[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 15 (Thursday, January 23, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 3860-3867]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-01026]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 72
[Docket No. PRM-72-8; NRC-2018-0017]
Requirements for the Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM), submitted by Raymond Lutz and Citizens
Oversight, Inc. (the petitioners), dated January 2, 2018. The
petitioners requested that the NRC amend its regulations regarding
spent nuclear fuel storage systems to embrace the Hardened Extended-
life Local Monitored Surface Storage (HELMS) approach and identified
multiple revisions to accommodate such an approach. The NRC is denying
the petition because the petitioners do not present information that
supports the requested changes to the regulations or that provides
substantial increase in the overall protection of occupational or
public health and safety. The NRC's current regulations and oversight
activities continue to provide for the adequate protection of public
health and safety and to promote the common defense and security.
DATES: The docket for PRM-72-8 is closed on January 23, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0017 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of
the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0017. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section
of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy McCartin, telephone: 301-415-
7099, email: [email protected], or Gregory R. Trussell,
telephone: 301-415-6244, email: [email protected]. Both are
staff of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Public Comments on the Petition
III. Reasons for Denial
IV. Availability of Documents
V. Conclusion
I. The Petition
Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking--requirements for filing,'' provides an
opportunity for any interested person to petition the Commission to
issue, amend, or rescind any regulation in 10 CFR chapter I. On January
2, 2018, the NRC received a petition from Raymond Lutz and Citizens
Oversight, Inc. The NRC
[[Page 3861]]
docketed this petition on January 22, 2018, and assigned it Docket No.
PRM-72-8. The NRC published a notice of docketing and request for
public comment on March 22, 2018 (83 FR 12504). The petitioners request
that the NRC amend 10 CFR part 72, ``Licensing requirements for the
independent storage of spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive
waste, and reactor-related greater than Class C waste,'' to embrace the
HELMS approach, for the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel.
The petitioners recommend a hardened storage system because they
state that the current storage systems are not equipped to resist
malicious attacks. The petitioners further state that the current
storage casks will corrode and crack and are not designed for
indefinite surface storage. However, the petitioners assert that spent
nuclear fuel will continue to be stored on the surface for very long
time periods, potentially indefinitely, due to the lack of a deep
geologic repository for permanent disposal. The NRC regulations provide
that storage casks can be initially licensed for up to 40 years with
possible renewals of up to 40 years, with no restriction on the number
of renewals. The petitioners assert this regulatory process creates an
indefinite timeframe, which they contend requires a storage system
designed for an extended life. For these reasons, the petitioners
recommend that all spent fuel storage systems have a design life of
1,000 years, which includes a ``passive life'' of 300 years. The
petitioners also assert that spent nuclear fuel needs to be moved to
local consolidated interim storage sites away from water resources and
dense populations. Additionally, the petitioners assert that the
storage casks need a more robust monitoring system, including
continuous monitoring during the initial 40 years.
The HELMS approach is discussed further in Section III, ``Reasons
for Denial,'' of this document.
II. Public Comments on the Petition
The notice of docketing of the PRM invited interested persons to
submit comments. The comment period closed on June 5, 2018, and the NRC
received 70 comment submissions from members of the public, interested
stakeholders, and industry groups. The discussion that follows
consolidates and summarizes the relevant issues. The public comments
are available in their entirety at www.regulations.gov under Docket ID
NRC-2018-0017. A list of the public comments and their respective ADAMS
Accession numbers is included in Section IV, ``Availability of
Documents,'' of this document.
The NRC received 58 comment submissions in support of the petition.
These commenters were opposed to indefinite storage, asserted that
casks are too thin, and supported double-wall canisters. Additionally,
many commenters supported the petitioners' recommendation for a 1,000-
year design life. Commenters stated that interim storage facilities can
be maintained for longer time periods with periodic replacement of the
casks and adequate resources and attention to maintaining the storage
facilities. Some commenters stated that a HELMS approach would address
imminent terrorist attacks as well as unpredictable events by moving
the waste to a half-dozen interim storage sites away from coastal areas
or waterways.
The NRC received four comment submissions from stakeholders and
industry groups that did not support the petition. In general, the
commenters asserted the petition is without merit, the petitioners'
suggestions are not supported by a technical basis, and costs were not
considered. The commenters argued that existing regulations and
oversight, including inspections, provide the necessary framework to
ensure the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. Additionally, the
commenters stated that the petitioners disregarded the NRC's experience
with spent fuel storage. One commenter noted that, in NRC's 2014 final
rule on the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel (79 FR 56251;
September 19, 2014), the Commission emphasized that the national policy
remains to dispose of spent fuel in a geologic repository and that the
petitioners did not provide a basis for revisiting the Commission's
policy decisions. The commenters also claimed that the petition
included factual inaccuracies; however, the commenters did not provide
specific information that the NRC could evaluate.
One commenter who opposed the petition noted that hardened onsite
storage would further fortify the structures with mounds of concrete,
steel, and gravel. This commenter believed that this would result in
the permanent-storage of spent nuclear fuel at the facility.
The NRC received a comment of general concern to stop the ``waste
burial'' at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The commenter stated
that money was being put before public safety but did not provide
specific information for the agency to evaluate.
The NRC also received several comment submissions that were outside
of the scope of this petition.
III. Reasons for Denial
A. General Discussion
The petitioners assert a mismatch now exists between the NRC
regulations for the storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry casks in 10
CFR part 72 and the status for the disposal and storage of spent
nuclear fuel today. The petitioners note that a geologic repository for
permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel does not exist. Additionally,
the petitioners state that storage of spent nuclear fuel at nuclear
plants for an indefinite period is allowed under the NRC's
regulations.\1\ The petitioners request many revisions to the 10 CFR
part 72 requirements and state these are needed to accommodate the
indefinite surface storage of spent nuclear fuel.
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\1\ The petitioners asserted that the NRC's 2014 final rule,
``Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,'' authorized indefinite
storage. As part of the development of the final rule, the NRC
prepared a generic environmental impact statement that analyzed the
environmental impacts of continued storage and provides a regulatory
basis for the rule. The final rule did not authorize the production
or storage of spent fuel, nor did it amend or extend the term of any
license.
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Although the 10 CFR part 72 regulations were developed at a time
when a geologic repository was expected to be operational in 1998,
extensive work has been done since the initial development of the
regulations to ensure that the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel
is safe and secure. This work includes revisions to 10 CFR part 72 and
the development of guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluation of
operational data collected nationally and internationally demonstrates
that the NRC's regulatory framework for the continued storage of spent
nuclear fuel provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of
public health and safety. The Commission described the basis for the
safety and security of continued storage most recently in the NRC's
2014 final rule on continued storage and accompanying NUREG-2157,
``Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel.'' In these two documents, the NRC discussed its current
regulatory framework for the storage of spent nuclear fuel as a basis
for the continued safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. The NRC explained
that:
1. Decades of operating experience and ongoing NRC inspections
demonstrate that the reactor and independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI) licensees continue to meet their obligation to
safely store spent fuel in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR
parts 50, 52, and 72.
[[Page 3862]]
2. The NRC continues to improve its understanding of long-term dry
storage issues and is separately examining the regulatory framework and
potential technical issues related to extended storage and subsequent
transportation of spent fuel for multiple ISFSI license renewal periods
extending beyond 120 years.
3. The NRC also is closely following Department of Energy and
industry efforts to study the effects of storing high burn-up spent
fuel in casks.
4. If the NRC were to be informed of or to identify a concern with
the safe storage of spent fuel, the NRC would evaluate the issue and
take whatever action or change in its regulatory program is necessary
to continue providing adequate protection of public health and safety
and promoting the common defense and security.
The NRC has determined that regulatory oversight will continue in a
manner consistent with the NRC's regulatory actions and oversight in
place today in order to provide for continued storage of spent fuel in
a safe manner until the fuel can be safely disposed of in a repository.
Since the publication of the 2014 final rule, the NRC has continued
to evaluate issues associated with the storage of spent nuclear fuel in
dry casks and has not identified any necessary changes to the
regulations based on the concerns raised by the petitioners.
Furthermore, the NRC routinely evaluates the safe storage of spent
nuclear fuel through operating experience and inspection findings. If
the NRC identified an area needing additional oversight, the NRC would
revise the regulatory requirements. After consideration of the
proposals presented by the petitioners, the rationale provided in the
NRC's 2014 final rule, and the evaluations discussed in this document,
the NRC finds the regulatory changes requested by the petitioners are
not needed to provide reasonable assurance that continued storage of
spent nuclear fuel in dry cask storage systems is safe and secure.
B. The HELMS Approach
The petitioners describe a strategy for the storage of spent
nuclear fuel and request changes to 10 CFR part 72 to implement a HELMS
approach. Therefore, the NRC's evaluation of the petitioners' requests
is structured according to this approach.
1. Hardened Storage
The petitioners assert that ``hardened'' storage is needed to
address concerns associated with safety (e.g., unpredictable natural
events such as earthquakes) and security (e.g., terrorist activity).
Safety (Natural Events)
The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR part 72 include both siting
requirements (subpart E, Siting Evaluation Requirements) and design
criteria (subpart F, General Design Criteria) that require an applicant
to evaluate the impact of natural events on the safety of dry cask
storage systems and facilities. In particular, 10 CFR 72.122 requires
that natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tornados, and floods) that
exist or that could occur at a proposed site must be identified and
assessed according to the potential to affect the safe operation of a
dry cask storage system and facility. The applicant or licensee must
assess the capabilities of the structures, systems, and components
important to safety to withstand the effects of the severe natural
phenomena and continue to perform their safety functions. For these
reasons, the NRC finds its regulations in 10 CFR part 72 provide an
adequate framework to evaluate the capabilities of dry cask storage
systems and facilities to withstand a wide range of extreme natural
events.
The petitioners also request that the NRC revise its regulations to
indicate that storage is preferable ``east of 104[deg] west longitude
so as to avoid the region of high-seismic activity west of this line.''
The NRC finds that this specific revision is not necessary. The
assessment of natural hazards required by 10 CFR part 72 provides data
on natural events, such as earthquakes, that are used in the siting of
dry cask storage facilities. The NRC regulations require assessment of
the hazards, which takes into consideration the specific facility
design and the magnitude of the seismic risk. This assessment
incorporates an understanding of how structures, systems, and
components relied on for safety are affected by the hazards for a
specific site and design.
The NRC is aware of the variability in the seismic risk across the
United States and incorporates these data in its regulations; 10 CFR
72.102 specifically identifies 104[deg] west longitude in the
requirements for geological and seismological characteristics.
Additionally, the NRC evaluated and revised the investigation of
seismic hazards for a spent nuclear storage facility in the 2003 final
rule, Geological and Seismological Characteristics for Siting and
Design of Dry Cask Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations and
Monitored Retrievable Storage Installations (68 FR 54143; September 16,
2003). The 2003 final rule revised 10 CFR part 72 to incorporate
changes to: (1) Utilize the experience gained in applying the existing
regulations and from recent seismic research; and (2) provide
regulatory flexibility to incorporate state-of-the-art improvements in
the geosciences and earthquake engineering into licensing actions.
These revisions improved the evaluation of seismic hazards but did not
categorically exclude regions solely on geographic location. The NRC's
regulations recognize that geographic areas west of approximately
104[deg] west longitude are known to have potential seismic activity
and provide specific requirements for the evaluation of seismicity in
these areas. The NRC, however, determined that the exclusion of storage
of spent nuclear fuel west of approximately 104[deg] west longitude is
unnecessary to ensure that seismic events are appropriately
investigated in the safety evaluation of storage of spent nuclear fuel.
Security (Terrorist Attacks)
The petitioners recommend that hardened storage such as ``an outer
building of sufficient strength to resist terrorist attacks'' also
should be considered to provide a measure of defense-in-depth.
The NRC provides security requirements for physical protection for
spent fuel storage and transportation in 10 CFR part 72, 10 CFR part
73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,'' and orders that
provide additional security measures. For example, the NRC's
regulations at 10 CFR 73.51 include security measures to minimize the
likelihood of a successful terrorist attack, including: (1) Spent
nuclear fuel must be stored only within a protected area so that access
requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, and
one of the barriers is required to offer substantial penetration
resistance; (2) the perimeter of the protected area must be subject to
continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm
system; and (3) the primary alarm station must be located within a
protected area and have bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and
floor.
Additionally, the NRC initiated several actions designed to provide
high assurance that a terrorist attack would not lead to a significant
radiological event at an ISFSI. These include: (1) Continual evaluation
of the threat environment by the NRC, in coordination with the
intelligence and law enforcement communities, which provides, in part,
the basis for the protective measures currently required; (2)
protective measures in place to
[[Page 3863]]
reduce the likelihood of an attack that could lead to a significant
release of radiation; (3) the robust design of storage casks, which
provides substantial resistance to penetration; and (4) NRC security
assessments of the potential consequences of terrorist attacks against
ISFSIs. Over the past 20 years, no known or suspected attempts have
taken place to: (1) Sabotage or to steal radioactive material from
storage casks at ISFSIs; or (2) directly attack an ISFSI. Nevertheless,
the NRC is continually evaluating the threat environment to determine
whether any specific threat to ISFSIs exists.
The NRC conducted security assessments for ISFSIs using several
storage cask designs that are representative of current NRC certified
designs. The results of these security assessments contain sensitive
unclassified information and therefore are not publicly available.
Plausible threat scenarios considered in the generic security
assessments for ISFSIs included a large aircraft impact similar in
magnitude to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and ground assaults
using expanded adversary characteristics consistent with the design
basis threat for radiological sabotage for nuclear power plants. Based
on these assessments, the NRC concluded there is no need for further
security measures at ISFSIs beyond those currently required by
regulation and imposed by orders issued after September 11, 2001. The
post-9/11 orders are not publicly available because they contain
safeguards information. Furthermore, the NRC is not aware of any threat
analyses that support requirements for additional hardening of spent
fuel casks.
2. Extended Life
To plan for indefinite storage, the petitioners request that the
regulations be revised to require that dry cask storage systems be
designed for a ``design life'' of 1,000 years, which includes a
``passive life'' of 300 years with a goal that during this period the
storage system ``will remain safe, contained, and shielded'' without
maintenance or other intervention. The petitioners describe a dual-wall
container as one approach for extended dry cask storage.
The petitioners recommend that several sections in 10 CFR part 72
be changed to implement the 1,000-year design life. The petitioners
suggest that a dual-wall container be required based, in part, on the
petitioners' position that the single-wall canisters currently used in
many storage system designs will inevitably be compromised due to
cracking. However, the petitioners emphasize that the HELMS proposal
does not rely on the adoption of this specific proposal, if the
extended-life criterion is satisfied (Petition Attachment page 6).
Under the current regulations, dry cask storage systems are
designed as passive systems, which rely on natural air circulation for
cooling, and are inherently robust, massive, and highly resistant to
damage. The NRC regulations at 10 CFR 72.128 and 72.236 specify
requirements for ensuring dry cask storage facilities and systems are
safe and will remain safe under normal, off-normal, and accident
conditions.
The license terms for spent fuel storage systems must not exceed 40
years, as specified at 10 CFR 72.42 for a storage installation and at
10 CFR 72.238 for an initial certificate for spent fuel storage casks.
However, a license or certificate may be renewed for a period not to
exceed 40 years and multiple renewals may be requested. The NRC has
determined that a 40-year licensing period, in conjunction with the
slow degradation rates of spent fuel storage systems, provides
reasonable assurance that significant storage, handling, and
transportation issues do not arise during a single license period.
Additionally, if information collected during a license period
identifies emerging issues and concerns, there would be sufficient time
to develop regulatory solutions and incorporate them into future
licensing periods. The NRC requires that the collection of appropriate
information and the implementation of aging management activities are
part of license renewals. These include: (1) Time-limited aging
analyses that demonstrate that the structures, systems, and components
important to safety continue to perform their intended functions; and
(2) aging management programs for specific issues known to be
associated with aging, which could adversely affect structures,
systems, and components important to safety.
The NRC determined its regulatory framework provides reasonable
assurance for the continued safe and secure storage of spent fuel.
Since the publication of NRC's 2014 final rule on the continued storage
of spent nuclear fuel (79 FR 56251; September 19, 2014) the NRC has
issued guidance that defines acceptable approaches to manage aging
during extended storage through inspections, monitoring activities, and
preventive actions. Two of the NRC's guidance documents addressing
aging management are: (1) NUREG-1927, Revision 1, ``Standard Review
Plan for Renewal of Specific Licenses and Certificates of Compliance
for Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel''; and (2) NUREG-2214, ``Managing
Aging Processes in Storage (MAPS) Report.'' The Standard Review Plan,
NUREG-1927, Revision 1, provides guidance for the staff's review of
general information, scoping evaluation information, and aging
management information in a renewal application. Specifically, the
Standard Review Plan addresses the review of time-limited aging
analyses and aging management programs to address issues associated
with aging, including aging management programs for welded stainless
steel canisters, reinforced concrete structures, and high burnup fuel.
The MAPS report, NUREG-2214, provides a generic evaluation of aging
mechanisms, which have the potential to undermine the ability of dry
cask storage systems' structures, systems, and components to fulfill
their important-to-safety functions. The MAPS report also updates the
NRC's aging management program guidance and discusses additional aging
management programs that were not described in NUREG-1927. For example,
the MAPS report discusses a program for managing the aging of bolted
cask storage systems, which is an alternative to welded canister-based
designs.
The NRC also developed a temporary instruction, NRC Temporary
Instruction 2690/011, ``Review of Aging Management Programs at
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.'' The temporary
instruction serves as an information-gathering activity and the
resulting data will be used to develop a new NRC inspection procedure
to evaluate licensees' performance of these aging management
activities.
The nuclear industry has recently contributed operational
information, data, and proposals to address extended storage. This
includes a system to collect and disseminate operating experience, for
use by aging management programs at storage sites. The industry has
also published guidance on developing aging management activities in
license renewal applications. This guidance is entitled ``Format,
Content and Implementation Guidance for Dry Cask Storage Operations-
Based Aging Management'' (NEI 14-03) and is being reviewed by the NRC
for endorsement. The NEI 14-03 provides a broad framework for
integrating feedback from dry cask storage operating experience,
research, monitoring and inspections into the management of aging-
related degradation for structures, systems, and components at ISFSIs.
Additionally, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
[[Page 3864]]
(INPO) implemented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Aging Management INPO Database that collects, aggregates, and shares
aging-related operating information to inform the aging management
programs of ISFSI licensees and certificate of compliance holders.
In addition to the activities mentioned above that generically
address extended storage, the NRC has undertaken research and guidance
development on more focused aging issues. Two focus areas are high-
burnup fuel and stress corrosion cracking of spent fuel storage
canisters.
The NRC recognizes that the cladding for high-burnup spent nuclear
fuel may be subject to aging mechanisms (e.g., hydride reorientation
and creep) due to its service history (e.g., time, temperature,
pressure) that could affect performance during handling, storage, and
transportation of spent fuel. Since the publication of the NRC's 2014
final rule on continued storage, the NRC continues to research the
effects of extended storage of high-burnup spent nuclear fuel, as part
of the NRC's effort to evaluate and update its regulations. In 2018,
the NRC published for comment NUREG-2224, ``Dry Storage and
Transportation of High Burnup Spent Nuclear Fuel.'' The NUREG-2224
report presents an engineering assessment of a wide range of recent
studies and activities evaluating the mechanical performance of high-
burnup spent nuclear fuel cladding. The studies evaluated in NUREG-2224
examined specific aspects of storage and transportation of high-burnup
spent nuclear fuel, including:
A study on fatigue strength provides data to allow for
more accurate assessments of the structural behavior of high-burnup
spent nuclear fuel under normal conditions of transportation and
hypothetical accident conditions, as well as dry storage system drop
and tip-over events (NUREG/CR-7198, Revision 1);
A study on how the characteristics of high-burnup spent
nuclear fuel could affect the mechanisms by which spent nuclear fuel
can breach the cladding and the amount of spent nuclear fuel that can
be released from the failed fuel rods (NUREG/CR-7203); and
Investigations of the fatigue and bending strength
performance of high-burnup spent nuclear fuel cladding in as-irradiated
and hydride-reoriented conditions (Wang et al.).
Stress corrosion cracking of spent fuel storage canisters is
another aspect of extended storage that has received significant NRC
and stakeholder attention. The nuclear community has undertaken
research and guidance development to understand this aging mechanism
and to develop inspection approaches, including the creation of new
rules for canister inspections in the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The nuclear industry,
Federal government, the Department of Energy national laboratories, and
suppliers of spent fuel dry storage systems participate in the Extended
Storage Collaboration Program (ESCP), which investigates aging effects
and mitigation options for the extended storage and transportation of
spent nuclear fuel. In 2015, the ESCP published, ``Susceptibility
Assessment Criteria for Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of
Welded Stainless Steel Canisters for Dry Cask Storage Systems.'' This
document summarizes the major factors that affect the susceptibility of
stainless steel dry storage canisters to atmospheric chloride-induced
stress corrosion cracking and identifies which dry cask storage systems
will most likely need inspections and enhanced monitoring programs to
detect the potential for initiation and propagation of chloride-induced
stress corrosion cracking. In 2017. the ESCP also published, ``Aging
Management Guidance to Address Potential Chloride-Induced Stress
Corrosion Cracking of Welded Stainless Steel Canisters.'' This document
provides guidance and recommendations for the development of an aging
management program to address the potential for chloride-induced stress
corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel canisters, with an
emphasis on evaluating and incorporating user-generated information and
operational experience, as they become available.
Significant work continues both nationally and internationally to
enhance the understanding of the degradation of dry cask storage
systems--including stress corrosion cracking of spent fuel storage
containers--as well as the inspection and collection of operating
experience. These efforts are consistent with the NRC's regulatory
approach to enhance understanding of potential degradation mechanisms
associated with dry cask storage systems. This enhanced understanding
assists the NRC with identifying potential concerns with the safe
storage of the spent fuel, with evaluating any such issues identified,
and taking necessary actions, up to and including issuing orders or
revising its regulations.
Although the petitioners request a long-lived waste package design
with the goal of no maintenance or other interventions for the initial
300 years, the petitioners request that the NRC retain its current
license term of up to 40 years for a certificate of compliance or
license in 10 CFR part 72. The petitioners express the opinion that dry
cask storage should be enhanced, but do not provide information to
support the claim that the NRC's regulatory approach for dry cask
storage is not safe and secure.
The NRC's current practice of renewing a certificate of compliance
or a license for no more than 40 years allows for new technical and
scientific information and operational data to be considered by the NRC
when it decides whether to approve the renewal of a license or
certificate of compliance. The NRC's licensing requirements in 10 CFR
part 72 provide for a robust storage system design. However, the 40-
year term does not mean a dry storage cask is no longer safe at the end
of the licensing period. The NRC has determined that to renew a spent
fuel storage cask design, the certificate holder or licensee must
assess the need for maintenance and/or monitoring in the future. In
NUREG-2157, the NRC evaluated environmental impacts by assuming ``the
replacement of dry casks after 100 years of service life; however,
actual replacement times will depend on actual degradation observed
during ongoing regulatory oversight for maintaining safety during
continued storage. Scientific studies and operational experience to
date do not preclude a dry cask service life longer than 100 years''
(NUREG-2157; page B-18). The NRC continues to evaluate aging management
programs and to monitor dry cask storage in order to update its
service-life assumptions and to identify and address circumstances that
could require repackaging of spent fuel earlier than anticipated.
If the repackaging of spent nuclear fuel becomes necessary, the
regulations in 10 CFR 72.236(h) require that spent fuel storage systems
be compatible with wet or dry spent fuel loading and unloading
facilities. If a storage canister needs to be opened, the licensee must
keep radioactive material confined, maintain the fuel in an arrangement
that does not cause a nuclear chain reaction, and shield the workers
and the public from radiation. The industry has decades of operating
experience with wet transfer of new fuel and spent fuel, which involves
spent fuel handling equipment and procedures that are similar to those
used in a dry transfer system. The NRC concluded the safe transfer of
spent fuel will occur regardless of whether a site maintains a
[[Page 3865]]
spent fuel pool (see Section 4.17.2 of NUREG-2157). Transfer operations
at existing facilities routinely maintain public and occupational doses
that are well within existing limits.
The NRC also notes the following design and operational
characteristics of spent fuel storage systems continue to support safe
storage of spent fuel:
Dry cask storage systems are designed as passive systems
that rely on natural air circulation for cooling and they are
inherently robust, massive, and highly resistant to damage.
Dry cask storage facilities and systems are designed to
remain safe under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.
The degradation rates of spent fuel storage systems are
sufficiently slow that significant storage, handling, and
transportation issues are not expected to develop during a single 40-
year license period.
If information collected during a license period indicates
any emerging issues and concerns, there would be sufficient time to
develop technical and regulatory solutions and incorporate them into
future licensing periods.
In summary, the NRC's regulatory approach uses the operational
experience and scientific information collected and assessed during
licensed operation to ensure the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.
The petitioners' proposal to specify a 1000-year lifetime for a storage
system is unnecessary, arbitrary, and offers no commensurate benefit to
public health and safety when compared with the NRC's current approach.
The NRC's current regulatory framework requires a re-evaluation be
conducted at least every 40 years to determine the continued safety of
a dry cask storage system and to assess the need for maintenance and/or
monitoring in the future. The technical arguments provided by the
petitioners do not raise concerns that are not addressed by the NRC in
both regulations and NUREG-2157. The NRC finds the recommended 1,000-
year design life for a storage canister is not necessary to maintain
the continued safe storage of spent nuclear fuel, consistent with the
NRC regulations.
The NRC concludes that its current regulations at 10 CFR part 72
provide adequate protection of the public health and safety without the
need for an extended design life as proposed by the petitioners.
3. Local Siting
The petitioners assert that spent fuel should be consolidated at a
limited number of local sites, which according to the petitioners means
locating a consolidated storage site ``near the source of the waste.''
The petitioners request the NRC's regulations be revised to restrict
the siting of consolidated storage installations to: (1) At least 5
miles from any ocean, bay, river, lake, or other important water
resource; (2) at least 300 feet above sea level if it is within 30
miles of any ocean; (3) at least 15 miles away from the boundary of any
city, town, or other population and at least 5 miles from residential
properties; (4) at least 5 miles from any major road, railroad,
waterway, or industrial area; and (5) preferably east of 104[deg] west
longitude to avoid a region of high seismic activity.
The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR part 72 require that dry cask
storage systems be compatible with the local geographical and
environmental characteristics where the storage facility is located. In
particular, the structures, systems, and components important to safety
must be designed to: (1) Be compatible with site characteristics and
environmental conditions associated with normal operations,
maintenance, and testing; (2) withstand the effects of natural
phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods; and (3) consider
the most severe natural phenomena reported for the site and surrounding
area, with appropriate margins to take into account the limitations of
the data and the period of time in which the data have accumulated.
Additionally, an applicant must demonstrate that individual dose limits
will be met for normal operations (10 CFR 72.104) and accident
conditions (10 CFR 72.106). These public dose limits take into
consideration local characteristics, such as the location of nearby
residents and transportation routes that traverse the controlled area
of the facility.
The NRC concludes its regulatory requirements for the safe storage
of dry spent fuel at a specific location provide reasonable assurance
of adequate protection of public health and safety. A license
application for spent fuel storage evaluates the relevant hazards,
conditions, and characteristics for a specific site in a safety
evaluation report. The NRC finds the specific siting criteria suggested
by the petitioners are unnecessary.
Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking provides an example of
how site-specific concerns are evaluated by the NRC. The petitioners
cite this cracking phenomenon as being an unavoidable degradation of
stainless steel canisters exposed to outside air. The petitioners
request dual-wall containers, or another approach, be adopted to
prevent a radiation release to the public and environment during
extended storage. Areas near salt water bodies with chloride-containing
salts at elevated levels may have increased potential for chloride-
induced stress corrosion cracking of canisters. The NRC conducted
testing to determine the conditions under which welded stainless steel
canisters may be susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, including
that caused by chlorides. The test results were published in two
publicly-available reports: (1) NUREG/CR-7030, ``Atmospheric Stress
Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility of Welded and Unwelded 304, 304L, and
316L Austenitic Stainless Steels Commonly Used for Dry Cask Storage
Containers Exposed to Marine Environments'' (October 2010); and (2)
NUREG/CR-7170, ``Assessment of Stress Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility
for Austenitic Stainless Steels Exposed to Atmospheric Chloride and
Non-Chloride Salts'' (February 2014).
The NUREG/CR-7030 report documents the NRC's evaluation of the
stress corrosion cracking susceptibility of welded and unwelded
austenitic stainless steels that are commonly used in dry storage
systems in humid, chloride-rich environments. The test results reported
in NUREG/CR-7030 indicate that chloride-induced stress corrosion
cracking is highly dependent on the concentration of deposited sea
salt, residual stress, cask temperature, and the relative humidity of
the surrounding environment. The report recommends methods for
determining salt deposition rates on the stainless steel canisters
currently used in dry storage systems. The NRC assessed stress
corrosion cracking susceptibility for austenitic stainless steels
exposed to atmospheric chloride and non-chloride salts to determine the
conditions under which dry storage canisters may be susceptible to
stress corrosion cracking. These findings were presented in NUREG/CR-
7170. Additional testing recommended in NUREG/CR-7170 is currently
being undertaken at national laboratories and universities under the
ESCP. The NRC will use the results of these additional studies to
evaluate the adequacy of siting requirements. However, to date, the NRC
has not identified information indicating the current siting
requirements are inadequate.
The NRC concludes that its regulatory requirements for the safe
storage of dry spent fuel at a specific location provide reasonable
assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety. A
licensee applying for approval of a spent fuel storage facility must
evaluate the relevant hazards, conditions, and characteristics for a
specific site in a
[[Page 3866]]
safety analysis report. A licensee must demonstrate that the facility
will meet the safety limits for the release of radioactive materials in
effluents and dose limits accounting for site characteristics, such as
seismic hazards, the local population, tsunamis, and floods. Therefore,
the NRC concludes it is not necessary to incorporate the petiitioners'
proposed additional siting requirements into NRC's regulations.
4. Monitoring
The petitioners request that continuous monitoring be required
during the initial licensing period of up to 40 years, to determine
when corrective action would be needed. The petitioners suggest that
periodic monitoring would be required after this initial period.
The NRC's regulations provide robust inspection and monitoring
procedures for identifying conditions that could undermine safety.
Additionally, the NRC's regulatory guidance assists licensees in
meeting the requirements. The regulations at 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1)-(3)
require that a licensee provide the surveillance requirements for
inspecting and monitoring stored waste and for maintaining the
integrity of required systems and components of an ISFSI in its
technical specifications. The regulations at 10 CFR 72.122(h)(4)
require that licensees be capable of monitoring spent fuel to identify
concerns and take corrective actions as necessary to maintain safe
storage conditions.
The NRC is evaluating licensees' aging management programs against
NRC Temporary Instruction 2690/011, ``Review of Aging Management
Programs at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations,'' as part of
its oversight of renewed licenses and certificates of compliance. The
NRC uses the inspection process to determine whether licensees have
adequate processes or procedures planned or in place to implement
approved aging management programs consistent with the requirements of
10 CFR part 72, and as provided in renewed ISFSI licenses and renewed
certificates of compliance for casks. The temporary instruction
includes a comprehensive evaluation of aging management programs,
including the licensees' inspection and monitoring methods and
techniques, and the frequency, sample size, data collection, and timing
of licensee inspections.
Furthermore, NUREG-2157 summarizes technical information supporting
low degradation rates of spent fuel in dry cask storage systems and
concludes that dry cask storage systems will provide adequate
protection for periods well beyond a 40-year license period. The NRC
stated that scientific ``studies and operational experience to date do
not preclude a dry cask service life longer than 100 years'' (see
NUREG-2157, page B-18). Additionally, dry cask storage systems rely on
passive structures, systems, and components to maintain safety and have
no active or moving parts during storage. The 40-year license period is
sufficiently short and the degradation of storage system materials is
sufficiently slow that significant storage, handling, and
transportation issues are not expected to arise during a single license
period, and if information collected during a license period identifies
emerging issues and concerns, there would be sufficient time to develop
regulatory solutions and incorporate them into future licensing periods
(NUREG-2157, Appendix B). Therefore, the NRC does not require
continuous monitoring.
The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR part 72 provide the licensee
flexibility in designing the monitoring program appropriate to its
facility; however, the NRC inspects the monitoring and aging management
programs to verify compliance with the regulations. Specifically, the
NRC verifies through inspection that the functions of the structures,
systems, and components important to safety are maintained throughout
the period of extended operation. The NRC is not aware of technical
information supporting the need for continuous monitoring of ISFSI
systems, and the petitioners did not provide any such support.
5. Surface Storage
The petitioners assert that the NRC and the public should embrace
surface storage of spent nuclear fuel and should plan to store it
safely, passively, and indefinitely on the surface because that is how
waste is currently stored. This assertion does not involve a proposed
change to the existing regulations.
C. Summary
The NRC maintains that a strong regulatory framework including both
regulatory oversight and licensee compliance is important to the
continued safe storage of spent fuel. The NRC's regulatory framework
for spent fuel storage is supported by well-developed regulatory
guidance; voluntary domestic and international consensus standards;
research and analytical studies; and processes for implementing
licensing reviews, inspection programs, and enforcement oversight
(NUREG-2157, page B-33). The technical information and operational
experience collected and evaluated both internationally and nationally
on dry cask storage continues to support the adequacy of 10 CFR part 72
to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health
and safety and to promote the common defense and security.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adams Accession No. or Federal
Document Date Register citation or website
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-72-8).... January 2, 2018..................... ML18022B207.
Requirements for the Indefinite March 22, 2018...................... 83 FR 12504.
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,
Petition for Rulemaking; Notice of
Docketing and Request for Comment.
Public Commenters List................ May 9, 2019......................... ML19137A265.
Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear September 19, 2014.................. 79 FR 56238.
Fuel; Final Rule.
NUREG-2157, ``Generic Environmental September 2014...................... ML14196A105 (Vol. 1), ML14196A107
Impact Statement for Continued (Vol. 2), Also ML14198A440
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel''. (Package).
Geological and Seismological September 16, 2003.................. 68 FR 54143.
Characteristics for Siting and Design
of Dry Cask Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installations and Monitored
Retrievable Storage Installations;
Final Rule.
[[Page 3867]]
NUREG-1927, Revision 1, ``Standard June 2016........................... ML16179A148.
Review Plan for Renewal of Specific
Licenses and Certificates of
Compliance for Dry Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel''.
NUREG-2214, ``Managing Aging Processes October 2017........................ ML19214A111.
in Storage (MAPS) Report''.
NRC Temporary Instruction 2690/011, January 2018........................ ML17167A268.
``Review of Aging Management Programs
at Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installations''.
Nuclear Energy Institute NEI 14-03, December 2016....................... ML16356A210.
Revision 2, ``Format, Content and
Implementation Guidance for Dry Cask
Storage Operations-Based Aging
Management''.
NUREG-2224, ``Dry Storage and July 2018........................... ML18214A132.
Transportation of High Burnup Spent
Nuclear Fuel'' (Draft for Comment).
NUREG/CR-7198, Revision 1, October 2017........................ ML17292B057.
``Mechanical Fatigue Testing of High-
Burnup Fuel for Transportation
Applications''.
NUREG/CR-7203, ``A Quantitative Impact September 2015...................... ML15266A413.
Assessment of Hypothetical Spent Fuel
Reconfiguration in Spent Fuel Storage
Casks and Transportation Packages''.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Wang, September 2016...................... ORNL/SR-2016/424, Available at:
J.-A., H. Wang, H. Jiang, Y. Yan, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/
B.B. Bevard, J.M. Scaglione; ``FY files/2017/02/f34/
2016 Status Report: Documentation of 10Documentation%20DataCollectCIRF
All CIRFT Data including Hydride T%20TestsRodEndsHydrideReorTest.p
Reorientation Tests''. df.
Electric Power Research Institute, September 2015...................... EPRI-3002005371. The EPRI report
``Susceptibility Assessment Criteria is publicly available at the
for Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion www.epri.com website.
Cracking (CISCC) of Welded Stainless
Steel Canisters for Dry Cask Storage
Systems''.
Electric Power Research Institute, March 2017.......................... EPRI-3002008193. The EPRI report
``Aging Management Guidance to is publicly available at the
Address Potential Chloride-Induced www.epri.com website.
Stress Corrosion Cracking of Welded
Stainless Steel Canisters''.
NUREG/CR-7030, ``Atmospheric Stress October 2010........................ ML103120081.
Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility of
Welded and Unwelded 304, 304L, and
316L Austenitic Stainless Steels
Commonly Used for Dry Cask Storage
Containers Exposed to Marine
Environments''.
NUREG/CR-7170, ``Assessment of Stress February 2014....................... ML14051A417.
Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility for
Austenitic Stainless Steels Exposed
to Atmospheric Chloride and Non-
Chloride Salts''.
NUREG-1949, ``Safety Evaluation Report January 2015........................ ML15022A146.
Related to Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic
Repository at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada,'' Volume 2: Repository Safety
Before Permanent Closure.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
The NRC determined that the petitioners do not present information
that supports the requested changes to the regulations or provides
substantial increase in the overall protection of occupational or
public health and safety. The NRC's current regulations continue to
provide for the adequate protection of public health and safety and to
promote the common defense and security.
For the reasons cited in Section III of this document, the NRC is
denying PRM-72-8.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2020-01026 Filed 1-22-20; 8:45 am]
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