[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 103 (Thursday, May 28, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32055-32057]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11453]


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NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE


Solicitation of Written Comments by the National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence

AGENCY: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

ACTION: Request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence 
(the ``Commission'') was created by Congress in the John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 to ``consider 
the methods and means necessary to advance the development of 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies 
by the United States to comprehensively address the national security 
and defense needs of the United States.'' In connection with this 
effort, the Commission seeks to learn more about the general public's 
views on these topics.

DATES: Comment Date: The Commission requests comments on or before 
September 30, 2020 to be considered by the Commission in the formation 
of its final report.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. 05-2020-
01, by one of the following methods:
     Email: [email protected]. Please include the docket number 
in the subject line of the message.
     Mail: National Security Commission on Artificial 
Intelligence, Attn: RFI COMMENT--Docket No. 05-2020-01, 2530 Crystal 
Drive, Box 45, Arlington, VA 22202.
     Fax: +1-571-778-5049. Please include the docket number on 
the cover page of the fax.
    Due to the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, email is the 
Commission's primary method of receiving public comment. All 
submissions received must include the docket number. If the Commission 
cannot read your comment due to technical difficulties and cannot 
contact you for clarification, the Commission may not be able to 
consider your comment. Late comments will be considered as time 
permits. Please note, any comments received by the Commission may be 
published online or included with its reports and/or recommendations. 
Submitters should be aware that the Commission is subject to the 
Freedom of Information Act and will transfer official records, 
including comments received, to the National Archives and Records 
Administration upon termination of the Commission.
    Website: The most current information about the Commission and its 
activities and recommendations is available on the Commission's 
website: https://www.nscai.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general inquiries, submission 
process questions, or any additional information about this request for 
comments, please contact Tara Rigler by email at [email protected] or 
by phone at 703-614-6379.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

[[Page 32056]]

    Background: The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19 NDAA), Sec. 1051, Public Law 115-232, 132 
Stat. 1636, 1962-65 (2018), as amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Sec. 1735, Public Law 116-92 
(2019), created the National Security Commission on Artificial 
Intelligence (the ``Commission'') to ``consider the methods and means 
necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, and associated technologies by the United States to 
comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the 
United States.''
    Specifically, in Section 1051 of the FY19 NDAA, Congress directed 
the Commission to consider:
    A. ``The competitiveness of the United States in artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, and other associated technologies, 
including matters related to national security, defense, public-private 
partnerships, and investments.''
    B. ``Means and methods for the United States to maintain a 
technological advantage in artificial intelligence, machine learning, 
and other associated technologies related to national security and 
defense.''
    C. ``Developments and trends in international cooperation and 
competitiveness, including foreign investments in artificial 
intelligence, related machine learning, and computer science fields 
that are materially related to national security and defense.''
    D. ``Means by which to foster greater emphasis and investments in 
basic and advanced research to stimulate private, public, academic and 
combined initiatives in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
other associated technologies, to the extent that such efforts have 
application materially related to national security and defense.''
    E. ``Workforce and education incentives to attract and recruit 
leading talent in artificial intelligence and machine learning 
disciplines, including science, technology, engineering, and math 
programs.''
    F. ``Risks associated with United States and foreign country 
advances in military employment of artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, including international law of armed conflict, international 
humanitarian law, and escalation dynamics.''
    G. ``Associated ethical considerations related to artificial 
intelligence and machine learning as it will be used for future 
applications related to national security and defense.''
    H. ``Means to establish data standards, and incentivize the sharing 
of open training data within related national security and defense 
data-driven industries.''
    I. ``Consideration of the evolution of artificial intelligence and 
appropriate mechanism for managing such technology related to national 
security and defense.''
    J. ``Any other matters the Commission deems relevant to the common 
defense of the Nation.''
    The Commission is required to provide the President and the 
Congress a final report containing its findings and recommendations 
regarding these matters no later than March 2021. In connection with 
this effort, the Commission seeks to learn more about the general 
public's views on these topics.
    Specific Topics to Address: The Commission invites written comments 
on any of the topics set forth above under ``Background'' for which 
Congress has requested Commission input.
    In addition, the Commission would welcome comments on any of the 
following seven consensus principles from its November 2019 Interim 
Report, which can be accessed at https://www.nscai.gov/reports:
    1. Global leadership in AI technology is a matter of national 
security.
    2. Adopting AI for defense and security is an urgent priority.
    3. Private sector and government share responsibility for our 
nation's future.
    4. People matter more than ever in an AI competition.
    5. Protecting our most valuable assets and ideas must not come at 
the expense of free inquiry and innovation.
    6. Ethical and trustworthy AI is a strategic and operational 
necessity.
    7. Any use of AI by the United States must have American values--
including the rule of law--at its core.
    Furthermore, the Commission also welcomes comments related to any 
of the Commission's November 2019 Interim Report judgments stemming 
from the Commission's lines of effort:

Line of Effort 1--Invest in AI Research & Development and Software

    1. Federal R&D funding for AI has not kept pace with the 
revolutionary potential it holds or with aggressive investments by 
competitors. Investments that are multiple times greater than current 
levels are needed.
    2. Untapped opportunities exist to build a nationwide AI R&D 
infrastructure and encourage regional innovation ``clusters.'' Such AI 
districts for defense would benefit both national security and economic 
competitiveness.
    3. The U.S. government should implement more flexible funding 
mechanisms to support AI research. Business as usual is insufficient.
    4. The U.S. government must identify, prioritize, coordinate, and 
urgently implement national security-focused AI R&D investments.
    5. Bureaucratic and resource constraints are hindering government-
affiliated labs and research centers from reaching their full potential 
in AI R&D.

Line of Effort 2--Apply AI to National Security Missions

    6. AI can help the U.S. Government execute core national security 
missions, if we let it.
    7. Implementation of the government's national security strategies 
for AI is threatened by bureaucratic impediments and inertia. Defense 
and intelligence agencies must urgently accelerate their efforts.
    8. Pockets of successful bottom-up innovation exist across the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Intelligence 
Community (IC). These isolated programs cannot translate into strategic 
change without top-down leadership to overcome organizational barriers.
    9. AI adoption and deployment requires a different approach to 
acquisition.
    10. Rapidly fielding AI is an operational necessity. To get there 
requires investment in resilient, robust, reliable, and secure AI 
systems.
    11. AI is only as good as the infrastructure behind it. Within DoD 
in particular this infrastructure is severely underdeveloped.
    12. The U.S. government is not adequately leveraging basic, 
commercial AI to improve business practices and save taxpayer dollars. 
Departments and agencies must modernize to become more effective and 
cost-efficient.

Line of Effort 3--Train and Recruit AI Talent

    13. National security agencies need to rethink the requirements for 
an AI-ready workforce. That includes extending familiarity with a range 
of relevant AI technologies throughout organizations, infusing training 
on the ethical and responsible development and fielding of AI at every 
level, and spreading the use of modern software tools.
    14. DoD and the IC are failing to capitalize on existing technical 
talent because they do not have effective ways to identify AI-relevant 
skills already present in their workforce. They should systematically 
measure and incentivize the development of those skills.

[[Page 32057]]

    15. The U.S. Government is not fully utilizing civilian hiring 
authorities to recruit AI talent. Agencies need to make better use of 
pipelines for people with STEM training.
    16. Expanding AI-focused fellowships and exchange opportunities can 
give officials and service members access to cutting-edge technology, 
and bring talent from our top AI companies into federal service.
    17. The military and national security agencies are struggling to 
compete for top AI talent. They need a better pitch, incentive 
structure, and better on-ramps for recent graduates.
    18. American colleges and universities cannot meet the demand for 
undergraduate student interest in AI and computer science generally.
    19. The American AI talent pool depends heavily on international 
students and workers. Our global competitiveness hinges on our ability 
to attract and retain top minds from around the world.

Line of Effort 4--Protect and Build Upon U.S. Technological Advantages 
& Hardware

    20. The U.S. Government should continue to use export controls--
including multilateral controls--to protect specific U.S. and allied AI 
hardware advantages, in particular those in semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment.
    21. However, traditional item-based export controls and narrowly-
scoped foreign investment reviews are by themselves insufficient to 
sustain U.S. competitiveness in AI.
    22. The United States must continue leading in AI-related hardware, 
and ensure the government has trusted access to the latest 
technologies.
    23. Law enforcement and academic leaders can and should find common 
ground on preserving an open research system while reducing security 
risks from foreign government-directed activity on American campuses.

Line of Effort 5--Marshal Global AI Cooperation

    24. The United States must enhance its competitiveness in AI by 
establishing a network of partners dedicated to AI data sharing, R&D 
coordination, capacity building, and talent exchanges.
    25. AI presents significant challenges for military 
interoperability. If the United States and its allies do not coordinate 
early and often on AI-enabled capabilities, the effectiveness of our 
military coalitions will suffer.
    26. U.S. diplomacy should be open to possible cooperation with 
China and Russia on promoting AI safety and managing AI's impact on 
strategic stability.
    27. The United States should lead in establishing a positive agenda 
for cooperation with all nations on AI advances that promise to benefit 
humanity.

Line of Effort 6--Ethics and Responsible AI (this cross-cutting 
priority has been elevated to an identified level of effort since the 
publication of the November 2019 Interim Report)

    28. Developing trustworthy AI systems is essential for operational 
integrity and adoption. It is closely connected to, and depends on, 
reliability, robustness, auditability, explainability, and fairness.
    29. From the earliest phase, systems should be designed with ethics 
in mind.
    30. Each agency's design and deployment of AI, as with other 
technologies, must align with America's democratic values and 
institutional values.
    31. Throughout their life cycles, ethical AI systems for national 
security will need to preserve individual rights and liberties as 
protected by law. In international contexts, this includes America's 
commitments to international humanitarian law and human rights.

    Dated: May 22, 2020.
Michael Gable,
Chief of Staff.
[FR Doc. 2020-11453 Filed 5-27-20; 8:45 am]
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