[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 41 (Monday, March 2, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12398-12430]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-03398]



[[Page 12397]]

Vol. 85

Monday,

No. 41

March 2, 2020

Part II





Federal Reserve System





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12 CFR Parts 225 and 238





Control and Divestiture Proceedings; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 41 / Monday, March 2, 2020 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 12398]]


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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Parts 225 and 238

[Regulations Y and LL; Docket No. R-1662]
RIN 7100-AF 49


Control and Divestiture Proceedings

AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Board is adopting a final rule to revise the Board's 
regulations related to determinations of whether a company has the 
ability to exercise a controlling influence over another company for 
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act or the Home Owners' Loan Act. 
The final rule expands the number of presumptions for use in such 
determinations. By codifying the presumptions in the Board's Regulation 
Y and Regulation LL, the Board's rules will provide substantial 
additional transparency on the types of relationships that the Board 
generally views as supporting a determination that one company controls 
another company. The final rule is largely consistent with the proposal 
and includes certain targeted adjustments to the Board's historical 
practice, as described in detail in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

DATES: The final rule is effective on April 1, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Laurie Schaffer, Deputy General 
Counsel, (202) 452-2272, Alison Thro, Deputy Associate General Counsel, 
(202) 452-3236, Mark Buresh, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-5270, Greg 
Frischmann, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-2803, or Brian Phillips, Senior 
Attorney, (202) 452-3321, Legal Division; Melissa Clark, Lead Financial 
Institution Policy Analyst, (202) 452-2277, or Sheryl Hudson, Lead 
Financial Institution Policy Analyst, (202) 912-7839, Division of 
Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551. 
For users of Telecommunication Device for Deaf (TDD) only, call (202) 
263-4869.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Background and Summary of the Proposal
    A. Description of ``Control'' Under the Bank Holding Company Act
    B. Summary of the Board's Historical Interpretation of 
``Control'' Under the Bank Holding Company Act
    C. Summary of the Proposal
    D. Summary of Comments Received on the Proposal
II. Final Rule--Presumptions of Control and Noncontrol
    A. Control Hearings and the Role of Presumptions of Control and 
Noncontrol
    B. Description of the Tiered Presumptions
    C. Description of Additional Presumptions and Exclusions
III. Final Rule--Control-Related Definitions
    A. First Company and Second Company
    B. Voting Securities and Nonvoting Securities
    C. Control of Securities
    D. Calculation of Total Equity Percentage
    E. Limiting Contractual Rights
    F. Director Representatives
    G. Investment Advisers
IV. Application to Savings and Loan Holding Companies
    A. Control Under HOLA Compared to the BHC Act
    B. Revisions to Regulation LL
V. Additional Implementation Matters
VI. Administrative Law Matters
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Plain Language

I. Background and Summary of the Proposal

    In May 2019, the Board issued a proposal seeking comment on 
revisions to its rules regarding the definition of control in the Bank 
Holding Company Act (``BHC Act''),\1\ and the Home Owners' Loan Act 
(``HOLA'').\2\ The proposal was published in the Federal Register on 
May 14, 2019, and the period for public comment ended on July 15, 
2019.\3\ The proposal was intended to provide bank holding companies, 
savings and loan holding companies, depository institutions, investors, 
and the public with a better understanding of the facts and 
circumstances that the Board considers most relevant when assessing 
control and thereby increase transparency around the Board's views on 
control under the BHC Act and HOLA.
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    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.
    \2\ 12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.
    \3\ 84 FR 21634 (May 14, 2019).
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    Under the BHC Act, control is defined by a three-pronged test: A 
company has control over another company if the first company (i) 
directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons 
owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of the other company; (ii) controls in any manner the 
election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the other 
company; or (iii) directly or indirectly exercises a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of the other company.\4\ HOLA 
includes a substantially similar definition of control.\5\ While the 
first two prongs of the definition of control are easily understood 
bright-line standards, the third prong of the definition of control 
requires a facts and circumstances determination by the Board. As a 
result, it is often difficult for an investor that does not meet either 
of the first two prongs of the definition of control to determine 
whether it will be considered controlling or noncontrolling by the 
Board under the third prong.
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    \4\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2); 12 CFR 225.2(e).
    \5\ See 12 U.S.C. 1467a(a)(2); 12 CFR 238.2(e).
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    In practice, large minority investors often seek to protect or 
enhance their investments through multiple forms of engagement with the 
target company that provide the investor with an opportunity to monitor 
and influence the target company. This situation in particular 
frequently has raised questions regarding whether the investor will be 
able to exercise a controlling influence over the management or 
policies of the target company when the investment and all other 
aspects of the relationship are considered in the aggregate. These 
issues arise for both companies seeking to invest in banking 
organizations and banking organizations seeking to make investments in 
other companies.
    Under the statutory framework, the determination of whether a 
company has the ability to exercise a controlling influence over 
another company is a factual determination. The Board's experience has 
shown that the variety of equity investments, negotiated investment 
terms, and business and other arrangements between companies makes it 
difficult to prescribe a set of rigid rules that determine whether one 
company exercises a controlling influence over another company in all 
situations. As a result, Board determinations regarding the presence or 
absence of a controlling influence have taken into account the specific 
facts and circumstances of each case.\6\ Nonetheless, the Board has 
developed over time a number of factors and thresholds that the Board 
believes generally are indicative of the ability or inability of a 
company to exercise a controlling influence over another company.
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    \6\ See 12 CFR 225.143; Policy Statement on equity investments 
in banks and bank holding companies (September 22, 2008), 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080922c.htm.
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    The Board believes that the final rule, which is largely consistent 
with the proposal, will increase the transparency and consistency of 
the Board's control framework. As a result, the final rule should help 
to facilitate permissible investments in banking organizations and by 
banking organizations.

[[Page 12399]]

    The final rule includes certain targeted adjustments relative to 
historical practice that the Board believes are appropriate based on 
its experience over the past few decades. The specific provisions of 
the final rule, including the targeted adjustments, are described in 
detail in this preamble.

A. Description of ``Control'' Under the Bank Holding Company Act

    Control is a foundational concept under the BHC Act and related 
statutes.\7\ Most notably, control is used to determine the scope of 
application of the BHC Act because a company is defined to be a bank 
holding company if the company directly or indirectly controls a bank 
or bank holding company.\8\ Accordingly, a company that controls a bank 
or bank holding company is subject to the Board's regulations and 
supervisory oversight, which includes examinations,\9\ regular 
financial reporting,\10\ capital and liquidity requirements,\11\ source 
of strength obligations,\12\ activities restrictions,\13\ and 
restrictions on affiliate transactions.\14\
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    \7\ The following discussion is limited to the BHC Act because 
much of the Board's experience with control has arisen in the 
context of the BHC Act, rather than HOLA. The final rule generally 
applies the same standards in the context of the BHC Act and HOLA, 
though the final rule is different in each context where appropriate 
to recognize the limited differences between the BHC Act and HOLA 
with respect to the definition of control.
    \8\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(1).
    \9\ 12 U.S.C. 1844(c); 12 CFR 225.5(c).
    \10\ 12 U.S.C. 1844(c); 12 CFR 225.5(b).
    \11\ See, e.g., 12 CFR part 217; 12 CFR 225 app. C; 12 CFR part 
249.
    \12\ 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1.
    \13\ 12 U.S.C. 1843; 12 CFR 225 subpart C.
    \14\ 12 U.S.C. 371c and 371c-1; 12 CFR part 223.
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    In assessing control, the Board historically has focused on two key 
purposes of the BHC Act to guide its understanding of the meaning of 
control and controlling influence. First, the BHC Act was intended to 
ensure that companies that acquire control of banks have the financial 
strength and managerial ability to exercise control in a safe and sound 
manner. Second, the BHC Act was intended to separate banking from 
commerce by preventing companies with commercial interests from 
exercising control over banking organizations and by restricting the 
nonbanking activities of banking organizations.\15\
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    \15\ Bank Holding Company Act Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 6778 
Before H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong. 85 (1969).
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    Congress enacted the BHC Act in 1956. In the original BHC Act, 
Congress defined ``bank holding company'' to mean any company that (1) 
``directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 
25 per centum or more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks 
or of a company which is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of 
this Act, or (2) which controls in any manner the election of a 
majority of the directors of each of two or more banks.'' \16\
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    \16\ Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Public law 84-511, 70 
Stat. 133 (May 9, 1956). The original BHC Act also defined ``bank 
holding company'' to include a company that holds 25 percent or more 
of the voting securities of two or more banks or bank holding 
companies, if such securities are held by trustees for the benefit 
of the shareholders or members of the company. This prong of control 
was repealed in 1966. See An Act to Amend the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956, Public Law 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (July 1, 1966).
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    In 1970, Congress made significant amendments to the BHC Act, 
including revisions to the definition of control. Specifically, 
Congress added to the existing two prongs of the definition of control 
a new third prong. This third prong provided that a company has control 
over a bank or other company if the ``Board determines after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly 
exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of 
the bank or company.'' \17\ Congress added the controlling influence 
prong to address concerns that a company could structure an investment 
in a bank below the two bright-line thresholds of control while still 
having the ``power directly or indirectly to direct or cause the 
direction of the management or policies of any bank.'' \18\
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    \17\ An Act to Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
Public Law 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760, 1761 (December 31, 1970). HOLA, 
originally enacted in 1933, contains substantially similar language 
for its definition of control. As a corollary to the third prong in 
the BHC Act, HOLA's definition of control of a savings association 
or other company includes ``if the Board determines after reasonable 
notice and opportunity for hearing, that such person directly or 
indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or 
policies of such association or other company.'' 12 U.S.C. 
1467a(a)(2)(D).
    \18\ Bank Holding Company Act Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 6778 
Before H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong. 87 (1969).
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B. Summary of the Board's Historical Interpretation of ``Control'' 
Under the Bank Holding Company Act

    Since the 1970 amendments to the BHC Act, the Board has had 
numerous occasions to interpret and apply the controlling influence 
prong of the BHC Act. The Board historically has interpreted 
controlling influence not to require that an investor is able to 
exercise complete domination or absolute control over all aspects of 
the management and policies of a company. Instead, the Board has found 
that a controlling influence is possible at lower levels of influence, 
including where a company is not able to determine the outcome of a 
significant matter under consideration.\19\ In other words, control 
requires only ``the mere potential for manipulation of a bank.'' \20\
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    \19\ Patagonia Corp., 63 Federal Reserve Bulletin 288 (1977) 
(citing Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 738, 739 (6th Cir. 1941) 
(interpreting ``controlling influence'' in the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act, which has a nearly identical definition of 
control as in the BHC Act, to not ``necessarily [require] those 
exercising a controlling influence [to] be able to carry their 
point.'' Rather a controlling influence can be effective ``without 
accomplishing the purpose fully'')).
    \20\ Interamericas Investments, Ltd. v. Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 111 F.3d 376, 383 (5th Cir. 1997).
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    In assessing the controlling influence prong, the Board has 
considered a number of factors, including the size of a company's 
voting and total equity investment in the other company; the presence 
of countervailing shareholders of the other company; a company's 
representation on the board of directors or board committees of the 
other company; covenants or other agreements that allow a company to 
influence or restrict the management decisions of the other company; 
and the nature and scope of the business relationships between the 
companies.\21\ The Board's regulations include procedures for 
determining controlling influence, as well as certain standards for 
identifying controlling influence. The Board also has issued guidance 
documents related to control on several occasions. For example, the 
Board issued a limited set of regulatory presumptions of control for 
use in control proceedings in 1971 and updated these presumptions in 
1984.\22\ In addition, the Board issued policy statements regarding the 
controlling influence prong of the BHC Act in 1982 and 2008.\23\
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    \21\ A relationship between two companies may raise supervisory 
or other concerns whether or not the relationship raises controlling 
influence concerns.
    \22\ 36 FR 18945 (Sept. 24, 1971); 49 FR 794, 817, 828-29 (Jan. 
5, 1984).
    \23\ See 68 Federal Reserve Bulletin 413 (July 1982) (codified 
at 12 CFR 225.143); Policy Statement on equity investments in banks 
and bank holding companies (September 22, 2008). The Board has 
issued two additional policy statements that are also relevant to 
the meaning of control and controlling influence: ``Statement of 
policy concerning divestitures by bank holding companies'' (12 CFR 
225.138) and ``Presumption of continued control under section 
2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act'' (12 CFR 225.139). These 
policy statements remain in effect to the extent not superseded by 
the final rule.
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C. Summary of the Proposal

    The proposal established tiered presumptions of control in the 
Board's regulations. The proposal also provided several additional 
presumptions of control and noncontrol, along with

[[Page 12400]]

various ancillary provisions such as definitions of terms used in the 
proposed presumptions.
    As noted, the BHC Act and HOLA provide that control due to 
controlling influence arises once the Board determines, based on the 
facts presented and after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that a 
company controls another company. The proposal established presumptions 
intended to assist the Board in conducting such a hearing or other 
proceeding and to provide additional information to the public 
regarding the circumstances in which the Board believes that 
controlling influence is likely to exist.\24\
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    \24\ Under the final rule, the Board retains the ability to find 
a controlling influence based on the facts and circumstances 
presented by a particular case. However, the Board generally does 
not expect to find that a company controls another company unless 
the first company triggers a regulatory presumption of control with 
respect to the second company.
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    The proposal--like this final rule--related solely to the issue of 
whether an investment, alone or in combination with other 
relationships, raises control concerns. The Board may have safety and 
soundness or other concerns arising out of either controlling or 
noncontrolling relationships of a banking organization. Thus, that an 
investment is not presumed to be controlling does not mean that the 
investment and all other aspects of a relationship are necessarily 
consistent with safe and sound banking practices or other expectations 
or requirements of the Board.\25\ The Board retains the right to review 
investments involving banking organizations under its jurisdiction for 
potential safety and soundness or other concerns.
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    \25\ For example, contractual covenants and business 
relationships between a banking organization and a company may raise 
safety and soundness or other concerns whether or not the 
relationship raises control concerns. In particular, a contractual 
provision may not allow a company to restrict substantially the 
discretion of a banking organization, but may impose financial 
obligations on the banking organization that are inconsistent with 
safe and sound operation of the banking organization.
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D. Summary of Comments Received on the Proposal

General Comments
    Many commenters were supportive of the Board's overall efforts to 
bring increased transparency, clarity, and consistency to the Board's 
views regarding controlling influence. Some commenters noted that the 
additional clarity provided by the proposal would improve the speed 
with which banking institutions can raise capital.
    Certain commenters argued that the Board's presumptions of control 
presumed control at levels too low to be supported by the underlying 
statutes.\26\ Several of these commenters contended that Congress 
intended the controlling influence prong of the BHC Act to cover only 
situations with higher levels of influence than the Board has 
traditionally considered controlling, which some commenters referred to 
as situations of ``actual control.'' Many commenters who supported 
higher thresholds for the presumptions of control argued that unduly 
low thresholds would inhibit investments into and by banking 
organizations and, in particular, would inhibit investments by banking 
organizations into start-up technology companies. These commenters 
generally argued that there was no public benefit to limiting such 
investments and that there could be a negative impact on the economy. 
At least one commenter also suggested that a higher threshold for 
control would be appropriate in order to mitigate the extraterritorial 
application of the BHC Act on the foreign operations of foreign firms.
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    \26\ Specific suggestions from commenters are described in the 
appropriate sections of this preamble on specific presumptions.
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    In support of a higher threshold for control, several commenters 
suggested that the Board look to its treatment of merchant banking 
investments, as well as the definition of banking entity under the 
Volcker Rule. These commenters argued that the Board had established 
looser definitions of control in these areas that should be applied to 
control more generally. Other commenters argued that the Board should 
separate control in general under the BHC Act from the definition of 
banking entity under the Volcker Rule. In addition, certain commenters 
provided suggestions for revising the Board's rules related to merchant 
banking to separate merchant banking from questions of control.
    A few commenters objected to the proposal on the basis that the 
Board's current standards and processes around controlling influence 
have functioned well. Such commenters asserted that the proposal may 
have various negative effects by weakening the existing framework. 
Several commenters objected to the elements of the proposal that they 
viewed as raising the threshold for control for several reasons, 
including concern that the proposal could lead to greater concentration 
in the banking industry or to greater concentration in the shareholder 
base of the banking industry. At least one commenter expressed concern 
that the proposal might allow companies to have greater influence over 
banking organizations without being subject to the bank regulatory 
framework and noted that retaining discretion to review each case on 
the facts and circumstances presented was necessary to address the wide 
variety of potential relationships among companies. At least one 
commenter stated that the Board should consider the economic and 
competitive impact of these types of increased consolidation and should 
update its analysis of competitive issues more generally. At least one 
commenter also stated that the Board should carefully consider the 
impact of the control proposal on smaller banking organizations and the 
ability of banking organizations to sponsor and advise investment 
funds.
    The Board believes that the proposal reflected an appropriate 
interpretation of the controlling influence prong of the BHC Act and 
generally conformed to historical Board practice implementing and 
interpreting the statute. The Board's historical practice is consistent 
with the underlying statutes, the legislative history, and relevant 
case law. The Board has made several changes in the final rule compared 
to the proposal, as described in more detail in the applicable sections 
of this preamble, but the Board is issuing the final rule in a form 
substantially consistent with the proposal. As indicated in the 
proposal, the final rule contains certain targeted adjustments from 
current practice in light of the Board's experience administering the 
statute. These changes are generally technical in nature rather than 
fundamental changes to the Board's substantive standards for 
controlling influence. As the final rule is generally consistent with 
current practice, significant changes in outcomes are not anticipated 
and, therefore, no major impact on the banking industry is expected. 
Importantly, the final rule significantly improves the transparency and 
predictability around questions of controlling influence.
    Some commenters expressed concern that certain of the presumptions 
could have extraterritorial reach by attributing control over companies 
outside the United States, especially by foreign banking organization. 
Commenters recommended that the Board clarify that lawful home country 
activities and relationships currently in existence should not be upset 
by the proposal. A few commenters argued for different control 
standards for qualifying foreign banking organizations, or for foreign 
companies more generally. At least one commenter argued that the 
Board's rules should take foreign control standards

[[Page 12401]]

into account when considering relationships involving foreign entities 
or that the Board should revise its control standards to not apply to 
relationships that are wholly outside the United States.
    The statutory framework for control does not contemplate different 
definitions of control for companies in different jurisdictions. For 
this reason, neither the proposal nor the Board's historical practice 
contains such distinctions. The final rule is consistent with the 
proposal in this regard. As noted, the final rule is generally 
consistent with the Board's current practice and, as a result, the 
final rule is not expected to result in substantially different 
outcomes for questions of controlling influence involving foreign 
companies.
Comments on Scope of Application
    Some commenters suggested that the final rule should make it clear 
that an investment that does not trigger a presumption of control and 
is less than 5 percent of any class of voting securities should be 
considered passive for purposes of section 4(c)(6) of the BHC Act. The 
final rule is intended to apply to questions of control under the BHC 
Act and HOLA. As a result, the control framework in the final rule 
applies for purposes of section 4(c)(6) and, in particular, the Board's 
interpretation of section 4(c)(6) located in section 225.137 of the 
Board's Regulation Y.\27\
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    \27\ 12 CFR 225.137.
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Comments on Interaction With Other Regulations
    Several commenters suggested that the Board apply the proposed 
control standards to control under the Change in Bank Control Act 
(``CIBCA'').\28\ Several commenters also recommended that the Board 
apply the proposed control standards to the Board's Regulation O and 
Regulation W.\29\ Commenters suggested that applying the control 
standards in the proposal to these other contexts would improve the 
simplicity and efficiency of the Board's regulations by establishing a 
uniform, trans-regulatory concept of control. Some commenters noted 
that, in certain cases, this could result in a more permissive control 
standard than currently applies under CIBCA, Regulation O, and 
Regulation W.
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    \28\ 12 U.S.C. 1817(j).
    \29\ 12 CFR part 215; 12 CFR part 223.
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    A few commenters also argued that the threshold for filing a notice 
under CIBCA was too low and that the Board should streamline the CIBCA 
notice process--in coordination with the FDIC and OCC--to reduce the 
burden of CIBCA filings. These commenters asserted that the existing 
CIBCA regulations restricted investment into banking organizations and 
therefore recommended that the Board revise its regulations to reduce 
the number of filings and the information required in a filing. 
Specific recommendations for reduced burden included creating a process 
for investors to rebut the 10 percent presumption of control under the 
CIBCA regulations, reducing the required content of a CIBCA notice, and 
increasing reliance on public information such as public filings with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''). At least one 
commenter stated that the Board should reduce the scope of CIBCA filing 
requirements to remove or limit, for example, CIBCA filing requirements 
for investments in predominantly non-financial grandfathered savings 
and loan holding companies.
    Other commenters argued against applying the proposed control 
framework to contexts other than control under the BHC Act and HOLA. 
These commenters noted that the control concept under the BHC Act and 
HOLA serves a different purpose than under CIBCA, Regulation O, and 
Regulation W. For example, control under CIBCA requires filing a one-
time notice, while control under the BHC Act results in a permanent 
regulatory status that comes with activity restrictions, prudential 
regulation, approval requirements for major transactions, periodic 
examinations, and reporting requirements. Some commenters also 
encouraged the Board to provide additional clarity about the operation 
of the presumptions of control under the regulations implementing 
CIBCA.
    The final rule applies to questions of control under the BHC Act 
and HOLA; it does not extend to CIBCA, Regulation O, and Regulation W. 
The Board may in the future consider conforming revisions to other 
elements of its regulatory framework, including CIBCA, Regulation O, 
and Regulation W. While common control standards across the Board's 
regulatory framework may provide efficiency benefits, each of the 
regulations identified by commenters arises out of different provisions 
of law and is intended to address different concerns in specific 
contexts.
    Some commenters suggested that the Board provide additional 
guidance for investments in non-corporate entities, such as 
partnerships and limited liability companies. In certain sections, the 
proposal provided for the special characteristics of non-corporate 
entities. The final rule retains these provisions but does not contain 
further information regarding the treatment of non-corporate entities 
because of the wide variety of forms such entities can take. The Board 
generally expects to apply equivalent control standards to all types of 
legal entities while taking into account the unique features of 
different entity types.

II. Final Rule--Presumptions of Control and Noncontrol

A. Control Hearings and the Role of Presumptions of Control and 
Noncontrol

    The BHC Act provides that control due to controlling influence 
arises following a Board determination that a company controls another 
company. The presumptions of control in the final rule are intended to 
assist the Board in the context of such a determination and to provide 
additional public information regarding the Board's views on 
controlling influence.
    Under the final rule, the Board, in its discretion, may issue a 
preliminary determination of control if it appears that a company has 
the power to exercise a controlling influence over a bank or other 
company. A company that receives a preliminary determination of control 
must respond within 30 days with (i) a plan to terminate the control 
relationship; (ii) an application for the Board's approval of the 
control relationship; or (iii) a response contesting the preliminary 
determination, setting forth supporting facts and circumstances, and, 
if desired, requesting a hearing or other proceeding. If a company 
contests a preliminary determination of control and requests a hearing 
or other proceeding, then the Board shall order a hearing or other 
appropriate proceeding if material facts are in dispute. The 
presumptions in the final rule would apply at such a hearing or other 
proceeding in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 
Board's Rules of Practice for Formal Hearings. After considering all 
relevant facts and circumstances, including information gathered during 
any hearing or other proceeding, the Board would issue a final order 
stating its determination on controlling influence. Under the final 
rule, as under the proposal, the procedures differ from the existing 
procedures in the Board's regulations in only two modest ways. First, 
the final rule clarifies that failure to respond to a preliminary 
determination of control from the Board would constitute waiver of the 
right to present additional information to the Board and waiver of the 
opportunity to

[[Page 12402]]

request a hearing or other proceeding. Second, the final rule contains 
an express requirement to submit additional information in writing in 
response to a preliminary determination of control.
    Some commenters recommended that the Board grant additional time to 
respond to preliminary determinations of control. The final rule 
maintains the existing 30-day timeframe because 30 days should 
generally be sufficient time to respond to a preliminary determination 
of control. Thirty days is consistent with, or, in some cases, longer 
than, the procedural timeframes provided by the Board for similar 
administrative processes.\30\ In addition, the final rule provides that 
the Board may allow for additional time in its discretion, so firms 
that need additional time may request additional time. The procedures 
for control proceedings in the final rule are consistent with the 
proposal.
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    \30\ See, e.g., 12 CFR part 263.
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B. Description of the Tiered Presumptions

    As discussed, a core consideration for control established by 
Congress in the BHC Act is the percentage of voting securities that one 
company controls of a second company. Under the statute, a company that 
controls 25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of a 
second company controls the second company.\31\ Similarly, under the 
statute, a company that controls less than 5 percent of any class of 
voting securities of a company is presumed not to control the second 
company.\32\ This statutory framework leaves a space between 5 percent 
and 25 percent of a class of voting securities where a company does not 
have clear statutory control and is not presumed not to control. For 
companies within this range of voting securities of 5 percent to less 
than 25 percent voting, the Board considers the full facts and 
circumstances of the relationship between the two companies when 
determining whether the first company controls the second company, 
consistent with the controlling influence prong of the BHC Act.\33\
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    \31\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2)(A).
    \32\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(3).
    \33\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2)(C).
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    The framework established by Congress implies that a company with a 
level of voting securities at the higher end of the range--closer to 25 
percent--is more likely to control the second company, while a company 
at the lower end of the range--closer to 5 percent--is less likely to 
control the second company. The Board's experience supports these 
implications. As a result, where a company's voting securities 
percentage falls within this range is one of the most salient 
considerations for determining whether the first company controls the 
second company.
    The final rule, like the proposed rule, establishes a series of 
tiered presumptions of control. These presumptions are arranged in 
tiers based on the level of voting securities of the first company in 
the second company. Each of these presumptions applies where the first 
company has at least a specified level of voting securities in a second 
company, and another specified relationship with the second company. 
The presumptions use three thresholds for voting securities: 5 percent, 
10 percent, and 15 percent.
    Consistent with the proposal, many of the other control factors 
referenced in the final rule also vary in magnitude. For instance, 
business relationships between two companies can range from minimal to 
very significant, and more significant business relationships provide a 
greater means of exercising (and a greater incentive to exercise) a 
controlling influence than less significant business relationships. In 
recognition of this, the presumptions in the final rule effectively 
assume that higher levels of business relationships, combined with 
higher levels of voting securities, increase the likelihood of the 
ability to exercise a controlling influence.
Director Representation
    The Board has long considered a company's level of representation 
on the board of directors of a second company as an important factor 
for controlling influence. The importance of director representation to 
controlling influence is supported by the second prong of the 
definition of control in the BHC Act, which provides that control over 
the election of a majority of the board of directors of a company 
constitutes control of the company. Traditionally, the board of 
directors of a company is the body that makes strategic decisions and 
establishes major policies for the company. One of the most important 
issues that holders of voting securities can vote on is the selection 
of the members of the board of directors of a company.
    For a company that controls 5 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of a second company, the proposal presumed control if 
the first company controlled a quarter or more of the board of 
directors of the second company. This presumption reflected the view 
that the combination of a material level of voting power combined with 
control over a quarter or more of the board of directors is generally 
enough to constitute a controlling influence. This element of the 
proposal reflected a modest liberalization of practice. Under the 
Board's precedents, a noncontrolling company that controlled more than 
10 percent of a class of voting securities of another company often was 
limited to one or two director representatives at the second company 
(regardless of the size of the board of directors at the second 
company).\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Policy Statement on equity investments in banks and bank 
holding companies (September 22, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposal presumed that a company that controls 5 
percent or more of any class of voting securities of a second company 
controls the second company if the first company has director 
representatives that are able to make or block the making of major 
operational or policy decisions of the second company. This presumption 
was intended to address supermajority voting requirements, individual 
veto rights, or any similar unusual provision that would allow a 
minority of the board of directors of the second company to control 
effectively major operational or policy decisions of the second 
company.
    Commenters generally supported the proposal to allow a company to 
have up to a quarter of the representatives on the board of directors 
of another company without triggering a presumption of control. 
Commenters generally also confirmed that they preferred the proposal to 
a standard where companies with higher levels of voting securities must 
have reduced levels of director representation to avoid triggering a 
presumption of control. The final rule is consistent with the proposal 
with respect to the total share of director representatives that a 
company may have on the board of directors of another company before 
triggering a presumption of control.
    In addition to the share of director representatives that one 
company has on the board of directors of a second company, the proposed 
presumptions considered particular director representatives to have 
outsized ability to affect the decisions of the second company. For 
instance, the chair of the board of directors of a company is generally 
recognized as a leader of the company and its board of directors, and 
the chair may have additional powers, such as the ability to set the 
agenda for meetings of the board of directors. Similarly, certain 
committees of the board of directors may have the power to take actions 
that bind the company without the need for approval by the

[[Page 12403]]

full board of directors. In these circumstances, such a committee is 
nearly equivalent to the full board of directors with respect to those 
decisions that it is empowered to make unilaterally.
    To recognize the enhanced power wielded by directors in the 
positions described in the paragraph above, the proposal included a 
presumption of control if a company controls 15 percent or more of any 
class of voting securities of a second company and if any director 
representative of the first company also serves as the chair of the 
board of directors of the second company. In addition, the proposal 
included a presumption of control if a company controls 10 percent or 
more of any class of voting securities of a second company and the 
director representatives of the first company occupy more than a 
quarter of the positions on any board committee of the second company 
that has the power to bind the company without the need for additional 
action by the full board of directors.
    With respect to the presumption of control for a director 
representative serving as chair of the board, commenters suggested that 
different standards should apply depending on whether the company was 
publically traded, on the basis that public companies are subject to 
heightened governance standards compared to private companies. 
Commenters also suggested that the Board take the presence of 
independent directors into account because independent directors could 
limit the influence of the chair of the board.
    With respect to the presumption of control for director 
representatives serving on certain committees, commenters generally 
supported the distinction drawn in the proposal between committees with 
power to act independently and committees with only advisory powers. 
Some commenters suggested that the presumption of control should apply 
only if the director representatives occupied 50 percent or more of an 
independent committee. At least one commenter suggested clearly 
excluding advisory committees from the committee presumption.
    The final rule is consistent with the proposal with respect to the 
presumptions of control for director representatives serving as chair 
of the board or serving on certain committees. Distinguishing between 
public and private companies, or between companies that have a high 
versus low proportion of independent directors, would add substantial 
complexity to the framework. In addition, incorporating such 
distinctions may increase uncertainty with respect to control because 
the proportion of independent directors or the public status of a 
company may change without action by an investor. Moreover, as noted 
above, the presumption of control related to director representatives 
occupying more than 25 percent of a committee that has the power to 
take action to bind the company is premised on the concern that such a 
committee is nearly equivalent to the full board of directors with 
respect to those items that the committee can act on unilaterally. As a 
result, the final rule retains the 25 percent committee standard 
contained in the proposal to correspond to the 25 percent entire-board 
standard for director representatives. With respect to the questions on 
advisory committees, the standard under the final rule is whether a 
committee has the ability to take action that binds the company or its 
subsidiaries. If an advisory committee does not have that ability, it 
is not a committee covered by the presumption.
    The proposal also included a presumption regarding the solicitation 
of proxies for the election of directors, consistent with Board 
precedent. Under the proposal, the Board would have presumed control if 
a company that controls 10 percent or more of any class of voting 
securities of a second company solicits proxies to appoint a number of 
directors that equals or exceeds a quarter of the total directors on 
the board of directors of the second company. This 25 percent standard 
aligned the presumption for proxy solicitations to elect directors with 
the proposed presumption for having director representatives.
    The Board did not receive comments specifically on the presumption 
of control related to the solicitation of proxies to elect directors. 
The final rule is consistent with the proposal with respect to this 
presumption of control, though the final rule has been revised slightly 
to describe the standard more clearly.
Business Relationships
    The Board has long believed that a company's business relationships 
with another company provide a mechanism through which the first 
company could exercise a controlling influence over the second company. 
For example, a business relationship between an investor and another 
company that accounts for a substantial portion of the revenues or 
expenses of the investor may create a financial incentive for the 
investor to attempt to influence the second company. Similarly, a 
business relationship between an investor and another company that 
accounts for a substantial portion of the revenues or expenses of the 
second company may create a powerful lever of influence for the 
investor over the second company.
    Under the proposal, the Board presumed control in the following 
circumstances:
    i. If a company controls 5 percent or more of any class of voting 
securities of a second company and has business relationships with the 
second company that generate in the aggregate 10 percent or more of the 
total annual revenues or expenses of the first company or the second 
company;
    ii. If a company controls 10 percent or more of any class of voting 
securities of a second company and has business relationships with the 
second company that generate in the aggregate 5 percent or more of the 
total annual revenues or expenses of the first company or the second 
company; or
    iii. If a company controls 15 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of a second company and has business relationships 
with the second company that generate in the aggregate 2 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the first company or 
the second company.
    In addition, the Board has long believed that if a company is able 
to enter into a business relationship with a second company on terms 
that are not market terms, it is likely that the first company has a 
significant level of influence over the second company. Thus, under the 
proposal, the Board presumed control if a company controls 10 percent 
or more of any class of voting securities of a second company and has 
business relationships with the second company that are not on market 
terms.
    Many commenters suggested that the Board's proposed presumptions 
related to business relationships used revenue and expense thresholds 
that were too low. These commenters suggested that, as a consequence, 
the presumptions would capture business relationships that generally 
would be too small to provide a controlling influence and that the rule 
could therefore unnecessarily inhibit beneficial business 
relationships. Similarly, some commenters argued that the business 
relationship presumptions had the effect of conflating influence over a 
business relationship with influence over the management and policies 
of a company. A few commenters suggested that the thresholds 
established in the proposal for business relationships would create 
particular issues for banking organizations seeking to make minority 
investments in smaller companies, such

[[Page 12404]]

as recently formed financial technology firms.
    Various commenters recommended different thresholds for the control 
presumptions based on business relationships. For example, some 
commenters recommended that the Board revise the business relationship 
presumptions such that an investor with less than 15 percent of any 
class of voting securities in a second company would not be presumed to 
have control regardless of the size of business relationships between 
the companies. Similarly, a few commenters recommended that the 
business relationship thresholds for a presumption of control be raised 
substantially at different levels of voting securities. For example, at 
least one commenter stated that the presumptions of control should be 
set at 50 percent of revenues and expenses for an investor with between 
5 and 10 percent of voting securities, at 33 percent of revenues and 
expenses for an investor between 10 and 15 percent of voting 
securities, and at 25 percent of revenues and expenses for an investor 
between 15 and 25 percent of voting securities. Some commenters also 
suggested applying higher thresholds in certain circumstances, such as 
if there were a larger shareholder or a party with a larger business 
relationship.
    A few commenters suggested that the Board abandon quantitative 
metrics for business relationships and instead presume control only if 
a company threatens to terminate or alter business relationships with 
another company for the purpose of exercising a controlling influence 
over the second company's management or policies.
    As noted, the Board historically has viewed business relationships 
as an important mechanism through which one company can exercise 
control over the management or policies of another company. The Board's 
longstanding view has required business relationships to be 
quantitatively limited and qualitatively immaterial to avoid raising 
control concerns. Consistent with this principle, the proposal provided 
several presumptions based on voting securities and business 
relationships. The Board views the thresholds at which the proposed 
business relationship presumptions of control were set to be reasonable 
and generally consistent with its past practice. The final rule, 
therefore, retains the threshold levels that were included in the 
proposal. Further, the final rule includes the presumption related to 
business relationships that are not on market terms without change from 
the proposal, for the reasons described above.
    Some commenters argued that the Board should modify the business 
relationships thresholds to focus only on the revenues (not expenses) 
of the two companies. These commenters contended that a business 
relationship that is a substantial expense to one party generally does 
not provide that party with any additional ability to exercise control 
over the counterparty. While commenters acknowledged uncommon 
exceptions to this general standard--such as a relationship that cannot 
be easily replaced--commenters asked that the rule not consider 
expenses or only consider expenses under circumstances likely to be 
relevant to control. A number of commenters further argued that the 
presumptions should only take into account the scale of business 
relationships from the perspective of the second company and not the 
first company. Specifically, these commenters contended that the fact 
that a relationship was significant to a first company did not mean 
that it was significant to a second company and only relationships that 
were significant from the perspective of the second company would 
provide the first company with an ability to exert influence over the 
second company.
    In response to these comments, the final rule differs from the 
proposal in that the final presumptions of control related to business 
relationships only include thresholds based on the revenues and 
expenses of the second company. As commenters noted, the significance 
of business relationships from the perspective of a first company is 
not necessarily indicative of the first company's ability to control a 
second company, even though it may provide an incentive for the first 
company to attempt to exercise control over the second company. A 
business relationship that is significant to a second company as a 
source of revenue or expense, however, may be leveraged by the first 
company to exercise influence over the second company.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Though the final rule is expected to cover most controlling 
influence concerns arising out of business relationships, the Board 
may raise controlling influence concerns under specific facts and 
circumstances consistent with historical precedent, such as 
relationships with special qualitative significance (for example, 
relationships that are difficult to replace and are necessary for 
core functions). In addition, the revised business relationship 
presumptions of control do not in any way limit the ability of the 
Board to take action to address business relationships that raise 
safety and soundness or other concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result, under the final rule, a company would be presumed to 
control another company when:
    i. The first company controls 5 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of the second company and has business relationships 
with the second company that generate in the aggregate 10 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company;
    ii. The first company controls 10 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of the second company and has business relationships 
with the second company that generate in the aggregate 5 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company; or
    iii. The first company controls 15 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of the second company and has business relationships 
with the second company that generate in the aggregate 2 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company.
    Some commenters sought clarification of concepts used in the 
business relationship presumptions, such as total annual revenues and 
total annual expenses, and encouraged the Board to rely on well-
understood and widely available definitions of these concepts. 
Commenters suggested that the Board provide clear standards for 
measurement and attribution of revenues and expenses, and that the 
Board clarify what accounting standards could be relied upon for such 
measurements. Some commenters argued for a longer period of time over 
which to measure the companies' business relationships, such as two 
years or three years. A number of commenters argued that the thresholds 
for business relationships should only apply with respect to a company 
and its consolidated subsidiaries and should not include business 
relationships from unconsolidated subsidiaries.
    A few commenters argued for an exception to the business 
relationship presumptions for a company that could not calculate both 
sides of the business relationship but had a good faith basis for 
believing that the relationships were within the limits of the 
presumptions. At least one commenter recommended that business 
relationships be measured based only on the financial statements of a 
company at the time of an investment in order to make it easier to 
comply with the business relationship thresholds.
    Consistent with the proposal, the business relationship 
presumptions in the final rule include thresholds based on total 
consolidated annual revenues and expenses. Revenues and expenses are 
meant to be understood as these terms are commonly understood in the 
context of U.S. generally accepted

[[Page 12405]]

accounting principles (``GAAP'').\36\ Principles of consolidation are 
also meant to be applied as generally implemented in the context of 
GAAP. Thus, the general expectation is that a company's consolidated 
income statement for the preceding fiscal year should contain the 
necessary information to determine revenues and expenses for purposes 
of the presumptions. Further, the final rule maintains annual 
measurement of revenues and expenses for purposes of the presumptions 
as annual financials provide an existing and widely relied upon means 
to understand the significance of business relationships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ For purposes of the final rule, revenue is understood to 
mean gross income, not income net of expenses. If a company does not 
prepare financial statements according to GAAP, the Board expects to 
rely on the non-GAAP financial statements of the company, while 
taking differences in accounting standards into account as 
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters sought specific exclusions from the business 
relationship presumptions. At least one commenter recommended that the 
final rule exclude certain types of business relationships, such as 
arm's-length lending and deposit relationships, or non-exclusive 
business relationships where alternative service providers are 
available. Some commenters sought clarification regarding specific 
contexts, such as whether management fees paid by limited partners to 
general partners should be included as business relationships. 
Similarly, commenters argued that readily marketable debt securities of 
a company owned by another company should not be included in business 
relationships if the terms were not negotiated by the two companies.
    At least one commenter argued that the presumptions should not take 
into account business relationships between an investment fund and any 
company in which the fund makes an investment, to the extent such 
relationships are at arm's length and non-exclusive. Some commenters 
suggested that the business relationship presumption should take 
account of the special circumstances of start-up companies by measuring 
revenues over a longer period or not considering business relationships 
during the first several years of a company's existence. Several 
commenters argued that business relationships involving referrals 
should not be included for revenue purposes because the amount of 
referral fees can be volatile.
    The final rule contains no specific exclusions from the 
presumptions for particular types of business relationships. The final 
rule establishes clear and generally applicable standards that rely on 
well-understood accounting principles that aim to capture the economic 
significance of business relationships between two companies. The 
introduction of exclusions for particular types of relationships or 
counterparties would add substantial complexity to the rule.
    Some commenters argued that there should be a temporary transition 
or grace period, during which business relationships could exceed 
applicable thresholds without triggering a presumption of control. As 
discussed, the business relationship presumptions in the final rule are 
based on annual consolidated revenues and expenses. The use of annual 
measurement allows for some, but not excessive, day-to-day volatility 
in business relationships that should be sufficient for companies to 
manage. As a result, the final rule includes no additional transition 
or grace period.
    In addition, consistent with the proposal, the final rule does not 
include a presumption of control based on threats to alter or terminate 
business relationships. Although such actions may be relevant to 
determinations of control, adding such a presumption would increase the 
complexity of the final rule.
Senior Management Interlocks
    The officers of a company wield significant power over the company 
because they implement the major policies set by the board of 
directors, make all the ancillary policy decisions necessary for 
implementation, and operate the company on a day-to-day basis. In 
addition, officers often make influential recommendations to the board 
of directors regarding major policy decisions. As a result of this 
substantial degree of influence, the Board historically has viewed 
situations where an agent of a significant investor company serves as a 
management official of another company as providing a significant 
avenue for the first company to exercise a controlling influence over 
the second company.
    The proposal included a presumption of control where a company that 
controls 5 percent or more of any class of voting securities of a 
second company has more than one senior management interlock with the 
second company. In addition, the proposal included a presumption of 
control where a company that controls 15 percent or more of any class 
of voting securities of a second company has any senior management 
interlock with the second company. In order to trigger either of these 
presumptions, the individual must serve as an employee or director at 
the first company and as a senior management official at the second 
company. The proposal defined a senior management official of a company 
as any person who participates or has the authority to participate 
(other than in the capacity as a director) in major policymaking 
functions of the company.
    In addition, the proposal included a presumption of control where a 
company that controls 5 percent or more of any class of voting 
securities of a second company has an employee or director who serves 
as the chief executive officer (or an equivalent role) of the second 
company. The chief executive officer of a company is generally the most 
powerful senior management official of the company.
    Some commenters criticized the proposed presumption based on senior 
management interlocks on the basis that the scope of individuals 
treated as senior management officials was unclear. These commenters 
generally encouraged the Board to limit the scope of covered senior 
management officials to a clearly identifiable group, rather than using 
the qualitative standard included in the proposal. A few commenters 
also argued that larger companies should be permitted to have more 
senior management interlocks.
    The final rule includes the proposed presumptions of control for 
senior management interlocks without revision. The Board has long 
recognized the potential for senior management interlocks to be a 
conduit by which one company can influence another company, and the 
final rule is consistent with this understanding. Consistent with the 
proposal, the presumptions related to senior management interlocks in 
the final rule include targeted adjustments to historical practice to 
refine the scope of relevant interlocks to focus on senior officers 
and, in particular, the chief executive officer. The focus on senior 
management officials leans against the types of interlocks most likely 
to raise controlling influence concerns, but also permits an investor 
to have multiple junior employee interlocks that would not increase the 
investor's ability to influence operations and policies at the investee 
company.
    Also consistent with the proposal, the final rule defines ``senior 
management official'' to be any person with authority to participate 
(other than as a director) in major policy making functions of a 
company. This definition is based on the function that a person serves 
rather than a person's official title. The Board recognizes that this 
definition is not

[[Page 12406]]

precise and will consider providing additional clarity around this 
definition after acquiring more experience with the senior management 
interlocks presumptions.
Contractual Limits on Major Operational or Policy Decisions
    A company that controls a material amount of voting securities of a 
second company also may have contractual arrangements with the second 
company, such as investment agreements, debt relationships, service 
agreements, or agreements related to other business relationships. 
Often, these contractual rights do not raise controlling influence 
concerns because the rights, for example, are limited in scope or 
reinforce the protections provided to the investor under the law. 
However, the Board has viewed many other contractual provisions as 
raising controlling influence concerns when the agreement has the 
effect of substantially enhancing one company's influence over the 
discretion of another company.\37\
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    \37\ Contractual covenants also may raise safety and soundness 
concerns, such as a covenant that impairs the ability of a banking 
organization to raise additional capital, or a covenant that imposes 
substantial financial obligations on a banking organization. Safety 
and soundness concerns may arise in the absence of, or in addition 
to, controlling influence concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contractual rights often raise controlling influence concerns when 
they provide an investor with the ability to direct or block major 
operational or policy decisions of another company, whether such 
decisions are made by management or by the board of directors of the 
other company. The ability of an investor effectively to veto an 
important business decision of a company generally provides the 
investor with the ability to exercise a significant influence over a 
major operational or policy decision of the company.
    The Board also has long recognized that contracts governing 
business relationships, including many loan agreements, contain 
restrictive covenants and that the existence of these covenants has not 
been sufficient, in itself, to constitute a controlling influence. 
Thus, the Board generally has not viewed restrictive covenants in the 
context of loan transactions or commercial services to raise 
controlling influence concerns. However, when a company has both 
control over a material percentage of the voting securities of another 
company and covenants that significantly restrict the discretion of the 
second company, the covenants have raised controlling influence 
concerns. These concerns have been raised whether the covenants arise 
directly from the terms of the equity investment or from separate 
agreements between the companies.
    Under the proposal, a company generally was presumed to control a 
second company if the first company (i) owns 5 percent or more of any 
class of voting securities of the second company; and (ii) has any 
contractual right that significantly restricts the discretion of the 
second company over major operational or policy decisions.\38\ A 
company with less than 5 percent of each class of voting securities of 
a second company would not have triggered this presumption of control 
even if the first company had covenants that significantly restricted 
the discretion of the second company over major operational and policy 
decisions. Thus, the proposal both recognized the potentially 
significant influence that covenants can provide and recognized the 
normal use of restrictive covenants in loan agreements and other 
market-terms business relationships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ The proposal provided an exclusion for limiting contractual 
rights in the context of a pending merger that are designed to 
ensure that the target company operates in the ordinary course while 
the merger is pending. The final rule includes this exclusion 
consistent with the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The presumption of control under the proposal introduced a new 
defined term, ``limiting contractual right,'' defined as a contractual 
right that allows a company to restrict significantly the discretion of 
a second company, including its senior management officials and 
directors, over major operational or policy decisions. The proposal 
also included a nonexclusive list of examples of contractual rights 
that are generally considered to be limiting contractual rights, as 
well as a nonexclusive list of examples of contractual rights that are 
generally not considered to be limiting contractual rights.
    Commenters argued that the Board should either raise the voting 
securities threshold at which the presumption of control based on 
limiting contractual rights would apply or remove the presumption 
entirely. At least one commenter argued that the presumption related to 
limiting contractual rights should not apply to an investor that 
controls less than 10 percent of each class of voting securities. In 
addition, commenters raised concerns with some of the specific rights 
listed in the proposal as examples of limiting contractual rights. 
These comments are discussed later in this preamble in the section 
related to the definition of limiting contractual rights.
    Consistent with the proposal, under the final rule, a company is 
presumed to control another company if the first company controls 5 
percent or more of any class of voting securities of the second company 
and the first company has a limiting contractual right with respect to 
the second company. As discussed, limiting contractual rights can allow 
a company to exercise significant influence over another company, such 
as by providing the first company with an effective veto over decisions 
of the second company, overriding the discretion of the board of 
directors of the second company or the choices of its shareholders. 
However, limiting contractual rights are often important provisions in 
commercial agreements, including many loan agreements, and the Board 
has long recognized the importance of such contractual provisions in 
the context of commercial relationships. Thus, consistent with the 
proposal, under the final rule, a company must also control a material 
percentage of the voting securities of another company--specifically, 
at least 5 percent of any class of voting securities--in order to be 
presumed to control the other company due to a limiting contractual 
right. In other words, the final rule reflects that the Board's concern 
with limiting contractual rights generally arises from the combination 
of a limiting contractual right and control over a material share of 
voting securities.\39\ This approach is intended to balance the normal 
use of restrictive covenants in standard lending and other commercial 
relationships, while also recognizing the power of limiting contractual 
rights to enhance the influence of a company that is a material equity 
investor in another company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ This is different from management agreements, which raise 
control concerns regardless of the share of voting securities 
controlled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total Equity
    The Board has long subscribed to the view that the overall size of 
an equity investment, including both voting and nonvoting equity, is an 
important indicator of the degree of influence an investor may have. A 
company is likely to pay heed to its large shareholders in order to 
maintain stability in its capital base, enhance its ability to raise 
additional equity capital in the future, and to prevent the negative 
market signal that may be created by the sale of a large block of 
equity by an unhappy shareholder. All of these concerns are present 
independent of the ability of an investor to exercise the voting powers 
of

[[Page 12407]]

equity to attempt to influence the investee company. Further, an 
investor with a large equity investment also has a powerful incentive 
to wield influence over the company in which it has invested due to the 
investor's substantial economic interest in the investee company. 
However, the Board also has recognized that nonvoting equity does not 
provide the same ability to exercise a controlling influence as voting 
equity.
    Accordingly, under the proposal, a company was presumed to control 
another company if the first company controls less than 15 percent of 
the voting securities of the second company but one-third or more of 
the total equity of the second company. In addition, a company was 
presumed to control another company if the first company controls 15 
percent or more of the voting securities of the second company and 25 
percent or more of the second company's total equity. This element of 
the proposal was consistent with the total equity standard described in 
the Board's 2008 Policy Statement.
    Some commenters argued that total equity on its own does not 
provide a company with a substantial ability to exercise a controlling 
influence and therefore recommended that the Board increase the amount 
of total equity the first company could control in the second company 
before triggering a presumption of control. A few commenters suggested 
that the Board permit all investors to own up to one-third of the total 
equity of a company (regardless of voting equity position) without 
triggering a presumption of control. Other commenters advocated for 
alternative tiered presumptions related to total equity, such as 
presumptions of control where a company (i) has 15 percent or more of 
the voting securities of the second company and one-third or more of 
the total equity; (ii) has between 10 percent and 15 percent voting and 
more than 40 percent total equity; and (iii) has under 10 percent 
voting and more than 50 percent total equity. Some commenters suggested 
that the Board have an exception to the total equity presumption if 
another shareholder has a significant block of voting securities in the 
second company that could prevent the first company from using total 
equity to exercise a controlling influence over the second company.
    In the final rule, the Board is simplifying its total equity 
presumption so that a company will be presumed to control a second 
company when the first company controls one-third or more of the total 
equity of the second company. The threshold of one-third or more of 
total equity would apply without regard to the first company's voting 
securities percentage. In addition to simplifying, this adjustment to 
the proposal reflects that nonvoting equity, while a significant 
mechanism through which control may be exercised, should not be capped 
at the same 25 percent voting securities level that the statute 
identifies as control.
    Commenters also raised a variety of issues around the Board's 
proposed methodology for calculating a company's total equity position 
in another company. These comments are discussed below in section 
III.D. of the preamble.
Proxies on Issues
    The Board historically has raised controlling influence concerns if 
a company with control over 10 percent or more of a class of voting 
securities of a second company solicits proxies from the shareholders 
of the second company on any issue. The Board did not propose a 
presumption of control for a company that controls 10 percent or more 
of a class of voting securities of a second company and solicits 
proxies from the shareholders of the second company on any issue. Many 
commenters supported the Board's decision to not include a presumption 
of control based on soliciting proxies on issues presented to the 
shareholders.
    Consistent with the proposal, the Board is not adopting a general 
presumption of control for a company that solicits proxies from the 
shareholders of another company.\40\ Accordingly, under the final rule, 
a noncontrolling investor generally may act as a shareholder and engage 
with the target company and other shareholders on issues through proxy 
solicitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ The final rule includes a presumption of control related to 
soliciting proxies for the election of directors, which is discussed 
in the section of this preamble related to the presumptions of 
control based on director representation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Threats To Dispose of Securities
    Historically, the Board has viewed threats to dispose of large 
blocks of voting or nonvoting securities in an effort to try to affect 
the policy and management decisions of another company as presenting 
potential controlling influence concerns. As a result, the Board 
traditionally has raised controlling influence concerns if a company 
with control over 10 percent or more of a class of voting securities of 
a second company threatens to dispose of its investment if the second 
company refuses to take some action desired by the first company. 
However, the Board also has recognized that an investor that is unhappy 
or disagrees with the business decisions of the company in which it has 
invested should be able to exit its investment and that the possibility 
of investor exit imposes important discipline on management. The Board 
did not propose a presumption of control based on threats to dispose of 
securities.
    Many commenters expressed support for the Board's decision to not 
include a presumption of control based on attempts to exercise control 
by threatening to dispose of securities.
    Consistent with the proposal, the Board is not adopting a 
presumption of control based on one company attempting to exercise 
control over another company by threatening to dispose of its 
securities in the second company. By not adopting a presumption, the 
Board recognizes that investors generally should be able to exit 
investments without raising control concerns.

C. Description of Additional Presumptions and Exclusions

    In addition to the tiered presumption framework described 
previously, the proposal included several additional presumptions of 
control. Several of these presumptions clarified presumptions already 
in Regulation Y and Regulation LL, and others of these presumptions 
related to standards that the Board historically has used to make 
control decisions but has not before included in regulation. This 
section of the preamble discusses these additional presumptions and how 
they are reflected in the final rule.
Management Agreements
    The Board has long believed that management agreements under which 
a company can direct or exercise significant influence over the 
management or operations of another company raise significant 
controlling influence concerns.\41\ The proposal expanded slightly the 
existing regulatory presumption to expressly identify additional types 
of agreements or understandings that allow a company to direct or 
exercise significant influence over the core business or policy 
decisions of another company. The proposal also clarified that a 
management agreement includes an agreement where a company is a 
managing member, trustee, or general partner of another company, or 
exercises similar functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See 12 CFR 225.31(d)(2)(i); 12 CFR 238.21(d)(2)(i) 
(citations are to the Code of Federal Regulations prior to the 
amendments made by this final rule).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12408]]

    The Board did not receive comment specifically on the presumption 
of control arising from a management agreement. Accordingly, the Board 
is finalizing the presumption as proposed, including with the 
clarifications that expressly include agreements where a company is a 
managing member, trustee, or general partner of another company.
Investment Advice and Investment Funds
    The proposal included a presumption of control where a company 
serves as investment adviser to an investment fund and controls 5 
percent or more of any class of voting securities of the fund or 25 
percent or more of the total equity of the fund. For purposes of this 
presumption, the proposal defined ``investment adviser'' to include any 
person registered as an investment adviser under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (``Advisers Act''), any person registered as a 
commodity trading adviser under the Commodity Exchange Act, or a 
foreign equivalent of such a registered adviser.\42\ Similarly, 
``investment fund'' included a wide range of investment vehicles, 
including investment companies registered under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, investment companies that are exempt from registration 
under the Investment Company Act, and foreign equivalents of either 
registered investment companies or exempt investment companies.\43\ 
Other investment vehicles, such as commodity funds and real estate 
investment trusts, generally also were included as investment funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.; 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
    \43\ 15 U.S.C. 80a et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the proposed presumption of control would not have applied 
if the investment adviser organized and sponsored the investment fund 
within the preceding twelve months. This provision allowed the 
investment adviser to avoid triggering the presumption of control over 
the investment fund during the initial seeding period of the fund.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The proposed presumption of control for service as an 
investment adviser to an investment fund was intended to be 
consistent with the Board's precedents regarding when an investment 
adviser controls an advised investment fund under the BHC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposal provided a limited exception from the 
presumptions of control where the investment fund was an investment 
company registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 and certain other criteria were satisfied.\45\ In order to qualify 
for this exception:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 15 U.S.C. 80a et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The only permitted business relationships between the 
investment adviser and the investment company were investment advisory, 
custodian, transfer agent, registrar, administrative, distributor, and 
securities brokerage services provided by the investment adviser to the 
investment company;
     Representatives of the investment adviser must occupy 25 
percent or less of the board of directors or trustees of the investment 
company; and
     The investment adviser must control less than 5 percent of 
each class of voting securities of the investment company and less than 
25 percent of the total equity of the investment company.
    Corresponding to the seeding period in the investment adviser 
presumption, the last criteria in the registered investment company 
exception did not apply if the investment adviser had organized and 
sponsored the investment company within the preceding twelve months. 
This provision allowed the investment adviser to control greater 
percentages of securities of the investment company during the initial 
seeding period of the investment company.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See, e.g., Mellon Bank Corporation, 79 Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 626 (1993); The Chase Manhattan Corporation, 81 Federal 
Reserve Bulletin 883 (1995); Commerzbank AG, 83 Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 678 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters argued that the proposals with respect to investment 
funds and registered investment companies were inconsistent with prior 
Board precedent, most notably a single case where the Board allowed a 
bank holding company to retain up to 25 percent of the voting 
securities of an investment company under certain conditions.\47\ Many 
commenters argued that the rule should follow this precedent and allow 
investment advisers to control up to 25 percent of the voting 
securities of an advised investment fund without triggering a 
presumption of control, rather than 5 percent as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See Letter to H. Rodgin Cohen, Esq., dated June 24, 1999, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/BHC_ChangeInControl/1999/19990624/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters also suggested a one-year seeding period was too 
short and should be extended to three years to be consistent with the 
Volcker Rule. In addition, commenters suggested that the seeding 
periods should be available to authorized participants, not just 
organizers and sponsors. Some commenters advocated for an approach 
where no seeding period was specified in the rule and instead the 
seeding period would be a reasonable period determined by fund 
managers.
    A few commenters recommended that the investment company exception 
apply to foreign equivalents of U.S. registered investment companies 
and certain other types of investment funds, such as exempt investment 
companies and business development companies. Some commenters also 
requested that registered investment companies be excluded from the 
presumptions of control without having to satisfy any conditions. 
Several commenters further argued that the Board should apply the 
standards of the SEC for independent directors rather than the Board's 
standards for director representatives for purposes of determining how 
many director representatives a company has on the board of directors 
of a registered investment company. At least one commenter suggested 
that the Board exclude any ordinary-course business relationships 
between investment companies and their advisers from consideration in 
the context of control.
    The final rule retains the presumption of control for investment 
advisers of investment funds as proposed. The exception for registered 
investment companies is not included in the final rule. Both the 
control presumption and the exception were designed to align with Board 
precedent regarding control over investment funds and thus were 
intended to be complementary in scope. The registered investment 
company exception had minimal incremental information value beyond the 
general investment fund presumption, and the details of the exception 
raised many questions regarding how it would function. Thus, it has 
been removed from the final rule to simplify the rule.
    The final rule retains the threshold of 5 percent of a class of 
voting securities for purposes of the investment adviser presumption of 
control. The single precedent identified by commenters that permitted 
ownership of up to 25 percent of the voting securities of a fund was an 
unusual case based in part on statutory provisions that are no longer 
in effect. In addition, in that precedent, the Board relied on 
additional constraints to mitigate control concerns and these 
additional constraints were not included in the proposal. The threshold 
of 5 percent of any class of voting securities is consistent with the 
preponderance of Board precedent in this area.
    The final rule retains the one-year seeding period, consistent with 
the proposal. The one-year seeding period is consistent with the bulk 
of Board precedent related to organizing and sponsoring investment 
funds and

[[Page 12409]]

provides a reasonable amount of time for the seeding of most investment 
funds. The one-year seeding period is only available to the company 
that organizes and sponsors an investment fund and not to other early 
investors in an investment fund, because only the sponsor/organizer 
necessarily controls all the equity securities of the company when the 
fund is formed.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ The one-year seeding period in the final rule does not 
alter the rules applicable to hedge fund and private equity fund 
investments under the Volcker Rule, including the rules addressing 
permissible seeding periods for such funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At least one commenter recommended that the Board confirm the 
ongoing applicability of control letters from the General Counsel of 
the Board to mutual fund families, and investments made in accordance 
with those letters. The application of the final rule to existing 
structures is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this preamble. The 
Board does not intend to revisit existing structures that were 
previously reviewed by the Federal Reserve System and have not changed 
materially.
Accounting Consolidation
    Under the proposal, the Board presumed that a company that 
consolidates a second company under GAAP controls the second company. 
The presumption was based on an understanding that GAAP generally calls 
for consolidation under circumstances where the consolidating entity 
has a controlling financial interest over the consolidated entity. 
Consolidation is typically required under GAAP due to ownership of a 
majority of the voting securities of a company, which would 
significantly exceed the voting security threshold for control under 
the BHC Act and HOLA. In addition, GAAP requires consolidation of 
companies under the variable interest entity standard (i) where a 
company has significant economic exposure to a variable interest entity 
and has the power to direct the activities of the entity that most 
significantly impact the entity's economic performance or (ii) where a 
company controls a variable interest entity by contract.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See, e.g., ASC 810-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters urged the Board to abandon the proposed presumption 
of control where a first company consolidates a second company for 
purposes of GAAP. Commenters also urged the Board not to expand the 
proposed consolidation presumption based on GAAP to consolidation under 
other accounting standards. These commenters argued that the standards 
for consolidation for variable interest entities did not conform to the 
Board's standards for controlling influence. Commenters also stated 
that presuming that consolidated variable interest entities are 
controlled could have unintended consequences for foreign banking 
organizations subject to the Board's U.S. intermediate holding company 
requirements.\50\ In addition, commenters expressed concern that the 
accounting consolidation rules were promulgated by a different 
authority with different purposes and that the consolidation standards 
were subject to change outside of the control of the Board. Some 
commenters requested exclusions for variable interest entities in 
certain contexts, such as an exclusion for asset-backed commercial 
paper conduits or particular types of ownership or management 
relationships between a company and a variable interest entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See 12 CFR 252.153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule establishes a presumption of control when one 
company consolidates a second company for purposes of GAAP. This 
presumption is consistent with the proposal. A company that 
consolidates another company due to control over a majority of the 
voting securities of the second company should control the second 
company under the voting securities control prong of the BHC Act and 
HOLA. A company that consolidates another company under the variable 
interest entity standard must have substantial ability to direct the 
activities of the second company (in addition to having a potentially 
significant economic exposure). A company that is consolidated under 
the variable interest entity standard often would be controlled under 
one of the other presumptions of control in the final rule such as the 
management agreement presumption. The inclusion of the GAAP 
consolidation presumption should reduce burden and uncertainty by 
allowing companies to identify presumptive control relationships based 
on existing accounting standards.
    The presumption of control where one company consolidates a second 
company for purposes of GAAP covers, by its terms, only those companies 
that prepare financial statements under GAAP. The Board notes, however, 
that the Board is likely to have control concerns where a company 
consolidates another company on its financial statements under another 
accounting standard, particularly if the other accounting standard has 
consolidation standards that are similar to the consolidation standards 
under GAAP.
    Regarding the interaction of the final rule and the intermediate 
holding company requirements of the Board's Regulation YY, a foreign 
banking organization that is required to form a U.S. intermediate 
holding company must hold all ownership interests in U.S. subsidiaries 
through its U.S. intermediate holding company.\51\ In general, 
ownership interest under the intermediate holding company requirements 
does not include contractual relationships, including contractual 
relationships that result in consolidation of a company under the 
variable interest entity standard. Thus, for example, where a U.S. 
branch of a foreign bank has a contract with an asset-backed commercial 
paper conduit that causes the conduit to be consolidated by the branch 
under the variable interest entity standard, the contract is not an 
ownership interest and therefore may remain between the branch and the 
conduit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ 12 CFR 252.153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal sought comment on whether the Board should presume 
that a company controls a second company if the first company applies 
the equity method of accounting with respect to its investment in the 
second company. Many commenters opposed the introduction of this 
presumption. These commenters argued that the standards for the equity 
method of accounting were different than control under the BHC Act and 
HOLA and that the practical effect of such a presumption would be to 
presume control over a company due to control over 20 percent of a 
company's voting securities, substantially below the statutory 
threshold of 25 percent. Similar to comments regarding accounting 
consolidation, commenters also objected to the Board's control-based 
reliance on accounting standards designed for different purposes.
    The final rule does not include a presumption of control when one 
company applies the equity method of accounting with respect to its 
investment in a second company. Although equity method accounting 
treatment indicates a substantial relationship between two companies, 
unlike consolidation, equity method accounting is not as closely linked 
to the Board's views on what constitutes a controlling influence.
Divestiture
    The proposal substantially revised the Board's standards regarding 
divestiture of control. The Board historically has taken the position 
that a company that has controlled another company may be

[[Page 12410]]

able to exert a controlling influence over that company even after a 
substantial divestiture.\52\ As a result, the Board typically has 
applied a stricter standard for terminating control than for 
establishing new noncontrolling investments.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See, e.g., ``Statement of policy concerning divestitures by 
bank holding companies'' (divestiture policy statement). 12 CFR 
225.138. The divestiture policy statement indicates that divestiture 
is a special consideration for purposes of control and that the 
Board's normal rules and presumptions regarding control may not 
always be appropriate in the context of divestiture. See also Am. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (holding 
that ``controls and influences exercised for so long and so 
extensively [under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act] are not 
severed instantaneously, sharply and completely, especially when 
powers of voting, consultation and influence such as have been 
retained remain'').
    \53\ See, e.g., 12 CFR 225.139 (``2(g)(3) policy statement''). 
The 2(g)(3) policy statement describes the implementation of section 
2(g)(3) of the BHC Act (Congress removed section 2(g)(3) from the 
BHC Act in 1996). Section 2(g)(3) created a rebuttable presumption 
that a transferor continued to control securities of a company 
transferred to a transferee if the transferee was indebted to the 
transferor or if there were certain director or officer interlocks 
between the transferor and transferee. The 2(g)(3) policy statement 
remains relevant because it reflects the Board's longstanding 
position that terminating control requires reducing relationships to 
lower levels than would be consistent with a new noncontrolling 
relationship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal provided that a company that previously controlled a 
second company during the preceding two years would be presumed to 
continue to control the second company if the first company owned 15 
percent or more of any class of voting securities of the second 
company. The divestiture presumption did not apply if a majority of 
each class of voting securities of the second company would be 
controlled by a single unaffiliated individual or company after the 
divestiture by the first company. Further, the divestiture presumption 
generally did not apply in cases where a company sold a subsidiary to a 
third company and received stock of the third company as consideration 
for the sale.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See, e.g., Letter to Mark Menting, Esq., dated February 14, 
2012, https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/LegalInterpretations/bhc_changeincontrol20120214.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters supported the proposed divestiture presumption. 
Other commenters argued that the threshold for the divestiture 
presumption should be raised higher than 15 percent or that the 
divestiture presumption should be entirely removed from the rule. At 
least one commenter requested clarification as to the conditions 
required for the exception to the divestiture presumption to apply, 
specifically whether the other shareholder must control a majority of 
every class of voting securities of the second company, or only a 
majority of the securities of the class of voting securities that the 
divesting shareholder is selling. In addition, commenters asked the 
Board to clarify how the divestiture presumption interacts with the 
seeding period in the investment fund context.
    The final rule includes the divestiture presumption substantially 
as proposed. As noted, the possibility of continued control in the 
context of a partial divestiture has been identified as a concern in 
Board precedent and case law. The final rule balances these concerns 
with the goal of providing greater transparency and certainty to the 
Board's consideration of controlling influence issues.
    The final rule does not provide an exception to the presumption to 
facilitate the organization and sponsorship of investment funds. Such 
an exception is not necessary because an investment adviser must have 
less than 5 percent of each class of voting securities of an investment 
fund after the initial one-year seeding period in order to not trigger 
the investment fund presumption of control, and the divestiture 
presumption only applies where a company retains at least 15 percent of 
any class of voting securities.
    Regarding the commenter requests for clarification of the exception 
to the divestiture presumption, the Board clarifies that the exception 
only applies when an unaffiliated person controls 50 percent or more of 
the outstanding securities of each class of voting securities of the 
company being divested.
Presumption of Control for the Combined Ownership of a Company and Its 
Senior Management Officials and Directors
    The proposal included a presumption that a company controls a 
second company when (i) the first company controls at least 5 percent 
of any class of voting securities of the second company and (ii) the 
senior management officials and directors of the first company, 
together with their immediate family members and the first company, own 
25 percent or more of a class of voting securities of the second 
company (5-25 presumption). The proposed presumption reflected the 
Board's historical position that it is often appropriate to attribute 
securities held by management officials of a company to the company 
itself for purposes of measuring control by a company under the BHC 
Act. The management officials of a company are well positioned to 
coordinate their actions with each other and the company to act as a 
single voting bloc to advance the interests of the company.
    The proposal differed from current practice, however, by providing 
an exception to this general presumption. Specifically, the presumption 
did not apply if (i) the first company controls less than 15 percent of 
each class of voting securities of the second company and (ii) the 
senior management officials and directors of the first company, 
together with their immediate family members, control 50 percent or 
more of each class of voting securities of the second company.
    The proposed exclusion to the presumption reflected the Board's 
traditional understanding that, when individuals control an outright 
majority of a class of voting securities of a second company, it is 
likely the individuals who are truly exercising control over the second 
company, rather than any company that employs the individuals. Under 
these circumstances, the first company is generally not a significant 
conduit for control over the second company.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See Vickars-Henry Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 629 F.2d 629 
(9th Cir. 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At least one commenter requested that the Board clarify how the 
rule attributing ownership of securities held by senior management 
officials, directors, or controlling shareholders of a company to that 
company (proposed 12 CFR 225.9(c), 238.10(c)) would operate in 
conjunction with the 5-25 presumption (proposed 12 CFR 225.32(d)(6), 
238.22(d)(6)).
    The final rule does not include the 5-25 presumption of control of 
a company. Instead, this presumption of control of a company has been 
integrated into the standard for control by a company over voting 
securities. Specifically, the final rule provides that a company that 
controls 5 percent or more of any class of voting securities of another 
company also controls any securities issued by the second company that 
are controlled by the senior management officials, directors, or 
controlling shareholders of the first company, or immediate family 
members of such individuals. In addition, the final rule incorporates 
into this standard for control over securities the exclusion contained 
in the proposed 5-25 presumption, as described further in section III.C 
of this preamble.
Closely Held Companies and Widely Held Companies
    In developing the proposal, the Board considered whether there 
should be different presumptions for (i) companies

[[Page 12411]]

that are widely held relative to companies that are closely held or 
(ii) companies that are majority owned by a third party. The Board 
considered these factors because it could be reasonable to assume that 
a major investor in a company that is otherwise widely held has 
outsized influence compared to a context where the major investor is 
one of several major investors in a closely held company. Similarly, in 
many cases, it could be reasonable to assume that a major investor has 
reduced influence over a company where another investor has an outright 
majority of the voting securities of the company. The proposal, 
however, did not include different presumptions for widely held 
companies versus closely held companies or for companies under the 
majority control of a third party because such distinctions increased 
the complexity of the proposal and could have made the presumptions 
more difficult to apply in practice.
    Some commenters argued that the presence of a larger, third-party 
shareholder should create a presumption of non-control for any company 
with a lesser interest. Commenters provided several different proposals 
for how this might be implemented, ranging from an exemption from the 
presumptions of control where a third party controls a majority of the 
securities of a company to an exemption from the presumptions of 
control where a third party controls a sufficiently large plurality of 
the securities of a company. Some commenters suggested that the 
presence of a larger, third-party shareholder should raise the level of 
other relationships, particularly business relationships, that two 
companies could have before triggering a presumption of control. 
Commenters also argued that a majority shareholder should give rise to 
a presumption of noncontrol for all other shareholders.
    Other commenters supported the Board's proposal not to create 
different presumptions depending on the shareholder composition of the 
second company because of the complexity this would add to the rule.
    The presumptions in the final rule do not differentiate between 
closely held and widely held companies and generally do not turn on the 
presence of a majority third-party shareholder. Although a company's 
influence over another company may vary based on the shareholder 
structure of the second company, adding exceptions to certain 
presumptions of control because the second company is closely held or 
majority-controlled by a third party would significantly increase the 
complexity of the rule. Moreover, the Board notes that the statutory 
framework contemplates that multiple companies could control a single 
company even if there is one company that has predominant, or even 
majority, control over the voting securities of the company. Finally, 
having control determinations turn on the shareholder structure of the 
target company may create practical difficulties for investors. For 
example, a first company could establish a relationship that does not 
trigger a presumption of control over a second company, but the second 
company could subsequently become more widely held, leading the first 
company to trigger a presumption of control without any action of its 
own.
Fiduciary Exception
    Under the proposal, the presumptions of control did not apply to 
the extent that a company controls voting or nonvoting securities of a 
second company in a fiduciary capacity without sole discretionary 
authority to exercise the voting rights. This exception for holding 
securities in a fiduciary capacity is currently in the control 
provisions of Regulation Y and was retained in full.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See 12 CFR 225.31(d)(2)(iv); see also 12 U.S.C. 
1841(a)(5)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters argued that the Board's proposed exclusion for 
securities held in a fiduciary capacity was overly restrictive because 
it included a requirement that the fiduciary not have sole 
discretionary voting authority over the securities. Commenters noted 
that, although not having sole discretionary voting authority was 
required for the fiduciary exemption in section 3 of the BHC Act, 
section 4 of the BHC Act excluded securities held in a fiduciary 
capacity without this additional requirement.
    Commenters also sought clarification of when a company would be 
considered to have sole discretionary authority to exercise voting 
rights. At least one commenter asked that the Board provide that an 
investment adviser lacks sole discretionary voting authority where an 
investment fund has the right to revoke the adviser's voting authority.
    In response to the issues raised by commenters, the fiduciary 
exception in the final rule only requires that the securities of a 
depository institution or a depository institution holding company be 
held without sole discretionary voting authority. Accordingly, the 
final rule's fiduciary exception would parallel the different fiduciary 
exceptions in section 3 and section 4 of the BHC Act. The same 
exception would apply for purposes of Regulation LL, to provide 
parallel treatment under the BHC Act and HOLA. The final rule also 
includes additional clarifying edits to the fiduciary exception.
    The final rule does not provide broader clarity around the scope of 
the fiduciary exception. The Board notes, however, that the fiduciary 
exception in the final rule is intended to align with the Board's 
traditional understanding of the scope of the fiduciary exceptions in 
the BHC Act and Regulation Y. The primary example of the role covered 
by the fiduciary exception is that of the trust department of a 
depository institution that is authorized to engage in fiduciary 
activities. Companies may contact the Board or its staff to seek 
clarification as to whether any particular holding of securities would 
qualify for the fiduciary exception.
Rebuttable Presumption of Noncontrol
    Under the proposal, a company was presumed not to control a second 
company if the first company (i) controls less than 10 percent of every 
class of voting securities of the second company and (ii) is not 
presumed to control the second company under any of the proposed 
presumptions of control. This provision of the proposal modestly 
expanded the statutory and pre-existing regulatory rebuttable 
presumption of noncontrol that applies where a first company controls 
less than 5 percent of any class of voting securities of a second 
company.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(3), 12 CFR 225.31(e), and 238.21(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters supported the proposed presumption of noncontrol, 
arguing that controlling influence would be especially unusual for 
companies with less than 10 percent of each class of voting securities 
of another company. Some commenters argued that the Board should expand 
the presumption of noncontrol further to cover any company that did not 
trigger a presumption of control. At least one commenter argued that a 
presumption of noncontrol should at least apply to foreign entities 
that do not trigger a presumption of control in order to mitigate 
extraterritorial application of the BHC Act. Commenters also raised 
concerns with the proposed exclusion from the presumption of noncontrol 
for any company that triggered a presumption of control, at least as 
applied to companies with less than 5 percent of any class of voting 
securities of another company.

[[Page 12412]]

    The final rule adopts the rebuttable presumption of noncontrol as 
proposed.\58\ Thus, a company is presumed not to control a second 
company if the first company (i) controls less than 10 percent of every 
class of voting securities of the second company and (ii) is not 
presumed to control the second company under any of the presumptions of 
control. This approach and calibration of the noncontrol presumption 
reflects the Board's experience that a company with less than 10 
percent of any class of voting securities of another company is 
unlikely to have a controlling influence over the second company, 
absent the indicia of control specified in the control presumptions. 
The additional changes supported by some commenters would increase the 
scope of the presumption of noncontrol significantly, well beyond both 
the presumption of noncontrol in the BHC Act and the Board's 
experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ As under the proposal, the filing requirements applicable 
to bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies for 
investments in 5 percent or more of any class of voting securities 
of a company are not impacted as a result of the presumption of 
noncontrol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Final Rule--Control-Related Definitions

    The proposal proposed to amend Regulation Y and Regulation LL to 
update and clarify the definitions of various control-related terms. 
This section discusses in detail how the final rule addresses each of 
these definitions.
    Some commenters indicated that the Board should define additional 
terms to provide further clarity regarding the application of the 
presumptions of control. For example, a commenter suggested that the 
Board clarify how the presumptions of control would apply to an 
agreement among shareholders that is designed to preserve a company's 
tax status under the Internal Revenue Code. In addition, a commenter 
stated that the Board should clarify whether a testamentary trust 
qualified as a ``company'' under the proposal.
    The final rule does not introduce new defined terms compared to the 
proposal, though certain changes have been made to the proposed defined 
terms as described in detail in this section. Consistent with the 
proposal, the final rule includes defined terms to the extent 
appropriate to clarify the application of the rule, while avoiding 
over-prescription that could limit the Board's ability to respond 
appropriately to unusual facts and circumstances or to prevent evasion 
of the framework. Specifically with respect to agreements to preserve 
tax status under the Internal Revenue Code, the final rule, consistent 
with the proposal, clarifies that covenants to take reasonable steps to 
maintain a specific tax status generally are not limiting contractual 
rights and that agreements among shareholders to preserve a certain tax 
status generally do not constitute restrictions on securities that 
provide control over the covered securities. On the status of 
testamentary trusts as companies under the BHC Act, neither the 
proposal nor the final rule alters the Board's standards related to 
testamentary trusts.

A. First Company and Second Company

    The core of the proposal was the addition of a series of 
presumptions of control that apply in the context of the Board making a 
determination that one company has the ability to exercise a 
controlling influence over another company. To clarify the application 
of these presumptions, the proposal provided definitions of ``first 
company'' and ``second company.''
    The proposal defined ``first company'' as the company whose control 
over a second company was the subject of a determination of control by 
the Board. The proposal defined ``second company'' as the company the 
control of which by a first company was the subject of a determination 
of control by the Board. For many of the proposed presumptions, the 
first company was presumed to control the second company if the first 
company, together with its subsidiaries, had particular relationships 
with the second company, together with its subsidiaries.
    In addition, the proposal provided that, for purposes of the 
proposed presumptions, any company that was both a subsidiary of the 
first company and the second company should be treated as a subsidiary 
of the first company but not as a subsidiary of the second company. 
This provision prevented the second company's relationships with a 
joint venture subsidiary with the first company from being considered 
relationships with the first company for purposes of the presumptions 
of control.
    Some commenters contended that it would be more appropriate to 
consider only relationships between top-tier parent companies. 
Relatedly, a few commenters stated that first company and second 
company should not be defined to include their subsidiaries. With 
respect to joint ventures, some commenters argued that the language of 
the proposal was difficult to apply and that it would be better not to 
consider any relationships with joint ventures when reviewing for 
control between joint venture partners.
    The final rule adopts the definitions of first company and second 
company as proposed.\59\ For purposes of controlling influence, the 
Board historically has considered the relationships between one company 
and its subsidiaries, on the one hand, and another company and its 
subsidiaries, on the other hand. Grouping a parent company with its 
subsidiaries reflects an understanding that a subsidiary generally will 
comply with directions from its parent company. Considering only direct 
relationships between two companies would ignore this dynamic and thus 
the economic realities of corporate structures. For example, an 
investing company may own securities in a top-tier bank holding company 
while having substantial business relationships with the bank holding 
company's subsidiary bank. Considering the investing company's 
relationships with the bank holding company alone and with the bank 
alone would exclude important aspects of the combined relationship 
between the investing company, on the one hand, and the bank holding 
company and the bank, on the other hand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ First company and second company could take a variety of 
legal entity forms, including a stock corporation, limited liability 
company, partnership, business trust, or foreign equivalents of such 
legal entities. See 12 U.S.C. 1467a(a)(1)(C) and 1841(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding joint ventures, the Board historically has recognized 
that relationships with joint ventures can be significant for purposes 
of controlling influence analysis because such relationships can 
represent a significant connection between the joint venture partners. 
For this reason, the final rule does not completely exclude 
relationships with joint ventures. Instead, consistent with the 
proposal, the final rule provides that a company that is a subsidiary 
of both the first company and the second company is treated as a 
subsidiary of the first company and not of the second company for 
purposes of applying the presumptions of control. The Board believes 
that this is a reasonable standard for recognizing the potential 
importance of joint ventures without overstating such importance.

B. Voting Securities and Nonvoting Securities

    The BHC Act defines control to include the ownership, control, or 
power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of a 
company.\60\ In addition, several of the proposed presumptions required 
identifying the percentage of a class of

[[Page 12413]]

voting securities controlled by a company in another company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulation Y and Regulation LL previously included definitions of 
``voting securities'' and ``nonvoting shares.'' \61\ The proposal 
changed the defined term ``nonvoting shares'' to ``nonvoting 
securities'' and added to the definition of ``nonvoting securities'' 
equity instruments issued by companies other than stock corporations, 
such as limited liability companies and partnerships. In addition, the 
proposal revised the definition of ``nonvoting securities'' to clarify 
that common stock can be nonvoting securities.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ 12 CFR 225.2(q).
    \62\ For safety and soundness reasons, the Board generally 
believes that voting common stockholders' equity should be the 
dominant form of equity for a banking organization. See, e.g., 78 FR 
62018, 62044 (Oct. 11, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulation Y and Regulation LL also provide a nonexclusive list of 
examples of the types of voting rights that the Board has considered to 
be within the scope of the defensive voting rights that nonvoting 
securities may contain.\63\ The proposal revised the definition of 
nonvoting securities to expressly permit certain additional defensive 
voting rights that are commonly found in investment funds that are 
organized as limited liability companies and limited partnerships. 
Specifically, the proposal provided that defensive voting rights that 
do not cause a security to be a voting security include the right to 
vote to remove a general partner or managing member for cause, the 
right to vote to replace a general partner or managing member that has 
been removed for cause or has become incapacitated, and the right to 
vote to dissolve the company or to continue operations following the 
removal of a general partner or managing member. Some commenters asked 
that the Board provide that certain securities--including limited 
partnership interests, REIT investment units, and trust beneficiary 
rights--are nonvoting securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ 12 CFR 225.2(q)(2)(i); 12 CFR 238.2(r)(2)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule is largely consistent with the proposal on the 
definitions of voting securities and nonvoting securities. To prevent 
evasion, the final rule does not categorically exclude any specific 
types of securities issued by certain legal entities from the 
definition of voting securities. Although there is substantial 
variability in the terms and structures of securities in the financial 
markets, the definitions of voting securities and nonvoting securities 
in the final rule have been drafted broadly to apply effectively to all 
forms of legal entities.

C. Control of Securities

    The proposed rule reflected the Board's current practice for 
determining whether a company's securities are owned, controlled, or 
held with power to vote by an investor and provided rules for 
determining the percentage of a class of a company's voting securities 
attributed to a person.
Ownership, Control, and Holding With Power To Vote
    The proposal provided rules for determining whether a person 
``controls'' a security.\64\ Specifically, the proposal provided that a 
person controls a security if the person owns the security or has the 
power to sell, transfer, pledge, or otherwise dispose of the security. 
In addition, a person controls a security if the person had the power 
to vote the security, other than due to holding a short-term, revocable 
proxy. This proposed definition of control over securities is 
consistent with Board precedent and with the language of the BHC 
Act.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ These proposed standards effectively replaced the 
presumptions for control over voting securities currently in 12 CFR 
225.31(d)(1). In this discussion, ``person'' has the meaning 
provided in 12 CFR 225.2(l) and 12 CFR 238.2(j).
    \65\ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2)-(3) and 1842(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters suggested that power to dispose of securities in 
certain circumstances should not provide control over the securities, 
such as securities held in a fiduciary capacity or as collateral that 
may be rehypothecated. A few commenters argued that securities held in 
a small business investment company or in a merchant banking portfolio 
company should not be considered controlled. Commenters also argued 
that securities held in an underwriting, dealing, or market making 
capacity should not be considered controlled for purposes of the 
presumptions of control.
    The final rule makes minor revisions to the proposal's provisions 
on control over securities. The final rule is consistent with Board 
precedent and the statutory framework. However, the Board does 
recognize that securities held by an underwriter for a very limited 
period of time for purposes of conducting a bona fide underwriting 
generally do not raise control concerns. An underwriter generally would 
hold the securities only for a few days and only for the purpose of 
prompt resale to the market.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ For example, the Board's capital rule provides a 5-day 
holding period for underwriting securities. 12 CFR 217.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board does not believe that the final control rule should make 
exceptions for small business investment company investments, merchant 
banking portfolio company investments, or any specific investment 
types. The Board's general regulatory framework addresses the 
permissibility of these investments, and there are no compelling 
reasons to treat these investments differently than other investments 
under the Board's control framework. For example, if a financial 
holding company owns 100 percent of the securities of a merchant 
banking portfolio company, the financial holding company controls the 
portfolio company for purposes of the BHC Act under the first prong of 
the definition of control. The financial holding company is able to 
have this ownership interest under its merchant banking authority, but 
must treat the portfolio company as a controlled subsidiary under 
Regulation Y.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ 12 CFR part 225, subpart J.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Options, Warrants, and Convertible Instruments
    The proposal provided standards for deeming a person to control a 
security through control of an option or warrant to acquire the 
security or through control of a convertible instrument that may be 
converted into, or exchanged for, the security. Under the proposal's 
``look-through'' approach, a person would control all securities that 
the person could control upon exercise of any options or warrants. In 
addition, a person would control all securities that the person could 
control as a result of the conversion or exchange of a convertible 
instrument controlled by the person. This approach was consistent with 
the Board's longstanding precedent of generally considering a person to 
control any securities (i) that the person has a contractual right to 
acquire now or in the future; or (ii) that the person would 
automatically acquire upon occurrence of a future event.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See, e.g., 2008 Policy Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposal provided that a person controls the 
maximum number of securities that could be obtained under the terms of 
the option, warrant, or convertible instrument. Thus, for example, if 
the number of securities that could be acquired upon exercise of an 
option varied based on some metric, such as the market price or book 
value of the securities, the person with the option was considered to 
control the highest percentage of the class of securities that could 
possibly be acquired under the terms of the option.
    Moreover, for purposes of calculating a person's percentage of a 
class of voting securities or total equity, the proposal generally 
deemed a person to control

[[Page 12414]]

the percentage resulting from the exercise of the person's options, 
warrants, or conversion features, assuming that no other parties 
exercised their options, warrants, or conversion features. However, if, 
for example, a person is only able to exercise an option when all 
outstanding options in a class are simultaneously exercised by all 
holders, the percentage controlled by the person should reflect the 
exercise of all the outstanding options in the class, not just those 
options held by the person.
    The proposal included several limited exceptions to this general 
look-through approach. Consistent with the 2008 Policy Statement, the 
proposal incorporated a limited exception for financial instruments 
that may convert into voting securities but by their terms may not 
become voting securities in the hands of the current holder or any 
affiliate of the current holder and may only convert to voting 
securities upon transfer to (i) the issuer or an affiliate of the 
transferor, (ii) in a widespread public distribution, (iii) in 
transfers where no transferee or group of associated transferees would 
receive 2 percent or more of any class of voting securities of the 
issuer, or (iv) to a transferee that controls 50 percent or more of 
every class of voting securities before the transfer.
    The proposal also exempted from the general look-through approach a 
purchase agreement to acquire securities that had not yet closed. This 
exemption allowed parties to enter into securities purchase agreements 
pending regulatory approval, due diligence, and satisfaction of other 
conditions to closing.
    In addition, the proposal exempted from the general look-through 
approach any options, warrants, or convertible instruments that 
permitted an investor to acquire additional voting securities only to 
maintain the investor's percentage of voting securities in the event 
the issuing company increased the number of its outstanding voting 
securities.
    Many commenters suggested that the Board should apply the look-
through approach only to narrow classes of options, warrants, and 
convertible instruments, or that the Board should not look through 
options, warrants, or convertible instruments at all. Some commenters 
suggested that the Board only look through options or convertible 
instruments if they could be freely exercised within 60 days, are in 
the money, or are not subject to a remote contingency trigger or 
condition outside of the holder's control. Some commenters argued that 
the look-through approach should not apply to options if the investor 
does not have control over the exercise of the option. A few commenters 
asked the Board to clarify the application of the standards from the 
2008 Policy Statement under the proposal. A few commenters suggested 
that the Board clarify that nonvoting securities will remain nonvoting 
even if they have the right to elect directors after six quarterly 
dividend payments are missed, consistent with Board precedent.
    The final rule is generally consistent with the proposal with 
respect to these provisions. However, the final rule includes an 
additional exception to the look-through approach that preferred 
securities that have no voting rights unless the issuer fails to pay 
dividends for six or more quarters are only considered to be voting 
securities if a sufficient number of dividends are missed and the 
voting rights are active. As noted by commenters, this additional 
narrow exception to the look-through approach is consistent with Board 
precedent and helps to address a fairly common feature of preferred 
securities. Securities with springing voting rights that do not fit 
into this exception generally will be considered to be voting 
securities under the look-through approach.
    The final rule does not include any of the other limitations on the 
look-through approach supported by commenters. The look-through 
approach appropriately recognizes that options, warrants, and 
convertible instruments provide the holder of such instruments with the 
ability to control the underlying securities by exercising the option, 
warrant, or convertible instrument, or transferring the option, 
warrant, or convertible instrument. In addition, many of the suggested 
limitations on the look-through approach are not practicable. For 
example, looking through in-the-money options while not looking through 
out-of-the-money options could result in unpredictable moves from non-
control to control of a bank without the ability of the investor to 
apply or receive prior approval under section 3 of the BHC Act. 
Moreover, excluding from the look-through approach options, warrants, 
and convertible instruments with remote contingency triggers would 
require the Board to adopt an impracticable measure of remoteness. The 
Board notes that the final rule's exception to the look-through 
approach based on transfer restrictions has been slightly revised to 
conform more precisely to the 2008 Policy Statement.
Control Over Securities Through Restrictions on Rights
    Consistent with current regulations, the proposal provided that a 
person controls securities if the person is a party to an agreement or 
understanding under which the rights of the owner or holder of 
securities are restricted in any manner, unless the restriction falls 
under one of the exceptions specified in the rule.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ This standard could result in multiple persons being 
considered to have control over the same securities. This remains 
possible under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal provided six exceptions to this general rule, each 
designed to accommodate certain common restrictions on securities that 
do not provide the type of control over securities relevant to this 
rulemaking. The first exception was for rights of first refusal, rights 
of last refusal, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, or similar rights 
that are on market terms and that do not impose significant 
restrictions on the transfer of the securities. Second, the proposal 
provided an exception for arrangements that restrict the rights of an 
owner or holder of securities when the restrictions are incidental to a 
bona fide loan transaction. Third, the proposal provided that an 
arrangement that restricts the ability of a shareholder to transfer 
securities pending the consummation of an acquisition of the securities 
does not provide the restricting party control over the securities of 
the restricted party. Fourth, the proposal generally provided that an 
arrangement that requires a current shareholder of a company to vote in 
favor of a proposed acquisition of the company would not result in the 
proposed acquirer controlling the securities of the current 
shareholder. Fifth, the proposal exempted arrangements among the 
shareholders of a company designed to preserve the tax status or tax 
benefits of a company, such as qualifying as a Subchapter S Corporation 
\70\ or to preserve tax assets (such as net operating losses) against 
impairment.\71\ Sixth, the proposal provided that a short-term 
revocable proxy would not provide the holder of the proxy with control 
over the securities governed by the proxy.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See 26 U.S.C. 1361.
    \71\ See 26 U.S.C. 382. In order to qualify for this exemption, 
the arrangement was required to not impose restrictions on 
securities beyond those reasonably necessary to achieve the goal of 
preserving tax status, tax benefits, or tax assets. Agreements of 
this type may raise significant safety and soundness concerns under 
certain circumstances, independent of whether control concerns are 
raised.
    \72\ The proposed treatment of short-term revocable proxies was 
consistent with the Board's current regulations regarding notices 
under the Change in Bank Control Act. See 12 CFR 225.41(d)(4); 12 
CFR 225.42(a)(5).

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[[Page 12415]]

    The Board received very few comments on this framework and is 
adopting the framework as proposed.
Control of Securities Through Associated Individuals and Subsidiaries
    The proposal provided that a company that owns, controls, or holds 
with power to vote 5 percent or more of any class of voting securities 
of a second company controls any securities issued by the second 
company that are owned, controlled, or held with power to vote by the 
senior management officials, directors, or controlling shareholders of 
the first company, or by the immediate family members of such 
individuals.\73\ In addition, the proposal provided that a person 
controls all voting securities controlled by any subsidiaries of the 
person, and that a person generally does not control any voting 
securities controlled by any non-subsidiary of the person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See 12 CFR 225.31(d)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At least one commenter argued that the Board should not consider 
securities held in separate accounts by an insurance company to be 
controlled by the insurance company, or that the Board should clarify 
how separate accounts may be structured so that securities in such 
accounts are not treated as controlled by the insurance company. One 
commenter requested clarification regarding the attribution of voting 
securities held in a voting trust.
    The final rule defines control over securities through associated 
individuals and subsidiaries in a manner substantially consistent with 
the proposal. The final rule has been revised, however, to integrate 
the standards for control over voting securities through associated 
individuals with the proposed 5-25 presumption. Specifically, the 
proposed 5-25 presumption substantially overlapped with the provision 
providing that a company should be attributed the securities of its 
senior management officials, directors, and controlling shareholders, 
as well as immediate family members of such individuals. As a result, 
as discussed above, the proposed 5-25 presumption is not necessary and 
is not included in the final rule. However, the Board is revising the 
provisions related to control over voting securities through associated 
individuals to incorporate the exception to the proposed 5-25 
presumption when the company controls less than 15 percent of each 
class of voting securities of the other company and a majority of each 
class of voting securities of the other company are controlled by the 
first company's senior management officials, directors, and controlling 
shareholders, as well as immediate family members of such individuals.
    The final rule does not include the express statement from the 
proposal that a company does not control securities that are controlled 
by a non-subsidiary of the company. Although the Board continues to 
believe that a company generally should not be deemed to control 
securities held by a non-subsidiary of the company, the Board has 
removed this provision from the final rule so as not to create an 
expectation that a company would never be deemed to control securities 
held by a non-subsidiary. For example, a company generally would be 
deemed to control securities held by a non-subsidiary if the company 
had an option to acquire those securities.
Reservation of Authority
    The proposal included a reservation of authority to allow the Board 
to determine that securities that would otherwise be considered 
controlled by a person under the proposal are not controlled by the 
person. Similarly, the proposed reservation of authority allowed the 
Board to determine that securities that are not considered controlled 
by a person under the proposal are controlled by the person. The Board 
received no comments specifically on this reservation of authority 
provision and the final rule includes the reservation of authority 
consistent with the proposal. The reservation of authority is meant to 
allow the Board to deal with rare circumstances that do not align with 
the intent of the rule.
Percentage of a Class of Voting Securities
    The proposal provided a rule for calculating the percentage of a 
class of voting securities controlled by a person. The proposed rule 
considered both the number of securities and the voting power of those 
securities. Specifically, the percentage of a class of voting 
securities controlled by a person was the greater of (i) the number of 
voting securities of the class controlled by the person divided by the 
number of issued and outstanding voting securities of the class 
(expressed as a percentage) and (ii) the number of votes that the 
person could cast divided by the total number of votes that may be cast 
under the terms of all the voting securities of the class that are 
issued and outstanding (expressed as a percentage).
    Commenters argued that the Board should not include two voting 
ownership tests and should only calculate voting ownership based on 
voting power not on number of voting securities owned.
    The final rule is generally consistent with the proposal. 
Considering both voting power and number of voting securities is 
consistent with the text of the BHC Act, the legislative history, and 
Board precedents. This method of calculation also prevents evasion 
through the use of securities with different voting power.

D. Calculation of Total Equity Percentage

    The proposal provided a methodology for calculating a company's 
total equity percentage in a second company that was a stock 
corporation that prepared financial statements according to GAAP. The 
first step to calculate a company's total equity in a second company 
was to determine the percentage of each class of voting and nonvoting 
common or preferred stock issued by the second company that the first 
company controlled.\74\ The second step was to multiply the percentage 
of each class of stock controlled by the first company by the value of 
shareholders' equity allocated to the class of stock under GAAP, with 
retained earnings allocated to common stock. The third and final step 
was to divide the first company's dollars of shareholders' equity by 
the total shareholders' equity of the second company, as determined 
under GAAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ For this purpose, all classes of common stock--whether 
voting or nonvoting--were treated as a single class. If certain 
classes of common stock had different economic interests per share 
in the issuing company, the number of shares of common stock was 
adjusted to equalize the economic interest per share.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal also provided adjustments to this general standard for 
more complex structures. For example, a first company was considered to 
control all equity securities controlled by its subsidiaries. The 
proposal also provided that a first company controls a pro rata share 
of equity securities controlled by a non-subsidiary of the first 
company.
    Under the proposal, the total equity calculation methodology 
applied by its terms only to stock corporations that prepare financials 
under GAAP. However, the proposed rule indicated that the Board 
generally would apply the methodology in other circumstances as well, 
to the extent appropriate.
    The proposal also included several anti-evasion provisions. 
Specifically, where a company controlled debt of a second company that 
was functionally

[[Page 12416]]

equivalent to equity of the second company, the debt was counted as 
equity for purposes of the total equity calculation. The proposal 
provided a nonexclusive list of factors that the Board would examine in 
deciding whether to treat debt instruments as functionally equivalent 
to equity. These factors included treatment of the debt as equity under 
accounting, regulatory, or tax standards; subordination of the debt; or 
long maturity of the debt. Similarly, the proposal provided that other 
interests in a company beyond debt that were functionally equivalent to 
equity may be treated as equity.
    In addition to a methodology for calculating total equity, the 
proposal provided a standard for the frequency of measurement of total 
equity. Under the proposal, an investing company was required to 
calculate its total equity in a second company each time the investing 
company acquired control over additional equity interests of the second 
company or divested control of equity interests of the second company.
    Many commenters criticized the proposed total equity calculation 
methodology. In particular, commenters argued that it would lead to a 
first company being presumed to control a second company where the 
second company had negative retained earnings and the first company 
controlled preferred securities of the second company that included a 
liquidation preference. Several commenters recommended that retained 
earnings from start-up companies be excluded from the total equity 
calculation to avoid this problem. Some commenters alternatively 
recommended that the final rule include an exception for start-up 
companies where the total equity presumption would not apply for the 
first several years of a company's existence.
    Certain commenters suggested that the Board calculate total equity 
using a common stock equivalent method as an alternative to the 
proposed methodology. Some commenters argued that the Board should 
establish more flexible rules for investments by and in investment 
funds.
    Many commenters recommended that the Board not include debt 
instruments or other interests in the total equity calculation under 
the proposal's functional equivalence standard. Commenters argued that 
the standard was vague and could inhibit the use of certain common 
types of debt and other economic interests. At least one commenter 
suggested that the Board also provide that equity may be treated as 
functionally equivalent to debt under appropriate circumstances and 
thus excluded from total equity.
    Various commenters urged the Board to eliminate or restrict the 
scope of the provisions of the total equity methodology that required a 
company to include a pro rata share of equity securities held by a non-
subsidiary.
    One commenter suggested that the Board revise the frequency of 
recalculation of total equity to require recalculation only if a 
company acquires control over additional voting equity, or only if a 
company controls five percent or more of a class of voting securities. 
Some commenters recommended that the final rule require recalculation 
of total equity only when a company acquires equity, never in the case 
of divestiture of equity.
    The final rule's methodology for determining a company's total 
equity percentage in another company is largely consistent with the 
proposal. The Board believes that the GAAP-based core methodology of 
the final rule is effective, fit for purpose, well-understood, and easy 
to apply. The final rule includes a technical correction to the formula 
for total equity so that pari passu classes of preferred stock (i.e., 
classes of preferred securities of the same seniority in liquidation) 
are treated as a single class.
    The final rule includes without change the provision whereby debt 
or other interests may be treated as equity if the interests are 
functionally equivalent to equity. The Board expects to reclassify debt 
as equity under the rule only under unusual circumstances to prevent 
evasion of the rule. The list of debt features that support a 
reclassification as equity should not be understood to indicate that a 
debt instrument having any one of such features automatically would be 
treated as equity.
    In response to concerns raised by commenters, the final rule 
provides flexibility for excluding nominally equity instruments from 
total equity if the equity instruments are determined to be 
functionally equivalent to debt. The final rule also includes a non-
exclusive list of characteristics that could indicate that an equity 
instrument may be functionally equivalent to debt, such as protections 
generally provided to creditors, a limited term, a fixed rate of return 
or a variable rate of return linked to a reference interest rate, 
classification as debt for tax purposes, or classification as debt for 
accounting purposes.\75\ This provision is intended to provide 
flexibility for unusual structures and is expected to be used rarely. 
Companies should consult with the Board or its staff in order to 
determine whether equity instruments would be excluded from total 
equity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See, e.g., ASC 480-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule does not include the proposed provision that 
required a company to include a pro rata share of equity securities 
held by a non-subsidiary Accordingly, a company must include in the 
total equity calculation only equity securities it controls directly or 
indirectly through its subsidiaries.
    Also in response to concerns raised by commenters, the final rule 
requires calculation of total equity only when a first company acquires 
control over additional equity of a second company. The first company 
is not required to recalculate its total equity when it sells or 
otherwise disposes of equity of the second company. This change will 
prevent a divestiture from causing an increase in total equity due to 
balance sheet changes at the second company.

E. Limiting Contractual Rights

    Under the proposal, a company was presumed to control a second 
company if the first company had a contractual right that significantly 
restricts, or allows the first company to significantly restrict, the 
discretion of the second company over major operational or policy 
decisions.\76\ Such contractual provisions was defined as a limiting 
contractual right.
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    \76\ For purposes of this restriction, a contractual arrangement 
between the first company and a subsidiary of the second company, or 
between a subsidiary of the first company and the second company, 
could constitute a limiting contractual right of the first company 
over the second company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal provided examples of provisions that generally were 
considered limiting contractual rights and examples of provisions that 
generally were not considered limiting contractual rights. The examples 
included in the proposal were not intended to be a complete list of 
provisions that would or would not be considered limiting contractual 
rights. Rather, the provisions were meant as non-exclusive examples to 
provide transparency. The examples of limiting contractual rights 
listed in the proposal were:
     Restrictions on activities in which a company may engage, 
including a prohibition on (i) entering into new lines of business, 
(ii) making substantial changes to or discontinuing existing lines of 
business, (iii) entering into a contractual arrangement with a third 
party that imposes significant financial obligations on the company, or 
(iv) materially altering the policies or procedures of the company;

[[Page 12417]]

     Requirements that a company direct the proceeds of the 
investment to effect any action, including to redeem the company's 
outstanding voting securities;
     Restrictions on hiring, firing, or compensating senior 
management officials of a company, or restrictions on significantly 
modifying a company's policies concerning the salary, compensation, 
employment, or benefits plan for employees of the company;
     Restrictions on a company's ability to merge or 
consolidate, or its ability to acquire, sell, lease, transfer, spin-
off, recapitalize, liquidate, dissolve, or dispose of subsidiaries or 
major assets;
     Restrictions on a company's ability to make significant 
investments or expenditures;
     Requirements that a company achieve or maintain certain 
fundamental financial targets, such as a debt-to-equity ratio, a net 
worth requirement, a liquidity target, or a working capital 
requirement;
     Requirements that a company not exceed a specified 
percentage of classified assets or non-performing loans;
     Restrictions on a company's ability to pay or not pay 
dividends, change its dividend payment rate on any class of securities, 
redeem senior instruments, or make voluntary prepayment of 
indebtedness;
     Restrictions on a company's ability to authorize or issue 
additional junior equity or debt securities, or amend the terms of any 
equity or debt securities issued by the company;
     Restrictions on a company's ability to engage in a public 
offering or to list or de-list securities on an exchange;
     Restrictions on a company's ability to amend its articles 
of incorporation or by-laws, other than limited restrictions that are 
solely defensive for the investor;
     Restrictions on the removal or selection of any 
independent accountant, auditor, or investment banker; or
     Restrictions on a company's ability to alter significantly 
accounting methods and policies, or its regulatory, tax, or corporate 
status, such as converting from a stock corporation to a limited 
liability company.
    The proposal's examples of contractual provisions that generally 
would not be limiting contractual rights were:
     A restriction on a company's ability to issue securities 
senior to the securities owned by the investor;
     A requirement that a company provide the investor with 
financial reports of the type ordinarily available to common 
stockholders;
     A requirement that a company maintain its corporate 
existence;
     A requirement that a company consult with the investor on 
a reasonable periodic basis;
     A requirement that a company comply with applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements;
     A requirement that a company provide the investor with 
notice of the occurrence of material events affecting the company or 
its significant assets;
     A market standard ``most-favored nation'' requirement that 
the investor receive similar contractual rights as those held by other 
investors in a company; or
     Drag-along rights, tag-along rights, rights of first or 
last refusal, or stock transfer restrictions related to preservation of 
tax benefits of a company, such as S-corporation status and tax carry 
forwards, or other similar rights.
    Commenters suggested that the scope of the definition of limiting 
contractual rights might be inconsistent with past precedent. Many 
commenters argued that the list of limiting contractual rights was 
overly broad and encompassed many standard investor protection rights. 
In addition, many commenters argued that the open-ended definition of 
limiting contractual right to include any right that restricts or 
allows one company to exert significant influence over another was 
overly vague.
    In addition, commenters objected to including within the scope of 
limiting contractual rights various of the examples provided, including 
limits on: The second company's ability to enter into new lines of 
business; how the second company directs the proceeds of investments; 
the second company's ability to incur additional debt or raise 
additional equity; requirements that the second company maintain a 
particular financial ratio; the second company's ability to amend the 
terms of its debt or equity securities; the second company's ability to 
engage in a public offering, or to list or de-list securities on an 
exchange; the second company's ability to merge or consolidate with 
another company; the second company's ability to dispose of material 
subsidiaries or assets; and the second company's ability to alter its 
accounting methods or policies or its regulatory, tax, or liability 
status.
    The final rule's definition of a limiting contractual right is 
generally consistent with the proposal. Limiting contractual rights are 
important indicia of controlling influence. In particular, limiting 
contractual rights provide a means for a company to cause or prevent 
otherwise permissible actions by another company, independent of the 
first company's exercise of its voting rights as a shareholder in the 
second company. Using such contractual rights, a company that has 
relatively low voting power may effectively control another company's 
decisions over important actions, or at least have influence over such 
decisions well beyond what the first company's voting power would 
provide.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Such limiting contractual rights also may raise safety and 
soundness concerns by restricting the ability of a company to take 
appropriate actions to address supervisory issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The variety of forms that limiting contractual rights may take 
makes the functional definition included in the final rule preferable 
to a prescriptive definition. The final rule, consistent with the 
proposal, includes lists of contractual rights that generally would or 
would not be considered limiting contractual rights in order to provide 
additional clarity around the specific application of the definition. 
The lists of contractual rights reflect a distillation of the Board's 
past practice and current understanding of the types of contractual 
restrictions that likely would or would not raise controlling influence 
concerns. The lists of contractual rights have not been changed from 
the proposal, though the introductory text of each list has been 
revised to make it clear that the listed provisions are examples of 
what generally would or would not be considered a limiting contractual 
right. Whether or not a particular contractual right is a limiting 
contractual right depends on whether the contractual right meets the 
functional regulatory definition of a limiting contractual right.
    Commenters argued that a restriction on new lines of business 
should not be considered a limiting contractual right because such a 
restriction would help a bank holding company comply with the activity 
limitations in the BHC Act. Similarly, commenters argued that covenants 
to comply with the activities restrictions under the BHC Act or HOLA 
should not be treated as limiting contractual rights. Under the final 
rule, a contractual prohibition on engaging in particular activities is 
generally a limiting contractual right. However, the Board notes that a 
contractual provision that provides a reasonable and non-punitive 
mechanism for an investing company to reduce its investment to comply 
with the activities restrictions of the BHC Act or HOLA generally would 
not be a limiting contractual right.
    One commenter asked the Board to clarify whether a contractual 
right restricting ``materially altering policies

[[Page 12418]]

or procedures'' would qualify as a limiting contractual right. A 
restriction of this type generally would be considered a limiting 
contractual right. It is similar to the example of a limiting 
contractual right provided in the final rule related to amendments to 
the articles or bylaws of a company.
    Commenters suggested that the right to information available to 
shareholders should be expanded to include access to information that 
is necessary or appropriate to allow the first company to monitor its 
investment and to monitor regulatory, legal, or other requirements or 
standards, including the presumptions of control in the final rule. In 
the Board's view, an investor's right to access information regarding 
the relationship between the investor and the investee company, such as 
the information necessary to determine the application of the 
presumptions of control, generally would not be considered a limiting 
contractual right. In addition, the final rule has been revised to 
clarify that a contractual right to information ordinarily available to 
common shareholders, whether or not the information is financial in 
nature, is generally not a limiting contractual right.
    Commenters also argued that the presumption of control based on 
limiting contractual rights should be revised so that the presumption 
does not apply if the first company cannot exercise the right 
unilaterally or if the first company is not the largest single decider 
of the exercise of the right. One commenter sought clarification as to 
whether, and in what circumstances, voting rights exercised by a group 
of investors (such as a voting right that can only be exercised by 
certain preferred shareholders) would be treated as a limiting 
contractual right. To avoid undue complexity, the final rule does not 
specifically address contractual provisions that incorporate elements 
of voting by requiring agreement of a certain percentage of certain 
parties. Companies with questions on a particular limiting contractual 
right may contact the Board or its staff to address the specific 
situation.
    In addition, commenters expressed concern that the proposal would 
treat standard loan or bond covenants as limiting contractual rights. 
Commenters argued that treating loan covenants as limiting contractual 
rights would make it impossible for a bank to make a loan to another 
company if its affiliate had also made an equity investment in that 
company. Some commenters argued that standard loan covenants should not 
trigger a presumption of control when they are on market terms, there 
are multiple lenders, and the first company has less than 15 percent 
voting power in the second company. The final rule does not include any 
revisions in response to these comments. In the Board's view, a 
contractual provision that significantly restricts a company's 
discretion over operational and policy decisions ought to be treated as 
a limiting contractual right in the final rule. Whether or not the 
limiting contractual right is embedded in a market-standard loan 
agreement does not affect the influence the limiting contractual right 
provides the holder of the right. The Board generally has controlling 
influence concerns when a company, directly or indirectly, both 
controls a material amount of voting securities of another company and 
has the ability to significantly restrict the discretion of the other 
company over operational or policy decisions by contract.

F. Director Representatives

    As discussed, the Board has long taken the position that director 
representatives of a company serving on the board of directors of a 
second company are an avenue through which the first company may 
exercise a controlling influence over the second company. To provide 
more clarity on when the Board deems an individual to be a director 
representative of a company, the proposal defined director 
representative to be any director who (i) is a current director, 
employee, or agent of the company; (ii) was a director, employee, or 
agent of the company within the preceding two years; or (iii) is an 
immediate family member of an individual who is a current director, 
employee, or agent of the company, or was a director, employee, or 
agent of the company within the preceding two years. In addition, the 
proposal provided that a director is a director representative of a 
first company if the director was proposed to serve as a director by 
the first company, whether by exercise of a contractual right or 
otherwise. The proposal also specified that a nonvoting observer is not 
a director representative.
    Some commenters suggested that the definition of a director 
representative was too broad and could include directors over which the 
first company did not have substantial influence. In particular, some 
commenters contended that director representatives should not include 
individuals elected to the board of directors of a mutual fund by a 
first company if the director representatives are independent of the 
first company.
    A few commenters expressed concern that the proposed definition 
might mean that the Board would attribute a director to a company if 
the company merely suggested the name of the director to a nominating 
committee. Some commenters also expressed concern about the ambiguity 
of treating ``agents'' of a company as director representatives and 
requested that the Board define the term agent in this context.
    Several commenters argued that the definition of director 
representative should include only former directors of the first 
company and should not include former employees. Similarly, some 
commenters suggested that a company should only be attributed a former 
officer, director, or employee if the individual became a director of 
the second company while still an officer, director, or employee of the 
first company.
    Some commenters argued that the inclusion of immediate family 
members of directors, employees, and agents of the first company was 
too broad and would create compliance difficulties, especially with 
respect to employees of large companies. These commenters argued that 
the immediate family member prong ought to be removed from the 
definition of director representative.
    In response to the comments received, the Board is substantially 
amending the definition of a director representative to be more 
functional and more narrow. Specifically, under the final rule, 
``director representative'' is defined as an individual that represents 
the interests of a first company through service on the board of 
directors of a second company. The final rule then provides a non-
exclusive list of examples of persons who generally would be considered 
to be director representatives for purposes of the final rule: (i) 
Individuals who are officers, employees, or directors of the first 
company, (ii) individuals who were officers, employees, or directors of 
the first company within the preceding two years, and (iii) individuals 
who were nominated or proposed by the first company to be directors of 
the second company. Companies may contact the Board or its staff for 
guidance in determining whether or not a particular individual would be 
considered to be a director representative for purposes of the final 
rule.

G. Investment Advisers

    The proposal defined investment adviser for purposes of the 
proposed presumptions to mean a company that is registered as an 
investment adviser with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act,\78\ 
a company registered

[[Page 12419]]

with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') as a commodity 
trading adviser under the Commodity Exchange Act,\79\ a company that is 
a foreign equivalent of an investment adviser or commodity trading 
adviser registered with the SEC or CFTC, respectively, or a company 
that engages in any of the activities set forth in section 
225.28(b)(6)(i) through (iv) of the Board's Regulation Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.
    \79\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board did not receive comments specifically on the definition 
of investment adviser, although the Board did receive comments on the 
presumption of control based on investment advisory relationships. The 
comments on the presumption of control based on investment advisory 
relationships are discussed earlier in this preamble. The final rule 
adopts the definition of investment adviser as proposed.

IV. Application to Savings and Loan Holding Companies

    As noted, the proposal applied equally to bank holding companies 
and savings and loan holding companies to the maximum extent permitted 
by law. HOLA defines control in a substantially similar manner as the 
BHC Act.\80\ The Board previously recognized that the statutory control 
framework under the BHC Act and HOLA are nearly identical and 
determined to apply matching procedures for reviewing controlling 
influence cases involving savings and loan holding companies under 
Regulation LL as apply to bank holding companies under Regulation 
Y.\81\ Consistent with this principle, the proposal incorporated the 
proposed control presumptions and related revisions into the Board's 
Regulation LL for savings and loan holding companies in essentially the 
same manner as into the Board's Regulation Y for bank holding 
companies. The Board is also amending portions of subpart A of 
Regulation LL to incorporate current Sec.  238.9 into Sec.  238.8. This 
does not any change requirements under these sections, but is merely a 
technical edit to make room for the new section Sec.  238.9 adopted by 
this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Compare 12 U.S.C. 1467a(a)(2) (HOLA) with 12 U.S.C. 
1841(a)(2) (BHC Act).
    \81\ 76 FR 56508, 56509 (Sept. 13, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Control Under HOLA Compared to the BHC Act

    Although controlling influence is defined similarly under HOLA and 
the BHC Act, there are several differences between the definitions of 
``control'' in each statute. Under HOLA, the definition of control 
applies to both individuals and companies controlling other companies, 
while control is limited to companies controlling other companies under 
the BHC Act.\82\ Under HOLA, a person controls a company if the person 
has more than 25 percent of any class of voting securities of the 
company, rather than 25 percent or more of any class of voting 
securities under the BHC Act.\83\ Unlike the BHC Act, HOLA specifies 
that a general partner of a partnership controls the partnership, a 
trustee of a trust controls the trust, and a person that has 
contributed more than 25 percent of the capital of a company controls 
the company.\84\ Further, HOLA does not include the BHC Act's 
presumption of noncontrol for a company with a less than 5 percent 
voting interest in another company.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ 12 U.S.C. 1467a(a)(2).
    \83\ 12 U.S.C. 1467a(2)(A)-(B) and 1841(a)(2)(A).
    \84\ 12 U.S.C. 1467a(2)(B)-(C).
    \85\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At least one commenter stated that the Board should confirm past 
decisions of the Office of Thrift Supervision indicating that 
contributed capital for purposes of HOLA was the same as total equity, 
or that the Board should otherwise clarify its interpretation of 
contributed capital for purposes of HOLA. One commenter suggested that 
the Board should seek additional public comment on its interpretation 
of contributed capital.
    In response to comments received on the proposal, the final rule 
has been revised to reflect that contributed capital for purposes of 
HOLA generally has the same meaning as total equity as used by the 
Board in the context of control under the BHC Act. As a result, the 
final rule differs from the proposal in several respects. Specifically, 
the final rule omits the concept of total equity from subpart C of 
Regulation LL because subpart C relates to questions of controlling 
influence and contributed capital is a separate part of the statutory 
definition of control under HOLA. The rules for calculating total 
equity under subpart D of Regulation Y reflect how the Board generally 
expects to measure contributed capital for purposes of HOLA and 
Regulation LL.

B. Revisions to Regulation LL

    Under the proposal, the Board included in Regulation LL the same 
presumptions and related amendments made to Regulation Y, with limited 
changes to reflect the relevant differences between control under the 
BHC Act and HOLA. The proposed defined terms were located in Sec.  
238.2 of Regulation LL. The proposed provisions relating to the 
calculation of the percentage of a class of securities controlled by a 
person were located in Sec.  238.9 of Regulation LL. The proposed 
provisions related to control proceedings, including the proposed 
presumptions of control and noncontrol, were located in subpart C of 
Regulation LL.
    The Board did not receive any comments specifically on how the rule 
amended Regulation LL, other than the contributed capital issue 
described previously. Accordingly, other than the provisions related to 
total equity and the placement of proposed Sec.  238.10 in Sec.  238.9 
instead, the final rule creates an essentially consistent control 
framework between Regulation Y and Regulation LL.

V. Additional Implementation Matters

Use of Passivity Commitments

    Some commenters suggested that the Board abandon its use of 
passivity commitments and clarify that such commitments are not needed 
going forward. Other commenters requested that the Board clarify 
whether it intends to continue to seek either the general passivity 
commitments or any of the specialized types of similar commitments. A 
few commenters also requested that the Board provide a process under 
which companies that have provided passivity commitments may obtain 
relief from the commitments to align to the control framework. Some 
commenters suggested that investors that had previously submitted 
passivity commitments to the Board should be allowed to increase their 
relationships with the target company without seeking relief from 
commitments so long as the increased relationships would not trigger a 
presumption of control under the final rule.
    The Board does not intend to obtain the standard-form passivity 
commitments going forward in the ordinary course. The Board will 
continue to obtain control-related commitments in specific contexts, 
such as commitments from employee stock ownership plans and mutual fund 
complexes, and in special situations.
    In the wake of the final rule, companies that have provided the 
standard form of passivity commitments to the Board may contact the 
Board or the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank to seek relief from these 
commitments. Absent unusual circumstances, the

[[Page 12420]]

Board expects to be receptive to such requests for relief.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Companies that have provided commitments in connection with 
TARP securities may also seek relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Application of the Final Rule

    Several commenters suggested that the Board's new control framework 
should only apply prospectively. Similarly, some commenters suggested 
that the Board grandfather all existing investments or more narrowly 
grandfather existing investments that had been reviewed by the Board or 
its staff. Some commenters advocated for a three-year phase-in period 
for foreign banking organizations so that these firms could make 
adjustments to their business practices to account for the final rule.
    The final rule provides additional information regarding the 
Board's views on questions of controlling influence, but it is 
generally consistent with the Board's current practice. As it is not a 
fundamental change to current practice, the final rule does not 
grandfather existing structures and does not provide a transition 
period to allow firms to conform existing investments. The Board does 
not expect to revisit structures that have already been reviewed by the 
Federal Reserve System unless such structures are materially altered 
from the facts and circumstances of the original review. To the extent 
that a company previously considered an existing relationship between 
two companies to not constitute control, the relationship was not 
reviewed by the Federal Reserve System, and the relationship would be 
presumed to be a controlling relationship under the final rule, the 
company may contact the Board or its staff to discuss potential 
actions.

VI. Administrative Law Matters

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521) (PRA), the Board may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number. The Board reviewed the final rule and 
determined that it does not create any new or revise any existing 
collection of information under section 3504(h) of title 44.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    An initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) was included in 
the proposal in accordance with section 603(a) of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA). In the IRFA, the 
Board requested comment on the effect of the proposed rule on small 
entities and on any significant alternatives that would reduce the 
regulatory burden on small entities. The Board did not receive any 
comments on the IRFA. The RFA requires an agency to prepare a final 
regulatory flexibility analysis unless the agency certifies that the 
rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Based on its analysis, and for 
the reasons stated below, the Board certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under regulations issued by the Small Business Administration, a 
small entity includes a bank, bank holding company, or savings and loan 
holding company with assets of $600 million or less and trust companies 
with total assets of $41.5 million or less (small banking 
organization).\88\ As of June 30, 2019, there were approximately 2,976 
small bank holding companies, 133 small savings and loan holding 
companies, and 537 small SMBs. The final rule may also have 
implications for additional entities that have material relationships 
with banking organizations; however, the scope of potentially affected 
entities and thus the extent to which affected entities are small 
entities under the regulations of the Small Business Administration, is 
not known.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See 13 CFR 121.201. Effective August 19, 2019, the SBA 
revised the size standards for banking organizations to $600 million 
in assets from $550 million in assets. 84 FR 34261 (July 18, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section, the final 
rule establishes a more detailed framework for the Board to determine 
whether a company has control over another company for purposes of the 
BHC Act and HOLA. The final rule consists of a series of rebuttable 
presumptions of control, a rebuttable presumption of noncontrol, and 
various ancillary items such as definitions of terms used in the 
presumptions. The presumptions of control generally would be consistent 
with the Board's current practice with respect to controlling 
influence, with certain targeted adjustments.
    A main impact of the final rule will be to enhance transparency to 
the public on the Board's views on controlling influence. The final 
rule most directly affects bank holding companies and savings and loan 
holding companies, though it also could impact state member banks and 
other companies with relationships with depository institutions and 
depository institution holding companies. However, the final rule 
generally will not impact banking organizations in the ordinary course; 
there are no regular compliance, recordkeeping, or reporting 
requirements associated with the final rule. Rather, the impact of the 
final rule will generally be in the context of certain types of 
significant transactions that companies may decide to engage in. In 
addition, any material impact would be concentrated in companies 
engaged in the particular types of investments where controlling 
influence is a concern for the parties involved, which is a narrow 
subset of all transactions banking organizations may be party to. For 
the reasons discussed above, the Board anticipates that any economic 
impact of the final rule, including on small banking organizations, 
will be a reduction of burden associated with structuring transactions 
to address control issues. Therefore, the Board does not expect the 
rule to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.

C. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act \89\ requires the Federal 
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules 
published after January 1, 2000. The Board have sought to present the 
final rule in a simple and straightforward manner, did not receive any 
comments on the use of plain language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ Public Law 106-102, section 722, 113 Stat. 1338, 1471 
(1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 225

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital 
planning, Holding companies, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Securities, Stress testing.

12 CFR Part 238

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Federal 
Reserve System, Holding companies, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Holding companies, Securities.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System amends 12 CFR chapter II as follows:

[[Page 12421]]

PART 225--BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND CHANGE IN BANK CONTROL 
(REGULATION Y)

0
1. The authority citation for part 225 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(13), 1818, 1828(o), 1831i, 1831p-
1, 1843(c)(8), 1844(b), 1972(1), 3106, 3108, 3310, 3331-3351, 3906, 
3907, and 3909; 15 U.S.C. 1681s, 1681w, 6801 and 6805.

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
2. In Sec.  225.2:
0
a. Remove the words ``bank or other company'' and add in their place 
``company'' wherever they occur in paragraphs (e) introductory text and 
(e)(1);
0
b. Revise paragraphs (e)(2) and (q)(2); and
0
c. Add paragraph (u).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:


Sec.  225.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) A company is deemed to control voting securities or assets 
owned, controlled, or held, directly or indirectly:
    (i) By the company, or by any subsidiary of the company;
    (ii) That the company has power to vote or to dispose of;
    (iii) In a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the company or any 
of its subsidiaries;
    (iv) In a fiduciary capacity (including by pension and profit-
sharing trusts) for the benefit of the shareholders, members, or 
employees (or individuals serving in similar capacities) of the company 
or any of its subsidiaries; or
    (v) According to the standards under Sec.  225.9 of this part.
* * * * *
    (q) * * *
    (2) Nonvoting securities. Common shares, preferred shares, limited 
partnership interests, limited liability company interests, or similar 
interests are not voting securities if:
    (i) Any voting rights associated with the securities are limited 
solely to the type customarily provided by statute with regard to 
matters that would significantly and adversely affect the rights or 
preference of the security, such as the issuance of additional amounts 
or classes of senior securities, the modification of the terms of the 
security, the dissolution of the issuing company, or the payment of 
dividends by the issuing company when preferred dividends are in 
arrears;
    (ii) The securities represent an essentially passive investment or 
financing device and do not otherwise provide the holder with control 
over the issuing company; and
    (iii) The securities do not entitle the holder, by statute, 
charter, or in any manner, to select or to vote for the selection of 
directors, trustees, or partners (or persons exercising similar 
functions) of the issuing company; except that limited partnership 
interests or membership interests in limited liability companies are 
not voting securities due to voting rights that are limited solely to 
voting for the removal of a general partner or managing member (or 
persons exercising similar functions at the company) for cause, to 
replace a general partner or managing member (or persons exercising 
similar functions at the company) due to incapacitation or following 
the removal of such person, or to continue or dissolve the company 
after removal of the general partner or managing member (or persons 
exercising similar functions at the company).
* * * * *
    (u) Voting percentage. For purposes of this part, the percentage of 
a class of a company's voting securities controlled by a person is the 
greater of:
    (1) The quotient, expressed as a percentage, of the number of 
shares of the class of voting securities controlled by the person, 
divided by the number of shares of the class of voting securities that 
are issued and outstanding, both as adjusted by Sec.  225.9 of this 
part; and
    (2) The quotient, expressed as a percentage, of the number of votes 
that may be cast by the person on the voting securities controlled by 
the person, divided by the total votes that are legally entitled to be 
cast by the issued and outstanding shares of the class of voting 
securities, both as adjusted by Sec.  225.9 of this part.

0
3. Section 225.9 is added to read as follows:


Sec.  225.9   Control over securities.

    (a) Contingent rights, convertible securities, options, and 
warrants. (1) A person that controls a security, option, warrant, or 
other financial instrument that is convertible into, exercisable for, 
exchangeable for, or otherwise may become a security controls each 
security that could be acquired as a result of such conversion, 
exercise, exchange, or similar occurrence.
    (2) If a financial instrument of the type described in paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section is convertible into, exercisable for, 
exchangeable for, or otherwise may become a number of securities that 
varies according to a formula, rate, or other variable metric, the 
number of securities controlled under paragraph (a)(1) of this section 
is the maximum number of securities that the financial instrument could 
be converted into, be exercised for, be exchanged for, or otherwise 
become under the formula, rate, or other variable metric.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a person does 
not control voting securities due to controlling a financial instrument 
if the financial instrument:
    (i) By its terms is not convertible into, is not exercisable for, 
is not exchangeable for, and may not otherwise become voting securities 
in the hands of the person or an affiliate of the person; and
    (ii) By its terms is only convertible into, exercisable for, 
exchangeable for, or may otherwise become voting securities in the 
hands of a transferee after a transfer:
    (A) In a widespread public distribution;
    (B) To the issuing company;
    (C) In transfers in which no transferee (or group of associated 
transferees) would receive 2 percent or more of the outstanding 
securities of any class of voting securities of the issuing company; or
    (D) To a transferee that would control more than 50 percent of 
every class of voting securities of the issuing company without any 
transfer from the person.
    (4) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a person that 
has agreed to acquire securities or other financial instruments 
pursuant to a securities purchase agreement does not control such 
securities or financial instruments until the person acquires the 
securities or financial instruments.
    (5) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a right that 
provides a person the ability to acquire securities in future issuances 
or to convert nonvoting securities into voting securities does not 
cause the person to control the securities that could be acquired under 
the right, so long as the right does not allow the person to acquire a 
higher percentage of the class of securities than the person controlled 
immediately prior to the future acquisition.
    (6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a preferred 
security that would be a nonvoting security but for a right to vote on 
directors that activates only after six or more quarters of unpaid 
dividends is not considered to be a voting security until the security 
holder is entitled to exercise the voting right.
    (7) For purposes of determining the percentage of a class of voting 
securities or the total equity percentage of a company controlled by a 
person that

[[Page 12422]]

controls a financial instrument of the type described in paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section:
    (i) The securities controlled by the person under paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (6) of this section are deemed to be issued and outstanding; 
and
    (ii) Any securities controlled by anyone other than the person 
under paragraph (a)(1) through (6) of this section are not deemed to be 
issued and outstanding, unless by the terms of the financial 
instruments the securities controlled by the other persons must be 
issued and outstanding in order for the securities of the person to be 
issued and outstanding.
    (b) Restriction on securities. A person that enters into an 
agreement or understanding with a second person under which the rights 
of the second person are restricted in any manner with respect to 
securities that are controlled by the second person, controls the 
securities of the second person, unless the restriction is:
    (1) A requirement that the second person offer the securities for 
sale to the first person for a reasonable period of time prior to 
transferring the securities to a third party;
    (2) A requirement that, if the second person agrees to sell the 
securities, the second person provide the first person with the 
opportunity to participate in the sale of the securities by the second 
person;
    (3) A requirement under which the second person agrees to sell its 
securities to a third party if a majority of security holders agrees to 
sell their securities to the third party;
    (4) Incident to a bona fide loan transaction in which the 
securities serve as collateral;
    (5) A short-term and revocable proxy;
    (6) A restriction on transferability that continues only for a 
reasonable amount of time necessary to complete an acquisition by the 
first person of the securities from the second person, including the 
time necessary to obtain required approval from an appropriate 
government authority with respect to the acquisition;
    (7) A requirement that the second person vote the securities in 
favor of a specific acquisition of control of the issuing company, or 
against competing transactions, if the restriction continues only for a 
reasonable amount of time necessary to complete the transaction, 
including the time necessary to obtain required approval from an 
appropriate government authority with respect to an acquisition or 
merger; or
    (8) An agreement among security holders of the issuing company 
intended to preserve the tax status or tax benefits of the company, 
such as qualification of the issuing company as a Subchapter S 
corporation, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 1361(a)(1) or any successor 
statute, or prevention of events that could impair deferred tax assets, 
such as net operating loss carryforwards, as described in 26 U.S.C. 382 
or any successor statute.
    (c) Securities held by senior management officials or controlling 
equity holders of a company. A company that controls 5 percent or more 
of any class of voting securities of another company controls all 
securities issued by the second company that are controlled by senior 
management officials, directors, or controlling shareholders of the 
first company, or by immediate family members of such persons, unless 
the first company controls less than 15 percent of each class of voting 
securities of the second company and the senior management officials, 
directors, and controlling shareholders of the first company, and 
immediate family members of such persons, control 50 percent or more of 
each class of voting securities of the second company.
    (d) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) 
through (c) of this section, the Board may determine that securities 
are or are not controlled by a company based on the facts and 
circumstances presented.

0
4. Subpart D is revised to read as follows:
Subpart D--Control and Divestiture Proceedings
Sec.
225.31 Control proceedings.
225.32 Rebuttable presumptions of control of a company.
225.33 Rebuttable presumption of noncontrol of a company.
225.34 Total equity.

Subpart D--Control and Divestiture Proceedings


Sec.  225.31   Control proceedings.

    (a) Preliminary determination of control. (1) The Board in its sole 
discretion may issue a preliminary determination of control under the 
procedures set forth in this section in any case in which the Board 
determines, based on consideration of the facts and circumstances 
presented, that a first company has the power to exercise a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of a second company.
    (2) If the Board makes a preliminary determination of control under 
this section, the Board shall send notice to the first company 
containing a statement of the facts upon which the preliminary 
determination is based.
    (b) Response to preliminary determination of control. (1) Within 30 
calendar days after issuance by the Board of a preliminary 
determination of control or such longer period permitted by the Board 
in its discretion, the first company against whom the preliminary 
determination has been made shall:
    (i) Consent to the preliminary determination of control and either:
    (A) Submit for the Board's approval a specific plan for the prompt 
termination of the control relationship; or
    (B) File an application or notice under this part, as applicable; 
or
    (ii) Contest the preliminary determination by filing a response, 
setting forth the facts and circumstances in support of its position 
that no control exists, and, if desired, requesting a hearing or other 
proceeding.
    (2) If the first company fails to respond to the preliminary 
determination of control within 30 days or such longer period permitted 
by the Board in its discretion, the first company will be deemed to 
have waived its right to present additional information to the Board or 
to request a hearing or other proceeding regarding the preliminary 
determination of control.
    (c) Hearing and final determination. (1) The Board shall order a 
hearing or other appropriate proceeding upon the petition of a first 
company that contests a preliminary determination of control if the 
Board finds that material facts are in dispute. The Board may, in its 
discretion, order a hearing or other appropriate proceeding without a 
petition for such a proceeding by the first company.
    (2) At a hearing or other proceeding, any applicable presumptions 
established under this subpart shall be considered in accordance with 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Board's Rules of Practice for 
Formal Hearings (12 CFR part 263).
    (3) After considering the submissions of the first company and 
other evidence, including the record of any hearing or other 
proceeding, the Board will issue a final order determining whether the 
first company has the power to exercise a controlling influence over 
the management or policies of the second company. If a controlling 
influence is found, the Board may direct the first company to terminate 
the control relationship or to file an application or notice for the 
Board's approval to retain the control relationship.
    (d) Submission of evidence. (1) In connection with contesting a 
preliminary determination of control

[[Page 12423]]

under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section, a first company may submit 
to the Board evidence or any other relevant information related to its 
control of a second company.
    (2) Evidence or other relevant information submitted to the Board 
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section must be in writing and may 
include a description of all current and proposed relationships between 
the first company and the second company, including relationships of 
the type that are identified under any of the rebuttable presumptions 
in Sec. Sec.  225.32 and 225.33 of this part, copies of any formal 
agreements related to such relationships, and a discussion regarding 
why the Board should not determine the first company to control the 
second company.
    (e) Definitions. For purposes of this subpart:
    (1) Board of directors means the board of directors of a company or 
a set of individuals exercising similar functions at a company.
    (2) Director representative means any individual that represents 
the interests of a first company through service on the board of 
directors of a second company. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2), 
examples of persons who are directors of a second company and generally 
would be considered director representatives of a first company 
include:
    (i) A current officer, employee, or director of the first company;
    (ii) An individual who was an officer, employee, or director of the 
first company within the prior two years; and
    (iii) An individual who was nominated or proposed to be a director 
of the second company by the first company.
    (iv) A director representative does not include a nonvoting 
observer.
    (3) First company means the company whose potential control of a 
second company is the subject of determination by the Board under this 
subpart.
    (4) Investment adviser means a company that:
    (i) Is registered as an investment adviser with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 
U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.);
    (ii) Is registered as a commodity trading advisor with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission under the Commodity Exchange Act 
(7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.);
    (iii) Is a foreign equivalent of an investment adviser or commodity 
trading advisor, as described in paragraph (e)(4)(i) or (ii) of this 
section; or
    (iv) Engages in any of the activities set forth in Sec.  
225.28(b)(6)(i) through (iv) of this part.
    (5) Limiting contractual right means a contractual right of the 
first company that would allow the first company to restrict 
significantly, directly or indirectly, the discretion of the second 
company, including its senior management officials and directors, over 
operational and policy decisions of the second company.
    (i) Examples of limiting contractual rights may include, but are 
not limited to, a right that allows the first company to restrict or to 
exert significant influence over decisions related to:
    (A) Activities in which the second company may engage, including a 
prohibition on entering into new lines of business, making substantial 
changes to or discontinuing existing lines of business, or entering 
into a contractual arrangement with a third party that imposes 
significant financial obligations on the second company;
    (B) How the second company directs the proceeds of the first 
company's investment;
    (C) Hiring, firing, or compensating one or more senior management 
officials of the second company, or modifying the second company's 
policies or budget concerning the salary, compensation, employment, or 
benefits plan for its employees;
    (D) The second company's ability to merge or consolidate, or its 
ability to acquire, sell, lease, transfer, spin-off, recapitalize, 
liquidate, dissolve, or dispose of subsidiaries or assets;
    (E) The second company's ability to make investments or 
expenditures;
    (F) The second company achieving or maintaining a financial target 
or limit, including, for example, a debt-to-equity ratio, a fixed 
charges ratio, a net worth requirement, a liquidity target, a working 
capital target, or a classified assets or nonperforming loans limit;
    (G) The second company's payment of dividends on any class of 
securities, redemption of senior instruments, or voluntary prepayment 
of indebtedness;
    (H) The second company's ability to authorize or issue additional 
junior equity or debt securities, or amend the terms of any equity or 
debt securities issued by the second company;
    (I) The second company's ability to engage in a public offering or 
to list or de-list securities on an exchange, other than a right that 
allows the securities of the first company to have the same status as 
other securities of the same class;
    (J) The second company's ability to amend its articles of 
incorporation or by-laws, other than in a way that is solely defensive 
for the first company;
    (K) The removal or selection of any independent accountant, 
auditor, investment adviser, or investment banker employed by the 
second company; or
    (L) The second company's ability to significantly alter accounting 
methods and policies, or its regulatory, tax, or liability status 
(e.g., converting from a stock corporation to a limited liability 
company); and
    (ii) A limiting contractual right does not include a contractual 
right that would not allow the first company to significantly restrict, 
directly or indirectly, the discretion of the second company over 
operational and policy decisions of the second company. Examples of 
contractual rights that are not limiting contractual rights may 
include:
    (A) A right that allows the first company to restrict or to exert 
significant influence over decisions relating to the second company's 
ability to issue securities senior to securities owned by the first 
company;
    (B) A requirement that the first company receive financial reports 
or other information of the type ordinarily available to common 
stockholders;
    (C) A requirement that the second company maintain its corporate 
existence;
    (D) A requirement that the second company consult with the first 
company on a reasonable periodic basis;
    (E) A requirement that the second company provide notices of the 
occurrence of material events affecting the second company;
    (F) A requirement that the second company comply with applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements;
    (G) A market standard requirement that the first company receive 
similar contractual rights as those held by other investors in the 
second company;
    (H) A requirement that the first company be able to purchase 
additional securities issued by the second company in order to maintain 
the first company's percentage ownership in the second company;
    (I) A requirement that the second company ensure that any security 
holder who intends to sell its securities of the second company provide 
other security holders of the second company or the second company 
itself the opportunity to purchase the securities before the securities 
can be sold to a third party; or
    (J) A requirement that the second company take reasonable steps to 
ensure

[[Page 12424]]

the preservation of tax status or tax benefits, such as status of the 
second company as a Subchapter S corporation or the protection of the 
value of net operating loss carry-forwards.
    (6) Second company means the company whose potential control by a 
first company is the subject of determination by the Board under this 
subpart.
    (7) Senior management official means any person who participates or 
has the authority to participate (other than in the capacity as a 
director) in major policymaking functions of a company.
    (f) Reservation of authority. Nothing in this subpart shall limit 
the authority of the Board to take any supervisory or enforcement 
action otherwise permitted by law, including an action to address 
unsafe or unsound practices or conditions, or violations of law.


Sec.  225.32   Rebuttable presumptions of control of a company.

    (a) General. (1) In any proceeding under Sec.  225.31(b) or (c) of 
this part, a first company is presumed to control a second company in 
the situations described in paragraphs (b) through (i) of this section. 
The Board also may find that a first company controls a second company 
based on other facts and circumstances.
    (2) For purposes of the presumptions in this section, any company 
that is a subsidiary of the first company and also a subsidiary of the 
second company is considered to be a subsidiary of the first company 
and not a subsidiary of the second company.
    (b) Management contract or similar agreement. The first company 
enters into any agreement, understanding, or management contract (other 
than to serve as investment adviser) with the second company, under 
which the first company directs or exercises significant influence or 
discretion over the general management, overall operations, or core 
business or policy decisions of the second company. Examples of such 
agreements include where the first company is a managing member, 
trustee, or general partner of the second company, or exercises similar 
powers and functions.
    (c) Total equity. The first company controls one third or more of 
the total equity of the second company.
    (d) Ownership or control of 5 percent or more of voting securities. 
The first company controls 5 percent or more of the outstanding 
securities of any class of voting securities of the second company, 
and:
    (1)(i) Director representatives of the first company or any of its 
subsidiaries comprise 25 percent or more of the board of directors of 
the second company or any of its subsidiaries; or
    (ii) Director representatives of the first company or any of its 
subsidiaries are able to make or block the making of major operational 
or policy decisions of the second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (2) Two or more employees or directors of the first company or any 
of its subsidiaries serve as senior management officials of the second 
company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (3) An employee or director of the first company or any of its 
subsidiaries serves as the chief executive officer, or serves in a 
similar capacity, of the second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (4) The first company or any of its subsidiaries enters into 
transactions or has business relationships with the second company or 
any of its subsidiaries that generate in the aggregate 10 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company, 
each on a consolidated basis; or
    (5) The first company or any of its subsidiaries has any limiting 
contractual right with respect to the second company or any of its 
subsidiaries, unless such limiting contractual right is part of an 
agreement to merge with or make a controlling investment in the second 
company that is reasonably expected to close within one year and such 
limiting contractual right is designed to ensure that the second 
company continues to operate in the ordinary course until the merger or 
investment is consummated or such limiting contractual right requires 
the second company to take an action necessary for the merger or 
investment to be consummated.
    (e) Ownership or control of 10 percent or more of voting 
securities. The first company controls 10 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company, and:
    (1) The first company or any of its subsidiaries propose a number 
of director representatives to the board of directors of the second 
company or any of its subsidiaries in opposition to nominees proposed 
by the management or board of directors of the second company or any of 
its subsidiaries that, together with any director representatives of 
the first company or any of its subsidiaries on the board of directors 
of the second company or any of its subsidiaries, would comprise 25 
percent or more of the board of directors of the second company or any 
of its subsidiaries;
    (2) Director representatives of the first company and its 
subsidiaries comprise more than 25 percent of any committee of the 
board of directors of the second company or any of its subsidiaries 
that can take action that binds the second company or any of its 
subsidiaries; or
    (3) The first company or any of its subsidiaries enters into 
transactions or has business relationships with the second company or 
any of its subsidiaries that:
    (i) Are not on market terms; or
    (ii) Generate in the aggregate 5 percent or more of the total 
annual revenues or expenses of the second company, each on a 
consolidated basis.
    (f) Ownership or control of 15 percent or more of voting 
securities. The first company controls 15 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company, and:
    (1) A director representative of the first company or of any of its 
subsidiaries serves as the chair of the board of directors of the 
second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (2) One or more employees or directors of the first company or any 
of its subsidiaries serves as a senior management official of the 
second company or any of its subsidiaries; or
    (3) The first company or any of its subsidiaries enters into 
transactions or has business relationships with the second company or 
any of its subsidiaries that generate in the aggregate 2 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company, 
each on a consolidated basis.
    (g) Accounting consolidation. The first company consolidates the 
second company on its financial statements prepared under U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles.
    (h) Control of an investment fund. (1) The first company serves as 
an investment adviser to the second company, the second company is an 
investment fund, and the first company, directly or indirectly, or 
acting through one or more other persons:
    (i) Controls 5 percent or more of the outstanding securities of any 
class of voting securities of the second company; or
    (ii) Controls 25 percent or more of the total equity of the second 
company.
    (2) The presumption of control in paragraph (h)(1) of this section 
does not apply if the first company organized and sponsored the second 
company within the preceding 12 months.
    (i) Divestiture of control. (1) The first company controlled the 
second company under Sec.  225.2(e)(1)(i) or (ii) of this part at any 
time during the prior

[[Page 12425]]

two years and the first company controls 15 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (i)(1) of this section, a first 
company will not be presumed to control a second company under this 
paragraph if 50 percent or more of the outstanding securities of each 
class of voting securities of the second company is controlled by a 
person that is not a senior management official or director of the 
first company, or by a company that is not an affiliate of the first 
company.
    (j) Securities held in a fiduciary capacity. For purposes of the 
presumptions of control in this section, the first company does not 
control securities of the second company that the first company holds 
in a fiduciary capacity, except that if the second company is a 
depository institution or a depository institution holding company, 
this paragraph (j) only applies to securities held in a fiduciary 
capacity without sole discretionary authority to exercise the voting 
rights of the securities.


Sec.  225.33   Rebuttable presumption of noncontrol of a company.

    (a) In any proceeding under Sec.  225.31(b) or (c) of this part, a 
first company is presumed not to control a second company if:
    (1) The first company controls less than 10 percent of the 
outstanding securities of each class of voting securities of the second 
company; and
    (2) The first company is not presumed to control the second company 
under Sec.  225.32 of this part.
    (b) In any proceeding under this subpart, or judicial proceeding 
under the Bank Holding Company Act, other than a proceeding in which 
the Board has made a preliminary determination that a first company has 
the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or 
policies of a second company, a first company may not be held to have 
had control over a second company at any given time, unless the first 
company, at the time in question, controlled 5 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company, or had already been found to have control on the basis of the 
existence of a controlling influence relationship.


Sec.  225.34   Total equity.

    (a) General. For purposes of this subpart, the total equity 
controlled by a first company in a second company that is organized as 
a stock corporation and prepares financial statements pursuant to U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles will be calculated as 
described in paragraph (b) of this section. With respect to a second 
company that is not organized as a stock corporation or that does not 
prepare financial statements pursuant to U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles, the first company's total equity in the second 
company will be calculated so as to be reasonably consistent with the 
methodology described in paragraph (b) of this section, while taking 
into account the legal form of the second company and the accounting 
system used by the second company to prepare financial statements.
    (b) Calculation of total equity--(1) Total equity. The first 
company's total equity in the second company, expressed as a 
percentage, is equal to:
    (i) The sum of Investor Common Equity and, for each class of 
preferred stock issued by the second company, Investor Preferred 
Equity, divided by
    (ii) Issuer Shareholders' Equity.
    (2) Investor Common Equity equals the greater of:
    (i) Zero, and
    (ii) The quotient of the number of shares of common stock of the 
second company that are controlled by the first company divided by the 
total number of shares of common stock of the second company that are 
issued and outstanding, multiplied by the amount of shareholders' 
equity of the second company not allocated to preferred stock under 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ If the second company has multiple classes of common stock 
outstanding and different classes of common stock have different 
economic interests in the second company on a per share basis, the 
number of shares of common stock must be adjusted for purposes of 
this calculation so that each share of common stock has the same 
economic interest in the second company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Investor Preferred Equity equals, for each class of preferred 
stock issued by the second company, the greater of:
    (i) Zero, and
    (ii) The quotient of the number of shares of the class of preferred 
stock of the second company that are controlled by the first company 
divided by the total number of shares of the class of preferred stock 
that are issued and outstanding, multiplied by the amount of 
shareholders' equity of the second company allocated to the class of 
preferred stock under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ If there are different classes of preferred stock with equal 
seniority (i.e., pari passu classes of preferred stock), the pari 
passu shares are treated as a single class. If pari passu classes of 
preferred stock have different economic interests in the second 
company on a per share basis, the number of shares of preferred 
stock must be adjusted for purposes of this calculation so that each 
pari passu share of preferred stock has the same economic interest 
in the second company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (c) Consideration of debt instruments and other interests in total 
equity. (1) For purposes of the total equity calculation in paragraph 
(b) of this section, a debt instrument or other interest issued by the 
second company that is controlled by the first company may be treated 
as an equity instrument if that debt instrument or other interest is 
functionally equivalent to equity.
    (2) For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the principal 
amount of all debt instruments and the market value of all other 
interests that are functionally equivalent to equity that are 
controlled by the first company are added to the sum under paragraph 
(b)(1)(i) of this section, and the principal amount of all debt 
instruments and the market value of all other interests that are 
functionally equivalent to equity that are outstanding are added to 
Issuer Shareholders' Equity.
    (3) For purposes of paragraph (c)(1) of this section, a debt 
instrument issued by the second company may be considered functionally 
equivalent to equity if it has equity-like characteristics, such as:
    (i) Extremely long-dated maturity;
    (ii) Subordination to other debt instruments issued by the second 
company;
    (ii) Qualification as regulatory capital under any regulatory 
capital rules applicable to the second company;
    (iii) Qualification as equity under applicable tax law;
    (iv) Qualification as equity under U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles or other applicable accounting standards;
    (v) Inadequacy of the equity capital underlying the debt at the 
time of the issuance of the debt; or
    (vi) Issuance not on market terms.
    (4) For purposes of paragraph (c)(1) of this section, an interest 
that is not a debt instrument issued by the second company may be 
considered functionally equivalent to equity if it has equity-like 
characteristics, such as entitling its owner to a share of the profits 
of the second company.
    (d) Exclusion of certain equity instruments from total equity. (1) 
For purposes of the total equity calculation in paragraph (b) of this 
section, an equity instrument issued by the second company that is 
controlled by the first company may be treated as not an equity 
instrument if the equity instrument is functionally equivalent to debt.

[[Page 12426]]

    (2) For purposes of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, an equity 
instrument issued by the second company may be considered functionally 
equivalent to debt if it has debt-like characteristics, such as 
protections generally provided to creditors, a limited term, a fixed 
rate of return or a variable rate of return linked to a reference 
interest rate, classification as debt for tax purposes, or 
classification as debt for accounting purposes.
    (e) Frequency of total equity calculation. The total equity of a 
first company in a second company is calculated each time the first 
company acquires control over equity instruments of the second company, 
including any debt instruments or other interests that are functionally 
equivalent to equity in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

PART 238--SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES (REGULATION LL)

0
5. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  5 U.S.C. 552, 559; 12 U.S.C. 1462, 1462a, 1463, 
1464, 1467, 1467a, 1468, 1813, 1817, 1829e, 1831i, 1972; 15 U.S.C. 
78l.

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
6. Amend Sec.  238.2 by revising paragraphs (e), (r)(2), and (tt) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  238.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (e) A person shall be deemed to have control of:
    (1) A savings association if the person directly or indirectly or 
acting in concert with one or more other persons, or through one or 
more subsidiaries, owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, or 
holds proxies representing, more than 25 percent of the voting shares 
of such savings association, or controls in any manner the election of 
a majority of the directors of such association;
    (2) Any other company if the person directly or indirectly or 
acting in concert with one or more other persons, or through one or 
more subsidiaries, owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, or 
holds proxies representing, more than 25 percent of the voting shares 
or rights of such other company, or controls in any manner the election 
or appointment of a majority of the directors or trustees of such other 
company, or is a general partner in or has contributed more than 25 
percent of the capital of such other company;
    (3) A trust if the person is a trustee thereof;
    (4) A company if the Board determines, after reasonable notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that such person directly or indirectly 
exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of 
such association or other company; or
    (5) Voting securities or assets owned, controlled, or held, 
directly or indirectly:
    (i) By the company, or by any subsidiary of the company;
    (ii) That the company has power to vote or to dispose of;
    (iii) In a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the company or any 
of its subsidiaries;
    (iv) In a fiduciary capacity (including by pension and profit-
sharing trusts) for the benefit of the shareholders, members, or 
employees (or individuals serving in similar capacities) of the company 
or any of its subsidiaries; or
    (v) According to the standards under Sec.  238.9 of this part.
* * * * *
    (r) * * *
    (2) Nonvoting securities. Common shares, preferred shares, limited 
partnership interests, limited liability company interests, or similar 
interests are not voting securities if:
    (i) Any voting rights associated with the securities are limited 
solely to the type customarily provided by statute with regard to 
matters that would significantly and adversely affect the rights or 
preference of the security, such as the issuance of additional amounts 
or classes of senior securities, the modification of the terms of the 
security, the dissolution of the issuing company, or the payment of 
dividends by the issuing company when preferred dividends are in 
arrears;
    (ii) The securities represent an essentially passive investment or 
financing device and do not otherwise provide the holder with control 
over the issuing company; and
    (iii) The securities do not entitle the holder, by statute, 
charter, or in any manner, to select or to vote for the selection of 
directors, trustees, or partners (or persons exercising similar 
functions) of the issuing company; except that limited partnership 
interests or membership interests in limited liability companies are 
not voting securities due to voting rights that are limited solely to 
voting for the removal of a general partner or managing member (or 
persons exercising similar functions at the company) for cause, to 
replace a general partner or managing member (or persons exercising 
similar functions at the company) due to incapacitation or following 
the removal of such person, or to continue or dissolve the company 
after removal of the general partner or managing member (or persons 
exercising similar functions at the company).
* * * * *
    (tt) Voting percentage. For purposes of this part, the percentage 
of a class of a company's voting securities controlled by a person is 
the greater of:
    (1) The quotient, expressed as a percentage, of the number of 
shares of the class of voting securities controlled by the person, 
divided by the number of shares of the class of voting securities that 
are issued and outstanding, both as adjusted by Sec.  238.9 of this 
part; and
    (2) The quotient, expressed as a percentage, of the number of votes 
that may be cast by the person on the voting securities controlled by 
the person, divided by the total votes that are legally entitled to be 
cast by the issued and outstanding shares of the class of voting 
securities, both as adjusted by Sec.  238.9 of this part.


0
7. Section 238.8 is amended by revising the section heading and adding 
paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.8   Safe and sound operations, and Small Bank Holding Company 
Policy Statement.

* * * * *
    (b) The Board's Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement (12 CFR 
part 225, appendix C) (Policy Statement) applies to savings and loan 
holding companies as if they were bank holding companies. To qualify or 
rely on the Policy Statement, savings and loan holding companies must 
meet all qualifying requirements in the Policy Statement as if they 
were a bank holding company. For purposes of applying the Policy 
Statement, the term ``nonbank subsidiary'' as used in the Policy 
Statement refers to a subsidiary of a savings and loan holding company 
other than a savings association or a subsidiary of a savings 
association.
    (c) The Board may exclude any savings and loan holding company, 
regardless of asset size, from the Policy Statement under paragraph (b) 
of this section if the Board determines that such action is warranted 
for supervisory purposes.


0
8. Section 238.9 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  238.9   Control over securities.

    (a) Contingent rights, convertible securities, options, and 
warrants. (1) A person that controls a security, option, warrant, or 
other financial instrument that is convertible into, exercisable for, 
exchangeable for, or otherwise may

[[Page 12427]]

become a security controls each security that could be acquired as a 
result of such conversion, exercise, exchange, or similar occurrence.
    (2) If a financial instrument of the type described in paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section is convertible into, exercisable for, 
exchangeable for, or otherwise may become a number of securities that 
varies according to a formula, rate, or other variable metric, the 
number of securities controlled under paragraph (a)(1) of this section 
is the maximum number of securities that the financial instrument could 
be converted into, be exercised for, be exchanged for, or otherwise 
become under the formula, rate, or other variable metric.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a person does 
not control voting securities due to controlling a financial instrument 
if the financial instrument:
    (i) By its terms is not convertible into, is not exercisable for, 
is not exchangeable for, and may not otherwise become voting securities 
in the hands of the person or an affiliate of the person; and
    (ii) By its terms is only convertible into, exercisable for, 
exchangeable for, or may otherwise become voting securities in the 
hands of a transferee after a transfer:
    (A) In a widespread public distribution;
    (B) To the issuing company;
    (C) In transfers in which no transferee (or group of associated 
transferees) would receive 2 percent or more of the outstanding 
securities of any class of voting securities of the issuing company; or
    (D) To a transferee that would control more than 50 percent of 
every class of voting securities of the issuing company without any 
transfer from the person.
    (4) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a person that 
has agreed to acquire securities or other financial instruments 
pursuant to a securities purchase agreement does not control such 
securities or financial instruments until the person acquires the 
securities or financial instruments.
    (5) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a right that 
provides a person the ability to acquire securities in future issuances 
or to convert nonvoting securities into voting securities does not 
cause the person to control the securities that could be acquired under 
the right, so long as the right does not allow the person to acquire a 
higher percentage of the class of securities than the person controlled 
immediately prior to the future acquisition.
    (6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a preferred 
security that would be a nonvoting security but for a right to vote on 
directors that activates only after six or more quarters of unpaid 
dividends is not considered to be a voting security until the security 
holder is entitled to exercise the voting right.
    (7) For purposes of determining the percentage of a class of voting 
securities of a company controlled by a person that controls a 
financial instrument of the type described in paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section:
    (i) The securities controlled by the person under paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (6) of this section are deemed to be issued and outstanding; 
and
    (ii) Any securities controlled by anyone other than the person 
under paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section are not deemed to 
be issued and outstanding, unless by the terms of the financial 
instruments the securities controlled by the other persons must be 
issued and outstanding in order for the securities of the person to be 
issued and outstanding.
    (b) Restriction on securities. A person that enters into an 
agreement or understanding with a second person under which the rights 
of the second person are restricted in any manner with respect to 
securities that are controlled by the second person, controls the 
securities of the second person, unless the restriction is:
    (1) A requirement that the second person offer the securities for 
sale to the first person for a reasonable period of time prior to 
transferring the securities to a third party;
    (2) A requirement that, if the second person agrees to sell the 
securities, the second person provide the first person with the 
opportunity to participate in the sale of the securities by the second 
person;
    (3) A requirement under which the second person agrees to sell its 
securities to a third party if a majority of security holders agrees to 
sell their securities to the third party;
    (4) Incident to a bona fide loan transaction in which the 
securities serve as collateral;
    (5) A short-term and revocable proxy;
    (6) A restriction on transferability that continues only for a 
reasonable amount of time necessary to complete an acquisition by the 
first person of the securities from the second person, including the 
time necessary to obtain required approval from an appropriate 
government authority with respect to the acquisition;
    (7) A requirement that the second person vote the securities in 
favor of a specific acquisition of control of the issuing company, or 
against competing transactions, if the restriction continues only for a 
reasonable amount of time necessary to complete the transaction, 
including the time necessary to obtain required approval from an 
appropriate government authority with respect to an acquisition or 
merger; or
    (8) An agreement among security holders of the issuing company 
intended to preserve the tax status or tax benefits of the company, 
such as qualification of the issuing company as a Subchapter S 
corporation, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 1361(a)(1) or any successor 
statute, or prevention of events that could impair deferred tax assets, 
such as net operating loss carryforwards, as described in 26 U.S.C. 382 
or any successor statute.
    (c) Securities held by senior management officials or controlling 
equity holders of a company. A company that controls 5 percent or more 
of any class of voting securities of another company controls all 
securities issued by the second company that are controlled by senior 
management officials, directors, or controlling shareholders of the 
first company, or by immediate family members of such persons, unless 
the first company controls less than 15 percent of each class of voting 
securities of the second company and the senior management officials, 
directors, and controlling shareholders of the first company, and 
immediate family members of such persons, control 50 percent or more of 
each class of voting securities of the second company.
    (d) Reservation of authority. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) 
through (c) of this section, the Board may determine that securities 
are or are not controlled by a company based on the facts and 
circumstances presented.


0
9. Subpart C is revised to read as follows:
Subpart C--Control Proceedings
Sec.
238.21 Control proceedings.
238.22 Rebuttable presumptions of control of a company.
238.23 Rebuttable presumption of noncontrol of a company.

Subpart C--Control Proceedings


Sec.  238.21   Control proceedings.

    (a) Preliminary determination of control. (1) The Board in its sole 
discretion may issue a preliminary determination of control under the 
procedures set forth in this section in any case in which the Board 
determines, based on consideration of the facts and circumstances 
presented, that a first company has the power to exercise a

[[Page 12428]]

controlling influence over the management or policies of a second 
company.
    (2) If the Board makes a preliminary determination of control under 
this section, the Board shall send notice to the first company 
containing a statement of the facts upon which the preliminary 
determination is based.
    (b) Response to preliminary determination of control. (1) Within 30 
calendar days after issuance by the Board of a preliminary 
determination of control or such longer period permitted by the Board 
in its discretion, the first company against whom the preliminary 
determination has been made shall:
    (i) Consent to the preliminary determination of control and either:
    (A) Submit for the Board's approval a specific plan for the prompt 
termination of the control relationship; or
    (B) File an application or notice under this part, as applicable; 
or
    (ii) Contest the preliminary determination by filing a response, 
setting forth the facts and circumstances in support of its position 
that no control exists, and, if desired, requesting a hearing or other 
proceeding.
    (2) If the first company fails to respond to the preliminary 
determination of control within 30 days or such longer period permitted 
by the Board in its discretion, the first company will be deemed to 
have waived its right to present additional information to the Board or 
to request a hearing or other proceeding regarding the preliminary 
determination of control.
    (c) Hearing and final determination. (1) The Board shall order a 
hearing or other appropriate proceeding upon the petition of a first 
company that contests a preliminary determination of control if the 
Board finds that material facts are in dispute. The Board may, in its 
discretion, order a hearing or other appropriate proceeding without a 
petition for such a proceeding by the first company.
    (2) At a hearing or other proceeding, any applicable presumptions 
established under this subpart shall be considered in accordance with 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Board's Rules of Practice for 
Formal Hearings (12 CFR part 263).
    (3) After considering the submissions of the first company and 
other evidence, including the record of any hearing or other 
proceeding, the Board will issue a final order determining whether the 
first company has the power to exercise a controlling influence over 
the management or policies of the second company. If a controlling 
influence is found, the Board may direct the first company to terminate 
the control relationship or to file an application or notice for the 
Board's approval to retain the control relationship.
    (d) Submission of evidence. (1) In connection with contesting a 
preliminary determination of control under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this 
section, a first company may submit to the Board evidence or any other 
relevant information related to its control of a second company.
    (2) Evidence or other relevant information submitted to the Board 
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section must be in writing and may 
include a description of all current and proposed relationships between 
the first company and the second company, including relationships of 
the type that are identified under any of the rebuttable presumptions 
in Sec. Sec.  238.22 and 238.23 of this part, copies of any formal 
agreements related to such relationships, and a discussion regarding 
why the Board should not determine the first company to control the 
second company.
    (e) Definitions. For purposes of this subpart:
    (1) Board of directors means the board of directors of a company or 
a set of individuals exercising similar functions at a company.
    (2) Director representative means any individual that represents 
the interests of a first company through service on the board of 
directors of a second company. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2), 
examples of persons who are directors of a second company and generally 
would be considered director representatives of a first company 
include:
    (i) A current officer, employee, or director of the first company;
    (ii) An individual who was an officer, employee, or director of the 
first company within the prior two years; and
    (iii) An individual who was nominated or proposed to be a director 
of the second company by the first company.
    (iv) A director representative does not include a nonvoting 
observer.
    (3) First company means the company whose potential control of a 
second company is the subject of determination by the Board under this 
subpart.
    (4) Investment adviser means a company that:
    (i) Is registered as an investment adviser with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 
U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.);
    (ii) Is registered as a commodity trading advisor with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission under the Commodity Exchange Act 
(7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.);
    (iii) Is a foreign equivalent of an investment adviser or commodity 
trading advisor, as described in paragraph (e)(4)(i) or (ii) of this 
section; or
    (iv) Engages in any of the activities set forth in 12 CFR 
225.28(b)(6)(i) through (iv).
    (5) Limiting contractual right means a contractual right of the 
first company that would allow the first company to restrict 
significantly, directly or indirectly, the discretion of the second 
company, including its senior management officials and directors, over 
operational and policy decisions of the second company.
    (i) Examples of limiting contractual rights may include, but are 
not limited to, a right that allows the first company to restrict or to 
exert significant influence over decisions related to:
    (A) Activities in which the second company may engage, including a 
prohibition on entering into new lines of business, making substantial 
changes to or discontinuing existing lines of business, or entering 
into a contractual arrangement with a third party that imposes 
significant financial obligations on the second company;
    (B) How the second company directs the proceeds of the first 
company's investment;
    (C) Hiring, firing, or compensating one or more senior management 
officials of the second company, or modifying the second company's 
policies or budget concerning the salary, compensation, employment, or 
benefits plan for its employees;
    (D) The second company's ability to merge or consolidate, or its 
ability to acquire, sell, lease, transfer, spin-off, recapitalize, 
liquidate, dissolve, or dispose of subsidiaries or assets;
    (E) The second company's ability to make investments or 
expenditures;
    (F) The second company achieving or maintaining a financial target 
or limit, including, for example, a debt-to-equity ratio, a fixed 
charges ratio, a net worth requirement, a liquidity target, a working 
capital target, or a classified assets or nonperforming loans limit;
    (G) The second company's payment of dividends on any class of 
securities, redemption of senior instruments, or voluntary prepayment 
of indebtedness;
    (H) The second company's ability to authorize or issue additional 
junior equity or debt securities, or amend the terms of any equity or 
debt securities issued by the second company;
    (I) The second company's ability to engage in a public offering or 
to list or

[[Page 12429]]

de-list securities on an exchange, other than a right that allows the 
securities of the first company to have the same status as other 
securities of the same class;
    (J) The second company's ability to amend its articles of 
incorporation or by-laws, other than in a way that is solely defensive 
for the first company;
    (K) The removal or selection of any independent accountant, 
auditor, investment adviser, or investment banker employed by the 
second company; or
    (L) The second company's ability to significantly alter accounting 
methods and policies, or its regulatory, tax, or liability status 
(e.g., converting from a stock corporation to a limited liability 
company); and
    (ii) A limiting contractual right does not include a contractual 
right that would not allow the first company to significantly restrict, 
directly or indirectly, the discretion of the second company over 
operational and policy decisions of the second company. Examples of 
contractual rights that are not limiting contractual rights may 
include:
    (A) A right that allows the first company to restrict or to exert 
significant influence over decisions relating to the second company's 
ability to issue securities senior to securities owned by the first 
company;
    (B) A requirement that the first company receive financial reports 
or other information of the type ordinarily available to common 
stockholders;
    (C) A requirement that the second company maintain its corporate 
existence;
    (D) A requirement that the second company consult with the first 
company on a reasonable periodic basis;
    (E) A requirement that the second company provide notices of the 
occurrence of material events affecting the second company;
    (F) A requirement that the second company comply with applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements;
    (G) A market standard requirement that the first company receive 
similar contractual rights as those held by other investors in the 
second company;
    (H) A requirement that the first company be able to purchase 
additional securities issued by the second company in order to maintain 
the first company's percentage ownership in the second company;
    (I) A requirement that the second company ensure that any security 
holder who intends to sell its securities of the second company provide 
other security holders of the second company or the second company 
itself the opportunity to purchase the securities before the securities 
can be sold to a third party; or
    (J) A requirement that the second company take reasonable steps to 
ensure the preservation of tax status or tax benefits, such as status 
of the second company as a Subchapter S corporation or the protection 
of the value of net operating loss carry-forwards.
    (6) Second company means the company whose potential control by a 
first company is the subject of determination by the Board under this 
subpart.
    (7) Senior management official means any person who participates or 
has the authority to participate (other than in the capacity as a 
director) in major policymaking functions of a company.
    (f) Reservation of authority. Nothing in this subpart shall limit 
the authority of the Board to take any supervisory or enforcement 
action otherwise permitted by law, including an action to address 
unsafe or unsound practices or conditions, or violations of law.


Sec.  238.22   Rebuttable presumptions of control of a company.

    (a) General. (1) In any proceeding under Sec.  238.21(b) or (c) of 
this part, a first company is presumed to control a second company in 
the situations described in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. 
The Board also may find that a first company controls a second company 
based on other facts and circumstances.
    (2) For purposes of the presumptions in this section, any company 
that is a subsidiary of the first company and also a subsidiary of the 
second company is considered to be a subsidiary of the first company 
and not a subsidiary of the second company.
    (b) Management contract or similar agreement. The first company 
enters into any agreement, understanding, or management contract (other 
than to serve as investment adviser) with the second company, under 
which the first company directs or exercises significant influence or 
discretion over the general management, overall operations, or core 
business or policy decisions of the second company. Examples of such 
agreements include where the first company is a managing member, 
trustee, or general partner of the second company, or exercises similar 
powers and functions.
    (c) Ownership or control of 5 percent or more of voting securities. 
The first company controls 5 percent or more of the outstanding 
securities of any class of voting securities of the second company, 
and:
    (1)(i) Director representatives of the first company or any of its 
subsidiaries comprise 25 percent or more of the board of directors of 
the second company or any of its subsidiaries; or
    (ii) Director representatives of the first company or any of its 
subsidiaries are able to make or block the making of major operational 
or policy decisions of the second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (2) Two or more employees or directors of the first company or any 
of its subsidiaries serve as senior management officials of the second 
company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (3) An employee or director of the first company or any of its 
subsidiaries serves as the chief executive officer, or serves in a 
similar capacity, of the second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (4) The first company or any of its subsidiaries enters into 
transactions or has business relationships with the second company or 
any of its subsidiaries that generate in the aggregate 10 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company, 
each on a consolidated basis; or
    (5) The first company or any of its subsidiaries has any limiting 
contractual right with respect to the second company or any of its 
subsidiaries, unless such limiting contractual right is part of an 
agreement to merge with or make a controlling investment in the second 
company that is reasonably expected to close within one year and such 
limiting contractual right is designed to ensure that the second 
company continues to operate in the ordinary course until the merger or 
investment is consummated or such limiting contractual right requires 
the second company to take an action necessary for the merger or 
investment to be consummated.
    (d) Ownership or control of 10 percent or more of voting 
securities. The first company controls 10 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company, and:
    (1) The first company or any of its subsidiaries propose a number 
of director representatives to the board of directors of the second 
company or any of its subsidiaries in opposition to nominees proposed 
by the management or board of directors of the second company or any of 
its subsidiaries that, together with any director representatives of 
the first company or any of its subsidiaries on the board of directors 
of the second company or any of its subsidiaries, would comprise 25 
percent or more of the board of directors

[[Page 12430]]

of the second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (2) Director representatives of the first company and its 
subsidiaries comprise more than 25 percent of any committee of the 
board of directors of the second company or any of its subsidiaries 
that can take action that binds the second company or any of its 
subsidiaries; or
    (3) The first company or any of its subsidiaries enters into 
transactions or has business relationships with the second company or 
any of its subsidiaries that:
    (i) Are not on market terms; or
    (ii) Generate in the aggregate 5 percent or more of the total 
annual revenues or expenses of the second company, each on a 
consolidated basis.
    (e) Ownership or control of 15 percent or more of voting 
securities. The first company controls 15 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company, and:
    (1) A director representative of the first company or of any of its 
subsidiaries serves as the chair of the board of directors of the 
second company or any of its subsidiaries;
    (2) One or more employees or directors of the first company or any 
of its subsidiaries serves as a senior management official of the 
second company or any of its subsidiaries; or
    (3) The first company or any of its subsidiaries enters into 
transactions or has business relationships with the second company or 
any of its subsidiaries that generate in the aggregate 2 percent or 
more of the total annual revenues or expenses of the second company, 
each on a consolidated basis.
    (f) Accounting consolidation. The first company consolidates the 
second company on its financial statements prepared under U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles.
    (g) Control of an investment fund. (1) The first company serves as 
an investment adviser to the second company, the second company is an 
investment fund, and the first company, directly or indirectly, or 
acting through one or more other persons, controls 5 percent or more of 
the outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the 
second company.
    (2) The presumption of control in paragraph (g)(1) of this section 
does not apply if the first company organized and sponsored the second 
company within the preceding 12 months.
    (h) Divestiture of control. (1) The first company controlled the 
second company under Sec.  238.2(e)(1) or (2) of this part at any time 
during the prior two years and the first company controls 15 percent or 
more of the outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of 
the second company.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (h)(1) of this section, a first 
company will not be presumed to control a second company under this 
paragraph if 50 percent or more of the outstanding securities of each 
class of voting securities of the second company is controlled by a 
person that is not a senior management official or director of the 
first company, or by a company that is not an affiliate of the first 
company.
    (i) Securities held in a fiduciary capacity. For purposes of the 
presumptions of control in this section, the first company does not 
control securities of the second company that the first company holds 
in a fiduciary capacity, except that if the second company is a 
depository institution or a depository institution holding company, 
this paragraph (i) only applies to securities held in a fiduciary 
capacity without sole discretionary authority to exercise the voting 
rights of the securities.


Sec.  238.23  Rebuttable presumption of noncontrol of a company.

    (a) In any proceeding under Sec.  238.21(b) or (c) of this part, a 
first company is presumed not to control a second company if:
    (1) The first company controls less than 10 percent of the 
outstanding securities of each class of voting securities of the second 
company; and
    (2) The first company is not presumed to control the second company 
under Sec.  238.22 of this part.
    (b) In any proceeding under this subpart, or judicial proceeding 
under the Home Owners' Loan Act, other than a proceeding in which the 
Board has made a preliminary determination that a first company has the 
power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or 
policies of a second company, a first company may not be held to have 
had control over a second company at any given time, unless the first 
company, at the time in question, controlled 5 percent or more of the 
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of the second 
company, or had already been found to have control on the basis of the 
existence of a controlling influence relationship.

    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, February 14, 2020.
Ann Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2020-03398 Filed 2-27-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P