Federal Register, Volume 85 Issue 143 (Friday, July 24, 2020)

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 143 (Friday, July 24, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 44994-45030]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-13604]

[[Page 44993]]

Vol. 85

Friday,

No. 143

July 24, 2020

Part III

Department of Transportation

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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 174, et al.

Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 143 / Friday, July 24, 2020 / Rules
and Regulations

[[Page 44994]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 174, 179, and 180

[Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025 (HM-264)]
RIN 2137-AF40

Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: PHMSA, in coordination with the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), is amending the Hazardous Materials Regulations
(HMR) to allow for the bulk transport of ``Methane, refrigerated
liquid,'' commonly known as liquefied natural gas (LNG), in rail tank
cars. This rulemaking authorizes the transportation of LNG by rail in
DOT-113C120W specification rail tank cars with enhanced outer tank
requirements, subject to all applicable requirements and certain
additional operational controls. The enhancements to the outer tank are
indicated by the new specification suffix ``9'' (DOT-113C120W9).

DATES:
Effective date: This rule is effective August 24, 2020.
Voluntary compliance date: Voluntary compliance is authorized July
24, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Ciccarone, Standards and
Rulemaking Division, (202) 366-8553, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, or Mark Maday, Federal Railroad Administration,
(202) 366-2535, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Abbreviations and Terms

AAR Association of American Railroads
APA Administrative Procedure Act
ASNT American Society of Non-destructive Testing
ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials
AWS American Welding Society
BLET Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
BNSF Burlington Northern Santa Fe
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
CTMV Cargo Tank Motor Vehicle
DOT Department of Transportation
DOT-SP Department of Transportation Special Permit
DP Distributed Power
EA Environmental Assessment
ECP Electronically Controlled Pneumatic
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
E.O. Executive Order
EOT End of Train
ERG Emergency Response Guidebook
ETS Energy Transport Solutions, LLC
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FRSA Federal Railroad Safety Act
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GRL Gross Rail Load
HHFT High-Hazard Flammable Train
HLRW High Level Radioactive Waste
HMEP Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness
HMT Hazardous Materials Table
HMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations
IAFC International Association of Fire Chiefs
IAFF International Association of Fire Fighters
IBR Incorporation by Reference
IFR Interim Final Rule
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MLI Multi-Layer Insulation
NASFM National Association of State Fire Marshals
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NYDEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
NYDHSES New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Services
NYDOT New York State Department of Transportation
OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PRD Pressure Relief Device
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
PSR Physicians for Social Responsibility
RSI Railway Supply Institute
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RIN Regulatory Identifier Number
RSI-CTC Railway Supply Institute Committee on Tank Cars
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel
SI Super Insulation
TTD Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO
The Center The Center for Biological Diversity
TC Transport Canada
TDG Transportation of Dangerous Goods
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
UN United Nations
U.S.C. United States Code
VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion

Table of Contents

I. Overview
II. NPRM and Background
A. Petition for Rulemaking (P-1697)
B. Regulatory Review
C. DOT Special Permit 20534
III. Amendments to the HMR Adopted in This Final Rule
A. Existing HMR Requirements for Rail Transport of Flammable
Cryogenic Material
B. The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car
C. Additional Operational Controls for LNG Transportation
IV. Summary and Discussion of Comments to the Rulemaking Docket
A. Tank Car Design
B. Operational Controls
C. Environmental Impacts
D. Economic Analysis
E. Emergency Response
F. Comments of General Opposition
G. Comments From the Puyallup Tribe
H. Comments Beyond the Scope of This Rulemaking
V. Section-by-Section Review
VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
C. Executive Order 13771
D. Executive Order 13132
E. Executive Order 13175
F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Policies and Procedures
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
J. Environmental Assessment
K. Privacy Act
L. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
M. Executive Order 13211
List of Subjects

I. Overview

In this final rule, PHMSA is authorizing the transportation of LNG
by rail tank car, pursuant to Federal Hazardous Materials
Transportation law (Federal hazmat law; 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.),
because we have determined that bulk rail transport is a safe
alternative for this energy product. The final rule authorizes the
transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113 tank cars, which have an
established track record of safety in transporting other cryogenic
flammable materials. The DOT-113 tank car authorized for LNG service
will be enhanced with an outer tank that is thicker and made of steel
with a greater puncture resistance to provide an added measure of
safety and crashworthiness. Additionally, there will be operational
controls in the form of enhanced braking requirements, remote

[[Page 44995]]

monitoring, and route analysis, which are intended to exceed current
safety requirements for other flammable cryogenic materials.
PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the environment by
advancing the safe transportation of energy products and other
hazardous materials that are essential to our daily lives. To do this,
the agency establishes national policy, sets and enforces standards,
conducts research to prevent incidents, and prepares the public and
first responders to reduce consequences if an incident does occur.
PHMSA and FRA share responsibility for regulating the transportation of
hazardous materials by rail and take a system-wide, comprehensive
approach that focuses on prevention, mitigation, and response to manage
and reduce the risk posed to people and the environment. In line with
PHMSA's mission and shared responsibility with FRA for oversight of the
rail transport of hazardous materials, PHMSA is issuing this final rule
to authorize the transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113C120W
specification rail tank cars with enhanced outer tank material and
thickness (those enhancements to be indicated by the specification
suffix ``9''), subject to operational controls for braking, monitoring,
and route analysis.
This authorization conforms to the intent and purpose of the HMR
(49 CFR parts 171-180), which are designed to ensure the safe
transportation of all hazardous materials packagings (including tank
cars). Collectively, the HMR combine packaging design and maintenance,
operational controls, package handling, employee training, hazard
communication, emergency response information, and security plan
requirements to safeguard transportation. These measures help ensure
that hazardous contents safely remain within a package during the
course of transportation while also providing for public awareness and
appropriate response mechanisms. Supplemental to the HMR, PHMSA
oversees a Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) grant
program that provides funding to the emergency response community for
training and planning purposes, furthering appropriate response
efforts.
The United States leverages domestic technology improvements to
transform American life through increased natural gas production and
energy independence. As a result, the United States is today the
world's largest natural gas producer through economical production from
shale and other unconventional formations.\1\ Transportation of natural
gas, however, can be constrained by the capacity of existing
transportation infrastructure, which negatively affects regions with
insufficient access to pipelines or ports. This constraint on capacity,
coupled with increased natural gas production in the United States, has
resulted in the consideration of using rail transport to help
efficiently deliver natural gas to domestic U.S. and international
markets.
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\1\ CRS, ``An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas:
Resources and Federal Actions,'' 7-5700, Summary, (2015).
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Authorizing the use of proven DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars
to transport LNG will allow the rail industry to play a role in the
safe, efficient transport of this important energy product for the 21st
century. LNG--referred to as ``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' \2\
within the HMR--has been transported safely by trucks on highways and
by marine vessels for over 40 years in the United States, and over 50
years internationally. However, the HMR did not authorize the bulk
transport of LNG in rail tank cars prior to this rulemaking action,
instead permitting rail transport of LNG only on an ad hoc basis as
authorized by the conditions of a PHMSA special permit (49 CFR 107.105)
or in a portable tank secured to a rail car pursuant to the conditions
of an FRA approval. The recent expansion in U.S. natural gas production
has increased interest in a programmatic approach to using
appropriately the nation's rail infrastructure to facilitate efficient
transportation of LNG. In response to that interest, PHMSA, in
coordination with the FRA, issues this final rule to amend the HMR to
permit the bulk transport of LNG in DOT-113C120W specification rail
tank cars with enhanced outer tank requirements (those enhancements to
be indicated by the specification suffix ``9''), subject to operational
controls for braking, monitoring, and routing.
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\2\ Use of this description in quotes and with methane
capitalized reflects the proper shipping name as listed in the Sec.
172.101 Hazardous Materials Table.
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In addition, this final rule satisfies the directive in Executive
Order (E.O.) 13868 [84 FR 15495, April 19, 2019] to propose, consistent
with applicable law, regulations that ``treat LNG the same as other
cryogenic liquids and permit LNG to be transported in approved rail
tank cars.'' \3\ E.O. 13868 recognizes the leading role that the United
States plays in producing natural gas, the importance of improving the
United States' capacity to supply natural gas, including LNG, to
domestic and international markets, and the need to continue to
transport this energy product in a safe and efficient manner. In
issuing this final rule, PHMSA furthers the purposes and policies set
forth in E.O. 13868 by enabling an additional safe, reliable, and
efficient transportation alternative for bringing domestically produced
natural gas to existing, and potentially new, markets.
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\3\ PHMSA notes that it first announced in the ``Spring 2018
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions'' [83
FR 27085] that it had initiated a ``pre-rule'' action on LNG by
Rail, and subsequently announced that it would proceed with an NPRM
in the ``Fall 2018 Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions'' [83 FR 57803]. While these
actions notified the public of PHMSA's intention to develop propose
a regulatory framework for the safe rail transportation of LNG,
PHMSA had not published a proposed rulemaking by the time the
President issued E.O. 13868 on April 10, 2018.
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The present action is based on a longstanding understanding of the
properties of LNG and an evidence-based approach to the safety of the
DOT-113 tank cars designed and used to transport flammable cryogenic
materials. At the same time, in promulgating this final rule, and as it
does with other hazardous materials, PHMSA recognizes that there is
ongoing and potential future research related to the transportation of
LNG by all modes. The Agency will continue to use this research to
inform potential future regulatory activity, as appropriate.
In the following table, PHMSA provides an overview of: (1) The
requirements for LNG transportation in tank cars pursuant to DOT
Special Permit 20534 (DOT-SP 20534),\4\ issued to Energy Transport
Solutions, LLC (ETS) during the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
\5\ comment period to authorize ETS's rail transportation of LNG along
specific routes; (2) the requirements proposed in the October 24, 2019
NPRM; and (3) the requirements adopted in this final rule. Requirements
related to the thermal performance of the DOT-113C120W tank car are
unchanged from the NPRM (75 psig maximum start to discharge pressure;
maximum pressure when offered; and design service temperature). But
this final rule, after consideration of comments received in the docket
and to provide additional operational controls and crashworthiness for
LNG tank cars, adopts supplemental requirements to those initially
proposed in the NPRM: Remote monitoring of pressure and location for
LNG tank cars in

[[Page 44996]]

transportation; two-way end-of-train (EOT) or distributed power (DP)
system for trains transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of LNG in a
continuous block, or 35 or more loaded tank cars of LNG throughout the
train; and a requirement that railroads comply with Sec. 172.820 route
planning requirements. In addition, to account properly for the
properties of LNG, this final rule raises the maximal filling density
limit to 37.3% from the proposed 32.5%. Finally, in this final rule
PHMSA is also adopting enhanced outer tank requirements compared with
the requirements that apply to other DOT-113C120W-specification tank
cars, including a thicker 9/16th inch outer tank made from high quality
TC-128B normalized steel. Compliance with these enhanced outer tank
requirements will be indicated by the new specification suffix ``9''
(DOT-113C120W9).
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\4\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2019-0100-3006.
\5\ Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail NPRM [84
FR 56964].

Table 1--Summary of DOT-SP 20534, NPRM Proposals, and Final Rule Components
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LNG requirements
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DOT special permit
Topics 20534 NPRM Final rule
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Approval of LNG...................... Permitted between Permitted Nationwide... Permitted Nationwide.
Wyalusing, PA and
Gibbstown, NJ, with no
intermediate stops.
Remote Monitoring.................... Required as a condition Not Required........... Required as a Special
of the DOT-SP. Provision for LNG.
Maximum Start to Discharge Pressure.. Not Specified.......... 75 psig................ 75 psig.
Maximum Pressure when Offered for 15 psig................ 15 psig................ 15 psig.
Transportation.
Design Service Temperature........... Not Specified.......... Minus 260 [deg]F....... Minus 260 [deg]F.
Maximum Permitted Filling Density 32.5%.................. 32.5%.................. 37.3%.
(percent by weight).
When is a two-way end-of-train (EOT) Required when a train Not Proposed........... Required when a train
or a distributed power (DP) system is transporting 20 or is transporting 20 or
required. more tank cars more loaded tank cars
authorized under this of LNG in a continuous
special permit. block or 35 or more
loaded tank cars of
LNG throughout the
train.
Route Controls....................... Authorized only on one Not Proposed........... Must comply with
route. 172.820.
Minimum Wall Thickness of the Outer Shell: \7/16\''........ Shell: \7/16\''........ Shell and Tank Head:
Tank Shell and the Outer Tank Heads. Tank Head: \1/2\''..... Tank Head: \1/2\''..... Enhanced \9/16\''.
Required Outer Tank Steel Type(s).... As specified in AAR As specified in AAR AAR TC 128, Grade B
Specifications for Specifications for normalized steel
Tank Cars, Appendix M. Tank Cars, Appendix M. plate.
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II. NPRM and Background

PHMSA on October 24, 2019, in consultation with the FRA, published
the NPRM proposing to authorize the transport of LNG by rail. PHMSA
issued the NPRM in response to a petition for rulemaking (P-1697) \6\
from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and a review of
existing regulations.
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\6\ PHMSA-2017-0020-0002.
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The NPRM proposed a framework for transporting LNG by rail safely
by designating an authorized packaging, and by determining how the
packaging would be filled safely. PHMSA chose the DOT-113C120W
specification tank car packaging designed for flammable cryogenic
material. This packaging has been transporting similar flammable
cryogenic materials for decades with no fatalities or serious injuries.
As for the filling/loading controls, PHMSA proposed a maximum start-to-
discharge pressure of 75 psig, a maximum permitted filling density of
32.5 percent by weight, a maximum pressure when offered for
transportation of 15 psig, and a design service temperature of minus
260 degrees Fahrenheit. The maximum offering pressure of 15 psig
proposed in the NPRM is consistent with the 20-day transportation
requirement for cryogenic materials and the allowable average daily
pressure rise of 3 psig per day during transportation.
In the NPRM, PHMSA also proposed operational controls consistent
with the existing requirements of the HMR, and invited comment on
whether existing regulations and the operational controls in AAR's
Circular OT-55 entitled ``Recommended Railroad Operating Practices For
Transportation of Hazardous Materials'' \7\ are sufficient. The NPRM
also sought comment on the potential need for additional operating
controls. Beyond the operational controls already included for other
flammable cryogenic materials transported by rail, PHMSA specifically
referenced train length and composition, speed restrictions, braking
requirements, and routing requirements as potential areas of interest
to provide for enhanced operational control requirements. PHMSA also
encouraged commenters to provide data on the safety or economic impacts
associated with any additional operational controls, including analysis
of the safety justification or cost impact of their implementation.
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\7\ The freight rail industry developed the first edition of OT-
55, which details railroad operating practices for hazardous
materials, in the late 1980s, as part of an inter-industry hazardous
materials rail safety task force that also included the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council) and
the Railway Progress Institute (now the Railway Supply Institute).
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PHMSA also received a request from the Offices of the Attorneys
General of New York and Maryland to extend the 60-day comment period
for the NPRM an additional 30 days. PHMSA issued a notice \8\ on
December 23, 2019, extending the comment period until January 13, 2020.
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\8\ Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail;
Extension of Comment Period [84 FR 70491], https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/23/2019-27656/hazardous-materials-liquefied-natural-gas-by-rail-extension-of-comment-period.

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A. Petition for Rulemaking (P-1697)

1. AAR's Petition for Rulemaking and the NPRM
On January 17, 2017, AAR submitted a petition for rulemaking to
PHMSA, entitled ``Petition for Rulemaking to Allow Methane,
Refrigerated Liquid to be Transported in Rail Tank Cars'' (P-1697),
requesting revisions to the Hazardous Materials Table (HMT; Sec.
172.101) and Sec. 173.319 of the HMR that would permit the
transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113 tank cars. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq. requires Federal agencies to
give interested persons the right to petition an agency to issue,
amend, or repeal a rule. 5 U.S.C. 553(e). PHMSA's rulemaking procedures
at Sec. 106.95 allow interested persons to ask PHMSA to add, amend, or
repeal a regulation by filing a petition for rulemaking along with
information and arguments supporting the requested action. In May 2018,
PHMSA accepted P-1697 in accordance with Sec. 106.105 by notifying AAR
that the request merited consideration in a future rulemaking.\9\
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\9\ PHMSA-2017-0020-0005.
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In its petition, AAR proposed that PHMSA amend the entry for
``United Nations (UN) 1972, Methane, refrigerated liquid'' in the HMT
to add a reference to Sec. 173.319 in Column (8C) authorizing
transport in rail tank cars. Additionally, AAR proposed that PHMSA
amend Sec. 173.319 to include specific requirements for DOT-113 tank
cars used for the transportation of LNG, and suggest that the
authorized tank car specifications be DOT-113C120W and DOT-
113C140W.\10\ AAR further proposed amending Sec. 173.319(d)(2) to
include maximum filling densities comparable to those specified for
cargo tanks containing LNG in Sec. 173.318(f)(3). AAR argued that
``LNG should be authorized for rail transportation because it is a safe
method of transporting this commodity, LNG shippers have indicated a
desire to use rail to transport it, and because railroads potentially
will need to transport LNG for their own use as a locomotive fuel.''
With respect to shipper demand, AAR contended the following:
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\10\ The HMR do not authorize the DOT-113C140W specification
tank car for hazardous materials transportation. See section ``III.
A. Tank Car Specification'' of the NPRM for further discussion.

The only way to transport LNG is by obtaining special approval
from PHMSA for rail transport, or by transporting it via highway;
and that notwithstanding the requirement for a special approval,
customers have expressed interest in shipping LNG by rail from
Pennsylvania to New England, and between the U.S. and Mexico.
Authorizing transportation of LNG by rail likely would stimulate
more interest. In addition, several railroads are actively exploring
LNG as a locomotive fuel. If railroads are to use LNG-powered
locomotives, they would need to supply LNG along their networks.
Transporting LNG in tank cars would be an optimal, if not essential,
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way to transport LNG to those locations.

Furthermore, with respect to rail as a safe method of
transportation, AAR noted:

Rail is undeniably safer than over-the-road transportation of
LNG, and transport via that mode should be facilitated. The reason
the hazardous materials regulations do not currently authorize the
transportation of LNG by rail is simply that there was a lack of
demand for rail transport of LNG when PHMSA authorized DOT-113 tank
cars for the transportation of cryogenic liquids and listed the
cryogenic liquids that could be transported in those cars. There was
no determination that rail was an unsuitable mode of transporting
LNG.

In the NPRM, PHMSA noted that AAR's requested action fits generally
into the existing structure of the HMR, which combines packaging design
and maintenance, operational controls, package handling, employee
training, hazard communication, emergency response information, and
security plan requirements to ensure safe transportation of hazardous
materials. In the NPRM, PHMSA also requested public comment on the
proposals present in AAR's petition, including their potential to
reduce regulatory burdens, enhance domestic energy production, and
impact safety.
2. The Center for Biological Diversity's Response to P-1697
On May 15, 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity (the Center)
submitted a comment to P-1697, recommending that PHMSA deny AAR's
petition for rulemaking because of potential environmental impacts of
transporting LNG. The Center commented that PHMSA should not proceed in
evaluating the petition request until the Agency has conducted a
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) evaluation, prepared an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA),
and provided opportunity for public review and comment in accordance
with Federal hazmat law, as applicable. PHMSA regulations do not
require PHMSA to conduct a NEPA evaluation at the time it responds to a
petition, and PHMSA has not taken such actions historically as part of
its decision whether to accept or deny a petition for rulemaking. As
result, PHMSA did not prepare an EA or EIS prior to responding to P-
1697. This decision was made with the knowledge that PHMSA would be
required to conduct a NEPA analysis as part of a potential rulemaking.
When PHMSA published the NPRM, it prepared a draft EA, see Section
V. J. ``Environmental Assessment'' of the NPRM. A final EA for the
rulemaking is included in the rulemaking docket as part of the analysis
for the final rule.

B. Regulatory Review

On October 2, 2017, DOT published a notice \11\ in the Federal
Register expressing Department-wide plans to review existing
regulations and other agency actions to evaluate their continued
necessity, determine whether they are crafted effectively to solve
current problems, and evaluate whether they potentially burden the
development or use of domestically produced energy resources. As part
of this review process, DOT invited the public to provide input on
existing rules and other agency actions that have potential for repeal,
replacement, suspension, or modification.
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\11\ Notification of Regulatory Review, Docket No. DOT-OST-2017-
0069 [82 FR 45750].
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The Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials Transportation
(Interested Parties) submitted a comment \12\ supporting the
authorization of LNG for rail tank car transport. Specifically, the
Interested Parties noted in its comment that LNG shares similar
properties to other flammable cryogenic materials currently authorized
by rail tank car and

[[Page 44998]]

has already been moved in the United States under a special permit.
Additionally, they noted that Transport Canada authorizes LNG for
transportation by rail in DOT-113-equivalent rail cars and that there
is increased commercial demand for rail transport of LNG within the
United States and between the United States and Mexico.
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\12\ Comment from Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials
Transportation, Document No. DOT-OST-2017-0069-2591, at: https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2591. The
Interested Parties is a volunteer-run coalition of organizations
that share an interest in legislative and regulatory issues related
to the safe and secure domestic and international transportation of
hazardous materials. Interested Parties members include associations
representing hazardous materials shippers, carriers, packaging
manufacturers and other related groups, including the Agricultural
Retailers Association; American Chemistry Council; American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers; American Trucking Associations;
American Pyrotechnics Association; Association of HazMat Shippers;
The Chlorine Institute; Compressed Gas Association; Council on the
Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles; Dangerous Goods Advisory
Council; The Fertilizer Institute; Gases and Welding Distributors
Association; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Liquid
Terminals Association; International Vessel Operators Dangerous
Goods Association; Medical Device Battery Transport Council;
National Association of Chemical Distributors; National Private
Truck Council; National Tank Truck Carriers; Plastics Industry
Association; Petroleum Marketers Association of America;
Radiopharmaceutical Shippers & Carriers Conference; Railway Supply
Institute, Inc.; Reusable Industrial Packaging Association; Sporting
Arms Ammunition Manufacturers Institute; The Sulphur Institute; and
the Utility Solid Waste Activities Group.
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After consideration of the issues, PHMSA is acting on the comment
from the Interested Parties by amending the HMR to allow for bulk
transport of LNG by rail in a DOT-113 specification tank car.
Additionally, this action supports the objectives of the Notification
of Regulatory Review because it is expected to ``promote [the] clean
and safe development of our Nation's vast energy resources, while
avoiding regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy
production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job creation.''

C. DOT Special Permit 20534

On August 21, 2017, PHMSA received an application for a special
permit from ETS to authorize the transportation in commerce of
``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' in DOT-113C120W tank cars.
Upon completion of its preliminary evaluation of the application,
PHMSA published for public comment a Notice of Draft Environmental
Assessment for a Special Permit Request for Liquefied Natural Gas by
Rail in the Federal Register on June 6, 2019.\13\ The notice requested
comment on potential safety, environmental, and any additional impacts
that should be considered as part of the special permit evaluation
process. The docket for the draft Environmental Assessment enclosed a
draft special permit. The notice was initially published with a 30-day
comment period and was extended an additional 30 days after requests
from numerous stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and private individuals. The extended comment period closed on
August 7, 2019 and PHMSA received 2,994 comments.
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\13\ Hazardous Materials Safety: Notice of Availability of the
Draft Environmental Assessment for a Special Permit Request for
Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail [84 FR 26507].
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On December 5, 2019, PHMSA granted DOT-SP 20534 to ETS authorizing
the transportation of LNG in DOT-113C120W tank cars between Wyalusing,
Pennsylvania, and Gibbstown, New Jersey, with no intermediate stops,
and subject to certain operational controls. Some of the operational
controls required by the special permit had not been proposed in the
draft special permit; PHMSA introduced those additional operational
controls in response to comments received and additional documentation
provided by the applicant, as well as to further reduce risk by
supplementing the robust safety regime established by the HMR. Those
information requests also were intended to increase PHMSA and FRA's
knowledge of ETS's operations to inform later decisions on DOT-SP 20534
and the HMR. Specifically, PHMSA added the following requirements to
the special permit:
(1) Each tank car must be operated in accordance with Sec. 173.319
except for the identified maximum permitting filling density, maximum
operating pressure, and remote sensing equipment as specified in the
special permit;
(2) Shipments are authorized between Wyalusing, Pennsylvania, and
Gibbstown, New Jersey, with no intermediate stops.
(3) Within 90 days after issuance, the grantee shall prepare and
submit a plan providing per shipment quantities, timelines, and other
actions to be taken for moving from single car shipments to multi-car
shipments, and subsequently to unit trains (20 or more tank cars).
(4) Trains transporting 20 or more tank cars authorized under this
special permit must be equipped and operated with a two-way end of
train device as defined in 49 CFR 232.5 or distributed power as defined
in 49 CFR 229.5.
(5) Prior to the initial shipment of a tank car under this special
permit, the grantee must provide training to emergency response
agencies that could be affected between the authorized origin and
destination. The training shall conform to NFPA-472, a voluntary
consensus standard developed by the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) establishing minimum competencies for responding to
hazardous materials emergencies, including known hazards in emergencies
involving the release of LNG, and emergency response methods to address
an incident involving a train transporting LNG.
(6) While in transportation, the grantee must remotely monitor each
tank car for pressure, location, and leaks.
Following issuance of DOT-SP 20534, PHMSA published a notice \14\
in the Federal Register that PHMSA had added DOT-SP 20534 and documents
supporting the special permit decision--the Special Permit Evaluation
Form and Final Environmental Assessment--to the docket for the HM-264
NPRM (Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025) for consideration by the public
because of the overlapping subject matter. PHMSA invited comments on
DOT-SP 20534 operational controls to be submitted to the HM-264
rulemaking docket by December 23, 2019.\15\ PHMSA noted it would
consider any additional comments on the operational controls included
in DOT-SP 20534, which was posted to the HM-264 rulemaking docket to
aid in determining appropriate operational controls for this final
rule. PHMSA encouraged commenters to provide data on the safety or
economic impacts associated with operational controls in the special
permit, including analysis of the safety benefits and the potential
cost-benefit impact of implementing those or other operational
controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ Hazardous Materials: Notice of Issuance of Special Permit
Regarding Liquefied Natural Gas [84 FR 67768].
\15\ On December 23, 2019, PHMSA extended the comment period to
January 13, 2020 [84 FR 70491].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Amendments to the HMR Adopted in This Final Rule

In this final rule, PHMSA is authorizing LNG, a well characterized
and understood material, for transportation in a specific rail car
packaging that has a long, safe record carrying similar cryogenic
materials, including flammable materials. Additionally, to provide an
additional level of safety and in response to comments, PHMSA is
adopting certain supplemental packaging integrity enhancements and
operational controls.

A. Existing HMR Requirements for Rail Transport of Flammable Cryogenic
Material

Federal hazmat law, 49 U.S.C. 5103, requires PHMSA \16\ to
designate material or a group or class of material as hazardous when it
determines that transporting the material in commerce in a particular
amount and form may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety or
property, and to prescribe regulations for the safe transportation of
hazardous material in commerce. Transportation includes the movement of
that hazardous material and any loading, unloading, or storage
incidental to the movement.\17\ These statutory provisions are
implemented within PHMSA regulations at 49 CFR parts 171 to 180 (i.e.,
the HMR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ The authority was delegated by the Secretary of
Transportation in 49 CFR 1.97.
\17\ 49 U.S.C. 5102(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The HMR prescribe a comprehensive suite of requirements for
hazardous material classification, hazard communication, emergency
response

[[Page 44999]]

information, training, packaging, and material handling. These
requirements are designed to prevent the release of hazardous materials
in transportation, and in the event of a release, to provide emergency
responders and the public with necessary information to protect
themselves and mitigate the consequences of the release to the greatest
extent possible. The HMR are a proven hazardous material regulatory
system well suited to manage the risks of LNG transportation in rail
tank cars. The robust requirements already in place in the HMR for
packaging, rail car handling, hazard communication and training address
many of the safety concerns related to the transportation of LNG by
rail. Moreover, PHMSA works closely with other Federal and State
partners to enforce the requirements of the HMR.
1. Packaging
Selecting proper packaging for a hazardous material is a critical
step in the HMR safety system. Hazardous materials packaging must be
chemically and physically compatible with the material contained in the
package, also known as the lading. The packaging must be able to
withstand all conditions normally encountered during transportation,
which include humidity and pressure changes, shocks, and vibrations.
The HMR authorize many types of packagings for hazardous materials,
ranging in size from 1 milliliter glass sample tubes, to 30,000-gallon
railroad tank cars. Different modes of transportation (highway, air,
rail, and vessel) and varying volumes of hazardous materials present
different challenges, and require a variety of packaging designs to
account for different conditions encountered in transportation. Tank
cars used for rail transportation must be designed to withstand
exposure to weather, in-train forces and switching, vibrations, dynamic
forces, and exposure to the lading they transport.
Cryogenic materials pose unique challenges for selecting
appropriate transportation packaging. The lading's extreme cold
properties render most types of packaging material too brittle to
maintain containment during transportation. Therefore, all cryogenic
packagings in the HMR are required to be constructed from specific
steel alloys with physical properties that enable them to retain their
strength and ductility at the lading's extreme low temperatures.
Another challenge that must be considered is ensuring that the
lading remains at these cold temperatures during transportation.
Temperature maintenance of the lading prevents expansion and
overpressure conditions, or possible activation of the transportation
vessel's pressure relief device. To help ensure that neither scenario
occurs during transportation, all bulk packagings authorized in the HMR
for transportation of flammable cryogenic materials (e.g., DOT-113 tank
cars, MC-338 cargo tanks, and UN T75 portable tanks) are built as a
``tank-within-a-tank'' design. The inner tank contains the cryogenic
material. The space between the inner and outer tanks is evacuated to a
high degree of vacuum (absolute pressure less than 75 microns of
mercury or 0.0001 atmospheres). The outer surface of the inner tank is
wrapped with a high-grade insulation consisting of multiple layers of a
thin reflecting material such as an aluminum foil sandwiched between a
thin non-conducting paper type material. Alternately, the physical
insulation may also be made of fine grained perlite particles filling
the void space between the inner and outer tanks. The combined effect
of vacuum in the annular space between the inner and outer tanks
together with the physical insulation substantially reduces the heat
transfer from the atmosphere to the lading, thus effectively
maintaining the lading temperature within safe limits during
transportation. Furthermore, the outer tank shields the inner tank from
physical damage, exposure to the elements, and in-train forces, while
providing structural support to the packaging.
Tank car design is a mature field, and the requirements for
designing and building a tank car able to withstand the conditions
encountered during transportation are codified in part 179 of the HMR.
An industry publication, AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended
Practices, Section C--III, Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification
M-1002 (AAR Specifications for Tank Cars), is incorporated by reference
into the HMR. HMR tank specifications and standards are aligned with
authoritative design and construction standards found in the ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section VIII, Division 1 Rules
for Construction of Pressure Vessels, and welding requirements found in
ASME BPVC Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications. The inner and
outer tanks are designed to ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 using the
design margins and loading conditions for pressure vessels. The ASME
BPVC Section VIII Division 1 design margin and loading conditions
determine the design thickness of both the inner and outer tanks.
However, the HMR prescribe minimum thicknesses requirements for both
tanks. American Welding Society (AWS) standards are used during
manufacturing to ensure that the welding performed has quality control
systems and is performed by qualified personnel. The DOT-113 tank car
requirements in the HMR incorporate elements of rigorous engineering
standards, including the ASME BPVC as well as the AAR Specifications
for Tank Cars, M-1002. M-1002 in turn draws on well-established
industry standards of the AWS, ASTM, American Society of Non-
destructive Testing (ASNT) as well as ASME, for design, materials,
fabrication, testing and inspection requirements. The ASME BPVC,
Section VIII, Division 1, has become the international benchmark
standard for pressure vessel design for a multitude of industries,
including transportation. These standards impose criteria for forming,
fabricating, inspecting, and testing pressure vessels and their
components and for qualifying welders, welding operators, and welding
procedures to ensure the soundness of pressure vessels. Starting from
these rigorous design principles, the specification requirements in
part 179 of the HMR add design requirements to address conditions
encountered in transportation and not necessarily applicable to
stationary storage. For example, the HMR require the use of specific
steels that balance toughness, strength, and weldability with being
able to withstand extremely low temperatures.
Like other bulk packagings, cryogenic packagings authorized in the
HMR, including DOT-113 tank cars, have requirements for safety relief
devices, also referred to as pressure relief devices (PRDs). PRDs are
designed to vent the contents of the tank in a controlled manner to
prevent the inner tank from suffering a catastrophic failure or
explosion due to pressure-increasing events, such as exposure to fire.
DOT-113 tank cars have two different PRDs: (1) A pair of reclosing
pressure relief valves (PRVs), which operate on a temporary basis to
relieve inner tank pressure and bring it back to safe levels; and (2) a
pair of non-reclosing safety vents (rupture disk) that open at a
pressure higher than the start to discharge pressure of the PRVs and
remain open once the disk ruptures. The latter devices are a failsafe
in the event the primary PRVs fail to perform as intended.
The HMR explicitly authorize LNG for transportation in UN T75
insulated portable tanks that are loaded onto railroad flat cars and
MC-338 cargo

[[Page 45000]]

tanks, which are both tank-within-a-tank designs. Both bulk packagings
have an established safety record for LNG and other flammable cryogenic
materials over many years of transportation, demonstrating the high
level of safety provided by the tank-within-a-tank design. On May 4,
1963, the Interstate Commerce Commission Safety and Service Board
published final rule Order 57 [28 FR 4495], which authorized the
transportation of liquefied hydrogen in a DOT-113 tank car. The DOT-113
specification itself was adopted into the HMR on December 1, 1962 in
final rule Order 56 [27 FR 11849]. Prior to adoption, the DOT-113
design had been authorized to transport liquefied hydrogen by special
permits, documents issued by PHMSA and its predecessor agencies that
permit a variance from the requirements of the HMR provided an
equivalent level of safety is maintained. PHMSA and its predecessor
agencies have used special permits to evaluate new transportation
technologies and practices prior to authorizing them for broader use.
Liquefied ethylene, a flammable cryogenic material with physical
properties (including flammability range and cryogenic state) similar
to LNG, has been authorized for transportation in DOT-113C120W tank
cars since the publication of final rule HM-115, Cryogenic Liquids [48
FR 27674, June 16, 1983]. The DOT-113C120W tank car was authorized by
special permit prior to adoption in the HMR.
It is essential to ensure that cryogenic lading remains below a
maximum temperature during transportation. The HMR address this
currently by requiring tank car owners to ensure the thermal integrity
of DOT-113 packages through measurement of thermal performance
throughout the life of the tank. Specifically, the HMR prohibit the
transportation of a DOT-113 if the average daily pressure rise in the
tank exceeded 3 psig during the prior shipment. The insulation located
in the annular space between the outer and inner tanks can lose its
effectiveness over time due to conditions encountered during
transportation, through settling of the insulation or through the
development of micro vacuum leaks. New multi-layer insulation systems
do not suffer settling problems, but are still susceptible to the
degradation of vacuum and therefore must be monitored in the same way
as older insulation systems. As the effectiveness of the insulation
system lessens, more thermal energy can be transmitted to the inner
tank and the lading. The rate of thermal energy transfer can be
determined by measuring the pressure the lading exerts on the inner
tank at the time the material is offered, and after the material
arrives at its destination. If the average daily pressure rise during
transportation exceeds 3 psig, the thermal integrity of the tank must
be tested. This testing involves measuring either pressure rise or
calculated heat transfer over a 24-hour period. When the pressure rise
test is performed, the absolute pressure in the annular space of the
loaded tank car may not exceed 75 microns of mercury at the beginning
of the test and may not increase more than 25 microns during the 24-
hour period. If the tank fails the thermal integrity test, it must be
removed from hazardous material transportation service until it has
been repaired and passes the required thermal integrity tests. This
system of thermal integrity management has proven to be an effective
way of preventing unsafe pressure increases during transportation for
the existing DOT-113 fleet, and PHMSA expects that it will continue to
be effective for DOT-113s used in LNG service.
The flammability and low-temperature hazards presented by LNG in
transportation are well understood. The DOT-113C120W tank car has a
well-established safety record transporting similar cryogenic flammable
materials. The construction specifications for the steel used for
fabricating the inner tank of the DOT-113C120W tank car requires it to
withstand a (design) service temperature of -260 [deg]F, which is also
the temperature of LNG at atmospheric pressure (i.e., LNG is not cooled
below this temperature). The austenitic steel required for the inner
tank retains all necessary strength and ductility at -260 [deg]F, and
is suitable for use to -423 [deg]F the shipping temperature of
liquefied hydrogen, a far lower temperature than it would be exposed to
in LNG service.
2. Hazard Communication
Once the lading has been properly packaged, the HMR prescribe an
extensive system of multi-layered hazard communication tools designed
to provide information on the type and location of hazardous materials
present to transportation employees, emergency responders, and the
public. The discussion below will focus on hazard communication
requirements specific to rail transportation, but similar requirements
exist for highway, vessel, and air transport, with variations to
account for specific challenges applicable to each mode of
transportation.
The HMR require that a tank car containing a hazardous material
conspicuously display placards on each side and each end of the car.
The diamond-shaped placards are designed to be instantly recognizable
to any trained emergency responder or transportation employee. Placards
allow for quick identification of the DOT hazard class or division of
the material being transported by their color, symbol, and the numeral
entered in the bottom corner of the placard. Specifically, for DOT-113
tank cars transporting flammable gases such as LNG, the placard must
also be placed on a white square background to increase the contrast
and visibility of the placard in accordance with Sec. 172.510(a)(3),
and as a visual signal of the special handling procedures for DOT-113
tank cars transporting flammable gases. Tank cars must additionally be
marked on each side and each end with the UN ID number of the hazardous
material being carried. This marking is typically displayed on a white
rectangle in the center of the placard. Moreover, tank cars loaded with
flammable gases, like LNG, are required to be marked on two sides with
the key words of the proper shipping name, or the common name of the
material being transported. Therefore, a tank car transporting LNG will
be marked with the words ``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' or ``Natural
gas, refrigerated liquid'' on two sides of the tank car.
The train crew is required to maintain a document which identifies
the position in the train of each rail car containing a hazardous
material. The crew is also required to maintain emergency response
information for each hazardous material carried in the train. This
emergency response information must include specific information
related to the material being transported, including:
[cir] Immediate hazards to health;
[cir] Risks of fire or explosion;
[cir] Immediate precautions to be taken in the event of an accident
or incident;
[cir] Immediate methods for handling fires;
[cir] Initial methods for handling spills or leaks in the absence
of fire; and
[cir] Preliminary first aid measures.
As one method of compliance with these requirements, train crews
often carry the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG),\18\ a joint
publication of PHMSA, Transport Canada, the Secretariat of
Communication and Transport of Mexico, and interested parties from
government and industry,

[[Page 45001]]

to supplement emergency response information provided by the person
shipping the hazardous material. The ERG is intended for use by
emergency services personnel to provide guidance for initial response
to hazardous materials transportation incidents. The ERG cross-
references specific materials with incident response information,
including firefighting instructions and evacuation distances. The ERG
is made widely available, as PHMSA provides millions of free copies of
the ERG to emergency responders in every State, and several commercial
publishers have copies available for purchase. Smartphone applications
of the ERG are also available. The ERG includes instruction to handle
incidents involving flammable cryogenic materials such as LNG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\18\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/ERG2016.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the document carried by the train crew is required to
display clearly the emergency response telephone number for each
hazardous material transported in the train. The phone number must be
easily recognizable to the train crew, or any other person using the
train document in an emergency. The telephone number must be of a
person who either: (1) Is knowledgeable of the hazardous material being
shipped, and has comprehensive emergency response and incident
mitigation information for that material; or (2) has immediate access
to a person who possesses such knowledge and information. The emergency
response telephone number must be monitored at all times the material
is in transportation. A telephone number that requires a call back
(such as an answering service, answering machine, or beeper device)
does not meet this requirement. The emergency response telephone number
may be monitored by the person offering the hazardous material, or an
agency or organization capable of, and accepting responsibility for,
providing the comprehensive emergency response and incident mitigation
information.
The railroad industry has also developed its own electronic hazard
communication aids, beyond the requirements of the HMR. Specifically,
the AAR, in conjunction with its members and Railinc (an AAR technology
subsidiary), has developed and deployed an application called
AskRail.\19\ The AskRail app links to the freight railroad industry's
train and railcar information database maintained by Railinc. AskRail
provides an emergency responder who has registered to use the service
with detailed information about the type and location of all cars
carrying hazardous materials in a train including emergency response
guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ https://public.railinc.com/products-services/askrail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This existing system of hazard communication under the HMR,
supplemented by industry efforts such as AskRail, accurately
communicates the hazards presented by hazardous materials to emergency
responders, transportation employees, and the public and contributes to
proper emergency response when accidents occur in transportation.
3. Training
The HMR requirements for safe transportation of hazardous materials
also encompass training for all hazmat employees involved in the
transportation of hazardous material. See part 172 subpart H. Training
is the cornerstone of compliance with the HMR, because only properly
trained employees can ensure the applicable HMR requirements are
followed appropriately. All hazmat employees must be trained and tested
by their employer to perform their HMR-related functions correctly and
safely. This includes employees who prepare a hazardous material
package for transportation, transport hazardous materials (e.g., the
train crew), or unload hazardous material. See Sec. 171.8. In
accordance with Sec. 172.704, training must cover:
[cir] General awareness of HMR requirements;
[cir] Function-specific training applicable to the particular
functions performed by the employee (e.g., proper loading procedures
for flammable cryogenic material);
[cir] Safety;
[cir] Security awareness; and
[cir] In-depth security training, when applicable.
Training must be documented in accordance with Sec. 172.704(d),
and repeated at least every 3 years.
4. Security Plans
The HMR also address security requirements for certain high-risk
hazardous materials. Offerors and carriers of materials listed in Sec.
172.800 must develop and adhere to a transportation security plan for
hazardous materials. Security plans are required of any offeror or
carrier of flammable gas in a quantity over 792 gallons, which is far
below the volume of a single tank car of LNG or similar flammable
cryogenic material. Security plans must include an assessment of
transportation security risks for shipments of the hazardous materials,
including site-specific or location-specific risks associated with
facilities at which the hazardous materials listed in Sec. 172.800 are
prepared for transportation, stored, or unloaded incidental to
movement, and appropriate measures to address the assessed risks.
Specifically, security plans must address three elements:
[cir] Personnel security. Measures to confirm information provided
by job applicants hired for positions that involve access to and
handling of the hazardous materials covered by the security plan.
[cir] Unauthorized access. Measures to address the assessed risk
that unauthorized persons may gain access to the hazardous materials
covered by the security plan or transport conveyances being prepared
for transportation of the hazardous materials covered by the security
plan.
[cir] En route security. Measures to address the assessed security
risks of shipments of hazardous materials covered by the security plan
en route from origin to destination, including shipments stored
incidental to movement.
Properly implemented security plans decrease the risk that a
shipment of hazardous material, including LNG, can be used in an attack
against persons or critical infrastructure within the United States.
5. Preparing a Packaging for Transportation
Hazardous materials packages must be prepared and filled in such a
way to ensure that there can be no detectable release of hazardous
materials to the environment during conditions normally incident to
transportation. Specifically, for LNG, there are several existing
requirements in the HMR that address the proper filling of a DOT-113
tank car to ensure safe transportation of the commodity. These package
preparation requirements include:
As provided in Sec. 173.31, when the car is offered into
transportation, the offeror must inspect the tank car and all closures
prior to movement (i.e., the pre-trip inspection); and
Filling density restrictions and loading pressure
restrictions in Sec. 173.319 for cryogenic material.
The filling and loading restrictions in Sec. 173.319 are based on
the physical properties of each flammable cryogenic material and are
designed to ensure that during transportation, the inner tank will not
experience a pressure rise that triggers the PRVs to activate.
6. Route Planning
The HMR address requirements for rail route planning in Sec.
172.820. Trains

[[Page 45002]]

meeting the following criteria are required to assess the safety and
security risks along transportation routes (Sec. 172.820(c)) and
perform an alternative route analysis (Sec. 172.820(d)):
(1) More than 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) in a single carload of a
Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 explosive;
(2) A quantity of a material poisonous by inhalation in a single
bulk packaging;
(3) A highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive)
material, as defined in Sec. 173.403 of this subchapter; or
(4) A high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) as defined in Sec. 171.8
of this subchapter.
Historically, there has been considerable public and Congressional
interest in the safe and secure rail routing of security-sensitive
hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 \20\
directed the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to publish a rule governing the rail routing of security-
sensitive hazardous materials. On December 21, 2006, PHMSA, in
coordination with FRA and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), published an
NPRM under Docket HM-232E (71 FR 76834), which proposed to revise the
current requirements in the HMR applicable to the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Specifically, the HM-
232E NPRM proposed to require rail carriers to compile annual data on
specified shipments of hazardous materials, use the data to analyze
safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials are
transported, assess alternative routing options, and make routing
decisions based on those assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ53/PLAW-110publ53.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the HM-232E NPRM, PHMSA solicited comments on whether the
proposed requirements should also apply to flammable gases, flammable
liquids, or other materials that could be weaponized, as well as
hazardous materials that could cause serious environmental damage if
released into rivers or lakes. Commenters who addressed this issue
indicated that rail shipments of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives;
PIH materials; and highway-route controlled quantities of radioactive
materials pose significant rail safety and security risks warranting
the enhanced security measures proposed. Commenters generally did not
support enhanced security measures for a broader list of materials than
were proposed in the NPRM.
PHMSA adopted the NPRM's proposed security measures in an April 16,
2008 Interim Final Rule (IFR) (73 FR 20752) which was subsequently
amended by a November 26, 2008 final rule (73 FR 72182). The 2008 IFR
and final rule imposed a series of rail routing requirements in Sec.
172.820. Carriers must compile annual data on certain shipments of
explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials; use the data to analyze
safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials are
transported; assess alternative routing options; and make routing
decisions based on those assessments. In accordance with Sec.
172.820(e), the carrier must select the route posing the least overall
safety and security risk. The carrier must retain in writing all route
review and selection decision documentation. Additionally, the rail
carrier must identify a point of contact on routing issues involving
the movement of covered materials and provide that contact information
to the appropriate State, local, and tribal personnel.
PHMSA proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, in Sec. 174.310(a)(1),
to modify the rail routing requirements specified in Sec. 172.820 to
apply to any HHFT. The routing requirements discussed in the NPRM
reflect the practices recommended by the NTSB in recommendation R-14-
4,\21\ and are in widespread use across the rail industry for security-
sensitive hazardous materials. An overwhelming majority of commenters
expressed support for additional routing requirements for HHFTs and
thus, PHMSA finalized the proposed requirements.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\21\ https://www.ntsb.gov/publications/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-14-004.
\22\ 80 FR 26644.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In this final rule, PHMSA makes any railroad that transports a
quantity of LNG in a tank car subject to the route planning
requirements in Sec. 172.820.
7. Operational Controls
In addition to requirements for packaging, hazard communication,
training, and security plans that must be met before the hazardous
material is offered for transportation, the HMR contain operational
controls requirements for the safe transportation of hazardous
materials in tank cars. These requirements include specific provisions
for handling flammable cryogenic materials similar to LNG, including
loading and unloading requirements for tank cars in Sec. Sec. 173.31
and 174.67, which help prevent movement of tank cars during loading/
unloading operations, help prevent other rail equipment from
approaching tank cars during loading/unloading through use of derails,
bumpers, or lining switches to prevent entry, and include specific
instructions that tank car unloading personnel are required to follow,
such as attendance of the unloading operation and care of tools used
for unloading.
Other operational controls include an unloading requirement in
Sec. 174.204 that requires that tank cars containing a flammable
cryogenic material must be unloaded directly from the car to permanent
storage tanks of sufficient capacity to receive the entire contents of
the car. Finally, switching restrictions in Sec. 174.83(b) prohibit a
DOT-113 specification tank car displaying a Division 2.1 (flammable
gas) placard, including a DOT-113 specification tank car containing a
residue of a Division 2.1 material (e.g., LNG), from being cut off
while in motion, coupled into with more force than is necessary to
complete the coupling, or struck by any car moving under its own
momentum. These special handling requirements protect DOT-113 tank cars
from experiencing unnecessary impact forces during switching.
Compliance with these switching restrictions is highlighted by the
special white background for the flammable gas placard required by
Sec. 172.510 for DOT-113, and a marking requirement for the tank car
which indicates that the cars may not be humped or cut off while in
motion (see Sec. 179.400-25).
Additionally, three operational controls currently address the
expedited movement of a tank car transporting hazardous materials,
delivery of tank cars containing gases and cryogenic material, and
notification of delays in transit. First, Sec. 174.14 requires that a
carrier must forward each shipment of hazardous materials promptly and
within 48 hours (Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excluded), after
acceptance at the originating point or receipt at any yard, transfer
station, or interchange point, except that where biweekly or weekly
service only is performed, a shipment of hazardous materials must be
forwarded on the first available train. Furthermore, Sec. 174.14(b)
states that a tank car loaded with any Division 2.1 material (which
would include LNG), may not be received and held at any point, subject
to forwarding orders, to defeat the purpose of this requirement for the
expedited movement of a hazardous material, or to

[[Page 45003]]

defeat the requirements of Sec. 174.204 for tank car delivery of gases
such as cryogenic liquids. Section 174.204 prohibits tank cars
containing Class 2 materials from being unloaded unless the shipment is
consigned for delivery to an unloading facility on private tracks, and
prohibits the storage of Division 2.1 (flammable) cryogenic material.
If a tank car containing Class 2 material cannot be delivered to a
private track for unloading, the regulation does allow the car to be
unloaded on a rail carriers tracks provided the lading is piped
directly from the tank car to permanent storage tanks. Finally, in
accordance with Sec. 173.319, the shipper must notify FRA whenever a
tank car containing any flammable cryogenic material is not received by
the consignee within 20 days from the date of shipment.
8. Risk Based Framework
The HMR address the risks inherent in the transportation of
hazardous materials through comprehensive packaging, hazard
communication, training, security planning, and material- and mode-
specific operational controls.
The HMR regulate 435 million shipments of hazardous materials every
year and by all modes of transportation, with an average of 20
hazardous material incidents resulting in death and serious injury each
year, most of which occur in the highway mode. The existing HMR
requirements are robust and will adequately address the risks posed by
transportation of LNG in DOT-113C120W tank cars. However, in this final
rule, PHMSA is adopting certain additional safety measures designed to
further reduce those risks. These safety measures are discussed in
detail in the following section.

B. The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car

PHMSA considers the existing DOT-113C120W tank car a suitable
packaging for transportation of LNG by rail. The inner tank is capable
of withstanding the cryogenic temperatures and chemical properties of
LNG, and the thermal protection system is capable of maintaining LNG at
a safe pressure and temperature throughout transportation. However, in
this final rule, to improve crashworthiness and in response to comments
received, PHMSA requires that DOT-113C120W tank cars used for LNG
transportation must be constructed with a thicker outer tank, and that
the outer tank be constructed of a higher quality steel currently
required for construction of DOT-117A and PIH/TIH tank car tanks. PHMSA
has determined that the thicker outer tank in DOT-117A and PIH/TIH tank
cars improved crashworthiness. The DOT-117A crashworthiness improvement
results are discussed below. Additionally, PHMSA is adopting the
proposals for maximum offering pressure as proposed in the NPRM, but is
amending the maximum filling density to 37.3%.
1. Suitability of the DOT-113C120W Tank Car for LNG
The DOT-113C120W tank car has a long history of safe transportation
of flammable cryogenic material similar to LNG. The safe history of
DOT-113C120W tank cars used for the transportation of other cryogenic
materials such as ethylene since 1983 (and earlier under special
permits) is a key factor in determining that this tank car design is
appropriate for the transportation of LNG. Please see our discussion of
the history of the DOT-113 specification in ``Section III.A. Existing
HMR Requirements for Rail Transport of Flammable Cryogenic Gas'' for
further details.
DOT-113C120W rail tank cars are vacuum-insulated tank-within-a-tank
designs (similar to a thermos bottle) consisting of an inner alloy
stainless steel tank enclosed within a carbon steel outer tank
specifically designed for the transportation of cryogenic material,
such as liquid hydrogen, oxygen, ethylene, nitrogen, and argon.
Additionally, the design and use of the DOT-113 specification tank car
includes added safety features--such as protection systems for piping
between the inner and outer tanks, multiple PRDs (pressure relief
valves and vents), and insulation--that contribute to an excellent
safety record throughout its 50 years of service. The HMR currently
authorize the DOT-113C120W specification tank car, the same
specification being authorized for LNG in this rule, for another
flammable cryogenic material, ethylene, which has chemical properties
similar to those of LNG.
The DOT-113 tank car requirements in the HMR incorporate elements
of rigorous engineering standards, including the ASME BPVC as well as
the AAR Specifications for Tank Cars, M-1002. M-1002 in turn draws on
well-established industry standards of the American Society for Testing
and Materials (ASTM), American Society of Non-destructive Testing
(ASNT), as well as ASME, for design, materials, fabrication, testing
and inspection requirements. The ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1,
is the international benchmark standard for pressure vessel design for
a multitude of industries, including transportation. Starting from
these rigorous design principles, the specification requirements in
part 179 of the HMR add design requirements to address conditions
encountered in transportation and not necessarily applicable to
stationary storage. For example, the HMR require the use of specific
steels that balance toughness, strength, and weldability with being
able to withstand extremely low temperatures.
When cryogenic ethylene is transported in DOT-113C120W
specification tank cars, it is offered at cryogenic service temperature
(defined in Sec. 173.115(g) as colder than -90 [deg]C), as LNG would
be in this final rule. The delimiter letter ``C''--as used in ``DOT-
113C120W''--indicates the car is designed for a loading and shipping
temperature as low as -260 [deg]F (-162 [deg]C) (see the specification
requirements in Sec. 179.401-1 for DOT-113C120W tank cars). Negative
260 [deg]F corresponds to the temperature at which LNG converts from a
gas to a liquid. The HMR do not permit the filling of a tank car below
its service temperature (see Sec. 173.319(a)(4)(ii)). However, should
the inner tank experience colder temperatures, the 300-grade austenitic
stainless steels, 304/304L, permitted for the inner tank, are
authorized to withstand the much lower service temperature of cryogenic
hydrogen, 423 [deg]F.
Similarly, the standard heat transfer rate assigned to the DOT-
113C120W tank car in Sec. 179.401-1, a maximum of 0.4121 Btu per day
per pound of water capacity, is consistent with the requirements for
the other bulk packages authorized for LNG in the HMR (MC 338 cargo
tanks and UN T75 portable tanks), and packages authorized by DOT
Special Permits. The specific design properties of the DOT-113C120W,
including service temperature and thermal performance, make it an
appropriate packaging for safe transportation of LNG, in the same way
that the packaging is currently used to transport cryogenic ethylene.
2. Materials of Construction for DOT-113 Tank Cars
In the United States, storage vessels for LNG are designed and
constructed in accordance with ASME BPVC Section VIII Rules for
Construction of Pressure Vessels, Division 1. To maintain the low
temperature, LNG storage tanks are usually made with an inner and outer
tank with insulating material between and a vacuum applied to the
annular space.

[[Page 45004]]

a. Inner Tank
ASTM A240/240M 300-grade austenitic stainless steels, 304/304L, are
the only steels authorized in the HMR for constructing the inner tank
of a DOT-113 tank car. The major elements in these steels are: Carbon--
0.08% (0.03%); manganese--2.00% (both); chromium--18.0-20.00% (both);
nickel--8.00-11.00% (8.00-12.00%); and the remainder iron. The role of
chromium and nickel in the 304/304L grade steels is to: (1) Retain the
Face Centered Cubic (FCC) atomic structure which gives 304/304L its
strength, ductility and toughness down to cryogenic temperatures and
(2) provide a corrosion resistant passive layer. The tensile strength
of 304/304L steel is 70,000-75,000 psi with Charpy V-notch toughness
(resistance to brittle failure) values in the range of 80-130 ft. lbs.
at -320 [deg]F (minimum Charpy V-notch failure value is 60 ft. lbs.),
below the temperature range encountered during LNG transportation. The
service environment of a railroad tank car is dynamic and severe and
can result in the accumulation of impact and fatigue damage. Austenitic
stainless steels, which are readily weldable using qualified welders
and welding procedures, are therefore well-suited for use in the
construction and repair of tank cars.
For storage tanks, ASME design criteria allow for the use of 300-
grade stainless steels or ASTM A553 Standard Specification for Pressure
Vessel Plates, Alloy Steel, Quenched and Tempered 7, 8, and 9% Nickel.
Both the 304/304L and A553 steels have similar nickel content limits,
but utilize the nickel to achieve strength and toughness in different
ways. The A553 steel is a heat treatable, ``quench and tempered'' type
of steel with the nickel helping to form martensite, a strong but
brittle metallurgical product. The quench and tempering treatment makes
welding A553 difficult, requiring expertise in welding procedure
development and operator skill which adds risk to its use for tank
cars. By contrast, the nickel content in 304/304L stainless steels
facilitates the formation of austenite, a strong, tough and ductile
form of steel, which maintains its physical properties at cryogenic
temperatures. This, coupled with its excellent weldability, make it the
clear choice for cryogenic tank cars.
The inner tank has a minimum thickness requirement of 3/16th inch
(after forming) unless increased through a calculated formula in
179.400-8, which increases thickness based on inner diameter of the
tank. The calculations used to determine the thickness of the inner
tank are aligned with the ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 and align
with all other tanks used for cryogenic materials. Typically, DOT-113
inner tanks exceed the minimum value of 3/16th inch thickness to
conform to ASME calculations and to avoid localized thinning arising
from manufacturing processes and the variation in the thickness of
steel sourced from steel mills. Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA
maintains the current requirements for inner tanks.
b. Outer Tank
For DOT-113 tank cars, plate materials listed in M-1002 Appendix M
must be used for the outer tank. Industry practice has been to
fabricate the external tank from ASTM A516-70 steel. A516-70 steel has
provided reliable performance in the service history of DOT-113 tank
cars. However, PHMSA in this final rule is authorizing rail transport
of LNG in DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars with enhanced outer tank
thickness and materials (with a specification suffix ``9'' added to
denote those enhancements). Specifically, this final rule requires DOT-
113C120W9-specification tank cars carrying LNG to have a minimum outer
tank thickness of 9/16'' (compared to 7/16'' for other DOT-113C120W-
specification tank cars). Further, those thicker outer tanks must be
made of TC-128 Grade B (TC-128B) normalized steel. TC-128B normalized
steel is currently used for TIH and flammable liquid tank car designs
and its manufacturing process produces a more puncture resistant steel
as compared to A516-70 steel. AAR TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is a
high-strength, fine-grained carbon-manganese-silicon steel intended for
fusion-welded tank car tanks in service at moderate and lower
temperatures. By normalizing (heating the steel to 1600 [deg]F and air
cooling) TC-128 steel and controlling its chemistry, the outer tank of
an LNG tank car made from TC-128 Grade B steel has a reduced
probability of tank failure due to cracking and an increased resistance
to puncture compared to ASTM A516-70 steel.
The TC-128 Grade B normalized carbon steel used to construct the
outer tank for DOT-113C120W9 tank cars does not maintain the same
strength and ductility at the cryogenic temperatures of the lading.
However, this is not a safety concern for DOT-113 tank cars. Existing
DOT-113C120W tank cars used in cryogenic ethylene service have outer
tanks constructed of ASTM A516-70 carbon steel. ASTM A516-70 is also
not resistant to cryogenic temperatures, and has been used safely in
the outer tank of DOT-113C120W tank cars for decades. Similarly, the
steel used to construct the outer tanks of other ``tank-within-a-tank''
cryogenic packagings, including MC-338 cargo tanks, UN T75 portable
tanks, and ocean-going LNG tanker ships, is not resistant to cryogenic
temperature.
LNG in these packagings is contained during transportation in an
inner stainless-steel tank or tank lined with cryogenic compatible
liners, which maintains strength and ductility at cryogenic
temperatures, while the outer tank provides accident protection and
structural support to the packaging. The only way LNG can be released
from the inner tank of a rail tank car to the void space between the
inner and outer tanks is if the inner tank is compromised. In a rail
accident, a puncture of the inner tank can occur only after the outer
tank is breached. In such a scenario, any LNG released from the breach
of the inner tank will also be released into the environment and not be
contained in the space between the two tanks even if the outer tank is
made of stainless steel that maintains strength and ductility at
cryogenic temperatures. Therefore, there is no safety advantage in
making the outer tank of stainless steel. On other hand, making the
outer tank of stainless steel able to withstand cryogenic temperatures
in addition to withstanding the in-train forces during transportation,
providing puncture resistance, and ensuring structural support for the
tank car would be prohibitively expensive (especially if the thickness
is the same as or thicker than the adopted 9/16th inch TC-128 Grade B
normalized carbon steel design).
As explained further below, PHMSA expects that each of the
enhancements provided for in the final rule will improve tank car
crashworthiness.
c. Determination of Inner and Outer Tank Requirements
PHMSA is maintaining the requirements for the inner tank. ASTM A
240/A 240M, Type 304 or 304L steel has the correct balance of strength,
durability, and weldability for use in transportation applications for
cryogenic materials, as demonstrated over many years of use. However,
due to the possibility of LNG being transported in blocks of tank cars
within each train that are larger than the blocks of tank cars that are
typically used for rail transportation of other flammable cryogenic
liquids, and in response to comments, PHMSA is authorizing in this
final rule rail transportation of LNG

[[Page 45005]]

in DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars with enhanced outer tank
thickness and materials (those enhancements to be indicated by the
specification suffix ``9'') to obtain improved crashworthiness.
The inner tank design of DOT-113C120W9 tank cars will be identical
to other DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars, and will have the same
safety features to vent the contents in the event of an unsafe pressure
increase. In essence, the lading retention capabilities of the DOT-
113C120W9 and other DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars are identical,
with specific enhancements to the outer tank of the tank car design
being employed to increase crashworthiness.
The outer tank enhancements for the DOT-113C120W9 incorporate the
best available technology for the outer tank of a tank car with little
additional manufacturing costs. Increasing wall thickness and the use
of normalized steel (which increases the ductility of the steel) of the
outer tank wall together provide enhanced crashworthiness for the tank
car. Previously, there was limited economic rationale to amend the
outer tank characteristics for the DOT-113C120W tank car to incorporate
those elements because of the small size of the fleet and the small
number of tank cars within each train. The existing level of safety
provided by the DOT-113C120W tank car and existing operational controls
is sufficient for the current use scenarios, as shown by the safety
history of that tank car with over 100,000 shipments.
Currently, because of market demand and usage patterns for
ethylene, DOT-113 tank cars are transported as part of mixed commodity
freight trains at one to three cars per train. However, as the number
of tank cars within a train increases--in blocks of cars larger than
three or in unit trains--there is a higher probability that a car
containing a flammable cryogenic material such as LNG will be involved
should a derailment or other accident occur.
PHMSA cannot predict the number of DOT-113C120W9 tank cars per
train the LNG market will support, but we know that from ETS's
application for DOT-SP 20534, that it has plans to operate unit trains
of at least 80 cars per train at some point in the future. With the
possibility of larger numbers of cars in LNG transportation, PHMSA and
FRA have determined that applying improved outer tank requirements is
feasible from a manufacturing and economic perspective. Given the
feasibility of securing a more robust tank car design within prevailing
manufacturing processes across North America, PHMSA determined that the
authorization for transporting LNG by rail can achieve an additional
safety margin by employing the more robust car design described herein.
If a tank car containing LNG is breached during a derailment, the
LNG will behave largely the same way as crude oil or ethanol. The LNG
lading will be released as a very cold liquid, creating an LNG pool
that could catch on fire. Employing a thicker outer shell will reduce
the puncture probability of the inner tank, and thus mitigate the
consequences of the derailment. Moreover, a tank car is estimated to
have a service life of approximately 50 years. DOT-113 tank cars
compliant with the enhanced outer shell requirements are projected to
cost 3% more to manufacture. When divided by the large number of
carloads that would be carried during a DOT-113's 50-year service life,
the 9/16th inch TC-128B normalized steel outer tank is highly cost-
effective in that it will mitigate the consequences of derailment
involving LNG by reducing the number of tanks punctured in the unlikely
event of an accident. See our discussion of modeling crashworthiness in
Section III. B. 6. ``Finite Element Modeling and Validation'' for
additional information.
3. Safety History
DOT-113 tank cars have a demonstrated safety record of over 50
years. More than 100,000 rail shipments of cryogenic material in DOT-
113 tank cars have taken place with no reported fatalities or serious
injuries occurring due to a train-accident caused release of product.
Only twice--during the 2011 incident in Moran, KS and the 2014 incident
in Mer Rouge, LA--did the inner tank of a DOT-113 tank car release
product due to damage sustained during an accident. LNG transportation
by rail in currently authorized packaging also has a demonstrated,
albeit brief, safety history. Since LNG was authorized to be shipped by
rail in T-75 UN containers, PHMSA and FRA have no record of any rail
incidents involving these packagings.
4. Crashworthiness Assessment/Field Tests
PHMSA and FRA are confident, based on rigorous modeling, testing,
and experience (described in detail in below), that the DOT
specification tank cars, enhanced with a 9/16th inch outer tank made of
TC-128 Grade B normalized steel, will provide sufficient
crashworthiness in accident scenarios compared to tank cars
manufactured from 7/16th inch A516-70 steel outer tanks. As part of the
analysis conducted for the Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, (HM-251; 80 FR 26643, May 8,
2015) along with the final rule RIA, PHMSA determined that there was a
reduction in the number of tank cars punctured when increasing the
outer tank thickness from 7/16th inch to 9/16th inch of TC-128 Grade B
normalized steel with a train traveling at 40 mph.
This final rule will require the same increase in thickness of the
same type of steel as was required in the HM-251 final rule for DOT-117
tank cars. PHMSA, therefore, expects a similar increase in safety
benefits from the use of enhanced outer tank thickness and improved
materials.
5. Comparison of Derailments
In the following table, FRA compared three derailment accidents
that occurred in relatively similar conditions. All accidents involved
trains travelling at similar speeds, in similar weather conditions, and
with a similar number of cars derailed. The tank cars that derailed in
Guernsey, Saskatchewan, had a tank thickness of 9/16th inch and had 62
percent fewer shell punctures than the tank cars that derailed in
Casselton, North Dakota, and 69 percent fewer tank punctures than the
tank cars that derailed in Arcadia, Ohio. The tank cars involved in the
Casselton and Arcadia derailments had a tank thickness of 7/16th inch.
These scenarios validate the extensive modeling and simulations done
and provide evidence of the substantial safety benefit of requiring an
outer tank thickness of 9/16th inch in the construction of the DOT-
113C120W tank car that is being authorized for the transportation of
LNG by rail in this rule.

[[Page 45006]]

Table 3--Comparison of Derailments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Derailment location
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guernsey, SK Casselton, ND Arcadia, OH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Derailment date...................... 2/6/2020............... 12/30/2013............. 2/6/2011.
Temp at Time of Derailment........... -18 [deg]C (0 [deg]F).. -18 [deg]C (-1 [deg]F). -4 [deg]C (25 [deg]F).
Train speed (MPH).................... 42..................... 48..................... 42.
Type of cars (Specification)......... DOT 117J (286K)........ DOT 111 Legacy (263K).. DOT 111 Legacy (263K).
Shell Thickness...................... 9/16th inch............ 7/16th inch............ 7/16th inch.
Total cars derailed.................. 32..................... 20..................... 32.
Total cars breached.................. 8...................... 19..................... 30.
Head Punctures....................... 0...................... 3...................... 10.
Shell Punctures...................... 5...................... 13..................... 16.
Fittings Compromised................. 3...................... 10..................... 13.
Product(s) released.................. UN 1267 Crude Oil...... UN 1267 Crude Oil...... UN 1987 Ethanol.
Fire Occurred........................ Yes.................... Yes.................... Yes.
Thermal Ruptures..................... No..................... Yes.................... Yes.
Approximate size of derailment area.. 900'L x 250'W (est).... 600'L x 600'W.......... 1200'L x 450'W.
General topography of derailment area Flat field, raised RR Flat/straight tangent Flat field, raised RR
bed. track. bed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Finite Element Modeling and Validation
FRA's Research program, in coordination with PHMSA, funded the
development and continued refinement of Finite Element (FE) Models for
a variety of tank car specifications as well as computer simulation of
impacts and derailments. FE modeling is a widely-used method for
evaluating the effects of stresses on components or structures and is
used in the fields of structural analysis, heat transfer, and fluid
flow. Within the FRA research program, component and full scale tests
results are used to validate the computer simulations and their
assumptions and boundary conditions. Full scale test results are
compared to simulation results, including the overall force-time or
force-indentation histories, the puncture/non-puncture outcomes, the
rigid body motions of the tank car, the internal pressures within the
lading, and the energy absorbed by the tank during the impact.
The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center)
supports the FRA in this research effort, and has performed pre- and
post-test FE analyses corresponding to several component and full-scale
shell impact tests. Validated models and computer simulations are a
necessary alternative to full-scale impact testing which are time
consuming, expensive, and challenging to perform.
A primary purpose for a pre-test simulation is to estimate the
threshold puncture speed of the test ram car. The puncture speed of the
tank car is the speed at which, under the test conditions, the initial
kinetic energy of the ram car is equal to the energy necessary to
puncture the inner and outer tank. The threshold puncture speed is the
maximum speed at which the tank car can be impacted under the
prescribed conditions without resulting in a tear to the inner and
outer tanks that would allow its lading to escape.
Results of recent tests and simulations demonstrate the potential
improvement in crashworthiness from the outer tank enhancements set
forth in this final rule. In November 2019 FRA conducted a full-scale
impact test of a DOT-113C120W tank car at TTC in Pueblo, CO.\23\
According to the test report, the initial kinetic energy imparted to
the inner and outer tanks was about 2.8 Million ft.-lbs. Further, it is
estimated that the residual energy (after puncture of the inner and
outer tanks) was about 25% of the initial energy. Accordingly, the
puncture energy of the DOT-113 tank is about 75% of 2.8 Million ft.-
lbs., or 2.1 Million ft.-lbs. A separate full-scale impact test was
performed on a DOT-117J100W specification tank car equipped with a
jacket and thermal protection material. A review of the test report
suggests that the tank (made of TC-128B normalized steel) absorbed an
energy of about 1.9 Million ft.-lbs., without puncture. The report also
notes that under those conditions, the tank was near puncture. PHMSA
estimates the puncture capacity of the DOT-117 car to be about 2
Million ft.-lbs. Comparing the puncture capacities of the two tank
specifications (DOT-113 @2.1 Million ft.-lbs., and the DOT-117 @2
Million ft.-lbs.), their performances are very similar, and that the
DOT-113 might even have a slightly higher puncture resistance. The two
tank cars have about the same cumulative thickness. Therefore, based on
the puncture tests and modeling, PHMSA and FRA anticipate that
increasing the outer tank thickness of the DOT-113 from 7/16 to 9/16 (a
28.5% increase), and requiring the use of the more puncture-resistant
TC-128B normalized steel, will add about 20-30% to the puncture
resistance (i.e., reduction in number of punctures) of the DOT-
113C120W9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\23\ Full-Scale Shell Impact Test of a DOT-113 Tank Car, RR 20-
03, February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The above comparison of testing and simulation results was used to
determine the suitability of the DOT-113 tank car for LNG service, as
well as to determine the increased safety gained by using a 9/16th inch
thick outer tank shell of TC-128 Grade B, normalized steel. Further, a
similar model was created in the Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
[HM-251, 80 FR 26643] rulemaking to help evaluate how effectively the
increased thickness improved on the DOT-111 tank car (predecessor to
the DOT-117). The results of that modeling were factored into design of
the current DOT-117 specification tank car which improved on the DOT-
111 tank car design.
7. Loading and Preparation for Offering
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting a 37.3 percent maximum
filling density for LNG, which will allow for approximately 2 percent
outage below the inlet of the pressure control valve to prevent the
venting of liquid material at start-to-discharge pressure, thus
ensuring the safe transportation of LNG. In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed a
32.5 percent filling density. However, PHMSA has determined a 37.3
percent maximum filling density is appropriate

[[Page 45007]]

because it is consistent with outages determined to be safe for LNG in
other packagings such as MC-338 cargo tanks and UN T75 portable tanks.
This maximum filling density is also more conservative than maximum
filling densities set in the HMR for other flammable cryogenic
materials, which allows for 0.5 percent outage at the start-to-
discharge pressure. See Sec. 173.319(b)(1). Additionally, a 37.3
percent maximum filling density harmonizes with Canada's Transportation
of Dangerous Goods (TDG) regulations which have been in place since
2015.
PHMSA expects that any tank car containing a cryogenic material
will be delivered to its destination within 20 days of offering, and
requires notification of any car that has not reached its destination
within this timeframe. See Sec. 173.319(a)(3). Therefore, PHMSA is
adopting a 15 psig maximum offering pressure, as proposed, which is
appropriate for the transportation of LNG and is consistent with the
level of safety provided to other flammable cryogenic materials. The
HMR do not prohibit shippers from offering a tank car of LNG at a lower
pressure.
8. Review Approval Provision to Exceed Weight
On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule amending the HMR to
incorporate provisions contained in several widely used or longstanding
special permits that have an established safety record. The final rule,
Hazardous Materials: Incorporation of Special Permits into Regulations
(75 FR 27205, May 14, 2010), in part, amended the HMR to allow certain
rail tank cars transporting hazardous materials to exceed the gross
weight on rail limitation of 263,000 pounds upon approval of the FRA.
On January 25, 2011, the FRA published a notice (76 FR 4250) of FRA's
approval pursuant to the Final Rule of the operation of certain tank
cars in hazardous materials service that exceed 263,000 pounds and
weigh up to 286,000 pounds gross rail load (GRL). In 2002, AAR adopted
a revised industry standard related to railroad freight cars weighing
over 263,000 pounds GRL and weighing up to 286,000 pounds. This revised
industry standard, AAR Standard S-286 (adopted 2002, revised 2003,
2005, 2006), Free/Unrestricted Interchange for 286,000 pound GRL Cars
(S-286), is applicable to rail freight cars manufactured, rebuilt or
modified on or after January 1, 2003, and is the existing industry
standard for designing, building, and operating rail cars at gross
weights over 263,000 pounds and up to 286,000 pounds. S-286 sets forth
industry-tested practices for designing, building, and operating rail
cars at gross weights over 263,000 pounds and up to 286,000 pounds. S-
286 provides for the free interchange among carriers of cars built to
meet its requirements.
In this rulemaking, DOT-113 tank cars in LNG service will be
required to have an outer tank that is 9/16th inch thick (after
forming) and made from TC-128 Grade B, normalized steel plate.
Depending on the specific design characteristics of a tank car
manufactures approved car design, PHMSA and FRA determined that simply
the use of 9/16th inch TC-128, Grade B normalized steel for the outer
tank would not increase the GRL above 263,000 pounds; however, PHMSA
and FRA understand that operators may select certain specification
designs that may place the rail car at a GRL over 263,000 pounds.
In an effort to maintain consistency with FRA's current approval
(see 76 FR 4250, January 25, 2011) of newly manufactured railroad tank
cars with a GRL exceeding 263,000 pounds, this final rule will amend
the HMR to state that tank cars manufactured for LNG service after (the
effective date of this final rule) may be loaded to a maximum GRL of
286,000 provided the tank car meets the following criteria:
1. Tank car is constructed in accordance with S-286.
2. The outer shell and heads are constructed with TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel.
This aligns with the action PHMSA and FRA took when creating the
DOT-117 specification and does not place a new burden on tank car
manufacturers. A tank car manufacturer may therefore consider their
design ``approved'' provided it meets the two conditions above, with no
application to FRA or PHMSA required.

C. Additional Operational Controls for LNG Transportation

In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to rely on the operational controls
already required in the HMR for the transportation by rail of other
flammable cryogenic materials, and invited comment on whether
additional operational controls may be warranted. PHMSA encouraged
commenters to provide data on the safety or economic impacts associated
with any proposed operational controls, including analysis of the
safety justification or cost impact of implementing operational
controls.
In this final rule, PHMSA is amending the HMR to adopt operational
controls beyond the current extensive requirements of the HMR. These
additional operational controls consist of requirements for:
A two-way end-of-train (EOT) device or distributed power
(DP) for trains with 20 continuous tank cars of LNG, or 35 tank cars of
LNG throughout the entire train;
Location and inner tank pressure monitoring for each tank
car containing LNG; and
Compliance with Sec. 172.820 route planning requirements
(i.e., rail routing).
PHMSA and FRA believe that the current requirements of the HMR
ensure a robust level of safety for the transport of LNG by rail that
is further reinforced by widely-adopted voluntary industry standards in
AAR Circular OT-55. Additionally, the new operational controls in this
final rule will add a still greater margin of safety to address the
risks posed by LNG transportation in DOT-113C120W tank cars.
1. AAR Circular OT-55
AAR Circular OT-55 (OT-55) outlines operational controls for trains
meeting the industry definition of a ``Key Train,'' including speed
restrictions, track requirements, storage requirements, and the
designation of ``Key Routes,'' which are subject to additional
inspection and equipment requirements. OT-55 defines a ``Key Train'' as
any train with:
One tank car load of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard
(PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia (UN1005),
or ammonia solutions (UN3318);
20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any
combination of hazardous material, or;
One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), High
Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW).
Key Trains have a maximum speed of 50 mph. If a defect to a rail
car (e.g., hanging equipment) is reported by a wayside detector but not
confirmed by visual inspection, the maximum speed is reduced to 30 mph.
Circular OT-55 defines a ``Key Route'' as ``any track with a
combination of 10,000 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of
hazardous materials, or a combination of 4,000 car loadings of PIH or
TIH (Hazard zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia, flammable gas,
Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives, environmentally sensitive chemicals, Spent
Nuclear Fuel (SNF), and High Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW) over a
period of one year.'' OT-55 states that ``main tracks on `Key Routes'
must be inspected by rail defect detection and track geometry
inspection cars or any equivalent level of inspection no less than two
times

[[Page 45008]]

each year; sidings are similarly inspected no less than one time each
year; and main track and sidings will have periodic track inspections
that will identify cracks or breaks in joint bars.'' Finally, OT-55
states that ``wayside defective bearing detectors shall be placed at a
maximum of 40 miles apart on ``Key Routes,'' or equivalent level of
protection may be installed based on improvements in technology.''
These recommended practices were originally implemented by all major
Class I rail carriers operating in the United States, with smaller
short-line railroads following on as signatories.
While PHMSA did not propose to incorporate by reference OT-55 or to
adopt the requirements for ``Key Trains'' in the HMR, the railroad
industry's widespread, voluntary adoption of the circular is an
important consideration for PHMSA in assessing the need for prescribing
additional operational controls by regulation. AAR first published
Circular No. OT-55 in January 1990 to document recommended railroad
operating practices for the transportation of hazardous materials. The
first issue of the circular included recommended mainline and yard
operating practices, designation of key routes, proposed separations
from hazmat storage areas, training of transportation employees, and
implementation of TRANSCAER[supreg]. TRANSCAER[supreg] is a national
community outreach program that works to improve community awareness,
emergency planning and incident response for the transportation of
hazardous materials, criteria for shipper notification, and procedures
for handling time sensitive materials. Over the past 30 years, OT-55
has been routinely revised as needed to incorporate technological
developments and other changes in industry practice concerning the safe
transportation of hazardous materials. For instance, OT-55 has adopted
revisions to AAR's interchange standards, and technology advancements
such as the use of electronic emergency response information to provide
timely and reliable information to emergency responders.
To further promote compliance with the recommended practices
outlined in OT-55, and compliance with Federal transportation laws, the
rail industry developed and published the United States Hazardous
Materials Instructions for Rail, commonly referred to as ``HM-1.'' The
purpose of the HM-1 is to provide the rail industry with uniform
hazardous materials operating rules that railroads can implement and
consistently apply to support compliance with Federal regulations, and
to enhance significantly employee safety and the safety of the
communities through which the railroads operate. The HM-1 may be
implemented as published, or it may be modified by an individual
railroad to be consistent with its unique operating rules and
practices.
Through its enforcement activities, FRA verifies that each railroad
has established operating rules governing the safe transportation of
hazardous materials, and utilizes those instructions to enforce that
railroad's compliance with the Federal operating and hazardous
materials transportation regulations.
In accordance with the ``Key Train'' definition and the changes
being adopted, OT-55's operational controls would apply to the bulk
transport of LNG by rail in a train that is composed of 20 car loads or
intermodal portable tank loads in which LNG is present along with any
combination of other hazardous materials. Due to the operational
controls required for ``Key Trains,'' Circular OT-55 provides an
additional level of safety regardless of what combination of hazardous
materials the train is transporting. PHMSA and FRA believe this
industry standard reduces the risk of derailments and collisions and
therefore decreases the risk involved in the transportation of all
hazardous materials, including LNG.
PHMSA and FRA note that the hazardous materials operating
instructions from Circular OT-55-Q, the most recent edition, have been
incorporated into railroads' (carriers') operating rules. Furthermore,
FRA regularly performs reviews of railroads and their operating rules
and are not aware of any instances in which a railroad is failing to
adhere to Circular OT-55 when operating ``Key Trains.''
2. Additional Operational Controls in the Final Rule
In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting several additional
operational controls:
(1) Trains with a block of 20 loaded tank cars of LNG, or 35 loaded
tank cars of LNG throughout the entire train, are required to be
equipped with an EOT device or DP.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\24\ See Section IV, B. Operational Controls, 1. Braking and
Routing for further discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Each loaded tank car containing LNG must be monitored for
location and tank pressure by the offeror and notify the carrier if the
tank pressure rises by more than 3 psig in any 24-hour period.
(3) Each carrier operating trains carrying a loaded tank car of LNG
must perform additional planning requirements in accordance with Sec.
172.820 (i.e., rail routing). While the general operational controls in
the HMR, as supplemented by the widespread, voluntary practices
governing Key Trains in Circular OT-55, provide robust protections
against derailment and other accidents (and by extension, a loss of
package integrity resulting from the same) involving train
configurations with only a handful of tank cars, PHMSA believes that
the additional operational controls established by this final rule will
ensure safe transportation of LNG regardless of train configuration. As
explained earlier, trains currently transport to three DOT-113 tank
cars of flammable cryogenic materials (such as ethylene) in mixed
commodity freight trains. However, if the market for rail
transportation of LNG evolves to include movement of LNG in larger
quantities (in blocks of cars or unit configurations) within each
train, there is a higher probability that, should a derailment occur,
one or more cars containing LNG would be involved and would be
breached.
The additional operational controls will decrease the likelihood
and severity of derailments (DP/EOT device); decrease the likelihood
that an LNG tank car is lost in transport (location monitoring);
increase the likelihood that the railroad is notified immediately in
the unlikely event that a tank car experiences unsafe conditions during
transportation (pressure monitoring); and reduce the severity of the
consequences in a derailment scenario by requiring that railroads
transport LNG on the safest route available to them (rail routing and
risk assessment). Over a DOT-113 tank car's expected 50-year service
life, the use of DP/EOT devices for block carriage and unit trains,
remote monitoring, and risk-based routing of trains transporting LNG
will help ensure the transportation safety of LNG on the rail
transportation network.
Enhanced braking requirements can result in accident avoidance and
can lessen the consequences of an accident by more quickly slowing the
train and decreasing the energy of impacts by reducing the number of
tank cars affected by a potential derailment. PHMSA decided on the HHFT
threshold (i.e., a continuous block of 20 loaded LNG tank cars or 35
loaded LNG tank cars throughout the train) based on the effectiveness
of this existing requirement for flammable liquids in rail
transportation. PHMSA reviewed the possibility of requiring
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking on cars meeting the
above threshold, but determined that ECP

[[Page 45009]]

brakes are not a practical alternative given that ECP brakes are not
cost justified when applied to unit train configurations in the HHFT
environment. See HM-251F; 83 FR 48393 (Sept. 25, 2019).\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\25\ PHMSA notes that while this rulemaking does not prohibit
LNG rail transportation in unit trains, the likelihood is low that
there will be LNG unit trains, at least initially. Development of
the necessary infrastructure, especially construction of DOT-
113C120W9 tank cars, to transport LNG by railroad, particularly by
unit trains, demands significant financial investment, long term
commitment, and considerable planning. LNG tank car fleets would
need to be built, and there is a limit to the construction capacity
of the industry. As a result, FRA anticipates that industry will
transport LNG in smaller configurations, at least until
infrastructure is in place to allow for unit train service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Given the availability of existing braking technologies, PHMSA is
requiring advanced braking in the form of a two-way EOT device or,
alternatively, a linked and operational DP system located at the rear
of the train. A two-way EOT device or DP system is more effective than
conventional brakes because a locomotive engineer can initiate an
emergency brake application from the front and rear of the train, which
can reduce stopping distances and lessen in-train forces that can cause
or contribute to the severity of certain derailments. These advanced
braking requirements are consistent with the current requirements for
HHFTs, which apply to Class 3 flammable liquids that are transported in
a single block of twenty cars or 35 cars dispersed throughout a single
train.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\26\ See Section IV, B. Operational Controls, 1. Braking and
Routing for a more detailed discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The requirement to remotely monitor a tank car containing LNG will
allow shippers and carriers to better identify adverse conditions and
prevent a non-accidental release of LNG while in transportation.
Moreover, the requirements in this final rule allow for flexibility for
shippers and carriers in determining how to best monitor the location
of the tank cars and pressure within the inner tank. PHMSA and FRA
expect that the industry will develop standard practices and implement
technologies to meet the HMR performance standard for monitoring.
PHMSA is also adopting routing requirements in Sec. 172.820 to
further reduce the risk of a train accident. This amendment requires
railroads to evaluate safety and security risk factors when assessing
the potential routes to be used to transport LNG. The 27 safety and
security risk factors set forth in Appendix D of Part 172 against which
carriers evaluate their routes provide a robust framework for
identifying and managing route-based risks associated with LNG
transportation by rail. FRA regularly conducts evaluations of a
railroad's route risk assessment requirements to ensure adherence to
the requirement.
Requirements of the route analysis measures for a rail carrier
include:
Compilation of commodity transportation data;
Analysis of safety and security risks for transportation
route(s);
Identification and analysis of potential alternate
route(s); and
Based on the above data, selection of the practicable
route posing the least overall safety and security risk.
By expanding the existing route analysis and consultation
requirements of Sec. 172.820 to include LNG by tank car, PHMSA is
incorporating additional safety elements that are available within the
overall hazardous materials regulatory scheme. It is worth noting that
routing requirements were not mandated in the special permit issued to
ETS because the permit is issued to a shipper rather than a rail
carrier who is ultimately responsible for the route risk analysis. In
this final rule, there is no limitation on specific origins and
destinations, thereby necessitating routing and risk analysis under
Sec. 172.820. Some of the operational controls included in special
permit DOT-SP 20534 were not adopted or were revised in the final rule.
The requirement to submit a plan providing per shipment quantities,
timelines, etc., was included in DOT-SP 20534 in order to gather more
information about the movement of the material. This requirement is not
feasible for a broadly applicable regulatory authorization. In this
final rule, PHMSA applied the HHFT criteria in reaching its
determination to require the same braking requirements for LNG
transportation. After review of the comments and the safety history of
flammable liquid HHFTs, PHMSA concludes that this is best option to
ensure safe movement of LNG. In the final rule, the remote monitoring
requirements are different than what was included in the DOT-SP 20534
because PHMSA does not believe that direct monitoring for leaks is
necessary. Monitoring for tank pressure and tank car location
parameters will sufficiently inform the offeror of the tank car's
location and condition and allow notification to the carrier should an
undesirable condition occur. For example, registering and notification
of an unexpected decrease in pressure could likely indicate a methane
release and could be communicated immediately to the rail carrier and
the closest emergency responders.
With respect to train length and weight limitations, PHMSA
determined that there should not be a maximum for either in this
rulemaking. PHMSA notes that the HMR do not limit the number of
shipments a shipper can offer into transportation, nor do the HMR
restrict the number or type of hazardous materials rail cars that a
carrier can transport in a train. An individual railroad's appropriate
train operating lengths are based on multiple factors, including, but
not limited to, track profile, train make-up, train dynamics, and crew
training. Due to these and other unique factors that influence a
specific railroad's operation, PHMSA and FRA conclude that
determination of appropriate train lengths is best left to the
individual railroads.
Regarding separation distance, which is the number of non-placarded
rail cars between a locomotive or occupied caboose and railcars
containing hazardous materials (see Sec. 174.85), PHMSA has concluded
that it is appropriate to maintain the current requirement at this
time, pending further study of the issue. Non-placarded rail cars are
rail cars that do not contain an amount of hazardous material that
require placarding (see 49 CFR part 172 subpart F for additional
information about placarding requirements). The current requirement for
a flammable gas, like LNG, requires a separation distance of five cars
between the engine and placarded tank car, when train length permits.
If train length does not permit a separation distance of five cars, the
tank car(s) must be placed near the middle of the train, but not nearer
than the second car from an engine or occupied caboose. These long-
standing separation distance requirements protect train crews from the
releases of hazardous materials in accident conditions. PHMSA and FRA
collaborated under the scope of the Rail Safety Advisory Committee
Hazardous Materials Issues Working Group Task No. 15-04 to consider the
separation distance issue.
Ultimately, due to an absence of consensus of the Working Group
participants, as well as a lack of established incident data, the
members did not reach agreement on a change to the existing regulation
governing hazardous materials in train separation distances. Moreover,
PHMSA worked with the Volpe Center in its review of rail accidents
occurring between 2006 and 2015 where there was a release of hazardous
materials near the head end of the train (occupied locomotive). The
review found no reported crew injuries

[[Page 45010]]

and therefore no injuries that were potentially preventable with
additional buffer cars.
Extensive research exists on separation distance of hazardous
materials from train crews and locomotives, and other hazardous
materials in a train. PHMSA has initiated a research project in
coordination with the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) as an initial step in addressing NTSB Safety
Recommendations R-17-1 and -2.\27\ This effort will result in a report
that identifies gaps in the existing studies, areas for further
research, and what conclusions can be drawn collectively from the
existing knowledge base, if any. PHMSA may consider changes to the
separation distance requirements in Sec. 174.85 of the HMR for
placarded rail cars and tank cars in mixed commodity freight train and
unit train configurations pending the outcome of the study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\27\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-17-001-002.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In consideration of the foregoing, PHMSA is not amending the
separation distance requirement in this final rule.

IV. Summary and Discussion of Comments to the Rulemaking Docket

The NPRM comment period closed on January 13, 2020. PHMSA received
445 comment submissions \28\ to the rulemaking docket through the
extended comment period. PHMSA considered all comments in the
development of this final rule. The comments submitted to this docket
may be accessed via http://www.regulations.gov. The following table
categorizes the commenters by background:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\28\ Some comment submissions noted additional signatories.
Those were considered in the development of the final rule.

Table 4--NPRM Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description and
Commenter background Count examples of category
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organizations........ 27 Environmental Groups
(17); Emergency
Response
Organizations (6);
Other (4).
Governments......................... 15 Local (6); State (6);
Federal (2); Tribal
(1).
Private Individuals................. 391
Industry Stakeholders............... 12 Tank Car Manufacturers
(1); Trade
Associations (10);
Shippers (1).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA received comments relating to tank car design, operational
controls, emergency response, and potential environmental and economic
impacts. These comments are summarized and discussed in greater detail
below.

A. Tank Car Design

In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to authorize DOT-113C120W tank cars for
use in the transportation of LNG by rail and to amend the ``Pressure
Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting'' Table in Sec.
173.319(d)(2) by adding a column for methane as follows:

Table 5--Proposed Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum permitted filling density (percent by weight)
Maximum start-to-discharge -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
pressure (psig) Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene Hydrogen Methane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17............................ ........................... .................... ................... 6.60.......................
45............................ 52.8.......................
75............................ ........................... 51.1................ 51.1............... ........................... 32.5.
Maximum pressure when offered 10 psig.................... 20 psig............. 20 psig............ ........................... 15 psig.
for transportation.
Design service temperature.... Minus 260 [deg]F........... Minus 260 [deg]F.... Minus 155 [deg]F... Minus 423 [deg]F........... Minus 260 [deg]F.
Specification (Sec. 113D60W, 113C60W........... 113C120W............ 113D120W........... 113A175W, 113A60W.......... 113C120W.
180.507(b)(3) of this
subchapter).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed in the summary of amendments in this final rule in
Section III, the start-to-discharge pressure setting, filling density,
maximum offering pressure, and the thermal characteristics of the DOT-
113 tank car in Sec. 173.319 were selected to allow enough holding
time (including loading, transit, storage incidental to movement, and
unloading) such that the inner tank would not experience a pressure
rise sufficient to activate the reclosing PRV during conditions
normally incident to transportation. Additionally, if the pressure in
the inner tank were to reach the start-to-discharge pressure of the
reclosing PRV, the inlet to the valve would successfully vent vapor to
relieve further pressure buildup. That is, the combination of these
conditions (the start-to-discharge pressure setting, filling density,
maximum offering pressure, and the thermal characteristics of the DOT-
113C120W) acts as a safety measure to prevent activation of the PRV
under normal conditions of transport. At the maximum offering pressure
of 15 psig and the start-to-discharge pressure setting of 75 psig for
the reclosing PRV adopted in this final rule, the tank car has a 60
psig pressure range before venting occurs. Using an average daily
pressure rise of 0.75 to 1.5 psig as indicated by industry, even if the
FRA notification requirement for tank cars in transportation for over
20 days is reached, the tank would see only a 15 to 30 psig pressure
increase--meaning there would still be a 30 to 45 psig buffer remaining
before venting occurs (or an aggregate 20 to 60 days of holding time).
Please see Section III. B. ``The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car''
for additional details on the offering pressure, set-to-discharge
pressure, and the revised filling density requirements for LNG in this
final rule.

[[Page 45011]]

PHMSA received numerous comments about the tank car design for the
transportation of LNG by rail, which it sorted into the following
subtopics:

1. General Suitability of the DOT-113C120W Specification Tank
Car;
2. Crashworthiness Assessment/Field Tests;
3. High Nickel Steels;
4. Maximum Permitted Filling Density;
5. Maximum Pressure When Offered;
6. Insulation;
7. Maximum Gross Rail Weight; and
8. The DOT-113C140W Tank Car Specification.
In this section, PHMSA responds to 15 sets of substantive comments
related to tank car design for LNG transportation.
1. General Suitability of the DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car
PHMSA received various comments regarding the general safety of the
tank car design as proposed in the NPRM. Notably, the Railway Supply
Institute Committee on Tank Cars (RSI-CTC) cited the regulatory history
of the DOT-113C120W as an indication that DOT previously considered it
for the transport of LNG and that the specification itself was
originally designed to accommodate cryogenic materials, like LNG. RSI-
CTC noted that the Hazardous Materials Regulations Board, a predecessor
agency to PHMSA, published a notice in the Federal Register in 1971 as
part of the HM-91 \29\ rulemaking docket indicating that the agency was
``considering amendment of the Department's Hazardous Materials
Regulations to provide for the shipment of ethylene, hydrogen, methane,
[and] natural gas . . . in a cold liquefied gas state in certain tank
cars.'' RSI-CTC further commented that the delimiter letter ``C''
indicates that DOT-113C120W tank cars were specifically designed for
the safe transportation of cryogenic materials like LNG. They also
pointed out that these cars are subject to additional operating
requirements, namely thermal integrity and in-transit reporting
requirements, which have led to a strong safety record of over 50
years. Similarly, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC)
agreed with the NPRM's proposal to use DOT-113 tank cars, noting that
other refrigerated liquids are transported safely using this
specification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\29\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/standards-rulemaking/rulemakings/archived-rulemakings/67251/36fr-20166.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other commenters expressed concern over the tank car design,
stating that there is a lack of testing on the suitability of the tank
car for the transportation of LNG. The Governor of Washington State, on
behalf of Washington State, claimed that PHMSA's assertion of a
demonstrated safety record for DOT-113 tank cars is baseless without a
completed risk assessment, because LNG is not currently authorized for
transportation in DOT-113 tank cars and PHMSA and FRA may not be aware
of every incident involving these cars. The Surfrider Foundation noted
its belief that the proposed tank cars were never designed or intended
to be used for the transport of LNG. Likewise, the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) expressed concern that PHMSA is moving
forward with a deregulatory action without proper evaluation. CPUC also
stated that transporting LNG in DOT-113 tank cars poses an unacceptable
risk, further noting that an increase in pressure could trigger venting
and that exposure of the newly vented gas to a heat source could result
in an expanded fire or secondary explosion. Finally, CPUC also stated
that the proposed modification to the HMR to authorize a DOT-113 tank
car would be untested and that this is inconsistent with PHMSA's
mission for safety.
Furthermore, various commenters--including the New York State
Department of Transportation (NYDOT), the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYDEC), the New York State Division of
Homeland Security and Emergency Services (NYDHSES), and the NTSB--
stated their belief that the limited number of incidents involving DOT-
113 tank cars does not provide adequate evidence to ensure that they
are safe for the transportation of LNG. These commenters expressed that
the sample size of crashes is too small given the low number of DOT-113
tank cars in existence, and therefore, they requested additional
research on the suitability of these tank cars for LNG service.
Similarly, a group of environmental protection NGOs expressed their
belief that PHMSA failed to provide analysis to justify its claim that
the current known safety record of DOT-113 rail cars provides a
meaningful comparison to their understanding of planned large-scale
shipments of 100-car trains of LNG throughout the United States. They
further commented that PHMSA did not provide adequate data or analysis
to support its conclusions about how DOT-113 tank cars and their
cargoes will behave in a potential crash on main line rail routes.
Additionally, they asserted that PHMSA failed to provide data on the
risk of cascading failure of tank cars, noting that the lack of data
undermines PHMSA's statement that highway transportation is less safe
than rail transportation. Furthermore, the Center requested that PHMSA
consider the specific issues surrounding LNG tank cars, such as the
placement of valves and other appendages that may be sheared off during
a derailment; the puncture resistance of the tank car and potential
jacketing to prevent punctures; the heat resistance of LNG tank cars to
prevent explosions from fires during derailments; and braking
requirements that are adequate for the weight of LNG tank cars.
With respect to concerns about the potential for explosions, the
IAFC noted that the DOT-113 tank car is specifically designed to
prevent a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) and that in
the event of an accident, the LNG would initially spread before either
warming or freezing. They further noted that if the released LNG were
to catch fire, it would most likely be limited to the contents of the
specific tank car that experienced the release, rather than spreading
to the other tank cars. However, Earthjustice \30\ expressed concern
regarding two LNG motor vehicle accidents in Spain where a BLEVE was
observed, and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) noted that no
test data or mathematical models exist to predict whether and when a
LNG tank car exposed to an external fire would undergo a BLEVE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\30\ Earthjustice's January 14, 2020 comment was filed on behalf
for the Center, Clean Air Council, Delaware Riverkeeper Network,
Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Mountain Watershed
Association, and Sierra Club.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA Response
PHMSA agrees with RSI-CTC's comment and notes that the HM-91
rulemaking specifically considered that ``methane, liquefied'' (as
referenced in the rulemaking) could be shipped in a DOT-113C120W
specification tank car.
The safety history of DOT-113C120W tank cars is sufficient to draw
a conclusion that these tank cars are appropriate for the bulk
transportation of LNG. Please refer to our discussion on the DOT-
113C120W tank car in Section III. B. ``The DOT-113C120W Specification
Tank Car'' for further details. Also, please note that PHMSA is
enhancing this already suitable packaging with additional outer tank
requirements to improve crashworthiness. Although the HM-91 rulemaking
published October 16, 1971 [36 FR 20166] and docket was subsequently
withdrawn, PHMSA subsequently undertook a separate rulemaking published
March 1, 1974

[[Page 45012]]

[HM-115, 44 FR 12826] to authorize the transport of a flammable
cryogenic material (ethylene) in DOT-113C120W specification tank cars.
While methane (i.e., LNG) was not authorized for transport in that
later rulemaking, there is no indication in the record that the
omission was due to safety concerns.
With respect to Earthjustice's concern, the above BLEVE incidents
that occurred in Tivissa, Catalonia, Spain \31\ and Zarzalico, Murcia,
Spain \32\ with cargo tank motor vehicles transporting LNG do not serve
as an appropriate comparison to LNG rail tank cars. The tanks involved
in these incidents had a single inner steel tank covered by an envelope
of polyurethane foam and a lacquered aluminum jacket as opposed to the
tank-within-a-tank design of the DOT-113C120W tank car consisting of an
inner and outer tank made of steel. Although the cargo tanks involved
in the incidents were both constructed of 304L stainless steel, the
insulation material and the outer jacket (constructed of 2mm (0.080 in)
of aluminum) held no vacuum. Neither the polyurethane insulation nor
the thin aluminum, which were used in the construction and design of
the outer tanks, are particularly fire resistant. Therefore, these
envelopes around the tanks provided little fire protection in the
accident scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\31\ Explosion of a road tanker containing liquefied natural
gas. Eula`ia Planas-Cuchi, Nu[acute]ria Gasulla, Albert Ventosa,
Joaquim Casal. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
17 (2004) 315-32. https://www.academia.edu/7741565/Explosion_of_a_road_tanker_containing_liquified_natural_gas.
\32\ Analysis of the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
(BLEVE) of a Liquefied Natural Gas Road Tanker: The Zarzalico
Accident. E Planas, E. Pastor, J. Casal, J.M. Bonilla. Centre for
Studies on Technological Risk (CERTEC). Department of Chemical
Engineering. Universitat Polit[egrave]cnica de Catalunya. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/46606613.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conversely, the DOT-113C120W tank car has a steel outer tank and a
multi-layer insulation system, and is significantly superior in terms
of both impact and fire resistance than the cargo tanks involved in the
Spanish incidents. The annular space of the DOT-113 design works in
combination with a properly functioning pressure relief system to
diminish the likelihood of a high-energy event such as a BLEVE. Also,
in the case of the Zarzalico accident, a significant portion of the
insulation was destroyed by the fire, and in both cases the tank
containing the LNG was directly exposed to the fire. Direct contact by
flames resulted in increased pressure in the tank, followed by thermal
tears of the unprotected tanks due to a decrease in material
properties, rapid release of the contents, and subsequent ignition of
the vapor cloud. Direct contact by flames on the inner tank of a DOT-
113 is significantly less likely due to the more robust design of the
DOT-113 tank car.
In response to comments from CPUC and members of the public, PHMSA
notes that venting of a flammable cryogenic material, other than that
caused by an accident, is prohibited, and is unlikely to occur given
the DOT-113C120W tank car's safety features and operational controls to
expedite the movement of flammable cryogenic materials. Although there
may be rare instances as a result of offeror's failure to properly
operate or maintain the pressure relief system, this concern is
adequately addressed by existing HMR requirements for monitoring the
average daily pressure rise, requirements for routine maintenance of
PRDs, and the supplemental requirement adopted in this final rule to
monitor the pressure in the tank remotely so that the shipper will be
aware of issues that may result in venting before the tank car reaches
its destination. Please see our discussion of existing operational
controls in the HMR and the tank car design features in Section III.
``Amendments to the Hazardous Materials Regulations Adopted in this
Final Rule'' of this final rule for further discussion of the existing
framework that ensures safe, expedited movement of flammable cryogenic
materials like LNG.
CPUC's comment brought up concerns over potential secondary fires
caused by the release of LNG from a tank car due to exposure to fire,
and BLEVEs of tank cars exposed to fire. As stated in the NPRM, DOT-113
specification tank cars are inherently more robust when compared to
other specification tank cars, due to their unique design, materials of
construction, and their specific purpose to transport cryogenic
materials. The tank-within-a-tank design of the DOT-113 specification
tank car reduces the probability of cascading failures of other
undamaged DOT-113 specification tank cars being transported in a block
or unit train configuration. While it is possible that ignition of
these vapors could occur if an ignition source is present, the fire
would be contained to the proximity of the release point of the vapors
from the tank car. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that an
undamaged DOT-113 specification tank car involved in a derailment would
result in explosion due to a BLEVE due to the design of the tank car,
the loading pressure requirements for cryogenic materials, the mandated
requirements for redundant pressure relief systems (valves and safety
vents) and the insulation systems that are built into each car. It is
not possible to state with certainty whether a BLEVE is possible in the
case of a LNG tank car derailment, and what conditions need to be
present for such an event to occur. However, in a full-scale test \33\
conducted in 2018, a double walled portable cryogenic tank was filled
with liquid nitrogen (and PRDs operated as designed) and exposed to a
greater than 200-minute engulfing propane pool fire. The tank was
neither destroyed nor did a BLEVE occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\33\ FRA Full Scale Test titled: ``Fire Performance of a UN-T75
Portable Tank Phase 1: Loaded with Liquid Nitrogen''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on the suitability of the DOT-113 design and material of
construction for cryogenic material, safety history of the car, and the
existing framework in the HMR for hazard communication and operational
control, PHMSA concludes that the DOT-113C120W tank car is a safe
packaging to transport LNG by rail. PHMSA has evaluated years of LNG
transportation via other modes and packagings, both international and
domestic, to help assess the potential risks of LNG by rail resulting
in our determination that the containment vessel is an equally safe
alternative. PHMSA reaffirms that the DOT-113 tank car is suitable for
use in LNG service, as it has a demonstrated safety record of over 50
years in the service of similar flammable cryogenic materials.
2. Crashworthiness Assessment/Field Tests
PHMSA received various comments regarding the crashworthiness and
general field testing of the DOT-113C120W tank car. Notably, NTSB and
other commenters requested that PHMSA and FRA complete a thorough
crashworthiness and safety assessment of the DOT-113C120W tank car
specification prior to authorizing it for LNG service. Further, they
stated that relying on data for the accident history of similar
hazardous materials transported in the small fleet of DOT-113 tank cars
(as was done in the NPRM) or making engineering assumptions based on
the performance of pressure tank cars with different features and
operating parameters (as was done in the Exponent Report \34\
referenced in the Special Permit 20534 docket) does not provide a
statistically significant or valid safety assessment.

[[Page 45013]]

They also called into question how PHMSA determined that the
specification DOT-113C120W tank car is an acceptable packaging to
transport LNG. They noted their belief that the small number of DOT-113
tank cars in use and the documented 14 incidents referenced in the
NPRM, in which three shell breaches occurred between 1980 and 2017, do
not provide a demonstrated safety record. The Physicians for Social
Responsibility cited the need to develop a new, robust tank car design.
The Delaware Riverkeeper Network cited a lack of field tests on the
survivability of the DOT-113 tank car loaded with LNG and the lack of
simulation of the tank car ``hulls.'' The Puyallup Tribe of Indians
stated its belief that PHMSA is in violation of the APA, stating that
the NPRM was not supported by a complete and technically sufficient
administrative record because there are ongoing and incomplete studies
to determine the safety of transporting LNG in DOT-113 tank cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\34\ The referenced Exponent Report is a study to examine the
risks of bulk transportation of LNG by investigation the potential
risk profiles for transport of LNG versus liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) by cargo tank motor vehicle and rail tank car. https://
www.exponent.com/knowledge/alerts/2015/08/bulktransportation/~/
media/03b73782ec76446798c70f6ac403ef84.ashx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Earthjustice questioned the suitability of the DOT-113 tank car
noting that ``. . . of the three specific derailments of the DOT113C120
tank car noted by the EA, all three ended up either breaching or
needing to be breached and losing their entire cargoes. This represents
4.5% of the entire DOT113C120 tank car fleet.''
PHMSA Response
As noted previously, PHMSA does not agree that Earthjustice's
analysis calls into question the suitability of the DOT-113C120W tank
car. PHMSA has concluded that the safety history of DOT-113C120W tank
cars is sufficient to demonstrate that these tank cars are appropriate
for the transportation of LNG, as the DOT-113 tank car has a
demonstrated safety record of over 40 years. Since authorized in the
HMR, there have been no train-accident related fatalities or serious
injuries in over 100,000 shipments of cryogenic material in DOT-113
tank cars. PHMSA has reviewed the approximately 450 Incident Report
Form 5800.1 filings involving releases from DOT-113 (or equivalent
AAR204W \35\) tank cars. Nearly all of these filings resulted from the
non-accidental release of product attributed to defective or improperly
secured valves and/or associated fittings and not a breach of the tank.
The HMR requirements for the design and material of construction for
the DOT-113, as well as existing operational controls and handling
requirements for the tank car, have contributed significantly to the
strong safety history of the DOT-113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\35\ The AAR204W is also authorized for the transportation of
non-flammable cryogenic materials and has a similar design to a DOT-
113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA disagrees with the suggestion that the Exponent Report in
support of the DOT-SP 20534 is irrelevant to the discussion. That study
conducted a quantitative risk assessment addressing unit train movement
of LNG in DOT-113 tank cars. The study creates multiple models that
estimate the potential damage of an LNG incident. Specifically,
transport releases were evaluated along 1-mile long segments with
varying population densities. While commenters have claimed that the
study does not have a large enough sample size, PHMSA notes that the
study used all the available data on DOT-113 incidents. The reason for
that perceived lack of data is that DOT-113 tank cars have not been
involved in many incidents during the timeframe that DOT-113s have been
in use. Given that the study uses all the available data on DOT-113
incidents, PHMSA believes that the study's findings are useful in
informing this final rule.
After internal review and in consideration of certain substantive
comments received to the NPRM, PHMSA is further enhancing the safety of
these tank cars to be equipped with a 9/16th inch thick outer tank and
constructed from TC-128 Grade B Normalized steel. This represents a 28%
increase in outer tank thickness over the current minimum requirements
for a DOT-113C120W tank car in use for other flammable cryogenic
materials. PHMSA has concluded that this change will improve the
crashworthiness of the tank, thereby improving its effectiveness in
retaining LNG contents during a crash scenario. This conclusion is
supported by modeling conducted on the DOT-117 specification tank car
with a 9/16th inch thick shell and heads used in flammable liquid
service when compared with the previous DOT-111 tank cars with 7/16th
inch steel. See Section III. B. ``The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank
Car'' for further details on the tank car enhancements added in this
final rule.
3. High Nickel Steels for Inner Tanks
The Puyallup Tribe stated that PHMSA failed to provide a sufficient
factual basis to support its assertion that the materials used in the
fabrication of DOT-113 tank car inner tanks are appropriate for the
transportation of LNG. They noted that stationary LNG storage tanks use
high nickel steels and that the specifications for American Society of
Testing and Materials (ASTM) A240/240M 304, or 304L steels used in DOT-
113C120W tank cars provide for a range of nickel content that can
equal--but can also extend outside of--the range recommended for
stationary LNG tanks. Therefore, they commented that there is no
evidence that all steels meeting this specification will have the
performance specifications appropriate for storing LNG that is being
transported by rail. The Tribe further expressed their belief that
PHMSA has not adequately demonstrated why ASTM A240/240M 304, or 304L
steel will ensure safe transport of LNG in tank cars.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA disagrees with the Puyallup Tribe that there is no factual
basis for the existing requirements for ASTM A240/240M 304, or 304L
steels. The ASTM 300 series steels required in part 179 for DOT-113
tank cars have a long, successful history demonstrating the suitability
of this steel as the material of construction for the inner tank of
DOT-113 tank cars.
The 300-grade austenitic stainless steels (304/304L), commonly
referred to as ``18-8 grade'' stainless steels, are the only steels
authorized in the HMR for use when constructing the inner tank of a
DOT-113 tank car. As discussed in Section III. B. ``The DOT-113C120W
Specification Tank Car,'' ASTM A240/240M 304, or 304L steels have the
best balance of toughness, strength, and weldability for
transportation, along with being able to withstand extremely low
temperatures.
By contrast, ASTM A553 steel, also known as ``9% Nickel'' alloy
steel, has less ductility and requires special welding protocols. A553
steel can be used for static storage vessels which do not have to
withstand the dynamic stress conditions experienced by the tank car
during movement and the more frequent thermal cycles of loading and
unloading experienced by tank cars. In tank cars, the use of A553 steel
is not advisable, due to the physical properties of the steel. The HMR
have not approved it for use in tank cars, in part, due to problems
encountered with welded repairs.
Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA is maintaining the requirement
to construct the inner tank of a DOT-113 tank car from ASTM A240/240M
304, or 304L steels for the inner tank. Please see Section III. B.
``The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car'' for further discussion of
the properties of 304 and 304L steel and the material of construction
requirements for the inner tank of a DOT-113 tank car.

[[Page 45014]]

4. Maximum Permitted Filling Density
AAR, RSI-CTC, and Chart Inc. disagreed with the maximum filling
density proposed in the NPRM. Chart Inc. recommended that the filling
density be 38.1 percent for a safety relief valve set at 75 psig,
thereby corresponding to the 51.1 percent tabulated value for liquid
ethylene. Chart Inc. further noted that flammable cryogenic materials
in tank cars are required to have a 0.5 percent outage below the inlet
of the pressure relief or pressure control valve at the start-to-
discharge pressure setting of the valve, with the tank car in a level
attitude.
RSI-CTC commented that PHMSA did not provide an explanation as to
why it is imposing a maximum filling density that results in 15 percent
outage rather than the standard 0.5 percent outage identified in
existing regulations for other flammable cryogenic materials authorized
by rail tank car. They stated that limiting LNG to a maximum filling
density of 32.5 percent would require approximately 13 percent more
tank cars to move the same volume of commodity, noting that this could
increase the risk in transportation. Moreover, they stated that PHMSA's
proposed limit is inconsistent with Transport Canada's regulations,
which impose a 37.3 percent maximum filling density. To resolve this
issue, they recommended that PHMSA consider adopting a maximum filling
density of 37.3 percent, which they point out would harmonize the
United States and Canada, as well as reduce the overall safety risk by
reducing the total number of tank cars required.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA notes the concerns over the proposed filling density and the
potential inconsistencies related to the outage requirements for
flammable cryogenic materials. The filling density of 32.5% specified
in the NPRM was based on a 15% outage (vapor volume) at PRV start to
discharge pressure. The AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended
Practices, M-1004 ``Specifications for Fuel Tenders'' requires the LNG
filling of tenders used to fuel LNG powered locomotives with 15% vapor
volume. The operating demands on tenders combined with the need for
more vapor as a fuel and the expected refueling processes make the
filling density acceptable for use with fuel tenders. In contrast, tank
cars do not require these same considerations, and thus, the filling
density should be aligned with other bulk packagings.
After reviewing the comments provided to the NPRM and conducting
further technical analysis, PHMSA agrees that the proposed 32.5 percent
filling density unnecessarily limits the amount of LNG that can be
loaded into the tank car designed for commercial shipments and not
locomotive fueling. Calculations were performed through linear
regression analysis of authorized filling densities for cryogenic
material in cargo tanks (see Sec. 173.318). The equations derived
during that analysis were compared with filling density values
currently authorized for tank cars in Sec. 173.319 for ethylene and
hydrogen. The comparison between cargo tanks and tank cars filling
density values held true for ethylene and hydrogen, so the equation was
therefore used to derive the filling density for LNG in tank cars. This
filling density value was compared to the results of calculations
conducted by AAR, Transport Canada, and FRA. A filling density of 37.3%
by weight is consistent with these four (AAR, Transport Canada, FRA,
PHMSA) analyses.
Therefore, in this final rule PHMSA is adopting a 37.3 percent
maximum filling density for LNG, which will require approximately 2
percent outage below the inlet of the PRD at the start-to-discharge
pressure to prevent the venting of liquid material should the device
activate. This represents a greater level of safety than other
cryogenic packagings authorized in the HMR and internationally, which
only require a 0.5% outage requirement below the PRD inlet at the
start-to-discharge pressure. Additionally, a 37.3 percent maximum
filling density harmonizes with Transport Canada's TDG regulations.
Please see the Section III.B. ``The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank
Car'' discussion for additional discussion of filling density.
5. Maximum Pressure When Offered
RSI-CTC stated that the proposed offering pressure of 15 psig for
the Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting in Sec.
173.319(d)(2) is inconsistent with Transport Canada's requirements,
which impose a 10 psig maximum offering pressure, and departs from
AAR's practice of assuming a 10 psig maximum offering pressure to
determine the individual specification requirements for DOT-113C120W
tank cars. They also stated that while PHMSA appears to be relying on
Sec. 173.319(e)(1) for its determination that 15 psig is consistent
with the 20-day transportation requirement for cryogenic materials and
the estimated 3 psig per day maximum pressure increase during
transportation, current regulations for DOT-113 tank cars as set forth
in part 179, subpart F do not specify a time-in-transit limit for
cryogenic materials. Rather, RSI-CTC asserted that both DOT's
predecessor and the AAR have historically assumed a 30-day hold time in
developing the DOT-113C120W specification. Moreover, the commenter
noted that the average daily pressure rise limit of 3 psig per day, as
set forth in Sec. 179.319, is an operating specification for shippers
designed to trigger inspection of the tank vacuum to ensure thermal
integrity and should not be imposed as a design requirement to
calculate the maximum offering pressure.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA agrees that the HMR do not specify a time-in-transit limit.
However, PHMSA requires notification to FRA if a flammable cryogenic
material has not reached the consignee within 20 days. FRA closely
monitors any situation requiring notification of more than 20 days in
transit, and our experience is that rail carriers act to expedite
movement of the tank car to its destination or take swift corrective
action to reduce the pressure within the tank if necessary. Therefore,
PHMSA believes that the 15 psig maximum offering pressure is
appropriate for the transportation of LNG and is consistent with the
level of safety provided to other flammable cryogenic materials.
Further, the HMR do not prohibit shippers from offering a tank car of
LNG at a lower pressure. Please see Section III.B. ``The DOT-113C120W
Specification Tank Car'' and III.C. ``Additional Operational Controls
for LNG Transportation'' for additional discussion of offering pressure
and the operational controls for the movement of these tank cars.
6. Insulation
Chart Inc. noted in their comment that Mylar is a plastic material
that is incompatible with the potential for flammable gas in the
annular space. They further stated that common wrapped insulation used
in such tanks is often referred to as MultiLayer Insulation (MLI),
Super Insulation (SI), or MultiLayer Super Insulation, which consists
of alternating layers of aluminum foil and a non-conducting spacer
material. Chart Inc. further explained that fiberglass or Perlite
powder can be used as a potential alternative in place of or in
addition to the MLI or SI.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA agrees that use of the term Mylar in the preamble of the NPRM
was inconsistent with the current design and practice. The DOT-113
construction

[[Page 45015]]

design relies on a performance standard in Sec. 179.400-4 that does
not specify the use of Mylar or any other specific type of material to
be used for insulation. In the NPRM, PHMSA inadvertently represented
``Mylar'' as a specification requirement for MLI or SI use on a DOT-
113, when in fact, it is not. Please see our discussion of the
insulation system and thermal performance monitoring program in Section
III of this final rule for more information on DOT-113 insulation
requirements.
7. Maximum Gross Rail Weight
RSI-CTC and AAR commented on the existing allowable gross weight of
rail tank cars. They stated the FRA provided notice in the Federal
Register of approval of the operation of certain tank cars in hazardous
materials service up to 286,000 pounds GRL, further noting that this
approval does not address cryogenic tank cars.\36\ Specifically, RSI-
CTC recommended adding language in Sec. 179.13 that would authorize a
GRL limitation of up to 286,000 pounds, thereby removing the need for
FRA approval and allowing for heavier inner or outer tanks. They
further stated that authorizing cryogenic tank cars to operate with
286,000 pounds GRL would not increase the volume of commodity
transported (which would still be limited to 34,500 gallons) and would
enable manufacturers to increase the weight of the tank car by building
it with a thicker outer shell, which would enhance the overall safety
of these tank cars in cryogenic service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\36\ Notice regarding FRA approval for operating certain
railroad tank cars in excess of 263,000 pounds gross rail load.
January 25, 2011; 76 FR 4350.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA Response
PHMSA acknowledges that the thicker outer tank, as required in this
rulemaking, will have a net impact of increasing the overall weight of
a loaded DOT-113C120W9 tank car. The added tank thickness is expected
to increase the overall weight of the tank car by approximately 11,050
pounds. See the Table 6 below for a comparison of the DOT-113C120W and
DOT-113C120W9 tank car weights. PHMSA estimates the light (empty)
weight of a DOT-113 tank car for LNG to be approximately 138,050 pounds
and the estimated weight of allowable LNG that can be loaded into the
car at roughly 108,000 pounds. This equates to a maximum gross weight
on rail of only 246,050 pounds. However, the request to remove the
approval requirement for tank cars greater than 263,000 pounds GRL is
beyond the scope of this rulemaking, as it is not specific to LNG and
would therefore impact all cryogenic materials transported by tank car.
Additionally, while 2011 FRA Notice does not specifically mention
cryogenic tank cars, PHMSA and FRA reiterate that the broad language in
the FRA's January 2011 approval clearly contemplates application to
cryogenic tank cars. Therefore, a DOT-113 tank car manufactured for LNG
service after (the effective date of this final rule) is approved for a
maximum GRL of 286,000 provided the tank car meets the following
criteria:
1. Tank car is constructed in accordance with S-286.
2. The outer shell and heads are constructed with TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel.
Please see our discussion of maximum GRL in Section III.B. ``The
DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car'' of this final rule for additional
details. PHMSA is adding a new section, Sec. 179.400-26, to the DOT-
113 specification requirements to indicate clearly that DOT-113C120W9
tank cars exceeding 263,000 lbs. gross weight are (in light of FRA's
January 2011 approval) approved by FRA for a maximum gross weight of
286,000 provided they meet the two conditions above.
The following table provides a comparison of the approximate weight
of a DOT113C120W tank car with an outer tank shell thickness of \7/16\
(i.e., the current standard) vs. \9/16\ (i.e., the standard adopted in
this final rule) is provided in the following table. Note that
stiffening ring weight changes with outer tank thickness. In this
comparison, a thicker outer tank corresponds to less stiffening ring
weight.

Table 6--Gross Rail Weight Calculation
[Approximate weights for a DOT113C120W Tank Car]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Outer Shell Thickness........... \7/16\''.......... \9/16\''.
Inner Tank Thickness............ \3/8\''........... \3/8\''.
Combined Tank Weight............ 98,250 lbs........ 109,500 lbs.
Stiffening Ring Weight.......... 1,750 lbs......... 1,550 lbs.
Fittings/Piping/Housing......... 3,800 lbs......... 3,800 lbs.
Running Gear.................... 23,200 lbs........ 23,200 lbs.
Estimated Light Weight.......... 127,000 lbs....... 138,050 lbs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. DOT-113C140W Tank Car Specification
Consistent with its prior petition, AAR reiterated its suggestion
that PHMSA adopt the DOT-113C140W tank car standard. However, AAR noted
that PHMSA may require more time to evaluate the new tank car
specification, as it is not currently authorized by the HMR. Therefore,
AAR suggested that PHMSA proceed with authorizing the DOT-113C120W tank
car for LNG service at this time and consider authorizing the DOT-
113C140W tank car in a future rulemaking.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA agrees that it would take additional time and resources to
create and evaluate a new specification (e.g., the DOT-113C140W) not
authorized under the current HMR. Furthermore, PHMSA believes the
addition of this tank car specification warrants further engineering
review and evaluation, including consideration of safety risks
presented by the new design specification. Increased thickness and
improved outer tank materials, as required in this final rule, require
minimal engineering effort; and insofar as PHMSA regulations establish
minimum thickness requirements for DOT-113 cars, those regulations have
always permitted outer tanks of varying thickness above those lower
limits.
In contrast, a new inner tank design with a higher test pressure of
140 psig requires significant engineering effort that is beyond the
scope of this rulemaking. An inner tank designed to withstand a test
pressure of 140 psig has a thicker wall, and has different pressure
relief features that would need to be tested extensively prior to
authorization for use in transportation. The designs for the new inner
tank, the 140 psig pressure relief system, and the new design's thermal
performance would each need to be validated. The inner tank, along with
the thermal protection provided by the annular space, is the most
safety critical component to retaining the contents of the car during
normal conditions incident to transportation. The outer tank, on the
other hand, shields the inner tank from physical damage, exposure to
the elements, and in-train forces, while providing structural support
to the packaging. Unlike a change to the inner tank, the enhancements
to the outer tank denoted by the new specification suffix would not
require the extensive additional engineering review because PHMSA and
FRA have access to testing and modeling data that demonstrate the

[[Page 45016]]

crashworthiness improvements from a thicker 9/16th inch outer tank.
9. PHMSA Determination Regarding Tank Car Design
In summary, PHMSA acknowledges the comments received addressing the
appropriateness of the DOT-113C120W tank car for LNG transportation. As
discussed in this section, and in Section III, PHMSA has concluded that
the DOT-113C120W tank car is an appropriate packaging for LNG
transportation.
The existing structure of the HMR--to include requirements for
packaging design--provides for the safe transportation of all hazardous
materials. The DOT-113C120W9 tank car is a variation of the DOT-113
specification currently authorized in the HMR for use as a packaging
for cryogenic material, including flammable cryogenic material like
LNG. The ``C'' delimiter for this type of tank car indicates a
temperature rating for service that is suitable for LNG. Furthermore,
the existing HMR include requirements for components specific to
flammable cryogenic material services, such as PRDs and thermal
insulation systems.
PHMSA believes that transportation of LNG by DOT-113C120W-
specification rail tank car as proposed in the NPRM would be safe if
LNG was transported in similar quantities to what is currently done for
ethylene. Currently, because of market demand and usage patterns for
ethylene, DOT-113 tank cars are transported as part of mixed commodity
freight trains at one to three cars per train. However, when
transported in larger fleets--in blocks of cars larger than three or in
unit trains--there is a higher probability that cars containing this
material will be involved in a derailment when a derailment or other
accident occurs, leaving the potential for more hazardous material to
be released during an incident. While PHMSA cannot predict the number
of DOT-113C120W9 tank cars per train the LNG market will support, the
agency does have relevant information from ETS's application for DOT SP
20534, which indicates the company plans to operate unit trains of at
least 80 cars per train at some point in the future. Therefore, even
though the current outer tank specifications of existing DOT-113s are
appropriate for the physical properties of LNG, the potential increased
risk involved in transporting LNG in blocks of more than three or in
unit trains warrants the additional safety margin that is currently
available from the tank car manufacturing industry. As a result, PHMSA
is amending the DOT-113 specification to require tank cars with a
minimum outer tank thickness of 9/16th inch constructed from TC-128
Grade B, normalized steel (those enhancements to be indicated by the
specification suffix ``9''). PHMSA believes that this change will
further enhance the safety of the DOT-113 tank car by significantly
increasing its crashworthiness.

B. Operational Controls

PHMSA did not propose supplemental operational controls in the NPRM
beyond the existing requirements in the HMR, but did invite comment on
whether PHMSA and FRA should rely on existing regulations and the
operational controls in AAR's Circular OT-55, or if additional
operational controls may be warranted based on an assessment of risk.
PHMSA encouraged commenters to provide data on the safety or economic
impacts associated with any proposed operational controls, including
analysis of the safety justification or cost impact of implementing
operational controls. Further, PHMSA invited comment on the operational
controls included in the special permit described above, due to the
overlapping content contained in the NPRM.
Numerous commenters expressed concern about the possible
operational controls associated with the transportation of LNG by rail.
For example, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF)
suggested that PHMSA conduct a more expansive safety assessment of the
DOT-113 rail car before making the decision to forgo additional
operational controls. In the responses below, PHMSA has sorted these
comments into the following subtopics: Braking and Routing
Requirements, Maximum Train Length and Weight, Speed Restrictions and
AAR Circular OT-55, and Separation Distance. Please also see Section
III.C. ``Additional Operational Controls for LNG Transportation'' for
more discussion.
1. Braking and Routing Requirements
NTSB, the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD), New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), Members of the
New Jersey Senate and Assembly, NYDOT, NYDEC, NYDHSES, IAFF, and others
commented that PHMSA should require braking and routing requirements
for trains carrying LNG. NTSB specifically commented that PHMSA should
require that trains be ``equipped and operated with either
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes, a two-way end-of-
train (EOT) device as defined in 49 CFR 232.5, or a distributed power
(DP) system as defined in 49 CFR 229.5.''
Conversely, AAR commented that there is no justification for
braking and routing requirements for trains carrying LNG shipments to
be as restrictive as the requirements for HHFTs. AAR noted that if
PHMSA were to apply braking and routing requirements similar to those
imposed on HHFTs to trains carrying LNG, the requirements should only
apply to a train transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of LNG in a
continuous block, or to a train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of
LNG throughout the train.
PSR and the Surfrider Foundation expressed concern that the
possibility of a terrorist attack has not been properly considered when
looking at the security measures for LNG by rail. They further stated
that the urban routing of LNG unit trains would make them highly
vulnerable to attack by terrorists and that the predictability and
visibility of commercial rail traffic through urban settings would make
targeting easy and devastating. The Governor of Washington State, on
behalf of Washington State, also expressed concern that the NPRM did
not address the risk of terrorist attacks.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA agrees that requiring enhanced braking is necessary for
trains meeting an LNG analog of the HHFT threshold (i.e., 20 continuous
tank cars of LNG or 35 tank cars of LNG throughout the train). PHMSA
and FRA determined that this threshold best captures the higher-risk
bulk quantities transported in unit trains, while excluding lower-risk
manifest trains. PHMSA and FRA have concluded that the HHFT threshold
is suitable for the transportation of LNG because these materials have
similar risk profiles when transported in such configurations. If a
tank car containing LNG is breached during a derailment, the LNG will
behave largely the same way as crude oil or ethanol. The LNG lading
will be released as a very cold liquid, creating an LNG pool and likely
a fire.
The effective use of braking on a train can result in accident
avoidance and can lessen the consequences of an accident by diminishing
in-train forces. This can reduce the likelihood of a tank car being
punctured and decrease the likelihood of a derailment. PHMSA believes
that requiring enhanced braking for these train configurations provides
a cost-effective way to reduce the number of cars and the energy
associated with train accidents.

[[Page 45017]]

In consideration of the comments received, consistent with comments
from NTSB and others, PHMSA is adding a requirement that for a single
train with 20 or more loaded tank cars of LNG in a continuous block or
a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of LNG throughout
the train, each carrier must ensure that the train is equipped and
operated with either an EOT device, as defined in 49 CFR 232.5, or a DP
system, as defined in 49 CFR 229.5.
Some public commenters, including Earthjustice, noted that PHMSA
did not propose a requirement that trains transporting LNG be equipped
with ECP brakes, which they suggest would provide an extra measure of
safety. PHMSA and FRA did consider adopting ECP brake requirements in
this final rule but ultimately determined that such a braking
requirement would not be practical.
Freight railroads in the U.S. overwhelmingly rely on conventional
air brakes to comply with FRA regulations for stopping a train.\37\
This conventional air brake system has been in use since 1869 and has
proven to be reliable and effective. Conventional air brakes use air
pressure to apply and release the brakes on each car in a train. When
air pressure is reduced in a braking application, the air brakes will
apply sequentially from the front to the back of the train. ECP brake
systems are an alternative braking technology that integrate electronic
and pneumatic communications hardware into one package to allow for
nearly instantaneous responses to locomotive braking commands
throughout an entire train. While some types of ECP brake systems
overlay the air brake system, the integrative functions of ECP brakes
essentially require the entire train be equipped with operable ECP
brakes if the system is to be effective. Except in very rare
circumstances where the railroads are capable of keeping and
maintaining captive unit train fleets, railroads in the U.S. have not
implemented ECP brake systems into their operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\37\ 49 CFR part 232.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA previously considered and adopted ECP brake requirements for
a limited subset of HHFTs in its final rule on ``Enhanced Tank Car
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,''
(HM-251; 80 FR 26643, May 8, 2015), based on the potential benefits of
those trains' being operated effectively as a captive fleet. However, a
subsequent re-evaluation of the HM-251 ECP brake requirements found
that even the ``captive'' unit train configurations operating with ECP
brakes are not cost-beneficial in the HHFT environment. (HM-251F; 83 FR
48393; Sep. 25, 2018). As a result, PHMSA removed requirements
pertaining to ECP brake systems on high-hazard flammable unit
trains.\38\ PHMSA relies on the analysis in HM-251F to inform its
decision in this final rule to not require ECP brakes on trains
transporting LNG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\38\ The HM-251 final rule defined a ``high-hazard flammable
unit train'' (HHFUT) as a train comprised of 70 or more loaded tank
cars containing Class 3 flammable liquids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While PHMSA is not implementing ECP brake requirements, both
agencies recognize the importance of advanced braking for trains
transporting large quantities of LNG. As result, PHMSA is requiring
advanced braking in the form of a two-way EOT device or linked and
operational DP system located at the rear of the train. The two-way EOT
device or DP system at that rear of the train is more effective than
conventional brakes because the rear cars can receive the emergency
brake command more quickly, which allows the back of the train to start
braking quicker than if the train was only equipped with conventional
air brakes. This can reduce stopping distances and lessen in-train
forces that can cause or contribute to the severity of certain
derailments.
The action taken by PHMSA in this final rule, requiring the use of
a two-way EOT device or DP unit at the end of the train for a single
train with 20 or more loaded tank cars of LNG in a continuous block or
a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of LNG throughout
the train, is consistent with the comments of NTSB, Members of the New
Jersey Senate and Assembly, and the Attorneys General for various
States. It matches the current requirements for HHFTs, which apply to
Class 3 flammable liquids that are transported in a single block of
twenty cars or 35 cars dispersed throughout a single train. Given the
comments received and the similarity in risk profiles with HHFTs, PHMSA
and FRA have determined that the requirement for a two-way EOT device
or a DP system in the rear of the train is an acceptable safety
measure.
Regarding rail routing requirements, PHMSA agrees that requiring
additional planning and route analysis will provide safety benefits to
the transportation of LNG by rail. The routing requirement will reduce
the severity of the consequences of a derailment by requiring that
railroads transport LNG on the safest route available to them.
Accordingly, PHMSA is amending Sec. 172.820 to require that a
train carrying LNG in a rail tank car be subject to the additional
planning requirements of that section. This change will require rail
carriers to compile annual data on shipments of LNG and use the data to
analyze safety and security risks along rail routes where LNG is
transported, assess alternative routing options, and make routing
decision based on those assessments.
Regarding the risk of terrorism, 49 CFR part 172, subpart I--Safety
and Security Plans, prescribes security requirements for shippers and
carriers while a hazardous material is in transportation. Flammables
(e.g., LNG) transported in large bulk quantities (i.e., 3,000 liters
[792 gallons]) in a single packaging such as a tank car are subject to
requirements for development and implementation of plans to address
security risks, including preventing unauthorized access to the
material, providing for en route security, and personnel security.
PHMSA believes these existing requirements adequately address the
security risks associated with the transportation of LNG by rail.
Please see additional discussion of existing security planning and rail
routing requirements in Section III. A. ``Existing HMR Requirements for
Rail Transport of Flammable Cryogenic Material.''
2. Maximum Train Length/Weight
Some commenters suggested limiting the number of LNG tank cars in a
train; however, no commenters provided specific recommendations on what
would constitute the preferred maximum number of cars. The National
Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) noted that although 19 cars
of LNG would not trigger the ``Key Train'' requirements, it would be a
large enough quantity to present a significant hazard.
AAR noted that research \39\ on the safety impact of operating so-
called ``long'' trains suggests that there is no increased risk of
derailment, further commenting that the use of fewer, longer trains may
reduce derailment rates. AAR further stated that PHMSA should not
create a limit on train length within the context of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\39\ See footnote 9, page 3--https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2018-0025-0209.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Others expressed concern that these tank cars could damage and
degrade train tracks, leading to potential future derailments.
Additionally, a few commenters noted that PHMSA and FRA should assess
and fix damaged

[[Page 45018]]

railroad tracks prior to making any determination on whether it is safe
to transport LNG by rail.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA appreciates comments regarding potential limitation of
maximum weight and length for trains containing LNG. PHMSA has
determined that there should not be a maximum for either in this
rulemaking. PHMSA notes that the HMR do not limit the number of
shipments a shipper can offer into transportation, and do not restrict
the number or type of hazardous materials rail cars a carrier can
transport in a train. PHMSA and FRA believe that train length is best
determined by individual railroads. The function of determining an
individual railroad's appropriate train operating lengths is based on
multiple factors. The railroads are best positioned to determine the
appropriate train lengths and weight based on multiple factors
including, but not limited to, the following: Route characteristics,
train make-up, train dynamics, and crew training and experience.
Furthermore, FRA notes that damage and degradation to railroad tracks
due to the transport of DOT-113C120W9 tank cars is unlikely. All routes
used to transport hazardous materials have rail infrastructure to
handle trains with rail cars with a GRL of 286,000 pounds. Railroads
execute a track and rail integrity inspection program that exceed the
minimum Federal requirements. In addition, they are implementing
technology that enables the inspection of more miles of track per day
and identifies defects with greater reliability.
3. Speed Restrictions/AAR Circular OT-55
PHMSA received several comments recommending stricter regulations
regarding the transport of LNG by rail, including speed restrictions
and other operational controls. Numerous commenters, such as NTSB,
NASFM, Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Congressman DeFazio, and the
Attorneys General for various States, expressed concern that PHMSA did
not propose additional safety regulations for the transport of LNG by
rail in the NPRM. NASFM noted that, regardless of current industry
practice, the AAR Circular OT-55 is ``recommended,'' rather than
mandated by regulation. Earthjustice commented that OT-55 is
insufficient to keep LNG safe, stating that there is a lack of
transparency on its use. They further noted that without further
analysis, PHMSA cannot confirm railroads are following OT-55. They also
claimed that even if HHFT-style operational controls were put in place,
the material is still too dangerous and liable to spill in the event of
a derailment and potentially cause a BLEVE or vapor cloud explosion
(VCE).
Several commenters, including NTSB, recommended that PHMSA
implement operational controls similar to the protections currently in
place for HHFTs, as provided in Sec. 174.310.
A few commenters, including AAR and RSI-CTC, noted that they agree
with PHMSA's determination that AAR's Circular OT-55 provides a
``detailed protocol establishing recommended railroad operational
practices'' for transporting hazardous materials. One commenter further
noted that they do not support incorporation of Circular OT-55 by
reference because it would disincentivize the development of industry
standards that are more rigorous than the Federal requirement. NYDOT,
NYDEC, and NYDHSES commented that they would like to see the AAR
Circular OT-55 incorporated into the HMR and the HHFT requirements
applied to trains carrying LNG.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA notes that AAR's Circular OT-55 is a detailed protocol
establishing railroad operating practices for the transportation of
hazardous materials, including speed restrictions, which was developed
by the rail industry through the AAR.\40\ The recommended practices
were originally implemented by all Class I rail carriers operating in
the United States, with short-line railroads following on as
signatories. Also, since Circular OT-55 is an industry practice, new
safety procedures can be adopted efficiently and implemented
nationally. The industry voluntary approach allows for greater
flexibility to stay abreast of fast-changing technology and changes in
the market, and facilitates safety by leveraging industry incorporation
of OT-55 into their operating rules and cooperation with regulators
versus an adversarial enforcement relationship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\40\ Circular OT-55, ``Recommended Railroad Operating Practices
for Transportation of Hazardous Materials,'' https://www.railinc.com/rportal/documents/18/260773/OT-55.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thus, PHMSA believes the operational control recommendations in AAR
Circular OT-55 address safety concerns related to train movements of
hazardous materials comprehensively, including train speed restrictions
in Key Train configuration. OT-55 limits Key Train speed to 50 mph.
PHMSA and FRA believe that this maximum speed limit is appropriate for
the transportation of LNG based on its similarity to other Division 2.1
flammables, including cryogenic materials, that are allowed to be
transported at a maximum speed of 50 mph, and based on the DOT
Specification 113 standards. Additionally, AAR's Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices (MSRP) establishes rail equipment standards,
including equipment speed restrictions, that limits tank cars
(including DOT-113 tank cars) to an operating speed of 50 MPH. This
speed restriction is independent of whether they are aggregated into a
Key Train configuration or not.
Further, PHMSA and FRA have verified that railroads are
implementing and following Circular OT-55 through their operating
rules. PHMSA and FRA believe this industry standard reduces the risk of
derailments and collisions and therefore decreases the risk involved in
the transportation of all hazardous materials, including LNG. Please
see Section III.C. ``Additional Operational Controls for LNG
Transportation'' for a full discussion of the benefits of OT-55.
4. Separation Distance
Commenters, including NTSB and the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), noted that the transportation of LNG
would also increase the safety risk for train crews. The NTSB
referenced two safety recommendations issued to PHMSA in response to
the December 30, 2013, collision of two Burlington Northern Santa Fe
(BNSF) freight trains in Casselton, North Dakota (R-17-1 and -2) that
resulted in the derailment of 20 tank cars loaded with crude oil and
the release of 476,000 gallons. The safety recommendations reference
risks posed to train crews and the separation distance and
configuration of hazardous materials cars, locomotives, and occupied
equipment to ensure the protection of train crews during both normal
operations and accident conditions. In the comment to the NPRM, the
NTSB urged PHMSA to implement appropriate train crew separation
distance requirements, as recommended by Safety Recommendations R-17-1
and -2, issued March 9, 2017. Specifically, the Safety Recommendations
are:

R-17-01
Evaluate the risks posed to train crews by hazardous materials
transported by rail, determine the adequate separation distance
between hazardous materials cars and locomotives and occupied
equipment that ensures the protection of train crews during both
normal operations and accident

[[Page 45019]]

conditions, and collaborate with the Federal Railroad Administration
to revise 49 Code of Federal Regulations 174.85 to reflect those
findings.
R-17-02
Pending completion of the risk evaluation and action in
accordance with its findings prescribed in Safety Recommendation R-
17-01, withdraw regulatory interpretation 06-0278 that pertains to
49 Code of Federal Regulations 174.85 for positioning placarded rail
cars in a train and require that all trains have a minimum of five
nonplacarded cars between any locomotive or occupied equipment and
the nearest placarded car transporting hazardous materials,
regardless of train length and consist.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\41\ ``Consist'' means the group of rail cars that make up the
train.

AAR commented that there should not be additional buffer car
requirements for trains transporting LNG or any other hazardous
material. They further noted that it is not justified from a safety and
risk standpoint.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA has initiated a research project in coordination with the
Volpe Center to address NTSB Safety Recommendations R-17-1 and -2. This
effort will result in a report that identifies gaps in the existing
studies, areas for further research, and what conclusions can be drawn
collectively from the existing knowledge base, if any. PHMSA may
consider changes to the separation distance requirements in Sec.
174.85 of the HMR for placarded rail cars and tank cars in mixed
commodity freight train and unit train configurations pending the
outcome of the study. However, PHMSA is not amending the separation
distance requirement in this final rule at this time. See Section
III.C. ``Additional Operational Controls for LNG Transportation'' for
further discussion of operational controls include consideration of
separation distances.
PHMSA and FRA collaborated under the scope of the Rail Safety
Advisory Committee Hazardous Materials Issues Working Group Task No.
15-04 to address the issue of separation distance. Ultimately, due to
an absence of consensus of the Working Group participants, as well as a
lack of established incident data, the members did not reach agreement
on a change to the existing regulation governing hazardous materials in
train separation distances. Moreover, PHMSA worked with the Volpe
Center in its review of rail accidents occurring between 2006 and 2015
where there was a release of hazardous materials near the head end of
the train (occupied locomotive). The study found no reported crew
injuries and therefore no injuries that were potentially preventable
with additional buffer cars.
5. PHMSA Determination Regarding Operational Controls
The existing structure of the HMR--to include requirements for
operational controls--provides for the safe transportation of all
hazardous materials. In the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA considered additional
operational controls specific to LNG, such as mirroring the operational
controls adopted for HHFTs,\42\ adopting OT-55 or ``Key Train''
requirements into the HMR, limiting train length, or requiring controls
for train composition, speed, braking, and routing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\42\ As defined in Sec. 171.8, a high-hazard flammable train
means a single train transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of a
Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a single train
carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid
throughout the train consist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA acknowledges the concerns about relying on a widely adopted,
voluntary industry standard, rather than imposing regulatory
requirements. After internal review and in consideration of certain
substantive comments, PHMSA is requiring a two-way EOT device or DP on
the rear of any train consisting of 20 or more loaded tank cars of LNG
in a continuous block or 35 or more loaded tank cars of LNG throughout
the train. Further, PHMSA is requiring that each rail car of LNG must
be remotely monitored for pressure and location. Finally, trains
consisting of an LNG tank car are subject to route planning and routing
analysis requirement. PHMSA believes these operational controls, in
conjunction with what is already required under the HMR and the ``Key
Train'' requirements in Circular OT-55, will ensure the safe
transportation of LNG. PHMSA and FRA have verified that railroads are
following and implementing Circular OT-55 through incorporation into
their operating rules. PHMSA does not believe that explicit speed
restrictions are necessary given the widespread adoption of Circular
OT-55. PHMSA and FRA expect that Circular OT-55 will be evaluated by
the rail industry regularly and that additional operational safety
measures beyond the minimum requirements of the HMR will be included to
address operational concerns, as appropriate. FRA actively works with
AAR's Hazardous Materials Committee, which is responsible for reviewing
and updating of OT-55. The Committee reviews OT-55 annually and
determines if an update is warranted. If a change to OT-55 is needed,
the Committee will update the document accordingly and will published
it as an AAR Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC).

C. Environmental Impacts

PHMSA received many comments recommending further analysis of the
environmental impacts associated with this rulemaking. Please refer to
the Final Environmental Assessment for discussion and response to
comments.

D. Economic Analysis

PHMSA received several comments related to the economic analysis of
the rulemaking. Please refer to the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) for discussion and response to comments.

E. Emergency Response

Several commenters expressed concern about the perceived emergency
response ramifications associated with the transportation of LNG by
rail tank car. PHMSA has sorted these into the following subtopics:
Training for Emergency Responders, Current Emergency Planning,
Evacuation Distances, and Modeling Availability.
1. Training for Emergency Responders
Several commenters are concerned that emergency responders lack the
training and expertise to respond to an LNG tank car incident,
especially in unit train configurations. They commented that the
current emergency response requirements may be insufficient to address
an incident involving LNG, including the potential for a BLEVE in
accident conditions. The Center requested proper training and
notification of local responders to the presence of LNG trains. NYDOT,
NYDEC, NJDEP, and NYDHSES suggested that PHMSA provide specific
training, resources, and support to emergency response personnel,
including cooperation with State fire training agencies to ensure
training is consistent, effective, and readily available as a
requirement in the final rule, similar to the special permit. NFPA
cited previous comments they have submitted to regulatory actions
regarding emergency response resources. Specifically, NFPA stated that
adding a flammable cryogenic material, like LNG, to the existing HHFT
rail shipments posed further challenges to the capabilities and
resources for local responders. IAFC recommended that PHMSA work with
shippers and carriers to develop and deliver critical product,
container and emergency response information, and related training
materials for the emergency planning and response communities.
Furthermore, the Governor of Washington State, on behalf of

[[Page 45020]]

Washington State, contended that the NPRM did not address crew training
and emergency response.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA agrees that proper training and information sharing are
necessary ingredients in promoting a safety transportation system and
is committed to ensuring emergency responders have the information and
tools they need to respond to hazardous materials incidents safely.
First, PHMSA notes that Class I railroads typically provide and sponsor
training for emergency responders along their routes. Additionally,
while large-scale LNG incident response training is available through
various organizations,\43\ the currently available training is not
specific to rail transportation, and PHMSA and FRA are working jointly
with relevant industry experts to ensure the availability of
appropriate training resources for emergency responders that include
rail-specific information. For example, FRA has already provided grant
funding to TRANSCAER[supreg] to develop and refine LNG by rail
emergency response training.\44\ Additionally, PHMSA is developing a
Commodity Preparedness and Incident Management Reference Sheet similar
to that which was created for crude oil transportation. This reference
sheet will provide emergency response organizations with a standard
incident management framework based on pre-incident planning,
preparedness principles, and best practices. Furthermore, it will
address transportation safety and precautions; hazard assessment and
risk; rail safety procedures; logistics; and the tools, equipment, and
resources necessary to prepare for and respond to incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\43\ For example, the following organizations provide LNG
response training: Texas A&M Extension Service (https://teex.org/program/lng-emergency-response/) and Northeast Gas Association
(https://www.northeastgas.org/tql-lng-safety.php).
\44\ See https://www.transcaer.com/training/online-training-courses/seconds-count-are-you-prepared for additional information on
TRANSCAER[supreg].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA required in DOT-SP 20534 that the grantee provide training,
conforming to NFPA 472, to emergency response agencies that could be
affected between the authorized origin and destination. However, due to
the ongoing efforts to ensure adequate emergency response training
described above, such a requirement is not necessary in this final
rule.
PHMSA is also engaged in outreach activities to educate and gain
input from emergency responders directly. In October 2019, PHMSA and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Fire Academy
(NFA) held a Town Hall Meeting in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.\45\
The purpose of the Town Hall Meeting was to seek input from and note
concerns of the emergency preparedness community and its stakeholders
in the mid-Atlantic region--specifically, Pennsylvania and New Jersey,
related to LNG transportation. The meeting consisted of a series of
technical presentations on LNG transportation risks and incident
response protocols. Then, attendees participated in open discussions
related to the topic of general rail transportation of LNG. While
attendees provided general inputs on issues related to improving the
overall effective response capability in the event of a rail incident
of LNG, there was no heightened concern regarding the commodity or mode
of transportation. PHMSA found that the emergency responders in
attendance were well oriented to the challenges of LNG incident
response, as they already have LNG transiting through their communities
in other modes of transportation and have improved and adjusted their
plans to include LNG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\45\ See the LNG by Rail Transport Town Hall Meeting Report, at:
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2019-0100-3005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA is committed to furthering engagement with emergency
responders throughout the country regarding the transportation of LNG
by rail through various forms of outreach, to include additional Town
Hall Meetings, participation at the annual IAFC conference, trainings,
and webinars.
2. Current Emergency Planning
Numerous commenters, to include The Village of Barrington,
Illinois, expressed concern for the safety of emergency responders.
Several individuals stated their belief that current emergency response
plans may be insufficient to address a rail incident involving LNG,
further noting that an LNG train derailment could cause severe damage
to the surrounding area and that first responders would be unable to
control any type of fire or explosions. Additionally, some commenters
expressed specific concern that there is no way to extinguish an LNG
fire, with the only option to let the fire burn out.
Additionally, the NJDEP requested that emergency response plans be
in place to prepare local responders better. They also requested that
the emergency response plans include the route and an alternative route
analysis, developed with the State and local emergency responders
impacted, identifying all sensitive receptors within the 1-mile buffer
of the route and any alternative routes, with plans on how to protect
public health and safety and the environment. They stated that this
information should be shared with the States, providing an opportunity
for States to comment on routes and planning.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA directs grant programs that are designed to improve hazardous
materials safety. For example, the HMEP grants to States, Territories
and Native American tribes enhance their emergency response
capabilities when dealing with hazardous materials related
transportation incidents. The grants, authorized under 49 U.S.C 5116,
assists each recipient in performing their hazardous materials response
duties and aid in the development, implementation, and improvement of
emergency plans for local communities and training for emergency
responders to help communities prepare for a potential hazardous
materials transportation incident. The hazmat safety grant programs
have helped to foster partnerships with State and local communities
through ensuring emergency responders are prepared and trained to
respond properly to hazmat transportation incidents nationwide. PHMSA
believes that these efforts will prepare emergency responders for the
risks regarding LNG transportation. PHMSA will continue to assess the
effectiveness of these programs and the preparedness of emergency
responders. As previously noted, FRA has provided grant funding to
TRANSCAER[supreg] to develop and refine LNG emergency response
training.
Finally, as discussed in Section III of this final rule, PHMSA is
revising Sec. 172.820(a) to add a condition requiring any rail carrier
transporting a quantity of LNG in a rail tank car to comply with the
additional safety and security planning requirements for transportation
by rail, which means the rail carrier is subject to collecting
commodity data, performing a route analysis, and determining
alternative routes. We are further revising the additional planning
requirements to add a new condition for rail carriers to factor in
transport of LNG to a routing analysis prior to the onset of transport
of any loaded tank car of LNG. Once transport of LNG begins for a
carrier, it can revert to the standard requirement to compile commodity
flow data no later than 90 days after the end of each calendar year and
use that data in analyzing the safety and security risks for the
transportation

[[Page 45021]]

route(s), and subsequently identifying alternative routes.
These actions will strengthen the emergency response planning
requirements and will assist in getting needed information to emergency
responders.
3. Evacuation Distances
Other commenters cited concerns over the feasibility of imposing
evacuation distances in an LNG accident. The IAFF commented that an LNG
tank car fire would require the evacuation of all people within a 1-
mile radius, stating that this would not be possible in most
jurisdictions across the United States. They stated that any fire
involving multiple LNG cars would place large numbers of the public at
risk while depleting many communities of their emergency response
resources. They further commented that consequences would be disastrous
unless responders receive extensive training specific to an LNG-by-rail
event. PSR commented that in the event of an LNG by rail fire and/or
explosion, PHMSA would be unable to adequately define the hazard zone
and the risk to nearby populations. PSR stated that first responders,
health professionals, planners, and concerned citizens would not know
the extent of the hazard zone or the nature and degree of risk it
poses. PSR further expressed that the dangers clearly call for greater
elaboration, including the response measures necessary to minimize harm
and protect human life.
Additionally, the City of Zion Fire and Rescue noted that the
Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) uses the same response guidance for
LNG and LPG. They stated that a 1-mile evacuation radius would be
inadequate for a large LNG fire and that it would not be feasible to
implement a larger evacuation distance. Finally, Earthjustice expressed
its belief that Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National Lab testing
noted that methane fires behave differently than other hydrocarbon
fires, and that LNG has a potential for a ``wider than anticipated
vapor cloud.''
PHMSA Response
PHMSA disagrees that the 1-mile evacuation distance is not possible
and further notes that LNG is currently authorized for transportation
by cargo tank and that the recommended 1-mile evacuation distance for
LNG tank car fires is consistent with response guidance for cargo tank
fires involving LNG. Furthermore, ERG recommends a 1-mile evacuation
distance for many hazardous materials; therefore, emergency responders
are familiar with this recommended distance, having used this guidance
for decades. Additionally, PHMSA updates the ERG regularly in
consultation with the response community and other experts, and adjusts
recommended protective action distances as part of this process.
PHMSA and FRA are aware of, and have extensively reviewed, the
available studies on LNG pool fires and evacuation distances.
Specifically, PHMSA has reviewed studies conducted by Sandia National
Laboratory \46\ for DOE, a study conducted by ABSG for FERC \47\ on the
hazard characteristics of LNG released over water, and a study on LNG
pool fires on land.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\46\ https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0933/ML093350855.pdf.
\47\ https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/cons-model/cons-model.pdf.
\48\ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327900878_Experimental_Study_of_LNG_Pool_Fire_on_Land_in_the_Field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The purpose of the ERG and the evacuation distances contained
therein is to assist responders in making initial decisions upon
arriving at the scene of a hazardous materials transport incident. The
ERG should not be considered as substitutes for emergency response
training, knowledge, experience, or sound judgment. The ERG also cannot
address all possible circumstances that may be associated with a
hazardous material release incident. Additionally, each guide page
within the ERG provides guidance for responding to incidents involving
multiple different but related hazardous materials. In the current 2016
edition of the ERG, LNG has been assigned to Guide 115, ``Gases--
Flammable (Including Refrigerated Liquids).'' Guide 115 provides
generalized response recommendations for over 100 different hazardous
materials. Therefore, this guide page should only be used until a
specific incident can be assessed and more appropriate response
measures implemented.
Based on PHMSA's review of available literature on the properties
of LNG releases, the current evacuation distances are appropriate.
Therefore, PHMSA will make no change to the current evacuation
distances for LNG.
4. Modeling Availability
The Delaware Riverkeeper Network expressed concern that there are
no publicly available modeling estimates by PHMSA or private
consultants on the downwind distances for an LNG by rail release and
how it can travel into trackside communities. They further commented
that there is a need for candid emergency event training materials for
rail workers and local emergency responders.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA notes that various software programs are available to model
the dispersion of gases, including LNG. Moreover, PHMSA sponsored a
study by the UK Health and Safety Laboratory to develop a Model
Evaluation Protocol that can be used to evaluate the suitability of
vapor dispersion models for predicting hazard ranges associated with
large spills of LNG.\49\ Finally, the ERG provides an initial
evacuation distance for flammable gases including LNG.\50\ Therefore,
PHMSA believes that there are sufficient tools available to the
emergency response community to ensure adequate modeling in the event
of an incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\49\ Evaluating vapor dispersion models for safety analysis of
LNG facilities. M.J. Ivings, SE Grant, S.F. Jagger, C.J. Lea, J.R.
Steward and D.M. Webber. (September 2016). https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/Hazardous-materials/RFLNGDispersionModelMEP.ashx.
\50\ See section ``III. E. 3, Evacuation Distances'' for further
discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. PHMSA Determination Regarding Emergency Response
The existing structure of the HMR--to include requirements for
security plans, emergency response information, and training--provides
for the safe transportation of all hazardous materials. Notably, 49 CFR
part 172, subpart G sets forth the applicability and requirements for
emergency response information which must be made immediately available
to emergency responders. The HMR currently require the following
information to accompany a shipment of LNG by rail:
(1) Immediate hazards to health;
(2) Risks of fire or explosion;
(3) Immediate precautions to be taken in the event of an accident
or incident;
(4) Immediate methods for handling fires;
(5) Initial methods for handling spills or leaks in the absence of
fire; and
(6) Preliminary first aid measures.
PHMSA believes that the current requirements for emergency response
information are appropriate for future movement of LNG by rail.
Additionally, PHMSA directs comprehensive grant programs that are
designed to improve hazardous materials safety. The hazmat safety grant
programs have helped to foster partnerships with local communities and
universities to provide resources for emergency preparedness and the
implementation of best

[[Page 45022]]

practices regarding hazardous materials safety nationwide.

F. Comments of General Opposition

PHMSA received hundreds of comments expressing general opposition
to the overall intent of the NPRM and the provisions proposed therein
to authorize the transportation of LNG in rail tank cars. Many of these
commenters voiced general concern about the public health, safety, and/
or environmental risks of trains carrying bulk quantities of LNG. There
was also opposition to the overall timeline of the rule, and PHMSA's
authority to issue it.
Specifically, Theresa Pugh Consulting LLC opposed the
transportation of LNG by rail in the lower 48 States, noting that
Alaska may be an exception because of extreme circumstances that might
require the need for LNG transportation by tank car. PSR and various
others expressed concern that LNG by rail would pose risks to people
living in proximity to rail lines, especially in densely populated
urban and suburban areas. PSR specifically stated that it views issuing
a national approval for LNG by rail as premature.
The Guardians of Martin County, Inc. and the Alliance for Safe
Trains both expressed concern over LNG trains sharing the same track as
passenger trains in Florida. The Guardians of Martin County, Inc. noted
the age of infrastructure and population density of the area these
trains would pass through. The Alliance for Safe Trains noted that a
high-speed rail project will be sharing tracks or riding on parallel
tracks to trains carrying LNG. Various commenters, including the
Surfrider Foundation, commented that the proposals in the NPRM are
extremely dangerous. The Surfrider Foundation stated that LNG is a
flammable, volatile, and hazardous material with numerous examples of
accidents and safety issues. The Surfrider Foundation further stated
that one government study put the hazard range for a vapor cloud at
more than 1.5 miles.
The Delaware Riverkeeper Network disagreed with the language in
AAR's petition suggesting that DOT and Transport Canada maintain
consistent requirements for LNG by rail. They stated that there is
insufficient justification to change the HMR because no rail cars of
LNG have been transported in Canada to date.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA notes that many of these comments did not contain sufficient
information or supporting rationale that could be assessed to determine
the provisions authorized in this rulemaking. PHMSA agrees with
commenters that the risks related to the transportation of LNG by rail
should be assessed and properly mitigated to ensure safety for the
public and the environment. As outlined above, PHMSA has assessed the
risks posed by the transportation of LNG by rail. PHMSA finds that the
design elements of the DOT-113C120W9 rail tank car, the operational
controls required in this final rule, combined with the existing HMR
requirements that would apply and the voluntary industry standards in
AAR Circular OT-55, will provide a safe transportation environment for
LNG by rail.
PHMSA acknowledges commenters' general opposition to the transport
of LNG on routes that bring this material into close proximity to the
public. To address this concern, PHMSA is applying the existing
additional planning requirements to the transport of LNG in rail tank
cars, which include routing analysis requirements, to factor the risk
of LNG transport in route planning. In this final rule, there is no
geographical limit to LNG train operations, making routing analysis
beneficial. This amendment will require railroads to evaluate safety
and security risk factors when assessing the potential routes to be
used to transport LNG. The 27 safety and security risk factors required
by the route risk assessment provide a robust framework for carrier
evaluation of the routes considered for use in LNG transportation.
Trains consisting of, and in some cases made up entirely of, rail
cars carrying hazardous materials are moved on the same rail lines as
passenger trains across the country. For densely-populated passenger
train corridors (e.g., Northeast Corridor and Florida's east coast)
railroads typically operate freight trains (with and without hazmat) at
night to maximize efficiency and fluidity (i.e., freight trains will
not slow down passenger trains, and freight trains will not be placed
in sidings to make way for passenger trains). On cross country routes
the passenger and freight trains meet with greater frequency. In both
cases, the passenger and, more likely, freight trains will be operating
under positive train control, which is specifically intended to prevent
collisions, or incidents resulting from misaligned switches, incursions
into work zones, and overspeed derailments.

G. Comments From the Puyallup Tribe

PHMSA received comments from the Puyallup Tribe of Tacoma,
Washington contending that the rulemaking would have potential direct
and disparate impacts on the Tribe and its members. The Puyallup Tribe
submitted that the rulemaking will result in rail transportation of LNG
crossing its reservation (located within the metropolitan area of
Tacoma, Washington) and adjacent areas when travelling to and from
Puget Sound Energy's planned Tacoma LNG facility. The Puyallup Tribe
asserted that rail traffic entails a number of hazards for the Tribe
and its members, including the following: Safety risks associated with
the release of LNG being transported by rail; degradation of air
quality in the area due to more diesel trains operating in the vicinity
of the reservation; an increase in rail traffic that would frustrate
quiet enjoyment of Tribal lands; and increased exposure to rising sea
levels from climate change.
At the Puyallup Tribe's request, PHMSA personnel held a meeting
with representatives of the Puyallup Tribe at PHMSA's headquarters in
Washington, DC on February 12, 2020. Attendees at the meeting discussed
the Puyallup Tribe's concerns regarding the Tacoma LNG facility, as
well as the Puyallup Tribe's written comments submitted in the docket
for this rulemaking. A summary of the February 12, 2020 meeting has
been posted to the docket. PHMSA contacted representatives of the
Puyallup Tribe and made itself available for additional meetings.
PHMSA Response
PHMSA submits that those of the Puyallup Tribe's concerns
predicated on potential rail transport of LNG to and from Puget Sound
Energy's Tacoma LNG facility are inapposite. The Tacoma LNG facility is
regulated by Washington State and not PHMSA. Further, it does not
appear that rail transportation of LNG to the Tacoma LNG facility is
currently permitted by the terms of that facility's State
authorization; rather, Condition 41 of the Puget Sound Air Agency
Authorizing Order specifies that the ``sole source of natural gas
supply used in all operations'' at the Tacoma LNG Facility will be from
Canada via pipeline.\51\ Nor does the Authorizing Order seem to
contemplate rail transportation of LNG from that facility; rather, LNG
transported from that facility will be transported by truck, or will be
converted to natural gas for supply to customers via Puget Sound

[[Page 45023]]

Energy's natural gas pipeline distribution system.\52\ Indeed,
schematics of the Tacoma LNG facility within the Puget Sound Air Agency
docket suggest that rail infrastructure neither exists nor is
contemplated at the site.\53\
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\51\ See Puget Sound Clean Air Agency, Order of Approval No.
11386 (Dec. 10, 2019) (Authorizing Order); Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement: Proposed Tacoma LNG Project at (Mar.
2019) (Tacoma LNG FSEIS). These and other documents in the Puget
Sound Clean Air Agency docket can be found at the following link:
https://pscleanair.gov/460/Current-Permitting-Projects.
\52\ See Tacoma LNG FSEIS at 1, 2-2, 2-4 to 2-5.
\53\ See Tacoma LNG FSEIS at Figures 1-1 and 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Comments Beyond the Scope of This Rulemaking

PHMSA also received miscellaneous comments opposing the bulk
transport of LNG by any mode of transportation (to include highway or
pipeline), as well as numerous comments pertaining to the ethical
ramifications of fossil fuel extraction and usage. Commenters
questioned the ethics of, and requested an end to, fracking, use of
fossil fuels, and the practice of transporting coal in open railcars
near waterways. Commenters also expressed concerns with LNG trains
sharing railways with high-speed trains, and high-speed trains having
at grade crossings citing safety concerns. These comments either did
not provide recommendations for regulatory action, exceeded the scope
of PHMSA's authority, or were not within the scope of this rulemaking.

V. Section-by-Section Review

The following is a section-by-section review of the amendments in
this final rule.

A. Section 172.101

Section 172.101 provides the HMT and instructions for its use.
PHMSA is amending the entry for ``UN1972, Methane, refrigerated
liquid'' in the HMT to add reference to the cryogenic liquids in (rail)
tank cars packaging section--Sec. 173.319 in Column (8C).
Additionally, PHMSA is amending the entry to add a special provision.

B. Section 172.102

Section 172.102 provides the special provisions and instructions
for their applications. PHMSA is amending paragraph (c)(1) to add
special provision 440. Special provision 440 requires that each tank
car used to transport LNG be remotely monitored for pressure and
location. Additionally, the offeror must notify the carrier if the tank
pressure rise exceeds 3 psig in a 24-hour period.

C. Section 172.820

Section 172.820 prescribes additional safety and security planning
requirements for transportation by rail, specifically, commodity data,
a rail routing analysis, and identification of practicable
alternative(s). Paragraph (a) of this section provides the
applicability for when a rail carrier must comply with the requirements
of this section. In this final rule, PHMSA is revising Sec. 172.820(a)
to add a condition requiring any rail carrier transporting a quantity
of UN1972 (``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' (cryogenic liquid) or
``Natural gas, refrigerated liquid'' (cryogenic liquid)) to comply with
the additional safety and security planning requirements for
transportation by rail. Further, PHMSA is revising paragraph (b) to
remove the initial compliance date applicable to HHFTs as these dates
have since passed (i.e., rail carriers subject to the additional
planning requirements because of transporting HHFTs had to complete the
initial commodity flow data collection by March 31, 2016, using 2015
data), and adding a new condition for rail carriers to factor in
transport of LNG (UN1972) to a routing analysis prior to the onset of
transport of any loaded tank car of LNG. Once transport of LNG begins
for a carrier, it can revert to the standard requirement in paragraph
(b) that requires it to compile commodity flow data no later than 90
days after the end of each calendar year and use that data in analyzing
the safety and security risks for the transportation route(s), and
subsequently identifying alternative routes.

D. Section 173.319

Section 173.319 prescribes requirements for cryogenic liquids
transported in rail tank cars. Paragraph (d) provides which cryogenic
liquids may be transported in a DOT-113 tank car when directed to this
section by Column (8C) of the Sec. 172.101 HMT. PHMSA is amending
paragraph (d)(2) to authorize the transport of ``Methane, refrigerated
liquid'' (i.e., LNG). Additionally, PHMSA is amending the Pressure
Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting Table in Sec.
173.319(d)(2) to specify settings for methane in DOT-113C120W tank
cars, specifically, a start-to-discharge pressure valve setting of 75
psig; a design service temperature of -260 [deg]F; a maximum pressure
when offered for transportation of 15 psig; and a filling density of
37.3 percent by weight.

E. Section 174.200

Section 174.200 prescribes the special handling requirements for
Class 2 materials transported by rail. PHMSA is amending this section
to include the operational requirements for trains containing tank cars
of LNG. PHMSA is adding paragraph (d), which states that for a single
train of 20 or more loaded tank cars of ``Methane, refrigerated
liquid'' in a continuous block or a single train carrying 35 or more
loaded tank cars of ``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' throughout the
train, each carrier must ensure the train is equipped and operated with
either an EOT device, as defined in 49 CFR 232.5, or a DP system, as
defined in 49 CFR 229.5.

F. Section 179.400-5

Section 179.400-5 prescribes the material requirements for the
construction of DOT-113 tank cars. Paragraph (b) states that any steel
casting, steel forging, steel structural shape or carbon steel plate
used to fabricate the outer jacket or heads must be as specified in AAR
Specifications for Tank Cars, appendix M. PHMSA is amending this
paragraph to require that for tank cars transporting ``Methane,
refrigerated liquid,'' the outer shell must be made of AAR TC 128,
Grade B normalized steel plate as specified in Sec. 179.100-7(a).

G. Section 179.400-8

Section 179.400-8 prescribes the requirements for plate thickness
on the DOT-113 specification tank car. Paragraph (d) states that the
minimum wall thickness for the outer jacket shell, after forming, must
be no less than 7/16th inch and the outer jacket heads must be no less
than \1/2\ inch thick. PHMSA is amending paragraph (d) to require DOT-
113 tank cars used in LNG service to have an outer shell and tank head
thickness, after forming, of 9/16th inch. Additionally, the shell and
heads must be made of AAR TC 128, Grade B normalized steel plate as
specified in Sec. 179.100-7(a).

H. Section 179.400-26

PHMSA is adding Sec. 179.400-26 to provide the authorization for a
DOT-113 tank car to be loaded to a gross weight on rail of up to
286,000 pounds (129,727 kg) upon approval by the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).

I. Section 180.515

Section 180.515 discusses requirements for marking tank cars as
part of their continuing qualification for service. In this final rule,
PHMSA is adding the new specification suffix ``9'' to the DOT-113C120W
specification to indicate compliance with enhanced outer tank steel and
thickness requirements beyond the standard DOT-113C120W specification.
In conformance with this change, PHMSA is adding a new paragraph (d) to
Sec. 180.515 to require that the ``9'' suffix always remain marked as
part of the specification DOT-113C120W9 for these enhanced tank cars,
to distinguish

[[Page 45024]]

standard DOT-113C120W tank cars (such as those currently used to
transport ethylene) from enhanced DOT-113C120W9 cars authorized for
LNG. PHMSA intends this new paragraph to reduce confusion for tank car
users.

VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking

This rulemaking is published under the authority of the Federal
hazmat law. Section 5103(b) of the Federal hazmat law authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe regulations for the safe
transportation, including security, of hazardous materials in
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.'' The Secretary's
authority regarding hazardous materials safety is delegated to PHMSA at
49 CFR 1.97. This rulemaking authorizes the transportation of LNG by
rail in DOT-113C120W tank cars, with certain enhanced outer tank
requirements, subject to all applicable requirements and certain
additional operational controls.

B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rulemaking is considered a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and
Review'' [58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993)], and was reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This rulemaking is also
considered a significant rulemaking under the DOT regulations governing
rulemaking procedures (49 CFR part 5). E.O. 12866 requires agencies to
regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs,'' and to develop regulations that ``impose the least burden on
society.'' Similarly, DOT regulations require that regulations issued
by PHMSA and other DOT Operating Administrations ``should be designed
to minimize burdens and reduce barriers to market entry whenever
possible, consistent with the effective promotion of safety'' and
should generally ``not be issued unless their benefits are expected to
exceed their costs.'' Sec. 5.5(f)-(g).
Additionally, E.O. 12866 and DOT regulations require agencies to
provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation, which also
reinforces requirements for notice and comment under the APA.\54\
Therefore, in the previously published NPRM, PHMSA sought public
comment on revisions to the HMR authorizing the transportation of LNG
by rail tank car. PHMSA also sought comment on the preliminary cost and
cost savings analyses, as well as any information that could assist in
quantifying the benefits of this rulemaking. Those comments are
addressed, and additional discussion about the economic impacts of the
final rule are provided, within the final RIA posted in the docket.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\54\ 5 U.S.C. 553; 49 CFR 5.5(i).
\55\ See Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025 at www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This final rule adopts the proposal in the NPRM, with certain
amendments, to allow the transportation of LNG by rail in an authorized
tank car. Under current regulatory standards, LNG is not authorized for
transportation by tank car. Therefore, this final rule is considered an
enabling rule.
In promulgating this final rule, PHMSA is providing a path for
potential benefits that would not otherwise be gained in the absence of
this rulemaking, such as increased transportation efficiency, increased
modal safety, expanded fuel usage, improved accessibility to remote
regions, and increased U.S. energy competitiveness. These benefits are
described qualitatively in the Final RIA. The final rule essentially
prescribes packaging for a flammable cryogenic material (i.e., LNG) for
shippers and rail carriers who choose to transport LNG by rail. The
discretionary and voluntary decision of a shipper and railroad company
to transport LNG by rail, upon implementation of this final rule,
requires full compliance with all existing regulations governing the
transportation of flammable cryogenic materials, and the operation of
freight and other non-passenger train services; as well as the
additional requirements adopted under the final rule, namely, enhanced
outer tank design and material standards and operational controls
supplemental to the existing operational controls in the HMR.

C. Executive Order 13771

This rulemaking is expected to be an Executive Order 13771
deregulatory action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this
final rule can be found in the final RIA posted in the docket.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\56\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Executive Order 13132

This rulemaking was analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism.'' This
rulemaking may preempt State, local, and Tribal requirements but does
not amend any regulation that has substantial direct effects on the
States, the relationship between the Federal government and the States,
or the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, the consultation and funding
requirements of E.O. 13132 do not apply.
Federal hazmat law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, contains express
preemption provisions relevant to this proceeding. As amended by
Section 1711(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2319), 49 U.S.C. 5125(a) provides that a requirement of a
State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe is preempted--
unless the non-Federal requirement is authorized by another Federal law
or DOT grants a waiver of preemption under section 5125(e)--if (1)
complying with the non-Federal requirement and the Federal requirement
is not possible (dual compliance test); or (2) the non-Federal
requirement, as applied and enforced, is an obstacle to accomplishing
and carrying out the Federal requirement (obstacle test).
Additionally, 49 U.S.C. 5125(b)(1) provides that a non-Federal
requirement concerning any of five subjects is preempted when the non-
Federal requirement is not ``substantively the same as'' a provision of
Federal hazmat law, a regulation prescribed under that law, or a
hazardous materials security regulation or directive issued by the
Department of Homeland Security (covered subjects test).\57\ To be
``substantively the same,'' the non-Federal requirement must conform
``in every significant respect to the Federal requirement. Editorial
and other similar de minimis changes are permitted.'' The subject areas
covered under this authority are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\57\ Unless the non-Federal requirement is authorized by another
Federal law or DOT grants a waiver of preemption under 49 CFR
5125(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous
materials;
(2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and
placarding of hazardous materials;
(3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents
related to hazardous materials and requirements related to the number,
contents, and placement of those documents;
(4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; and
(5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance,
recondition, repair, or testing of a packaging or container
represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified

[[Page 45025]]

for use in transporting hazardous material.
This rule addresses subject items (2) and (5) above, which are
covered subjects, and therefore, non-Federal requirements that fail to
meet the ``substantively the same'' standard are vulnerable to
preemption under the Federal hazmat law. Moreover, PHMSA will continue
to make preemption determinations applicable to specific non-Federal
requirements on a case-by-case basis, using the obstacle, dual
compliance, and covered subjects tests provided in Federal hazmat law.
Federal preemption also may exist pursuant to section 20106 of the
former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), repealed, revised,
reenacted, and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106, and the former Safety
Appliance Acts (SAA), repealed revised, reenacted, and recodified at 49
U.S.C. 20301-20304, 20306. Section 20106 of the former FRSA provides
that States may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or
order related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject
matter of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies
under the section's ``essentially local safety or security hazard.''
The former SAA has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as preempting
the field ``of equipping cars with appliances intended for the
protection of employees.'' Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Ind., 236
U.S. 439, 446 (1915). The train's power braking system is considered a
safety mechanism within the terms of the former SAA. 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5).

E. Executive Order 13175

This rulemaking was analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13175, ``Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments'' and DOT Order 5301.1,
``Department of Transportation Policies, Programs, and Procedures
Affecting American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Tribes.'' The
Department assessed the impact of the rulemaking on Indian tribal
governments and determined that it would not significantly or uniquely
affect Tribal communities or Indian tribal governments because it
neither sets national requirements for transporting LNG via rail, nor
imposes substantial compliance costs on Indian tribal governments, nor
mandates Tribal action.
PHMSA is committed to satisfying its obligations under E.O. 13175
and DOT Order 5301.1 related to Tribal outreach to ensure meaningful
and timely engagement of Tribal governments in PHMSA rulemaking. As
discussed above, PHMSA personnel have conducted a face-to-face meeting
with representatives of the Puyallup Tribe to solicit their concerns
during the development of this final rule. PHMSA has addressed those
concerns, as well as the written comments submitted by the Puyallup
Tribe, in the final rule and final EA. Further, since the February 2020
meeting with the Puyallup Tribe, PHMSA has contacted representatives of
the Puyallup Tribe and extended invitations for follow-up meetings with
PHMSA leadership. The Puyallup Tribe has not accepted PHMSA's
invitation to conduct further meetings.

F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies
and Procedures

This rulemaking complies with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.), which requires agencies to consider whether a
rulemaking would have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities'' to include small businesses, not-for-profit
organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not
dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations under 50,000. This rulemaking has been developed in
accordance with Executive Order 13272, ``Proper Consideration of Small
Entities in Agency Rulemaking'', and DOT's procedures and policies to
promote compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act to ensure that
potential impacts of draft rules on small entities are properly
considered.
(1) a statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule.
The amendments to the HMR made in this final rule, which enable LNG
to be transported by rail, are intended to provide relief by
authorizing the transportation of LNG in tank cars with enhanced
crashworthiness features and additional operational controls with no
anticipated reduction in safety. This final rule creates options for
transporting LNG, which otherwise would be limited to trucks, or
maritime transportation modes; or, alternately, re-gasification and
movement by pipeline in a gas state. This rule enables movement by
rail, thereby giving shippers an alternate mode that may offer cost or
other advantages over existing permitted modes to ship LNG. It lifts
the blanket prohibition on movement of LNG by rail tank cars.
(2) a statement of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a
statement of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a
statement of any changes made in the proposed rule as a result of such
comments.
PHMSA addressed public comments filed under the NPRM, as well as
the Special Permit. The comments were addressed by topic and addressed
accordingly. Please refer to Section IV. ``Summary and Discussion of
Comments to the Rulemaking Docket,'' of the preamble.
(3) the response of the agency to any comments filed by the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in response
to the proposed rule, and a detailed statement of any change made to
the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of the comments.
PHMSA did not receive comments filed on behalf of the Chief Counsel
for Advocacy at the Small Business Administration (SBA).
(4) a description of and an estimate of the number of small
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such
estimate is available.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires a review of
proposed and final rules to assess their impact on small entities,
unless the Secretary certifies that the rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601 as a small business concern
that is independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its
field of operation. As far as the railroad industry, the SBA stipulates
in its size standards that a ``small entity'' in the railroad industry
is a for profit ``line-haul railroad'' that has fewer than 1,500
employees, a ``short line railroad'' with fewer than 1,500 employees, a
``commuter rail system'' with annual receipts of less than $16.5
million, or a contractor that performs support activities for railroads
with annual receipts of less than $16.5 million.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\58\ U. S. Small Business Administration, ``Table of Small
Business Size Standards Matched to North American Industry
Classification System Codes, August 19, 2019. https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2019-08/SBA%20Table%20of%20Size%20Standards_Effective%20Aug%2019,%202019.pdf.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public
comment. Under that authority, FRA has published a final statement of
agency policy that formally establishes ``small

[[Page 45026]]

entities'' or ``small businesses'' as railroads, contractors, and
hazardous materials shippers that meet the revenue requirements of a
Class III railroad as set forth in 49 CFR 1201.1-1, which is $20
million or less in inflation-adjusted annual revenues,\59\ and commuter
railroads or small governmental jurisdictions that serve populations of
50,000 or less. See 68 FR 24891 (May 9, 2003) (codified at 49 CFR part
209, appendix C). PHMSA is using this definition for the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\59\ The Class III railroad revenue threshold is $39,194,876 or
less, for 2018. (The Class II railroad threshold is between
$39,194,876 and $489,935,956; and the Class I railroad threshold is
$489,935,956 or more.) See Surface Transportation Board (STB),
available at https://www.stb.gov/econdata.nsf/d03c0c2161a050278525720a0044a825/1acf737531cf98ce8525841e0055e02e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The final rule would be applicable to all railroads, although not
all requirements would be relevant to all railroads. Railroads
operating on the general system are required to use two-way EOT
regardless of type of load unless exempted under 49 CFR 232.407(e).
Two-way EOT devices cost approximately $4,000. As stated in the Final
RIA, most Class III railroads, due to their type of train operation,
are not required to have two-way EOT devices, except in certain
situations. FRA regulations provide exceptions from the requirement to
use two-way EOT device in 49 CFR 232.407(e). For Class III railroads
that would be required to install two-way EOT devises, the monetary
burden of the requirement to purchase and install those devices is less
than 1% of the average annual revenue of small railroad entities.
Therefore, the impact of this requirement is also minimal.
As further stated in the Final RIA, there are two other types of
entities that are subject to the rule in addition to railroad
companies: shippers, and tank car manufacturers (to the extent of
design specifications). There are three main types of shippers: oil and
gas companies, chemical companies and oil and fuel logistics companies.
PHMSA estimated the number of small entities that could potentially be
impacted by this rule using its own registration data and the Dun and
Bradstreet data.
PHMSA first queried pipeline-related entities. The SBA definition
of a small entity for those business categories is set at 1,000
employees or, in the case of annual revenue thresholds, is set at $27.5
million. PHMSA applied the following NAICS codes for this analysis:
211130 Natural Gas Extraction, 213111 Drilling Oil and Gas Wells,
213112 Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations, 325110
Petrochemical Manufacturing, 325199 All Other Basic Organic Chemical
Manufacturing, and 486210 Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas.
PHMSA's queries identified a total of nine small entities: six under
213112 Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations and three under
486210 Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas.
PHMSA also conducted a similar but broader query of companies that
may potentially ship LNG by rail using PHMSA's PDM system in
conjunction with the Dun and Bradstreet data. The query identified
several potential subsets of SBA-size small entities; however, there is
considerable overlapping in definitions and variation in operations
among the codes to render a specific number(s). One possibly relevant
NAICS code for this rule is industrial gas manufacturing (NAICS 32512).
This industry is comprised of establishments primarily engaged in the
manufacturing of organic and inorganic gasses in compressed, liquid or
solid forms. The industry has a 529 entities earning a total of almost
$10 billion in annual sales in the U.S. (2018). The companies are
comprised mainly of large well-established entities. A small entity
within that industry has an annual revenue of $28.23 billion (2019).
The cost burden to shippers of this rule consist of the purchase and
installation expense of remote monitoring devices and of a thicker
outer tank for DOT-113 Tank Car in LNG Service. As stated in the Final
RIA, the current estimated cost of remote monitoring devices is
approximately $2,400-$4,000 per car depending upon the vendor plus
additional costs for monitoring software. The estimated cost of the
requirement to install 9/16-inch outer shell on all DOT-113 tank cars
in LNG service is an additional $15,000 to $20,000 for the additional
and higher-quality steel, plus $3,000-$5,000 for additional
construction expenses. The base cost of an existing 7/16-inch outer
tank DOT-113 is approximately $725,000. PHMSA concludes that the impact
of this rule is less than 1% of average annual revenue for these
entities.
Therefore, PHMSA concludes that this rule does not impose a
significant burden on small entities in this category.
(5) a description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the
classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record.
PHMSA is revising 49 CFR 172.820 to require any rail carrier
transporting a tank car quantity of UN1972 (Methane, refrigerated
liquid (cryogenic liquid) or Natural gas, refrigerated liquid
(cryogenic liquid)) to comply with the additional safety and security
planning requirements for transportation by rail. PHMSA estimates that
this rule does not impose a significant information collection and
recordkeeping burdens on small entities. Please refer to Section VI.G.,
``Paperwork Reduction Act,'' of the preamble for additional information
about the potential burdens associated with this requirement.
(6) a description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other significant
alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the
impact on small entities was rejected.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs agencies to establish
exceptions and differing compliance standards for small entities, where
it is possible to do so and still meet the objectives of applicable
regulatory statutes. PHMSA considered three regulatory alternatives
(including a ``no action'' alternative) when developing the NPRM. The
alternatives (other than the `no action' alternative) were designed in
accordance with necessary safety, engineering and operational
specifications. These specifications, as such, do not provide leeway
for variation of design or degrees of stringency. The chemical
characteristics of LNG combined with the potential to be transported in
blocks of 20 or more tank cars or unit trains require specific
packaging (i.e. tank car) which costs approximately $750,000 per tank
car according to PHMSA and FRA estimates. The operational control
specifications, as mentioned above, do not impose a significant
monetary burden on small entities.
Other entities subject to this rule include rail tank car
manufacturers. Although PHMSA does not regulate these entities, it does
regulate the design specifications of rail tank cars. PHMSA estimates
there are approximately seven rail tank car manufacturers in the U.S.,
none of which are considered small entities. The impact of the rule, in
this case, is potentially positive, since it will generate new purchase
order opportunities for those entities.

[[Page 45027]]

G. Paperwork Reduction Act

Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations requires
that PHMSA provide interested members of the public and affected
agencies an opportunity to comment on information collection and
recordkeeping requests. As detailed in Section V.C. ``Section172.820'',
PHMSA is requiring any rail carrier transporting a tank car quantity of
UN1972 (Methane, refrigerated liquid (cryogenic liquid) or Natural gas,
refrigerated liquid (cryogenic liquid)) to comply with the additional
safety and security planning requirements for transportation by rail.
PHMSA currently accounts for burden associated with safety and security
planning requirements in OMB Control Number 2137-0612, ``Hazardous
Materials Security Plans.'' PHMSA estimates that this revision will
lead to the following increase in burden:
Annual Increase in Number of Respondents: 0.
Annual Increase in Number of Responses: 8.
Annual Increase in Burden Hours: 677.
Annual Increase in Salary Costs: $41,170.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 96-511), no
person is required to respond to an information collection unless it
has been approved by OMB and displays a valid OMB control number. As
this revision was not proposed in the NPRM, PHMSA will publish a
separate 60-day and 30-day notice to provide an opportunity for public
comment on the proposed estimated increase in burden.
Requests for a copy of this information collection should be
directed to Steven Andrews or Shelby Geller, Office of Hazardous
Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001,
Telephone (202) 366-8553.

H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.

I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.,
requires agencies to assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions
on State, local, and Tribal governments, and the private sector.\60\
For any NPRM or final rule that includes a Federal mandate that may
result in the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal governments, in
the aggregate of $100 million or more (or $169 million adjusted for
inflation) in any given year, the agency must prepare, amongst other
things, a written statement that qualitatively and quantitatively
assesses the costs and benefits of the Federal mandate.\61\ A Federal
mandate is defined, in part, as a regulation that imposes an
enforceable duty upon State, local, or Tribal governments or would
reduce or eliminate the amount of authorization of appropriation for
Federal financial assistance that would be provided to State, local, or
Tribal governments for the purpose of complying with a previous Federal
mandate.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\60\ 2 U.S.C. 1531.
\61\ Id. at 1532.
\62\ Id. at 658(5)(A), 1555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The NPRM concluded that the rulemaking does not impose unfunded
mandates because it does not result in costs of $169 million or more,
adjusted for inflation, to either State, local, or Tribal governments,
in the aggregate, or to the private sector and is the least burdensome
alternative that achieves the objective of the rulemaking.
In response to the NPRM, Theresa Pugh Consulting, LLC argued that
the UMRA requires that PHMSA analyze the costs that State, local, or
Tribal governments might incur as a result of responding to potential
emergencies caused by the transportation of LNG in rail tank cars.
The final rule, as revised based on comments received, does not
include a Federal mandate that may result in an aggregate expenditure
by State, local, and Tribal governments of $169 million or more.
Additionally, the final rule does not impose a requirement on State,
local, or Tribal governments, much less a requirement that the DOT can
enforce. In the event State, local, or Tribal governments need
additional resources to plan for a potential LNG-related accident, they
may request grants from PHMSA's Hazardous Materials Emergency
Preparedness funds, established under 49 U.S.C. 5116(h), to support
development, improve, and carry out emergency plans.
In conclusion, this final rule does not impose unfunded mandates
under the UMRA of 1995. It does not result in costs of $169 million or
more to either State, local, or Tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or to the private sector, and it is the least burdensome alternative
that achieves the objective of the rulemaking.

J. Environmental Assessment

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq., requires Federal agencies to consider the consequences of
major Federal actions and prepare a detailed statement on actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. The
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) implementing regulations (40 CFR
part 1500-1508) require Federal agencies to conduct an environmental
review considering (1) the need for the action, (2) alternatives to the
action, (3) probable environmental impacts of the action and
alternatives, and (4) the agencies and persons consulted during the
consideration process (see 40 CFR 1508.9(b)). DOT Order 5610.1C,
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts,'' establishes
departmental procedures for evaluation of environmental impacts under
NEPA and its implementing regulations.
PHMSA has completed its NEPA analysis. Based on the environmental
assessment, PHMSA determined that an environmental impact statement is
not required for this rulemaking because it does not constitute an
action meeting the criteria that normally requires the preparation of
an environmental impact statement. As explained in the final EA, PHMSA
has found that the selected action will not have a significant impact
on the human environment in accordance with Section 102(2) of NEPA.
PHMSA issued and solicited comments on a draft EA posted to the
docket along with the NPRM. The final EA and Finding of No Significant
Impact has been placed into the docket addressing the comments
received.

K. Privacy Act

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these
comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to http://www.regulations.gov, as described in the
system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
http://www.dot.gov/privacy.

L. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis

Under Executive Order 13609 (``Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation''), agencies must consider whether the impacts associated
with significant variations between domestic and international
regulatory approaches

[[Page 45028]]

are unnecessary or may impair the ability of American business to
export and compete internationally. See 77 FR 26413 (May 4, 2012). In
meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation
can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that
are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation.
International regulatory cooperation can also reduce, eliminate, or
prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.
Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465),
prohibits Federal agencies from establishing any standards or engaging
in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. For purposes of these requirements,
Federal agencies may participate in the establishment of international
standards, so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic
objective, such as providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude
imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
PHMSA participates in the establishment of international standards
to protect the safety of the American public. PHMSA has assessed the
effects of the rulemaking to ensure that it does not cause unnecessary
obstacles to foreign trade. Insofar as the final rule authorizes rail
transportation of LNG to domestic U.S. and other North American
markets, it would promote foreign trade. Further, the final rule's
authorization of rail transportation of LNG aligns U.S. practice with
Transport Canada regulations permitting rail transportation of LNG.
Accordingly, this rulemaking is consistent with Executive Order 13609
and PHMSA's obligations under the Trade Agreement Act, as amended.

M. Executive Order 13211

Executive Order 13211 (``Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use'') [66 FR
28355; May 18, 2001] requires Federal agencies to prepare a Statement
of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' Under the
executive order, a ``significant energy action'' is defined as any
action by an agency (normally published in the Federal Register) that
promulgates, or is expected to lead to the promulgation of, a final
rule or regulation (including a notice of inquiry, Advance NPRM, and
NPRM) that (1)(i) is a significant regulatory action under Executive
Order 12866 or any successor order and (ii) is likely to have a
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy (including a shortfall in supply, price increases, and increased
use of foreign supplies); or (2) is designated by the Administrator of
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as a
significant energy action.
This final rule is a significant action under E.O. 12866 because
OIRA believes it raises novel, legal, and policy issues arising out of
legal mandates; however, it is expected to have an annual effect on the
economy of less than $100 million. Further, this action is not likely
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution or use
of energy in the United States. The Administrator of OIRA has not
designated the final rule as a significant energy action. For
additional discussion of the anticipated economic impact of this
rulemaking, please review the final RIA.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 172

Education, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Incorporation by reference, Labeling, Packaging and containers,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 173

Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference,
Packaging and containers, Radioactive materials, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Uranium.

49 CFR Part 174

Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference,
Radioactive materials, Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 179

Hazardous materials transportation, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 180

Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference,
Motor carriers, Motor vehicle safety, Packaging and containers,
Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing, PHMSA amends 49 CFR chapter I as
follows:

PART 172--HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS

0
1. The authority citation for part 172 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81, 1.96 and
1.97.

0
2. In Sec. 172.101, revise the table entry for ``Methane, refrigerated
liquid (cryogenic liquid) or Natural gas, refrigerated liquid
(cryogenic liquid), with high methane content)'' (UN1972) to read as
follows:

Sec. 172.101 Purpose and use of the hazardous materials table.

* * * * *

[[Page 45029]]

Sec. 172.101--Hazardous Materials Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(8) (9) (10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazardous Packaging (Sec. 173.***) Quantity limitations (see Vessel stowage
materials Hazard Special ------------------------------------- Sec. Sec. 173.27 and ----------------------
Symbols descriptions and class or Identification PG Label provisions 175.75)
proper shipping division No. codes (Sec. ----------------------------
names 172.102) Exceptions Non-bulk Bulk Passenger Cargo Location Other
aircraft/ aircraft
rail only
(1) (2)............... (3) (4).............. (5) (6) (7).......... (8A)......... (8B)......... (8C) (9A)........ (9B)........ (10A)....... (10B)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * * * *
Methane, 2.1 UN1972........... ..... 2.1 T75, TP5, 440 None......... None......... 318, Forbidden... Forbidden... D........... 40
refrigerated 319
liquid (cryogenic
liquid) or
Natural gas,
refrigerated
liquid (cryogenic
liquid), with
high methane
content).

* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
3. In Sec. 172.102, amend paragraph (c)(1) by adding special provision
440 under ``Code/Special Provisions'' to read as follows:

Sec. 172.102 Special provisions.

* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *

Code/Special Provisions

* * * * *
440 When this material is transported by tank car, the offeror must
ensure each tank car is remotely monitored for pressure and location.
Additionally, the offeror must notify the carrier if the tank pressure
rise exceeds 3 psig over any 24-hour period.
* * * * *

0
4. In Sec. 172.820, revise paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) to read as
follows:

Sec. 172.820 Additional planning requirements for transportation by
rail.

(a) General. Each rail carrier transporting in commerce one or more
of the following materials is subject to the additional safety and
security planning requirements of this section:
(1) More than 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) in a single carload of a
Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 explosive;
(2) A quantity of a material poisonous by inhalation in a single
bulk packaging;
(3) A highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive)
material, as defined in Sec. 173.403 of this subchapter;
(4) A high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) as defined in Sec. 171.8
of this subchapter; or
(5) A quantity of UN1972 (Methane, refrigerated liquid or Natural
gas, refrigerated liquid) when transported in a rail tank car.
(b) * * *
(1) Commodity data must be collected by route, a line segment or
series of line segments as aggregated by the rail carrier. Within the
rail carrier selected route, the commodity data must identify the
geographic location of the route and the total number of shipments by
UN identification number for the materials specified in paragraph (a)
of this section.
(i) A rail carrier subject to additional planning requirements of
this section based on paragraph (a)(5) of this section that has yet to
transport UN 1972, must factor in planned shipments of UN 1972 to the
commodity data for use in the paragraph (c) route analysis prior to
initial transport of the material.
(ii) [Reserved]
* * * * *

PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND
PACKAGINGS

0
5. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81, 1.96 and
1.97.

0
6. In Sec. 173.319, revise paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:

Sec. 173.319 Cryogenic liquids in tank cars.

* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Ethylene, hydrogen (minimum 95 percent parahydrogen), and
methane, cryogenic liquids must be loaded and shipped in accordance
with the following table:

Table 1 to Sec. 173.319(d)--Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum permitted filling density (percent by weight)
Maximum start-to-discharge -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
pressure (psig) Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene Hydrogen Methane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17............................ ........................... .................... ................... 6.60 ...................
45............................ 52.8....................... .................... ................... ........................... ...................
75............................ ........................... 51.1................ 51.1............... ........................... 37.3.
Maximum pressure when offered 10 psig.................... 20 psig............. 20 psig............ ........................... 15 psig.
for transportation.
Design service temperature.... Minus 260 [deg]F........... Minus 260 [deg]F.... Minus 155 [deg]F... Minus 423 [deg]F........... Minus 260 [deg]F.
Specification (see Sec. 113D60W, 113C60W........... 113C120W............ 113D120W........... 113A175W, 113A60W.......... 113C120W9.
180.507(b)(3) of this
subchapter).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: For DOT 113 cryogenic tank cars, delimiters indicate the following:
A--authorized for minus 423 [deg]F loading;
C--authorized for minus 260 [deg]F loading;
D--authorized for minus 155 [deg]F loading.
The specification suffix ``9'' indicates the tank car is equipped with (minimum) 9/16 inch TC 128B normalized steel outer jacket and tank heads.

[[Page 45030]]

* * * * *

PART 174--CARRIAGE BY RAIL

0
7. The authority citation for part 174 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 33 U.S.C. 1321; 49 CFR 1.81 and
1.97.

0
8. In Sec. 174.200, add paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec. 174.200 Special handling requirements.

* * * * *
(d) For a single train of 20 or more loaded tank cars of Methane,
refrigerated liquid in a continuous block or a single train carrying 35
or more loaded tank cars of Methane, refrigerated liquid throughout the
train consist, each carrier must ensure the train is equipped and
operated with either a two-way end-of-train (EOT) device, as defined in
49 CFR 232.5, or a distributed power (DP) system, as defined in 49 CFR
229.5.

PART 179--SPECIFICATIONS FOR TANK CARS

0
9. The authority citation for part 179 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
10. In Sec. 179.400-5, revise paragraph (b) to read as follows:

Sec. 179.400-5 Materials.

* * * * *
(b)(1) Any steel casting, steel forging, steel structural shape or
carbon steel plate used to fabricate the outer jacket or heads must be
as specified in AAR Specifications for Tank Cars, appendix M.
(2) For DOT-113C120W9 tank cars, the outer jacket shell and outer
jacket heads must be made of AAR TC-128, Grade B normalized steel plate
as specified in Sec. 179.100-7(a).
* * * * *

0
11. In Sec. 179.400-8, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec. 179.400-8 Thickness of plates.

* * * * *
(d)(1) The minimum wall thickness, after forming, of the outer
jacket shell may not be less than \7/16\ inch. The minimum wall
thickness, after forming, of the outer jacket heads may not be less
than \1/2\ inch and they must be made from steel specified in Sec.
179.16(c).
(2) For DOT 113C120W9 tank cars, the minimum wall thickness of the
outer jacket shell and the outer jacket heads must be no less than \9/
16\ inch after forming, and must be made of AAR TC-128, Grade B
normalized steel plate.
(3) The annular space is to be evacuated, and the cylindrical
portion of the outer jacket between heads, or between stiffening rings
if used, must be designed to withstand an external pressure of 37.5
psig (critical collapsing pressure), as determined by the following
formula:

Pc = [2.6E(t/D)\2.5\]/[(L/D) - 0.45(t/D)\0.5\]

Where:

Pc = Critical collapsing pressure (37.5 psig minimum) in
psig;
E = modulus of elasticity of jacket material, in psi;
t = minimum thickness of jacket material, after forming, in inches;
D = outside diameter of jacket, in inches;
L = distance between stiffening ring centers in inches. (The heads
may be considered as stiffening rings located \1/3\ of the head
depth from the head tangent line.)
* * * * *

0
12. Add Sec. 179.400-26 to read as follows:

Sec. 179.400-26 Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL).

A tank car may be loaded to a gross weight on rail of up to 286,000
pounds (129,727 kg) upon approval by the Associate Administrator for
Safety, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). See Sec. 179.13.

PART 180--CONTINUING QUALIFICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF PACKAGINGS

0
13. The authority citation for part 180 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
14. In Sec. 180.515, add paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec. 180.515 Markings.

* * * * *
(d) The specification marking for DOT 113 tank cars built in
accordance with the DOT 113C120W9 specification must display the last
numeral of the specification number (i.e., ``DOT 113C120W9'').

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 19, 2020, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Howard R. Elliott,
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2020-13604 Filed 7-23-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P