[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 131 (Wednesday, July 8, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41023-41026]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-14668]



[[Page 41023]]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[DOE-HQ-2020-0028]


Securing the United States Bulk-Power System

AGENCY: Office of Electricity, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Request for information (RFI).

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SUMMARY: Pursuant to Executive Order 13920 (E.O. 13920) issued May 1, 
2020, titled ``Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,'' the 
Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) is seeking information to 
understand the energy industry's current practices to identify and 
mitigate vulnerabilities in the supply chain for components of the 
bulk-power system (BPS).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before August 7, 2020. If you 
anticipate difficulty in submitting comments within that period, 
contact the person listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT as soon as 
possible.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are encouraged to submit comments, 
identified by ``Bulk-Power System EO RFI,'' by any of the following 
methods:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&po=0&D=DOE-HQ-2020-0028. Follow the instructions 
for submitting comments.
    Email: [email protected]. Include ``Bulk-Power System EO 
RFI'' in the subject line of the message.
    Mail: Charles Kosak, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Transmission 
Permitting and Technical Assistance Division, Office of Electricity, 
Mailstop OE-20, Room 8G-024, Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Charles Kosak, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance Division, 
Office of Electricity, email: [email protected] or phone: 
(202) 586-2036.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Background
    B. Executive Order 13920 of May 1, 2020 (Securing the United 
States Bulk-Power System)
II. Request for Information
    A. Supply Chain
    B. Economic Analysis
III. Submission of Comments

I. Introduction

A. Background

    E.O. 13920 (85 FR 26595, May 4, 2020) declares that threats by 
foreign adversaries to the BPS constitute a national emergency. The BPS 
provides the electricity that supports the United States (U.S.) 
national defense, our vital emergency services, critical 
infrastructure, economy, and way of life. The Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence's (ODNI) National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center (NCSC) assesses that China and Russia (near-peer 
foreign adversaries) possess highly advanced cyber programs and that 
both nations pose a major threat to the U.S. government, including, but 
not limited to, military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical, 
infrastructures. The BPS is a target of these adversaries' asymmetric 
cyber and physical plans and operations. A successful attack on the BPS 
would present significant risks to the U.S. economy and public health 
and safety and would render the U.S. less capable of acting in defense 
of itself and its allies. The Department of Defense's 2018 National 
Defense Strategy states that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary and 
that malicious cyber activity against personal, commercial, or 
government infrastructure is growing significantly. According to ODNI's 
2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 
(see https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR_-SSCI.pdf), 
near-peer foreign adversaries have the capability and integrated plans 
necessary to launch cyber-attacks causing localized, disruptive effects 
on critical infrastructure--such as the disruption of a natural gas 
pipeline and electric infrastructure for days to weeks--in the U.S. 
These near-peer foreign adversaries continue to map U.S. critical 
infrastructure with the long-term goal of being able to cause 
substantial damage. According to the 2020-2022 National 
Counterintelligence Strategy (see https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-features/2741-the-national-counterintelligence-strategy-of-the-united-states-of-america-2020-2020), these foreign adversaries are employing 
innovative combinations of traditional spying, economic espionage, and 
supply chain and cyber operations to gain access to critical 
infrastructure. They are also attempting to access our Nation's key 
supply chains at multiple points--from concept to design, manufacture, 
integration, deployment, and maintenance--by, among other things, 
inserting malware into important information technology networks and 
communications systems. As such, DOE is using NCSC's supply chain risk 
management (SCRM) framework to inform this RFI (see https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-what-we-do/ncsc-supply-chain-threats). The 
NCSC leads and supports the U.S. Government's counterintelligence (CI) 
and security activities that are critical to protecting our Nation; 
provides CI outreach to U.S. private sector entities at risk of foreign 
intelligence penetrations; and issues public warnings regarding 
intelligence threats to the U.S. and establishes the de facto standard 
for Federal SCRM processes.
    E.O. 13920 directs DOE, in consultation with the heads of several 
other agencies, to issue regulations implementing the authorities the 
President delegated to the Secretary of Energy. The rulemaking process 
will allow the opportunity for stakeholder comment and input on the 
substance of the rule. Consistent with the Department's commitment to 
public participation in the rulemaking process, the Department is 
soliciting views on safeguarding the supply chain from threats and 
vulnerabilities. The Department is also soliciting views on its 
economic analysis.

B. Executive Order 13920 of May 1, 2020 (Securing the United States 
Bulk-Power System)

    On May 1, 2020, the President issued Executive Order 13920, which 
has four main pillars:

    (1) Prohibit any acquisition, importation, transfer, or 
installation of BPS electric equipment by any person or with respect 
to any property to which a foreign adversary or an associated 
national thereof has any interest, that poses an undue risk to the 
BPS, the security or resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure or 
the U.S. economy, or U.S. national security;
    (2) Authorize the Secretary to establish and publish criteria 
for recognizing particular equipment and vendors in the BPS electric 
equipment market as ``pre-qualified'' for future transactions and to 
apply these criteria to establish and publish a list of pre-
qualified equipment and vendors;
    (3) Direct the Secretary, in consultation with heads of other 
agencies, to identify existing BPS electric equipment in which a 
foreign adversary or associated national thereof has an interest 
that poses an undue risk to the BPS, the security or resiliency of 
U.S. critical infrastructure or the U.S. economy, or U.S. national 
security and develop recommendations to identify, isolate, monitor, 
or replace this equipment as appropriate; and
    (4) Establish a Task Force on Federal Energy Infrastructure 
Procurement Policies Related to National Security, which will focus 
on the coordination of Federal Government procurement of energy 
infrastructure, the sharing of risk information

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and risk management practices, and the development of 
recommendations for implementation to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulatory Council (FAR Council).

    E.O. 13920 defines BPS as (i) facilities and control systems 
necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission 
network (or any portion thereof); and (ii) electric energy from 
generation facilities needed to maintain transmission reliability. This 
definition includes transmission lines rated at 69,000 volts (69 kV) or 
more, but does not include facilities used in the local distribution of 
electric energy.
    E.O. 13920 defines BPS electric equipment as items used in BPS 
substations, control rooms, or power generating stations, including 
reactors, capacitors, substation transformers, coupling capacitor 
potential devices [expressed in the E.O. as current coupling capacitors 
and coupling capacity voltage transformers], large generators, backup 
generators, substation voltage regulators, shunt capacitor equipment, 
automatic circuit reclosers, instrument transformers, protective 
relaying, metering equipment, high voltage circuit breakers, generation 
turbines, industrial control systems, distributed control systems, and 
safety instrumented systems. Items not included in the preceding list 
and that have broader application of use beyond the BPS are outside the 
scope of E.O. 13920.
    ``Foreign adversaries'' are defined as any foreign government or 
foreign non-government person engaged in a long-term pattern or serious 
instance of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of 
the U.S. or its allies or the security and safety of U.S. persons. The 
current list of ``foreign adversaries'' consists of the governments of 
the following countries: The People's Republic of China (China), the 
Republic of Cuba (Cuba), the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Russian 
Federation (Russia), and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(Venezuela). This determination is based on multiple sources, including 
ODNI's 2016-2019 Worldwide Threat Assessments of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, the 2020-2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy, and the 
2018 National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America (see 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf). Note, the abovementioned countries identified as 
``foreign adversaries'' are here identified as such only for the 
purposes of E.O. 13920. The identification does not reflect a 
determination by the U.S. about the nature of other countries for any 
purposes other than this Executive Order. Additionally, the Secretary 
will periodically review this list in consultation with appropriate 
agency heads and may add to, subtract from, supplement, or otherwise 
amend the list at any time.

II. Request for Information

    The Department seeks public input on the following questions 
regarding the first three pillars of E.O. 13920. Please carefully read 
Section III below regarding the public nature of submissions. As 
explained in detail below, any information that you do not want to be 
publicly viewable should not be included in your comment, nor in any 
document attached to your comment. Instructions regarding how to 
provide Confidential Business Information are also provided below. To 
the extent possible, please reference the question being addressed in 
your response.

A. Supply Chain

    Although this RFI covers the full scope of BPS electric equipment 
as defined in E.O. 13920, the Department seeks comments on specific 
equipment as outlined below to enable a phased process by which the 
Department can prioritize the review of BPS electric equipment by 
function and impact to the overall BPS. In doing so, the Department 
employs a defense-in-depth, phased approach that addresses risk as well 
as the dynamic nature of threats and vulnerabilities affecting the BPS. 
Accordingly, the Secretary may establish specific pre-qualification 
criteria for a set of components that support defense critical electric 
infrastructure (DCEI) and other critical loads and critical 
transmission feeders (69 kV and above) reported under critical 
infrastructure protection reliability standards as formulated by the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and approved by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Specific essential 
reliability services of interest may also include black start systems. 
The Department seeks comment on addressing the following types of 
equipment: Transformers (including generation step-up transformers), 
reactive power equipment (reactors and capacitors), circuit breakers, 
and generation (including power generation that is provided to the BPS 
at the transmission level and back-up generation that supports 
substations). This includes both the hardware and electronics 
associated with equipment monitoring, intelligent control, and relay 
protection. Only transformers rated at 20 MVA and with a low-side 
voltage of 69 kV and above are included.
    The Department does not plan to develop a SCRM tool or repeat 
questions already deemed best practices from well-established SCRM 
frameworks and tools, including the ODNI NCSC Supply Chain 
Directorate's SCRM Best Practices (see https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/supplychain/20190405-UpdatedSCRM-Best-Practices.pdf).
    The Department will build upon efforts by standards development 
organizations, including but not limited to, NIST 800 series standards 
(see https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/sp800), ISO standards (see 
https://www.iso.org/home.html), ISA/IEC 62433 standards (see http://www.isa.org/intech/201810standards/), and NERC-CIP standards (see 
https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx). The Department 
is focused on improving utility owner/operator's asset/operations risk 
assessment by incorporating the identification of enterprise risk 
associated with supply chain vendor/services into the acquisition 
systems process. For example, the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity 
Model (C2M2) is an available tool that an organization might apply to 
continuously assess its cybersecurity posture (see https://www.energy.gov/ceser/activities/cybersecurity-critical-energy-infrastructure/energy-sector-cybersecurity-0).
    The Department believes that it is prudent, and in the public 
interest, to address national security implications in acquisitions. 
This RFI is designed to specifically address: (1) Evidence-based 
cybersecurity maturity metrics and (2) foreign ownership, control, and 
influence (FOCI). As part of the Federal acquisition process and NERC-
CIP standards, the Department is considering:
     Limited procurements,
     select build versus buy,
     the consequences of insufficient SCRM, and
     evidence-based performance metrics that support a 
continuous improvement process.
    With that background, the Department seeks information responsive 
to the following questions:
    (A-1) Do energy sector asset owners and/or vendors conduct 
enterprise risk assessments, including a cyber maturity model 
evaluation on a periodic basis? Provide an explanation or description 
of an assessment program if it addresses the mitigation of risks 
associated with FOCI with respect to foreign adversaries (see https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/ctp/foci/).

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    (A-2) Do energy sector asset owners and/or vendors identify, 
evaluate, and/or mitigate the following:
    a. FOCI with respect to foreign adversaries with respect to access 
to company and utility data, product development, and source code 
(including research partnerships);
    b. potential supply chain risks from sub-tier suppliers, 
recognizing that some sub-tier supply chain manufacturers could have 
FOCI with respect to foreign adversaries; and
    c. assets and services critical risk tolerance regarding protecting 
these assets and services from FOCI?
    (A-3) Are non-standard incentives or changes to established 
standard development organizations' SCRM standards (including NIST 800 
series, ISA/IEC 62443, NERC-CIP, and other Cyber Risk Maturity Model 
evaluations/practices) necessary to build capacity to protect source 
code, establish a secure software and firmware development lifecycle, 
and maintain software integrity? How are benchmarks documented and 
tracked, including:
    a. The ability to provide software, firmware, and hardware ``bill 
of materials'' (e.g. NTIA Software Component Transparency [see https://www.ntia.doc.gov/SoftwareTransparency] or equivalent industry norm) and 
track supply chain provenance and white-labeling;
    b. authentication practices that prevent tampering, unauthorized 
production, and counterfeits; and
    c. monitoring and tracking sub-tier supplier's adherence to 
security requirements as part of the SCRM?
    (A-4) What information is available concerning the following: BPS 
electric equipment cyber vulnerability testing standards, analyses of 
vulnerabilities, and information on compromises of BPS electric 
equipment over the last five years, including results of independent 
BPS electric equipment testing and penetration testing of enterprise 
systems for vulnerabilities (including methodology for discovery and 
remediation)?
    a. What process does the energy sector have to share information 
with utilities regarding vulnerabilities and vice versa? Are 
contingency plans in place? How is the effectiveness of vulnerability 
testing and mitigation efforts monitored, tracked, and audited?
    b. Is a record of an analysis of component vulnerabilities and any 
compromises of components and systems maintained for a specific period 
of time (e.g., five years)? If yes, are the results of independent 
component testing and penetration testing of enterprise systems for 
vulnerabilities (including timeline for discovery and remediation) also 
maintained?
    c. How are the results of independent component testing and 
penetration testing of enterprise systems for vulnerabilities 
(including timeline for discovery and remediation) maintained?
    d. How are vulnerabilities identified by external entities 
addressed? How is the distribution of information regarding patching 
security vulnerabilities in the supply chain facilitated?
    e. What insecure by design/vulnerable communication protocols exist 
today that should be retired or cannot be disabled or mitigated from 
BPS electric equipment (examples of protocols include Distributed 
Network Protocol 3 [DNP3], File Transfer Protocol [FTP], Telnet, or 
Modbus)?
    (A-5) What governance of sub-tier vendors do energy sector asset 
owners and/or vendors have in place? Is contract language for Supply 
Chain Security included in procurement contracts? Are metrics for 
supply chain security, along with cost, schedule, and performance 
maintained? What specific guidance should be developed for Integrator/
Installer/Maintenance Service provider activities?
    (A-6) Can energy sector asset owners and/or vendors document the 
level of engagement in information sharing and testing programs that 
identify threats and vulnerabilities and incorporation of indicators of 
compromise (e.g., Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Information 
Sharing and Analysis Organization)? Does the energy sector participate 
in a community for sharing supply chain risks? Does the energy sector 
encourage security related information exchange with external entities, 
including the Federal government?
    (A-7) What physical and logistical role-based access control 
policies have been developed to monitor and restrict access during 
installation when a foreign adversary, or associated foreign-owned, 
foreign-controlled, or foreign-influenced person is installing BPS 
electric equipment at a BPS site in the U.S.? What policies and 
practices exist to ensure installers/integrators effectively protect 
the systems and components during installation and commissioning? What 
policies and practices are in place to ensure that service providers 
(including those providing remote monitoring and management of systems) 
effectively maintain the security protections of the systems and 
components they are monitoring? Does an insider threat program exist?
    (A-8) Are there critical mineral or supply chain materials, and if 
so, what are they? Specify if any of these critical inputs rely on 
foreign sources, and the cause for that reliance, such as lack of 
domestic capability or quality factors. Per Executive Order 13817, the 
Department of Interior prepared The Final List of Critical Materials 
2018, see: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/18/2018-10667/final-list-of-critical-minerals-2018.

B. Economic Analysis

    As this RFI covers the full scope of BPS electric equipment as 
defined in E.O. 13920, the Department seeks information responsive to 
the following questions:
    (B-1) Within the E.O. 13920 definition of BPS electric equipment, 
what are the estimated one-time and recurring costs of developing, 
implementing, and periodically revising compliance plans and procedures 
associated with the Executive Order, including but not limited to:
    a. Evaluating requirements.
    b. Developing compliance plans and frameworks: Supply chain 
documentation, foreign involvement evaluations, risk assessments, and 
process reviews.
    c. Implementing plans: New supplier processes and contractual 
provisions; and supplier audits.
    d. Supporting transaction reviews: Records retention and responding 
to information inquiries.
    e. Negotiating agreements to mitigate concerns raised in connection 
with transactions.
    f. Other compliance costs.
    (B-2) Within the E.O. 13920 definition of BPS electric equipment, 
are there categories of BPS electric equipment that are more reliant on 
vendors likely to become the subject of transaction reviews, and if so, 
what are they? What are the sourcing challenges and cost impacts for 
companies facing prohibited transactions for those BPS electric 
equipment categories?
    (B-3) Does the energy sector have a procedure to identify services, 
components, and/or systems which are or should be covered by E.O. 
13920? If yes, list the services, components, and systems and provide 
the reasoning regarding why they should or should not be covered by 
E.O. 13920.
    (B-4) What unique challenges could E.O. 13920 present to small 
businesses? \1\
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    \1\ Using the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) classifications, the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
defines small businesses in terms of firm revenues or employees. 
SBA's Table of Size Standards can be found at https://www.sba.gov/document/support--table-size-standards.

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III. Submission of Comments

    DOE invites all interested parties to submit in writing by August 
7, 2020, comments and information on matters addressed in this RFI.
    Submitting comments via http://www.regulations.gov. The http://www.regulations.gov web page requires you to provide your name and 
contact information. Your contact information will be viewable to DOE 
only. Your contact information will not be publicly viewable except for 
your first and last names, organization name (if any), and submitter 
representative name (if any). If your comment is not processed properly 
because of technical difficulties, DOE will use this information to 
contact you. If DOE cannot read your comment due to technical 
difficulties and cannot contact you for clarification, DOE may not be 
able to consider your comment.
    However, your contact information will be publicly viewable if you 
include it in the comment or in any documents attached to your comment. 
Any information that you do not want to be publicly viewable should not 
be included in your comment, nor in any document attached to your 
comment. Persons viewing comments will see only first and last names, 
organization names, correspondence containing comments, and any 
documents submitted with the comments.
    Do not submit to http://www.regulations.gov information for which 
disclosure is restricted by statute, such as trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information (hereinafter referred to as 
Confidential Business Information (``CBI'')). Comments submitted 
through http://www.regulations.gov cannot be claimed as CBI. Comments 
received through the website will waive any CBI claims for the 
information submitted. For information on submitting CBI, see the 
Confidential Business Information section.
    DOE processes submissions made through http://www.regulations.gov 
before posting. Normally, comments will be posted within a few days of 
being submitted. However, if large volumes of comments are being 
processed simultaneously, your comment may not be viewable for up to 
several weeks. Please keep the comment tracking number that http://www.regulations.gov provides after you have successfully uploaded your 
comment.
    Submitting comments via email or postal mail. Comments and 
documents submitted via email or postal mail also will be posted to 
http://www.regulations.gov. If you do not want your personal contact 
information to be publicly viewable, do not include it in your comment 
or any accompanying documents. Instead, provide your contact 
information on a cover letter. Include your first and last names, email 
address, telephone number, and optional mailing address. The cover 
letter will not be publicly viewable as long as it does not include any 
comments.
    Include contact information each time you submit comments, data, 
documents, and other information to DOE.
    Comments, data, and other information submitted to DOE 
electronically should be provided in PDF (preferred), Microsoft Word or 
Excel, WordPerfect, or text (ASCII) file format. Provide documents that 
are not secured, written in English, and free of any defects or 
viruses. Documents should not contain special characters or any form of 
encryption and, if possible, they should carry the electronic signature 
of the author.
    Campaign form letters. Please submit campaign form letters by the 
originating organization in batches of between 50 to 500 form letters 
per PDF or as one form letter with a list of supporters' names compiled 
into one or more PDFs. This reduces comment processing and posting 
time.
    Confidential Business Information. According to 10 CFR 1004.11, any 
person submitting information that he or she believes to be 
confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should submit via 
email two well-marked copies: One copy of the document marked 
confidential including all the information believed to be confidential, 
and one copy of the document marked ``non-confidential'' with the 
information believed to be confidential deleted. Submit these documents 
via email. DOE will make its own determination about the confidential 
status of the information and treat it according to its determination.
    It is DOE's policy that all comments may be included in the public 
docket, without change and as received, including any personal 
information provided in the comments (except information deemed to be 
exempt from public disclosure).

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on July 2, 
2020, by Bruce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity, 
pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of Energy. That 
document with the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For 
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of 
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE Federal 
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the 
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document 
of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way 
alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the 
Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on July 2, 2020.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2020-14668 Filed 7-7-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P