one-year period, the data shows that a number of U.S. banks 
booked more than 10 percent--and in some cases close to 50 percent--
of the reported notional amount of swaps across their entire bank-
to-bank swaps books through non-U.S. subsidiaries. In other words, a 
number of U.S. banks are already booking material amounts of swaps 
with each other through their non-U.S. wholly-owned consolidated 
subsidiaries.
    Non-U.S. banks conducting swap activity in the U.S. The Final 
Rule reverses the position taken by the Commission in the proposed 
rule that would have prevented a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap 
entity from obtaining substituted compliance for various 
transactional requirements for swaps with non-U.S. swap entities 
that are booked in the U.S. branch.\27\ The cross-border notice of 
proposed rulemaking upon which the Final Rule is based (``2019 
Proposal'') would have permitted substituted compliance only for the 
foreign-based swaps of a non-U.S. swap entity. Both under the 2019 
Proposal and the Final Rule, a swap conducted by a non-U.S. swap 
entity through a U.S. branch would not be considered a ``foreign-
based swap.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ 2019 Proposal, rule text, Sec. 23.23(e)(3), 85 FR 952, 
1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sensibly, under the 2019 Proposal, substituted compliance would 
be available only for foreign-based swaps. As the Commission 
explained in the 2019 Proposal, ``[t]he Commission preliminarily 
believes that the requirements listed in the proposed definitions 
are appropriate to identify swaps of a non-U.S. banking organization 
operating through a foreign branch in the United States that should 
remain subject to Commission requirements. . . .'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ 2019 Proposal, 85 FR 952, 968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the Commission repeats nearly verbatim the rationale 
articulated in the 2019 Proposal for applying CFTC regulations 
without substituted compliance to transactions booked in the United 
States, conducted in the United States, and within an organization 
regulated under the laws of the United States, the Final Rule now 
excludes swaps booked in a U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap entity 
from this general principle, and permits it to obtain substituted 
compliance for its transactions with non-U.S. persons.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The Commission's adoption of the opposite of what was 
proposed also presents significant notice and comment issues under 
the Administrative Procedure Act. See Environmental Integrity 
Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 998 (``Whatever a ``logical 
outgrowth'' of this proposal may include, it certainly does not 
include the Agency's decision to repudiate its proposed 
interpretation and adopt its inverse.''); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1104 (``An agency, however, does not have 
carte blanche to establish a rule contrary to its original proposal 
simply because it receives suggestions to alter it during the 
comment period.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has no authority to grant substituted compliance 
for transactions occurring within the United States. The ability of 
the Commission to consider international comity in determining 
whether to apply CFTC regulations or permit substituted compliance 
with the laws of a foreign regulator only applies with respect to 
activities outside the United States. The Final Rule defines a 
``foreign-based swap'' in a manner that does not include swaps 
booked in the U.S. branch of a non-U.S. swap entity. The fact that 
one of the counterparties to a transaction is owned by a non-U.S. 
entity does not transform activity conducted by that entity within 
the United States into foreign activity. Thus, the Final Rule not 
only retreats from the application of U.S. law to transactions that 
are arranged, negotiated, and executed in the United States, it even 
retreats from the application of U.S. law to transactions that are 
booked in the United States. This is not in accordance with either 
Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA''), which limits 
the application of the swaps provisions of the CEA only with respect 
to activities outside the United States, or with the principles of 
international comity, which the Commission recognizes only applies 
with respect to activity occurring in another jurisdiction.

Weakening the Standards for Substituted Compliance

    I agree with the Commission's interpretation of CEA Section 2(i) 
that international comity is an important consideration in 
determining the extent to which the CEA and the CFTC's swap 
regulations should apply to cross-border swap activity occurring in 
another jurisdiction. I have voted for every substituted compliance 
determination presented to the Commission during my tenure under the 
standards adopted in the Guidance.
    The standards established in the Final Rule for substituted 
compliance determinations, however, depart significantly from the 
current standards. The Final Rule creates a lesser standard that 
permits a finding of comparability if the Commission determines that 
``some or all of the relevant foreign jurisdiction's standards are 
comparable . . . or would result in comparable outcomes . . . .'' 
\30\ Under the Guidance, however, the Commission must also find that 
the regulations of the other jurisdiction are as ``comprehensive'' 
as the Commission's regulations. Furthermore, the Final Rule permits 
the Commission to consider any factors it ``determines are 
appropriate, which may include'' \31\ any of four factors listed in 
the Final Rule. This ``standard for review'' is not a standard at 
all. It permits the Commission to withdraw the cross-border 
application of its regulations regardless of the robustness of the 
other jurisdiction's regulatory regime, for whatever reasons the 
Commission chooses. In the absence of more rigorous, objective 
criteria, it will be very difficult for the Commission to deny 
requests from other jurisdictions or market participants for 
comparability determinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Final Rule, rule text, section 23.23(g)(4).
    \31\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion

    The Final Rule is a significant retreat from the robust yet 
balanced cross-border framework presented in the Guidance. The 
current framework has worked well to both protect the U.S. financial 
system from systemic risks arising from swap activities outside the 
U.S. and recognize the interests of other nations in regulating 
conduct within their own borders. The Final Rule destroys this 
balance.
    I cannot support this abdication of responsibility to protect 
the U.S. financial markets and the American taxpayer.

[FR Doc. 2020-16489 Filed 9-11-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P