[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 165 (Tuesday, August 25, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 52422-52454]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-13185]



[[Page 52421]]

Vol. 85

Tuesday,

No. 165

August 25, 2020

Part II





Federal Communications Commission





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47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97





Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age; Final Rule and 
Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 165 / Tuesday, August 25, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97

[IB Docket No. 18-313; FCC 20-54; FRS 16850]


Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission adopts amendments to its 
rules related to satellite orbital debris mitigation, to reflect the 
Report and Order adopted on April 23, 2020. A proposed rule document 
for the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM or Further Notice) 
related to this Final rule document is published elsewhere in this 
issue of the Federal Register.

DATES: The amendments to Sec. Sec.  25.271 and 25.282 are effective 
September 24, 2020. The other rule amendments contain information 
collection requirements that are not effective until approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget. The Commission will publish a document 
in the Federal Register announcing the effective date for those 
amendments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Merissa Velez, International Bureau, 
Satellite Division, at (202) 418-0751. For information regarding the 
PRA information collection requirements contained in the PRA, contact 
Cathy Williams, Office of Managing Director, at (202) 418-2918 or 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order (Order), IB Docket No. 18-313, FCC 20-54, adopted on April 
23, 2020, and released on April 24, 2020. The full text of this 
document is available on the Commission's website at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-54A1.pdf. To request materials 
in accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an email to 
[email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), the 
Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) 
of the possible significant economic impact on small entities of the 
policies and rules adopted in the Order.

Congressional Review Act

    The Commission will send a copy of this Order in a report to be 
sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 
the Congressional Review Act (CRA), see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Synopsis

I. Introduction

    A wide range of new and existing commercial technologies depend on 
reliable communications with spacecraft. The cost, integrity, and 
reliability of these communications can be negatively affected by 
orbital debris, which presents an ever-increasing threat to operational 
spacecraft. The environment in space continues to change and evolve in 
the New Space Age as increasing numbers of satellites are launched and 
new satellite technology is developed. The regulations we adopt today 
are designed to ensure that the Commission's actions concerning radio 
communications, including licensing U.S. spacecraft and granting access 
to the U.S. market for non-U.S. spacecraft, mitigate the growth of 
orbital debris, while at the same time not creating undue regulatory 
obstacles to new satellite ventures. This action will help to ensure 
that Commission decisions are consistent with the public interest in 
space remaining viable for future satellites and systems and the many 
services that those systems provide to the public.
    The Report and Order (Order) comprehensively updates the 
Commission's existing rules regarding orbital debris mitigation, which 
were adopted in 2004. Our goal is to provide the clearest possible 
regulatory framework for applicants for non-Federal satellite 
communications. We also seek comment in a Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (Further Notice) on probability of accidental explosions, 
collision risk for multi-satellite systems, maneuverability 
requirements, casualty risk, indemnification, and performance bonds 
tied to successful spacecraft disposal.

II. Background

    There are a variety of predictions for how the space economy and 
space environment will evolve in the coming New Space Age, but one 
clear indicator of the changes to come is the unprecedented number of 
non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) space stations \1\ for which 
applications have been submitted at the FCC. Some of the systems have 
begun preliminary operations, and we expect these activities to 
accelerate in the coming years. These new large constellations, many of 
which are designed to provide global broadband services, are likely to 
bring thousands of new satellites to low-Earth orbit (LEO). At the same 
time, there are a number of commercial systems with more than a hundred 
satellites that are already fully operational and providing commercial 
imaging and other Earth-exploration services. Additional satellite 
constellations, again in potentially large numbers, will be coming 
online to provide other innovative services such as ``Internet of 
Things.'' Moreover, the last decade has seen an exponential increase in 
the number of operations by small satellites with short duration 
missions for academic and research purposes, as the miniaturization of 
electronic components along with increased ``rideshare'' launch 
opportunities has led to the flourishing of ``CubeSat'' spacecraft 
missions, including launches with unprecedented numbers of satellites 
on board. In the meantime, operators continue to launch new, 
technologically-advanced communications satellites into the 
geostationary orbit (GSO), providing critical services across the 
globe.
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    \1\ Throughout this Order, we use the terms ``space station,'' 
``satellite,'' and ``spacecraft.'' ``Space station'' is defined in 
the Commission's rules as ``[a] station'' located on an object which 
is beyond, is intended to go beyond, or has been beyond, the major 
portion of the Earth's atmosphere.'' 47 CFR 2.1, 25.103. This is 
consistent with terminology used by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). ITU Radio Regulations (R.R.) 1.64. 
The Commission's rules define ``satellite'' as ``[a] body which 
revolves around another body of preponderant mass, and which has a 
motion primarily and permanently determined by the force of 
attraction of that other body.'' 47 CFR 2.1. In this Order we refer 
only to artificial satellites. The Commission's rules define 
``spacecraft'' as ``[a] man-made vehicle which is intended to go 
beyond the major portion of the Earth's atmosphere.'' 47 CFR 2.1, 
25.103. These terms are used interchangeably in this Order, but we 
observe that ``satellite'' and ``spacecraft'' are more broadly 
defined than ``space station.''
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    At the same time, studies indicate that already in some regions of 
LEO, the number of new objects and fragments generated from collisions 
exceeds those removed by natural atmospheric drag. Other regions have 
sufficient densities of orbital debris to lead some analysts to 
conclude that they are close to or have already reached a ``runaway'' 
status, where the debris population will grow indefinitely due to 
collisions between debris objects. The predicted increase in the number 
of satellites in orbit requires that orbital debris mitigation be taken 
seriously by all operators in order to ensure the continued safe and 
reliable use of space for satellite

[[Page 52423]]

communications and other activities. The number of U.S. commercial 
satellites in space exceeds the number of U.S. government satellites, 
and the actions taken by operators today have the potential to impact 
the orbital environment for hundreds or thousands of years.
    The Commission first adopted comprehensive rules on orbital debris 
mitigation in 2004 in its Mitigation of Orbital Debris Second Report 
and Order. The rules require disclosure of an applicant's debris 
mitigation plans as part of the technical information submitted to the 
Commission. The Commission reasoned that the disclosures would allow 
the Commission to examine whether a space station operator has taken 
orbital debris into consideration, while finding that the costs 
associated with disclosure would not be unduly burdensome when balanced 
against the public interest benefits of preserving safe and affordable 
access to space, and disclosure would provide flexibility for the 
Commission to address new developments in space station design and 
permit discretion when granting conditioning, or denying an 
authorization. As part of its 2004 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission 
also explained how its orbital debris rules related to certain 
regulations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and regulations of the Department of Transportation, Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). Additionally, the Commission applied the 
new rules to amateur and experimental space stations, authorized under 
parts 97 and 5 of the Commission's rules, respectively, and considered 
liability issues and insurance as they related to Commission-authorized 
space stations.
    Since 2004, there have been a variety of technical and policy 
updates to orbital debris mitigation standards, policy, and guidance 
documents. Additionally, scientific research and policy discussions on 
debris mitigation have continued in a wide variety of existing and new 
forums both in the United States and internationally.
    In the United States, Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3), titled 
``National Space Traffic Management Policy,'' recognized the growing 
threat to space activities from orbital debris, and directs the 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, 
Commerce, and Transportation, and the Director of National 
Intelligence, and in consultation with the Chairman of the Commission, 
to lead efforts to update the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Standard Practices (ODMSP) and establish new guidelines for satellite 
design and operation. The ODMSP apply to missions operated or procured 
by U.S. government agencies, and ``provides a reference for to promote 
efficient and effective space safety practices for other domestic and 
international operators.'' SPD-3 stated that the United States should 
eventually incorporate appropriate standards and best practices, 
derived in part from the ODMSP, into Federal law and regulation through 
appropriate rulemaking or licensing actions, and that such guidelines 
should encompass protocols for all stages of satellite operation from 
design through end-of-life. This rulemaking is one such activity.
    The updated ODMSP were issued on December 10, 2019. This represents 
the first update to the ODMSP since the practices were originally 
established in 2001. The preamble states that the revised ODMSP 
includes ``improvements to the original objectives as well as 
clarification and additional standard practices for certain classes of 
space operations.'' The revised ODMSP preamble states that the United 
States Government ``will follow the ODMSP, consistent with mission 
requirements and cost effectiveness in the procurement and operation of 
spacecraft, launch services, and the conduct of tests and experiments 
in space.'' The preamble goes on to state that ``[w]hen practical, 
operators should consider the benefits of going beyond the standard 
practices and take additional steps to limit the generation of orbital 
debris.''
    At the U.S. government agency level, the NASA Technical Standard 
(NASA Standard) and other NASA documents contain additional detail 
informing orbital debris mitigation measures when it comes to the 
development of NASA programs and projects. The NASA Standard provides 
specific technical requirements for limiting orbital debris generation 
consistent with NASA policies, and has been updated regularly, with the 
most recent update on April 25, 2019. The NASA Orbital Debris Program 
Office also develops and maintains a number of software modelling tools 
designed to assist with current orbital debris mitigation analysis and 
help better understand the evolution of the orbital environment. 
Several of these are available at no cost to the public. The software 
modeling tool that has been used by many Commission applicants is the 
NASA Debris Assessment Software, which provides a means of calculating, 
during the planning and design phase, various metrics-related debris 
mitigation practices such as assessing collision risk and casualty 
risk, which are relevant to some, but not all, of the Commission's 
requirements. The FAA (for launch vehicles and intact re-entry) and 
NOAA (for commercial remote sensing satellites) both have orbital 
debris-related regulations which apply to non-government (in most cases 
commercial) operators licensed by those agencies. Both agencies are 
currently considering updates to their rules, including some rules 
relevant to orbital debris mitigation.
    Internationally, there have been a number of significant 
developments relevant to the mitigation of orbital debris. The Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), an international 
forum of government bodies that includes NASA and other space agencies, 
``for the coordination of activities related to the issues of man-made 
and natural debris in space[,]'' issued an updated set of consensus 
guidelines for debris mitigation in 2007. The IADC Guidelines cover a 
wide range of topics including limitation of debris released during 
normal operations, minimization of the potential for on-orbit break-
ups, post-mission disposal, and prevention of on-orbit collisions. Work 
by the IADC also helped to inform the development of the Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations (UN) Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which were endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly in 2007. As with the IADC Guidelines, the UN Guidelines 
established voluntary, non-binding consensus principles and guidelines 
for space debris mitigation. More recent developments include the IADC 
issuance in 2017 of a ``Statement on Large Constellations of Satellites 
in Low Earth Orbit,'' as well as the adoption by the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of a preamble and 21 consensus guidelines 
for the ``Long-Term Sustainability of Space Activities.'' Additionally, 
there are international standards-setting organizations, such as the 
International Standards Organization that have issued standards for 
space activities, including orbital debris mitigation.
    The commercial space industry has been increasingly active in 
developing voluntary, consensus-based principles and guidelines through 
industry associations and working groups. In 2019, an organization 
known as the Space Safety Coalition published a set of best practices 
for long-term sustainability of space operations, which have been 
endorsed by at least 37 entities, primarily commercial space

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companies. Also in 2019, the Satellite Industry Association (SIA), a 
trade association representing satellite operators, service providers, 
manufacturers, launch services providers, and ground equipment 
suppliers released a set of ``Principles of Space Safety.'' Both of 
these documents emphasize the importance of responsible space 
operations to ensure the long-term sustainability of the space 
environment. There have also been standards and guidance issued by 
organizations focusing on specific operational areas, such as the 
standards and recommended practices developed by the Consortium for 
Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations for commercial 
rendezvous, proximity operations, and on-orbit servicing. Additionally, 
organizations such as the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council 
on Space Technologies are working toward other approaches to space 
debris, for example, a ``Space Sustainability Rating'' that would 
provide a score representing a mission's sustainability as it relates 
to debris mitigation and alignment with international guidelines.
    The Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on 
November 15, 2018 (84 FR 4742 (February 19, 2019)) seeking comment on a 
comprehensive update to its rules relating to orbital debris 
mitigation. It sought comment on issues ranging from minor updates 
codifying established metrics into existing rules to how to assess the 
risks posed by constellations of thousands of satellites, as well as 
topics such as economic incentives for operators that would align with 
orbital debris mitigation best practices.
    Comments on the NPRM were due April 5, 2019, and reply comments 
were due May 6, 2019. We received 45 comments and 19 reply comments. A 
list of commenters, reply commenters, and other filers is contained in 
Appendix C of the Report and Order.

III. Discussion

    In the discussion that follows, we first address the Commission's 
overall regulatory approach to orbital debris mitigation, including 
economic and other issues. We then discuss the need for rule 
modifications to address topics such as collision risk, orbit 
selection, trackability, and minimizing release of debris. Next, we 
address post-mission disposal, as well as other topics such as 
proximity operations, security of spacecraft commands, and orbit-
raising. Then, we discuss liability issues and economic incentives, and 
finally, we address the scope of our rules and other miscellaneous 
issues raised by commenters.

A. Regulatory Approach to Mitigation of Orbital Debris

1. FCC Statutory Authority Regarding Orbital Debris
    The Commission licenses radio frequency uses by satellites under 
the authority of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act). 
When the Commission adopted debris mitigation rules applying to 
satellites across all service types, the Commission concluded that its 
authority to review orbital debris mitigation plans fell within its 
responsibilities and obligations under the Act, derived from its 
authority with respect to authorizing radio communications. As the 
Commission then noted, the Act charges the FCC with encouraging ``the 
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.'' 
Additionally, the Act provides for the licensing of radio 
communications, including satellite communications, only upon a finding 
that the ``public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served 
thereby.'' These provisions of the Act have remained unchanged since 
the Commission's previous analysis of its authority in this area, in 
which it concluded that orbital debris and related mitigation issues 
are relevant in determining whether the public interest would be served 
by authorization of any particular satellite-based communications 
system, or by any particular practice or operating procedure of such 
satellite systems. The analysis undertaken by the Commission is 
designed to ensure that the space systems reviewed by the Commission 
have sufficient plans to mitigate orbital debris, consistent with the 
public interest. As the Commission also previously concluded, to the 
extent that spacecraft are controlled through radiocommunications 
links, there is a direct connection between the radiocommunications 
functions we are charged with licensing under the Act and the physical 
operations of the spacecraft. Rules that limit the generation of 
orbital debris are intended to minimize the orbital debris that would 
negatively affect the cost, reliability, continuity and safety of all 
commercial, experimental and amateur satellite operations licensed or 
authorized by the Commission. Orbital debris also negatively affects 
the availability, integrity, and capability of both incumbent and 
newly-authorized satellite systems, thereby raising the potential for 
impairing the ability of such systems to use the spectrum to the full 
extent that the Commission authorized.
    We note that even prior to the adoption of a comprehensive set of 
rules on orbital debris mitigation in 2004, the Commission was 
reviewing the orbital debris mitigation plans of satellites and systems 
on a case-by-case basis. Rules requiring disclosure of plans to 
mitigate orbital debris were adopted for licensees in the 2 GHz mobile-
satellite service in 2000, and those rules were the basis for rules 
applicable to all services that were adopted shortly thereafter. Thus, 
as part of its licensing and grant of space systems, the Commission has 
been reviewing the orbital debris mitigation plans of non-Federal 
satellites and systems for over 20 years.
    The Commission sought comment on whether the 2004 order cited all 
relevant and potential sources of Commission authority in this area, 
and whether the provisions discussed, or other provisions, provide the 
Commission with requisite authority in this area. Several commenters 
agree with the Commission taking a refreshed look at its authority in 
this area. No commenters, however, make specific arguments questioning 
the Commission's statutory authority generally, express different views 
on the Commission's authority pursuant to the Communications Act, or 
offer other views on sources of Commission authority. We therefore see 
no reason to arrive at a different conclusion than the Commission did 
in 2004 with respect to the Commission's authority on review of orbital 
debris mitigation plans.
    Some commenters emphasize that the Commission should revisit its 
authority considering the authority of other agencies and 
organizations, in the interest of avoiding duplicative requirements and 
standards. We recognize, as observed by the Commerce Department, that 
significant elements of non-Federal space operations are subject to 
regulation by other Federal agencies, most notably NOAA and the FAA. We 
continue to work closely with other agencies to ensure that our 
activities are not duplicative of their activities, and coordinate with 
other agencies in individual cases, as necessary. To the extent that 
commenters ask us to refresh the legal analysis of our authority in 
light of the evolution of international standards, we note that changes 
in international guidelines related to the mitigation of orbital debris 
can and do inform regulatory approaches, but do not have the force of 
law and would not alter the FCC's legal authority in this area.
    A few commenters correctly observe that some of the Commission's 
NPRM

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proposals go beyond a narrower focus on debris mitigation, such as in 
the ODMSP, and also relate in part to other functional areas often 
referred to as space situational awareness or space traffic management. 
These functional areas generally concern the collection and 
dissemination of data about objects and activities in space (space 
situational awareness), and the management of activities in space to 
ensure safe operations, through measures such as coordination and 
collision avoidance (space traffic management). As an example of a rule 
that goes beyond the guidelines in the ODMSP, the rule we codify below 
regarding ability of an FCC-licensed spacecraft to be tracked can 
improve both the ability to monitor the space environment (space 
situational awareness) as well as the ability of operators to 
coordinate amongst each other and make informed decisions to prevent 
collisions (space traffic management). These improvements in turn may 
reduce the likelihood that new debris will be created in space. We 
conclude that even though some of the rules we adopt in this Order may 
involve or relate to concepts of space situational awareness or space 
traffic management, because they are directly tied to the mitigation of 
orbital debris and will contribute to the Commission's ability to 
ensure that non-Federal satellite systems will serve the public 
interest, these rules fall within the Commission's broad authority 
under Title III of the Act to license radio spectrum pursuant to that 
public interest mandate.
2. Relationship With Other U.S. Government Activities
    The Commission recognized the importance of a coordinated, 
effective regulatory environment that meets the dual goals of orbital 
debris mitigation and furthering U.S. space commerce. Specifically, in 
the NPRM, the Commission sought comment on whether there are any areas 
in which the proposed requirements overlap with requirements clearly 
within the authority of other agencies, in order to avoid duplicative 
activities, and whether there are any exceptions to applications of our 
rules that would be appropriate in specific circumstances. The NRPM 
also highlighted the ongoing activities of various executive branch 
agencies of the U.S. government related to the Space Policy Directive-3 
(SPD-3), including the now-completed updating of the ODMSP. In 
accordance with its consultatory role described in SPD-3, the 
Commission has been engaged with those ongoing activities. The 
Commission additionally sought comment on the suitability of various 
orbital debris mitigation guidance and standards.
    Commenters addressing these topics universally supported 
interagency coordination, and many mentioned the sharing of expertise 
regarding space operations. Commenters also generally supported 
application of consistent principles as well as elimination of 
regulatory duplication. The Commerce Department provided informative 
comments describing in detail many of the Commerce Department and 
interagency initiatives currently underway as a result of the Space 
Policy Directives. At this time, we are pleased to highlight the recent 
completion of the revisions to the ODMSP, and look forward to further 
work with the Commerce Department and other agencies on an evolving 
``whole of government'' approach to space activities. Given the pace 
that the industry is evolving, and our responsibility to continue 
licensing satellites and systems on a day-to-day basis, we find that it 
would not be beneficial at this time to delay our rule updates. We 
expect that regulation of orbital debris will be an iterative process 
as new research becomes available and new policies are developed, and 
as discussions continue concerning approaches to improving the 
organization of the regulation of space activities. If it becomes clear 
through a change to the governing law that an activity the Commission 
is currently undertaking is instead one that another agency is charged 
with performing, we will modify our process and regulations 
accordingly.
    We continue to carefully follow the rulemaking developments of 
other agencies, in particular those of the FAA and NOAA, as those 
agencies look to update their rules related to authorization of 
commercial space activities. The NPRM did not propose any change to the 
specific conclusions drawn by the Commission in 2004 with respect to 
the role of the Commission vis-[agrave]-vis other agencies such as the 
FAA and NOAA. We will continue to coordinate closely with other 
agencies in any cases where it appears that the other agency may have 
relevant expertise or in cases that present unique scenarios that 
implicate overlap with that agency's responsibilities.
    Consistent with the coordinated approach recommended by many 
commenters, we look to the recent updates to the ODMSP to help inform 
our rules. The revised ODMSP addresses the same general topics and 
issues as the proposals in the Notice, and as discussed by commenters 
in the record developed in this proceeding. Similar to the approach 
that the Commission took in 2004, the organization of this Order and 
the Further Notice generally follows the organization of the ODMSP 
objectives, and in the relevant content areas we describe the revised 
ODMSP approach. As requested by the Commerce Department, we use, to the 
extent feasible, the most recent updates to the ODMSP.
    A number of commenters suggested the Commission participate in 
international processes regarding mitigation of orbital debris. We 
observe that Commission representatives have participated as part of 
official U.S. government delegations in established international 
forums, such as the United Nations, IADC, and International 
Telecommunication Union, and will continue to participate through 
established channels under the guidance of the U.S. State Department or 
U.S. government entity with responsibility for overseeing the 
international activities.
3. Economic Considerations
    In addition to regulatory requirements to control or mitigate 
orbital debris, certain commenters argue that developing mechanisms and 
processes that harness market forces can lead to a close alignment of 
private and public interests. Market-based methodologies rely upon 
market dynamics and economic principles that generate efficiencies not 
always achieved by command-and control regulation. As a growing share 
of space is accounted for by orbital debris, public welfare is promoted 
when industry participants have economic incentives to consider the 
public welfare benefits of reducing orbital debris as offset by any 
public welfare costs associated with taking measures to reduce the 
generation of such debris. Such benefits include decreased operational 
risk due to the reduced potential for collisions with space debris. 
Moreover, because most useful orbital altitudes are limited but also 
available for use by others at an effective price that does not 
necessarily reflect the cost each user imposes on others, they 
constitute a ``common pool resource'' such that the effective price to 
use space does not prevent its over-use. Given the substantial 
commercial sector investments in space, as noted by the increase in 
satellite launches and the potential concomitant increase in debris, an 
important challenge for regulators going forward is to adopt rules and 
explore economic mechanisms that promote the public

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interest in the safe and sustainable use of space.
    In the NPRM, the Commission included a regulatory impact analysis 
designed to assess various approaches to reducing debris in orbit from 
an economic perspective. Many of these approaches were consistent with 
the rule revisions proposed by the Commission in the NPRM, and others 
represented different means of reducing debris. To the extent that the 
comments directed to this section overlapped with other topics in the 
NPRM, we discuss those comments in the various sections below. 
Commenters generally disagreed with the additional approaches discussed 
as part of the regulatory impact analysis, such as limiting launches, 
and as addressed below, we decline to further address those approaches 
at this time. Several commenters presented views on novel approaches, 
at least in the space debris context, for incentivizing particular 
activities. For example, the New York University School of Law 
Institute for Policy Integrity proposed that the Commission broadly 
consider market-based alternatives such as different liability rules, 
marketable permits or offsets, and regulatory fees. Although we 
ultimately conclude that these approaches are not sufficiently robust 
on their own to address the problem of orbital debris, and thus 
regulation in this area is necessary, we address these and other 
approaches below.
    Given the nature of space, some commenters raise the point that the 
Commission's actions in this area may be limited in value since they 
cannot account for activities of actors that are not subject to U.S. 
law and regulations. Although we address the application of our rules 
to non-U.S.-licensed satellites in more detail below, as an 
introductory matter it is worth pointing out that we have been 
applying, and will continue to apply, our rules on orbital debris 
mitigation to those operators of existing or planned non-U.S.-licensed 
satellites seeking access to the United States market. This means that 
any non-Federal satellite communicating with an earth station in the 
United States will be subject to an orbital debris assessment under the 
Commission's rules.\2\ Given the interest by many satellite operators 
in serving the U.S. market, this provides means for our regulations to 
have a broader reach than if the regulations were just to apply to 
operators seeking a U.S. license, and helps to ensure that non-U.S. 
licensees do not gain competitive advantage by following less rigorous 
debris mitigation practices than U.S.-licensed satellites.
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    \2\ The requirement of providing information on orbital debris 
mitigation has been, and will continue to be, applicable to part 25 
satellites, including those granted U.S. market access, as well as 
part 5 experimental and part 97 amateur satellites.
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4. Other Introductory Matters
    A number of commenters state that the Commission should focus its 
efforts on performance-based regulation, rather than prescriptive 
regulation (e.g., regulation of satellite performance rather than 
regulation of design). We have endeavored throughout this Order to 
adopt a performance-based approach where feasible. We agree with those 
commenters who argue, for example, that performance metrics can enable 
operators to develop innovative and cost-effective solutions in many 
instances.
    Several commenters also request that rules be based on specific 
metrics to ensure regulatory transparency, and that the Commission 
provide clear guidance on how to achieve certain metrics. In many areas 
we are providing metrics and identifying methodology, typically using 
publicly-available NASA assessment tools, which are already used by 
many satellite applicants.\3\ In these cases, applicants may look to 
detailed guidance published by NASA in preparing orbital debris 
mitigation plans. There will continue to be some areas, such as those 
in which the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices express qualitative objectives or aspirational goals, without 
a quantitative metric, where for now we will assess issues on a case-
by-case basis. We also seek comment on adopting more quantitative rules 
in certain areas in the Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making. 
Finally, we note that a number of commenters (generally those operators 
planning large NGSO constellations), expressed concern as a general 
matter about metrics being applied on an aggregate basis to a 
constellation of NGSO satellites. We address these concerns in 
connection with individual rules, including whether in particular cases 
the Commission needs to consider the full factual scenario relevant to 
a licensing decision, including understanding of the complete scope of 
the risk involved with the proposed operations.
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    \3\ In some cases we provide the opportunity for applicants to 
use other software programs, for example, provided that those 
programs are of equal or higher fidelity. For example, NASA has the 
Debris Assessment Software, capable of calculating collision risk, 
casualty risk, etc., and available at no cost, but there are higher 
fidelity tools as well. Other organizations like the European Space 
Agency also have well-established software tools. See European Space 
Agency, ``ESA makes space debris software available online'' (June 
25, 2014), https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/ESA_makes_space_debris_software_available_online.
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    In our recent order adopting elective streamlined licensing 
procedures for qualifying small satellites, the Commission noted that 
the qualification criteria that we were adopting would be modified as 
necessary or appropriate to conform to rules adopted in this orbital 
debris proceeding. Accordingly, in several areas of our decision here, 
we adopt conforming rules for small satellites that file applications 
under those elective streamlined procedure. In addition, unless 
specified otherwise, the rules discussed below will apply to amateur 
satellites authorized under the procedures specified in part 97 of the 
Commission's rules and experimental satellites authorized under the 
procedures specified in part 5 of the Commission's rules.
    One party, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, filed 
a comment in this docket arguing that the Commission has a 
responsibility to consider the safety of substances used in satellite 
construction and operation and environmental issues associated with 
such operations. Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 
proposes that the Commission require review of technical specifications 
of satellites being launched and in particular to review the proposed 
use of toxic fuels as propellants. Public Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility does not raise specific questions, or make specific 
proposals, regarding the orbital debris rules proposed in the Notice, 
and the issues it raised thus fall outside the scope of this 
proceeding.

B. Safe Flight Profiles

    Our existing orbital debris rules include several disclosure 
requirements designed to ensure that operators are addressing the issue 
of potential collisions with debris or other objects. We update our 
rules on safe flight profiles to specify metrics that NASA applies to 
its missions, and adopt additional disclosures relating to orbital 
characteristics and maneuverability. We also seek comment on some 
additional issues as part of the Further Notice.
1. Collisions With Large Objects
    In the NPRM, the Commission proposed that applicants for NGSO 
satellites must state whether the probability that their spacecraft 
will collide with a large object during the orbital lifetime of the 
spacecraft will be less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The current NASA 
Standard defines a ``large object'' as an object larger than 10 cm in 
diameter. To date, many applicants have

[[Page 52427]]

used NASA's Debris Assessment Software to conduct the analysis for LEO 
spacecraft.
    Most commenters addressing this issue supported our proposal, and 
we adopt it. Some commenters appear to have misunderstood this 
proposal, believing that the proposal was to require a specific 
threshold for maneuvers in individual instances of predicted 
conjunctions, for example. The particular metric adopted is intended to 
address the overall collision risk of a satellite during its orbital 
lifetime, and not individual conjunction events. In preparing the risk 
assessment, applicants should use the latest version of the NASA Debris 
Assessment Software or a higher fidelity assessment tool.
    In the NPRM, the Commission also sought comment on whether, for 
purposes of conducting the analysis, and absent evidence to the 
contrary, the collision risk with large objects should be assumed zero 
or near zero during the period of the time when the space station is 
able to conduct collision avoidance maneuvers. Several commenters 
agreed with this approach. A number of commenters pointed out that this 
requires an assumption that maneuvering systems are 100% reliable, and 
some suggested instead incorporating the probability thresholds at 
which operators undertake collision avoidance maneuvers into the 
overall assessment of collision risk. Those thresholds vary among 
operators, but are typically at lower probabilities than the 0.001 
metric as applied through the NASA Debris Assessment Software. As a 
simplifying assumption, we believe the alternative assumption of zero 
is warranted. However, in individual cases, to the extent there is 
evidence that a particular system or operator is unable to effectively 
maneuver or is maneuvering only at risk thresholds that raise 
reasonable questions about its ability to meet the 0.001 collision risk 
metric even with some degree of maneuverability, this assumption will 
not be applied.
    Systems with Multiple Space Stations. In the NPRM, the Commission 
also sought comment on the assessment of the collision risk presented 
by a system as a whole, i.e., in the aggregate. Commenters expressed a 
variety of views on assessing probability of collision with large 
objects on a system-wide basis, including on what specific metrics, if 
any, should apply. Additionally, subsequent to the Notice, the revised 
ODMSP was issued, which includes a section discussing ``large 
constellations,'' and states that ``in determining the successful post-
mission disposal threshold [for large constellations], factors such as 
mass, collision probability, orbital location and other relevant 
parameters should be considered.'' As described in the Further Notice, 
we seek to develop the record further on this issue and how to address 
multi-satellite systems, including large constellations.
    GSO Satellites. The Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) suggests that 
we apply the requirement to GSO satellites as well as NGSO satellites, 
because GSO satellites can also be involved in collisions that would 
generate large amounts of un-trackable, long-term debris in the 
geostationary orbit (GEO) region. In the NPRM, the Commission proposed 
inclusion of the metric into the disclosure specifically for NGSO 
satellites. The NASA Standard formulation discussed in the Notice 
applies to ``each spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stage in or 
passing through LEO.'' \4\ Currently, all space station applicants, 
including applicants for GSO space stations, must provide a statement 
that the space station operator has assessed and limited the 
probability of the space station becoming a source of debris by 
collisions with large debris or other operational space stations. We 
believe that continuing to apply this disclosure approach to applicants 
for GSO systems is sufficient, without needing to adopt a specific 
metric at the current time. We encourage GSO operators to provide 
quantitative collision risk information, but believe that requiring 
such analysis as part of the initial application materials is 
unnecessary,\5\ given that GSO operators are assigned to particular 
orbital locations, including a specific ``station keeping box,'' and 
must comply with certain well-established disposal procedures.
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    \4\ NASA Standard, 4.5.2, at 36 (Requirement 4.5-1). Aerospace 
suggests that we limit the period of assessing collision probability 
to a finite time such as 100 years. Aerospace Comments at 8. We 
decline to adopt this into our rules, since we are not adopting a 
specific metric for GSO space stations. However, NGSO space stations 
not disposed of through atmosphere re-entry, i.e., space stations in 
medium-Earth orbit (MEO) may refer to this 100-year outer limit in 
implementing the collision risk assessment. See ODMSP 3-1.
    \5\ The Commission may request such analysis if there is an 
application for a particularly unique type of operation in the GEO 
region, or there is evidence to suggest that certain GSO operations 
may pose unique risks to the GEO environment.
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2. Collisions With Small Objects
    In the NPRM, the Commission sought comment on adding a quantifiable 
metric to our existing rules regarding the probability of a space 
station becoming a source of debris by collisions with small debris or 
meteoroids that could cause loss of control and prevent post-mission 
disposal. The NPRM referenced the NASA Standard, which states that for 
each spacecraft, the program or project shall demonstrate that, during 
the mission of the spacecraft, the probability of accidental collision 
with orbital debris and meteoroids sufficient to prevent compliance 
with the applicable post-mission disposal maneuver requirements does 
not exceed 0.01 (1 in 100). The revised ODMSP includes a similar 
provision.\6\ Our current rules require a statement that operators 
(both GSO and NGSO) have assessed and limited the probability of the 
satellite becoming a source of debris by collisions with small debris 
or meteoroids that could cause loss of control or prevent post-mission 
disposal. Generally, operators have provided information regarding 
spacecraft shielding, redundant systems, or other designs that would 
enable the spacecraft systems to survive a collision with small debris. 
Some operators have been providing the information specified in the 
NASA Standard, calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ ODMSP at 3-2. The ODMSP identifies micrometeoroids and 
orbital debris smaller than 1 cm. Id. As noted, an assessment 
performed using the NASA Debris Assessment Software will satisfy our 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Most commenters addressing this issue agreed with the inclusion of 
the NASA Standard-derived metric in our rules. NASA notes that this 
particular agency requirement, when applied to NASA missions, has been 
achievable and cost-effective with shielding, use of redundant systems, 
or other design or operational options. OneWeb disagrees with the 
inclusion of a separate small object collision metric, on the basis 
that the Commission should adopt a comprehensive deorbit reliability 
metric that accounts for all failure modes. In our view, adoption of 
this small object collision metric, along with the disposal reliability 
metric discussed below, sufficiently addresses potential satellite 
failure modes, because it takes into consideration both failures due to 
collisions with small debris and other potential sources of failure for 
post-mission disposal. We conclude that incorporating the NASA 
Standard-derived metric into our rules for NGSO applicants is in the 
public interest as it provides more certainty for operators regarding 
an acceptable disclosure of risk specifically related to collisions 
with small objects. We conclude that the benefits of this approach are 
worth the efforts of operators in performing an

[[Page 52428]]

additional calculation in preparation of their orbital debris 
mitigation plan, because this calculation may be completed using the 
NASA Debris Assessment Software or a comparable or higher fidelity 
assessment tool, and many applicants already conduct this assessment.
    We conclude that applicants for GSO space station will also be 
required to include a disclosure related to this metric. In the NPRM, 
the Commission had proposed to add this metric to our rules for both 
NGSO and GSO space stations, but we received several comments 
suggesting that inclusion of this metric into our rules for GSO space 
stations would be of limited utility. One of the commenters, Boeing, 
seems to have changed its view on this point in supplemental comments. 
Additionally, while Eutelsat suggests that the risks posed to GSO 
satellites in this area are materially lower than the risks posed to 
NGSO satellites, we do not see this as a reason not to apply the metric 
in our rules for GSO spacecraft, since it should be easier for those 
spacecraft to satisfy the rule. Accordingly, we adopt our proposal.
3. Disclosures Regarding Planned Orbit(s)
    Identification of Other Relevant Satellites and Systems. In the 
NPRM, the Commission sought comment on revising the wording of its rule 
regarding identifying other space stations that are operating in 
similar or identical orbits in low-Earth orbit. The Commission proposed 
revising the rule to require that, instead of identifying satellites 
with similar or identical orbits, the statement must identify planned 
and/or operational satellites with which the applicant's satellite 
poses a collision risk, and indicate what steps have been taken to 
coordinate with the other spacecraft system and facilitate future 
coordination, or what other measures the operator may use to avoid 
collisions. The Commission also proposed to extend this rule to all 
NGSO satellites, rather than just those that will be launched into the 
LEO region, since overlap in orbits among NGSO spacecraft in other 
regions may also result in collisions. Several commenters supported 
these revisions, and we adopt them.\7\ As part of the public record, 
this disclosure can also help to inform other operators that may be 
operating or plan to operate in the same region of space. Since this 
wording is similar to the previous rule, we find that there are 
unlikely to be significant additional costs from compliance with this 
disclosure requirement, but to the extent there are any additional 
costs in research and assessment of the environment in which the 
spacecraft will be located, we conclude they are warranted in the 
interest of ensuring that operators take into consideration other 
relevant space stations and systems when preparing orbital debris 
mitigation plans, and coordinate with those operators when necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ We also adopt a conforming rule that is applicable to 
applicants for the streamlined small satellite process in Sec.  
25.122 and streamlined small spacecraft process in Sec.  25.123. See 
Appendix A, Final Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSSMA and LeoSat oppose a requirement that the collision analysis 
include analysis with respect to planned systems, arguing that planned 
systems change frequently and not all systems are known. We clarify 
that the rule will require a disclosure identifying potential systems 
of concern, but does not require that the applicant's calculated 
collision risk include such systems (which would go beyond what can be 
assessed using the NASA Debris Assessment Software). It is important, 
however, that applicants assess planned systems, what impact such 
systems may have on their operations, and what coordination can be 
completed with the operators of such systems. While not all planned 
systems may come to fruition and there may be systems that would be 
unknown to applicants, such as foreign or government systems, we expect 
applicants to make best efforts to analyze the environment in which 
their satellites will be operating \8\ and specify how they plan to 
coordinate, to the extent possible, with other operators to ensure safe 
operations. Boeing asks that we clarify that the disclosure must 
specify only those other NGSO satellite systems ``the normal operation 
of which'' pose a risk of collision. We concur with Boeing's 
clarification of the rule, but decline to change the rule language 
since we believe that it is self-evident that an operator can only take 
into consideration the planned or normal operations of another 
operator's system.
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    \8\ Applicants may be able to assess planned systems based on 
filings with the Commission or International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU). We expect applicants to identify planned systems on a ``best 
efforts'' basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Orbit Selection and Other Orbital Characteristics. In the NPRM, the 
Commission also proposed that any applicants planning an NGSO 
constellation that would be deployed in the LEO region above 650 km in 
altitude specify why the applicant had chosen the particular orbit and 
describe other relevant characteristics of the orbit. The Commission 
reasoned that missions deploying above 650 km altitude may represent a 
greater risk from a long-term orbital debris perspective, since 
satellites that fail above that altitude will generally not re-enter 
Earth's atmosphere within 25 years, and depending on the deployment 
altitude, may be in orbit for centuries or longer. The Commission also 
sought comment on whether it should require a statement concerning the 
rationale for selecting an orbit from operators of satellites that will 
remain in orbit for a long period of time relative to the time needed 
to perform their mission.
    After review of the record, we decline to adopt these proposals. We 
conclude after further consideration that the long-term risks 
associated with deployments above 650 km are sufficiently addressed 
through our other rules, such as collision risk assessment, and 
reliability of post-mission disposal and that therefore the additional 
statement is not necessary. Indeed, application of the Commission's 
other orbital debris mitigation rules may in some instances result in 
an operator deciding to deploy below 650 km. While SpaceX, for example, 
supported the proposed disclosure regarding rationale for selecting a 
particular orbit, we conclude that concerns the Commission may have 
about risks associated with operations in a particular orbit can be 
adequately addressed through other measures addressed in this 
proceeding.
    We do adopt our proposal, however, that NGSO systems disclose 
information regarding other relevant characteristics of the chosen 
deployment orbit not already covered, such as the presence of a large 
concentration of existing debris in a particular orbit. Boeing states 
that the Commission should not adopt regulation in this area, because 
operators are adequately incentivized to select initial orbits that are 
sufficiently free of hazards, or invest in other measures to facilitate 
the safety of their satellites. We find that this disclosure will help 
to ensure that operators have considered all the characteristics of the 
deployment and operational orbits, and are fully aware of the risks 
associated with operations in the particular orbit. This may not always 
be the case, particularly with smaller operators or operators who use a 
rideshare launch. If an orbit is particularly congested with debris, 
for example, an operator may want to consider modifying its operations 
slightly to avoid having to perform a large number of collision 
avoidance maneuvers.
4. Orbit Variance and Orbit Selection for Large NGSO Systems
    The Notice sought comment on whether the Commission should adopt

[[Page 52429]]

an upper limit for variances in orbit for NGSO systems. ``Variance'' 
refers to the range of altitude, such as ``1025 km plus or minus 10 
km,'' in which a satellite or constellation of satellites will operate. 
The Commission asked whether variance in altitude should be limited in 
an NGSO system in order to enable more systems to co-exist in LEO 
without overlap in orbital altitude, and if so, how an appropriate 
limit should be set. We received a number of comments related to 
orbital variance for large NGSO systems, and even more comments on the 
related topic of whether, and how, the Commission should assign orbital 
altitude ranges for large constellations of NGSO satellites, such that 
the altitudes do not overlap.
    The question of whether two satellite systems can coexist in a 
given region of space, such as a circular LEO orbit, depends on 
multiple factors, including the number and size of satellites, the 
capabilities of the satellites such as maneuverability, costs of 
maneuvering (such as interruption of service), availability and 
timeliness of data on satellite parameters (both from telemetry and 
from radar or optical observations), planning cycles for maneuvers, and 
the time required to coordinate operations between systems, etc. Larger 
deployments of satellites into circular LEO orbits have been into 
separate orbital ``shells.'' As a practical matter, in cases where two 
planned systems propose use of the same shell, coordination typically 
results in one or both systems adjusting planned orbital altitudes, so 
that the constellations are separated, rather than in the operators 
coordinating their operations at the same or overlapping altitude 
ranges. While some commenters urge that we adopt specific requirements 
for separation of orbits, others argue that coordination, data sharing, 
and collision avoidance practices should be sufficient to avoid 
collisions, or that limits are not practicable for the regions in which 
some operators operate, particularly small satellite operators. ORBCOMM 
states that the operational availability of NGSO orbits appears likely 
to become an increasingly scarce resource, but states that it is 
premature to try and set rules on maximum altitude variance and orbit 
selections. Other commenters argue, particularly with respect to 
systems proposing large orbital variances, that the Commission must 
consider the impact of such systems on the rational, efficient, and 
economic use of orbital resources. At this time, we decline to adopt a 
maximum orbital variance for NGSO systems and decline to adopt a 
required separation between orbital locations, and will instead 
continue to address these issues case-by-case. There are a wide range 
of considerations in such cases, and while we are concerned about the 
risk of collisions between the space stations of NGSO systems operating 
at similar orbital altitudes, as the Commission has previously stated, 
we think that these concerns are best addressed in the first instance 
through inter-operator coordination.
    As part of the disclosure of system characteristics, we note that 
some applicants for large systems may be asked to provide a description 
of the planned orbital variance, and the relationship of that variance 
to the system's technical capabilities and operational requirements 
(e.g., ability to avoid collisions). Such applicants may also need to 
address how their system operations will accommodate spacecraft 
transiting through the system and other systems, large or small, 
operating in the same region. If operators require a large orbit 
variance for their system, particularly if this might substantially 
constrain operations by other systems, they should plan to describe why 
and explain whether other less impactful alternatives were considered.
5. Protection of Inhabitable Spacecraft
    The Commission proposed in the NPRM that for any NGSO space station 
deployed above the International Space Station (ISS) and that will 
transit through the ISS orbit either during or following the space 
station's operations, the applicant provide information about any 
operational constraints caused to the ISS or other inhabitable 
spacecraft \9\ and strategies used to avoid collision with such 
spacecraft. The Commission explained that normal operations of the ISS 
could be disrupted or constrained by collision avoidance maneuvers that 
the ISS would need to perform to avoid satellites transiting through 
the ISS orbit.
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    \9\ We use the term ``inhabitable spacecraft'' to mean any 
spacecraft capable of having crew aboard. Secure World Foundation 
points out that there may be additional human-occupied spacecraft on 
orbit in the coming years, and supports requirements that take these 
additional spacecraft into consideration. Secure World Foundation 
Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We conclude that it is in the public interest to adopt the proposed 
disclosure requirement.\10\ The statement must describe the design and 
operational strategies, if any, that will be used to minimize the risk 
of collision and enable the operator to avoid posing any undue 
operational constraints to the inhabitable spacecraft. Commenters agree 
that special protections should be afforded to inhabitable spacecraft. 
We find that requiring this information will help to ensure that the 
applicant has taken into consideration the inhabitable spacecraft, and 
will provide information in the public record to help the Commission 
and other interested parties, such as NASA, determine if there are any 
potential issues with the applicant's operations vis-[agrave]-vis the 
ISS or other inhabitable spacecraft. NASA states that disruption to ISS 
operations may be lessened if a spacecraft in the process of disposal 
through atmospheric reentry remains active and able to maneuver until 
the apogee is below ISS altitude. We conclude that the benefits in 
assuring the safety of human life in space and minimizing disruption to 
the operations of inhabitable spacecraft outweighs any additional cost 
to applicants in preparing such a disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ This includes transit either during the applicant space 
stations' mission or de-orbit phase. See Appendix A, Final Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Maneuverability
    Disclosure. Maneuverability can be an important component of space 
debris mitigation, both by enabling space stations to engage in 
collision avoidance and by facilitating spacecraft disposal. The 
Commission proposed in the NPRM that applicants disclose the extent of 
maneuverability of the planned space stations. The Commission noted 
this could include an explanation of the number of collision avoidance 
maneuvers the satellite could be expected to make, and/or any other 
means the satellite may have to avoid conjunction events, including the 
period both during the satellite's operational lifetime and during the 
remainder of its time in space prior to disposal. The Commission 
tentatively concluded that this information could assist in the 
Commission's public interest determination, particularly regarding any 
burden that other operators would have to bear in order to avoid 
collisions and false conjunction warnings. Most commenters addressing 
this topic agree with the maneuverability disclosure, and we adopt this 
disclosure.
    LeoSat disagrees with the proposal, arguing that specific 
information related to satellite maneuverability is proprietary and 
competitive in nature, that public disclosure of this information as 
part of an application could prompt a ``race to the bottom'' among 
satellite operators, and that any information initially disclosed in an 
application will become stale and inaccurate as the operator's 
satellites age and their propulsion capacity is consumed. It does not 
appear that LeoSat has support among fellow

[[Page 52430]]

satellite operators for its proposition that satellite maneuverability 
information is proprietary and competitive. Further, even if such 
information has some potential ``competitive'' value, such information 
would likely need to be shared with another operator in the event of a 
potential conjunction, and all operators will be better able to make 
informed decisions if they have a baseline understanding of the 
maneuvering potential of other satellites in orbit. Moreover, it is not 
clear to us how disclosure would cause a ``race to the bottom,'' and 
even if information became outdated as some spacecraft were no longer 
able to maneuver, having initial information on what capabilities the 
satellites were designed with could still assist the Commission in its 
review of the system and also assist other operators. We find that the 
benefits of having information regarding maneuverability as part of the 
record outweigh these commenters' generalized competitive concerns. 
Boeing also disagrees in some respects with the proposed disclosure on 
the basis that the Commission has not provided guidance on the number 
of avoidance maneuvers that would be presumptively deemed acceptable. 
We plan to consider the maneuverability disclosure as factual 
information, and at this time do not establish a presumptive number of 
avoidance maneuvers that would trigger concern. We believe that on 
balance, this area is an appropriate one for a disclosure and provides 
useful information, including to other operators. We encourage 
operators to submit as much information as they reasonably can 
regarding maneuverability, ideally providing the type of information 
mentioned by NASA in its comments, including maneuver methods and 
capabilities, as well as any other mechanisms to mitigate conjunction 
likelihood (e.g., cross-sectional area modulation). This would also 
include information regarding the propulsive technology itself (i.e., 
ion thrusters, traditional chemical thrusters, etc.), thrust level, and 
a description of the guidance and operations scheme for determining 
maneuvers, where applicable. Generally speaking, operators should 
submit a written description of the space stations' expected 
capabilities, including, if possible, the expected time it would take 
the space station to modify its orbital location by a certain distance 
to avoid a collision.
    Propulsion or Maneuverability Above a Certain Altitude. The 
Commission also sought comment in the NPRM on whether it should require 
all NGSO satellites planning to operate above a particular altitude to 
have propulsion capabilities reserved for station-keeping and to enable 
collision avoidance maneuvers, regardless of whether propulsion is 
necessary to de-orbit within 25 years, and if so, what altitude should 
be adopted. A number of commenters supported some requirement along 
these lines, with some identifying 400 km as an altitude above which 
propulsion or other maneuvering capabilities should be required, 
generally based on the approximate operational altitude of the ISS. 
Other commenters disagreed with this suggestion. We seek to expand the 
record on this potential requirement in the Further Notice.

C. Tracking and Data Sharing

    In the NPRM, the Commission observed that the successful 
identification of satellites and sharing of tracking data are important 
factors in the provision of timely and accurate assessments of 
potential conjunctions with other spacecraft. We continue to believe 
that improvements in the ability to track and identify satellites may 
help to reduce the risk of collisions. These factors can help to enable 
effective collision avoidance through coordination between operators, 
and improve the accuracy of conjunction warnings, whether those 
warnings are from a public or private entity specializing in space 
situational awareness and space traffic management. The Commission made 
several specific proposals in the Notice related to trackability, 
identification, and sharing of tracking data, which are discussed 
below. We adopt a number of our proposals in this area, while ensuring 
that our rules provide flexibility for the continued advancement of 
space situational awareness and space traffic management functions, 
including any transition of certain activities in the United States to 
a civilian entity, and the accommodation of non-governmental 
associations and other private sector enterprises engaged in these 
functions.
    We also received several comments addressing improvements to the 
U.S. space situational awareness and space traffic management functions 
more generally. In this proceeding, the Commission has not considered 
other activities related to space situational awareness and space 
traffic management, such as maintaining a comprehensive catalog of 
space objects or providing conjunction warnings. These functions as a 
general matter are well beyond the type of analysis that we have 
historically addressed through our rules and licensing process, but we 
suggest that these comments be filed for consideration in the 
proceeding currently underway in the Commerce Department, if they have 
not been already, so that the comments can be taken into consideration 
in that context.
    Relatedly, the Commerce Department notes that its Request for 
Information on Commercial Capabilities in Space Situational Awareness 
Data and Space Traffic Management Services (RFI), issued last year, 
will have bearing on the Commission's proposals in this proceeding, and 
asked us to take their RFI into consideration in this proceeding. We 
have reviewed the comments filed in response to the RFI, and note that 
in some instances they are the same in part, or similar to comments 
submitted to the docket file for the instant proceeding. Other comments 
to the RFI focus on space situational awareness and space traffic 
management functions, such as development of an open architecture data 
repository, that are not directly germane to the Commission's 
proposals.
1. Trackability and Satellite Identification
    Trackability. The Commission proposed in the NPRM to require a 
statement from an applicant regarding the ability to track the proposed 
satellites using space situational awareness facilities, such as the 
U.S. Space Surveillance Network. The Commission also proposed that 
objects greater than 10 cm by 10 cm by 10 cm in size be presumed 
trackable for LEO. For objects with any dimension less than 10 cm, the 
Commission proposed that the applicant provide additional information 
concerning trackability, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis.
    Commenters generally support the proposed approach to size as it 
relates to trackability. NASA recommends that the term ``satellite 
trackability'' be interpreted to mean that an object is trackable if, 
through the regular operation of space situational awareness assets, it 
can be tracked and maintained so as to be re-acquirable at will, and 
that the object's orbital data is sufficient for conjunction 
assessments. According to NASA, this will typically mean that the 
object possesses trackability traits (e.g., sufficient size and radar/
optical cross-section) to allow it to be acquired routinely by multiple 
space situational awareness assets in their regular modes of operation. 
Several commenters agree that in LEO, a 10 x 10 x 10 cm cube should 
meet this standard. We agree, and adopt the proposed rule stating that

[[Page 52431]]

space stations of this size in LEO are deemed presumptively trackable, 
modified slightly to cover space stations that are 10 cm or larger in 
their smallest dimension.\11\ We clarify that this presumption covers 
those space stations that are 10 cm or larger in their smallest 
dimension excluding deployable components.\12\
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    \11\ This would enable a spherical space station, for example, 
to presumptively satisfy the rule so long as it has a diameter of 10 
cm or greater.
    \12\ Space stations smaller than 10 cm in the smallest 
dimension, but which will use deployable components to enhance 
trackability will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSSMA proposes that the Commission require applicants to simply 
certify that they can be tracked reliably by widely available tracking 
technology. Swarm similarly suggests that the rules permit smaller 
satellite form factors pursuant to an affirmative demonstration that 
such spacecraft can be accurately tracked, and that size should be 
merely one factor in assessing trackability. Although there may be 
future improvements in standard space situational awareness tracking 
facilities, at this time we believe it is in the public interest to 
adopt the presumed trackable approach for space stations in LEO larger 
than 10 cm in the smallest dimension, and for other cases, including 
where a satellite is planning to use deployable devices to increase the 
surface area, we conclude that operators should provide more 
information to support their conclusion that the space station will be 
reliably trackable. For a spacecraft smaller than 10 cm x 10 cm x 10 
cm, for example, some of the standard space situational awareness 
tracking facilities may no longer be able to track the satellite. In 
these instances, part of a demonstration supporting a finding of 
trackability may be a showing that the operator has taken on the cost 
of bringing the trackability back up to the level it would be for a 
larger spacecraft, perhaps by enlisting a commercial space situational 
awareness provider. CSSMA and others argue that the Commission should 
permit operators flexibility to choose appropriate solutions, and that 
ground-based space situational awareness capabilities may improve 
significantly in the future. We find that our approach provides 
operators with flexibility to satisfy the Commission's rule, because it 
permits a case-by-case assessment of trackability where the space 
station is smaller than 10 cm in the smallest diameter. Global NewSpace 
Operators argues that we should provide further detail on what 
information we are looking for in the disclosure, for example, to what 
accuracy and how often should tracking occur, and whether we will ask 
for verification from the space situational awareness provider that 
they can indeed track the proposed satellites. We decline to provide 
additional detailed guidance in our rules on this topic, as an 
acceptable disclosure could vary significantly depending on the 
trackability solution that will be used by the applicant. We expect, 
however, that applicants will specify the tracking solution and provide 
some indication of prior successful demonstrated use of the technology 
or service, either as part of a commercial or government venture. This 
would include addressing reliability of deployment of any deployable 
spacecraft parts that are being relied on for tracking. Tracking 
solutions that have not been well-established or previously 
demonstrated will be subject to additional scrutiny, and applicants may 
need to consider a back-up solution in those instances.
    In addition, our rule provides flexibility for trackability 
demonstrations above LEO, where Aerospace states that it is not clear 
that a 10 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm object could be reliably tracked. 
Aerospace states that the assumed size for reliable tracking in the GEO 
region by the current Space Surveillance Network is one meter, done 
primarily with optical sensors. The Commission will address the 
trackability demonstration on a case-by-case basis for satellites that 
would operate above the LEO region, including in the GEO region, and we 
do not see the need at this time to include a specific size value in 
our rules for those space stations.
    In the NPRM, the Commission inquired whether there were hardware or 
information sharing requirements that might improve tracking 
capabilities, and whether such technologies are sufficiently developed 
that a requirement for their use would be efficient and effective. 
Aerospace suggests that hardware such as transponders or other 
signature enhancements and data sharing would benefit trackability, but 
it is not clear that any commercial transponder hardware or 
comprehensive data sharing methods currently exist. Aerospace states 
that a potential rule could drive development in this area, and 
consider enhancements such as radar reflectors for small objects in 
orbits well above LEO. NASA cautions against relying on active tracking 
assistance that would no longer occur once the spacecraft is unpowered, 
and observes that at the present time, on-board tracking improvement 
methods such as beacons or corner cube reflectors are not sufficiently 
supported by space situational awareness assets to enable significant 
and reliable tracking improvements. Keplerian Tech suggests that the 
Commission should mandate the use of an independent transponder 
solution, such as the space beacon that it has developed. Swarm 
suggests that trackability can be improved through the use of active or 
passive signature enhancements, such as the passive radar retro 
reflectors that would be used by Swarm's proposed satellites. CSSMA 
opposes a specification of any particular type of tracking technology, 
and suggests that mandating use of an independent tracking solution 
would impose unnecessary costs on operators. According to CSSMA, the 
level of trackability needed to maintain a safe orbital environment can 
already be attained by well-established active or passive tracking 
methods.
    We conclude that the provision of position data in addition to 
standard space situational awareness data, through radiofrequency 
identification tags or other means, may ultimately be a way to support 
a finding that a spacecraft smaller than 10 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm is 
trackable, but until the establishment of the commercial data 
repository, reliance on most alternative technologies does not appear 
to be readily implementable. A number of commenters oppose the adoption 
of any rule that would specify a particular type of tracking 
technology. We agree. While we encourage operators to use various means 
to ensure that their spacecraft is trackable and to help ensure that 
accurate positioning information can be obtained, we believe it is 
premature to require that operators use a particular tracking solution, 
such as an independent transponder. As technologies for obtaining 
spacecraft positioning information continue to evolve, however, we may 
revisit this issue in the future.
    We do adopt the disclosure proposed in the NPRM that applicants 
specify whether space station tracking will be active (that is, with 
participation of the operator by emitting signals via transponder or 
sharing data with other operators) or passive (that is, solely by 
ground based radar or optical tracking of the object. This disclosure, 
in connection with the other descriptive disclosures discussed in this 
section, will provide a way for the Commission and any interested 
parties to understand the extent to which the operator is able to 
obtain satellite positioning information separately from information 
provided by the 18th Space Control Squadron or other space situational 
awareness facilities. We believe this

[[Page 52432]]

requirement presents minimal costs, since an operator will readily have 
access to this information based on the basic characteristics of its 
spacecraft (for example, will it be transmitting its Global Positioning 
System location information via transponder?). Operators are likely to 
select either active or passive means of tracking depending on the 
mission specifications, but it is useful for the Commission to 
understand as part of its holistic review of the application, the 
overall trackability and ability to identify the satellite.
    Relatedly, we also adopt the NPRM proposal that operators certify 
that their space station will have a unique telemetry marker allowing 
it to be distinguished from other satellites or space objects. This is 
the same as the certification we have previously adopted for small 
satellites applying under the streamlined process, and is unlikely to 
pose any additional costs for most operators, since the vast majority 
of operators already distinguish their satellite's signal from other 
signals through use of unique signal characteristics. Few commenters 
addressed this issue, and some expressed support or sought 
clarification. As we clarified in the Small Satellite Order, we expect 
that when a spacecraft transmits telemetry data to the ground it will 
include in that transmission some marker that allows the spacecraft to 
be differentiated from other spacecraft. This signal-based 
identification marker, which should be different from those of other 
objects on a particular launch, can assist with identification of a 
satellite for space situational awareness purposes. Boeing argues that 
the Commission does not need to verify whether an active telemetry 
marker will be unique since satellite operators have adequate 
incentives to distinguish their own telemetry beacons from those of 
other satellites, but we disagree, because smaller-scale operators may 
not have these incentives or know that they should implement this type 
telemetry marker to help identify their satellite.
    Identification. Additionally, the Commission sought comment on 
whether applicants should be required by rule to provide information 
about the initial deployment to the 18th Space Control Squadron or any 
successor civilian entity. We noted that, as an example, communications 
with the 18th Space Control Squadron may be particularly important in 
the case of a multi-satellite deployment to assist in the 
identification of a particular satellite. We adopt a rule requiring 
that applicants disclose how the operator plans to identify the space 
station(s) following deployment, for example, how the operator plans to 
obtain initial telemetry.\13\ We expect that for most operators this 
disclosure will be fairly straightforward, but requesting this 
information, alongside the other information requested on satellite 
trackability, will help the Commission and any other interested parties 
to understand whether the satellite poses a risk of being misidentified 
following deployment, for example, in the case of a multi-satellite 
deployment. As Global NewSpace Operators suggests, we will consider 
favorably in an application the use of radiofrequency transponder tags 
or other unique telemetry markers that can support the identification 
of objects once in orbit. Overall, we want to emphasize the importance 
of operators planning for satellite identification in advance so that 
they are able to troubleshoot potential issues, particularly for multi-
satellite deployments. Also, as the Secure World Foundation suggests, 
we encourage additional research in this area on how identification 
aids may help distinguish one satellite from another early after 
payload separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See Appendix A, Final Rules. We also adopt a conforming 
rule in Sec.  25.122 that is applicable to small satellites and 
small spacecraft applying under the streamlined processes. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also adopt a requirement that applicants must disclose whether 
the satellite will be registered with the 18th Space Control Squadron 
or successor civilian entity. At this time, the typical registration 
process for new operators includes contacting the 18th Space Control 
Squadron via email with information on the satellite common name, 
launch date and time window, launch location and launching agency, the 
satellite owning organization and operating organization, the contact 
information for the operations center, and any usernames for the 
website Space-Track.org. A number of established operators also 
maintain ongoing relationships with the 18th Space Control Squadron, 
either directly or through intermediary organizations, such as the 
Space Data Association, and routinely exchange information about 
upcoming launch activities. It is possible that this process may change 
in the future, but we adopt a disclosure requirement broad enough to 
accommodate ``registration'' generally, even if the process changes. We 
conclude that the costs associated with the disclosure, to the extent 
they are not already routinely followed by most established operations, 
are outweighed by the importance of operators sharing information with 
a central entity that can provide space situational awareness support. 
Additionally, the operators themselves benefit from the services that 
are provided at no charge by the 18th Space Control Squadron, and so 
the burden of operators disclosing whether they are in fact benefiting 
from these services is minimal.
2. Ongoing Space Situational Awareness
    Sharing Ephemeris and Other Information. In addition to the sharing 
of information related to initial identification of a satellite 
included in the NPRM, the Commission also proposed that space station 
operators share ephemeris and information on any planned maneuvers with 
the 18th Space Control Squadron or any successor civilian entity. The 
Commission sought comment on whether this should be a requirement 
implemented through a rule. The Commission also sought comment on 
whether NGSO operators should be required to maintain ephemeris data 
for each satellite they operate and share that data with any other 
operator identified in its disclosure of any operational space stations 
that may raise a collision risk. The Commission observed that this 
requirement would help to facilitate communications between operators 
even before a potential conjunction warning is given.
    Most commenters agreed with the goals of the proposed requirements. 
Some commenters argue that data sharing exchanges should respect owner/
operator intellectual property and proprietary information and should 
be limited to only the information necessary to describe explicit 
maneuvers, initial deployment, or conjunction avoidance. Several 
commenters also seek flexibility to share maneuverability and status 
data using any reasonable method identified by the providing operator. 
After consideration of the record on this issue, we adopt a disclosure 
requirement regarding sharing of ephemeris and other data. 
Specifically, we adopt a rule stating that applicants must disclose the 
extent to which the space station operator plans to share information 
regarding initial deployment, ephemeris, and/or planned maneuvers with 
the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity, or other entities 
that engage in space situational awareness or space traffic management 
functions, and/or other operators. This also includes disclosure of 
risk thresholds for when an operator will deem it appropriate to 
conduct a collision avoidance maneuver. This disclosure provides an 
opportunity for the Commission to assess the extent to

[[Page 52433]]

which the operator is actively engaging with space situational 
awareness facilities, keeping in mind that the need for such engagement 
may vary depending on the scale of the system.\14\ We observe that for 
certain types of systems, for example, those using electric propulsion, 
sharing of ephemeris data is particularly critical in preventing 
collisions, and so we would look for a detailed description of those 
plans when assessing the application for those systems. The disclosure 
will also assist other operators in understanding how they may be able 
to best coordinate with the applicants' system and provide flexibility 
for operators to demonstrate how their plans for sharing information 
will facilitate space safety. As one example, a particular operator may 
decide to share ephemeris information with the private Space Data 
Association, which would be indicated in its disclosure. This also 
addresses any operator's concerns regarding proprietary information and 
security, since operators concerned with these issues could take them 
into consideration as part of their plan for how to share 
ephemeris.\15\
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    \14\ We also adopt a conforming edit in Sec.  25.122 to the 
rules applicable to small satellite and small spacecraft applicants 
for streamlined processing. See Appendix A, Final Rules.
    \15\ We would expect, however, that if there are significant 
limitations on ways in which information that is being shared, or 
the quantity of information shared, the operator will demonstrate 
that it is not compromising space safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also extend this disclosure to experimental and amateur systems 
at the authorization stage. As with the rule updates discussed above, 
we believe the benefits of this disclosure in encouraging space safety 
and coordination outweigh any costs to the operator in specifying the 
extent to which, and how, it will share ephemeris and other information 
during operations.
    Tyvak suggests that requiring licensees to submit information 
pertaining to planned maneuvers is not conducive to the flexibility of 
agile space, but we do not see how submission of information in advance 
of planned maneuvers would have any significant impact on an operator's 
ability to perform such spacecraft maneuvers, and may provide other 
operators with useful information about the planned scope of operations 
that will facilitate coordination. Although we are adopting a 
disclosure requirement rather than an operational requirement, if this 
information changes during the course of the system's operations, the 
operator will need to update the file for its license or grant by 
specifying how it has changed.
    We conclude that this disclosure is more beneficial than a more 
specific requirement, as it provides flexibility for operators to use a 
combination of different resources, including private sector space 
situational awareness resources, as well as accommodate potential 
changes in the U.S. entity responsible for space situational awareness 
and space traffic management functions relevant to non-Federal 
operators. In the near term, we encourage all operators to engage with 
the 18th Space Control Squadron, either directly or through 
intermediary organizations, and avail themselves of the space 
situational awareness and space traffic management functions that the 
18th Space Control Squadron provides. At this time, we do not adopt a 
separate operational requirement regarding sharing of information with 
the 18th Space Control Squadron or other operators whose systems may 
pose a collision risk. We conclude that requirement is unnecessary 
given the application disclosure requirement we adopt here as well as 
the separate certification that upon receipt of a space situational 
awareness conjunction warning, the operator will review and take all 
possible steps to assess the collision risk, and will mitigate the 
collision risk if necessary--and that the assessment and potential 
mitigation should include, as appropriate, sharing ephemeris data and 
other relevant operational information.
    Conjunction Warnings. The Commission proposed that applicants for 
NGSO space stations certify that, upon receipt of a conjunction 
warning, the operator of the satellite will take all possible steps to 
assess and, if necessary, to mitigate collision risk, including, but 
not limited to: Contacting the operator of any active spacecraft 
involved in such warning; sharing ephemeris data and other appropriate 
operational information directly with any such operator; and modifying 
spacecraft attitude and/or operations. The Commission also sought 
comment on whether any different or additional requirements should be 
considered regarding the ability to track and identify satellites in 
NGSO or respond to conjunction warnings.
    As discussed below, based on the record, we adopt the proposal from 
the NPRM. We believe this certification will enhance certainty among 
operators, and thereby help to reduce collision risk. Most commenters 
addressing this issue agreed generally with the Commission's proposal, 
although some commenters had varying views on implementation of the 
proposed requirement. NASA and Aerospace recommend that applicants 
submit information outlining plans that they intend to follow 
operationally in order to minimize collision risk. Global NewSpace 
Operators suggests that the Commission simply require the applicant to 
have an operational procedure and process for a conjunction warning, 
rather than a certification. We see the potential benefits of having 
applicants outline operational steps to minimize collision risk, but we 
believe that the information that would be included in this type of 
submission is already addressed by other aspects of the rules. As 
described above, we will request information on maneuverability of the 
satellites, and applicants will be required to disclose how they have 
coordinated or plan to coordinate with other operators whose satellites 
may pose a collision risk, as well as disclose how they plan to share 
ephemeris and other information during the course of the spacecraft 
operations.
    Other commenters suggest modifications to the language of the 
proposed rule to provide operators with some additional flexibility 
when responding to conjunction warnings. The Commission's proposed rule 
stated that the space station operator ``must certify that upon receipt 
of a space situational awareness conjunction warning, the operator will 
review the warning and take all possible steps to assess and, if 
necessary, to mitigate collision risk, including, but not limited to: 
Contacting the operator of any active spacecraft involved in such a 
warning; sharing ephemeris data and other appropriate operational 
information with any such operator; modifying space station attitude 
and/or operations.'' Several commenters, including SIA, Telesat, and 
others, were concerned that the use of the term ``all possible steps'' 
would not give operators enough flexibility to decide how to respond, 
and proposed the language ``appropriate steps'' instead. Taking into 
consideration the concerns expressed in the record, we adopt a slightly 
different formulation of the certification. Specifically, the rule we 
adopt states that the space station operator must certify that upon 
receipt of a space situational awareness conjunction warning, the 
operator will review and take all possible steps to assess the 
collision risk, and will mitigate the collision risk if necessary. As 
appropriate, steps to assess and mitigate the collision risk should 
include, but are not limited to: Contacting the operator of any active 
spacecraft involved in such a warning; sharing ephemeris data

[[Page 52434]]

and other appropriate operational information with any such operator; 
and modifying space station attitude and/or operations. We believe that 
the terms ``if necessary'' and ``as appropriate'' provide sufficient 
flexibility for operators to determine what is appropriate in 
individual cases. Finally, Boeing suggests that this requirement may be 
unnecessary, because operators already have sufficient incentives to 
avoid collision risks. We conclude, however, that this certification is 
useful in ensuring that all space actors, in particular new space 
actors, are aware of and have planned responses to conjunction 
warnings, consistent with responsible space operations.
    We also encourage operators to reference industry-recognized best 
practices in addressing conjunction warnings. NASA, for example, notes 
that there are currently industry-recognized best practices of 
submitting ephemerides to the 18th Space Control Squadron for 
screening, examining and processing all resultant conjunction warnings 
from each conjunction screening, mitigating high-interest events at a 
level consistent with the mission's risk mitigation strategy, and 
explicit conjunction avoidance screening by the 18th Space Control 
Squadron of ephemerides that include any risk mitigation maneuvers 
prior to maneuver execution.

D. Topics Related to Creation of Debris During Operations

    The Commission's existing orbital debris rules require disclosure 
of debris released during normal operations. This has been a 
longstanding requirement, and is consistent with the revised U.S. 
Government Standard Practices objective regarding ``Control of Debris 
Released During Normal Operations.'' The Commission observed in 2004 
that communications space stations do not typically involve the release 
of planned debris. Although there are some unique experiments on space 
stations today that do potentially involve the planned release of 
debris, we observe that most communications space stations still do not 
typically release debris absent some type of anomaly. Where there is a 
planned release of debris, however, we examine such plans on a case-by-
case basis. Accordingly, the Commission did not propose to update our 
general rule in this area, as it has functioned well for the past 15 
years. In the Notice, the Commission did propose to update its rules, 
however, in two specific areas related to the release of debris, 
discussed below, which reflect evolving satellite and launch 
technologies.
1. Deployment Devices
    In the NPRM, the Commission observed that in several instances 
applicants sought to deploy satellites using deployment mechanisms that 
detach from or are ejected from a launch vehicle upper stage and are 
designed solely as a means of deploying a satellite or satellites, and 
not intended for other operations--and that once these mechanisms have 
deployed the onboard satellite(s), they become orbital debris. In one 
example, the Commission received applications for communications with 
deployment devices designed to deploy smaller spacecraft after the 
devices separating from the launch vehicle. In another example, the 
Commission received an application for an experimental satellite that 
would be released from a tubular cylinder deployer, using a spring 
mechanism. There are also more well-established uses of deployment 
devices, such as a separation ring used to facilitate the launch of 
geostationary satellites. Several commenters explain the advantages of 
use of deployment devices such as rings or other deployment vehicles, 
sometimes referred to as ``free-flyers,'' stating, for example, that 
such devices can allow safe, reliable deployment of multiple 
spacecraft. Spaceflight posits that deployment devices contribute to a 
safe space environment, where such devices allow spacecraft to be 
placed into orbit using well-established launch services and well-
designed and planned deployment missions.
    The Commission proposed in the NPRM to require disclosure by 
applicants if ``free-flying'' deployment devices are used to deploy 
their spacecraft, as well as requiring a specific justification for 
their use. We adopt our proposal, and require that applicants for a 
Commission license disclose whether they plan to have their spacecraft 
deployed using a deployment device. This includes disclosure of all 
devices, defined as separate deployment devices, distinct from the 
space station launch vehicle, regardless of whether they will be 
authorized by the Commission.\16\ Although in some instances it is 
difficult to draw a clear line between a launch vehicle and deployment 
device, for purposes of this rule, as explained below, we consider a 
deployment device to be a device not permanently physically attached to 
or otherwise controlled as part of the launch vehicle. For purposes of 
this discussion, we distinguish between consideration of orbital debris 
mitigation issues involving such free-flying deployment devices and 
consideration of orbital debris mitigation issues involving multi-
satellite deployments generally, including use of deployment devices 
that are part of or remain attached to the launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ For Commission-authorized devices, as explained below, this 
can be disclosed by referencing the deployment device application 
file number. Devices not authorized by the Commission could include, 
for example, deployment devices not requiring an authorization for 
radiocommunications, or obtaining an authorization for 
radiocommunications from an administration other than the United 
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have considered the arguments of Eutelsat, University Small-
Satellite Researchers, and Boeing, who suggest that it would be 
burdensome for space station applicants to disclose information 
regarding free-flying or uncoupled deployment devices. Eutelsat states 
that satellite operators are not responsible for launch procedure and 
do not choose the specific deployment device used for launch of their 
satellite, which may not be determined until after the space station 
application is submitted. Some commenters suggest that information 
regarding a free-flying deployment device should be outside the scope 
of the Commission's purview, either for jurisdictional or practical 
reasons. We disagree with these points. It is reasonable to consider 
objects with limited purpose, other than launch vehicles, as part of 
the deployment or operations of a Commission-licensed spacecraft. Free-
flying deployment devices are, in terms of their effect on the orbital 
debris environment, indistinguishable from lens covers, tie-down 
cables, and other similar devices, in that they fulfill a limited 
function and then become debris. In some instances, the required 
disclosure may be as straightforward as incorporating by reference the 
information contained in a separate Commission application that has 
been submitted by the operator of the deployment device. In other 
instances, the space station operator will need to obtain the 
information regarding the deployment device from the operator and/or 
manufacturer of that device. The space station operator will be able to 
obtain this information, since the space station will be using the 
deployment device. Second, our experience has been that FAA launch-
related analyses do not include consideration of free-flying or 
separated deployment devices, since such devices are not considered 
part of the launch vehicle. In this sense, depending on the factual 
scenario, the devices can be considered either ``spacecraft'' or 
``operational debris'' related to the

[[Page 52435]]

authorized space stations.\17\ Our goal is to avoid a regulatory gap in 
which the orbital debris issues associated with a particular deployment 
device are not under review by any government entity. We will continue 
to coordinate with the FAA as needed, and in any case where an 
applicant believes that the deployment device would be under the FAA's 
authority, the applicant should make us aware so we can coordinate with 
the FAA in the particular case and avoid overlapping review. Eutelsat 
points out that in some instances the launching entity may not even be 
within U.S. jurisdiction or regulatory authority. In these instances, 
the operator should still provide information regarding use of any 
free-flying or separated deployment devices, consistent with our policy 
to require same information related to orbital debris mitigation from 
market access applicants as from U.S. license applicants. For example, 
it would not be in the public interest for us to authorize market 
access for a non-U.S.-licensed satellite where the satellite meets our 
orbital debris mitigation requirements, but will be deployed by a free-
flying device that has a 200-year on-orbit lifetime and presents a 
significant collision risk. Although, as Eutelsat states, market access 
may be requested long after the satellite is launched, that fact has 
not prevented us from applying our orbital debris regulations to such 
satellites in the past.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ In the NPRM, we proposed that the rule cover any separate 
deployment devices ``not part of the space station launch.'' 33 FCC 
Rcd at 11396, Appendix A, Proposed Rules. In an effort to clarify 
the scope of the rule, we adopt a slightly different formulation 
here, which states that the rule covers any separate deployment 
devices that are ``distinct from the space station launch 
vehicle,that may become a source of orbital debris.'' See Appendix 
A, Final Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We will continue to largely assess these on a case-by-case basis at 
this time, since the individual facts can vary widely and so it is 
difficult to assess specific disclosure rules for each different type 
of device that may be used.\18\ Consistent with the NPRM proposal, we 
will require that applicants disclosing the use of a deployment device 
also provide an orbital debris mitigation disclosure for any separate 
deployment devices. The information provided by applicants should 
address basic orbital debris principles, such as the orbital lifetime 
of the device, and collision risk associated with the device itself. 
Where applicable, the information should also address the method, 
sequencing, and timing by which the spacecraft be deployed into orbit. 
Boeing opposes the adoption of an information disclosure requirement 
absent ``clear and objective criteria articulating when the use of such 
devices is permissible.'' There are a variety of facts to assess in 
connection with use of deployment device and potential for contribution 
to the orbital debris environment. In some uses, a deployment device 
may become debris, but serve to decrease the collision risk associated 
with the individual deployed objects. In the case of well-established 
deployment practices, such as use of a detachable separator ring for a 
GSO deployment, the disclosure should be relatively straightforward, 
and we would not expect operators to provide significant detail 
regarding utilization of such a deployment practice. In other 
instances, use of a deployment device may increase the risk of 
collision among satellites deployed from the device, as compared to 
other means of deployment, even where the device itself may present a 
low risk. The different factual scenarios presented here illustrate the 
difficulty in making a ``one-size-fits-all'' rule when it comes to 
determining what is an acceptable use of a deployment device. We 
conclude the more effective approach at this time is to adopt a 
disclosure requirement, and to continue to assess the specific uses on 
a case-by-case basis. Disclosure in this instance provides flexibility 
to address new developments in space station design and facilitates the 
Commission identifying facts to support decisions to grant, condition, 
or deny an authorization in a manner consistent with the Communications 
Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ In ex parte filings, SIA expresses concern with the 
Commission's review of deployment devices on a case-by-case basis 
without identifying any criteria for their permissible use, such as 
required number of years for disposal. See Letter from Tom Stroup, 
President, Satellite Industry Association, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC, IB Docket No. 18-313, Attach. at 4 (email to Tom 
Sullivan, Chief of the International Bureau, FCC) (filed April 15, 
2020) (SIA Apr. 15, 2020 Ex Parte). We would have concerns regarding 
use of a deployment device if the device constitutes a debris object 
that exceeds 25 years on orbit in the LEO region, or exceeds the 
0.001 collision risk probability that would be assessed if it were 
an otherwise functional spacecraft, for example, as indicia 
associated with negatively contributing to the debris environment. 
See also Letter from Bruce A. Olcott, Counsel to the Boeing Company, 
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, IB Docket No. 18-313, at 3 
(filed April 16, 2020) (Boeing Apr. 16, 2020 Ex Parte). Boeing 
argues that deployment devices should be addressed in the Further 
Notice, see id., but we find that the disclosure-based approach 
adopted here is appropriate for the limited number of cases and 
variety of factual scenarios involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also received a number of comments related to the best means in 
which to evaluate collision risk specifically associated with the 
deployment of multiple satellites from a deployment device (e.g., re-
contact analysis). We expect that recontact analysis will be conducted 
by operators, and that information will be provided to the Commission, 
but we do not adopt specific rules in this Order on how to conduct a 
re-contact analysis in the instance where a deployment device is 
deploying multiple satellites. Free-flying deployers releasing multiple 
satellites are still relatively new, and there is not consensus on what 
constitutes an adequate analysis of re-contact risk, and the extent to 
which re-contact risk is different from typical collision risk in terms 
of likelihood of creating debris. Accordingly, we will continue to 
assess this issue on a case-by-case basis in the context of a 
particular mission profile. In addition to compiling information 
regarding collision risk, however, we encourage operators of free-
flying deployment devices to adopt practices that will help reduce 
risks associated with multi-satellite deployments--including 
formulating a deployment sequence that minimizes re-contact risks and 
making other operators with satellites nearby aware and updated on the 
scope of the deployment.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ In this context, re-contact is the potential for two or 
more satellites or released as part of a multi-satellite deployment 
to subsequently collide with each other or with any free-flying 
deployment devices that may be used for the deployment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, we do not adopt rules in this Order related to multi-
satellite launches more generally, i.e. multi-satellite launches not 
involving separate, free-flying deployment devices. In the Notice, the 
Commission also sought comment on whether we should include in our 
rules any additional information requirements for satellite applicants 
that will be part of a multi-satellite launch. A number of commenters 
suggested that these issues should be handled by the launch licensing 
authority and/or that there would be other difficulties involved in 
requiring additional information regarding launch and deployment from 
an FCC applicant. We observe that there are a number of established 
practices for multi-satellite deployment that are associated with low 
risk of re-contact, or otherwise a low risk of debris creation since 
any recontact would occur at low velocities. While we decline to adopt 
any rules related to this topic at this time, we may revisit this issue 
in the future.
2. Minimizing Debris Generated by Release of Persistent Liquids
    In the NPRM, the Commission proposed to update the rules to cover 
the release of liquids that, while not presenting an explosion risk, 
could nonetheless, if released into space,

[[Page 52436]]

cause damage to other satellites due to collisions. Specifically, the 
Commission proposed to include a requirement to identify any liquids 
that if released, either intentionally or unintentionally, will persist 
in droplet form. The Commission observed that there has been increasing 
interest in use by satellites (including small satellites) of 
alternative propellants and coolants, some of which would become 
persistent liquids when released by a deployed satellite. The NPRM also 
stated our expectation that the orbital debris mitigation plan for any 
system using persistent liquids should address the measures taken, 
including design and testing, to eliminate the risk of release of 
liquids and to minimize risk from any unplanned release of liquids.
    Some commenters addressing this issue disagreed with the Commission 
adopting a rule to address this issue, with most expressing concern 
that there was not sufficient evidence that release of certain 
propellants, for example, would result in persistent droplets or create 
any additional risk in the orbital environment. Along these lines, 
Aerospace states that it is important to distinguish between releases 
that could result in droplets or solids that could be a collision 
threat and those that dissipate or are too small to cause damage on 
impact. Aerospace points out, for example, that there are a number of 
beneficial operations including venting or using excess propellant and 
oxidizer that constitute release of liquids that are less likely to 
cause impact damage. Aerospace recommends that the Commission's 
proposed rule be clarified to explicitly permit the venting of volatile 
liquids and pressurants that could create future risk of fragmenting 
the spacecraft if not released, but will not form hazardous droplets. 
We agree that it is important to distinguish between those releases 
that could result in a long-term risk to the orbital environment and 
those that are unlikely to create any significant additional risks, 
such as release of volatile propellants that are soon dispersed through 
natural processes. Additionally, we have long recognized the importance 
of operators limiting the risk of accidental explosions, including by 
venting pressurized systems at a spacecraft's end of life.\20\
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    \20\ See also 47 CFR 25.114(d)(14)(ii); 2004 Orbital Debris 
Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 11580-82, paras. 29-33. Boeing asks that we 
update our rules regarding removal of stored energy at the 
spacecraft's end-of-life to acknowledge that stored energy sources 
can be ``safed.'' Boeing Feb. 14, 2020 Ex Parte at 7-8. It is 
unclear exactly what Boeing requests, but to the extent that Boeing 
is concerned that the existing rule does not adequately address 
removal of stored energy, we note that our existing rules leaves 
various options for stored energy to be discharged or removed, 
including by indicating that ``other equivalent procedures'' or 
``other appropriate measures'' may be used in addition to the 
enumerated examples provided in Sec. Sec.  25.114(d)(14)(ii) and 
25.283(c) of the Commission's rules, respectively. 47 CFR 
25.114(d)(14)(ii), 25.283(c). We view our provisions on this topic 
as consistent with the ODMSP. Should an applicant seek to use 
measures not specifically listed in Sec. Sec.  25.114(d)(14)(ii) and 
25.283(c), we would expect that the applicants would provide 
documentation regarding the chosen method, consistent with the types 
of documentation that listed in the NASA Standard regarding 
eliminating stored energy sources. See NASA Standard 4.4.4.2.
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    We adopt our proposed disclosure requirement, but clarified to 
require that applicants must specify only the release of those liquids 
that may in fact persist in the environment and pose a risk.\21\ Thus, 
the applicant will determine whether any liquids have a chemical 
composition that is conducive to the formation of persistent droplets. 
If so, then the applicant will disclose that fact to the 
Commission.\22\ The main consideration in making this determination is 
whether the liquid, if released into space, will disperse through 
evaporation, or remain in droplet form, as is typical of some ionic 
liquids, such as NaK droplets. If the applicant determines that 
released liquids will not persist due to evaporation or chemical 
breakdown, for example, then the applicant need not address the release 
of such liquids.\23\ We conclude that asking applicants--who have the 
most information regarding the operational profile of the mission and 
characteristics of the potentially released substances--to assess the 
risk will address the commenters' concerns that such a requirement may 
be overinclusive or premature. We clarify that this rule would apply to 
any liquids, not just propellants. In addition, we clarify that this 
rule will apply equally to release of liquids throughout the orbital 
lifetime. We further conclude that the benefit of identifying potential 
risks associated with use of certain liquids, if such liquids could 
become long-term debris objects, outweighs any costs to operators in 
assessing the chemical composition of any liquids to determine the 
physical properties of such liquids following release into the orbital 
environment.
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    \21\ According to Boeing, the Commission must ensure that an 
adequate mechanism is in place to permit the submission of 
information regarding such liquids on a confidential basis, since 
satellite manufacturers treat their propellants as highly 
proprietary. Boeing Comments at 9. Similar to other contexts, we 
point out that there are means for applicants to submit information 
confidentially, in instances where they are able to justify 
confidential treatment under the Commission's rules. See 47 CFR 
0.459.
    \22\ Boeing states that the Commission should provide clear and 
objective guidance regarding when the use of such liquids would be 
permitted. Boeing Comments at 9; Boeing Feb. 14, 2020 Ex Parte at 
13. SIA similarly expresses concern with a case-by-case approach for 
reviewing these matters. SIA Apr. 15, 2020 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. 
at 4-5. Here, we believe a disclosure requirement should entail 
minimal costs for most operators and will provide flexibility to 
address new developments in space station design. As Boeing points 
out, there may be tradeoffs associated with use of certain new types 
of propellants in terms of orbital debris mitigation, and we believe 
these tradeoffs are best addressed on a case-by-case basis. See 
Boeing Comments at 10. Relevant considerations in cases involving 
use of persistent liquids may include, for example, design and 
testing of methods for containment of the liquid and prevention of 
release in space in droplet form. In a later ex parte filing, Boeing 
asks that we consider these issues in the Further Notice. See Boeing 
Apr. 16, 2020 Ex Parte at 3. For the reasons specified here, 
however, we believe that a case-by-case approach is sufficient at 
this time to address this relatively unique issue.
    \23\ Boeing asks that we state that the use of liquids that 
would result in persistent droplets if released is presumptively 
appropriate if reasonable measures are taken to prevent their 
release. Boeing Comments at 10. If the operator discloses that such 
liquids would present a risk to the orbital environment if 
accidentally released, then we would ask operators to describe the 
measures that are taken to prevent such accidental release. If 
unintentional release of the liquids would present a significantly 
greater risk to the orbital environment that would be otherwise 
posed by an accidental explosion of the spacecraft (not taking into 
account release of the liquids), for example, then the operator 
should expect to provide additional information to the Commission 
regarding measures taken to prevent release as well as potential 
alternatives.
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E. Post-Mission Disposal

    Post-mission disposal is an integral part of the mitigation of 
orbital debris, and the commercial space industry has increasingly 
recognized the importance of not leaving defunct objects in orbit after 
their useful life. In 2004, the Commission established specific rules 
for GSO space station disposal based on U.S. and international 
guidance, and in the absence of an anomaly, Commission-authorized space 
station operators have complied with those rules. In this Order, we 
adopt specific rules for disposal of NGSO space stations, and address 
reliability of post-mission disposal for NGSO space stations as well. 
As in 2004, we base these rules on updated sources of guidance, 
including the revised ODMSP, adapted for the commercial and otherwise 
non-governmental context.
    The orbital lifetime of a particular space station affects the 
collision risk it presents and reduction in post-mission orbital 
lifetime reduces collision risk. Spacecraft that are unable to complete 
post-mission disposal, particularly when left at higher altitudes where 
they may persist indefinitely, will contribute to increased congestion 
in the space environment over the long-term and increase risks to 
future space operations.

[[Page 52437]]

1. Post-Mission Orbital Lifetime
    In the NPRM, the Commission inquired whether the 25-year benchmark 
for completion of NGSO post-mission disposal by atmospheric re-entry 
remains a relevant benchmark, as applied to commercial or other non-
Federal systems. The 25-year benchmark has been applied in Commission 
licensing decisions for NGSO systems. The NASA Standard and ODMSP 
specify a maximum 25-year post-mission orbital lifetime, with the 
revised ODMSP stating that for spacecraft disposed of by atmospheric 
reentry, the spacecraft shall be ``left in an orbit in which, using 
conservative projections for solar activity, atmospheric drag will 
limit the lifetime to as short as practicable but no more than 25 
years.'' Most commenters supported a reduction in the 25-year benchmark 
as applicable to non-Federal systems, but disagreed on the length of 
time, and on whether a single benchmark was appropriate for all 
missions.
    As a practical matter, space stations that conduct collision 
avoidance maneuvers would achieve the main goal of limitations on 
orbital lifetime--avoiding collisions with large objects. Even with no 
maneuver capability, spacecraft deployed to and operating below 400 km 
generally re-enter Earth's atmosphere as a result of atmospheric drag 
within, at most, several years. For such satellites, when functioning 
normally, specification of a maximum post-mission orbital lifetime may 
be unnecessary. We examine in the Further Notice a maneuverability 
requirement for satellites operating above 400 km. Given the practical 
reality that satellites with maneuvering capabilities are likely to 
meet the objectives of limitations on post-mission orbital lifetime, 
the need to incorporate a separate provision into our rules regarding 
post-mission orbital lifetime will depend on whether we adopt a 
maneuverability requirement, and therefore will be addressed in the 
Further Notice.
    At this time, we will require that applicants planning disposal by 
atmospheric re-entry specify the planned time period for post-mission 
disposal as part of the description of disposal plans for the space 
station. We maintain the Commission's existing rule requiring a 
statement detailing post-mission disposal plans for the space station 
at end of life. The Commission also sought comment on whether we should 
account for solar activity in our rules or grant conditions. We note 
that the NASA Debris Assessment Software takes into consideration solar 
flux that may affect atmospheric drag, among other environmental 
factors. To the extent that the operator plans to rely on atmospheric 
drag for re-entry, reliance on NASA Debris Assessment Software or a 
higher fidelity assessment tool will meet the requirement on specifying 
the time period for post-mission disposal.
    The Commission also sought comment on whether operators planning 
disposal through atmospheric re-entry should be required to continue 
obtaining spacecraft tracking information, for example by using radio 
facilities on the spacecraft to the greatest extent possible following 
the conclusion of the primary mission. Boeing argues that satellite 
operators should not be required to maintain communication links and 
active tracking with the satellite following the end of the missions 
unless they had initially indicated in the application that active 
tracking, rather than passive tracking, would be used to monitor the 
location of the spacecraft. Boeing also states that satellite operators 
should be required to continue to obtain spacecraft tracking 
information for retired satellites only if the satellite operator's 
original calculations regarding acceptable collision risk as the 
satellite's orbit decays depend upon the operator's ability to conduct 
collision avoidance. Iridium, on the other hand, suggests that 
satellites should be controlled all the way through atmospheric re-
entry. We do not adopt a specific regulation specifying the extent to 
which an operator should be required to maintain communications links 
or otherwise obtain spacecraft tracking information following the 
conclusion of the satellite's main mission at this time, since absent 
any particular requirements to maintain maneuvering capabilities, for 
example, operators are likely to have a wide range of capabilities in 
this area such that it would not be reasonable to adopt a ``one-size-
fits all'' rule absent other requirements such as requiring active 
tracking capabilities, which we decline to adopt above. We do, however, 
encourage all operators to maintain communications links for tracking, 
control, and collision avoidance purposes for as long as possible 
following the conclusion of the spacecraft's primary operations, even 
below 400 km, and to continue to provide location information to the 
18th Space Control Squadron and other operators for as long as 
possible, in accordance with the operators' plan for sharing ephemeris.
2. Reliability and Post-Mission Disposal
    In the NPRM, the Commission considered whether to add to the rules 
a specific metric for reliability of disposal in order to help us 
better evaluate the applicant's end-of-life disposal plan. The 
Commission proposed to require that applicants provide information 
concerning the expected reliability of disposal measures involving 
atmospheric re-entry, and the method by which the expected reliability 
was derived. The Commission also sought comment on whether we should 
specify a probability of no less than a certain standard, such as 0.90, 
and whether the evaluation should be on an aggregate basis if an 
operator plans to deploy multiple satellites, for example, in an NGSO 
constellation. The Commission also asked whether, for large 
constellation deployments, a more stringent metric should apply. The 
revised ODMSP states that the probability of successful post-mission 
disposal should be no less than 0.9, with a goal of 0.99 or better, and 
further states that each spacecraft in a large constellation of 100 or 
more operational spacecraft should have a probability of successful 
post-mission disposal at a level greater than 0.9 with a goal of 0.99 
or better.
    The majority of commenters addressing the issue agree with the 
Commission revising its rules to incorporate a standard for reliability 
of disposal. While the Commission sought comment on a broader design 
and fabrication reliability standard as well, many commenters suggest 
that focusing on disposal reliability is a more effective way to 
minimize the long-term impact of failed satellites on the orbital 
environment. With respect to the specific metric, NASA notes that it 
currently employs a 0.9 disposal reliability for individual spacecraft 
not part of a constellation, and, consistent with the revisions to the 
ODMSP, states that inter-agency discussions have concluded that 
constellations (100 or more spacecraft) should have a post-mission 
disposal reliability of greater than 0.9. NASA goes on to state that 
large constellations (1000 or more spacecraft) should have a post-
mission disposal reliability goal of 0.99 or better. A number of 
commenters agree with a tiered approach to reliability, specifically, 
with a 0.9 reliability for individual satellites and a higher 
reliability for individual satellites that are part of a constellation.
    We conclude that a baseline post-mission disposal reliability of 
0.90 is appropriate for individual NGSO space stations, and that larger 
systems will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for whether a higher 
per-spacecraft disposal reliability standard is necessary to avoid 
significant long-term impacts to the

[[Page 52438]]

orbital environment. The rule adopted specifies that NGSO applicants 
provide a demonstration that the probability of successful post-mission 
disposal is 0.9 or greater for any individual space station.\24\ 
Consistent with the general approach taken in the revised ODMSP, the 
rule further states that for space systems consisting of multiple space 
stations, the demonstration should include additional information 
regarding efforts to achieve a higher per-spacecraft probability of 
successful post-mission disposal, with a goal of 0.99 or better for 
large systems. Under this approach, particular scrutiny will be given 
to larger deployments, including consideration of factors such as mass, 
collision probability, and orbital location. We believe this method 
will avoid some of the concerns associated with arbitrary cutoffs of 
numbers of space stations. and will allow assessment of acceptable 
post-mission disposal reliability taking into account all relevant 
factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Appendix A, Final Rules. We also note that the terms 
``post-mission disposal reliability'' and ``probability of 
successful post-mission disposal'' have the same meaning and are 
used interchangeably in this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters disagree with applying a disposal reliability 
standard in the aggregate. NASA recommends the use of a reliability 
metric expressed on a per-satellite basis. For purposes of post-mission 
disposal reliability, we agree that the target probability of 
successful post-mission disposal is best expressed on a per-satellite 
basis rather than in the aggregate. However, and as recognized in the 
ODMSP, consideration of the risks presented by deployment of large 
numbers of satellites supports higher per-satellite reliability, 
particularly for deployments involving larger numbers of satellites.
    For purposes of calculating the probability of successful post-
mission disposal, we define successful post-mission disposal for 
spacecraft in LEO as re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere within 25 
years or less following completion of the spacecraft mission. We 
recognize that consistent with the discussion above on post-mission 
lifetime, 25 years will in almost all instances be a longer period than 
the planned post-mission lifetime of the spacecraft.\25\ We believe 
this is an appropriate balance, however, by giving operators options to 
meet a performance-based post-mission disposal reliability standard 
while mitigating the long-term impact of spacecraft failures on the 
orbital environment. Absent unusual circumstances, this would allow 
spacecraft and systems deployed at low altitudes to achieve a 100% 
probability of successful post-mission disposal even if the satellites 
themselves fail immediately upon deployment. We observe that at lower 
deployment altitude, however, a high percentage of failed satellites 
could result in a high collision risk for a system as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ We also adopt a conforming rule regarding post-mission 
disposal reliability applicable to small satellites that would 
qualify for the part 25 streamlined process. See Appendix A, Final 
Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Global NewSpace Operators suggests the Commission should not be 
prescriptive in how applicants meet post-mission disposal reliability 
requirements but should instead encourage innovative approaches to how 
this problem is solved. We agree and expect operators would include in 
their demonstration, for example, a description of any backup 
mechanisms or system redundancies that should be factored into 
assessment of post-mission disposal reliability.
    We note that at some point, a very high level of reliability 
becomes difficult to achieve absent extraordinary cost and effort. We 
also note that in some instances, development of the spacecraft is 
likely to be a rapidly iterative process, involving more in-orbit 
testing than ground testing. In these scenarios, lower deployment 
altitudes may be required in order to achieve a post-mission disposal 
reliability consistent with the public interest. In other cases, where 
the applicant has demonstrated significant ground-based testing 
commensurate with a high reliability, the lower deployment altitudes 
may not be as significant a consideration.
    Operators of large constellations replenishing on a regular basis 
or otherwise deploying a system through multiple launches should strive 
to improve reliability with each successive deployment, since it 
appears such improvements may have significant impact on the longer-
term debris environment. Related to this point, Iridium suggests the 
Commission require all operators of space stations above 400 km to 
notify the Commission of any on-orbit satellite failures, whether such 
failures occur before or during operations. According to Iridium, once 
an operator makes such a notification, the Commission should require 
the operator to identify and correct the root causes of failure on the 
ground prior to launching any additional satellites. Other commenters 
similarly request the Commission address how it will verify compliance 
with operator disclosures on post-mission reliability and other issues. 
In instances where an applicant for a system consisting of multiple 
satellites submits information that the expected total probability of 
collision, post-mission disposal reliability, or casualty risk is close 
to the acceptable threshold, the Commission will require, as an initial 
condition of the license, that, in case a rate of failure that would 
result in values above the risk threshold(s) described in the 
application is observed, such occurrence be reported to the Commission. 
The Commission could also require reporting as a result of information 
that comes to the attention of the Commission during the licensee's 
operations. In appropriate circumstances, the Commission could 
subsequently modify the license in accordance with section 316 of the 
Communications Act to address a rate of failure that departs materially 
from the expected reliability level, since that departure would affect 
the public interest assessment underlying grant of the license.
a. Deployment Orbit
    Initial Deployment Below 650 km. The Commission sought comment on 
whether applicants for space stations in LEO certify that the 
satellites that will operate at an altitude of 650 km or above would be 
initially deployed into an orbit at an altitude below 650 km and then, 
once it was established that the satellites had full functionality, 
they could be maneuvered up to their planned operational altitude. The 
Commission reasoned this may help to ensure that if satellites are 
found to be non-functional immediately following deployment, the 
satellites would re-enter the atmosphere within 25 years.
    Commenters addressing this issue generally disagree with the NPRM 
proposal. NASA recommends that a post-mission disposal reliability 
metric be adopted rather than requiring an initial deployment altitude 
below 650 km, stating that the lower deployment would add to the 
complexity of the deployment of spacecraft and not significantly reduce 
risk. Other commenters suggested that this would create additional 
difficulties in development of a constellation and meeting of 
milestones, without significant benefits, and that the goal of reducing 
dead-on-arrival satellites could be met by other means. We decline to 
adopt a uniform requirement that NGSO satellites deploy first to 650 km 
and then raise their orbits to deployment altitude. We conclude that 
reliability of post-mission disposal and collision risk standards we 
adopt here more effectively address the same underlying issues 
regarding the long-term impact of non-functional satellites on the 
orbital

[[Page 52439]]

environment. It should be noted, however, that in order to achieve 
post-mission disposal reliability objectives, the use of this strategy 
may be necessary, particularly for deployments involving larger numbers 
of satellites.
    Testing. The Commission also sought comment on whether applicants 
for large NGSO constellations should be required to test a certain 
number of satellites in a lower orbit for a certain number of years 
before deploying larger numbers of satellites, in order to resolve any 
unforeseen flaws in the design that could result in the generation of 
debris. Several commenters pointed out that operators of new 
constellations of NGSO satellites have conducted testing of a few 
satellites to verify their performance before launching larger numbers. 
Boeing suggests that the Commission should not dictate the length of 
such test operations, since operators are usually able to determine 
fairly quickly whether satellites are operating as intended or whether 
any anomalies are apparent that may necessitate an extended period of 
monitoring. Other commenters agree that operators should be able to set 
their own timelines for in-orbit testing. Boeing further argues that 
operators have sufficient incentives to employ a testing approach to 
avoid the significant costs that would result from an unanticipated 
fault affecting a large number of satellites. OneWeb contends that 
required testing could impact an operator's ability to comply with the 
Commission's NGSO milestone rules.
    We observe that there are tradeoffs with different testing 
modalities, and we expect that there will be some systems that will 
undergo a rapidly iterative development process following initial 
deployments. In such cases, those operators should consider deploying 
at lower altitudes and with smaller numbers of satellites, to ensure 
minimal impact on the orbital debris environment. We agree with those 
commenters suggesting that it may be difficult to fully determine on 
the ground how a satellite will perform in the space environment. As 
Boeing points out, several operators of planned NGSO systems have 
launched test satellites, usually consisting of just a few satellites, 
prior to any larger deployment. We believe the economic incentives are 
aligned to a certain extent to encourage such testing by operators of 
larger systems, given the costs involved in launching satellites. We 
may also revisit the basis for an applicant's license grant should it 
become evident that the licensee's satellite performance with respect 
to orbital debris mitigation is not consistent with what was specified 
in the application. In appropriate circumstances, the Commission could 
subsequently modify the license in accordance with section 316 of the 
Communications Act to address risks that depart materially from the 
expected level of risk or reliability, since that departure would 
affect the public interest assessment underlying grant of the license. 
We therefore at this time do not see the need for a regulatory 
specification regarding how much testing should be done before a 
certain level of constellation deployment. As discussed above, we 
expect that operators will be testing systems related to satellite 
disposal as well, and, if the operators conclude after deployment of a 
few satellites that they are not able to meet the reliability for post-
mission disposal specified in their application, the operators will 
make changes to these systems to ensure that the required reliability 
is achieved.
b. Automatic Initiation of Disposal
    In the NPRM, the Commission proposed that applicants seeking to 
operate NGSO space stations should provide a statement that the 
spacecraft disposal will be automatically initiated in the event of 
loss of power or contact with the spacecraft, or describe other means 
to ensure that reliability of disposal will be achieved, such as 
internal redundancies, ongoing monitoring of the disposal function, or 
automatic initiation of disposal if communications become limited. The 
Commission also sought comment on the costs and benefits associated 
with these design features. After review of the record, we decline to 
adopt any regulations at this time with respect to automatic de-orbit.
    Most commenters addressing this issue disagreed with the 
Commission's proposal, although some expressed support. Commenters 
generally felt that a rule on this topic would not adequately address 
the wide range of factual scenarios involved in disposal operations, 
that technologies for automatic disposal are not sufficiently 
developed, or that autonomous systems may not provide true redundancy, 
which satellite operators already incorporate into their designs. 
Several commenters suggest future work in this area may be appropriate. 
One commenter suggests use of autonomous decommissioning devices on the 
satellite that would duplicate critical functions of the spacecraft. It 
states that such a device could ensure absolute capability to perform 
decommissioning maneuvers, and would avoid investment in re-designing 
the satellite platform itself. Although we decline to adopt a specific 
requirement for automatic initiation of disposal, we note that such 
operations could factor into the review described above with respect to 
post-mission disposal reliability. For example, to the extent that such 
devices can improve such reliability by way of back-up and redundancy, 
they can be considered. We observe that the development of robustly 
reliable autonomous systems could help to establish a high-level of 
reliability for post-mission disposal, but we will consider such 
technologies on a case-by-case basis.
c. Direct Spacecraft Retrieval
    The Commission sought comment in the NPRM on what weight, if any, 
the Commission should give to post-mission disposal proposals relying 
on direct spacecraft retrieval, i.e., the use of one spacecraft to 
retrieve another from orbit. As discussed in the Notice, this also 
includes activities referred to as ``active debris removal''. The 
Commission observed in the NPRM that there are a number of specific 
technologies under development for direct spacecraft retrieval, and 
sought comment on whether it should be considered as a valid debris 
mitigation strategy in certain circumstances. We observe that the 
revised ODMSP provides for direct retrieval of a structure preferably 
at the completion of the mission, but no more than 5 years after 
completion of mission. The revised ODMSP also provides that active 
debris removal operations should follow the objectives generally 
applicable to other operations.
    We generally agree with those commenters stating that it would be 
premature to establish more detailed regulations in this area. To the 
extent that any applicants seek to rely on direct retrieval as a means 
to dispose of their spacecraft, the plan may be considered on a case-
by-case basis, keeping in mind that the technology would need to be 
sufficiently developed at the time of the application for the 
Commission to be able to assess the reliability of the disposal method. 
Although the technology for direct retrieval is not sufficiently 
developed for commercial applications at the moment, in the future this 
type of technology may enable some missions that would not otherwise be 
possible currently.
3. MEO Disposal
    In the NPRM, the Commission sought comment on whether to include 
provisions in the rules regarding disposal of certain NGSO satellites 
operating in orbits above LEO. Specifically, the Commission sought 
comment on whether there were

[[Page 52440]]

particular practices for post mission disposal above LEO that were 
sufficiently developed to formalize in our rules. We observe that the 
revised ODMSP addresses disposal of spacecraft in medium-Earth orbit 
(MEO), defined as the region between the LEO region (below 2,000 km) 
and the GEO region (between 35,586 and 35,986 km). The ODMSP provides 
options of both long-term storage between LEO and GEO, and removal from 
orbit using unstable disposal orbits that will result in atmospheric 
re-entry of the spacecraft.
    Several commenters suggest that continuing a case-by-case 
assessment regarding disposal of spacecraft operating above LEO remains 
appropriate. Aerospace provides some additional technical detail 
regarding options for disposal above LEO, as well as with respect to 
high-eccentricity disposals. We will continue to assess disposal for 
spacecraft operating between LEO and GEO on a case-by-case basis. This 
includes those systems that would be considered to be operating in MEO 
as well as in highly-elliptical orbits (HEO). Applicants for such 
spacecraft should identify the planned method of disposal and explain 
their plans. In developing a description of the planned disposal, 
applicants should be aware of and address the issues described in 
Objective 4 of the ODMSP, including, for example, limiting collision 
risk, and limiting time spent by the spacecraft in certain zones. 
Applicants should also discuss the rationale for the selected disposal 
strategy. We observe that compared to storage strategies, which result 
in risk of debris generation that lasts essentially forever, the 
removal of satellites from orbit using eccentricity growth reduces the 
risk of debris generation over the long-term. This strategy should 
therefore be seriously considered by mission designers.

F. GSO License Extensions and Related Issues

    Assessment of Request for Extension. In the NPRM, the Commission 
proposed to codify the current practice of requesting certain types of 
information from GSO licensees requesting license term extensions. The 
Commission proposed that the rule would specify that the applicants 
should state the duration of the requested license extension and the 
total remaining satellite lifetime, certify that the satellite has no 
single point of failure that could affect its ability to conduct end-
of-life procedures as planned, that remaining fuel reserves are 
adequate to complete deorbit as planned, and that telemetry, tracking, 
and command links are fully functional. The Commission noted that in 
the event that an applicant is unable to make any of the 
certifications, the applicant could provide a narrative description 
justifying the extension. We adopt the proposed rule, modified to 
address commenter's concerns with the proposed certification concerning 
single point failures, as described below.
    Commenters are concerned that the proposed certification that the 
satellite has ``no single point of failure or other malfunctions, 
defects, or anomalies during its operations that could affect its 
ability to conduct end-of-life procedures'' could unduly restrict the 
ability of operators to obtain extensions for satellites with years of 
useful life remaining and suggest a more flexible, case-by-case 
approach, as is currently followed. We modify our proposed rule on 
single points of failure or other malfunctions, defects, or anomalies 
to accommodate a description rather than a certification. An operator 
could specify, for example, that despite a single point of failure, the 
reliability of post mission disposal remains within acceptable levels. 
We will continue our case-by-case approach to assessing requests for 
license extensions, and the descriptive nature of this disclosure will 
enable an operator to provide additional information about potential 
risk and disposal reliability. Additionally, Space Logistics requests 
that the Commission adopt rules that would permit a GSO space station 
licensee to extend its satellite license term by the length of any 
mission extension service in lieu of such certifications. We would also 
address this under our case-by-case approach.
    Limit of 5 Years Per Extension Request. The Commission proposed in 
the NPRM to limit license term extensions to no more than five years in 
a single modification application for any satellite originally issued a 
fifteen-year license term. Currently, the Commission receives license 
extension requests for varying numbers of years and processes those 
requests on a case-by-case basis. The Commission tentatively concluded 
that five years may be an appropriate limit for a single modification 
to help ensure reasonable predictions regarding satellite health while 
affording operators some flexibility. We adopt this rule as proposed.
    A number of commenters, primarily operators or manufacturers of 
existing GSO satellites, oppose a cap on how many years may be 
requested at a time through an extension request. Telesat, for example, 
states the Commission should continue its current flexible approach 
because it minimizes regulatory proceedings and costs for the 
Commission and licensees. Although the limitation of a single license 
term extension to five years could potentially result in more 
modification requests being filed with the Commission as operators seek 
multiple license extensions, we conclude that the additional costs of 
preparing an application and paying a modification application fee are 
outweighed by the benefits of revisiting license extensions within five 
years--namely, ensuring that the extension continues to be consistent 
with the public interest by reevaluating the satellite health and 
functionality information that provides a basis for extending the 
license term. Lockheed Martin contends that it is not appropriate to 
limit extensions to five years if a longer term is justifiable based on 
a review of the provided specifics. Similarly, SIA argues that a five-
year limit would significantly constrict the ability of GSO operators 
to leverage the full value of their in-orbit assets. According to SIA, 
the Commission should continue to permit GSO operators to demonstrate, 
through the modification application process, that the satellite is 
capable of continuing to serve the public interest for an appropriate 
additional term. We fully recognize that there are satellites capable 
of providing service well beyond the initial 15-year license term, and 
in appropriate cases will license those satellites for additional 
license extensions. Under the approach we adopt here, GSO satellite 
licenses may be extended for more than five years in total, but the 
extensions will be granted in increments of five years, at most, 
through applications for modification. While GSO space station 
licensees understandably want to provide service for as long as 
possible using their existing space station(s), they are not 
necessarily incentivized to make conservative estimates when requesting 
license term extensions. The five-year limit per extension will allow 
for reassessment of satellite health on a regularized basis even for 
those satellites with longer lifetimes, which serves the public 
interest.
    Intelsat argues the Commission should not limit the duration of 
license extension requests because in some countries, such as Brazil, 
landing rights are granted for the term specified in the original U.S. 
license and only one renewal is permitted, and so the landing rights 
are limited to the duration of the initial U.S. license term plus the 
length of the extension. Therefore, Intelsat argues, the Commission's 
five-year cap on an individual license term extension would limit the 
maximum period for

[[Page 52441]]

landing rights in other countries. While we appreciate that operators 
are navigating regulatory processes in other nations as well as the 
United States, we cannot be responsible for the approach that other 
countries take with respect to landing rights--and have no control over 
whether and when another administration attaches significance to 
Commission decisions. We find that this rule change is in the public 
interest for the reasons discussed above, and if operators have 
concerns regarding the approaches of other administrations, they should 
address those issues with the relevant administration(s).
    Sirius XM asks that we exempt Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service 
(SDARS) licensees with eight-year license terms from the proposed five-
year limit on license extensions. Sirius XM states that it would 
unfairly disadvantage SDARS licensees since the initial license term 
for those operations is shorter. In the NPRM we proposed that the five-
year limit on license extensions would apply to only those satellites 
with an initial 15-year license term. Given the limited number of SDARS 
licensees, we will continue the current case-by-case approach to the 
length of license extensions for these satellites, rather than imposing 
the five-year cap. AT&T requests a similar exemption for GSO direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS) space stations that were initially authorized 
for a license term of ten years. In a recent Report and Order, we 
updated the license term for DBS satellites operating on a non-
broadcast basis from 10 years to 15 years, and concluded that the few 
existing non-broadcast DBS licensees that had not already had licenses 
extended may have their license extended to match a 15-year license 
term upon application to modify the license. Licensees with an initial 
term of less than 15 years will also be treated on a case-by-case basis 
for subsequent extensions, rather than being subject to the five-year 
cap.
    Other Issues. In the NPRM, the Commission also sought comment on 
whether there are types of GSO satellite anomalies that should trigger 
immediate reporting, and whether there were any types of satellite 
buses that warrant heightened scrutiny for purposes of assessing 
license extensions. Those commenters addressing these issues disagreed 
with adoption of rules in either of these areas, and we decline to 
adopt any new rules on these topics at this time because we think it is 
unnecessary to adopt specific requirements in this area and can 
continue to address these issues on a case-by-case basis. With respect 
to GSO anomaly reporting, we observe that GSO operators typically 
already provide information informally to the Commission regarding 
anomalies, and the Further Notice seeks comment on incentives for GSO 
operators to maximize the probability of successful disposal. 
Additionally, regarding satellite design issues, we continue to expect 
that operators will disclose issues that may be systematic to a 
particular GSO satellite design as part of their license extension 
request--and note that the Commission may consider such systematic 
issues as they arise and when assessing requests for license extensions 
under its continued case-by-case approach.

G. Casualty Risk Assessment

    In the NPRM, the Commission sought comment on two issues related to 
the human casualty risk assessment for space stations disposed of by 
re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. First, the Commission sought comment 
on whether to update our rules to specify that the human casualty risk 
assessment must include all objects that would have an impacting 
kinetic energy of 15 joules, consistent with the NASA Standard. 
Commenters generally supported including the 15 joule metric in the 
Commission's rule. We adopt the proposal.
    Second, the Commission proposed that where the calculated risk of 
human casualty from surviving debris is determined to be greater than 
zero, as calculated using either the NASA Debris Assessment Software or 
a higher fidelity assessment tool, the applicant must provide a 
statement indicating the calculated human casualty risk, as well as the 
input assumptions used in modeling re-entry. The Commission further 
sought comment on whether to assess human casualty risk in the 
aggregate as well as on a per-satellite basis, and what metric should 
be used to evaluate such risk.
    The revised ODMSP states that for those satellites disposed of by 
reentry into Earth's atmosphere, ``the risk of human casualty from 
surviving components with impact kinetic energies greater than 15 
joules should be less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000).'' The ODMSP also 
states that ``[d]esign-for-demise and other measures, including . . . 
targeted reentry away from landmasses, to further reduce reentry human 
casualty risk should be considered.'' With respect to ``large 
constellations,'' the ODMSP states that, ``[i]n developing the mission 
profile, the program should limit the cumulative reentry human casualty 
risk from the constellation.''
    At this time, we adopt the approach advocated by some commenters 
and incorporate the 0.0001 (1 in 10,000) or less human casualty risk 
metric into our rules for those satellites that would be disposed of by 
atmospheric re-entry. This continues the approach followed in licensing 
since the adoption in 2004 of debris mitigation rules, and will provide 
in the codified rules an explicit reference point for applicants, 
consistent with the ODMSP and NASA Standard. In the Further Notice we 
seek additional comment on how the additional ODMSP guidance related to 
design-for-demise and other measures such as targeted reentry to 
further reduce human casualty risk should be addressed in our rules, as 
well as the guidance for large constellations that such constellations 
limit cumulative reentry human casualty risk. Thus, to the extent that 
some commenters suggest that we should apply a more stringent standard 
than 1 in 10,000 and consider total casualty risk on a system-wide 
basis, we address those topics in the Further Notice.
    Several commenters suggest that NASA's Debris Assessment Software 
does not account for some potential sources of casualty risk 
adequately. NASA updates the Debris Assessment Software casualty risk 
assessment tool on an ongoing basis, including recently updating the 
reentry survivability model. To the extent that an applicant believes 
that its satellite design will not be adequately assessed with the 
Debris Assessment Software tool, it should submit a higher fidelity 
analysis that provides an improved assessment, and the rule revisions 
we adopt here are consistent with this approach.

H. Proximity Operations

    In the NPRM, the Commission noted the increasing number of 
commercial missions proposed involving proximity operations and 
rendezvous of spacecraft. The Commission proposed that applicants be 
required to disclose whether the spacecraft is capable of, or will be, 
performing rendezvous or proximity operations. The Commission also 
sought comment on whether the rules should include anything more 
specific regarding information sharing about proximity operations with 
the 18th Space Control Squadron or any successor civilian entity.
    We adopt a disclosure requirement that would identify situations 
where there are planned rendezvous and proximity operations and provide 
a vehicle for further review of those operations. The disclosure 
requirement follows the general approach in the revised ODMSP of 
analyzing such

[[Page 52442]]

operations within the framework of standard debris mitigation 
objectives--limiting debris release, preventing accidental explosions, 
and limiting collision risk.\26\ Commenters generally supported this 
approach. We note the evolving and developing nature of these 
operations, and accordingly find that more specific technical or 
operational requirements are premature at this time.
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    \26\ See, e.g., Space Logistics Comments at 2, 6-7; Consortium 
for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations Comments at 2; 
Aerospace Comments at 18. Space Logistics states that disclosures 
regarding on-orbit servicing specifically should be provided in the 
context of a satellite license application or a modification 
application of an existing license to operate a ``mission extension 
vehicle'' with a different client vehicle. Space Logistics Comments 
at 6, n.13. As adopted, the disclosure regarding such operations 
would be an application requirement, and would also be required of 
any operators as part of a license modification, if the modification 
involved such operations.
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I. Encryption and Security of Spacecraft Command

    In the NPRM, the Commission proposed a rule requiring that 
operators of space stations having onboard propulsion systems encrypt 
telemetry, tracking, and command communications with the space station. 
The Commission noted concerns that a malevolent actor could take 
control of and command satellites. A particular scenario of direct 
relevance to this proceeding is if the commandeered satellite has 
propulsion capabilities and can be used to introduce additional debris 
into the space environment and/or threaten damage to other spacecraft. 
Commenters to the Notice express a variety of views on whether, and the 
extent to which, encryption should be undertaken to secure telemetry, 
tracking, and command links, both for spacecraft with propulsion and 
those without. While many recognize the need for securing commands, 
many also raise concerns about mandating the use of specific encryption 
standards. Based on the record established in this proceeding, we adopt 
a clarifying update to our existing rule on control of transmitting 
stations and the security of command communications applicable to 
commercial systems. We decline at this time to specifically include in 
our rules the more detailed and prescriptive security measures outlined 
in some comments, such as requiring use of a specific encryption 
standard.
    Several commenters point out that most satellites do not have 
sufficiently precise guidance and navigation capabilities to be used 
effectively by a malevolent actor to target and collide with other 
satellites, thereby causing debris. At orbital velocities, the 
capabilities necessary to present a credible threat require advanced 
systems at a level of technical sophistication well beyond what is 
commonly deployed, particularly in typical low-cost small satellite 
missions. For this reason, we are not adopting the proposed rule 
focusing on those satellites with propulsion systems.
    Many of the comments focus more generally on the issue of securing 
command communications. A number of commenters argue that the 
Commission should not impose detailed encryption requirements, 
particularly those tied to a single standard, because satellite 
operators already have sufficient incentives to protect their space 
assets through encryption and other methods for restricting access only 
to authorized users. We agree that given the diversity of satellite 
operations, requiring the use of a one-size-fits-all encryption 
standard is not appropriate at this time, and will continue to address 
concerns related to securing facilities through existing high-level 
performance obligations identified in FCC rules. As a matter of 
clarification, we are including specific language in the relevant part 
25 rule to indicate that the rule applies to space stations.\27\ We 
also encourage experimental and amateur licensees to continue to ensure 
that they are in full compliance with the Commission's existing rules 
applicable to experimental \28\ and amateur licensees regarding control 
of transmitting stations.\29\
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    \27\ See Appendix A, Final Rules, Sec.  25.271(d). Operators 
have flexibility to adopt security strategies, including encryption 
and other measures, to ensure that their system is secure.
    \28\ Section 5.107 of the Commission's rules requires, in part, 
that each experimental licensee ``shall be responsible for 
maintaining control of the transmitter authorized under its station 
authorization, including the ability to terminate transmissions 
should interference occur[,]'' and that for conventional 
experimental radio stations the licensee ``shall ensure that 
transmissions are in conformance with the operating characteristics 
prescribed in the station authorization and that the station is 
operated only by persons duly authorized by the licensee.'' 47 CFR 
5.107.
    \29\ Section 97.5 of the Commission's rules requires, in part, 
that amateur station apparatus ``must be under the physical control 
of a person named in an amateur station license grant on the 
[Universal Licensing System] consolidated license database or a 
person authorized . . . by Sec.  97.107 . . . before the station may 
transmit on any amateur service frequency from any place that is . . 
. [w]ithin 50 km of the Earth's surface and at a place where the 
amateur service is regulated by the FCC[,] . . . or [m]ore than 50 
km above the Earth's surface aboard any craft that is documented or 
registered in the United States.'' 47 CFR 97.5. Section 97.109 of 
the Commission's rules also addresses station control, including 
provisions for remote control of stations, 47 CFR 97.109. Specific 
to space stations, Sec.  97.207(b) states that ``[a] space station 
must be capable of effecting a cessation of transmissions by 
telecommand whenever such cessation is ordered by the FCC[,]'' 47 
CFR 97.207(b), and Sec.  97.211(b) states that a space telecommand 
station may transmit special codes intended to obscure the meaning 
of telecommand messages to the station in space operation[,]'' 47 
CFR 97.211(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize that the discussion regarding the security of TT&C 
communications is only one element of the broader topic of 
cybersecurity for satellite and ground station operations. There has 
been increasing discussion within the satellite industry regarding the 
importance of securing communications links. Commenters suggest that 
there is need for additional guidance and best practices on cyber 
security or cyber resiliency for satellite systems. Consideration of 
cybersecurity is an important part of their overall system development, 
and we encourage all operators to do so, including by following 
industry-developed best practices and government guidance, where 
applicable.

J. Frequency Coordination for Orbit-Raising

    The Commission considered in the NPRM whether to modify its rule 
requiring authority for telemetry, tracking, and command functions to 
raise the satellite to its normal orbit following launch. Specifically, 
the rule limited such operations to a non-harmful interference, 
unprotected basis, and addressed only GSO operations. The rule made it 
clear that orbit-raising types of maneuvers in the pre-operational 
phase for GSO satellites are authorized operations, even though they 
may vary from the orbital parameters specified in the license. The 
Commission proposed to modify the rule such that satellite telemetry, 
tracking, and command communications for orbit raising must be 
coordinated between satellite operators for both GSO and NGSO 
satellites, rather than require those operations to be performed on a 
non-interference basis. The Commission also proposed to extend the rule 
generally to NGSO satellites, so that orbit-raising maneuvers in the 
pre-operational phase for NGSO satellites would be considered 
authorized operations, even though they may vary from the orbital 
parameters specified in the license. We address each of these proposals 
in turn.
    Coordination Among Operators of Frequency Use During Orbit Raising. 
Most commenters agreed with the Commission revising its rules so that 
telemetry, tracking, and command operations would be entitled to 
interference protection if coordinated with potentially affected 
satellite networks. Some commenters asked for clarification, or minor 
modifications,

[[Page 52443]]

such as requiring informal, rather than formal coordination between 
operators.
    Under existing procedures, an operator is not strictly required to 
coordinate, but could simply accept interference from other operators. 
We find that this is not an ideal regime for telemetry, tracking, and 
command operations, and take this opportunity to clarify that operators 
should coordinate these operations to ensure that such operations are 
not subject to interference that could impact those critical 
communications links and affect physical space station operations. This 
rule change is appropriate as part of this proceeding because it 
implicates communications related to the physical location of the space 
station. This coordination should also ensure that satellites already 
in service are not subject to interference from satellites engaged in 
orbit-raising. We further clarify that the ``coordination'' specified 
in the revised rule is informal operator-to-operator coordination, 
rather than, for example, the formal procedures specified in the ITU 
regulations. Eutelsat points out that current practices involves 
discussion between operators to facilitate operations on a non-
interference basis. Sirius XM states that we should not modify this 
rule with respect to GSO operators, because operators have conducted 
orbit raising for GSO satellites on a non-harmful-interference, 
unprotected basis for decades without issue. That may be the case, but 
we see no downside to clarifying that operators should be coordinating 
such operations. Sirius XM seems concerned that it would need to accept 
interference from satellites undertaking these operations, but that is 
not the case--we are simply ensuring that such operations are 
coordinated between operators, which appears largely to be a 
continuation of existing practices. We expect that the practice of 
coordination between operators will continue and the goal of our rule 
revision is to encourage such discussions, rather than requiring that 
the operator conducting orbit-raising activities operate on a non-
interference basis. We decline to specify any particular requirements 
for the coordination process, other than that operators undertake 
coordination in good faith, with the goal of facilitating orbit-raising 
operations and ensuring the availability of the telemetry, tracking, 
and command links, while not unduly disrupting other ongoing 
operations.
    A few commenters raise other issues. Global NewSpace Operators 
suggests that the Commission consider the unique aspects of NGSO orbit 
raising, including that it is much faster and that a specific 
radiofrequency interference event may occur without impacting 
operations due to the short duration. Regardless of the possibly short 
duration of a potential interference event, when it comes to frequency 
use for NGSO orbit raising, we maintain that it is in the public 
interest for space stations operators to coordinate those operations, 
even if the result is an agreed-upon short period of interference. 
Lockheed Martin supports the proposed change, but suggests an exemption 
for non-Earth orbit missions. The rule, as modified here, will continue 
to refer to ``short-term, transitory maneuvers.'' Rather than carve-out 
an exemption for non-Earth orbiting missions, we simply note that 
frequency use associated with longer-term transitory maneuvers can be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis, including as part of the space 
station authorizing conditions.
    CSSMA comments specifically regarding systems operating in the 
Earth-Exploration Satellite Service, Meteorological-Satellite Service, 
and Space Operations Service, and states that since those operations 
are generally on a non-exclusive basis, CSSMA does not believe 
regulated radiofrequency coordination requirements are necessary in 
those bands. We would not characterize our rule clarification here as 
``regulated radiofrequency coordination requirements,'' but simply a 
change that would ensure coordination specifically is completed to the 
extent necessary for telemetry, tracking, and command operations to be 
reliable and not impact other existing operations. If use of a 
particular frequency band is already shared through geographic 
separation of earth stations, for example, and the communications used 
for orbit-raising would be within the scope of that established 
sharing, then the operations would be considered ``coordinated'' and 
the operator would not need to undertake any additional coordination 
activities. There could be situations, however, where orbit-raising 
communications might be outside the scope of the established sharing 
regime for regular operations, and those orbit-raising communications 
would be coordinated. Thus, we decline to establish a carve-out for 
frequency bands that are used on a non-exclusive basis.
    Intelsat asks that the rule be expanded to cover all orbit-raising 
operations, including Earth-to-space launch and early orbit phase 
(LEOP) operations conducted by earth stations, which are currently 
authorized pursuant to special temporary authority. Since these radio 
frequency operations are authorized pursuant to special temporary 
authority, we declined to carve out an exception for earth station LEOP 
operations. We may revisit this issue in the future, however.
    Inclusion of Communications for Orbit-Raising in Authorization for 
NGSOs. Although most commenters who address this issue agree with the 
proposal to extend authority to transmit to NGSO space stations during 
orbit-raising as part of a grant, without additional specific approval, 
upon further consideration we decline to adopt this proposal. Instead 
we will continue the existing case-by-case practice of addressing these 
operations as part of the initial grant or through a license 
modification or special temporary authority. The change that the rule 
revision would have made would be to include such authority 
automatically in the original grant as we do for GSOs. After further 
consideration, we conclude that the explicit authorization process 
gives us the ability to examine the individual facts more closely, 
given the diversity of the types of operations present for NGSO orbit-
raising. For NGSO satellites there is a broad range of potential 
operations that could be characterized as transmissions in connection 
with short-term, transitory maneuvers directly related to post-launch, 
orbit-raising maneuvers, and we conclude that it is in the public 
interest for those types of operations to be explicitly authorized, 
rather than automatically included in the grant. This will give other 
operators more information regarding the nature of such operations and 
facilitate coordination between operators as well as coordination with 
government operations in frequency bands shared with Federal 
operations. For the same reasons, we decline to extend the rule to 
operators supporting orbit-raising of MEO spacecraft at the end of the 
satellite's mission, as requested by SES/O3b.

K. Liability Issues and Economic Incentives

1. Indemnification
    In the NPRM, the Commission sought comment on whether Commission 
space station licensees should indemnify the United States against any 
costs associated with a claim brought against the United States related 
to the authorized facilities under international law, specifically the 
Outer Space Treaties. Almost all commenters addressing the proposed 
indemnification requirement raised

[[Page 52444]]

concerns, and several argued the proposal should be examined further 
before it is adopted. We conclude that further development of the 
record on this topic is warranted and we address this topic in the 
Further Notice.
2. Other Economic Incentives
    Insurance. Separate from an indemnification requirement, the 
Commission had sought comment on the utility of insurance on its own as 
a means to incentivize operators to adhere to best practices in space. 
Specifically, the ability to obtain lower insurance premiums could 
provide an economic incentive for operators to adopt debris mitigation 
strategies that reduce risk. A number of commenters suggest that 
insurance generally would not necessarily incentivize good behavior in 
space, and provide information concerning the functioning of insurance 
markets that suggest they do not by themselves provide adequate 
incentives for debris mitigation. Given some of the limitations of 
insurance, we decline to adopt an insurance requirement on its own as a 
way of incentivizing ``good behavior'' in space. However, we seek 
comment in the Further Notice on whether a rule regarding 
indemnification will help to ensure that liability is considered as 
operators make decisions concerning satellite design and operation.
    Other Incentives. In the Further Notice, we propose a performance 
bond for satellite disposal, which we tentatively believe would be in 
the public interest as an economic incentive. We decline, however, to 
adopt several of the other economic incentives proposed by commenters 
as ways to encourage best practices in orbital debris mitigation for 
Commission-authorized satellites and systems. None of the additional 
proposals have been developed sufficiently to demonstrate how they 
could be applied to the orbital debris mitigation context at this time. 
We do not discount these possibilities altogether, however, and may 
revisit other economic incentives at some point in the future.
    NYU and Duke Science Regulatory Lab, for example, recommend that 
the FCC carefully consider employing ``market-based processes'' that 
``harness the efficiencies of the market to achieve policy objectives'' 
by exploring the use of government created rights--commonly referred to 
as ``marketable permits.'' Examples of such marketable permits may 
include: ``a cap and trade'' system, auctioned launch permits, a 
``credit trading system, ''and a ``priority review voucher.'' Such 
marketable permits could create a limited right to place a designated 
mass object into orbit during a specific time frame and, as such, may 
be used to deter and mitigate orbital debris. As noted by various 
commenters, however, establishing any such marketable permit would be a 
substantial undertaking, given the complexities of defining, for 
example, an appropriate and tradeable ``unit of exchange'' or a 
quantifiable and verifiable monitoring process. Additionally, it is not 
clear how this type of system would fit within the Commission's 
satellite licensing structure.
    NYU suggests the use of a regulatory fee to deter and mitigate 
orbital debris. Such a regulatory fee, however, would require 
calibrating the dollar value of orbital debris; determining the amount 
of revenue that is required to achieve some orbital debris target, 
e.g., the projected cost for removal, mitigation or better design to 
minimize debris; and then deciding how to allocate fees across these 
differing objectives. The Commission also has limitations on its 
authority under the Communications Act to impose new regulatory fees--
and indeed, we may not take into account risks of orbital debris 
creation under existing law. These issues are compounded further by the 
fact that satellite operators are not homogenous and include large 
global satellite operators as well as smaller regional operators that 
supply services to distinct geographic regions thereby affecting 
differently scale economies and the intensity of competition. 
Accordingly, we do not adopt these models for reducing or mitigating 
orbital debris.

L. Scope of Rules

1. Amateur and Experimental Operations
    The Commission proposed in the NPRM to amend the rules governing 
experimental satellite and amateur satellite authorizations to maintain 
consistency with the proposed revisions to the orbital debris 
mitigation rules for commercial systems.\30\ These authorized 
satellites have long been subject to orbital debris mitigation rules--
as the Commission concluded in 2004 that it was in the public interest 
to require a description of the design and operational strategies used 
to mitigate orbital debris from applicants seeking to conduct 
experimental or amateur satellite operations. In the NPRM, the 
Commission stated that it continues to believe that it is appropriate 
for amateur licensees and experimental applicants to provide a similar 
amount of disclosure regarding debris mitigation plans as will be 
required of commercial satellites, and sought comment. A number of 
commenters agreed that the amateur and experimental operations should 
be subject to the same orbital debris mitigation rules as commercial 
operations. Commenters with interest in amateur operations generally 
request that we carefully consider the impact of any proposed 
regulations on amateur satellite organizations and others building and 
operating space stations in the amateur satellite service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 11380, para. 82. The Commission noted 
that although it used the term ``commercial'' generally to refer to 
operations under part 25 of the Commission's rules, there is no 
requirement in part 25 that operations authorized under that part 
must be for an inherently commercial purpose. Id. at n.184.
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    In most instances, the issues relevant to amateur and experimental 
operations are discussed above in the context of specific rule changes. 
We address a few additional issues below. As a general matter, the 
Secure World Foundation asks us to clarify the intent and actual impact 
of the proposed rule changes on the experimental and amateur satellite 
communities. As part of our analysis on the specific rule changes 
above, we have taken into consideration any comments filed by parties 
with an interest in amateur satellites, or experimental satellite 
licensing, such as AMSAT and the University Small-Satellite 
Researchers. Where concerns have been raised about the application of 
rules to satellites and systems authorized under the experimental and 
amateur authorization processes, we have addressed those concerns. We 
note that, absent exceptions as noted in the discussion above, we will 
generally apply the same orbital debris mitigation rules to 
experimental and amateur-authorized stations because we conclude that 
these space stations can also pose risks to the on-orbit environment 
and to humans on the surface of the Earth, and so it is in the public 
interest to apply the same orbital debris requirements to satellites 
regardless of the type of authorization. We recognize as a general 
matter that amateur and experimental satellite operators may incur 
costs as a result of the revised orbital debris mitigation practices we 
adopt in this Order. However, given the potentially significant risks 
associated with any space station, we believe these costs are 
outweighed by the benefits of having orbital debris mitigation rules 
that are generally-applicable to non-government satellites, and that do 
not favor one type of system over another based solely on whether the 
application is filed under part 5, part 25, or part 97.

[[Page 52445]]

    Global NewSpace Operators suggests that an applicant should only be 
required to submit a collision analysis if it has the resources to do 
so, suggesting that some amateur or experimental space station 
operators may not. Since compliance can be demonstrated through use of 
the NASA Debris Assessment Software, which is available at no-cost, and 
has been used by many experimental applicants and amateur space station 
operators, we do not see an issue with applying this requirement to 
those types of space stations.
    We also recognize that in some instances, space stations, 
particularly amateur and experimental stations, are co-located on 
spacecraft with other space stations. AMSAT requests that we consider 
certain exemptions from orbital debris requirements in this scenario. 
In instances where there are multiple space stations co-located on the 
same spacecraft, and information on orbital debris mitigation plans has 
been provided or will be provided by one or more of the space station 
applicants in conformance with the Commission's rules, applicants for 
other co-located space stations may satisfy the disclosure requirements 
through incorporation by reference. In other words, there is no need 
for space station applicants to submit multiple copies of the same 
documentation to the Commission.\31\ We decline to adopt a blanket 
exemption from orbital debris disclosures for space stations co-located 
with U.S. government space stations, but suggest that applicants for 
such space stations could seek a waiver of our orbital debris 
mitigation disclosure requirements on the basis that the plans are 
being evaluated by another U.S. government entity. In such instances, 
the Commission would request that the FCC applicant or operator specify 
the U.S. government agency and contact for officials who would be 
responsible for the orbital debris mitigation component of the 
spacecraft operations. This should be a relatively straightforward 
process in many cases--for example, there is no reason for the 
Commission to independently evaluate the orbital debris mitigation plan 
for an experimental space station planned to be co-located on the ISS. 
Applicants and operators should be aware however, that additional 
information may be necessary in certain factual scenarios--such as 
where the governmental space station operations will conclude before 
the Commission-authorized operations.
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    \31\ This would only apply where the orbital debris mitigation 
information submitted for one space station would cover the orbital 
debris mitigation requirements associated for the other space 
station. It would not apply, for example, where a space station is 
only temporarily located on another spacecraft. See CSSMA Reply at 3 
(cautioning that any exemptions should not apply to satellites 
temporarily co-located on deployment vehicles).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Non-U.S.-Licensed Satellites
    The Commission also proposed in the NPRM that the new and amended 
rules adopted should be applicable to non-U.S.-licensed satellites 
seeking access to the U.S. market. This approach is consistent with the 
Commission's current rules. A number of commenters support the 
Commission's proposal to continue applying orbital debris mitigation 
requirements to non-U.S. licensed satellites seeking authority to 
access the U.S. market, and some commenters also support the existing 
approach of allowing non-U.S.-licensed satellite operators seeking U.S. 
market access to satisfy orbital debris mitigation requirements by 
demonstrating that their orbital debris mitigation efforts are subject 
to direct and effective regulatory oversight by another national 
licensing authority. CSSMA suggests that operators be permitted to 
demonstrate that their system's orbital debris mitigation plans are 
subject to direct and effective regulatory oversight by their foreign 
national licensing administration in cases where the operator does not 
have a substantial U.S. commercial presence, but is using U.S.-based 
activities for telemetry, tracking, and command. Global NewSpace 
Operators, on the other hand, states that the degree of activity should 
not be a factor and that transmission and reception on a limited basis, 
such as telemetry, tracking, and command, still constitutes a 
commercial activity and those operators should be held to the same 
rules as a U.S.-licensed operator. We agree with Global NewSpace 
Operators, and we do not think it is useful to make degree of activity 
the deciding factor for how to assess an applicant's orbital debris 
mitigation plans.
    Regarding orbital debris mitigation plans specifically, the 
Commission previously concluded that the disclosure requirements could 
be satisfied by showing that the satellite system's debris mitigation 
plans are subject to the direct and effective oversight by a non-U.S.-
satellite system's national licensing authority--which could include 
submitting an English language version of the debris mitigation rules 
or regulations of the authority and indicating the current status of 
the national licensing authority's review. SpaceX asks that we extend 
this treatment to systems authorized by countries only with truly 
equivalent approaches to safe space. We decline to set the exact 
parameters here for what constitutes ``direct and effective oversight'' 
in every instance, since foreign administrations may have different 
approaches which ultimately achieve the same result. We note, however, 
that transparency of the other administration's process is an important 
part of this assessment, particularly since the Commission's rules 
include a number of disclosures that are meant to inform not only the 
Commission, but also other operators so that those operators can plan 
accordingly.

M. Other Issues

1. Lunar/Other Orbits
    Several commenters suggested that we adopt rules relating to the 
protection of lunar and other orbits. We believe that regulations 
specific to lunar and other orbits is premature, and decline to 
establish any such rules at this time, particularly as they relate to 
satellite disposal. Operators will be required, however, to provide 
information in applications concerning limiting release of debris, 
limiting explosion risk, safe flight profiles, and plans for post-
mission disposal, if any.
2. Implementation of the New Rules
    Several commenters suggest that it is not practical to apply new 
debris mitigation requirements retroactively to operators already in-
orbit. CSSMA, for example, asks that we take into account that any 
changes to existing rules must be phased in over a period of several 
years so that the U.S. industry has time to evolve its technology and 
business plans. We observe that most of the rules adopted in this 
proceeding are application rules. Except where otherwise specified in 
this Order, the rules will apply to new applicants and not 
retroactively to existing applicants.
    In some specific instances, applications have been granted in part 
on the condition that the applicant file a modification application for 
Commission review including updated information on their orbital debris 
mitigation plan. These modification applications must provide 
information that satisfies the new rules that we adopt as part of this 
proceeding. Additionally, any other modifications filed by existing 
licensees or grantees seeking to modify their authorization as it 
relates to the orbital debris mitigation plan will be subject to rules 
adopted in this proceeding.
    There is also one change to an operational rule regarding orbit-
raising coordination. We do not anticipate that this will present any 
concerns to existing operators from a compliance

[[Page 52446]]

perspective, since the record suggests that many operators already 
coordinate orbit-raising activities with other potentially affected 
operators. Therefore, we require operators to comply beginning on the 
effective date of the rule, or if compliance is not possible, seek 
waiver of the rule.

N. Additional Topics From the Regulatory Impact Analysis

    In the NPRM, as part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the 
Commission considered and sought comment on various regulatory 
alternatives to reducing debris in orbit. Some of these approaches were 
related to other specific proposals in the NPRM (e.g., changes in 
operations and disposal procedures). Other alternatives (e.g., fewer 
launches) were different from the proposals that the Commission 
otherwise proposed in the Notice. The Commission sought comment on six 
regulatory alternatives to address orbital debris: fewer launches, 
changes in satellite design, changes in operations and disposal 
procedures, use of economic incentives, active collision avoidance, and 
active debris cleanup. The majority of these involve some type of 
regulatory activity. Based on the record and as discussed below, we 
conclude that as a general matter, operators would not necessarily be 
incentivized on their own to take action that is beneficial for the 
prevention and reduction of orbital debris in orbit absent regulatory 
action.
    As an introduction to the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the 
Commission provided some high-level analysis on the benefits of 
mitigating orbital debris, and how debris can be characterized as a 
negative externality. That is, that while the debris problem is a 
significant consideration for the joint use of orbital resources, such 
considerations may not play a sufficient role in economic decision-
making by operators individually. Reductions in the amount of debris 
created can help preserve orbital resources over the long-term. The 
costs and benefits are difficult to quantify--but in a worst-case 
scenario, certain valuable orbits could become useable only at an 
extremely high cost, rendering them unusable for most operators. If 
there were large concentrations of debris in LEO, for example, certain 
areas could not be used to provide any satellite service. The same 
holds true for GEO, a particularly valuable orbit for satellite 
communications. These would be significant costs for the satellite 
industry overall, and may end up in the discontinuation of certain 
types of commercial satellites or systems, not to mention the potential 
impact on costs for U.S. government systems. Moreover, there is a 
tendency of debris to generate yet more debris through collisions--
resulting in an escalating debris situation, even if no new debris is 
added as a result of ongoing operations. On the other hand, there are 
costs associated with practices such as collision avoidance and 
disposal--which we discuss in the context of each section above.
    Additionally, there are considerations of how any U.S. regulations, 
specifically FCC regulations, can benefit the overall orbital debris 
environment, since the United States is only one among many spacefaring 
nations. Given the common pool nature of space, as previously 
explained, one country's decision to improve the efficiency with which 
space is used will convey a benefit to other countries that employ 
space even if that country does not employ such measures. That only the 
satellite operators of the country employing the measures designed to 
limit orbital debris are incurring the associated costs while the 
benefits are enjoyed by everyone, likely will create incentives for 
other countries to ``free-ride'' off of the efforts of the providers 
licensed by efficiency enhancing countries. In the Notice the 
Commission reiterated the Commission's 2004 statement that: ``we do not 
believe that the theoretical possibility that other countries could 
take ill-considered actions, at variance with international norms, in 
any way should prevent the Commission from adopting objective and 
transparent measures concerning orbital debris mitigation that serve 
the public interest.'' Furthermore, as discussed above, we will apply 
the same orbital debris mitigation rules to non-U.S.-licensed 
satellites and systems seeking market access as we apply to U.S.-
licensed systems, so that both types of satellites and systems will be 
subject to the same orbital debris regulation.
    Some of the commenters in this proceeding responded to specific 
aspects of the Regulatory Impact Analysis, and in particular, disagreed 
with the options of limiting launches and regulating how satellites or 
satellite systems are designed. For example, Eutelsat states, from the 
perspective of a GSO operator, that regulation of spacecraft design 
could inhibit innovation and competition by manufacturers regarding 
ways to limit orbital debris, improve satellite operations, and ensure 
reliable end-of-life operations. Eutelsat further states that it may be 
difficult to identify a meaningful list of design elements that should 
be limited by rule and frequently updated to reflect technological 
progress. Astranis also disagrees with the Commission regulating how 
satellites or satellite systems are designed, stating that in the case 
of GSO satellites, market forces (including manufacturer and operator 
commercial objectives) and well-settled international requirements are 
sufficient to drive reliable design elements. Global NewSpace Operators 
states that while the government has a role to play in incentivizing 
industry, it does not recommend mandating specific satellite design 
concepts or active collision avoidance, rather preferring that these 
elements emerge as industry best practices. The Secure World Foundation 
states that changes in satellite design, operations and disposal and 
procedures, and economic incentives should all be considered as part of 
strengthening orbital debris mitigation requirements, and that ensuring 
better post-mission disposal through design and procedures represents 
the best opportunity for reducing the future growth of the space debris 
population from new launches. The Secure World Foundation also notes 
that even with strong post-mission disposal, active debris removal or 
just-in-time collision avoidance of existing large debris objects will 
be required to prevent the collisions that will generate thousands of 
new pieces of debris. According to the Secure World Foundation and 
Global NewSpace Operators, it is difficult to determine what the exact 
right mix of these components will be, and suggests that the U.S. 
government consider funding more public research and analysis of the 
orbital debris problem and holistic approaches to addressing space 
sustainability. Many commenters also expressed views on the costs of 
certain rule revisions in the context of the discussion above, which we 
have considered as part of those analyses. Overall, we conclude that 
taking the action to adopt updates to our rules at this time balances 
the costs of requiring U.S. commercial and other non-governmental 
operators to address orbital debris mitigation as part of the current 
licensing process, with the benefit of limiting the increase in new 
debris in orbit. At the same time, we recognize the need for continued 
research and development in this area, and expect that given the pace 
of developments in the space industry and U.S. government, orbital 
debris regulation may become a more rapidly iterative process than it 
has been in the past. Given the record established both specific to the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis as well as specific to other

[[Page 52447]]

topics in the proceeding, we agree with Global NewSpace Operators that 
the most practical, cost-neutral, and immediate regulatory actions can 
come from requiring changes in operations and disposal procedures.

Ordering Clauses

    It Is Ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 301, 303, 307, 308, 
309, and 310 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 
151, 154(i), 301, 303, 307, 308, 309, and 310, that this Report and 
Order is adopted, the policies, rules, and requirements discussed 
herein are adopted, and parts 5, 25, and 97 of the Commission's rules 
are amended as set forth in Appendix A of the Report and Order.
    It Is Further Ordered that the amendments of the Commission's rules 
to Sec. Sec.  25.271(d) and 25.282, 47 CFR 25.271(d), 25.282, set forth 
in Appendix A of the Report and Order, are adopted, effective thirty 
days from the date of publication in the Federal Register. The other 
amendments to the Commission's rules set forth in Appendix A of this 
Order contain new or modified information collection requirements that 
require review and approval by the Office of Management and Budget 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, and will become effective after the 
Commission publishes a notice in the Federal Register announcing such 
approval and the relevant effective date.
    It Is Further Ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Report and Order the Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration.
    It Is Further Ordered that the Commission shall send a copy of this 
Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 
(RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Mitigation of 
Orbital Debris in the New Space Age (Notice), released in November 2018 
in this proceeding. No comments were filed addressing the IRFA. This 
present Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the 
RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

    This Order adopts updates to the Commission's rules relating to the 
mitigation of orbital debris. This represents the first comprehensive 
update to our rules on orbital debris mitigation since their adoption 
in 2004. These rule changes are informed by the Commission's experience 
gained in the licensing process and address updates in mitigation 
guidelines and practices as well as market developments. Adoption of 
these rule revisions will ensure that applicants for a Commission space 
station license or authorization, or grant of market access, provide a 
complete statement concerning plans for orbital debris mitigation 
enabling the Commission to fully evaluate whether the proposed 
operations are consistent with the public interest. Adoption of these 
rules will also provide specific guidance on evaluation criteria for 
orbital debris mitigation plans in a number of areas, for both non-
geostationary orbit (NGSO) and geostationary-orbit (GSO) space 
stations. This action will help to ensure that Commission decisions are 
consistent with the public interest in space remaining viable for 
future satellites and systems and the many services that those systems 
provide to the public.
    The Order adopts several changes to 47 CFR parts 5, 25, and 97. 
Principally, it:
    (1) Revises the Commission's application disclosure rules regarding 
mitigation of orbital debris to incorporate specific metrics for 
assessments of risk of collision with large objects, risk of collision 
with small objects, and re-entry casualty risk;
    (2) Adopts application disclosures regarding protection of 
inhabitable spacecraft, maneuverability trackability, space station 
identification, and sharing of information regarding initial space 
station deployment, ephemeris, and/or planned maneuvers;
    (3) Adopts a demonstration requirement for applicants for NGSO 
space stations that the probability of success of the chosen disposal 
method is 0.9 or greater for any individual space station, with the 
demonstration including efforts to achieve a higher probability of 
success for larger systems;
    (4) Codifies the current practice of requesting certain types of 
information from GSO licensees requesting license term extensions, and 
limits most GSO licensees to license extensions in increments of five 
years; and
    (5) Adopts other rules updates to address specific situations, 
including proximity operations, use of deployment devices, and certain 
types of plans for disposal of space stations.

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response 
to the IRFA

    No comments were filed that specifically addressed the IRFA.

C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration

    Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the 
RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the proposed 
rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not file any 
comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Proposed Rules Will Apply

    The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where 
feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the proposed rules and policies, if adopted herein. The RFA 
generally defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning 
as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small 
governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' 
has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the 
Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is 
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the 
Small Business Administration (SBA). Below, we describe and estimate 
the number of small entities that may be affected by adoption of the 
final rules.
Satellite Telecommunications and All Other Telecommunications.
    Satellite Telecommunications. This category comprises firms 
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other 
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by 
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of 
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite 
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth 
station operators. The category has a small business size standard of 
$35 million or less in average annual receipts, under SBA rules. For 
this category, U.S.

[[Page 52448]]

Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there were a total of 333 firms 
that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 299 firms had annual 
receipts of less than $25 million. Consequently, we estimate that the 
majority of satellite telecommunications providers are small entities
    All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other Telecommunications'' 
category is comprised of establishments primarily engaged in providing 
specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, 
communications telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry 
also includes establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite 
terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one or more 
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, 
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. 
Establishments providing internet services or voice over internet 
protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied telecommunications 
connections are also included in this industry. The SBA has developed a 
small business size standard for ``All Other Telecommunications'', 
which consists of all such firms with annual receipts of $35 million or 
less. For this category, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that 
there were 1,442 firms that operated for the entire year. Of those 
firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts less than $25 million and 
15 firms had annual receipts of $25 million to $49,999,999. Thus, the 
Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' firms potentially affected by our action can be 
considered small. These rule changes would also apply to experimental 
space station applicants under part 5 and amateur space station 
operators under part 97, and we estimate that in almost all cases these 
entities will qualify under the definition of small entities. 
Additionally, we estimate that some space station applicants applying 
under part 25 of the Commission's rules will qualify as small entities 
affected by these rule changes.

E. Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    The Order amended those rules that are applicable to space station 
operators requesting a licensee or authorization from the Commission, 
or entities requesting that the Commission grant a request for U.S. 
market access. These applicants must submit a debris mitigation plan to 
the Commission as part of the application process, and the Order 
revised in part the information to be included in that debris 
mitigation plan. These revisions codified a number of informational 
requirements that applicants were providing under the existing rules, 
including providing some specific metrics for operators to reference in 
preparing orbital debris mitigation plans. The Order also adopts some 
additional disclosure requirements related to orbital debris 
mitigation. Applicants requesting authorization from the Commission 
must comply with existing technical disclosure requirements, including 
those related to orbital debris mitigation. Much of the information 
covered in the revised rules is information that applicants already 
provide or that the Commission would currently seek from the applicant 
under its existing general disclosure requirements. Most applicants 
already prepare orbital debris mitigation plans using the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Debris Assessment Software 
identified in the revised rules as an acceptable assessment tool. This 
assessment tool is available at no cost and documentation on how to use 
the software is made available online by NASA. The additional 
disclosure and certification requirements adopted in the Report and 
Order are consistent with the types of legal and technical requirements 
already specified in the Commission's application rules, and therefore 
we expect that all parties, including small entities, will have the 
resources to prepare and disclose orbital debris mitigation plans in 
accordance with the revised rules.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives 
that it has considered in developing its approach, which may include 
the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) the establishment 
of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that 
take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the 
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and 
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the 
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption 
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small 
entities.''
    (1) Differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables. 
The Order requires all space station applicants to disclose plans to 
mitigate orbital debris at the application stage, and thus applicants 
may prepare and submit the information according to their schedule, so 
long as the information is part of the application to the Commission, 
and there is enough time for the Commission to review and act on the 
application prior to launch. Applicants for GSO license extensions 
similarly may prepare information in support of their request for an 
extension in accordance with their preferred timetable. As noted, the 
revised requirements overall are consistent with the level of technical 
analysis that applicants currently provide in preparing an application 
for Commission review. We do make a timetable modification in the 
amateur space station rules to accommodate the notification process for 
Part 97 amateur authorizations. Applicants for systems consisting of 
multiple space stations will need to provide some additional 
information at the application stage, recognizing the impact of a 
system consisting of multiple satellites on the orbital debris 
environment. As noted above, operation of multiple space stations is 
not always correlated with larger entities, however, since small 
entities may also plan to operate multiple space stations. As a general 
matter, we observe that space station operations by small entities can 
pose the same public interest concerns as those posed by large entities 
when it comes to contribution to the orbital debris environment, with 
the level of contribution to the debris environment being driven by 
factors other than the size of the entity.
    (2) Clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance 
or reporting requirements. The Order clarifies a number of existing 
compliance requirements by providing specific metrics and guidance in a 
number of areas that inform an applicant's disclosures and 
certifications related to orbital debris mitigation. The Order also 
clarifies the authorization process by specifying additional 
disclosures in the rules, thereby providing applicants, including small 
entities, with a more complete view of the information that the 
Commission needs during a typical license or authorization process in 
order to adequately assess the applicant's orbital debris mitigation 
plan.
    (3) Use of performance, rather than design, standards. The Order 
specifically addresses comments requesting the use of performance, 
rather than prescriptive, or design, standards. We have endeavored 
throughout the Report and Order to adopt a performance-based approach 
where feasible.

[[Page 52449]]

    (4) Exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for 
small entities. With respect to exemptions, we reiterate our 
observation that as a general matter, space station operations by small 
entities can present the same public interest concerns as those posed 
by large entities when it comes to contribution to the orbital debris 
environment, with the level of contribution to the debris environment 
being driven by factors other than the size of the entity. Therefore, 
we do not adopt exemptions from coverage of a rule for small entities.

Report to Congress

    The Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, 
in a report to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In 
addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this 
FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA. A copy of the Order 
and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal 
Register.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Satellites.

Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends title 47 of the CFR, parts 5, 25, and 
97 as follows:

PART 5--EXPERIMENTAL RADIO SERVICE

0
1. The authority citation for part 5 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 336.


0
2. Amend Sec.  5.64, by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  5.64  Special provisions for satellite systems.

* * * * *
    (b) Except where the satellite system has already been authorized 
by the FCC, applicants for an experimental authorization involving a 
satellite system must submit a description of the design and 
operational strategies the satellite system will use to mitigate 
orbital debris, including the following information:
    (1) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the amount of debris released in a planned manner during normal 
operations. Where applicable, this statement must include an orbital 
debris mitigation disclosure for any separate deployment devices, 
distinct from the space station launch vehicle, that may become a 
source of orbital debris;
    (2) A statement indicating whether the space station operator has 
assessed and limited the probability that the space station(s) will 
become a source of debris by collision with small debris or meteoroids 
that would cause loss of control and prevent disposal. The statement 
must indicate whether this probability for an individual space station 
is 0.01 (1 in 100) or less, as calculated using the NASA Debris 
Assessment Software or a higher fidelity assessment tool;
    (3) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the probability, during and after completion of mission 
operations, of accidental explosions or of release of liquids that will 
persist in droplet form. This statement must include a demonstration 
that debris generation will not result from the conversion of energy 
sources on board the spacecraft into energy that fragments the 
spacecraft. Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic 
energy. This demonstration should address whether stored energy will be 
removed at the spacecraft's end of life, by depleting residual fuel and 
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, 
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any 
remaining source of stored energy, or through other equivalent 
procedures specifically disclosed in the application;
    (4) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the probability of the space station(s) becoming a source of 
debris by collisions with large debris or other operational space 
stations.
    (i) Where the application is for an NGSO space station or system, 
the following information must also be included:
    (A) A demonstration that the space station operator has assessed 
and limited the probability of collision between any space station of 
the system and other large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter) during 
the total orbital lifetime of the space station, including any de-orbit 
phases, to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The probability shall be 
calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher 
fidelity assessment tool. The collision risk may be assumed zero for a 
space station during any period in which the space station will be 
maneuvered effectively to avoid colliding with large objects.
    (B) The statement must identify characteristics of the space 
station(s)' orbits that may present a collision risk, including any 
planned and/or operational space stations in those orbits, and indicate 
what steps, if any, have been taken to coordinate with the other 
spacecraft or system, or what other measures the operator plans to use 
to avoid collision.
    (C) If at any time during the space station(s)' mission or de-orbit 
phase the space station(s) will transit through the orbits used by any 
inhabitable spacecraft, including the International Space Station, the 
statement must describe the design and operational strategies, if any, 
that will be used to minimize the risk of collision and avoid posing 
any operational constraints to the inhabitable spacecraft.
    (D) The statement must disclose the accuracy, if any, with which 
orbital parameters will be maintained, including apogee, perigee, 
inclination, and the right ascension of the ascending node(s). In the 
event that a system will not maintain orbital tolerances, e.g., its 
propulsion system will not be used for orbital maintenance, that fact 
should be included in the debris mitigation disclosure. Such systems 
must also indicate the anticipated evolution over time of the orbit of 
the proposed satellite or satellites. All systems must describe the 
extent of satellite maneuverability, whether or not the space station 
design includes a propulsion system.
    (E) The space station operator must certify that upon receipt of a 
space situational awareness conjunction warning, the operator will 
review and take all possible steps to assess the collision risk, and 
will mitigate the collision risk if necessary. As appropriate, steps to 
assess and mitigate the collision risk should include, but are not 
limited to: contacting the operator of any active spacecraft involved 
in such a warning; sharing ephemeris data and other appropriate 
operational information with any such operator; and modifying space 
station attitude and/or operations.
    (ii) Where a space station requests the assignment of a 
geostationary orbit location, it must assess whether there are any 
known satellites located at, or reasonably expected to be located at, 
the requested orbital location, or assigned in the vicinity of that 
location, such that the station keeping volumes of the respective 
satellites might overlap or touch. If so, the statement must include a 
statement as to the identities of those parties and the measures that 
will be taken to prevent collisions.

[[Page 52450]]

    (5) A statement addressing the trackability of the space 
station(s). Space station(s) operating in low-Earth orbit will be 
presumed trackable if each individual space station is 10 cm or larger 
in its smallest dimension, exclusive of deployable components. Where 
the application is for an NGSO space station or system, the statement 
shall also disclose the following:
    (i) How the operator plans to identify the space station(s) 
following deployment and whether space station tracking will be active 
or passive;
    (ii) Whether, prior to deployment, the space station(s) will be 
registered with the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity; 
and
    (iii) The extent to which the space station operator plans to share 
information regarding initial deployment, ephemeris, and/or planned 
maneuvers with the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity, 
other entities that engage in space situational awareness or space 
traffic management functions, and/or other operators.
    (6) A statement disclosing planned proximity operations, if any, 
and addressing debris generation that will or may result from the 
proposed operations, including any planned release of debris, the risk 
of accidental explosions, the risk of accidental collision, and 
measures taken to mitigate those risks.
    (7) A statement detailing the disposal plans for the space station, 
including the quantity of fuel--if any--that will be reserved for 
disposal maneuvers. In addition, the following specific provisions 
apply:
    (i) For geostationary orbit space stations, the statement must 
disclose the altitude selected for a disposal orbit and the 
calculations that are used in deriving the disposal altitude.
    (ii) For space stations terminating operations in an orbit in or 
passing through the low-Earth orbit region below 2,000 km altitude, the 
statement must disclose whether the spacecraft will be disposed of 
either through atmospheric re-entry, specifying if direct retrieval of 
the spacecraft will be used. The statement must also disclose the 
expected time in orbit for the space station following the completion 
of the mission.
    (iii) For space stations not covered by either paragraph (b)(7)(i) 
or (ii) of this section, the statement must indicate whether disposal 
will involve use of a storage orbit or long-term atmospheric re-entry 
and rationale for the selected disposal plan.
    (iv) For all NGSO space stations under paragraph (b)(7)(ii) or 
(iii) of this section, the following additional specific provisions 
apply:
    (A) The statement must include a demonstration that the probability 
of success of the chosen disposal method will be 0.9 or greater for any 
individual space station. For space station systems consisting of 
multiple space stations, the demonstration should include additional 
information regarding efforts to achieve a higher probability of 
success, with a goal, for large systems, of a probability of success 
for any individual space station of 0.99 or better. For space stations 
under paragraph (b)(7)(ii) of this section that will be terminating 
operations in or passing through low-Earth orbit, successful disposal 
is defined as atmospheric re-entry of the spacecraft within 25 years or 
less following completion of the mission. For space stations under 
paragraph (b)(7)(iii) of this section, successful disposal will be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
    (B) If planned disposal is by atmospheric re-entry, the statement 
must also include:
    (1) A disclosure indicating whether the atmospheric re-entry will 
be an uncontrolled re-entry or a controlled targeted reentry.
    (2) An assessment as to whether portions of any individual 
spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of 
the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules, and 
demonstration that the calculated casualty risk for an individual 
spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher 
fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000).

PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

0
3. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319, 
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.


0
4. Amend Sec.  25.114 by revising paragraph (d)(14) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.114  Applications for space station authorizations.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (14) A description of the design and operational strategies that 
will be used to mitigate orbital debris, including the following 
information:
    (i) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the amount of debris released in a planned manner during normal 
operations. Where applicable, this statement must include an orbital 
debris mitigation disclosure for any separate deployment devices, 
distinct from the space station launch vehicle, that may become a 
source of orbital debris;
    (ii) A statement indicating whether the space station operator has 
assessed and limited the probability that the space station(s) will 
become a source of debris by collision with small debris or meteoroids 
that would cause loss of control and prevent disposal. The statement 
must indicate whether this probability for an individual space station 
is 0.01 (1 in 100) or less, as calculated using the NASA Debris 
Assessment Software or a higher fidelity assessment tool;
    (iii) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the probability, during and after completion of mission 
operations, of accidental explosions or of release of liquids that will 
persist in droplet form. This statement must include a demonstration 
that debris generation will not result from the conversion of energy 
sources on board the spacecraft into energy that fragments the 
spacecraft. Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic 
energy. This demonstration should address whether stored energy will be 
removed at the spacecraft's end of life, by depleting residual fuel and 
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, 
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any 
remaining source of stored energy, or through other equivalent 
procedures specifically disclosed in the application;
    (iv) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the probability of the space station(s) becoming a source of 
debris by collisions with large debris or other operational space 
stations.
    (A) Where the application is for an NGSO space station or system, 
the following information must also be included:
    (1) A demonstration that the space station operator has assessed 
and limited the probability of collision between any space station of 
the system and other large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter) during 
the total orbital lifetime of the space station, including any de-orbit 
phases, to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The probability shall be 
calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher 
fidelity assessment tool. The collision risk may be assumed zero for a 
space station during any period in which the space station will be 
maneuvered effectively to avoid colliding with large objects.
    (2) The statement must identify characteristics of the space 
station(s)' orbits that may present a collision risk,

[[Page 52451]]

including any planned and/or operational space stations in those 
orbits, and indicate what steps, if any, have been taken to coordinate 
with the other spacecraft or system, or what other measures the 
operator plans to use to avoid collision.
    (3) If at any time during the space station(s)' mission or de-orbit 
phase the space station(s) will transit through the orbits used by any 
inhabitable spacecraft, including the International Space Station, the 
statement must describe the design and operational strategies, if any, 
that will be used to minimize the risk of collision and avoid posing 
any operational constraints to the inhabitable spacecraft.
    (4) The statement must disclose the accuracy, if any, with which 
orbital parameters will be maintained, including apogee, perigee, 
inclination, and the right ascension of the ascending node(s). In the 
event that a system is not able to maintain orbital tolerances, e.g., 
its propulsion system will not be used for orbital maintenance, that 
fact must be included in the debris mitigation disclosure. Such systems 
must also indicate the anticipated evolution over time of the orbit of 
the proposed satellite or satellites. All systems must describe the 
extent of satellite maneuverability, whether or not the space station 
design includes a propulsion system.
    (5) The space station operator must certify that upon receipt of a 
space situational awareness conjunction warning, the operator will 
review and take all possible steps to assess the collision risk, and 
will mitigate the collision risk if necessary. As appropriate, steps to 
assess and mitigate the collision risk should include, but are not 
limited to: Contacting the operator of any active spacecraft involved 
in such a warning; sharing ephemeris data and other appropriate 
operational information with any such operator; and modifying space 
station attitude and/or operations.
    (B) Where a space station requests the assignment of a 
geostationary orbit location, it must assess whether there are any 
known satellites located at, or reasonably expected to be located at, 
the requested orbital location, or assigned in the vicinity of that 
location, such that the station keeping volumes of the respective 
satellites might overlap or touch. If so, the statement must include a 
statement as to the identities of those satellites and the measures 
that will be taken to prevent collisions;
    (v) A statement addressing the trackability of the space 
station(s). Space station(s) operating in low-Earth orbit will be 
presumed trackable if each individual space station is 10 cm or larger 
in its smallest dimension, excluding deployable components. Where the 
application is for an NGSO space station or system, the statement shall 
also disclose the following:
    (A) How the operator plans to identify the space station(s) 
following deployment and whether space station tracking will be active 
or passive;
    (B) Whether, prior to deployment, the space station(s) will be 
registered with the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity; 
and
    (C) The extent to which the space station operator plans to share 
information regarding initial deployment, ephemeris, and/or planned 
maneuvers with the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity, 
other entities that engage in space situational awareness or space 
traffic management functions, and/or other operators.
    (vi) A statement disclosing planned proximity operations, if any, 
and addressing debris generation that will or may result from the 
proposed operations, including any planned release of debris, the risk 
of accidental explosions, the risk of accidental collision, and 
measures taken to mitigate those risks.
    (vii) A statement detailing the disposal plans for the space 
station, including the quantity of fuel--if any--that will be reserved 
for disposal maneuvers. In addition, the following specific provisions 
apply:
    (A) For geostationary orbit space stations, the statement must 
disclose the altitude selected for a disposal orbit and the 
calculations that are used in deriving the disposal altitude.
    (B) For space stations terminating operations in an orbit in or 
passing through the low-Earth orbit region below 2,000 km altitude, the 
statement must disclose whether the spacecraft will be disposed of 
through atmospheric re-entry, specifying if direct retrieval of the 
spacecraft will be used. The statement must also disclose the expected 
time in orbit for the space station following the completion of the 
mission.
    (C) For space stations not covered by either paragraph 
(d)(14)(vii)(A) or (B) of this section, the statement must indicate 
whether disposal will involve use of a storage orbit or long-term 
atmospheric re-entry and rationale for the selected disposal plan.
    (D) For all space stations under paragraph (d)(14)(vii) (B) or (C) 
of this section, the following additional specific provisions apply:
    (1) The statement must include a demonstration that the probability 
of success of the chosen disposal method will be 0.9 or greater for any 
individual space station. For space station systems consisting of 
multiple space stations, the demonstration should include additional 
information regarding efforts to achieve a higher probability of 
success, with a goal, for large systems, of a probability of success 
for any individual space station of 0.99 or better. For space stations 
under paragraph (d)(14)(vii)(B) of this section, successful disposal is 
defined as atmospheric re-entry of the spacecraft within 25 years or 
less following completion of the mission. For space stations under 
paragraph (d)(14)(vii)(C) of this section, successful disposal will be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
    (2) If planned disposal is by atmospheric re-entry, the statement 
must also include:
    (i) A disclosure indicating whether the atmospheric re-entry will 
be an uncontrolled re-entry or a controlled targeted reentry.
    (ii) An assessment as to whether portions of any individual 
spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of 
the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules, and 
demonstration that the calculated casualty risk for an individual 
spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher 
fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000).
    (E) Applicants for space stations to be used only for commercial 
remote sensing may, in lieu of submitting detailed post-mission 
disposal plans to the Commission, certify that they have submitted such 
plans to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for 
review.
    (viii) For non-U.S.-licensed space stations, the requirement to 
describe the design and operational strategies to minimize orbital 
debris risk can be satisfied by demonstrating that debris mitigation 
plans for the space station(s) for which U.S. market access is 
requested are subject to direct and effective regulatory oversight by 
the national licensing authority.
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  25.121 by adding paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.121  License term and renewals.

* * * * *
    (f) Geostationary Satellite License Term Extensions. (1) For 
geostationary space stations issued an initial license term for a 
period of 15 years, licensees may apply for a modification to extend 
the license term in increments of five years or less.
    (2) Geostationary space station licensees seeking a license term

[[Page 52452]]

extension through a license modification application must provide a 
statement that includes the following:
    (i) The requested duration of the license extension;
    (ii) The estimated total remaining space station lifetime;
    (iii) A description of any single points of failure or other 
malfunctions, defects, or anomalies during the space station operation 
that could affect its ability to conduct end-of-life procedures as 
planned, and an assessment of the associated risk;
    (iv) A certification that remaining fuel reserves are adequate to 
complete de-orbit as planned; and
    (v) A certification that telemetry, tracking, and command links are 
fully functional.

0
6. Amend Sec.  25.122 by revising paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  25.122  Applications for streamlined small space station 
authorization.

* * * * *
    (c) Applicants filing for authorization under the streamlined 
procedure described in this section must include with their 
applications certifications that the following criteria will be met for 
all space stations to be operated under the license:
    (1) The space station(s) will operate only in non-geostationary 
orbit;
    (2) The total in-orbit lifetime for any individual space station 
will be six years or less;
    (3) The space station(s):
    (i) Will be deployed at an orbital altitude of 600 km or below; or
    (ii) Will maintain a propulsion system and have the ability to make 
collision avoidance and deorbit maneuvers using propulsion;
    (4) Each space station will be identifiable by a unique signal-
based telemetry marker distinguishing it from other space stations or 
space objects;
    (5) The space station(s) will release no operational debris;
    (6) The space station operator has assessed and limited the 
probability of accidental explosions, including those resulting from 
the conversion of energy sources on board the space station(s) into 
energy that fragments the spacecraft;
    (7) The probability of a collision between each space station and 
any other large object (10 centimeters or larger) during the orbital 
lifetime of the space station is 0.001 or less as calculated using 
current National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) software 
or other higher fidelity model;
    (8) The space station(s) will be disposed of post-mission through 
atmospheric re-entry. The probability of human casualty from portions 
of the spacecraft surviving re-entry and reaching the surface of the 
Earth is zero as calculated using current NASA software or higher 
fidelity models;
    (9) Operation of the space station(s) will be compatible with 
existing operations in the authorized frequency band(s). Operations 
will not materially constrain future space station entrants from using 
the authorized frequency band(s);
    (10) The space station(s) can be commanded by command originating 
from the ground to immediately cease transmissions and the licensee 
will have the capability to eliminate harmful interference when 
required under the terms of the license or other applicable 
regulations;
    (11) Each space station is 10 cm or larger in its smallest 
dimension;
    (12) Each space station will have a mass of 180 kg or less, 
including any propellant;
    (13) The probability that any individual space station will become 
a source of debris by collision with small debris or meteoroids that 
would cause loss of control and prevent disposal is 0.01 (1 in 100) or 
less; and
    (14) Upon receipt of a space situational awareness conjunction 
warning, the licensee or operator will review and take all possible 
steps to assess the collision risk, and will mitigate the collision 
risk if necessary. As appropriate, steps to assess and mitigate the 
collision risk should include, but are not limited to: Contacting the 
operator of any active spacecraft involved in such a warning; sharing 
ephemeris data and other appropriate operational information with any 
such operator; and modifying space station attitude and/or operations.
    (d) The following information in narrative form shall be contained 
in each application:
    (1) An overall description of system facilities, operations, and 
services and an explanation of how uplink frequency bands would be 
connected to downlink frequency bands;
    (2) Public interest considerations in support of grant;
    (3) A description of means by which requested spectrum could be 
shared with both current and future operators, (e.g., how ephemeris 
data will be shared, antenna design, earth station geographic 
locations) thereby not materially constraining other operations in the 
requested frequency band(s);
    (4) If at any time during the space station(s)' mission or de-orbit 
phase the space station(s) will transit through the orbits used by any 
inhabitable spacecraft, including the International Space Station, a 
description of the design and operational strategies, if any, that will 
be used to minimize the risk of collision and avoid posing any 
operational constraints to the inhabitable spacecraft shall be 
furnished at the time of application;
    (5) A statement identifying characteristics of the space 
station(s)' orbits that may present a collision risk, including any 
planned and/or operational space stations in those orbits, and 
indicating what steps, if any, have been taken to coordinate with the 
other spacecraft or system, or what other measures the licensee plans 
to use to avoid collision;
    (6) A statement disclosing how the licensee or operator plans to 
identify the space station(s) following deployment and whether space 
station tracking will be active or passive; whether the space 
station(s) will be registered with the 18th Space Control Squadron or 
successor entity prior to deployment; and the extent to which the space 
station licensee or operator plans to share information regarding 
initial deployment, ephemeris, and/or planned maneuvers with the 18th 
Space Control Squadron or successor entity, other entities that engage 
in space situational awareness or space traffic management functions, 
and/or other operators;
    (7) A description of the design and operation of maneuverability 
and deorbit systems, if any, and a description of the anticipated 
evolution over time of the orbit of the proposed satellite or 
satellites;
    (8) If there are planned proximity operations, a statement 
disclosing those planned operations, and addressing debris generation 
that will or may result from the proposed operations, including any 
planned release of debris, the risk of accidental explosions, the risk 
of accidental collision, and measures taken to mitigate those risks;
    (9) A demonstration that the probability of success of disposal is 
0.9 or greater for any individual space station. Space stations 
deployed to orbits in which atmospheric drag will, in the event of a 
space station failure, limit the lifetime of the space station to less 
than 25 years do not need to provide this additional demonstration; and
    (10) A list of the FCC file numbers or call signs for any known 
applications or Commission grants related to the proposed operations 
(e.g., experimental license grants, other space station or earth 
station applications or grants).

0
7. Amend Sec.  25.123 by adding paragraph (b)(11) to read as follows:

[[Page 52453]]

Sec.  25.123  Applications for streamlined small spacecraft 
authorization.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (11) Upon receipt of a space situational awareness conjunction 
warning, the operator will review and take all possible steps to assess 
the collision risk, and will mitigate the collision risk if necessary. 
As appropriate, steps to assess and mitigate the collision risk should 
include, but are not limited to: Contacting the operator of any active 
spacecraft involved in such a warning; sharing ephemeris data and other 
appropriate operational information with any such operator; and 
modifying space station attitude and/or operations.
* * * * *

0
8. Amend Sec.  25.271 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.271  Control of transmitting stations.

* * * * *
    (d) The licensee shall ensure that the licensed facilities are 
properly secured against unauthorized access or use whenever an 
operator is not present at the transmitter. For space station 
operations, this includes securing satellite commands against 
unauthorized access and use.
* * * * *

0
9. Amend Sec.  25.282 by revising paragraph (b) as follows:


Sec.  25.282  Orbit raising maneuvers.

* * * * *
    (b) The space station operator will coordinate on an operator-to-
operator basis with any potentially affected satellite networks.
* * * * *

PART 97--AMATEUR RADIO SERVICE

0
10. The authority citation for part 97 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 151-155, 301-609, unless otherwise noted.


0
11. Amend Sec.  97.207 by revising paragraph (g)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  97.207  Space station.

* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (1) A pre-space notification within 30 days after the date of 
launch vehicle determination, but no later than 90 days before 
integration of the space station into the launch vehicle. The 
notification must be in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9 
and 11 of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio 
Regulations and must specify the information required by Appendix 4 and 
Resolution No. 642 of the ITU Radio Regulations. The notification must 
also include a description of the design and operational strategies 
that the space station will use to mitigate orbital debris, including 
the following information:
    (i) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the amount of debris released in a planned manner during normal 
operations. Where applicable, this statement must include an orbital 
debris mitigation disclosure for any separate deployment devices, 
distinct from the space station launch vehicle, that may become a 
source of orbital debris;
    (ii) A statement indicating whether the space station operator has 
assessed and limited the probability that the space station(s) will 
become a source of debris by collision with small debris or meteoroids 
that would cause loss of control and prevent disposal. The statement 
must indicate whether this probability for an individual space station 
is 0.01 (1 in 100) or less, as calculated using the NASA Debris 
Assessment Software or a higher fidelity assessment tool;
    (iii) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the probability, during and after completion of mission 
operations, of accidental explosions or of release of liquids that will 
persist in droplet form. This statement must include a demonstration 
that debris generation will not result from the conversion of energy 
sources on board the spacecraft into energy that fragments the 
spacecraft. Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic 
energy. This demonstration should address whether stored energy will be 
removed at the spacecraft's end of life, by depleting residual fuel and 
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, 
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any 
remaining source of stored energy, or through other equivalent 
procedures specifically disclosed in the application;
    (iv) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and 
limited the probability of the space station(s) becoming a source of 
debris by collisions with large debris or other operational space 
stations.
    (A) Where the application is for an NGSO space station or system, 
the following information must also be included:
    (1) A demonstration that the space station operator has assessed 
and limited the probability of collision between any space station of 
the system and other large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter) during 
the total orbital lifetime of the space station, including any de-orbit 
phases, to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The probability shall be 
calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher 
fidelity assessment tool. The collision risk may be assumed zero for a 
space station during any period in which the space station will be 
maneuvered effectively to avoid colliding with large objects.
    (2) The statement must identify characteristics of the space 
station(s)' orbits that may present a collision risk, including any 
planned and/or operational space stations in those orbits, and indicate 
what steps, if any, have been taken to coordinate with the other 
spacecraft or system, or what other measures the operator plans to use 
to avoid collision.
    (3) If at any time during the space station(s)' mission or de-orbit 
phase the space station(s) will transit through the orbits used by any 
inhabitable spacecraft, including the International Space Station, the 
statement must describe the design and operational strategies, if any, 
that will be used to minimize the risk of collision and avoid posing 
any operational constraints to the inhabitable spacecraft.
    (4) The statement must disclose the accuracy, if any, with which 
orbital parameters will be maintained, including apogee, perigee, 
inclination, and the right ascension of the ascending node(s). In the 
event that a system is not be maintained to specific orbital 
tolerances, e.g., its propulsion system will not be used for orbital 
maintenance, that fact should be included in the debris mitigation 
disclosure. Such systems must also indicate the anticipated evolution 
over time of the orbit of the proposed satellite or satellites. All 
systems must describe the extent of satellite maneuverability, whether 
or not the space station design includes a propulsion system.
    (5) The space station operator must certify that upon receipt of a 
space situational awareness conjunction warning, the operator will 
review and take all possible steps to assess the collision risk, and 
will mitigate the collision risk if necessary. As appropriate, steps to 
assess and mitigate the collision risk should include, but are not 
limited to: Contacting the operator of any active spacecraft involved 
in such a warning; sharing ephemeris data and other appropriate 
operational information with any such operator; and modifying space 
station attitude and/or operations.
    (B) Where a space station requests the assignment of a 
geostationary orbit location, it must assess whether there are any 
known satellites located at, or

[[Page 52454]]

reasonably expected to be located at, the requested orbital location, 
or assigned in the vicinity of that location, such that the station 
keeping volumes of the respective satellites might overlap or touch. If 
so, the statement must include a statement as to the identities of 
those parties and the measures that will be taken to prevent 
collisions.
    (v) A statement addressing the trackability of the space 
station(s). Space station(s) operating in low-Earth orbit will be 
presumed trackable if each individual space station is 10 cm or larger 
in its smallest dimension, exclusive of deployable components. Where 
the application is for an NGSO space station or system, the statement 
shall also disclose the following:
    (A) How the operator plans to identify the space station(s) 
following deployment and whether space station tracking will be active 
or passive;
    (B) Whether, prior to deployment, the space station(s) will be 
registered with the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity; 
and
    (C) The extent to which the space station operator plans to share 
information regarding initial deployment, ephemeris, and/or planned 
maneuvers with the 18th Space Control Squadron or successor entity, 
other entities that engage in space situational awareness or space 
traffic management functions, and/or other operators.
    (vi) A statement disclosing planned proximity operations, if any, 
and addressing debris generation that will or may result from the 
proposed operations, including any planned release of debris, the risk 
of accidental explosions, the risk of accidental collision, and 
measures taken to mitigate those risks.
    (vii) A statement detailing the disposal plans for the space 
station, including the quantity of fuel--if any--that will be reserved 
for disposal maneuvers. In addition, the following specific provisions 
apply:
    (A) For geostationary orbit space stations, the statement must 
disclose the altitude selected for a disposal orbit and the 
calculations that are used in deriving the disposal altitude.
    (B) For space stations terminating operations in an orbit in or 
passing through the low-Earth orbit region below 2,000 km altitude, the 
statement must disclose whether the spacecraft will be disposed of 
either through atmospheric re-entry, specifying if direct retrieval of 
the spacecraft will be used. The statement must also disclose the 
expected time in orbit for the space station following the completion 
of the mission.
    (C) For space stations not covered by either paragraph 
(g)(1)(vii)(A) or (B) of this section, the statement must indicate 
whether disposal will involve use of a storage orbit or long-term 
atmospheric re-entry and rationale for the selected disposal plan.
    (D) For all NGSO space stations under paragraph (g)(1)(vii)(B) or 
(C) of this section, the following additional specific provisions 
apply:
    (1) The statement must include a demonstration that the probability 
of success of the chosen disposal method will be 0.9 or greater for any 
individual space station. For space station systems consisting of 
multiple space stations, the demonstration should include additional 
information regarding efforts to achieve a higher probability of 
success, with a goal, for large systems, of a probability of success 
for any individual space station of 0.99 or better. For space stations 
under paragraph (g)(1)(vii)(B) of this section that will be terminating 
operations in or passing through low-Earth orbit, successful disposal 
is defined as atmospheric re-entry of the spacecraft within 25 years or 
less following completion of the mission. For space stations under 
paragraph (g)(1)(vii)(C) of this section, successful disposal will be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
    (2) If planned disposal is by atmospheric re-entry, the statement 
must also include:
    (i) A disclosure indicating whether the atmospheric re-entry will 
be an uncontrolled re-entry or a controlled targeted reentry.
    (ii) An assessment as to whether portions of any individual 
spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of 
the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules, and 
demonstration that the calculated casualty risk for an individual 
spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher 
fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000).
    (viii) If any material item described in this notification changes 
before launch, a replacement pre-space notification shall be filed with 
the International Bureau no later than 90 days before integration of 
the space station into the launch vehicle.
* * * * *

[FR Doc. 2020-13185 Filed 8-24-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P