[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 72 (Tuesday, April 14, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20745-20769]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-07777]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-88600; File No. SR-FINRA-2020-011]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Address 
Brokers With a Significant History of Misconduct

April 8, 2020.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that 
on April 3, 2020, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. 
(``FINRA'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'' 
or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, 
II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by FINRA. The 
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the 
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    FINRA is proposing to (1) amend the FINRA Rule 9200 Series 
(Disciplinary Proceedings) and the 9300 Series (Review of Disciplinary 
Proceeding by National Adjudicatory Council and FINRA Board; 
Application for SEC Review) to allow a Hearing Officer to impose 
conditions or restrictions on the activities of a respondent member 
firm or respondent broker, and require a respondent broker's member 
firm to adopt heightened supervisory procedures for such broker, when a 
disciplinary matter is appealed to the National Adjudicatory Council 
(``NAC'') or called for NAC review; (2) amend the FINRA Rule 9520 
Series (Eligibility Proceedings) to require member firms to adopt 
heightened supervisory procedures for statutorily disqualified brokers 
during the period a statutory disqualification eligibility request is 
under review by FINRA; (3) amend FINRA Rule 8312 (FINRA BrokerCheck 
Disclosure) to allow the disclosure through FINRA BrokerCheck of the 
status of a member firm as a ``taping firm'' under FINRA Rule 3170 
(Tape Recording of Registered Persons by Certain Firms); and (4) amend 
the FINRA Rule 1000 Series (Member Application and Associated Person 
Registration) to require a member firm to submit a written request to 
FINRA's Department of Member Regulation (``Member Regulation''), 
through the Membership Application Group (``MAP Group''), seeking a 
materiality consultation and approval of a continuing membership 
application, if required, when a natural person that has, in the prior 
five years, one or more ``final criminal matters'' or two or more 
``specified risk events'' \3\ seeks to become an owner, control person, 
principal or registered person of the member firm.
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    \3\ As explained more below, the proposed definitions of ``final 
criminal matter'' and ``specified risk event'' generally include 
final, adjudicated disclosure events disclosed on a person's or 
firm's Uniform Registration Forms. For purposes of the proposed rule 
change, Uniform Registration Forms for firms and brokers refer to, 
and would be defined as, the Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer 
Registration (Form BD), the Uniform Application for Securities 
Industry Registration or Transfer (Form U4), the Uniform Termination 
Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U5) and the 
Uniform Disciplinary Action Reporting Form (Form U6), as such may be 
amended or any successor(s) thereto.
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    The text of the proposed rule change is available on FINRA's 
website at http://www.finra.org, at the principal office of FINRA and 
at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, FINRA included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. FINRA has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, 
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
Overview
    FINRA uses a combination of tools to reduce the risk of harm to 
investors from member firms and the brokers they hire that have a 
history of misconduct. These tools include assessments of applications 
filed by member firms to retain or employ an individual subject to a 
statutory disqualification, reviews of membership and continuing 
membership applications (``CMAs''), disclosure of brokers' regulatory 
backgrounds, supervision requirements, focused examinations, risk 
monitoring and disciplinary actions. These tools, among others, have 
been useful in identifying and addressing a range of misconduct and 
serve to further the Exchange Act goals, reflected in FINRA's mission, 
of investor protection and market integrity.
    In addition, FINRA Rule 3110 (Supervision) requires member firms to 
establish and maintain a system to supervise the activities of each 
associated person that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance 
with applicable securities laws and FINRA rules. The rule also requires 
member firms to establish, maintain and enforce written procedures to 
supervise the types of business in which they engage and the activities 
of their associated persons that are reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with applicable securities laws and FINRA rules.\4\
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    \4\ See Rule 3110(a) and (b).
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    Despite these requirements and FINRA's ongoing efforts to 
strengthen protections for investors and the markets through its 
oversight of member firms and the brokers they employ, persistent 
compliance issues continue to arise in some member firms. Recent 
studies, for example, find that some firms persistently employ brokers 
who engage in misconduct, which results in higher levels of misconduct 
by these firms. These studies also provide evidence that past 
disciplinary and other regulatory events associated with a member firm 
or individual can be predictive of similar future events, such as 
repeated disciplinary actions, arbitrations and complaints.\5\ This 
risk

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cannot always be adequately addressed by FINRA's existing rules and 
programs.
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    \5\ For example, in 2015 FINRA's Office of the Chief Economist 
(OCE) published a study that examined the predictability of 
disciplinary and other disclosure events associated with investor 
harm based on past similar events. The OCE study showed that past 
disclosure events, including regulatory actions, customer 
arbitrations and litigations of brokers, have significant power to 
predict future investor harm. See Hammad Qureshi & Jonathan Sokobin, 
Do Investors Have Valuable Information About Brokers? (FINRA Office 
of the Chief Economist Working Paper, Aug. 2015). A subsequent 
academic research paper presented evidence that suggests a higher 
rate of new disciplinary and other disclosure events is highly 
correlated with past disciplinary and other disclosure events, as 
far back as nine years prior. See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos, & Amit 
Seru, The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct, J. Pol. Econ. 
127, no. 1 (Feb. 2019): 233-295.
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    Brokers and member firms with a history of misconduct can pose a 
particular challenge for FINRA's existing examination and enforcement 
programs. For example, FINRA examinations of member firms can identify 
compliance failures--or imminent failures--and prescribe remedies to be 
taken, but examiners are not empowered to require a firm to change or 
limit its business operations in a particular manner. While these 
constraints on the examination process protect firms from potentially 
arbitrary or overly onerous examination findings, a firm or individual 
with a history of misconduct can take advantage of these limits to 
continue ongoing activities that harm or pose risk of harm to investors 
until they result in an enforcement action.
    FINRA disciplinary actions, in turn, can be brought only after a 
violation--and any resulting customer harm--may have already occurred. 
In addition, disciplinary proceedings can take significant time to 
develop, prosecute and conclude, during which time the respondent in a 
disciplinary proceeding is able to continue misconduct, perpetuating 
significant risks of additional harm to customers and investors. 
Litigated enforcement actions brought by FINRA involve a hearing and 
often multiple rounds of appeals, thereby effectively forestalling the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions--and their potential deterrent 
effect--for an extended period. For example, a FINRA enforcement 
proceeding could involve a hearing before a Hearing Panel, numerous 
motions, an appeal to the NAC, and further appeals to the SEC and 
federal courts of appeals. Moreover, even when a FINRA Hearing Panel or 
Hearing Officer imposes a significant sanction, the sanction is stayed 
during appeal to the NAC, many sanctions are automatically stayed on 
appeal to the SEC, and they potentially can be stayed during appeal to 
the courts. When all appeals are exhausted, the respondent's FINRA 
registration may have terminated, limiting FINRA's jurisdiction and 
eliminating the leverage that FINRA has to incent the respondent to 
comply with the sanction, including making restitution to customers.
    Similarly, FINRA's eligibility proceedings are sometimes not 
available or sufficient to address the risks posed by brokers with a 
significant history of past misconduct. Federal law and regulations 
define the types of misconduct that presumptively disqualify a broker 
from associating with a member firm and also govern the standards and 
procedures FINRA must follow when a firm seeks to associate or continue 
associating with a broker subject to a statutory disqualification. 
These laws and regulations limit who FINRA may subject to an 
eligibility proceeding and affect how FINRA may exercise its authority 
in those proceedings.
    FINRA's membership proceedings also do not always protect against 
the risks posed when a firm hires brokers with a significant history of 
misconduct. For firms eligible for the safe harbor for business 
expansions in IM-1011-1 (Safe Harbor for Business Expansions), there 
are a defined set of expansions (including, among other things, 
increases in the number of associated persons involved in sales) that 
are presumed not to be a material change in business operations and 
therefore do not require the firm to file a CMA.
    Thus, notwithstanding the existing protections afforded by the 
federal securities laws and FINRA rules, the risk of potential customer 
harm may persist where a firm or broker has a significant history of 
past misconduct.
    FINRA is taking steps to strengthen its tools to respond to brokers 
with a significant history of misconduct and the firms that employ 
them, several of which are described below. In addition, the proposed 
rule change, as explained further below, would create several 
additional protections to address this risk.
Additional Steps Undertaken by FINRA
    As part of this initiative, FINRA has undertaken the following:
    [rtarr8] Published Regulatory Notice 18-15 (Heightened 
Supervision), which reiterates the existing obligation of member firms 
to implement for such individuals tailored heightened supervisory 
procedures under Rule 3110;
    [rtarr8] Published Regulatory Notice 18-17 (FINRA Revises the 
Sanction Guidelines), which announced revisions to the FINRA Sanction 
Guidelines;
    [rtarr8] Raised fees for statutory disqualification applications; 
\6\ and
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    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83181 (May 7, 2018), 
83 FR 22107 (May 11, 2018) (Notice of Filing and Immediate 
Effectiveness of File No. SR-FINRA-2018-018).
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    [rtarr8] Revised the qualification examination waiver guidelines to 
permit FINRA to more broadly consider past misconduct when considering 
examination waiver requests.
    In addition, to further address issues created by member firms that 
have a significant history of misconduct, FINRA has issued a Regulatory 
Notice seeking comment on proposed new Rule 4111 (Restricted Firm 
Obligations).\7\
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    \7\ See Regulatory Notice 19-17 (May 2019).
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Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9200 Series and FINRA Rule 9300 
Series To Enhance Investor Protection During the Pendency of an Appeal 
or Call-for-Review Proceeding
    FINRA is proposing amendments to the Rule 9200 Series (Disciplinary 
Proceedings) and Rule 9300 Series (Review of Disciplinary Proceeding by 
National Adjudicatory Council and FINRA Board; Application for SEC 
Review) to bolster investor protection during the pendency of an appeal 
from, or a NAC review of, a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer 
disciplinary decision, by empowering Hearing Officers to impose 
conditions or restrictions on disciplined respondents and requiring 
firms to adopt heightened supervision plans concerning disciplined 
individual respondents. The proposed rule also would establish a 
process for an expedited review by the Review Subcommittee of the NAC 
of any conditions or restrictions imposed.
    Currently, the Rule 9200 and Rule 9300 Series permit FINRA to bring 
disciplinary actions against member firms, associated persons of member 
firms or persons within FINRA's jurisdiction for alleged violations of 
FINRA rules, SEC regulations or federal securities laws. Following the 
filing of a complaint, FINRA's Chief Hearing Officer will assign a 
Hearing Officer to preside over the disciplinary proceeding and appoint 
a Hearing Panel, or an Extended Hearing Panel if applicable,\8\ to 
conduct a hearing and issue a written decision. For each case, the 
Hearing Panel or, in the case of default

[[Page 20747]]

decisions, the Hearing Officer will issue a written decision that makes 
findings and, if violations occurred, imposes sanctions. Sanctions can 
include, among other things, fines, suspensions, bars and orders to pay 
restitution.
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    \8\ References to ``Hearing Panel'' will refer to both a Hearing 
Panel and an Extended Hearing Panel collectively, unless otherwise 
noted. A Hearing Panel consists of a FINRA Hearing Officer and two 
panelists, drawn primarily from a pool of current and former 
securities industry members of FINRA's District and Regional 
Committees, as well as its Market Regulation Committee, former 
members of FINRA's NAC and former FINRA Directors or Governors.
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    Under FINRA's disciplinary procedures, any party can appeal a 
Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer decision to the NAC. In addition, any 
member of the NAC or the NAC's Review Subcommittee, or the General 
Counsel in the case of default decisions, may on their own initiate a 
review of a decision. On appeal or review, the NAC will determine if a 
Hearing Panel's or a Hearing Officer's findings were factually 
supported and legally correct. The NAC also reviews any sanctions 
imposed and considers the FINRA Sanction Guidelines when doing so. The 
NAC prepares a proposed written decision. If the FINRA Board of 
Governors does not call the case for review, the NAC's decision becomes 
final and constitutes the final disciplinary action of FINRA, unless 
the NAC remands the proceeding to the Hearing Officer or Hearing Panel. 
If the FINRA Board of Governors calls the case for review, the FINRA 
Board of Governors' decision constitutes the final disciplinary action 
of FINRA, unless the Board of Governors remands the proceeding to the 
NAC. A respondent in a FINRA disciplinary proceeding may appeal a final 
FINRA disciplinary action to the SEC, and further to a United States 
federal court of appeals.
    When a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer decision is on appeal or 
review before the NAC, any sanctions imposed by the Hearing Panel or 
Hearing Officer decision, including bars and expulsions, are 
automatically stayed and not enforced against the respondent during the 
pendency of the appeal or review proceeding.\9\ In turn, the filing of 
an application for SEC review stays the effectiveness of any sanction, 
other than a bar or an expulsion, imposed in a decision constituting a 
final FINRA disciplinary action.\10\
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    \9\ See FINRA Rules 9311(b), 9312(b). In contrast, an appeal to 
the NAC or a call for NAC review does not stay a decision, or that 
part of a decision, that imposes a permanent cease and desist order. 
See FINRA Rules 9311(b), 9312(b).
    \10\ See FINRA Rule 9370(a).
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    Proposed FINRA Rule 9285 (Interim Orders and Mandatory Heightened 
Supervision While on Appeal or Discretionary Review) would establish 
additional investor protections when a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer 
decision that makes findings that a respondent violated a statute or 
rule provision is appealed to the NAC or called for NAC review.
    Proposed Rule 9285(a) would provide that the Hearing Officer that 
participated in the underlying disciplinary proceeding may impose any 
conditions or restrictions on the activities of a respondent during the 
appeal as the Hearing Officer considers reasonably necessary for the 
purpose of preventing customer harm. In light of comments received in 
response to Regulatory Notice 18-16, FINRA has modified the proposal to 
make the imposition of possible conditions and restrictions a separate, 
second step after a finding of a violation by a Hearing Panel or 
Hearing Officer, and to provide greater clarity on how the process 
would operate.
    Unless otherwise ordered by a Hearing Officer, proposed Rule 
9285(a)(1) would allow FINRA's Department of Enforcement 
(``Enforcement''), within ten days after service of a notice of appeal 
from, or the notice of a call for NAC review of, a disciplinary 
decision of a Hearing Officer or Hearing Panel, to file a motion for 
the imposition of conditions or restrictions on the activities of a 
respondent that are reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing 
customer harm.\11\ Proposed Rule 9285(a)(1) also would provide 
expressly that the Hearing Officer that participated in the underlying 
disciplinary proceeding would have jurisdiction to rule on a motion 
seeking conditions or restrictions, notwithstanding the appeal or call 
for NAC review. FINRA believes that the Hearing Officer's knowledge 
about the factual background and the violations, gained through 
presiding over the disciplinary proceeding, would make the Hearing 
Officer well qualified to evaluate the potential for customer harm and 
craft, in the first instance and in an expeditious manner, tailored 
conditions and restrictions to minimize that potential harm. In a 
change from the proposal in Regulatory Notice 18-16, the proposed rule 
would give the Hearing Officer who participated in the underlying 
proceeding (instead of the Hearing Panel) the authority to impose 
conditions or restrictions that are reasonably necessary for the 
purpose of preventing customer harm, a change that FINRA believes will 
enable orders imposing conditions or restrictions to be imposed more 
expeditiously.
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    \11\ See Rule 9311(a) (generally allowing a party to file a 
notice of appeal within 25 days after service of a decision issued 
pursuant to Rule 9268 or Rule 9269) and Rule 9312 (generally 
allowing a call for review within 45 days after the date of service 
of a decision issued pursuant to Rule 9268 and within 25 days after 
the date of service of a default decision issued pursuant to Rule 
9269).
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    Proposed Rule 9285(a)(2) through (a)(5), along with proposed Rule 
9285(c), would establish the briefing, timing and other procedural 
requirements relating to the imposition of conditions or restrictions. 
The proposed rule would permit Enforcement to file a motion seeking the 
imposition of conditions or restrictions that are reasonably necessary 
for the purpose of preventing customer harm, and the motion must 
specify the conditions and restrictions that are sought to be imposed 
and explain why they are necessary. A respondent would have the right 
to file an opposition or other response to the motion within ten days 
after service of the motion, unless otherwise ordered by the Hearing 
Officer, and must explain why no conditions or restrictions should be 
imposed or specify alternative conditions and restrictions that are 
sought to be imposed and explain why they are reasonably necessary for 
the purpose of preventing customer harm. Enforcement would have no 
automatic right to file a reply. The Hearing Officer would decide the 
motion on the papers and without oral argument, unless an oral argument 
is specifically ordered. In addition, the Hearing Officer would be 
required to issue a written order ruling upon the motion in an 
expeditious manner and no later than 20 days after any opposition or 
permitted reply is filed. In an enhancement from the proposal in 
Regulatory Notice 18-16, proposed Rule 9285(a)(5) also would require 
that the Office of Hearing Officers provide a copy of the order to each 
FINRA member with which the respondent is associated.
    If the Hearing Officer grants a motion for conditions or 
restrictions, its order should describe the activities that the 
respondent shall refrain from taking and any conditions imposed. The 
Hearing Officer would be guided by the limiting principle--set forth in 
proposed Rule 9285(a)(5)--that the Hearing Officer shall have the 
authority to impose any conditions or restrictions that the Hearing 
Officer considers reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing 
customer harm. As FINRA explained in Regulatory Notice 18-16, the 
conditions and restrictions imposed should target the misconduct 
demonstrated in the disciplinary proceeding and be tailored to the 
specific risks posed by the member firm or broker. Conditions or 
restrictions could include, for example, prohibiting a member firm or 
broker from offering private placements in cases of misrepresentations 
and omissions made to customers, or

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prohibiting penny stock liquidations in cases involving violations of 
the penny stock rules. A condition could also include posting a bond to 
cover harm to customers before the sanction imposed becomes final or 
precluding a broker from acting in a specified capacity. FINRA believes 
authorizing Hearing Officers to impose conditions or restrictions 
during the period an appeal or review proceeding is pending would allow 
FINRA to target the demonstrated bad conduct of a respondent during the 
pendency of the appeal or review and add an interim layer of investor 
protection while the disciplinary proceeding remains pending.\12\
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    \12\ The examples of conditions and restrictions set forth above 
are intended to provide guidance concerning the kinds of conditions 
and restrictions that could be imposed. FINRA expects that requiring 
Enforcement to file a motion specifying the conditions or 
restrictions sought also will help focus adjudicators on options 
that are available, and allow for the flexibility needed to address 
the risk posed by different factual scenarios. If helpful to 
adjudicators and parties, FINRA also would publish additional 
guidance on the kinds of restrictions or conditions that could be 
imposed.
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    Proposed Rule 9285(b), along with proposed Rule 9285(c), would 
establish an expedited process for the review of a Hearing Officer's 
order imposing conditions or restrictions. Specifically, proposed Rule 
9285(b)(1) would permit a respondent that is subject to a Hearing 
Officer order imposing conditions or restrictions to file, within ten 
days after service of that order, a motion with the Review Subcommittee 
to modify or remove any or all of the conditions or restrictions. 
Proposed Rule 9285(b)(2) would provide, among other things, that the 
respondent has the burden to show that the conditions or restrictions 
are not reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing customer 
harm.\13\
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    \13\ In Regulatory Notice 18-16, FINRA originally proposed that 
the respondent would also be required to demonstrate that Hearing 
Officer ``committed an error by ordering the conditions or 
restrictions imposed.'' FINRA believes that it is more appropriate 
for the burden in proposed Rule 9285(b)(2) to mirror what 
Enforcement must show when seeking conditions or restrictions and 
the Hearing Officer's authority to impose conditions and 
restrictions.
     Notwithstanding that FINRA no longer proposes including the 
``committed an error'' standard in the proposed rule, FINRA intends 
that the Review Subcommittee would essentially conduct a de novo 
review when considering a respondent's motion to modify or remove 
conditions or restrictions. An exception would be for a Hearing 
Officer's credibility determinations, which are entitled to 
considerable weight and deference, and can be overturned only where 
the record contains substantial evidence for doing so.
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    Proposed Rule 9285(b)(3) would give Enforcement five days from 
service of the respondent's motion to file an opposition or other 
response, unless otherwise ordered by the Review Subcommittee. Proposed 
Rule 9285(b)(4) would provide that the respondent may not file a reply. 
Proposed Rule 9285(b)(5) would provide that the NAC's Review 
Subcommittee would decide the motion based on the papers and without 
oral argument, unless an oral argument is specifically ordered by the 
Review Subcommittee, and make that decision in an expeditious manner 
and no later than 30 days after the filing of the opposition. The rule 
would provide that the Review Subcommittee could approve, modify or 
remove any and all of the conditions or restrictions. It also would 
require that FINRA's Office of General Counsel provide a copy of the 
Review Subcommittee's order to each FINRA member with which the 
respondent is associated. Proposed Rule 9285(b)(6) would provide that 
the filing of a motion pursuant to Rule 9285(b) would stay the 
effectiveness of the conditions and restrictions ordered by the Hearing 
Officer until the Review Subcommittee rules on the motion.
    Proposed Rule 9285(d) would provide that conditions or restrictions 
imposed by a Hearing Officer that are not subject to a stay or imposed 
by the Review Subcommittee shall remain in effect until FINRA's final 
decision takes effect. Thus, the conditions or restrictions would 
remain in effect until there is a final FINRA disciplinary action and 
all appeals are exhausted.
    The remainder of proposed Rule 9285 sets requirements for member 
firms, during an appeal or NAC review proceeding, to establish 
mandatory heightened supervision plans for disciplined respondents. 
Specifically, when a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer disciplinary 
decision finding that a respondent violated a statute or rule provision 
is appealed or called for NAC review, proposed Rule 9285(e) would 
require any member with which the respondent is associated to adopt a 
written plan of heightened supervision of the respondent. The plan of 
heightened supervision would be required to comply with FINRA Rule 
3110,\14\ be reasonably designed and tailored to include specific 
supervisory policies and procedures that address the violations found 
by the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer, and be reasonably designed to 
prevent or detect a reoccurrence of those violations. The plan of 
heightened supervision would be required to, at a minimum, designate an 
appropriately registered principal responsible for carrying out the 
plan of heightened supervision. Proposed Rule 9285(d) also would 
require that the plan of heightened supervision be signed by the 
designated principal and include an acknowledgement that the principal 
is responsible for implementing and maintaining the plan. The plan of 
heightened supervision would be required to remain in place until 
FINRA's final decision takes effect. Thus, the plan of heightened 
supervision would be required to remain in place until there is a final 
FINRA disciplinary action and all appeals are exhausted.\15\
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    \14\ Rule 3110 requires member firms to establish and maintain a 
system to supervise the activities of each associated person that is 
reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities 
laws and FINRA rules. See also Regulatory Notice 18-15 (Guidance on 
Implementing Effective Heightened Supervisory Procedures for 
Associated Persons with a History of Misconduct), at p.2 & n.2 
(April 2018).
    \15\ Although proposed Rule 9285(d) would not require heightened 
supervision plans after FINRA's final decision takes effect, the 
supervisory obligations of member firms regarding associated persons 
with a history of past misconduct would continue to apply. See 
Regulatory Notice 18-15 (April 2018).
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    Proposed Rule 9285(d) would require the member to file the written 
plan of heightened supervision with FINRA's Office of General Counsel 
and serve a copy on Enforcement and the respondent, within ten days of 
any party filing an appeal from the Hearing Panel's or Hearing 
Officer's decision or of the case being called for NAC review. 
Similarly, if the respondent becomes associated with another member 
firm while the Hearing Panel's or Hearing Officer's decision is on 
appeal to, or review before, the NAC, that firm would be required, 
within ten days of the respondent becoming associated with it, to file 
a copy of a plan of heightened supervision with FINRA's Office of 
General Counsel and serve a copy on Enforcement and the respondent.
    In a change from Regulatory Notice 18-16, FINRA has modified the 
heightened supervision plan requirements to account for the possibility 
that a firm could be required pursuant to proposed Rule 9285(e) to 
adopt a mandatory heightened supervision plan before any conditions or 
restrictions imposed pursuant to proposed Rule 9285 take effect. 
Proposed Rule 9285(e)(1) would require that a member that has adopted a 
written plan of heightened supervision for a respondent would be 
required to file and serve an amended plan that takes into account any 
conditions or restrictions imposed pursuant to proposed Rule 9285, 
within ten days of the conditions or restrictions becoming effective.
    Proposed Rule 9285 would apply to disciplinary proceedings 
initiated on or

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after the effective date of the proposed rule.
    Along with proposed Rule 9285, FINRA is proposing corresponding 
amendments to five existing rules: FINRA Rules 9235 (Hearing Officer 
Authority), 9311 (Appeal by Any Party; Cross-Appeal), 9312 (Review 
Proceeding Initiated by Adjudicatory Council), 9321 (Transmission of 
Record), and 9556 (Failure to Comply with Temporary and Permanent Cease 
and Desist Orders).
    The proposed amendments to Rule 9235 would provide that the Hearing 
Officer has the authority to rule on a motion pursuant to Rule 9285 for 
conditions or restrictions.
    The proposed amendments to Rules 9311 and 9312 would ensure that 
the stay provisions in those rules do not affect a motion for 
conditions or restrictions.\16\ Currently, Rule 9311(b) provides, in 
pertinent part, that an appeal to the NAC from a decision issued 
pursuant to Rule 9268 or Rule 9269 shall operate as a stay of that 
decision until the NAC issues a decision pursuant to Rule 9349 or, in 
cases called for discretionary review by the FINRA Board, until a 
decision is issued pursuant to Rule 9351. Rule 9312(b) contains similar 
stay provisions for decisions that are called for review. Rules 9311(b) 
and 9312(b) would be amended to expressly state that, notwithstanding 
the stay of sanctions under Rules 9311 and 9312, the Hearing Officer 
may impose such conditions and restrictions on the activities of a 
respondent as the Hearing Officer considers reasonably necessary for 
the purpose of preventing customer harm, in accordance in proposed Rule 
9285(a), and that the Review Subcommittee shall consider any motion 
filed pursuant to Rule 9285(b) to modify or remove any or all of the 
conditions or restrictions.
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    \16\ The proposed amendments to Rule 9312 discussed in this 
paragraph reflect an enhancement to the proposal in Regulatory 
Notice 18-16 (April 2018).
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    Other proposed amendments to Rule 9311 and 9312 would ensure that a 
member firm is notified of events that would require it to adopt a 
written plan of heightened supervision pursuant to proposed Rule 
9285.\17\ Proposed Rule 9311(g) would require the Office of Hearing 
Officers, when an appeal is filed from a decision finding that a 
Respondent violated a statute or rule provision, to promptly notify 
each FINRA member with which the Respondent is associated that an 
appeal has been filed. Similarly, proposed Rule 9312(c)(3) would 
require the Office of General Counsel, when a decision finding that a 
Respondent violated a statute or rule provision is called for review, 
to promptly notify each FINRA member with which the Respondent is 
associated of the call for review.
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    \17\ The proposed amendments to Rules 9311 and 9312 discussed in 
this paragraph are an enhancement from the proposal in Regulatory 
Notice 18-16 (April 2018).
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    The proposed amendments to Rule 9321 would govern the record 
related to a motion for conditions or restrictions.\18\ Rule 9321 
currently governs the process for the Office of Hearing Officers to 
transmit the record of a disciplinary proceeding to the NAC. The 
proposed amendments to Rule 9321 would set forth provisions for how the 
Office of Hearing Officers would transmit to the NAC the supplemental 
record of a proceeding concerning a motion to impose conditions or 
restrictions.
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    \18\ The proposed amendments to Rule 9321 reflect an enhancement 
to the proposal in Regulatory Notice 18-16 (April 2018).
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    Rule 9556 currently governs expedited proceedings for failures to 
comply with temporary and permanent cease and desist orders. The 
proposed amendments to Rule 9556 would grant FINRA staff the authority 
to bring an expedited proceeding against a respondent that fails to 
comply with conditions and restrictions imposed pursuant to proposed 
Rule 9285 and create the process for the expedited proceeding. 
Specifically, proposed Rule 9556(a)(2) would permit FINRA staff to 
issue a notice to a respondent stating that the failure to comply with 
the conditions or restrictions imposed under Rule 9285 within seven 
days of service of the notice will result in a suspension or 
cancellation of membership or a suspension or bar from associating with 
any member. Proposed Rule 9556(c)(2) would govern the contents of the 
notice. It would require that the notice explicitly identify the 
conditions or restrictions that are alleged to have been violated and 
contain a statement of facts specifying the alleged violation. It also 
would require that the notice state or explain--just as the rule 
currently requires for a notice of a failure to comply with temporary 
and permanent cease and desist orders--when the FINRA action will take 
effect, what the respondent must do to avoid such action, that the 
respondent may file a written request for a hearing with the Office of 
Hearing Officers pursuant to Rule 9559, the deadline for requesting a 
hearing and the Hearing Officer's or Hearing Panel's authority.
Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series To Require Interim 
Plans of Heightened Supervision of a Disqualified Person During the 
Period When FINRA is Reviewing an Eligibility Application
    FINRA is proposing to amend FINRA Rule 9522 (Initiation of 
Eligibility Proceeding; Member Regulation Consideration) in the FINRA 
Rule 9520 Series (Eligibility Proceedings) to require a member firm 
that files an application to continue associating with a disqualified 
person under Rule 9522(a)(3) or 9522(b)(1)(B) to also include an 
interim plan of heightened supervision that would be in effect 
throughout the entirety of the application review process.\19\ The 
proposed amendments would delineate the circumstances under which a 
statutorily disqualified individual may remain associated with a FINRA 
member while FINRA is reviewing the application.
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    \19\ In Regulatory Notice 18-16 (April 2018), FINRA originally 
proposed the amendments discussed in this section as amendments to 
FINRA Rule 9523.
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    As background, brokers who have engaged in the types of misconduct 
specified in the Exchange Act's statutory disqualification provisions 
must undergo special review by FINRA before they are permitted to re-
enter or continue working in the securities industry. In conducting its 
review, FINRA seeks to exclude brokers who pose a risk of recidivism 
from re-entering or continuing in the securities business, subject to 
the limits developed in SEC case law.
    As a general framework, the Exchange Act sets out the types of 
misconduct that presumptively exclude brokers from engaging in the 
securities business, identified as statutory disqualifications.\20\ 
These statutory disqualifications are the result of actions against a 
broker taken by a regulator or court based on a finding of serious 
misconduct that calls into question the integrity of the broker, and 
include, among other things, any felony and certain misdemeanors for a 
period of ten years from the date of conviction; expulsions or bars 
(and current suspensions) from membership or participation in a self-
regulatory organization; bars (and current suspensions) ordered by the 
SEC, Commodity Futures Trading Commission or other appropriate 
regulatory agency or authority; willful violations of the federal 
securities and

[[Page 20750]]

commodities laws or MSRB rules; permanent or temporary injunctions from 
acting in certain capacities; and certain final orders of a state 
securities commission.
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    \20\ Section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act defines the 
circumstances when a person is subject to a ``statutory 
disqualification.''
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    The Exchange Act and SEC rules thereunder establish a framework 
within which FINRA evaluates whether to allow an individual who is 
subject to a statutory disqualification to associate with a member 
firm.\21\ A member firm that seeks to employ or continue the employment 
of a disqualified individual must file an application seeking approval 
from FINRA (``SD Application'').\22\ The Rule 9520 Series sets forth 
rules governing eligibility proceedings, in which FINRA evaluates 
whether to allow a member, person associated with a member, potential 
member or potential associated person subject to a statutory 
disqualification to enter or remain in the securities industry. A 
member firm's SD Application to associate with, or continue associating 
with, a disqualified person is subject to careful scrutiny by FINRA to 
review whether the individual's association with the member firm is in 
the public interest and does not create an unreasonable risk or harm to 
the market or investors. To determine whether the SD Application will 
be approved or denied, FINRA takes into account factors that include 
the nature and gravity of the disqualifying event; the length of time 
that has elapsed since the disqualifying event and any intervening 
misconduct occurring since; the regulatory history of the disqualified 
individual, the firm and individuals who will act as supervisors; the 
potential for future regulatory problems; the precise nature of the 
securities-related activities proposed in the SD Application; and any 
proposed plan of heightened supervision.\23\
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    \21\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(g)(2) (``A registered securities 
association may, and in cases in which the Commission, by order, 
directs as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors shall, deny membership to any registered 
broker or dealer, and bar from becoming associated with a member any 
person, who is subject to a statutory disqualification.''); see also 
17 CFR 240.19h-1.
    \22\ See General Information on FINRA's Eligibility 
Requirements, http://www.finra.org/industry/general-information-finras-eligibility-requirements.
    \23\ FINRA's review of many SD Applications also is governed by 
the standards set forth in Paul Edward Van Dusen, 47 S.E.C. 668 
(1981), and Arthur H. Ross, 50 S.E.C. 1082 (1992). These standards 
provide that in situations where an individual's misconduct has 
already been addressed by the SEC or FINRA, and certain sanctions 
have been imposed for such misconduct, FINRA should not consider the 
individual's underlying misconduct when it evaluates an SD 
Application. In Van Dusen, the SEC stated that when the period of 
time specified in the sanction has passed, in the absence of ``new 
information reflecting adversely on [the applicant's] ability to 
function in his proposed employment in a manner consonant with the 
public interest,'' it is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of 
the Exchange Act and unfair to deny an application for re-entry. 47 
S.E.C. at 671. The SEC also noted in Van Dusen, however, that an 
applicant's re-entry is not ``to be granted automatically'' after 
the expiration of a given time period. Id. Instead, the SEC 
instructed FINRA to consider other factors, such as: (1) ``other 
misconduct in which the applicant may have engaged''; (2) ``the 
nature and disciplinary history of a prospective employer''; and (3) 
``the supervision to be accorded the applicant.'' Id. Further, in 
Ross, the SEC established a narrow exception to the rule that FINRA 
confine its analysis to ``new information.'' 50 S.E.C. at 1085. The 
S.E.C. stated that FINRA could consider the conduct underlying a 
disqualifying order if an applicant's later misconduct was so 
similar that it formed a ``significant pattern.'' Id. at 1085 n.10.
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    If FINRA recommends approval of the SD Application, the 
recommendation is submitted either directly to the SEC for its review 
or to the NAC and ultimately to the SEC for their reviews and 
approvals, as applicable. If FINRA recommends denial of the SD 
Application, the member firm has the right to a hearing before a panel 
of the Statutory Disqualification Committee and the opportunity to 
demonstrate why the SD Application should be approved.\24\ If the NAC 
denies the SD Application, the member firm can appeal the decision to 
the SEC and, thereafter, a federal court of appeals.\25\
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    \24\ The hearing panel considers evidence and other matters in 
the record and makes a written recommendation on the SD Application 
to the Statutory Disqualification Committee. See Rule 9524(a)(10). 
The Statutory Disqualification Committee, in turn, recommends a 
decision to the NAC, which issues a written decision to the member 
firm that filed the SD Application. See Rules 9524(a)(10), 9524(b).
    \25\ Approximately 73.5 percent of the SD Applications filed 
during 2013-2018 were either denied by FINRA, withdrawn because the 
applicant expected FINRA would recommend denial of its application, 
or closed because the SD Application was not required by operation 
of law. Approximately 12.5 percent were approved. FINRA approval 
sometimes resulted from legal principles, including those embodied 
in the Exchange Act and in case law, as noted above, which limits 
FINRA's discretion to deny an application. The remaining 14 percent 
of the SD Applications are pending.
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    Currently, as part of an SD Application, a member firm will propose 
a written plan of heightened supervision of the statutorily 
disqualified person that would become effective upon approval by FINRA 
of the SD Application to associate with the statutorily disqualified 
person.\26\ A heightened supervisory plan must be acceptable to FINRA, 
and FINRA will reject any plan that is not specifically tailored to 
address the individual's prior misconduct and mitigate the risk of 
future misconduct. In this regard, FINRA's primary consideration is a 
heightened supervisory plan carefully constructed to best ensure 
investor protection.
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    \26\ See General Information on FINRA's Eligibility 
Requirements, http://www.finra.org/industry/general-information-finras-eligibility-requirements (explaining that ``in virtually 
every application that the NAC approves, it will do so subject to 
the applicant member's agreement to implement a special supervisory 
plan'').
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    Despite the fact that FINRA will generally not approve an SD 
Application that lacks an acceptable plan of heightened supervision, 
there is currently no requirement under FINRA rules that firms place 
statutorily disqualified individuals whom they employ on interim 
heightened supervision while an SD Application is pending. However, the 
proposed amendments to Rule 9522 would establish this requirement, 
consistent with existing FINRA guidance.\27\
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    \27\ FINRA has reminded member firms of their obligation to 
tailor the firm's supervisory systems to account for brokers with a 
history of industry or regulatory-related incidents, including 
disciplinary actions. And specifically as to disqualified persons, 
FINRA has stated that a firm's continuing to associate with a person 
who becomes disqualified while associated with the firm raises 
significant investor protection concerns, and that such a firm 
should evaluate the facts and circumstances to make a determination 
of whether adopting and implementing an interim plan of heightened 
supervision during the pendency of an SD Application would be 
appropriate. See Regulatory Notice 18-15 (April 2018).
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    Specifically, proposed Rule 9522(f) would require that an 
application to continue associating with a statutorily disqualified 
person must include an interim plan of heightened supervision and a 
written representation from the member firm that the statutorily 
disqualified person is currently subject to that plan. The proposed 
rule would require that the interim plan of heightened supervision 
comply with Rule 3110 and be reasonably designed and tailored to 
include specific supervisory policies and procedures that address any 
regulatory concerns related to the nature of the disqualification, the 
nature of the firm's business, and the disqualified person's current 
and proposed activities during the review process. The proposed rule 
also would require that the SD Application identify an appropriately 
registered principal responsible for carrying out the interim plan of 
heightened supervision, and that the responsible principal sign the 
plan and acknowledge his or her responsibility for implementing and 
maintaining it. The interim plan of heightened supervision would be in 
effect throughout the entirety of the SD Application review process, 
which would conclude only upon the final resolution of the eligibility 
proceeding.
    Proposed Rule 9522(g) would authorize Member Regulation to reject 
an SD Application filed pursuant to

[[Page 20751]]

Rule 9522(a)(3) or Rule 9522(b)(1)(B) that seeks the continued 
association of a disqualified person if it determines that the 
application is substantially incomplete--either because it does not 
include a reasonably designed interim plan of heightened supervision or 
because it does not include a written representation that the 
disqualified person is currently subject to that plan. The sponsoring 
firm would have ten days after service of the notice of delinquency, or 
such other time as prescribed by Member Regulation, to remedy the SD 
Application.
    Under proposed Rule 9522(h), if an applicant firm fails to remedy 
an SD Application that is substantially incomplete, Member Regulation 
would provide written notice of its determination to reject the SD 
Application and its reasons for so doing, and FINRA would refund the 
application fee, less $1,000, which FINRA would retain as a processing 
fee. Upon such rejection of the SD Application, the applicant firm 
would be required to promptly terminate association with the 
disqualified person.\28\
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    \28\ As part of its examination program, FINRA would generally 
examine for compliance with interim plans of heightened supervision 
established pursuant to proposed Rule 9522(f).
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    The proposed amendments to Rule 9522 would apply to SD Applications 
that are filed on or after the effective date of the proposed rule 
amendments.
Proposed Amendments to FINRA Rule 8312
    Rule 8312 (FINRA BrokerCheck Disclosure) governs the information 
FINRA releases to the public through its BrokerCheck system.\29\ 
BrokerCheck helps investors make informed choices about the brokers and 
member firms with which they conduct business by providing extensive 
registration and disciplinary history to investors at no charge. FINRA 
requires member firms to inform their customers of the availability of 
BrokerCheck.\30\
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    \29\ The BrokerCheck website address is brokercheck.finra.org.
    \30\ See FINRA Rule 2210(d)(8) (requiring that each of a 
member's websites include a readily apparent reference and hyperlink 
to BrokerCheck on the initial web page that the member intends to be 
viewed by retail investors and any other web page that includes a 
professional profile of one or more registered persons who conduct 
business with retail investors); FINRA Rule 2267 (requiring members 
to provide to customers the FINRA BrokerCheck Hotline Number and a 
statement as to the availability to the customer of an investor 
brochure that includes information describing BrokerCheck).
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    Rule 8312(b) currently requires that FINRA release information 
about, among other things, whether a particular member firm is subject 
to the provisions of FINRA Rule 3170 (Tape Recording of Registered 
Persons by Certain Firms) (the ``Taping Rule''), but only in response 
to telephonic inquiries via the BrokerCheck toll-free telephone 
listing. The Taping Rule is designed to ensure that a member firm with 
a significant number of registered persons that previously were 
employed by ``disciplined firms'' \31\ has specific supervisory 
procedures in place to prevent fraudulent and improper sales practices 
or other customer harm.\32\ Under the Taping Rule, a member with a 
specified percentage of registered persons who have been associated 
with disciplined firms in a registered capacity in the last three years 
is designated as a ``taping firm.'' \33\
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    \31\ Rule 3170(a)(2) defines a ``disciplined firm'' to mean:
     (A) A member that, in connection with sales practices involving 
the offer, purchase, or sale of any security, has been expelled from 
membership or participation in any securities industry self-
regulatory organization or is subject to an order of the SEC 
revoking its registration as a broker-dealer;
     (B) a futures commission merchant or introducing broker that 
has been formally charged by either the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission or a registered futures association with deceptive 
telemarketing practices or promotional material relating to security 
futures, those charges have been resolved, and the futures 
commission merchant or introducing broker has been closed down and 
permanently barred from the futures industry as a result of those 
charges; or
     (C) a futures commission merchant or introducing broker that, 
in connection with sales practices involving the offer, purchase, or 
sale of security futures is subject to an order of the SEC revoking 
its registration as a broker or dealer.
    \32\ To assist member firms in complying with Rule 3170, FINRA 
publishes on its website a list of Disciplined Firms Under FINRA 
Taping Rule, which identifies firms that meet the definition of 
``disciplined firm'' and that were disciplined within the last three 
years. As of March 31, 2020, that list identified seven firms as 
``disciplined firms.'' See https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/oversight-enforcement/disciplinary-actions/disciplined-firms-under-taping-rule.
    \33\ Rule 3170(a)(5)(A) defines a ``taping firm'' to mean:
     (i) A member with at least five but fewer than ten registered 
persons, where 40% or more of its registered persons have been 
associated with one or more disciplined firms in a registered 
capacity within the last three years;
     (ii) A member with at least ten but fewer than twenty 
registered persons, where four or more of its registered persons 
have been associated with one or more disciplined firms in a 
registered capacity within the last three years;
     (iii) A member with at least twenty registered persons where 
20% or more of its registered persons have been associated with one 
or more disciplined firms in a registered capacity within the last 
three years.
     As of March 31, 2020, there is one firm that is designated as a 
taping firm.
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    A member firm that either is notified by FINRA or otherwise has 
actual knowledge that it is a taping firm must establish, maintain and 
enforce special written procedures for supervising the telemarketing 
activities of all its registered persons. Those procedures must include 
procedures for recording all telephone conversations between the taping 
firm's registered persons and both existing and potential customers, 
and for reviewing the recordings to ensure compliance with applicable 
securities laws and regulations and applicable FINRA rules. The Taping 
Rule also requires taping firms to retain all the recordings for a 
period of not less than three years and file quarterly reports with 
FINRA.\34\
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    \34\ Rule 3170 provides member firms that trigger application of 
the taping requirement a one-time opportunity to adjust their 
staffing levels to fall below the prescribed threshold levels and 
thus avoid application of the Taping Rule. See Rule 3170(c).
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    To provide enhanced disclosure to the public of information as to 
whether a member firm is subject to the Taping Rule, FINRA is proposing 
to delete the requirement in Rule 8312(b) that FINRA provide that 
information only in response to telephonic inquiries via the 
BrokerCheck toll-free telephone listing. As a result, proposed Rule 
8312(b) would permit FINRA to release through BrokerCheck information 
as to whether a particular member firm is subject to the Taping 
Rule.\35\ FINRA believes that broadening the disclosure through 
BrokerCheck of the status of a member firm as a taping firm will help 
inform more investors of the heightened procedures required of the 
firm, which may incent the investors to research more carefully the 
background of a broker associated with the taping firm.
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    \35\ See Rule 8312(a) (requiring that ``[i]n response to a 
written inquiry, electronic inquiry, or telephonic inquiry via a 
toll-free telephonic listing,'' FINRA shall release through 
BrokerCheck information regarding, in pertinent part, a current or 
former FINRA member).
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Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 1000 Series to Impose Additional 
Obligations on Member Firms That Associate With Persons With a 
Significant History of Past Misconduct \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The text of FINRA Rules 1011, 1017 and CAB Rule 111 
incorporates the changes approved by the SEC in Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 88482 (March 26, 2020), 85 FR 18299 (April 1, 2020) 
(Order Approving File No. SR-FINRA-2019-030) (``MAP Rules Amendment 
Release'').
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Current MAP Process
    FINRA is proposing amendments to the FINRA Rule 1000 Series (Member 
Application and Associated Person Registration)--specifically the rules 
that govern membership proceedings (``MAP Rules'')--to impose 
additional obligations on member firms when a natural person that has, 
in the prior five years, either one or more ``final criminal matters'' 
or two or more ``specified risk events'' seeks to become an owner,

[[Page 20752]]

control person, principal or registered person of the member.
    Reviewing CMAs is one of the ways FINRA seeks to address the risks 
posed by brokers with a significant history of misconduct. Rule 1017 
specifies the changes in a member's ownership, control or business 
operations that require a CMA and FINRA's approval.\37\ Among the 
events that require a CMA are a ``material change in business 
operations,'' which is defined to include: (1) Removing or modifying a 
membership agreement restriction; (2) market making, underwriting or 
acting as a dealer for the first time; and (3) adding business 
activities that require a higher minimum net capital under SEA Rule 
15c3-1.\38\ In addition, a CMA is required for business expansions to 
increase the number of ``associated persons involved in sales,'' 
offices, or markets made that are a material change in business 
operations.\39\ However, IM-1011-1 (Safe Harbor for Business 
Expansions) creates a safe harbor for incremental increases in these 
three categories of business expansions. Under this safe harbor 
provision, a member, subject to specified conditions and thresholds, 
may undergo such business expansions without filing a CMA.\40\ One such 
expansion is an increase, within the parameters set forth in IM-1011-1, 
in the number of ``associated persons involved in sales.'' \41\
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    \37\ See Rule 1017(a). The events that require a member to file 
a CMA for approval before effecting the proposed event are:
     (1) A merger of the member with another member, unless both 
members are members of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (``NYSE'') 
or the surviving entity will continue to be a member of the NYSE;
     (2) a direct or indirect acquisition by the member of another 
member, unless the acquiring member is a member of the NYSE;
     (3) direct or indirect acquisitions or transfers of 25 percent 
or more in the aggregate of the member's assets or any asset, 
business or line of operation that generates revenues composing 25 
percent or more in the aggregate of the member's earnings measured 
on a rolling 36-month basis, unless both the seller and acquirer are 
members of the NYSE;
     (4) a change in the equity ownership or partnership capital of 
the member that results in one person or entity directly or 
indirectly owning or controlling 25 percent or more of the equity or 
partnership capital; or
     (5) a material change in business operations as defined in Rule 
1011.
     In addition, Rule 1017(a)(6) mandates a member firm to seek a 
materiality consultation in two situations in which specified 
pending arbitration claims, unpaid arbitration awards, or unpaid 
arbitration settlements are involved. See MAP Rules Amendment 
Release.
    \38\ See Rules 1011(l), 1017(a)(5). Rule 1011(l) sets forth a 
non-exhaustive list of events that are material changes in business 
operations. FINRA also has provided guidance on additional criteria 
member firms should take into consideration when assessing the 
materiality of a proposed change. See Notice to Members 00-73 
(October 2000). A member may file an application for approval of a 
material change in business operations at any time, but the member 
may not effect such change until the conclusion of the proceeding, 
unless Member Regulation and the member otherwise agree. See Rule 
1017(c)(3).
    \39\ See Rule 1017(b)(2)(C) (``If the application requests 
approval of an increase in Associated Persons involved in sales, 
offices, or markets made, the application shall set forth the 
increases in such areas during the preceding 12 months.'').
    \40\ The safe harbor is unavailable to a member that has a 
membership agreement that contains a specific restriction as to one 
or more of the three areas of expansion or to a member that has a 
``disciplinary history'' as defined in IM-1011-1. The safe harbor 
also is not available to any member that is seeking to add one or 
more ``associated persons involved in sales'' and one or more of 
those associated persons has a ``covered pending arbitration 
claim,'' an unpaid arbitration award or unpaid settlement related to 
an arbitration. See MAP Rules Amendment Release.
    \41\ For eligible firms, IM-1011-1 permits a firm that has one 
to ten ``associated persons involved in sales'' to increase that 
number by ten persons within a one-year period, and a firm that has 
11 or more ``associated persons involved in sales'' to increase that 
number by ten persons or 30 percent, whichever is greater, within a 
one-year period. See IM-1011-1.
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    In determining whether to approve a CMA, Member Regulation, through 
the MAP Group (collectively, ``the Department''), evaluates whether the 
applicant and its associated persons meet each of the standards for 
admission in FINRA Rule 1014(a) and whether the applicant would 
continue to meet those standards upon approval of the CMA.\42\ The 
Department evaluates an applicant's financial, operational, supervisory 
and compliance systems to ensure that each applicant meets these 
standards for admission.
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    \42\ See Rule 1017(h)(1) and (h)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of the standards, Rule 1014(a)(3), requires an applicant to 
demonstrate that it and its associated persons are capable of complying 
with the federal securities laws and FINRA rules, including observing 
high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade. When the Department evaluates the Rule 1014(a)(3) standard, it 
takes into consideration, among other things, whether persons 
associated with an applicant are the subject of disciplinary actions 
taken against them by industry authorities, criminal actions, civil 
actions, arbitrations, customer complaints, remedial actions or other 
industry-related matters that could pose a threat to public 
investors.\43\ Some of these matters are considered whether they are 
adjudicated, settled or pending.\44\ Some of these events are so 
material that, when they exist, a presumption exists that the CMA 
should be denied.\45\
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    \43\ See Rule 1014(a)(3).
    \44\ See Rule 1014(a)(3).
    \45\ See Rule 1017(h) (``Where the Department determines that 
the Applicant or its Associated Person are the subject of any of the 
events set forth in Rule 1014(a)(3)(A) and (C) through (E), a 
presumption exists that the application should be denied.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although firms with a ``disciplinary history'' as defined by IM-
1011-1 are not eligible to use the safe harbor, none of the safe 
harbor's parameters relates to the history of a member firm's 
associated persons. Given the recent studies that provide evidence of 
the predictability of future regulatory-related events for brokers with 
a history of past regulatory-related events, FINRA is concerned about 
instances where a member on-boards associated persons with a 
significant history of misconduct and does so within the safe-harbor 
parameters, thus avoiding prior consultation or review by FINRA. FINRA 
believes there are instances in which a member firm's hiring of an 
associated person with a significant history of misconduct--and other 
associations with such persons--would reflect a material change in 
business operations.
[rtarr8]Proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) To Require Materiality Consultations
    The proposed amendments to the MAP Rules would seek to address this 
concern. Proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) would require that a member firm, 
notwithstanding Rule 1017(a)(3),\46\ (a)(4),\47\ (a)(5) \48\ and (a)(6) 
\49\ and IM-1011-1,\50\ file a CMA when a natural person seeking to 
become an owner, control person, principal or registered person of a 
member has, in the prior five years, one or more ``final criminal 
matters'' or two or more ``specified risk events''--as further 
explained below--unless the member has submitted a

[[Page 20753]]

written request to the Department seeking a materiality consultation 
for the contemplated activity. Rule 1017(a)(7) would further provide, 
however, that Rule 1017(a)(7) would not apply when the member is 
required to file an SD Application or written request for relief 
pursuant to Rule 9522 for approval of the same contemplated 
association.\51\ Proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) also would contain 
requirements for the request seeking a materiality consultation and the 
Department's review and determination, including a description of the 
possible outcomes of FINRA's determination on a materiality 
consultation.
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    \46\ Rule 1017(a)(3) requires a member to file a CMA for 
approval of direct or indirect acquisitions or transfers of 25 
percent or more in the aggregate of the member's assets or any 
asset, business or line of operation that generates revenues 
composing 25 percent or more in the aggregate of the member's 
earnings measured on a rolling 36-month basis, unless both the 
seller and acquirer are members of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 
The reference to Rule 1017(a)(3) in proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) 
reflects a change from the proposal in Regulatory Notice 18-16.
    \47\ Rule 1017(a)(4) requires a member to file a CMA for 
approval of a change in the equity ownership or partnership capital 
of the member that results in one person or entity directly or 
indirectly owning or controlling 25 percent or more of the equity or 
partnership capital.
    \48\ Rule 1017(a)(5) requires a member to file a CMA for 
approval of a ``material change in business operations.''
    \49\ See MAP Rules Amendment Release.
    \50\ The reference to IM-1011-1 in proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) 
reflects a change from the proposal in Regulatory Notice 18-16.
    \51\ In that event, the member firm would be required to obtain 
FINRA's approval to associate or continue associating with the 
disqualified person pursuant to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series, but it 
would not also be required to request a materiality consultation or 
file a CMA pursuant to proposed Rule 1017(a)(7). The Member 
Regulation staff that considers the SD Application may consult with 
the MAP Group, as appropriate.
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    Proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) also would establish that the safe harbor 
for business expansions in IM-1011-1 would not be available to the 
member firm when a materiality consultation is required under proposed 
Rule 1017(a)(7). In a corresponding change, proposed IM-1011-3 
(Business Expansions and Persons with Specified Risk Events) would 
provide that the safe harbor for business expansions in IM-1011-1 would 
not be available to any member that is seeking to add a natural person 
who has, in the prior five years, one or more ``final criminal 
matters'' or two or more ``specified risk events'' and seeks to become 
an owner, control person, principal or registered person of the member. 
Proposed IM-1011-3 would further provide, in those circumstances, that 
if the member is not otherwise required to file a CMA, the member must 
comply with the requirements of proposed Rule 1017(a)(7).\52\ Proposed 
Rule 1017(a)(7) and proposed IM-1011-3 would not apply when a person is 
already a principal at a member firm and seeks to add an additional 
principal registration at that same firm. In that instance, the 
proposed rule amendments would not require a materiality consultation.
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    \52\ FINRA has modified the language in proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) 
and IM-1011-3 from the versions that were proposed in Regulatory 
Notice 18-16. FINRA has done so for clarity and to align the 
structure of these proposed rules to the changes to the MAP Rules 
approved in the MAP Rules Amendment Release.
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    Currently, FINRA has a voluntary materiality consultation 
process.\53\ As explained above, a member is required to file a CMA 
when it plans to undergo an event specified under Rule 1017 (e.g., 
acquisition or transfer of the member's assets, a business expansion). 
Before taking this step, a member has the option of seeking guidance, 
or a materiality consultation, from FINRA on whether or not such 
proposed event would require a CMA.\54\ The materiality consultation 
process is voluntary, and FINRA has published guidelines about this 
process on FINRA.org.\55\ A request for a materiality consultation, for 
which there is no fee, is a written request from a member for FINRA's 
determination on whether a contemplated change in business operations 
or activities is material and would therefore require a CMA. The 
characterization of a proposed change as material depends on an 
assessment of all the relevant facts and circumstances. Through this 
consultation, FINRA may communicate with the member to obtain further 
documents and information regarding the contemplated change and its 
anticipated impact on the member. Where FINRA determines that a 
contemplated change is material, FINRA will instruct the member to file 
a CMA if it intends to proceed with such change. Ultimately, the member 
is responsible for compliance with Rule 1017. If FINRA determines 
during the materiality consultation that the contemplated business 
change is material, then the member potentially could be subject to 
disciplinary action for failure to file a CMA under Rule 1017.\56\
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    \53\ See The Materiality Consultation Process for Continuing 
Membership Applications, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/materiality-consultation-process; see also Regulatory 
Notice 18-23 (July 2018).
    \54\ See IM-1011-1 (stating, ``[f]or any expansion beyond these 
[safe harbor] limits, a member should contact its district office 
prior to implementing the change to determine whether the proposed 
expansion requires an application under Rule 1017''); see also 
Notice to Members 00-73 (October 2000) (stating that ``[a] member 
may, but is not required to, contact the District Office to obtain 
guidance on'' whether a change and expansion that falls outside of 
the safe harbor provisions is material).
    \55\ See The Materiality Consultation Process for Continuing 
Membership Applications, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/materiality-consultation-process.
    \56\ See Notice to Members 00-73 (October 2000).
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    The proposed rule change would establish an additional category of 
mandatory materiality consultations.\57\ The materiality consultations 
required by proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) would focus on, and the submitting 
member firm would need to provide information relating to, the conduct 
underlying the individual's ``final criminal matters'' and ``specified 
risk events,'' as well as other matters relating to the subject person, 
such as disciplinary actions taken by FINRA or other industry 
authorities, adverse examination findings, customer complaints, pending 
or unadjudicated matters, terminations for cause or other incidents 
that could indicate a threat to public investors. The Department's 
assessment in the materiality consultation would consider, among other 
things, whether the events are customer-related; whether the events 
represent discrete actions or are based on the same underlying conduct; 
the anticipated activities of the person; the disciplinary history, 
experience and background of the proposed supervisor, if applicable; 
the disciplinary history, supervisory practices, standards, systems and 
internal controls of the member firm and whether they are reasonably 
designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and 
regulations and FINRA rules; whether the member firm employs or intends 
to employ in any capacity multiple persons with one or more ``final 
criminal matters'' or two or more ``specified risk events'' in the 
prior five years; and any other investor protection concern raised by 
seeking to make the person an owner, control person, principal or 
registered person of the member firm.
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    \57\ FINRA Rule 1017(a)(6) will mandate materiality 
consultations if a member is contemplating: (i) To add one or more 
``associated persons involved in sales'' and one or more of those 
associated persons has a ``covered pending arbitration claim,'' an 
unpaid arbitration award or an unpaid settlement related to an 
arbitration; or (ii) any direct or indirect acquisition or transfer 
of a member's assets or any asset, business or line of operation 
where the transferring member or an associated person of the 
transferring member has a covered pending arbitration claim, an 
unpaid arbitration award or an unpaid settlement related to an 
arbitration, and the member is not otherwise required to file a CMA. 
See MAP Rules Amendment Release. In a separate proposal, FINRA is 
proposing to mandate materiality consultations under other 
circumstances. See Regulatory Notice 18-23 (July 2018) (seeking 
comment on a proposal to the MAP rules that would, among other 
things, codify the materiality consultation process and mandate a 
consultation under specified circumstances such as where an 
applicant seeks to engage in, for the first time, retail foreign 
currency exchange activities, variable life settlement sales to 
retail customers, options activities or municipal securities 
activities).
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[rtarr8]Proposed Definitions of ``Final Criminal Matter'' and 
``Specified Risk Event''
    The terms ``final criminal matter'' and ``specified risk event'' 
would be defined in proposed amendments to Rule 1011 (Definitions). 
Proposed Rule 1011(h) would define the term ``final criminal matter'' 
to mean a final criminal matter that resulted in a conviction of, or 
guilty plea or nolo contendere (no contest) by, a person that is 
disclosed, or was required to be disclosed, on the applicable Uniform 
Registration

[[Page 20754]]

Forms.\58\ Proposed Rule 1011(p) would define ``specified risk event'' 
to mean any one of the following events that are disclosed, or are or 
were required to be disclosed, on the applicable Uniform Registration 
Forms: (1) A final investment-related,\59\ consumer-initiated customer 
arbitration award or civil judgment against the person for a dollar 
amount at or above $15,000 in which the person was a named party; (2) a 
final investment-related, consumer-initiated customer arbitration 
settlement or civil litigation settlement for a dollar amount at or 
above $15,000 in which the person was a named party; (3) a final 
investment-related civil action where (A) the total monetary sanctions 
(including civil and administrative penalties or fines, disgorgement, 
monetary penalties other than fines, or restitution) were ordered for a 
dollar amount at or above $15,000, or (B) the sanction against the 
person was a bar, expulsion, revocation, or suspension; and (4) a final 
regulatory action where (A) the total monetary sanctions (including 
civil and administrative penalties or fines, disgorgement, monetary 
penalties other than fines, or restitution) were ordered for a dollar 
amount at or above $15,000, or (B) the sanction against the person was 
a bar (permanently or temporarily), expulsion, rescission, revocation 
or suspension from associating with a member.
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    \58\ Proposed Rule 1011(r) would define ``Uniform Registration 
Forms'' to mean the Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer 
Registration (Form BD), the Uniform Application for Securities 
Industry Registration or Transfer (Form U4), the Uniform Termination 
Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U5) and the 
Uniform Disciplinary Action Reporting Form (Form U6), as such may be 
amended or any successor(s) thereto.
    \59\ The Form U4 Explanation of Terms defines the term 
``investment-related'' as pertaining to securities, commodities, 
banking, insurance, or real estate (including, but not limited to, 
acting as or being associated with a broker-dealer, issuer, 
investment company, investment adviser, futures sponsor, bank, or 
savings association).
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    The proposed definitions and criteria would provide transparency 
regarding how the proposed rules would be applied, as they are based on 
disclosure events required to be reported on the Uniform Registration 
Forms. Firms, in general, would be able to identify the specific set of 
disclosure events that would count towards the proposed criteria and, 
using available data, determine independently whether a proposed 
association with an individual would require a materiality 
consultation.\60\
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    \60\ The exceptions are that the Uniform Registration Forms do 
not provide information about customer awards or judgments against, 
or customer settlements with, control affiliates who have not filed 
a Form U4. For those events, firms would have to gather that 
information directly from the person.
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    In addition, as explained more below in the Economic Impact 
Assessment, FINRA developed the proposed criteria and definitions with 
significant attention to the economic trade-off between including 
individuals who are less likely to subsequently pose risk of harm to 
customers, and not including individuals who are more likely to 
subsequently pose risk of harm to customers.
    FINRA believes the proposed amendments to the Rule 1000 Series 
would further promote investor protection by applying stronger 
standards for continuing membership with FINRA and for changes to a 
current member firm's ownership, control or business operations.
    If the Commission approves the proposed rule change, FINRA will 
announce the effective date of the proposed rule change in a Regulatory 
Notice to be published no later than 90 days following Commission 
approval. The effective date will be no later than 180 days following 
publication of the Regulatory Notice announcing Commission 
approval.\61\
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    \61\ FINRA notes that the proposed rule change would impact all 
members, including members that are funding portals or have elected 
to be treated as capital acquisition brokers (``CABs''), given that 
the funding portal rule set incorporates the Rule 9200 Series and 
Rule 9300 Series and Rule 9556 by reference, and the CAB rule set 
incorporates Rules 1011, 1017 and 8312 and the Rule 9200 Series, 
Rule 9300 Series and Rule 9500 Series by reference. In addition, 
FINRA is proposing corresponding amendments to CAB Rule 111, to 
reflect that a CAB would be subject to IM-1011-3, and amendments to 
Funding Portal Rule 900(b) to require heightened supervision during 
the time an eligibility request is pending.
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2. Statutory Basis
    FINRA believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the 
provisions of Section 15A(b)(6) of the Act,\62\ which requires, among 
other things, that FINRA rules must be designed to prevent fraudulent 
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, and, in general, to protect investors and the 
public interest. The proposed rule change is designed to protect 
investors and the public interest by strengthening the tools available 
to FINRA to address the risks posed by brokers with a significant 
history of misconduct and the firms that employ them. Allowing Hearing 
Officers to impose tailored conditions and restrictions on respondents 
after the finding of a violation, and requiring firms to place 
disciplined respondent brokers with whom they associate under mandatory 
heightened supervision during the pendency of an appeal or a review 
proceeding, would create strong measures of deterrence while an appeal 
or review proceeding is pending and while the sanctions imposed have 
not yet taken effect. Likewise, requiring firms to place disqualified 
persons on interim plan of heightened supervision while an SD 
Application is pending would require that a fundamental investor 
protection measure--almost always required at firms that FINRA, as part 
of the eligibility proceedings process, permits to associate with 
disqualified persons--be established at an earlier point in time and 
thereby limit the potential for harm to the public. Broadening the 
disclosure through BrokerCheck of the status of a member firm as a 
taping firm, beyond only telephonic BrokerCheck inquiries, will inform 
more investors of the heightened procedures required of the taping 
firm, and thereby incent investors to research carefully the background 
of a broker associated with the taping firm. Finally, requiring member 
firms to seek materiality consultations when a person seeking to become 
an owner, control person, principal or registered person has a 
significant history of misconduct will give FINRA an opportunity to 
assess whether the proposed association is material and warrants closer 
regulatory scrutiny and, further, may create incentives for changes in 
behavior by both brokers and the firms that employ them. In situations 
where the proposed association of a person with a significant history 
of misconduct would require a CMA, FINRA would then be able to assess, 
if the firm still seeks to proceed, whether the member firm would 
continue to meet all the Rule 1014 membership standards if the proposed 
association were approved and prevent the proposed association if it 
would not continue to meet those standards.\63\
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    \62\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(6).
    \63\ See Rule 1014(a) (Standards for Admission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As such, the proposed rule change will help address concerns 
regarding brokers with a significant history of misconduct in 
situations where risks for potential further harm to investors may 
exist, particularly when such individuals concentrate at a firm or are 
able to move readily from firm to firm. The proposed additional 
obligations on such brokers and the increased scrutiny by the firms 
that employ them, should create incentives for brokers and firms to 
change activities and behaviors to mitigate FINRA's concerns.

[[Page 20755]]

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    FINRA does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in 
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
Economic Impact Assessment
    FINRA has undertaken an economic impact assessment, as set forth 
below, to analyze the regulatory need for the proposed rulemaking, its 
potential economic impacts, including anticipated benefits and costs, 
and the alternatives FINRA considered in assessing how to best meet its 
regulatory objectives.
(a) Regulatory Need
    FINRA uses a number of measures to deter and discipline misconduct 
by brokers and the firms that employ them. These measures span across 
several FINRA programs, including statutory disqualification processes, 
review of membership applications, disclosure of brokers' regulatory 
backgrounds, supervision requirements, focused examinations, risk 
monitoring and disciplinary actions.
    Nonetheless, some brokers, while relatively small in number, may 
continue to present heightened risk of harm to investors and act in 
ways that could harm their customers--sometimes substantially. Any 
misconduct by these brokers may also undermine confidence in the 
securities markets as a whole. For example, recent studies provide 
evidence on predictability of future regulatory-related events for 
brokers with a history of past regulatory-related events such as 
repeated disciplinary actions, arbitrations and customer 
complaints.\64\
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    \64\ See supra note 5.
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    Brokers with a history of misconduct can pose a particular 
challenge to FINRA's existing programs, such as FINRA examination and 
enforcement programs. For example, while the FINRA examination program 
can identify compliance failures and prescribe remedies to be taken, 
examiners are not empowered to require individuals to make changes to 
or limit their activities in a particular manner. While these 
constraints on the examination process protect against potentially 
arbitrary or overly onerous examination findings, an individual with a 
history of misconduct can take advantage of these limitations to 
continue ongoing activities that harm or pose risk of harm to investors 
until they result in an enforcement action. Likewise, enforcement 
actions can take significant time to develop, prosecute and conclude, 
during which time the individual is able to continue misconduct.
    Furthermore, although FINRA has adopted rules that impose 
supervisory obligations on firms to ensure they are appropriately 
supervising their brokers' activities, some firms do not effectively 
carry out these supervisory obligations to ensure compliance. This is 
consistent with some recent academic studies, which find that some 
firms persistently employ brokers who engage in misconduct, and that 
misconduct can be concentrated at these firms, suggesting that some 
firms may not be acting appropriately as a first line of defense to 
prevent customer harm.\65\
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    \65\ For example, see Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos, & Amit Seru, The 
Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct, J. Pol. Econ. 127, no. 1 
(Feb. 2019): 233-295.
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    Therefore, without additional protections, the risk of potential 
customer harm may continue to exist at firms that employ brokers that 
have a significant number of regulatory-related events and that fail to 
effectively carry out their supervisory obligations. The proposals are 
designed to further promote investor protection by mitigating these 
concerns while preserving principles of fairness.
(b) Economic Baseline
    The following provides the economic baseline for each of the 
current proposals. These baselines serve as the primary points of 
comparison for assessing economic impacts, including incremental 
benefits and costs of the proposed rule amendments. For this proposal, 
FINRA reviewed and analyzed relevant data over the 2013-2018 period 
(review period).
1. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9200 Series and FINRA Rule 
9300 Series
    The economic baseline used to evaluate the economic impacts of the 
proposed rule changes to the Rule 9200 Series and Rule 9300 Series is 
the current regulatory framework under these rules.\66\ FINRA analyzed 
disciplinary matters that were appealed to the NAC over the review 
period that reached a final decision by the NAC.\67\ During the review 
period, there were approximately 20 such appeals filed each year, of 
which approximately 80 percent were filed by brokers, five percent were 
filed by firms, and the remaining 15 percent were filed jointly by 
brokers and firms.\68\ FINRA determined that, on average, these 
disciplinary decisions were on appeal to the NAC for approximately 15 
months.\69\
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    \66\ The proposal also includes corresponding amendments to Rule 
9556.
    \67\ This analysis included all NAC appeals (including calls for 
NAC review) filed during the review period that reached a final 
decision by May 1, 2019. The analysis includes all NAC decisions, 
including affirmations, modifications or reversals of the findings 
in the disciplinary matters. The analysis excludes appeals that were 
withdrawn prior to the resolution of the appeal process.
    \68\ FINRA further estimates that approximately 94 percent of 
the appeals filed by brokers involved one broker, and the remaining 
six percent involved two brokers. All the appeals filed by firms 
were associated with one firm.
    \69\ The median processing time was approximately 14 months, 
while the 25th and the 75th percentiles were approximately 11 months 
and 19 months, respectively.
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2. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series
    The economic baseline used to evaluate the economic impacts of the 
proposed rule changes to the Rule 9520 Series is the current regulatory 
framework under these rules. FINRA analyzed SD Applications filed 
during the review period and determined that there were 80 SD 
Applications filed by 71 firms for 79 individuals, or approximately 13 
applications that were filed by 12 firms each year.\70\ Approximately 
65 percent of these applications were filed by small firms, 12 percent 
were filed by mid-size firms, and 23 percent were filed by large 
firms.\71\ FINRA also examined the resolution of these applications and 
determined that approximately 12.5 percent of the SD Applications were 
approved, 11 percent were denied, 14 percent were pending during the 
review period, and the remaining applications (62.5 percent) did not 
require a resolution because the statutorily disqualified individual's 
registration with the filing firm was terminated or the SD Application 
was subsequently withdrawn.\72\ FINRA determined that, on average, the 
processing time for an SD Application that reached a final

[[Page 20756]]

resolution (i.e., an approval or a denial) was approximately 15 
months.\73\
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    \70\ One of these 79 individuals was associated with multiple SD 
Applications over the review period. Of the 71 firms that filed SD 
Applications, approximately 90 percent filed one application during 
the review period, and the remaining 10 percent filed two or more 
applications.
    \71\ FINRA defines a small firm as a member with at least one 
and no more than 150 registered persons, a mid-size firm as a member 
with at least 151 and no more than 499 registered persons, and a 
large firm as a member with 500 or more registered persons. See 
FINRA By-Laws, Article I.
    \72\ In approximately 21 percent of the SD Applications, the 
application was withdrawn because the decision leading to the 
disqualifying event was overturned, thus the individual was no 
longer subject to a statutory disqualification, or because the 
sanctions were no longer in effect.
    \73\ The median processing time was approximately 14 months, and 
the 25th and the 75th percentiles were approximately 10 months and 
19 months, respectively.
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3. Proposed Amendments to FINRA Rule 8312
    The economic baseline used to evaluate the economic impacts of the 
proposed rule changes to Rule 8312 (FINRA BrokerCheck Disclosure) is 
the current regulatory framework under Rules 8312 and 3170. During the 
review period, FINRA determined that 17 firms hired or retained enough 
registered persons from previously disciplined firms to be designated 
as a ``taping firm'' under Rule 3170 and were notified about their 
status during this period. All of these firms were small firms with an 
average size of approximately 40 registered persons. Of these 17 firms, 
12 firms did not become subject to the rule's recording requirements 
because they either took advantage of the one-time staff-reduction 
opportunity in Rule 3170(c) or terminated their FINRA membership, and 
one firm was granted an exemption pursuant to Rule 3170(d). As a 
result, only four of the firms designated as ``taping firms'' became 
subject to the recording requirements of Rule 3170.
4. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 1000 Series
    The economic baseline used to evaluate the economic impacts of the 
proposed rule changes to the MAP Rules is the current regulatory 
framework under these rules. The proposed rule change would directly 
impact individuals with one or more final criminal matters or two or 
more specified risk events within the prior five years, who seek to 
become owners, control persons, principals or registered persons of a 
member firm. The criteria used for identifying individuals under this 
proposal and the number of individuals meeting the proposed criteria 
are discussed below.
(c) Economic Impacts
    The following provides the economic impacts, including the 
anticipated benefits and costs for each of the current proposals.
1. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9200 Series and FINRA Rule 
9300 Series
    The proposed rule amendments would directly impact firms and 
brokers whose disciplinary matters are on appeal to, or review by, the 
NAC. These impacts would vary across appeals and depend on, among other 
factors, the nature and severity of the conditions or restrictions 
imposed on the activities of respondents. As discussed above, the scope 
of these conditions or restrictions would depend on what the Hearing 
Officer determines to be reasonably necessary for the purpose of 
preventing customer harm. Further, the conditions and restrictions 
would be tailored to the specific risks posed by the brokers or firms 
during the appeal period. Accordingly, the conditions and restrictions 
are not intended to rise to the level of the underlying sanctions and 
would likely not be economically equivalent to imposing the sanctions 
during the appeal. In addition, respondents will be able to seek 
expedited reviews of orders imposing conditions or restrictions.
Anticipated Benefits
    The primary benefit of this proposal accrues from limiting the 
potential risk of continued harm to customers by respondents during the 
appeal period by imposing conditions or restrictions on their 
activities, and requiring them to be subject to heightened supervision 
plans, while their disciplinary matter is on appeal. In order to 
evaluate these benefits and assess the potential risk posed by brokers 
during the appeal period, FINRA examined cases that were appealed to 
the NAC during 2013-2016 and determined whether the brokers associated 
with an appeal to the NAC had a new disclosure event--for this 
analysis, a final criminal matter or a specified risk event, as defined 
above--at any time from the filing of the appeal through the year-end 
after the year in which the appeal reached a decision.\74\ Based on 
this analysis, FINRA estimates that 21 of the 75 brokers who appealed 
to the NAC during the 2013-2016 period were associated with a total of 
28 disclosure events that occurred during the interstitial period after 
the filing of their appeal to the NAC.\75\ FINRA anticipates that the 
proposed heightened supervision requirement and the conditions or 
restrictions placed on the activities of these brokers would lead to 
greater oversight of their activities by their firm during the appeal 
period, thereby reducing the potential risk of future customer harm 
during this period.\76\
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    \74\ In making these calculations, FINRA based its analysis on 
the occurrence of disclosure events as used in proposed IM-1011-3 
and Rule 1017(a)(7). The analysis includes events that occurred and 
reached a resolution between the NAC appeal year and a year after 
the NAC decision year to allow sufficient time for events that 
occurred during the pendency of NAC to reach a resolution. 
Accordingly, the sample period for this analysis is based on appeals 
filed during the 2013-2016 period, instead of the full review period 
(2013-2018).
    \75\ These estimates are based on appeals filed by brokers, or 
jointly filed by brokers and firms, and excludes appeals that were 
filed only by firms. These estimates likely underrepresent the 
overall risk of customer harm posed by these brokers, because they 
are based on a specific set of events and outcomes used for 
classifying brokers for the proposed amendments to the MAP Rules. In 
addition, these brokers had other disclosure events after their 
appeal was filed, and some of these other events may also be 
associated with risk of customer harm.
    \76\ FINRA also anticipates that the proposed changes to Rule 
9556, which will establish an expedited proceeding for failures to 
comply with conditions or restrictions, will help ensure that the 
firms will comply with the conditions and restrictions imposed.
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Anticipated Costs
    The costs of this proposal would primarily fall upon brokers or 
firms whose activities during the appeal period would be subject to the 
specific conditions or restrictions imposed by the Hearing Officer.\77\ 
In addition, firms would incur costs associated with implementing 
heightened supervision for brokers while their disciplinary matters are 
under appeal. These costs would likely vary significantly across firms 
and could increase if the broker acts in a principal capacity. For 
example, firms employing disciplined respondents who serve as 
principals, executive managers or owners, or who operate in other 
senior capacities, would likely assume higher costs in developing and 
implementing tailored supervisory plans. Such plans may entail re-
assignments of responsibilities, restructuring within senior management 
and leadership, and more complex oversight and governance approaches. 
These potential costs, in turn, may result in some brokers voluntarily 
leaving the industry rather than waiting for the resolution of the 
appeal process.\78\
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    \77\ Brokers and firms that choose to defend against motions for 
conditions and restrictions and that pursue expedited reviews of 
orders imposing conditions or restrictions would incur additional 
costs associated with these reviews.
    \78\ The proposal may also impose costs on issuers in limited 
instances where a firm is enjoined from participating in a private 
placement and the issuer is especially reliant on that firm. The 
private issuer may incur search costs to find a replacement firm or 
individual and incur other direct and indirect costs associated with 
the offering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The costs associated with this proposal would apply to brokers and 
their employing member firms while the brokers are employed during the 
pendency of the NAC appeals (the average processing time of which is 15 
months) and any subsequent appeals.\79\

[[Page 20757]]

Many broker-appellants, however, are not employed with any member firms 
when their NAC appeal is filed or leave shortly after the appeal is 
filed. FINRA examined the employment history, including employment 
start and end dates, of the 131 brokers \80\ associated with NAC 
appeals during the review period, and estimates that 54 of them (or 41 
percent) were not employed by any member firm during the appeal 
process, 33 of them (or 25 percent) were employed by a member firm only 
for part of the appeal process, and 44 of them (or 34 percent) were 
employed by a member firm throughout the appeal process.
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    \79\ FINRA has no estimate for the time associated with 
subsequent appeals.
    \80\ These 131 brokers correspond to those associated with a NAC 
appeal during the review period (2013-2018). The 75 brokers 
discussed in the Anticipated Benefits section above are a subgroup 
of brokers associated with a NAC appeal during the 2013-2016 period. 
See supra note 74.
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    FINRA notes that consistent with existing FINRA guidance, some 
firms may have already established heightened supervision of 
individuals while their disciplinary matters are on appeal.\81\ The 
existing heightened supervision plans may address all, some or none of 
the conditions or restrictions imposed by the Hearing Panel Officer. 
Accordingly, for these firms the anticipated costs of this proposal may 
be lower.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See Regulatory Notice 18-15 (April 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Economic Impacts
    In developing the proposal, FINRA considered the possibility that, 
in some cases, this proposal may limit activities of brokers and firms, 
while their disciplinary matter is under appeal, in instances where the 
restricted activities do not pose a risk to customers. In such cases, 
these brokers and firms may lose economic opportunities, and their 
customers may lose the benefits associated with the provision of these 
services. FINRA believes that the proposed rule changes mitigate such 
risks by requiring the conditions or restrictions imposed to be 
reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing customer harm and by 
providing a respondent with the right to seek expedited review of a 
motion to modify or remove any or all of the conditions and 
restrictions. Further, as discussed above, approximately 66 percent of 
the broker-appellants during the review period either were not employed 
by a member firm during the appeal process or were employed by a member 
firm only for part of the appeal process. Accordingly, these brokers 
would not be impacted by this proposal or would be subject to the 
proposed limitations only for a limited period of time.
2. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series
    The proposed rule amendments would impact statutorily disqualified 
individuals and their employing firms while the SD Application is being 
processed. These individuals would be subject to heightened supervision 
during the pendency of their SD Applications.
Anticipated Benefits
    The primary benefit of this proposed rule change would arise from 
greater oversight by employing firms of the activities of statutorily 
disqualified individuals during the pendency of their SD Applications, 
thereby reducing the potential risk of customer harm during this 
period. In order to assess the potential risk posed by these 
individuals during the pendency of their SD Applications, FINRA 
examined whether individuals associated with an SD Application filed 
during the 2013-2016 period had a disclosure event \82\ at any time 
from the filing of the SD Application through two years after 
filing.\83\ Based on this analysis, FINRA estimates that 26 (or 51 
percent) of the 51 individuals associated with SD Applications during 
the 2013-2016 period had a total of 41 disclosure events during the 
interstitial period after the filing of their SD Application.\84\
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    \82\ For purposes of this analysis, ``disclosure event'' 
included final criminal matters and specified risk events, as 
defined in proposed Rule 1011(h) and (p).
    \83\ This analysis includes events that occurred and reached a 
resolution from the SD Application filing year until the end of two 
years later to allow sufficient time for events that occurred during 
the eligibility proceeding to reach a resolution. Accordingly, the 
sample period for this analysis is based on SD Applications filed 
during the 2013-2016 period, instead of the full review period 
(2013-2018).
    \84\ This likely underrepresents the overall risk of customer 
harm, because the disclosure events in this analysis included only 
final criminal matters and specified risk events.
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Anticipated Costs
    The costs associated with this proposal would fall primarily on 
firms that incur direct and indirect costs associated with establishing 
and implementing the tailored heightened supervision plan while an SD 
Application is under review. As discussed above, the costs would likely 
vary significantly across firms and could increase if the statutorily 
disqualified individuals also serve as principals, executive managers, 
or owners or operate in other senior capacities. Moreover, the 
heightened supervision requirement may deter some firms from retaining 
these individuals and, as a result, these individuals may find it more 
difficult to remain in the industry.
3. Proposed Amendments to the BrokerCheck Rule
    The proposed amendments would impact taping firms and their 
registered persons. Taping firms have a proportionately significant 
number of registered persons who were associated with firms that were 
expelled by a self-regulatory organization or had their registration 
revoked by the SEC for sales practice violations, and as a result, may 
pose greater risk to their customers.
Anticipated Benefits
    The primary benefit of this proposed rule change would arise from 
the investor protection benefits associated with disclosing a firm's 
status as a ``taping firm'' through BrokerCheck to the investors. This 
would allow investors to make more informed choices about the brokers 
and firms with which they conduct business. The anticipated benefits 
would increase with the likelihood that a potential or actual customer 
to a taping firm seeks information through BrokerCheck.
Anticipated Costs
    The proposal would not impose any direct costs on brokers or firms. 
Nonetheless it may impact their businesses, as investors may rely on 
information about a firm's status as a taping firm in determining whom 
to engage for financial services and brokerage activities. Disclosing 
the status of a firm as a ``taping firm'' through BrokerCheck may also 
further deter firms from hiring or retaining brokers who were employed 
previously by disciplined firms in order to avoid the ``taping firm'' 
thresholds and resulting disclosure on BrokerCheck.\85\
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    \85\ As discussed above, only four firms during the review 
period became subject to the taping requirements of Rule 3170. As a 
result, FINRA does not anticipate that this proposal would be 
associated with significant economic impacts, including the 
anticipated benefits or costs.
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4. Proposed Amendments to MAP Rules
    The proposed rule change would directly impact individuals with one 
or more final criminal matters or two or more specified risk events 
within the prior five years, who seek to become owners, control 
persons, principals or registered persons of a member firm. To estimate 
the number of brokers who would meet the proposed criteria, FINRA 
analyzed the categories of events and conditions associated with the 
proposed criteria for all brokers during the review period. For each 
year, FINRA determined the approximate number of

[[Page 20758]]

brokers who met the proposed criteria and became owners, control 
persons, principals or registered persons of a member firm. As 
discussed in more detail below, this analysis showed that there were 
110-215 such individuals, per year, who would have met the proposed 
criteria had it been in place during the review period.
    The proposal is intended to apply to brokers who may pose greater 
risks to their customers than other brokers. A framework for evaluating 
the effectiveness of the criteria is to observe the rate at which 
brokers identified collectively by the criteria are substantially more 
likely to have regulatory-related events, including specified risk 
events and final criminal matters, than their peers. Based on FINRA's 
analysis of all individuals who sought to become owners, control 
persons, principals or registered persons of a member firm during the 
review period, individuals who would have met the proposed criteria had 
on average 1.4-1.6 final criminal matters and specified risk events 
(per broker), while other brokers had on average 0.002-0.004 such 
events (per broker).\86\ These estimates suggest that individuals who 
would have been affected by this proposal (had it been in place during 
the review period) had on average over 450-900 times more final 
criminal matters and specified risk events than other brokers during 
the same review period.
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    \86\ As discussed above, the proposed criteria includes 
individuals with one or more ``final criminal matters'' or two or 
more ``specified risk events'' in the prior five years. The 
individuals who would have met the proposed criteria as a result of 
two or more ``specified risk events'' in the prior five years had on 
average 2.3-2.9 such events during the review period.
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Anticipated Benefits
    The primary benefit of the proposed amendments would be to reduce 
the potential risk of future customer harm by individuals who meet the 
proposed criteria and seek to become an owner, control person, 
principal, or registered person of a member firm. FINRA believes the 
proposed rule change would further promote investor protection by 
applying stronger standards for continuing membership with FINRA and 
for changes to a current member firm's ownership, control or business 
operations. These benefits would primarily arise from changes in broker 
and firm behavior and increased scrutiny by FINRA of brokers who meet 
the proposed criteria during the review of a materiality consultation 
and, where appropriate, a CMA.
    To scope these potential benefits and assess the potential risk 
posed by brokers who would meet the proposed criteria, FINRA evaluated 
the extent to which brokers who would have met the criteria during 
2013-2016 (had the criteria existed) and sought the proposed roles were 
associated with ``new'' final criminal matters or specified risk events 
after having met the proposed criteria. These ``new'' events correspond 
to events that were identified or occurred after the broker's meeting 
the proposed criteria, and do not include events that were pending at 
the time of meeting the criteria and subsequently resolved in the years 
afterwards. As shown in Exhibit 3e, FINRA estimates that, in 2013, 215 
brokers would have met the proposed criteria and sought the proposed 
roles. These brokers were associated with 35 ``new'' final criminal 
matters or specified risk events that occurred after their meeting the 
proposed criteria, between 2014 and 2018. Exhibit 3e similarly shows 
the number of events associated with brokers who would have met the 
proposed criteria and sought the proposed roles in 2014, 2015, and 
2016. Across 2013-2016, there were 635 unique brokers who would have 
met the proposed criteria and sought the proposed roles, and these 
brokers were associated with a total of 93 events that occurred in the 
years after they met the proposed criteria.
    Exhibit 3e also shows, for the 2013-2016 period, a factor 
representing a multiple for the average number of events for brokers 
who would have met the proposed criteria and sought the proposed roles 
relative to other brokers who sought the proposed roles. For example, 
the factor of 16x for 2013 indicates that brokers meeting the proposed 
criteria and seeking the proposed roles in 2013 had on average 16 times 
more new events (per broker) in the subsequent years (2014-2018) than 
other brokers who sought those roles in 2013.\87\ Overall, this 
analysis demonstrates that brokers who would have met the proposed 
criteria and sought the proposed roles during the 2013-2016 period had 
on average approximately 16-49 times more new criminal matters and 
specified risk events after meeting the criteria than other brokers who 
sought the proposed roles.
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    \87\ Brokers meeting the proposed criteria and seeking the 
proposed roles in 2013 had on average 0.16 new events (per broker) 
in the subsequent years (2014-2018) compared to 0.01 events (per 
broker) for other brokers seeking the proposed roles.
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Anticipated Costs
    The cost of this proposal would fall on the firms that seek to add 
owners, control persons, principals or registered persons who meet the 
proposed criteria. These firms would be directly impacted by the 
proposals through the requirements to seek a materiality consultation 
with FINRA and, potentially, to file a CMA. While there is no FINRA fee 
for seeking a materiality consultation, firms may incur internal costs 
or costs associated with engaging external experts in conjunction with 
the filing of a CMA. In addition, the proposal could result in delays 
to a firm's ability to add owners, control persons, principals or 
registered persons who meet the proposed criteria, during the time the 
mandatory materiality consultation and any required CMA is being 
processed. FINRA examined the time to process materiality consultations 
and determined that, on average, these consultations are completed 
within eight to ten days, although this time period could be longer 
depending on the complexity of the contemplated expansion or 
transaction and the aggregate number of consultations under review. 
These anticipated costs may deter some firms from hiring individuals 
meeting the proposed criteria, who as a result may find it difficult to 
remain in the industry or bear other labor market related costs.
Other Economic Impacts
    To provide transparency and clarity regarding the application of 
this proposal, the proposed criteria is based on disclosure events 
required to be reported on the Uniform Registration Forms. Information 
about disclosure events reported on the Uniform Registration Forms is 
generally available to firms and FINRA. Accordingly, firms would be 
able to identify the specific set of disclosure events that would count 
towards the proposed criteria and replicate the proposed thresholds 
using available data, with a few exceptions.\88\ In determining the 
proposed numeric threshold, FINRA considered three key factors: (1) The 
different types of reported disclosure events; (2) the counting 
criteria (i.e., the number of reported events required to trigger the 
obligations); and (3) the time period over which the events are 
counted. In

[[Page 20759]]

evaluating the proposed numeric threshold versus alternative criteria, 
significant attention was given to the impact of possible 
misidentification of individuals; specifically, the economic trade-off 
between including individuals who are less likely to subsequently pose 
risk of harm to customers, and not including individuals who are more 
likely to subsequently pose risk of harm to customers. There are costs 
associated with both types of misidentifications. For example, 
subjecting individuals who are less likely to pose a risk to customers 
to mandatory materiality consultations, and potentially CMAs, would 
impose additional costs on these individuals, their affiliated firms 
and customers. The proposed numeric threshold aims to appropriately 
balance these costs in the context of economic impacts associated with 
the proposed amendments to the MAP Rules.
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    \88\ Firms have access to disclosure events reported on Form U4, 
U5, and U6 filings for individuals who were previously registered 
with the same firms or with other firms. Firms do not have access, 
however, to information regarding individuals that is disclosed on 
another firm's Form BD. Firms may not have access to information 
about disclosure events for individuals, including control 
affiliates, who were not previously registered.
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    The proposal may create incentives for changes in behavior to avoid 
meeting the proposed threshold. Under the proposal standing alone, 
brokers and firms may be more likely to try to settle customer 
complaints or arbitrations below $15,000 so that their settlements do 
not count towards the proposed threshold. To the extent, if any, that 
customers also would be willing to settle for less, this change may 
reduce the compensation provided to customers.\89\ Alternatively, it 
could increase the time, effort and costs for customers associated with 
negotiating a settlement, even if the settled amount would not change. 
Brokers and firms also may consider underreporting the disclosure 
events to avoid being subject to the proposed rule. However, this 
potential impact is mitigated by the facts that many of the events are 
reported by FINRA or other regulators, incorrect or missing reports can 
trigger regulatory action by FINRA, and FINRA rules require firms to 
take appropriate steps to verify the accuracy and completeness of the 
information contained in the Uniform Registration Forms before they are 
filed. FINRA also has the ability to check for unreported events, 
particularly those that third parties report in separate public 
notices, such as the outcomes of some civil proceedings.
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    \89\ The proposed $15,000 threshold for customer settlements 
corresponds to the reporting threshold for the Uniform Registration 
Forms and for the settlement information to be displayed through 
BrokerCheck. Accordingly, the change in incentives to brokers and 
firms associated with the proposed rule should be considered in the 
presence of the incentives already in place.
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    FINRA recognizes that in some instances, firms may not be able to 
identify certain individuals with disclosure events who may seek to 
become owners, control persons, principals or registered persons of the 
firm. Similarly, firms may have less incentive to conduct appropriate 
due diligence on those individuals for whom firms may not have readily 
available disclosure history.\90\ Firms still would be required, 
however, to seek information on relevant disclosure events from 
individuals who seek to become principals or registered persons, as 
part of the registration process, and take reasonable steps (e.g., by 
conducting background checks) to verify the accuracy and completeness 
of the information provided by the individuals. Nonetheless, FINRA 
recognizes that in some cases, even after conducting reasonable due 
diligence, firms may not have the required information to identify 
certain individuals who meet the proposed criteria, and these 
individuals may continue to pose risk of future investor harm. FINRA 
believes that these risks are mitigated by its own examination risk 
programs that monitor and examine individuals for whom there are 
concerns of ongoing misconduct or imminent risk of harm to investors. 
These programs identify high-risk individuals based on the analysis of 
data available to the firms as well as additional regulatory data 
available to FINRA.\91\
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    \90\ For example, as discussed above, firms do not have access 
to disclosure events for non-registered control affiliates at other 
firms. FINRA uses disclosure events reported on Form BD across all 
firms to identify disclosure records of non-registered control 
affiliates.
    \91\ See supra note 88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing this proposal, FINRA analyzed disclosure events 
reported on the Uniform Registration Forms for all individuals during 
the review period. For each year, FINRA evaluated the data and 
determined the approximate number of individuals who would have met the 
proposed numeric threshold of one or more final criminal matters or two 
or more specified risk events in the prior five years. Exhibit 3a shows 
the disclosure categories that FINRA considered and the subcategories 
that were used for identifying final criminal matters and specified 
risk events. The exhibit also shows the mapping of these disclosure 
categories to the underlying questions in Form U4.\92\ Exhibit 3b shows 
the corresponding mapping of these disclosure categories to the 
questions in Form BD.\93\ Exhibit 3c provides a breakdown of the 
disclosure categories for all individuals registered with FINRA in 
2018.\94\ The exhibit illustrates the impacts of refining subcategories 
of reported disclosure events and using different numeric thresholds on 
the number of disclosure events and the number of registered persons 
associated with these events.\95\ This analysis has led FINRA to 
initially propose the numeric threshold set forth in the current 
proposal.
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    \92\ Forms U5 and U6 have questions similar to Form U4 that can 
also be mapped to the disclosure categories in Exhibit 3a.
    \93\ Form BD includes information on disclosure events for 
individual control affiliates, including non-registered control 
affiliates that may not have Form U4, U5, or U6 filings. Form BD is 
the primary source of information on disclosure events for these 
unregistered control affiliates. Form BD includes information on 
final criminal matters and certain specified risk events associated 
with regulatory actions and civil judicial actions, but does not 
include information on customer awards or settlements.
    \94\ Exhibit 3c does not include information on individuals who 
were not registered with FINRA in 2018. These non-registered 
individuals may include non-registered associated persons, including 
non-registered control affiliates.
    \95\ Exhibit 3c shows the number of criminal disclosures and 
``disclosures considered in developing specified risk events'' 
(regulatory action disclosures, civil judicial disclosures, and 
customer complaint, arbitration, and civil litigation disclosures)--
including final and pending disclosures--for brokers who were 
registered with FINRA in 2018, over such brokers' entire reporting 
history; the number of brokers associated with these disclosure 
events; and the impact of refining the disclosure categories and the 
periods over which these events are counted. For example, the 
exhibit shows that brokers who were registered with FINRA in 2018 
had, over their entire reporting history, 19,655 criminal 
disclosures and 134,928 ``disclosures considered in developing 
specified risk events.'' It also shows that 41,915 individuals had, 
over their entire reporting history, one or more criminal 
disclosures or two or more ``disclosures considered in developing 
specified risk events.'' When narrowing the disclosure categories to 
include only the ``final criminal matters'' and ``specified risk 
events'' as defined in this proposal (including the five-year 
lookback period), the results narrow to 174 final criminal matters 
and 2,616 specified risk events, and to 414 brokers who met the 
proposed numeric threshold of one or more final criminal matters or 
two or more specified risk events in the prior five years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The additional proposed obligations would only apply to individuals 
with one or more final criminal matters or two or more specified risk 
events within the prior five years who seek to become owners, control 
persons, principals, or registered persons of a firm. Accordingly, 
FINRA examined registration information in order to identify all 
individuals who would have met the proposed criteria and sought the 
proposed roles during the review period. Those identified serve as a 
reasonable estimate for the number of individuals who would have been 
directly impacted by this proposal had it been in place at the time. 
This analysis indicates that there were 110-215 such individuals per 
year, as shown in Exhibit 3d. These individuals represent 0.09-0.16 
percent of individuals who became owners, control persons, principals, 
or registered

[[Page 20760]]

persons with a new member in any year during the review period.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ These percentages are calculated by dividing FINRA's 
estimate of the number of individuals who met the proposed criteria 
each year during the review period and sought the proposed roles 
(110-215 individuals per year) by the number of individuals who 
became owners, control persons, principals, or registered persons 
with a new member each year during the review period (122,003-
131,156 individuals per year).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA also analyzed firms that employed individuals who would be 
directly impacted by this proposal. The analysis shows that in each 
year over the review period, there were between 74-155 firms employing 
individuals who would have met the proposed criteria. Approximately 41 
percent of these firms were small, 12 percent were mid-size, and the 
remaining 47 percent were large.\97\ FINRA estimates that approximately 
31 percent of the individuals meeting the proposed criteria and who 
sought the proposed roles were employed by small firms, ten percent by 
mid-size firms and 59 percent by large firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ See supra note 71.
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(d) Alternatives Considered
    FINRA recognizes that the design and implementation of the rule 
proposals may impose direct and indirect costs on a variety of 
stakeholders, including member firms, associated persons, regulators, 
investors, and the public. Accordingly, in developing its rule 
proposals, FINRA sought to identify alternative ways to enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposals while maintaining their 
regulatory objectives. The following provides a discussion of the 
alternatives FINRA considered for the current proposals.
1. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9200 Series and FINRA Rule 
9300 Series
    As an alternative to the proposal to authorize Hearing Officers to 
impose conditions or restrictions, FINRA considered whether to require 
sanctions imposed by the FINRA Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer in 
disciplinary decisions to be effective during the pendency of the NAC 
appeals and subsequent appeals. FINRA believes that such an approach 
could be too restrictive in disciplinary matters with significant 
sanctions and where the risk of harm may be specific to particular 
activities. Accordingly, FINRA believes that conditions and 
restrictions that are tailored specifically to the risk posed by the 
individuals during the pendency of the appeals, and are reasonably 
necessary for the purpose of preventing customer harm, would provide a 
better balance between protecting investors and preventing undue costs 
on individuals and firms while their appeals are pending.
2. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series
    This proposal would subject statutorily disqualified individuals 
employed with member firms to heightened supervision during the 
pendency of their SD Applications. Considering that the problem 
addressed by the proposed amendments to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series is 
very specific, FINRA did not consider any significant alternatives to 
this targeted proposal.
3. Proposed Amendments to FINRA Rule 8312
    Considering that this proposal would likely not be associated with 
material economic impacts, FINRA did not consider any significant 
alternatives to this proposal.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ As discussed above, there were only four firms that became 
subject to the taping requirements of Rule 3170 during the review 
period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 1000 Series
    FINRA considered several alternatives to the numeric and 
categorical thresholds for identifying individuals who would be subject 
to the proposed amendments to the MAP Rules. In determining the 
proposed threshold, FINRA focused significant attention on the economic 
trade-off between incorrect identification of individuals who may not 
subsequently pose risk of harm to their customers, and not including 
individuals who may subsequently pose risk of harm to customers. FINRA 
also considered three key factors: (1) The different types of reported 
disclosure events, (2) the counting criteria (i.e., the number of 
reported events), and (3) the time period over which the events are 
counted. FINRA considered several alternatives for each of these three 
factors.
a. Alternatives Associated With the Types of Disclosure Events
    In determining the different types of disclosure events, FINRA 
considered all categories of disclosure events reported on the Uniform 
Registration Forms, including the financial disclosures and the 
termination disclosures. FINRA decided to exclude financial 
disclosures, which include personal bankruptcies, civil bonds, or 
judgments and liens. While these events may be of interest to investors 
in evaluating whether or not to engage a broker, these types of events 
are not by themselves direct evidence of customer harm. FINRA also 
considered whether termination disclosures should be included as 
specified risk events. Termination disclosures include job separations 
after allegations against the brokers.\99\ Certain termination 
disclosures reflect conflicts of interest between the firm and the 
broker and, as a result, may not necessarily be indicative of 
misconduct. Further, the underlying allegations in the termination 
disclosures may be associated with other disclosure events, such as 
those associated with customer settlements or awards, regulatory 
actions or civil judicial actions, which are already included in the 
proposed criteria. Where so, the underlying conduct posing potential 
future customer harm would be captured in the proposed criteria. As a 
result, FINRA did not include termination disclosures as specified risk 
events. Accordingly, FINRA considered the remaining five categories of 
disclosure events listed in Exhibit 3a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Termination disclosures involve situations where the 
individual voluntarily resigned, was discharged, or was permitted to 
resign after allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Within each disclosure category included in the proposed criteria, 
FINRA considered whether pending matters should be included or if the 
criteria should be restricted to final matters that have reached a 
resolution not in favor of the broker. Pending matters may be 
associated with an emerging pattern of customer harm and capture timely 
information of potential ongoing or recent misconduct. However, pending 
matters may also include disclosure events that remain unresolved or 
subsequently get dismissed because they lack merit or suitable 
evidence. FINRA excluded pending matters in the current proposal 
because the potential adverse impacts on the individuals who may be 
identified because of pending matters would likely outweigh the benefit 
of including pending matters.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ For example, individuals who may be identified on a fixed 
numeric threshold based upon pending matters could find it difficult 
to become owners, control persons, principals, or registered persons 
of a member firm while these matters are pending, even if such 
matters are subsequently dismissed. See also Exhibit 3c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Exhibit 3a shows the five categories of disclosure events that were 
considered and the subcategories that were included in the proposed 
criteria. For criminal matters, FINRA considered whether criminal 
charges that do not result in a conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere (no contest) should be included in the proposed criteria. 
These events correspond to criminal matters in which the associated 
charges

[[Page 20761]]

were subsequently dismissed or withdrawn and, as a result, are not 
necessarily evidence of misconduct. Accordingly, FINRA only included 
criminal convictions, including pleas of guilty or nolo contendere (no 
contest), in the proposed criteria.
    For customer settlements and awards, FINRA considered whether 
settlements and awards in which the broker was not ``named'' should be 
considered as a specified risk event. These ``subject of'' customer 
settlements and awards correspond to events where the customer 
initiates a claim against the firm and does not specifically name the 
broker, but the firm identifies the broker as required by the Uniform 
Registration Forms.\101\ In these cases, the broker is not party to the 
proceedings or settlement. There may be conflicts of interest between 
the firm and the broker such that the claim may be attributed to the 
broker without the ability of that broker to directly participate in 
the resolution. Accordingly, FINRA excluded ``subject of'' customer 
settlements and awards from the proposed criteria. FINRA recognizes 
that excluding these events may also undercount instances where the 
broker may have been responsible for the alleged customer harm.
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    \101\ For example, the Instructions to Form U4 provide that the 
answer to Questions 14I(4) or 14I(5) should be ``yes'' if the broker 
was not named as a respondent/defendant but (1) the Statement of 
Claim or Complaint specifically mentions the individual by name and 
alleges the broker was involved in one or more sales practice 
violations or (2) the Statement of Claim or Complaint does not 
mention the broker by name, but the firm has made a good faith 
determination that the sales practice violation(s) alleged involves 
one or more particular brokers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For civil judicial actions and regulatory actions, FINRA considered 
whether all sanctions associated with final matters should be included 
in the proposed criteria or whether certain less severe sanctions 
should be excluded. Final regulatory action or civil judicial action 
disclosures may be associated with a wide variety of activities, 
ranging from material customer harm to more technical rule violations, 
such as a failure to make timely filings or other events not directly 
related to customer harm. However, due to the way in which such 
information is currently reported, it is not straightforward to 
distinguish regulatory or civil judicial actions associated with 
customer harm from other such actions.\102\ In the absence of a 
reliable way to identify regulatory and civil judicial actions 
associated with customer harm, FINRA considered using a proxy of 
severity of the underlying sanctions as a way to exclude events that 
are likely not associated with material customer harm. Therefore, FINRA 
is proposing to include regulatory actions or civil judicial actions 
that are associated with more severe sanctions, such as bars, 
suspensions or monetary sanctions above a de minimis dollar threshold 
of $15,000. FINRA notes that relying strictly on a proxy for severity 
would likely exclude certain regulatory actions or civil judicial 
actions that are associated with customer harm, and may include certain 
regulatory actions or civil judicial actions that are not associated 
with customer harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ For example, the Uniform Registration Forms contain 
information in disclosure reporting pages that could be useful in 
identifying regulatory actions or civil judicial actions associated 
with customer harm, but it is stored as ``free-text'' and, 
therefore, cannot be reliably compared across disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA also considered several alternative de minimis dollar 
thresholds for disclosure events included in the proposed criteria. For 
example, FINRA considered higher dollar thresholds of $25,000, $50,000 
and $100,000 for customer settlements, customer awards, and monetary 
sanctions associated with regulatory actions and civil judicial 
actions. A dollar threshold may capture a dimension of severity of the 
alleged customer harm. The Uniform Registration Forms establish a de 
minimis dollar reporting threshold of $10,000 for complaints filed 
prior to 2009 and $15,000 afterwards. The reporting threshold may, 
however, be low and possibly include instances where the payment was 
made to end the complaint and minimize litigation costs. However, the 
dollar threshold does not account for the value of the customers' 
accounts, and there are likely cases where even low dollar amounts 
represent remuneration of a significant portion of customer 
investments. Accordingly, a dollar threshold may be both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive, and as a result FINRA considered a range 
of alternative thresholds. Increasing the dollar threshold from $15,000 
to $25,000, $50,000 and $100,000 would decrease the number of 
individuals impacted by this proposal from 110-215 individuals each 
year over the review period (as explained above) to 108-207 
individuals, 103-197 individuals and 97-180 individuals each year, 
respectively. Finally, FINRA notes that establishing a de minimis 
dollar threshold that is different than the current reporting 
requirements could increase confusion among investors and registered 
persons and would likely create additional incentives for brokers and 
firms to keep future settlements below the dollar level that would 
trigger the restrictions, to the detriment of customers.
b. Alternatives Associated With the Counting Criteria
    FINRA considered a range of alternative criteria for counting 
criminal matters or specified risk events. For example, FINRA 
considered whether the counting criteria for final criminal matters 
should be two or more final criminal matters or one final criminal 
matter and another specified risk event. This alternative would 
effectively count final criminal matters the same way as other 
specified risk events. FINRA believes that final criminal matters are 
generally more directly tied to serious misconduct than some of the 
other specified risk events. Accordingly, FINRA believes that one final 
criminal matter, as defined by this proposal, should be sufficient to 
trigger the proposed criteria.\103\
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    \103\ FINRA recognizes that final criminal matters include 
felony convictions that may not be investment related (e.g., a 
conviction associated with multiple DUIs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA also considered alternative criteria for counting specified 
risk events. For example, FINRA considered decreasing the proposed 
threshold from two specified risk events to one. This alternative would 
change the proposed criteria to one or more final criminal matters or 
one (instead of two) or more specified risk events during the prior 
five-year period. This approach would increase the number of 
individuals impacted by this proposal from 110-215 individuals to 341-
675 individuals each year, over the review period. FINRA also 
considered increasing the proposed threshold from two specified risk 
events to three, thereby changing the proposed criteria to one or more 
final criminal matter or three (instead of two) or more specified risk 
events during the prior five-year period. This approach would decrease 
the number of individuals impacted by this proposal from 110-215 
individuals to 86-161 individuals each year, over the review period. 
For the reasons explained above, FINRA considered alternative criteria 
for counting specified risk events, but chose the specification in the 
current proposal.
c. Alternatives Associated With the Time Period Over Which the 
Disclosure Events Are Counted
    FINRA also considered alternative criteria for the time period over 
which final criminal matters and specified risk events are counted. For 
example, FINRA considered whether final criminal matters or specified 
risk events should

[[Page 20762]]

be counted over the individual's entire reporting period or counted 
only over a more recent period. Based on its experience, FINRA believes 
that events that are more than ten years old do not necessarily pose 
the same level of possible future risk to customers as more recent 
events. Further, counting final criminal matters or specified risk 
events over an individual's entire reporting period would imply that 
individuals with such events would be subject to the criteria for their 
entire career, even if they subsequently worked without being 
associated with any future events. Accordingly, FINRA decided to 
include final criminal matters or specified risk events occurring only 
in a more recent period.
    FINRA also considered a threshold based on a five-year lookback 
period for final criminal matters, but a five-to-ten year lookback 
period for specified risk events. Specifically, FINRA considered a 
threshold that would be met if the individual had one specified risk 
event having resolved during the previous ten years, and a second 
specified risk event resolved during the previous five years, or if the 
individual had one or more final criminal matters resolved in the prior 
five-year period. This approach would increase the number of 
individuals impacted by this proposal from 110-215 individuals to 127-
236 individuals each year, over the review period. For the reasons 
explained above, FINRA considered alternative criteria for the lookback 
period for specified risk events, but chose the specification in the 
current proposal.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    The proposed rule change was published for comment in Regulatory 
Notice 18-16 (April 2018). Thirteen comments were received in response 
to the Regulatory Notice.\104\ A copy of the Regulatory Notice is 
attached as Exhibit 2a [sic]. A list of commenters is attached as 
Exhibit 2b [sic]. Copies of the comment letters received in response to 
the Regulatory Notice are attached as Exhibit 2c [sic]. Of the 13 
comment letters received, eight were generally in favor of the proposed 
rule change, two were generally opposed, and one stated that the 
proposal was an improvement over the status quo but that significantly 
more action would be needed to protect investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ All references to commenters are to the comment letters as 
listed in Exhibit 2b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA has considered the comments received. In light of some of 
those comments, FINRA has made some modifications to the proposal. The 
comments and FINRA's responses are set forth in detail below.
General Support for and Opposition to the Proposal
    Five commenters expressed general support for the proposed rule 
changes in Regulatory Notice 18-16, but all had suggestions on how 
aspects of the proposal should be modified.\105\ Two commenters 
expressed support for the proposed amendments, subject to certain 
modifications.\106\ One commenter expressed general support for the 
proposed amendments except the proposed amendments to the Rule 1000 
Series.\107\ Two commenters suggested different approaches that FINRA 
could take.\108\ One commenter expressed opposition to specific aspects 
of the proposal.\109\ One commenter opined that the proposal has 
numerous deficiencies and offered remedies.\110\ All of these 
commenters' suggestions are discussed in more detail below.
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    \105\ MML, NASAA, PIABA, SIFMA, Wulff Hansen.
    \106\ Cambridge, FSI.
    \107\ Janney.
    \108\ Better Markets, IBN.
    \109\ Luxor.
    \110\ Network 1.
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Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rules 9200 and 9300 Series To Enhance 
Investor Protection During the Pendency of an Appeal or Call-for-Review 
Proceeding
[rtarr8] Conditions or Restrictions
    The proposed amendments to the Rule 9200 and 9300 Series would 
allow a Hearing Officer to impose conditions or restrictions on the 
activities of a respondent during the pendency of an appeal to the NAC 
from, or call for NAC review of, a disciplinary decision.
    Some commenters expressed support for these specific proposals. FSI 
commented that permitting Hearing Officers to impose conditions and 
restrictions strikes the appropriate balance between the member's 
rights and investor protection concerns. NASAA supported imposing 
temporary remedies on parties that lose at the hearing level, writing 
that it would align FINRA's procedures with federal and state law. 
PIABA wrote that a disciplinary respondent should not be permitted to 
conduct business as usual during a disciplinary appeal.
    Several commenters requested that a disciplined respondent and 
firms that associate with a disciplined respondent have an opportunity 
to propose to the Hearing Officers the conditions and restrictions that 
should be imposed.\111\ Cambridge stated that this opportunity would 
help ensure that conditions and restrictions are not overly broad and 
account for a firm's size, resources and ability to supervise, and that 
it would alleviate concerns about potential lost income, lost 
opportunities and lost clients that could result from the conditions or 
restrictions. SIFMA wrote that this opportunity would help ensure that 
any conditions and restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for 
the nature and scale of the misconduct at issue and tailored to a 
firm's business model, and that it would reduce the number of motions 
to modify or remove conditions or restrictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ Cambridge, FSI, SIFMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While FINRA appreciates the comments, FINRA notes that the proposal 
allows an individual respondent to make arguments concerning the 
potential conditions and restrictions to the Hearing Officer. In this 
regard, nothing in the proposed rule change prevents a respondent in a 
disciplinary proceeding from proposing, in opposition or response to a 
motion for conditions or restrictions, the conditions and restrictions 
that could or should be imposed. Likewise, nothing prevents an 
individual respondent, during the underlying disciplinary proceeding 
itself, from introducing relevant evidence. Moreover, FINRA rules only 
give named parties the right to participate in a FINRA disciplinary 
proceeding, and the complaint issued against an individual respondent 
will not always name that person's employing firm as a respondent. 
However, in light of these comments, FINRA is proposing to modify the 
proposed rule as set forth in Regulatory Notice 18-16 to clarify that a 
respondent's opposition or other response to a motion for conditions or 
restrictions must explain why no conditions or restrictions should be 
imposed or specify alternate conditions or restrictions that are sought 
to be imposed and explain why the conditions or restrictions are 
reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing customer harm.
    Cambridge stated that the proposal does not address the recourse 
available for damages that could result from any conditions or 
restrictions imposed, in the event the underlying disciplinary decision 
is reversed on appeal. FINRA believes the proposal mitigates such 
risks. The standard for imposing conditions or restrictions--those that 
the Hearing Officer considers reasonably necessary for the purpose of 
preventing customer harm--and the ability to

[[Page 20763]]

request an expedited proceeding before the Review Subcommittee for 
prompt review of any conditions or restrictions imposed would act to 
ensure the conditions and restrictions imposed are reasonably tailored 
to address the potential concerns. The Hearing Officer that imposes 
conditions or restrictions in the first instance would be knowledgeable 
about the case and, therefore, well-suited to craft restrictions or 
conditions that are tailored to addressing the potential customer harm. 
And if a respondent believes that the conditions or restrictions 
imposed are too burdensome, the respondent would be permitted to 
request an expedited review and stay the conditions or restrictions.
    Better Markets suggested that Hearing Officers should be required, 
not just permitted, to impose conditions or restrictions that are 
necessary to protect investors pending an appeal to the NAC. FINRA 
believes, however, that it is more appropriate to give Hearing Officers 
discretion. There may be situations when conditions or restrictions may 
be deemed not necessary, such as when a respondent firm or a respondent 
individual's employing firm has already undertaken substantial 
subsequent remedial measures or when the violations at issue do not 
involve the risk of customer harm.
    FSI and Luxor opposed the standard in proposed FINRA Rule 9285(a) 
that the Hearing Officer may impose conditions or restrictions that it 
considers ``reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing customer 
harm.'' FSI opined that that standard could lead to conditions or 
restrictions that are unduly burdensome or unrelated to the misconduct, 
and it suggested that the standard also require that the conditions and 
restrictions be ``reasonably designed to prevent further violations of 
the rule or rules the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer [in the 
underlying disciplinary proceeding] has found to have been violated.'' 
FSI further suggested that, when imposing conditions or restrictions, 
Hearing Officers be required to consider the firm's size, resources and 
overall ability to supervise the registered representative's compliance 
with the conditions or restrictions. Luxor wrote that the proposed 
standard would have a chilling effect on a respondent's right to appeal 
because, depending on the conditions and restrictions imposed, the 
respondent may be unable to afford legal representation or may suffer 
irreversible damage to a book of business.
    FINRA's proposed standard, however, is consistent with the rules of 
other self-regulatory organizations.\112\ Moreover, FINRA believes that 
the proposed standard--both its use of the term ``reasonably 
necessary'' and its emphasis on ``for the purpose of preventing 
customer harm''--provides sufficient and appropriate limiting 
parameters. FINRA also believes that requiring that conditions or 
restrictions be reasonably designed to prevent further violations of 
the rule or rules found to have been violated in the underlying 
disciplinary decision, as FSI suggests, may not allow the Hearing 
Officer to adequately address the investor protection concerns that 
have been raised by the activities of the respondent. As FINRA 
explained above (and in Regulatory Notice 18-16), the conditions and 
restrictions imposed should target the misconduct demonstrated in the 
disciplinary proceeding and be tailored to the specific risks posed by 
the member firm or broker. With regard to FSI's suggestions to amend 
the standard to require consideration of numerous additional factors, 
FINRA believes that, for investor protection purposes, the primary 
driver of the conditions or restrictions should be what is reasonably 
necessary to prevent customer harm, not the size of the respondent's 
employing firm or its claims about its resources. FINRA believes that 
the proposed standard--coupled with the parties' ability to participate 
in the process, the knowledge of the Hearing Officers, and the 
availability of an expedited review--are appropriate to yield 
conditions or restrictions that are targeted at the specific, 
identifiable risks presented to customers and that are not overly 
burdensome. FINRA further proposes, that in light of this and other 
comments, to clarify the process for imposing conditions and 
restrictions during the pendency of an appeal. Specifically, FINRA is 
proposing to modify the proposed rule as set forth in Regulatory Notice 
18-16 to clarify when and how parties can seek to impose reasonably 
necessary conditions and restrictions following a disciplinary decision 
by a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer, the process for a respondent to 
request an appeal through an expedited proceeding of such conditions 
and restrictions, and to further clarify that such conditions and 
restrictions would be stayed during such expedited proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See BOX Rule 12110 (``Pending effectiveness of a decision 
imposing a sanction on the Respondent, the person, committee or 
panel issuing the decision (the `adjudicator') may impose such 
conditions and restrictions on the activities of the Respondent as 
it considers reasonably necessary for the protection of investors 
and the Exchange.''); CBOE Rule 13.11(b) (``Pending effectiveness of 
a decision imposing a sanction on the Respondent, the Hearing Panel 
or the CRO, as applicable, may impose such conditions and 
restrictions on the activities of the Respondent as the Hearing 
Panel or the CRO, as applicable, considers reasonably necessary for 
the protection of investors and the Exchange''); CBOE BZX Rule 8.11 
(``Pending effectiveness of a decision imposing a penalty on the 
Respondent, the CRO, Hearing Panel or committee of the Board, as 
applicable, may impose such conditions and restrictions on the 
activities of the Respondent as he, she or it considers reasonably 
necessary for the protection of investors, creditors and the 
Exchange.''); MIAX Options Rule 1011(b) (``Pending effectiveness of 
a decision imposing a sanction on the Respondent, the person, 
committee or panel issuing the decision (the `adjudicator') may 
impose such conditions and restrictions on the activities of the 
Respondent as it considers reasonably necessary for the protection 
of investors and the Exchange.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters requested that a different burden be applied in 
proposed Rule 9285(b)(2) for seeking the modification or removal of 
conditions or restrictions.\113\ PIABA suggested that, to modify or 
remove conditions or restrictions, the respondent should be required to 
provide clear and convincing evidence of a manifest error by the trier 
of fact and show the likelihood of success of the underlying appeal. 
Cambridge and FSI suggested that the respondent should have to show 
that the Hearing Officer committed an error, that the conditions or 
restrictions are overly broad, or that they are not narrowly tailored 
to prevent future occurrences of the underlying violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ Cambridge, FSI, PIABA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA declines these comments. As explained above, the burden in 
proposed Rule 9285(b)(2) is that the respondent would have to 
demonstrate that the conditions or restrictions imposed are not 
reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing customer harm. This 
burden is consistent with the standard set forth in proposed Rule 
9285(a) for establishing conditions and restrictions in the first 
place. Furthermore, FINRA believes that, for fairness reasons, a 
respondent's ability to seek the modification or removal of conditions 
or restrictions should not be constrained by the underlying merits of 
the respondent's disciplinary appeal. Because there would be a 
separate, specific standard for the imposition of conditions or 
restrictions--i.e., those that the Hearing Officer considers reasonably 
necessary for the purpose of preventing customer harm--any conditions 
or restrictions imposed could be erroneous for a reason that is 
entirely unrelated to whether a respondent's underlying appeal has a 
likelihood of success. Likewise, FINRA does not

[[Page 20764]]

support establishing a burden of proof that would be more difficult to 
meet, such as a ``clear and convincing evidence of a manifest error by 
the trier of fact'' standard. Thus, FINRA has retained that aspect of 
the standard proposed in Regulatory Notice 18-16 that would require a 
respondent to demonstrate, when moving to modify or remove conditions 
or restrictions, that the conditions or restrictions imposed are not 
reasonably necessary for the purpose of preventing customer harm.
    PIABA and Better Markets wrote about the provisions in proposed 
Rule 9285(b) that would allow a respondent to seek expedited review of 
an order imposing conditions or restrictions. PIABA supported the 
proposed expedited review process. Better Markets, on the other hand, 
wrote that expedited reviews would add burdens to the NAC and cause 
delays in processing underlying disciplinary appeals. FINRA has 
retained the proposed expedited review process. FINRA has added the 
expedited review process to make the overall process more fair for the 
respondents involved. It also will further investor protection: Because 
the filing of a motion to modify or remove conditions or restrictions 
would stay the effectiveness of the conditions or restrictions, an 
expedited review would allow properly imposed conditions and 
restrictions to become effective sooner. Moreover, because proposed 
Rule 9285(b) would assign the NAC's Review Subcommittee--and not the 
NAC itself--to decide motions to modify or remove conditions or 
restrictions and establish a 30-day deadline for doing so, FINRA 
expects that the expedited review process will not result in materially 
longer times for the NAC to process underlying disciplinary appeals.
    Several commenters disagreed with how, pursuant to proposed Rule 
9285(b), a motion to modify or remove conditions or restrictions would 
effect a stay of the conditions or restrictions. Better Markets and 
NASAA suggested that, for investor protection reasons, there should be 
no stays. NASAA further commented that permitting stays would be 
inconsistent with how proposed Rule 9285(b) would require firms to 
establish heightened supervision over individuals who appeal 
disciplinary decisions. Luxor, on the other hand, essentially sought to 
expand stays, writing that no conditions and restrictions should be 
imposed during a disciplinary appeal except upon a showing by FINRA of 
clear and convincing evidence of imminent harm to the public.
    In light of the conflicting comments and FINRA's belief that the 
stay provision strikes the right balance, FINRA is proposing to retain 
the proposed stay provision. It appropriately balances the investor-
protection benefits of imposing reasonably necessary conditions and 
restrictions with the Exchange Act requirement that FINRA provide a 
fair procedure in disciplinary proceedings. A stay of appropriately 
issued conditions or restrictions would be in place only during the 
relatively short duration of an expedited proceeding. Moreover, FINRA 
does not agree that having a temporary stay of conditions or 
restrictions during the expedited proceeding process and requiring 
firms to establish heightened supervision plans during the pendency of 
appeals are inconsistent. Proposed Rule 9285(e) would require a 
disciplined respondent's member firm to establish a reasonably designed 
heightened supervision plan regardless of whether a Hearing Officer 
imposes conditions and restrictions.\114\ Thus, there is no reason for 
a respondent's firm to delay adopting a heightened supervision plan 
while any conditions or restrictions are stayed pending an expedited 
review. Moreover, proposed Rule 9285(e) contemplates that a 
respondent's firm would need to create an amended plan of heightened 
supervision that takes into account any conditions or restrictions 
imposed after the initial plan is adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ See also Regulatory Notice 18-15 (April 2018) (Guidance on 
Implementing Effective Heightened Supervisory Procedures for 
Associated Persons with a History of Past Misconduct).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PIABA wrote that the proposal should require that an individual 
respondent's employing firm be notified immediately of any conditions 
or restrictions imposed. FINRA generally agrees with this comment and, 
as explained above, has modified the proposal to require that the 
Office of Hearing Officers or the Office of General Counsel, as 
appropriate, provide a copy of the order imposing conditions and 
restrictions to each FINRA member with which the respondent is 
associated. This would be similar to how FINRA rules currently require 
that copies of disciplinary decisions be provided to each FINRA member 
with which a respondent is associated.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See Rule 9268(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[rtarr8] Heightened Supervision of Disciplined Respondents
    FINRA also received comments concerning the proposed amendments to 
require, in the event of an appeal or call for review, that an 
individual respondent's member firm adopt heightened supervisory 
procedures for that individual respondent.
    Better Markets and PIABA expressed support for requiring firms to 
adopt written plans of heightened supervision while a disciplinary 
appeal is pending.
    FSI and SIFMA stated that requiring firms to adopt written plans of 
heightened supervision within ten days of any appeal or call for review 
is an insufficiently short amount of time, and that firms should have 
30 days. FINRA believes, however, that the ten-day period is 
appropriate under the circumstances. The longer the time period without 
a plan of heightened supervision in place, the greater the risk to 
investors. Retaining the shorter, ten-day deadline will allow the 
investor-protection benefits of the heightened supervision plans to be 
in place sooner. FINRA also believes that the ten-day period is 
sufficient because a firm should be aware of the potential need to 
adopt a heightened supervision plan well in advance of when it would be 
required to do so. In this regard, Form U4 requires that registered 
persons report when they are the subject of a regulatory complaint that 
could result in an affirmative answer to other Form U4 disclosure 
questions that ask about self-regulatory organization findings and 
disciplinary actions, and FINRA rules require that the Office of 
Hearing Officers promptly provide a copy of a disciplinary decision to 
each member with which a respondent is associated. Furthermore, the 
ten-day deadline for adopting a heightened supervision plan would begin 
only when the respondent appeals the decision to the NAC or when the 
matter is called for review. FINRA Rules 9311 and 9312 provide 25 days 
to file an appeal and 25 to 45 days to call a case for review.
    PIABA suggested that a firm required to adopt a plan of heightened 
supervision pursuant to proposed Rule 9285 also should be required to 
document its enforcement of that plan. FINRA has previously indicated 
that documenting the enforcement of a heightened supervision plan could 
be a useful element of such a plan.\116\ Instead of singling out 
additional provisions like these in the rule text, however, FINRA 
believes that its published notices provide a thorough source of 
guidance on heightened supervision plans, including what provisions 
should

[[Page 20765]]

be included at a minimum, and what other provisions can be part of an 
effective plan.\117\ As needed or appropriate, FINRA would be able to 
update its published guidance to account for the heightened supervision 
plans required by the proposed rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ See Notice to Members 97-19 (April 1997) (advising that 
firms could require supervisors of registered representatives 
subject to special supervisory arrangements to provide a sign-off on 
daily activity or to periodically attest in writing that they have 
carried out the terms of the special supervision).
    \117\ See Notice to Members 97-17 (April 1997); Regulatory 
Notice 18-15 (April 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Luxor suggested that heightened supervision plans would not be 
necessary where a Hearing Officer imposes conditions or restrictions. 
FINRA believes that even when conditions and restrictions are imposed, 
the respondent's member firm would still need to address, in a 
heightened supervision plan, how it would implement and execute those 
conditions and restrictions. Furthermore, heightened supervision plans 
would be needed to address activities that are not subject to any 
imposed conditions or restrictions.
Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 9520 Series To Require Automatic 
Interim Plans of Heightened Supervision of a Disqualified Person During 
the Period When FINRA Is Reviewing an Eligibility Application
    Several commenters specifically approved of the proposed amendments 
to Rule 9522, which would require a member firm to adopt interim 
heightened supervisory procedures for a disqualified person during the 
pendency of the firm's SD Application to continue associating with that 
disqualified person. NASAA commented that this regulatory gap should be 
closed. PIABA commented that there is an obvious benefit to the 
proposal.
    Better Markets suggested that firms should be required to adopt a 
plan of heightened supervision immediately when an associated person is 
found to have committed acts that are grounds for becoming 
disqualified, even pending the associated person's appeal of the 
underlying disqualifying event. While FINRA agrees that there may be 
benefits to requiring firms to place a disqualified associated person 
on a heightened supervision plan immediately and before the filing of 
an application to continue associating with that person, FINRA believes 
the timing requirement of the proposed rule--to require such a plan 
once a firm has made a determination to seek approval for continued 
association with the disqualified associated person--strikes the 
appropriate balance.
    Network 1 wrote that requiring firms to expend resources on 
developing heightened supervision plans for disqualified persons while 
an SD Application is pending is a disincentive to hiring the person at 
all. While FINRA recognizes that the requirement to develop and 
implement an interim heightened supervision plan in these circumstances 
may deter some firms from retaining or hiring a disqualified person, 
FINRA believes that if a firm elects to sponsor a disqualified person 
it needs to provide greater oversight of the activities of such person 
during the pendency of the SD Application, thereby reducing the 
potential risk of customer harm during this period. Moreover, if the SD 
Application is approved by FINRA, the firm would in almost all cases be 
required to prepare a plan of heightened supervision.
    Aderant noted that although proposed Rule 9522(g) sets a ten-day 
deadline to remedy a substantially incomplete application that seeks 
the continued associated of a disqualified person, the version proposed 
in Regulatory Notice 18-16 did not identify the specific event that 
triggers the ten-day deadline. FINRA agrees that a modification is 
appropriate and has revised proposed Rule 9522(g) to establish that the 
event triggering the ten-day deadline is service of the notice of 
delinquency.
Proposed Amendments to FINRA Rule 8312
    The proposed amendments to FINRA Rule 8312 would remove the 
requirement that the only means through which persons can request 
information as to whether a particular member is subject to the 
provisions of the Taping Rule is a telephonic inquiry via the 
BrokerCheck toll-free telephone listing. The proposed amended rule 
would permit FINRA to release this information through BrokerCheck 
regardless of how it is requested.
    NASAA agreed with this proposal, stating that it would advance 
investor protection.
    Other commenters opposed it. Luxor wrote that the proposal is 
punitive, will disproportionately cause reputational damage to small 
firms, and will create a perception that a taping firm and its 
representatives are to be viewed negatively simply by association with 
behavior that occurred at other firms and other persons. Network 1 
commented that there is little likelihood the public will understand 
the difference between a taping firm and a disciplined firm. FINRA 
notes that Rule 8312 already provides, however, that FINRA will release 
whether a particular member firm is subject to the Taping Rule in 
response to telephonic inquiries via the BrokerCheck toll-free 
telephone listing. The proposed amendments--which will only remove the 
telephonic inquiry limitation--will simply make it easier for investors 
to obtain this same information by expanding the means through which 
investors can access it. Moreover, the comment that the proposed 
amendments would have a disproportionate effect on small firms has no 
basis; there is currently only one firm subject to the Taping Rule.
    Several comments raised concerns regarding the content of the 
proposed BrokerCheck disclosure relating to taping firms. Better 
Markets and PIABA requested that the disclosure be explained in 
BrokerCheck and include a specific narrative description of why the 
disclosure is being made. NASAA suggested that the proposed BrokerCheck 
disclosure appear only on the BrokerCheck reports of the few firms that 
are subject to the Taping Rule. NASAA further commented that the 
disclosure should identify the firm as subject to the Taping Rule and 
explain in plain English what that means. Network 1 and Better Markets 
raised concerns as to how the proposed amendments would impact the 
information disclosed through BrokerCheck concerning individuals. 
Network 1 requested that FINRA amend the proposal to ensure that the 
information disclosed on BrokerCheck not communicate any ``guilt by 
association'' for persons who are employees of taping firms and who 
have ``clean records.'' Better Markets, on the other hand, suggested 
that the BrokerCheck profiles of individual brokers should denote when 
they are associated with taping firms.
    FINRA appreciates the concerns expressed and agrees that the 
BrokerCheck disclosure of a firm as being subject to the Taping Rule 
should include a clear explanation of what that means, to help 
investors understand why the taping firm is subject to heightened 
procedures and incent them to research the background of a broker 
associated with the taping firm.
Proposed Amendments to the FINRA Rule 1000 Series To Impose Additional 
Obligations on Member Firms That Associate With Persons With a 
Significant History of Past Misconduct
[rtarr8] General Comments
    The proposed amendments to the FINRA Rule 1010 Series would require 
a member firm to submit a letter to Member Regulation seeking a 
materiality consultation when a natural person that has, in the prior 
five years, one or more ``final criminal matters'' or two or more 
``specified risk events''

[[Page 20766]]

seeks to become an owner, control person, principal or registered 
person.
    Several commenters expressed general support for the proposed 
amendments to the Rule 1000 Series.\118\ Better Markets characterized 
requiring materiality consultations before hiring as an important 
regulatory innovation. NASAA described the proposal as a reasonable 
means of getting Member Regulation more involved in members' decisions 
to associate with individuals who have significant disciplinary 
histories. PIABA wrote that the proposed amendments would promote 
investor protection, adequately apply stronger standards for continuing 
membership, and remind firms of the need to keep new representatives 
with significant disciplinary histories under a well-defined, well-
enforced supervisory plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ Better Markets, Cambridge, NASAA, PIABA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Janney and SIFMA commented that the proposed rule requiring 
materiality consultations is contrary to the spirit of FINRA's current 
guidance about materiality consultations, which they assert focuses on 
changes to a firm's business model and not the activity or 
employability of individuals. FINRA disagrees with this assertion and 
believes the proposed rule is consistent with FINRA rules governing the 
membership application process, which considers, among other things, 
firms' hiring decisions and individuals' past activities. For example, 
the safe harbor in IM-1011-1 is premised on the notion that hiring a 
certain number of associated persons involved in sales can be a 
material change in business operations that requires the filing of a 
CMA, and the safe harbor is not available to a member firm or a 
principal of a firm that has a specified disciplinary history. 
Likewise, FINRA rules require Member Regulation to consider, in new 
membership applications and CMAs, a variety of criminal, civil, 
regulatory, and arbitration events when assessing whether an applicant 
and its associated persons are capable of complying with federal 
securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, and FINRA 
rules.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ See Rule 1014(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters expressed concern about the possible negative 
impact of the proposed rule on a firm's hiring practices and the 
ability of individuals with such events to be hired. Luxor commented 
that the proposed rule changes are unnecessary, because FINRA can 
contact a firm when it has hired ``high-risk brokers.'' Luxor also 
commented that if a person has a license to operate and has not been 
barred or otherwise precluded from operating, no additional 
consultation should be required when a firm wishes to hire that person. 
Janney stated that the investing public and the markets would be better 
protected by FINRA taking contemporaneous action, instead of disrupting 
the hiring practices of an unrelated firm as many as five years after 
the underlying disclosure events in proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) and IM-
1011-3 have occurred. Janney also expressed the view that it appears 
that FINRA would like to review transitions specifically in the context 
of an affiliation change, and the proposed rule would create the 
ability to prevent transition of a registered representative without 
taking enforcement action.
    FINRA believes the proposed rule is necessary to ensure that FINRA 
has a more meaningful regulatory touchpoint at the time an individual 
with a significant history of misconduct seeks to become an owner, 
control person, principal or registered person of a member firm. The 
proposal would apply in the limited circumstance where such individual 
meets the required thresholds for disclosure events. FINRA believes 
requiring firms to ask FINRA for a materiality consultation, for 
example, when it is planning to hire a particular individual that meets 
the required thresholds, would allow FINRA the opportunity to 
meaningfully assess the underlying disciplinary events and review the 
firm's supervisory practices and internal controls. The ability of 
FINRA to conduct this review contemporaneously furthers investor 
protection. Moreover, nothing in the proposed rule precludes FINRA from 
taking enforcement action when necessary or appropriate.
[rtarr8] Definitions and Criteria That Would Require a Materiality 
Consultation
    FINRA received numerous comments concerning the definitions in 
proposed Rule 1011 of ``final criminal matter'' and ``specified risk 
event'' and the criteria in proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) that would trigger 
the need to request a materiality consultation. Some commenters 
expressly supported the proposed definitions and criteria.\120\ FSI 
wrote that the numeric parameters and proposed criteria are sound and 
reasonable, and it supported how the ``specified risk events'' are 
final and investment- or regulatory-related. NASAA wrote that the 
proposed definition of ``final criminal matter'' appropriately captures 
the scope of disclosable criminal events on the Uniform Registration 
Forms. PIABA wrote that the criteria and definitions are appropriate 
and clear enough to avoid confusion, and that the minor compliance 
costs will be far outweighed by the increased investor protections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ FSI, NASAA, PIABA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters suggested alternatives to the proposed definitions 
and criteria. For example:
     Some commenters proposed that the definition of ``final 
criminal matter'' include only investment- or fraud-related criminal 
matters \121\ or matters that would generate a risk of customer 
harm.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ Luxor, Wulff Hansen.
    \122\ MML. This commenter also requested guidance concerning 
whether ``final criminal matter'' would include situations where a 
person receives a deferred sentence and can clear a conviction 
through compliance with a court-ordered program. Per the proposed 
definition, whether a ``final criminal matter'' would count for 
purposes of proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) and IM-1011-3 would depend on 
whether the matter ``is disclosed, or was required to be disclosed, 
on the applicable Uniform Registration Forms.'' The setting aside of 
a conviction does not necessarily mean that it need not be reported 
on, or that the matter should be expunged from, the Uniform 
Registration Forms. See, e.g., Form U4 and U5 Interpretive Questions 
and Answers, http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Interpretive-Guidance-final-03.05.15.pdf (Questions 14A and 14B, Interpretive 
Question and Answer 2, stating that ``[e]ach order setting aside a 
conviction will be reviewed by RAD staff to determine if the 
conviction must be reported'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Several commenters proposed that the definition of 
``specified risk event'' use a dollar threshold that is either higher 
\123\ or lower \124\ than $15,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Cambridge, IBN, Janney, MML. Cambridge asserted that some 
unfair high-risk characterizations resulting from a $15,000 
threshold would involve control persons, principals and registered 
persons who are required to disclose events due to a managerial role 
but are ``likely not directly involved in'' the underlying 
violations in those disclosed events. FINRA notes that the proposed 
definition of ``specified risk event'' does not include final awards 
or settlements where the person was not named but is only the 
``subject of.''
    \124\ Better Markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Some commenters proposed that the final awards and 
settlements that are counted as ``specified risk events'' be broadened 
\125\ or narrowed.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ NASAA.
    \126\ Luxor, Network 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Several commenters proposed changes to how ``specified 
risk events'' would be counted.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Luxor, MML, Wulff Hansen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Some commenters suggested that lookback periods for events 
that would trigger a materiality consultation be either shortened \128\ 
or increased.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Luxor.
    \129\ NASAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Luxor wrote that additional factors should be included in 
the criteria for whether a materiality consultation is required, 
including the length of time the individual has been in the industry,

[[Page 20767]]

the number of events during that period, and the circumstances of those 
events.
     Several commenters suggested narrowing the kinds of 
business expansions that would require materiality consultations.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ Janney, Luxor, MML, SIFMA, Wulff Hansen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering all the commenters' suggested alternative 
definitions and criteria, FINRA has decided to retain the definitions 
of ``final criminal matter'' and ``specified risk events'' and the 
criteria that would trigger a materiality consultation that it proposed 
in Regulatory Notice 18-16. Many of the comments concern issues that 
FINRA already considered and addressed in the economic assessment in 
Regulatory Notice 18-16, and the comments have not persuaded FINRA that 
any changes to the definitions or criteria would be more efficient or 
effective at addressing the potential for future customer harm 
presented. As FINRA explained in Regulatory Notice 18-16, the primary 
benefit of the proposed rule change would be to reduce the potential 
risk of future customer harm by individuals who meet the proposed 
criteria and seek to become an owner, control person, principal or 
registered person of a member firm. The proposed rule change would 
further promote investor protection by applying stronger standards for 
changes to a current member firm's ownership, control or business 
operations, including the potential that such changes would require the 
filing and approval of a CMA. In developing this proposal, one of the 
guiding principles was to provide transparency regarding the proposal's 
application, so that firms could largely identify with available data 
the specific set of disclosure events that would count towards the 
proposed criteria and whether a proposed business change would trigger 
the need for a materiality consultation. This is why FINRA's proposal 
is based mostly on events disclosed on the Uniform Registration Forms, 
which are generally available to firms and FINRA.
    While FINRA generally agrees with the comments that the proposed 
materiality consultation process should account for situations where 
numerous ``specified risk events'' are related,\131\ it does not 
believe that modifying the rule-based criteria is the best way to do 
so. Rather, FINRA believes the materiality consultation process should 
allow it to assess an individual's particular events. Moreover, based 
on experience gained through the materiality consultations, FINRA may 
be able to develop guidance for the Department concerning situations 
involving the ``specified risk events'' that could affect whether a 
proposed business expansion is or is not material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ MML, Wulff Hansen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Wulff Hansen suggested that a materiality consultation should be 
required when a person having two or more ``specified risk events'' is 
already associated with a member and seeks to become an owner or 
control person. FINRA notes that the proposed rule already would 
require materiality consultations for internal moves. As explained 
above, however, the proposed rule would not apply when a person who 
meets the proposed criteria in proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) is already a 
principal at a member firm and seeks to add an additional principal 
registration at that same firm. In that instance, the proposed rule 
amendments would not require a materiality consultation.
[rtarr8] Materiality Consultation Procedures
    FSI and Janney requested that FINRA develop additional procedures 
for the materiality consultation process. For example, these commenters 
wrote that FINRA should establish time frames for FINRA staff to issue 
a decision in a materiality consultation, with one commenter explaining 
that time deadlines would allow firms to minimize litigation risks when 
making hiring decisions. FSI asked that FINRA consider establishing 
rule-based remedies for firms that disagree with FINRA staff's 
materiality consultation decisions, and a rule-based requirement that 
FINRA explain in writing a decision that requires a firm to file a 
CMA.\132\ MML suggested that the proposed rule should outline the 
issues that would be central to the Department's materiality 
determination and clarify the proposed requirement that a member submit 
a written letter to the Department in a ``manner prescribed by FINRA.''
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    \132\ FSI also wrote that additional procedures would be 
appropriate because the materiality consultations would be a rule-
based requirement, not voluntary.
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    In general, FINRA believes that additional rule-based procedures 
for the materiality consultation process would undermine its 
informality, flexibility and expedited nature. By analogy, FINRA's 
existing materiality consultation process has no written-decision 
requirement and no appeal process. Nevertheless, FINRA believes it 
would be helpful to provide guidance about the materiality consultation 
process that would be required by the proposed rule, to supplement the 
already published guidance about FINRA's existing materiality 
consultation process.\133\ For that reason, FINRA has explained in 
detail--both in Regulatory Notice 18-16 and above--the kinds of 
information that the firm should provide when seeking a materiality 
consultation required by proposed Rule 1017(a)(7) and what information 
would be relevant to the Department's materiality decision. FINRA also 
will provide more guidance as necessary as to what firms should provide 
when seeking the materiality consultation required by the proposed rule 
amendments.
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    \133\ See The Materiality Consultation Process for CMAs, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/materiality-consultation-process. FINRA's existing guidance provides that a materiality 
consultation submission should include, but is not limited to, the 
following: (i) A description of the proposed change in business 
sufficient for staff to understand the scope of the business and how 
it will be conducted; (ii) why the firm believes that the proposed 
new business or product is similar in scope or nature to their 
existing business; (iii) the anticipated impact the change will have 
to the firm's supervisory structure; (iv) any impact the proposed 
change will have to the firm's capital or liquidity; (v) the nature 
and scope of updates required to written supervisory procedures, 
systems and firm operations; (vi) any recent disciplinary matters 
that relate to the proposed activities as well as how the firm's 
overall regulatory history may impact the ability of the firm to 
effectively conduct the activity; and (vii) any relevant 
documentation to support the proposal.
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Miscellaneous Comments
    SIFMA requested that FINRA provide a notification to firms of 
registered persons who have ``specified risk events,'' similar to how 
FINRA provides information gathered in its public records searches for 
information relating to bankruptcies, judgments and liens, asserting 
that individuals may not identify and disclose ``specified risk 
events'' to firms in a timely manner. FINRA appreciates this 
suggestion, but notes that the events included in the definition are 
derived from the Uniform Registration Forms and, therefore, firms 
should generally be able to conduct appropriate due diligence to 
identify such individuals. Indeed, FINRA Rule 3110(e) already requires 
firms to establish and implement written procedures reasonably designed 
to verify the accuracy and completeness of the information contain in 
an applicant's initial or transfer Form U4, which would include 
verifying the accuracy and completeness of answers and disclosures 
concerning ``final criminal matters'' and the events covered by the 
definition of ``specified risk events.''
    Cambridge commented that persons should have the opportunity to 
confidentially submit an application seeking a materiality consultation 
to ``pre-qualify'' a transition from one firm

[[Page 20768]]

to another and gain confidence that they are free to make such a 
transfer. FINRA does not believe, however, that prequalification of a 
person with a significant history of misconduct would be appropriate, 
or even possible, in the absence of additional information about, among 
other things, the specific context in which the person would be 
associated with a new firm and the activities and history of such 
proposed new firm.
    Better Markets opined that the proposed rule change would reflect 
an improvement over the status quo but is still insufficient, and that 
FINRA should do more to reduce the number of brokers with a significant 
history of misconduct and the prevalence of recidivism. Specifically, 
Better Markets wrote that FINRA should ban brokers with two criminal 
convictions or three ``specified risk events'' at a $5,000 level 
(instead of the proposed $15,000 level) and immediately and permanently 
expel a firm where more than 20% of its brokers have three or more 
``specified risk events.'' Better Markets also suggested that FINRA 
engage in more investor education on the topic of recidivist brokers, 
design a user-friendly disclosure system that clearly identifies 
brokers with a demonstrable pattern of violations, and repeal the part 
of FINRA Rule 9311 that stays a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer 
decision pending an appeal to the NAC.
    FINRA's efforts to address the risks posed by brokers with a 
significant history of misconduct are ongoing, and FINRA appreciates 
comments on additional steps that FINRA might take. Some of Better 
Markets' suggestions, however, amount to a request that FINRA create 
new categories of ``statutory disqualification.'' Federal law defines 
the types of misconduct that presumptively disqualify a broker from 
associating with a firm, and amending what qualifies as a statutory 
disqualification is beyond FINRA's jurisdiction. In addition, FINRA 
does not agree that repealing the provision in Rule 9311(b) that stays 
the effect of a Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer decision would be 
appropriate at this time. FINRA's rule that stays the effect of a 
Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer decision is consistent with rules of 
other self-regulatory organizations and the SEC.\134\ Moreover, the 
proposed rule change would protect investors during a disciplinary 
appeal by empowering Hearing Officers to impose conditions and 
restrictions that they consider reasonably necessary for the purpose of 
preventing customer harm.
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    \134\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 201.360(d) (providing that an SEC ALJ's 
initial decision shall not become final as to a party or person who 
timely files a petition for review); CBOE Rule 13.11(b) (providing 
that sanctions shall not become effective until the Exchange review 
process is completed or the decision otherwise becomes final); 
NASDAQ PHLX Rule 9311(b) (providing that an appeal to the Exchange 
Review Council from a disciplinary decision shall operate as a stay 
until the Exchange Review Council issues a decision); NYSE CHX 
Article 12, Rule 6 (providing that the enforcement of any orders or 
penalties shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of appeal 
pending the outcome of final review by a Judiciary Committee or the 
Board of Directors).
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Miscellaneous Comments Outside the Scope of the Proposal
    Some comments raised concerns regarding broader issues, such as 
arbitration proceedings and public disclosure of arbitration 
settlements,\135\ the composition of Hearing Panels in FINRA's 
disciplinary proceedings,\136\ questions about whether firms are 
permitted to pay disqualified persons consistent with FINRA Rule 
8311,\137\ various Constitutional protections that FINRA should adopt 
in investigations and disciplinary proceedings,\138\ and how FINRA 
might improve the Taping Rule to prevent non-compliance with that 
rule.\139\ FINRA believes, however, that these comments are all outside 
the scope of the proposal.
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    \135\ IBN suggested that FINRA should have local arbitration 
hearings, with panels composed of local representatives and local 
firms, and that FINRA should eliminate mandatory arbitration or 
require arbitrators to be lawyers and follow the rule of law. 
Network 1 commented that FINRA should consider the ``prejudicial 
effect'' on brokers of the six-year limitations period for filing an 
arbitration claim and of nuisance-value arbitration actions brought 
by non-attorney representatives; that references to arbitration 
claims brought by a non-attorney representative that are settled or 
that result in an award in favor of the broker should be removed 
from the broker's public record; and that an arbitration claim 
brought by a non-attorney representative that results in a 
settlement should not be made available to the public at all.
    \136\ Network 1 commented that FINRA adjudicatory panels should 
include one attorney with a demonstrated history of representing 
brokers or member firms, securities industry experience, and 
knowledge of securities laws, regulations and rules and industry 
practices in the investment banking and securities businesses. It 
also commented that FINRA should establish a process for soliciting 
``bona fide neutrals'' to sit on adjudicatory panels.
    \137\ Network 1.
    \138\ Network 1.
    \139\ NASAA.
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III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-FINRA-2020-011 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-FINRA-2020-011. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 
p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and 
copying at the principal office of FINRA. All comments received will be 
posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that 
we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment 
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make 
available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-
FINRA-

[[Page 20769]]

2020-011 and should be submitted on or before May 5, 2020.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\140\
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    \140\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-07777 Filed 4-13-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P