II. Special Issues for Comment

OSHA has a particular interest in comments on the following issues:

- Whether the proposed information collection requirements are necessary for the proper performance of the agency’s functions, including whether the information is useful;
- The accuracy of OSHA’s estimate of the burden (time and costs) of the information collection requirements, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used;
- The quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and
- Ways to minimize the burden on employers who must comply; for example, by using automated or other technological information collection and transmission techniques.

III. Proposed Actions

OSHA is requesting that OMB extend the approval of the collection of information (paperwork) requirements contained in the Anhydrous Ammonia Storage and Handling Standard. There is a slight adjustment decrease in burden hours for this ICR. The burden hours have decreased a total of 1 hour (from 337 to 336 hours).

Type of Review: Extension of a currently approved collection.


OMB Number: 1218–0208.

Affected Public: Business or other for-profit; farms.

Number of Respondents: 201,300.

Frequency of Response: On occasion.

Total Responses: 2,013.

Average Time per Response: 10 minutes (10/60 hour) for a worker to replace or revise markings on ammonia containers.

Estimated Total Burden Hours: 336.

Estimated Cost (Operation and Maintenance): $0.

IV. Public Participation—Submission of Comments on This Notice and Internet Access to Comments and Submissions

You may submit comments in response to this document as follows:

1. Electronically at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal;
2. Facsimile; or
3. By mail.

All comments, attachments, and other material must clearly identify your electronic comments by your name, date, and the docket number so the agency can attach them to your comments.

Because of security procedures, the use of regular mail may cause a significant delay in the receipt of comments. For information about security procedures concerning the delivery of materials by hand, express delivery, messenger, or courier service, please contact the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693–2350, (TTY (877) 889–5627).

Comments and submissions are posted without change at http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA cautions commenters about submitting personal information such as your social security number and date of birth. Although all submissions are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index, some information (e.g., copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download from this website. All submissions, including copyrighted material, are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. Information on how to access the OSHA Docket Office for information about materials not available from the website, and for assistance in using the internet to locate dockets.

V. Authority and Signature

Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, directed the preparation of this notice. The authority for this notice is the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506 et seq.) and Secretary of Labor’s Order No. 1–2012 (77 FR 3912).


Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.

[FR Doc. 2020–11986 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–26–P
abrogating State sovereign immunity when States infringe copyrights.”  

I. Background

a. The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any person against a nonconsenting State.”  

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, however, “can authorize Congress to strip the States of immunity.”  

Section 1 of that Amendment provides that states may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and section 5 gives Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” those prohibitions, including by subjecting states to suit in federal court.

Enacted on November 15, 1990, the CRCA amended the Copyright Act to expressly provide that states are not immune from suit for copyright infringement. Congress adopted the legislation in response to a 1985 Supreme Court decision, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, in which the Court held that to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must use “unequivocal” language making its intention explicit. At the time, the Copyright Act was silent on whether states were subject to liability, although some pre-Atascadero courts had held that Congress intended states to be subject to infringement claims.

Shortly after the Atascadero decision, Congress asked then-Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman to study what “practical problems” copyright owners faced in enforcing their rights against state governments. The Office subsequently issued a request for public comment and received approximately forty responses. Most comments were submitted by copyright owners, some of whom expressed concern about the risk of future infringement by state entities, while others discussed past acts of infringement committed by states. The Office summarized these comments in a public report (the “Oman Report”), which ultimately recommended that Congress “amend the Copyright Act . . . to ensure that copyright owners have an effective remedy against infringing states.”

But see Wilhal v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1962) (dismissing copyright claim against school district on Eleventh Amendment grounds because the district was “a part of the governmental system of Iowa, constituting a part of its educational system and engaged in performing a state governmental function under state law”).


The CRCA, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, which addressed whether Congress had validly abrogated states’ immunity from patent infringement suits when it adopted the Patent Remedy Act. In Florida Prepaid, the Court set out a number of requirements that Congress needed to meet for such abrogation to constitute a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, Congress was required to identify a “pattern of patent infringement” by state governments. Second, the infringement must constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment such that patent owners “Intellectual Property Clause”). The Supreme Court had not yet addressed that question. Shortly before the report was completed, however, the Court granted certiorari in United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987), certiorari granted sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988), in which the Third Circuit had held that Article I could be a basis for abrogation. The Oman Report recommended that if the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, Congress should revise section 501 of the Copyright Act to “clarify its intent to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity pursuant to its [Intellectual Property Clause] power.” Oman Report at 104. Otherwise, the Report recommended that Congress “amend the jurisdictional provision in 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), to provide that where states are defendants, private individuals may sue them in state court for copyright damages.” Id. at 104-85.

17 17 U.S.C. 511(a); see also id. at 511(b) (“In a suit described in subsection (a) for a violation described in that subsection, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for the violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against any public or private entity other than a State, its instrumentalities, or employee of a State acting in his or her official capacity.”).

18 Id. at 501(a).


20 Id. at 640.
were being deprived of property “without due process of law.” 23 The Court explained that such a deprivation occurs “only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent.” 24 The Court cautioned that, because states do not violate due process when they commit a “negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person’s property,” patent infringement that was merely negligent rather than intentional or reckless did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 25 Third, there must be “congruence and proportionality” between the constitutional violations Congress seeks to remedy and the means adopted for that purpose. 26

The Court in Florida Prepaid struck down the Patent Remedy Act for failure to meet these requirements. It concluded that Congress had not identified a pattern of infringement because (1) Congress had “little evidence of infringing conduct” by state actors; 27 (2) Congress “barely considered” the adequacy of state-law remedies for patent infringement by the state; 28 (3) the legislative record did not reflect a pattern of intentional or reckless infringements, but instead consisted only of “a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the Constitution”; 29 and (4) the legislation was not limited to “cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer any state-court remedy,” or cases where the infringement was not negligent or committed pursuant to state policy. 30 After the Court’s decision, Congress considered, but did not pass, legislation that would have conditioned states’ ability to recover damages for infringement of their own intellectual property on their waiver of immunity to infringement damages. 31

23 Id. at 642.
24 Id. at 643.
25 Id. at 645.
26 Id. at 639 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
27 Id. at 640–41.
28 Id. at 643–44.
29 Id. at 645–66.
30 Id. at 646–47.
31 See Sovereign immunity and Protection of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3–4 (Feb. 27, 2000) (prepared statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg58184/pdf/CHRG-107shrg58184.pdf (discussing Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001 and stating that “no condition could be more reasonable or proportionate than the condition that in order to obtain full protection for your federal intellectual property rights, you must respect those of others”);
32 Allen v. Cooper
This year, the Supreme Court decided Allen v. Cooper, a case considering the validity of the CRCA’s abrogation of state immunity. In Allen, a videographer brought an infringement action against North Carolina after the state published his videos and photographs of a sunken pirate ship online without authorization. North Carolina contended that it was immune to suit and that the CRCA failed to properly abrogate its immunity. Applying the analysis from Florida Prepaid, the Court held that the CRCA failed the congruence and proportionality test for substantially the same reasons that applied to the Patent Remedy Act. 33 With respect to the legislative record, the Court found the evidence of copyright infringement supporting the CRCA to be “scarcely more impressive than what the Florida Prepaid Court saw,” amounting to “only a dozen possible examples of state infringement.” 34 The Court also pointed to congressional testimony and statements by Members of Congress suggesting that copyright infringement by states currently was not a widespread problem. 35 The Court further held that Congress had failed to make a sufficient showing of unconstitutional infringement by states. Under its precedent, the Court noted, “a merely negligent act does not ‘deprive’ a person of property,” and therefore “an infringement must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause.” 36 In the case of the CRCA, only two of the infringements cited in the legislative record appeared to be intentional. 37 Moreover, the record contained “no information about the availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement (such as contract or unjust enrichment suits)—even though they might themselves satisfy due process.” 38 The Court thus concluded that the balance struck by the CRCA “between constitutional wrong and statutory remedy” was “askew.” 39 The “exceedingly slight” evidence of Fourteenth Amendment injury, combined with the fact that the statute extended to “every infringement case against a State,” meant that “the law’s ‘indiscriminate scope’ [was] ‘out of proportion’ to any due process problem.” 40 At the conclusion of the opinion, the Court observed that its decision “need not prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future.” 41 It noted that in adopting the CRCA, “Congress acted before this Court created the ‘congruence and proportionality’ test,” and therefore it “likely did not appreciate the importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the redress or prevention of unconstitutional injuries—and of creating a legislative record to back up that connection.” 42 Under that standard, “if [Congress] detects violations of due process, then it may enact a proportionate response,” and “[t]hat kind of tailored statute can effectively stop States from behaving as copyright pirates.” 43

d. Current Study
On April 28, 2020, Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy sent a letter to the Copyright Office noting that the Allen decision has “created a situation in which copyright owners are without remedy if a State infringes their copyright and claims State sovereign immunity,” and expressing concern “about the impact this may have on American creators and innovators.” 44 The letter states that the Senators “have heard from affected copyright owners that in recent years State infringements of copyright have become much more common.” 45 To determine whether there is a sufficient basis for federal legislation, the letter asks that the Office “study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringements by state entities without adequate remedies under state law. As part of this analysis, the Office should consider the

33 Id. at 1004. The Court had previously reserved, but not decided, the question “whether reckless conduct suffices” to violate due process. Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 324 n.3 (1986)); Id. at 1006. 34 Id. at 2006–07.
35 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.
36 Id. at 1006.
37 Id. at 1004.
38 Id. at 1006. The Court had previously reserved, but not decided, the question “whether reckless conduct suffices” to violate due process. Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 324 n.3 (1986)); Id. at 1006.
39 Id. at 1006. The Court had previously reserved, but not decided, the question “whether reckless conduct suffices” to violate due process. Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 324 n.3 (1986)); Id. at 1006.
40 Id. at 1007.
41 Request Letter at 1.
42 Id. at 2.
extent to which such infringements appear to be based on intentional or reckless conduct.”

The letter requests that the Office provide a public report summarizing the findings of this study, as well as the facts and analyses upon which those findings are based, by April 30, 2021.

Pursuant to this request, the Office is seeking public input in multiple phases. The Office is providing 60 days for written comments from interested parties on the topics outlined below. To fulfill the request from Congress and the requirements of the Court, the Office seeks factual evidence and other verifiable information to support this inquiry. For each question, to the extent available, please include empirical data or other quantitative analysis in your response. If describing a litigation matter, please include information sufficient for the Office to identify such matter, such as the relevant court, docket number, asserted claims, and dates. As applicable, the Office encourages commenters to append relevant materials, such as pleadings, opinions, or other documentary evidence, in support of their comments. If participants currently gathering empirical research and analyses find themselves unable to complete them within the 60-day period for submissions, they are encouraged to contact the Office promptly, describing the nature of the research and indicating the time required for completion. To the extent possible, the Office will seek to accommodate such submissions by providing an additional comment period limited to the provision of empirical data at a later date, but encourages all commenters to meet the noticed deadline if possible, so that the Office may fully consider the submissions in light of the congressional deadline.

After this comment period has closed, the Office intends to host one or more public roundtables to seek additional input, potentially virtually. The Office may request further written comments on particular issues discussed in response to this notice and/or at the public roundtables.

II. Subjects of Inquiry

The Copyright Office invites written comments on the subjects below. A party choosing to respond to this Notice of Inquiry need not address every subject, but the Office requests that responding parties clearly identify and separately address each subject for which a response is submitted. The Office also requests that commenters explain their interest in the study and, with respect to each answer, the basis for their knowledge (e.g., the commenter is a copyright owner, artist, academic, or state official).

1. Please provide information regarding specific instances of infringing conduct committed by a state government entity, officer, or employee, including, where relevant:
   a. The work(s) infringed;
   b. The act(s) of alleged infringement;
   c. When the infringement occurred;
   d. The state actor(s) who committed the infringement;
   e. Whether the infringement was intentional or reckless, and the basis for that conclusion;
   f. Whether the infringement was committed pursuant to a state policy;
   g. Whether the state was contacted by or on behalf of the copyright owner in response to the infringement, and if so, how the state responded;
   h. Whether a lawsuit was filed as a result of the infringement, and if so, where the case was filed, what claim(s) were brought regarding the infringement, whether the case remains pending, and if not, how it was resolved; and
   i. If a lawsuit was not filed, why the copyright owner chose not to do so, including whether it attempted to resolve the matter privately in lieu of litigation, and any relevant details with respect to those attempts.

2. To what extent does state sovereign immunity affect the licensing or sale of copies of copyrighted works to state entities? For example:
   a. Do copyright owners provide different payment or licensing terms in transactions with state entities than are provided in transactions with other parties?
   b. Have copyright owners changed aspects of their sales or licensing practices as a result of state sovereign immunity?
   c. Do different states or state entities take different approaches to working with copyrighted material? Are there particular states that more frequently infringe?

3. What remedies are available for copyright owners when states infringe their works?
   a. To what extent did copyright owners file suits under the Copyright Act against state entities prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Cooper?
   b. In your opinion, does the availability of injunctive relief against state officials provide an adequate remedy to address the needs of copyright owners in response to instances of state copyright infringement?
   c. To what extent are there state law causes of action that may provide a remedy for copyright infringements by state entities? Are there state court cases in which a copyright owner has been awarded a judgment on such a claim?
   d. To the extent state law provides a cause of action relevant to copyright infringement, how do the elements of the cause of action and/or available remedies differ from those applicable to claims under the Copyright Act?
   e. In your opinion, are those remedies adequate to address the needs of copyright owners in response to instances of state copyright infringement?

4. How can Congress determine whether copyright infringement by a state is common or infrequent? What metrics should be used in making such a determination?

5. Has the prevalence of infringement by states increased in recent years?
   a. What empirical evidence is available to determine whether and to what extent there has been a change over time?
   b. To what extent, if any, have instances of actual or threatened infringement by states increased since the decision in Allen, or can they be expected to increase?

6. How do different states handle claims of infringement? Please discuss, as relevant:
   a. Whether any state agencies carry insurance policies that would cover infringement by a state employee, and if so, whether those insurance policies distinguish between infringement that is intentional, reckless, or negligent?
   b. Any laws, regulations, or policies that state entities have adopted to minimize the likelihood of, or to provide a remedy for, copyright infringement by a state entity?
   c. How frequently copyright owners claim a state actor has infringed their rights, either privately or in litigation?
   d. How state entities typically respond to credible claims of copyright infringement, including any formal or informal policies providing for negotiations with or payment to the copyright owner, as well as whether the Attorney General’s office is notified of such claims?
   e. What state entities are eligible to assert sovereign immunity as a defense to copyright infringement claims?
   f. Whether state entities have the right to waive sovereign immunity as a defense to an infringement lawsuit in

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43 Id.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Notice of Intent To Grant an Exclusive License

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of intent to grant exclusive invention license.

SUMMARY: NASA hereby gives notice of its intent to grant an exclusive invention license in the United States to practice the invention described and claimed in NASA Case Number MFS–33884–1, entitled “Ruggedizing a Commercial Camera for Space Flight Environments,” to Imperx, Inc., having its principal place of business in Boca Raton, Florida. NASA has not yet made a determination to grant the requested license and may deny the requested license even if no objections are submitted within the comment period.

DATES: The prospective exclusive license may be granted unless NASA receives written objections including evidence and argument, no later than June 18, 2020 that establish that the grant of the license would not be consistent with the requirements regarding the licensing of federally owned inventions as set forth in the Bayh-Dole Act and implementing regulations. Competing applications completed and received by NASA no later than June 18, 2020 will also be treated as objections to the grant of the contemplated exclusive license. Objections submitted in response to this notice will not be made available to the public for inspection and, to the extent permitted by law, will not be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

ADDRESSES: Objections relating to the prospective license may be submitted to James J. McGroary, Chief Patent Counsel/LS01, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL 35812, (256) 544–0013. Email james.j.mcgroary@nasa.gov.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice of intent to grant an exclusive invention license is issued in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 209(e) and 37 CFR 404.7(a)(1)(i). The patent rights in these inventions have been assigned to the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The prospective exclusive license will comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

Information about other NASA inventions available for licensing can be found online at http://technology.nasa.gov.

Helen M. Galus,
Agency Counsel for Intellectual Property.

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION


New Postal Products

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing a recent Postal Service filing for the Commission’s consideration concerning negotiated service agreements. This notice informs the public of the filing, invites public comment, and takes other administrative steps.

DATES: Comments are due: June 5, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments electronically via the Commission’s Filing Online system at http://www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit comments electronically should contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section by telephone for advice on filing alternatives.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at 202–789–6820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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I. Introduction
II. Docketed Proceeding(s)