[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 113 (Thursday, June 11, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35648-35649]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-12638]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
Notice of Availability of the Report on the Secretary of Energy's
Final Decision and Supporting Reasoning Regarding Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2019-2, Safety of the Savannah
River Site Tritium Facilities
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) announces the availability of a Report on the
Secretary of Energy's Final Decision and Supporting Reasoning Regarding
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2019-2, Safety
of the Savannah River Site Tritium Facilities. The Board issued
Recommendation 2019-2 on June 11, 2019. The Recommendation focused on
the Department of Energy (DOE) actions to improve the safety of the
Tritium Facilities, upgrades to safety management programs, and the
implementation of robust controls to prevent very high radiation doses,
creating the potential for acute radiation sickness or fatality in a
significant number of individuals. The Recommendation identified three
specific sub-recommendations.
DATES: This notice will be published on June 11, 2020.
ADDRESSES: This report, together with its attachments, documents the
Secretary of Energy's final decision and supporting reasoning regarding
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board) Recommendation
2019-2, Safety of the Savannah River Site Tritium Facilities.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about this
Notice, please contact Ms. Nicole Nelson-Jean, Manager of the Savannah
River Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Savannah River Field Office, P.O. Box A,
Aiken, South Carolina 29802; phone: 803-208-3689; email to:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As explained in detail in the Department's
September 10, 2019, response to the Recommendation (the text of which
is included as Attachment 1 to this report), the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Administrator
stated that DOE/NNSA's safety programs and policies, and their
effective implementation by its well trained workforce, provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and
safety. In addition, focused ongoing actions at the Tritium Facilities
adequately address DNFSB concerns outlined in Recommendation 2019-2 and
make the need for additional actions in response to the DNFSB
Recommendation unnecessarily duplicative of that effort, and would
therefore, detract from our continued progress. The Administrator's
response, on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, constituted a full non-
acceptance of the Recommendation.
Per 42 United States Code Section 2286d paragraph (e), Board
Recommendations, when the Secretary of Energy does not fully accept a
Recommendation, the Board must either reaffirm or revise the
recommendation, and the Secretary of Energy must then consider the
Board's action and make a final decision on whether to implement all or
part of the Board's recommendations. Subject to subsection (i) of the
section, the Secretary shall publish the final decision and the
reasoning for such decision in the Federal Register and shall transmit
to the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed
Services, Appropriations, and Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate a written report containing that decision and reasoning.
The Board reaffirmed the Recommendation in a letter to the
Secretary of Energy on December 5, 2019. In the letter, the Board
provided the following context to support the Board's Recommendation:
[[Page 35649]]
``In rejecting Recommendation 2019-2, DOE presented several actions
and plans in its September 10, 2019, letter and during the briefing on
October 28, 2019, as addressing our concerns. We acknowledge that these
ongoing and planned actions are aimed at addressing issues identified
in Recommendation 2019-2. However, we are concerned these actions will
not, in the near term or long term, fully address the high consequences
to workers. Further, we do not agree that ongoing actions and plans
obliviate the need for Recommendation 2019-2.''
The Board's December 5, 2019, letter does not provide any new
substantive information and reaffirms its original recommendation
without changing it. The Board's reaffirmation ignores the reasoning
and analysis underlying the DOE/NNSA position and incorrectly asserts
that the disagreement has to do with Board's authority rather than the
Board's analysis.
In a letter dated January 3, 2020, the DOE/NNSA Administrator
reaffirmed, on behalf of the Secretary, the Department's September 10,
2019, response as the Secretary's final decision regarding
Recommendation 2019-2 (the text of which is included as Attachment 2 to
the attached report).
The current Tritium Facilities' documented safety analysis contains
appropriate safety significant controls, along with continuous
improvement efforts and a new documented safety analysis. These efforts
are nearing completion and will strengthen the safety posture at the
Tritium Facilities. The planned Tritium Finishing Facility, included in
the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, will fundamentally
improve safety at Savannah River Site (SRS), as DOE/NNSA moves from the
H-Area Old Manufacturing (HAOM) Facility to this new seismically-
qualified facility. Furthermore, the SRS Emergency Management Program
has demonstrated steady and significant improvement over the past
several years and continues to provide adequate protection to the
workforce and the public surrounding the SRS.
DOE/NNSA has already initiated, and in some cases completed, the
actions the DNFSB recommends; the SRS tritium operations are providing
adequate protection of public and additionally, workforce safety. Many
significant long-term projects to enhance safety in SRS tritium
operations are nearing completion. Notably, the ongoing major
construction project to replace the HAOM Tritium Facilities with new,
modern, and robust facilities is being supported by the Department and
Congress.
These activities are significant and are the proper implementation
of DOE/NNSA safety improvements at SRS. Therefore, DOE/NNSA concludes
that the most efficient, effective, and quickest way to improve safety
at the SRS Tritium Facilities is to continue with the current approach
and path forward. As previously noted, DOE/NNSA actions and plans that
would have responded to this recommendation are complete or underway
and therefore, are considered to have met the issues highlighted in the
recommendation.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on April 6,
2020, by Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, pursuant to
delegated authority from the Secretary of Energy. That document with
the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way
alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on June 8, 2020.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2020-12638 Filed 6-10-20; 8:45 am]
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