    [Federal Register Volume 85, Number 168 (Friday, August 28, 2020)]
    [Rules and Regulations]
    [Pages 53209-53234]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 2020-18804]

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    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    47 CFR Parts 1 and 96

    [AU Docket No. 20-25; FCC 20-110]

    Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band
    for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements,
    Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for
    Auction 107

    AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

    ACTION: Final action; requirements and procedures.

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    SUMMARY: This document summarizes the procedures and deadlines for the
    upcoming auction of 3.7 GHz Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band.
    The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice summarized here is intended to
    familiarize applicants with the procedures and other requirements
    governing participation in Auction 107 by providing details regarding
    the procedures, terms, conditions, dates, and deadlines, as well as an
    overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.

    DATES: Applications to participate in Auction 107 must be submitted
    prior to 6 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. Upfront payments for Auction
    107 must be received by 6 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. Bidding in
    Auction 107 is scheduled to begin on December 8, 2020.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For auction legal questions, Erik
    Beith or Daniel Habif in the Auctions Division of the Office of
    Economics and Analytics at (202) 418-0660. For general auction
    questions, the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868. For 3.7 GHz Service
    questions, Anna Gentry in the Mobility Division of the Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau at (202) 418-1991.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 107
    Procedures Public Notice, AU Docket No. 20-25, FCC 20-110, adopted on
    August 6, 2020, and released on August 7, 2020. The complete text of
    the public notice, including attachments and any related documents, is
    available for public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET
    Monday through Thursday or from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays
    in the FCC Reference Information Center, located in Room CY-A257, of
    the FCC Headquarters, 445 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554, except
    when Commission Headquarters is otherwise closed to visitors. See
    Public Notice, Restrictions on Visitors to FCC Facilities, March 12,
    2020. The complete text of the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice is
    also available on the Commission's website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107.
    To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities
    (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email
    to FCC504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at
    (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

    I. General Information

    A. Introduction

        1. With the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, the Commission
    established the procedures to be used for Auction 107, the auction of
    new flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band (the 3.7 GHz
    Service).
        2. The bidding for new licenses in Auction 107 is scheduled to
    commence on December 8, 2020. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice
    provides details regarding the procedures, terms, conditions, dates,
    and deadlines governing participation in Auction 107 bidding, as well
    as an overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.

    B. Background and Relevant Authority

        3. In the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, 85 FR 31705, May 27, 2020, the
    Commission made available 280 megahertz of spectrum in the 3.7-3.98 GHz
    band for licensed use. In that Order, the Commission proposed to modify
    the licenses and market access authorizations of incumbent Fixed
    Satellite Service (FSS) operators, transmit receive earth station
    licensees, and Fixed Service (FS) licensees to clear the 3.7-4.0 GHz
    band for new flexible-use terrestrial operations in the contiguous
    United States. Among other things, the Commission authorized both fixed
    and mobile operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band using geographic area
    licensing, established licensing and operating rules for the new 3.7
    GHz Service, and decided to use its competitive bidding rules to assign
    3.7 GHz Service licenses.
        4. On March 3, 2020, in accordance with section 309(j)(3) of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission released the
    Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, 85 FR 23287, April 27, 2020, seeking
    comment on certain competitive bidding procedures and various other
    procedures to be used in Auction 107. The Commission received comments
    from seven parties in response to the

    [[Page 53210]]

    Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, including five reply comments. These
    comments are available under proceeding 20-25 in the Commission's
    Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). The ECFS home page is publicly
    accessible at: www.fcc.gov/ecfs. In the Auction 107 Procedures Public
    Notice, the Commission resolved all open issues raised in the Auction
    107 Comment Public Notice and addressed the comments received.
        5. Prospective applicants should familiarize themselves with the
    Commission's rules regarding the 3.7 GHz Service. In addition,
    prospective applicants should be thoroughly familiar with the
    procedures, terms, and conditions contained in the Auction 107
    Procedures Public Notice and any future public notices that may be
    released in proceeding 20-25.
        6. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders,
    and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or
    supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time
    and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental
    generally applicable information to applicants. In addition, the
    Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) and the Office of Economics
    and Analytics (OEA) retain the authority to establish further
    procedures during the course of the auction. It is the responsibility
    of all applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with
    all public notices pertaining to Auction 107. Copies of most auctions-
    related Commission documents, including public notices, can be
    retrieved from the Commission's FCC Auctions internet site at
    www.fcc.gov/auctions. Additionally, documents are available at the
    Commission's headquarters during normal business hours when the
    building is open to the public.

    C. Description of Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 107

        7. Auction 107 will offer 5,684 new flexible-use overlay licenses
    for spectrum in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band throughout the contiguous United
    States subject to clearing requirements. The 280 megahertz of spectrum
    available in Auction 107 will be licensed on an unpaired basis in three
    blocks divided into 20-megahertz sub-blocks by partial economic area
    (PEA) in the contiguous states and the District of Columbia (PEAs 1-41,
    43-211, 213-263, 265-297, 299-359, and 361-411). Flexible-use overlay
    licenses will not be issued for Honolulu, Anchorage, Kodiak, Fairbanks,
    Juneau, Puerto Rico, Guam-Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin
    Islands, American Samoa, and the Gulf of Mexico (PEAs 42, 212, 264,
    298, 360, 412-416). Specifically, the A Block will cover 100 megahertz
    from 3.7-3.8 GHz in five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3700-3720 MHz (A1),
    3720-3740 MHz (A2), 3740-3760 MHz (A3), 3760-3780 MHz (A4), and 3780-
    3800 MHz (A5). The B Block will cover 100 megahertz from 3.8-3.9 GHz in
    five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3800-3820 MHz (B1), 3820-3840 MHz (B2),
    3840-3860 MHz (B3), 3860-3880 MHz (B4), and 3880-3900 MHz (B5). The C
    Block will cover 80 megahertz from 3.9-3.98 GHz, and four 20-megahertz
    sub-blocks will be licensed for flexible use: 3900-3920 MHz (C1), 3920-
    3940 MHz (C2), 3940-3960 MHz (C3), and 3960-3980 MHz (C4). The 20
    megahertz at 3980-4000 MHz will be a guard band and not available for
    auction. 3.7 GHz Service licenses will be issued for 15-year, renewable
    license terms. Licenses in the 46 PEAs may be issued as paired interim
    and final licenses, which taken together, provide authorization for a
    block over the full 15-year license term. A licensee in the 3.7-3.98
    GHz band may provide any services permitted under terrestrial fixed or
    mobile allocations, as set forth in the non-Federal Government column
    of the Table of Frequency Allocations in section 2.106 of the
    Commission's rules. A summary of the licenses offered in Auction 107 is
    available in Attachment A to the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice,
    which is available on the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107.
        8. Incumbent satellite operators have, in aggregate, made
    sufficient commitments to clear the 3.7-4.0 GHz band on the accelerated
    timeline described in the 3.7 GHz Report and Order. As a result,
    licenses in the A Block in 46 of the top 50 PEAs--PEAs 1-4, 6-10, 12-
    19, 21-41, and 43-50--will be subject to the Phase I accelerated
    relocation deadline, and licenses in the B and C Blocks in the 46 PEAs
    and in the A, B, and C Blocks in the remaining 360 PEAs will be subject
    to the Phase II accelerated relocation deadline.

    D. Auction Specifics

    1. Auction Title and Start Date
        9. The auction of licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band will be
    referred to as ``Auction 107.'' Bidding in Auction 107 will begin on
    Tuesday, December 8, 2020. The initial schedule for bidding rounds in
    Auction 107 will be announced by public notice at least one week before
    bidding begins.
        10. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be
    conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all
    licenses.
    2. Auction Dates and Deadlines
        11. The following dates and deadlines apply to Auction 107: Auction
    Application Tutorial Available (via internet). No later than August 21,
    2020.

    Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
        Filing Window Opens--September 9, 2020, 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time
    (ET)
    Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
        Filing Window Deadline--September 22, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
        Upfront Payments (via wire transfer)--June 19, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
        Bidding Tutorial Available (via internet)--No later than July 9,
    2020
        Mock Auction--December 3, 2020
        Bidding Begins in Auction 107--December 8, 2020
    3. Requirements for Participation
        12. Those wishing to participate in Auction 107 must: Submit a
    short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m.
    ET on September 22, 2020, following the electronic filing procedures
    set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions (available in the Education
    section of the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auctions/107); submit
    a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC
    Form 159) by 6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020, following the procedures
    and instructions set forth in the FCC Form 159 Instructions; and comply
    with all provisions outlined in the Auction 107 Procedures Public
    Notice and applicable Commission rules.

    II. Applying To Participate in Auction 107

    A. General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications

        13. An application to participate in Auction 107, referred to as a
    short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information that the
    Commission uses to determine whether the applicant has the legal,
    technical, and financial qualifications to participate in a Commission
    auction for spectrum licenses. The short-form application is the first
    part of the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In the
    first phase, a party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file a
    short-form application in which it certifies, under penalty of perjury,
    that it is qualified to participate. Eligibility to participate in
    Auction 107 is based on an applicant's short-form application and
    certifications and on the applicant's submission of a sufficient
    upfront

    [[Page 53211]]

    payment for the auction. After bidding closes, in the second phase of
    the process, each winning bidder must file a more comprehensive post-
    auction, long-form application (FCC Form 601) for the licenses it wins
    in the auction, and it must have a complete and accurate ownership
    disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) on file with the
    Commission. Being deemed qualified to bid in Auction 107 does not
    constitute a determination that a party is qualified to hold a
    Commission license or is eligible for a designated entity bidding
    credit.
        14. A party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file an FCC
    Form 175 electronically via the Auction Application System prior to
    6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020, following the procedures prescribed
    in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. If an applicant claims eligibility
    for a bidding credit, then the information provided in its FCC Form 175
    as of the filing date will be used to determine whether the applicant
    may request the claimed bidding credit. An applicant that files an FCC
    Form 175 for Auction 107 will be subject to the Commission's rule
    prohibiting certain communications. An applicant is subject to the
    prohibition beginning at the deadline for filing short-form
    applications--6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. The prohibition will
    end for applicants on the post-auction down payment deadline for
    Auction 107.
        15. An applicant bears full responsibility for submitting an
    accurate, complete, and timely short-form application. Each applicant
    must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its
    FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and
    its participation in the auction, and it must confirm that it is
    legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a
    license. If an Auction 107 applicant fails to make the required
    certifications in its FCC Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its
    application will be deemed unacceptable for filing and cannot be
    corrected after the filing deadline.
        16. An applicant should note that submitting an FCC Form 175 (and
    any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation by the certifying
    official that he or she is an authorized representative of the
    applicant with authority to bind the applicant, that he or she has read
    the form's instructions and certifications, and that the contents of
    the application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and
    correct. Submitting a false certification to the Commission may result
    in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures,
    ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or criminal
    prosecution.
        17. Applicants are cautioned that, because the required information
    submitted in FCC Form 175 bears on each applicant's qualifications,
    requests for confidential treatment will not be routinely granted. The
    Commission generally has held that it may publicly release confidential
    business information where the party has put that information at issue
    in a Commission proceeding or where the Commission has identified a
    compelling public interest in disclosing the information. In this
    regard, the Commission specifically has held that information submitted
    in support of receiving bidding credits in auction proceedings should
    be made available to the public.
        18. An applicant must designate at least one individual as an
    authorized bidder, and no more than three, in its FCC Form 175. The
    Commission's rules prohibit an individual from serving as an authorized
    bidder for more than one auction applicant.
        19. No individual or entity may file more than one short-form
    application or have a controlling interest in more than one short-form
    application. If a party submits multiple short-form applications for an
    auction, then only one application may form the basis for that party to
    become qualified to bid in that auction.
        20. Similarly, and consistent with the Commission's general
    prohibition on joint bidding agreements, a party is generally permitted
    to participate in a Commission auction only through a single bidding
    entity. Accordingly, the filing of applications in Auction 107 by
    multiple entities controlled by the same individual or set of
    individuals generally will not be permitted. This restriction applies
    across all applications, without regard to the geographic areas
    selected. There is a limited exception to the general prohibition on
    the filing of multiple applications by commonly controlled entities for
    qualified rural wireless partnerships and individual members of such
    partnerships. Under this limited exception, each qualifying rural
    wireless partnership and its individual members will be permitted to
    participate separately in an auction.
        21. After the initial short-form application filing deadline,
    Commission staff will review all timely submitted applications for
    Auction 107 to determine whether each application complies with the
    application requirements and whether the applicant has provided all
    required information concerning the applicant's qualifications for
    bidding. After this review is completed, a public notice will be
    released announcing the status of applications and identifying the
    applications that are complete and those that are incomplete because of
    minor defects that may be corrected. The public notice will include the
    deadline for resubmitting modified applications. To become a qualified
    bidder, an applicant must have a complete application (i.e., have
    timely filed an application that is deemed complete after the deadline
    for correcting any identified deficiencies), and must make a timely and
    sufficient upfront payment. Qualified bidders will be identified by
    public notice at least 10 days prior to the mock auction.
        22. An applicant should consult the Commission's rules to ensure
    that all required information is included in its short-form
    application. To the extent the information in the Auction 107
    Procedures Public Notice does not address a potential applicant's
    specific operating structure, or if the applicant needs additional
    information or guidance concerning the described disclosure
    requirements, the applicant should review the educational materials for
    Auction 107 (see the Education section of the Auction 107 website at
    www.fcc.gov/auction/107) and/or use the contact information provided to
    consult with Commission staff to better understand the information it
    must submit in its short-form application.

    B. License Area Selection

        23. An applicant must select all the license areas on which it may
    want to bid from the list of available PEAs on its FCC Form 175. An
    applicant must carefully review and verify its PEA selections before
    the FCC Form 175 filing deadline because those selections cannot be
    changed after the auction application filing deadline. An applicant is
    not required to place bids on any or all of the license areas selected,
    but the FCC Auction Bidding System (bidding system) will not accept
    bids for blocks located in PEAs that the applicant did not select in
    its FCC Form 175. The auction application system, however, will provide
    an applicant the option to select ``all PEAs.''

    C. Disclosure of Agreements and Bidding Arrangements

        24. An applicant must provide in its FCC Form 175 a brief
    description of, and identify each party to, any partnerships, joint
    ventures, consortia or agreements, arrangements, or understandings of
    any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any
    agreements that address or

    [[Page 53212]]

    communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices),
    bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or
    not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the
    applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the
    applicant, is a party. A controlling interest includes all individuals
    or entities with positive or negative de jure or de facto control of
    the applicant. In connection with the agreement disclosure, the
    applicant must certify under penalty of perjury in its FCC Form 175
    that it has described, and identified each party to, any such
    agreements, arrangements, or understandings to which it (or any party
    that controls it or that it controls) is a party. If, after the FCC
    Form 175 filing deadline, an auction applicant enters into any
    agreement relating to the licenses being auctioned, then it is subject
    to these same disclosure obligations. All applicants must maintain the
    accuracy and completeness of the information in their pending auction
    application.
        25. For purposes of making the required agreement disclosures on
    the FCC Form 175, if parties agree in principle on all material terms
    prior to the application filing deadline, then each party to the
    agreement that is submitting an auction application must provide a
    brief description of, and identify the other party or parties to, the
    agreement on its respective FCC Form 175, even if the agreement has not
    been reduced to writing. Parties that have not agreed in principle by
    the FCC Form 175 filing deadline should not describe, or include the
    names of parties to, the discussions on their applications.
        26. The Commission's rules generally prohibit joint bidding and
    other arrangements involving auction applicants (including any party
    that controls or is controlled by such applicants). For purposes of the
    prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement includes any arrangement
    relating to the licenses being auctioned that addresses or
    communicates, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction, bidding
    strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific
    licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangement relating to the
    post-auction market structure.
        27. This prohibition applies to joint bidding arrangements
    involving two or more nationwide providers, as well as joint bidding
    arrangements involving a nationwide provider and one or more non-
    nationwide providers, where at least one party to the arrangement is an
    applicant for the auction. A ``non-nationwide provider'' refers to any
    provider of communications services that is not a nationwide provider.
    The Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be nationwide
    providers for the purpose of implementing the Commission's competitive
    bidding rules in Auction 107.
        28. Under certain circumstances, a non-nationwide provider may
    enter into an agreement to form a consortium or a joint venture (as
    applicable) that results in a single party applying to participate in
    an auction. A designated entity can participate in one consortium or
    joint venture in an auction, and non-nationwide providers that are not
    designated entities may participate in an auction through only one
    joint venture. A non-nationwide provider may enter into only one
    agreement to form a consortium or joint venture (as applicable), and
    such consortium or joint venture shall be the exclusive bidding vehicle
    for its members in the auction. The general prohibition on joint
    bidding arrangements excludes certain agreements, including those that
    are solely operational in nature. Under the Commission's rules,
    agreements that are solely operational in nature are those that address
    operational aspects of providing a mobile service, such as agreements
    for roaming, device acquisition, and spectrum leasing and other
    spectrum use arrangements, provided that any such agreement does not
    both relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate,
    directly or indirectly, bidding at auction (including specific prices
    to be bid) or bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on
    which to bid or not to bid) or post-auction market structure.
        29. The Commission's rules require each applicant to certify in its
    short-form application that it has disclosed any arrangements or
    understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned to
    which it (or any party that controls or is controlled by it) is a
    party. The applicant must also certify that it (or any party that
    controls or is controlled by it) has not entered and will not enter
    into any arrangement or understanding of any kind relating directly or
    indirectly to bidding at auction with, among others, any other
    applicant or a nationwide provider.
        30. Although the Commission's rules do not prohibit auction
    applicants from communicating about matters that are within the scope
    of an excepted agreement that has been disclosed in an FCC Form 175,
    certain discussions or exchanges could nonetheless touch upon
    impermissible subject matters, and compliance with the Commission's
    rules will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.
        31. A winning bidder will be required to disclose in its FCC Form
    601 post-auction application the specific terms, conditions, and
    parties involved in any agreement relating to the licenses being
    auctioned into which it had entered prior to the time bidding was
    completed. This applies to any bidding consortium, joint venture,
    partnership, or other agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any
    kind entered into relating to the competitive bidding process,
    including any agreements relating to the licenses being auctioned that
    address or communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific
    prices), bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which
    to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which
    the applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the
    applicant, is a party.

    D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

        32. Each applicant must comply with the applicable part 1 ownership
    disclosure requirements and provide information required by sections
    1.2105 and 1.2112, and, where applicable, section 1.2110, of the
    Commission's rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant must fully
    disclose information regarding the real party- or parties-in-interest
    in the applicant or application and the ownership structure of the
    applicant, including both direct and indirect ownership interests of
    10% or more. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring that
    information submitted in its short-form application is complete and
    accurate.
        33. In certain circumstances, an applicant may have previously
    filed an FCC Form 602 ownership disclosure information report or filed
    an auction application for a previous auction in which ownership
    information was disclosed. The most current ownership information
    contained in any FCC Form 602 or previous auction application on file
    with the Commission that used the same FCC Registration Number (FRN)
    the applicant is using to submit its FCC Form 175 will automatically be
    pre-filled into certain ownership sections on the applicant's FCC Form
    175, if such information is in an electronic format compatible with FCC
    Form 175. Applicants are encouraged to submit an FCC Form 602 ownership
    report or update any ownership information on file with the Commission
    in an FCC Form 602 ownership report prior to starting a short-form
    application for Auction 107 to ensure that their most recent ownership
    information is pre-filled into their short-form application. Each
    applicant must carefully review any ownership information

    [[Page 53213]]

    automatically entered into its FCC Form 175, including any ownership
    attachments, to confirm that all information supplied on FCC Form 175
    is complete and accurate as of the application filing deadline. Any
    information that needs to be corrected or updated must be changed
    directly in FCC Form 175.

    E. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirements

        34. Section 310 of the Communications Act requires the Commission
    to review foreign investment in radio station licenses and imposes
    specific restrictions on who may hold certain types of radio licenses.
    Section 310 applies to applications for initial radio licenses,
    applications for assignments and transfers of control of radio
    licenses, and spectrum leasing arrangements under the Commission's
    secondary market rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant is
    required to disclose information concerning foreign ownership of the
    applicant. If an applicant has foreign ownership interests in excess of
    the applicable limit or benchmark set forth in section 310(b), then it
    may seek to participate in Auction 107 as long as it has filed a
    petition for declaratory ruling with the Commission prior to the FCC
    Form 175 filing deadline. An applicant must certify in its FCC Form 175
    that, as of the deadline for filing its application to participate in
    the auction, the applicant either is in compliance with the foreign
    ownership provisions of section 310 or has filed a petition for
    declaratory ruling requesting Commission approval to exceed the
    applicable foreign ownership limit or benchmark in section 310(b) that
    is pending before, or has been granted by, the Commission. Additional
    information concerning foreign ownership disclosure requirements is
    provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.

    F. Information Procedures During the Auction Process

        35. The Commission is limiting information available in Auction 107
    in order to prevent the identification of bidders placing particular
    bids until after the bidding has closed. The Commission will not make
    public until after bidding has closed: (1) The license areas that an
    applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application, (2) the
    amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant, (3)
    any applicant's bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related
    information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid.
        36. Once the bidding begins in Auction 107, under the limited
    information procedures (sometimes also referred to as anonymous
    bidding), information to be made public after each round of bidding
    will include, for licenses in each geographic area, the supply, the
    aggregate demand, the price at the end of the last completed round, and
    the price for the next round. The identities of bidders placing
    specific bids and the net bid amounts (reflecting bidding credits) will
    not be disclosed until after the close of bidding.
        37. Bidders will have access to additional information related to
    their own bidding and bidding eligibility through the Commission's
    bidding system. For example, bidders will be able to view their own
    level of eligibility, both before and during the auction.
        38. After the close of bidding, bidders' PEA selections, upfront
    payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related
    actions will be made publicly available.
        39. The direct or indirect communication to other applicants or the
    public disclosure of non-public information (e.g., reductions in
    eligibility, identities of bidders) could violate the Commission's rule
    prohibiting certain communications. To the extent an applicant believes
    that such a disclosure is required by law or regulation, including
    regulations issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the
    applicant should consult with the Commission staff in the Auctions
    Division before making such disclosure.

    G. Prohibited Communications and Compliance With Antitrust Laws

        40. The rules prohibiting certain communications set forth in
    section 1.2105(c) apply to each applicant that files a short-form
    application (FCC Form 175) in Auction 107. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the
    Commission's rules provides that, subject to specified exceptions,
    after the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are
    prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to,
    communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any nationwide
    provider of communications services that is not an applicant, or, if
    the applicant is a nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider
    that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of their own, or
    each other's, or any other applicants' bids or bidding strategies
    (including post-auction market structure), or discussing or negotiating
    settlement agreements, until after the down payment deadline.
    1. Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c)
        41. An applicant for purposes of this rule includes all controlling
    interests in the entity submitting the FCC Form 175 auction
    application, as well as all holders of interests amounting to 10% or
    more of the entity, and all officers and directors of that entity. A
    party that submits an application becomes an applicant under the rule
    at the application deadline, and that status does not change based on
    later developments. Thus, an auction applicant that does not correct
    deficiencies in its application, fails to submit a timely and
    sufficient upfront payment, or does not otherwise become qualified,
    remains an ``applicant'' for purposes of the rule and remains subject
    to the prohibition on certain communications until the Auction 107 down
    payment deadline.
        42. The Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be
    nationwide providers for the purposes of the prohibited communications
    rule for Auction 107.
    2. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline
        43. Section 1.2105(c)'s prohibition of certain communications
    begins at an auction's short-form application filing deadline and ends
    at the auction's down payment deadline after the auction closes, which
    will be announced in a future public notice.
    3. Scope of Prohibition on Certain Communications; Prohibition on Joint
    Bidding Agreements
        44. Section 1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibits certain
    communications between applicants for an auction, regardless of whether
    the applicants seek permits or licenses in the same geographic area or
    market. The rule also applies to communications by applicants with non-
    applicant nationwide providers of communications services and by
    nationwide applicants with non-applicant non-nationwide providers. The
    rule further prohibits joint bidding arrangements, including
    arrangements relating to the permits or licenses being auctioned that
    address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction,
    bidding strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the
    specific permits or licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangements
    relating to the post-auction market structure. The rule allows for
    limited exceptions for communications within the scope of any
    arrangement consistent with the exclusion from the Commission's rules
    prohibiting joint bidding, provided such

    [[Page 53214]]

    arrangement is disclosed on the applicant's auction application.
    Applicants may communicate pursuant to any pre-existing agreements,
    arrangements, or understandings relating to the licenses being
    auctioned that are solely operational or that provide for the transfer
    or assignment of licenses, provided that such agreements, arrangements,
    or understandings are disclosed on their applications and do not both
    relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate bids
    (including amounts), bidding strategies, or the particular permits or
    licenses on which to bid or the post-auction market structure.
        45. The prohibition against communicating in any manner includes
    public disclosures as well as private communications and indirect or
    implicit communications. Consequently, an applicant must take care to
    determine whether its auction-related communications may reach another
    applicant. Applicants must determine whether their communications with
    other parties are permissible under the rule once the prohibition
    begins at the deadline for submitting applications, even before the
    public notice identifying applicants is released.
        46. Parties subject to section 1.2105(c) should take special care
    in circumstances where their officers, directors, and employees may
    receive information directly or indirectly relating to any applicant's
    bids or bidding strategies. Such information may be deemed to have been
    received by the applicant under certain circumstances. For example,
    Commission staff have found that, where an individual serves as an
    officer and director for two or more applicants, the bids and bidding
    strategies of one applicant are presumed conveyed to the other
    applicant through the shared officer, which creates an apparent
    violation of the rule.
        47. Section 1.2105(c)(1) prohibits applicants from communicating
    with specified other parties only with respect to their own, or each
    other's, or any other applicant's bids or bidding strategies. A
    communication conveying bids or bidding strategies (including post-
    auction market structure) must also relate to the licenses being
    auctioned in order to be covered by the prohibition. Thus, the
    prohibition is limited in scope and does not apply to all
    communications between or among the specified parties. The Commission
    consistently has made clear that application of the rule prohibiting
    communications has never required total suspension of essential ongoing
    business. Entities subject to the prohibition may negotiate agreements
    during the prohibition period, provided that the communications
    involved do not relate to both: (1) The licenses being auctioned and
    (2) bids or bidding strategies or post-auction market structure.
        48. Business discussions and negotiations that are unrelated to
    bidding in Auction 107 and that do not convey information about the
    bids or bidding strategies, including the post-auction market
    structure, of an applicant are not prohibited by the rule. Moreover,
    not all auction-related information is covered by the prohibition. For
    example, communicating merely whether a party has or has not applied to
    participate in Auction 107 will not violate the rule. In contrast,
    communicating how a party will participate, including specific
    geographic areas selected, specific bid amounts, and/or whether or not
    the party is placing bids, would convey bids or bidding strategies and
    would be prohibited.
        49. Each applicant must remain vigilant not to communicate,
    directly or indirectly, information that affects, or could affect, bids
    or bidding strategies. Certain discussions might touch upon subject
    matters that could convey price or geographic information related to
    bidding strategies. Such subject areas include, but are not limited to,
    management, sales, local marketing agreements, and other transactional
    agreements.
        50. Bids or bidding strategies may be communicated outside of
    situations that involve one party subject to the prohibition
    communicating privately and directly with another such party. For
    example, the Commission has warned that prohibited communications
    concerning bids and bidding strategies may include communications
    regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds in support of
    bids or bidding strategies to the extent such communications convey
    information concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or
    indirectly. Moreover, the Commission found a violation of the rule
    against prohibited communications when an applicant used the
    Commission's bidding system to disclose its bidding strategy in a
    manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to cooperate
    and collaborate in specific markets, and has placed auction
    participants on notice that the use of its bidding system to disclose
    market information to competitors will not be tolerated and will
    subject bidders to sanctions.
        51. When completing a short-form application, each applicant should
    avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate section 1.2105(c).
    An applicant should avoid including any information in its short-form
    application that might convey information regarding its PEA selections,
    such as referring to certain markets in describing agreements,
    including any information in application attachments that will be
    publicly available that may otherwise disclose the applicant's PEA
    selections, or using applicant names that refer to licenses being
    offered.
        52. Applicants also should be mindful that communicating non-public
    application or bidding information publicly or privately to another
    applicant may violate section 1.2105(c) even though that information
    subsequently may be made public during later periods of the application
    or bidding processes.
    4. Communicating With Third Parties
        53. Section 1.2105(c) does not prohibit an applicant from
    communicating bids or bidding strategies to a third party, such as a
    consultant or consulting firm, counsel, or lender. The applicant should
    take appropriate steps, however, to ensure that any third party it
    employs for advice pertaining to its bids or bidding strategies does
    not become a conduit for prohibited communications to other specified
    parties, as that would violate the rule. For example, an applicant
    might require a third party, such as a lender, to sign a non-disclosure
    agreement before the applicant communicates any information regarding
    bids or bidding strategy to the third party. Within third-party firms,
    separate individual employees, such as attorneys or auction
    consultants, may advise individual applicants on bids or bidding
    strategies, as long as such firms implement firewalls and other
    compliance procedures that prevent such individuals from communicating
    the bids or bidding strategies of one applicant to other individuals
    representing separate applicants. Although firewalls and/or other
    procedures should be used, their existence is not an absolute defense
    to liability if a violation of the rule has occurred.
        54. In the case of an individual, the objective precautionary
    measure of a firewall is not available. An individual that is privy to
    bids or bidding information of more than one applicant presents a
    greater risk of becoming a conduit for a prohibited communication.
    Whether a prohibited communication has taken place in a

    [[Page 53215]]

    given case will depend on all the facts pertaining to the case,
    including who possessed what information, what information was conveyed
    to whom, and the course of bidding in the auction.
        55. Potential applicants may discuss the short-form application or
    bids for specific licenses or license areas with the counsel,
    consultant, or expert of their choice before the short-form application
    deadline. The same third-party individual could continue to give advice
    after the short-form deadline regarding the application, provided that
    no information pertaining to bids or bidding strategies, including PEAs
    selected on the short-form application, is conveyed to that individual.
    To the extent potential applicants can develop bidding instructions
    prior to the short-form deadline that a third party could implement
    without changes during bidding, the third party could follow such
    instructions for multiple applicants provided that those applicants do
    not communicate with the third party during the prohibition period.
        56. Applicants also should use caution in their dealings with other
    parties, such as members of the press, financial analysts, or others
    who might become conduits for the communication of prohibited bidding
    information. For example, even though communicating that it has applied
    to participate in the auction will not violate the rule, an applicant's
    statement to the press that it intends to stop bidding in an auction
    could give rise to a finding of a section 1.2105 violation. Similarly,
    an applicant's public statement of intent not to place bids during
    bidding in Auction 107 could also violate the rule.
    5. Section 1.2105(c) Certifications
        57. By electronically submitting its FCC Form 175 auction
    application, each applicant for Auction 107 certifies its compliance
    with section 1.2105(c) of the rules. If an applicant has a non-
    controlling interest with respect to more than one application, the
    applicant must certify that it has established internal control
    procedures to preclude any person acting on behalf of the applicant
    from possessing information about the bids or bidding strategies of
    more than one applicant or communicating such information with respect
    to either applicant to another person acting on behalf of and
    possessing such information regarding another applicant. The mere
    filing of a certifying statement as part of an application will not
    outweigh specific evidence that a prohibited communication has
    occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when
    warranted. Any applicant found to have violated these communication
    prohibitions may be subject to sanctions.
    6. Duty To Report Prohibited Communications
        58. Section 1.2105(c)(4) requires that any applicant that makes or
    receives a communication that appears to violate section 1.2105(c) must
    report such communication in writing to the Commission immediately, and
    in no case later than five business days after the communication
    occurs. Each applicant's obligation to report any such communication
    continues beyond the five-day period after the communication is made,
    even if the report is not made within the five-day period.
    7. Procedures for Reporting Prohibited Communications
        59. A party reporting any information or communication pursuant to
    sections 1.65, 1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must take care to ensure
    that any report of a prohibited communication does not itself give rise
    to a violation of section 1.2105(c). For example, a party's report of a
    prohibited communication could violate the rule by communicating
    prohibited information to other parties specified under the rule
    through the use of Commission filing procedures that allow such
    materials to be made available for public inspection.
        60. Parties must file only a single report concerning a prohibited
    communication and must file that report with the Commission personnel
    expressly charged with administering the Commission's auctions. This
    rule is designed to minimize the risk of inadvertent dissemination of
    information in such reports. Any reports required by section 1.2105(c)
    must be filed consistent with the instructions set forth in the Auction
    107 Procedures Public Notice. Such reports must be filed with the Chief
    of the Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics, by the
    most expeditious means available. Any such report should be submitted
    by email to the Auctions Division Chief and sent to auction107@fcc.gov.
    If you choose to submit a report in hard copy, contact Auctions
    Division staff at auction107@fcc.gov or (202) 418-0660 for guidance.
        61. A party seeking to report such a prohibited communication
    should consider submitting its report with a request that the report or
    portions of the submission be withheld from public inspection by
    following the procedures specified in section 0.459 of the Commission's
    rules. Filers requesting confidential treatment of documents must be
    sure that the cover page of the filing prominently displays that the
    documents seek confidential treatment. For example, a filing might
    include a cover page stamped with ``Request for Confidential Treatment
    Attached'' or ``Not for Public Inspection.'' Any such request must
    cover all the material to which the request applies. Because the hand-
    delivery filing location at FCC Headquarters is permanently closed,
    such materials should be submitted in accordance with the procedures
    described in Order, Amendment of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
    Procedure, May 28, 2020. Such parties are encouraged to coordinate with
    the Auctions Division staff about the procedures for submitting such
    reports.
    8. Winning Bidders Must Disclose Terms of Agreements
        62. Each applicant that is a winning bidder will be required to
    provide as part of its long-form application any agreement or
    arrangement it has entered into and a summary of the specific terms,
    conditions, and parties involved in any agreement it has entered into.
    Such agreements must have been entered into prior to the filing of
    short-form applications. This applies to any bidding consortia, joint
    venture, partnership, or agreement, understanding, or other arrangement
    entered into relating to the competitive bidding process, including any
    agreement relating to the post-auction market structure. Failure to
    comply with the Commission's rules can result in enforcement action.
    9. Additional Information Concerning Prohibition on Certain
    Communications in Commission Auctions
        63. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and
    OEA/WTB addressing the application of section 1.2105(c) is available on
    the Commission's auction web page at www.fcc.gov/summary-listing-documents-addressing-application-rule-prohibiting-certain-communications.
    10. Antitrust Laws
        64. Applicants remain subject to the antitrust laws. Compliance
    with the disclosure requirements of section 1.2105(c)(4) will not
    insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance,
    a violation of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking
    place well before any party submits a short-form application. The
    Commission has cited a number of examples of potentially
    anticompetitive actions that would be prohibited under antitrust laws:
    For example, actual or potential competitors may not agree to divide

    [[Page 53216]]

    territories in order to minimize competition, regardless of whether
    they split a market in which they both do business, or whether they
    merely reserve one market for one and another market for the other.
        65. To the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific
    allegations that suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws
    may have occurred, the Commission may refer such allegations to the
    United States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant
    is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules
    in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding
    process, it may be subject to a forfeiture and may be prohibited from
    participating further in Auction 107 and in future auctions, among
    other sanctions.

    H. Provisions for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers

        66. In Auction 107, bidding credits will be available to applicants
    demonstrating eligibility for a small business or a rural service
    provider bidding credit and subsequently winning license(s). A bidding
    credit represents an amount by which a bidder's winning bid will be
    discounted. These bidding credits will not be cumulative--an applicant
    is permitted to claim either a small business bidding credit or a rural
    service provider bidding credit, but not both. Each applicant must also
    certify that it is eligible for the claimed bidding credit in its FCC
    Form 175. Each applicant should review carefully the Commission's
    decisions regarding the designated entity provisions as well as the
    part 1 rules.
        67. Applicants applying for designated entity bidding credits
    should take due account of the requirements of the Commission's rules
    and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control of such
    applicants. These rules include a prohibition, which applies to all
    applicants (whether they seek bidding credits or not), against changes
    in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or
    transfer of control. Applicants should not expect to receive any
    opportunities to revise their ownership structure after the filing of
    their short- and long-form applications, including making revisions to
    their agreements or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders,
    or others in order to address potential concerns relating to compliance
    with the designated entity bidding credit requirements.
    1. Small Business Bidding Credit
        68. For Auction 107, bidding credits will be available to eligible
    small businesses and consortia thereof. Under the service rules
    applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service licenses to be offered in Auction
    107, the level of bidding credit available is determined as follows: A
    bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed
    $55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive a 15%
    discount on its winning bid; a bidder with attributed average annual
    gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the preceding five
    years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its winning bid.
        69. Small business bidding credits are not cumulative; an eligible
    applicant may receive either the 15% or the 25% bidding credit on its
    winning bid, but not both. The Commission's unjust enrichment
    provisions also apply to a winning bidder that uses a bidding credit
    and subsequently seeks to assign or transfer control of its license
    within a certain period to an entity not qualifying for at least the
    same level of small business bidding credit. Thus, for example, the
    Commission's unjust enrichment provisions would not apply to a winning
    bidder that uses the 15% small business bidding credit and seeks to
    transfer control of its license to an entity that qualifies for either
    the 15% small business bidding credit or the rural service provider
    bidding credit. The provisions would apply, however, if that same
    winning bidder uses the 25% small business bidding credit, unless the
    proposed transferee also qualifies for the 25% small business bidding
    credit.
        70. Each applicant claiming a small business bidding credit must
    disclose the gross revenues for the preceding five years for each of
    the following: (1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its
    controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling
    interests. The applicant must also submit an attachment that lists all
    parties with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use
    agreements or arrangements for any licenses that may be won by the
    applicant in Auction 107. In addition, to the extent that an applicant
    has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of
    more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license that may be won
    in Auction 107, the identity and the attributable gross revenues of any
    such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed. This attribution
    rule will be applied on a license-by-license basis. As a result, an
    applicant may be eligible for a bidding credit on some, but not all, of
    the licenses for which it is bidding in Auction 107. If an applicant is
    applying as a consortium of small businesses, then the disclosures
    described in this paragraph must be provided for each consortium
    member.
    2. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit
        71. An eligible applicant may request a 15% discount on its winning
    bid using a rural service provider bidding credit. To be eligible for a
    rural service provider bidding credit, an applicant must: (1) Be a
    service provider that is in the business of providing commercial
    communications services and, together with its controlling interests,
    affiliates, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, has fewer
    than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable
    subscribers; and (2) serve predominantly rural areas, defined as
    counties with a population density of 100 or fewer persons per square
    mile. An applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit must
    provide the number of subscribers served as of the short-form
    application deadline. An applicant may count any subscriber as a single
    subscriber even if that subscriber receives more than one service. For
    instance, a subscriber receiving both wireline and telephone service
    and broadband would be counted as a single subscriber.
        72. Each applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit
    must disclose the number of its subscribers, along with the number of
    subscribers of its affiliates, controlling interests, and the
    affiliates of its controlling interests. The applicant must also submit
    an attachment that lists all parties with which the applicant has
    entered into any spectrum use agreements or arrangements for any
    licenses that may be won by the applicant in Auction 107. To the extent
    that an applicant has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder
    for the use of more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license
    that may be won in Auction 107, the identity and the attributable
    subscribers of any such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed.
    Eligible rural service providers may form a consortium. If an applicant
    is applying as a consortium of rural service providers, then the
    disclosures described in this paragraph, including the certification,
    must be provided for each consortium member.
    3. Caps on Bidding Credits
        73. Eligible applicants claiming either a small business or rural
    service provider bidding credit will be subject to specified caps on
    the total amount of bidding credit discounts that they may receive. The
    Commission adopted a $25

    [[Page 53217]]

    million cap on the total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be
    awarded to an eligible small business, and a $10 million cap on the
    total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be awarded to an
    eligible rural service provider in Auction 107. No winning designated
    entity bidder will receive more than $10 million in bidding credit
    discounts in total for licenses won in markets with a population of
    500,000 or less. To the extent an applicant seeking a small business
    bidding credit does not claim the full $10 million in bidding credits
    in those smaller markets, it may apply the remaining balance to its
    winning bids on licenses in larger markets, up to the aggregate $25
    million cap.
    4. Attributable Interests
    a. Controlling Interests and Affiliates
        74. An applicant's eligibility for designated entity benefits is
    determined by attributing the gross revenues (for those seeking small
    business benefits) or subscribers (for those seeking rural service
    provider benefits) of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
    interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. Controlling
    interests of an applicant include individuals and entities with either
    de facto or de jure control of the applicant. Typically, ownership of
    greater than 50% of an entity's voting stock evidences de jure control.
    De facto control is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the
    totality of the circumstances. The following are some common indicia of
    de facto control: The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50% of
    the board of directors or management committee; the entity has
    authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that
    control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and the entity plays
    an integral role in management decisions.
        75. Applicants should refer to section 1.2110(c)(2) of the
    Commission's rules and the FCC Form 175 Instructions to understand how
    certain interests are calculated in determining control for purposes of
    attributing gross revenues. For example, officers and directors of an
    applicant are considered to have a controlling interest in the
    applicant.
        76. Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an
    individual or entity that: (1) Directly or indirectly controls or has
    the power to control the applicant, (2) is directly or indirectly
    controlled by the applicant, (3) is directly or indirectly controlled
    by a third party that also controls or has the power to control the
    applicant, or (4) has an ``identity of interest'' with the applicant.
    The Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant
    encompasses both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates
    of controlling interests of the applicant.
        77. An applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must
    demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit by: (1) Meeting the
    applicable small business size standard, based on the controlling
    interest and affiliation rules, and (2) retaining control, on a
    license-by-license basis, over the spectrum associated with the
    licenses for which it seeks small business benefits. Control and
    affiliation may arise through, among other things, ownership interests,
    voting interests, management and other operating agreements, or the
    terms of any other types of agreements--including spectrum lease
    agreements--that independently or together create a controlling, or
    potentially controlling, interest in the applicant's or licensee's
    business as a whole. Except under the limited provisions provided for
    spectrum manager lessors, the Commission's decision to discontinue its
    policy requiring designated entity licensees to operate as primarily
    facilities-based providers of service directly to the public does not
    alter the rules that require the Commission to consider whether any
    particular use agreement may confer control of or create affiliation
    with the applicant. Once an applicant demonstrates eligibility as a
    small business under the first prong, it must also be eligible for
    benefits on a license-by-license basis under the second prong. As part
    of making the FCC Form 175 certification that it is qualified as a
    designated entity under section 1.2110, an applicant is certifying that
    it does not have any spectrum use or other agreements that would confer
    either de jure or de facto control of any license it seeks to acquire
    with bidding credits. For instance, if an applicant has a spectrum use
    agreement on a particular license that calls into question whether,
    under the Commission's affiliation rules, the user's revenues should be
    attributed to the applicant for that particular license, rather than
    for its overall business operations, the applicant could be ineligible
    to acquire or retain benefits with respect to that particular license.
        78. If an applicant executes a spectrum use agreement that does not
    comply with the Commission's relevant standard of de facto control,
    then it will be subject to unjust enrichment obligations for the
    benefits associated with that particular license, as well as the
    penalties associated with any violation of section 310(d) of the
    Communications Act and related regulations, which require Commission
    approval of transfers of control. Although in this scenario the
    applicant may not be eligible for a bidding credit and may be subject
    to the Commission's unjust enrichment rules, the applicant need not be
    eligible for small business benefits on each of the spectrum licenses
    it holds in order to demonstrate its overall eligibility for such
    benefits. If that spectrum use agreement (either alone or in
    combination with the designated entity controlling interest and
    attribution rules) goes so far as to confer control of the applicant's
    overall business, then the gross revenues of the additional interest
    holders will be attributed to the applicant, which could render the
    applicant ineligible for all current and future small business benefits
    on all licenses. The Commission applies the same de facto control
    standard to designated entity spectrum manager lessors that is applied
    to non-designated entity spectrum manager lessors.
    b. Limitation on Spectrum Use
        79. The gross revenues (or the subscribers, in the case of a rural
    service provider) of an applicant's disclosable interest holder are
    attributable to the applicant, on a license-by-license basis, if the
    disclosable interest holder has an agreement with the applicant to use,
    in any manner, more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license
    won by the applicant and acquired with a bidding credit during the
    five-year unjust enrichment period for the applicable license. A
    disclosable interest holder of an applicant seeking designated entity
    benefits is defined as any individual or entity holding a 10% or
    greater interest of any kind in the applicant, including but not
    limited to, a 10% or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants,
    options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee. Any applicant
    seeking a bidding credit for licenses won in Auction 107 will be
    subject to this attribution rule and must make the requisite
    disclosures.
        80. Certain disclosable interest holders may be excluded from this
    attribution rule. An applicant claiming the rural service provider
    bidding credit may have spectrum license use agreements with a
    disclosable interest holder, without having to attribute the
    disclosable interest holder's subscribers, so long as the disclosable
    interest holder is independently eligible for a rural service provider
    credit and the use agreement is otherwise permissible under the
    Commission's existing rules. If applicable, the applicant must attach
    to its FCC Form 175 any additional

    [[Page 53218]]

    information as may be required to indicate any license (or license
    area) that may be subject to this attribution rule or to demonstrate
    its eligibility for the exception from this attribution rule. The
    Commission intends to withhold from public disclosure all information
    contained in any such attachments until after the close of Auction 107.
    c. Exceptions From Attribution Rules for Small Businesses and Rural
    Service Providers
        81. Applicants claiming designated entity benefits may be eligible
    for certain exceptions from the Commission's attribution rules. For
    example, in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the
    controlling interest standard, the Commission will not attribute to the
    applicant the personal net worth, including personal income, of its
    officers and directors. To the extent that the officers and directors
    of the applicant are controlling interest holders of other entities,
    the gross revenues of those entities will be attributed to the
    applicant. Moreover, if an officer or director operates a separate
    business, the gross revenues derived from that separate business would
    be attributed to the applicant, although any personal income from such
    separate business would not be attributed. The Commission has also
    exempted from attribution to the applicant the gross revenues of the
    affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's officers and directors,
    if certain conditions specified in section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii) of the
    Commission's rules are met. An applicant claiming this exemption must
    provide, in an attachment, an affirmative statement that the applicant,
    affiliate and/or controlling interest is an eligible rural telephone
    cooperative within the meaning of section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and the
    applicant must supply any additional information as may be required to
    demonstrate eligibility for the exemption from the attribution rule.
        82. An applicant claiming a rural service provider bidding credit
    may be eligible for an exception from the Commission's attribution
    rules as an existing rural partnership. To qualify for this exception,
    an applicant must be a rural partnership providing service as of July
    16, 2015, and each member of the rural partnership must individually
    have fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and
    cable subscribers. The Commission will evaluate eligibility for an
    existing rural wireless partnership on the same basis as it would for
    an applicant applying for a bidding credit as a consortium of rural
    service providers. A partnership that includes a nationwide provider as
    a member will not be eligible for the benefit. Members of such
    partnerships that fall under this exception may also apply as
    individual applicants or members of a consortium (to the extent that it
    is otherwise permissible to do so under the Commission's rules) and
    seek eligibility for a rural service provider bidding credit.
        83. A consortium of small businesses or rural service providers may
    seek an exception from the Commission's attribution rules. A consortium
    of small businesses or rural service providers is a conglomerate
    organization composed of two or more entities, each of which
    individually satisfies the definition of small business or rural
    service provider. A consortium must provide additional information for
    each member demonstrating each member's eligibility for the claimed
    bidding credit in order to show that the applicant satisfies the
    eligibility criteria for the bidding credit. The gross revenue or
    subscriber information of each consortium member will not be aggregated
    for purposes of determining the consortium's eligibility for the
    claimed bidding credit. This information must be provided to ensure
    that each consortium member qualifies for the bidding credit sought by
    the consortium.

    I. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

        84. Each applicant must make certifications regarding whether it is
    a current or former defaulter or delinquent. A current defaulter or
    delinquent is not eligible to participate in Auction 107, but a former
    defaulter or delinquent may participate so long as it is otherwise
    qualified and makes an upfront payment that is 50% more than would
    otherwise be necessary. An applicant is considered a current defaulter
    or a current delinquent when it, any of its affiliates, any of its
    controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling
    interests, is in default on any payment for any Commission construction
    permit or license (including a down payment) or is delinquent on any
    non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the filing deadline for
    auction applications. Non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency includes,
    within the meaning of the rule, all amounts owed under Federal
    programs, including contributions to the Universal Service Fund (USF),
    Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, and the North American
    Numbering Plan Administration, notwithstanding that the administrator
    of any such fund may not be considered a Federal ``agency'' under the
    Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. For example, an applicant with
    a past due USF contribution as of the auction application filing
    deadline would be disqualified from participating in Auction 107 under
    the Commission's rules. If the applicant cures the overdue debt prior
    to the auction application filing deadline (and such debt does not fall
    within one of the exclusions described in section 1.2105(a)(2)(xii)),
    it may be eligible to participate in Auction 107 as a former defaulter.
    Each applicant must certify under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form
    175 that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the
    affiliates of its controlling interests are not in default on any
    payment for a Commission construction permit or license (including down
    payments) and that it is not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any
    Federal agency. Additionally, an applicant must certify under penalty
    of perjury whether it (along with its controlling interests) has ever
    been in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or
    license (including down payments) or has ever been delinquent on any
    non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, subject to the exclusions. The
    term ``controlling interest'' is defined in section 1.2105(a)(4)(i) of
    the Commission rules.
        85. An applicant is considered a former defaulter or a former
    delinquent when, as of the FCC Form 175 deadline, the applicant or any
    of its controlling interests has defaulted on any Commission
    construction permit or license or has been delinquent on any non-tax
    debt owed to any Federal agency, but has since remedied all such
    defaults and cured all of the outstanding non-tax delinquencies. The
    applicant may exclude from consideration any cured default on a
    Commission construction permit or license or cured delinquency on a
    non-tax debt owed to a Federal agency for which any of the following
    criteria are met: (1) The notice of the final payment deadline or
    delinquency was received more than seven years before the FCC Form 175
    filing deadline, (2) the default or delinquency amounted to less than
    $100,000, (3) the default or delinquency was paid within two quarters
    (i.e., six months) after receiving the notice of the final payment
    deadline or delinquency, or (4) the default or delinquency was the
    subject of a legal or arbitration proceeding and was cured upon
    resolution of the proceeding. Notice to a debtor may include notice of
    a final payment deadline or notice of delinquency and may be express or
    implied depending on the origin of any

    [[Page 53219]]

    Federal non-tax debt giving rise to a default or delinquency. The date
    of receipt of the notice of a final default deadline or delinquency by
    the intended party or debtor will be used for purposes of verifying
    receipt of notice. A debt will not be deemed to be in default or
    delinquent until after the expiration of a final payment deadline. To
    the extent that the rules providing for payment of a specific federal
    debt permit payment after an original payment deadline accompanied by
    late fee(s), such debts would not be in default or delinquent for
    purposes of applying the former defaulter rules until after the late
    payment deadline. Any winning bidder that fails to timely pay its post-
    auction down payment or the balance of its final winning bid amount(s)
    or is disqualified for any reason after the close of an auction will be
    in default and subject to a default payment. Commission staff provide
    individual notice of the amount of such a default payment as well as
    procedures and information required by the Debt Collection Improvement
    Act of 1996, including the payment due date and any charges, interest,
    and/or penalties that accrue in the event of delinquency. Such notice
    provided by Commission staff assessing a default payment arising out of
    a default on a winning bid, constitutes notice of the final payment
    deadline with respect to a default on a Commission license.
        86. Applicants are encouraged to review previous guidance on
    default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of the
    auction short-form application process. Parties are also encouraged to
    consult with Auctions Division staff if they have any questions about
    default and delinquency disclosure requirements.
        87. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United
    States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The
    Commission has previously adopted rules, including a provision referred
    to as the ``red light rule,'' that implement its obligations under the
    Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection
    of debts owed to the United States. Under the red light rule,
    applications and other requests for benefits filed by parties that have
    outstanding debts owed to the Commission will not be processed. The
    Commission's adoption of the red light rule does not alter the
    applicability of any of its competitive bidding rules, including the
    provisions and certifications of sections 1.2105 and 1.2106, with
    regard to current and former defaults or delinquencies.
        88. The Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides
    information regarding debts currently owed to the Commission, may not
    be determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the
    default and delinquency disclosure requirements of section 1.2105.
    Thus, while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of
    long-form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's lack
    of current red light status is not necessarily determinative of its
    eligibility to participate in an auction (or whether it may be subject
    to an increased upfront payment obligation). A prospective applicant in
    Auction 107 should note that any long-form applications filed after the
    close of bidding will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's
    red light rule, and such review may result in the dismissal of a
    winning bidder's long-form application. Applicants that have their
    long-form applications dismissed will be deemed to have defaulted and
    will be subject to default payments under sections 1.2104(g) and
    1.2109(c) of the Commission's rules. Each applicant should carefully
    review all records and other available Federal agency databases and
    information sources to determine whether the applicant, or any of its
    affiliates, or any of its controlling interests, or any of the
    affiliates of its controlling interests, owes or was ever delinquent in
    the payment of non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. To access the
    Commission's Red Light Display System, go to: https://apps.fcc.gov/redlight/login.cfm.

    J. Optional Applicant Status Identification

        89. Applicants owned by members of minority groups and/or women, as
    defined in section 1.2110(c)(3), and rural telephone companies, as
    defined in section 1.2110(c)(4), may identify themselves regarding this
    status in filling out their FCC Form 175 applications. This applicant
    status information is collected for statistical purposes only and
    assists the Commission in monitoring the participation of various
    groups in its auctions.

    K. Modifications to FCC Form 175

    1. Only Minor Modifications Allowed
        90. After the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline, an Auction 107
    applicant will be permitted to make only minor changes to its
    application consistent with the Commission's rules. Minor amendments
    include any changes that are not major, such as correcting
    typographical errors and supplying or correcting information as
    requested to support the certifications made in the application.
    Examples of minor changes include the deletion or addition of
    authorized bidders (to a maximum of three) and the revision of
    addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant, its responsible
    party, and its contact person. Major modification to an FCC Form 175
    (e.g., change of PEA selection, certain changes in ownership that would
    constitute an assignment or transfer of control of the applicant,
    change in the required certifications, change in applicant's legal
    classification that results in a change in control, or change in
    claimed eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding credit) will not
    be permitted after the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline. If an
    amendment reporting changes is a ``major amendment,'' as described in
    section 1.2105(b)(2), the major amendment will not be accepted and may
    result in the dismissal of the application. Any change in control of an
    applicant will be considered a major modification, and the application
    will consequently be dismissed. Even if an applicant's FCC Form 175 is
    dismissed, the applicant would remain subject to the communication
    prohibitions of section 1.2105(c) until the down payment deadline for
    Auction 107.
    2. Duty To Maintain Accuracy and Completeness of FCC Form 175
        91. Each applicant has a continuing obligation to maintain the
    accuracy and completeness of information furnished in a pending
    application, including a pending application to participate in Auction
    107. An applicant's FCC Form 175 and associated attachments will remain
    pending until the release of a public notice announcing the close of
    the auction. Auction 107 applicants remain subject to the section
    1.2105(c) prohibition on certain communications until the post-auction
    deadline for making down payments on winning bids in Auction 107. An
    applicant's post-auction application (FCC Form 601) is considered
    pending from the time it is accepted for filing by the Commission until
    a Commission grant or denial of the application is no longer subject to
    reconsideration by the Commission or to review by any court. An
    applicant for Auction 107 must furnish additional or corrected
    information to the Commission within five business days after a
    significant occurrence or amend its FCC Form 175 no more than five
    business days after the applicant becomes aware of the need for the
    amendment. An applicant is obligated to amend its pending

    [[Page 53220]]

    application even if a reported change may result in the dismissal of
    the application because it is subsequently determined to be a major
    modification.
    3. Modifying an FCC Form 175
        92. A party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file an FCC
    Form 175 electronically via the FCC's Auction Application System.
    During the initial filing window, an applicant will be able to make any
    necessary modifications to its FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application
    System. An applicant that has certified and submitted its FCC Form 175
    before the close of the initial filing window may continue to make
    modifications as often as necessary until the close of that window; the
    applicant must re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 before the
    close of the initial filing window to confirm and effect its latest
    application changes. After each submission, a confirmation page will be
    displayed stating the submission time and submission date. Applicants
    are advised to retain a copy of this confirmation page.
        93. An applicant will also be allowed to modify its FCC Form 175 in
    the Auction Application System, except for certain fields, during the
    resubmission filing window and after the release of the public notice
    announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. An applicant will not
    be allowed to modify electronically in the Auction Application System
    the applicant's legal classification, the applicant's name, or the
    certifying official. During the resubmission filing window and after
    the release of the public notice announcing the qualified bidders for
    an auction, if an applicant needs to make permissible minor changes to
    its FCC Form 175 or must make changes in order to maintain the accuracy
    and completeness of its application pursuant to sections 1.65 and
    1.2105(b)(4), then it must make the change(s) in the Auction
    Application System and re-certify and re-submit its application to
    confirm and effect the change(s).
        94. An applicant's ability to modify its FCC Form 175 in the
    Auction Application System will be limited between the closing of the
    initial filing window and the opening of the application resubmission
    filing window, and between the closing of the resubmission filing
    window and the release of the public notice announcing the qualified
    bidders for an auction. During these periods, an applicant will be able
    to view its submitted application, but will be permitted to modify only
    the applicant's address, responsible party address, and contact
    information (e.g., name, address, telephone number, etc.) in the
    Auction Application System. An applicant will not be able to modify any
    other pages of the FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application System
    during these periods. If, during these periods, an applicant needs to
    make other permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175, or changes to
    maintain the accuracy and completeness of its application, the
    applicant must submit a letter briefly summarizing the changes to its
    FCC Form 175 via email to auction107@fcc.gov. The email summarizing the
    changes must include a subject line referring to Auction 107 and the
    name of the applicant, for example, ``Re: Changes to Auction 107
    Auction Application of XYZ Corp.'' Any attachments to the email must be
    formatted as Adobe[supreg] Acrobat[supreg] (PDF) or Microsoft[supreg]
    Word documents. An applicant that submits its changes in this manner
    must subsequently modify, certify, and submit its FCC Form 175
    application(s) electronically in the Auction Application System once it
    is again open and available to applicants.
        95. Applicants should also note that even at times when the Auction
    Application System is open and available to applicants, the system will
    not allow an applicant to make certain other permissible changes itself
    (e.g., correcting a misstatement of the applicant's legal
    classification). If an applicant needs to make a permissible minor
    change of this nature, then it must submit a written request by email
    to the Auctions Division Chief, via auction107@fcc.gov, requesting that
    the Commission manually make the change on the applicant's behalf. Once
    Commission staff has informed the applicant that the change has been
    made in the Auction Application System, the applicant must then re-
    certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application
    System to confirm and effect the change(s).
        96. Any amendment(s) to the application and related statements of
    fact must be certified by an authorized representative of the applicant
    with authority to bind the applicant. Submission of any such amendment
    or related statement of fact constitutes a representation by the person
    certifying that he or she is an authorized representative with such
    authority and that the contents of the amendment or statement of fact
    are true and correct.
        97. Applicants must not submit application-specific material
    through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System. Parties
    submitting information related to their applications should use caution
    to ensure that their submissions do not contain confidential
    information or communicate information that would violate section
    1.2105(c) or the limited information procedures adopted for Auction
    107. An applicant seeking to submit, outside of the Auction Application
    System, information that might reflect non-public information, such as
    an applicant's PEA selection(s), upfront payment amount, or bidding
    eligibility, should consider including in its email a request that the
    filing or portions of the filing be withheld from public inspection
    until the end of the prohibition on certain communications.
        98. Questions about FCC Form 175 amendments should be directed to
    the Auctions Division at (202) 418-0660.

    III. Preparing for Bidding in Auction 107

    A. Due Diligence

        99. Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating
    and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a
    bearing on the value of the licenses that it is seeking in Auction 107.
    The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of
    this spectrum or these licenses for particular services. Each applicant
    should be aware that a Commission auction represents an opportunity to
    become a Commission licensee, subject to certain conditions and
    regulations. This includes the established authority of the Commission
    to alter the terms of existing licenses by rulemaking, which is equally
    applicable to licenses awarded by auction. A Commission auction does
    not constitute an endorsement by the Commission of any particular
    service, technology, or product, nor does a Commission license
    constitute a guarantee of business success.
        100. An applicant should perform its due diligence research and
    analysis before proceeding, as it would with any new business venture.
    Each potential bidder should perform technical analyses and/or refresh
    its previous analyses to assure itself that, should it become a winning
    bidder for any Auction 107 license, it will be able to build and
    operate facilities that will fully comply with all applicable technical
    and legal requirements. Each applicant should inspect any prospective
    sites for communications facilities located in, or near, the geographic
    area for which it plans to bid, confirm the availability of such sites,
    and to familiarize itself with the Commission's rules regarding the
    National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic

    [[Page 53221]]

    Preservation Act (NHPA), and other environmental statutes.
        101. Each applicant in Auction 107 should continue to conduct its
    own research throughout the auction in order to determine the existence
    of pending or future administrative or judicial proceedings that might
    affect its decision on continued participation in the auction. Each
    applicant is responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various
    possible outcomes and for considering the potential impact on licenses
    available in an auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in
    the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice do not constitute an
    exhaustive list of steps that should be undertaken prior to
    participating in Auction 107. The burden is on the potential bidder to
    determine how much research to undertake, depending upon the specific
    facts and circumstances related to its interests. For example,
    applicants should pay particular attention to the framework adopted in
    the 3.7 GHz Report and Order that requires new overlay licensees to pay
    a specified share of accelerated relocation payments as well as
    relocation expenses to reimburse incumbents for the reasonable costs of
    transitioning out of the lower 300 megahertz of the band in the
    contiguous United States.
        102. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated
    risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such
    matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make
    use of the licenses available in Auction 107. Each potential bidder is
    responsible for undertaking research to ensure that any licenses won in
    the auction will be suitable for its business plans and needs. Each
    potential bidder must undertake its own assessment of the relevance and
    importance of information gathered as part of its due diligence
    efforts.
        103. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees
    regarding the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases
    or any third-party databases, including, for example, court docketing
    systems. To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all
    information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, it must
    obtain or verify such information from independent sources or assume
    the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases.
    Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees
    regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been
    provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.

    B. Licensing Considerations

    1. Transition of Incumbent Operations
        104. Potential applicants in Auction 107 should consider carefully
    the process for transitioning incumbent operations out of the 3.7-3.98
    GHz band when developing business plans, assessing market conditions,
    and evaluating the availability of equipment for 3.7 GHz Service
    operations. Each applicant should follow closely releases from the
    Commission concerning these issues and consider carefully the technical
    and economic implications for commercial use of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band.
    2. International Coordination
        105. Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas
    adjacent to the Canadian and Mexican borders should be aware that the
    use of the 3.7 GHz Service frequencies they acquire in Auction 107 are
    subject to current and future agreements with the governments of Canada
    and Mexico.
        106. The Commission routinely works with the United States
    Department of State and Canadian and Mexican government officials to
    ensure the efficient use of the spectrum as well as interference-free
    operations in the border areas near Canada and Mexico. Until such time
    as any adjusted agreements, as needed, between the United States,
    Mexico, and/or Canada can be agreed to, operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz
    band must not cause harmful interference across the border, consistent
    with the terms of the agreements currently in force.
    3. Environmental Review Requirements
        107. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules for
    environmental review under the NEPA, the NHPA, and other environmental
    statutes. Licensees and other applicants that propose to build certain
    types of communications facilities for licensed service must follow
    Commission procedures implementing obligations under NEPA and NHPA
    prior to constructing the facilities. Under NEPA, a licensee or
    applicant must assess if certain environmentally sensitive conditions
    specified in the Commission's rules are relevant to the proposed
    facilities, and prepare an environmental assessment when applicable.
    This assessment may require consultation with expert agencies having
    environmental responsibilities, such as U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
    the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency, among others. If an environmental assessment is required, then
    facilities may not be constructed until environmental processing is
    completed. Under NHPA, a licensee or applicant must follow the
    procedures in section 1.1320 of the Commission's rules, the Nationwide
    Programmatic Agreement for Collocation of Wireless Antennas and the
    Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National
    Historic Preservation Act Review Process. Compliance with section 106
    of the NHPA requires tribal consultation, and if construction of the
    communications facilities would have adverse effects on historic or
    tribally significant properties, an environmental assessment must be
    prepared.
    4. Mobile Spectrum Holdings Policies
        108. Bidders are reminded of the Commission's mobile spectrum
    holdings policies applicable to the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. Specifically,
    the Commission did not impose a pre-auction bright-line limit on
    acquisitions of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. Instead, the Commission
    incorporated into the spectrum screen the 280 megahertz of spectrum
    available in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. The Commission will also perform
    case-by-case review of the long-form license applications filed as a
    result of Auction 107.

    C. Bidder Education

        109. Before the opening of the short-form filing window for Auction
    107, detailed educational information will be provided in various
    formats to would-be participants on the Auction 107 web page. OEA will
    provide various materials on the pre-bidding processes in advance of
    the opening of the short-form application window, beginning with the
    release of step-by-step instructions for completing the FCC Form 175,
    which OEA has made available in the Education section of the Auction
    107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. OEA will provide an online
    application procedures tutorial for the auction, covering information
    on pre-bidding preparation, completing short-form applications, and the
    application review process.
        110. In advance of the start of the mock auction, OEA will provide
    educational materials on the bidding procedures for Auction 107,
    beginning with release of a user guide for the bidding system and
    bidding system file formats, followed by an online bidding procedures
    tutorial. The educational materials shall be released as soon as
    reasonably possible to provide potential applicants and bidders with
    time to understand them and ask questions before bidding begins.

    [[Page 53222]]

        111. The online tutorials will allow viewers to navigate the
    presentation outline, review written notes, and listen to audio of the
    notes. Additional features of this web-based tool include links to
    auction-specific Commission releases, email links for contacting
    Commission staff, and screen shots of the online application and
    bidding systems. The online tutorials will be accessible in the
    Education section of the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. Once posted, the tutorials will be accessible anytime.

    D. Short-Form Applications: Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on September 22,
    2020

        112. In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 107, an applicant
    must first follow the procedures to submit a short-form application
    (FCC Form 175) electronically via the Auction Application System,
    following the instructions set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.
    The short-form application will become available with the opening of
    the initial filing window and must be submitted prior to 6:00 p.m. ET
    on September 22, 2020. Late applications will not be accepted. No
    application fee is required.
        113. Applications may be filed at any time beginning at noon ET on
    September 9, 2020, until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. ET on
    September 22, 2020. Applicants should file early and are responsible
    for allowing adequate time for filing their applications. There are no
    limits or restrictions on the number of times an application can be
    updated or amended until the initial filing deadline on September 22,
    2020.
        114. An applicant must always click on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button
    on the ``Certify & Submit'' screen to successfully submit its FCC Form
    175 and any modifications; otherwise the application or changes to the
    application will not be received or reviewed by Commission staff.
    Additional information about accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC
    Form 175 is provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. Applicants
    requiring technical assistance should contact FCC Auctions Technical
    Support at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202) 414-1250; or (202) 414-
    1255 (text telephone (TTY)); hours of service are Monday through
    Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. All calls to Technical Support
    are recorded.
        115. Applicants are cautioned that the Commission periodically
    performs scheduled maintenance of its IT systems. During scheduled
    maintenance activities, which typically occur over the weekends, every
    effort is made to minimize any downtime to auction-related systems,
    including the Auction Application System. However, there are occasions
    when auction-related systems may be temporarily unavailable.

    E. Application Processing and Minor Modifications

    1. Public Notice of Applicants' Initial Application Status and
    Opportunity for Minor Modifications
        116. After the deadline for filing auction applications, the
    Commission will process all timely submitted applications to determine
    whether each applicant has complied with the application requirements
    and provided all information concerning its qualifications for bidding.
    OEA will issue a public notice with applicants' initial application
    status, identifying: (1) Those that are complete; and (2) those that
    are incomplete or deficient because of defects that may be corrected.
    The public notice will include the deadline for resubmitting corrected
    applications and an electronic copy will be sent by email to the
    contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 for each applicant. In
    addition, each applicant with an incomplete application will be sent
    information on the nature of the deficiencies in its application, along
    with the name and contact information of a Commission staff member who
    can answer questions specific to the application.
        117. After the initial application filing deadline on September 22,
    2020, applicants can make only minor modifications to their
    applications. Major modifications (e.g., change of PEA selection,
    certain changes in ownership that would constitute an assignment or
    transfer of control of the applicant, change in the required
    certifications, change in applicant's legal classification that results
    in a change in control, or change in claimed eligibility for a higher
    percentage of bidding credit) will not be permitted. After the deadline
    for resubmitting corrected applications, an applicant will have no
    further opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its application or
    provide any additional information that may affect Commission staff's
    ultimate determination of whether and to what extent the applicant is
    qualified to participate in Auction 107.
        118. Commission staff will communicate only with an applicant's
    contact person or certifying official, as designated on the applicant's
    FCC Form 175, unless the applicant's certifying official or contact
    person notifies Commission staff in writing that another representative
    is authorized to speak on the applicant's behalf. In no event, however,
    will the Commission send auction registration materials to anyone other
    than the contact person listed on the applicant's FCC Form 175 or
    respond to a request for replacement registration materials from anyone
    other than the authorized bidder, contact person, or certifying
    official listed on the applicant's FCC Form 175. Authorizations may be
    sent by email to auction107@fcc.gov.
    2. Public Notice of Applicants' Final Application Status After Upfront
    Payment Deadline
        119. After Commission staff reviews resubmitted applications and
    upfront payments, OEA will release a public notice identifying
    applicants that have become qualified bidders for the auction. A
    Qualified Bidders Public Notice will be issued before bidding in the
    auction begins. Qualified bidders are those applicants with submitted
    FCC Form 175 applications that are deemed timely filed and complete and
    that have made a sufficient upfront payment.

    F. Upfront Payments

        120. In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 107, a sufficient
    upfront payment and a complete and accurate FCC Remittance Advice Form
    (FCC Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be submitted before 6:00 p.m. ET on
    November 2, 2020. After completing its short-form application, an
    applicant will have access to an electronic pre-filled version of the
    FCC Form 159. An accurate and complete FCC Form 159 must accompany each
    payment. Proper completion of this form is critical to ensuring correct
    crediting of upfront payments. Payers using the pre-filled FCC Form 159
    are responsible for ensuring that all the information on the form,
    including payment amounts, is accurate. Instructions for completing FCC
    Form 159 for Auction 107 are provided in the Auction 107 Procedures
    Public Notice.
    1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer for Auction 107
        121. Upfront payments for Auction 107 must be wired to, and will be
    deposited in, the U.S. Treasury.
        122. Wire transfer payments for Auction 107 must be received before
    6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. An applicant must initiate the wire
    transfer through its bank, authorizing the bank to wire funds from the
    applicant's account to the proper account at the U.S. Treasury. No
    other payment method is acceptable. To avoid untimely payments,
    applicants should discuss arrangements (including bank

    [[Page 53223]]

    closing schedules and other specific bank wire transfer requirements,
    such as an in-person written request before a specified time of day)
    with their bankers several days before they plan to make the wire
    transfer, and must allow sufficient time for the transfer to be
    initiated and completed before the deadline. The information needed to
    place an order for a wire transfer is set forth in the Auction 107
    Procedures Public Notice.
        123. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire
    transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must print and fax
    a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202) 418-2843.
    Alternatively, the completed form can be scanned and sent as an
    attachment to an email to RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov. On the fax cover sheet
    or in the email subject header, write ``Wire Transfer--Auction Payment
    for Auction 107''. To meet the upfront payment deadline, an applicant's
    payment must be credited to the Commission's account for Auction 107
    before the deadline.
        124. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring timely submission
    of its upfront payment and for timely filing of an accurate and
    complete FCC Form 159. An applicant should coordinate with its
    financial institution well ahead of the due date regarding its wire
    transfer and allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and
    completed prior to the deadline. Among other things, each applicant is
    cautioned to plan ahead regarding any potential delays in its or its
    financial institution's ability to complete wire transfers due to the
    COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission repeatedly has cautioned auction
    participants about the importance of planning ahead to prepare for
    unforeseen last-minute difficulties in making payments by wire
    transfer. Each applicant also is responsible for obtaining confirmation
    from its financial institution that its wire transfer to the U.S.
    Treasury was successful and from Commission staff that its upfront
    payment was timely received and that it was deposited into the proper
    account. To receive confirmation from Commission staff, contact Scott
    Radcliffe of the Office of Managing Director's Revenue & Receivables
    Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 418-7518 or Theresa Meeks at (202)
    418-2945.
        125. All payments must be made in U.S. dollars. All payments must
    be made by wire transfer. Upfront payments for Auction 107 go to an
    account number different from the accounts used in previous FCC
    auctions.
        126. Failure to deliver a sufficient upfront payment as instructed
    herein by the upfront payment deadline will result in dismissal of the
    short-form application and disqualification from participation in the
    auction.
    2. Completing and Submitting FCC Form 159
        127. Information that supplements the standard instructions for FCC
    Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is provided in the Auction 107 Procedures
    Public Notice to help ensure correct completion of FCC Form 159 for
    upfront payments for Auction 107. Applicants need to complete FCC Form
    159 carefully, because mistakes may affect bidding eligibility and lack
    of consistency between information provided in FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/
    03), FCC Form 175, long-form application (FCC Form 601), and
    correspondence about an application may cause processing delays.
    Appropriate cross-references between the FCC Form Remittance Advise and
    the short-form application are described in the Auction 107 Procedures
    Public Notice.
    3. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
        128. An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each
    applicant seeking to participate in bidding to establish its
    eligibility to bid on licenses.
        129. Applicants that are former defaulters must pay upfront
    payments 50% greater than non-former defaulters. For purposes of this
    classification as a former defaulter or a former delinquent, defaults
    and delinquencies of the applicant itself and its controlling interests
    are included.
        130. An applicant must make an upfront payment sufficient to obtain
    bidding eligibility on the generic blocks on which it will bid. Upfront
    payments are based on MHz-pops, and the amount of the upfront payment
    submitted by an applicant will determine its initial bidding
    eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may
    place bids in any single round. In order to bid for a block, qualified
    bidders must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the
    number of bidding units assigned to that generic block in a PEA. At a
    minimum, an applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to
    establish eligibility to bid on at least one block in one of the PEAs
    selected on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 107, or else the applicant
    will not become qualified to participate in the auction. The total
    upfront payment does not affect the total dollar amount the bidder may
    bid.
        131. Upfront payments for a generic block in a PEA are based on
    $0.015 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1-50, $0.0030 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51-100,
    and $0.0015 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to a minimum of
    $500. The results of the upfront payment calculations will be rounded
    as follows: Results above $10,000 will be rounded to the nearest
    $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 will be rounded to the
    nearest $100; and results below $1,000 will be rounded to the nearest
    $10. The upfront payment amount per block in each PEA is set forth in
    the Attachment A file, available at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. The
    upfront payment amounts are approximately half the minimum opening bid
    amounts.
        132. Each generic block in a PEA is assigned a specific number of
    bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per $10 of the upfront
    payment. The number of bidding units for one block in a given PEA is
    fixed, since it is based on the MHz-pops in the block and does not
    change during the auction as prices change. Thus, in calculating its
    upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine the maximum
    number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid in any single round
    and submit an upfront payment amount for the auction covering that
    number of bidding units. In some cases, a qualified bidder's maximum
    eligibility may be less than the amount of its upfront payment because
    the qualified bidder has either previously been in default on a
    Commission construction permit or license or delinquent on non-tax debt
    owed to a Federal agency, or has submitted an upfront payment that
    exceeds the total amount of bidding units associated with the license
    areas it selected on its FCC Form 175. In order to make this
    calculation, an applicant should add together the bidding units for the
    number of blocks in PEAs on which it seeks to be active in any given
    round. Applicants should check their calculations carefully, as there
    is no provision for increasing a bidder's eligibility after the upfront
    payment deadline.
        133. If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its
    upfront payment for the maximum amount of generic blocks in each PEA on
    which it plans to bid by multiplying the number of bidding units on
    which it wishes to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number
    of bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will
    calculate the number of bidding units a non-former defaulter would get
    for the upfront payment received, divide that number by 1.5, and round
    the result up to the nearest bidding unit. If a former

    [[Page 53224]]

    defaulter fails to submit a sufficient upfront payment to establish
    eligibility to bid on at least one generic block in a PEA, the
    applicant will not be eligible to participate in Auction 107.

    G. Auction Registration

        134. All qualified bidders for Auction 107 are automatically
    registered for the auction. Registration materials will be distributed
    prior to the auction by overnight delivery. The mailing will be sent
    only to the contact person at the contact address listed in the FCC
    Form 175 and will include the SecurID[supreg] tokens that will be
    required to place bids.
        135. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration
    mailing will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified
    bidder for Auction 107 that has not received this mailing by noon on
    November 25, 2020, should call the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868.
    Receipt of this registration mailing is critical to participating in
    the auction, and each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has
    received all the registration materials.
        136. If a SecurID[supreg] token is lost or damaged, only a person
    who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the contact person, or
    the certifying official on the applicant's short-form application may
    request a replacement. To request a replacement, call the Auction
    Bidder Line at the telephone number provided in the registration
    materials or the Auction Hotline at (717) 338-2868.

    H. Remote Electronic Bidding via the FCC Auction Bidding System

        137. Bidders will be able to participate in Auction 107 over the
    internet using the FCC Auction Bidding System (bidding system). Bidders
    will have the option of placing bids by telephone through a dedicated
    auction bidder line. Please note that the telephonic bid assistants are
    required to use a script when entering bids placed by telephone.
    Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to
    bid by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The
    length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary; please allow a
    minimum of 10 minutes. The toll-free telephone number for the auction
    bidder line will be provided to qualified bidders prior to the stat of
    bidding in the auction.
        138. Only qualified bidders are permitted to bid. Each authorized
    bidder must have his or her own SecurID[supreg] token, which the
    Commission will provide at no charge. Each applicant will be issued
    three SecurID[supreg] tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his or her
    SecurID[supreg] token. In order to access the bidding function of the
    bidding system, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round
    using the passcode generated by the SecurID[supreg] token and a
    personal identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are
    strongly encouraged to print a bid summary for each round after they
    have completed all their activity for that round. For security
    purposes, the SecurID[supreg] tokens and a telephone number for bidding
    questions are only mailed to the contact person at the contact address
    listed on the FCC Form 175. Each SecurID[supreg] token is tailored to a
    specific auction. SecurID[supreg] tokens issued for other auctions or
    obtained from a source other than the FCC will not work for Auction
    107. The SecurID[supreg] tokens can be recycled, and the Commission
    requests that bidders return the tokens to the FCC. Pre-addressed
    envelopes will be provided to return the tokens once the auction has
    ended.
        139. The Commission makes no warranties whatsoever and shall not be
    deemed to have made any warranties, with respect to the bidding system,
    including any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a
    particular purpose. In no event shall the Commission, or any of its
    officers, employees, or agents, be liable for any damages whatsoever
    (including, but not limited to, loss of business profits, business
    interruption, loss of use, revenue, or business information, or any
    other direct, indirect, or consequential damages) arising out of or
    relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning, or use of the
    bidding system. Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of
    the Commission's technical, programming, or other advice or service
    provided in connection with the bidding system.
        140. To the extent an issue arises with the bidding system itself,
    the Commission will take all appropriate measures to resolve such
    issues quickly and equitably. Should an issue arise that is outside the
    bidding system or attributable to a bidder, including, but not limited
    to, a bidder's hardware, software, or internet access problem that
    prevents the bidder from submitting a bid prior to the end of a round,
    the Commission shall have no obligation to resolve or remediate such an
    issue on behalf of the bidder. Similarly, if an issue arises due to
    bidder error using the bidding system, the Commission shall have no
    obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the
    bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a bidding round, the results of
    bid processing will not be altered absent evidence of any failure in
    the bidding system.

    I. Mock Auction

        141. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a
    mock auction for the clock phase, which will begin on December 3, 2020.
    Only those bidders that are qualified to participate in Auction 107
    will be eligible to participate in the mock auction. The mock auction
    will enable qualified bidders to become familiar with the bidding
    system and to practice submitting bids prior to the auction. All
    qualified bidders, including all their authorized bidders, are
    encouraged to participate to assure that they can log in to the bidding
    system and gain experience with the bidding procedures. Participating
    in the mock auction may reduce the likelihood of a bidder making a
    mistake during the auction. Details regarding the mock auction will be
    announced in the Qualified Bidders Public Notice for Auction 107.
        142. After the clock phase of the auction concludes, a separate
    mock auction for the assignment phase will be held for those qualified
    bidders that won generic blocks in the clock phase.

    J. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

        143. At any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in
    conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction
    107 in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, network
    interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an
    auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other
    reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive
    bidding. OEA will notify participants of any such delay, suspension, or
    cancellation by public notice and/or through the bidding system's
    announcement function. If the bidding is delayed or suspended, then OEA
    may, in its sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting from
    the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or
    cancel the auction in its entirety. OEA and WTB will exercise this
    authority at their discretion.

    K. Fraud Alert

        144. As is the case with many business investment opportunities,
    some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction 107 to
    deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals of
    fraud include the following:
         The first contact is a ``cold call'' from a telemarketer
    or is made in

    [[Page 53225]]

    response to an inquiry prompted by a radio or television infomercial.
         The offering materials used to invest in the venture
    appear to be targeted at IRA funds, for example, by including all
    documents and papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA
    accounts.
         The amount of investment is less than $25,000.
         The sales representative makes verbal representations
    that: (a) The Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
    Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or other government
    agency has approved the investment; (b) the investment is not subject
    to state or federal securities laws; or (c) the investment will yield
    unrealistically high short-term profits. In addition, the offering
    materials often include copies of actual FCC releases, or quotes from
    FCC personnel, giving the appearance of FCC knowledge or approval of
    the solicitation.
        145. Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes
    is available from the FCC, as well as the FTC and SEC. Additional
    sources of information for potential bidders and investors may be
    obtained from the following sources:
         The FCC's Consumer Call Center at (888) 225-5322 or by
    visiting www.fcc.gov/general/frauds-scams-and-alerts-guides.
         the FTC at (877) FTC-HELP ((877) 382-4357) or by visiting
    www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0238-investment-risks.
         the SEC at (202) 942-7040 or by visiting www.sec.gov/investor.
        146. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment
    schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud
    Information Center at (202) 835-0618.

    IV. Bidding Procedures

        147. Auction 107 will be conducted using an ascending clock auction
    design with two phases. The first phase of the auction--the clock
    phase--will consist of successive clock bidding rounds in which bidders
    indicate their demands for a number of generic license blocks in
    specific categories and PEAs. In the second phase--the assignment
    phase--winning clock phase bidders will have the opportunity to bid for
    their preferred combinations of frequency-specific license assignments,
    consistent with their clock phase winnings, in a series of single
    sealed-bid rounds conducted by PEA or, in some cases, PEA group.
        148. Updated technical guides that provide the mathematical details
    of the auction design and algorithms for the clock and assignment
    phases of Auction 107 are available in the Education section of the
    Auction 107 website (www.fcc.gov/auction/107). The information in the
    updated technical guides supplements the Auction 107 Procedures Public
    Notice.

    A. Clock Phase

    1. Clock Auction Design
        149. During the clock phase of Auction 107, bidders will indicate
    their demands for generic license blocks in up to two bidding
    categories in specific geographic areas--in this case, PEAs. Under the
    clock auction format, the auction will proceed in a series of rounds,
    with bidding conducted simultaneously for all spectrum blocks in all
    PEAs available in the auction. During each bidding round, the bidding
    system will announce a per-block clock price for each product--a
    category in a PEA--and qualified bidders will submit, for each product
    for which they wish to bid, the number of blocks they seek at the clock
    prices associated with the current round. Bidding rounds will be open
    for predetermined periods of time. Bidders will be subject to activity
    and eligibility rules that govern the pace at which they participate in
    the auction.
        150. In Auction 107, For each product, the clock price for a
    generic license block will increase from round to round if bidders
    indicate total demand for blocks in that product that exceeds the
    number of blocks available. The bidding rounds will continue until, for
    all products, the total number of blocks that bidders demand does not
    exceed the supply of available blocks. At that point, those bidders
    indicating demand for a product at the final price will be deemed
    winning bidders.
        151. Following the clock phase, the assignment phase will offer
    clock phase winners the opportunity to bid an additional amount for
    licenses with specific frequencies. All winning bidders, regardless of
    whether they bid in the assignment phase, will be assigned licenses for
    contiguous blocks within each PEA.
    2. Generic License Blocks and Bidding Categories
        152. The clock phase categories will be determined based on the
    specific clearing deadline to which incumbent earth stations are
    subject, i.e., Phase I or Phase II.
        153. In the 46 PEAs where certain blocks are subject to the Phase I
    deadline and others only to the Phase II deadline, clock phase bidding
    will be conducted for two categories of generic blocks based on whether
    the Phase I or Phase II deadline applies to the specific blocks.
    Accordingly, in the 46 PEAs where certain blocks are subject to the
    Phase I deadline, the first category of generic blocks will consist of
    the 20-megahertz sub-blocks between 3.7-3.8 GHz. This category,
    designated Category A, will comprise the five blocks subject to the
    Phase I deadline. The second category of blocks, Category BC, will
    consist of the nine blocks that are subject to the Phase II deadline.
    In the remaining 360 PEAs where there are no blocks subject to the
    Phase I deadline there will be a single bidding category, designated
    ABC, consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7-3.98
    GHz.
        154. In each bidding round, a bidder will have the opportunity to
    bid for the quantity of generic blocks it demands in each bidding
    category available in each PEA. Bidding in the clock phase will
    determine a single price for all the generic blocks in each category in
    each PEA.
    3. Bidding Rounds
        155. Auction 107 will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each
    followed by the release of round results. The Commission will conduct
    bidding simultaneously for all spectrum blocks in all bidding
    categories for all PEAs available in the auction. In the first bidding
    round of Auction 107, a bidder will indicate, for each product, how
    many generic license blocks it demands at the minimum opening bid
    price.
        156. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public
    notice to be released at least one week before the start of bidding.
    The bidding schedule may be changed in order to foster an auction pace
    that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round
    results and adjust their bidding strategies. Such changes may include
    the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between
    rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding
    activity and other factors. The bidding system will announce any such
    changes to the bidding schedule several rounds before the change
    occurs.
        157. A bidder may submit its bids using the bidding system's upload
    function, which allows bid files in a comma-separated value (CSV)
    format to be uploaded. A bidder may also submit bids through the
    auction bidding system user interface or using the telephonic bidder
    line. The bidding system will not allow bids to be submitted unless the
    bidder selected the PEAs on its FCC Form 175 and the bidder has
    sufficient bidding eligibility.
        158. During each round, a bidder may also remove bids placed in the
    current

    [[Page 53226]]

    round. If a bidder modifies its bids for blocks in a PEA in a round,
    the system takes the last bid submission as that bidder's bid for the
    round.
    4. Stopping Rule
        159. The Commission will use a simultaneous stopping rule for the
    clock phase of Auction 107, under which all blocks in both categories
    in all PEAs will remain available for bidding until the bidding stops
    in every PEA. In the clock phase, bidding will close for blocks in all
    PEAs after the first round in which there is no excess processed demand
    in any product. Consequently, it is not possible to determine in
    advance how long the bidding in Auction 107 will last. No bids may be
    withdrawn after the close of a round.
    5. Availability of Bidding Information
        160. The Commission will make public after each clock round of
    Auction 107, for each category in each PEA: (1) The supply, (2) the
    aggregate demand, (3) the posted price of the last completed round
    (which generally is the clock price of the previous round if demand
    exceeds supply; the start-of-round price of the previous round if
    supply exceeds demand; or the price at which a reduction caused demand
    to equal supply), and (4) the clock price for the next round. The
    identities of bidders demanding blocks in a specific category or PEA
    will not be disclosed until after Auction 107 concludes (i.e., after
    the close of bidding).
        161. Each bidder will have access to additional information related
    to its own bidding and bid eligibility. After the bids of a round have
    been processed, the bidding system will inform each bidder of the
    number of blocks it holds after the round (its processed demand) for
    every product and its eligibility for the next round.
    6. Activity Requirement and Activity Upper Limit
        162. Activity requirement. Bidders are required to maintain a
    minimum, high level of activity in each clock round in order to
    maintain bidding eligibility. The activity requirement (the activity
    requirement percentage) will be between 90% and 100% of a bidder's
    bidding eligibility in all clock rounds. The initial activity
    requirement percentage will be 95%. Failure to maintain the requisite
    activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility,
    possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place
    additional bids in the auction. Bidders that do not place any bids in
    the first round of the auction will have their eligibility reduced to
    zero, and will be eliminated from bidding during the remainder of the
    auction.
        163. The Commission will use upfront payments to determine a
    bidder's initial (maximum) eligibility in terms of bidding units. Each
    spectrum block in a PEA will be assigned a specific number of bidding
    units based on the number of MHz-pops in the PEA. Therefore, a bidder's
    upfront payment will determine the maximum number of blocks as measured
    by their associated bidding units that a bidder can demand at the start
    of the auction.
        164. The activity rule will be satisfied when a bidder has bidding
    activity on blocks with bidding units that total at least the activity
    requirement percentage of its eligibility in the round. If the activity
    rule is met, then the bidder's eligibility will not change in the next
    round. Bidding eligibility will be reduced as the auction progresses if
    a bidder does not meet the activity requirement. The bidding system
    will reduce the bidder's eligibility to the amount at which the bidder
    would be meeting the activity requirement, which can be calculated by
    multiplying the bidder's activity by the reciprocal of the activity
    requirement. For example, with an activity requirement of 95%, the
    eligibility of a bidder not meeting the activity requirement would be
    calculated as the bidder's activity multiplied by 100/95, rounded up to
    the nearest integer.
        165. For this clock auction, a bidder's activity in a round for
    purposes of the activity rule will be the sum of the bidding units
    associated with the bidder's processed demands, which may not be equal
    to its submitted demands. For instance, if a bidder requests a
    reduction in the quantity of blocks it demands in a product, but the
    bidding system does not apply the request because demand for the
    product would fall below the available supply, the bidder's activity
    will reflect its unreduced demand. Under the ascending clock auction
    format, the FCC auction bidding system will not allow a bidder to
    reduce the quantity of blocks it demands in a product if the reduction
    would result in aggregate demand falling below (or further below) the
    available supply of blocks in the product.
        166. Activity upper limit. A bidder will be allowed to submit bids
    with associated bidding activity greater than its current bidding
    eligibility, noting, however, that a bidder's activity as applied by
    the auction bidding system during bid processing will not exceed the
    bidder's current bidding eligibility. Because a bidder's eligibility
    for the next round is calculated based on the bidder's demands as
    applied by the auction bidding system during bid processing, a bidder's
    eligibility may be reduced even if the bidder submitted bids that meet
    its activity requirement for the round. This may occur, for example, if
    the bidder bids to reduce its demand in PEA X by two blocks (with 10
    bidding units each) and bids to increase its demand by one block (with
    20 bidding units) in PEA Y. If the bidder's demand can only be reduced
    by one block in PEA X (because there is only one block of excess
    demand), the increase in PEA Y cannot be applied, and absent other
    bidding activity the bidder's eligibility would be reduced. The
    Commission anticipates that an ``activity upper limit'' will help a
    bidder avoid having its eligibility reduced as a result of submitted
    bids that cannot be applied during bid processing. For example,
    depending upon the bidder's overall bidding eligibility and the
    activity limit percentage, a bidder could submit an ``additional'' bid
    or bids that would be considered (in price point order with its other
    bids) and applied as available eligibility permits during the bid
    processing.
        167. When submitting bids with associated bidding activity greater
    than its current bidding eligibility, a bidder should consider the
    price points associated with each of its bids to indicate the order in
    which it wishes the bidding system to consider its bid requests.
    Therefore, if bids submitted at lower price points cannot be applied as
    requested, thereby leaving the bidder with unused eligibility, then the
    system will consider the additional bids submitted at higher price
    points to use the otherwise lost eligibility. Although a bidder may
    submit bids with associated bidding units exceeding 100% of its current
    bidding eligibility, its processed activity can never exceed its
    eligibility. Thus, if a bidder submits bids with associated bidding
    units exceeding the bidder's current eligibility, the bidding system
    will not apply all of those bids.
        168. After Round 1, a bidder may submit bids with bidding units
    totaling up to its activity upper limit, which is equal to the bidder's
    current bidding eligibility for the round times a percentage (the
    activity limit percentage) equal to or greater than 100%. An initial
    activity limit percentage of 120% will apply to Round 2 and subsequent
    rounds. In any bidding round, the auction bidding system will advise
    the bidder of its current bidding eligibility, its required bidding
    activity, and its activity upper limit.
        169. OEA retains the discretion to change the activity requirement

    [[Page 53227]]

    percentage and the activity limit percentage during the auction, and to
    set the activity limit percentage within a range of 100% and 140%. The
    bidding system will announce any such changes in advance of the round
    in which they would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to
    adjust their bidding strategies.
        170. Missing bids. Under the clock auction format, a bidder is
    required to indicate its demands in every round, even if its demands at
    the new round's prices are unchanged from the previous round. Missing
    bids--bids that are not reconfirmed--are treated by the auction bidding
    system as bids that request to reduce to a quantity of zero blocks for
    the product at the start-of-round price. If these bids are applied, or
    applied partially, then a bidder's bidding activity, and its bidding
    eligibility for the next round, may be reduced.
    7. Acceptable Bids
    a. Minimum Opening Bids and Reserve Price
        171. The Commission established in the Auction 107 Procedures
    Public Notice minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 107. The bidding
    system will not accept bids lower than the minimum opening bids for
    each product. Based on the Commission's experience in past auctions,
    setting minimum opening bid amounts judiciously is an effective tool
    for accelerating the competitive bidding process.
        172. In the first bidding round of Auction 107, a bidder will
    indicate how many generic license blocks in a PEA it demands at the
    minimum opening bid price. Minimum opening bid amounts are calculated
    based on bandwidth and license area population using a tiered approach,
    under which minimum opening bid amounts will vary by market population.
    For PEAs 1-50, minimum opening bid amounts are based on $0.03 per MHz-
    pop; for PEAs 51-100, minimum opening bid amounts are based on $0.006
    per MHz-pop; and for all other PEAs, minimum opening bid amounts are
    based on $0.003 per MHz-pop, subject to a minimum of $1,000. These
    minimum opening bid amounts are specified in the Attachment A file.
    b. Clock Price Increments
        173. After bidding in the first round and before each subsequent
    round, the FCC auction bidding system will announce the start-of-round
    price and the clock price for each product for the upcoming round--that
    is, the lowest price and the highest price at which bidders can specify
    the number of blocks they demand during the round. The start-of-round
    price is also referred to as the posted price of the previous round. As
    long as aggregate demand for blocks in the product exceeds the supply
    of blocks, the start-of-round price will be equal to the clock price
    from the prior round. Aggregate demand for a product is equal to the
    total number of blocks for which bidders have processed demand. If
    aggregate demand equals supply at a price in a previous round, either a
    clock price or an intra-round price, then the start-of-round price for
    the next round will be equal to the price at which demand equaled
    supply. If demand was less than supply in the previous round, then the
    start-of-round price for the next round will not increase.
        174. The Commission will set the clock price for blocks in a
    specific product for a round by adding a percentage increment to the
    start-of-round price. For example, if the start-of-round price for a
    block in a given product is $10,000, and the percentage increment is
    20%, then the clock price for the round will be $12,000. Results above
    $10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000
    but above $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $100; and results
    below $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $10.
        175. The Commission will set the clock price for blocks in a PEA by
    adding a fixed increment percentage to the start-of-round price. The
    Commission will set the increment percentage within a range of 5% to
    20% inclusive and will set the initial increment percentage at 10%. The
    Commission may adjust the increment as rounds continue.
    c. Intra-Round Bids
        176. A bidder may make intra-round bids by indicating a point
    between the start-of-round price and the clock price at which its
    demand for blocks changes. In placing an intra-round bid, a bidder
    would indicate a specific price and a quantity of blocks it demands if
    the price for blocks should increase beyond that price. For example, if
    a bidder has processed demand of three blocks at the start-of-round
    price of $100, but wishes to hold only two blocks if the price
    increases by more than $10 (assuming the bid increment is greater than
    $10), then the bidder will indicate a bid quantity of two at a price of
    $110 ($100 + $10). Similarly, if the bidder wishes to reduce its demand
    to zero should the price increase at all above $100, then the bidder
    will indicate a bid quantity of zero at the start-of-round price of
    $100.
        177. Intra-round bids are optional; a bidder may choose to express
    its demands only at the clock prices.
    8. Bids To Change Demand, Bid Types, and Bid Processing
        178. A bidder that is willing to maintain the same demand in a
    product at the new clock price will bid for that quantity at the clock
    price, indicating that it is willing to pay up to and including that
    price, if need be, for the specified quantity. Bids to maintain demand
    will always be applied by the auction bidding system. A bidder that
    wishes to change the quantity it demands in a product (relative to its
    demand from the previous round as processed by the bidding system) can
    express its demand at the clock price or at an intra-round price, but
    depending upon the bidder's eligibility and the aggregate demand for
    the product, the bidding system may not be able to apply the requested
    change.
        179. In order to facilitate bidding for multiple blocks in a
    product, bidders will be permitted to make two types of bids: Simple
    bids and switch bids.
         A ``simple'' bid indicates a desired quantity of blocks in
    a product at a price (either the clock price or an intra-round price).
    Simple bids may be applied partially. A simple bid that involves a
    reduction from the bidder's previous demands may be implemented
    partially if aggregate excess demand is insufficient to support the
    entire reduction. A simple bid to increase a bidder's demand in a
    category may be applied partially if the total number of bidding units
    associated with the bidder's full increase in demand exceeds the
    bidder's bidding eligibility for the round.
         A ``switch'' bid, applicable in PEAs in which there are
    blocks in both A and BC categories, allows the bidder to request to
    move its demand for a quantity of blocks from the A category to the BC
    category, or vice versa, within the same PEA. A switch bid may be
    applied partially, but the increase in demand in the ``to'' category
    will always match in quantity the reduction in the ``from'' category.
        180. These bid types will allow bidders to express their demand for
    blocks in the next clock round without running the risk that they will
    be forced to purchase more spectrum at a higher price than they wish.
    When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the uniform
    price for the category will stop increasing at that point, since the
    partial application of the bid results in demand falling to

    [[Page 53228]]

    equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a simple bid or a switch bid
    that cannot be applied fully will not face a price that is higher than
    its bid price for the remaining demand.
        181. A bidder may bid for multiple blocks in a bidding category in
    a PEA and may submit bids for multiple PEAs. The assignment phase will
    assign contiguous blocks to winners of multiple blocks in a PEA and
    give bidders an opportunity to express their preferences for specific
    frequency blocks, thereby facilitating aggregations of licenses.
        182. The auction bidding system will, after each bidding round,
    process bids to change demand to determine the processed demand of each
    bidder for each product and a posted price for each product that would
    serve as the start-of-round price for the next round.
    a. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids To Reduce Demand
        183. The FCC auction bidding system will not apply a bid to reduce
    the quantity of blocks a bidder demands in a product if the reduction
    would result in aggregate demand falling below (or further below) the
    available supply of blocks in the product. Therefore, if a bidder
    submits a simple bid to reduce the number of blocks for which it has
    processed demand as of the previous round, then the FCC auction bidding
    system will treat the bid as a request to reduce demand that will be
    applied only if the ``no excess supply'' rule would be satisfied.
    Similarly, if a bidder submits a switch bid to move its demand for a
    quantity of blocks from the A category to the BC category within the
    same PEA, the FCC auction bidding system will treat the bid as a
    request that will be applied only if the ``no excess supply'' rule
    would be satisfied for the A category in the PEA.
    b. Eligibility Rule for Bids To Increase Demand
        184. The bidding system will not allow a bidder to increase the
    quantity of blocks it demands in a product if the total number of
    bidding units associated with the bidder's demand exceeds the bidder's
    bidding eligibility for the round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a
    simple bid to increase the number of blocks for which it has processed
    demand as of the previous round, the FCC auction bidding system will
    treat the bid as a request to increase demand that will be applied only
    if that would not cause the bidder's activity to exceed its
    eligibility.
    c. Partial Application of Bids
        185. A bid (simple bid or switch bid) that involves a reduction
    from the bidder's previous demands will be applied partially--that is,
    reduced by fewer blocks than requested in the bid--if excess demand is
    insufficient to support the entire reduction. A switch bid may be
    applied partially, but the increase in demand in the ``to'' category
    will always match in quantity the reduction in the ``from'' category. A
    simple bid to increase a bidder's demand will be applied partially if
    the total number of bidding units associated with the bidder's demand
    exceeds the bidder's bidding eligibility for the round.
    d. Processed Demands
        186. After a round ends, the bidding system will process bids to
    change demand in order of price point, where the price point represents
    the percentage of the bidding interval for the round. Bids to maintain
    demand are always applied before the bidding system considers bids to
    change demand. For example, if the start-of-round price is $5,000 and
    the clock price is $6,000, a price of $5,100 will correspond to the 10%
    price point, since it is 10% of the bidding interval between $5,000 and
    $6,000. The bidding system will first consider intra-round bids in
    ascending order of price point and then bids at the clock price. The
    system will consider bids at the lowest price point across all
    products, then look at bids at the next price point in all products,
    and so on. If there are multiple bids at a single price point, the
    system will process bids in order of a bid-specific pseudo-random
    number. As it considers each submitted bid during bid processing, the
    bidding system will determine the extent to which there is excess
    demand in each product at that point in the processing to determine
    whether a bidder's request to reduce demand can be applied. Similarly,
    the auction bidding system will evaluate the activity associated with
    the bidder's most recently determined demands at that point in the
    processing to determine whether a request to increase demand can be
    applied.
        187. Because in any given round some bidders may request to
    increase demands for licenses while others may request reductions, the
    price point at which a bid is considered by the auction bidding system
    can affect whether it is applied. Bids not applied because of
    insufficient aggregate demand or insufficient eligibility will be held
    in a queue and considered, again in order of price point, if there
    should be excess demand or sufficient eligibility later in the
    processing after other bids are processed.
        188. Once a round closes, the auction bidding system will process
    bids to change demand by first considering the bid submitted at the
    lowest price point and determining the maximum extent to which that bid
    can be applied given bidders' demands as determined at that point in
    the bid processing. If the bid can be applied (either in full or
    partially), the number of licenses the bidder holds at that point in
    the processing will be adjusted, and aggregate demand will be
    recalculated accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied in full, the
    unfulfilled bid, or portion thereof, will be held in a queue to be
    considered later during bid processing for that round. The bidding
    system will then consider the bid submitted at the next highest price
    point, applying it in full, in part, or not at all, given the most
    recently determined demands of bidders. Any unfulfilled requests will
    again be held in the queue, and aggregate demand will again be
    recalculated. Every time a bid or part of a bid is applied, the
    unfulfilled bids held in the queue will be reconsidered, in the order
    of their original price points (and by pseudo-random number, in the
    case of tied price points). The auction bidding system will not carry
    over unfulfilled bid requests to the next round, however. The bidding
    system will advise bidders of the status of their bids when round
    results are released.
    e. Price Determination
        189. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice describes the bid
    processing procedures to determine, based on aggregate demand, the
    posted price for each product for the round that will serve as the
    start-of-round price for the next round. The uniform price for all of
    the blocks in a product will increase from round to round as long as
    there is excess demand for blocks in the product, but will not increase
    if aggregate demand does not exceed the available supply of blocks.
        190. If, at the end of a round, the aggregate demand for blocks in
    the product exceeds the supply of blocks, then the posted price will
    equal the clock price for the round. If a reduction in demand was
    applied during the round and caused demand in the product to equal
    supply, then the posted price will be the price at which the reduction
    was applied. If aggregate demand is less than or equal to supply and no
    bid to reduce demand was applied for the product, then the posted price
    will equal the start-of-round price for the round. The range of
    acceptable

    [[Page 53229]]

    bid amounts for the next round will be set by adding the percentage
    increment to the posted price.
        191. When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the
    uniform price for the product will stop increasing at that point, since
    the partial application of the bid will result in demand falling to
    equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a bid to reduce demand that
    cannot be fully applied will not face a price for the remaining demand
    that is higher than its bid price.
        192. After the bids of the round have been processed, if the
    stopping rule has not been met, the FCC auction bidding system will
    announce clock prices to indicate a range of acceptable bids for the
    next round. Each bidder will be informed of its processed demand and
    the extent of excess demand for blocks in each product.
    9. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase
        193. Under the clock auction format for Auction 107, bidders with
    processed demand for a product at the time the stopping rule is met
    will become the winning bidders of licenses corresponding to that
    number of blocks and will be assigned specific frequencies in the
    assignment phase. The final clock phase price for a generic block in a
    product will be the posted price for the final round.

    B. Assignment Phase

        194. The assignment phase will determine which frequency-specific
    licenses will be won by the winning bidders of generic blocks during
    the clock phase. In the assignment phase, winning bidders will have the
    opportunity to bid for preferred combinations of frequency-specific
    licenses. A bidder can indicate a price using a sealed bid for one or
    more possible frequency assignments for which it wishes to express a
    preference, consistent with its winning bids for generic blocks in the
    clock phase. The bid prices will represent the maximum payment that the
    bidder is willing to pay for the frequency-specific license assignment,
    in addition to the final price established in the clock phase for the
    generic blocks. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice will determine
    the optimal assignment of licenses within each assignment category in
    each PEA based on bid amounts in the assignment phase.
        195. The assignment phase will use an alternative approach for PEAs
    with blocks in two clock phase categories that allows for final
    frequency specific assignments of contiguous blocks within each PEA.
    Accordingly, the assignment phase procedures for the 46 PEAs where
    certain blocks are subject to the Phase I deadline will make a separate
    interim assignment of contiguous blocks within Category A, i.e., those
    blocks subject to the Phase I deadline, and will make a separate final
    assignment of contiguous blocks for all of a bidder's clock phase
    winnings whether in Category A and/or BC. In the 360 PEAs where there
    are no blocks subject to the Phase I deadline, the assignment phase
    procedures will make one assignment for all of a bidder's clock phase
    winnings in Category ABC, consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz
    blocks between 3.7-3.98 GHz. Procedures to implement this approach are
    set forth in more detail in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.
        196. Participation in the assignment phase is voluntary; a winning
    bidder in the clock phase of Auction 107 need not bid in order to be
    assigned contiguous licenses corresponding to the outcome of the clock
    phase. Moreover, a bidder that wins multiple blocks in Category A in
    one of the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the Phase I deadline will
    receive an interim assignment for contiguous blocks of licenses in
    conjunction with a final assignment for contiguous blocks, which could
    include blocks in any of the 14 available blocks in the PEA, even
    without bidding in the assignment phase. More specifically, to provide
    each winning bidder with frequency-specific licenses based on its
    interim and final assignments, the bidding system will match interim
    and final assignments as follows: First, any blocks that appear both in
    a bidder's interim and final assignment will be matched together. Then,
    considering all remaining blocks in the bidder's interim assignment
    (from lowest to highest), each will be matched with the lowest
    available block in the bidder's final assignment.
    1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs
        197. Sequencing of rounds. Assignment rounds will be conducted for
    the largest markets first. This sequencing will enable bidders to
    establish a ``footprint,'' making it easier for a bidder to incorporate
    frequency assignments from previously assigned areas into its bid
    preferences for other areas, and recognizes that a bidder winning
    blocks in multiple PEAs may prefer contiguous blocks across adjacent
    PEAs.
        198. Specifically, the Commission will conduct a separate
    assignment round for each of the top 20 PEAs sequentially, beginning
    with the largest PEAs. Once the top 20 PEAs have been assigned, the
    Commission will conduct, for each Regional Economic Area Grouping
    (REAG), a series of assignment rounds for the remaining PEAs within
    that region. Top 20 PEAs are PEAs 1-20. The six REAGs are: Northeast,
    Southeast, Great Lakes, Mississippi Valley, Central, and West. The
    assignment rounds will be sequenced within a REAG in descending order
    of population for a PEA group or individual PEA.
        199. Grouping of PEAs. To reduce the total amount of time required
    to complete the assignment phase, the Commission will group for
    assignment any non-top 20 PEAs within a REAG in which the same bidders
    won the same number of blocks in each clock phase category, and all are
    subject to the small markets bidding cap or all are not subject to the
    cap. This approach will also help maximize contiguity across PEAs.
    Accordingly, where these criteria are met, a bidder will submit a
    single set of bids for assignment options that will apply to all the
    PEAs in the group and will be assigned the same frequency-specific
    licenses in each PEA.
        200. The Commission will conduct the bidding for the different
    REAGs in parallel. That is, bidding for assignments in multiple PEAs or
    PEA groups will take place during the same timed bidding round.
    2. Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing
        201. Prior to the start of the assignment phase, the bidding system
    will provide each clock phase winner with bidding options for all
    possible contiguous frequency assignments for blocks won in the clock
    phase. More specifically, in the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the
    Phase I deadline, a winner of Category A blocks will have options for
    all possible contiguous interim assignments for the quantity of A
    blocks it won and all possible contiguous final assignments of all
    blocks it won in the clock phase regardless of the clock phase bidding
    category. A bidder will not see a separate set of bidding options for
    generic BC blocks won. They will be assigned as part of the final joint
    assignment of A and BC blocks. For example, suppose that, in one of the
    46 PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline, a bidder won three Category A
    blocks and four Category BC blocks. Then, the bidder will be assigned
    three blocks in the interim assignment and seven blocks in the final
    assignment. The bidder will have three bidding options for the interim
    frequency assignment (A1-A3, A2-A4, and A3-A5) and eight bidding
    options for the final frequency assignment (A1-B2, A2-B3, A3-B4, A4-B5,
    A5-C1, B1-C2, B2-C3, and B3-C4). In the 360 PEAs where there are no
    blocks subject to the Phase I deadline,

    [[Page 53230]]

    a clock phase winner will have one set of options for all possible
    contiguous assignments for its clock phase winnings in Category ABC,
    consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7-3.98 GHz.
        202. A bidder will not see a separate set of bidding options for
    generic BC blocks won. They will be assigned as part of the final joint
    assignment of A and BC blocks.
        203. An optimization approach will be used to determine the winning
    frequency assignment for each assignment category in each PEA or PEA
    group. The bidding system will select the assignment that maximizes the
    sum of bid amounts among all assignments in which each bidder's
    assignment is contiguous. If there are multiple blocks in a category
    that remain unsold, the unsold licenses will be contiguous.
        204. Further, the additional price a bidder will pay for a specific
    frequency assignment (above the final clock phase price) will be
    calculated consistent with a generalized ``second price'' approach--
    that is, the winner will pay a price that would be just sufficient to
    result in the bidder receiving that same winning frequency assignment
    while ensuring that no group of bidders is willing to pay more for an
    alternative assignment in which every bidder is assigned contiguous
    spectrum. This price will be less than or equal to the price the bidder
    indicated it was willing to pay for the assignment. Determining prices
    in this way encourages bidders to bid their full value for the
    assignment, knowing that if the assignment is selected, they will pay
    no more than would be necessary to ensure that the outcome is
    competitive.
    3. Information Available to Bidders During the Assignment Phase
        205. After the clock phase concludes but before bidding begins in
    the assignment phase, the bidding system will provide to each
    assignment phase bidder a menu of bidding options consisting of
    possible configurations of frequency-specific licenses on which it can
    bid. These bidding options will be consistent with the bidder's clock-
    phase winnings. The bidding system will also announce the order in
    which assignment rounds will take place and indicate which PEAs will be
    grouped together for bidding. The bidding system will provide clock
    phase winning bidders with this information as soon as possible and
    will announce a schedule of assignment phase rounds that will commence
    no sooner than five business days later.
        206. After each assignment round, the bidding system will inform
    each bidder of its own assignment and assignment payment for each
    assignment category for each PEA or PEA group assigned in the round.
    The bidding system will also provide each bidder with its current total
    payment, which is calculated as the sum of the bidder's total clock
    payment across all PEAs and the bidder's assignment payments for the
    PEAs for which an assignment round has already completed. This
    information will provide the bidder a running estimate during the
    assignment rounds of the dollar amount it will owe at the end of the
    auction. A bidder that is claiming a bidding credit will also be
    informed about its current bidding credit discount and whether the
    discount has been capped.
    4. Final Payment Calculations
        207. When all assignment rounds have been completed, a bidder's
    final payment takes into account the sum of final clock phase prices
    across all licenses that it won, the sum of all of the bidder's
    assignment payments, and any claimed bidding credits. Specifically, if
    a bidder is not claiming a bidding credit, its final payment is
    determined by summing the final clock phase prices across all licenses
    that it won and its assignment payments across all PEAs or PEA groups.
        208. If a bidder claims a bidding credit, a bidding credit discount
    is calculated by applying the bidder's bidding credit percentage to the
    sum of the bidder's clock payments and assignment payments, capping the
    bidding credit discount if it exceeds the applicable caps for small
    businesses, rural service providers, and small markets. The resulting
    bidding credit discount is subtracted from the sum of the bidder's
    clock payments and assignment payments to determine the final payment
    for a bidder with a bidding credit.

    C. License Authorizations for Interim and Final Assignments

        209. The Commission will condition the 3.7 GHz licenses awarded
    post-auction for the interim and final frequency assignments deadline.
        210. For a given frequency block in the 46 PEAs with blocks subject
    to the Phase I deadline, the interim and final authorizations may be
    awarded via either a single standard license authorization (where both
    the interim and final assignments are for the same frequency block(s))
    or through a two-license paired authorization (including an interim
    assignment and a final assignment of different specific frequency
    blocks) that collectively provides authority for the full 15-year
    license term. In the paired authorization approach, the interim
    assignment of the pair would expire on the earlier of December 5, 2025,
    or the date the relevant PEA is confirmed cleared, with no option for
    renewal, and the resulting final license would provide for operation
    after the interim authorization expires until the remainder of the 15-
    year term. The B1-C4 blocks in a PEA will be confirmed cleared
    consistent with the process for validation of a space station
    operator's Certification of Accelerated Relocation that it satisfied
    the Phase II clearing deadline, as described in section 27.1412(g) of
    the Commission's rules. These paired authorizations together provide
    the full range of interim and final rights over the license term. To
    ensure consistent treatment of licenses for frequencies in the A block,
    paired interim and final licenses will be conditioned to clarify that
    if they are transferred/assigned, they must be transferred/assigned
    together, in the same manner. There is no restriction on spectrum
    leasing for either of the paired authorizations.
        211. The assignment phase results will dictate whether a particular
    winning bidder may be awarded a single or paired license
    authorizations. For example, if a winner of clock phase Category A
    blocks (in the 46 PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline) is assigned to
    the same frequencies for both interim and final assignments, a single
    authorization will be issued providing both interim and final rights
    for those A block frequencies. If the winner of the interim assignment
    for specific frequencies in the A block does not also win the final
    assignment for the same frequencies in that block, a paired
    authorization will be issued to the bidder for an interim assignment in
    blocks A1-A5 and final assignment in blocks A1-C4 that together provide
    interim and final rights. In all other cases where one or more clock
    phase Category A blocks are not won and therefore no interim assignment
    is made, the winner of a final assignment will be issued a single
    authorization conveying final rights. For example, if the bidder wins
    only BC or ABC blocks in the PEA in the clock phase. The resulting
    final license will provide for operation on the earlier of December 5,
    2025 or the date the relevant PEA is confirmed cleared. That is, in the
    event a Category A generic block is unsold and therefore interim rights
    are not assigned to a bidder, interim rights revert to the licensee
    holding the final authorization for that frequency block.

    [[Page 53231]]

    D. Calculating Individual ``Per-License'' Prices

        212. While final auction payments for winning bidders will be
    calculated with bidding credit caps and assignment payments applied on
    an aggregate basis, rather than to individual license authorizations
    (single or paired), the bidding system will also calculate a ``per-
    license'' price for each license authorization. Such individual prices
    may be needed if a licensee later incurs license-specific obligations,
    such as unjust enrichment payments.
        213. After the assignment phase, the auction bidding system will
    determine a net and gross post-auction price for each license
    authorization (or paired authorization, if the authorization comprises
    both an interim and final frequency assignment) that was won by a
    bidder by apportioning assignment payments and bidding credit discounts
    (only applicable for the net price) across all the license
    authorizations or paired authorizations that the bidder won. To
    calculate the gross per-license price, the auction bidding system will
    apportion the assignment payment to authorizations in proportion to the
    final clock phase price of the blocks that the bidder is assigned in
    that assignment category and PEA (or PEA group). To calculate the net
    price, the auction bidding system will first apportion any applicable
    bidding credit discounts to each PEA or PEA group in proportion to the
    gross payment for that market. Then, for each PEA or PEA group, the
    auction bidding system will apportion the assignment payment and the
    discount to licenses in proportion to the final clock phase price of
    the blocks that the bidder is assigned in that assignment category for
    that PEA (or PEA group).

    E. Auction Results

        214. The bidding system will determine winning bidders as described
    in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice. After release of the
    public notice announcing auction results, the public will be able to
    view and download bidding and results data through the FCC Public
    Reporting System (PRS).

    F. Auction Announcements

        215. Commission staff will use auction announcements to report
    necessary information, such as schedule changes, to bidders. All
    auction announcements will be available by clicking a link in the
    bidding system.

    V. Post-Auction Procedures

        216. The public notice announcing the close of the bidding and
    auction results will be released shortly after bidding has ended in
    Auction 107. This public notice will also establish the deadlines for
    submitting down payments, final payments, and the long-form
    applications (FCC Form 601) for the auction.

    A. Down Payments

        217. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing
    public notice for Auction 107, each winning bidder must submit
    sufficient funds (in addition to its upfront payment) to bring its
    total amount of money on deposit with the Commission to 20% of the net
    amount of its winning bids (less any bidding credits, if applicable).

    B. Final Payments

        218. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of
    the net amount for each of its winning bids within 10 business days
    after the deadline for submitting down payments.

    C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

        219. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing
    public notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly
    completed post-auction application (FCC Form 601) for the license(s)
    they won through the auction.
        220. A winning bidder claiming eligibility for a small business
    bidding credit or a rural service provider bidding credit must
    demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit sought in its FCC
    Form 601 post-auction application. Further instructions on these and
    other filing requirements will be provided to winning bidders in the
    auction closing public notice for Auction 107.
        221. Winning bidders organized as bidding consortia must comply
    with the FCC Form 601 post-auction application procedures set forth in
    section 1.2107(g) of the Commission's rules. Specifically, license(s)
    won by a consortium must be applied for as follows: (a) An individual
    member of the consortium or a new legal entity comprising two or more
    individual consortium members must file for licenses covered by the
    winning bids; (b) each member or group of members of a winning
    consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to file a
    separate FCC Form 601 for its/their respective license(s) in their
    legal business name; (c) in the case of a license to be partitioned or
    disaggregated, the member or group filing the applicable FCC Form 601
    shall include the parties' partitioning or disaggregation agreement
    with the FCC Form 601; and (d) if a designated entity credit is sought
    (either small business or rural service provider), the applicant must
    meet the applicable eligibility requirements in the Commission's rules
    for the credit.

    D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

        222. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing
    public notice for Auction 107, each winning bidder must also comply
    with the ownership reporting requirements in sections 1.913, 1.919, and
    1.2112 of the Commission's rules by submitting an ownership disclosure
    information report for wireless telecommunications services (FCC Form
    602) with its FCC Form 601 post-auction application.
        223. If a winning bidder already has a complete and accurate FCC
    Form 602 on file in the FCC's Universal Licensing System (ULS), then it
    is not necessary to file a new report, but the winning bidder must
    certify in its FCC Form 601 application that the information on file
    with the Commission is complete and accurate. If the winning bidder
    does not have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if it is not complete and
    accurate, it must submit a new one.
        224. When a winning bidder submits an FCC Form 175, ULS
    automatically creates an ownership record. This record is not an FCC
    Form 602, but it may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602 with the
    ownership information submitted on the winning bidder's FCC Form 175
    application. A winning bidder must review the pre-filled information
    and confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the filing date of
    the FCC Form 601 post-auction application before certifying and
    submitting the FCC Form 602. Further instructions will be provided to
    winning bidders in the auction closing public notice.

    E. Default and Disqualification

        225. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the
    close of an auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment by
    the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely long-form application,
    fails to make a full and timely final payment, or is otherwise
    disqualified) is liable for default payments as described in section
    1.2104(g)(2). A default payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal
    to the difference between the amount of the bidder's winning bid and
    the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering the same
    spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a
    percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid,
    whichever is less.
        226. The percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an
    additional payment for defaults in a particular

    [[Page 53232]]

    auction is established in advance of the auction. The additional
    default payment for Auction 107 is 15% of the applicable bid for
    winning bids. The bidding system will calculate individual per-license
    prices that are separate from final auction payments, which are
    calculated on an aggregate basis. These prices determine the defaulted
    bid amount on individual licenses.
        227. Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission has the
    discretion to re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest
    bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a
    default or disqualification involves gross misconduct,
    misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, then the Commission
    may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in
    future auctions and may take any other action that it deems necessary,
    including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing
    authorizations held by the applicant.

    F. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

        228. All refunds of upfront payment balances will be returned to
    the payer of record as identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer
    submits written authorization instructing otherwise. Bidders are
    encouraged to use the Refund Information icon found on the Auction
    Application Manager page or the Refund Form link available on the
    Auction Application Submit Confirmation page in the FCC Auction
    Application System to access the form. After the required information
    is completed on the blank form, the form should be printed, signed, and
    submitted to the Commission by mail, fax, or email as instructed in the
    Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.

    VI. Procedural Matters

        229. Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As
    required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), a
    Supplemental Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental
    IRFA) was incorporated in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice
    released in March 2020. The Commission sought public comment on the
    proposals in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, including comments
    on the Supplemental IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the
    Supplemental IRFA. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice establishes
    the procedures to be used for Auction 107 and supplements the Initial
    and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses completed by the Commission
    in the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 FR 44128, August 29,
    2018, and the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, and other Commission orders
    pursuant to which Auction 107 will be conducted. This present
    Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental FRFA)
    conforms to the RFA.
        230. Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules. The Auction 107
    Procedures Public Notice implements auction procedures for those
    entities that seek to bid to acquire licenses in Auction 107. Auction
    107 will be the Commission's second auction of mid-band spectrum in
    furtherance of the deployment of fifth-generation (5G) wireless, the
    Internet of Things (IoT), and other advanced spectrum-based services.
    The Public Notice adopts procedural rules and terms and conditions
    governing Auction 107, and the post-auction application and payment
    processes, as well as sets the minimum opening bid amounts for
    flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band (3.7 GHz
    Service) that will be offered in Auction 107.
        231. To promote the efficient and fair administration of the
    competitive bidding process for all Auction 107 participants, the
    Commission adopted the following procedures proposed in the Auction 107
    Comment Public Notice:
         Use of anonymous bidding/limited information procedures
    which will not make public: (1) The license areas that an applicant
    selects for bidding in its auction application (FCC Form 175); (2) the
    amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for
    Auction 107; (3) an applicant's bidding eligibility; and (4) any other
    bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the
    bidder placing a bid, until after bidding has closed;
         establishment of bidding credit caps for eligible small
    businesses and rural service providers in Auction 107;
         adjustment of the bidding schedule as necessary in order
    to manage the pace of Auction 107;
         use of a simultaneous stopping rule in Auction 107, under
    which all blocks in both categories in all PEAs will remain available
    for bidding until bidding has stopped in every PEA;
         provision of discretionary authority to OEA, in
    conjunction with WTB, to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction
    107 for any reason that affects the ability of the competitive bidding
    process to be conducted fairly and efficiently;
         use of a clock auction format for Auction 107 under which
    each qualified bidder will indicate in successive clock bidding rounds
    its demands for categories of generic blocks in specific PEAs, and
    associated bidding and bid processing procedures to implement the clock
    auction format;
         use of an activity rule, which requires a bidder to bid
    actively during the auction on a high percentage of its bidding
    eligibility, including a modification that would allow a bidder to
    submit bids, but not to be assigned bids, that exceed its bidding
    eligibility;
         use of an activity rule that does not include a waiver of
    the rule to preserve a bidder's eligibility;
         a requirement that bidders be active on between 90% and
    100% of a bidder's bidding eligibility in all clock rounds;
         a specific minimum opening bid amount for generic blocks
    in each product available in Auction 107;
         a specific upfront payment amount for generic blocks in
    each product available in Auction 107;
         establishment of a bidder's initial bidding eligibility in
    bidding units based on that bidder's upfront payment through assignment
    of a specific number of bidding units for each generic block;
         establishment of acceptable bid amounts, including clock
    price increments and intra-round bids, along with a methodology for
    calculating such amounts;
         a methodology for processing bids and requests to reduce
    and increase demand subject to the no excess supply rule for bids to
    reduce demand and the eligibility rule for bids to increase demand;
         use of bid processing procedures that the auction bidding
    system will use, after each bidding round, to process bids to determine
    the processed demand of each bidder and a posted price for each product
    that would serve as the start-of-round price for the next round;
         establishment of an assignment phase that will determine
    which frequency-specific licenses will be won by the winning bidders of
    generic blocks during the clock phase; and
         establishment of additional default payments of 15% for
    bids pursuant to section 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the event that a
    winning bidder defaults or is disqualified after the auction.
        232. The procedures for the conduct of Auction 107 constitute the
    more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules
    contemplated by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission's rules and the
    underlying rulemaking orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report and Order,
    and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent
    therewith.
        233. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in
    Response to the IRFA. There were no comments filed that specifically
    address the

    [[Page 53233]]

    procedures and policies proposed in the Supplemental IRFA.
        234. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
    Small Business Administration. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act
    of 2010, which amended the RFA, the Commission is required to respond
    to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA and
    to provide a detailed statement of any changes made to the proposed
    procedures as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not
    file any comments in response to the procedures that were proposed in
    the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice.
        235. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to
    Which the Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs agencies to provide a
    description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small
    entities that may be affected by the rules and policies adopted herein.
    The RFA generally defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same
    meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and
    ``small governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small
    business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern''
    under the Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one
    which: (1) Is independently owned and operated, (2) is not dominant in
    its field of operation, and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
    established by the SBA.
        236. As noted above, Regulatory Flexibility Analyses were
    incorporated into the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rule Making and 3.7
    GHz Report and Order. These orders provide the underlying authority for
    the procedures proposed in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice and
    are adopted herein for Auction 107. In those regulatory flexibility
    analyses, the Commission described in detail the small entities that
    might be significantly affected. In the Auction 107 Procedures Public
    Notice, the Commission incorporated by reference the descriptions and
    estimates of the number of small entities from the previous Regulatory
    Flexibility Analyses in the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
    3.7 GHz Report and Order.
        237. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
    Compliance Requirements for Small Entities. The Commission designed the
    auction application process itself to minimize reporting and compliance
    requirements for applicants, including small business applicants. In
    the first part of the Commission's two-phased auction application
    process, parties desiring to participate in an auction file
    streamlined, short-form applications in which they certify under
    penalty of perjury as to their qualifications. Eligibility to
    participate in bidding is based on an applicant's short-form
    application and certifications, as well as its upfront payment. In the
    second phase of the process, winning bidders file a more comprehensive
    long-form application. Thus, an applicant that fails to become a
    winning bidder does not need to file a long-form application or provide
    the additional showings and more detailed demonstrations required of a
    winning bidder.
        238. The Commission does not expect that the processes and
    procedures adopted in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice will
    require small entities to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, or
    other professionals to participate in Auction 107 and comply with the
    procedures the Commission adopts because of the information, resources,
    and guidance it makes available to potential and actual participants.
    The Commission cannot quantify the cost of compliance with the
    procedures, however, the Commission does not believe that the cost of
    compliance will unduly burden small entities that choose to participate
    in the auction. The processes and procedures are consistent with
    existing Commission policies and procedures used in prior auctions.
    Thus, some small entities may already be familiar with such procedures
    and have the processes and procedures in place to facilitate compliance
    resulting in minimal incremental costs to comply. For those small
    entities that may be new to the Commission's auction process, the
    various resources that will be made available, including, but not
    limited to, the mock auction, remote electronic bidding, and access to
    hotlines for both technical and auction assistance, should help
    facilitate participation without the need to hire professionals. For
    example, the Commission will release an online tutorial that will help
    applicants understand the procedures for filing the auction short-form
    applications (FCC Form 175). The Commission will offer other
    educational opportunities for applicants in Auction 107 to familiarize
    themselves with the FCC Auction Application System and the bidding
    system. By providing these resources as well as the resources discussed
    below, the Commission expects small entities that use the available
    resources to experience lower participation and compliance costs.
        239. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on
    Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered. The RFA
    requires an agency to describe any significant, specifically small
    business, alternatives that it has considered in reaching its approach,
    which may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1)
    The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
    timetables that take into account the resources available to small
    entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
    compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small
    entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
    (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
    such small entities.''
        240. The Commission has taken steps to minimize any economic impact
    of its auction procedures on small entities through, among other
    things, the many free resources the Commission provides to potential
    auction participants. Consistent with the past practices in prior
    auctions, small entities that are potential participants will have
    access to detailed educational information and Commission personnel to
    help guide their participation in Auction 107, which should alleviate
    any need to hire professionals. More specifically, small entities and
    other auction participants may seek clarification of, or guidance on,
    complying with competitive bidding rules and procedures, reporting
    requirements, and using the bidding system. Additionally, an FCC
    Auctions Hotline will provide small entities one-on-one access to
    Commission staff for information about the auction process and
    procedures. Further, the FCC Auctions Technical Support Hotline is
    another resource that provides technical assistance to applicants,
    including small entities, on issues such as access to or navigation
    within the electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the bidding system. Small
    entities and other would-be participants will also be provided with
    various materials on the pre-bidding process in advance of the short-
    form application filing window, which includes step-by-step
    instructions on how to complete FCC Form 175. In addition, small
    entities will have access to the web-based, interactive online
    tutorials produced by Commission staff to familiarize themselves with
    auction procedures, filing requirements, bidding procedures, and other
    matters related to an auction.
        241. Various databases and other sources of information, including
    the Auctions program websites and copies of Commission decisions, are
    available to the public without charge, providing a low-cost mechanism
    for small entities to conduct research prior to and throughout the
    auction. Prior to and at the close of Auction 107, the

    [[Page 53234]]

    Commission will post public notices on the Auctions website, which
    articulate the procedures and deadlines for the auction. The Commission
    will make this information easily accessible and without charge to
    benefit all Auction 107 applicants, including small entities, thereby
    lowering their administrative costs to comply with the Commission's
    competitive bidding rules.
        242. Eligible bidders will be given an opportunity to become
    familiar with auction procedures and the bidding system by
    participating in a mock auction. Eligible bidders will have access to a
    user guide for the bidding system, bidding file formats, and an online
    bidding procedures tutorial in advance of the mock auction. Further,
    the Commission intends to conduct Auction 107 electronically over the
    internet using a web-based auction system that eliminates the need for
    small entities and other bidders to be physically present in a specific
    location. These mechanisms are made available to facilitate
    participation in Auction 107 by all eligible bidders and may result in
    significant cost savings for small entities that use them. Moreover,
    the adoption of bidding procedures in advance of the auction,
    consistent with statutory directive, is designed to ensure that the
    auction will be administered predictably and fairly for all
    participants, including small businesses.
        243. Another step taken to minimize the economic impact for small
    entities participating in Auction 107 is the Commission's adoption of
    bidding credits for small businesses. In accordance with the service
    rules applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service licenses to be offered in
    Auction 107, bidding credit discounts will be available to eligible
    small businesses and small business consortiums on the following basis:
    (1) A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not
    exceed $55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive
    a 15% discount on its winning bid or (2) a bidder with attributed
    average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the
    preceding five years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its
    winning bid. Eligible applicants can receive only one of the available
    bidding credits--not both.
        244. The total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be
    awarded to an eligible small business is capped at $25 million. In
    addition, the Commission adopts a $10 million cap on the overall amount
    of bidding credits that any winning small business bidder may apply to
    winning licenses in markets with a population of 500,000 or less. Based
    on the technical characteristics of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band and the
    Commission's analysis of past auction data, the Commission anticipates
    that the caps will allow the majority of small businesses to take full
    advantage of the bidding credit program, thereby lowering the relative
    costs of participation for small businesses. The Commission declined to
    adopt a small business bidding credit cap of at least $200 million
    requested by one commenter, Moise Advisory, because, as the Commission
    previously explained, the proposed $25 million cap in past auctions
    would have allowed the vast majority of eligible small businesses to
    realize the full value of their bidding credits.
        245. These procedures for the conduct of Auction 107 constitute the
    more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules
    contemplated by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission's rules and the
    underlying rulemaking orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report and Order
    and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent
    therewith.
        246. Report to Congress. The Commission will send a copy of the
    Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, including the Supplemental FRFA,
    in a report to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In
    addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Auction 107 Procedures
    Public Notice, including the Supplemental FRFA to the Chief Counsel for
    Advocacy of the SBA.

    Federal Communications Commission.
    Marlene Dortch,
    Secretary.

    [FR Doc. 2020-18804 Filed 8-27-20; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6712-01-P