[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 13 (Tuesday, January 21, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3469-3480]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-00835]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

[Docket No. FMCSA-2019-0048]


California's Meal and Rest Break Rules for Drivers of Passenger-
Carrying Commercial Motor Vehicles; Petition for Determination of 
Preemption

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), DOT.

ACTION: Order; grant of petition for determination of preemption.

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SUMMARY: The FMCSA grants the petition submitted by the American Bus 
Association (ABA) requesting a determination that the State of 
California's Meal and Rest Break rules (MRB rules) are preempted under 
49 U.S.C. 31141 as applied to passenger-carrying commercial motor 
vehicle drivers subject to FMCSA's hours of service regulations. 
Federal law provides for preemption of State laws on commercial motor 
vehicle safety that are additional to or more stringent than Federal 
regulations if they (1) have no safety benefit; (2) are incompatible 
with Federal regulations; or (3) would cause an unreasonable burden on 
interstate commerce. The FMCSA has determined that California's MRB 
rules are laws on commercial motor vehicle (CMV) safety, that they are 
more stringent than the Agency's hours of service regulations, that 
they have no safety benefits that extend beyond those already provided 
by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, that they are 
incompatible with the Federal hours of service regulations, and that 
they cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The 
California MRB rules, therefore, are preempted under 49 U.S.C. 
31141(c).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles J. Fromm, Deputy Chief 
Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, (202) 
493-0349; email [email protected].

Electronic Access

    You may see all the comments online through the Federal Document 
Management System (FDMS) at http://www.regulations.gov.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov or Room W12-140 on the 
ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. The FDMS is available 24 hours each day, 365 
days each year.
    Privacy Act: Anyone may search the FDMS for all comments received 
into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the 
comment (or of the person signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
Privacy Act Statement for the FDMS published in the Federal Register on 
December 29, 2010. 75 FR 82132.

Background

    On January 10, 2019, ABA petitioned FMCSA to preempt California 
statutes and rules requiring employers to give their employees meal and 
rest breaks during the work day, as applied to drivers of passenger-
carrying CMVs subject to FMCSA's hours of service (HOS) regulations. 
For the reasons set forth below, FMCSA grants the petition.

California Meal and Rest Break Rules

    Section 512, Meal periods, of the California Labor Code reads, in 
part, as follows:

    ``(a) An employer may not employ an employee for a work period 
of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with 
a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total 
work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the 
meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the

[[Page 3470]]

employer and employee. An employer may not employ an employee for a 
work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the 
employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, 
except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the 
second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer 
and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.''
    ``(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Industrial Welfare 
Commission may adopt a working condition order permitting a meal 
period to commence after six hours of work if the commission 
determines that the order is consistent with the health and welfare 
of the affected employees.''

    Section 516 of the California Labor Code reads, in relevant in 
part, as follows:

    ``(a) Except as provided in Section 512, the Industrial Welfare 
Commission may adopt or amend working condition orders with respect 
to break periods, meal periods, and days of rest for any workers in 
California consistent with the health and welfare of those 
workers.''

    Section 226.7 of the California Labor Code reads, in relevant part, 
as follows:

    ``(b) An employer shall not require an employee to work during a 
meal or rest or recovery period mandated pursuant to an applicable 
statute, or applicable regulation, standard, or order of the 
Industrial Welfare Commission. . . .''
    ``(c) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal or rest 
or recovery period in accordance with a state law, including, but 
not limited to, an applicable statute or applicable regulation, 
standard, or order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, . . . the 
employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the 
employee's regular rate of compensation for each workday that the 
meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.''

    Section 11090 of Article 9 (Transport Industry) of Group 2 
(Industry and Occupation Orders) of Chapter 5 (Industrial Welfare 
Commission) of Division 1 (Department of Industrial Relations) of Title 
8 (Industrial Relations) of the California Code of Regulations, is 
entitled ``Order Regulating Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions in the 
Transportation Industry'' hereafter: ``8 CCR section 11090'' or 
``section 11090.'' \1\ Section 11090(11). Meal Periods, reads as 
follows:
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    \1\ California Industrial Welfare Commission Order No. 9-2001 is 
identical to 8 CCR Section 11090.

    ``(A) No employer shall employ any person for a work period of 
more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not less than 30 
minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) 
hours will complete the day's work the meal period may be waived by 
mutual consent of the employer and the employee.''
    ``(B) An employer may not employ an employee for a work period 
of more than ten (10) hours per day without providing the employee 
with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that 
if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal 
period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the 
employee only if the first meal period was not waived.''
    ``(C) Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during a 30 
minute meal period, the meal period shall be considered an ``on 
duty'' meal period and counted as time worked. An ``on duty'' meal 
period shall be permitted only when the nature of the work prevents 
an employee from being relieved of all duty and when by written 
agreement between the parties an on-the-job paid meal period is 
agreed to. The written agreement shall state that the employee may, 
in writing, revoke the agreement at any time.''
    ``(D) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period 
in accordance with the applicable provisions of this order, the 
employer shall pay the employee one (1) hour of pay at the 
employee's regular rate of compensation for each workday that the 
meal period is not provided.''
    ``(E) In all places of employment where employees are required 
to eat on the premises, a suitable place for that purpose shall be 
designated.''

    Section 11090(12). Rest Periods, reads as follows:

    ``(A) Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to 
take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the 
middle of each work period. The authorized rest period time shall be 
based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) 
minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof. 
However, a rest period need not be authorized for employees whose 
total daily work time is less than three and one-half (3\1/2\) 
hours. Authorized rest period time shall be counted as hours worked 
for which there shall be no deduction from wages.''
    ``(B) If an employer fails to provide an employee a rest period 
in accordance with the applicable provisions of this order, the 
employer shall pay the employee one (1) hour of pay at the 
employee's regular rate of compensation for each workday that the 
rest period is not provided.''

    Although section 11090(3)(L) provides that ``[t]he provisions of 
this section are not applicable to employees whose hours of service are 
regulated by: (1) The United States Department of Transportation, Code 
of Federal Regulations, Title 49, sections 395.1 to 395.13, Hours of 
Service of Drivers,'' the California courts have interpreted the word 
``section'' to refer only to section 11090(3), which regulates ``hours 
and days of work,'' not to all of section 11090, including meal and 
rest breaks in section 11090(11) and (12). See Cicairos v. Summit 
Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal App. 4th 949 (2006).

Federal Preemption Under the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984

    Section 31141 of title 49, United States Code, a provision of the 
Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act), 49 U.S.C. Chap. 311, 
Subchap. III, prohibits States from enforcing a law or regulation on 
CMV safety that the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) has 
determined to be preempted. To determine whether a State law or 
regulation is preempted, the Secretary must decide whether a State law 
or regulation: (1) Has the same effect as a regulation prescribed under 
49 U.S.C. 31136, which is the authority for much of the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Regulations; (2) is less stringent than such a 
regulation; or (3) is additional to or more stringent than such a 
regulation. 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(1). If the Secretary determines that a 
State law or regulation has the same effect as a regulation based on 
section 31136, it may be enforced. 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(2). A State law 
or regulation that is less stringent may not be enforced. 49 U.S.C. 
31141(c)(3). And a State law or regulation the Secretary determines to 
be additional to or more stringent than a regulation based on section 
31136 may be enforced unless the Secretary decides that the State law 
or regulation (1) has no safety benefit; (2) is incompatible with the 
regulation prescribed by the Secretary; or (3) would cause an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(4). To 
determine whether a State law or regulation will cause an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce, the Secretary may consider the 
cumulative effect that the State's law or regulation and all similar 
laws and regulations of other States will have on interstate commerce. 
49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(5). The Secretary need only find that one of the 
conditions set forth at paragraph (c)(4) exists to preempt the State 
provision(s) at issue. The Secretary may review a State law or 
regulation on her own initiative, or on the petition of an interested 
person. 49 U.S.C. 31141(g). The Secretary's authority under section 
31141 is delegated to FMCSA Administrator by 49 CFR 1.87(f).

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) Concerning HOS for 
Drivers of Passenger-Carrying CMVs, Fatigue, and Coercion

    For drivers operating a passenger-carrying CMV in interstate 
commerce, the Federal HOS rules allow up to 10 hours of driving time 
following 8 consecutive hours off duty, and driving is prohibited after 
the operator has

[[Page 3471]]

accumulated 15 hours of on-duty time.\2\ 49 CFR 395.5(a). The 15-hour 
on-duty limit is non-consecutive; therefore, any time that a driver 
spends off-duty does not count against the 15-hour window.\3\ While the 
HOS rules for passenger-carrying CMVs impose limits after which driving 
is prohibited, they do not mandate a 30-minute rest period within the 
drive-time window, unlike the HOS rules for property-carrying CMVs. The 
HOS rules also impose weekly driving limits. In this regard, drivers 
are prohibited from operating a passenger-carrying CMV after having 
been on duty 60 hours in any 7 consecutive days, if the employing motor 
carrier does not operate CMVs every day of the week; or after having 
been on duty 70 hours in any period of 8 consecutive days, if the 
employing motor carrier operates CMVs every day of the week. 49 CFR 
395.5(b).
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    \2\ Subject to certain conditions, a driver who is driving a 
passenger-carrying CMV that is equipped with a sleeper berth, may 
accumulate the equivalent of 8 consecutive hours of off-duty time by 
taking a combination of at least 8 consecutive hours off-duty and 
sleeper berth time; or by taking two periods of rest in the sleeper 
berth. 49 CFR 395.1(g)(3).
    \3\ ``Off-duty'' time is not specifically defined in the HOS 
rules; however, the Agency issued guidance stating that a driver may 
record time as off-duty provided: (1) The driver is relieved of all 
duty and responsibility for the care and custody of the vehicle, its 
accessories, and any cargo or passengers it may be carrying, and (2) 
during the stop, and for the duration of the stop, the driver must 
be at liberty to pursue activities of his/her own choosing. 78 FR 
41852 (July 12, 2013).
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    Additionally, the FMCSRs prohibit a driver from operating a CMV, 
and a motor carrier from requiring a driver to operate a CMV, while the 
driver is impaired by illness, fatigue, or other cause, such that it is 
unsafe for the driver to begin or continue operating the CMV. 49 CFR 
392.3. The FMCSRs also prohibit a motor carrier, shipper, receiver or 
transportation intermediary from coercing a driver to operate a CMV in 
violation of this and other provisions of the FMCSRs. 49 CFR 390.6.

The ABA Petition and Comments Received

    As set forth more fully below, ABA argues that California's MRB 
rules are within the scope of the Secretary's preemption authority 
under section 31141 because they are laws ``on commercial motor vehicle 
safety.'' In this regard, ABA cites the Agency's 2018 Decision finding 
that the MRB rules are preempted under section 31141, as applied to 
drivers of property-carrying CMVs subject to the HOS rules. 
Additionally, ABA argues that the MRB rules ``undermine existing 
Federal fatigue management rules'' and ``require drivers to take breaks 
that might be counterproductive to safety.'' The ABA also contends that 
the MRB rules ``conflict with driver attendance needs,'' that they are 
``untenable'' due to inadequate parking for CMVs, and that they make it 
difficult to comply with the Federal regulations governing passenger 
service responsibility and terminal facilities. Lastly, ABA argues that 
``compliance costs create an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce.'' The ABA's petition seeks an FMCSA determination that 
California's MRB rules, as applied to passenger-carrying CMV drivers 
who are subject to the HOS rules, are preempted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
31141 and, therefore, may not be enforced.
    The FMCSA published a notice in the Federal Register on May 9, 
2019, seeking public comment on whether California's MRB rules, as 
applied to drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs, are preempted by Federal 
law. 84 FR 20463. Although preemption under section 31141 is a legal 
determination reserved to the judgment of the Agency, FMCSA sought 
comment on issues raised in ABA's petition or otherwise relevant. While 
the public comment period ended on June 10, 2019, the Agency accepted 
all public comments submitted through November 7, 2019. The Agency 
received 28 comments, with 20 in support of the petition and 8 in 
opposition.\4\ The Agency considered all the comments received. They 
are discussed more fully below.
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    \4\ A comment letter submitted by the Center for Justice and 
Democracy, opposing ABA's petition, was joined by 23 organizations.
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The Agency's Prior Decisions Regarding Preemption Under Section 31141

I. FMCSA's Decision Rejecting a Petition for a Preemption Determination

    On July 3, 2008, a group of motor carriers \5\ petitioned FMCSA for 
a determination under 49 U.S.C. 31141(c) that: (1) The California MRB 
rules are regulations on CMV safety, (2) the putative State regulation 
imposes limitations on a driver's time that are different from and more 
stringent than Federal ``hours of service'' regulations governing the 
time a driver may remain on duty, and (3) that the State law should 
therefore be preempted. 73 FR 79204.
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    \5\ Affinity Logistics Corp.; Cardinal Logistics Management 
Corp.; C.R. England, Inc.; Diakon Logistics (Delaware), Inc.; 
Estenson Logistics, LLC; McLane Company, Inc.; McLane/Suneast, Inc.; 
Penske Logistics, LLC; Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.; Trimac 
Transportation Services (Western), Inc.; and Velocity Express, Inc.
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    On December 24, 2008, the Agency denied the petition for 
preemption, reasoning that the MRB rules are merely one part of 
California's comprehensive regulation of wages, hours, and working 
conditions, and that they apply to employers in many other industries 
in addition to motor carriers. 73 FR 79204. The FMCSA concluded that 
the MRB rules were not regulations ``on commercial motor vehicle 
safety'' within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 31141 because they applied 
broadly to all employers and not just motor carriers, and that they 
therefore were not within the scope of the Secretary's statutory 
authority to declare unenforceable a State motor vehicle safety 
regulation that is inconsistent with Federal safety requirements.\6\ 
Ibid. at 79205-06.
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    \6\ In a 2014 amicus brief in the matter of Dilts v. Penske 
Logistics, LLC, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, No. 12-55705 (2014), the United States explained that FMCSA 
continued to adhere to the view expressed in the 2008 Decision that 
California's MRB rules were not preempted by section 31141 because 
they were not laws ``on commercial motor vehicle safety.'' 2014 WL 
809150, 26-27. The Ninth Circuit made no determination whether the 
MRB rules were within the scope of the Secretary's preemption 
authority under section 31141 because that question was not before 
the Court. See 769 F.3d 637.
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II. FMCSA's 2018 Decision Granting Petitions To Preempt the MRB Rules

    In 2018, the American Trucking Associations (ATA) and the 
Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association (SCRA) petitioned FMCSA to 
reconsider its 2008 Decision and declare California's MRB rules 
preempted under section 31141 insofar as they apply to drivers of CMVs 
subject to the Federal HOS rules. The ATA acknowledged that FMCSA had 
previously determined that it could not declare the California MRB 
rules preempted under section 31141 because they were not regulations 
``on commercial motor vehicle safety.'' The 2018 petitioners urged the 
Agency to revisit that determination, noting that, by its terms, the 
statute did not limit the Agency's preemption authority to those State 
laws that directly targeted the transportation industry. Rather, the 
appropriate question was whether the State law targeted conduct already 
covered by a Federal regulation designed to ensure motor vehicle 
safety. The 2018 petitioners also provided evidence that California's 
meal and rest break laws were detrimental to the safe operation of 
CMVs.
    The FMCSA published a notice in the Federal Register seeking public 
comment on whether the California MRB rules should be declared 
preempted. 83 FR 50142 (Oct. 4, 2018). The Agency sought public 
comments in order to make an informed decision on issues relevant to 
the determination, including what effect California's rules had on 
interstate motor carrier

[[Page 3472]]

operations. Ibid. In total, FMCSA received more than 700 comments, and 
several letters from members of Congress.
    On December 21, 2018, FMCSA issued a determination declaring the 
MRB rules preempted with respect to operators of property-carrying 
motor vehicles subject to the Federal HOS rules. 83 FR 67470. The 
Agency first acknowledged that it was departing from its 2008 Decision 
finding that the MRB rules were not laws ``on commercial motor vehicle 
safety'' because they were laws of broad applicability and not 
specifically directed to motor vehicle safety. Ibid. at 67473-74. The 
Agency explained that its 2008 Decision was ``unnecessarily 
restrictive'' and not supported by either the statutory language or 
legislative history. Ibid. The Agency considered the fact that language 
of section 31141 mirrors that of 49 U.S.C. 31136, which instructs the 
Secretary to ``prescribe regulations on commercial motor vehicle 
safety.'' 49 U.S.C. 31136(a). The Agency explained that Congress, by 
tying the scope of the Secretary's preemption authority directly to the 
scope of the Secretary's authority to regulate the CMV industry, 
provided a framework for determining whether a State law or regulation 
is subject to section 31141. The Agency concluded that ``[I]f the State 
law or regulation imposes requirements in an area of regulation that is 
already addressed by a regulation promulgated under 31136, then the 
State law or regulation is a regulation ``on commercial motor vehicle 
safety.'' Ibid. at 67473. The Agency further determined that because 
California's MRB rules plainly regulated the same conduct as the 
Federal HOS regulations, they were laws ``on commercial motor vehicle 
safety.''
    Having concluded that the California MRB rules were laws ``on 
commercial motor vehicle safety,'' under section 31141, the Agency next 
determined that they are additional to or more stringent than the 
Federal HOS regulations. 83 FR 67474-75. The FMCSA found that the MRB 
rules require employers to provide property-carrying CMV drivers with 
more rest breaks than the Federal HOS regulations; and allow a smaller 
window of driving time before a break is required. Ibid.
    The Agency next explained that because the MRB rules are more 
stringent, they may be preempted if the Agency determined that that MRB 
rules have no safety benefit, that they are incompatible with HOS 
regulations, or that enforcement of the MRB rules would cause an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 83 FR 67475. The FMCSA 
found that the MRB rules provided no safety benefit beyond the Federal 
regulations, and that given the current shortage of available parking 
for CMVs, the required additional breaks adversely impacted safety 
because they exacerbated the problem of CMVs parking at unsafe 
locations. Ibid. at 67475-77. The Agency also determined that the MRB 
rules were incompatible with the Federal HOS regulations because they 
required employers to provide CMV drivers with more breaks, at less 
flexible times, than the Federal HOS regulations. Ibid. at 67477-78.
    Lastly, the Agency determined that enforcing the MRB rules would 
impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 83 FR 67478-80. 
In this regard, the 2018 petitioners and other commenters provided 
information demonstrating that the MRB rules imposed significant and 
substantial costs stemming from decreased productivity and 
administrative burden. Ibid. at 67478-79. The Agency also considered 
the cumulative effect on interstate commerce of similar laws and 
regulations in other States. Currently 20 other States have varying 
applicable break rules. The Agency determined that the diversity of 
State regulation of meal and rest breaks for CMV drivers has resulted 
in a patchwork of requirements that the Agency found to be an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Ibid. at 67479-80.
    Accordingly, FMCSA granted the petitions for preemption and 
determined that California ``may no longer enforce'' its meal and rest 
break rules with respect to drivers of property-carrying commercial 
motor vehicles subject to the HOS rules.

Decision

I. Section 31141 Expressly Preempts State Law Therefore the Presumption 
Against Preemption Does Not Apply

    In their comments, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the 
Teamsters) and the American Association for Justice contend that 
California's MRB rules are subject to a presumption against preemption. 
Citing the Agency's amicus brief in Dilts v. Penske, the Teamsters 
argue that the MRB rules fall within an area of California's 
traditional police power and thus are subject to the presumption. The 
American Association of Justice argues that the presumption requires 
FMCSA to adopt ``the reading that disfavors pre-emption'' in 
interpreting section 31141.
    The presumption against preemption is a canon of statutory 
interpretation employed by courts that favors reading ambiguous Federal 
statutes in a manner that avoids preempting State law absent clear 
congressional intent to do so. See, e.g., Association des Eleveurs de 
Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 
2017). The FMCSA acknowledges that ``in all preemption cases, and 
particularly in those in which Congress has legislated in a field which 
the States have traditionally occupied, [there] is an assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.'' Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (alterations 
omitted). Where, however, a provision at issue constitutes an area of 
traditional State regulation, ``that fact alone does not `immunize' 
state employment laws from preemption if Congress in fact contemplated 
their preemption.'' Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 643 
(9th Cir. 2014). And here there is no dispute that Congress has given 
FMCSA the authority to review and preempt State laws; the only 
questions concern the application of that authority to specific State 
laws. The FMCSA is aware of no authority suggesting that the 
presumption against preemption limits an agency's ability to interpret 
a statute authorizing it to preempt State laws.
    In any event, when a ``statute contains an express pre-emption 
clause, [courts] do not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but 
instead focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily 
contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent.'' Puerto 
Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 
(2016) (quotations omitted); see also Atay v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 
688, 699 (9th Cir. 2016). Section 31141 expressly preempts State laws 
on commercial motor vehicle safety. Thus, the MRB rules are not subject 
to a presumption against preemption, and the question that FMCSA must 
answer is whether the MRB rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-
carrying CMVs, should be preempted under section 31141.

II. The California MRB Rules, as Applied to Drivers of Passenger-
Carrying CMVs, Are Laws or Regulations ``on Commercial Motor Vehicle 
Safety'' Within the Meaning of 49 U.S.C. 31141

    The initial question in a preemption analysis under section 31141 
is whether the State provisions at issue are laws or regulations ``on 
commercial motor vehicle safety.'' 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(1). In the 2008 
Decision, the Agency narrowly construed section 31141 to conclude that 
because the MRB rules are ``one part of California's comprehensive 
regulations governing wages, hours and

[[Page 3473]]

working conditions,'' and apply to employers in many other industries 
in addition to motor carriers, the provisions are not regulations ``on 
commercial motor vehicle safety,'' and, thus, were not within the scope 
of the Secretary's preemption authority. 73 FR 79204, 79206. The FMCSA 
reconsidered this conclusion and explained in its 2018 Decision that 
both the text of section 31141 and its structural relationship with 
other statutory provisions make it clear that Congress's intended scope 
of section 31141 was broader than the construction the Agency gave it 
in the 2008 Decision. In this regard, the Agency explained:

    The ``on commercial motor vehicle safety'' language of section 
31141 mirrors that of section 31136, and by tying the scope of the 
Secretary's preemption authority directly to the scope of the 
Secretary's authority to regulate the CMV industry, the Agency 
believes that Congress provided a framework for determining whether 
a State law or regulation is subject to section 31141. In other 
words, if the State law or regulation imposes requirements in an 
area of regulation that is already addressed by a regulation 
promulgated under 31136, then the State law or regulation is a 
regulation ``on commercial motor vehicle safety.'' Because 
California's MRB rules impose the same types of restrictions on CMV 
driver duty and driving times as the FMCSA's HOS regulations, which 
were enacted pursuant to the Secretary's authority in section 31136, 
they are ``regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety.'' Thus, 
the MRB rules are ``State law[s] or regulation[s] on commercial 
motor vehicle safety,'' and are subject to review under section 
31141. 83 FR 67470.

Consistent with the reasoning in the 2018 Decision, the Agency finds 
that if the State law or regulation at issue imposes requirements in an 
area of regulation that is within FMCSA's section 31136 regulatory 
authority, then the State law or regulation is a regulation ``on 
commercial motor vehicle safety.
    Regarding California's MRB rules, as applied to drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs, ABA argues that the MRB rules ``require[ ] 
meal and rest breaks of fixed durations and at mandated intervals 
throughout the work day so as to prevent fatigue-related incidents.'' 
The ABA further contends that, ``The fact that the FMCSA has 
promulgated regulations for commercial truck and bus drivers in 49 CFR 
part 395 addressing the very hours of service and break issues 
encompassed in the California MRB Rules underscores that the State 
rules are requirements `on commercial motor vehicle safety.' '' The 
Agency agrees. As explained above, the Federal HOS rules for passenger-
carrying CMVs have long imposed drive time limits for drivers. While 
the HOS rules do not include a mandated 30-minute rest period, they 
regulate how long a driver may operate a passenger-carrying CMV before 
an off-duty period is required. The Federal regulations also prohibit 
drivers from operating CMVs when fatigued, and thus require drivers to 
take any additional breaks necessary to prohibit fatigued driving, and 
prohibit employers from coercing drivers into operating a CMV during 
these required breaks. Thus, both the HOS and MRB rules impose 
requirements for off-duty periods. Therefore, the Agency determines 
that, because the HOS and MRB rules cover the same subject matter, the 
MRB rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs, are laws 
on CMV safety.
    California's Labor Commissioner, California's Attorney General, the 
American Association for Justice, the Teamsters, and other commenters 
who oppose ABA's petition argue that the Agency's analysis and 
conclusions in the 2018 Decision were incorrect and that FMCSA should 
revert to the legal position articulated in the 2008 Decision and in 
the Government's amicus brief in Dilts v. Penske. California's Labor 
Commissioner and Attorney General further contend the Agency's 2018 
Decision ``improperly changed the agency's position and expanded the 
preemptive scope of the statute'' and that the MRB rules are ``are 
employment laws of general applicability rather than regulations on 
commercial motor vehicles'' as the Agency determined in 2008 and in its 
Dilts amicus brief. The FMCSA disagrees with this argument. As the 
Agency explained in the 2018 Decision, its prior position articulated 
in 2008 need not forever remain static. When an Agency changes course, 
it must provide a ``reasoned analysis for the change.'' See Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). The 
Agency's 2018 Decision acknowledged the changed interpretation of 
section 31141 and provided a reasoned explanation for the new 
interpretation. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
514-16 (2009). Similarly, this decision explains the basis for the 
Agency's conclusion that the MRB rules are laws on CMV safety, as 
applied to drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs. Irrespective of the 
whether the MRB rules have general applicability to employers and 
workers in the State, when they are applied to CMV drivers, they govern 
the same conduct as the Federal HOS rules. Therefore, they are laws on 
CMV safety.
    FMCSA's interpretation of section 31141 is consistent with the 
legislative history of the 1984 Act. As originally enacted, the 1984 
Act granted the Agency authority to promulgate regulations ``pertaining 
to'' CMV safety, and likewise to review State laws ``pertaining to'' 
CMV safety. Public Law 98-554 Sec. Sec.  206(a), 208(a) (originally 
codified at 49 U.S.C. App. 2505, 2507). Congress amended these 
provisions during the 1994 recodification of Title 49 of the United 
States Code. See Public Law 103-272 (July 5, 1994), 108 Stat. 1008. As 
recodified, the law allows the Agency to promulgate regulations and 
review State laws ``on commercial motor vehicle safety,'' rather than 
``pertaining to commercial motor vehicle safety.'' Compare 49 U.S.C. 
app. 2505 and 49 U.S.C. app. 2507 (1984) with 49 U.S.C. 31136 and 49 
U.S.C. 31141(c)(1) (1994). Congress made clear, however, that any 
changes made during their comprehensive effort to restructure and 
simplify Title 49 ``may not be construed as making a substantive change 
in the laws replaced.'' Public Law 103-272 Sec. Sec.  1(e), 6(a). The 
change in wording therefore did not narrow the Agency's rulemaking 
authority or the scope of the State laws subject to preemption review. 
California's MRB rules clearly ``pertain to'' CMV safety as applied to 
drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs subject to the HOS rules, and 
therefore fall within the scope of section 31141. See, e.g., 
``Pertain,'' Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/pertain 
(definition 1) (``to have reference or relation; relate.'').
    The Agency's interpretation is also consistent with congressional 
purposes. Congress was concerned that a lack of uniformity between 
Federal and State laws on the same subject matter could impose 
substantial burdens on interstate truck and bus operations, and 
potentially hamper safety. See, e.g., 1984 Cong. Rec. 28215 (Oct. 2, 
1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood); ibid. at 28219 (statement of Sen. 
Danforth). Accordingly, as the Senate Report on the bill that became 
the 1984 Act explained, the preemption review provision was designed to 
ensure ``as much uniformity as practicable whenever a Federal standard 
and a State requirement cover the same subject matter.'' S. Rep. 98-424 
at 14 (1984). The fact that a State regulation may be broader than a 
Federal safety regulation and impose requirements outside the area of 
CMV safety does not eliminate Congress's concerns. Such laws may still 
be incompatible with Federal safety standards or unduly burden 
interstate commerce when applied to the operation of a CMV.

[[Page 3474]]

    In their comments, the Labor Commissioner and Attorney General also 
argue that the Agency should not preempt the MRB rules because the 
``FMCSA specifically declined to regulate rest periods for drivers of 
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles and the Federal commercial 
motor vehicle safety regulations are only intended to be `minimum 
safety standards.' '' The Agency finds this argument unpersuasive. As 
explained above, both the MRB rules, as applied to drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs, and the Federal HOS rules limit the amount of 
time that a driver may work before an off-duty period is required. In 
comments on ABA's petition, the ATA correctly pointed out that the 
Agency made the affirmative decision in 2003 not to subject drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs to the same HOS rules as property-carriers 
because of operational considerations that distinguish bus drivers from 
truck drivers with respect to fatigue. See 68 FR 22456, 22462 (Apr. 28, 
2003). Irrespective of the fact that the HOS rules for passenger-
carrying CMVs do not include a provision requiring a 30-minute rest 
break, both the HOS and the MRB rules govern the same subject matter--
how long a driver may drive before a required off-duty period. The 
absence of a 30-minute break provision in the HOS rules for passenger 
carriers does not mean that California's MRB rules are not laws on CMV 
safety.
    As the Agency noted in the 2018 Decision, in response to the ATA 
and SCRA petitions regarding property-carrying CMVs, the California 
Labor Commissioner acknowledged that the MRB rules improve driver and 
public safety. Here, in response to ABA's petition, the Labor 
Commissioner and the Attorney General ``reaffirm that California's meal 
and rest period requirements promote driver and public safety.'' These 
statements further demonstrate that the MRB rules are rules ``on CMV 
safety'' and, therefore, fall squarely within the scope of the 
Secretary's preemption authority.

III. The MRB Rules Are ``Additional to or More Stringent Than'' the 
Agency's HOS Regulations for Passenger-Carrying Vehicles Within the 
Meaning of Section 31141

    Having concluded that the MRB rules, as applied to drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs, are laws ``on commercial motor vehicle 
safety,'' under section 31141, the Agency next must decide whether the 
MRB rules have the same effect as, are less stringent than, or are 
additional to or more stringent than the Federal HOS regulations for 
passenger-carrying CMVs. 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(1).
    As explained above, the HOS rules prohibit a driver from operating 
a passenger-carrying CMV for more than 10 hours following 8 consecutive 
hours off duty, or for any period after having been on duty 15 hours 
following 8 consecutive hours off duty. 49 CFR 395.5(a). The 15-hour 
on-duty limit is non-consecutive; therefore, any time that a driver 
spends off-duty does not count against the 15-hour duty window. While 
the HOS regulations permit drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs to take 
time off duty in the middle of a duty period for a rest break and 
extend the 15-hour window in which they may drive, the rules do not 
require that they do so. Conversely, not only do the MRB rules require 
employers to provide passenger-carrying CMV drivers with meal and rest 
breaks, they are required to provide them at specified intervals. 
Therefore, California's MRB rules are additional to or more stringent 
than the HOS regulations.
    California's Labor Commissioner and Attorney General do not deny 
that the MRB rules require employers to provide for breaks during the 
work day while the Federal HOS regulations for passenger-carrying CMVs 
do not. Citing Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc., 385 P.3d 823 
(Cal. 2016), and Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 155 P.3d 284 
(Cal. 2007), they argue in their comments that the MRB rules are not 
``additional to or more stringent than'' the Agency's HOS regulations 
because under the MRB rules, employers may either provide the required 
meal and rest periods or pay additional wages. The Labor Commissioner 
and Attorney General assert that California law permits employers to 
pay higher wages as an alternative to complying with the MRB rules, and 
that the MRB rules therefore are not more stringent that the HOS 
regulations.
    The Agency disagrees. As FMCSA explained in its December 2018 
Decision, California law prohibits an employer from requiring an 
employee to work during a mandated meal or rest break, and provides for 
additional pay as a remedy for violating that prohibition. Cal. Labor 
Code 226.7(b)-(c). The California Supreme Court has held that section 
226.7 ``does not give employers a lawful choice between providing 
either meal and rest breaks or an additional hour of pay,'' and that 
``an employer's provision of an additional hour of pay does not excuse 
a section 226.7 violation.'' Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 274 
P.3d 1160, 1168 (Cal. 2012) (emphasis in original).\7\ This ruling is 
not undercut by the two cases cited by the Labor Commissioner and 
Attorney General. While it is true that the California Supreme Court 
stated in Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc. that ``employers who 
find it especially burdensome to relieve their employees of all duties 
during rest periods'' could provide the extra hour of pay, it 
emphasized that this ``option[ ] should be the exception rather than 
rule, to be used'' only in the context of ``irregular or unexpected 
circumstances such as emergencies.'' 385 P.3d at 834 & n.14. And while 
the California Supreme Court in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc. 
held that the extra hour of pay is ``wages'' for statute of limitations 
purposes, that ruling predated Kirby by six years, and is not 
inconsistent with Kirby's holding that an employer does not have a 
lawful choice to ignore the MRB rules. Indeed, the California Supreme 
Court in Kirby specifically noted that its decision was consistent with 
Murphy. See Kirby, 274 P.3d at 1168 (``[T]o say that a section 226.7 
remedy is a wage . . . is not to say that the legal violation 
triggering the remedy is nonpayment of wages. As explained above, the 
legal violation is nonprovision of meal or rest breaks. . . .''). 
Accordingly, the MRB rules do not give employers the option of either 
complying with the requirements or providing the additional hour of 
pay.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ In Kirby, the California Supreme Court addressed, inter 
alia, the question of whether a section 226.7 claim alleging an 
employer's failure to provide statutorily mandated meal and rest 
periods, constituted an action brought for the nonpayment of wages. 
See 274 P.3d at 1167. The Court held that it did not and explained 
that the premium pay ``is the legal remedy for a violation . . . but 
whether or not it has been paid is irrelevant to whether section 
226.7 was violated. In other words, section 226.7 does not give 
employers a lawful choice between providing either meal and rest 
breaks or an additional hour of pay.'' Ibid.
    \8\ Even if employers did have an option of either complying 
with the MRB Rules or paying additional wages, the MRB Rules would 
still be ``additional to or more stringent than'' the HOS 
regulations, since the MRB Rules would either: (1) Require that 
employers provide for breaks not required by the HOS regulations; or 
(2) provide the remedy of additional pay not required by the HOS 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Employers of passenger-carrying CMV drivers complying with the 
minimum requirements of the HOS regulations would nevertheless be 
violating the MRB rules on their face. That alone is dispositive of the 
relevant inquiry. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-424, at 14 (``It is the 
Committee's intention that there be as much uniformity as practicable 
whenever a Federal standard and a State requirement cover the same 
subject matter. However, a State requirement and a Federal standard 
cover the same

[[Page 3475]]

subject matter only when meeting the minimum criteria of the less 
stringent provision causes one to violate the other provision on its 
face.''). The MRB rules therefore are ``additional to or more stringent 
than'' the HOS regulations.

IV. The MRB Rules Have No Safety Benefits That Extend Beyond Those 
Provided by the FMCSRs

    Because the MRB rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying 
CMVs, are more stringent than the Federal HOS regulations, they may be 
enforced unless the Agency also decides either that the MRB rules have 
no safety benefit, that they are incompatible with the HOS regulations, 
or that enforcement of the MRB rules would cause an unreasonable burden 
on interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(4). The Agency need only 
find that one of the aforementioned conditions exists to preempt the 
MRB rules. Ibid.
    Section 31141 authorizes the Secretary to preempt the MRB rules if 
they have ``no safety benefit.'' 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(4)(A). Consistent 
with the 2018 Decision, FMCSA continues to interpret this language as 
applying to any State law or regulation that provides no safety benefit 
beyond the safety benefit already provided by the relevant FMCSA 
regulations. The statute tasks FMCSA with determining whether a State 
law that is more stringent than Federal law, which would otherwise 
undermine the Federal goal of uniformity, is nevertheless justified. 
There would be no point to the ``safety benefit'' provision if it were 
sufficient that the more stringent State law provides the same safety 
benefit as Federal law. A State law or regulation need not have a 
negative safety impact to be preempted under section 31141(c)(4)(A); 
although, a law or regulation with a negative safety impact could be 
preempted.
    The ABA argues that California's MRB rules ``undermine existing 
federal fatigue management rules.'' In this regard, ABA contends:

    Under the MRB rules, drivers are required to take periodic 
breaks at certain times regardless of whether the driver feels 
fatigued. At other times, when the driver might actually feel 
fatigued, the driver might feel obligated to continue the trip 
because of the delay already caused by taking the designated break 
under California law. FMCSA has determined that providing the driver 
with flexibility to determine when to take a break, based on the 
driver's own physiology, traffic congestion, weather and other 
factors, will encourage safer driving practices than simply 
mandating a break at designated intervals. The MRB Rules act counter 
to this FMCSA mandate and the flexibility the FMCSA rules allow.

In its comments on ABA's petition, ATA agreed, stating that 
``specifying multiple arbitrary breaks, even when a driver is not 
fatigued, makes it less likely that a driver will take a break when he 
or she is fatigued.'' The Truckload Carriers Association also noted 
that ``flexibility will empower drivers to rest when they are feeling 
fatigued, regardless of how long they have been in the driver's seat 
that day or how far they are from their final destination.'' This 
sentiment was also echoed by other commenters, such as the Greater 
California Livery Association and the National Limousine Association. 
Additionally, the United Motorcoach Association stated, ``The 
application of the California Meal and Rest Break rules clearly 
endangers passengers and the traveling public. Any suggestion that a 
bus or motorcoach driver can simply pull off to the side of the road 
and `rest' while 50+ passengers sit patiently behind the driver is 
wildly mistaken.''
    Citing several National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) studies, 
safety recommendations, and the NTSB 2019-2020 Most Wanted List 
addressing issues surrounding fatigue-related highway accidents, the 
California Labor Commissioner and Attorney General contend that the MRB 
rules support the public safety goal of reducing fatigue-related 
accidents. In addition, the Labor Commissioner and Attorney General 
point out that FMCSA commissioned an Evidence Report to assess and 
characterize the relationship between crash and fatigue in generally 
healthy motorcoach drivers.\9\ They contend that the Evidence Report 
described studies that showed ``that a 30-minute rest break reduced the 
incidence of `safety critical events' while others showed that long-
haul truck drivers who napped had a significantly lower incidence of 
crash or near-crash.'' The Labor Commissioner and Attorney General 
added that ``the timeframe for incidence of crash maps closely to the 
timeframe for California's meal and rest periods.'' They argue that 
because the HOS rules for passenger-carrying CMVs do not require 
drivers to take the same 30-minute rest period applicable to property-
carrying CMVs, ``FMCSA cannot conclude, as it did in the December 2018 
preemption determination regarding property-carrying commercial motor 
vehicles, that California's meal and rest period requirements `do not 
provide additional safety benefits.''' Accordingly, they conclude that 
``it defies logic to suggest that the safety of bus drivers and their 
precious human cargo is not enhanced by the State's break 
requirements.'' The Amalgamated Transit Union, the Transportation 
Trades Department/AFL-CIO, the Teamsters, and the American Association 
for Justice make similar arguments and cite publications by the NTSB 
and others to show that CMV drivers' safety performance can easily 
deteriorate due to fatigue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Manila Consulting Group, Inc. Evidence Report, Fatigue and 
Motorcoach/Bus Driver Safety. McLean, VA: Manila Consulting Group, 
Inc; December 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency disagrees that the absence of a 30-minute break 
requirement in the HOS rules for drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs, 
unlike property-carriers, renders it impossible for the Agency to find 
that that the MRB rules provide no safety benefit beyond the Federal 
regulations. The FMCSA has long recognized that there are operational 
differences between commercial passenger carriers and commercial 
freight carriers and that those differences require different fatigue 
management measures. In this regard, the Agency's 2003 HOS final rule 
did not propose any changes to the Federal HOS rules for drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs because the Agency determined that the nature 
of passenger-carrier operations requires a different framework for 
fatigue management than the HOS rules for property-carrier operations 
which includes more flexibility to accommodate operational challenges 
presented in passenger carrier transportation. 68 FR 22456, 22461 (Apr. 
28, 2003). In addition, when the Agency revised the HOS rules in 2011 
to mandate a 30-minute off-duty rest period for drivers operating 
property-carrying CMVs, the Agency did not impose a similar requirement 
on drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs. 76 FR 81134, 81186. In response 
to a commenter who opposed different HOS rules for property- and 
passenger-carriers, the Agency explained, ``[T]he HOS rules are not 
one-size-fits-all.'' Ibid. at 81165. The Agency's decision in 2011 not 
to impose a 30-minute rest period requirement for passenger-carrying 
CMVs was appropriate given the nature of bus operations, where drivers 
may stop and rest at times that coincide with passenger rest stops.
    The ABA and several commenters have described the operational 
differences. In this regard, ABA points out, ``In looking at a bus 
driver's schedule in practice, a scheduled service driver often will 
take multiple breaks during intermediate stops along a schedule. These 
will occur whenever practical, such as when all passengers disembark 
for a food or restroom break.'' Similarly, the United Motorcoach 
Association explains that ``most charter drivers take their meals with 
the groups.'' Coach USA notes that

[[Page 3476]]

``charter/tour drivers are able to take breaks while their passengers 
are out sightseeing'' and further explains that ``buses operating on 
long trips take pre-scheduled breaks for the benefit of the drivers and 
passengers. . . .'' Greyhound Lines (Greyhound) noted that a typical 
schedule would be ``structured to provide the driver and passenger a 
safe and comfortable meal and rest stop at the approximate half-way 
point of the trip.''
    The Federal regulations establish a fatigue management framework 
for drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs that prohibits a driver from 
operating a CMV if she feels too fatigued or is otherwise unable to 
safely drive and that prohibits employers from coercing a driver too 
fatigued to operate the CMV safely to remain behind the wheel. 49 CFR 
392.3, 390.6. In addition, the Federal HOS rules provide for a 
nonconsecutive 15-hour duty window that gives drivers flexibility to 
schedule off-duty breaks at times that accord with the passenger 
itinerary or travel schedule and with the driver's actual level of 
fatigue. 49 CFR 395.5(a). The HOS rule in conjunction with FMCSRs 
prohibiting fatigued driving and coercion sufficiently mitigate the 
risk that fatigued driving would lead to crashes. Additionally, the 
Agency believes that this framework is appropriate because it provides 
the flexibility needed for passenger carrier operations while still 
prohibiting a driver from operating a CMV when too fatigued to safely 
do so. Interposing the MRB rules on top of the Agency's framework 
eliminates the regulatory flexibilities provided and requires the 
driver to stop the bus and log off duty at fixed intervals each day 
regardless of the driver's break schedule or actual level of fatigue. 
The Agency determines that the MRB rules provide no safety benefit 
beyond the safety benefit already provided by the Federal regulatory 
framework for passenger-carrying CMVs.
    The Agency acknowledges the dangers of fatigued driving. However, 
the Labor Commissioner and the Attorney General mischaracterize one of 
the statements quoted from the Evidence Report. In evaluating the 
question ``How much rest does a fatigued professional driver need to 
resume driving unimpaired,'' the Evidence Report did, in fact, state 
that studies found that ``a 30-minute rest break reduced the incidence 
of `safety critical events.''' However, that statement was made in 
relation to drivers of property-carrying CMVs. Evidence Report: Fatigue 
and Motorcoach/Bus Driver Safety at 84. With regard to passenger-
carrying CMVs, the Evidence Report explained that, ``No included 
studies assessed only motorcoach drivers or presented data in a manner 
that allowed us to specifically address this driver group.'' Ibid. The 
Agency notes that the Labor Secretary has provided no data or research 
to show that California's MRB rules have led to a reduction in fatigue-
related crashes among passenger-carrying CMVs.
    The ABA further argues that a ``lack of adequate parking also makes 
the MRB rules untenable.'' In this regard, ABA cites the Agency's 
finding in the 2018 Decision that the increase in required stops to 
comply with the MRB Rules, when the driver may not be fatigued, will 
exacerbate the problem of property-carrying CMV drivers parking at 
unsafe locations. The ABA contends that ``[b]us drivers face an even 
more difficult task than truck drivers to find a parking space and 
safely park the vehicle several times each day in order to comply with 
the California requirements while ensuring that the passengers are 
safely accommodated.'' The United Motorcoach Association explained, 
``[A] bus or motorcoach parked on the side of the road while a driver 
`rests' poses a crash risk from traffic.'' The Truckload Carrier's 
Association stated, ``While the lack of safe truck parking is already 
an issue at the forefront of our industry, it is conceivably even worse 
for buses as they are more restricted than trucks as to where they can 
park given that they are transporting human cargo.'' The National 
Limousine Association, Coach USA and other commenters also advanced 
similar arguments.
    The Agency agrees that California's enforcement of the MRB rules 
could exacerbate the problem of CMV drivers parking at unsafe 
locations. The shortage of safe, authorized parking spaces for CMVs and 
the negative safety implication of enforcing the MRB rules is well-
documented in FMCSA's 2018 Decision preempting California's MRB rules 
for drivers of property carrying CMVs. See 83 FR 67476-77. The Agency 
adopts that reasoning here. If a passenger-carrying CMV driver resorted 
to stopping at an unsafe location--such as a highway shoulder and 
ramp--to comply with the MRB rules, such an action would present a 
safety hazard to the passengers, the driver, and other highway users.
    In sum, the MRB rules abrogate the flexibilities provided by the 
Federal HOS rules for passenger-carrying CMVs without an added safety 
benefit. Therefore, FMCSA determines that the MRB rules do not provide 
a safety benefit not already realized under the FMCSRs.

V. The MRB Rules Are Incompatible With the Federal HOS Regulations for 
Passenger-Carrying CMVs

    The Agency has determined that the MRB rules are ``additional to or 
more stringent than a regulation prescribed by the Secretary under 
section 31136;'' therefore, they must be preempted if the Agency also 
determines that the MRB rules are ``incompatible with the regulation 
prescribed by the Secretary.'' 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(4)(B). The 1984 Act 
limits the scope of the Agency's inquiry in this regard to a State 
law's compatibility with a regulation prescribed under section 31136. 
The ABA argues that the MRB rules conflict with various regulatory 
provisions that were not prescribed pursuant to the authority of 
section 31136.\10\ Because the provisions cited were not prescribed 
pursuant to section 31136, they fall outside the scope of a section 
31141 compatibility analysis. Therefore, the Agency has limited its 
compatibility analysis to the question of whether the MRB rules are 
incompatible with the HOS rules for passenger-carrying CMVs, which were 
prescribed pursuant to section 31136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The ABA cites the regulations implementing the 
transportation and related provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 at 49 CFR part 37, issued pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. 12101-12213 and 49 U.S.C. 322; former Interstate Commerce 
Commission regulations at 49 CFR part 374, subpart C, issued under 
49 U.S.C. 13301 and 14101; and California's regulations prohibiting 
idling, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, Sec.  2485.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the MRB rules' compatibility with the HOS rules, ABA 
argues that ``the timing requirements for meal and rest breaks under 
the MRB rules remove the flexibility allowed under the federal HOS 
regulations, thus making the MRB rules incompatible with the federal 
HOS regulations.'' Similarly, Coach USA stated, ``Under the federal HOS 
rules applicable to motor passenger carriers, bus drivers have the 
flexibility to take breaks when they need breaks, and when they can 
safely do so consistent with the need to monitor the bus and the 
passengers at all times. These federal rules have proven their worth in 
terms of bus safety; incompatible state regulations such as 
California's can only add confusion to the bus sector.''
    The American Association for Justice argues that FMCSA erred in 
applying the regulatory definition for ``compatibility,'' found at 49 
CFR 355.5, in the Agency's 2018 Decision preempting the MRB rules for 
drivers of property carrying CMVs.\11\ In this

[[Page 3477]]

regard, the American Association for Justice states, ``If only laws 
that are `identical' to federal rules could meet this standard, as ATA 
and ABA claim, then every state law that is `additional to or more 
stringent' than federal law would meet this requirement and be 
preempted.'' The California Labor Commissioner and Attorney General 
make a similar argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Under 49 CFR 355.5, ``Compatible or Compatibility means 
that State laws and regulations applicable to interstate commerce 
and to intrastate movement of hazardous materials are identical to 
the FMCSRs and the HMRs or have the same effect as the FMCSRs. . . 
.'' See also 49 CFR 350.105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency finds that the MRB rules, as applied to drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs, are incompatible with the Federal HOS 
regulations. Assuming arguendo that the Agency's application of the 
regulatory definition of ``compatible'' is inconsistent with Congress's 
intent, FMCSA need not rely on the fact that the MRB rules are not 
``identical to'' or ``have the same effect'' as the HOS rules to find 
them incompatible. Congress's clear intent for the 1984 Act was to 
minimize disuniformity in the national safety regulatory regime. See 
Pub. L. 98-554, title II Sec.  202, 203 (``The Congress finds that . . 
. improved, more uniform commercial motor vehicle safety measures and 
strengthened enforcement would reduce the number of fatalities and 
injuries and the level of property damage related to commercial motor 
vehicle operations.''); S.Rep. No. 98-424, at 14 (``It is the 
Committee's intention that there be as much uniformity as practicable 
whenever a federal standard and a state requirement cover the same 
subject matter.''); see also ibid. at 15 (``In adopting this section, 
the Committee does not intend that States with innovative safety 
requirements that are not identical to the national norm be discouraged 
from seeking better ways to protect their citizens, so long as a strong 
safety need exists that outweighs this goal of uniformity.''). As 
described below, the MRB rules frustrate Congress's goal of uniformity 
because they abrogate the flexibility that the Agency allows under the 
HOS rules. This fact alone renders the MRB rules incompatible.
    California's MRB rules require employers to provide passenger-
carrying CMV drivers with meal and rest breaks of specified duration at 
specific intervals. With regard to meal break timing, the California 
Supreme Court clarified that, in the absence of a waiver, California 
law ``requires a first meal period no later than the end of an 
employee's fifth hour of work, and a second meal period no later than 
the end of an employee's 10th hour of work. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513, 537 (Cal. 2012). As discussed infra, an 
employer must relieve the employee of all duty and employer control 
during the meal break. Ibid. at 533. On-duty meal breaks (breaks 
occurring on the jobsite) are permissible under California law ``only 
when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of 
all duty and when by written agreement'' the employer and employee 
mutually agree to an ``on-the-job paid meal period.'' Ibid. California 
interprets the circumstances justifying on-duty meal periods very 
narrowly, and any agreement consenting to on-the-job breaks may be 
revoked by the employee at any time. See generally Abdullah v. U.S. 
Security Associates, Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 958-60 (9th Cir. 2013). While 
employers do not have an affirmative obligation to ensure that the 
employee stops working, they do have an obligation to make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that the employee can take a 30-minute uninterrupted 
break, free from all responsibilities. Ibid. at 535-37. With regard to 
rest period timing, the California Supreme Court explained, ``Employees 
are entitled to 10 minutes' rest for shifts from three and one-half to 
six hours in length, 20 minutes for shifts of more than six hours up to 
10 hours, 30 minutes for shifts of more than 10 hours up to 14 hours, 
and so on.'' Ibid. at 529. In contrast to the required meal breaks, 
employers may never require their employees to remain ``on call'' 
during these mandatory rest periods. Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 
385 P.3d at 832. In contrast, the HOS rules do not mandate breaks at 
specified intervals. Instead, the HOS rules allow, but do not require, 
drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs the flexibility to take off-duty 
breaks as necessary, and other provisions of the FMCSRs prohibit a 
driver from operating a CMV when too fatigued to safely do so.
    The Labor Commissioner and the Attorney General contend that the 
MRB rules are not incompatible with the HOS rules because they ``impose 
an obligation to provide required meal and rest periods or to simply 
provide an additional hour of pay for not providing the break (assuming 
an exemption has not been granted for the rest period requirement, and 
that there is no waiver of the meal period or agreement to an on-duty 
meal period).'' This argument is also unavailing. As explained supra, 
in Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., the California Supreme Court 
held that section 226.7 ``does not give employers a lawful choice 
between providing either meal and rest breaks or an additional hour of 
pay,'' and that ``an employer's provision of an additional hour of pay 
does not excuse a section 226.7 violation.'' 274 P.3d at 1168 (emphasis 
in original). In addition, while California's regulations authorize the 
Labor Commissioner to grant an employer an exemption from the 10-minute 
rest break requirement, such exemptions are granted at the Labor 
Commissioner's discretion, and there is no provision for an exemption 
from the 30-minute meal break requirement.\12\ See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 
8, 11090 (IWC Order 9-2001), subd. 17. Lastly, while the Labor 
Commissioner and the Attorney General mention that the meal break may 
be waived, it may only be waived by the mutual consent of the employer 
and employee, and if the employee's shift is of sufficient length to 
require two 30-minute meal breaks, both may not be waived. See Cal. 
Code Regs. tit. 8, 11090 (IWC Order 9-2001), subd. 11(A)-(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The Labor Commissioner may grant an employer's exemption 
request if, after due investigation, it is found that the 
enforcement of the rest period provision would not materially affect 
the welfare or comfort of employees and would work an undue hardship 
on the employer. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, 11090 (IWC Order 9-
2001), subd. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Teamsters contend that ``California's rule in no way conflicts 
with Federal regulations.'' This argument also fails. The Agency's 
compatibility determination is different from ``conflict preemption'' 
under the Supremacy Clause, where conflict arises when it is impossible 
to comply with both the State and Federal regulations. The express 
preemption provision in section 31141 does not require such a stringent 
test. In any event, California's MRB rules actively undermine 
Congress's goal of uniformity, as well as FMCSA's affirmative policy 
objectives by abrogating the flexibility that the Agency built into the 
HOS rules. That would be sufficient to support a finding of 
incompatibility even under the conflict preemption test urged by the 
Teamsters.
    The FMCSA determines that the MRB rules, as applied to drivers of 
passenger-carrying CMVs, are incompatible with the Federal HOS 
regulations.

VI. Enforcement of the MRB Rules Would Cause an Unreasonable Burden on 
Interstate Commerce

    The MRB rules may not be enforced if the Agency decides that 
enforcing them ``would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce.'' 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(4)(C). Section 31141 does not prohibit 
enforcement of a State requirement that places an incidental

[[Page 3478]]

burden on interstate commerce, only burdens that are unreasonable.
A. Operational Burden and Costs
    The ABA argues that complying with the MRB rules is operationally 
burdensome because the rules require that drivers be relieved of all 
duty during the mandated meal and rest breaks, which do not permit a 
driver to attend to passenger needs. The ABA also argues that complying 
with the MRB rules compromises operators' ability to meet passenger 
itinerary and scheduling requirements. The ABA further contends that 
the cost of complying with MRB rules unreasonably burdens interstate 
commerce.
    In describing the operational burden caused by the MRB rules' 
requirement that drivers be relieved of all duty, ABA explains:

    Under the California MRB rules, when the bus driver logs off 
duty to take the required meal or rest breaks, the driver must be 
``relieved of all duty'' for the break period, unless the ``nature 
of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty,'' 
and the employee enters into a revocable written agreement to remain 
on duty. Calif. Wage Order 9 11(C). This is simply not feasible for 
typical intercity bus operations. Drivers cannot leave the bus, the 
passengers and their baggage and other belongings for ten or 30 
minutes several times each day, abdicating all responsibility for 
the safety or security of the passengers or property on the bus.

The ABA asserts that ``during the MRB mandated `breaks' it is 
unreasonable to assume that the driver may simply disavow any 
responsibility for the passengers, their belongings or the coach.'' The 
ABA states that while a driver may agree to waive a mandated break, the 
driver may rescind such an agreement at any time, thus such a waiver 
agreement affords no certainty to the carrier.
    The ABA also argues that complying with the MRB rules compromises 
operators' ability to meet scheduling requirements. In this regard, ABA 
states, ``[I]ntercity bus companies providing scheduled service 
typically offer interline connections with other motor carriers through 
the National Bus Traffic Association and also with Amtrak. They have 
designated and agreed times at which the services will meet, and 
passengers will transfer from one carrier to another.'' The ABA further 
explains, ``Charter and tour bus operators, while typically not 
interlining with other carriers, also have dedicated schedules and 
service obligations to their passengers. They frequently must meet time 
constraints to deliver their passengers to a scheduled athletic 
contest, an artistic performance, or other timed event.'' The ABA 
concludes that requiring a driver to comply with the MRB rules ``while 
accounting for traffic, weather, passenger rest stop needs and other 
disruptions, makes it inconceivable that a carrier could reliably meet 
the requirements of these service obligations.''
    In addition, ABA further contends that the cost of complying with 
the MRB rules unreasonably burdens interstate commerce, stating, ``The 
cost of compliance with the meal and rest break rules are staggering. 
Nor are these costs hypothetical.'' The ABA states, ``Requiring 
additional driving time and/or drivers would change the fundamental 
nature of bus service. Buses would no longer offer the most affordable 
source of intercity passenger transportation.''
    Several commenting motor carriers also described the operational 
burdens imposed by the MRB rules. Greyhound expressed concern about the 
requirement that drivers be relieved of all duty during meal breaks 
under the MRB rules, stating, ``During rest stops, Greyhound drivers 
are still responsible for the safety and security of the bus as well as 
passengers. The driver must ensure the safe de-boarding of passengers 
and their safe and timely re-boarding, ensure the bus remains secure, 
answer passenger questions, retrieve luggage if requested and respond 
to emergency situations.'' Greyhound argues, ``The nature of the job 
prohibits a completely duty-free break in the majority of locations 
where the driver may stop.'' Greyhound states that a driver cannot be 
relieved of all duty during MRB rule mandated breaks without other 
Greyhound personnel present. Coach USA stated:

    Even during scheduled meal and rest breaks, a driver cannot 
safely be relieved of all duty. During a scheduled meal stop, for 
example, all passengers exit the vehicle, and the driver secures the 
bus and then begins his or her meal break. During these breaks, 
Coach drivers sometimes are required to address emergency passenger 
situations that arise, such as a passenger who needs urgent access 
to her insulin or another who needs to access an EpiPen left on the 
bus to deal with an allergic reaction. Passengers also sometimes 
need bus access for any number of other reasons, such as having left 
money needed to purchase food on the bus. If the bus is locked and 
secured and the driver has left the area of the bus to take a 
California-rule mandated off-duty break, these passengers will face 
real problems. Further, passengers with mobility impairments may 
also need attention, including assistance in boarding and de-
boarding the bus. In these situations, drivers cannot ignore a 
passenger's urgent needs, yet could not meet those needs to the 
extent they are required by California regulation to be relieved of 
all duty.

Transportation Charter Services commented that complying with the MRB 
rules interferes with operational schedules and service connections. 
The company explained that the driver's daily itinerary is determined 
by the group chartering the bus and that passenger meal, rest, and view 
point stops are scheduled based on travel times between destinations, 
which do not always coincide with the break time required by the MRB 
rules. Other commenters including H & L Charter Co., Pacific Coachways 
Charter Services, Best Limousines & Transportation, Royal Coach Tours, 
Sierra Pacific Tours, the California Bus Association, and Classic 
Charter made similar arguments.
    In addition, several commenters described the ways in which 
complying with the MRB rules compromises operators' ability to meet 
scheduling requirements. Coach USA explained, ``Such mandated stops 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for bus carriers to meet 
schedules that passengers expect them to meet.'' Coach USA further 
stated, ``Passengers depend on such schedules to make connections and 
timely arrive at their destinations. The California rules impair the 
ability of bus carriers to provide the timely and efficient service 
passengers expect and thus unduly burden commerce.'' Coach USA also 
said that the unpredictability of driving conditions is already a 
burden that bus carriers need to deal with while maintaining schedules 
and that ``[a]dding mandatory rest and meal breaks at given hours into 
the mix of factors that impact schedules will make keeping such 
schedules all the more difficult, burdening the ability of carriers to 
meet their interstate commerce obligations.''
    Greyhound explained that its network ``is an interlocking 
interstate system of schedules which connect with other buses of 
Greyhound, other intercity bus companies, local transit, Amtrak and 
other modes at hundreds of locations in California and across the 
country.'' Greyhound argued that if a driver stops to take a required 
break, ``that stop will jeopardize connections throughout the system 
that interstate passengers rely on.'' Greyhound said that it carried 
769,566 interstate passengers in the last fiscal year who either 
started or finished their journeys at a California location. The 
company contends, ``All of these passengers face potential disruptions 
to their trips because of missed connections or delayed arrivals and 
departures caused by the inflexibility of the MRB Rules on the one hand 
and the

[[Page 3479]]

vagaries of California traffic on the other.''
    Mr. Thomas Miller, an airport shuttle and charter bus operator, 
also described administrative and operational burdens associated with 
complying with the MRB rules and how they affect scheduling. He 
explained, ``California laws with respect to the 5-hour meal break 
rules do not work in the bus and charter operator business. Traffic is 
so unpredictable you cannot stay legal 100% of the time.'' Mr. Miller 
further stated, ``We require our drivers to take an unpaid rest break 
at the airport even if the total round trip is under 5 hours. They hate 
it, they would rather have it at home on their split shift.''
    Several commenters discussed the need to have additional personnel 
present with the driver to attend to passenger needs or the need to 
undertake other measures in order to comply with the MRB rules. In this 
regard, the United Motorcoach Association commented that ``The 
California MRB needlessly extends a driver's workday and . . . will 
periodically require a relief driver to avoid exceeding driving and/or 
on-duty limits to accommodate the California MRB.'' Similarly, 
Greyhound stated that complying with the requirement that drivers be 
relieved of all duty is impracticable without other Greyhound personnel 
present. Coach USA stated, ``Commerce would be further burdened if 
carriers were forced to meet the California rules by hiring two 
drivers. . . . Not only would this impose extraordinary cost burdens, 
but it would make much worse a driver shortage that already confronts 
the motor passenger carrier industry.'' Mr. Miller explained that his 
attorney advised him to consider having his drivers report for work 40 
minutes earlier to account for the MRB rules mandated breaks. Other 
commenters such as the Greater California Livery Association and the 
National Limousine Association stated that complying the with MRB rules 
would result in a ``substantial increase in driver costs'' due to 
decreased productivity and the need for additional drivers.
    The California Labor Commissioner and Attorney General dispute that 
enforcing the MRB rules unreasonably burdens interstate commerce. They 
rely on Yoder v. Western Express, Inc., 181 F. Supp.3d 704 (C.D. Cal. 
2015), in which a Federal district court held that application of 
California's wage and hour laws to a motor carrier did not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause. The Labor Commissioner and the Attorney 
General argue that ``California wage and hour laws at issue, including 
meal and rest break requirements, should be afforded, at minimum, 
significant weight in a Commerce Clause analysis.'' They explain that 
the district court in Yoder applied the standard set forth in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), under which non-discriminatory 
State laws will generally not be found to violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause ``unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'' See Yoder, 181 
F. Supp. 3d at 718 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). They note that the 
court in Yoder found that ``California has an indisputably legitimate 
public interest in enforcing labor laws which protect its workers'' and 
rejected the claim of the defendant, Western Express, that the burden 
on interstate commerce was clearly excessive in relation to 
California's legitimate public interest in regulating employment 
matters. See Yoder, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 720. The Labor Commissioner and 
the Attorney General conclude that ABA's assertions of an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce fails ``in light of California's 
`legitimate interest in promoting driver and public safety' which FMCSA 
has recognized.''
    The Amalgamated Transit Union contends that ABA's petition failed 
to ``include any evidence of the costs of the MRB rules.'' Similarly, 
the Transportation Trades Department/AFL-CIO argues that ``while ABA 
makes the claim that `the cost of compliance with the meal and rest 
break rules are staggering' it provides absolutely no empirical 
evidence for this statement and relies entirely on conjecture.'' The 
Teamsters state that ABA ``provides no empirical evidence'' to support 
its argument related to the costs associated with MRB rule compliance. 
The Teamsters continue, ``For decades, the motor carrier industries 
have presumably found a way--one that is feasible--to comply with 
federal laws in conjunction with state laws. While and to the extent 
that compliance can result in increased expenditures, this does not 
outweigh the safety benefits that protect drivers and passengers.''
    The FMCSA concludes that application of the MRB rules to passenger-
carrying motor carriers unreasonably burdens interstate commerce. The 
Agency does not believe that the operational burdens described by ABA 
and the carriers are mere speculation. As ABA correctly states, the MRB 
rules provide that ``[u]nless the employee is relieved of all duty 
during a 30 minute meal period, the meal period shall be considered an 
``on duty'' meal period and counted as time worked.'' Cal. Code Regs. 
tit. 8, 11090 ((IWC Order 9-2001), subd. 11(C) (emphasis added). The 
California Supreme Court explained that the employee must be free to 
leave the premises, without any work-related responsibilities, during 
the entire 30-minute period. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 273 P.3d at 533. Further, ``[a]n `on duty' meal period shall be 
permitted only when the nature of the work prevents an employee from 
being relieved of all duty and when by written agreement between the 
parties. . . . that the employee may, in writing, revoke the agreement 
at any time.'' Ibid. Moreover, an employer may never require their 
employees to remain ``on call'' during a 10-minute rest break. Augustus 
v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 385 P.3d at 832. The Agency agrees that the 
requirement that a driver be relieved of all duty for a meal break or 
rest break at specified intervals without regard to location or 
passenger needs would result in significant operational burden for the 
motor carrier. While the MRB rules provide that an employer and 
employee may agree to an ``on duty'' meal break or to waive the meal 
break altogether, the employee may unilaterally rescind that agreement 
at any time. As ABA and most commenters have described, it would be 
untenable for a motor carrier transporting passengers to have the 
driver become unavailable to attend to passenger needs at an 
inopportune time and location due to an MRB-mandated off-duty break. 
The Agency also agrees with ABA that complying with the MRB rules 
presents an operational burden regarding scheduling. Under the Federal 
HOS rules, motor carriers and drivers have the flexibility to schedule 
off-duty breaks in a way the best accommodates the driver's need for 
rest, passenger needs, and the travel schedule; the MRB rules offer 
much less flexibility.
    The FMCSA also concludes that the California Labor Commissioner and 
Attorney General do not show that there is no unreasonable burden by 
relying on the district court opinion in Yoder v. Western Express. As 
noted above, Yoder analyzed whether California's wage and hour laws 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause, not whether those laws were 
preempted under 49 U.S.C. 31141. FMCSA acknowledges that it has 
suggested in the past that the test for determining whether a State law 
unreasonably burdens interstate commerce under section 31141 is the 
same as or similar to the test for determining whether a State law

[[Page 3480]]

violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Upon further consideration, 
however, FMCSA concludes that nothing in the text of section 31141 or 
elsewhere suggests that only unconstitutional State laws can cause an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. In any event, even if FMCSA 
could only find an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce by 
finding that the burdens on commerce are clearly excessive in relation 
to putative local benefits, that standard would easily be met here. As 
discussed above, there is no evidence that the MRB rules provide a 
safety benefit beyond the benefits already provided by the Federal HOS 
regulations. The significant burdens identified by ABA and the carriers 
thus are clearly excessive.
    Based on the foregoing, FMCSA concludes that the MRB rules cause an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
B. Cumulative Effect of the MRB Rules and Other States' Similar Laws
    Section 31141 does not limit the Agency to looking only to the 
State whose rules are the subject of a preemption determination. The 
FMCSA ``may consider the effect on interstate commerce of 
implementation of that law or regulation with the implementation of all 
similar laws and regulations of other States.'' 49 U.S.C. 31141(c)(5). 
To date, 20 States in addition to California regulate, in varying 
degrees, meal and rest break requirements, as the National Conference 
of State Legislators, the Center for Justice and Democracy, and the 
American Association for Justice have pointed out.\13\ The ABA argues 
that ``[c]omplying with each of these regulatory schemes absolutely 
presents an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.'' Several other 
commenters have described the burden resulting from differing State 
meal and rest break laws. Greyhound explained, ``20 other states have 
meal and rest break provisions. . . . [t]he potential applicability of 
these provisions could wreak havoc on Greyhound's carefully constructed 
interstate, interconnected route system and could pose a serious threat 
to the many small bus companies, who rely on their Greyhound 
connections to support their intercity services.'' The National 
Limousine Association and the Greater California Livery Association 
explained, ``The proliferation of rules like California's in at least 
20 other states, applied to drivers of CMVs in interstate commerce, 
would increase the associated productivity loss enormously and 
represent an even greater burden on interstate commerce.'' Coach USA 
stated that ``confusion would become commonplace to meet all such break 
requirements as state borders are crossed.'' The United Motorcoach 
Association commented, ``As passenger carrier drivers cross multiple 
state lines, the result can be fluctuating start/stop times resulting 
in sleep truncation and disruption.'' Other commenters, such as 
Transportation Charter Services, Pacific Coachways Charter Services, 
Best Limousine & Transportation, Royal Coach Tours, Sierra Pacific 
Tours, the California Bus Association, and Classic Charter stated that 
having to comply with the meal and rest break requirements of 20 states 
and the Federal HOS rules would make it impossible for them to meet 
planned schedules and itineraries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ According to the National Conference of State Legislators 
and the American Association for Justice, the following States have 
meal and rest break laws: California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and West 
Virginia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2018 Decision, FMCSA described the meal and rest break laws 
of Oregon, Nevada, and Washington and noted differences regarding when 
each State required a break to occur. See 83 FR 67470, 67479-80. The 
Agency determined that the diversity of State regulation of required 
meal and rest breaks for CMV drivers has resulted in a patchwork of 
requirements. Ibid. The Agency adopts that reasoning here.
    The American Association for Justice argues that ABA failed to 
provide ``adequate justification for singling out the laws of one state 
when similar arguments can be made for the laws in the other 20 
states.'' Similarly, the Center for Justice and Democracy argues that 
ABA has provided ``no adequate explanation for specifically singling 
out California law in this petition.'' The Agency is not persuaded by 
this argument. Nothing in section 31141 prohibits a petitioner from 
seeking a preemption determination concerning the laws of one State, 
even where other States have similar laws. Having concluded that the 
MRB rules impose significant operational burden and costs, the Agency 
further determines that the burden would be increased by the cumulative 
effect of other States' similar laws.
C. Summary
    Consistent with the Agency's 2018 Decision, FMCSA acknowledges that 
the State of California has a legitimate interest in promoting driver 
and public safety. However, just as the Federal HOS rules and other 
provisions in the FMCSRs serve to promote that interest with respect to 
drivers of property-carrying CMVs, so do they serve to promote it for 
drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs. The Labor Commissioner and the 
Attorney General have stated that the local benefit of enforcing the 
MRB rules is driver and public safety. However, the Agency has 
determined that the MRB rules offer no safety benefit beyond the 
Federal regulations governing drive-time limits, fatigue, and coercion. 
The FMCSA also determines that enforcing the MRB rules results in 
increased operational burden and costs. In addition, the Agency finds 
that requiring motor carriers to comply with Federal HOS rules and also 
identify and adjust their operations in response to the many varying 
State requirements is an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 
Even where the differences between individual State regulations are 
slight, uniform national regulation is significantly less burdensome. 
The Agency finds that the burden on interstate commerce caused by the 
MRB rules is clearly excessive relative to any safety benefit. The 
Agency therefore concludes that the MRB rules place an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce.

Preemption Decision

    As described above, FMCSA concludes that: (1) The MRB rules are 
State laws or regulations ``on commercial motor vehicle safety,'' to 
the extent they apply to drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs subject to 
FMCSA's HOS rules; (2) the MRB rules are additional to or more 
stringent than FMCSA's HOS rules; (3) the MRB rules have no safety 
benefit; (4) the MRB rules are incompatible with FMCSA's HOS rules; and 
(5) enforcement of the MRB rules would cause an unreasonable burden on 
interstate commerce. Accordingly, FMCSA grants ABA's petition for 
preemption and determines that the MRB rules are preempted pursuant to 
49 U.S.C. 31141. Effective the date of this decision, California may no 
longer enforce the MRB rules with respect to drivers of passenger-
carrying CMVs subject to FMCSA's HOS rules.

    Issued under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.87 and redelegated 
by Notice executed on January 7, 2020, on: January 13, 2020.
Alan Hanson,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2020-00835 Filed 1-17-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-EX-P