[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 120 (Monday, June 22, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 37364-37376]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11348]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 1

[MD Docket No. 19-105; MD Docket No. 20-105; FCC 20-64; FRS 16782]


Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2020

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final actions.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) acts on several proposals that will impact FY 2020 
regulatory fees.

DATES: These final actions are effective July 22, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roland Helvajian, Office of Managing 
Director at (202) 418-0444.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order, FCC 20-64, MD Docket No. 19-105, and MD Docket No. 20-105, 
adopted on May 12, 2019 and released on May 13, 2020. The full text of 
this document is available for public inspection and copying during 
normal business hours in the FCC Reference Center (Room CY-A257), 445 
12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554, or by downloading the text from 
the Commission's website at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0906/FCC-17-111A1.pdf.

I. Administrative Matters

A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA),\1\ 
the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(FRFA) relating to this Report and Order. The FRFA is located towards 
the end of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See 5 U.S.C. 603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C. 601-612, has been 
amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 (SBREFA), Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). 
The SBREFA was enacted as Title II of the Contract with America 
Advancement Act of 1996 (CWAAA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Final Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

    2. This document does not contain new or modified information 
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(PRA), Public Law 104-13. In addition, therefore, it does not contain 
any new or modified information collection burden for small business 
concerns with fewer than 25 employees, pursuant to the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(4).

C. Congressional Review Act

    3. The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and 
Budget, concurs that these rules are non-major under the Congressional 
Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of this 
Report & Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

II. Introduction

    4. In this Report and Order, we follow through on our proposal in 
the FY 2019 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(FNPRM) \2\ to level the playing field between domestic and foreign 
licensed space stations by assessing a regulatory fee on commercial 
space stations licensed by other administrations (non-U.S. licensed 
space stations) with United States market access, among other things. 
We also adjust the FTE allocation for the international bearer circuit 
(IBC) category, and we decline to grant a categorically lower 
regulatory fee for VHF stations to account for signal limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 
2019, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 
FCC Rcd 8199 (2019) (FY 2019 Report and Order (84 FR 50890 
(September 26, 2019) and FY 2019 FNPRM (84 FR 56734 (October 23, 
2019))).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Report and Order

    1. In this Report and Order, we level the playing field among space 
stations by assessing a regulatory fee on non-U.S. licensed space 
stations with United States market access and including those non-U.S. 
licensed space stations in the current regulatory fee categories for 
geostationary (GSO) and non-geostationary (NGSO) space stations. We 
impose this fee regardless of whether the non-U.S. licensed space 
station operator obtains the market access through a declaratory ruling 
or through an earth station applicant as a point of communication. We 
also take the related action of adding four FTEs into the satellite 
regulatory fee category to account for the work that benefits these new 
fee payors. We further adjust the FTE allocation for the international 
bearer circuit (IBC) category from 6.9 FTEs to eight FTEs to reflect 
direct FTE work in the International Bureau that benefits the fee 
payors in the IBC regulatory fee category. Finally, we decline to 
categorically lower regulatory fees for VHF stations to account for 
signal limitations.

[[Page 37365]]

A. Assessing Regulatory Fees on Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations With 
U.S. Market Access

    2. The Commission currently assesses regulatory fees on GSO and 
NGSO space stations licensed by the Commission but does not assess 
regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations that have been 
granted market access to the United States.\3\ The issue of assessing 
regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations with U.S. market 
access has been raised several times previously. In the FY 1999 Report 
and Order, the Commission declined to adopt such a fee.\4\ In 2013 and 
again in 2014, the Commission sought comment on assessing regulatory 
fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations with U.S. market access,\5\ 
but the Commission declined to adopt such a fee at the time because it 
might ``raise[ ] significant issues regarding our authority to assess 
such a fee as well as the policy implications if other countries 
decided to follow our example.'' \6\ The following year, the Commission 
observed that excluding non-U.S. licensed satellite operators from fees 
amounted to a subsidy of such operators by U.S. licensed satellite 
operators.\7\ The Commission thus concluded that the four FTEs working 
on market access petitions or other matters involving non-U.S. licensed 
space stations should be removed from the regulatory fee assessments 
for U.S. licensed space stations and considered indirect for regulatory 
fee purposes.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Under the Commission's rules, a satellite licensed by an 
administration other than the United States may seek to communicate 
with satellite earth stations in the United States through a process 
called market access. 47 CFR 25.137. Market access is either 
requested by the space station operator through a petition for 
declaratory ruling from the Commission that market access by the 
non-U.S. licensed space station is in the public interest, or 
through an application by a U.S. licensed earth station to 
communicate with the non-U.S. licensed space station. 47 CFR 
25.137(a). In either case, the Commission does not license the space 
station, but the request for U.S. market access requires the 
submission and review of the same legal and technical information 
for the non-U.S. licensed space station as would be required in a 
license application for that space station. 47 CFR 25.137(b).
    \4\ Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 
1999, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 9868, 9883, paragraph 39 (1999) 
(79 FR 37982, paragraphs 53-56 (July 3, 2014) (FY 1999 Report and 
Order).
    \5\ Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 
2014, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Second Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 6417, 6433-34, paragraphs 
47-50 (2014) (79 FR 37982, paragraphs 53-56 (July 3, 2014)) (FY 2014 
NPRM); Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 
2013, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd 7790, 7809-810, paragraphs 47-49 (2013) (78 
FR 34612, paragraphs 53-55 (June 10, 2013)) (FY 2013 NPRM).
    \6\ Assessment and Collection for Regulatory Fees for Fiscal 
Year 2014, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd at 10781, paragraph 34 (79 FR 54190 
(September 11, 2014)) (FY 2014 Report and Order).
    \7\ Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 
2015, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 
FCC Rcd at 10278, paragraph 24 (2015) (80 FR 55775, paragraphs 24-26 
(September 17, 2015)) (FY 2015 Report and Order).
    \8\ FY 2015 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 10278, paragraph 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The issue of assessing regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed 
space stations with U.S. market access has been raised several times 
since Congress originally adopted the statutory schedule of regulatory 
fees originally in 1993.\9\ In exercising our Congressional mandate to 
collect regulatory fees each fiscal year, we proceed with careful 
consideration and make changes in our process only after fully 
developing the record. This may mean, as it did here, that the 
Commission considers the adoption of a new fee category or a change in 
categories multiple times and only proceeds with making a change when 
it develops sufficient basis for making the change. This meticulous 
approach to making changes moreover serves the goal of ensuring that 
our actions in assessing regulatory fees are fair, administrable, and 
sustainable.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Section 6002(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (hereinafter, ``1993 Budget Act''). See Public Law 103-66, 
Title VI, 6002(a), 107 Stat. 397 (approved August 10, 1993). 
Congress made subsequent minor amendments to the schedule.
    \10\ See FY 2012 NPRM at 8464-65, paragraphs 14-16 (77 FR 29275 
(May 17, 2012)). The concept of administrability includes the 
difficulty in collecting regulatory fees under a system that could 
have unpredictable dramatic shifts in assessed fees in certain 
categories from year to year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. In the FY 2019 FNPRM, the Commission again sought comment on 
assessing regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations with U.S. 
market access, noting that the International Bureau's policy, 
regulatory, international, user information, and enforcement activities 
all benefit non-U.S. licensed space stations that access the U.S. 
market.\11\ Non-U.S. licensed space stations are monitored to ensure 
that their operators satisfy all conditions placed on their grant of 
U.S. market access, including space station implementation milestones 
and operational requirements, and are subject to enforcement action if 
the conditions are not met.\12\ The Commission specifically sought 
comment on whether ``we should or must assess regulatory fees on non-
U.S. licensed space stations serving the United States under section 9, 
given that non-U.S. licensed space stations appear to benefit from the 
Commission's regulatory activities in much the same manner as U.S. 
licensed space stations.'' \13\ The Commission noted that its initial 
decision in 1999 was premised on the Commission's understanding at the 
time that its authority reached only space station ``licensees,'' i.e., 
those licensed under Title III. We observed that section 9 of 
Communications Act, as amended by the RAY BAUM'S Act, does not mention 
``licensees'' but only the ``number of units'' in each payor category--
and that the ``unit'' used for assessing satellite space station 
regulatory fees is ``per operational station in geostationary orbit'' 
or ``per operational system in non-geostationary orbit,'' units that do 
not distinguish between the government issuing the license.\14\ The 
Commission also sought comment on reallocating four International 
Bureau indirect FTEs as direct, if regulatory fees are adopted for non-
U.S. licensed space stations.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8212, paragraph 63.
    \12\ Id.
    \13\ Id. at 8213, paragraph 64.
    \14\ Id.
    \15\ Id. at 8214, paragraph 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. We conclude that we can and should adopt regulatory fees for 
non-U.S. licensed space stations with U.S. market access. On the 
question of whether we may assess regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed 
space stations with U.S. market access, we start with the statutory 
text. The Act contemplates that we impose fees on regulatees that 
reflect the ``benefits provided to the payor of the fee by the 
Commission's activities.'' \16\ The Act specifically contemplates the 
subset of regulatees that must be exempted from regulatory fees in a 
section entitled ``Parties to which fees are not applicable.'' \17\

[[Page 37366]]

Notably, Congress did not include operators of non-U.S. licensed space 
stations with U.S. market access in that list, and thus did not require 
the Commission to exempt them from an assessment of regulatory fees. 
Moreover, the Commission's authority to waive regulatory fees is 
limited to specific instances and the Commission has consistently 
rejected consideration of waiving the regulatory fee for classes of 
regulatees.\18\ Given the framework where the Commission has a mandate 
to collect fees from its regulatees, coupled with a limited list of 
exempt entities and narrow waiver authority, nothing in the text of the 
statute supports maintaining a blanket exception from regulatory fees 
for non-U.S. licensed space stations granted market access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 47 U.S.C. 159(d).
    \17\ The statute exempts governmental and nonprofit entities, 
amateur radio operators, and noncommercial radio and television 
stations are exempt from regulatory fees under section 9(e)(1). 47 
U.S.C. 159(e)(1); 47 CFR 1.1162. Moreover, we note that the 
exemption for noncommercial radio ad television stations, which 
Congress added to the statute in the RAY BAUM's Act, was a 
codification of an exemption that the Commission had previously 
established in its rules. See 47 CFR 1.1162(e) (1994); also compare 
current section 9(e) with the now-deleted section 9(h). The 
Commission adopted the exemption based on its interpretation of the 
legislative history and Congressional direction. See Implementation 
of Section 9 of the Communications Act, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd 6957 at paragraphs 18 through 22 (59 FR 12570 
(March 17, 1994)) (explaining noncommercial broadcast exemption 
based on legislative history and wording of the statute) (1994); 
Implementation of Section 9 of the Communications Act, Report and 
Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 533 at paragraphs 13, 20-21 (59 FR 30984 (June 16, 
1994)) (1994). In addition, Congress also codified in the RAY BAUM's 
Act the Commission's de minimis rule through the adoption of new 
section 9(e)(2). See FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8206-
07, paragraphs 46 through 47.
    \18\ 47 CFR 1.1166.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. U.S. licensed operators agree, arguing that we have the 
authority to impose regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space station 
operators with market access because section 9 provides that the 
purpose of regulatory fees is to recover the costs of the Commission's 
activities taking ``into account factors that are reasonably related to 
the benefits provided to the payor of the fee by the Commission's 
activities.'' \19\ Commenters contend that the use of the term ``number 
of units'' in the amended section 9(c)(1)(A), instead of ``licensee,'' 
broadens the language of the statute so that it appears to be 
applicable to both U.S. licensed and non-U.S. licensed space 
stations.\20\ SpaceX contends that the Commission ``must consider 
increases and decreases only in the `number of units' of operational 
GSO satellites and NGSO systems regardless of licensing 
administration.'' \21\ Based on the plain language of statute--and the 
absence of any express limitation that we impose regulatory fees only 
on ``licensees'' or that we exempt non-U.S. licensed space stations 
with U.S. market access, we conclude that there is no statutory bar to 
adopting a new regulatory fee for non-U.S. licensed space stations with 
U.S. market access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ U.S. Satellite Licensees Comments at 8 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
159(d)). These joint commenters are EchoStar Satellite Services, LLC 
(EchoStar), Hughes Network Systems, LLC (Hughes), Intelsat License 
LLC (Intelsat), and Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX).
    \20\ U.S. Satellite Licensees Comments at 8-9; SpaceX Comments 
at 4-7; SpaceX Reply Comments at 6.
    \21\ SpaceX Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. We dismiss the arguments of some commenters that focus on 
whether Congress intended to expand our authority by removing the word 
``licensees'' in the amended section 9.\22\ Telesat argues that ``[t]he 
number of `units' says nothing about which entities are subject to the 
Commission's regulatory fee authority in the first instance.'' \23\ 
Inmarsat contends that ``the plain language of RAY BAUM'S Act is not 
directed to the entities from which the Commission may collect fees, 
but the manner in which the Commission may adjust fees.'' \24\ Such 
arguments, however, are a double-edged sword because the word 
``licensees'' in that sentence was the only textual hook (under prior 
law) that such advocates had for arguing that the Commission's 
authority was limited to assessing fees on licensees. And so, although 
we tend to agree that this change does not imply a change in who could 
be assessed, we also find that the use of the word ``licensee'' did not 
imply that only licensees could be assessed. In other words, whether 
Congress intended to expand the reach of regulatory fees with this 
language is irrelevant. The question instead remains whether Congress 
precluded us from imposing regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space 
stations that clearly benefit from market access to the United States 
and the activities of the Commission--and nothing in the language of 
the Act suggests Congress intended to preclude such regulatees from the 
ambit of regulatory fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ OneWeb Comments at 4-7; Telesat Canada (Telesat) Comments 
at 3-4 & Reply Comments at 9-10; Myriota Comments at 5-6; Eutelsat 
Comments at 5; Kepler Communications (Kepler) Reply Comments at 2-3; 
Inmarsat Reply Comments at 2-3.
    \23\ Telesat Comments at 10.
    \24\ Inmarsat Reply Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Absent any textual hook, commenters turn to the legislative 
history of section 9 \25\ and argue that the Commission has taken this 
position previously.\26\ Indeed, in the FY 1999 Report and Order, the 
Commission based its conclusion on legislative history from 1991.\27\ 
We find that it is appropriate to re-evaluate this conclusion at this 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Telesat Comments at 2; Eutelsat Comments at 4-5; Inmarsat 
Reply Comments at 2-3.
    \26\ FY 1999 Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 9883, paragraph 39; 
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 1995, 
Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 13512, 13550, paragraph 110 (1995) (60 
FR 34004, paragraphs 16-18 (June 29, 1995)) (FY 1995 Report and 
Order).
    \27\ FY 1999 Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 9883, paragraph 39; 
FY 1995 Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 13550, paragraph 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. The legislative history referred to in the FY 1999 Report and 
Order and the FY 1995 Report and Order is found in the House and Senate 
Reports, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102 H. Rpt. 207, September 
17, 1991, in which the Committee stated: ``The Committee intends that 
fees in this category be assessed on operators of U.S. facilities, 
consistent with FCC jurisdiction. Therefore, these fees will apply only 
to space stations directly licensed by the Commission under Title III 
of the Communications Act. Fees will not be applied to space stations 
operated by international organizations subject to the International 
Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. Section 288 et seq.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ House and Senate Reports, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
102 H. Rpt. 207, at 33 (Sept. 17, 1991). The language of the 1991 
House and Senate Report was incorporated by reference in the 
Conference Report accompanying the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Act, 
which included the regulatory fee program. See Conference Report H. 
Rept. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1993); see also FY 1995 
Report and Order at 13550. The 1991 language related to a comparable 
bill that passed the House in 1991 but was not passed into law. See 
PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The 
Conference Report accompanying the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Act 
did not provide any statement on space station regulatory fees 
beyond incorporating by reference the language from 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. To understand these committee reports, it is helpful to 
recognize that in 1991 there was a very different marketplace and 
regulatory environment than now exists in 2020. In 1991, U.S. licensed 
space stations operated as either domestic satellites (domsats) \29\ or 
international systems (separate satellite systems).\30\ Satellite 
services in the United States, however, were mainly provided by 
INTELSAT and INMARSAT, which were treaty-based international 
governmental organizations. Both were the product of a unique set of 
initiatives undertaken by the United States and other countries to 
develop the global communications satellite systems. As a result, they 
both benefited from a framework of protections based in statute,\31\ 
treaty,

[[Page 37367]]

and Commission policy that protected and preserved the status of each 
international governmental organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 22 FCC 2d 86 
(1970). The Commission's Transborder Policy did permit the use of 
domsats for certain international services based on criteria set 
forth in a letter dated July 23, 1981 from then Under Secretary of 
State James L. Buckley to then FCC Chairman Mark Fowler (Buckley 
Letter). The Buckley Letter stated that domsats could be used for 
public international telecommunications with nearby countries where: 
(1) INTELSAT could not provide the service; or (2) it would be 
clearly uneconomical or impractical to provide the planned service 
over the INTELSAT system. See Transborder Satellite Video Services, 
88 FCC2d 258 (1981); Satellite Business Systems, 88 FCC2d 195 
(1981).
    \30\ Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International 
Communications, 101 FCC2d 1046 (1985), recon. grtd, 61 R.R. 2d 649 
(1986), further recon. grtd 1 FCC Rcd 439 (1986). The term 
``separate satellite system'' refers to U.S. licensed international 
systems that are owned and operated separately from the INTELSAT 
global satellite system.
    \31\ The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 declared it U.S. 
policy to join with other countries to create a commercial, global 
communications satellite system. Public Law 87-624, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Aug. 31, 1962), 76 Stat. 419. Similarly, the International 
Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act of 1978 declared it U.S. 
policy to provide for U.S. participation in INMARSAT in order to 
develop a global maritime satellite system that will meet the 
maritime commercial and safety needs of the United States and 
foreign countries. Public Law 95-564, 92 Stat. 2392 (1978). The 
statutes provided that COMSAT would be the U.S. signatory to both 
INTELSAT and INMARSAT. COMSAT, itself, had its own unique status 
under treaties. All three entities were privatized by 2000/2001 in 
accordance with the requirements of the ORBIT Act. For a review of 
the privatization process for these entities, refer to the FCC's 
multiple ORBIT Act reports. See, e.g., FCC Report to Congress as 
Required by the ORBIT Act, 15 FCC Rcd 11288 (2000); FCC Report to 
Congress as Required by the ORBIT Act, 16 FCC Rcd 12810 (2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    11. In this context, the phrase ``space stations operated by 
international organizations subject to the International Organizations 
Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. Section 288 et seq.'' used in the 1991 
legislative history referred to INTELSAT and INMARSAT, which at that 
time were international governmental organizations formed as a result 
of international treaties and with explicit support by the United 
States through statutory and regulatory mechanisms.\32\ This conclusion 
is borne out by the focus in the same legislative history on licenses 
issued directly by the FCC (as opposed to indirect regulation of 
provision of INTELSAT and INMARSAT services through licenses issued to 
COMSAT) and on the International Organization Immunities Act, which 
provides certain exemptions, immunities, and privileges to 
international organizations and their employees, such as exemption from 
custom duties and internal-revenue taxes,\33\ and which applied to both 
INTELSAT and INMARSAT as international governmental organizations. 
Further, it was not until 1997 that the Commission adopted a formal 
process for granting market access to non-U.S. licensed space 
stations.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Communications Satellite Corp. v. FCC, 836 F.2d 623 (1988) 
(providing a helpful description of the statutory and treaty-based 
genesis of INTELSAT, and the complicated regulatory framework 
whereby it provided international services to the U.S. domestic 
market); Satellites that Form a Global Communications System in 
Geostationary Orbit, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization, 15 
FCC Rcd 15460, recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd 25234 (2000), further 
proceedings, 16 FCC Rcd 12280 (2001). As such, they had the unique 
circumstance that their global satellite systems were not licensed 
by any national licensing authority.
    \33\ 22 U.S.C. 288a (Privileges, exemptions, and immunities of 
international organizations).
    \34\ The adoption by the United States in 1997 of the WTO 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services obligated the United 
States to open its satellite markets to foreign systems licensed by 
other WTO member countries. Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) (April 30, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 336 (1997) 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1998). The Commission therefore adopted 
procedures to give satellite systems licensed by other countries 
access to the U.S. market. Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory 
Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide 
Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United States, 
Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 24094 (1997) (62 FR 64167 (December 4, 
1997)) (DISCO II). Prior to the adoption of DISCO II, the Commission 
allowed very limited provision of service in the U.S. through non-
U.S. licensed space stations only upon a showing that existing U.S. 
domestic satellite capacity was inadequate to satisfy specific 
service requirements. Letter from Bertram Rein, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State, to Kenneth Williamson, Minister of Embassy of 
Canada (Nov. 7, 1972). See also Letter from Thomas Tycz, Chief, 
Satellite and Radiocommunication Division, F.C.C. International 
Bureau, to Teresa Baer, Attorney, Latham & Watkins (Feb. 13, 1996) 
(confirming verbal grant of special temporary authority for Hughes 
Communications Galaxy, Inc. to lease capacity from a Brazilian 
satellite to provide domestic U.S. service).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    12. Today, there are many commercial non-U.S. licensed satellite 
companies offering service in the United States. The two International 
Government Organizations operating satellites at that time--INTELSAT 
and INMARSAT--are no longer International Governmental Organizations 
but instead are commercial enterprises. INTELSAT became a private 
company in 2001, Intelsat, Ltd., after 37 years as an International 
Governmental Organization.\35\ Intelsat's corporate headquarters are in 
Luxembourg and the United States, and it currently has a fleet of more 
than 50 satellites.\36\ INMARSAT, now Inmarsat, Inc., is headquartered 
in London, England, has offices in over 40 countries, and owns and 
operates 13 satellites.\37\ Other commercial non-U.S. licensed 
satellite companies include Eutelsat Communications SA, a public 
corporation, which has 38 satellites, is headquartered in France,\38\ 
and has satellites licensed by France and other countries, including 
the United States; \39\ and Telesat, a private Canadian satellite 
company, with 16 satellites.\40\ These companies, and others, have U.S. 
market access and compete with the U.S. licensed satellite companies 
such as commenters EchoStar Satellite Services (EchoStar) and Space 
Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). We find that the 1991 legislative 
history \41\ purportedly limiting regulatory fees to U.S. licensed 
satellites is no longer relevant because in stating that ``[f]ees will 
not be applied to space stations operated by international 
organizations'' it was not exempting from regulatory fees commercial 
non-U.S. licensed satellites with general U.S. market access, which did 
not exist at that time, but two International Governmental 
Organizations that no longer exist. In other words, we find that the 
legislative history of the Act poses no bar to assessing regulatory 
fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations with U.S. market access. 
Operators of non-U.S. licensed space stations contend that Congress did 
in fact contemplate certain circumstances in which non-US licensed 
space stations could be used to provide service in the United 
States.\42\ But at that time, Congress could not have been 
contemplating non-U.S. licensed space stations that provide commercial 
service in the United States on an ongoing, unrestricted basis under 
the same regulatory framework as their U.S. licensed counterparts.\43\ 
The circumstances that the operators cite consisted of very limited 
provision of service in the U.S. through non-U.S. licensed space 
stations upon a showing that existing U.S. domestic satellite capacity 
was inadequate to satisfy specific service requirements.\44\ Such case-
by-case approval of use of a non-U.S. licensed satellite on a 
bilateral, government-to-government basis to provide limited services 
was much more rare, and of a very different nature, than the 
regulations that the Commission adopted years later to permit U.S. 
market access by non-U.S. licensed space stations.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See http://www.intelsat.com/about-us/history/.
    \36\ See http://www.intelsat.com/global-network/satellites/overview/.
    \37\ See https://www.inmarsat.com/about-us/our-technology/our-satellites/.
    \38\ See https://www.eutelsat.com/en/group/our-history.html.
    \39\ Eutelsat Comments at 1.
    \40\ See https://www.telesat.com/services.
    \41\ SpaceX observes that this legislative history is nearly 30 
years old and ``extremely dated.'' SpaceX Reply Comments at 6-7.
    \42\ Letter from Joseph A. Godles, Attorney for Telesat Canada, 
et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC (filed April 22, 2020) 
(Godles April 22 Ex Parte).
    \43\ See DISCO II, 12 FCC Rcd at 24098, paragraph 7 (stating 
that ``[a]s required by Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended (Communications Act), we will examine all requests to 
determine whether grant of authority is consistent with the public 
interest, convenience and necessity.'' See also DISCO II, 12 FCC Rcd 
at 24098, paragraph 7, n.7 (citing 47 U.S.C. 301, et seq.).
    \44\ See footnote [49], supra.
    \45\ In 1993, the Commission considered and rejected the 
adoption of the type of market access provisions that the Commission 
would adopt several years later. Amendment of the Commission's Rules 
to Establish Rules & Policies Pertaining to A Non-Voice, Non-
Geostationary Mobile-Satellite Serv., Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 
8450, 8454 paragraph 13 (1993) (58 FR 68053 (December 23, 1993)) 
(adopting rules clarifying ``the basic tenets that [non-voice, non-
geostationary orbit satellite service] transceivers operating in the 
United States must communicate with or through U.S. authorized space 
stations only, and that such communications must be authorized as 
well by the space station licensee or an authorized vendor'' and 
explicitly rejecting a proposal that the FCC ``devise a rule that 
will allow domestically authorized user transceivers to access 
foreign-licensed [non-voice, non-geostationary orbit satellite 
service] space station systems'' stating that ``[w]e do not believe 
that this type of arrangement should be dealt with by regulation.'') 
(emphasis added).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 37368]]

    13. Non-U.S. licensed space station operators contend that 
Congressional silence subsequent to the Commission's statements 
regarding the legislative history of section 9 presumes Congress's 
approval of the Commission's prior interpretation and argue that the 
``acquiescence doctrine'' supports their position.\46\ While this 
doctrine recognizes that Congressional silence may have some bearing on 
the interpretation of a statute, it neither requires that an agency's 
interpretation be cemented in stone if not overtaken by subsequent 
legislative action, nor forecloses an agency from changing its 
interpretation of a statute and how the legislative history should 
inform such interpretation,\47\ no matter how longstanding, 
particularly when the prior interpretation is based on error.\48\ Here 
we acknowledge a change in our interpretation of the legislative 
history underlying section 9 based on a fuller and more accurate 
analysis of the context of the legislative history at the time it was 
adopted.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See Godles April. 22 Ex Parte at 3.
    \47\ Courts do not uniformly embrace the proposition that 
Congressional silence denotes acquiescence. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 
F.2d 349, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (``We begin by noting that 
attributing legal significance to Congressional inaction is a 
dangerous business''), citing Power Reactor Development Co. v. 
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO, 367 U.S. 396, 408-10 (1961). The Supreme Court has said that 
Congressional failure to repudiate particular decisions ``frequently 
betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis'' rather than 
conscious choice, Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 n.21 (1969) 
and ``affords the most dubious foundation for drawing positive 
inferences,'' United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960) 
(Harlan, J.). See also Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 533 
(1947) (``The doctrine of legislative acquiescence is at best only 
an auxiliary tool for use in interpreting ambiguous statutory 
provisions'').
    \48\ Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (``We 
note initially that an administrative agency is permitted to change 
its interpretation of a statute, especially where the prior 
interpretation is based on error, no matter how longstanding.'') 
(internal citations omitted). Similarly, an agency may change its 
policies and standards, so long as it provides a reasoned 
explanation for change. See, e.g., FCC vs. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009); National Labor Relations Board v. 
CNN America, Inc., 865 F.3d 740, 751 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
    \49\ We also note that when Congress recently re-visited section 
9 as part of the RAY BAUM'S Act, it did not elect to amend the list 
of entities exempted from assessment of regulatory fees to include 
non-U.S. licensed space stations. Although non-U.S. licensed space 
station operators state that ``[n]othing in Ray Baum's Act, or in 
the associated legislative history, evidences any intent to alter 
the FCC's understanding that its authority to impose regulatory fees 
on space stations is limited to those licensed pursuant to Title 
III,'' Godles April 22 Ex Parte at 4, it could equally be said that 
Congress demonstrated no intent to endorse our prior interpretation 
or reiterate some intent to exempt non-U.S. licensed space stations 
in the legislative history of the RAY BAUM'S Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    14. On the policy question of whether we should assess regulatory 
fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations with U.S. market access, we 
start with the fact that these non-U.S. licensed space stations benefit 
from the Commission's regulatory activities in much the same manner as 
U.S. licensees.\50\ Operators of U.S. licensed space stations argue 
that non-U.S. licensed operators consume, and benefit from, Commission 
resources just as do U.S. licensees.\51\ They estimate that nearly half 
of all satellite space station authorizations granted between 2014 and 
2018 (30 of 62) were filed by non-U.S. operators \52\ and that non-U.S. 
operators participate actively in Commission rulemaking proceedings and 
benefit from Commission monitoring and enforcement activities.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8213, paragraph 64.
    \51\ See, e.g., U.S. Satellite Licensees Comments at 1-2.
    \52\ In addition, they note that there are more market access 
requests than new satellite applications; in 2019 there were nine 
new market access requests, but only six new U.S. satellite license 
applications. U.S. Satellite Licensees Reply Comments at 2-3.
    \53\ U.S. Satellite Licensees Reply Comments at 2. Furthermore, 
SpaceX highlights that Eutelsat and Telesat are also involved in a 
proceeding to repurpose C-band satellite spectrum in which these 
non-U.S. operators and others have argued that they may not be 
denied access to portions of the 3700-4200 GHz band in the United 
States without significant compensation. SpaceX Reply Comments at 2-
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    15. Certain non-U.S. licensed space stations argue that they should 
not contribute regulatory fees because the Commission incurs no costs 
regulating them and that non-U.S. licensed space stations do not 
benefit from the FCC's regulatory activities, including international 
coordination and enforcement activities.\54\ Inmarsat contends that 
non-U.S. licensed satellites do not benefit from FCC regulatory 
activities because oversight of their operations is accomplished by the 
country that licenses the satellite, not by the FCC.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Eutelsat Comments at 2-3 (``Foreign-licensed satellite 
operators do not receive a Commission license or the benefits that 
come with it.''); Myriota Comments at 3 (``Foreign-licensed 
satellite system operators do not receive an FCC space station 
license or the significant benefits associated with it. . . .''); 
Eutelsat Comments at 3 (``While [compliance] oversight is ongoing, 
the administrative burden is both minimal and conducted for the 
benefit of United States space and earth station licensees.''); 
Myriota Comments at 3 (``Although [compliance] oversight is ongoing, 
however, the actual administrative cost of such monitoring is 
minimal and imposing a recurring regulatory fee to recover these de 
minimis costs would not be appropriate.''); Inmarsat Reply Comments 
at 4 (``[Non-U.S. licensed space stations] do not receive the 
benefit of United States-led coordination negotiations, relying 
instead on the country of licensure.'').
    \55\ Inmarsat Reply Comments at 4 (``Spacecraft maintenance, 
end-of-life, and orbital debris mitigation are supervised not by the 
United States, but by the administration issuing the license.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    16. We find that the Commission devotes significant resources to 
processing the growing number of market access petitions of non-U.S. 
licensed satellites and that they benefit from much of the same 
oversight and regulation by the Commission as the U.S. licensed 
satellites. For example, processing a petition for market access 
requires evaluation of the same legal and technical information as 
required of U.S. licensed applicants. The operators of non-U.S. 
licensed space stations also benefit from the Commission's oversight 
efforts regarding all space and earth station operations in the U.S. 
market, since enforcement of Commission rules and policies in 
connection with all operators--whether licensed by the United States or 
otherwise--provides a fair and safe environment for all participants in 
the U.S. marketplace. Likewise, the Commission's adjudication, 
rulemaking, and international coordination efforts benefit all U.S. 
marketplace participants by evaluating and minimizing the risks of 
radiofrequency interference, increasing the number of participants in 
the U.S. satellite market, opening up additional frequency bands for 
use by satellite services, providing a level and uniform regime for 
mitigating the danger of orbital debris, and streamlining Commission 
rules that apply to all providers of satellite services in the United 
States, whether through U.S. licensed or non-U.S. licensed space 
stations.\56\ The active

[[Page 37369]]

participation of operators of non-U.S. licensed space stations in these 
adjudications and rulemakings--either individually or through 
involvement in industry trade organizations--demonstrates that they 
recognize benefits from Commission action to their operations within 
the U.S. market, since they would not participate in such proceedings 
if they held no possibility of benefit to them.\57\ Thus, the 
significant benefits to non-U.S. licensed satellites with market access 
support including them in regulatory fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8212-13, paragraph 
63 (citing Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, IB 
Docket No. 18-313, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order on 
Reconsideration, 33 FCC Rcd 11352 (2018) (84 FR 4742 (February 19, 
2019)) (Orbital Debris NPRM); Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the 
Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Use of Earth Stations in Motion 
Communicating with Non-Geostationary Orbit Space Stations in 
Frequency Bands Allocated to the Fixed-Satellite Service, IB Docket 
No. 18-315, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11416 (2018) 
(83 FR 67180 (December 28, 2018)) (ESIM NPRM); Amendment of the 
Commission's Policies and Rules for Processing Applications in the 
Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, IB Docket No. 06-160, Second 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11303 (2018) 84 FR 2126 
(February 6, 2019); Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the Commission's 
Rules to Facilitate the Use of Earth Stations in Motion 
Communicating with Geostationary Orbit Space Stations in Frequency 
Bands Allocated to the Fixed Satellite Service, IB Docket No 17-95, 
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC 
Rcd 9327 (2018) (84 FR 53630 (October 8, 2019) and 84 FR 5654 
(February 22, 2019)); Further Streamlining Part 25 Rules Governing 
Satellite Services, IB Docket No. 18-314, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11502 (2018) (84 FR 638 (January 31, 2019)) 
(Part 25 Further Streamlining NPRM); Streamlining Licensing 
Procedures for Small Satellites, IB Docket No. 18-86, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking 33 FCC Rcd 4152 (2018) (83 FR 24064 (May 24, 
2018)); Update to Parts 2 and 25 Concerning Non-Geostationary, 
Fixed-Satellite Service Systems and Related Matters, IB Docket No. 
16-408, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
32 FCC Rcd 7809 (2017) (82 FR 59972 (December 18, 2017) and 82 FR 
52869 (November 15, 2017)); Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the 
Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Use of Earth Stations in Motion 
Communicating with Geostationary Orbit Space Stations in Frequency 
Bands Allocated to the Fixed-Satellite Service, IB Docket No. 17-95, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 4239 (2017) (82 FR 27652 
(June 16, 2017)).
    \57\ Market access recipients filed comments in nearly all of 
the Commission's recent satellite rulemaking proceedings. See, e.g., 
Comments of WorldVu Satellites Limited d/b/a OneWeb, SES Americom 
and Eutelsat in Orbital Debris NPRM, (filings made Apr. 5, 2019); 
ESIM NPRM (filings made Feb. 11, 2019) and Part 25 Further 
Streamlining NPRM (filings made Mar. 18, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    17. In the FY 2019 FNPRM, we also sought comment on whether 
assessing non-U.S. licensed space stations would promote regulatory 
parity among space station operators.\58\ U.S. licensees argue that the 
current fee system is inequitable and encourages companies to simply 
move overseas to evade fees and oversight.\59\ Non-U.S. licensed 
satellite operators respond by contending that imposing regulatory fees 
on non-U.S. licensed satellites would place those entities at a 
competitive disadvantage.\60\ Non-U.S. licensed satellite operators are 
already paying regulatory fees in their own jurisdictions and, they 
assert, our regulatory fees would be a duplicative fee.\61\ Operators 
of non-U.S. licensed space stations also contend that imposing 
regulatory fees will negatively impact U.S. consumers because smaller 
foreign operators will bypass the U.S. market and the increased costs 
will be passed on to U.S. consumers.\62\ Imposing such a fee, they 
argue, would jeopardize the United States' position in the global 
satellite market and other jurisdictions could also now impose similar 
charges on U.S. licensed satellites.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8212-13, paragraph 
63.
    \59\ U.S. Satellite Licensees Comments at 2.
    \60\ WorldVu Satellites Limited d/b/a OneWeb (OneWeb) Comments 
at 1-4; Kepler Reply Comments at 4.
    \61\ Eutelsat Comments at 2, 7; Telesat Reply Comments at 3-4.
    \62\ OneWeb Comments at 7-8 & Reply Comments at 6; Myriota 
Comments at 3-4; Kepler Reply Comments at 4-5; Telesat Reply 
Comments at 4.
    \63\ OneWeb Comments at 7-8 & Reply Comments at 4-5; Myriota 
Comments at 3-4; Eutelsat Comments at 6-8; Telesat Reply Comments at 
5; Inmarsat Reply Comments at 4; Kepler Reply Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. We agree with the comments of U.S. licensed space station 
operators--who express more concern about fee inequity in the United 
States than the prospect of new or increased fees in other markets--
that entities receiving U.S. market access, through either a space 
station or earth station authorization, should be subject to the same 
satellite regulatory fees as those assessed on U.S. licensed space 
station systems.\64\ Indeed, we are not convinced by the parade of 
horribles cited by non-U.S. licensed satellite operators as they offer 
insufficient evidence to support their claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ U.S. Satellite Licensees Comments at 6-7. SpaceX proposes 
that earth station operators that received U.S. market access prior 
to August 27, 2019, the release date of the FY 2019 Report and 
Order, would be exempt from such regulatory fees under this 
proposal. SpaceX Comments at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    19. Non-U.S. licensed satellite operators also argue that an 
assessment of fees conflicts with international trade agreements under 
the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services.\65\ Eutelsat 
and Telesat contend that under the Commission's DISCO II decision, the 
Commission rejected the idea of issuing a separate license for non-U.S. 
licensed space stations.\66\ In response, SpaceX asserts that spreading 
the regulatory costs evenly across U.S. and non-U.S. licensed space 
station operators instead of imposing the entire cost on U.S. space 
station licensees is fully consistent with the DISCO II decision.\67\ 
We find that our actions are consistent with the DISCO II decision 
because we are treating non-U.S. licensed space station operators the 
same as U.S. licensed space station operators in assessing regulatory 
fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Telesat Comments at 12 & Reply Comments at 5; Kepler Reply 
Comments at 3; Inmarsat Reply Comments at 4-5. AT&T disagrees that 
this assessment of fees would be precluded by international 
agreements. AT&T Reply Comments at 5-6; OneWeb Reply Comments at 7-
8.
    \66\ Eutelsat Comments at 2, 7, citing DISCO II at 24174, 
paragraph 188; Telesat Reply Comments at 6. OneWeb also argues that 
our proposal would violate DISCO II because it would put non-U.S. 
licensed satellite operators at a disadvantage. OneWeb Comments at 
2. We disagree, as discussed above, because the U.S. licensed 
satellite operators competing against non-U.S. licensed operators, 
are disadvantaged due to the imposition of regulatory fees on the 
U.S. licensed operators.
    \67\ SpaceX Reply Comments at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    20. Non-U.S. licensed space station operators argue that it would 
be unfair now to assess regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space 
stations accessing the U.S. market because they have relied on a prior 
finding that regulatory fees for space stations were to be assessed on 
only those stations licensed by the United States and that they have 
made business plans based on this long-standing prior finding.\68\ 
Licensees have no vested right to an unchanged regulatory 
framework.\69\ This is as true for market access grantees as it is for 
licensees, since both are subject to the Commission's regulatory 
framework while providing service in the United States. Moreover, each 
year the Commission engages in a proceeding seeking comment on its 
proposed fees for the year and frequently makes adjustments to the 
regulatory scheme to reflect changes in fact and law. For the reasons 
stated herein, we have concluded that non-U.S. licensed space stations 
accessing the U.S. market should be subject to assessment of regulatory 
fees under section 9.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Godles April 22 Ex Parte at 3.
    \69\ Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 Mhz Band, 
21 FCC Rcd 678, 682 (2006); Motient Communications Inc., 19 FCC Rcd 
13086, 13093 (2004), citing Amendment of Part 1 of Commission's 
Rules--Competitive Bidding Procedures, Order on Reconsideration of 
the Third Report and Order, Fifth Report and Order, and Fourth 
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 15 FCC Rcd 15293, 15306 
paragraph 22 (2000) (65 FR 52323 (August 29, 2000) and 65 FR 52401 
(August 29, 2000)).
    \70\ Congress mandates that the Commission recover as an 
offsetting collection its fiscal year appropriation and prescribes 
the mechanism to do so. Congress has prescribed that regulatees bear 
the FTE burden associated with the Commission's work in respect to a 
given set of regulatees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    21. Including non-U.S. licensed space stations in the Commission's 
assessment of regulatory fees is important to fulfilling Congress's 
mandate that the Commission recover the costs associated with its 
activities, since market access by non-U.S. licensed space stations has 
become a significant portion of the satellite services regulated by the 
Commission and exemption of non-U.S. licensed space stations places the 
burden of regulatory fees--which are designed to defray the costs of 
Commission regulatory activities (which we undertake to serve the 
overall interests of the public, including all parties engaged in the 
communications marketplace)--solely on the shoulders

[[Page 37370]]

of U.S. licensees, either directly or indirectly.\71\ We find that this 
is not sustainable, since the ability to gain the same benefits of 
Commission activities without being assessed regulatory fees presents 
an incentive for space station operators, even U.S.-based companies, to 
elect to be licensed by a foreign administration in order to still have 
access to the U.S. market, but without being assessed regulatory fees. 
In summary, we conclude that assessing the same regulatory fees on non-
U.S. licensed space stations with market access as we assess on U.S. 
licensed space stations will better reflect the benefits received by 
these operators through the Commission's adjudicatory, enforcement, 
regulatory, and international coordination activities. Moreover, it 
will promote regulatory parity and fairness among space station 
operators by evenly distributing the regulatory cost recovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ The Commission's prior solution in 2015 of recategorizing 
four International Bureau FTEs as indirect to avoid assessing U.S. 
licensed space stations for work that directly benefited non-U.S. 
licensed space stations that did not pay regulatory fees still 
required U.S. licensees to bear the costs of the non-U.S. licensed 
space station operators participation in the regulatory environment; 
it simply broadened the base of U.S. licensees bearing those costs, 
since the costs were labeled as indirect, and therefore borne by all 
FCC entities that were assessed regulatory fees. See FY 2015 Report 
and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 10278, paragraph 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    22. In the interest of equity and to eliminate regulatory 
arbitrage, we further conclude that regulatory fees for non-U.S. 
licensed space stations should be contributed regardless of the method 
by which the space station obtains U.S. market access. In addition to 
receiving U.S. market access directly through a petition for 
declaratory ruling, a non-U.S. licensed space station operator may also 
receive market access by being added as a point of communication in an 
earth station license application. In either case, the Commission's 
review of the space station market access request is the same. The 
earth station application may be filed by the non-U.S. licensed 
operator, one of its subsidiaries, or an independent third party. 
Currently, neither the earth station licensee nor the non-U.S. 
satellite operator with market access through that earth station pays a 
regulatory fee despite the benefits it receives and the additional 
Commission resources consumed by such market access. We find that it 
serves the public interest to assess regulatory fees in the same manner 
against all non-U.S. licensed satellite operators with U.S. market 
access, regardless of how that access is obtained.
    23. We next address the mechanisms of assessment when non-U.S. 
satellite operators gain market access through earth stations. As of 
October 1, 2019, there are approximately 25 non-U.S. licensed space 
stations serving the U.S. market through earth station licensees. 
SpaceX proposes creating a new regulatory fee category for earth 
station authorizations that include a first-time market access grant 
for a satellite system to ``apply the same regulatory fee applicable to 
non-U.S. licensed systems granted market access at the space station 
level.'' \72\ SpaceX asserts that doing so ``would eliminate an 
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage while ensuring that the 
Commission's regulatory fee structure equitably covers satellite 
systems granted access to the U.S. market regardless of the mechanism 
used to achieve that end.'' \73\ We agree with SpaceX that assessing a 
regulatory fee to cover non-U.S. licensed space stations that gain 
market access through an earth station serves the public interest, 
although we assess the space station benefiting from the market access 
rather than the earth station operator(s). Doing so will place the 
responsibility with the space station operator directly benefiting from 
market access rather than one or multiple earth stations that may be 
communicating with many other satellites as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ SpaceX Comments at 8. Kepler argues that it would be 
inequitable to assess the same regulatory fee on a foreign satellite 
operator with a single earth station. Kepler Reply Comments at 5. We 
note the same argument can be made regardless of whether the foreign 
operator communicating with only one earth station does so through a 
petition for declaratory ruling and an earth station license or 
solely through an earth station license.
    \73\ SpaceX Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. We will therefore require non-U.S. licensed space stations that 
enter into the U.S. market through earth station authorizations to be 
subject to regulatory fees similar to those space stations receiving 
U.S. market access directly through a petition for declaratory 
ruling.\74\ Failure to pay a regulatory fee will subject the operator 
of the non-U.S. licensed space station to statutory penalties and the 
Commission's rules governing nonpayment.\75\ In addition to other 
penalties, non-payment may result in removal of the delinquent non-U.S. 
space station as a point of communication for any associated earth 
station authorizations. Non-payment may also prevent such space station 
to obtain future U.S. market access or other regulatory benefits until 
such matters are resolved.\76\ This action eliminates any regulatory 
arbitrage or gaming opportunity by eliminating any regulatory fee 
differences between receiving U.S. market access directly through a 
petition for declaratory ruling or indirectly, through an earth station 
license application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ As a general matter, a single NGSO constellation that 
includes both U.S. and foreign-licensed satellites will be treated 
the same as any wholly U.S. or foreign-licensed constellation for 
regulatory fee purposes.
    \75\ Under sections 9A(c)(1) & (2) of the Act, the Commission is 
required to impose a late payment penalty of 25 percent of the 
unpaid regulatory fee debt and to assess interest on the unpaid 
regulatory fee (including the 25 percent penalty) until the debt is 
paid in full. The Commission is also required to pursue collection 
of all past due regulatory fees (including penalty and interest) 
using all collection remedies available to it under the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996. These remedies include 
offsetting regulatory fee debt against monies owed to the debtor by 
the Commission, and referral of the debt to the United States 
Treasury for further collection efforts, including centralized 
offset against monies other Federal agencies may owe the debtor. 31 
U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 31 CFR part 901; 47 CFR 1.1901. The failure to 
timely pay regulatory fees also subjects regulatees to the 
Commission's ``red light'' rule and revocation of authorizations. 47 
CFR 1.1910 and 1.1164(f).
    \76\ See 47 U.S.C. 159A(c)(3) (dismissal of applications or 
filings); id. at 159A(c)(4) (revocations); 47 CFR 1.1164(f) (same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    25. In some cases, non-U.S. licensed space stations that do not 
access earth stations aboard aircraft (ESAA) terminals in the United 
States or its territorial waters have been identified as a point of 
communication for U.S. licensed ESAA terminals.\77\ To the extent such 
license clearly limits U.S. licensed ESAA terminals' access to these 
non-U.S. licensed space stations to situations in which these terminals 
are in foreign territories and/or over international waters and the 
license does not otherwise allow the non-U.S. licensed space station 
access to the U.S. market, the non-U.S. licensed space station does not 
fall within the category of a non-U.S. licensed space station with 
access to the U.S. market for regulatory fee purposes. In addition, a 
non-U.S. licensed space station that communicates with a U.S. licensed 
earth station solely for tracking, telemetry and command (TT&C) 
purposes will not fall within the category of a non-U.S. licensed space 
station with access to the U.S. market for regulatory fee purposes.\78\ 
The relevant earth station license, however, must clearly limit the 
non-U.S. licensed space station's access to TT&C communications only. 
If it does not include such a limitation, the relevant non-U.S. 
licensed space station will be

[[Page 37371]]

subject to regulatory fees. Accordingly, non-U.S. licensed space 
station operators may notify the Commission by July 15, 2020, as 
discussed below, to certify that their access is solely for TT&C and 
identify the relevant earth station licenses for any needed express 
condition that the relevant non-U.S. licensed space station is 
identified a point of communication for TT&C purposes only.\79\ 
Otherwise, they will be assessed regulatory fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See Letter from Karis Hastings, Counsel to SES, to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, at 2 (May 
5, 2020).
    \78\ See Letter from Pamela L. Meredith, Counsel to Kongsberg 
Satellite Services AS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal 
Communications Commission, at 1-2 (May 5, 2020).
    \79\ We note that an earth station authorization allowing any 
other kind of data acquisition by a non-U.S. licensed space station 
will be considered to have access to the U.S. market and will be 
subject to the regulatory fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. We understand that non-U.S. licensed satellite operators have 
not always been conscientious in the past about advising the Commission 
when they have ceased to provide service to the U.S. from a particular 
satellite. To provide a clear deadline for operators to correct the 
record and afford the International Bureau and the Office of Managing 
Director an opportunity to create a definitive list of market access 
grants from which to develop the final fee amounts, non-U.S. licensed 
space station operators with U.S. market access may notify the 
Commission by July 15, 2020 whether they want to relinquish that market 
access.\80\ Operators that relinquish their U.S. market access will not 
be assessed regulatory fees this year. Accordingly, for FY 2020 we will 
require regulatory fees to be paid by those non-U.S. licensed space 
stations that have U.S. market access after July 15, 2020.\81\ We 
instruct the International Bureau, when it receives a notice of 
surrender of market access by the operator of a non-U.S. licensed space 
station, to remove the space station as a point of communication in all 
earth station licenses, regardless of whether the earth station 
licensee itself requests removal of the non-U.S. licensed space station 
as a point of communication.\82\ We do this so that a non-U.S. licensed 
space station operator would not be prejudiced by non-action of a 
third-party earth station licensee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Such a voluntary surrender of market access can be made 
through existing procedures for surrender of grants of market access 
or removal of a non-U.S. licensed space station as a point of 
communications in an earth station license.
    \81\ We note that after FY 2020 it is the responsibility of a 
non-U.S. licensed space station with U.S. market access to inform 
the Commission (International Bureau) by September 30th before the 
new fiscal year begins that it is relinquishing its U.S. market 
access; failing timely notification, the non-U.S. licensed station 
will be assessed regulatory fees for the ensuing fiscal year. For 
example, in FY 2021, a non-U.S. licensed space station with U.S. 
market access must inform the Commission (International Bureau) by 
September 30, 2020 that it wishes to relinquish its market access or 
it will be charged the FY 2021 regulatory fee in September 2021.
    \82\ The International Bureau will include notice of such 
surrenders in its routine weekly Public Notices of Actions Taken for 
satellite space and earth stations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. Accordingly, we will issue an invoice for the annual space 
station regulatory fee to the non-U.S. licensed space station operator 
of record listed on the Schedule S filed in connection with a grant of 
a petition for declaratory ruling to access the U.S. market, or with an 
earth station application to add the non-U.S. licensed space station as 
a point of communication, as of July 16, 2020.\83\ To facilitate 
administration of regulatory fees, we require that all non-U.S. 
licensed space station operators with such market access to obtain an 
FCC Registration Number by August 1, 2020.\84\ Further, we remind non-
U.S. licensed space station operators who do not pay the regulatory 
fees in a timely fashion that they will be in violation of our 
regulatory fee rules and, while being subject to other regulatory fee 
enforcement consequences, may be unable to obtain future U.S. market 
access until such matters are resolved.\85\ To reiterate, this fee will 
be assessed on any non-U.S. licensed space station that has been 
granted market access through existing earth stations licensees as of 
July 16, 2020.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ In some cases, a single GSO satellite with access to the 
U.S. market may be operated by more than one entity, as reflected in 
the terms of the license or market access grant. In such cases, the 
satellite operators should notify OMD which operator/FRN is the 
contact for the space station regulatory fee purposes and that 
operator/FRN will be billed. If no notification is received, OMD 
will assign one party as the FRN contact for billing purposes.
    \84\ https://apps.fcc.gov/coresWeb/publicHome.do.
    \85\ See 47 U.S.C. 159(a).
    \86\ For FY 2021 and subsequent years, the date of assessment 
will be October 1, which is the standard date of assessment for 
space and earth stations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. We also conclude that we should reallocate four International 
Bureau indirect FTEs as direct to account for our decision to assess 
regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed space stations. The Commission 
previously recategorized four International Bureau FTEs as indirect to 
avoid assessing U.S. licensed space stations for work that directly 
involved non-U.S. licensed space stations that did not pay regulatory 
fees.\87\ We find that it is appropriate to make this adjustment to 
account for our decision to assess regulatory fees on non-U.S. licensed 
space stations and the section 9 requirement that the Commission set 
regulatory fees to ``reflect the full-time equivalent number of 
employees within the bureaus and offices of the Commission adjusted to 
take into account factors that are reasonably related to the benefits 
provided to the payor of the fee by the Commission's activities.'' \88\ 
We accordingly add four FTEs to the satellite regulatory fee category 
as direct FTEs to account for the work that was allocated as indirect 
previously. We note, however, that we add back these four FTEs only to 
correct the total number of direct FTEs in the International Bureau for 
regulatory fee purposes. The apportionment of fees among International 
Bureau regulatees is calculated based on the factors reasonably related 
to the benefits provided to the payors of the fee, as discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ FY 2015 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 10278, paragraph 
24. At the time, the Commission stated that the number of market 
access requests by these entities can vary; however, four FTEs was 
appropriate to be reallocated as indirect in calculating benefit to 
International Bureau fee payors at the time. See id. paragraph 24, 
and n. 94.
    \88\ 47 U.S.C. 159(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. Finally, we find that subjecting non-U.S. licensed space 
stations with U.S. market access to the space station regulatory fees 
is an amendment as defined in section 9(d) of the Act.\89\ Such an 
amendment must be submitted to Congress at least 90 days before it 
becomes effective pursuant to section 9A(b)(2).\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ Id.
    \90\ 47 U.S.C. 159A(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Apportionment of Fees Among International Bureau Regulatees

    30. The Commission has previously determined over the course of 
several orders that a significant number of FTEs in the International 
Bureau do work that should be considered indirect for regulatory fee 
purposes and set the number of direct FTEs at 24.\91\ The

[[Page 37372]]

International Bureau fees are divided into a satellite category (with 
subcategories of GSO space stations, NGSO space stations, and earth 
stations) and an international bearer circuits category (consisting of 
submarine cable systems in one subcategory and terrestrial and 
satellite international facilities in another). In the FY 2019 Report 
and Order, the Commission explained that we currently allocate 17.1 of 
the 24 International Bureau FTEs to the satellite category and 6.9 to 
the international bearer circuits category.\92\ Including the 4 FTEs 
that were previously considered indirect because of their work with 
non-U.S. licensed space stations as discussed above brings those totals 
to 21.1 FTEs assigned to the satellite category and 6.9 to the 
international bearer circuit category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ In FY 2013, the Commission proposed that all Satellite 
Division FTEs working on issues involving regulatees, 25 FTEs, be 
considered direct FTEs for determining the regulatory fees for space 
stations and earth stations. FY 2013 NPRM, 28 FCC Rcd at 7800, 
paragraphs 22-23. The Commission further proposed that two FTEs from 
the Telecommunications and Analysis Division be allocated as direct 
FTEs for regulatory fee purposes. Id. at 7802, paragraph 27. The 
Commission also proposed that the Global Strategy and Negotiation 
Division would be considered indirect because their activities 
benefit the Commission as a whole and are not specifically focused 
on International Bureau regulatees. Id. at 7802-803, paragraph 28. 
The Commission adopted the proposal, but revised the number of 
direct International Bureau FTEs to 28. Assessment and Collection of 
FY 2013 Regulatory Fees, Report and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 12351, 12355-
56, paragraph 14 (78 FR 52433 (August 23, 2013)) (FY 2013 Report and 
Order). Then, in 2015, the Commission further reduced the number of 
direct FTEs in the International Bureau to 24 due to the number of 
International Bureau FTEs in the Satellite Division working on non-
U.S. licensed space station market access requests. FY 2015 Report 
and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 10278, paragraph 24.
    \92\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8197, paragraph 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. In the FY 2019 FNPRM, we sought comment on whether we should 
adjust the apportionment among fee categories within the International 
Bureau.\93\ In response, the International Bureau undertook a review of 
its work, staffing, and distribution of responsibilities benefiting its 
fee payers, division by division and between the Telecommunications and 
Analysis Division and the Satellite Division. Based on this review, we 
find that adjusting the FTE allocation for the international bearer 
circuit category to 8 FTEs rather than 6.9 FTEs would better reflect 
the direct FTE work in the International Bureau that benefits the fee 
payors in the international bearer circuit category. This action brings 
the FTEs for the satellite category to 20 and the total number of 
direct FTEs for the International Bureau to 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ Id. at 8214, paragraph 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. We are not persuaded by the Submarine Cable Coalition's 
assertion that two FTEs from the Telecommunications and Analysis 
Division are sufficient for international bearer circuit 
regulation.\94\ As we explained in the FY 2015 Report and Order, two 
FTEs do not take into account all the work provided for this industry 
by the International Bureau.\95\ Currently, almost all of the work of 
the Telecommunications and Analysis Division, as well as some of the 
work by the Office of the Bureau Chief, benefits international 
telecommunications service providers including submarine cable 
operators.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 3-4. The Commission 
initially indicated the number of FTEs was two in 2013. FY 2013 
NPRM, 28 FCC Rcd at 7802, paragraph 27.
    \95\ FY 2015 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 10273, paragraph 12.
    \96\ One exception is the work in the Telecommunications and 
Analysis Division on foreign ownership issues under section 310 of 
the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 310, which benefits domestic 
common carrier wireless providers by facilitating foreign investment 
in wireless carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. The Submarine Cable Coalition also argues that the number of 
FTEs in the International Bureau was not appropriately reduced when the 
Office of Economics and Analytics was created and the reassignment of 
staff led to decreases in the direct FTEs in the Media, Wireline 
Competition, and Wireless Telecommunication Bureaus.\97\ None of the 24 
FTEs from the International Bureau identified as direct for regulatory 
fee purposes, however, were moved to the Office of Economics and 
Analytics. Therefore, the number of direct FTEs in the International 
Bureau was not reduced due to the creation of the Office of Economics 
and Analytics. Accordingly, we reject these arguments. In the FY 2019 
Report and Order we recognized that the increase to fees for 
International Bureau regulatees was not trivial when we rejected 
similar arguments and explained that such an increase was consistent 
with previous FTE shifts we have made as well as the statute.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 4-5.
    \98\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8195, paragraphs 
15-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    34. GSO and NGSO Space Stations Apportionment. In the FY 2019 
FNPRM, we sought comment on adjustments to the allocation of FTEs among 
GSO and NGSO space and earth station operators.\99\ The FY 2019 annual 
regulatory fee per unit for Space Stations (Geostationary Orbit) is 
$159,625, and the comparable fee per unit for Space Stations (Non-
Geostationary Orbit) is $154,875.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Id. at 8214, paragraph 67 (citing Letter from Jennifer A. 
Manner, Senior Vice President, EchoStar Satellite Operating 
Corporation and Hughes Network Systems, LLC, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC, MD Docket No. 19-105, Attachment at 1 (filed Aug. 8, 
2019) (EchoStar August 8 Ex Parte Letter)).
    \100\ 47 CFR 1.1156(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. In response, SES Americom, Intelsat, EchoStar, and Hughes 
(collectively, the GSO Satellite Operators), request that the 
Commission rebalance the cost allocations between GSO and NGSO space 
stations to address perceived unfairness in the current balance and 
because the current balance purportedly does not align with underlying 
costs.\101\ The GSO Satellite Operators observe that, for FY 2019, the 
expected regulatory fee revenue from GSO satellite operators was 
$15,643,250, which is more than 14 times the expected $1,084,125 
regulatory fee revenue for NGSO satellite operators.\102\ This 
imbalance in regulatory fee revenue results from the large disparity in 
number of units between GSO space stations (98) and NGSO space stations 
(7),\103\ even though under a single NGSO license hundreds, or 
thousands, of satellites can be operated while counting as a single 
unit for regulatory fee purposes, whereas only one satellite can be 
operated per GSO space station regulatory fee unit.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ GSO Satellite Operators Comments at 1-2.
    \102\ Id. at 2 (citing FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 
8223-24, Appendix B).
    \103\ It may also arise from the fact that the Commission does 
not assess regulatory fees on licenses that do not have operational 
satellites associated with them. Thus, even though there may be an 
increase in NGSO licensing in recent years, there would not be an 
increase in regulatory fees if those licensed systems had not yet 
launched and operated satellites.
    \104\ See, e.g., Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Application 
for Approval for Orbital Deployment and Operating Authority for the 
SpaceX NGSO Satellite System, IBFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118, 
SAT-LOA-20170726-00110, 33 FCC Rcd 3391 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. We agree with the GSO Satellite Operators that the 
significantly larger amount of regulatory fee payments by GSO operators 
cannot be attributed to them benefiting more from the Commission's 
regulatory activities. We instead allocate 80% of space station fees to 
Space Stations (Geostationary Orbit) and 20% to Space Stations (Non-
Geostationary Orbit). We consider three factors that reflect the 
benefits of Commission oversight to GSO and NGSO operators: The number 
of applications processed (that is, the benefits of adjudication), the 
number of changes made to the Commission's rules (that is, the benefit 
of rulemaking), and the number of FTEs working on oversight for each 
category of operators.
    37. First, using the data compiled from the International Bureau 
Filing System, we looked at the applications received and processed by 
the International Bureau for each of the most recent three years (that 
is, 2017-2019).\105\ The breakdown shows that GSO applications 
accounted for 79% (108/136) of applications disposed in 2019 and 79% 
(124/157) of applications received in 2019. For 2018, the GSO share is 
75% (88/117) disposed and 84% (77/92) received. For 2017, the GSO share 
is 84% (122/146) disposed and 77% (128/167) received. Thus, the

[[Page 37373]]

total number of applications received and disposed of in this three-
year period continues to support a significantly greater allocation of 
adjudication benefits to GSO than NGSO systems in the range of 75% to 
84%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ The application counts include applications from U.S. and 
non-U.S. space station operators for new systems, requests for 
modification or amendment, and requests for special temporary 
authority. By reporting the data as part of this proceeding, we 
address the request of the Satellite Industry Association to provide 
additional factual detail on fee decisions. Satellite Industry 
Association Comments at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. Second, using compiled data for the last three years on the 
number of Commission-level items originating from the Satellite 
Division of the International Bureau, we considered each items' 
relative precedential value to GSO and NGSO operators.\106\ The list 
consists of 6 items during 2017-2019,\107\ of which 3 held more benefit 
for GSOs and 3 held more benefit for NGSOs.\108\ Accordingly, the data 
presented suggests that there was approximately the same rulemaking 
benefit to GSO operators as to NGSO operators. We note, however, that, 
quantifying only the most recent rulemaking activities does not take 
into account any continued benefits derived from older rulemakings. 
Some of those continued benefits are received through the efforts of 
adjudication and administration of the rules adopted in those 
rulemakings. Accordingly, we find that attributing a value to 
rulemaking activities directly is a somewhat subjective exercise and 
lacks precision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ We limited our review to Commission-level items because of 
their greater precedential value and because they include rulemaking 
proceedings that affect the industry as a whole, rather than a 
particular entity.
    \107\ Notices of Proposed Rulemakings that resulted in the 
adoption of an Order within the same three-year period were not 
included since inclusion could result in double-counting of an 
eventual benefit.
    \108\ The following proceedings primarily benefit GSO systems: 
(1) Amendment of the Commission's Policies and Rules for Processing 
Applications in the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, Second 
Report & Order, IB Docket No. 06-160 (rel. Sep. 27, 2019); (2) 
Further Streamlining Part 25 Rules Governing Satellite Services, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11502 (2018); and (3) 
Facilitating the Communications of Earth Stations in Motion with 
Non-Geostationary Orbit Space Stations, Report and Order and Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 9327 (84 FR 53630 (October 
8, 2019) and 84 FR 5654 (February 22, 2019)) (2018). The following 
rulemaking proceedings primarily benefit NGSO systems: (1) 
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11352 (2019); (2) Streamlining 
Licensing Procedures for Small Satellites, Report and Order, 34 FCC 
Rcd 13077 (2019); (3) Facilitating the Communications of Earth 
Stations in Motion with Non-Geostationary Orbit Space Stations, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11416 (83 FR 67180 
(December 28, 2018)) (2018). One of the six items, Mitigation of 
Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, could be seen as benefitting 
both GSOs and NGSOs, but since the item largely addresses mitigation 
of debris resulting from new space operations in NGSOs, it was 
counted as benefitting NGSO more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. Third, we considered whether we could examine FTE activities 
directly, but there has been no change in the number of FTEs 
attributable to satellite regulatory activities in the International 
Bureau from previous years and the International Bureau does not 
separate FTEs by work done on GSO versus NGSO matters.\109\ Indeed, a 
single FTE may work on authorizations and rulemakings that benefit both 
categories of satellite operations. Because we are unable to assess 
benefits based on a clearly identifiable division of work by assigned 
FTEs, we must estimate the relative percentage of FTEs that are 
attributable to benefitting either GSO or NGSO systems based on the 
factors above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ Similarly, the International Bureau also does not separate 
FTEs by work done on U.S. licensed versus non-U.S. licensed space 
stations. Most regulatory activities benefit all space stations, 
whether U.S. licensed or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    40. We recognize the considerable challenge of assigning a precise 
number to the apportionment of regulatory fees between GSO and NGSO 
space stations. Taking all of the foregoing factors and data into 
consideration we conclude, however, that the GSO/NGSO ratio should be 
adjusted to reflect that GSO space stations derived roughly 75-84% of 
the benefit from the Commission's adjudicatory efforts. Given that our 
consideration of FTE activities did not yield a clearly identifiable 
division between GSO and NGSO, and because it is difficult to be 
precise in quantifying benefits of rulemaking activities, we believe a 
number in the middle of the 75-84% range is appropriate. We are also 
mindful that the number of NGSO units for which regulatory fees are 
assessed is small, so selection of a number at the bottom end of the 
75-84% range would result in a much greater change in the regulatory 
fee assessed. We find that selecting a number in the middle of the 75-
84% range best reflects the other factors considered in our re-
balancing and imposes a balanced burden in that range on all space 
station operators, including the smaller number of NGSO system 
operators. Accordingly, for FY 2020, GSO and NGSO space stations will 
be allocated 80% and 20% of the space station fees, respectively.
    41. Earth Station and Space Station Apportionment. Although the FY 
2019 FNPRM did not propose adjusting the allocation within the 
satellite category for earth station regulatory fees, certain satellite 
operators asked that we review such apportionment \110\ and suggested 
that we implement different earth station subcategories for regulatory 
fee purposes.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ GSO Satellite Operators Comments, at 4; SIA Comments at 9.
    \111\ GSO Satellite Operators Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. We decline to adopt any changes at this time. We find that 
there is insufficient evidence in the record to increase the 
apportionment of fees paid by earth station licensees. GSO Satellite 
Operators state that earth station licensees collectively are 
responsible for $1,402,500 in total regulatory fees, which is less than 
one-eleventh of the regulatory fees paid by GSO space station 
licensees.\112\ Although the GSO Satellite Operators claim that this 
proportion is out of synch with actual relative costs,\113\ they do not 
provide any data to support this claim, or propose an appropriate 
apportionment of fees between earth and space stations. In support of 
their claim, GSO Satellite Operators point solely to a pair of 
proceedings focused on Earth Stations in Motion (ESIMs).\114\ Although 
earth station licensees do benefit from these proceedings, we also find 
that the proceedings are of equal, if not more, benefit to space 
station licensees, which would gain access to additional frequency 
bands in which to sell transponder capacity for mobility services and 
increased streamlining of their regulatory environment. Accordingly, 
the record does not support an increase of the apportionment of fees 
paid by earth station licensees at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ Id.
    \113\ Id.
    \114\ Id. (citing Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the 
Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Use of Earth Stations in Motion 
Communicating with Geostationary Orbit Space Stations in Frequency 
Bands Allocated to the Fixed-Satellite Service, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 4239 (2017); Facilitating the Communications 
of Earth Stations in Motion with Non-Geostationary Orbit Space 
Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd 11416 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. We also find that the record does not support implementing 
different classes of earth stations for regulatory fee purposes or 
increasing earth station regulatory fees. GSO Satellite Operators 
suggest that blanket-licensed earth station licensees involving 
multiple antennas under a single authorization should pay higher fees 
than other earth station licensees because blanket-licensed earth 
station licensees require more regulatory oversight.\115\ The GSO 
Satellite Operators, however, provide no factual support for the 
proposition other than a conclusory statement. GSO Satellite Operators 
instead observe that the fee schedule originally adopted by Congress 
differentiated between blanket-licensed earth stations and stand-alone 
antennas.\116\ But the prior statutory differentiation pertained to 
application fees, not regulatory fees--

[[Page 37374]]

i.e., it was not tied to the statutory factors that bind us in setting 
regulatory fees.\117\ Accordingly, we find no basis in the record to 
support an increase in regulatory fees for earth station licenses or to 
support the creation of a separate, higher regulatory fee for blanket-
licensed earth stations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ GSO Satellite Operators Comments at 4.
    \116\ Id. at 4-5.
    \117\ The GSO Satellite Operators cite section 159(g) of Title 
47 of the United States Code in support, which was repealed in 2018. 
GSO Satellite Operators Comments at 5 n.12. Section 159(g) was 
entitled ``Application of Application Fees'' and addressed the 
separate issue of FCC filing fees, not regulatory fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Regulatory Fees Paid by VHF Broadcasters

    44. In the FY 2018 Report and Order, we adopted a new methodology 
for assessment of broadcast television regulatory fees, finding that 
the service contour-based population method more accurately reflects 
the actual market served by full-power television stations for purposes 
of assessing regulatory fees than the DMA-based methodology we 
previously employed.\118\ We also said that we would phase in 
implementation of the new methodology in two years, using a 
transitional fee structure for FY 2019 fees and the new methodology for 
assessment of FY 2020 fees.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal 
Year 2018, Report and Order and Order, 33 FCC Rcd 8497, 8501-8502, 
paragraphs 13-15 (2018) (83 FR 47079, paragraphs 13-15 (September 
18, 2018)) (FY 2018 Report and Order).
    \119\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. In the FY 2019 FNPRM, we sought comment on whether we should 
adjust population counts for the new methodology to address a signal 
limitation issue raised by commenters to the FY 2019 NPRM.\120\ 
Specifically, those commenters argued that VHF channels should have 
lower regulatory fees because the predicted contour distance does not 
adequately account for all of the possible effects on the VHF station 
signal, such as environmental noise issues, the result of which may 
limit the signal and the population reached. Thus, they argued, the 
population count is overstated for VHF stations and should be adjusted 
downward accordingly.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ FY 2019 Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 8214-15, paragraph 
68 and FY 2019 NPRM (84 FR 26234 (June 5, 2019)).
    \121\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. Commenters reiterate and amplify the signal limitation concern. 
NAB explains that following the digital transition, some VHF channels 
encountered environmental noise that affected the reliability of those 
broadcasters' signals.\122\ As a compensatory measure, some VHF 
stations have increased their power levels, resulting in an increase in 
the theoretical, but not the actual, population served and higher 
regulatory fees under the new methodology.\123\ PMCM TV argues that we 
should assess VHF stations, and especially low band VHF stations, a 
significantly lower regulatory fee.\124\ Maranatha Broadcasting 
proposes that we average the fee amounts assessed to the commercial 
full power UHF stations in a given market and apply the average UHF fee 
as the fee to be assessed VHF stations in the same market.\125\ 
Maranatha Broadcasting argues that the population methodology does not 
properly account for ``the inherent technical inferiority of the VHF 
signal in the digital broadcast world,'' and that VHF stations should 
not be charged more than UHF stations in the same market.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ NAB Comments at 2.
    \123\ NAB Comments at 3-4; NAB suggests a station's original DTV 
contour is a more accurate reflection of a VHF station's actual 
coverage and population reach. See also Maranatha Broadcasting 
Comments at 1-4.
    \124\ PMCM Comments at 4. PMCM TV and Maranatha Broadcasting 
observe that the advertising revenues for TV are based on the DMA 
where the station is located, because that is where most of the 
audience is, and not on the population outside the DMA that may also 
be able to reach the station. PMCM TV Comments at 4; Maranatha 
Broadcasting Comments at 5.
    \125\ Maranatha Broadcasting Comments at 6-7. See also Letter 
from Barry Fisher, President, Maranatha Broadcasting Company, Inc., 
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, MD Docket No. 19-105, (filed 
May 1, 2020).
    \126\ Maranatha Broadcasting Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. We decline to categorically lower regulatory fees for VHF 
stations to account for signal limitations. Inconsistencies in the 
reports of low-VHF reception issues have led the Media Bureau to 
conclude that there is nothing inherent in VHF transmission that 
creates signal deficiencies but that environmental noise issues can 
affect reception in certain areas and situations. And although we agree 
that environmental noise blockages affecting signal strength and 
reception exist, they do not exist across the board. The impact of 
signal disruptions, to the extent they exist, varies widely from 
service area to service area and does not lend itself to an across-the-
board rule. However, we do agree with NAB and propose to take into 
account the licensed power increases that go beyond the maximum allowed 
for VHF stations. Therefore, we will assess the fees for those VHF 
stations that are licensed with a power level that exceeds the maximum 
based on the maximum power level specified for channels 2-6 in Sec.  
73.622(f)(6) and for channels 7-13 in Sec.  73.622(f)(7).

IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA),\127\ an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) 
was included in the FY 2019 Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.\128\ 
The Commission sought written public comment on these proposals 
including comment on the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the IRFA.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ 5 U.S.C. 603. The RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601-612 has been amended 
by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA), Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 847 (1996).
    \128\ Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal 
Year 2019, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 34 FCC Rcd 8189 (2019) (FY 2019 FNPRM).
    \129\ 5 U.S.C. 604.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Report and Order

    2. In this Report and Order, the Commission assesses for the first 
time a regulatory fee on non-U.S. licensed space stations with United 
States market access, by including those non-U.S. licensed space 
stations in the current regulatory fee categories for GSO and NGSO 
space stations. This fee is assessed regardless of whether the foreign 
satellite operator obtains the market access through a declaratory 
ruling or through an earth station applicant as a point of 
communication. In either case, the Commission's review of the space 
station market access request is the same. The earth station 
application may be filed by the foreign operator, one of its 
subsidiaries, or an independent third party. Currently, the regulatory 
fee paid by an earth station licensee that has secured market access 
for a foreign satellite operator is the same as the fee paid by any 
other earth station licensee in its class, despite the additional 
Commission resources consumed by such market access requests. For these 
reasons, and because it is inequitable and anticompetitive for U.S. 
licensed space stations to pay regulatory fees while non-U.S. licensed 
space stations with U.S. market access do not, the Commission assesses 
its existing GSO and NGSO regulatory fee categories on non-U.S. 
licensed space stations that have access to the United States market, 
either through a petition for market access or through an earth 
station.

B. Summary of the Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in 
Response to the IRFA

    3. None.

[[Page 37375]]

C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration

    4. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended 
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments. In this section respond 
specifically to any comment filed by Chief Counsel of SBA. The Chief 
Counsel did not file any comments in response to the proposed rules in 
the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this proceeding

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities To Which 
the Rules Will Apply

    5. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the proposed rules and policies, if adopted.\130\ The RFA 
generally defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning 
as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small 
governmental jurisdiction.'' \131\ In addition, the term ``small 
business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' 
under the Small Business Act.\132\ A ``small business concern'' is one 
which: (1) Is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in 
its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 
established by the SBA.\133\ Nationwide, there are a total of 
approximately 27.9 million small businesses, according to the SBA.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ 5 U.S.C. 603(b)(3).
    \131\ 5 U.S.C. 601(6).
    \132\ 5 U.S.C. 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition 
of ``small-business concern'' in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 
632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 601(3), the statutory definition of a 
small business applies ``unless an agency, after consultation with 
the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and 
after opportunity for public comment, establishes one or more 
definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of 
the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal 
Register.''
    \133\ 15 U.S.C. 632.
    \134\ See SBA, Office of Advocacy, ``Frequently Asked 
Questions,'' https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental 
Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that 
are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at 
the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly 
affected herein.\135\ First, while there are industry specific size 
standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory 
flexibility analysis, according to data from the SBA's Office of 
Advocacy, in general a small business is an independent business having 
fewer than 500 employees.\136\ These types of small businesses 
represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States which translates 
to 28.8 million businesses.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ See 5 U.S.C. 601(3)-(6).
    \136\ See SBA, Office of Advocacy, ``Frequently Asked Questions, 
Question 1--What is a small business?'' https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf (June 2016).
    \137\ See SBA, Office of Advocacy, ``Frequently Asked Questions, 
Question 2--How many small businesses are there in the U.S.?'' 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf 
(June 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. Next, the type of small entity described as a ``small 
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is 
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' 
\138\ Nationwide, as of August 2016, there were approximately 356,494 
small organizations based on registration and tax data filed by 
nonprofits with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ 5 U.S.C. 601(4).
    \139\ Data from the Urban Institute, National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) reporting on nonprofit organizations 
registered with the IRS was used to estimate the number of small 
organizations. Reports generated using the NCCS online database 
indicated that as of August 2016 there were 356,494 registered 
nonprofits with total revenues of less than $100,000. Of this 
number, 326,897 entities filed tax returns with 65,113 registered 
nonprofits reporting total revenues of $50,000 or less on the IRS 
Form 990-N for Small Exempt Organizations and 261,784 nonprofits 
reporting total revenues of $100,000 or less on some other version 
of the IRS Form 990 within 24 months of the August 2016 data release 
date. See http://nccs.urban.org/sites/all/nccs-archive/html//tablewiz/tw.php where the report showing this data can be generated 
by selecting the following data fields: Report: ``The Number and 
Finances of All Registered 501(c) Nonprofits''; Show: ``Registered 
Nonprofits''; By: ``Total Revenue Level (years 1995, Aug to 2016, 
Aug)''; and For: ``2016, Aug'' then selecting ``Show Results.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Finally, the small entity described as a ``small governmental 
jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities, 
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special 
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' \140\ U.S. 
Census Bureau data from the 2012 Census of Governments \141\ indicate 
that there were 90,056 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of 
general purpose governments and special purpose governments in the 
United States.\142\ Of this number there were 37, 132 General purpose 
governments (county,\143\ municipal and town or township \144\) with 
populations of less than 50,000 and 12,184 Special purpose governments 
(independent school districts \145\ and special districts \146\) with 
populations of less than 50,000. The 2012 U.S. Census Bureau data for 
most types of governments in the local government category show that 
the majority of these governments have populations of less than 
50,000.\147\ Based on this data we estimate that at least 49,316 local 
government jurisdictions fall in the category of ``small governmental 
jurisdictions.'' \148\

[[Page 37376]]

Governmental entities are, however, exempt from application fees.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ 5 U.S.C. 601(5).
    \141\ See 13 U.S.C. 161. The Census of Government is conducted 
every five (5) years compiling data for years ending with ``2'' and 
``7''. See also Program Description Census of Government https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/affhelp/jsf/pages/metadata.xhtml?lang=en&type=program&id=program.en.COG#.
    \142\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, Local 
Governments by Type and State: 2012--United States--States, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG02.US01. Local 
governmental jurisdictions are classified in two categories--General 
purpose governments (county, municipal and town or township) and 
Special purpose governments (special districts and independent 
school districts).
    \143\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, County 
Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2012--United 
States--States. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG06.US01. There were 2,114 county governments with 
populations less than 50,000.
    \144\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, 
Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and 
State: 2012--United States--States. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG07.US01. There were 18,811 municipal 
and 16,207 town and township governments with populations less than 
50,000.
    \145\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, 
Elementary and Secondary School Systems by Enrollment-Size Group and 
State: 2012--United States--States. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG11.US01. There were 12,184 independent 
school districts with enrollment populations less than 50,000.
    \146\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, 
Special District Governments by Function and State: 2012--United 
States--States. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG09.US01. The U.S. Census Bureau data did not provide a 
population breakout for special district governments.
    \147\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments, County 
Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2012--United 
States--States. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG06.US01; Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by 
Population-Size Group and State: 2012--United States--States--
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG07.US01; 
and Elementary and Secondary School Systems by Enrollment-Size Group 
and State: 2012--United States--States. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG11.US01. While 
U.S. Census Bureau data did not provide a population breakout for 
special district governments, if the population of less than 50,000 
for this category of local government is consistent with the other 
types of local governments the majority of the 38, 266 special 
district governments have populations of less than 50,000.
    \148\ Id.
    \149\ 47 U.S.C. 158(d)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' category is comprised of establishments primarily 
engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as 
satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station 
operation.\150\ This industry also includes establishments primarily 
engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and associated 
facilities connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable 
of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications 
from, satellite systems.\151\ Establishments providing internet 
services or voice over internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-
supplied telecommunications connections are also included in this 
industry.\152\ The SBA has developed a small business size standard for 
All Other Telecommunications, which consists of all such firms with 
annual receipts of $35 million or less.\153\ For this category, U.S. 
Census Bureau data for 2012 shows that there were 1,442 firms that 
operated for the entire year.\154\ Of those firms, a total of 1,400 had 
annual receipts less than $25 million and 15 firms had annual receipts 
of $25 million to $49, 999,999.\155\ Thus, the Commission estimates 
that the majority of ``All Other Telecommunications'' firms potentially 
affected by our action can be considered small.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definitions, NAICS Code 
``517919 All Other Telecommunications'', https://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?input=517919&search=2017+NAICS+Search&search=2017.
    \151\ Id.
    \152\ Id.
    \153\ See 13 CFR 121.201, NAICS code 517919.
    \154\ U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Economic Census of the United 
States, Table EC1251SSSZ4, Information: Subject Series--Estab and 
Firm Size: Receipts Size of Firms for the United States: 2012, NAICS 
code 517919, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ECN/
2012_US/51SSSZ4//naics~517919.
    \155\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other 
Compliance Requirements

    10. This Report and Order does not adopt any new reporting, 
recordkeeping, or other compliance requirements.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    11. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its approach, which may 
include the following four alternatives, among others: (1) The 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ 5 U.S.C. 603(c)(1)-(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    12. This Report and Order does not adopt any new reporting 
requirements. Therefore, no adverse economic impact on small entities 
will be sustained based on reporting requirements. In keeping with the 
requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, we have considered 
certain alternative means of mitigating the effects of fee increases to 
a particular industry segment. For example, The Commission's annual de 
minimis threshold of $1,000, replaced last year with a new section 
9(e)(2) annual regulatory fee exemption of $1,000, will reduce burdens 
on small entities with annual regulatory fees that total $1,000 or 
less. Also, regulatees may also seek waivers or other relief on the 
basis of financial hardship. See 47 CFR 1.1166.

G. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict

    13. None.

V. Ordering Clauses

    14. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to the authority 
found in sections 4(i) and (j), 9, 9A, and 303(r) of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 154(j), 159, 159A, and 
303(r), this Report and Order is hereby adopted.
    15. It is further ordered that the Report and Order shall be 
effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.
    16. It is further ordered that the amendment adopted in section III 
A shall be effective 90 days after notice to Congress, pursuant to 
section 159A(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. 159A(b),
    17. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis in this document, to Congress and the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Federal Communications Commission.
Cecilia Sigmund,
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2020-11348 Filed 6-19-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P