[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 16 (Friday, January 24, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4276-4278]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-01177]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

[Case No. 18-BIS-0002]


Order Relating to Marjan Caby

    In the Matter of: Marjan Caby, 8500 SW 109th Avenue, Apt. 211, 
Miami, FL 33173, et al., Respondents.

    The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce 
(``BIS''), has notified Marjan Caby, of Miami, Florida, that it has 
initiated an administrative proceeding against her pursuant to Section 
766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (the 
``Regulations''),\1\ through the issuance of a Charging Letter alleging 
that Marjan Caby, Ali Caby, Arash Caby, AW-Tronics LLC, (``AW-
Tronics'') and Arrowtronic, LLC (``Arrowtronic'') (collectively, 
``Respondents'') violated the Regulations as follows:
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    \1\ The Regulations originally issued under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. 
III 2015) (``the EAA''), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The 
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was extended by successive 
Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in full force and 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 
U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the 
President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export 
Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While 
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for 
three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA 
provides, in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that 
were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect 
pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment 
(August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms 
until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. The 
Regulations are currently codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2018). The charged violation 
occurred in 2013-2014. The Regulations governing the violation at 
issue are found in the 2013-2014 versions of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774 (2013-2014)). The 2019 Regulations 
set forth the procedures that apply to this matter.
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Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy

    Beginning as early as in or about September 2013, and continuing 
through in or about March 2014, Respondents conspired and acted in 
concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about one or more acts 
that constitute a violation of the Regulations. The purpose and object 
of the conspiracy was to unlawfully export goods from the United States 
through transshipment points to Syria, including to Syrian Arab 
Airlines (``Syrian Air''), the flag carrier airline of Syria and a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT''), and in doing so evade 
the prohibitions and licensing requirements of the Regulations and 
avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement.
    Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the Regulations, a license is required 
for the export or reexport to Syria of all items subject to the 
Regulations, except food and medicine classified as EAR99. Furthermore, 
pursuant to Section 744.12 of the Regulations, a license is required to 
export or reexport items subject to the Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian 
Air was designated as an SDGT on May 16, 2013 (see 78 FR 32304, May 29, 
2013), under authority granted to the Department of the Treasury by 
Executive Order 13,224, and was at all times pertinent hereto (and 
remains) listed as an SDGT. At all pertinent times, AW-Tronics and 
Arrowtronic were active limited liability companies incorporated in the 
State of Florida. Documentary evidence and

[[Page 4277]]

email correspondence shows that AW-Tronics personnel represented to 
various transaction parties that AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic 
(collectively, ``AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic'') were the same company. Arash 
Caby was listed on Florida corporate records as a Managing Member of 
AW-Tronics at the time of the violations. From January 2014 until its 
most recent annual report in January 2017, Ali Caby was listed on 
Florida corporate records as the registered agent of AW-Tronics. AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic has maintained offices in Miami, Florida and Sofia, 
Bulgaria, as well as other locations.
    As part of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators used electronic mail 
(email) and other forms of communication to communicate with each other 
between the United States, Bulgaria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 
Syria. Under their scheme, co-conspirators would purchase from U.S. 
suppliers or vendors items subject to the Regulations for export to 
Syrian Air in Syria, including aircraft parts and equipment, and would 
provide materially false or misleading documents and information to 
conceal the illegal exports. In furtherance of the conspiracy, they 
also would arrange for payment for the illegal exports to be made using 
third-party companies to transfer payments between the co-conspirators. 
Overall, between in or about September 2013 and in or about March 2014, 
Respondents engaged in multiple transactions with Syrian Air involving 
the export of aircraft parts and equipment subject to the Regulations 
from the Miami office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic to Syrian Air's 
transshipment point in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. These items were 
actually intended for, and some or all were ultimately delivered to, 
Syrian Air in Syria.
    During the conspiracy, Ali Caby managed the Bulgaria office of AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby managed its Miami office, and 
Marjan Caby was its internal auditor. In furtherance of the conspiracy, 
each of these respondents exchanged numerous emails with other AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic employees authorizing or otherwise discussing the 
above-described exports to Syrian Air. These email communications 
included, for example, instructions that were designed to prevent U.S. 
law enforcement from detecting the unlawful exports to Syria and to 
allow them to continue by changing the routing of exports from AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic's Miami, Florida office. In March 2014, United 
States Customs and Border Protection seized a shipment of micro 
switches that, according to Electronic Export Information (EEI) filed 
in the Automated Export System, was destined for Syrian Air in the UAE, 
when, in fact, the ultimate destination was Syria. On March 5, 2014, 
Marjan Caby sent an email to AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic logistics 
employees, copying Alex Caby, that explained, ``We will . . . have 
packages stopped by the US Customs and Border Control [and] have a case 
file like this for the same client[,]'' and provided instructions 
stating, ``NOTHING WILL BE SHIPPED TO CLIENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 
THE USA OFFICE. WE HAVE TO SEND TO BG [Bulgaria] THEN TO CLIENT.'' 
(Emphasis in original). ``SYRIA'' was specifically listed as one 
country for which Respondents would use Bulgaria as a transshipment 
point. (Same). doing, Ali Caby, a/k/a Alex Caby, Arash Caby, a/k/a 
``Axel'' Caby, Marjan Caby, AW-Tronics, LLC, and Arrowtronic, LLC 
violated Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations, for which they are 
jointly and severally liable.
    Whereas, BIS and Marjan Caby have entered into a Settlement 
Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby 
they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and 
conditions set forth therein;
    Whereas, I have taken into consideration the plea agreement entered 
into by Marjan Caby with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern 
District of Florida, and the sentence imposed against her following or 
upon the entry of her guilty plea and conviction (``the plea agreement 
and sentence''); and
    Whereas, I have approved of the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
    It is therefore ordered:
    First, for the period of four (4) years from the date of this 
Order, Marjan Caby, with a last known address of 8500 SW 109th Avenue, 
Apt. 211, Miami, FL 33173, and when acting for or on her behalf, her 
successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the ``Denied Person''), may not, directly 
or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any 
commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as ``item'') exported to or to be exported from the United States that 
is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the 
Regulations, including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license 
exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any 
other activity subject to the Regulations; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.
    Second, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item 
subject to the Regulations;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or 
control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be 
exported from the United States, including financing or other support 
activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires 
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to 
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the 
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States, or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the 
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States 
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or 
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or 
controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any 
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from 
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means 
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
    Third, any licenses issued under the Regulations in which Marjan 
Caby has an interest as of the date of this Order shall be revoked by 
BIS.
    Fourth, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in 
Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to the Denied Person by affiliation, 
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of 
trade or related services

[[Page 4278]]

may also be made subject to the provisions of the Order.
    Fifth, Marjan Caby shall not take any action or make or permit to 
be made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the 
allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order.
    Sixth, the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and this 
Order shall be made available to the public.
    Seventh, this Order shall be served on Marjan Caby and shall be 
published in the Federal Register.
    This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this 
matter related to Marjan Caby, is effective immediately.

    Issued this 17th day of January, 2020.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020-01177 Filed 1-23-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P