[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 168 (Friday, August 28, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 53209-53234]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-18804]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 1 and 96

[AU Docket No. 20-25; FCC 20-110]


Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band 
for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, 
Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for 
Auction 107

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final action; requirements and procedures.

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SUMMARY: This document summarizes the procedures and deadlines for the 
upcoming auction of 3.7 GHz Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band. 
The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice summarized here is intended to 
familiarize applicants with the procedures and other requirements 
governing participation in Auction 107 by providing details regarding 
the procedures, terms, conditions, dates, and deadlines, as well as an 
overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.

DATES: Applications to participate in Auction 107 must be submitted 
prior to 6 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. Upfront payments for Auction 
107 must be received by 6 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. Bidding in 
Auction 107 is scheduled to begin on December 8, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For auction legal questions, Erik 
Beith or Daniel Habif in the Auctions Division of the Office of 
Economics and Analytics at (202) 418-0660. For general auction 
questions, the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868. For 3.7 GHz Service 
questions, Anna Gentry in the Mobility Division of the Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau at (202) 418-1991.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 107 
Procedures Public Notice, AU Docket No. 20-25, FCC 20-110, adopted on 
August 6, 2020, and released on August 7, 2020. The complete text of 
the public notice, including attachments and any related documents, is 
available for public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET 
Monday through Thursday or from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays 
in the FCC Reference Information Center, located in Room CY-A257, of 
the FCC Headquarters, 445 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554, except 
when Commission Headquarters is otherwise closed to visitors. See 
Public Notice, Restrictions on Visitors to FCC Facilities, March 12, 
2020. The complete text of the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice is 
also available on the Commission's website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. 
To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities 
(braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email 
to [email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
(202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

I. General Information

A. Introduction

    1. With the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, the Commission 
established the procedures to be used for Auction 107, the auction of 
new flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band (the 3.7 GHz 
Service).
    2. The bidding for new licenses in Auction 107 is scheduled to 
commence on December 8, 2020. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice 
provides details regarding the procedures, terms, conditions, dates, 
and deadlines governing participation in Auction 107 bidding, as well 
as an overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.

B. Background and Relevant Authority

    3. In the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, 85 FR 31705, May 27, 2020, the 
Commission made available 280 megahertz of spectrum in the 3.7-3.98 GHz 
band for licensed use. In that Order, the Commission proposed to modify 
the licenses and market access authorizations of incumbent Fixed 
Satellite Service (FSS) operators, transmit receive earth station 
licensees, and Fixed Service (FS) licensees to clear the 3.7-4.0 GHz 
band for new flexible-use terrestrial operations in the contiguous 
United States. Among other things, the Commission authorized both fixed 
and mobile operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band using geographic area 
licensing, established licensing and operating rules for the new 3.7 
GHz Service, and decided to use its competitive bidding rules to assign 
3.7 GHz Service licenses.
    4. On March 3, 2020, in accordance with section 309(j)(3) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission released the 
Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, 85 FR 23287, April 27, 2020, seeking 
comment on certain competitive bidding procedures and various other 
procedures to be used in Auction 107. The Commission received comments 
from seven parties in response to the

[[Page 53210]]

Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, including five reply comments. These 
comments are available under proceeding 20-25 in the Commission's 
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). The ECFS home page is publicly 
accessible at: www.fcc.gov/ecfs. In the Auction 107 Procedures Public 
Notice, the Commission resolved all open issues raised in the Auction 
107 Comment Public Notice and addressed the comments received.
    5. Prospective applicants should familiarize themselves with the 
Commission's rules regarding the 3.7 GHz Service. In addition, 
prospective applicants should be thoroughly familiar with the 
procedures, terms, and conditions contained in the Auction 107 
Procedures Public Notice and any future public notices that may be 
released in proceeding 20-25.
    6. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders, 
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or 
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time 
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental 
generally applicable information to applicants. In addition, the 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) and the Office of Economics 
and Analytics (OEA) retain the authority to establish further 
procedures during the course of the auction. It is the responsibility 
of all applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with 
all public notices pertaining to Auction 107. Copies of most auctions-
related Commission documents, including public notices, can be 
retrieved from the Commission's FCC Auctions internet site at 
www.fcc.gov/auctions. Additionally, documents are available at the 
Commission's headquarters during normal business hours when the 
building is open to the public.

C. Description of Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 107

    7. Auction 107 will offer 5,684 new flexible-use overlay licenses 
for spectrum in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band throughout the contiguous United 
States subject to clearing requirements. The 280 megahertz of spectrum 
available in Auction 107 will be licensed on an unpaired basis in three 
blocks divided into 20-megahertz sub-blocks by partial economic area 
(PEA) in the contiguous states and the District of Columbia (PEAs 1-41, 
43-211, 213-263, 265-297, 299-359, and 361-411). Flexible-use overlay 
licenses will not be issued for Honolulu, Anchorage, Kodiak, Fairbanks, 
Juneau, Puerto Rico, Guam-Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, and the Gulf of Mexico (PEAs 42, 212, 264, 
298, 360, 412-416). Specifically, the A Block will cover 100 megahertz 
from 3.7-3.8 GHz in five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3700-3720 MHz (A1), 
3720-3740 MHz (A2), 3740-3760 MHz (A3), 3760-3780 MHz (A4), and 3780-
3800 MHz (A5). The B Block will cover 100 megahertz from 3.8-3.9 GHz in 
five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3800-3820 MHz (B1), 3820-3840 MHz (B2), 
3840-3860 MHz (B3), 3860-3880 MHz (B4), and 3880-3900 MHz (B5). The C 
Block will cover 80 megahertz from 3.9-3.98 GHz, and four 20-megahertz 
sub-blocks will be licensed for flexible use: 3900-3920 MHz (C1), 3920-
3940 MHz (C2), 3940-3960 MHz (C3), and 3960-3980 MHz (C4). The 20 
megahertz at 3980-4000 MHz will be a guard band and not available for 
auction. 3.7 GHz Service licenses will be issued for 15-year, renewable 
license terms. Licenses in the 46 PEAs may be issued as paired interim 
and final licenses, which taken together, provide authorization for a 
block over the full 15-year license term. A licensee in the 3.7-3.98 
GHz band may provide any services permitted under terrestrial fixed or 
mobile allocations, as set forth in the non-Federal Government column 
of the Table of Frequency Allocations in section 2.106 of the 
Commission's rules. A summary of the licenses offered in Auction 107 is 
available in Attachment A to the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 
which is available on the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107.
    8. Incumbent satellite operators have, in aggregate, made 
sufficient commitments to clear the 3.7-4.0 GHz band on the accelerated 
timeline described in the 3.7 GHz Report and Order. As a result, 
licenses in the A Block in 46 of the top 50 PEAs--PEAs 1-4, 6-10, 12-
19, 21-41, and 43-50--will be subject to the Phase I accelerated 
relocation deadline, and licenses in the B and C Blocks in the 46 PEAs 
and in the A, B, and C Blocks in the remaining 360 PEAs will be subject 
to the Phase II accelerated relocation deadline.

D. Auction Specifics

1. Auction Title and Start Date
    9. The auction of licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band will be 
referred to as ``Auction 107.'' Bidding in Auction 107 will begin on 
Tuesday, December 8, 2020. The initial schedule for bidding rounds in 
Auction 107 will be announced by public notice at least one week before 
bidding begins.
    10. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be 
conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all 
licenses.
2. Auction Dates and Deadlines
    11. The following dates and deadlines apply to Auction 107: Auction 
Application Tutorial Available (via internet). No later than August 21, 
2020.

Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
    Filing Window Opens--September 9, 2020, 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time 
(ET)
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
    Filing Window Deadline--September 22, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
    Upfront Payments (via wire transfer)--June 19, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
    Bidding Tutorial Available (via internet)--No later than July 9, 
2020
    Mock Auction--December 3, 2020
    Bidding Begins in Auction 107--December 8, 2020
3. Requirements for Participation
    12. Those wishing to participate in Auction 107 must: Submit a 
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m. 
ET on September 22, 2020, following the electronic filing procedures 
set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions (available in the Education 
section of the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auctions/107); submit 
a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC 
Form 159) by 6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020, following the procedures 
and instructions set forth in the FCC Form 159 Instructions; and comply 
with all provisions outlined in the Auction 107 Procedures Public 
Notice and applicable Commission rules.

II. Applying To Participate in Auction 107

A. General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications

    13. An application to participate in Auction 107, referred to as a 
short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information that the 
Commission uses to determine whether the applicant has the legal, 
technical, and financial qualifications to participate in a Commission 
auction for spectrum licenses. The short-form application is the first 
part of the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In the 
first phase, a party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file a 
short-form application in which it certifies, under penalty of perjury, 
that it is qualified to participate. Eligibility to participate in 
Auction 107 is based on an applicant's short-form application and 
certifications and on the applicant's submission of a sufficient 
upfront

[[Page 53211]]

payment for the auction. After bidding closes, in the second phase of 
the process, each winning bidder must file a more comprehensive post-
auction, long-form application (FCC Form 601) for the licenses it wins 
in the auction, and it must have a complete and accurate ownership 
disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) on file with the 
Commission. Being deemed qualified to bid in Auction 107 does not 
constitute a determination that a party is qualified to hold a 
Commission license or is eligible for a designated entity bidding 
credit.
    14. A party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file an FCC 
Form 175 electronically via the Auction Application System prior to 
6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020, following the procedures prescribed 
in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. If an applicant claims eligibility 
for a bidding credit, then the information provided in its FCC Form 175 
as of the filing date will be used to determine whether the applicant 
may request the claimed bidding credit. An applicant that files an FCC 
Form 175 for Auction 107 will be subject to the Commission's rule 
prohibiting certain communications. An applicant is subject to the 
prohibition beginning at the deadline for filing short-form 
applications--6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. The prohibition will 
end for applicants on the post-auction down payment deadline for 
Auction 107.
    15. An applicant bears full responsibility for submitting an 
accurate, complete, and timely short-form application. Each applicant 
must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its 
FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and 
its participation in the auction, and it must confirm that it is 
legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a 
license. If an Auction 107 applicant fails to make the required 
certifications in its FCC Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its 
application will be deemed unacceptable for filing and cannot be 
corrected after the filing deadline.
    16. An applicant should note that submitting an FCC Form 175 (and 
any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation by the certifying 
official that he or she is an authorized representative of the 
applicant with authority to bind the applicant, that he or she has read 
the form's instructions and certifications, and that the contents of 
the application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and 
correct. Submitting a false certification to the Commission may result 
in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures, 
ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or criminal 
prosecution.
    17. Applicants are cautioned that, because the required information 
submitted in FCC Form 175 bears on each applicant's qualifications, 
requests for confidential treatment will not be routinely granted. The 
Commission generally has held that it may publicly release confidential 
business information where the party has put that information at issue 
in a Commission proceeding or where the Commission has identified a 
compelling public interest in disclosing the information. In this 
regard, the Commission specifically has held that information submitted 
in support of receiving bidding credits in auction proceedings should 
be made available to the public.
    18. An applicant must designate at least one individual as an 
authorized bidder, and no more than three, in its FCC Form 175. The 
Commission's rules prohibit an individual from serving as an authorized 
bidder for more than one auction applicant.
    19. No individual or entity may file more than one short-form 
application or have a controlling interest in more than one short-form 
application. If a party submits multiple short-form applications for an 
auction, then only one application may form the basis for that party to 
become qualified to bid in that auction.
    20. Similarly, and consistent with the Commission's general 
prohibition on joint bidding agreements, a party is generally permitted 
to participate in a Commission auction only through a single bidding 
entity. Accordingly, the filing of applications in Auction 107 by 
multiple entities controlled by the same individual or set of 
individuals generally will not be permitted. This restriction applies 
across all applications, without regard to the geographic areas 
selected. There is a limited exception to the general prohibition on 
the filing of multiple applications by commonly controlled entities for 
qualified rural wireless partnerships and individual members of such 
partnerships. Under this limited exception, each qualifying rural 
wireless partnership and its individual members will be permitted to 
participate separately in an auction.
    21. After the initial short-form application filing deadline, 
Commission staff will review all timely submitted applications for 
Auction 107 to determine whether each application complies with the 
application requirements and whether the applicant has provided all 
required information concerning the applicant's qualifications for 
bidding. After this review is completed, a public notice will be 
released announcing the status of applications and identifying the 
applications that are complete and those that are incomplete because of 
minor defects that may be corrected. The public notice will include the 
deadline for resubmitting modified applications. To become a qualified 
bidder, an applicant must have a complete application (i.e., have 
timely filed an application that is deemed complete after the deadline 
for correcting any identified deficiencies), and must make a timely and 
sufficient upfront payment. Qualified bidders will be identified by 
public notice at least 10 days prior to the mock auction.
    22. An applicant should consult the Commission's rules to ensure 
that all required information is included in its short-form 
application. To the extent the information in the Auction 107 
Procedures Public Notice does not address a potential applicant's 
specific operating structure, or if the applicant needs additional 
information or guidance concerning the described disclosure 
requirements, the applicant should review the educational materials for 
Auction 107 (see the Education section of the Auction 107 website at 
www.fcc.gov/auction/107) and/or use the contact information provided to 
consult with Commission staff to better understand the information it 
must submit in its short-form application.

B. License Area Selection

    23. An applicant must select all the license areas on which it may 
want to bid from the list of available PEAs on its FCC Form 175. An 
applicant must carefully review and verify its PEA selections before 
the FCC Form 175 filing deadline because those selections cannot be 
changed after the auction application filing deadline. An applicant is 
not required to place bids on any or all of the license areas selected, 
but the FCC Auction Bidding System (bidding system) will not accept 
bids for blocks located in PEAs that the applicant did not select in 
its FCC Form 175. The auction application system, however, will provide 
an applicant the option to select ``all PEAs.''

C. Disclosure of Agreements and Bidding Arrangements

    24. An applicant must provide in its FCC Form 175 a brief 
description of, and identify each party to, any partnerships, joint 
ventures, consortia or agreements, arrangements, or understandings of 
any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any 
agreements that address or

[[Page 53212]]

communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices), 
bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or 
not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the 
applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the 
applicant, is a party. A controlling interest includes all individuals 
or entities with positive or negative de jure or de facto control of 
the applicant. In connection with the agreement disclosure, the 
applicant must certify under penalty of perjury in its FCC Form 175 
that it has described, and identified each party to, any such 
agreements, arrangements, or understandings to which it (or any party 
that controls it or that it controls) is a party. If, after the FCC 
Form 175 filing deadline, an auction applicant enters into any 
agreement relating to the licenses being auctioned, then it is subject 
to these same disclosure obligations. All applicants must maintain the 
accuracy and completeness of the information in their pending auction 
application.
    25. For purposes of making the required agreement disclosures on 
the FCC Form 175, if parties agree in principle on all material terms 
prior to the application filing deadline, then each party to the 
agreement that is submitting an auction application must provide a 
brief description of, and identify the other party or parties to, the 
agreement on its respective FCC Form 175, even if the agreement has not 
been reduced to writing. Parties that have not agreed in principle by 
the FCC Form 175 filing deadline should not describe, or include the 
names of parties to, the discussions on their applications.
    26. The Commission's rules generally prohibit joint bidding and 
other arrangements involving auction applicants (including any party 
that controls or is controlled by such applicants). For purposes of the 
prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement includes any arrangement 
relating to the licenses being auctioned that addresses or 
communicates, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction, bidding 
strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific 
licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangement relating to the 
post-auction market structure.
    27. This prohibition applies to joint bidding arrangements 
involving two or more nationwide providers, as well as joint bidding 
arrangements involving a nationwide provider and one or more non-
nationwide providers, where at least one party to the arrangement is an 
applicant for the auction. A ``non-nationwide provider'' refers to any 
provider of communications services that is not a nationwide provider. 
The Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be nationwide 
providers for the purpose of implementing the Commission's competitive 
bidding rules in Auction 107.
    28. Under certain circumstances, a non-nationwide provider may 
enter into an agreement to form a consortium or a joint venture (as 
applicable) that results in a single party applying to participate in 
an auction. A designated entity can participate in one consortium or 
joint venture in an auction, and non-nationwide providers that are not 
designated entities may participate in an auction through only one 
joint venture. A non-nationwide provider may enter into only one 
agreement to form a consortium or joint venture (as applicable), and 
such consortium or joint venture shall be the exclusive bidding vehicle 
for its members in the auction. The general prohibition on joint 
bidding arrangements excludes certain agreements, including those that 
are solely operational in nature. Under the Commission's rules, 
agreements that are solely operational in nature are those that address 
operational aspects of providing a mobile service, such as agreements 
for roaming, device acquisition, and spectrum leasing and other 
spectrum use arrangements, provided that any such agreement does not 
both relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate, 
directly or indirectly, bidding at auction (including specific prices 
to be bid) or bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on 
which to bid or not to bid) or post-auction market structure.
    29. The Commission's rules require each applicant to certify in its 
short-form application that it has disclosed any arrangements or 
understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned to 
which it (or any party that controls or is controlled by it) is a 
party. The applicant must also certify that it (or any party that 
controls or is controlled by it) has not entered and will not enter 
into any arrangement or understanding of any kind relating directly or 
indirectly to bidding at auction with, among others, any other 
applicant or a nationwide provider.
    30. Although the Commission's rules do not prohibit auction 
applicants from communicating about matters that are within the scope 
of an excepted agreement that has been disclosed in an FCC Form 175, 
certain discussions or exchanges could nonetheless touch upon 
impermissible subject matters, and compliance with the Commission's 
rules will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.
    31. A winning bidder will be required to disclose in its FCC Form 
601 post-auction application the specific terms, conditions, and 
parties involved in any agreement relating to the licenses being 
auctioned into which it had entered prior to the time bidding was 
completed. This applies to any bidding consortium, joint venture, 
partnership, or other agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any 
kind entered into relating to the competitive bidding process, 
including any agreements relating to the licenses being auctioned that 
address or communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific 
prices), bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which 
to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which 
the applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the 
applicant, is a party.

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    32. Each applicant must comply with the applicable part 1 ownership 
disclosure requirements and provide information required by sections 
1.2105 and 1.2112, and, where applicable, section 1.2110, of the 
Commission's rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant must fully 
disclose information regarding the real party- or parties-in-interest 
in the applicant or application and the ownership structure of the 
applicant, including both direct and indirect ownership interests of 
10% or more. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring that 
information submitted in its short-form application is complete and 
accurate.
    33. In certain circumstances, an applicant may have previously 
filed an FCC Form 602 ownership disclosure information report or filed 
an auction application for a previous auction in which ownership 
information was disclosed. The most current ownership information 
contained in any FCC Form 602 or previous auction application on file 
with the Commission that used the same FCC Registration Number (FRN) 
the applicant is using to submit its FCC Form 175 will automatically be 
pre-filled into certain ownership sections on the applicant's FCC Form 
175, if such information is in an electronic format compatible with FCC 
Form 175. Applicants are encouraged to submit an FCC Form 602 ownership 
report or update any ownership information on file with the Commission 
in an FCC Form 602 ownership report prior to starting a short-form 
application for Auction 107 to ensure that their most recent ownership 
information is pre-filled into their short-form application. Each 
applicant must carefully review any ownership information

[[Page 53213]]

automatically entered into its FCC Form 175, including any ownership 
attachments, to confirm that all information supplied on FCC Form 175 
is complete and accurate as of the application filing deadline. Any 
information that needs to be corrected or updated must be changed 
directly in FCC Form 175.

E. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    34. Section 310 of the Communications Act requires the Commission 
to review foreign investment in radio station licenses and imposes 
specific restrictions on who may hold certain types of radio licenses. 
Section 310 applies to applications for initial radio licenses, 
applications for assignments and transfers of control of radio 
licenses, and spectrum leasing arrangements under the Commission's 
secondary market rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant is 
required to disclose information concerning foreign ownership of the 
applicant. If an applicant has foreign ownership interests in excess of 
the applicable limit or benchmark set forth in section 310(b), then it 
may seek to participate in Auction 107 as long as it has filed a 
petition for declaratory ruling with the Commission prior to the FCC 
Form 175 filing deadline. An applicant must certify in its FCC Form 175 
that, as of the deadline for filing its application to participate in 
the auction, the applicant either is in compliance with the foreign 
ownership provisions of section 310 or has filed a petition for 
declaratory ruling requesting Commission approval to exceed the 
applicable foreign ownership limit or benchmark in section 310(b) that 
is pending before, or has been granted by, the Commission. Additional 
information concerning foreign ownership disclosure requirements is 
provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.

F. Information Procedures During the Auction Process

    35. The Commission is limiting information available in Auction 107 
in order to prevent the identification of bidders placing particular 
bids until after the bidding has closed. The Commission will not make 
public until after bidding has closed: (1) The license areas that an 
applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application, (2) the 
amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant, (3) 
any applicant's bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related 
information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid.
    36. Once the bidding begins in Auction 107, under the limited 
information procedures (sometimes also referred to as anonymous 
bidding), information to be made public after each round of bidding 
will include, for licenses in each geographic area, the supply, the 
aggregate demand, the price at the end of the last completed round, and 
the price for the next round. The identities of bidders placing 
specific bids and the net bid amounts (reflecting bidding credits) will 
not be disclosed until after the close of bidding.
    37. Bidders will have access to additional information related to 
their own bidding and bidding eligibility through the Commission's 
bidding system. For example, bidders will be able to view their own 
level of eligibility, both before and during the auction.
    38. After the close of bidding, bidders' PEA selections, upfront 
payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related 
actions will be made publicly available.
    39. The direct or indirect communication to other applicants or the 
public disclosure of non-public information (e.g., reductions in 
eligibility, identities of bidders) could violate the Commission's rule 
prohibiting certain communications. To the extent an applicant believes 
that such a disclosure is required by law or regulation, including 
regulations issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
applicant should consult with the Commission staff in the Auctions 
Division before making such disclosure.

G. Prohibited Communications and Compliance With Antitrust Laws

    40. The rules prohibiting certain communications set forth in 
section 1.2105(c) apply to each applicant that files a short-form 
application (FCC Form 175) in Auction 107. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the 
Commission's rules provides that, subject to specified exceptions, 
after the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are 
prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to, 
communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any nationwide 
provider of communications services that is not an applicant, or, if 
the applicant is a nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider 
that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of their own, or 
each other's, or any other applicants' bids or bidding strategies 
(including post-auction market structure), or discussing or negotiating 
settlement agreements, until after the down payment deadline.
1. Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c)
    41. An applicant for purposes of this rule includes all controlling 
interests in the entity submitting the FCC Form 175 auction 
application, as well as all holders of interests amounting to 10% or 
more of the entity, and all officers and directors of that entity. A 
party that submits an application becomes an applicant under the rule 
at the application deadline, and that status does not change based on 
later developments. Thus, an auction applicant that does not correct 
deficiencies in its application, fails to submit a timely and 
sufficient upfront payment, or does not otherwise become qualified, 
remains an ``applicant'' for purposes of the rule and remains subject 
to the prohibition on certain communications until the Auction 107 down 
payment deadline.
    42. The Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be 
nationwide providers for the purposes of the prohibited communications 
rule for Auction 107.
2. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline
    43. Section 1.2105(c)'s prohibition of certain communications 
begins at an auction's short-form application filing deadline and ends 
at the auction's down payment deadline after the auction closes, which 
will be announced in a future public notice.
3. Scope of Prohibition on Certain Communications; Prohibition on Joint 
Bidding Agreements
    44. Section 1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibits certain 
communications between applicants for an auction, regardless of whether 
the applicants seek permits or licenses in the same geographic area or 
market. The rule also applies to communications by applicants with non-
applicant nationwide providers of communications services and by 
nationwide applicants with non-applicant non-nationwide providers. The 
rule further prohibits joint bidding arrangements, including 
arrangements relating to the permits or licenses being auctioned that 
address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction, 
bidding strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the 
specific permits or licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangements 
relating to the post-auction market structure. The rule allows for 
limited exceptions for communications within the scope of any 
arrangement consistent with the exclusion from the Commission's rules 
prohibiting joint bidding, provided such

[[Page 53214]]

arrangement is disclosed on the applicant's auction application. 
Applicants may communicate pursuant to any pre-existing agreements, 
arrangements, or understandings relating to the licenses being 
auctioned that are solely operational or that provide for the transfer 
or assignment of licenses, provided that such agreements, arrangements, 
or understandings are disclosed on their applications and do not both 
relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate bids 
(including amounts), bidding strategies, or the particular permits or 
licenses on which to bid or the post-auction market structure.
    45. The prohibition against communicating in any manner includes 
public disclosures as well as private communications and indirect or 
implicit communications. Consequently, an applicant must take care to 
determine whether its auction-related communications may reach another 
applicant. Applicants must determine whether their communications with 
other parties are permissible under the rule once the prohibition 
begins at the deadline for submitting applications, even before the 
public notice identifying applicants is released.
    46. Parties subject to section 1.2105(c) should take special care 
in circumstances where their officers, directors, and employees may 
receive information directly or indirectly relating to any applicant's 
bids or bidding strategies. Such information may be deemed to have been 
received by the applicant under certain circumstances. For example, 
Commission staff have found that, where an individual serves as an 
officer and director for two or more applicants, the bids and bidding 
strategies of one applicant are presumed conveyed to the other 
applicant through the shared officer, which creates an apparent 
violation of the rule.
    47. Section 1.2105(c)(1) prohibits applicants from communicating 
with specified other parties only with respect to their own, or each 
other's, or any other applicant's bids or bidding strategies. A 
communication conveying bids or bidding strategies (including post-
auction market structure) must also relate to the licenses being 
auctioned in order to be covered by the prohibition. Thus, the 
prohibition is limited in scope and does not apply to all 
communications between or among the specified parties. The Commission 
consistently has made clear that application of the rule prohibiting 
communications has never required total suspension of essential ongoing 
business. Entities subject to the prohibition may negotiate agreements 
during the prohibition period, provided that the communications 
involved do not relate to both: (1) The licenses being auctioned and 
(2) bids or bidding strategies or post-auction market structure.
    48. Business discussions and negotiations that are unrelated to 
bidding in Auction 107 and that do not convey information about the 
bids or bidding strategies, including the post-auction market 
structure, of an applicant are not prohibited by the rule. Moreover, 
not all auction-related information is covered by the prohibition. For 
example, communicating merely whether a party has or has not applied to 
participate in Auction 107 will not violate the rule. In contrast, 
communicating how a party will participate, including specific 
geographic areas selected, specific bid amounts, and/or whether or not 
the party is placing bids, would convey bids or bidding strategies and 
would be prohibited.
    49. Each applicant must remain vigilant not to communicate, 
directly or indirectly, information that affects, or could affect, bids 
or bidding strategies. Certain discussions might touch upon subject 
matters that could convey price or geographic information related to 
bidding strategies. Such subject areas include, but are not limited to, 
management, sales, local marketing agreements, and other transactional 
agreements.
    50. Bids or bidding strategies may be communicated outside of 
situations that involve one party subject to the prohibition 
communicating privately and directly with another such party. For 
example, the Commission has warned that prohibited communications 
concerning bids and bidding strategies may include communications 
regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds in support of 
bids or bidding strategies to the extent such communications convey 
information concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or 
indirectly. Moreover, the Commission found a violation of the rule 
against prohibited communications when an applicant used the 
Commission's bidding system to disclose its bidding strategy in a 
manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to cooperate 
and collaborate in specific markets, and has placed auction 
participants on notice that the use of its bidding system to disclose 
market information to competitors will not be tolerated and will 
subject bidders to sanctions.
    51. When completing a short-form application, each applicant should 
avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate section 1.2105(c). 
An applicant should avoid including any information in its short-form 
application that might convey information regarding its PEA selections, 
such as referring to certain markets in describing agreements, 
including any information in application attachments that will be 
publicly available that may otherwise disclose the applicant's PEA 
selections, or using applicant names that refer to licenses being 
offered.
    52. Applicants also should be mindful that communicating non-public 
application or bidding information publicly or privately to another 
applicant may violate section 1.2105(c) even though that information 
subsequently may be made public during later periods of the application 
or bidding processes.
4. Communicating With Third Parties
    53. Section 1.2105(c) does not prohibit an applicant from 
communicating bids or bidding strategies to a third party, such as a 
consultant or consulting firm, counsel, or lender. The applicant should 
take appropriate steps, however, to ensure that any third party it 
employs for advice pertaining to its bids or bidding strategies does 
not become a conduit for prohibited communications to other specified 
parties, as that would violate the rule. For example, an applicant 
might require a third party, such as a lender, to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement before the applicant communicates any information regarding 
bids or bidding strategy to the third party. Within third-party firms, 
separate individual employees, such as attorneys or auction 
consultants, may advise individual applicants on bids or bidding 
strategies, as long as such firms implement firewalls and other 
compliance procedures that prevent such individuals from communicating 
the bids or bidding strategies of one applicant to other individuals 
representing separate applicants. Although firewalls and/or other 
procedures should be used, their existence is not an absolute defense 
to liability if a violation of the rule has occurred.
    54. In the case of an individual, the objective precautionary 
measure of a firewall is not available. An individual that is privy to 
bids or bidding information of more than one applicant presents a 
greater risk of becoming a conduit for a prohibited communication. 
Whether a prohibited communication has taken place in a

[[Page 53215]]

given case will depend on all the facts pertaining to the case, 
including who possessed what information, what information was conveyed 
to whom, and the course of bidding in the auction.
    55. Potential applicants may discuss the short-form application or 
bids for specific licenses or license areas with the counsel, 
consultant, or expert of their choice before the short-form application 
deadline. The same third-party individual could continue to give advice 
after the short-form deadline regarding the application, provided that 
no information pertaining to bids or bidding strategies, including PEAs 
selected on the short-form application, is conveyed to that individual. 
To the extent potential applicants can develop bidding instructions 
prior to the short-form deadline that a third party could implement 
without changes during bidding, the third party could follow such 
instructions for multiple applicants provided that those applicants do 
not communicate with the third party during the prohibition period.
    56. Applicants also should use caution in their dealings with other 
parties, such as members of the press, financial analysts, or others 
who might become conduits for the communication of prohibited bidding 
information. For example, even though communicating that it has applied 
to participate in the auction will not violate the rule, an applicant's 
statement to the press that it intends to stop bidding in an auction 
could give rise to a finding of a section 1.2105 violation. Similarly, 
an applicant's public statement of intent not to place bids during 
bidding in Auction 107 could also violate the rule.
5. Section 1.2105(c) Certifications
    57. By electronically submitting its FCC Form 175 auction 
application, each applicant for Auction 107 certifies its compliance 
with section 1.2105(c) of the rules. If an applicant has a non-
controlling interest with respect to more than one application, the 
applicant must certify that it has established internal control 
procedures to preclude any person acting on behalf of the applicant 
from possessing information about the bids or bidding strategies of 
more than one applicant or communicating such information with respect 
to either applicant to another person acting on behalf of and 
possessing such information regarding another applicant. The mere 
filing of a certifying statement as part of an application will not 
outweigh specific evidence that a prohibited communication has 
occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when 
warranted. Any applicant found to have violated these communication 
prohibitions may be subject to sanctions.
6. Duty To Report Prohibited Communications
    58. Section 1.2105(c)(4) requires that any applicant that makes or 
receives a communication that appears to violate section 1.2105(c) must 
report such communication in writing to the Commission immediately, and 
in no case later than five business days after the communication 
occurs. Each applicant's obligation to report any such communication 
continues beyond the five-day period after the communication is made, 
even if the report is not made within the five-day period.
7. Procedures for Reporting Prohibited Communications
    59. A party reporting any information or communication pursuant to 
sections 1.65, 1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must take care to ensure 
that any report of a prohibited communication does not itself give rise 
to a violation of section 1.2105(c). For example, a party's report of a 
prohibited communication could violate the rule by communicating 
prohibited information to other parties specified under the rule 
through the use of Commission filing procedures that allow such 
materials to be made available for public inspection.
    60. Parties must file only a single report concerning a prohibited 
communication and must file that report with the Commission personnel 
expressly charged with administering the Commission's auctions. This 
rule is designed to minimize the risk of inadvertent dissemination of 
information in such reports. Any reports required by section 1.2105(c) 
must be filed consistent with the instructions set forth in the Auction 
107 Procedures Public Notice. Such reports must be filed with the Chief 
of the Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics, by the 
most expeditious means available. Any such report should be submitted 
by email to the Auctions Division Chief and sent to [email protected]. 
If you choose to submit a report in hard copy, contact Auctions 
Division staff at [email protected] or (202) 418-0660 for guidance.
    61. A party seeking to report such a prohibited communication 
should consider submitting its report with a request that the report or 
portions of the submission be withheld from public inspection by 
following the procedures specified in section 0.459 of the Commission's 
rules. Filers requesting confidential treatment of documents must be 
sure that the cover page of the filing prominently displays that the 
documents seek confidential treatment. For example, a filing might 
include a cover page stamped with ``Request for Confidential Treatment 
Attached'' or ``Not for Public Inspection.'' Any such request must 
cover all the material to which the request applies. Because the hand-
delivery filing location at FCC Headquarters is permanently closed, 
such materials should be submitted in accordance with the procedures 
described in Order, Amendment of the Commission's Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, May 28, 2020. Such parties are encouraged to coordinate with 
the Auctions Division staff about the procedures for submitting such 
reports.
8. Winning Bidders Must Disclose Terms of Agreements
    62. Each applicant that is a winning bidder will be required to 
provide as part of its long-form application any agreement or 
arrangement it has entered into and a summary of the specific terms, 
conditions, and parties involved in any agreement it has entered into. 
Such agreements must have been entered into prior to the filing of 
short-form applications. This applies to any bidding consortia, joint 
venture, partnership, or agreement, understanding, or other arrangement 
entered into relating to the competitive bidding process, including any 
agreement relating to the post-auction market structure. Failure to 
comply with the Commission's rules can result in enforcement action.
9. Additional Information Concerning Prohibition on Certain 
Communications in Commission Auctions
    63. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and 
OEA/WTB addressing the application of section 1.2105(c) is available on 
the Commission's auction web page at www.fcc.gov/summary-listing-documents-addressing-application-rule-prohibiting-certain-communications.
10. Antitrust Laws
    64. Applicants remain subject to the antitrust laws. Compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of section 1.2105(c)(4) will not 
insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance, 
a violation of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking 
place well before any party submits a short-form application. The 
Commission has cited a number of examples of potentially 
anticompetitive actions that would be prohibited under antitrust laws: 
For example, actual or potential competitors may not agree to divide

[[Page 53216]]

territories in order to minimize competition, regardless of whether 
they split a market in which they both do business, or whether they 
merely reserve one market for one and another market for the other.
    65. To the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific 
allegations that suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws 
may have occurred, the Commission may refer such allegations to the 
United States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant 
is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules 
in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding 
process, it may be subject to a forfeiture and may be prohibited from 
participating further in Auction 107 and in future auctions, among 
other sanctions.

H. Provisions for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers

    66. In Auction 107, bidding credits will be available to applicants 
demonstrating eligibility for a small business or a rural service 
provider bidding credit and subsequently winning license(s). A bidding 
credit represents an amount by which a bidder's winning bid will be 
discounted. These bidding credits will not be cumulative--an applicant 
is permitted to claim either a small business bidding credit or a rural 
service provider bidding credit, but not both. Each applicant must also 
certify that it is eligible for the claimed bidding credit in its FCC 
Form 175. Each applicant should review carefully the Commission's 
decisions regarding the designated entity provisions as well as the 
part 1 rules.
    67. Applicants applying for designated entity bidding credits 
should take due account of the requirements of the Commission's rules 
and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control of such 
applicants. These rules include a prohibition, which applies to all 
applicants (whether they seek bidding credits or not), against changes 
in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or 
transfer of control. Applicants should not expect to receive any 
opportunities to revise their ownership structure after the filing of 
their short- and long-form applications, including making revisions to 
their agreements or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders, 
or others in order to address potential concerns relating to compliance 
with the designated entity bidding credit requirements.
1. Small Business Bidding Credit
    68. For Auction 107, bidding credits will be available to eligible 
small businesses and consortia thereof. Under the service rules 
applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service licenses to be offered in Auction 
107, the level of bidding credit available is determined as follows: A 
bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed 
$55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive a 15% 
discount on its winning bid; a bidder with attributed average annual 
gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the preceding five 
years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its winning bid.
    69. Small business bidding credits are not cumulative; an eligible 
applicant may receive either the 15% or the 25% bidding credit on its 
winning bid, but not both. The Commission's unjust enrichment 
provisions also apply to a winning bidder that uses a bidding credit 
and subsequently seeks to assign or transfer control of its license 
within a certain period to an entity not qualifying for at least the 
same level of small business bidding credit. Thus, for example, the 
Commission's unjust enrichment provisions would not apply to a winning 
bidder that uses the 15% small business bidding credit and seeks to 
transfer control of its license to an entity that qualifies for either 
the 15% small business bidding credit or the rural service provider 
bidding credit. The provisions would apply, however, if that same 
winning bidder uses the 25% small business bidding credit, unless the 
proposed transferee also qualifies for the 25% small business bidding 
credit.
    70. Each applicant claiming a small business bidding credit must 
disclose the gross revenues for the preceding five years for each of 
the following: (1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its 
controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling 
interests. The applicant must also submit an attachment that lists all 
parties with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use 
agreements or arrangements for any licenses that may be won by the 
applicant in Auction 107. In addition, to the extent that an applicant 
has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of 
more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license that may be won 
in Auction 107, the identity and the attributable gross revenues of any 
such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed. This attribution 
rule will be applied on a license-by-license basis. As a result, an 
applicant may be eligible for a bidding credit on some, but not all, of 
the licenses for which it is bidding in Auction 107. If an applicant is 
applying as a consortium of small businesses, then the disclosures 
described in this paragraph must be provided for each consortium 
member.
2. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit
    71. An eligible applicant may request a 15% discount on its winning 
bid using a rural service provider bidding credit. To be eligible for a 
rural service provider bidding credit, an applicant must: (1) Be a 
service provider that is in the business of providing commercial 
communications services and, together with its controlling interests, 
affiliates, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, has fewer 
than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable 
subscribers; and (2) serve predominantly rural areas, defined as 
counties with a population density of 100 or fewer persons per square 
mile. An applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit must 
provide the number of subscribers served as of the short-form 
application deadline. An applicant may count any subscriber as a single 
subscriber even if that subscriber receives more than one service. For 
instance, a subscriber receiving both wireline and telephone service 
and broadband would be counted as a single subscriber.
    72. Each applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit 
must disclose the number of its subscribers, along with the number of 
subscribers of its affiliates, controlling interests, and the 
affiliates of its controlling interests. The applicant must also submit 
an attachment that lists all parties with which the applicant has 
entered into any spectrum use agreements or arrangements for any 
licenses that may be won by the applicant in Auction 107. To the extent 
that an applicant has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder 
for the use of more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license 
that may be won in Auction 107, the identity and the attributable 
subscribers of any such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed. 
Eligible rural service providers may form a consortium. If an applicant 
is applying as a consortium of rural service providers, then the 
disclosures described in this paragraph, including the certification, 
must be provided for each consortium member.
3. Caps on Bidding Credits
    73. Eligible applicants claiming either a small business or rural 
service provider bidding credit will be subject to specified caps on 
the total amount of bidding credit discounts that they may receive. The 
Commission adopted a $25

[[Page 53217]]

million cap on the total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be 
awarded to an eligible small business, and a $10 million cap on the 
total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be awarded to an 
eligible rural service provider in Auction 107. No winning designated 
entity bidder will receive more than $10 million in bidding credit 
discounts in total for licenses won in markets with a population of 
500,000 or less. To the extent an applicant seeking a small business 
bidding credit does not claim the full $10 million in bidding credits 
in those smaller markets, it may apply the remaining balance to its 
winning bids on licenses in larger markets, up to the aggregate $25 
million cap.
4. Attributable Interests
a. Controlling Interests and Affiliates
    74. An applicant's eligibility for designated entity benefits is 
determined by attributing the gross revenues (for those seeking small 
business benefits) or subscribers (for those seeking rural service 
provider benefits) of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling 
interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. Controlling 
interests of an applicant include individuals and entities with either 
de facto or de jure control of the applicant. Typically, ownership of 
greater than 50% of an entity's voting stock evidences de jure control. 
De facto control is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the 
totality of the circumstances. The following are some common indicia of 
de facto control: The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50% of 
the board of directors or management committee; the entity has 
authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that 
control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and the entity plays 
an integral role in management decisions.
    75. Applicants should refer to section 1.2110(c)(2) of the 
Commission's rules and the FCC Form 175 Instructions to understand how 
certain interests are calculated in determining control for purposes of 
attributing gross revenues. For example, officers and directors of an 
applicant are considered to have a controlling interest in the 
applicant.
    76. Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an 
individual or entity that: (1) Directly or indirectly controls or has 
the power to control the applicant, (2) is directly or indirectly 
controlled by the applicant, (3) is directly or indirectly controlled 
by a third party that also controls or has the power to control the 
applicant, or (4) has an ``identity of interest'' with the applicant. 
The Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant 
encompasses both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates 
of controlling interests of the applicant.
    77. An applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must 
demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit by: (1) Meeting the 
applicable small business size standard, based on the controlling 
interest and affiliation rules, and (2) retaining control, on a 
license-by-license basis, over the spectrum associated with the 
licenses for which it seeks small business benefits. Control and 
affiliation may arise through, among other things, ownership interests, 
voting interests, management and other operating agreements, or the 
terms of any other types of agreements--including spectrum lease 
agreements--that independently or together create a controlling, or 
potentially controlling, interest in the applicant's or licensee's 
business as a whole. Except under the limited provisions provided for 
spectrum manager lessors, the Commission's decision to discontinue its 
policy requiring designated entity licensees to operate as primarily 
facilities-based providers of service directly to the public does not 
alter the rules that require the Commission to consider whether any 
particular use agreement may confer control of or create affiliation 
with the applicant. Once an applicant demonstrates eligibility as a 
small business under the first prong, it must also be eligible for 
benefits on a license-by-license basis under the second prong. As part 
of making the FCC Form 175 certification that it is qualified as a 
designated entity under section 1.2110, an applicant is certifying that 
it does not have any spectrum use or other agreements that would confer 
either de jure or de facto control of any license it seeks to acquire 
with bidding credits. For instance, if an applicant has a spectrum use 
agreement on a particular license that calls into question whether, 
under the Commission's affiliation rules, the user's revenues should be 
attributed to the applicant for that particular license, rather than 
for its overall business operations, the applicant could be ineligible 
to acquire or retain benefits with respect to that particular license.
    78. If an applicant executes a spectrum use agreement that does not 
comply with the Commission's relevant standard of de facto control, 
then it will be subject to unjust enrichment obligations for the 
benefits associated with that particular license, as well as the 
penalties associated with any violation of section 310(d) of the 
Communications Act and related regulations, which require Commission 
approval of transfers of control. Although in this scenario the 
applicant may not be eligible for a bidding credit and may be subject 
to the Commission's unjust enrichment rules, the applicant need not be 
eligible for small business benefits on each of the spectrum licenses 
it holds in order to demonstrate its overall eligibility for such 
benefits. If that spectrum use agreement (either alone or in 
combination with the designated entity controlling interest and 
attribution rules) goes so far as to confer control of the applicant's 
overall business, then the gross revenues of the additional interest 
holders will be attributed to the applicant, which could render the 
applicant ineligible for all current and future small business benefits 
on all licenses. The Commission applies the same de facto control 
standard to designated entity spectrum manager lessors that is applied 
to non-designated entity spectrum manager lessors.
b. Limitation on Spectrum Use
    79. The gross revenues (or the subscribers, in the case of a rural 
service provider) of an applicant's disclosable interest holder are 
attributable to the applicant, on a license-by-license basis, if the 
disclosable interest holder has an agreement with the applicant to use, 
in any manner, more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license 
won by the applicant and acquired with a bidding credit during the 
five-year unjust enrichment period for the applicable license. A 
disclosable interest holder of an applicant seeking designated entity 
benefits is defined as any individual or entity holding a 10% or 
greater interest of any kind in the applicant, including but not 
limited to, a 10% or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants, 
options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee. Any applicant 
seeking a bidding credit for licenses won in Auction 107 will be 
subject to this attribution rule and must make the requisite 
disclosures.
    80. Certain disclosable interest holders may be excluded from this 
attribution rule. An applicant claiming the rural service provider 
bidding credit may have spectrum license use agreements with a 
disclosable interest holder, without having to attribute the 
disclosable interest holder's subscribers, so long as the disclosable 
interest holder is independently eligible for a rural service provider 
credit and the use agreement is otherwise permissible under the 
Commission's existing rules. If applicable, the applicant must attach 
to its FCC Form 175 any additional

[[Page 53218]]

information as may be required to indicate any license (or license 
area) that may be subject to this attribution rule or to demonstrate 
its eligibility for the exception from this attribution rule. The 
Commission intends to withhold from public disclosure all information 
contained in any such attachments until after the close of Auction 107.
c. Exceptions From Attribution Rules for Small Businesses and Rural 
Service Providers
    81. Applicants claiming designated entity benefits may be eligible 
for certain exceptions from the Commission's attribution rules. For 
example, in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the 
controlling interest standard, the Commission will not attribute to the 
applicant the personal net worth, including personal income, of its 
officers and directors. To the extent that the officers and directors 
of the applicant are controlling interest holders of other entities, 
the gross revenues of those entities will be attributed to the 
applicant. Moreover, if an officer or director operates a separate 
business, the gross revenues derived from that separate business would 
be attributed to the applicant, although any personal income from such 
separate business would not be attributed. The Commission has also 
exempted from attribution to the applicant the gross revenues of the 
affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's officers and directors, 
if certain conditions specified in section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii) of the 
Commission's rules are met. An applicant claiming this exemption must 
provide, in an attachment, an affirmative statement that the applicant, 
affiliate and/or controlling interest is an eligible rural telephone 
cooperative within the meaning of section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and the 
applicant must supply any additional information as may be required to 
demonstrate eligibility for the exemption from the attribution rule.
    82. An applicant claiming a rural service provider bidding credit 
may be eligible for an exception from the Commission's attribution 
rules as an existing rural partnership. To qualify for this exception, 
an applicant must be a rural partnership providing service as of July 
16, 2015, and each member of the rural partnership must individually 
have fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and 
cable subscribers. The Commission will evaluate eligibility for an 
existing rural wireless partnership on the same basis as it would for 
an applicant applying for a bidding credit as a consortium of rural 
service providers. A partnership that includes a nationwide provider as 
a member will not be eligible for the benefit. Members of such 
partnerships that fall under this exception may also apply as 
individual applicants or members of a consortium (to the extent that it 
is otherwise permissible to do so under the Commission's rules) and 
seek eligibility for a rural service provider bidding credit.
    83. A consortium of small businesses or rural service providers may 
seek an exception from the Commission's attribution rules. A consortium 
of small businesses or rural service providers is a conglomerate 
organization composed of two or more entities, each of which 
individually satisfies the definition of small business or rural 
service provider. A consortium must provide additional information for 
each member demonstrating each member's eligibility for the claimed 
bidding credit in order to show that the applicant satisfies the 
eligibility criteria for the bidding credit. The gross revenue or 
subscriber information of each consortium member will not be aggregated 
for purposes of determining the consortium's eligibility for the 
claimed bidding credit. This information must be provided to ensure 
that each consortium member qualifies for the bidding credit sought by 
the consortium.

I. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

    84. Each applicant must make certifications regarding whether it is 
a current or former defaulter or delinquent. A current defaulter or 
delinquent is not eligible to participate in Auction 107, but a former 
defaulter or delinquent may participate so long as it is otherwise 
qualified and makes an upfront payment that is 50% more than would 
otherwise be necessary. An applicant is considered a current defaulter 
or a current delinquent when it, any of its affiliates, any of its 
controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling 
interests, is in default on any payment for any Commission construction 
permit or license (including a down payment) or is delinquent on any 
non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the filing deadline for 
auction applications. Non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency includes, 
within the meaning of the rule, all amounts owed under Federal 
programs, including contributions to the Universal Service Fund (USF), 
Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, and the North American 
Numbering Plan Administration, notwithstanding that the administrator 
of any such fund may not be considered a Federal ``agency'' under the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. For example, an applicant with 
a past due USF contribution as of the auction application filing 
deadline would be disqualified from participating in Auction 107 under 
the Commission's rules. If the applicant cures the overdue debt prior 
to the auction application filing deadline (and such debt does not fall 
within one of the exclusions described in section 1.2105(a)(2)(xii)), 
it may be eligible to participate in Auction 107 as a former defaulter. 
Each applicant must certify under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 
175 that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the 
affiliates of its controlling interests are not in default on any 
payment for a Commission construction permit or license (including down 
payments) and that it is not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any 
Federal agency. Additionally, an applicant must certify under penalty 
of perjury whether it (along with its controlling interests) has ever 
been in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or 
license (including down payments) or has ever been delinquent on any 
non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, subject to the exclusions. The 
term ``controlling interest'' is defined in section 1.2105(a)(4)(i) of 
the Commission rules.
    85. An applicant is considered a former defaulter or a former 
delinquent when, as of the FCC Form 175 deadline, the applicant or any 
of its controlling interests has defaulted on any Commission 
construction permit or license or has been delinquent on any non-tax 
debt owed to any Federal agency, but has since remedied all such 
defaults and cured all of the outstanding non-tax delinquencies. The 
applicant may exclude from consideration any cured default on a 
Commission construction permit or license or cured delinquency on a 
non-tax debt owed to a Federal agency for which any of the following 
criteria are met: (1) The notice of the final payment deadline or 
delinquency was received more than seven years before the FCC Form 175 
filing deadline, (2) the default or delinquency amounted to less than 
$100,000, (3) the default or delinquency was paid within two quarters 
(i.e., six months) after receiving the notice of the final payment 
deadline or delinquency, or (4) the default or delinquency was the 
subject of a legal or arbitration proceeding and was cured upon 
resolution of the proceeding. Notice to a debtor may include notice of 
a final payment deadline or notice of delinquency and may be express or 
implied depending on the origin of any

[[Page 53219]]

Federal non-tax debt giving rise to a default or delinquency. The date 
of receipt of the notice of a final default deadline or delinquency by 
the intended party or debtor will be used for purposes of verifying 
receipt of notice. A debt will not be deemed to be in default or 
delinquent until after the expiration of a final payment deadline. To 
the extent that the rules providing for payment of a specific federal 
debt permit payment after an original payment deadline accompanied by 
late fee(s), such debts would not be in default or delinquent for 
purposes of applying the former defaulter rules until after the late 
payment deadline. Any winning bidder that fails to timely pay its post-
auction down payment or the balance of its final winning bid amount(s) 
or is disqualified for any reason after the close of an auction will be 
in default and subject to a default payment. Commission staff provide 
individual notice of the amount of such a default payment as well as 
procedures and information required by the Debt Collection Improvement 
Act of 1996, including the payment due date and any charges, interest, 
and/or penalties that accrue in the event of delinquency. Such notice 
provided by Commission staff assessing a default payment arising out of 
a default on a winning bid, constitutes notice of the final payment 
deadline with respect to a default on a Commission license.
    86. Applicants are encouraged to review previous guidance on 
default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of the 
auction short-form application process. Parties are also encouraged to 
consult with Auctions Division staff if they have any questions about 
default and delinquency disclosure requirements.
    87. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United 
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The 
Commission has previously adopted rules, including a provision referred 
to as the ``red light rule,'' that implement its obligations under the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection 
of debts owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, 
applications and other requests for benefits filed by parties that have 
outstanding debts owed to the Commission will not be processed. The 
Commission's adoption of the red light rule does not alter the 
applicability of any of its competitive bidding rules, including the 
provisions and certifications of sections 1.2105 and 1.2106, with 
regard to current and former defaults or delinquencies.
    88. The Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides 
information regarding debts currently owed to the Commission, may not 
be determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the 
default and delinquency disclosure requirements of section 1.2105. 
Thus, while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of 
long-form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's lack 
of current red light status is not necessarily determinative of its 
eligibility to participate in an auction (or whether it may be subject 
to an increased upfront payment obligation). A prospective applicant in 
Auction 107 should note that any long-form applications filed after the 
close of bidding will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's 
red light rule, and such review may result in the dismissal of a 
winning bidder's long-form application. Applicants that have their 
long-form applications dismissed will be deemed to have defaulted and 
will be subject to default payments under sections 1.2104(g) and 
1.2109(c) of the Commission's rules. Each applicant should carefully 
review all records and other available Federal agency databases and 
information sources to determine whether the applicant, or any of its 
affiliates, or any of its controlling interests, or any of the 
affiliates of its controlling interests, owes or was ever delinquent in 
the payment of non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. To access the 
Commission's Red Light Display System, go to: https://apps.fcc.gov/redlight/login.cfm.

J. Optional Applicant Status Identification

    89. Applicants owned by members of minority groups and/or women, as 
defined in section 1.2110(c)(3), and rural telephone companies, as 
defined in section 1.2110(c)(4), may identify themselves regarding this 
status in filling out their FCC Form 175 applications. This applicant 
status information is collected for statistical purposes only and 
assists the Commission in monitoring the participation of various 
groups in its auctions.

K. Modifications to FCC Form 175

1. Only Minor Modifications Allowed
    90. After the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline, an Auction 107 
applicant will be permitted to make only minor changes to its 
application consistent with the Commission's rules. Minor amendments 
include any changes that are not major, such as correcting 
typographical errors and supplying or correcting information as 
requested to support the certifications made in the application. 
Examples of minor changes include the deletion or addition of 
authorized bidders (to a maximum of three) and the revision of 
addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant, its responsible 
party, and its contact person. Major modification to an FCC Form 175 
(e.g., change of PEA selection, certain changes in ownership that would 
constitute an assignment or transfer of control of the applicant, 
change in the required certifications, change in applicant's legal 
classification that results in a change in control, or change in 
claimed eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding credit) will not 
be permitted after the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline. If an 
amendment reporting changes is a ``major amendment,'' as described in 
section 1.2105(b)(2), the major amendment will not be accepted and may 
result in the dismissal of the application. Any change in control of an 
applicant will be considered a major modification, and the application 
will consequently be dismissed. Even if an applicant's FCC Form 175 is 
dismissed, the applicant would remain subject to the communication 
prohibitions of section 1.2105(c) until the down payment deadline for 
Auction 107.
2. Duty To Maintain Accuracy and Completeness of FCC Form 175
    91. Each applicant has a continuing obligation to maintain the 
accuracy and completeness of information furnished in a pending 
application, including a pending application to participate in Auction 
107. An applicant's FCC Form 175 and associated attachments will remain 
pending until the release of a public notice announcing the close of 
the auction. Auction 107 applicants remain subject to the section 
1.2105(c) prohibition on certain communications until the post-auction 
deadline for making down payments on winning bids in Auction 107. An 
applicant's post-auction application (FCC Form 601) is considered 
pending from the time it is accepted for filing by the Commission until 
a Commission grant or denial of the application is no longer subject to 
reconsideration by the Commission or to review by any court. An 
applicant for Auction 107 must furnish additional or corrected 
information to the Commission within five business days after a 
significant occurrence or amend its FCC Form 175 no more than five 
business days after the applicant becomes aware of the need for the 
amendment. An applicant is obligated to amend its pending

[[Page 53220]]

application even if a reported change may result in the dismissal of 
the application because it is subsequently determined to be a major 
modification.
3. Modifying an FCC Form 175
    92. A party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file an FCC 
Form 175 electronically via the FCC's Auction Application System. 
During the initial filing window, an applicant will be able to make any 
necessary modifications to its FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application 
System. An applicant that has certified and submitted its FCC Form 175 
before the close of the initial filing window may continue to make 
modifications as often as necessary until the close of that window; the 
applicant must re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 before the 
close of the initial filing window to confirm and effect its latest 
application changes. After each submission, a confirmation page will be 
displayed stating the submission time and submission date. Applicants 
are advised to retain a copy of this confirmation page.
    93. An applicant will also be allowed to modify its FCC Form 175 in 
the Auction Application System, except for certain fields, during the 
resubmission filing window and after the release of the public notice 
announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. An applicant will not 
be allowed to modify electronically in the Auction Application System 
the applicant's legal classification, the applicant's name, or the 
certifying official. During the resubmission filing window and after 
the release of the public notice announcing the qualified bidders for 
an auction, if an applicant needs to make permissible minor changes to 
its FCC Form 175 or must make changes in order to maintain the accuracy 
and completeness of its application pursuant to sections 1.65 and 
1.2105(b)(4), then it must make the change(s) in the Auction 
Application System and re-certify and re-submit its application to 
confirm and effect the change(s).
    94. An applicant's ability to modify its FCC Form 175 in the 
Auction Application System will be limited between the closing of the 
initial filing window and the opening of the application resubmission 
filing window, and between the closing of the resubmission filing 
window and the release of the public notice announcing the qualified 
bidders for an auction. During these periods, an applicant will be able 
to view its submitted application, but will be permitted to modify only 
the applicant's address, responsible party address, and contact 
information (e.g., name, address, telephone number, etc.) in the 
Auction Application System. An applicant will not be able to modify any 
other pages of the FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application System 
during these periods. If, during these periods, an applicant needs to 
make other permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175, or changes to 
maintain the accuracy and completeness of its application, the 
applicant must submit a letter briefly summarizing the changes to its 
FCC Form 175 via email to [email protected]. The email summarizing the 
changes must include a subject line referring to Auction 107 and the 
name of the applicant, for example, ``Re: Changes to Auction 107 
Auction Application of XYZ Corp.'' Any attachments to the email must be 
formatted as Adobe[supreg] Acrobat[supreg] (PDF) or Microsoft[supreg] 
Word documents. An applicant that submits its changes in this manner 
must subsequently modify, certify, and submit its FCC Form 175 
application(s) electronically in the Auction Application System once it 
is again open and available to applicants.
    95. Applicants should also note that even at times when the Auction 
Application System is open and available to applicants, the system will 
not allow an applicant to make certain other permissible changes itself 
(e.g., correcting a misstatement of the applicant's legal 
classification). If an applicant needs to make a permissible minor 
change of this nature, then it must submit a written request by email 
to the Auctions Division Chief, via [email protected], requesting that 
the Commission manually make the change on the applicant's behalf. Once 
Commission staff has informed the applicant that the change has been 
made in the Auction Application System, the applicant must then re-
certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application 
System to confirm and effect the change(s).
    96. Any amendment(s) to the application and related statements of 
fact must be certified by an authorized representative of the applicant 
with authority to bind the applicant. Submission of any such amendment 
or related statement of fact constitutes a representation by the person 
certifying that he or she is an authorized representative with such 
authority and that the contents of the amendment or statement of fact 
are true and correct.
    97. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System. Parties 
submitting information related to their applications should use caution 
to ensure that their submissions do not contain confidential 
information or communicate information that would violate section 
1.2105(c) or the limited information procedures adopted for Auction 
107. An applicant seeking to submit, outside of the Auction Application 
System, information that might reflect non-public information, such as 
an applicant's PEA selection(s), upfront payment amount, or bidding 
eligibility, should consider including in its email a request that the 
filing or portions of the filing be withheld from public inspection 
until the end of the prohibition on certain communications.
    98. Questions about FCC Form 175 amendments should be directed to 
the Auctions Division at (202) 418-0660.

III. Preparing for Bidding in Auction 107

A. Due Diligence

    99. Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating 
and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a 
bearing on the value of the licenses that it is seeking in Auction 107. 
The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of 
this spectrum or these licenses for particular services. Each applicant 
should be aware that a Commission auction represents an opportunity to 
become a Commission licensee, subject to certain conditions and 
regulations. This includes the established authority of the Commission 
to alter the terms of existing licenses by rulemaking, which is equally 
applicable to licenses awarded by auction. A Commission auction does 
not constitute an endorsement by the Commission of any particular 
service, technology, or product, nor does a Commission license 
constitute a guarantee of business success.
    100. An applicant should perform its due diligence research and 
analysis before proceeding, as it would with any new business venture. 
Each potential bidder should perform technical analyses and/or refresh 
its previous analyses to assure itself that, should it become a winning 
bidder for any Auction 107 license, it will be able to build and 
operate facilities that will fully comply with all applicable technical 
and legal requirements. Each applicant should inspect any prospective 
sites for communications facilities located in, or near, the geographic 
area for which it plans to bid, confirm the availability of such sites, 
and to familiarize itself with the Commission's rules regarding the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic

[[Page 53221]]

Preservation Act (NHPA), and other environmental statutes.
    101. Each applicant in Auction 107 should continue to conduct its 
own research throughout the auction in order to determine the existence 
of pending or future administrative or judicial proceedings that might 
affect its decision on continued participation in the auction. Each 
applicant is responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various 
possible outcomes and for considering the potential impact on licenses 
available in an auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in 
the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice do not constitute an 
exhaustive list of steps that should be undertaken prior to 
participating in Auction 107. The burden is on the potential bidder to 
determine how much research to undertake, depending upon the specific 
facts and circumstances related to its interests. For example, 
applicants should pay particular attention to the framework adopted in 
the 3.7 GHz Report and Order that requires new overlay licensees to pay 
a specified share of accelerated relocation payments as well as 
relocation expenses to reimburse incumbents for the reasonable costs of 
transitioning out of the lower 300 megahertz of the band in the 
contiguous United States.
    102. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated 
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such 
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make 
use of the licenses available in Auction 107. Each potential bidder is 
responsible for undertaking research to ensure that any licenses won in 
the auction will be suitable for its business plans and needs. Each 
potential bidder must undertake its own assessment of the relevance and 
importance of information gathered as part of its due diligence 
efforts.
    103. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees 
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases 
or any third-party databases, including, for example, court docketing 
systems. To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all 
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, it must 
obtain or verify such information from independent sources or assume 
the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases. 
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees 
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been 
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.

B. Licensing Considerations

1. Transition of Incumbent Operations
    104. Potential applicants in Auction 107 should consider carefully 
the process for transitioning incumbent operations out of the 3.7-3.98 
GHz band when developing business plans, assessing market conditions, 
and evaluating the availability of equipment for 3.7 GHz Service 
operations. Each applicant should follow closely releases from the 
Commission concerning these issues and consider carefully the technical 
and economic implications for commercial use of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band.
2. International Coordination
    105. Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas 
adjacent to the Canadian and Mexican borders should be aware that the 
use of the 3.7 GHz Service frequencies they acquire in Auction 107 are 
subject to current and future agreements with the governments of Canada 
and Mexico.
    106. The Commission routinely works with the United States 
Department of State and Canadian and Mexican government officials to 
ensure the efficient use of the spectrum as well as interference-free 
operations in the border areas near Canada and Mexico. Until such time 
as any adjusted agreements, as needed, between the United States, 
Mexico, and/or Canada can be agreed to, operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz 
band must not cause harmful interference across the border, consistent 
with the terms of the agreements currently in force.
3. Environmental Review Requirements
    107. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules for 
environmental review under the NEPA, the NHPA, and other environmental 
statutes. Licensees and other applicants that propose to build certain 
types of communications facilities for licensed service must follow 
Commission procedures implementing obligations under NEPA and NHPA 
prior to constructing the facilities. Under NEPA, a licensee or 
applicant must assess if certain environmentally sensitive conditions 
specified in the Commission's rules are relevant to the proposed 
facilities, and prepare an environmental assessment when applicable. 
This assessment may require consultation with expert agencies having 
environmental responsibilities, such as U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, among others. If an environmental assessment is required, then 
facilities may not be constructed until environmental processing is 
completed. Under NHPA, a licensee or applicant must follow the 
procedures in section 1.1320 of the Commission's rules, the Nationwide 
Programmatic Agreement for Collocation of Wireless Antennas and the 
Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National 
Historic Preservation Act Review Process. Compliance with section 106 
of the NHPA requires tribal consultation, and if construction of the 
communications facilities would have adverse effects on historic or 
tribally significant properties, an environmental assessment must be 
prepared.
4. Mobile Spectrum Holdings Policies
    108. Bidders are reminded of the Commission's mobile spectrum 
holdings policies applicable to the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. Specifically, 
the Commission did not impose a pre-auction bright-line limit on 
acquisitions of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. Instead, the Commission 
incorporated into the spectrum screen the 280 megahertz of spectrum 
available in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. The Commission will also perform 
case-by-case review of the long-form license applications filed as a 
result of Auction 107.

C. Bidder Education

    109. Before the opening of the short-form filing window for Auction 
107, detailed educational information will be provided in various 
formats to would-be participants on the Auction 107 web page. OEA will 
provide various materials on the pre-bidding processes in advance of 
the opening of the short-form application window, beginning with the 
release of step-by-step instructions for completing the FCC Form 175, 
which OEA has made available in the Education section of the Auction 
107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. OEA will provide an online 
application procedures tutorial for the auction, covering information 
on pre-bidding preparation, completing short-form applications, and the 
application review process.
    110. In advance of the start of the mock auction, OEA will provide 
educational materials on the bidding procedures for Auction 107, 
beginning with release of a user guide for the bidding system and 
bidding system file formats, followed by an online bidding procedures 
tutorial. The educational materials shall be released as soon as 
reasonably possible to provide potential applicants and bidders with 
time to understand them and ask questions before bidding begins.

[[Page 53222]]

    111. The online tutorials will allow viewers to navigate the 
presentation outline, review written notes, and listen to audio of the 
notes. Additional features of this web-based tool include links to 
auction-specific Commission releases, email links for contacting 
Commission staff, and screen shots of the online application and 
bidding systems. The online tutorials will be accessible in the 
Education section of the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. Once posted, the tutorials will be accessible anytime.

D. Short-Form Applications: Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 
2020

    112. In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 107, an applicant 
must first follow the procedures to submit a short-form application 
(FCC Form 175) electronically via the Auction Application System, 
following the instructions set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. 
The short-form application will become available with the opening of 
the initial filing window and must be submitted prior to 6:00 p.m. ET 
on September 22, 2020. Late applications will not be accepted. No 
application fee is required.
    113. Applications may be filed at any time beginning at noon ET on 
September 9, 2020, until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. ET on 
September 22, 2020. Applicants should file early and are responsible 
for allowing adequate time for filing their applications. There are no 
limits or restrictions on the number of times an application can be 
updated or amended until the initial filing deadline on September 22, 
2020.
    114. An applicant must always click on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button 
on the ``Certify & Submit'' screen to successfully submit its FCC Form 
175 and any modifications; otherwise the application or changes to the 
application will not be received or reviewed by Commission staff. 
Additional information about accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC 
Form 175 is provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. Applicants 
requiring technical assistance should contact FCC Auctions Technical 
Support at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202) 414-1250; or (202) 414-
1255 (text telephone (TTY)); hours of service are Monday through 
Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. All calls to Technical Support 
are recorded.
    115. Applicants are cautioned that the Commission periodically 
performs scheduled maintenance of its IT systems. During scheduled 
maintenance activities, which typically occur over the weekends, every 
effort is made to minimize any downtime to auction-related systems, 
including the Auction Application System. However, there are occasions 
when auction-related systems may be temporarily unavailable.

E. Application Processing and Minor Modifications

1. Public Notice of Applicants' Initial Application Status and 
Opportunity for Minor Modifications
    116. After the deadline for filing auction applications, the 
Commission will process all timely submitted applications to determine 
whether each applicant has complied with the application requirements 
and provided all information concerning its qualifications for bidding. 
OEA will issue a public notice with applicants' initial application 
status, identifying: (1) Those that are complete; and (2) those that 
are incomplete or deficient because of defects that may be corrected. 
The public notice will include the deadline for resubmitting corrected 
applications and an electronic copy will be sent by email to the 
contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 for each applicant. In 
addition, each applicant with an incomplete application will be sent 
information on the nature of the deficiencies in its application, along 
with the name and contact information of a Commission staff member who 
can answer questions specific to the application.
    117. After the initial application filing deadline on September 22, 
2020, applicants can make only minor modifications to their 
applications. Major modifications (e.g., change of PEA selection, 
certain changes in ownership that would constitute an assignment or 
transfer of control of the applicant, change in the required 
certifications, change in applicant's legal classification that results 
in a change in control, or change in claimed eligibility for a higher 
percentage of bidding credit) will not be permitted. After the deadline 
for resubmitting corrected applications, an applicant will have no 
further opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its application or 
provide any additional information that may affect Commission staff's 
ultimate determination of whether and to what extent the applicant is 
qualified to participate in Auction 107.
    118. Commission staff will communicate only with an applicant's 
contact person or certifying official, as designated on the applicant's 
FCC Form 175, unless the applicant's certifying official or contact 
person notifies Commission staff in writing that another representative 
is authorized to speak on the applicant's behalf. In no event, however, 
will the Commission send auction registration materials to anyone other 
than the contact person listed on the applicant's FCC Form 175 or 
respond to a request for replacement registration materials from anyone 
other than the authorized bidder, contact person, or certifying 
official listed on the applicant's FCC Form 175. Authorizations may be 
sent by email to [email protected].
2. Public Notice of Applicants' Final Application Status After Upfront 
Payment Deadline
    119. After Commission staff reviews resubmitted applications and 
upfront payments, OEA will release a public notice identifying 
applicants that have become qualified bidders for the auction. A 
Qualified Bidders Public Notice will be issued before bidding in the 
auction begins. Qualified bidders are those applicants with submitted 
FCC Form 175 applications that are deemed timely filed and complete and 
that have made a sufficient upfront payment.

F. Upfront Payments

    120. In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 107, a sufficient 
upfront payment and a complete and accurate FCC Remittance Advice Form 
(FCC Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be submitted before 6:00 p.m. ET on 
November 2, 2020. After completing its short-form application, an 
applicant will have access to an electronic pre-filled version of the 
FCC Form 159. An accurate and complete FCC Form 159 must accompany each 
payment. Proper completion of this form is critical to ensuring correct 
crediting of upfront payments. Payers using the pre-filled FCC Form 159 
are responsible for ensuring that all the information on the form, 
including payment amounts, is accurate. Instructions for completing FCC 
Form 159 for Auction 107 are provided in the Auction 107 Procedures 
Public Notice.
1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer for Auction 107
    121. Upfront payments for Auction 107 must be wired to, and will be 
deposited in, the U.S. Treasury.
    122. Wire transfer payments for Auction 107 must be received before 
6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. An applicant must initiate the wire 
transfer through its bank, authorizing the bank to wire funds from the 
applicant's account to the proper account at the U.S. Treasury. No 
other payment method is acceptable. To avoid untimely payments, 
applicants should discuss arrangements (including bank

[[Page 53223]]

closing schedules and other specific bank wire transfer requirements, 
such as an in-person written request before a specified time of day) 
with their bankers several days before they plan to make the wire 
transfer, and must allow sufficient time for the transfer to be 
initiated and completed before the deadline. The information needed to 
place an order for a wire transfer is set forth in the Auction 107 
Procedures Public Notice.
    123. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire 
transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must print and fax 
a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202) 418-2843. 
Alternatively, the completed form can be scanned and sent as an 
attachment to an email to [email protected]. On the fax cover sheet 
or in the email subject header, write ``Wire Transfer--Auction Payment 
for Auction 107''. To meet the upfront payment deadline, an applicant's 
payment must be credited to the Commission's account for Auction 107 
before the deadline.
    124. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring timely submission 
of its upfront payment and for timely filing of an accurate and 
complete FCC Form 159. An applicant should coordinate with its 
financial institution well ahead of the due date regarding its wire 
transfer and allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and 
completed prior to the deadline. Among other things, each applicant is 
cautioned to plan ahead regarding any potential delays in its or its 
financial institution's ability to complete wire transfers due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission repeatedly has cautioned auction 
participants about the importance of planning ahead to prepare for 
unforeseen last-minute difficulties in making payments by wire 
transfer. Each applicant also is responsible for obtaining confirmation 
from its financial institution that its wire transfer to the U.S. 
Treasury was successful and from Commission staff that its upfront 
payment was timely received and that it was deposited into the proper 
account. To receive confirmation from Commission staff, contact Scott 
Radcliffe of the Office of Managing Director's Revenue & Receivables 
Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 418-7518 or Theresa Meeks at (202) 
418-2945.
    125. All payments must be made in U.S. dollars. All payments must 
be made by wire transfer. Upfront payments for Auction 107 go to an 
account number different from the accounts used in previous FCC 
auctions.
    126. Failure to deliver a sufficient upfront payment as instructed 
herein by the upfront payment deadline will result in dismissal of the 
short-form application and disqualification from participation in the 
auction.
2. Completing and Submitting FCC Form 159
    127. Information that supplements the standard instructions for FCC 
Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is provided in the Auction 107 Procedures 
Public Notice to help ensure correct completion of FCC Form 159 for 
upfront payments for Auction 107. Applicants need to complete FCC Form 
159 carefully, because mistakes may affect bidding eligibility and lack 
of consistency between information provided in FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/
03), FCC Form 175, long-form application (FCC Form 601), and 
correspondence about an application may cause processing delays. 
Appropriate cross-references between the FCC Form Remittance Advise and 
the short-form application are described in the Auction 107 Procedures 
Public Notice.
3. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    128. An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each 
applicant seeking to participate in bidding to establish its 
eligibility to bid on licenses.
    129. Applicants that are former defaulters must pay upfront 
payments 50% greater than non-former defaulters. For purposes of this 
classification as a former defaulter or a former delinquent, defaults 
and delinquencies of the applicant itself and its controlling interests 
are included.
    130. An applicant must make an upfront payment sufficient to obtain 
bidding eligibility on the generic blocks on which it will bid. Upfront 
payments are based on MHz-pops, and the amount of the upfront payment 
submitted by an applicant will determine its initial bidding 
eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may 
place bids in any single round. In order to bid for a block, qualified 
bidders must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the 
number of bidding units assigned to that generic block in a PEA. At a 
minimum, an applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to 
establish eligibility to bid on at least one block in one of the PEAs 
selected on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 107, or else the applicant 
will not become qualified to participate in the auction. The total 
upfront payment does not affect the total dollar amount the bidder may 
bid.
    131. Upfront payments for a generic block in a PEA are based on 
$0.015 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1-50, $0.0030 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51-100, 
and $0.0015 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to a minimum of 
$500. The results of the upfront payment calculations will be rounded 
as follows: Results above $10,000 will be rounded to the nearest 
$1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 will be rounded to the 
nearest $100; and results below $1,000 will be rounded to the nearest 
$10. The upfront payment amount per block in each PEA is set forth in 
the Attachment A file, available at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. The 
upfront payment amounts are approximately half the minimum opening bid 
amounts.
    132. Each generic block in a PEA is assigned a specific number of 
bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per $10 of the upfront 
payment. The number of bidding units for one block in a given PEA is 
fixed, since it is based on the MHz-pops in the block and does not 
change during the auction as prices change. Thus, in calculating its 
upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine the maximum 
number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid in any single round 
and submit an upfront payment amount for the auction covering that 
number of bidding units. In some cases, a qualified bidder's maximum 
eligibility may be less than the amount of its upfront payment because 
the qualified bidder has either previously been in default on a 
Commission construction permit or license or delinquent on non-tax debt 
owed to a Federal agency, or has submitted an upfront payment that 
exceeds the total amount of bidding units associated with the license 
areas it selected on its FCC Form 175. In order to make this 
calculation, an applicant should add together the bidding units for the 
number of blocks in PEAs on which it seeks to be active in any given 
round. Applicants should check their calculations carefully, as there 
is no provision for increasing a bidder's eligibility after the upfront 
payment deadline.
    133. If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its 
upfront payment for the maximum amount of generic blocks in each PEA on 
which it plans to bid by multiplying the number of bidding units on 
which it wishes to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number 
of bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will 
calculate the number of bidding units a non-former defaulter would get 
for the upfront payment received, divide that number by 1.5, and round 
the result up to the nearest bidding unit. If a former

[[Page 53224]]

defaulter fails to submit a sufficient upfront payment to establish 
eligibility to bid on at least one generic block in a PEA, the 
applicant will not be eligible to participate in Auction 107.

G. Auction Registration

    134. All qualified bidders for Auction 107 are automatically 
registered for the auction. Registration materials will be distributed 
prior to the auction by overnight delivery. The mailing will be sent 
only to the contact person at the contact address listed in the FCC 
Form 175 and will include the SecurID[supreg] tokens that will be 
required to place bids.
    135. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration 
mailing will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified 
bidder for Auction 107 that has not received this mailing by noon on 
November 25, 2020, should call the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868. 
Receipt of this registration mailing is critical to participating in 
the auction, and each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has 
received all the registration materials.
    136. If a SecurID[supreg] token is lost or damaged, only a person 
who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the contact person, or 
the certifying official on the applicant's short-form application may 
request a replacement. To request a replacement, call the Auction 
Bidder Line at the telephone number provided in the registration 
materials or the Auction Hotline at (717) 338-2868.

H. Remote Electronic Bidding via the FCC Auction Bidding System

    137. Bidders will be able to participate in Auction 107 over the 
internet using the FCC Auction Bidding System (bidding system). Bidders 
will have the option of placing bids by telephone through a dedicated 
auction bidder line. Please note that the telephonic bid assistants are 
required to use a script when entering bids placed by telephone. 
Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to 
bid by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The 
length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary; please allow a 
minimum of 10 minutes. The toll-free telephone number for the auction 
bidder line will be provided to qualified bidders prior to the stat of 
bidding in the auction.
    138. Only qualified bidders are permitted to bid. Each authorized 
bidder must have his or her own SecurID[supreg] token, which the 
Commission will provide at no charge. Each applicant will be issued 
three SecurID[supreg] tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his or her 
SecurID[supreg] token. In order to access the bidding function of the 
bidding system, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round 
using the passcode generated by the SecurID[supreg] token and a 
personal identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are 
strongly encouraged to print a bid summary for each round after they 
have completed all their activity for that round. For security 
purposes, the SecurID[supreg] tokens and a telephone number for bidding 
questions are only mailed to the contact person at the contact address 
listed on the FCC Form 175. Each SecurID[supreg] token is tailored to a 
specific auction. SecurID[supreg] tokens issued for other auctions or 
obtained from a source other than the FCC will not work for Auction 
107. The SecurID[supreg] tokens can be recycled, and the Commission 
requests that bidders return the tokens to the FCC. Pre-addressed 
envelopes will be provided to return the tokens once the auction has 
ended.
    139. The Commission makes no warranties whatsoever and shall not be 
deemed to have made any warranties, with respect to the bidding system, 
including any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose. In no event shall the Commission, or any of its 
officers, employees, or agents, be liable for any damages whatsoever 
(including, but not limited to, loss of business profits, business 
interruption, loss of use, revenue, or business information, or any 
other direct, indirect, or consequential damages) arising out of or 
relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning, or use of the 
bidding system. Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of 
the Commission's technical, programming, or other advice or service 
provided in connection with the bidding system.
    140. To the extent an issue arises with the bidding system itself, 
the Commission will take all appropriate measures to resolve such 
issues quickly and equitably. Should an issue arise that is outside the 
bidding system or attributable to a bidder, including, but not limited 
to, a bidder's hardware, software, or internet access problem that 
prevents the bidder from submitting a bid prior to the end of a round, 
the Commission shall have no obligation to resolve or remediate such an 
issue on behalf of the bidder. Similarly, if an issue arises due to 
bidder error using the bidding system, the Commission shall have no 
obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the 
bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a bidding round, the results of 
bid processing will not be altered absent evidence of any failure in 
the bidding system.

I. Mock Auction

    141. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a 
mock auction for the clock phase, which will begin on December 3, 2020. 
Only those bidders that are qualified to participate in Auction 107 
will be eligible to participate in the mock auction. The mock auction 
will enable qualified bidders to become familiar with the bidding 
system and to practice submitting bids prior to the auction. All 
qualified bidders, including all their authorized bidders, are 
encouraged to participate to assure that they can log in to the bidding 
system and gain experience with the bidding procedures. Participating 
in the mock auction may reduce the likelihood of a bidder making a 
mistake during the auction. Details regarding the mock auction will be 
announced in the Qualified Bidders Public Notice for Auction 107.
    142. After the clock phase of the auction concludes, a separate 
mock auction for the assignment phase will be held for those qualified 
bidders that won generic blocks in the clock phase.

J. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    143. At any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in 
conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 
107 in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, network 
interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an 
auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other 
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive 
bidding. OEA will notify participants of any such delay, suspension, or 
cancellation by public notice and/or through the bidding system's 
announcement function. If the bidding is delayed or suspended, then OEA 
may, in its sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting from 
the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or 
cancel the auction in its entirety. OEA and WTB will exercise this 
authority at their discretion.

K. Fraud Alert

    144. As is the case with many business investment opportunities, 
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction 107 to 
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals of 
fraud include the following:
     The first contact is a ``cold call'' from a telemarketer 
or is made in

[[Page 53225]]

response to an inquiry prompted by a radio or television infomercial.
     The offering materials used to invest in the venture 
appear to be targeted at IRA funds, for example, by including all 
documents and papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA 
accounts.
     The amount of investment is less than $25,000.
     The sales representative makes verbal representations 
that: (a) The Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or other government 
agency has approved the investment; (b) the investment is not subject 
to state or federal securities laws; or (c) the investment will yield 
unrealistically high short-term profits. In addition, the offering 
materials often include copies of actual FCC releases, or quotes from 
FCC personnel, giving the appearance of FCC knowledge or approval of 
the solicitation.
    145. Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes 
is available from the FCC, as well as the FTC and SEC. Additional 
sources of information for potential bidders and investors may be 
obtained from the following sources:
     The FCC's Consumer Call Center at (888) 225-5322 or by 
visiting www.fcc.gov/general/frauds-scams-and-alerts-guides.
     the FTC at (877) FTC-HELP ((877) 382-4357) or by visiting 
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0238-investment-risks.
     the SEC at (202) 942-7040 or by visiting www.sec.gov/investor.
    146. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment 
schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud 
Information Center at (202) 835-0618.

IV. Bidding Procedures

    147. Auction 107 will be conducted using an ascending clock auction 
design with two phases. The first phase of the auction--the clock 
phase--will consist of successive clock bidding rounds in which bidders 
indicate their demands for a number of generic license blocks in 
specific categories and PEAs. In the second phase--the assignment 
phase--winning clock phase bidders will have the opportunity to bid for 
their preferred combinations of frequency-specific license assignments, 
consistent with their clock phase winnings, in a series of single 
sealed-bid rounds conducted by PEA or, in some cases, PEA group.
    148. Updated technical guides that provide the mathematical details 
of the auction design and algorithms for the clock and assignment 
phases of Auction 107 are available in the Education section of the 
Auction 107 website (www.fcc.gov/auction/107). The information in the 
updated technical guides supplements the Auction 107 Procedures Public 
Notice.

A. Clock Phase

1. Clock Auction Design
    149. During the clock phase of Auction 107, bidders will indicate 
their demands for generic license blocks in up to two bidding 
categories in specific geographic areas--in this case, PEAs. Under the 
clock auction format, the auction will proceed in a series of rounds, 
with bidding conducted simultaneously for all spectrum blocks in all 
PEAs available in the auction. During each bidding round, the bidding 
system will announce a per-block clock price for each product--a 
category in a PEA--and qualified bidders will submit, for each product 
for which they wish to bid, the number of blocks they seek at the clock 
prices associated with the current round. Bidding rounds will be open 
for predetermined periods of time. Bidders will be subject to activity 
and eligibility rules that govern the pace at which they participate in 
the auction.
    150. In Auction 107, For each product, the clock price for a 
generic license block will increase from round to round if bidders 
indicate total demand for blocks in that product that exceeds the 
number of blocks available. The bidding rounds will continue until, for 
all products, the total number of blocks that bidders demand does not 
exceed the supply of available blocks. At that point, those bidders 
indicating demand for a product at the final price will be deemed 
winning bidders.
    151. Following the clock phase, the assignment phase will offer 
clock phase winners the opportunity to bid an additional amount for 
licenses with specific frequencies. All winning bidders, regardless of 
whether they bid in the assignment phase, will be assigned licenses for 
contiguous blocks within each PEA.
2. Generic License Blocks and Bidding Categories
    152. The clock phase categories will be determined based on the 
specific clearing deadline to which incumbent earth stations are 
subject, i.e., Phase I or Phase II.
    153. In the 46 PEAs where certain blocks are subject to the Phase I 
deadline and others only to the Phase II deadline, clock phase bidding 
will be conducted for two categories of generic blocks based on whether 
the Phase I or Phase II deadline applies to the specific blocks. 
Accordingly, in the 46 PEAs where certain blocks are subject to the 
Phase I deadline, the first category of generic blocks will consist of 
the 20-megahertz sub-blocks between 3.7-3.8 GHz. This category, 
designated Category A, will comprise the five blocks subject to the 
Phase I deadline. The second category of blocks, Category BC, will 
consist of the nine blocks that are subject to the Phase II deadline. 
In the remaining 360 PEAs where there are no blocks subject to the 
Phase I deadline there will be a single bidding category, designated 
ABC, consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7-3.98 
GHz.
    154. In each bidding round, a bidder will have the opportunity to 
bid for the quantity of generic blocks it demands in each bidding 
category available in each PEA. Bidding in the clock phase will 
determine a single price for all the generic blocks in each category in 
each PEA.
3. Bidding Rounds
    155. Auction 107 will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each 
followed by the release of round results. The Commission will conduct 
bidding simultaneously for all spectrum blocks in all bidding 
categories for all PEAs available in the auction. In the first bidding 
round of Auction 107, a bidder will indicate, for each product, how 
many generic license blocks it demands at the minimum opening bid 
price.
    156. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of bidding. 
The bidding schedule may be changed in order to foster an auction pace 
that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round 
results and adjust their bidding strategies. Such changes may include 
the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between 
rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding 
activity and other factors. The bidding system will announce any such 
changes to the bidding schedule several rounds before the change 
occurs.
    157. A bidder may submit its bids using the bidding system's upload 
function, which allows bid files in a comma-separated value (CSV) 
format to be uploaded. A bidder may also submit bids through the 
auction bidding system user interface or using the telephonic bidder 
line. The bidding system will not allow bids to be submitted unless the 
bidder selected the PEAs on its FCC Form 175 and the bidder has 
sufficient bidding eligibility.
    158. During each round, a bidder may also remove bids placed in the 
current

[[Page 53226]]

round. If a bidder modifies its bids for blocks in a PEA in a round, 
the system takes the last bid submission as that bidder's bid for the 
round.
4. Stopping Rule
    159. The Commission will use a simultaneous stopping rule for the 
clock phase of Auction 107, under which all blocks in both categories 
in all PEAs will remain available for bidding until the bidding stops 
in every PEA. In the clock phase, bidding will close for blocks in all 
PEAs after the first round in which there is no excess processed demand 
in any product. Consequently, it is not possible to determine in 
advance how long the bidding in Auction 107 will last. No bids may be 
withdrawn after the close of a round.
5. Availability of Bidding Information
    160. The Commission will make public after each clock round of 
Auction 107, for each category in each PEA: (1) The supply, (2) the 
aggregate demand, (3) the posted price of the last completed round 
(which generally is the clock price of the previous round if demand 
exceeds supply; the start-of-round price of the previous round if 
supply exceeds demand; or the price at which a reduction caused demand 
to equal supply), and (4) the clock price for the next round. The 
identities of bidders demanding blocks in a specific category or PEA 
will not be disclosed until after Auction 107 concludes (i.e., after 
the close of bidding).
    161. Each bidder will have access to additional information related 
to its own bidding and bid eligibility. After the bids of a round have 
been processed, the bidding system will inform each bidder of the 
number of blocks it holds after the round (its processed demand) for 
every product and its eligibility for the next round.
6. Activity Requirement and Activity Upper Limit
    162. Activity requirement. Bidders are required to maintain a 
minimum, high level of activity in each clock round in order to 
maintain bidding eligibility. The activity requirement (the activity 
requirement percentage) will be between 90% and 100% of a bidder's 
bidding eligibility in all clock rounds. The initial activity 
requirement percentage will be 95%. Failure to maintain the requisite 
activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility, 
possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place 
additional bids in the auction. Bidders that do not place any bids in 
the first round of the auction will have their eligibility reduced to 
zero, and will be eliminated from bidding during the remainder of the 
auction.
    163. The Commission will use upfront payments to determine a 
bidder's initial (maximum) eligibility in terms of bidding units. Each 
spectrum block in a PEA will be assigned a specific number of bidding 
units based on the number of MHz-pops in the PEA. Therefore, a bidder's 
upfront payment will determine the maximum number of blocks as measured 
by their associated bidding units that a bidder can demand at the start 
of the auction.
    164. The activity rule will be satisfied when a bidder has bidding 
activity on blocks with bidding units that total at least the activity 
requirement percentage of its eligibility in the round. If the activity 
rule is met, then the bidder's eligibility will not change in the next 
round. Bidding eligibility will be reduced as the auction progresses if 
a bidder does not meet the activity requirement. The bidding system 
will reduce the bidder's eligibility to the amount at which the bidder 
would be meeting the activity requirement, which can be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's activity by the reciprocal of the activity 
requirement. For example, with an activity requirement of 95%, the 
eligibility of a bidder not meeting the activity requirement would be 
calculated as the bidder's activity multiplied by 100/95, rounded up to 
the nearest integer.
    165. For this clock auction, a bidder's activity in a round for 
purposes of the activity rule will be the sum of the bidding units 
associated with the bidder's processed demands, which may not be equal 
to its submitted demands. For instance, if a bidder requests a 
reduction in the quantity of blocks it demands in a product, but the 
bidding system does not apply the request because demand for the 
product would fall below the available supply, the bidder's activity 
will reflect its unreduced demand. Under the ascending clock auction 
format, the FCC auction bidding system will not allow a bidder to 
reduce the quantity of blocks it demands in a product if the reduction 
would result in aggregate demand falling below (or further below) the 
available supply of blocks in the product.
    166. Activity upper limit. A bidder will be allowed to submit bids 
with associated bidding activity greater than its current bidding 
eligibility, noting, however, that a bidder's activity as applied by 
the auction bidding system during bid processing will not exceed the 
bidder's current bidding eligibility. Because a bidder's eligibility 
for the next round is calculated based on the bidder's demands as 
applied by the auction bidding system during bid processing, a bidder's 
eligibility may be reduced even if the bidder submitted bids that meet 
its activity requirement for the round. This may occur, for example, if 
the bidder bids to reduce its demand in PEA X by two blocks (with 10 
bidding units each) and bids to increase its demand by one block (with 
20 bidding units) in PEA Y. If the bidder's demand can only be reduced 
by one block in PEA X (because there is only one block of excess 
demand), the increase in PEA Y cannot be applied, and absent other 
bidding activity the bidder's eligibility would be reduced. The 
Commission anticipates that an ``activity upper limit'' will help a 
bidder avoid having its eligibility reduced as a result of submitted 
bids that cannot be applied during bid processing. For example, 
depending upon the bidder's overall bidding eligibility and the 
activity limit percentage, a bidder could submit an ``additional'' bid 
or bids that would be considered (in price point order with its other 
bids) and applied as available eligibility permits during the bid 
processing.
    167. When submitting bids with associated bidding activity greater 
than its current bidding eligibility, a bidder should consider the 
price points associated with each of its bids to indicate the order in 
which it wishes the bidding system to consider its bid requests. 
Therefore, if bids submitted at lower price points cannot be applied as 
requested, thereby leaving the bidder with unused eligibility, then the 
system will consider the additional bids submitted at higher price 
points to use the otherwise lost eligibility. Although a bidder may 
submit bids with associated bidding units exceeding 100% of its current 
bidding eligibility, its processed activity can never exceed its 
eligibility. Thus, if a bidder submits bids with associated bidding 
units exceeding the bidder's current eligibility, the bidding system 
will not apply all of those bids.
    168. After Round 1, a bidder may submit bids with bidding units 
totaling up to its activity upper limit, which is equal to the bidder's 
current bidding eligibility for the round times a percentage (the 
activity limit percentage) equal to or greater than 100%. An initial 
activity limit percentage of 120% will apply to Round 2 and subsequent 
rounds. In any bidding round, the auction bidding system will advise 
the bidder of its current bidding eligibility, its required bidding 
activity, and its activity upper limit.
    169. OEA retains the discretion to change the activity requirement

[[Page 53227]]

percentage and the activity limit percentage during the auction, and to 
set the activity limit percentage within a range of 100% and 140%. The 
bidding system will announce any such changes in advance of the round 
in which they would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to 
adjust their bidding strategies.
    170. Missing bids. Under the clock auction format, a bidder is 
required to indicate its demands in every round, even if its demands at 
the new round's prices are unchanged from the previous round. Missing 
bids--bids that are not reconfirmed--are treated by the auction bidding 
system as bids that request to reduce to a quantity of zero blocks for 
the product at the start-of-round price. If these bids are applied, or 
applied partially, then a bidder's bidding activity, and its bidding 
eligibility for the next round, may be reduced.
7. Acceptable Bids
a. Minimum Opening Bids and Reserve Price
    171. The Commission established in the Auction 107 Procedures 
Public Notice minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 107. The bidding 
system will not accept bids lower than the minimum opening bids for 
each product. Based on the Commission's experience in past auctions, 
setting minimum opening bid amounts judiciously is an effective tool 
for accelerating the competitive bidding process.
    172. In the first bidding round of Auction 107, a bidder will 
indicate how many generic license blocks in a PEA it demands at the 
minimum opening bid price. Minimum opening bid amounts are calculated 
based on bandwidth and license area population using a tiered approach, 
under which minimum opening bid amounts will vary by market population. 
For PEAs 1-50, minimum opening bid amounts are based on $0.03 per MHz-
pop; for PEAs 51-100, minimum opening bid amounts are based on $0.006 
per MHz-pop; and for all other PEAs, minimum opening bid amounts are 
based on $0.003 per MHz-pop, subject to a minimum of $1,000. These 
minimum opening bid amounts are specified in the Attachment A file.
b. Clock Price Increments
    173. After bidding in the first round and before each subsequent 
round, the FCC auction bidding system will announce the start-of-round 
price and the clock price for each product for the upcoming round--that 
is, the lowest price and the highest price at which bidders can specify 
the number of blocks they demand during the round. The start-of-round 
price is also referred to as the posted price of the previous round. As 
long as aggregate demand for blocks in the product exceeds the supply 
of blocks, the start-of-round price will be equal to the clock price 
from the prior round. Aggregate demand for a product is equal to the 
total number of blocks for which bidders have processed demand. If 
aggregate demand equals supply at a price in a previous round, either a 
clock price or an intra-round price, then the start-of-round price for 
the next round will be equal to the price at which demand equaled 
supply. If demand was less than supply in the previous round, then the 
start-of-round price for the next round will not increase.
    174. The Commission will set the clock price for blocks in a 
specific product for a round by adding a percentage increment to the 
start-of-round price. For example, if the start-of-round price for a 
block in a given product is $10,000, and the percentage increment is 
20%, then the clock price for the round will be $12,000. Results above 
$10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 
but above $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $100; and results 
below $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $10.
    175. The Commission will set the clock price for blocks in a PEA by 
adding a fixed increment percentage to the start-of-round price. The 
Commission will set the increment percentage within a range of 5% to 
20% inclusive and will set the initial increment percentage at 10%. The 
Commission may adjust the increment as rounds continue.
c. Intra-Round Bids
    176. A bidder may make intra-round bids by indicating a point 
between the start-of-round price and the clock price at which its 
demand for blocks changes. In placing an intra-round bid, a bidder 
would indicate a specific price and a quantity of blocks it demands if 
the price for blocks should increase beyond that price. For example, if 
a bidder has processed demand of three blocks at the start-of-round 
price of $100, but wishes to hold only two blocks if the price 
increases by more than $10 (assuming the bid increment is greater than 
$10), then the bidder will indicate a bid quantity of two at a price of 
$110 ($100 + $10). Similarly, if the bidder wishes to reduce its demand 
to zero should the price increase at all above $100, then the bidder 
will indicate a bid quantity of zero at the start-of-round price of 
$100.
    177. Intra-round bids are optional; a bidder may choose to express 
its demands only at the clock prices.
8. Bids To Change Demand, Bid Types, and Bid Processing
    178. A bidder that is willing to maintain the same demand in a 
product at the new clock price will bid for that quantity at the clock 
price, indicating that it is willing to pay up to and including that 
price, if need be, for the specified quantity. Bids to maintain demand 
will always be applied by the auction bidding system. A bidder that 
wishes to change the quantity it demands in a product (relative to its 
demand from the previous round as processed by the bidding system) can 
express its demand at the clock price or at an intra-round price, but 
depending upon the bidder's eligibility and the aggregate demand for 
the product, the bidding system may not be able to apply the requested 
change.
    179. In order to facilitate bidding for multiple blocks in a 
product, bidders will be permitted to make two types of bids: Simple 
bids and switch bids.
     A ``simple'' bid indicates a desired quantity of blocks in 
a product at a price (either the clock price or an intra-round price). 
Simple bids may be applied partially. A simple bid that involves a 
reduction from the bidder's previous demands may be implemented 
partially if aggregate excess demand is insufficient to support the 
entire reduction. A simple bid to increase a bidder's demand in a 
category may be applied partially if the total number of bidding units 
associated with the bidder's full increase in demand exceeds the 
bidder's bidding eligibility for the round.
     A ``switch'' bid, applicable in PEAs in which there are 
blocks in both A and BC categories, allows the bidder to request to 
move its demand for a quantity of blocks from the A category to the BC 
category, or vice versa, within the same PEA. A switch bid may be 
applied partially, but the increase in demand in the ``to'' category 
will always match in quantity the reduction in the ``from'' category.
    180. These bid types will allow bidders to express their demand for 
blocks in the next clock round without running the risk that they will 
be forced to purchase more spectrum at a higher price than they wish. 
When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the uniform 
price for the category will stop increasing at that point, since the 
partial application of the bid results in demand falling to

[[Page 53228]]

equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a simple bid or a switch bid 
that cannot be applied fully will not face a price that is higher than 
its bid price for the remaining demand.
    181. A bidder may bid for multiple blocks in a bidding category in 
a PEA and may submit bids for multiple PEAs. The assignment phase will 
assign contiguous blocks to winners of multiple blocks in a PEA and 
give bidders an opportunity to express their preferences for specific 
frequency blocks, thereby facilitating aggregations of licenses.
    182. The auction bidding system will, after each bidding round, 
process bids to change demand to determine the processed demand of each 
bidder for each product and a posted price for each product that would 
serve as the start-of-round price for the next round.
a. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids To Reduce Demand
    183. The FCC auction bidding system will not apply a bid to reduce 
the quantity of blocks a bidder demands in a product if the reduction 
would result in aggregate demand falling below (or further below) the 
available supply of blocks in the product. Therefore, if a bidder 
submits a simple bid to reduce the number of blocks for which it has 
processed demand as of the previous round, then the FCC auction bidding 
system will treat the bid as a request to reduce demand that will be 
applied only if the ``no excess supply'' rule would be satisfied. 
Similarly, if a bidder submits a switch bid to move its demand for a 
quantity of blocks from the A category to the BC category within the 
same PEA, the FCC auction bidding system will treat the bid as a 
request that will be applied only if the ``no excess supply'' rule 
would be satisfied for the A category in the PEA.
b. Eligibility Rule for Bids To Increase Demand
    184. The bidding system will not allow a bidder to increase the 
quantity of blocks it demands in a product if the total number of 
bidding units associated with the bidder's demand exceeds the bidder's 
bidding eligibility for the round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a 
simple bid to increase the number of blocks for which it has processed 
demand as of the previous round, the FCC auction bidding system will 
treat the bid as a request to increase demand that will be applied only 
if that would not cause the bidder's activity to exceed its 
eligibility.
c. Partial Application of Bids
    185. A bid (simple bid or switch bid) that involves a reduction 
from the bidder's previous demands will be applied partially--that is, 
reduced by fewer blocks than requested in the bid--if excess demand is 
insufficient to support the entire reduction. A switch bid may be 
applied partially, but the increase in demand in the ``to'' category 
will always match in quantity the reduction in the ``from'' category. A 
simple bid to increase a bidder's demand will be applied partially if 
the total number of bidding units associated with the bidder's demand 
exceeds the bidder's bidding eligibility for the round.
d. Processed Demands
    186. After a round ends, the bidding system will process bids to 
change demand in order of price point, where the price point represents 
the percentage of the bidding interval for the round. Bids to maintain 
demand are always applied before the bidding system considers bids to 
change demand. For example, if the start-of-round price is $5,000 and 
the clock price is $6,000, a price of $5,100 will correspond to the 10% 
price point, since it is 10% of the bidding interval between $5,000 and 
$6,000. The bidding system will first consider intra-round bids in 
ascending order of price point and then bids at the clock price. The 
system will consider bids at the lowest price point across all 
products, then look at bids at the next price point in all products, 
and so on. If there are multiple bids at a single price point, the 
system will process bids in order of a bid-specific pseudo-random 
number. As it considers each submitted bid during bid processing, the 
bidding system will determine the extent to which there is excess 
demand in each product at that point in the processing to determine 
whether a bidder's request to reduce demand can be applied. Similarly, 
the auction bidding system will evaluate the activity associated with 
the bidder's most recently determined demands at that point in the 
processing to determine whether a request to increase demand can be 
applied.
    187. Because in any given round some bidders may request to 
increase demands for licenses while others may request reductions, the 
price point at which a bid is considered by the auction bidding system 
can affect whether it is applied. Bids not applied because of 
insufficient aggregate demand or insufficient eligibility will be held 
in a queue and considered, again in order of price point, if there 
should be excess demand or sufficient eligibility later in the 
processing after other bids are processed.
    188. Once a round closes, the auction bidding system will process 
bids to change demand by first considering the bid submitted at the 
lowest price point and determining the maximum extent to which that bid 
can be applied given bidders' demands as determined at that point in 
the bid processing. If the bid can be applied (either in full or 
partially), the number of licenses the bidder holds at that point in 
the processing will be adjusted, and aggregate demand will be 
recalculated accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied in full, the 
unfulfilled bid, or portion thereof, will be held in a queue to be 
considered later during bid processing for that round. The bidding 
system will then consider the bid submitted at the next highest price 
point, applying it in full, in part, or not at all, given the most 
recently determined demands of bidders. Any unfulfilled requests will 
again be held in the queue, and aggregate demand will again be 
recalculated. Every time a bid or part of a bid is applied, the 
unfulfilled bids held in the queue will be reconsidered, in the order 
of their original price points (and by pseudo-random number, in the 
case of tied price points). The auction bidding system will not carry 
over unfulfilled bid requests to the next round, however. The bidding 
system will advise bidders of the status of their bids when round 
results are released.
e. Price Determination
    189. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice describes the bid 
processing procedures to determine, based on aggregate demand, the 
posted price for each product for the round that will serve as the 
start-of-round price for the next round. The uniform price for all of 
the blocks in a product will increase from round to round as long as 
there is excess demand for blocks in the product, but will not increase 
if aggregate demand does not exceed the available supply of blocks.
    190. If, at the end of a round, the aggregate demand for blocks in 
the product exceeds the supply of blocks, then the posted price will 
equal the clock price for the round. If a reduction in demand was 
applied during the round and caused demand in the product to equal 
supply, then the posted price will be the price at which the reduction 
was applied. If aggregate demand is less than or equal to supply and no 
bid to reduce demand was applied for the product, then the posted price 
will equal the start-of-round price for the round. The range of 
acceptable

[[Page 53229]]

bid amounts for the next round will be set by adding the percentage 
increment to the posted price.
    191. When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the 
uniform price for the product will stop increasing at that point, since 
the partial application of the bid will result in demand falling to 
equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a bid to reduce demand that 
cannot be fully applied will not face a price for the remaining demand 
that is higher than its bid price.
    192. After the bids of the round have been processed, if the 
stopping rule has not been met, the FCC auction bidding system will 
announce clock prices to indicate a range of acceptable bids for the 
next round. Each bidder will be informed of its processed demand and 
the extent of excess demand for blocks in each product.
9. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase
    193. Under the clock auction format for Auction 107, bidders with 
processed demand for a product at the time the stopping rule is met 
will become the winning bidders of licenses corresponding to that 
number of blocks and will be assigned specific frequencies in the 
assignment phase. The final clock phase price for a generic block in a 
product will be the posted price for the final round.

B. Assignment Phase

    194. The assignment phase will determine which frequency-specific 
licenses will be won by the winning bidders of generic blocks during 
the clock phase. In the assignment phase, winning bidders will have the 
opportunity to bid for preferred combinations of frequency-specific 
licenses. A bidder can indicate a price using a sealed bid for one or 
more possible frequency assignments for which it wishes to express a 
preference, consistent with its winning bids for generic blocks in the 
clock phase. The bid prices will represent the maximum payment that the 
bidder is willing to pay for the frequency-specific license assignment, 
in addition to the final price established in the clock phase for the 
generic blocks. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice will determine 
the optimal assignment of licenses within each assignment category in 
each PEA based on bid amounts in the assignment phase.
    195. The assignment phase will use an alternative approach for PEAs 
with blocks in two clock phase categories that allows for final 
frequency specific assignments of contiguous blocks within each PEA. 
Accordingly, the assignment phase procedures for the 46 PEAs where 
certain blocks are subject to the Phase I deadline will make a separate 
interim assignment of contiguous blocks within Category A, i.e., those 
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline, and will make a separate final 
assignment of contiguous blocks for all of a bidder's clock phase 
winnings whether in Category A and/or BC. In the 360 PEAs where there 
are no blocks subject to the Phase I deadline, the assignment phase 
procedures will make one assignment for all of a bidder's clock phase 
winnings in Category ABC, consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz 
blocks between 3.7-3.98 GHz. Procedures to implement this approach are 
set forth in more detail in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.
    196. Participation in the assignment phase is voluntary; a winning 
bidder in the clock phase of Auction 107 need not bid in order to be 
assigned contiguous licenses corresponding to the outcome of the clock 
phase. Moreover, a bidder that wins multiple blocks in Category A in 
one of the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the Phase I deadline will 
receive an interim assignment for contiguous blocks of licenses in 
conjunction with a final assignment for contiguous blocks, which could 
include blocks in any of the 14 available blocks in the PEA, even 
without bidding in the assignment phase. More specifically, to provide 
each winning bidder with frequency-specific licenses based on its 
interim and final assignments, the bidding system will match interim 
and final assignments as follows: First, any blocks that appear both in 
a bidder's interim and final assignment will be matched together. Then, 
considering all remaining blocks in the bidder's interim assignment 
(from lowest to highest), each will be matched with the lowest 
available block in the bidder's final assignment.
1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs
    197. Sequencing of rounds. Assignment rounds will be conducted for 
the largest markets first. This sequencing will enable bidders to 
establish a ``footprint,'' making it easier for a bidder to incorporate 
frequency assignments from previously assigned areas into its bid 
preferences for other areas, and recognizes that a bidder winning 
blocks in multiple PEAs may prefer contiguous blocks across adjacent 
PEAs.
    198. Specifically, the Commission will conduct a separate 
assignment round for each of the top 20 PEAs sequentially, beginning 
with the largest PEAs. Once the top 20 PEAs have been assigned, the 
Commission will conduct, for each Regional Economic Area Grouping 
(REAG), a series of assignment rounds for the remaining PEAs within 
that region. Top 20 PEAs are PEAs 1-20. The six REAGs are: Northeast, 
Southeast, Great Lakes, Mississippi Valley, Central, and West. The 
assignment rounds will be sequenced within a REAG in descending order 
of population for a PEA group or individual PEA.
    199. Grouping of PEAs. To reduce the total amount of time required 
to complete the assignment phase, the Commission will group for 
assignment any non-top 20 PEAs within a REAG in which the same bidders 
won the same number of blocks in each clock phase category, and all are 
subject to the small markets bidding cap or all are not subject to the 
cap. This approach will also help maximize contiguity across PEAs. 
Accordingly, where these criteria are met, a bidder will submit a 
single set of bids for assignment options that will apply to all the 
PEAs in the group and will be assigned the same frequency-specific 
licenses in each PEA.
    200. The Commission will conduct the bidding for the different 
REAGs in parallel. That is, bidding for assignments in multiple PEAs or 
PEA groups will take place during the same timed bidding round.
2. Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing
    201. Prior to the start of the assignment phase, the bidding system 
will provide each clock phase winner with bidding options for all 
possible contiguous frequency assignments for blocks won in the clock 
phase. More specifically, in the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the 
Phase I deadline, a winner of Category A blocks will have options for 
all possible contiguous interim assignments for the quantity of A 
blocks it won and all possible contiguous final assignments of all 
blocks it won in the clock phase regardless of the clock phase bidding 
category. A bidder will not see a separate set of bidding options for 
generic BC blocks won. They will be assigned as part of the final joint 
assignment of A and BC blocks. For example, suppose that, in one of the 
46 PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline, a bidder won three Category A 
blocks and four Category BC blocks. Then, the bidder will be assigned 
three blocks in the interim assignment and seven blocks in the final 
assignment. The bidder will have three bidding options for the interim 
frequency assignment (A1-A3, A2-A4, and A3-A5) and eight bidding 
options for the final frequency assignment (A1-B2, A2-B3, A3-B4, A4-B5, 
A5-C1, B1-C2, B2-C3, and B3-C4). In the 360 PEAs where there are no 
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline,

[[Page 53230]]

a clock phase winner will have one set of options for all possible 
contiguous assignments for its clock phase winnings in Category ABC, 
consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7-3.98 GHz.
    202. A bidder will not see a separate set of bidding options for 
generic BC blocks won. They will be assigned as part of the final joint 
assignment of A and BC blocks.
    203. An optimization approach will be used to determine the winning 
frequency assignment for each assignment category in each PEA or PEA 
group. The bidding system will select the assignment that maximizes the 
sum of bid amounts among all assignments in which each bidder's 
assignment is contiguous. If there are multiple blocks in a category 
that remain unsold, the unsold licenses will be contiguous.
    204. Further, the additional price a bidder will pay for a specific 
frequency assignment (above the final clock phase price) will be 
calculated consistent with a generalized ``second price'' approach--
that is, the winner will pay a price that would be just sufficient to 
result in the bidder receiving that same winning frequency assignment 
while ensuring that no group of bidders is willing to pay more for an 
alternative assignment in which every bidder is assigned contiguous 
spectrum. This price will be less than or equal to the price the bidder 
indicated it was willing to pay for the assignment. Determining prices 
in this way encourages bidders to bid their full value for the 
assignment, knowing that if the assignment is selected, they will pay 
no more than would be necessary to ensure that the outcome is 
competitive.
3. Information Available to Bidders During the Assignment Phase
    205. After the clock phase concludes but before bidding begins in 
the assignment phase, the bidding system will provide to each 
assignment phase bidder a menu of bidding options consisting of 
possible configurations of frequency-specific licenses on which it can 
bid. These bidding options will be consistent with the bidder's clock-
phase winnings. The bidding system will also announce the order in 
which assignment rounds will take place and indicate which PEAs will be 
grouped together for bidding. The bidding system will provide clock 
phase winning bidders with this information as soon as possible and 
will announce a schedule of assignment phase rounds that will commence 
no sooner than five business days later.
    206. After each assignment round, the bidding system will inform 
each bidder of its own assignment and assignment payment for each 
assignment category for each PEA or PEA group assigned in the round. 
The bidding system will also provide each bidder with its current total 
payment, which is calculated as the sum of the bidder's total clock 
payment across all PEAs and the bidder's assignment payments for the 
PEAs for which an assignment round has already completed. This 
information will provide the bidder a running estimate during the 
assignment rounds of the dollar amount it will owe at the end of the 
auction. A bidder that is claiming a bidding credit will also be 
informed about its current bidding credit discount and whether the 
discount has been capped.
4. Final Payment Calculations
    207. When all assignment rounds have been completed, a bidder's 
final payment takes into account the sum of final clock phase prices 
across all licenses that it won, the sum of all of the bidder's 
assignment payments, and any claimed bidding credits. Specifically, if 
a bidder is not claiming a bidding credit, its final payment is 
determined by summing the final clock phase prices across all licenses 
that it won and its assignment payments across all PEAs or PEA groups.
    208. If a bidder claims a bidding credit, a bidding credit discount 
is calculated by applying the bidder's bidding credit percentage to the 
sum of the bidder's clock payments and assignment payments, capping the 
bidding credit discount if it exceeds the applicable caps for small 
businesses, rural service providers, and small markets. The resulting 
bidding credit discount is subtracted from the sum of the bidder's 
clock payments and assignment payments to determine the final payment 
for a bidder with a bidding credit.

C. License Authorizations for Interim and Final Assignments

    209. The Commission will condition the 3.7 GHz licenses awarded 
post-auction for the interim and final frequency assignments deadline.
    210. For a given frequency block in the 46 PEAs with blocks subject 
to the Phase I deadline, the interim and final authorizations may be 
awarded via either a single standard license authorization (where both 
the interim and final assignments are for the same frequency block(s)) 
or through a two-license paired authorization (including an interim 
assignment and a final assignment of different specific frequency 
blocks) that collectively provides authority for the full 15-year 
license term. In the paired authorization approach, the interim 
assignment of the pair would expire on the earlier of December 5, 2025, 
or the date the relevant PEA is confirmed cleared, with no option for 
renewal, and the resulting final license would provide for operation 
after the interim authorization expires until the remainder of the 15-
year term. The B1-C4 blocks in a PEA will be confirmed cleared 
consistent with the process for validation of a space station 
operator's Certification of Accelerated Relocation that it satisfied 
the Phase II clearing deadline, as described in section 27.1412(g) of 
the Commission's rules. These paired authorizations together provide 
the full range of interim and final rights over the license term. To 
ensure consistent treatment of licenses for frequencies in the A block, 
paired interim and final licenses will be conditioned to clarify that 
if they are transferred/assigned, they must be transferred/assigned 
together, in the same manner. There is no restriction on spectrum 
leasing for either of the paired authorizations.
    211. The assignment phase results will dictate whether a particular 
winning bidder may be awarded a single or paired license 
authorizations. For example, if a winner of clock phase Category A 
blocks (in the 46 PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline) is assigned to 
the same frequencies for both interim and final assignments, a single 
authorization will be issued providing both interim and final rights 
for those A block frequencies. If the winner of the interim assignment 
for specific frequencies in the A block does not also win the final 
assignment for the same frequencies in that block, a paired 
authorization will be issued to the bidder for an interim assignment in 
blocks A1-A5 and final assignment in blocks A1-C4 that together provide 
interim and final rights. In all other cases where one or more clock 
phase Category A blocks are not won and therefore no interim assignment 
is made, the winner of a final assignment will be issued a single 
authorization conveying final rights. For example, if the bidder wins 
only BC or ABC blocks in the PEA in the clock phase. The resulting 
final license will provide for operation on the earlier of December 5, 
2025 or the date the relevant PEA is confirmed cleared. That is, in the 
event a Category A generic block is unsold and therefore interim rights 
are not assigned to a bidder, interim rights revert to the licensee 
holding the final authorization for that frequency block.

[[Page 53231]]

D. Calculating Individual ``Per-License'' Prices

    212. While final auction payments for winning bidders will be 
calculated with bidding credit caps and assignment payments applied on 
an aggregate basis, rather than to individual license authorizations 
(single or paired), the bidding system will also calculate a ``per-
license'' price for each license authorization. Such individual prices 
may be needed if a licensee later incurs license-specific obligations, 
such as unjust enrichment payments.
    213. After the assignment phase, the auction bidding system will 
determine a net and gross post-auction price for each license 
authorization (or paired authorization, if the authorization comprises 
both an interim and final frequency assignment) that was won by a 
bidder by apportioning assignment payments and bidding credit discounts 
(only applicable for the net price) across all the license 
authorizations or paired authorizations that the bidder won. To 
calculate the gross per-license price, the auction bidding system will 
apportion the assignment payment to authorizations in proportion to the 
final clock phase price of the blocks that the bidder is assigned in 
that assignment category and PEA (or PEA group). To calculate the net 
price, the auction bidding system will first apportion any applicable 
bidding credit discounts to each PEA or PEA group in proportion to the 
gross payment for that market. Then, for each PEA or PEA group, the 
auction bidding system will apportion the assignment payment and the 
discount to licenses in proportion to the final clock phase price of 
the blocks that the bidder is assigned in that assignment category for 
that PEA (or PEA group).

E. Auction Results

    214. The bidding system will determine winning bidders as described 
in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice. After release of the 
public notice announcing auction results, the public will be able to 
view and download bidding and results data through the FCC Public 
Reporting System (PRS).

F. Auction Announcements

    215. Commission staff will use auction announcements to report 
necessary information, such as schedule changes, to bidders. All 
auction announcements will be available by clicking a link in the 
bidding system.

V. Post-Auction Procedures

    216. The public notice announcing the close of the bidding and 
auction results will be released shortly after bidding has ended in 
Auction 107. This public notice will also establish the deadlines for 
submitting down payments, final payments, and the long-form 
applications (FCC Form 601) for the auction.

A. Down Payments

    217. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing 
public notice for Auction 107, each winning bidder must submit 
sufficient funds (in addition to its upfront payment) to bring its 
total amount of money on deposit with the Commission to 20% of the net 
amount of its winning bids (less any bidding credits, if applicable).

B. Final Payments

    218. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of 
the net amount for each of its winning bids within 10 business days 
after the deadline for submitting down payments.

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

    219. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing 
public notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly 
completed post-auction application (FCC Form 601) for the license(s) 
they won through the auction.
    220. A winning bidder claiming eligibility for a small business 
bidding credit or a rural service provider bidding credit must 
demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit sought in its FCC 
Form 601 post-auction application. Further instructions on these and 
other filing requirements will be provided to winning bidders in the 
auction closing public notice for Auction 107.
    221. Winning bidders organized as bidding consortia must comply 
with the FCC Form 601 post-auction application procedures set forth in 
section 1.2107(g) of the Commission's rules. Specifically, license(s) 
won by a consortium must be applied for as follows: (a) An individual 
member of the consortium or a new legal entity comprising two or more 
individual consortium members must file for licenses covered by the 
winning bids; (b) each member or group of members of a winning 
consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to file a 
separate FCC Form 601 for its/their respective license(s) in their 
legal business name; (c) in the case of a license to be partitioned or 
disaggregated, the member or group filing the applicable FCC Form 601 
shall include the parties' partitioning or disaggregation agreement 
with the FCC Form 601; and (d) if a designated entity credit is sought 
(either small business or rural service provider), the applicant must 
meet the applicable eligibility requirements in the Commission's rules 
for the credit.

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

    222. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing 
public notice for Auction 107, each winning bidder must also comply 
with the ownership reporting requirements in sections 1.913, 1.919, and 
1.2112 of the Commission's rules by submitting an ownership disclosure 
information report for wireless telecommunications services (FCC Form 
602) with its FCC Form 601 post-auction application.
    223. If a winning bidder already has a complete and accurate FCC 
Form 602 on file in the FCC's Universal Licensing System (ULS), then it 
is not necessary to file a new report, but the winning bidder must 
certify in its FCC Form 601 application that the information on file 
with the Commission is complete and accurate. If the winning bidder 
does not have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if it is not complete and 
accurate, it must submit a new one.
    224. When a winning bidder submits an FCC Form 175, ULS 
automatically creates an ownership record. This record is not an FCC 
Form 602, but it may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602 with the 
ownership information submitted on the winning bidder's FCC Form 175 
application. A winning bidder must review the pre-filled information 
and confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the filing date of 
the FCC Form 601 post-auction application before certifying and 
submitting the FCC Form 602. Further instructions will be provided to 
winning bidders in the auction closing public notice.

E. Default and Disqualification

    225. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of an auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment by 
the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely long-form application, 
fails to make a full and timely final payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) is liable for default payments as described in section 
1.2104(g)(2). A default payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal 
to the difference between the amount of the bidder's winning bid and 
the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering the same 
spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a 
percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, 
whichever is less.
    226. The percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an 
additional payment for defaults in a particular

[[Page 53232]]

auction is established in advance of the auction. The additional 
default payment for Auction 107 is 15% of the applicable bid for 
winning bids. The bidding system will calculate individual per-license 
prices that are separate from final auction payments, which are 
calculated on an aggregate basis. These prices determine the defaulted 
bid amount on individual licenses.
    227. Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission has the 
discretion to re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest 
bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a 
default or disqualification involves gross misconduct, 
misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, then the Commission 
may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in 
future auctions and may take any other action that it deems necessary, 
including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing 
authorizations held by the applicant.

F. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

    228. All refunds of upfront payment balances will be returned to 
the payer of record as identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer 
submits written authorization instructing otherwise. Bidders are 
encouraged to use the Refund Information icon found on the Auction 
Application Manager page or the Refund Form link available on the 
Auction Application Submit Confirmation page in the FCC Auction 
Application System to access the form. After the required information 
is completed on the blank form, the form should be printed, signed, and 
submitted to the Commission by mail, fax, or email as instructed in the 
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.

VI. Procedural Matters

    229. Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As 
required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), a 
Supplemental Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental 
IRFA) was incorporated in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice 
released in March 2020. The Commission sought public comment on the 
proposals in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, including comments 
on the Supplemental IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the 
Supplemental IRFA. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice establishes 
the procedures to be used for Auction 107 and supplements the Initial 
and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses completed by the Commission 
in the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 FR 44128, August 29, 
2018, and the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, and other Commission orders 
pursuant to which Auction 107 will be conducted. This present 
Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental FRFA) 
conforms to the RFA.
    230. Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules. The Auction 107 
Procedures Public Notice implements auction procedures for those 
entities that seek to bid to acquire licenses in Auction 107. Auction 
107 will be the Commission's second auction of mid-band spectrum in 
furtherance of the deployment of fifth-generation (5G) wireless, the 
Internet of Things (IoT), and other advanced spectrum-based services. 
The Public Notice adopts procedural rules and terms and conditions 
governing Auction 107, and the post-auction application and payment 
processes, as well as sets the minimum opening bid amounts for 
flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band (3.7 GHz 
Service) that will be offered in Auction 107.
    231. To promote the efficient and fair administration of the 
competitive bidding process for all Auction 107 participants, the 
Commission adopted the following procedures proposed in the Auction 107 
Comment Public Notice:
     Use of anonymous bidding/limited information procedures 
which will not make public: (1) The license areas that an applicant 
selects for bidding in its auction application (FCC Form 175); (2) the 
amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for 
Auction 107; (3) an applicant's bidding eligibility; and (4) any other 
bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the 
bidder placing a bid, until after bidding has closed;
     establishment of bidding credit caps for eligible small 
businesses and rural service providers in Auction 107;
     adjustment of the bidding schedule as necessary in order 
to manage the pace of Auction 107;
     use of a simultaneous stopping rule in Auction 107, under 
which all blocks in both categories in all PEAs will remain available 
for bidding until bidding has stopped in every PEA;
     provision of discretionary authority to OEA, in 
conjunction with WTB, to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 
107 for any reason that affects the ability of the competitive bidding 
process to be conducted fairly and efficiently;
     use of a clock auction format for Auction 107 under which 
each qualified bidder will indicate in successive clock bidding rounds 
its demands for categories of generic blocks in specific PEAs, and 
associated bidding and bid processing procedures to implement the clock 
auction format;
     use of an activity rule, which requires a bidder to bid 
actively during the auction on a high percentage of its bidding 
eligibility, including a modification that would allow a bidder to 
submit bids, but not to be assigned bids, that exceed its bidding 
eligibility;
     use of an activity rule that does not include a waiver of 
the rule to preserve a bidder's eligibility;
     a requirement that bidders be active on between 90% and 
100% of a bidder's bidding eligibility in all clock rounds;
     a specific minimum opening bid amount for generic blocks 
in each product available in Auction 107;
     a specific upfront payment amount for generic blocks in 
each product available in Auction 107;
     establishment of a bidder's initial bidding eligibility in 
bidding units based on that bidder's upfront payment through assignment 
of a specific number of bidding units for each generic block;
     establishment of acceptable bid amounts, including clock 
price increments and intra-round bids, along with a methodology for 
calculating such amounts;
     a methodology for processing bids and requests to reduce 
and increase demand subject to the no excess supply rule for bids to 
reduce demand and the eligibility rule for bids to increase demand;
     use of bid processing procedures that the auction bidding 
system will use, after each bidding round, to process bids to determine 
the processed demand of each bidder and a posted price for each product 
that would serve as the start-of-round price for the next round;
     establishment of an assignment phase that will determine 
which frequency-specific licenses will be won by the winning bidders of 
generic blocks during the clock phase; and
     establishment of additional default payments of 15% for 
bids pursuant to section 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the event that a 
winning bidder defaults or is disqualified after the auction.
    232. The procedures for the conduct of Auction 107 constitute the 
more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules 
contemplated by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission's rules and the 
underlying rulemaking orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, 
and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent 
therewith.
    233. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in 
Response to the IRFA. There were no comments filed that specifically 
address the

[[Page 53233]]

procedures and policies proposed in the Supplemental IRFA.
    234. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act 
of 2010, which amended the RFA, the Commission is required to respond 
to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA and 
to provide a detailed statement of any changes made to the proposed 
procedures as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not 
file any comments in response to the procedures that were proposed in 
the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice.
    235. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to 
Which the Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs agencies to provide a 
description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small 
entities that may be affected by the rules and policies adopted herein. 
The RFA generally defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same 
meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and 
``small governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small 
business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' 
under the Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one 
which: (1) Is independently owned and operated, (2) is not dominant in 
its field of operation, and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 
established by the SBA.
    236. As noted above, Regulatory Flexibility Analyses were 
incorporated into the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rule Making and 3.7 
GHz Report and Order. These orders provide the underlying authority for 
the procedures proposed in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice and 
are adopted herein for Auction 107. In those regulatory flexibility 
analyses, the Commission described in detail the small entities that 
might be significantly affected. In the Auction 107 Procedures Public 
Notice, the Commission incorporated by reference the descriptions and 
estimates of the number of small entities from the previous Regulatory 
Flexibility Analyses in the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
3.7 GHz Report and Order.
    237. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities. The Commission designed the 
auction application process itself to minimize reporting and compliance 
requirements for applicants, including small business applicants. In 
the first part of the Commission's two-phased auction application 
process, parties desiring to participate in an auction file 
streamlined, short-form applications in which they certify under 
penalty of perjury as to their qualifications. Eligibility to 
participate in bidding is based on an applicant's short-form 
application and certifications, as well as its upfront payment. In the 
second phase of the process, winning bidders file a more comprehensive 
long-form application. Thus, an applicant that fails to become a 
winning bidder does not need to file a long-form application or provide 
the additional showings and more detailed demonstrations required of a 
winning bidder.
    238. The Commission does not expect that the processes and 
procedures adopted in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice will 
require small entities to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, or 
other professionals to participate in Auction 107 and comply with the 
procedures the Commission adopts because of the information, resources, 
and guidance it makes available to potential and actual participants. 
The Commission cannot quantify the cost of compliance with the 
procedures, however, the Commission does not believe that the cost of 
compliance will unduly burden small entities that choose to participate 
in the auction. The processes and procedures are consistent with 
existing Commission policies and procedures used in prior auctions. 
Thus, some small entities may already be familiar with such procedures 
and have the processes and procedures in place to facilitate compliance 
resulting in minimal incremental costs to comply. For those small 
entities that may be new to the Commission's auction process, the 
various resources that will be made available, including, but not 
limited to, the mock auction, remote electronic bidding, and access to 
hotlines for both technical and auction assistance, should help 
facilitate participation without the need to hire professionals. For 
example, the Commission will release an online tutorial that will help 
applicants understand the procedures for filing the auction short-form 
applications (FCC Form 175). The Commission will offer other 
educational opportunities for applicants in Auction 107 to familiarize 
themselves with the FCC Auction Application System and the bidding 
system. By providing these resources as well as the resources discussed 
below, the Commission expects small entities that use the available 
resources to experience lower participation and compliance costs.
    239. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on 
Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered. The RFA 
requires an agency to describe any significant, specifically small 
business, alternatives that it has considered in reaching its approach, 
which may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) 
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small 
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and 
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for 
such small entities.''
    240. The Commission has taken steps to minimize any economic impact 
of its auction procedures on small entities through, among other 
things, the many free resources the Commission provides to potential 
auction participants. Consistent with the past practices in prior 
auctions, small entities that are potential participants will have 
access to detailed educational information and Commission personnel to 
help guide their participation in Auction 107, which should alleviate 
any need to hire professionals. More specifically, small entities and 
other auction participants may seek clarification of, or guidance on, 
complying with competitive bidding rules and procedures, reporting 
requirements, and using the bidding system. Additionally, an FCC 
Auctions Hotline will provide small entities one-on-one access to 
Commission staff for information about the auction process and 
procedures. Further, the FCC Auctions Technical Support Hotline is 
another resource that provides technical assistance to applicants, 
including small entities, on issues such as access to or navigation 
within the electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the bidding system. Small 
entities and other would-be participants will also be provided with 
various materials on the pre-bidding process in advance of the short-
form application filing window, which includes step-by-step 
instructions on how to complete FCC Form 175. In addition, small 
entities will have access to the web-based, interactive online 
tutorials produced by Commission staff to familiarize themselves with 
auction procedures, filing requirements, bidding procedures, and other 
matters related to an auction.
    241. Various databases and other sources of information, including 
the Auctions program websites and copies of Commission decisions, are 
available to the public without charge, providing a low-cost mechanism 
for small entities to conduct research prior to and throughout the 
auction. Prior to and at the close of Auction 107, the

[[Page 53234]]

Commission will post public notices on the Auctions website, which 
articulate the procedures and deadlines for the auction. The Commission 
will make this information easily accessible and without charge to 
benefit all Auction 107 applicants, including small entities, thereby 
lowering their administrative costs to comply with the Commission's 
competitive bidding rules.
    242. Eligible bidders will be given an opportunity to become 
familiar with auction procedures and the bidding system by 
participating in a mock auction. Eligible bidders will have access to a 
user guide for the bidding system, bidding file formats, and an online 
bidding procedures tutorial in advance of the mock auction. Further, 
the Commission intends to conduct Auction 107 electronically over the 
internet using a web-based auction system that eliminates the need for 
small entities and other bidders to be physically present in a specific 
location. These mechanisms are made available to facilitate 
participation in Auction 107 by all eligible bidders and may result in 
significant cost savings for small entities that use them. Moreover, 
the adoption of bidding procedures in advance of the auction, 
consistent with statutory directive, is designed to ensure that the 
auction will be administered predictably and fairly for all 
participants, including small businesses.
    243. Another step taken to minimize the economic impact for small 
entities participating in Auction 107 is the Commission's adoption of 
bidding credits for small businesses. In accordance with the service 
rules applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service licenses to be offered in 
Auction 107, bidding credit discounts will be available to eligible 
small businesses and small business consortiums on the following basis: 
(1) A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not 
exceed $55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive 
a 15% discount on its winning bid or (2) a bidder with attributed 
average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the 
preceding five years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its 
winning bid. Eligible applicants can receive only one of the available 
bidding credits--not both.
    244. The total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be 
awarded to an eligible small business is capped at $25 million. In 
addition, the Commission adopts a $10 million cap on the overall amount 
of bidding credits that any winning small business bidder may apply to 
winning licenses in markets with a population of 500,000 or less. Based 
on the technical characteristics of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band and the 
Commission's analysis of past auction data, the Commission anticipates 
that the caps will allow the majority of small businesses to take full 
advantage of the bidding credit program, thereby lowering the relative 
costs of participation for small businesses. The Commission declined to 
adopt a small business bidding credit cap of at least $200 million 
requested by one commenter, Moise Advisory, because, as the Commission 
previously explained, the proposed $25 million cap in past auctions 
would have allowed the vast majority of eligible small businesses to 
realize the full value of their bidding credits.
    245. These procedures for the conduct of Auction 107 constitute the 
more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules 
contemplated by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission's rules and the 
underlying rulemaking orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report and Order 
and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent 
therewith.
    246. Report to Congress. The Commission will send a copy of the 
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, including the Supplemental FRFA, 
in a report to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In 
addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Auction 107 Procedures 
Public Notice, including the Supplemental FRFA to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the SBA.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2020-18804 Filed 8-27-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P