[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 122 (Wednesday, June 24, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 37748-37751]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11386]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 16

[CPCLO Order No. 003-2020]


Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation

AGENCY: Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of 
Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Bureau of lnvestigation (FBI), a component of the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ or Department), is finalizing 
without changes its Privacy Act exemption regulations for the system of 
records titled, ``National Crime Information Center (NCIC),'' JUSTICE/
FBI-001, which were published as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
on September 18, 2019. Specifically, the Department's regulations will 
exempt the records maintained in JUSTICE/FBI-001 from one or more 
provisions of the Privacy Act. The exemptions are necessary to avoid 
interference with the FBI's law enforcement and national security 
functions and responsibilities. The Department received only one 
substantive comment on the proposed rule.

DATES: This final rule is effective July 24, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Katherine M. Bond, Assistant General 
Counsel, Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, Office of the General 
Counsel, FBI, Washington, DC, telephone 202-324-3000.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On September 10, 2019, the FBI published in 
the Federal Register a modified System of Records Notice (SORN) for an 
FBI system of records titled, ``National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC),'' JUSTICE/FBI-001, 84 FR 47533. The NCIC is a national criminal 
justice information system linking criminal (and authorized non-
criminal) justice agencies located in the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, U.S. territories and possessions, and selected foreign 
countries to facilitate the cooperative sharing of criminal justice 
information. The NCIC provides a system to receive and maintain 
information contributed by participating agencies relating to criminal 
justice and national security. Information maintained in the NCIC is 
readily accessible for authorized criminal justice purposes by 
authorized users via text-based queries (i.e., using names and other 
descriptive data).
    On September 18, 2019, the FBI published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to amend its existing regulations exempting 
records maintained in JUSTICE/FBI-001 from certain provisions of the 
Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552aG) and (k), and inviting public 
comment on the proposed exemptions. 84 FR 49073. The comment period was 
open through October 18, 2019. DOJ received only one substantive 
comment responsive to the proposed exemptions. That comment, from the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), urged that ``[a]ll of 
these proposals should be withdrawn,'' so that the Department claims no 
Privacy Act exemptions at all for NCIC system of records. EPIC makes a 
number of claims, among which are the following:
     ``The over collection and maintenance of information that 
is unverified and unaccountable with no system for redress leaves 
personal data at a risk.''
     ``The FBI sets forward no reason that it should be able to 
maintain records irrelevant or unnecessary to accomplish a purpose of 
the agency.''
     ``[T]he categories of sources of records at minimum are 
essential in order to keep the government accountable throughout their 
data collection and law enforcement activities.''
     ``The exemptions as currently proposed are needlessly 
overbroad.''
     ``The NCIC has been known to have inaccurate and 
unreliable records, making it particularly unsuitable for vast 
exemptions from regulations designed to protect and optimize the 
accuracy and reliability of information held on people.''
    After consideration of the statements in this public comment from 
EPIC, the Department has determined that, to protect the ability of the 
FBI to properly engage in its law enforcement and national security 
functions, the exemptions as proposed in the NPRM are codified in this 
final rule for the reasons stated below.

Response to Public Comments

    As stated above, the one substantive comment the FBI received 
regarding its NPRM urged the FBI to withdraw its proposed Privacy Act 
exemptions. While, generically, it might be true that ``[t]he over 
collection and maintenance of information that is unverified and

[[Page 37749]]

unaccountable with no system for redress leaves personal data at a 
risk,'' the Department does not agree with this characterization of the 
FBI's activities. Rather than ``over collect,'' the FBI works with 
local, state, federal, and tribal criminal justice partners to 
determine what information is necessary to collect and share to ensure 
that the NCIC contains only information relevant and necessary to 
assist criminal justice agencies in fulfilling their missions. At 
times, due to the reality of law enforcement investigations, it may not 
be possible to know in advance what information is relevant and 
necessary for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. That is one 
reason that Congress, in the Privacy Act, provided for the ability of 
agencies to exempt themselves from certain Privacy Act requirements.
    Further, regarding the assertion that the FBI will be maintaining 
``unverified'' information, NCIC policy includes strict validation 
requirements ensuring that criminal justice agencies periodically 
review their records to ensure to the extent feasible that they are 
accurate, timely, relevant, and complete. If a record is not timely 
validated, it is purged from the active NCIC file and retired. 
Additionally, NCIC policy requires that before any user can take 
official action on active records within the NCIC (e.g., arrest an 
individual, detain a missing person, seize stolen property, charge an 
individual with violation of a protection order, deny the purchase of a 
firearm, deny access to explosives), the user must confirm the validity 
and accuracy of the record with the agency that submitted the record to 
the NCIC. This ensures that agencies do not take action without 
verifying information from the NCIC. In addition, the FBI conducts 
triennial audits of all federal, state, and territorial repositories 
and a representative sample of local agencies to ensure compliance with 
policy. Findings of non-compliance are submitted to the Criminal 
Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board for review. 
NCIC access is subject to termination for egregious violations of 
policy provisions. The NCIC also creates and maintains transaction 
logs, which can be reviewed to detect potential misuse of system data. 
And, regarding redress, the FBI in fact has had in place for many years 
a system for lawful access and amendment of records, detailed at 28 CFR 
part 16.
    In the context of all of these steps taken by the FBI to promote 
data quality and appropriate data use, EPIC states that ``NCIC has been 
known to have inaccurate and unreliable records''--citing its own past 
assertions as support for this statement--and concludes that EPIC's 
allegations make NCIC ``particularly unsuitable for vast [Privacy Act] 
exemptions.'' When establishing the Privacy Act exemptions for law 
enforcement agencies, Congress considered and recognized the potential 
risks of law enforcement systems having inaccurate and unreliable 
records. Due to the nature of the type of work law enforcement agencies 
do and the type of information they must collect to do that work, it is 
not always possible to ensure the accuracy of records when collected. 
What is important is not whether a law enforcement agency may have 
inaccurate or unreliable records in its holdings; rather it is the 
steps taken by the law enforcement agency to promote data quality and 
appropriate data use under the circumstances. As detailed above, FBI 
efforts in this area are eminently reasonable, appropriate, and 
sufficient.
    In response to EPIC's claim that ``[t]he FBI sets forward no reason 
that it should be able to maintain records irrelevant or unnecessary to 
accomplish a purpose of the agency,'' the FBI has not made this claim. 
Nowhere does the FBI assert that it ``should be able to maintain 
records irrelevant or unnecessary to accomplish a purpose of the 
agency.'' The FBI merely states the fact that it is a law enforcement 
agency and must act according to the realities and requirements of law 
enforcement investigations. As stated in the NPRM, relevance and 
necessity are questions of judgment and timing. Information that 
appears relevant and necessary when collected may, after further 
investigation and analysis, be deemed unnecessary. It is only after 
information is placed in the context of a fully completed investigation 
and assessed in that light that its relevancy and necessity to a 
specific investigative activity can be established.
    EPIC states that ``the categories of sources of records at minimum 
are essential in order to keep the government accountable throughout 
their data collection and law enforcement activities.'' This statement 
fails to account for the wealth of public information, including 
information published by the Department and FBI, detailing types of 
information maintained in the NCIC as well as indicating the state, 
local, federal, and tribal law enforcement agency contributors of that 
information. This plethora of publicly available information already 
exists and allows the public to keep the government accountable 
regarding this system of records. As information detailing sources 
becomes more discrete, however, the realities of law enforcement 
agencies and investigations again come into play, including the fact 
that information frequently comes from sensitive sources. As stated in 
the NPRM, should subsection (e)(4)(!) be interpreted to require more 
detail regarding the record sources in this system than has already 
been published in the Federal Register through the SORN documentation, 
exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the sources of 
law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy 
and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide 
information to the FBI.
    EPIC states that ``[t]he exemptions as currently proposed are 
needlessly overbroad.'' On the contrary, in the NPRM and here in the 
Final Rule, the Department explains the need for each exemption. The 
exemptions as taken by FBI are as intended by Congress when it passed 
the Privacy Act, in order to ensure that law enforcement can continue 
to properly function in the face of the many requirements of the 
statute. After careful consideration, Congress allowed for exemptions 
from some requirements and not from others. Rather than acting counter 
to the Privacy Act, the Department and FBI are acting pursuant to it. 
Further, even though the FBI is authorized under the Privacy Act to 
maintain certain exemptions in all cases, the FBI takes seriously the 
privacy interests of the public. As stated in the proposed rulemaking, 
where the FBI determines compliance with an exempted Privacy Act 
provision--including access and amendment provisions--would not appear 
to interfere with or adversely affect interests of the United States or 
other system stakeholders, the FBI at its sole discretion may waive 
such exemption in that circumstance in whole or in part. In each 
circumstance, the FBI considers whether the facts of the request merit 
compliance with an exempted Privacy Act provision(s). In appropriate 
circumstances, as indicated in the Final Rule, the FBI may waive such 
exemptions at its discretion.
    The Department has considered the submitted comment; however, for 
the reasons set forth above and the rationales included in the 
regulations, the Department adopts in this Final Rule the exemptions 
and rationales proposed in the NPRM.

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563--Regulatory Review

    This regulation has been drafted and reviewed in accordance with 
Executive

[[Page 37750]]

Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' section l(b), 
Principles of Regulation, and Executive Order 13563 ``Improving 
Regulation and Regulatory Review'' section 1(b), General Principles of 
Regulation.
    The Department of Justice has determined that this rule is not a 
``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, section 
3(f), and accordingly this rule has not been reviewed by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and 
Budget pursuant to Executive Order 12866.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    This regulation will only impact Privacy Act-protected records, 
which are personal and generally do not apply to an individual's 
entrepreneurial capacity, subject to limited exceptions. Accordingly, 
the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, in accordance with the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this 
regulation and by approving it certifies that this regulation will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

Executive Order 13132 Federalism

    This regulation will not have substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive 
Order 13132, it is determined that this rule does not have sufficient 
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism 
Assessment.

Executive Order 12988--Civil Justice Reform

    This regulation meets the applicable standards set forth in 
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988 to eliminate 
drafting errors and ambiguity, minimize litigation, provide a clear 
legal standard for affected conduct, and promote simplification and 
burden reduction.

Executive Order 13175--Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal 
Governments

    This regulation will have no implications for Indian Tribal 
governments. More specifically, it does not have substantial direct 
effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the 
Federal government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities between the Federal government and Indian tribes. 
Therefore, the consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175 do 
not apply.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This regulation will not result in the expenditure by State, local 
and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of 
$100,000,000, as adjusted for inflation, or more in any one year, and 
it will not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. 
Therefore, no actions were deemed necessary under the provisions of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

Congressional Review Act

    This rule is not a major rule as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804 of the 
Congressional Review Act.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule imposes no information collection or recordkeeping 
requirements.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16

    Administrative practices and procedures, Courts, Freedom of 
information, and the Privacy Act.

    Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5 
U.S.C. 552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order 2940-2008, 28 
CFR part 16 is amended as follows:

PART 16--PRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMATION

0
1. The authority citation for part 16 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 553; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 
534; 31 U.S.C. 3717.


0
2. AmendSec.  16.96 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (g) and (h) and
0
b. Removing paragraph (i).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  16.96  Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems-
limited access.

* * * * *
    (g) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 
552a(c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(l), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and 
(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g):
    (I) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) (JUSTICE/FBI-001).
    (2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in 
the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552aG) and (k). 
Where the FBI determines compliance with an exempted provision would 
not appear to interfere with or adversely affect interests of the 
United States or other system stakeholders, the FBI in its sole 
discretion may waive an exemption, in whole or in part; exercise of 
this discretionary waiver prerogative in a particular matter shall not 
create any entitlement to or expectation of waiver in that matter or 
any other matter. As a condition of discretionary waiver, the FBI in 
its sole discretion may impose any restrictions deemed advisable by the 
FBI (including, but not limited to, restrictions on the location, 
manner, or scope of notice, access or amendment).
    (h) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for 
the following reasons:
    (I) From subsection (c)(3) the requirement that an accounting be 
made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is 
exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because 
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from 
records concerning him/her would specifically reveal law enforcement or 
national security investigative interest in the individual by the FBI 
or agencies that are recipients of the disclosures. Revealing this 
information could compromise ongoing, authorized law enforcement and 
intelligence efforts, particularly efforts to identify and defuse any 
potential acts of terrorism or other potential violations of criminal 
law. Revealing this information could also permit the record subject to 
obtain valuable insight concerning the information obtained during any 
investigation and to take measures to circumvent the investigation 
(e.g., destroy evidence or flee the area to avoid investigation).
    (2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this 
system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection 
(d) as well as the accounting disclosures provision of subsection 
(c)(3). The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate 
records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, 
in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI 
records, it will share that information in appropriate cases.
    (3) From subsection (d), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(8), (f), and (g) 
because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of 
law enforcement and intelligence records and compliance could alert the 
subject of an authorized law enforcement or intelligence activity about 
that particular activity and the investigative interest of the FBI and/
or other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Providing access 
could compromise sensitive law enforcement information; disclose 
information that could constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's 
personal privacy;

[[Page 37751]]

reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; provide 
information that would allow a subject to avoid detection or 
apprehension; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety 
of law enforcement personnel, confidential sources, and witnesses. The 
FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite 
its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole 
discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it 
will share that information in appropriate cases with subjects of the 
information.
    (4) From subsection (e)(l) because it is not always possible to 
know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law 
enforcement and intelligence purposes. Relevance and necessity are 
questions of judgment and timing. For example, what appears rekvant and 
necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed unnecessary. It is 
only after information is assessed that its relevancy and necessity in 
a specific investigative activity can be established.
    (5) From subsections (e)(2) and (3) because it is not feasible to 
comply with these provisions given the nature of this system. The 
majority of the records in this system come from other federal, state, 
local, joint, foreign, tribal, and international agencies; therefore, 
it is not feasible for the FBI to collect information directly from the 
individual or to provide notice. Additionally, the application of this 
provision could present a serious impediment to the FBI's 
responsibilities to detect, deter, and prosecute crimes and to protect 
the national security. Application of these provisions would put the 
subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and allow the 
subject an opportunity to engage in conduct intended to impede that 
activity or avoid apprehension.
    (6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection 
is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in 
this system than has already been published in the Federal Register 
through the SORN documentation. Should the subsection be so 
interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the 
sources of law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect 
the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who 
provide information to the FBI.
    (7) From subsection (e)(S) because in the collection of information 
for authorized law enforcement and intelligence purposes it is 
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, 
relevant, timely, and complete. With time, additional facts, or 
analysis, information may acquire new significance. The restrictions 
imposed by subsection (e)(S) would limit the ability of trained 
investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in 
reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal 
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. Although the FBI 
has claimed this exemption, it continuously works with its federal, 
state, local, tribal, and international partners to maintain the 
accuracy of records to the greatest extent practicable. The FBI does so 
with established policies and practices. The criminal justice and 
national security communities have a strong operational interest in 
using up-to-date and accurate records and will foster relationships 
with partners to further this interest.

    Dated: May 21, 2020.
Peter A. Winn,
Acting Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, United States 
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2020-11386 Filed 6-23-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-02-P