[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 11 (Thursday, January 16, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2820-2862]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-28343]



[[Page 2819]]

Vol. 85

Thursday,

No. 11

January 16, 2020

Part II





Department of Labor





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Wage and Hour Division





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29 CFR Part 791





Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 11 / Thursday, January 16, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Wage and Hour Division

29 CFR Part 791

RIN 1235-AA26


Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act

AGENCY: Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Labor (the Department) is updating and 
revising the Department's interpretation of joint employer status under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act) in order to promote 
certainty for employers and employees, reduce litigation, promote 
greater uniformity among court decisions, and encourage innovation in 
the economy.

DATES: This final rule is effective March 16, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy DeBisschop, Division of 
Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation, Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD), U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-0406 (this is not a 
toll-free number). Copies of this final rule may be obtained in 
alternative formats (Large Print, Braille, Audio Tape or Disc), upon 
request, by calling (202) 693-0675 (this is not a toll-free number). 
TTY/TDD callers may dial toll-free 1-877-889-5627 to obtain information 
or request materials in alternative formats.
    Questions of interpretation and/or enforcement of the agency's 
regulations may be directed to the nearest WHD district office. Locate 
the nearest office by calling WHD's toll-free help line at (866) 4US-
WAGE ((866) 487-9243) between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. in your local time 
zone, or log onto WHD's website for a nationwide listing of WHD 
district and area offices at http://www.dol.gov/whd/america2.htm.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Executive Summary

    The FLSA requires covered employers to pay their employees at least 
the federal minimum wage for every hour worked and overtime for every 
hour worked over 40 in a workweek.\1\ To be liable for paying minimum 
wage or overtime, a person or entity must be an ``employer,'' which the 
FLSA defines in section 3(d) to ``include[ ] any person acting directly 
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee.'' \2\
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    \1\ See 29 U.S.C. 206(a), 207(a).
    \2\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
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    As the Department has recognized since the FLSA's enactment, an 
employee can have two or more employers who are jointly and severally 
liable for the wages due the employee (i.e., joint employers). In 1958, 
the Department published an interpretive regulation, codified in 29 CFR 
part 791, which explained that joint employer status depends on whether 
multiple persons are ``not completely disassociated'' or ``acting 
entirely independently of each other'' with respect to the employee's 
employment.\3\ The regulation provided three situations where two or 
more employers are generally considered joint employers: Where there is 
an arrangement between them to share the employee's services, as, for 
example, to interchange employees; where one employer is acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or 
employers) in relation to the employee; or where they are not 
completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular 
employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly 
or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.\4\ 
Until this final rule, the Department had not meaningfully revised part 
791 since its promulgation over 60 years ago.
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    \3\ See 23 FR 5905 (Aug. 5, 1958) and 29 CFR 791.2(a).
    \4\ See 29 CFR 791.2(b).
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    The Department is concerned that part 791 does not provide adequate 
guidance for the most common joint employer scenario under the Act--
where an employer suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an employee to 
work, and another person simultaneously benefits from that work. Part 
791's focus on the association or relationship between potential joint 
employers is not necessarily helpful in determining whether the other 
person benefitting from the employee's work is the employee's employer 
too, especially considering the text of section 3(d) and Supreme Court 
and circuit court precedent determining joint employer status based on 
the degree of control exercised by the potential joint employer over 
the employee.
    Accordingly, in April, the Department published a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) detailing this concern, explaining how 
section 3(d) provides the textual basis for determining joint employer 
status under the Act, proposing a four-factor balancing test for 
determining joint employer status in the scenario where another person 
benefits from an employee's work, and proposing additional guidance 
regarding how to apply the test.\5\ In addition, the NPRM recognized 
that part 791's focus on the association between the potential joint 
employers is useful for determining joint employer status in a second 
scenario--where multiple employers suffer, permit, or otherwise employ 
an employee to work separate sets of hours in the same workweek and the 
issue is whether those separate sets of hours should be aggregated in 
the workweek. The Department proposed that the multiple employers are 
joint employers in this scenario if they are sufficiently associated 
with respect to the employment of the employee. Finally, the NPRM 
provided illustrative examples describing how the Department's proposal 
would apply in a number of factual scenarios involving multiple 
employers.
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    \5\ See 84 FR 14043 (Apr. 9, 2019).
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    Having received and reviewed the comments to its proposal, the 
Department now adopts as a final rule the analyses set forth in the 
NPRM largely as proposed. In the joint employer scenario where another 
person is benefitting from the employee's work, the Department is 
adopting a four-factor balancing test derived from Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency \6\ to assess whether the other 
person: (1) Hires or fires the employee; (2) supervises and controls 
the employee's work schedule or conditions of employment to a 
substantial degree; (3) determines the employee's rate and method of 
payment; and (4) maintains the employee's employment records. No single 
factor is dispositive in determining joint employer status, and the 
appropriate weight to give each factor will vary depending on the 
circumstances. However, satisfaction of the maintenance of employment 
records factor alone does not demonstrate joint employer status.
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    \6\ 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
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    The Department believes that this test is consistent with the ``any 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee'' language in the Act's definition of 
``employer.'' That language alone provides the textual basis for 
determining joint employer status under the Act. Although section 3(e) 
(defining ``employee'') \7\ and section 3(g) (defining ``employ'' as 
including ``to suffer or

[[Page 2821]]

permit to work'') \8\ broadly define who is an employee under the Act, 
only section 3(d) addresses whether a worker who is an employee under 
the Act has another employer for his or her work. Moreover, multiple 
circuit courts apply balancing tests that, similar to the Department's 
test, assess the potential joint employer's control over the employee.
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    \7\ 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1).
    \8\ 29 U.S.C. 203(g).
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    The Department's final rule provides additional guidance on how to 
apply this test. For example, to be a joint employer under the Act, the 
other person must actually exercise--directly or indirectly--one or 
more of the four control factors. The other person's ability, power, or 
reserved right to act in relation to the employee may be relevant for 
determining joint employer status, but such ability, power, or right 
alone does not demonstrate joint employer status without some actual 
exercise of control. The Department had proposed that the reserved 
right to act be irrelevant for determining joint employer status, but 
having reviewed and considered the comments received, it now recognizes 
that the reserved right to act can play some role in determining joint 
employer status, though there still must be some actual exercise of 
control. The Department's final rule also provides, in response to 
comments received, guidance on the meaning of ``employment records'' 
for purposes of applying the fourth factor and on what constitutes 
indirect acts of control for purposes of applying the factors 
generally.
    Application of the four factors should determine joint employer 
status in most cases. Nonetheless, the Department recognizes, 
consistent with longstanding precedent, that additional factors may be 
relevant for determining joint employer status. Accordingly, the final 
rule provides that additional factors may be considered, but only if 
they are indicia of whether the potential joint employer exercises 
significant control over the terms and conditions of the employee's 
work. In addition, the final rule provides that whether the employee is 
economically dependent on the potential joint employer is not relevant 
for determining the potential joint employer's liability under the Act. 
Economic dependence is relevant when applying section 3(g) and 
determining whether a worker is an employee under the Act; however, 
determining whether a worker who is an employee under the Act has a 
joint employer for his or her work is a different analysis that is 
based on section 3(d). Thus, factors that assess the employee's 
economic dependence are not relevant to determine whether the worker 
has a joint employer. Examples of such factors include: (1) Whether the 
employee is in a specialty job or a job that otherwise requires special 
skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight; (2) whether the employee has 
the opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her managerial 
skill; (3) whether the employee invests in equipment or materials 
required for work or the employment of helpers; and (4) the number of 
contractual relationships, other than with the employer, that the 
potential joint employer has entered into to receive similar services.
    The Department's proposal identified certain business models (such 
as a franchise model), certain business practices (such as allowing the 
operation of a store on one's premises), and certain contractual 
agreements (such as requiring a party in a contract to institute sexual 
harassment policies) as not making joint employer status more or less 
likely under the Act. The Department received many comments in response 
to its proposal, and the final rule identifies even more business 
models, business practices, and contractual agreements as not making 
joint employer status more or less likely under the Act. This will 
allow parties to make business decisions and enter into business 
relationships with more certainty and clarity regarding what actions 
will result in joint liability under the Act.
    In the other joint employer scenario under the Act--where multiple 
employers suffer, permit, or otherwise employ the employee to work 
separate sets of hours in the same workweek--the multiple employers are 
joint employers if they are sufficiently associated with respect to the 
employment of the employee. This approach is consistent with the 
Department's focus on the association between the potential joint 
employers. If the multiple employers are joint employers, they must 
aggregate the hours worked for each for purposes of determining 
compliance with the Act.
    Finally, the final rule provides even more illustrative examples 
applying the Department's analyses to factual situations than did the 
proposal--again, to provide more certainty and clarity regarding who is 
and is not a joint employer under the Act.
    The Department's estimates of the economic impacts of this final 
rule are discussed in sections VI and VII below. The Department 
estimates that costs in the form of regulatory familiarization with 
this final rule will range from $324.2 million to $416.7 million. 
Additionally, this final rule may reduce the number of persons who are 
joint employers in one scenario and as a result, employees will have 
the legal right to collect wages due under the Act from fewer 
employers. For these reasons, the Department acknowledges that there 
may be transfers from employees to employers. However, the Department 
lacks the data needed to calculate the potential amount or frequency of 
these transfers. This final rule is considered to be an Executive Order 
13771 deregulatory action and is economically significant for the 
purposes of Executive Order 12866. Qualitative details of the cost 
savings, benefits, and other economic impacts are discussed below.

II. Background

A. The FLSA

    The FLSA requires covered employers to pay their employees at least 
the federal minimum wage for every hour worked and overtime for every 
hour worked over 40 in a workweek.\9\ The FLSA defines the term 
``employee'' in section 3(e)(1) to mean ``any individual employed by an 
employer,'' \10\ and defines the term ``employ'' in section 3(g) to 
include ``to suffer or permit to work.'' \11\ ``Employer'' is defined 
in section 3(d) to ``include[ ] any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.'' 
\12\
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    \9\ See 29 U.S.C. 206(a), 207(a).
    \10\ 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1).
    \11\ 29 U.S.C. 203(g).
    \12\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
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B. Regulatory and Judicial History

    In July 1939, a year after the FLSA's enactment, WHD issued 
Interpretative Bulletin No. 13 addressing, among other topics, whether 
two or more companies could be jointly and severally liable for a 
single employee's hours worked under the Act.\13\ The Bulletin 
acknowledged the possibility of joint employer liability and provided 
an example where two companies arranged ``to employ a common watchman'' 
who had ``the duty of watching the property of both companies 
concurrently for a specified number of hours each night.'' \14\ The 
Bulletin concluded that the companies ``are not each required to pay 
the minimum rate required under the statute for all hours worked by the 
watchman . . . but . . . should be

[[Page 2822]]

considered as a joint employer for purposes of the [A]ct.'' \15\
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    \13\ See Interpretative Bulletin No. 13, ``Hours Worked: 
Determination of Hours for Which Employees are Entitled to 
Compensation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,'' ]] 16-17. 
In October 1939 and October 1940, the Department revised other 
portions of the Bulletin not pertinent here.
    \14\ Id. ] 16.
    \15\ Id.
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    The Bulletin provided a second example of an employee who works 40 
hours for company A and 15 hours for company B during the same 
workweek.\16\ The Bulletin explained that if A and B are ``acting 
entirely independently of each other with respect to the employment of 
the particular employee,'' they are not joint employers and may 
``disregard all work performed by the employee for the other company'' 
in determining their obligations to the employee under the Act for that 
workweek.\17\ On the other hand, if ``the employment by A is not 
completely disassociated from the employment by B,'' they are joint 
employers and must consider the hours worked for both as a whole to 
determine their obligations to the employee under the Act for that 
workweek.\18\ Relying on section 3(d) of the FLSA, the Bulletin 
concluded by saying that, ``at least in the following situations, an 
employer will be considered as acting in the interest of another 
employer in relation to an employee: If the employers make an 
arrangement for the interchange of employees or if one company 
controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, directly 
or indirectly, the other company.'' \19\
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    \16\ See id. ] 17.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.
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    In 1958, the Department published a regulation, codified in 29 CFR 
part 791, which expounded on Interpretative Bulletin No. 13.\20\ 
Section 791.2(a) reiterated that joint employer status depends on 
whether multiple persons are ``not completely disassociated'' or 
``acting entirely independently of each other'' with respect to the 
employee's employment.\21\ Section 791.2(b) explained, ``Where the 
employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more 
employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during 
the workweek,'' the employers are generally considered joint employers 
in situations such as:
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    \20\ See 23 FR 5905 (Aug. 5, 1958).
    \21\ 29 CFR 791.2(a).
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    (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share 
the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or
    (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the 
employee; or
    (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with 
respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to 
share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the 
fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common 
control with the other employer.\22\
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    \22\ 29 CFR 791.2(b) (footnotes omitted).
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    In 1961, the Department amended a footnote in the regulation to 
clarify that a joint employer is also jointly liable for overtime 
pay.\23\ Since this 1961 update, the Department has not published any 
other updates to part 791 until this final rule.
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    \23\ See 26 FR 7730, 7732 (Aug. 18, 1961).
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    In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Falk v. Brennan, a joint 
employer case.\24\ Falk did not cite or rely on part 791, but instead 
used section 3(d) to determine whether an apartment management company 
was a joint employer of the employees of the apartment buildings that 
it managed.\25\ The Court held that, because the management company 
exercised ``substantial control [over] the terms and conditions of the 
[employees'] work,'' the management company was an employer under 
section 3(d), and could therefore be jointly liable with the building 
owners for any wages due to the employees under the FLSA.\26\
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    \24\ See 414 U.S. 190.
    \25\ See id. at 195.
    \26\ Id.
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    In 1983, the Ninth Circuit issued a seminal joint employer 
decision, Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency.\27\ In 
Bonnette, seniors and individuals with disabilities receiving state 
welfare assistance (the ``recipients'') employed home care workers as 
part of a state welfare program.\28\ Taking an approach similar to 
Falk, the court addressed whether California and several of its 
counties (the ``counties'') were joint employers of the workers under 
section 3(d).\29\ In determining whether the counties were jointly 
liable for the home care workers under section 3(d), the court found 
``four factors [to be] relevant'': ``whether the alleged [joint] 
employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) 
supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of 
employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) 
maintained employment records.'' \30\ The court noted that these four 
factors ``are not etched in stone and will not be blindly applied'' and 
that the determination of joint employer status depends on the 
circumstances of the whole activity.\31\ Applying the four factors, the 
court concluded that the counties ``exercised considerable control'' 
and ``had complete economic control'' over ``the nature and structure 
of the employment relationship'' between the recipients and home care 
workers, and were therefore ``employers'' under section 3(d), jointly 
and severally liable with the recipients to the home care workers.\32\
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    \27\ See 704 F.2d 1465, abrogated on other grounds, Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Although the 
Ninth Circuit later adopted a thirteen-factor test in Torres-Lopez 
v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639-41 (9th Cir. 1997), many courts have 
treated Bonnette as the baseline for their own joint employer tests.
    \28\ See 704 F.2d at 1467-68.
    \29\ See id. at 1469-70.
    \30\ Id. at 1470.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Id.
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    In 2014, the Department issued Administrator's Interpretation (Home 
Care AI) No. 2014-2, concerning joint employer status in the context of 
home care workers.\33\ Consistent with Sec.  791.2, the Home Care AI 
described a joint employer as an additional employer who is ``not 
completely disassociated'' from the other employer(s) with respect to a 
common employee, and cited the breadth of the definitions of 
``employer'' and ``employ'' in sections 3(d) and (g).\34\ The Home Care 
AI opined that ``the focus of the joint employment regulation is the 
degree to which the two possible joint employers share control with 
respect to the employee and the degree to which the employee is 
economically dependent on the purported joint employers.'' \35\ The 
Home Care AI opined that ``a set of [joint employer] factors that 
addresses only control is not consistent with the breadth of [joint] 
employment under the FLSA'' because section 3(g)'s ``suffer or permit'' 
language governs FLSA joint employer status.\36\ The Home Care AI 
applied the four Bonnette factors as part of a larger multi-factor 
analysis that provided specific guidance about joint employer status in 
the home care industry.\37\
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    \33\ U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator's 
Interpretation No. 2014-2, ``Joint Employment of Home Care Workers 
in Consumer-Directed, Medicaid-Funded Programs by Public Entities 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act'' (June 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2014/FLSAAI2014_2.pdf.
    \34\ Id. at 2, 2 n.2.
    \35\ Id. at 3 n.3.
    \36\ Id. at 3 n.4.
    \37\ See id. at 9-14.
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    In 2016, the Department issued Administrator's Interpretation No. 
2016-1 (Joint Employer AI) concerning joint employer status under the 
FLSA and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
(MSPA), which the Department intended to be ``harmonious'' and ``read

[[Page 2823]]

in conjunction with'' the Home Care AI's discussion of joint employer 
status.\38\ The Joint Employer AI, although also citing the definitions 
in sections 3(d) and (e), described section 3(g)'s ``suffer or permit'' 
language as determining the scope of joint employer status.\39\ The 
Joint Employer AI opined that ``joint employment, like employment 
generally, `should be defined expansively.' '' \40\ It further opined 
that ``joint employment under the FLSA and MSPA [is] notably broader 
than the common law . . . which look[s] to the amount of control that 
an employer exercises over an employee.'' \41\ The Joint Employer AI 
concluded that, because ``the expansive definition of `employ' '' in 
both the FLSA and MSPA ``rejected the common law control standard,'' 
``the scope of employment relationships and joint employment under the 
FLSA and MSPA is as broad as possible.'' \42\ The Department rescinded 
the Joint Employer AI effective June 7, 2017.\43\
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    \38\ U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., WHD Administrator's 
Interpretation No. 2016-1, ``Joint employment under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act'' (Jan. 20, 2016).
    \39\ See id.
    \40\ Id. (quoting Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639).
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. Secretary of 
Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent Contractor Informal 
Guidance (June 7, 2017), available at https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607.
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C. The Department's Proposal

    On April 9, 2019, the Department proposed revisions to part 791 to 
update and clarify its interpretation of joint employer status under 
the FLSA. See 84 FR 14043-61.
    For the joint employer scenario where an employee has an employer 
who suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an employee to work and 
another person simultaneously benefits from that work, the Department 
proposed that the other person is the employee's joint employer under 
the Act only if that person is acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of the employer in relation to the employee. The Department 
proposed to adopt a four-factor balancing test derived (with one 
modification) from Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency 
assessing whether the potential joint employer:
     Hires or fires the employee;
     Supervises and controls the employee's work schedule or 
conditions of employment;
     Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; and
     Maintains the employee's employment records.

    The Department proposed to modify the first Bonnette factor so that 
a person's ability, power, or reserved contractual right to act with 
respect to the employee's terms and conditions of employment would not 
be relevant to that person's joint employer status under the Act.
    The Department also proposed that additional factors may be 
relevant to this joint employer analysis, but only if they are indicia 
of whether the potential joint employer is:
     Exercising significant control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work; or
     Otherwise acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
the employer in relation to the employee.
    The Department further proposed that, in determining the economic 
reality of the potential joint employer's status under the Act, whether 
an employee is economically dependent on the potential joint employer 
is not relevant. The Department identified certain ``economic 
dependence'' factors that are not relevant to the joint employer 
analysis, including, but not limited to, whether the employee:
     Is in a specialty job or a job otherwise requiring special 
skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight;
     Has the opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her 
managerial skill; and
     Invests in equipment or materials required for work or for 
the employment of helpers.
    The Department's proposal noted that a joint employer may be any 
``person'' as defined by section 3(a) of the Act, which includes ``any 
organized group of persons.'' It also proposed that a person's business 
model (such as a franchise model), certain business practices (such as 
allowing an employer to operate a store on the person's premises or 
participating in an association health or retirement plan), and certain 
business agreements (such as requiring an employer in a business 
contract to institute sexual harassment policies), do not make joint 
employer status more or less likely under the Act.
    In the other joint employer scenario under the Act--where multiple 
employers suffer, permit, or otherwise employ the employee to work 
separate sets of hours in the same workweek--the Department proposed 
only non-substantive revisions. Believing that part 791's current focus 
on the association between the potential joint employers is useful for 
determining joint employer status in this scenario, the Department 
proposed that the multiple employers are joint employers in this 
scenario if they are sufficiently associated with respect to the 
employment of the employee. The Department noted that, if they are 
joint employers, they must aggregate the hours worked for each for 
purposes of determining compliance with the Act.
    Finally, the Department's proposal included several other 
provisions. First, it reiterated that a person who is a joint employer 
is jointly and severally liable with the employer and any other joint 
employers for all wages due to the employee under the Act. Second, it 
provided a number of illustrative examples that applied the 
Department's proposed joint employer rule. Third, it contained a 
severability provision.

III. Need for Rulemaking

    The primary purpose of this final rule is to offer guidance 
explaining how to determine joint employer status where an employer 
suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an employee to work, and another 
person simultaneously benefits from that work.
    In the proposed rule, the Department sought to revise and clarify 
the standard for joint employer status in order to give the public more 
meaningful, detailed, and uniform guidance of who is a joint employer 
under the Act. The Department noted that circuit courts currently use a 
variety of multi-factor tests to determine joint employer status, which 
have resulted in inconsistent treatment of similar worker situations, 
uncertainty for organizations, and increased compliance and litigation 
costs. To promote greater uniformity in court decisions and 
predictability for organizations and employees, the Department is 
adopting with modifications the four-factor test that it proposed for 
determining joint employer status.
    As noted in the Proposed Rule, part 791 is silent on whether a 
business model can make joint employer status more or less likely, and 
in this final rule, the Department explains its longstanding position 
that certain business models--such as the franchise model--do not 
themselves indicate joint employer status under the FLSA. In addition, 
the Department presents illustrative examples of the degree of 
agreements and association between employers that will result in joint 
and several liability. These updates are intended to assist 
organizations that may be hesitant to enter into beneficial 
relationships or engage in worker-friendly business practices for fear 
of being held liable for the wages of

[[Page 2824]]

employees over whom they have insignificant control.

IV. Final Regulatory Revisions

A. Introductory Statement to Part 791

    As explained in the NPRM's preamble, the Department proposed to 
make ``non-substantive revisions'' to the introductory statement 
provided in Sec.  791.1. 84 FR 14047. In relevant part, the proposed 
statement reiterated the Department's intent for part 791 to ``serve as 
`a practical guide to employers and employees as to how [WHD] will seek 
to apply [the FLSA],' '' \44\ and continued to advise that the 
Department will use the interpretations provided in part 791 to guide 
its enforcement of the Act unless it ``concludes upon reexamination 
that they are incorrect or is otherwise directed by an authoritative 
judicial decision.'' Id.
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    \44\ 84 FR 14058 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
138 (1944)).
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    The Department received no comments specifically addressing its 
proposed revisions to the introductory statement, but several 
commenters opined on matters germane to its substance. Senator Patty 
Murray and several worker advocacy groups, such as National Employment 
Lawyers Association (NELA) and the Low Wage Worker Legal Network, 
asserted that part 791 constitutes an interpretive rule that is not 
binding on courts. Asserting that the proposed rule's analysis 
contradicts much of the existing judicial precedent addressing FLSA 
joint employer status, these commenters stated that the proposal would 
be entitled to little judicial deference and of limited value for 
employers seeking to rely upon it. See, e.g., NELA (``Why, for example, 
would any responsible employer in North Carolina follow the 
Department's . . . proposed test knowing that the Fourth Circuit 
endorsed an entirely different test in [Salinas v. Commercial 
Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017)]?''); Low Wage Worker 
Legal Network (predicting ``a deluge of new litigation to understand 
whether, and to what extent, the law has shifted''). Many commenters 
representing employees asserted that the Department's proposed rule 
would be unlawful specifically because, in their opinion, it sets forth 
an analysis that ignores longstanding Supreme Court and circuit court 
precedent. See, e.g., Coalition of State Attorneys General (Coalition 
of State AGs); Farmworker Justice; Legal Aid Justice Center.
    By contrast, commenters representing employers praised the proposed 
rule in part for its potential to restore uniformity to the varied 
analyses currently applied by courts in different jurisdictions to 
determine FLSA joint employer status. For example, HR Policy 
Association asserted that ambiguity in the existing regulation has 
resulted in a ``maze of tests'' that produce different judicial 
outcomes in cases with similar facts, creating ``substantial 
uncertainty for employers with national operations.'' See also 
International Bancshares Corporation. Describing the same problem, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce asserted that the proposed rule would return 
``much-needed uniformity to the Act's enforcement scheme, which 
Congress intended when it passed the legislation.'' As discussed below 
in greater detail, commenters representing employers overwhelmingly 
endorsed the proposed rule as a clear and appropriate interpretation of 
the FLSA.
    The Department appreciates commenter feedback addressing the 
purpose and underlying legal authority of this rulemaking. As explained 
in greater detail below, the Department believes that the analysis 
adopted in this final rule is faithful to both the FLSA and to binding 
Supreme Court precedent. Although the analysis clearly differs, to 
varying degrees, from the myriad FLSA joint employer tests applied by 
the federal circuit courts of appeals, the Department has previously 
promulgated interpretive guidance regarding joint employer liability 
that overtly conflicts with the approach taken in a particular federal 
circuit.\45\ And given the divergent views of joint employment in the 
circuit courts, it would not be possible to provide detailed guidance 
that is consistent with all of them. Moreover, the Department notes 
that some of the tests used by the circuit courts (including the 
standard articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Salinas) are based in 
part on the ambiguous guidance provided in the Department's existing 
part 791 regulation. And more importantly, some circuit courts use 
joint employer tests that are expressly grounded in the principle that 
the FLSA should be read broadly, and thus, any exemptions construed 
narrowly. For instance, in articulating a joint employer test that is 
broader than the Bonnette factors, the Fourth Circuit explained that 
``because the [Fair Labor Standards] Act is remedial and humanitarian 
in purpose, it should be broadly interpreted and applied to effectuate 
its goals.'' \46\ The Ninth Circuit likewise explained that ``the 
concept of joint employment should be defined expansively under the 
FLSA . . . in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the 
Act'' when adopting a test that gives weight to a wide range of 
factors.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ For instance, the Department's withdrawn Joint Employer AI 
expressly recognized its conflict with the First and Third Circuits' 
approach of ``apply[ing] factors that address only or primarily the 
potential joint employer's control.'' U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & 
Hour Div., WHD Administrator's Interpretation No. 2016-1, ``Joint 
employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act'' (Jan. 20, 2016); see 
also U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator's 
Interpretation No. 2014-2, ``Joint Employment of Home Care Workers 
in Consumer-Directed, Medicaid-Funded Programs by Public Entities 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act'' (June 19, 2014) (disagreeing 
with ``courts [that] apply only the factors addressing the potential 
joint employer's control'').
    \46\ Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 140 
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benshoff v. City of Va. Beach, 180 F.3d 
136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).
    \47\ Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 
754 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 
933 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that ``because the FLSA and AWPA are 
remedial statutes, we must construe them broadly'' when determining 
joint employer liability); Karr v. Strong Detective Agency, Inc., a 
Div. of Kane Servs., 787 F.2d 1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1986) (``[W]e 
need to give this concept [of joint employer] an expansive 
interpretation in order to effectuate Congress' remedial intent in 
enacting the FLSA.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While this principle is based in older Supreme Court case law,\48\ 
the Supreme Court's more recent holding in Encino v. Navarro puts some 
doubt on the continued viability of that principle. In Encino, the 
Court held that barring a ``textual indication'' to the contrary, the 
exemptive provisions of the FLSA should be given a ``fair reading.'' 
\49\ The Supreme Court ``reject[ed] th[e practice of construing FLSA 
exemptions narrowly] as a useful guidepost for interpreting the FLSA'' 
because it rests on ``the flawed premise that the FLSA pursues its 
remedial purpose at all costs.'' \50\ Instead, ```[a] fair reading' of 
the FLSA, neither narrow nor broad, is what is called for.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 
U.S. 290, 296 (1985) (``The Court has consistently construed the 
[Fair Labor Standards] Act `liberally to apply to the furthest 
reaches consistent with congressional direction,' . . . recognizing 
that broad coverage is essential to accomplish the goal of outlawing 
from interstate commerce goods produced under conditions that fall 
below minimum standards of decency.'') (citations omitted) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)).
    \49\ 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (finding ``no license to give 
the exemption [to the FLSA] anything but a fair reading''); see also 
id. at 1143 (finding ``no reason not to give the statutory text [of 
the FLSA exemption] a fair reading''); A. Scalia & B. Garner, 
Reading Law 363 (2012).
    \50\ Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1142 (internal quotations omitted).
    \51\ U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Bristol Excavating, Inc., 935 F.3d 
122, 135 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1142).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, this update to the part 791 regulations reflects the

[[Page 2825]]

Department's consideration of Encino, and subsequent circuit courts' 
instruction to give the FLSA ``a fair reading.'' \52\ The Department 
emphasizes that employers may safely rely upon the interpretations 
provided in revised part 791 under section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal 
Act unless and until any such interpretation ``is modified or rescinded 
or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal 
effect.'' 29 U.S.C. 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Id.; see also Diaz v. Longcore, 751 F. App'x 755, 758 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (rejecting plaintiffs' request to ``interpret [FLSA] 
provisions to provide broad rather than narrow protection to 
employees'' because ``[w]e must instead give the FLSA a `fair 
interpretation' '') (citing Encino, 138 S. Ct. at 1142).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For additional clarity for stakeholders, the Department adopts in 
the final rule non-substantive revisions to clarify, streamline, and 
modernize the language of Sec.  791.1. As in the prior rule, the 
introductory statement will comprise Sec.  791.1 of the final rule.

B. Two Joint Employer Scenarios

    The proposed rule stated that ``[t]here are two joint employer 
scenarios under the FLSA.'' 84 FR 14059. It described the first 
scenario as occurring when ``the employee has an employer who suffers, 
permits, or otherwise employs the employee to work . . . but another 
person simultaneously benefits from that work.'' Id. It described the 
second scenario as occurring when ``one employer employs a worker for 
one set of hours in a workweek, and another employer employs the same 
worker for a separate set of hours in the same workweek.'' Id. In this 
second scenario (unlike the first), the ``jobs and the hours worked for 
each employer are separate.'' Id. If the employers are joint employers 
of the worker, then all of the worker's hours worked for the employers 
are aggregated for the workweek, and ``both employers are jointly and 
severally liable for all of the hours the employee worked for them in 
the workweek.'' Id. Although the Department did not use such terms in 
its proposal and does not use such terms in its final rule, some courts 
have referred to the first scenario as ``vertical'' joint employment, 
and the second scenario as ``horizontal'' joint employment. See, e.g., 
Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(using the terms).
    Several commenters appreciated the discussion of the two scenarios. 
National Federation of Independent Business described the proposal's 
distinction between the two scenarios as ``a single, crucial, and 
correct analytical step'' and agreed that ``the question of joint 
employer status arises under the FLSA in two different situations that 
call for two different standards tailored to those situations.'' The 
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) expressed its ``support[ ] 
[for] the Department's proposal to clarify and distinguish `vertical' 
and `horizontal' joint employment'' and ``the effort to provide clear 
and understandable explanations of when the two sets of concepts 
apply.'' The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) stated that the 
proposal ``appropriately distinguishes `vertical' from `horizontal' 
joint employment situations by addressing them separately.'' Comments 
generally did not dispute the proposed rule's description of the two 
joint employer scenarios. For example, the National Employment Law 
Project (NELP) did not specifically comment on this feature of the 
proposed rule, but attached a copy of the Joint Employer AI to its 
comment, which similarly distinguished between the two scenarios.
    In the final rule, the Department will continue to describe and 
distinguish between the two joint employer scenarios. This distinction 
is especially useful given the Department's position (both in its 
proposal and, as discussed below, in the final rule) that the prior 
rule's standard for determining joint employer status under the Act was 
not helpful and did not provide an adequate explanation in the first 
scenario, but is useful (with some non-substantive revisions) for 
determining joint employer status in the second scenario. Accordingly, 
the Department has not made any changes in the final rule to the first 
sentence of proposed Sec.  791.2 or to any of the references to the two 
joint employer scenarios.

C. Section 3(d) as the Sole Textual Basis for Determining Joint 
Employer Status

    Section 3(d) of the FLSA provides that an ``employer'' ``includes 
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer 
in relation to an employee,'' ``includes a public agency,'' but ``does 
not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such 
labor organization.'' 29 U.S.C. 203(d). Under the Act, an ``employee'' 
is defined to mean, with certain exceptions, ``any individual employed 
by an employer,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(e), and ``employ'' ``includes to suffer 
or permit to work,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(g).
    The proposed rule (Sec.  791.2(a)(1)) stated that, in the first 
joint employer scenario, the other person simultaneously benefitting 
from the employee's work ``is the employee's joint employer only if 
that person is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the 
employer in relation to the employee.'' 84 FR 14059 (citing 29 U.S.C. 
203(d)). The NPRM's preamble explained that ``the textual basis for 
FLSA joint employer status is section 3(d), not section 3(e)(1) or 
3(g)''; ``3(e)(1) and 3(g) determine whether there is an employment 
relationship between the potential employer and the worker for a 
specific set of hours worked''; and ``3(d) alone determines another 
person's joint liability for those hours worked.'' Id. at 14050. 
Looking at the definitions' text, the NPRM's preamble further explained 
that sections 3(e)(1) and 3(g) ``do not expressly address the 
possibility of a second employment relationship'' and contemplate a 
single employer, but section 3(d), particularly its ``in the interest 
of an employer'' language, contemplates a second employer and 
``encompasses any additional persons that may be held jointly liable 
for the employee's hours worked in a workweek.'' Id. The Department 
cited to Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947), Falk v. 
Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1973), and Bonnette, 704 F.2d 1465, to support 
its ``clear textual delineation'' and concluded that ``[e]xplicitly 
tethering the joint employer standard in part 791 to section 3(d) will 
provide clearer guidance on how to determine joint employer status 
consistent with the text of the Act.'' Id. at 14050-51.
    A number of comments support adopting section 3(d) as the sole 
textual basis in the Act for determining joint employer status. For 
example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated that the Department 
``properly relies'' on section 3(d) ``rather than the broader `employ' 
definition.'' According to the Chamber, the definition of ``employ'' 
``is broad and intended to identify employees from those who would 
otherwise be independent contractors under common law,'' but ``that 
context is markedly different from the joint employer question, where 
it is not a question of whether the worker is in the employ of some 
entity, but rather whether a different, additional entity should also 
face liability as that worker's `employer.' '' Associated Builders and 
Contractors stated that it ``strongly supports the Department's 
clarification that only the definition of an `employer' in section 3(d) 
. . . determines joint employer status, not the definition of 
`employee' in Section 3(e)(1) or the definition of `employ' . . . in 
section 3(g).'' RILA ``commend[ed] the [Department] for clearly 
explaining and establishing the statutory basis for its

[[Page 2826]]

interpretation and application of joint employer status,'' ``agree[d] 
that it is useful to ground the regulatory approach to joint employer 
status on the statutory definition of `employer' '' in section 3(d), 
and further agreed that the ``statutory construction'' of section 3(d) 
``presumes that an at-issue worker already is employed by at least one 
employer when assessing whether another person or entity is also that 
person's employer.'' Coalition for a Democratic Workplace asserted 
that, ``contrary to likely critics of the Proposed Rule, its focus on 
the definition of `employer' as the term most relevant to the joint 
employer analysis does not undermine the Act's separate goal of 
covering a broad range of working relationships.'' Washington Legal 
Foundation added that ``[t]he correctness of DOL's decision to focus on 
the statutory definition of `employer' is confirmed by Falk, which also 
focused on [section] 3(d) in arriving at its definition of a `joint 
employer.' ''
    Finally, the Center for Workplace Compliance (CWC) also supported 
the Department's proposed legal analysis: ``While some authorities have 
assessed joint employment status by reference to all three definitions, 
the clearest textual interpretation is, as expressed by DOL in the 
preamble, that sections 3(e)(1) and 3(g) `determine whether there is an 
employment relationship between the potential employer and the worker 
for a specific set of hours worked, and [section] 3(d) alone determines 
another person's joint liability for those hours worked' '' (quoting 84 
FR 14050) (footnotes omitted). CWC added that the Department's 
interpretation ``is also consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as 
explained in the preamble, comparing Falk v. Brennan, a case that 
relied on [s]ection 3(d) to find a joint employment relationship, with 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, a case that found workers to be 
employees rather than independent contractors.'' Id. (footnotes 
omitted). Although it supports the Department's analysis, CWC, however, 
asserted that the proposed regulatory text did not clearly enough 
incorporate that analysis and ``urge[d] DOL to include an explicit 
statement that joint employer status is determined by [s]ection 3(d) in 
the text of the final rule itself.''
    Numerous other comments challenged the Department's proposed 
statutory analysis. They argued that that sections 3(d), 3(e), and 3(g) 
are all relevant for determining joint employment, and that the 
proposal that joint employer status is based only on section 3(d) is 
contrary to the Act's text, judicial precedent, and legislative intent. 
Starting with section 3(d)'s text, Southern Migrant Legal Services 
noted that the definition, compared to most of the other definitions in 
section 3 of the FLSA, merely provides that ``employer'' includes 
certain persons and thus ``provides only an incomplete description of 
the term `employer.' '' It claims that the definition is ``circular'' 
and quotes Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) 
for the proposition that the Act ``nowhere defines `employer' in the 
first instance.'' See also Low Wage Worker Legal Network (``The 
language of the [Act] does not support [the Department's proposed] 
interpretation. The word `joint' does not appear in Sec.  203(d). 
However, the word `includes' in . . . Sec.  203(d) would suggest that 
there are other types of employers under the FLSA than those that meet 
the statutory definition of Sec.  203(d).''). AFL-CIO stated that, 
rather than defining the term ``employer'' itself, section 3(d) 
``simply makes clear that the term employer includes the employer's 
agents.'' See also Southern Migrant Legal Services (``Section 3(d) was 
not drafted to provide a comprehensive definition of `employer,' but to 
simply make clear it included many corporate officers and managers, as 
well as the business entities for which they worked.''). SEIU described 
how, as a general matter, an employer's individual agents are not 
liable for the employer's actions, but that section 3(d) ``was enacted 
largely to ameliorate the adverse impact of the . . . rule proscribing 
individual liability in the absence of grounds for piercing the 
corporate veil'' (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st 
Cir. 1983); Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 
(6th Cir. 1991)). See also NELP (``[M]ost of the cases interpreting 
203(d) consider instances where a `person'--natural or corporate--is 
sufficiently involved in a corporation's day-to-day functions to be an 
`employer' under the FLSA''). In sum, according to Southern Migrant 
Legal Services, ``[t]he point of including Section 3(d) in the Act was 
`to prevent employers from shielding themselves from responsibility for 
the acts of their agents' '' (quoting Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d at 
1513).
    Numerous comments also took issue with the Department's proposal to 
exclude sections 3(e) and 3(g) from any joint employer analysis. The 
Coalition of State AGs stated that ``[t]he three definitions are 
interrelated, and courts have considered them together in analyzing 
joint-employment status'' (citing, e.g., Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. 
v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998)). Greater Boston Legal 
Services stated that ``[c]ourts around the country have . . . looked at 
the intertwined nature of the FLSA definitions for employ (Section 
3(e)(1)), employee (Section 3(g)) and employer (Section 3(d)) to guide 
joint-employer analysis'' (citing cases). Comments also discussed the 
breadth of the definitions. See, e.g., Coalition of State AGs (``Thus, 
the FLSA's far-reaching definitions for the terms `employer,' 
`employee,' and `employ' must be read broadly in light of the statute's 
remedial purpose.'') (citing cases); AFL-CIO (asserting that the 
Department's proposal fails to acknowledge ``the Supreme Court's 
repeated admonitions concerning the breadth of the definition of 
employment under the FLSA.'').
    Comments further stated that the history and purpose of section 
3(g)'s definition of ``employ'' as including ``to suffer or permit to 
work,'' given the particular meaning of that language and similar 
language in child labor statutes around the time of the FLSA's 
enactment, was to ensure that a business that engaged another to 
provide it with workers was also an employer of the workers under the 
Act. See, e.g., NELP (``[I]n fact, the central purpose of [`suffer or 
permit'] and its established understanding when inserted by Congress 
into the FLSA in 1938 was to do just that: to hold companies 
accountable for child labor (and minimum wage and overtime) violations 
even where the workers were directly hired, supervised, and paid by an 
independent contractor of that company.''); Farmworker Justice 
(``[W]here businesses took advantage of child labor and substandard 
labor practices but sought to evade responsibility by claiming an 
intermediary was the sole employer, the suffer or permit to work 
standard was applied to hold them accountable as `employers.' ''); 
Public Justice Center (``Thus, when the suffer or permit to work 
language was included in the FLSA, it allowed for joint responsibility 
of contractors and the businesses for whom they contracted to supply 
workers. That well-settled meaning was incorporated into the FLSA.''). 
In addition, comments described the Department's proposed legal 
analysis excluding section 3(g) from determining joint employer status 
as ``unique,'' see Public Justice Center, ``irrational[ ]'' and 
``utterly inconsistent with the statute and the case law,'' see 
Farmworker Justice, a ``novel and unsupportable proposition,'' see 
NELP, and ``fundamentally unsound'' (Greater Boston Legal Services, pg. 
5). See also

[[Page 2827]]

SEIU (``The idea that the Sec.  203(g) definition of `employ' is 
irrelevant to a determination of the existence of a joint employer 
relationship is truly remarkable, contradicted as it is by virtually 
every reported appellate opinion that concerns joint employment under 
the FLSA.'').
    Finally, some commenters viewed the Department as misstating 
Supreme Court decisions to defend its reliance on section 3(d) and 
exclusion of sections 3(e) and (g) when determining joint employer 
status. For example, Senator Patty Murray described the proposal's 
discussion of Falk v. Brennan as ``conclusory'' and ``obscur[ing] the 
Court's actual statement'' in that decision. According to Senator 
Murray, ``[t]he Court [in Falk] did not state, as the Department 
proposes to, that joint employment was to be decided with the exclusion 
of the FLSA's definition of `employ'; in fact, the Court used the 
definition of `employee' at 3(e)(1) that the Department proposes to 
exclude.'' Senator Murray concluded that the NPRM's ``claim that the 
Court [in Falk] somehow limited joint employer analysis to 3(d) by 
being silent on 3(g) is without merit.'' The Coalition of State AGs 
asserted that the Department's proposed legal analysis ``presents 
misleading characterizations of several Supreme Court cases,'' 
particularly Rutherford Food. NELP stated that the Department's 
proposed interpretation of section 3(g) conflicts with controlling 
Supreme Court authority, particularly Rutherford Food. And Farmworker 
Justice stated that the NPRM's description of Rutherford Food was 
``fatally flawed,'' ``misstate[d] the facts and holding'' of that 
decision, and was ``wrong when it states that the . . . Court's 
invocation of the `suffer or permit' definition in section 3(g) was 
merely to determine whether the [workers] were independent contractors 
rather than employees.''
    Having considered the comments, the Department adopts as proposed 
the interpretation that section 3(d) is the statutory basis for 
determining joint employer status under the Act.
    On the one hand, section 3(e) defines an ``employee'' to mean ``any 
individual employed by an employer.'' 29 U.S.C 203(e)(1). This 
definition, by its plain terms, focuses on the individual's status as 
an employee or not under the Act. However, in the first joint employer 
scenario, the individual's status as an employee is unquestioned. In 
the first scenario, the individual is an employee of one employer whose 
work for that employer happens to simultaneously benefit another 
person, and the issue is whether that other person is also the 
employee's employer. Moreover, section 3(e)--not section 3(d)--
incorporates the Act's definition (in section 3(g)) of ``employ'' as 
including ``to suffer or permit to work.'' Compare 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1) 
(defining ``employee'' as, with certain exceptions, ``any individual 
employed by an employer) with 29 U.S.C. 203(d) (using neither 
``employ'' nor ``employed'') (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has 
ruled, the Act's definition of ``employ'' was a rejection of the common 
law standard for determining who is an employee under the Act in favor 
of a broader scope of coverage. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (``[T]he FLSA . . . defines the verb `employ' 
expansively to mean `suffer or permit to work.' This . . . definition, 
whose striking breadth we have previously noted, stretches the meaning 
of `employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under 
a strict application of traditional agency law principles.'') 
(citations omitted); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 
150-51 (1947) (``But in determining who are `employees' under the Act, 
common law employee categories or employer-employee classifications 
under other statutes are not of controlling significance. This Act 
contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its 
application to many persons and working relationships, which prior to 
this Act, were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee 
category.'') (citations omitted). Thus, sections 3(e) and 3(g) 
determine whether an individual worker is an employee under the Act.
    On the other hand, section 3(d) defines ``employer'' to include 
``any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee.'' 29 U.S.C. 203(d). This language, 
by its plain terms, contemplates an employment relationship between an 
employer and an employee, as well as another person who may be an 
employer too--which exactly fits the first joint employer scenario 
under the Act. In that scenario, there is unquestionably an employee 
employed by an employer, and the issue is whether another person is an 
employer as well. This language from section 3(d) makes sense only if 
there is an employer and employee with an existing employment 
relationship and the issue is whether another person is an employer. 
Indeed, among the Act's definitions, only this language from section 
3(d) contemplates the possibility of a person in addition to the 
employer who is also an employer and therefore jointly liable for the 
employee's hours worked.
    The courts' decisions in Falk and Bonnette support focusing on 
section 3(d) as determining joint employer status. In Falk, it was 
``clear that the maintenance workers [were] employees of the building 
owners.'' 414 U.S. at 195. The issue thus was whether another person (D 
& F) was ``also an `employer' of the maintenance workers under 
s[ection] 3(d) of the Act, which defines `employer' as `any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee.' '' Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. 203(d)). The Court 
did not mention section 3(g), and although it referenced section 3(e), 
it squarely focused on section 3(d) and whether the other person was an 
``employer'' as determining the inquiry. Id. The Court concluded: ``In 
view of the expansiveness of the Act's definition of `employer' and the 
extent of D & F's managerial responsibilities at each of the buildings, 
which gave it substantial control of the terms and conditions of the 
work of these employees, we hold that D & F is, under the statutory 
definition, an `employer' of the maintenance workers.'' Id. Similarly, 
Bonnette framed the issue as whether additional persons were jointly 
responsible to the employees under the Act, identified and discussed 
the definition of ``employer'' under section 3(d) as determining the 
additional persons' joint responsibility, did not mention sections 3(e) 
or 3(g), and ``conclude[d] that, under the FLSA's liberal definition of 
`employer,' the [additional persons] were employers of the 
[employees],'' i.e., ``joint employers.'' 704 F.2d at 1469-1470.
    Rutherford Food is not contrary to this statutory interpretation 
separating sections 3(e) and (g) from section 3(d). In Rutherford Food, 
the focus was on whether the workers were employees under the FLSA or 
independent contractors: The Department argued that the workers were 
``within the classification of employees, as that term is used in the 
Act,'' the district court disagreed and ruled ``that they were 
independent contractors,'' and the court of appeals reversed because 
``the test for determining who was an employee under the Act was not 
the common law test of control,'' and the underlying economic realities 
showed that the workers were employees. 331 U.S. at 726-27. The Court 
cited in a footnote the Act's definitions of ``employer,'' 
``employee,'' and ``employ,'' see id. at 728 n.6, but in determining 
the workers' status as employees or independent contractors, it relied 
only on section

[[Page 2828]]

3(g): ``The definition of `employ' is broad. It evidently derives from 
the child labor statutes and it should be noted that this definition 
applies to the child labor provisions of this Act.'' Id. at 728. 
Looking at ``the circumstances of the whole activity,'' the Court 
concluded: ``While profits to the [workers] depended upon the 
efficiency of their work, it was more like piecework than an enterprise 
that actually depended for success upon the initiative, judgment or 
foresight of the typical independent contractor. Upon the whole, we 
must conclude that these [workers] were employees of the slaughtering 
plant under the Fair Labor Standards Act.'' Id. at 730. See also id. at 
729 (``Where the work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of 
an employee, putting on an `independent contractor' label does not take 
the worker from the protection of the Act.''). Indeed, the Court in 
Darden later discussed Rutherford Food in the context of whether 
certain workers were employees or not and explained how section 3(g) 
means that the scope of who is an employee under the Act is broader 
than under other statutes. See 503 U.S. at 325-26. The Darden Court 
noted that Rutherford Food ``adopted a broad reading of `employee' 
under the [Act],'' cited Rutherford Food to state that ``[t]he 
definition of `employee' in the [Act] evidently derives from the child 
labor statutes,'' and further cited Rutherford Food to conclude that 
the ``striking breadth'' of section 3(g)'s definition of ``employ'' 
``stretches the meaning of `employee' to cover some parties who might 
not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency 
law principles.'' Id.
    Finally, the statements in the proposed rule and the final rule 
that another person ``is the employee's joint employer only if that 
person is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer 
in relation to the employee'' and the citation to section 3(d) make 
explicitly clear that section 3(d)--not sections 3(e) or 3(g)--is the 
statutory basis for determining joint employer status under the Act.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, the Department has not made any 
changes in the final rule to the first two sentences of proposed Sec.  
791.2(a)(1).

D. Requests To Adopt the National Labor Relations Act Standard

    A few comments requested that the Department adopt as the joint 
employer standard under the FLSA the standard that once existed under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or that the Department 
harmonize its FLSA standard with the NLRA standard. For example, the 
National Association of Professional Employer Organizations stated that 
``the test for joint employment should focus on the actual exercise of 
[direct and immediate] control over the essential terms and conditions 
of employment of an employee.'' See also National Association of 
Convenience Stores. In other words, as the National Association of 
Professional Employer Organizations explained, these comments seek 
application of the standard that the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) applied under the NLRA ``for decades prior to [its Browning-
Ferris decision], and [which it] presently is proposing to adopt . . . 
in a notice of proposed rulemaking.'' A few other comments that 
generally supported the proposed rule nonetheless referenced a direct 
and immediate control standard or requested that the FLSA standard be 
harmonized with the NLRA standard or all federal law standards. See, 
e.g., National Association of Truckstop Operators; National Association 
of Home Builders (NAHB); National Federation of Independent Business. 
Finally, International Franchise Association, in addition to supporting 
the proposed rule, recommended adopting, ``at least in connection with 
franchising,'' ``the common law `instrumentality' test'' asking whether 
the potential joint employer has control over the specific behavior or 
condition of employment relevant in the given case.
    The Department rejects these requests because they have no legal 
basis. As an initial matter, the NLRA defines ``employer'' differently 
from the FLSA \53\ and does not define ``employ'' at all.\54\ In 
addition, the NLRB independently enforces the NLRA; the Department has 
no role in enforcing the NLRA. And although the Court in Rutherford 
Food suggested (over seventy years ago) that NLRA decisions may be 
``persuasive'' when deciding similar FLSA matters, 331 U.S. at 723-24, 
the NLRA decision cited by the Court was abrogated by Congressional 
amendments to the NLRA. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25 (discussing 
Congressional amendments to the NLRA as a result of NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)). Congress did not similarly 
amend the FLSA as a result of Rutherford Food. Finally, as discussed 
above, Congress rejected the common law standard when enacting the 
FLSA. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326; Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 150-
51. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Department has not made any 
changes in the final rule in response to these comments.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Compare 29 U.S.C. 152(2) with 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
    \54\ Compare Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor 
Relations Bd., 911 F.3d 1195, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (``[T]he 
National Labor Relations Act's test for joint-employer status is 
determined by the common law of agency[.]'') with Tony & Susan Alamo 
Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (``The test of 
employment under the [Fair Labor Standards] Act is one of `economic 
reality[.]' '').
    \55\ This final rule provides the standards for determining 
joint employer status under the FLSA. The Department will continue 
to use the standards in its MSPA joint employer regulation, 29 CFR 
500.20(h)(5), to determine joint employer status under MSPA, and 
will continue to use the standards in its FMLA joint employer 
regulations, 29 CFR 825.106, to determine joint employer status 
under the FMLA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Determining Joint Employer Status in the First Scenario (One Set of 
Hours Worked)

    Current part 791 determines joint employer status by asking whether 
two or more persons are or are not ``completely disassociated'' with 
respect to the employment of the employee.'' \56\ The proposed rule 
explained that this standard is not helpful for determining joint 
employer status in one of the joint employer scenarios under the Act--
where an employer suffers, permits, or otherwise employs an employee to 
work one set of hours in a workweek, and that work simultaneously 
benefits another person (for example, where the employer is a 
subcontractor or staffing agency, and the other person is a general 
contractor or staffing agency client). See 84 FR 14046 47. In this 
scenario, the employer and the other person are almost never 
``completely disassociated.'' Id. As noted in the NPRM, the ``not 
completely disassociated'' standard may therefore suggest that these 
situations always result in joint employer status, contrary to long-
standing policy. Id. Thus, the Department proposed to replace the 
language of ``not completely disassociated'' as the standard in such 
scenarios with a four-factor balancing test derived (with modification) 
from Bonnette, 704 F.2d 1465. See 84 FR 14047 48. The four proposed 
factors considered whether the potential joint employer hires or fires 
the employee; supervises and controls the employee's work schedules or 
conditions of employment; determines the employee's rate and method of 
payment; and maintains the employee's employment records. Id. The NPRM 
also clarified that the factors were intended to focus on the economic 
realities of the potential joint employer's exercise of control over 
the terms and conditions of the employee's work. 84 FR 14048.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ 29 CFR 791.2(a) (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department received robust commentary from a range of

[[Page 2829]]

stakeholders concerning how to determine joint employer status in the 
first scenario (one set of hours worked). Below, the Department first 
addresses comments received regarding the four-factor balancing test, 
discussing each factor and the final adopted language for the test 
itself. The Department then discusses the application of the four-
factor test and limits on the consideration of additional factors. 
Finally, the Department provides specific guidance concerning factors 
and business practices that should be excluded from the analysis, which 
it believes will provide additional clarity.
1. The Four-Factor Balancing Test
    Employers and employer representatives widely expressed general 
support for the adoption of the proposed four-factor balancing test, 
agreeing that it would provide necessary uniformity, clarity, and 
certainty for businesses. For example, the HR Policy Association 
commented that the ``Department's proposed rule, and in particular its 
proposed four-factor test, and related guidance expressly identifying 
key considerations and factors that are relevant and are not relevant, 
finally fill in the space where businesses confront joint employer 
issues today.'' See also Center for Workforce Compliance (``CWC 
supports the four factor balancing test that DOL has proposed[.]''); 
Restaurant Law Center and the National Restaurant Association (RLC & 
the Association) (agreeing ``that a multi-factor balancing test is 
appropriate''); Electronic Security Association (``[T]his four-factor 
balancing test as outlined will give more clarity and provide courts 
with firm guidance[.]''); National Council of Agricultural Employers 
(praising the ``four-factor balancing test set forth in'' Bonnette as 
``provid[ing] clarity and order''); NAHB (expressing support for the 
four-factor balancing test). Additionally, commenters noted that this 
increased clarity would, in turn, promote new and innovative business 
partnerships and allow for best practices within industries. The 
National Association of Truckstop Operators commented that the proposed 
test ``would enable NATSO's members--large and small--to enter into a 
variety of business relationships with certainty as to whether they may 
be held responsible for another entity's employees. They would know 
that they could provide high-level requirements for their business 
partners' employees (e.g., minimum training levels, inspection and 
delivery methods, etc.) and not be considered joint employers provided 
they do not affect the terms and conditions of employment (e.g., 
hiring, firing, work schedules, wages, etc.).'' Associated Builders and 
Contractors explained that inconsistent court rulings ``have confused 
and frustrated efforts of construction employers to maintain 
longstanding industry practices that have allowed the industry to 
perform services on a cost-efficient basis, but which are now placed in 
jeopardy by the over-broad joint employer standard espoused by some 
courts and the increased litigation costs resulting from the judicial 
confusion.''
    Employer representatives commented that there was support among 
circuit court rulings for using these particular factors. The National 
Retail Federation stated that the ``Bonnette test has been used for 
decades by the plurality of U.S. Courts of Appeals, and if adopted, 
would provide employers with certainty and stability in how the joint 
employer standard applies to their operations and business 
relationships.'' SHRM agreed, commenting that by ``ensuring that the 
inquiry is directed at a putative joint employer's actual control over 
critical terms of employment, the proposal stands on solid ground 
statutorily, and is consistent with the relevant Supreme Court 
authority.'' The International Franchise Association noted that the 
``Bonnette test has stood the test of time and provides the clearest 
guidance to employers and employees attempting to determine which 
business entities are or are not joint employers under specific 
circumstances.'' The U.S. Chamber of Commerce further stated that the 
proposed test would help ``rein in courts that have judicially expanded 
the scope of joint employer liability beyond Congress's intent'' by 
providing uniformity and properly focusing only on the FLSA's 
definition of ``employer'' to determine joint employer status, rather 
than the broader definition of ``employ.''
    The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) and Society of 
Independent Gasoline Marketers of America expressed general support, 
but expressed concern that the proposal may be read to indicate that 
satisfying any single factor would be sufficient to confer joint 
employer status, and these commenters requested that the Department 
specify that establishing one factor will typically not be sufficient.
    Employee representatives, workers, and worker advocacy groups 
generally opposed the proposed four-factor test as too restrictive and 
commented that using this test would harm workers, particularly 
vulnerable and low-wage workers. See, e.g., Greater Boston Legal 
Services (``Arbitrarily narrowing the standard to make it more 
difficult for employees to hold their actual employers accountable for 
FLSA violations will particularly harm low-wage workers and workers 
engaged in piecemeal, temporary, or contingent labor.''); NELA (``If 
enacted, the Proposed Rules will result in the loss of protections to 
workers whom Congress sought to protect by expansively defining the 
FLSA's coverage.''); Legal Aid Justice Center (``If enacted, the 
Proposed Rule would cause grievous harm to Virginia's poorest and most 
vulnerable workers.'').
    Many of these commenters contended that the Department's proposed 
test is inconsistent with case law. Southern Migrant Legal Services 
disagreed with the NPRM's statement that the proposed four-factor test 
``finds considerable support in the plurality of circuit courts that 
already apply similar multi-factor, economic realities tests'' and 
stated that this assertion ``badly misstates the law.'' Commenters 
noted that not a single circuit court has adopted the test as precisely 
formulated by the Department. See, e.g., Coalition of State AGs (``The 
Proposed Rule incorporates a four-factor test that no court has 
articulated or implemented and is more restrictive than current joint-
employment standards.''). The AFL-CIO also addressed the Department's 
legal analysis, commenting that the NPRM misreads Bonnette because the 
court in that case explicitly noted that the circumstances of the whole 
activity must be considered, not exclusively the four factors; the AFL-
CIO noted further that Bonnette has been criticized or rejected by 
several other circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit. Greater 
Boston Legal Services commented that the Department's proposed test 
would ``wipe out decades of court precedent and create confusion and 
prolonged litigation. The Department has departed from Bonnette and 
prevailing First Circuit decisions in two ways--by altering the four-
prong Bonnette test and by adding a series of additional proposals that 
further restrict criteria that courts may consider when determining 
joint employment status.''
    Commenters also opined that the four-factor test was contrary to 
Congressional intent, and instead, courts must consider all relevant 
facts in view of the case law, statutory text, and legislative history. 
See, e.g., National Women's Law Center (asserting that it would be 
contrary to Congressional intent and the language of the FLSA to limit 
the joint employer inquiry to just the Bonnette factors); Low Wage 
Worker Legal Network (same). Senator Patty Murray

[[Page 2830]]

stated that because ``Congress intentionally drew the FLSA's definition 
of employment to be more expansive than the common law, the 
Department's proposal to narrow the standard is clearly and directly 
opposed to congressional intent.''
    Additionally, many commenters stated that the proposed four-factor 
test was contrary to the plain language of the Act and its broad 
definitions of ``employ'' and employee.'' See, e.g., 14 U.S. Senators 
(``But DOL proposes to ignore the plain language of the statute, 
inventing a new and extremely restrictive standard that employees would 
have to show to hold their employers liable for abuses for which 
Congress intended them to be responsible.''); NELP (``[C]ontrolling 
Supreme Court and Circuit Court authority conflicts with DOL's novel 
and unsupportable proposition that the definition of `employ' in 
section 203(g) does not authorize a court to find joint employment.''). 
These concerns are addressed in the textual basis discussion of this 
preamble, supra, in which the Department explains its interpretation of 
section 3(d) and why it is the most appropriate textual basis for 
analyzing whether an entity is a joint employer under the Act.
    In addition to commenting on the proposed four-factor test 
generally, commenters also addressed the factors individually. Comments 
received regarding each individual factor follow below.
    Commenters specifically remarked upon the Department's modification 
of the Bonnette test regarding the first factor. The Department 
proposed that the first factor should be narrowed to consider only 
whether the potential joint employer hires or fires the employee, 
rather than whether the potential joint employer has the ``power'' to 
hire or fire the employee (as Bonnette articulates the factor). 
Employer representatives supported the modification to require an 
actual exercise of control in this regard, stating that this would 
provide clarity for employers and encourage and increase innovative 
business agreements. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted 
that the change reflected the ``recognition that actual control, rather 
than reserved control, must exist for a joint employee-employer 
relationship to arise'' and that ``[i]t is also consistent with the 
Rule's statement that the facts of the relationship between the 
employee and employer, rather than the structure of the relationship 
between cooperating businesses, should govern.'' Several commenters 
endorsed the NPRM's assertion that evaluating whether an entity 
``act[ed]'' to exercise control would be consistent with the text of 
section 3(d) of the Act. See, e.g., RLC & the Association (agreeing 
that the proposed modification is consistent with section 3(d) and that 
``[i]f there is no action by the alleged joint employer, then Section 
3(d) does not apply, and there can be no joint employment 
relationship.'').
    Employee representatives opposed this proposed factor, commenting 
that by only considering as relevant whether a potential joint employer 
actually exercises its power to hire and fire, the Department would be 
in conflict with every court, and would be narrowing the test to be 
even more restrictive than the common law. See, e.g., Advocates for 
Basic Legal Equality (``Even under the more restrictive common-law 
employment test, the DOL's proposal is too narrow: It fails to consider 
the right to control, a cornerstone of common-law employment 
determinations under long-standing Supreme Court and FLSA law.''); NELP 
(``The restrictive common law control test requires only a showing of 
the `right' to control, not its exercise.''). Additional discussion 
concerning the actual exercise of control versus the reserved right to 
control is included infra.
    Regarding the second factor, whether the potential joint employer 
supervises and controls the employee's work schedule or conditions of 
employment, several commenters asked the Department to clarify or 
narrow what is meant by ``conditions of employment.'' For example, the 
HR Policy Association suggested that the proposed factor be limited to 
considering whether the potential joint employer ``[s]upervises and 
controls the employee's individual work schedule or the employee's 
particular, day-to-day tasks.'' Similarly, the Retail Industry Leaders 
Association suggested that the factor be limited to mean ``specific 
hours worked and specific assigned tasks.'' See also National Retail 
Federation (same); RLC & the Association (recommending ``that a 
substantial frequency requirement be included in the definition and/or 
examples with respect to the second factor. Preferably, this would be a 
`day-to-day' frequency requirement'').
    There were few comments specifically addressing the third factor, 
whether the potential joint employer determines the employee's rate and 
method of payment.
    There were a number of comments, primarily from employer 
representatives, concerning the fourth factor, which considers whether 
the potential joint employer maintains the employee's employment 
records. Some commenters asked the Department to provide additional 
guidance regarding what qualifies as maintenance of employment records 
for purposes of the fourth factor and whether this factor alone can 
lead to a finding of joint employment. See, e.g., NACS; NAPEO; RLC & 
the Association; SHRM. Some commenters suggested that records related 
to the employer's compliance with contractual agreements identified in 
this rule as not making joint employer status more or less likely 
should not qualify as employment records under the fourth factor. See 
CDW. Others suggested that for purposes of satisfying the fourth 
factor, only those records that pertain to the first three factors 
should be employment records. See RILA; SHRM. Commenters also queried 
whether maintenance of records under the fourth factor means something 
more than mere possession of or access to those records. See SHRM. 
Finally, some commenters suggested that the fourth factor be deleted in 
the final rule. See NACS; NAPEO; RLC & the Association.
    After review and careful consideration, the Department adopts the 
proposed four-factor balancing test, derived from Bonnette and 
supported by other case law, as the test for analyzing joint employer 
status under this scenario, with a revision to the supervision and 
control factor and additional guidance regarding the maintenance of 
employment records factor. The Department believes that these four 
factors--which weigh the economic reality of the potential joint 
employer's control, direct or indirect, over the employee--are not only 
the most relevant factors to the joint employer analysis, but also 
afford stakeholders greatly needed clarity and uniformity.
    As a matter of statutory interpretation, these factors are fully 
consistent with the text of section 3(d) of the Act. As explained in 
detail supra, the Department believes that language in section 3(d) is 
the textual basis for joint employer status. When another person 
exercises control over hiring and firing, schedules, conditions of 
employment, rate and method of payment, and employment records, that 
person is ``acting . . . in the interest of'' the employer ``in 
relation to'' the employee, as contemplated by section 3(d). 
Recognizing this provision, Bonnette adopted a similar four-factor test 
to determine whether a potential joint employer is liable. Contrary to 
some comments, these factors are consistent with Supreme Court and 
circuit court precedent. The Supreme Court concluded in Falk, 414 U.S. 
at 195, that

[[Page 2831]]

pursuant to section 3(d), another person is jointly liable for an 
employee if that person exercises ``substantial control'' over the 
terms and conditions of the employee's work. The Department's four-
factor balancing test, which weighs the potential joint employer's 
exercise of control over certain terms and conditions of the employee's 
work, uses the same reasoning as Falk to determine joint employer 
status under section 3(d). In Falk, the Court explained that ``[i]n 
view of the expansiveness of the Act's definition of `employer' [in 
section 3(d)] and the extent of D & F's managerial responsibilities at 
each of the buildings, which gave it substantial control of the terms 
and conditions of the work of these employees, we hold that D & F is, 
under the statutory definition [in 3(d)], an `employer' of the 
maintenance workers.'' 414 U.S. at 195.
    Additionally, multiple circuit courts have adopted multi-factor 
balancing tests derived from Bonnette in order to analyze potential 
joint employer scenarios. The First and Fifth Circuits apply the 
Bonnette test, which is very close to the Department's proposed test. 
See Baystate, 163 F.3d at 675-76; Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 355-57 
(5th Cir. 2012). Although Gray involved whether an individual owner of 
the employer corporation was jointly liable under the FLSA, the court 
noted that it ``must apply the economic realities test to each 
individual or entity alleged to be an employer and each must satisfy 
the four part test.'' 673 F.3d at 355 (emphasis added) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).\57\ The Third Circuit also applies a similar 
four-factor test that considers whether the potential joint employer 
has the authority to hire and fire, promulgate work rules and 
assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, 
benefits, and hours; it also considers whether the potential employer 
exercises day-to-day supervision, including employee discipline; and 
controls employee records, including payroll, insurance, and tax 
records. See In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices 
Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469-71 (3d Cir. 2012). As the Third Circuit 
noted, ``[t]hese factors are not materially different'' from the 
Bonnette factors, which are not significantly different from the 
Department's adopted factors. Id. at 469. The Seventh Circuit has also 
suggested that joint employment depends on the measure of control 
exercised over the employee and that the Bonnette factors are relevant 
when assessing control. See Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. 
Commc'ns Ctr., 536 F.3d 640, 643 45 (7th Cir. 2008) (FMLA case 
addressing joint employment and using FLSA principles).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Two older Fifth Circuit decisions applied a different test 
to determine whether an entity was a joint employer under the Act, 
and the Fifth Circuit has not yet overruled those decisions--
creating some uncertainty about what joint employer test applies in 
the Fifth Circuit. See Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 
471 F.2d 235, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1973); Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 
405 F.2d 668, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1968).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department, of course, acknowledges that several other circuits 
currently apply varying joint employer tests. Indeed, this variance 
across the country is one of the primary reasons for this rulemaking; 
by promulgating a clear and straightforward regulation, the Department 
hopes to encourage greater consistency for stakeholders. Of the 
circuits that apply different joint employer tests, however, each of 
them applies at least one factor that resembles one of the factors from 
the Department's test. In Salinas, 848 F.3d at 141 42, three factors of 
its six-factor test are similar to Bonnette factors; in Layton v. DHL 
Exp. (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172, 1176 (11th Cir. 2012), more than half 
of the factors in its eight-factor test are similar to Bonnette 
factors, and in Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639-40, the court applied 
factors similar to the Bonnette factors but also added eight additional 
factors for consideration. See also Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 
355 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Bonnette factors 
can be sufficient to establish joint employer status, although a six-
factor test with one factor resembling one of the Bonnette factors 
applies if the Bonnette factors do not establish joint employer 
status).\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ The Second and Fourth Circuits rejected the Bonnette test 
as the only test and the test, respectively, because they did not 
believe it could be reconciled with the broad ``suffer or permit'' 
standard of the Act. Because, however, the Department believes that 
section 3(d), not section 3(g), is the touchstone for joint employer 
status, a Bonnette-based four-factor balancing test is preferable 
and consistent with the text of that statutory provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, these factors are simple, clear-cut, and easy to apply. 
One of the most prevalent themes among the comments from employer 
representatives was the great need for clarity and consistency in this 
area of the FLSA. The Department believes that the greater the number 
of factors in a multi-factor test, the more complex and difficult the 
analysis may be in any given case, and the greater the likelihood of 
inconsistent results in other similar cases. By using factors that 
focus on the exercise of control over the most essential and common 
terms and conditions of employment, the Department believes its 
proposed test will assist stakeholders, as well as courts, in 
determining FLSA joint employer status with greater ease and 
consistency. This simplicity will provide greater certainty to both 
employers and workers as to who is and is not a joint employer under 
the Act, before any investigation or litigation begins.
    Regarding the first factor specifically, the Department is adopting 
the factor considering whether the potential joint employer hires or 
fires the employee as proposed. The Department also adopts the third 
factor as proposed.
    Regarding the second factor, supervision and control over schedules 
or conditions of employment to a substantial degree, the Department 
believes that the majority of existing legal precedent does not support 
commenters' suggestion to limit supervision to a day-to-day basis to 
indicate joint employer status. Circuit courts articulate different 
tests, but they all agree that only supervision of a sufficient degree 
is indicative of joint employer status.\59\ For example, under the 
Third Circuit's joint employer test, supervision is one probative 
factor in favor of finding joint employer status to the extent it 
constitutes ``day-to-day'' involvement.\60\ While several courts 
outside of the Third Circuit have rejected a finding of joint employer 
status after noting the lack of day-to-day supervision, those courts 
did not explicitly hold that day-to-day supervision was necessary for 
joint employer liability.\61\ The Department

[[Page 2832]]

notes that a ``day to day'' analysis may be a reasonable means to 
distinguish between ``extensive supervision [that] . . . is indicative 
of an employment relationship'' and limited supervision that ``has no 
bearing on the joint employment inquiry,'' such as ``supervision with 
respect to contractual warranties of quality and time of deliver'' and 
other ``supervision [that] is perfectly consistent with a typical, 
legitimate subcontracting arrangement.'' \62\ Nonetheless, a general 
point of agreement among courts is that only substantial supervision is 
indicative of joint employer status. Accordingly, the Department is 
revising Sec.  791.2(a)(1)(ii) to state: ``Supervises and controls the 
employee's work schedule or conditions of employment to a substantial 
degree.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Salinas, 848 F.3d at 150 (noting that the putative joint 
employer ``went beyond double-checking to verify that the task was 
done properly,'' amounting to ``extensive supervision . . . 
indicative of an employment relationship, rather than an assessment 
of compliance with contractual quality and timeliness standards'' 
(citations and some punctuation omitted)); Zheng, 355 F.3d at 74-75 
(``Although Rutherford indicates that a defendant's extensive 
supervision of a plaintiff's work is indicative of an employment 
relationship, Rutherford indicates also that such extensive 
supervision weighs in favor of joint employment only if it 
demonstrates effective control of the terms and conditions of the 
plaintiff's employment.'' (citations omitted)); Layton, 686 F.3d at 
1179 (``[I]nfrequent assertions of minimal oversight do not 
constitute the requisite degree of supervision.'' (citation 
omitted)); In re Enter., 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012) (requiring 
``involvement in day-to-day employee supervision'').
    \60\ In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 469.
    \61\ See, e.g., Johnson v. Serenity Transp., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 
3d 974, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding against joint employer status 
where, ``for example, there are no allegations here that the 
Customer Defendants were involved in day-to-day oversight of 
driver's work''); Hugee v. SJC Grp., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 0423(GBD), 
2013 WL 4399226, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2013) (``In the economic 
realities test, the pertinent inquiry is whether the purported joint 
employer exercised control over the employee's day-to-day conditions 
of employment.'' (quotation marks omitted)); Zampos v. W & E 
Commc'ns, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2013) 
(``Relevant factors in determining whether a joint-employer 
relationship exists include . . . actual day-to-day supervision and 
direction of employees on the job.''); Jean-Louis v. Metro. Cable 
Commc'ns, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 111, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding no 
joint employer status where the ``evidence does not show that Time 
Warner controls the day-to-day manner in which technicians provide . 
. . service'').
    \62\ Zheng, 355 F.3d at 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, in response to comments received, the Department is 
modifying the regulatory language in Sec.  791.2(a)(3), discussed 
infra, to explain that evidence of a right to control regarding the 
first, second, and third factors may have some relevance to a joint 
employer analysis.
    Given the breadth of comments addressing the maintenance of 
employment records, the Department agrees this fourth factor needs 
additional clarification. Courts have frequently looked to maintenance 
of employment records as one of many factors appropriate for 
consideration in determining potential joint employer status.\63\ As 
such, the Department declines commenter requests to delete the fourth 
factor. However, courts have not found joint employer status when 
maintenance of employment records is the only evidence to support such 
a finding.\64\ In line with case law and Department practice, the 
Department has added regulatory language clarifying that, although the 
maintenance of employment records is a relevant factor, satisfaction of 
the fourth factor alone cannot lead to a finding of joint employer 
status. The Department is also adding regulatory language narrowing the 
scope of ``employment records'' to those records, such as payroll 
records, that reflect, relate to, or otherwise record information 
pertaining to the first three factors (i.e., hiring or firing, 
supervision and control of the work schedules or conditions of 
employment, or determining the rate and method of payment). Further, 
unless they are part of any of the above categories, records maintained 
by the potential joint employer related to the employer's compliance 
with contractual agreements identified in sections (d)(3) and (4) of 
this final rule as not making joint employer status more or less likely 
under the Act are not employment records for purposes of the fourth 
factor.
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    \63\ See, e.g., Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470.
    \64\ See Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 
(C.D. Cal. 2007); Beck v. Boce Group, L.C., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 
1191 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For all of the foregoing reasons, the Department adopts Sec.  
791.2(a)(1) as proposed, but has added a new paragraph codified at 
Sec.  791.2(a)(2) providing guidance regarding application of the 
fourth factor.
2. Application of the Four-Factor Balancing Test
    In addition to comments regarding the NPRM's proposed factors, the 
Department also received comments addressing how those factors should 
be applied or analyzed. In the proposed rule, the Department explained 
that the four factors comprised a balancing test, and that the factors 
were intended to focus on the economic realities of the potential joint 
employer's exercise of control over the terms and conditions of the 
employee's work.
    The proposed regulatory text (Sec.  791.2(a)(2) of the NPRM) 
explained that the potential joint employer must actually exercise one 
or more indicia of control (either directly or indirectly) in order to 
be jointly liable, and the potential joint employer's power or reserved 
contractual right to exercise a form of control over the employee is 
not relevant to the analysis. The text also stated that no one factor 
of the joint employer test is dispositive; rather, whether a person is 
a joint employer depends on an evaluation of all the facts in a given 
case, and the weight given to each factor will vary depending on the 
circumstances of a particular case.
    The NPRM's preamble explained that the Department was proposing a 
four-factor balancing test, which would weigh the potential joint 
employer's exercise of control over the terms and conditions of the 
employee's work. The Department further explained that the four 
proposed factors were intended to weigh the economic reality of the 
potential joint employer's active control, direct or indirect, over the 
employee.
    Commenters questioned certain aspects of how the factors should be 
considered or analyzed. For example, the National Association of 
Truckstop Operators requested that the Department ``clarify that all 
four factors of the test must be met to indicate joint employment.'' 
See also Society of Independent Gasoline Manufacturers of America (``In 
the final rule, the Department should clarify that whether a person is 
a joint employer under FLSA depends on whether all four factors of the 
test have been met given the totality of circumstances.'') Seyfarth 
Shaw expressed concern that the proposed regulatory language could ``be 
misconstrued by enforcement personnel or courts to suggest that any 
single factor . . . could suffice to confer joint employer status.''
    The Department also received numerous comments from both employer 
and employee representatives regarding the proposed regulatory language 
stating that the ``potential joint employer's ability, power, or 
reserved contractual right to act in relation to the employee is not 
relevant for determining joint employer status.''
    Employer representatives praised the requirement of an actual 
exercise of control, and applauded the proposal's statement that 
reserved rights to control should not be considered relevant to the 
analysis. The National Retail Federation commented that it ``strongly 
agrees with the Department's view that reserved but unexercised control 
should not affect joint employer status.'' The Coalition for a 
Democratic Workforce noted that the emphasis on the actual exercise of 
control ``is also consistent with Section 3(d) of the Act.'' See also 
Retail Industry Leaders Association (``This modification is consistent 
with the FLSA's statutory admonition that a person or entity must 
``act[ ]'' in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee to 
be an employer under the FLSA.'') (citation omitted).
    Employer representatives also appreciated that the requirement of 
active control would be ``similar to the test proposed by the National 
Labor Relations Board . . . related to the National Labor Relations Act 
. . . which would provide more uniformity among federal employment 
laws.'' See CDW. Similarly, the National Federation of Independent 
Business also ``welcomed'' the Department's proposal and commented that 
the proposed language ``harmonizes with the NLRB's pending proposal'' 
and as such, ``[s]mall and independent businesses would benefit 
significantly from having the joint employer doctrines of both the 
Department of Labor under the FLSA and of the National Labor Relations 
Board under the NLRA recognize that what a putative joint employer 
actually

[[Page 2833]]

does, and not what it theoretically could do, determines whether or not 
it has joint employer status with respect to an employee.''
    SHRM commented that the proposal would be very helpful in 
clarifying employer obligations, because ``actual exercise of power 
demonstrates control with a clarity that latent power can never 
achieve. By focusing on the actual exercise of power, the Department 
allows businesses to understand their FLSA obligations without worrying 
that the existence of boilerplate reservations of rights (e.g., to 
terminate an employee of a staffing agency) or similar rarely-or-never-
used contractual provisions might unexpectedly trigger overtime 
obligations for a group of workers who were never anticipated to be 
employees (of the secondary employer).'' The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
also supported the requirement for active exercise of control because, 
among other things, it is ``consistent with the Rule's statement that 
the facts of the relationship between the employee and employer, rather 
than the structure of the relationship between cooperating businesses, 
should govern.'' The Chamber explained that routine contractual 
reservations of control, such as contractual clauses that require 
contractors or business partners to meet certain goals and enforce 
certain criteria regarding their employees, ``are not probative of the 
relationship between the employer and the putative employee--the 
touchstone of the joint employer analysis--if the putative employer 
never exercises such control.''
    Employee representatives expressed strong opposition to the 
elimination of reserved rights of control from the joint employer 
analysis. Several commenters stated that the proposed elimination of 
the reserved right to control would be contrary not only to the Act, 
but also to the common law. The AFL-CIO, relying in part on sections 2 
and 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, stated that the common 
law ``clearly recognizes reserved control as relevant to determining if 
an employment relationship exists.'' Relatedly, NELP commented that 
``[t]he common law test for employment and joint employment does not 
require control to be exercised, direct, and immediate; only that the 
proposed joint employer have the right to control how the work is 
done.'' NELP further observed that the NPRM narrows Bonnette's common-
law factors to an even narrower test, an interpretation under which 
``even many single-company direct employees would not be considered 
employees, despite the fact that they would be considered employees 
under the common law agency doctrine.'' Sen. Patty Murray commented 
that ``[t]he proposal absurdly indicates that the potential joint 
employer must actually exercise one or more of these factors, directly 
or indirectly, to be jointly liable under the FLSA'' and stated that 
the Department's rationale for the proposal had ``no basis in the text 
of the FLSA, no basis in Supreme Court doctrine or circuit court law, 
and--as was already established--no basis even in the common law test 
that Congress purposely rejected in crafting the FLSA.''
    The AFL-CIO discussed a number of Supreme Court and circuit court 
cases recognizing reserved right to control in employment cases, and 
concluded that ``considering a putative joint employer's right of 
control relevant to the analysis is mandated by the common law and the 
Department cannot establish a standard narrower than the common law.'' 
See also NELP (``The DOL has no authority to so restrict settled 
law.''); SEIU (discussing federal court decisions applying section 3(g) 
that recognize that a company's right, power or ability to exercise 
control over an individuals' wages, hours and/or working conditions is 
relevant to determining if the company employs that worker). Greater 
Boston Legal Services commented that ``[h]aving the ability, albeit 
unrealized, to fire an employee is clearly a mechanism of control over 
the nature of the relationship between the employee and the putative 
employer.'' GBLS continued, stating that because the Department's 
proposal requires actual, exercised control, ``under many conceivable 
circumstances will result in very different outcomes from cases 
analyzed under Baystate,'' a case upon which the Department relied in 
the NPRM.
    Referring to the Department's 1997 MSPA rulemaking, 62 FR 11739 
(Mar. 12, 1997), Southern Migrant Legal Services commented that the 
proposed regulation ``represents a complete reversal of the 
Department's position the last time it engaged in rulemaking regarding 
joint employer status.'' SMLS stated that in that rulemaking, the 
Department rejected limiting control to an actual exercise of control, 
and concluded that where an employer retains any right to control the 
workers or the work, this would constitute control indicative of an 
employment relationship.
    Additionally, several commenters requested that the Department 
clarify the limits of indirect control. See Seyfarth Shaw; RLC & the 
Association; Coalition for a Democratic Workplace; National Retail 
Federation; Retail Industry Leaders Association; World Floor Covering 
Association. For example, Seyfarth Shaw warned that, absent limiting 
principles, the ```indirectly' modifier could invite litigation in a 
wide array of circumstances,'' such as where ``a shipping facility 
indirectly controls a worker's schedule by cutting back on its staffing 
needs during a slow period, or that it indirectly fires a worker by 
relaying to the direct employer that the worker violated a rule.'' See 
also RILA (``this modifier could invite litigation whether a particular 
action by a `benefited entity' constitutes `indirect' actual exercise 
of one of the Bonnette factors''). Seyfarth further requested that the 
Department ``clarify that a benefited entity's legitimate business 
decision that has incidental impact on a worker's employment does not 
constitute acting indirectly in the interest of the employer.''
    Other commenters agreed. See RILA; RLC & the Association. RLC & the 
Association explained their concern regarding indirect control in the 
context of when a restaurant ``contract[s] out for cleaning services.'' 
According to these commenters, ``[i]f an individual whom the cleaning 
services assigns to perform that work does not do a good job, does not 
show up, is rude to the restaurant's customers, harasses the 
restaurant's employees or demonstrates other deficiencies, the 
restaurant must be able to report that to the cleaning service and to 
ask that someone else be assigned to perform such services. In this 
context, it is still the cleaning service's decision as to whether to 
fire the employee or assign him or her to some other account.'' RLC & 
the Association thus requested that the Department clarify that 
``customer preferences and feedback do not constitute [indirect] hiring 
and firing, and that providing such feedback is not a factor that makes 
a joint employment relationship more or less likely.''
    Upon careful consideration, the Department adopts a modified 
version of proposed Sec.  791.2(a)(2) in response to the comments 
received, codified as Sec.  791.2(a)(3) of this final rule. As an 
initial matter, as a point of clarification, all four factors need not 
necessarily be satisfied in order for an entity to be deemed a joint 
employer. The Department made clear in its proposal that, consistent 
with case law, the four factors represent a balancing test. Moreover, 
as noted many times by the Department and now embodied in this 
regulation, whether a person is a joint employer under the Act will 
depend on how all the facts in a particular case are tied to the 
factors, and the appropriate

[[Page 2834]]

weight to give each factor will vary depending on the circumstances.
    In addition, the regulation now makes clear that an actual exercise 
of control, directly or indirectly, is required for at least one of the 
factors and is the clearer indication of joint employer status. The 
regulation also states, however, that a potential joint employer's 
ability, power, or reserved right to act in relation to the employee 
may be relevant for determining joint employer status, but such 
ability, power, or right alone does not demonstrate joint employer 
status without some actual exercise of control. For example, if a 
potential joint employer sets the wage rate for an employee and sets 
his or her weekly work schedule, and there was also evidence that this 
entity has authority to fire the employee at any time, then this 
reserved power would be relevant to the analysis and could properly be 
considered. The regulation also explains that standard contractual 
language reserving a right to act is alone insufficient for determining 
joint employer status; there still must be some actual exercise of 
control.
    This more nuanced approach is responsive to comments stating that 
the Department proposed a regulation narrower than the common law--this 
is not the Department's intent. This approach is consistent with the 
type of fact-specific, totality of circumstances analyses required for 
potential joint employer scenarios, as well as the requirement that no 
single factor is dispositive in determining joint employer status under 
the Act. Finally, the Department is removing the reference to 
``economic reality'' from Sec.  791.2(a)(3) of the final rule to 
clarify that the focus of the fact-specific, totality of circumstances 
analysis that the Department is adopting is to determine joint employer 
status; ``economic reality'' is an interpretive principle--not the 
inquiry itself.
    The Department agrees with the commenters that the concept of 
indirect, actual control requires further clarification. As an initial 
matter, it is necessary to distinguish direct from indirect control in 
the context of the first joint employer scenario. A potential joint 
employer may exercise direct control by, for instance, hiring or firing 
an employee; setting an employee's schedule; or determining an 
employee's pay. In each case, the inquiry focuses on the relationship 
between the potential joint employer and the employee. In contrast, 
indirect control must be exercised through another, intermediary 
employer. For example, the potential joint employer may exercise 
indirect control by directing the intermediary employer to fire or hire 
an employee; set an employee's schedule; or determine an employee's 
pay. In other words, indirect control refers to control that flows from 
the potential joint employer through the intermediary employer to the 
employee.
    There are two relevant relationships in determining indirect 
control. The first relationship is between the intermediary employer 
and the employee: The intermediary employer must exercise direct 
control over the employee, e.g., by firing, hiring, setting schedules, 
or determining pay. The second relationship is between the potential 
joint employer and the intermediary employer: If the potential joint 
employer directs the intermediary employer's exercise of control over 
the employee, indirect control exists. But agreeing to a mere request 
or recommendation, alone, is not enough for indirect control, but can 
be indicative in rare circumstances.
    When presented with this scenario, many federal court decisions 
have drawn a sensible distinction between mandatory directions and mere 
suggestions or requests when analyzing indirect control.\65\ For 
example, the Third Circuit articulated this distinction in In re 
Enterprise and held that such recommendations are not relevant to joint 
employer status. In that case, Enterprise Holdings lacked the necessary 
direct control or authority over a subsidiary's assistant managers for 
joint employer status.\66\ The plaintiffs sought to demonstrate joint 
employer status on the basis of indirect control by arguing that 
Enterprise Holdings ``functionally held many of these [authority] roles 
by way of the guidelines and manuals it promulgated to its 
subsidiaries.'' \67\ But the Third Circuit found ``no evidence that 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc.'s actions at any time amounted to mandatory 
directions rather than mere recommendations.'' \68\ Therefore, 
``[i]nasmuch as the adoption of Enterprise Holdings, Inc.'s suggested 
policies and practices was entirely discretionary on the part of the 
subsidiaries, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. had no more authority over the 
conditions of the assistant managers' employment than would a third-
party consultant who made suggestions for improvements to the 
subsidiaries' business practices.'' \69\ The Third Circuit's reasoning 
is grounded in common sense: If Enterprise Holdings lacks authority to 
require a subsidiary to adopt certain employment practices, it could 
not indirectly require the subsidiary's employee to adopt such 
practices. Conversely, courts have been willing to find joint employer 
status based, at least in part, on indirect control where the potential 
joint employer does have authority to require the intermediary employer 
to adopt employment policies and practices not related to quality 
control, legal obligations, or standards to protect the health and 
safety of the employees or public.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 470-71; see also Martin v. 
Sprint United Mgmt., 273 F. Supp. 3d 404, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(recognizing that a putative joint employer's mandatory payments 
rates would involve the exercise of control over a subcontractors' 
field agents rate of payment, but that mere suggestions that the 
subcontractor could ignore would not show control); Copantitla v. 
Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 309 10 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (weighing against joint employer status where the facts that a 
putative joint employer ``sometimes makes recommendations on 
hiring'' but the hirer ``is free to disregard them,'' and there was 
no other evidence indicating ``that her recommendations played a 
material role''); Dixon v. Zabka, No. 3:11-cv-982 (MPS), 2014 WL 
6084351, at *11 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2014) (``None of this evidence 
demonstrates that [the putative joint employer] exercised control 
over . . . wages or method of payment beyond mere suggestions and 
recommendations. Such evidence is not sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of fact . . . .'').
    \66\ In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 471 (``Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 
had no authority to hire or fire assistant managers, no authority to 
promulgate work rules or assignments, and no authority to set 
compensation, benefits, schedules, or rates or methods of payment. 
Furthermore, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. was not involved in employee 
supervision or employee discipline, nor did it exercise or maintain 
any control over employee records.'').
    \67\ Id.
    \68\ Id. at 470.
    \69\ Id.
    \70\ See, e.g., Zachary v. Rescare Okla., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 
1177, 1181 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (finding joint employer status where 
the parent company ``had the authority to exercise control over [the 
subsidiary's] employment decisions'' and parent's ``executives were 
actively involved in setting and implementing policies that governed 
[the subsidiary's employees]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In short, a potential joint employer exercises indirect control 
over an intermediary employer's employee by issuing ``mandatory 
directions'' to the intermediary employer. But the potential joint 
employer's request for an employment action is rarely evidence of 
indirect control because the intermediary employer has discretion to 
grant or refuse the request. In rare circumstances, such as when an 
intermediary employer repeatedly follows without question a potential 
joint employer's requests regarding employees, it may be inferred that 
the intermediary employer lacked discretion to refuse those requests, 
and therefore, indirect control exists.\71\

[[Page 2835]]

Determining when a potential joint employer's request, recommendation, 
or suggestion is in effect a mandatory direction can be a complex, 
fact-specific analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Whether and the extent to which a pattern of following 
recommendations indicates indirect control depends on the 
circumstances of each case. For instance, blind adherence to 
repeated recommendations from a company's sole client may indicate 
the recommendations were actually mandatory directions. But 
repeatedly following the recommendations of a consulting firm hired 
to provide advice regarding employment decisions would not indicate 
indirect control. See In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 471 (noting that 
``third-party consultant who made suggestions for improvements to [a 
client's] business practices'' is an obvious example where joint 
employer liability would not apply).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to provide clearer guidance, the Department is adding 
Sec.  791.2(a)(3)(ii) to clarify that ``[i]ndirect control is exercised 
by the potential joint employer through mandatory directions to another 
employer that directly controls the employee. But the direct employer's 
voluntary decision to grant the potential joint employer's request, 
recommendation, or suggestion does not constitute indirect control that 
may demonstrate joint employer status. Acts that incidentally impact 
the employee also do not indicate joint employer status.'' This 
language directly responds to commenters' concerns that a potential 
joint employer's complaint concerning a business partner's employee may 
indicate joint employer status if the business partner thereafter takes 
action to discipline or terminate the employee.\72\ Seyfarth; RLC and 
the Association. Under Sec.  791.2(a)(2)(ii), the complaint would be at 
most a strongly worded suggestion, and any actions taken against the 
employee would not indicate joint employer status because such actions 
would have been ``entirely discretionary on the part of the'' business 
partner.\73\ The result would be the same with respect to joint 
employer factors other than firing and hiring. For example, a 
restaurant could request lower fees from its cleaning contractor, which 
if agreed to, could impact the wages of the cleaning contractor's 
employees. But this request would not constitute an exercise of 
indirect control over the employee's rate of payment because the 
cleaning service has discretion to lower its employees' wages or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ The language further responds to commenters' concerns that 
general business decisions of a potential joint employer that 
incidentally impact the employees of the entities with whom it 
contracts or who are its business partners could indicate joint 
employer status. For instance, a shipping facility that cuts back on 
its staffing needs during a slow period may incidentally impact the 
work schedules of its staffing agency's employees, but that general 
business decision would fall short of control over the employees' 
work schedules that would indicate joint employer status.
    \73\ In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 471.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Limits on Consideration of Additional Factors
    After proposing a four-factor balancing test to determine joint 
employer status in the first scenario, the proposed rule identified two 
situations in which additional factors may be considered (Sec.  
791.2(b)) and addressed the role of economic dependence in determining 
joint employer status (Sec.  791.2(c)).
i. Considering Additional Factors
    The proposed rule (Sec.  791.2(b)) stated that ``[a]dditional 
factors may be relevant for determining joint employer status in this 
scenario, but only if they are indicia of whether the potential joint 
employer'': (1) Exercises ``significant control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work,'' or (2) otherwise ``act[s] directly 
or indirectly in the interest of the employer in relation to the 
employee.'' 84 FR 14059. The NPRM's preamble explained that, 
``[b]ecause joint employer status is determined by 3(d) . . . any 
additional factors must be consistent with the text of 3(d).'' 84 FR 
14049. The proposed limitation on additional factors parroting section 
3(d) differs from the text of section 3(d) by changing ``an employer'' 
to ``the employer'' and ``an employee'' to ``the employee.'' Compare 29 
U.S.C. 203(d) with 84 FR 14059. The NPRM's preamble further explained 
that ``any additional factors indicating `significant control' are 
relevant because the potential joint employer's exercise of significant 
control over the employee's work establishes its joint liability under 
Section 3(d).'' Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing In re Enter., 683 F.3d 
at 470; Falk, 414 U.S. at 195; Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470).
    A few comments expressed explicit support for one or both of the 
proposed limitations on consideration of additional factors. For 
example, Independent Association of Franchisees and National 
Multifamily Housing Council/National Apartment Association ``strongly 
support'' the proposed limitations. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
suggested that, ``[i]f the answer to the joint employer question is not 
clear from consideration of [the] four factors, then factfinders can 
move to . . . consider more general indicia of control.'' The Chamber 
did not comment on allowing consideration of additional factors 
indicating whether the potential joint employer otherwise acts directly 
or indirectly in the interest of the employer in relation to the 
employee.
    Some comments supported the proposed limited consideration of 
additional factors but requested modifications. For example, SHRM was 
supportive but stated that any additional factors ``must, in order to 
ensure consistency both with the four Bonnette factors and with the 
statutory definition of employer under the FLSA, address the actual 
exercise of control,'' and urged the Department in the final rule to 
``specifically identify the types of `additional factors' to be 
considered'' and to ``articulate that all `additional factors' to be 
considered must be consistent with four Bonnette factors.'' Similarly, 
Seyfarth Shaw was supportive but ``wonder[ed] whether the phrase 
`additional factors' could lead courts to consider an overly broad 
range of factors,'' and urged the Department to ``clarify that the 
factors expressly deemed not relevant in the final rule are never 
permissible `additional factors' for consideration'' and that 
``additional factors should be considered only if, among other things, 
they are consistent with the other factors set forth in the rule.'' 
World Floor Covering Association requested that the Department define 
``significant control'' \74\ and ``indirect control'' in the context of 
consideration of additional factors and provided suggested definitions. 
Washington Legal Foundation requested that the Department not allow 
consideration of additional factors indicative of whether the joint 
employer otherwise ``act[s] directly or indirectly in the interest of 
the employer in relation to the employee.'' According to WLF, ``[t]here 
is no justification for that alternative basis; if the additional 
factors do not indicate that [the potential joint employer] is 
exercising significant control over the terms and conditions of the 
work of [the employer's] employees, then it is not relevant to the 
joint-employer determination.'' See also Coalition for a Democratic 
Workplace (suggesting modifications).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ The comment used the phrase ``substantial control'' but 
presumably meant ``significant control'' based on the context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other comments criticized allowing consideration of other factors. 
For example, FedEx asserted that ``no other factors need be 
introduced'' and that permitting consideration of additional factors 
would ``leav[e] the door open for the next generation's patchwork of 
judge-made tests to emerge.'' FedEx suggested, in the alternative if 
the final rule allows consideration of additional factors, that the 
Department clarify that the four factors ``are the most important to 
any joint employer status analysis under the FLSA,'' that ``any other 
factor must result from actions that are material to FLSA compliance 
and

[[Page 2836]]

regular in frequency to the relationship (rather than merely occasional 
or incidental),'' and that any additional factors ``carry less weight'' 
than the four factors. Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of 
America requested that the Department ``remove'' or ``drastically 
revise'' the provision allowing limited consideration of additional 
factors because it will ``undercut'' the clarity that the proposal 
would otherwise provide, ``will inject significant uncertainty into any 
joint employment analysis (exactly what the Department is looking to do 
away with here),'' and ``will likely increase the instances of joint 
employment litigation.'' RLC & the Association ``recommend[ed] that no 
broad catch-alls be added'' and was ``concerned that having an 
`additional factors' aspect to the balancing test has the potential to 
open the floodgates, particularly because the terms `significant 
control' and `acting directly or indirectly' could be broadly 
construed.'' \75\ National Association of Professional Employer 
Organizations characterized the proposed limits on considering 
additional factors as an ``alternative,'' ``catch-all'' test that would 
``create[ ] a much broader analysis for joint employment than is 
currently recognized by either USDOL or federal courts analyzing the 
FLSA,'' and requested that this alternative test be removed or 
rewritten. NAPEO expressed particular concerns that there is ``no 
explanation of ``otherwise acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of the employer in relation to the employee,'' that ``a fair 
interpretation is that this language is at least as broad as the `not 
completely disassociated' language currently in the regulations,'' and 
that ``[t]his language creates an end around argument to apply joint 
employment in almost any situation.'' The National Association of 
Convenience Stores expressed nearly identical concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ National Restaurant Association added, in the alternative: 
``To the extent additional factors are considered, they should be 
applied with caution, and it is crucial that the DOL identify in 
greater detail examples of business practices that should not be 
given any weight as part of the balancing test.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of comments challenged the proposed limitations, arguing 
that they were too narrow and lacked any legal basis. For example, NELA 
asserted that the proposed limitations ``contravene[ ] the fundamental 
principle that the Supreme Court articulated in Rutherford Food--that 
`the determination of the [employment] relationship does not depend on 
. . . isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole 
activity' '' (alterations made by commenter). NELA further asserted 
that ``[c]ourts have relied on this principle for decades in 
determining joint employer status'' (citing, e.g., Bonnette, 704 F.2d 
at 1470; Salinas, 848 F.3d at 142; In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 469; 
Zheng, 355 F.3d at 71-72).\76\ Senator Murray argued that the 
Department's reliance on Falk and Bonnette to support the proposed 
limitations is misplaced.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ To the extent that the Department retains the proposed 
limitations in the final rule, NELA suggested many revisions.
    \77\ Specifically, Senator Murray argued: ``The Department 
attempts to cite to Bonnette and Falk to justify narrowing the 
possible review of additional factors to those that indicate 
`significant control,' but these cases do not support that 
proposition. In neither case did the courts limit the factors that 
could be considered in making a joint employment determination--nor 
did they hold or lend credence to a view that only factors 
indicating `significant control' were to be considered. In fact, the 
Department can cite to no portion of either holding that expresses 
this view. Rather, the Department cites generally to language in the 
holdings that state the employers had `substantial control' and 
`considerable control' without holding that those are the minimums 
to be met for any case of joint employment to be found.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Coalition of State AGs contended that the proposed 
limitations on consideration of additional factors ``preclude[ ] 
consideration of categories of relevant evidence'' and are ``based on a 
misreading of Bonnette.'' As explained by the Coalition of State AGs, 
the court in Bonnette acknowledged that, although its four factors 
``provide a useful framework for analysis in this case, . . . they are 
not etched in stone and will not be blindly applied. The ultimate 
determination must be based `upon the circumstances of the whole 
activity.' '' Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (quoting Rutherford Food, 331 
U.S. at 730). Finally, SEIU stated that the proposed limitations on 
considering additional factors are, like the proposed four-factor test, 
``hopelessly flawed as a matter of law'' because they too exclude 
section 3(g)'s definition of ``employ'' from the analysis (citing 
Rutherford Food), and that the proposed limited consideration of 
additional factors does not ``redeem'' the proposed rule.
    After careful consideration of the comments, the Department adopts 
the text of Sec.  791.2(b)(1)--which permits consideration of 
additional factors indicating whether the potential joint employer is 
``[e]xercising significant control over the terms and conditions of the 
employee's work''--as proposed. But the Department is eliminating Sec.  
791.2(b)(2), which permits consideration of additional factors 
indicating whether the potential joint employer is ``acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of the employer in relation to the 
employee.''
    As discussed above, the Department is adopting a four-factor 
balancing test to determine joint employer status under the Act in the 
first scenario. Courts that apply multi-factor balancing tests leave 
open the possibility of considering other factors. See, e.g., Bonnette, 
704 F.2d at 1470 (``The four factors . . . provide a useful framework 
for analysis in this case, but they are not etched in stone and will 
not be blindly applied. The ultimate determination must be based `upon 
the circumstances of the whole activity.' '') (quoting Rutherford, 331 
U.S. at 730); In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 469 (``We emphasize, however, 
that these factors do not constitute an exhaustive list of all 
potentially relevant facts, and should not be `blindly applied.' A 
determination as to whether a defendant is a joint employer `must be 
based on a consideration of the total employment situation and the 
economic realities of the work relationship.' '') (quoting Bonnette, 
704 F.2d at 1470) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted); 
Baystate, 163 F.3d at 675 (finding the factors used in Bonnette to 
``provide a useful framework''); Wirtz, 405 F.2d at 669-70 (``In 
considering whether a person or corporation is an `employer' or `joint 
employer', the total employment situation should be considered with 
particular regard to the following [five factors].''). There is no 
basis for the Department to depart from this legal precedent of 
allowing the consideration of additional factors.
    However, there must be limits on the consideration of additional 
factors when determining joint employer status, and the Department's 
limits under proposed Sec.  791.2(b)(1) are reasonable. Because 
evaluating control of the employment relationship by the potential 
joint employer over the employee is the purpose of the Department's 
four-factor balancing test, it is sensible to limit the consideration 
of additional factors to those that indicate control. This limit is 
supported by the Third Circuit's decision in In re Enterprise, which 
recognized that ``other indicia of `significant control' '' beyond the 
four factors that it enumerated may be relevant to determining joint 
employer status under the Act. 683 F.3d at 470. Accordingly, the 
Department's final rule adopts proposed Sec.  791.2(b)(1), which allows 
for consideration of additional factors that indicate whether the 
potential joint employer has ``significant control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work.'' In response to comments asking 
about the interplay between this limit and the second factor of the 
Department's test (which assesses whether the potential joint employer

[[Page 2837]]

``controls the employee's . . . conditions of employment to a 
substantial degree''), ``significant control over the terms and 
conditions of the employee's work'' must include something more than 
control over the employee's ``conditions of employment'' or the limit 
would be superfluous. Thus, ``terms and conditions of the employee's 
work'' may include aspects of the potential joint employer's 
relationship with the employee that are not encompassed when applying 
the second factor and looking at the ``conditions of employment''--but 
only if the additional aspect indicates significant control by the 
potential joint employer. For instance, the second factor is limited to 
supervision and control to a substantial degree of an employee's work 
schedule or work conditions. But in certain situations--for example, 
where an employee performs substantial remote work without opportunity 
for oversight--less supervision and control may constitute an indicator 
of significant control.
    Proposed Sec.  791.2(b)(2), however, does not provide meaningful 
limitation on the consideration of additional factors that do not 
indicate control because it simply repeats verbatim section 3(d) of the 
FLSA. And any future attempt by the Department to identify specific 
additional factors which fall within Sec.  791.2(b)(2) through sub-
regulatory guidance would be ineffective because the Department ``does 
not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead 
of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has 
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.'' Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (declining to defer to agency 
interpretation of ``a parroting regulation''). Accordingly, the 
Department is not adopting proposed Sec.  791.2(b)(2) in this final 
rule.
Economic Dependence
    The proposed rule Sec.  791.2(c)) stated that ``[w]hether the 
employee is economically dependent on the potential joint employer is 
not relevant for determining the potential joint employer's liability 
under the Act.'' 84 FR 14059. It further stated that ``no factors 
should be used to assess economic dependence'' when determining joint 
employer status, and identified examples of ``factors that are not 
relevant because they assess economic dependence'' as including whether 
the employee: (1) ``[i]s in a specialty job or a job that otherwise 
requires special skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight''; (2) 
``[h]as the opportunity for profit or loss based on his or her 
managerial skill''; and (3) ``[i]nvests in equipment or materials 
required for work or the employment of helpers.'' Id.
    The NPRM's preamble explained that, because under section 3(d) 
joint employer status is determined by the actions of the potential 
joint employer and not by the actions of the employee or his or her 
employer, any factors that focus on the actions of the employee or his 
or her employer are not relevant to the joint employer inquiry, 
including those focusing on the employee's ``economic dependence.'' 84 
FR 14050. The NPRM's preamble stated that the three economic dependence 
factors identified as not relevant focus on whether the employee is 
correctly classified as such under the Act--and not on whether the 
potential joint employer is acting in the interest of the employer in 
relation to the employee. Id. While courts have used these factors for 
determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor, 
they are not relevant for determining whether additional persons are 
jointly liable under the Act to a worker whose classification as an 
employee has already been established. Id. In support, the NPRM's 
preamble cited the Eleventh Circuit's exclusion in Layton, 686 F.3d at 
1176, of two of the three factors as not relevant to the joint employer 
inquiry. Id. It further stated that courts have found that the 
``usefulness'' of the traditional employment relationship test--which 
includes factors such as the skill required, opportunity for profit or 
loss, and investment in the business--is ``significantly limited'' in a 
joint employer case where the employee already has an employer and the 
question is whether an additional person is jointly liable with the 
employer for the employee. Id. (quoting Baystate, 163 F.3d at 675 n.9).
    Numerous comments expressed general support for excluding economic 
dependence as irrelevant when determining joint employer status. See, 
e.g., American Bakers Association (factors that are used to determine 
whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor 
``certainly are less relevant in a setting in which the worker has an 
acknowledged relationship with an employing entity''); Associated 
Builders and Contractors (agreeing that `` `economic dependence' on the 
potential joint employer should not determine the potential joint 
employer's liability'' and ``particularly support[ing] the three 
examples of `economic dependence' factors that the Department proposes 
to exclude from the joint employer analysis''); International Franchise 
Association (``strongly agree[ing] with the Department's rejection of 
[a standard] stating or implying that anyone who is `economically 
dependent' on another employer somehow becomes that employer's 
employee). Center for Workplace Compliance noted that, 
``[u]nfortunately, some authorities have found economic dependence to 
be relevant or even controlling in joint employment cases,'' but 
asserted that a ``sound textualist reasoning'' of section 3(d) shows 
that the employee's economic dependence is not relevant to the joint 
employer inquiry. Seyfarth Shaw likewise agreed that ``factors bearing 
on a worker's `economic dependence' relate to whether the worker is an 
`employee' under the FLSA and are not germane to the joint employment 
inquiry,'' and it suggested five additional economic dependence factors 
to identify as irrelevant for determining joint employer status. See 
also RILA (suggesting exclusion of the same five factors); SHRM 
(suggesting exclusion of three similar factors).\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Seyfarth Shaw suggested excluding: (1) The percentage or 
amount of the direct employer's income that is derived from its 
relationship with the putative joint employer; (2) The percentage or 
amount of an employee's income that is derived from assignment to 
perform work for a particular benefitted entity; (3) The number of 
contractual relationships, other than with the putative joint 
employer, that the direct employer has entered into to provide 
similar services; (4) The length of the relationship between the 
direct employer or its employees and the putative joint employer; 
and (5) The number of contractual relationships, other than with the 
direct employer, that the benefitted party has entered into to 
receive similar services. SHRM suggested excluding: (1) The 
percentage or amount of the direct employer's income that is derived 
from its relationship with the putative joint employer; (2) The 
length of the relationship between the direct employer or its 
employees and putative joint employer; and (3) The number of 
contractual relationships that one party has with other parties to 
provide or receive similar services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Numerous comments disputed the Department's legal basis for 
excluding economic dependence from the joint employer analysis. For 
example, Senator Murray explained that ``economic dependence is not 
only central to the analysis of whether the joint employment standard 
is met in a particular instance, it is the crux of the standard,'' and 
that ``[i]t defies logic to propose to ignore an employee's economic 
dependence on the potential joint employer in determining whether the 
potential joint employer satisfies the joint employer standard.'' 
Quoting Layton, 686 F.3d at 1177-78, and Baystate, 163 F.3d at 675, she 
claimed that ``even those cases the Department cites recognize the 
centrality of economic dependence to the inquiry.'' Greater Boston 
Legal Services similarly challenged the NPRM's reliance on

[[Page 2838]]

Baystate, argued that the NPRM was ``selective in its Baystate 
quotations,'' and concluded that the NPRM ``therefore obfuscate[ed] the 
actual details of Baystate to narrow the joint employer standard when 
instead the Department's Proposed Rule directly contradicts Baystate 
itself.'' NELA asserted that ``[c]ourts have routinely found factors 
related to economic dependence useful and relevant in their analysis of 
joint employment.'' Moreover, Farmworker Justice asserted that, by 
eliminating economic dependence from the joint employer inquiry, the 
Department is ``rejecting an aspect of the inquiry that courts have 
used for decades'' (citing cases). Farmworker Justice further asserted 
that it would be ``remarkably inappropriate'' for the Department to 
eliminate from the inquiry ``several important factors that are 
commonly used to apply the FLSA test,'' and especially whether the 
worker is in a specialty job given that Rutherford Food considered that 
factor. See also SEIU (describing as ``wholly illogical'' the notion 
that ``simply because the stated circumstance would be relevant to a 
determination whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor, that circumstance could not also be relevant to a 
determination whether that same individual is jointly employed by a 
second employer''). Nichols Kaster suggested an internal inconsistency 
in the Department's proposal because the economic dependence factors 
that it excludes may be relevant to showing control. ``[E]conomic 
dependence factors such as who provides the materials and whether the 
work was performed on the alleged employer's premises should not be 
precluded from the analysis as the Department suggests. They could be 
highly relevant evidence of control or the power to control.'' NELA 
agreed, stating that ``the fact that a person worked on the premises of 
a company and that the company provided them with equipment and 
materials to do their job . . . may make it more likely than not the 
company is directly or indirectly controlling the working conditions'' 
(citing Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72; Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 730).
    Having reviewed and considered the comments, the Department adopts 
its proposed analysis of the role of economic dependence in determining 
joint employer status under the Act and makes one change to the text of 
Sec.  791.2(c) in the final rule to add a fourth example of ``factors 
that are not relevant because they assess economic dependence.''
    Consistent with the Department's bifurcation of sections 3(e) and 
(g) to determine whether a worker is an employee under the Act and 
section 3(d) to determine whether additional persons are joint 
employers of an employee, economic dependence is indicative of a 
worker's status as an employee or not, but not indicative of whether an 
employee has a joint employer. Economic dependence as compared to the 
degree to which the worker is in business for himself or herself 
determines whether the worker is an employee under the Act or an 
independent contractor. See Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, 
L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 379 80 (5th Cir. 2019); Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, 
Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the multiple 
factors of the test that distinguishes between employees and 
independent contractors ``must always be aimed at an assessment of the 
`economic dependence' of the putative employees, the touchstone for 
this totality of the circumstances test.''); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. 
Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (``The [multiple factors of 
the test that distinguishes between employees and independent 
contractors] are aids--tools to be used to gauge the degree of 
dependence of alleged employees on the business with which they are 
connected. It is dependence that indicates employee status. Each test 
must be applied with that ultimate notion in mind.''). Thus, a worker 
who is an employee is necessarily economically dependent on the 
employer with regard to the work. When determining whether that 
employee has another person who is a joint employer for the work, 
considering the employee's economic dependence as well will only lead 
to a false positive and will not be indicative. The typical laborer 
working drywall on a construction site, the typical staffing company 
employee sent to a client, and the typical driver driving a company 
vehicle, by virtue of their employee status, are not exercising special 
skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight, do not have the opportunity 
for profit or loss based on their managerial skill, and are not 
investing in equipment or materials required for work or employing 
helpers (notwithstanding any technical skills that they may have). 
Considering such economic dependence factors as part of a joint 
employer analysis would focus on the employee's own status, would 
almost always suggest economic dependence when the worker is already 
employed by an employer for the work, and would not be helpful in 
determining whether the other person is also the employee's 
``employer'' (i.e., a joint employer) for the work. Cf. Layton, 686 
F.3d at 1176 (``Because it had been determined that the farm workers 
were employees of the contractor, there was no need to evaluate whether 
hallmarks of an independent-contractor relationship existed.'') (citing 
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 443-44 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
Thus, determining whether the other person is the employee's joint 
employer necessitates looking beyond the employee's own economic 
dependence, looking at the relationship between the employee and the 
other person, and resolving whether that other person is the employee's 
employer too. The Department's proposed four-factor balancing test does 
exactly that, and accordingly, economic dependence should not be 
considered.
    Finally, the Department believes that the three examples of 
``factors that are not relevant because they assess economic 
dependence'' identified in proposed Sec.  791.2(c) strike an 
appropriate balance and that identifying many additional factors in the 
text of the final rule is not warranted. Nonetheless, although the 
additional factors suggested by Seyfarth Shaw and others are not part 
of courts' economic dependence analysis when determining whether a 
worker is an employee or independent contractor under the Act, the 
Department is of the view that one of the suggested factors--the number 
of contractual relationships, other than with the employer, that the 
potential joint employer has entered into to receive similar services--
is not encompassed by the joint employer test that the Department is 
adopting for the first scenario. Specifically, this suggested factor is 
not relevant to the four-factor balancing test that the Department is 
adopting and does not otherwise indicate that the potential joint 
employer is exercising significant control. Whether a business needs 
only one vendor or supplier or many to provide a particular product or 
service at a time does not indicate whether that business is exercising 
significant control over the employees of any particular vendor or 
supplier. The Department is therefore adding this factor to the list of 
irrelevant factors in Sec.  791.2(c).
    On the other hand, the Department believes that the other suggested 
factors may sometimes touch on whether the potential joint employer is 
exercising significant control,\79\ and thus may

[[Page 2839]]

indicate that the potential joint employer is acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ The other suggested factors include: (1) The percentage or 
amount of the direct employer's income that is derived from its 
relationship with the putative joint employer; (2) The percentage or 
amount of an employee's income that is derived from assignment to 
perform work for a particular benefitted entity; (3) The number of 
contractual relationships, other than with the putative joint 
employer, that the direct employer has entered into to provide 
similar services; and (4) The length of the relationship between the 
direct employer or its employees and the putative joint employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Joint Employer May Be Any Person
    Because section 3(d) defines ``employer'' as ``any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee,'' the Department proposed adding in Sec.  791.2(d)(1) the 
Act's definition of ``person'' in section 3(a) to make it clear that a 
joint employer under section 3(d) broadly encompasses every kind of 
person contemplated by the Act. NELA commented that the full definition 
of ``employer'' in section 3(d) states that an employer includes `` 
`any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee' '' and includes a public agency, 
but does not include ``any labor organization (other than when acting 
as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of 
such labor organization'' (quoting section 3(d)). NELA expressed 
concern that by mirroring the language in section 3(a) that defines 
person without putting it in the context of the complete definition of 
employer as found in section 3(d), the proposed section could read as 
excluding public agencies from the definition of joint employer, and 
impermissibly including labor organizations, even when not acting as an 
employer. After reviewing this comment, the Department acknowledges 
that the full definition of employer in section 3(d) is applicable to a 
joint employer. The definition of ``person'' from section 3(a) was 
incorporated into proposed Sec.  791.2(d)(1) to clarify that the joint 
employer concept includes every kind of person contemplated by the Act, 
and was not intended to alter the definition of what type of entity 
could be considered a joint employer. Accordingly, the Department has 
incorporated into Sec.  791.2(d)(1) additional language from section 
3(d) of the Act to ensure that the definition of person in this section 
is read within that context.
5. Business Models, Contractual Provisions, and Business Practices That 
Do Not Make Joint Employer Status More or Less Likely
    In the NPRM, the Department proposed to clarify that a person's 
business model--for example, operating as a franchisor--does not make 
joint employer status more or less likely under the Act, because a 
person's business model does not indicate whether it is ``acting . . . 
in relation to'' an employee of an employer. 84 FR 14051. The 
Department also proposed excluding as irrelevant to the joint employer 
inquiry certain contractual provisions intended to encourage legal 
compliance or promote desired societal effects, such as provisions 
requiring an employer to institute workplace safety practices, sexual 
harassment policies, wage floors, morality clauses, or other provisions 
encouraging the employer's compliance with their legal obligations. To 
the extent that a business merely requires the employer to institute 
such general policies, and does not itself enforce the contractual 
provisions with respect to the workers, the Department proposed that 
such contractual provisions do not make joint employer status more or 
less likely. See id. Similarly, the Department proposed clarifying that 
certain business practices where a potential joint employer merely 
provides or shares resources or benefits with an employer--such as 
providing sample handbooks or other forms to the employer, allowing an 
employer to operate a facility on its premises, offering an association 
health or retirement plan to the employer or participating in such a 
plan with the employer, or jointly participating with an employer in an 
apprenticeship program--do not make joint employer status more or less 
likely. Id. The Department explained that merely providing or sharing 
the resources or benefits, in the absence of any action by a potential 
joint employer to control the use of the resources or benefits by the 
employer's employees, does not constitute ``acting . . . in relation 
to'' the employees. Id.
    Many employer representatives supported the proposals described 
above, agreeing that such business interactions do not involve 
exercising control over the employees or otherwise acting directly or 
indirectly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to an employee. 
See, e.g., American Hotel and Lodging Association; Center for Workplace 
Compliance; Coalition for a Democratic Workplace; International 
Franchise Association; RLC & the Association; Retail Industry Leaders 
Association; Society for Human Resource Management; U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. Many of these commenters asserted that this proposed language 
would provide additional clarity and encourage mutually beneficial 
business relationships that would ultimately also benefit workers by 
allowing larger businesses to provide guidance, resources, and best 
practices to smaller businesses without inadvertently risking joint 
employer liability. See, e.g., American Hotel and Lodging Association; 
Coalition for a Democratic Workplace; Society for Human Resource 
Management; U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Several other commenters, 
including the American Hotel and Lodging Association, HR Policy 
Association, Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, and 
several members of Congress, also noted that these provisions will 
further encourage businesses to be good corporate citizens by promoting 
or requiring higher legal or ethical standards in their relationships 
with other businesses, to take the appropriate steps to ensure the 
safety of all employees, or to foster safe and informed workplaces.
    Although few worker representatives commented specifically on this 
portion of the NPRM, those that did were unanimously opposed to the 
proposal to consider these factors as making joint employer status 
neither more or less likely. See AFL-CIO; Center for Law and Social 
Policy; Greater Boston Legal Services; NELA; United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of America. These commenters indicated that the 
proposed provisions would eliminate potentially relevant factors from 
consideration, as there may be circumstances in which these business 
models, business practices, or contractual provisions involve the 
exercise of direct or indirect control over employees' schedules, 
conditions of employment, rates and methods or payment, or the 
maintenance of employee records, particularly when considered in light 
of the totality of the circumstances. Commenters noted that as courts 
have repeatedly stated, whether a person is a joint employer under the 
FLSA will depend on all of the facts in a particular case, and they 
therefore objected that to exclude certain facts, such as business 
models, contractual agreements, or business practices, as irrelevant in 
all instances impermissibly prevents those facts from being considered 
in that broader context. See Greater Boston Legal Services (``[T]he 
Department's proposal shreds the reasoning of Baystate as

[[Page 2840]]

applied in its progeny decisions, explicitly excluding consideration of 
ways in which a putative employer controls the terms and conditions of 
work that have been important to courts when deciding joint employer 
questions.''); AFL-CIO (``The proposed rule departs from the Supreme 
Court's, the common law's, and its own command by wholly discounting 
elements of the relationship between the putative joint employers and 
between the employees and the alleged joint employer.'') These comments 
were often made in the context of the worker representatives' broader 
objections to the Department's proposed language indicating that the 
textual basis under the FLSA for joint employer status is section 3(d), 
rather than sections 3(e)(1) or 3(g), or objections that the 
Department's proposed four-factor test is an impermissibly narrow 
interpretation of joint employer status, as discussed above.
    After carefully considering the comments on this issue, the 
Department has determined that the part 791 regulations should 
appropriately categorize certain business models, business practices, 
and contractual provisions as making joint employer status neither more 
or less likely. As previously discussed, the Department has determined 
that section 3(d) is the textual basis for joint employer status in the 
FLSA, and that its four-factor test derived from Bonnette is the 
appropriate analysis for determining joint employer status in 
situations where a potential joint employer benefits from the work 
performed by another business' employees. Therefore, the relevance of 
additional factors should only be considered in the context of whether 
these factors could potentially indicate that a potential joint 
employer is ``acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee,'' not whether some other standard 
or test is being met. However, the business models, business practices, 
and contractual provisions identified in the NPRM, as revised and 
finalized here, do not involve a potential joint employer ``acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee.'' Instead, they involve businesses acting in relation to each 
other to develop or strengthen a mutually beneficial business 
relationship, improve the work products used in that business 
relationship, or encourage compliance with legal obligations or health 
and safety, standards. In any event, for a potential joint employer to 
use such general business models, practices or contractual provisions 
to exercise direct or indirect control over another employer's 
employees, the potential joint employer would have to take some action 
toward those employees to require or enforce these general practices 
and policies in relation to those particular employees. In that case, 
the relevant factor would be that action on the part of the potential 
joint employer, not the general practice or policy that the potential 
joint employer imposed on the employees themselves, and the action 
would be considered in determining the extent to which the potential 
joint employer acted to exercise control over the employees' terms or 
conditions of employment.
    In addition to generally supporting the proposals identified in 
proposed Sec.  791.2(d) of the NPRM, many employer representatives 
requested clarification as to those items or suggested additional 
business models, contractual agreements, or business practices that 
should also be identified as not making joint employer status more or 
less likely. See, e.g., Associated Builders and Contractors; Center for 
Workplace Compliance; International Franchise Association; RLC & the 
Association; Seyfarth Shaw; Society for Human Resource Management; U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce; World Floor Covering Association.
    For example, several commenters requested clarification as to 
whether business models other than the franchise model should also be 
considered as not making joint employer status more or less likely. The 
National Association of Convenience Stores and the Society of 
Independent Gasoline Marketers of America both commented that the brand 
and supply business model--in which one business agrees to sell another 
business' products under that business' brand name and comply with 
certain brand standards and signage requirements, without agreeing to 
limitations or requirements for other products or services offered--
should be identified as not making joint employer status more likely. 
RLC & the Association also requested clarification as to whether 
certain features common to various business models, such as 
establishing a profit-sharing arrangement with a franchisee in lieu of 
a franchise fee, would make joint employer status more likely. In 
contrast, the Independent Association of Franchisees requested the 
Department to clarify that the presence of various economic features 
found in franchise agreements, including various franchise fees charged 
or capital expenditures required of the franchisee under the terms of 
the agreements, would be sufficient to indicate that the franchisor was 
the employer of the franchisee. Relatedly, the Department received 
several comments from employer representatives stating that the 
regulation should specify that certain business practices involving the 
location and time period during which work is performed do not make 
joint employer status more or less likely, where those location or 
timing requirements are dictated by the nature of the work itself. 
Examples of such requirements that were mentioned in the comments 
include specifying the location and approximate time period when work 
is to be performed at a customer's home, requiring certain operating 
hours or time periods during which services must be provided to 
customers, or requiring that work be performed in a coordinated 
schedule with other businesses performing related work where the nature 
of the work is such that items of work must be completed in a certain 
order, as on a construction site. See Associated Builders and General 
Contractors, Inc.; Coalition for a Democratic Workplace; International 
Franchise Association; RLC & the Association; World Floor Covering 
Association. Commenters felt that these business practices did not 
involve any control over workers' terms or conditions of employment, 
but merely represented businesses contracting for the work necessary to 
meet their specific needs.
    In contrast, worker representatives who commented directly or 
indirectly on this provision felt strongly that business models should 
not be generally excluded from consideration of joint employer status. 
AFL-CIO asserted that a putative joint employer's business model is 
obviously relevant, because it determines the potential joint 
employer's relationship with the alleged employer and its employees. 
AFL-CIO further claimed that certain business models, such as temporary 
staffing agencies, labor supply firms, or franchisors, are empirically 
more likely to be joint employers. Other commenters, while not 
specifically addressing this proposed item, noted that business models 
involving the outsourcing of work increase workers' vulnerability to 
misclassification and wage theft. See NELA (``Permitting consideration 
of additional factors helps prevent unscrupulous employers from 
subverting FLSA liability by simply outsourcing direct supervision of 
workers to labor brokers or staffing agencies.''); Center for Law and 
Social Policy (``The growing variety and

[[Page 2841]]

number of business models and labor arrangements have made joint 
employment more common.''); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America (``[T]here are employers in the construction 
industry ready, willing, and able to construct sophisticated labyrinths 
to confound law enforcement, cheat employees, and make fair competition 
an uphill battle.'').
    The Department has carefully considered the comments on this 
provision. Although worker representatives may be correct that some 
business models could be more likely to involve joint employers, other 
factors remain the true test of whether a particular business using 
such models is indeed a joint employer. While the Department 
appreciates concerns regarding the vulnerability of low-wage workers in 
certain business models, there is nothing inherent in the decision to 
enter into a brand-and-supply agreement, operate as a franchisor, or 
use a similar business model that is indicative of joint employer 
status under the FLSA.\80\ Accordingly, the Department maintains its 
analysis that the franchise business model and other similar business 
models, such as brand and supply agreements, do not make joint employer 
status more likely. However, the Department recognizes the validity of 
commenters' concerns that it is overly broad to state that any business 
model adopted by a potential joint employer does not make joint 
employer status more likely, as business models may exist that do 
involve the exercise of direct or indirect control over workers' 
conditions of employment. In light of these comments, the Department 
has decided to modify proposed Sec.  791.2(d)(2) to make it clear that 
the franchise business model, the brand and supply business model, and 
other similar business models do not make joint employer status more 
likely, while still allowing for the possibility that business models 
could be devised that, unlike these models, would involve the exercise 
of control over employees' conditions of employment and would thus make 
joint employer status more likely. Specifically, the Department has 
revised Sec.  791.2(d)(2) to state that ``[o]perating as a franchisor 
or entering into a brand and supply agreement, or using a similar 
business model does not make joint employer status more likely under 
the Act.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ See, e.g., Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 939 F.3d 1051, 1056 
(9th Cir. 2019) (``McDonald's involvement in its franchises and with 
workers at the franchises is central to modern franchising and to 
the company's ability to maintain brand standards, but does not 
represent control over wages, hours, or working conditions'' such 
that it is a joint employer under California's wage and hour law), 
rehearing denied and opinion amended (Dec. 11, 2019); Orozco v. 
Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that the employee 
``concede[d] that the Franchise Agreement is insufficient, by 
itself, to establish that [franchisor] qualifies as [employee's]'s 
employer under the FLSA''); Chen v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 09-107 
(JAP), 2009 WL 3379946, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009) (collecting 
cases and noting that ``[c]ourts have consistently held that the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship does not create an employment 
relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee's employees'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has also considered commenters' concerns regarding 
specific features of the business models identified, and agrees that to 
the extent various features of franchise and other similar business 
models are merely an economic feature of the business model, such as 
the use of profit sharing or the eventual hiring of temporary workers, 
those factors would not affect these business models' lack of relevance 
to joint employer status, so long as such features do not involve 
acting directly or indirectly to control the employees. Similarly, the 
Department agrees that where the location or timing of the work is 
dictated by the nature or circumstances of the work itself, requiring 
the supplier, vendor, subcontractor, or other entity who is performing 
the work to meet those time and location requirements does not make 
joint employer status either more or less likely. As a general matter, 
businesses that contract for work to be performed by other entities 
must of necessity be able to indicate or even mandate the time and 
place of performance of that work that best meets their business needs, 
and should be able to do so without incurring joint employer 
liability.\81\ This is particularly true where the work takes place, as 
in the examples above, in areas that are not under the control of the 
employer. However, where the work takes place at the potential joint 
employer's premises, that fact may be relevant to the potential 
employer's control of working conditions.\82\ Likewise, where a 
potential joint employer does not merely contract for work to take 
place at the locations and times necessary to achieve their business 
objectives, but actually acts directly or indirectly to determine how 
employees' schedules, routes, or other working conditions will be 
altered or changed so that the potential joint employer's time and 
location needs can be met, rather than leaving such decisions to the 
employer's discretion, such actions may still be relevant to an 
analysis of joint employer status.\83\ The determination of whether a 
potential joint employer has merely contracted for performance of work 
at certain times or locations as dictated by the nature of the work, as 
opposed to acting directly or indirectly to exercise control over 
employees' schedules, routes, or other working conditions will of 
necessity be a fact-specific determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See, e.g., Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441 (``It is not surprising 
that [a farm] would (and, despite [the FLSA], should be able to) 
give general instruction to [a farm labor contractor] as to which 
crops to harvest at a particular time.''); Jean-Louis, 838 F. Supp. 
2d at 125-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that providing windows of time 
in which technicians had to perform cable installation in customers' 
homes did not constitute supervision or control of employees' work 
schedules).
    \82\ See, e.g., Layton, 686 F.3d at 1180 (noting that ownership 
of facilities where the work occurs is relevant to joint employer 
analysis because a business that owns or controls the worksite will 
likely be able to prevent labor law violations even if it delegates 
hiring and supervisory responsibilities to labor contractors).
    \83\ See, e.g., id. at 1179 (finding the fact that the potential 
joint employer ``communicated with Drivers . . . if a non-routine 
situation occurred and Drivers were needed to re-deliver a package 
or respond to a customer complaint . . . evidence[d] a small amount 
of supervision'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Multiple employer representatives supported the inclusion of Sec.  
791.2(d)(3) in the regulatory text, agreeing that contractual 
agreements requiring an employer to set a wage floor, institute sexual 
harassment policies, establish workplace safety practices, require 
morality clauses, adopt similar generalized business practices, or 
otherwise comply with the law do not make joint employer status either 
more or less likely. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors of 
America; Center for Workplace Compliance; Coalition for a Democratic 
Workforce; HR Policy Association; Retail Industry Leaders Association; 
Society for Human Resource Management; U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
Commenters emphasized that such contractual provisions or business 
policies allow businesses to positively affect the well-being of 
consumers and workers by using their influence with suppliers, vendors, 
franchisees, and other related parties to require enhanced compliance 
with legal and ethical standards. See Association of General 
Contractors; Center for Workplace Compliance; HR Policy Association. 
These commenters further noted that such agreements or policies, while 
often improving conditions for workers across a web of connected 
businesses, do not constitute acting directly or indirectly in relation 
to an employee and do not involve the exercise of control over 
employees' daily activities or conditions of employment.
    Although this provision received general support from employer 
representatives, many of these

[[Page 2842]]

commenters requested clarification as to the extent of this provision 
and provided examples of typical contractual agreements or general 
policies that they felt should fall within its scope. Commenters 
indicated that the provision should be expanded to make clear that 
business practices related to the contractual agreements, such as 
monitoring workplaces for compliance with the legal obligations or 
policies specified by the contractual agreements, requiring businesses 
to ensure that workers receive training related to compliance with such 
legal obligations or policies, requiring background checks for 
employees, requiring the removal of products that pose a safety hazard, 
or penalizing businesses that do not comply with the contractual 
agreements, would also not make joint employer status more or less 
likely. They also requested that the provision specify that contractual 
agreements or practices mandating compliance with legal obligations 
under employment laws such as the FLSA itself or the Davis-Bacon Act 
fall within the scope of this provision. See Associated Builders and 
Contractors; Center for Workplace Compliance; Coalition for a 
Democratic Workplace; HR Policy Association; Retail Industry Leaders 
Association; Society for Human Resource Management; U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. Commenters also suggested that the regulatory text be revised 
to indicate that in addition to the wage floors specifically mentioned 
in the text, contractual agreements requiring businesses to provide a 
minimum level of paid leave or other benefits to workers do not make 
joint employer status more or less likely.
    In contrast, worker representatives who commented on this provision 
indicated that contractual agreements such as setting wage floors, 
requiring sexual harassment policies, or setting workplace safety 
standards impermissibly excluded potentially relevant facts from 
consideration when determining joint employer status. See AFL-CIO; 
NELA; Greater Boston Legal Services. Commenters specifically 
highlighted that contractually requiring a wage floor can be relevant 
to consideration of whether a potential joint employer determines 
employees' rates of pay. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners (``DOL states that establishing rates of pay indicates joint 
employer status, but then diminishes its weight if it is included in a 
contract as a `wage floor' ''); AFL-CIO (``Setting a wage floor, most 
obviously, is not a `generalized business practice' or a requirement 
that another entity `comply with the law'. Rather, it is the exercise 
of control over employees' wages.'')
    Having reviewed the commenters' suggestions regarding this 
provision, the Department recognizes the value of contractual 
agreements and related business practices that encourage compliance 
with legal obligations and health or safety standards. Several 
commenters stated that businesses are increasingly choosing to take on 
certain responsibilities that are not required by law, but as part of 
the business' ``corporate social responsibility'' (CSR) initiatives. 
See HR Policy Association (``Many corporations choose to act as good 
corporate citizens by adopting ethical standards that exceed their 
legal obligations.''); National Retail Federation; Center for Workplace 
Compliance. A commenter noted that some of these CSR initiatives 
include seeking to improve the working conditions for employees 
throughout the business's supply chain. See Center for Workplace 
Compliance.
    Businesses should not be discouraged from entering into and 
enforcing against other businesses such contractual agreements out of 
fear that encouraging compliance with health, safety, or legal 
obligations among their suppliers, vendors, sub-contractors, or 
franchisees will cause them to be considered joint employers of the 
employees of these other businesses.\84\ Many courts have also 
recognized that measures to ensure compliance with legal, safety, or 
other similar obligations are not relevant to determining joint 
employer status.\85\ The Department further agrees with the commenters 
who stated that businesses that act to monitor or enforce these types 
of contractual agreements against other businesses are not acting 
directly or indirectly toward an employee, but are instead acting to 
preserve the terms of their contractual agreement. Therefore, such 
monitoring or enforcement against other businesses does not make joint 
employer status more or less likely, so long as the monitoring and 
enforcement are focused on the employer's compliance with the 
contractually agreed upon policies, rather than supervision and control 
of individual employees' working conditions. The Department has 
accordingly added to the regulatory text to clarify that this provision 
applies not only to contractual agreements that require compliance with 
legal obligations and health or safety standards, but also to 
monitoring and enforcement against other businesses and similar 
activities necessary to ensure that the contractual agreements are 
being fulfilled, and has provided additional examples in the regulatory 
text to illustrate this principle. The Department is also clarifying 
that such similar activities include requiring that an employee 
handbook include standards, policies, or procedures that improve 
compliance with legal obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160-
61 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (clothing store's monitoring efforts to ensure 
garment manufacturer's compliance with anti-sweat shop measures 
should not be considered when determining joint employer status).
    \85\ See, e.g., Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 951 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (distinguishing strict controls ``to ensure compliance 
with various safety and security regulations'' for airline 
passengers as ``qualitatively different from'' oversight that 
evinced joint employer status in another case); Zampos, 970 F. Supp. 
2d at 803 (requiring installation contractors to subject applicants 
to background checks and drug tests does not implicate ``hiring and 
firing'' factor because ``this purported control, relating to the 
safety and security of Comcast customers, is qualitatively different 
from the control exercised by an employer''); Godlewska v. HDA, 916 
F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 60 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Godlewska v. 
Human Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 561 F. App'x 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (contrasting 
``quality control[ ] . . . to ensure compliance with the law or 
protect clients' safety'' with ``control over the employee's `day-
to-day conditions of employment' [that] is relevant to the joint 
employment inquiry'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After carefully considering commenters' concerns, however, the 
Department acknowledges that although contractually requiring a wage 
floor or similar measures will generally not be determinative of joint 
employer status, there may be situations where such requirements may be 
relevant to a determination of joint employer status in combination 
with other factors. Therefore, the Department has deleted the language 
that it had proposed relating to wage floors from Sec.  791.2(d)(3). 
The Department has also made a non-substantive change by moving the 
language regarding the requirement of morality clauses from proposed 
Sec.  791.2(d)(3) to Sec.  791.2(d)(4), as after further analysis the 
Department considers that requiring the direct employer to have and 
enforce morality clauses is more a matter of protecting the potential 
joint employer's brand reputation than requiring compliance with legal 
obligations or health and safety standards.
    Several employer representatives also commented on how important it 
is for businesses to be able to require, maintain, and enforce quality 
standards in relation to the work performed on their behalf or under 
their brand name. The commenters emphasized that quality control 
measures are commonly included in a variety of business relationships 
to allow businesses to enter into mutually beneficial business 
relationships while still protecting their reputation for quality with 
their customers, and do not involve any

[[Page 2843]]

direct or indirect control of the employees' schedule, pay rates, or 
conditions of employment. These commenters suggested changes to 
proposed Sec.  791.2(d)(4) to specify the extent to which potential 
joint employers can require franchisees, sub-contractors, or other 
entities to comply with quality control standards instituted by the 
potential joint employer without making joint employer status more 
likely. Several commenters also provided additional examples of quality 
control measures that they believe should be included in the regulatory 
text as examples of business practices that do not make joint employer 
status more or less likely, such as providing quality or outcome 
standards, requiring employees to maintain a professional appearance or 
courteous demeanor with customers, or providing feedback to the 
employer when work has not been performed in accordance with the 
required quality standards. See, e.g., Coalition for a Democratic 
Workplace; International Franchise Association; Retail Industry Leaders 
Association; Seyfarth Shaw LLP; U.S. Chamber of Commerce. However, the 
Independent Association of Franchisees commented that the use of 
certain quality control practices common to franchise agreements, such 
as requiring franchisees to purchase supplies from certain vendors, 
should be sufficient to create an employment relationship between the 
franchisor and franchisee.
    The Department agrees with commenters that requiring, monitoring, 
and enforcing other businesses' compliance with quality control 
standards to ensure the consistent quality of a work product, brand, or 
business reputation is not a business practice that makes joint 
employer status more or less likely. Such quality control measures stem 
from a business' desire to protect its reputation, protect the quality 
of the ultimate work product, and ensure that customers continue to 
receive a high standard of service, and are thus of a very different 
nature than actions where a potential joint employer acts directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. 
Quality control measures are focused on the goods and services 
themselves by determining criteria for an acceptable work product or 
service and evaluating the end work product in light of those criteria, 
as opposed to actions directed toward day-to-day management of the 
workers. Many courts have recognized that ``supervision with respect to 
contractual warranties of quality and time of delivery has no bearing 
on the joint employment inquiry[.]'' \86\ Therefore, businesses are 
able to require and oversee quality control measures without that fact 
indicating liability as a joint employer. However, if a potential joint 
employer engages in supervision and becomes involved with employees' 
firing or disciplinary actions, scheduling, or other conditions of 
employment, such actions would of course still be relevant to an 
inquiry into joint employer status. To address confusion about whether 
businesses can merely require quality control standards, or whether 
they can also monitor and enforce those standards against other 
businesses without that fact indicating joint employer liability, the 
Department has added regulatory text to Sec.  791.2(d) to clarify that 
merely requiring quality control standards and ensuring that the work 
actually meets the required standards does not make joint employer 
status more or less likely. This additional text will now be Sec.  
791.2(d)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Zheng, 355 F.3d at 75. See also Godlewska, 916 F. Supp. 2d 
at 260 (``Quality control and compliance monitoring . . . are 
qualitatively different from control that stems from the nature of 
the relationship between the employees and the putative employer.'' 
(quotation marks omitted)); Jacobson v. Comcast Corp., 740 F. Supp. 
2d 683, 691-92 (D. Md. 2010) (``Comcast's quality control procedures 
ultimately stem from the nature of their business and the need to 
provide reliable service to their customers, not the nature of the 
relationship between the technicians and Comcast . . . . it is 
qualitatively different from the control exercised by employers over 
employees.''); Mendez v. Timberwood Carpentry & Restoration, No. H-
9-490, 2009 WL 4825220, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2009) (finding that 
supervisory rights that ``extend only to securing satisfactory 
completion of the terms of [an]Agreement or [the] quality of the 
work to be performed . . . ha[ve] no bearing on [an entity's] 
`employer' status'') (quotation marks omitted)); Chen v. Street Beat 
Sportswear, 364 F. Supp. 2d 269, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (``The Court 
will not consider evidence plaintiffs present with respect to [the 
control] factor to the extent it concerns the presence of Street 
Beat quality control personnel at the contractors' factories to 
monitor the quality of the work.''); Zhao, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 
(finding that performing quality control at factory where employees 
worked did not constitute the control or supervision typical of an 
employer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Employer representatives also provided feedback supporting the 
regulatory text identifying certain business practices, such as 
providing another employer with a sample handbook or forms, allowing an 
employer to operate a facility on its premises, offering or 
participating in an association health plan, or participating with an 
employer in an apprenticeship program as business practices that do not 
make joint employer status more or less likely. These commenters 
emphasized that by providing additional resources to employers and 
their employees, potential joint employers are giving employers access 
to a greater degree of business expertise, training resources, and 
benefit plans than they would be able to attain on their own. The 
commenters stated that by making it clear that such practices were not 
indicative of joint employer status, the proposed regulatory text will 
encourage businesses who had become wary of providing such resources to 
their franchisees, subcontractors, or other entities to continue to 
make those resources available to the benefit of those employers and 
their workers. Some commenters provided examples of additional business 
practices that they felt should also be specifically recognized as not 
making joint employer status more or less likely. For example, in 
addition to sample handbooks and forms, several commenters wanted 
clarification as to whether businesses could also provide or recommend 
other materials, such as sample operational or business plans, 
marketing materials, and suggested hiring or interview guidelines. They 
pointed out that such materials can assist businesses to improve their 
operating procedures and develop legally compliant workplace policies. 
See RLC & the Association; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; World Floor 
Covering Association. RLC & the Association asserted that franchisors 
frequently provide franchisees with a platform to post job 
advertisements and collect job applications, and often recommend or 
provide analytical systems and tools to increase efficiency, and stated 
that these common business practices should also not make joint 
employer status more or less likely.
    Commenters also inquired whether a potential joint employer could 
provide certain optional resources and benefits to employees without 
making joint employer status more or less likely. For example, 
commenters indicated that potential joint employers frequently offer 
training or educational opportunities to employees, either directly or 
through a cooperative business group, or allow employees free access to 
the potential joint employer's common areas, such as the cafeteria, 
break areas, nursing mother facilities, or company intranet, and they 
believed that these common practices should not make joint employer 
status more or less likely. See Retail Industry Leaders Association; 
Society for Human Resource Management; World Floor Covering 
Association.
    Commenters representing employees opposed the proposed 
identification of business practices considered not indicative of joint 
employer status. These commenters, including the AFL-CIO, asserted as a 
general matter that such provisions would be contrary to

[[Page 2844]]

case law encouraging a holistic evaluation of ``all evidence of control 
of terms and conditions of employment.'' AFL-CIO (emphasis in 
original); see also Greater Boston Legal Services; Low Wage Worker 
Legal Network; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners. Several 
commenters specifically objected to the proposal to exclude from 
consideration an entity's decision to ``allow[ ] the employer to 
operate a business on its premises,'' asserting that commenters 
objected to specific items listed in proposed Sec.  791.2(d)(4). See 
Low Wage Worker Legal Network (``Who owns the property where work is 
carried out has long been recognized as a significant factor in 
evaluating employment under the FLSA.''); Nichols Kaster (``[W]hether 
the work was performed on the alleged employer's premises should not be 
precluded from the analysis . . . [as it] could be highly relevant 
evidence of control or the power to control.''). The United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters and Joiners asserted that proposed Sec.  791.2(d)(4)'s 
residual exclusion of ``any other similar business practices'' would be 
``a clarion call for creative contracting that will shelter contractors 
who control a labor broker's workforce.''
    After carefully reviewing these comments, the Department believes 
that where one business provides another business with benefits or 
resources (including allowing it to operate a store-within-a-store), 
that the other business can use at its discretion, such sharing does 
not make joint employer status either more or less likely. For example, 
suggesting methods or providing materials that a franchisee, sub-
contractor, or other entity can use to improve their business 
strategies or profitability does not involve acting directly or 
indirectly in relation to employees; the potential joint employer 
provides those suggestions, samples, or resources to the employer, who 
may then determine how they should be implemented with respect to their 
own employees. An entity does not become a joint employer merely 
because another business chooses to follow that entity's business 
advice.\87\ Similarly, providing employees with access to resources or 
benefits to which they may not otherwise have access, such as optional 
educational or training opportunities, common areas, or additional 
benefit plan options, does not involve the exercise of direct or 
indirect control over employees' terms or conditions of work, whether 
those resources are provided to the employer or directly to the 
employees. To make joint employer status more or less likely, the 
potential joint employer would have to not only provide such resources, 
but would also have to somehow exercise control over the employees in 
relation to those resources. For example, if the potential joint 
employer disciplined a worker for not following certain policies, 
insisted that the employer hire specific job applicants or required 
employees to participate in a particular apprenticeship program, the 
potential joint employer would then be exercising control over the 
employees' conditions of employment beyond merely making resources 
available. Therefore, the Department has decided to retain this 
provision from the proposed rule. The Department has also moved this 
provision to Sec.  791.2(d)(5) to accommodate the additional text now 
incorporated at Sec.  791.2(d)(4), described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See Orozco, 757 F.3d at 449-51 (holding that there was 
insufficient evidence to legally find that the potential joint 
employer supervised and controlled workers' schedules, pay rates, or 
other conditions of employment, where the potential joint employer 
advised a franchisee on how to increase profitability, including a 
review of employees schedules, and the franchisee then adjusted 
workers' hour and pay, where the decision as to whether or how 
workers' schedules and pay would be adjusted was still up to the 
franchisee); Affo v. Granite Bay Care, Inc., Nos. 2:11-CV-482-DBH & 
2:12-CV-115-DBH, 2013 WL 2383627, at *10 (D. Me. May 30, 2013) 
(finding that the employer's use of the potential joint employer's 
staffing model and handbook does not suggest that the potential 
joint employer exercised control over the employer's workers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Test for Determining Joint Employer Status in the Second Scenario

    In the second joint employer scenario, the employee works separate 
jobs and hours for multiple employers, and the issue is whether the 
employers are joint employers of the employee such that all of the 
employee's hours worked for the employers are aggregated for the 
workweek and the employers are jointly and severally liable for all of 
the hours worked. Proposed Sec.  791.2(e) stated that, in this 
scenario, ``if the employers are acting independently of each other and 
are disassociated with respect to the employment of the employee, each 
employer may disregard all work performed by the employee for the other 
employer in determining its own responsibilities under the Act.'' 84 FR 
14059. On the other hand, ``if the employers are sufficiently 
associated with respect to the employment of the employee, they are 
joint employers and must aggregate the hours worked for each for 
purposes of determining compliance with the Act.'' Id. The proposed 
rule further stated that the employers ``will generally be sufficiently 
associated'' if there is ``an arrangement between them to share the 
employee's services;'' ``[o]ne employer is acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of the other employer in relation to the 
employee;'' or [t]hey share control of the employee, directly or 
indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.'' 
Id. The proposed rule noted that ``[s]uch a determination depends on 
all of the facts and circumstances'' and that ``[c]ertain business 
relationships . . . which have little to do with the employment of 
specific workers--such as sharing a vendor or being franchisees of the 
same franchisor--are alone insufficient to establish that two employers 
are sufficiently associated to be joint employers.'' Id. As explained 
in the NPRM's preamble, these proposals would amount to ``non-
substantive revisions'' to the current regulations' ``not completely 
disassociated'' analysis for determining joint employer status in this 
scenario. 84 FR 14052.
    The proposed revisions to the analysis for determining joint 
employer status in the second scenario did not engender many comments. 
Several comments asserted that the current regulations' ``not 
completely associated'' standard is ill-suited for the first joint 
employer scenario and/or supported application of the proposed 
``sufficiently associated'' analysis to the second joint employer 
scenario. See, e.g., SHRM (supporting the proposal); National 
Federation of Independent Business (current regulations' standard 
``makes sense'' in the second scenario and the proposed revisions 
preserve much of that standard and would provide a ``properly 
tailored'' standard for the second scenario); Center for Workplace 
Compliance (current regulations' focus on the relationship between the 
two potential joint employers is relevant to the second scenario, but 
not the first). Two comments agreed that the current regulations' 
standard is useful for determining joint employer status in the second 
scenario, but also suggested some ``non-substantive revisions'' to the 
proposed ``sufficiently associated'' analysis, including a statement 
that the proposed analysis is ``meant to be in line with past 
application'' of the current regulations' analysis and affirming that 
(even in the second scenario) the analysis must focus on whether an 
employer ``controls the terms and conditions of work utilizing the 
Bonnette factors.'' See Seyfarth Shaw; RILA. These comments also asked 
that the final rule address situations where one employee (for

[[Page 2845]]

example, a watchman) simultaneously works one set of hours for two 
related employers. See id. Finally, several comments defended the 
current regulations' ``not completely disassociated'' standard, which 
would ostensibly govern both scenarios in the view of these commenters. 
See, e.g., Southern Migrant Legal Services and Washington Lawyers' 
Committee.
    Having carefully considered the comments, the Department continues 
to be of the view that, in the second joint employer scenario, focusing 
on the relationship between the two employers is the correct approach. 
In the second scenario, the employee is employed by both employers and 
works separate jobs and hours for each employer. To the extent that the 
two employers are acting as one with respect to the employee, the 
employees' hours worked for the two employers should be treated as one 
set of hours worked. As explained in the NPRM's preamble, the current 
regulations' focus on the relationship between the two employers has 
been useful to both the public and courts. See 84 FR 14051-52. Non-
substantive revisions articulating the focus as whether the two 
employers are ``sufficiently associated,'' providing three situations 
where the two employers are generally sufficiently associated, and 
stating that certain business relationships which have little to do 
with the employment of specific workers are insufficient should make 
the regulations even more useful to both the public and courts. 
Accordingly, the Department adopts the analysis for determining joint 
employer status in the second scenario as proposed and does not make 
any changes to proposed Sec.  791.2(e).
    In response to requests from commenters for further revisions to 
the examples, the Department reiterates that its revisions to the 
current regulations are non-substantive and should not change the 
outcome in particular cases, and thus are ``in line'' with how joint 
employer status has been determined in the past in the second scenario. 
However, incorporating the Bonnette factors into the joint employer 
analysis in the second scenario would be inconsistent with the 
longstanding approach to focus on the relationship and association 
between the two potential joint employers. The Bonnette factors, by 
contrast, focus on the relationship between the potential joint 
employer and the employee of another employer. Finally, the Department 
has not changed its views of a situation where two employers arrange to 
employ a common watchman who watches both employers' properties 
concurrently. Although the employee works one set of hours for the two 
separate employers, the employers are joint employers because they have 
arranged to share the employee's services. This result is the same 
under the Department's 1939 Interpretative Bulletin No. 13, its current 
regulations, and this final rule. Of course, as explained previously, 
the two employers are not both required to pay the employee at least 
the minimum wage due under the Act because of their joint and several 
liability.

G. Liability of Joint Employer

    The proposed rule (Sec.  791.2(f)) explained that a joint employer 
``is jointly and severally liable with the employer and any other joint 
employers for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the 
Act.'' 84 FR 14059. This provision merely restates the longstanding 
principle of joint and several liability under the Act. The Department 
received no comments regarding its proposed Sec.  791.2(f), and it 
adopts that proposed section in the final rule.

H. Illustrative Examples

    In the NPRM, the Department proposed to add nine illustrative 
examples to the regulatory text applying the Department's proposed 
analysis to determine joint employer status. The proposed examples 
addressed each of the two potential joint employer scenarios (i.e., 
where an employee's work for an employer simultaneously benefits 
another entity, and where an employee works separately for two or more 
employers), and involved a variety of different industries and specific 
facts. The proposal cautioned that the conclusions following each of 
the nine proposed examples would be limited to substantially similar 
factual situations.
    Commenters representing employers overwhelmingly supported the 
proposal to add illustrative examples to the regulations, asserting 
that examples would bring added clarity. See, e.g., Association for 
Corporate Growth; Fed Ex; HR Policy Association; World Floor Covering 
Association. The American Hotel & Lodging Association and National 
Federation of Independent Businesses each noted that including examples 
in the regulatory text would be particularly helpful for small 
businesses that have fewer resources to spend on compliance and legal 
support. Several commenters, including the Retail Industry Leaders 
Association (RILA) and the Washington Legal Foundation, urged the 
Department to adopt more examples in its final rule, for even greater 
clarity.
    Few commenters representing employees addressed the proposed 
examples, but two commenters, the AFL-CIO and the Coalition of State 
AGs, criticized the proposed examples as collectively inadequate. Both 
commenters asserted that several of the proposed examples fail to 
provide enough information to determine whether a joint employment 
relationship exists, while the Coalition of State AGs asserted that 
other proposed examples were so ``unquestionably demonstrative of a 
joint-employment relationship [that they would be] unhelpful to someone 
trying to apply the new joint-employment standard to `close calls.' '' 
Several commenters, including commenters representing employers, had 
substantive concerns or suggested edits to the specific proposed 
examples, as discussed in greater detail below.
    After considering commenters' general feedback to the proposed 
examples, the Department has decided to adopt illustrative examples in 
this final rule. The Department believes that codifying factual 
examples in the regulations can provide helpful insight into how the 
Department intends for its FLSA joint employer analysis to be applied, 
particularly for smaller businesses who have (or might be 
contemplating) similar labor arrangements. Specifically, and as 
described in greater detail below, the Department has decided to adopt 
four of its proposed examples without edit, to adopt five of its 
proposed examples with some changes, and to add two new examples.
1. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(1)
    Proposed Example 1 described a cook working separate hours for two 
different restaurant establishments affiliated with the same nationwide 
franchise. These establishments are locally owned and managed by 
different franchisees that do not coordinate in any way with respect to 
the cook. Under these facts, the proposed example advised that the two 
restaurant establishments are not joint employers of the cook, because 
they are not associated in any meaningful way with respect to the 
cook's employment.
    The Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America (SIGMA) 
commented that proposed Example 1 ``provides excellent context and 
clarity surrounding joint employment as it relates to franchises.'' The 
Fisher Phillips law firm agreed with the analysis provided in proposed 
Example 1, but requested the Department to either modify the example or 
add a new example to illustrate that use of a third-

[[Page 2846]]

party ``virtual marketplace platform'' (VMP) to schedule the same 
worker would not extend joint liability to the two restaurants, or to 
the third party administering the VMP. Finally, HR Policy Association 
suggested adding language to the proposed analysis subsection 
clarifying that this example implicates the second joint employer 
scenario described in proposed Sec.  791.2(e) ``because the cook is 
employed by two different employers.'' \88\ The Department did not 
receive any other comments on this example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ HR Policy Association suggested similar clarifying edits to 
all of the proposed examples, to specify whether each example 
implicates the first and/or second joint employer scenario described 
in the Department's proposed analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has decided to adopt Example 1 as originally 
proposed in Sec.  791.2(g)(1). The Department agrees with Fisher 
Phillips that uncoordinated use of a common third party service to 
schedule workers does not establish that otherwise separate employers 
are associating with the respect to any particular worker, but believes 
that evaluating the joint employer status of the third party 
administering the scheduling service requires the consideration of 
additional facts that would complicate the example and detract from its 
focus on the franchise business model. Similarly, the Department agrees 
with HR Policy Association that Example 1 implicates the joint employer 
scenario described in Sec.  791.2(e) because it involves an employee 
working separate hours for separate employers in the same workweek, but 
language identifying which of the two potential joint employer 
scenarios described in Sec.  791.2(a)-(e) each example implicates is 
unnecessary and potentially confusing for lay readers. The Department 
therefore rejects HR Policy Association's similar suggested edits to 
the other proposed examples.
2. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(2)
    Proposed Example 2 described a cook working separate hours for two 
different restaurant establishments owned by the same person. Each 
week, the restaurants coordinate and set the cook's schedule of hours 
at each location on a weekly basis, and the cook works interchangeably 
at both restaurants. The restaurants decided together to pay the cook 
the same hourly rate. Here, the proposed example advised that the 
restaurant establishments are joint employers of the cook because they 
share common ownership, coordinate the cook's schedule of hours at the 
restaurants, and jointly decide the cook's terms and conditions of 
employment, such as the pay rate.
    The Nisei Farmers League expressed concern that the analysis for 
proposed Example 2 identified the fact that the restaurants jointly 
determined the cook's hourly pay rate as evidence indicating the 
existence of a joint employer relationship. Noting how common such a 
practice is in the agricultural industry, Nisei Farmers League asserted 
that a potential joint employer's role in setting a worker's pay rate 
should not be relevant to the analysis, because otherwise ``the 
business model between a grower and [a farm labor contractor] 
automatically weighs towards finding joint employment before the facts 
of the situation are reviewed.'' The Department did not receive any 
other comments on proposed Example 2.
    The Department has decided to adopt Example 2 as originally 
proposed in Sec.  791.2(g)(2). The Department disagrees with the Nisei 
Farmers League that ``jointly determining worker's pay rate should be 
given no weight'' in the analysis, especially in the second scenario 
where (as described in Example 2) the same individual works separate 
hours for ostensibly separate employers in the same workweek. The 
Department notes that, for FLSA purposes,\89\ growers utilizing farm 
labor contractors in the agricultural industry would be evaluated as 
potential joint employers under the first scenario described in Sec.  
791.2(a). Here, although determining the employee's rate and method of 
payment is one of the four main factors that determine whether an 
entity is a joint employer, no single factor is dispositive in 
determining joint employer status under the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ Most agricultural employers, agricultural associations, and 
farm labor contractors are also subject to MSPA. As noted earlier, 
the Department will continue to use the standards in its MSPA joint 
employer regulation to determine joint employer status under MSPA. 
See supra note 55. Among other factors, the MSPA joint employer 
regulation considers an agricultural employer's ``power, either 
alone or in addition to another employer, directly or indirectly, to 
. . . determine the pay rates or the methods of wage payment for the 
worker(s).'' 29 CFR 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(3)
    Proposed Example 3 described an arrangement between an office park 
company and a janitorial services company hired to clean the office 
park building after normal work hours. Their contract stipulates that 
the office park agrees to pay the janitorial company a fixed fee for 
these services and reserves the right to supervise the janitorial 
employees in their performance of those cleaning services. However, 
office park personnel do not set the janitorial employees' pay rates or 
individual schedules and do not in fact supervise the workers' 
performance of their work in any way. Under these facts, the proposed 
example advised that the office park is not a joint employer of the 
janitorial employees because it does not hire or fire the employees, 
determine their rate or method of payment, or exercise control over 
their conditions of employment. The proposed example elaborated that 
the office park's reserved contractual right to control the employee's 
conditions of employment does not demonstrate that it is a joint 
employer.
    The American Bakers Association said it appreciated proposed 
Example 3, which it viewed as representative of janitorial service 
arrangements common in the wholesale baking industry that should not 
constitute joint employment. SIGMA was generally supportive of Example 
3, but requested the Department to remove the phrase ``in any way,'' 
which they asserted ``is very strong and appears to limit instances--
such as where a company sets a sexual harassment policy--where a 
business may have a modicum of oversight.'' To help illustrate other 
elements of the proposed rule, RILA suggested inserting additional 
facts to Example 3 that would not affect the outcome of the analysis, 
such as contractual terms requiring the janitorial services company to 
complete the services within specified hours and to comply with all 
applicable health and safety laws, rules, and regulations. Consistent 
with its criticism of the Department's proposed treatment of reserved 
control, NELA criticized proposed Example 3's statement that ``the 
reserved right to control the employee's conditions of employment does 
not demonstrate that it is a joint employer'' as an incorrect 
application of the law. The Coalition of State AGs specifically 
identified proposed Example 3 as one of several examples it said ``fail 
to provide enough information for an accurate determination of joint 
employment under current court precedent.''
    The Department has decided to adopt proposed Example 3 with one 
modification at Sec.  791.2(g)(3). Consistent with the Department's 
change to its proposed treatment of reserved control, it has changed 
the sentence advising that the office park's reserved right to control 
the janitorial workers ``does not demonstrate that it is a joint 
employer'' to read, in relevant part, that the such reserved control 
``is not enough to establish that it is a joint employer.'' In

[[Page 2847]]

other words, while an entity's reserved right to control workers is 
relevant to the inquiry and indicative of joint employer status to some 
degree, it is far from dispositive where, as in this example, an entity 
does not otherwise exercise significant control over the terms and 
conditions of an employee's work. The Department declines RILA's 
suggested edits to Example 3, because inserting additional facts--
including facts identified as irrelevant to the FLSA joint employer 
inquiry in Sec.  791.2(d)--risks complicating the analysis and 
detracting from the example's focus on the relatively minimal 
importance of the office park's reserved right to control the workers. 
For similar reasons, the Department declines SIGMA's request to delete 
the phrase ``in any way'' from the example's description of the facts.
4. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(4)
    Proposed Example 4 described an arrangement between a country club 
and a landscaping company hired to maintain its golf course. The 
country club lacks authority to fire, hire, or supervise the 
landscaping employees. But in practice, it ``sporadically assign[s]'' 
tasks, provides ``periodic instructions,'' and ``keep[s] intermittent 
records'' of landscape employees' work. Furthermore, the landscaping 
company terminates a worker ``at the country club's direction'' because 
that worker failed to follow the country club's instructions. The 
application section of the example concluded that ``the country club is 
a joint employer of the landscaping employees'' based on the country 
club's direct supervision of the landscaper's employees and the 
indirect firing of one employee.
    Commenters found this example ``demonstrates the difficulty in 
applying the concept of `indirect, actual control.'' Coalition for 
Democratic Workplace; National Retail Federation; see also RLC and the 
Association. The National Retail Federation noted that ``the example 
does not provide any guidance on what it means to `direct' a 
termination for which the club has no contractual authority.'' The 
Coalition for Democratic Workspace expressed concern that the example's 
``vague limiting terms''--i.e., ``sporadic,'' ``periodic,'' and 
``intermittent''--leave it unclear whether the club's supervision of 
the landscaping employee triggers joint employment status. And the 
Retail Industry Leaders Association complained that the example 
``leaves unresolved whether the worker was causing damage to club 
property or violating safety rules (or by contrast, merely completing a 
task in a different order than the club official may have preferred).'' 
See also RLC and the Association (requesting an example specific to the 
restaurant industry involving a cleaning company employee who ``does 
not do a good job, does not show up, is rude to the restaurant's 
customers, harasses the restaurant's employees or demonstrates other 
deficiencies'').
    The Department has reconsidered the example set forth in proposed 
Sec.  791.2(g)(4) in light of its revised description of ``indirect 
control'' in Sec.  791.2(a), and has decided to revise the example for 
several reasons. As an initial matter, the Department has decided to 
replace the county club and landscaping company described in the 
proposed example with a restaurant and cleaning company, respectively. 
This change responds to the RLC and Association's request for an 
example relevant to the restaurant industry, but does not otherwise 
affect the analysis. For the sake of simplicity, our discussion of 
other changes to the proposed example will use the terms ``restaurant'' 
and ``cleaning company'' as if those were the entities described in the 
proposed example.
    Other changes to proposed Example 4 are more substantive. For 
example, the proposed description of the facts states that the cleaning 
company terminated an employee ``at the [restaurant's] direction.'' But 
the proposed facts also specifically state that the restaurant lacks 
authority to direct the cleaning company's firing or hiring decisions. 
The Department is therefore revising Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(i) to state the 
termination was ``[a]t the restaurant's request'' (emphasis added).
    The Department is further revising the example to clarify two 
factual matters that commenters found vague or ambiguous. First, the 
Department is removing the terms ``sporadic,'' ``periodic,'' and 
``intermittent'' because these vague terms obscure ``the degree of 
supervision'' on which joint employer status depends.\90\ The 
Department is instead specifying that the restaurant provides general 
instructions to a team leader from the cleaning company each workday 
and monitors the performance of the work, while a team leader from the 
cleaning company provides detailed supervision. The Department believes 
these revisions remove ambiguity and also make the example reflect real 
world business practices more accurately. Second, the Department is 
clarifying that the terminated employee failed to follow an instruction 
that related to guest safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ Layton, 686 F.3d at 1178.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(ii) concluded that the restaurant 
``indirectly fired one of the [cleaning company] employees.'' However, 
it is the Department's view that a single request to fire an employee 
in this example was not significant enough to exercise indirect control 
over hiring or firing. Importantly, the cleaning company was not 
necessarily obligated to comply with the requested firing. Rather, it 
could have sent that employee to a different client or even continued 
to send him to the restaurant. The Department is therefore revising 
Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(ii) to state that the termination of the cleaning 
company employee under these facts is not an exercise of indirect 
control by the restaurant.
    Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(ii) further states that the restaurant 
``directly supervises the [cleaning company] employees' work and 
determines their schedule.'' Joint employer status depends, in part, on 
whether supervision ``goes beyond general instructions . . . and begins 
to assign specific tasks, to assign specific workers, or to take an 
overly active role in the oversight of the work.'' \91\ This question 
cannot be answered under proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(i) because the 
restaurant official provides assignments and instructions on a 
``sporadic'' and ``periodic'' basis. And it is unclear whether those 
assignments and instructions are directed toward specific employees, or 
relayed to the cleaning company employees through a supervisor working 
for the cleaning company. In contrast, revised Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(i) 
provides concrete facts regarding the restaurant's supervisory actions 
and distinguishes such actions from the detailed supervision that is 
provided by the cleaning company's team leader. Under those facts, the 
restaurant's actions do not ``go beyond general instructions'' and 
therefore, although relevant, are not enough for joint employer status. 
The Department is therefore revising Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(ii) to conclude 
that, based on the facts presented in revised Sec.  791.2(g)(4)(i), the 
restaurant's supervision of the cleaning company's employees does not 
give rise

[[Page 2848]]

to joint employer status. The Department is further revising Sec.  
791.2(g)(4)(ii) to explain that keeping a record of the cleaning 
company's completed assignments is not relevant, because such records 
are not an ``employment record'' within the meaning of Sec.  
791.2(a)(1)(iv). However, to provide greater clarity, the Department 
has decided to add a contrasting example, codified in Sec.  
791.2(g)(5), illustrating where joint employer status would exist, in 
part, due to an entity's indirect control over the hiring and firing of 
another employer's employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ Layton, 686 F.3d at 1178 (``DHL had certain objectives--
having its packages delivered on time, serving its customers--that . 
. . [plaintiffs] were tasked with accomplishing. DHL did not involve 
itself with the specifics of how those goals would be reached--it 
did not apportion tasks to individuals, specify how many individuals 
should be assigned to each delivery route, or structure the chain of 
command among [plaintiffs]. Overall, this factor weighs against a 
finding of joint employment because DHL did not exert control as an 
employer would have.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(5)
    Proposed Example 5 described a packaging company requesting workers 
on a daily basis from a staffing agency. The packaging company 
determines each worker's hourly rate of pay, supervises their work, and 
uses sophisticated analysis of expected customer demand to continuously 
adjust the number of workers it requests and the specific hours for 
each worker, sending workers home depending on workload. Under these 
facts, the proposed example advised that the packaging company is a 
joint employer of the staffing agency's employees because it exercises 
sufficient control over their terms and conditions of employment by 
setting their rate of pay, supervising their work, and controlling 
their work schedules.
    The International Warehouse Logistics Association (IWLA) expressed 
concern that proposed Example 5 could ``create confusion among entities 
that engage in similar practices to the hypothetical packaging company, 
as they may assume that participating in any of the practices mentioned 
in the example would trigger a joint employer relationship.'' 
Accordingly, IWLA requested the Department to either remove proposed 
Example 5 or add language at the end of the analysis subsection 
clarifying that ``an entity found only to be engaged in some of the 
practices listed in the example may not automatically be considered to 
be a joint employer.'' RILA did not object to proposed Example 5, but 
asserted that employers would benefit from the addition of a converse 
example to the final rule illustrating the circumstances where a 
staffing agency client would not qualify as an FLSA joint employer.
    The American Staffing Association (ASA) criticized proposed Example 
5 as an unrealistic depiction of the staffing industry, asserting that 
staffing agencies (and not their business clients) typically set a 
temporary worker's rate of pay. ASA expressed concern that ``using an 
atypical example to illustrate joint employment in such arrangements 
may cause some staffing firms and clients to infer that a client cannot 
be a joint employer unless it sets the pay rates.'' Accordingly, ASA 
urged the Department to delete Example 5's references to pay rates 
entirely, believing that the example should illustrate that ``the two 
most common, and legally significant, forms of control exercised by 
staffing firm clients over the staffing firm's employees--supervision 
over their work and controlling their work schedules--are sufficient to 
establish [a staffing agency] client as a joint employer.'' Relatedly, 
the Coalition of State AGs identified Example 5 as one of several 
examples featuring so many facts indicating joint employment that it 
would be of little practical use in most instances.
    The Department appreciates ASA's criticism that proposed Example 5 
is not a realistic depiction of the staffing industry, and the related 
argument from the Coalition of State AGs that the proposed example is 
unhelpfully lopsided. Accordingly, the Department has decided to revise 
the example to illustrate that a staffing agency client exercising 
significant control over the scheduling and work performed by a 
temporary worker can qualify as an FLSA joint employer even though the 
staffing agency--rather than the client--determines the worker's 
specific rate of pay. These edits are consistent with the accepted 
understanding that not all of the factors in the four-factor balancing 
test need to be satisfied to establish that an entity qualifies as a 
joint employer. See, e.g., Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 
537 F.3d 132, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2008) (``The traditional four-factor test 
. . . strongly indicates that Bellevue should be deemed Barfield's 
joint employer . . . . [even though] the third [Bonnette] factor, 
relating determination of the rate and method of a worker's payment, is 
inconclusive.''); Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 140 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (finding joint employer status under the Bonnette test 
despite ``[l]ittle evidence suggest[ing]'' that the defendant was 
involved in determining the worker's rate of payment). However, the 
Department agrees with RILA that the public would benefit from an 
example illustrating a scenario where a staffing agency client would 
not qualify as a joint employer, notwithstanding some limited 
supervision over the work performed by temporary workers to ensure 
basic quality, quantity and safety standards.
    Accordingly, the Department adopted an edited version of proposed 
Example 5 in Sec.  791.2(g)(6) and added a new example arriving at a 
different outcome in Sec.  791.2(g)(7). Similar to the juxtaposition of 
proposed Examples 1 and 2, the Department believes that providing a 
contrasting pair of examples involving staffing agency clients would be 
particularly helpful for showing how the Department's joint employer 
analysis applies to temporary staffing agencies.
6. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(6)
    Proposed Example 6 described an Association, whose membership is 
subject to certain criteria such as geography or type of business, 
providing optional group health coverage and an optional pension plan 
to its members to offer to their employees. The example further 
described two employer members of the Association, B and C, who decide 
to offer the Association's optional group health coverage and pension 
plan to their respective employees who choose to opt in to the health 
and pension plans. The proposed example offered two conclusions. First, 
the example advised that the Association is not a joint employer of B 
and C's employees because participation in the Association's optional 
plans does not involve any control by the Association, direct or 
indirect, over B's or C's employees. Second, the example advised that B 
and C are not joint employers of each other's employees because, while 
they independently offer the same plans to their respective employees, 
there is no indication that B and C are coordinating, directly or 
indirectly, to control the other's employees.
    SIGMA complimented proposed Example 6 for illustrating the 
proposition that merely offering certain benefits to employees, such as 
health care or retirement plans, does not constitute joint employment. 
WFCA expressed concern that readers might interpret the proposed 
example and its analysis as confined to benefit plans offered by 
associations, and requested the Department to clarify that the analysis 
is equally applicable to benefit plans offered by franchisors or 
general contractors.
    The Department has decided to adopt Example 6 as originally 
proposed in Sec.  791.2(g)(8). The Department agrees with WFCA that the 
reasoning of Example 6 could also apply to a franchisor or general 
contractor that offers optional benefit plans to its franchisees or 
subcontractors, respectively. Because the examples provided in Sec.  
791.2(g) are not exhaustive illustrations of the permissible business 
practices

[[Page 2849]]

identified in Sec.  791.2(d), the Department does not believe that any 
edits to this proposed example are necessary.
7. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(7)
    Proposed Example 7 described a large national company, Entity A, 
contracting with multiple other businesses in its supply chain. As a 
precondition of doing business with Entity A, all contracting 
businesses must agree to comply with a code of conduct, which includes 
a minimum hourly wage higher than the federal minimum wage, as well as 
a promise to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. 
Here, the example advised that such contractual provisions are not 
enough to establish that Entity A is a joint employer of its 
contractors' employees.
    SIGMA commented that it fully supported the analysis provided in 
proposed Example 7, asserting that such contractual standards are 
``routine in the franchise space and should be acceptable under the 
joint employer standard'' (emphasis in original). HR Policy Association 
suggested adding to the facts that Entity A requires its contracting 
businesses to provide ``certain levels of paid leave,'' in addition to 
a wage floor above the federal minimum wage, to illustrate that a paid 
leave requirement would be equally irrelevant to the analysis. The 
Department received no other comments on Example 7.
    The Department agrees with HR Policy Association that a contractual 
provision insisting that suppliers provide their workers with a minimum 
amount of paid leave is no more indicative of joint employer status 
than a similar provision setting a wage floor above the federal minimum 
wage. However, in light of our agreement with other commenters that 
wage floors may be relevant to the ``rate or method of payment'' factor 
described in Sec.  791.2(a)(1)(iii), we decline to add a similar 
contractual provision to the example that would further complicate the 
analysis. To the contrary, we have amended the example's description of 
the facts to make clear that Entity A does not implicate any of the 
other three factors enumerated in Sec.  791.2(a)(1)--i.e., hiring and 
firing, supervision, and the maintenance of employment records--and 
added language explaining the role of the wage floor in the analysis. 
This modified version of proposed Example 7 is codified at Sec.  
791.2(g)(9).
8. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(8)
    Proposed Example 8 described Franchisor A as a global organization 
representing a hospitality brand with several thousand hotels under 
franchise agreements, including Franchisee B. Franchisor A provides 
Franchisee B with a sample employment application, a sample employee 
handbook, and other forms and documents for use in operating the 
franchise. The licensing agreement is an industry-standard document 
explaining that B is solely responsible for all day-to-day operations, 
including hiring and firing of employees, setting the rate and method 
of pay, maintaining records, and supervising and controlling conditions 
of employment. Under these facts, the proposed example advised that 
Franchisor A is not a joint employer of Franchisee B's employees, 
explaining that providing such samples, forms, and documents does not 
amount to direct or indirect control over B's employees that would 
establish joint liability.
    The American Bakers Association and SIGMA strongly supported 
proposed Example 8, agreeing with its analysis and predicting that it 
would have a clarifying effect for franchisors. RLC & the Association 
supported the outcome of the proposed example but urged the Department 
to expand the list of franchisor resources discussed in the example to 
``reflect the true scope and nature of the franchising relationship in 
the 21st century,'' identifying training services, labor scheduling 
tools, and ``certain point of sale, inventory management, and other 
software, products or equipment'' as potential items for inclusion. 
WFCA similarly suggested expanding the list of sample items discussed 
in the example to include ``suggested or sample operational plans, 
business plans, marketing materials, and similar items . . . 
[including] hiring guidelines and interview questions, provided they do 
not dictate who is hired or their wages and other conditions of 
employment.'' Finally, one commenter representing employees, NELA, 
asked the Department to specify that the sample forms and documents 
discussed in the proposed example are optional. NELA asserted that 
forms and documents that a franchisor requires its franchisees to use 
``can be evidence of control over the working conditions at issue and 
should be given weight in the joint employment analysis,'' but stated 
that they would agree with the outcome of the proposed example if the 
forms and documents were stipulated to be optional.
    The Department appreciates RLC & the Association and WFCA's request 
to expand on the list of franchisor resources discussed in proposed 
Example 8. In response to these comments, as well as the IFA's request 
for additional content in the final rule addressing permissible 
franchisor practices, the Department has decided to elaborate on the 
facts provided in the example. At the same time, the Department agrees 
with NELA's suggestion to emphasize that the franchisor resources 
provided in the example that relate specifically to staffing and 
employment, such as the employee handbook, are optional. The Department 
notes that several commenters representing employers seemed to endorse 
a distinction between employment-related resources that are provided as 
an optional matter to a business partner, and those that are imposed. 
See e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (suggesting regulatory text advising 
that ``[a] potential joint employer's practice of offering optional 
business resources to another employer that do not result in actual 
control by the potential joint employer over the other employer's 
employees, does not make joint employer status more or less likely 
under the Act.'') (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Department has 
adopted an edited version of proposed Example 8 in Sec.  791.2(g)(10).
9. Commenter Feedback to the Example in Proposed Sec.  791.2(g)(9)
    Proposed Example 9 described a large retail company that owns and 
operates a large store. The retail company contracts with a cell phone 
repair company, allowing the repair company to run its business 
operations inside the building in an open space near one of the 
building entrances. As part of the arrangement, the retail company 
requires the repair company to establish a policy of wearing specific 
shirts and to provide the shirts to its employees that look 
substantially similar to the shirts worn by employees of the retail 
company. Additionally, the contract requires the repair company to 
institute a code of conduct for its employees stating that the 
employees must act professionally in their interactions with all 
customers on the premises. Under these facts, the proposed example 
advised that the retail company is not a joint employer of the cell 
phone repair company's employees. The example elaborated that that the 
leasing agreement and code of conduct are irrelevant to the joint 
employer analysis, and that the retail company's uniform policy does 
not, on its own, demonstrate substantial control over the repair 
company's employees' terms and conditions of employment.
    SIGMA complimented the outcome and analysis of proposed Example 9, 
but requested an additional co-location example specific to the fuel 
retailing

[[Page 2850]]

industry (e.g., a fast food establishment operating an independent 
kiosk within a gas station convenience store). WFCA described the 
proposed example as ``very insightful,'' but requested an additional 
example to illustrate that ``requiring or supplying specific shirts and 
instituting a code of conduct is not limited to situations where the 
subcontractor is on the retailer's property.'' HR Policy Association 
suggested adding language to the analysis clarifying that the retail 
company's uniform requirement ``does not make joint employer status 
more likely.'' NELA stated that the proposed example's ``conclusion 
that joint employment is not present appears correct,'' but requested 
the Department to amend the statement in the analysis advising that 
``allowing the repair company to operate on its premises does not make 
joint employer status [for the retail company] more or less likely 
under the Act.'' Specifically, NELA requested the Department to 
characterize the store-within-a-store arrangement as a relevant but 
non-determinative fact for determining the retail company's status as a 
joint employer.
    The Department has decided to adopt Example 9 as originally 
proposed in Sec.  791.2(g)(11). The Department did not intend to imply 
that a uniform requirement imposed on another employer's employees is 
irrelevant to the joint employer analysis; the example merely 
illustrates that such a requirement is insufficient to establish joint 
employer status where, as the analysis underscores, ``there is no 
indication that [an entity] hires or fires the [another employer's] 
employees, controls any other terms and conditions of their employment, 
determines their rate and method of payment, or maintains their 
employment records'' (emphasis added). The Department agrees with WFCA 
that the relevance of a uniform requirement does not depend upon where 
the workers perform their work. However, the Department disagrees with 
NELA that an entity's decision to allow an employer to operate on their 
premises has any relevance in determining whether the entity is an FLSA 
joint employer. This kind of arrangement does not ``relat[e] to an 
employee,'' 29 U.S.C. 203(d), and concluding otherwise, even by 
characterizing such arrangements as minimally indicative of joint 
employer status, could deter entities from entering into such 
arrangements going forward. Consistent with the Department's decision 
to implement its proposed identification in Sec.  791.2(d) of ``store-
within-a-store'' arrangements as not making joint employer status more 
or less likely under the Act, the Department declines to edit the 
proposed treatment of the kind of arrangement at issue in this example.
10. Other Commenter Requests for New Examples
    Some commenters representing employers requested or suggested 
additional illustrative examples, in addition to those discussed 
earlier. For example, the National Association of Convenience Stores 
(NACS) requested an example ``explaining the effect (or lack thereof) 
of a brand and supply contract relationship on the joint employer 
analysis,'' such as an agreement between a gasoline supplier and a 
convenience store. Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and 
the NAHB separately requested one or more examples addressing potential 
joint employment situations in the construction industry. Like the 
Nisei Farmers League, the National Council of Agricultural Employers 
(NCAE) asked the Department to consider adding examples involving 
``agriculture, generally, and farm-labor contracting, specifically.'' 
Finally, HR Policy Association, RILA, and the Washington Legal 
Foundation drafted several suggested examples involving a variety of 
facts and industries for the Department's consideration.
    The Department declines these commenter requests and suggestions 
for additional illustrative examples. Including the new staffing agency 
example that will appear in Sec.  791.2(g)(7), the Department is 
implementing eleven illustrative examples in this final rule. The 
Department believes that these eleven examples are diverse enough to 
cover a wide variety of similar factual circumstances, regardless of 
the particular industry they describe. Finally, the Department notes 
that the final rule's elaboration in Sec.  791.2(d) of business models, 
contractual provisions, and business practices that do not make joint 
employer status more or less likely under the Act addresses the 
concerns of some of the commenters who requested additional examples. 
For example, in response to the NACS' request for an example involving 
a brand and supply agreement, the Department notes that Sec.  
791.2(d)(2) specifically identifies ``brand and supply'' agreements as 
business models which do not make joint employer status more or less 
likely.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., 
and its attendant regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, require the Department 
to consider the agency's need for its information collections, their 
practical utility, as well as the impact of paperwork and other 
information collection burdens imposed on the public, and how to 
minimize those burdens. This final rule does not contain a collection 
of information subject to OMB approval under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act.

VI. Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review; and 
Executive Order 13563, Improved Regulation and Regulatory Review

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the 
costs and benefits of a regulation and to adopt a regulation only upon 
a reasoned determination that the regulation's net benefits (including 
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, 
distributive impacts, and equity) justify its costs. Executive Order 
13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, 
of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.
    Under Executive Order 12866, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) must determine whether a regulatory action is a ``significant 
regulatory action,'' which includes an action that has an annual effect 
of $100 million or more on the economy. Significant regulatory actions 
are subject to review by OMB. As described below, this final rule is 
economically significant. Therefore, the Department has prepared a 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in connection with this final rule as 
required under section 6(a)(3) of Executive Order 12866, and OMB has 
reviewed the rule.
    By clarifying the standard for determining joint employer status, 
this final rule would reduce the burden on the public. This final rule 
has been determined to be an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory action.
    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), 
the Office of lnformation and Regulatory Affairs designated this rule 
as a `major rule', as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

A. Introduction

1. Background
    The FLSA requires a covered employer to pay its nonexempt employees 
at least the federal minimum wage for every hour worked and overtime 
premium pay of at least 1.5-times their regular rate of pay for all 
hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. The FLSA defines an 
``employer'' to ``include[ ] any person

[[Page 2851]]

acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee.'' These persons are ``joint'' employers who 
are jointly and severally liable with the employer for every hour 
worked by the employee in a workweek. 29 CFR part 791 contains the 
Department's official interpretation of joint employer status under the 
FLSA. In this rule, the Department revises part 791 to adopt a four-
factor balancing test to determine joint employer status in one of the 
joint employer scenarios under the Act--where an employer suffers, 
permits, or otherwise employs an employee to work, and another person 
simultaneously benefits from that work. This final rule explains what 
additional factors should and should not be considered, and provides 
guidance on how to apply this multi-factor test. The Department makes 
no substantive changes to part 791's guidance in the other joint 
employer scenario--where multiple employers suffer, permit, or 
otherwise employ an employee to work separate sets of hours in the same 
workweek. The Department believes that these revisions make it easier 
to determine whether a person is or is not a joint employer under the 
Act, thereby promoting compliance with the FLSA.
2. Need for Rulemaking
    For the reasons explained above, the Department has determined that 
its interpretation of joint employer status requires revision as it 
applies to the first joint employer scenario identified above (one set 
of hours worked in a workweek). The Department is concerned that the 
current regulation does not adequately address this scenario, and 
believes that its revisions provide needed clarity in this scenario. 
The Department also believes this rule:
     Helps bring clarity to the current judicial landscape, 
where different courts are applying different joint employer tests that 
have resulted in inconsistent treatment of similar worker situations, 
uncertainty for organizations, and increased compliance and litigation 
costs;
     Reduces the chill on organizations who may be hesitant to 
enter into certain relationships or engage in certain kinds of business 
practices for fear of being held liable for counterparty employees over 
which they have insignificant control;
     Better grounds the Department's interpretation of joint 
employer status in the text of the FLSA; and
     Is responsive to the current public and Congressional 
interest in the joint employer issue.
    The Department believes that the current regulation provides clear 
and useful guidance to determine joint employer status in the second 
scenario, but that non-substantive revisions to better reflect the 
Department's longstanding practice would be desirable.

B. Economic Impacts

    The Department estimated the number of affected firms and 
quantified the costs associated with this final rule. The Department 
expects that all businesses and state and local government entities 
would need to review the text of this rule, and therefore would incur 
regulatory familiarization costs. However, on a per-entity basis, these 
costs would be small (see section V.2 for detailed analysis of 
regulatory familiarization costs). Because this rule does not alter the 
standard for determining joint employer status in the second joint 
employer scenario where the employee works separate sets of hours for 
multiple employers in the same workweek, the Department believes that 
there would be no change in the aggregation of workers' hours to 
determine overtime hours worked.\92\ Therefore, there would be no 
impact on workers in the form of lost overtime, and no transfers 
between employers and employees. Although this rule would alter the 
standard for determining joint employer status where the employee works 
one set of hours in a workweek that simultaneously benefits another 
person, the Department believes that there would still be no impact on 
workers' wages due under the FLSA. This standard would not change the 
amount of wages the employee is due under the FLSA, but could reduce, 
in some cases, the number of persons who are liable for payment of 
those wages. To the extent this rule provides a clearer standard for 
determining joint employer status where the employee works one set of 
hours for his or her employer that simultaneously benefits another 
person, this rule may make it easier to determine who is liable for 
earned wages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ In this scenario, the employee's separate sets of hours are 
aggregated so that both employers are jointly and severally liable 
for the total hours the employee works in the workweek. As such, a 
finding of joint liability in this situation can result in some 
hours qualifying for an overtime premium. For example, if the 
employee works for employer A for 40 hours in the workweek, and for 
employer B for 10 hours in the same workweek, and those employers 
are found to be joint employers, A and B are jointly and severally 
liable to the employee for 50 hours worked--which includes 10 
overtime hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Costs
    Updating the Department's interpretation of joint employer status 
will impose direct costs on private businesses and state and local 
government entities by requiring them to review the new regulation. To 
estimate these regulatory familiarization costs, the Department 
determined: (1) The number of potentially affected entities, (2) the 
average hourly wage rate of the employees reviewing the regulation, and 
(3) the amount of time required to review the regulation.
    It is uncertain whether private entities will incur regulatory 
familiarization costs at the firm or the establishment level. For 
example, in smaller businesses there might be just one specialist 
reviewing the regulation. Larger businesses might review the rule at 
corporate headquarters and determine policy for all establishments 
owned by the business, while more decentralized businesses might assign 
a separate specialist to the task in each of their establishments. To 
avoid underestimating the costs of this rule, the Department uses both 
the number of establishments and the number of firms to estimate a 
potential range for regulatory familiarization costs. The lower bound 
of the range is calculated assuming that one specialist per firm will 
review the regulation, and the upper bound of the range assumes one 
specialist per establishment.
    The most recent data on private sector entities at the time this 
final rule was drafted are from the 2016 Statistics of U.S. Businesses 
(SUSB), which reports 6.1 million private firms and 7.8 million private 
establishments with paid employees.\93\ Additionally, the Department 
estimates 90,126 state and local governments (2017 Census of 
Governments) might incur costs under this rule.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ Statistics of U.S. Businesses 2016, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb.html, 2016 SUSB Annual Data Tables by 
Establishment Industry.
    \94\ 2017 Census of Governments--Organization. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department believes that even entities that do not currently 
have workers with one or more joint employers will incur regulatory 
familiarization costs, because they will need to confirm whether this 
final rule includes any provisions that may affect them or their 
employees.
    The Department judges one hour per entity, on average, to be an 
appropriate review time for the rule. The relevant statutory 
definitions have been in the FLSA since its enactment in 1938, the

[[Page 2852]]

Department has recognized the concept of joint employer status since at 
least 1939, and the Department already issued a rule interpreting joint 
employer status in 1958. Therefore, the Department expects that the 
standards applied by this rule should be at least partially familiar to 
the specialists tasked with reviewing it. Additionally, the Department 
believes many entities are not joint employers and thus would spend 
significantly less than one hour reviewing the rule. Therefore, the 
one-hour review time represents an average of less than one hour per 
entity for the majority of entities that are not joint employers, and 
more than one hour for review by entities that might be joint 
employers. The Department did not receive any comments providing a 
better estimate of the time to review this rule.
    The Department's analysis assumes that the rule would be reviewed 
by Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists (SOC 13-1141) 
or employees of similar status and comparable pay. The mean hourly wage 
for these workers is $32.65 per hour.\95\ In addition, the Department 
also assumes that benefits are paid at a rate of 46 percent \96\ and 
overhead costs are paid at a rate of 17 percent of the base wage, 
resulting in an hourly rate of $53.22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2018, https://www.bls.gov/oes/2018/may/oes131141.htm.
    \96\ The benefits-earnings ratio is derived from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee Compensation data 
using variables CMU1020000000000D and CMU1030000000000D.

       Table 1--Total Regulatory Familiarization Costs, Calculation by Number of Firms and Establishments
                                                    [$1000s]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           By firm                      By establishment
                NAICS sector                 -------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Firms           Cost \a\      Establishments      Cost \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting..           21,830           $1,162           22,594           $1,202
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil/Gas Extraction...           20,309            1,081           27,234            1,449
Utilities...................................            5,893              314           18,159              966
Construction................................          683,352           36,368          696,733           37,080
Manufacturing...............................          249,962           13,303          291,543           15,516
Wholesale Trade.............................          303,155           16,134          412,526           21,954
Retail Trade................................          650,997           34,646        1,069,096           56,897
Transportation and Warehousing..............          181,459            9,657          230,994           12,293
Information.................................           75,766            4,032          146,407            7,792
Finance and Insurance.......................          237,973           12,665          476,985           25,385
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing..........          300,058           15,969          390,500           20,782
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Serv          805,745           42,881          903,534           48,086
Management of Companies and Enterprises.....           27,184            1,447           55,384            2,948
Administrative and Support Services.........          340,893           18,142          409,518           21,794
Educational Services........................           91,774            4,884          103,364            5,501
Health Care and Social Assistance...........          661,643           35,212          890,519           47,393
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation.........          126,247            6,719          137,210            7,302
Accommodation and Food Services.............          527,632           28,080          703,528           37,441
Other Services (except Public Admin.).......          690,329           36,739          754,229           40,140
State and Local Governments.................           90,126            4,796           90,126            4,796
All Industries..............................        6,092,327          324,231        7,830,183          416,718
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Average annualized costs, 7 percent discount rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years................................................           43,143  ...............           55,450
In perpetuity................................................           21,211  ...............           27,262
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Average annualized costs, 3 percent discount rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years................................................           36,903  ...............           47,429
In perpetuity................................................            9,444  ...............           12,137
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Each entity is expected to allocate one hour of Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists' (SOC
  13-1141) time for regulatory familiarization. The mean hourly rate for this occupation is $32.65 based on
  BLS's May 2018 Occupational Employment Statistics, and the wage load factor is 1.63 (0.46 for benefits and
  0.17 for overhead). Therefore, the per-entity cost is $53.22.

    The Department estimates that the lower bound of regulatory 
familiarization cost range would be $324.2 million, and the upper 
bound, $416.7 million. Additionally, the Department estimates that the 
Retail Trade industry would have the highest upper bound ($56.9 
million), while the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 
industry would have the highest lower bound ($42.9 million). The 
Department estimates that all regulatory familiarization costs would 
occur in Year 1.
    Additionally, the Department estimated average annualized costs of 
this rule over 10 years and in perpetuity. Over 10 years, this rule 
would have an average annual cost of $43.1 million to $55.4 million, 
calculated at a 7 percent discount rate ($36.9 million to $47.4 million 
calculated at a 3 percent discount rate). In perpetuity, this rule 
would have an average annual cost of $21.2 million to $27.3 million, 
calculated at a 7 percent discount rate ($9.4 million to $12.1 million 
calculated at a 3 percent discount rate).
2. Potential Transfers
    There are two joint employer scenarios under the FLSA: (1) 
Employees work one set of hours that simultaneously benefit the 
employer and another person, and (2) employees work separate sets of 
hours for multiple employers.

[[Page 2853]]

    Employees who work one set of hours for an employer that 
simultaneously benefit another person are not likely to see a change in 
the wages owed them under the FLSA as a result of this rule. In this 
scenario, the employer is liable to the employee for all wages due 
under the Act for the hours worked. If a joint employer exists, then 
that person is jointly and severally liable with the employer for all 
wages due. To the extent that this standard for determining joint 
employer status reduces the number of persons who are joint employers 
in this scenario, neither the wages due the employee nor the employer's 
liability for the entire wages due would change. The employee would no 
longer have a legal right to collect the wages due under the Act from 
the person who would have been a joint employer under a different 
standard, but would still be able to collect the entire wages due from 
the employer.
    When discussing potential transfers in the NPRM, the Department 
stated that the proposed rule would not have any impact on employees' 
wages, because it would not change the amount of wages due to an 
employee under the Act. For purposes of the analysis, the Department 
assumed that employers always fulfill their legal obligations under the 
Act and pay their employees in full.
    Employee representatives criticized that assumption, contending 
that the NPRM's economic analysis was flawed because it failed to 
capture the costs to workers.\97\ The commenters asserted that the 
assumption that all employers always comply with their legal 
obligations under the Act is demonstrably false, because if it were 
true, there would be no successful FLSA investigations or cases.\98\ 
They also asserted that the rule would limit the ability of workers to 
collect wages due to them under the FLSA because when there is only one 
employer liable, it is more likely that the sole employer will lack 
sufficient assets to pay.\99\ The Department agrees that because this 
rule provides new criteria for determining joint employer status under 
the FLSA in the first scenario, it may reduce the number of businesses 
currently found to be joint employers from which employees may be able 
to collect back wages due to them under the Act. This, in turn, may 
reduce the amount of back wages that employees are able to collect when 
their employer does not comply with the Act and, for example, their 
employer is or becomes insolvent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ EPI, AFL-CIO, and Farmworker Justice, for example.
    \98\ AFL-CIO.
    \99\ AFL-CIO and Farmworker Justice. Additionally, Farmworker 
Justice noted that workers will be less likely to report FLSA 
violations to the Department because they will not expect to collect 
any back pay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPI submitted a quantitative analysis of transfers, estimating that 
transfers will result from both an increase in workplace fissuring and 
increased losses due to wage theft by employers.\100\ The Department 
appreciates EPI's quantitative analysis, but does not believe there are 
data to accurately quantify the impact of this rule. The Department 
lacks data on the current number of businesses that are in a joint 
employment relationship, or to estimate the financial capabilities (or 
lack thereof) of these businesses and therefore is unable to estimate 
the magnitude of a decrease in the number of employers liable as joint 
employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ Workplace fissuring refers to increased reliance by 
employers on subcontractors, temporary help agencies, and labor 
brokers rather than hiring employees directly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Employees who work separate sets of hours for multiple employers 
are not affected because the Department is not making any substantive 
revisions to the standard for determining joint employer status in this 
scenario. Therefore, joint liability (or lack thereof) in this scenario 
should not be altered by the promulgation of this rule.
3. Other Potential Impacts
    To the extent revising the Department's regulation provides more 
clarity, the revision could promote innovation and certainty in 
business relationships, which also benefits employees. The modern 
economy involves a web of complex interactions filled with a variety of 
unique business organizations and contractual relationships. When an 
employer contemplates a business relationship with another person, the 
other person may not be able to assess what degree of association with 
the employer will result in joint and several liability for the 
employer's employees. Indeed, the other person may be concerned with 
such liability despite having insignificant control over the employer's 
employee. This uncertainty could impact the other person's willingness 
to engage in any number of business practices vis-[agrave]-vis the 
employer--such as providing a sample employee handbook, or other forms, 
to the employer as part of a franchise arrangement; allowing the 
employer to operate a facility on its premises; using or establishing 
an association health plan or association retirement plan used by the 
employer; or jointly participating with an employer in an 
apprenticeship program--even though these business practices could 
benefit the employer's employees. Similarly, uncertainty regarding 
joint liability could also impact that person's willingness to bargain 
for certain contractual provisions with the employer, such as requiring 
workplace safety practices, sexual harassment policies, morality 
clauses, or other measures intended to encourage compliance with the 
law or to promote other desired business practices. The Department's 
revisions may provide additional certainty as businesses consider 
whether to adopt such business practices.
    Commenters agreed that the additional clarity would promote 
business relationships. For example, the International Franchise 
Association (IFA) explained how the current outdated regulations have 
caused a reduction in franchising opportunities. They wrote: 
``Franchisors are less inclined to work with newer franchisees or 
economically disadvantaged franchisees given the heightened risk of 
joint employer liability.'' In addition to increasing franchisee 
opportunities, the IFA argues that this rule would also increase the 
support that franchisors offer to their franchisees, which has been 
curtailed due to joint employment concerns. ``In the IFA Franchise 
Survey, 60% of franchisee respondents reported that they'd seen their 
interactions with franchisors regarding training affected, and close to 
half of the respondents witnessed changes in the advice and guidance 
around personnel policies and suggested templates offered them by their 
franchisors.'' The Chamber of Commerce and IFA cited a study conducted 
by a Chamber of Commerce economist that evaluated the impacts of the 
NLRB's proposed rule on joint employment status under the National 
Labor Relations Act. Dr. Ron Bird quantified the cost of franchisors 
``distancing'' themselves from franchisees to be between $17.2 billion 
and $33.3 billion annually. Because this study was associated with the 
NLRB's proposed rule, the Department has not addressed these costs in 
the economic analysis.
    The Department expects that this rule would reduce burdens on 
organizations. After initial rule familiarization, these revisions may 
reduce the time spent by organizations to determine whether they are 
joint employers. Likewise, clarity may reduce FLSA-related litigation 
regarding joint employer status, and reduce litigation among 
organizations regarding allocation of FLSA-related liability and 
damages. The rule may also promote greater uniformity among court

[[Page 2854]]

decisions, providing clarity for organizations operating in multiple 
jurisdictions. This uniformity could reduce organizations' costs 
because they would not have to consider multiple, jurisdiction-specific 
legal standards before entering into economic relationships.
    Because the Department does not have data on the number of joint 
employers, and the number of joint employer situations that could be 
affected, cost-savings attributable to this rule have not been 
quantified. The Department did not receive any comments providing data 
needed to quantify these impacts.

VII. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) as amended by the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), 
hereafter jointly referred to as the RFA, requires that an agency 
prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) when 
proposing, and a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) when 
issuing, regulations that will have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The agency is also required to 
respond to public comment on the NPRM. The Chief Counsel for Advocacy 
of the Small Business Administration was notified of this proposed rule 
upon submission of the rule to OMB under Executive Order 12866.

A. Objectives of, and Need for, the Final Rule

    The Department has determined that its interpretation of joint 
employer status requires revision as it applies to one of the joint 
employer scenarios under the Act (one set of hours worked for an 
employer that simultaneously benefits another person). The Department 
is concerned that the current regulation does not adequately address 
this scenario, and the Department believes that its revisions would 
provide needed clarity and ensure consistency with the Act's text.
    29 CFR part 791 contains the Department's official interpretations 
for determining joint employer status under the FLSA. It is intended to 
serve as a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the 
Department will look to apply it. However, the Department has not 
meaningfully revised this part since its promulgation in 1958, over 60 
years ago.
    The Department's objective is to update its joint employer rule in 
29 CFR part 791 to provide guidance for determining joint employer 
status in one of the joint employer scenarios under the Act (one set of 
hours worked for an employer that simultaneously benefits another 
person) in a manner that is clear and consistent with section 3(d) of 
the Act.

B. The Agency's Response to Public Comments

    Some commenters argue that the additional clarity of this 
rulemaking will be beneficial to small businesses. The National 
Federation of Independent Business wrote: ``Small and independent 
businesses in particular need standards for determining joint employer 
status that are easier to understand, and simpler and less expensive to 
administer, than the current standards. Small and independent 
businesses cannot afford the lawyers, accountants, and clerks that 
larger companies use to decipher complex regulations and implement 
costly business systems necessary to comply with the regulations; small 
and independent businesses mostly engage in do-it-yourself 
compliance.'' Similarly, the American Hotel and Lodging Association 
wrote: ``This clear rule would provide predictability and stability in 
the law, resulting in increased investment from the business community 
and economic growth across all sectors of the economy. Stable legal 
arrangements would encourage economically fruitful business-to-business 
relationships, which are particularly beneficial to small businesses.''
    Other commenters argue that this proposed rule would hurt small 
businesses because the full liability for labor law violations will now 
fall on small businesses, whereas before some of the liability was with 
the larger joint employer. The Center for American Progress wrote: 
``the draft regulations could let large corporations off the hook when 
they infringe on workers' rights, and, consequently, leave smaller 
companies solely liable for any workplace misdeeds and workers 
unprotected.'' The National Employment Law Project argues that small 
businesses will bear the liability without having the ability to 
prevent labor law violations: ``small businesses will be left to ensure 
compliance with the Act alone, without any assistance from the larger 
employer, in situations where the smaller company may not be able to 
ensure compliance without the cooperation of the larger lead or 
worksite employer.'' This would hurt both small businesses and their 
workers. A group of senator wrote: ``This makes DOL's proposal a free 
pass for large employers, all owing even those that should be joint 
employers as shown by the economic realities of the situation to walk 
away from wage-and-hour and child labor violations for which they 
should be held responsible, leaving smaller businesses on the hook and 
potentially leaving employees empty-handed.''
    Similarly, the AFL-CIO wrote that the ``RFA was intended to protect 
small businesses'' but that the proposed rule ``is intended to protect 
big businesses'' and the RFA underestimates costs to small employers, 
including increased legal exposure and increased cost of liability 
insurance. The Department disagrees that this rule will result in 
increased liability insurance costs or that this rule favors large 
businesses. Nor should small businesses face greater legal exposure. 
Indeed, a small business may be less likely to be liable as a joint 
employer for wages of another business's employee under the revised 
rule, while its liability for wages of its own employees will remain 
unchanged. Accordingly, the Department acknowledges that this rule 
could, on average, reduce legal exposure for small businesses; however, 
the Department lacks data to quantify this effect. The commenter 
offered no method and, other than a set of questions related to the 
Department's processes and litigation records, offered no suggestions 
for how to quantify asserted costs.
    The AFL-CIO also stated that the NPRM failed to analyze these 
additional costs to small businesses: Recordkeeping burdens related to 
documenting the amount of control exercised by their larger clients, 
decrease in the competitive ability of small businesses, and costs to 
assess any potential increased discordance among standards under 
parallel federal laws. The AFL-CIO further stated that the proposed 
rule will likely increase the litigation costs of small businesses. The 
Department disagrees that this rule will cause a competitive 
disadvantage to small businesses. The AFL-CIO stated that large 
businesses will no longer need to comply with the FLSA, giving them a 
competitive advantage. However, this is not true. Any business, 
regardless of its size, will be a joint employer under the FLSA if it 
meets the standard set forth in this final rule. Moreover, increased 
litigation costs can be avoided by ensuring compliance with the FLSA. 
Lastly, the Department does not believe this rule will increase any 
already-existing discordance with other federal laws.
    The Department believes this rule will create greater willingness 
to engage in the use of franchising and subcontracting by providing 
more

[[Page 2855]]

clarity about what kinds of activities could result in joint employer 
status, which can create new small businesses and expand business for 
existing small businesses. These benefits to the small business 
community are expected to outweigh any costs.

C. Description of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Final Rule 
Will Apply

    The RFA defines a ``small entity'' as a (1) small not-for-profit 
organization, (2) small governmental jurisdiction, or (3) small 
business. The Department used the entity size standards defined by SBA, 
in effect as of October 1, 2017, to classify entities as small. SBA 
establishes separate standards for 6-digit NAICS industry codes, and 
standard cutoffs are typically based on either the average number of 
employees, or the average annual receipts. For example, small 
businesses are generally defined as having fewer than 500, 1,000, or 
1,250 employees in manufacturing industries and less than $7.5 million 
in average annual receipts for nonmanufacturing industries. However, 
some exceptions do exist, the most notable being that depository 
institutions (including credit unions, commercial banks, and non-
commercial banks) are classified by total assets (small defined as less 
than $550 million in assets). Small governmental jurisdictions are 
another noteworthy exception. They are defined as the governments of 
cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or 
special districts with populations of less than 50,000 people.
    The Department obtained data from several sources to determine the 
number of small entities. However, the SUSB (2012) was used for most 
industries (the 2012 data is the most recent SUSB data that includes 
information on receipts). Industries for which the Department used 
alternative sources include credit unions,\101\ commercial banks and 
savings institutions,\102\ agriculture,\103\ and public 
administration.\104\ The Department used the latest available data in 
each case, so data years differ between sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Nat'l Credit Union Ass'n. (2012). 2012 Year End Statistics 
for Federally Insured Credit Unions, https://www.ncua.gov/analysis/Pages/call-report-data/reports/chart-pack/chart-pack-2018-q1.pdf.
    \102\ Fed. Depository Ins. Corp. (2018). Statistics on 
Depository Institutions--Compare Banks. Available at: https://www5.fdic.gov/SDI/index.asp. Data are from 3/31/18. Data is from 3/
11/2018 for employment, and data is from 6/30/2017 for the share of 
firms and establishments that are ``small''.
    \103\ U.S. Dep't of Agric. (2019). 2017 Census of Agriculture: 
United States Summary and State Data: Volume 1, Geographic Area 
Series, Part 51. Available at: https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf.
    \104\ Census of Governments. 2017. Available at: https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For each industry, the SUSB data tabulates total establishment and 
firm counts by both enterprise employment size (e.g., 0-4 employees, 5-
9 employees) and receipt size (e.g., less than $100,000, $100,000-
$499,999).\105\ The Department combined these categories with the SBA 
size standards to estimate the proportion of establishments and firms 
in each industry that are considered small. The general methodological 
approach was to classify all establishments or firms in categories 
below the SBA cutoff as a ``small entity.'' If a cutoff fell in the 
middle of a defined category, the Department assumed a uniform 
distribution of employees across that bracket to determine what 
proportion should be classified as small. The Department assumed that 
the small entity share of credit card issuing and other depository 
credit intermediation institutions (which were not separately 
represented in FDIC asset data), is similar to that of commercial 
banking and savings institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ The SUSB defines employment as of the week of March 12th 
of the particular year for which it is published.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Costs for Small Entities Affected by the Final Rule

    Table 2 presents the estimated number of small entities affected by 
the final rule. Based on the methodology described above, the 
Department found that 5.9 million of the 6.1 million firms (99 percent) 
and 6.3 million of the 7.8 million establishments (81 percent) qualify 
as small by SBA standards. As discussed in section V.B, these do not 
exclude entities that currently do not have joint employees, as those 
will still need to familiarize themselves with the text of the new 
rule. Moreover, we assume that the cost structure of regulatory 
familiarization will not differ between small and large entities (i.e., 
small entities will need the same amount of time for review and will 
assign the same type of specialist to the task).

                             Table 2--Regulatory Familiarization Costs for Small Entities, Average by Firm and Establishment
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  By firm                                 By establishment
                                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          NAICS sector                                                                                                       Cost per
                                                                    Firms       Percent of      Cost per    Establishments   Percent of  establishment a
                                                                                   total         firm a                        total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agric./Forestry/Fishing/Hunting................................       18,103            82.9           53           18,717         82.8               53
Mining/Quarrying/Oil & Gas Extraction..........................       19,625            96.6           53           21,974         80.7               53
Utilities......................................................        5,487            93.1           53            7,762         42.7               53
Construction...................................................      673,521            98.6           53          676,913         97.2               53
Manufacturing..................................................      241,932            96.8           53          264,112         90.6               53
Wholesale Trade................................................      292,615            96.5           53          328,327         79.6               53
Retail Trade...................................................      636,069            97.7           53          688,835         64.4               53
Transportation & Warehousing...................................      174,523            96.2           53          183,810         79.6               53
Information....................................................       73,288            96.7           53           83,559         57.1               53
Finance and Insurance..........................................      229,002            96.2           53          269,991         56.6               53
Real Estate & Rental & Leasing.................................      293,693            97.9           53          310,740         79.6               53
Prof., Scientific, & Technical Services........................      790,834            98.1           53          819,115         90.7               53
Management of Companies & Ent..................................       18,004            66.2           53           34,124         61.6               53
Administrative & Support Services..............................      332,072            97.4           53          347,167         84.8               53
Educational Services...........................................       87,566            95.4           53           90,559         87.6               53
Health Care & Social Assistance................................      638,699            96.5           53          726,524         81.6               53
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation..............................      123,530            97.8           53          126,281         92.0               53
Accommodation & Food Services..................................      520,690            98.7           53          556,588         79.1               53
Other Services.................................................      681,696            98.7           53          700,496         92.9               53
State & Local Governments b....................................       72,556            80.5           53           72,556         80.5               53

[[Page 2856]]

 
All Industries.................................................    5,923,504            97.2           53        6,328,152         80.8               53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Average annualized costs, 7 percent discount rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years...............................................................................            7                                              7
In perpetuity...............................................................................            3                                              3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Average annualized costs, 3 percent discount rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 10 years...............................................................................            6                                              6
In perpetuity...............................................................................            2                                              2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Each entity is expected to allocate one hour of Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists' (SOC 13-1141) time for regulatory
  familiarization. The mean hourly rate for this occupation is $32.65 based on BLS's May 2018 Occupational Employment Statistics, and the wage load
  factor is 1.63 (0.46 for benefits and 0.17 for overhead). Therefore, the per-entity cost is $53.22.
b Government entities are not classified as firms or establishments; therefore, we use the total number of entities for both calculations.

    The Department estimates that in Year 1, small entities will incur 
a minimum of approximately $315 million in total regulatory 
familiarization costs, and a maximum of approximately $337 million. 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services is the industry that 
will incur the highest total costs ($42.1 million to $43.6 million).
    Additionally, the Department estimated average annualized costs to 
small entities of this rule over 10 years and in perpetuity. Over 10 
years, this rule will have an average annual total cost of $42.0 
million to $44.8 million, calculated at a 7 percent discount rate 
($35.9 million to $38.3 million calculated at a 3 percent discount 
rate). In perpetuity, this rule will have an average annual total cost 
of $20.6 million to $22.0 million, calculated at a 7 percent discount 
rate ($9.2 million to $9.8 million calculated at a 3 percent discount 
rate).
    Based on the analysis above, the Department does not expect that 
small entities will incur large individual costs as a result of this 
rule. Even though all entities will incur familiarization costs, these 
costs will be relatively small on a per-entity basis (an average of 
$53.22 per entity). Furthermore, no costs will be incurred past the 
first year of the promulgation of this rule. As a share of revenues, 
costs do not exceed 0.003 percent on average for all industries (Table 
3). The industry where costs are the highest percent of revenues is 
Management of Companies and Enterprises where costs range from a lower 
bound of 0.014 percent to an upper bound of 0.027 percent of revenues. 
Additionally, the Department calculated the revenue per firm/
establishment for entities with 0 to 4 employees, as per SUSB data. The 
industry that has the smallest revenue per entity is Accommodation and 
Food Services (NAICS 72)--$226,700 per firm and $226,200 per 
establishment, in 2018 dollars. In this industry, the per-entity cost 
($53) is 0.023% to 0.024% of revenue. Accordingly, the Department does 
not expect that this rule would have a significant economic cost impact 
on a substantial number of small entities.

            Table 3--Total Regulatory Familiarization Costs for Small Entities, as Share of Revenues
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost as percent of revenue c
                                                         Total revenue for -------------------------------------
                      NAICS sector                         small entities                      By establishments
                                                            (millions) a       By firms (%)           (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting...............            $22,481              0.004              0.004
Mining, Quarrying, & Oil/Gas Extraction................            187,432              0.001              0.001
Utilities..............................................            127,789              0.000              0.000
Construction...........................................            771,322              0.005              0.005
Manufacturing..........................................          1,878,572              0.001              0.001
Wholesale Trade........................................          2,644,028              0.001              0.001
Retail Trade...........................................          1,451,679              0.002              0.003
Transportation & Warehousing...........................            241,043              0.004              0.004
Information............................................            202,889              0.002              0.002
Finance & Insurance....................................            266,724              0.005              0.005
Real Estate & Rental & Leasing.........................            200,375              0.008              0.008
Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services.........            650,998              0.006              0.007
Management of Companies & Enterprises..................              6,641              0.014              0.027
Administrative & Support Services......................            265,743              0.007              0.007
Educational Services...................................             81,623              0.006              0.006
Health Care & Social Assistance........................            643,098              0.005              0.006
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation......................             95,085              0.007              0.007
Accommodation & Food Services..........................            376,423              0.007              0.008
Other Services (except Public Administration)..........            377,251              0.010              0.010
State & Local Governments..............................              (\b\)              (\b\)              (\b\)

[[Page 2857]]

 
All Industries.........................................         10,491,197              0.003              0.003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Revenues estimated based on the 2012 Survey of U.S. Businesses published by the Census Bureau, inflated to
  2018 dollars using the GDP deflator.
\b\ Government entities are considered small if the relevant population is less than 50,000. Government revenue
  data are not readily available by size of government entity.
\c\ Calculated by dividing total revenues per industry by total costs per industry, by firm and by
  establishment, as shown in Table 2.

F. Analysis of Regulatory Alternatives

    The Department considered alternative tests for the first joint 
employer scenario--where an employee works one set of hours that 
simultaneously benefits another person. Those alternative tests, such 
as the Second and Fourth Circuits' joint employer tests, have more 
factors than the Department's proposed test, may have a second step, 
and rely substantially on the ``suffer or permit'' language in FLSA 
section 3(g).\106\ The Department, however, believes that section 3(d), 
not section 3(g), is the touchstone for joint employer status and that 
its proposed four-factor balancing test is preferable, in part because 
it is consistent with section 3(d). The Department's test is simpler 
and easier to apply because it has fewer factors and only one step, 
whereas the alternative tests involve a consideration of additional 
factors and are therefore more complex and indeterminate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ See Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69; Salinas, 848 F.3d at 136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department also considered applying the four-factor balancing 
test in Bonnette without modification. The Department instead specifies 
a four-factor test that tracks the language of Bonnette with 
modifications to the first and second factors and additional guidance 
regarding the fourth factor. For example, whereas the Bonnette test 
considers whether the potential joint employer had the ``power'' to 
hire and fire, the Department's test states that whether the employer 
actually exercised the power to hire and fire is a clearer indicator of 
joint employer status than having the right to do so. The Department 
believes that this modification will help ensure that its joint 
employer test is fully consistent with the text of section 3(d), which 
requires a potential joint employer to be ``acting . . . in relation to 
an employee.'' \107\ By rooting the joint employer standard in the text 
of the statute, the Department believes that its rule could provide 
workers and organizations with more clarity in determining who is a 
joint employer under the Act, thereby promoting innovation and 
certainty in businesses relationships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ 29 U.S.C. 203(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) \108\ requires 
agencies to prepare a written statement for rules that include any 
federal mandate that may result in increased expenditures by state, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $165 million ($100 million in 1995 dollars adjusted for 
inflation using the CPI-U) or more in at least one year. This statement 
must: (1) Identify the authorizing legislation; (2) present the 
estimated costs and benefits of the rule and, to the extent that such 
estimates are feasible and relevant, its estimated effects on the 
national economy; (3) summarize and evaluate state, local, and tribal 
government input; and (4) identify reasonable alternatives and select, 
or explain the non-selection, of the least costly, most cost-effective, 
or least burdensome alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ See 2 U.S.C. 1501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Authorizing Legislation

    This rule is issued pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.

B. Assessment of Quantified 109 Costs and Benefits
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ Only the rule familiarization cost is quantified, but the 
Department believes that there are potential cost savings that it 
could not quantify due to lack of data at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of the UMRA, this rule includes a federal mandate that 
is expected to result in increased expenditures by the private sector 
of more than $165 million in at least one year, but the rule will not 
result in increased expenditures by state, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, of $165 million or more in any one year.
    Based on the cost analysis in this final rule, the Department 
determined that the rule will result in Year 1 total costs for state 
and local governments totaling $4.8 million, all of them incurred for 
regulatory familiarization (see Table 1). There will be no additional 
costs incurred in subsequent years.
    The Department determined that the proposed rule will result in 
Year 1 total costs for the private sector between $319.4 million and 
$411.9 million, all of them incurred for regulatory familiarization. 
There will be no additional costs incurred in subsequent years.
    UMRA requires agencies to estimate the effect of a regulation on 
the national economy if, at its discretion, such estimates are 
reasonably feasible and the effect is relevant and material.\110\ 
However, OMB guidance on this requirement notes that such macroeconomic 
effects tend to be measurable in nationwide econometric models only if 
the economic effect of the regulation reaches 0.25 percent to 0.5 
percent of GDP, or in the range of $51.5 billion to $102.9 billion 
(using 2018 GDP). A regulation with smaller aggregate effect is not 
likely to have a measurable effect in macroeconomic terms unless it is 
highly focused on a particular geographic region or economic sector, 
which is not the case with this proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ See 2 U.S.C. 1532(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department's RIA estimates that the total costs of the proposed 
rule will be between $324.2 million and $416.7 million (see Table 1). 
All costs will occur in the first year of the promulgation of this 
rule, and there will be no additional costs in subsequent years. Given 
OMB's guidance, the Department has determined that a full macroeconomic 
analysis is not likely to show that these costs would have any 
measurable effect on the economy.

C. Response to Comments

    The Department received few comments on the proposed rule from 
state and local government entities. The New York City Department of 
Consumer Affairs took issue with the NPRM's restriction of definitions 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, arguing that the

[[Page 2858]]

proposed rule ``would ignore decades of legal precedent in which courts 
have appropriately combined the three definitions to establish a 
comprehensive definition of an employment relationship, and the intent 
of Congress in including such definitions in the Act.'' The State of 
Washington Department of Labor and Industries agreed, stating, ``Since 
both Congress and the Supreme Court have spoken on the definition of 
`employee' under FLSA, the DOL's proposal conflicts with Congress' 
intent and with settled law to narrow and limit the test. DOL cannot 
change an existing statutory definition by issuing a new interpretation 
or rule.'' The Coalition of State AGs concurred, writing, ``DOL 
violates long-standing tenets of statutory interpretation and ignores 
the common law development of the joint-employment doctrine in an 
attempt to support an overly narrow reading of the FLSA.''
    The New York City Department of Consumer Affairs also expressed 
concern that the proposed rule will undercut the protections of the 
FLSA because ``narrowing circumstances when a joint employment 
relationship is established will have a domino effect on state and 
local laws, weakening worker protections.'' The Coalition of State AGs 
espoused that the proposed rule was also too narrow, stating, ``A broad 
interpretation of joint employment under the FLSA would hold all 
parties violating labor standards accountable--both subsidiary 
businesses that are cutting paychecks and lead businesses that control 
or have the ability to control working conditions and pay.''
    The Coalition of State AGs was concerned on the NPRM's effect on 
the workforce as a whole, writing, ``Besides the myriad negative 
effects the fissuring workplace has had on workers' wages, benefits, 
and safety, it also harms businesses and employers. Most employers want 
to follow the law and pay their workers a fair wage. However, today's 
workplace structures incentivize a race to the bottom, leading 
conscientious employers to lose out on contracts to lower-bidding 
companies that may be able to offer lower bids, at least in part by 
violating wage and hour laws and failing to contribute to social safety 
nets.'' The State of Washington Department of Labor and Industries was 
concerned about the NPRM's effect on workers, noting, ``Given the 
realities of the modern workforce, the proposed rule will reduce worker 
protections, provide less accountability for employers to ensure 
compliance with labor laws, and is inconsistent with DOL's mandate and 
with settled law under FLSA.'' A group of Massachusetts legislators 
echoed that concern, stating, ``By limiting the accountability certain 
businesses have to their labor force, the proposed change will 
encourage these businesses to turn a blind eye to the detrimental 
practices of affiliated entities. In turn, this will mean that even 
more workers will suffer from wage theft, with few options for 
potential recourse.''
    The substantive arguments in these comments are not specific to 
state and local governments and are similar to arguments made in 
numerous other comments opposing the proposed rule. As such, the 
Department has responded to these arguments elsewhere in this final 
rule.

D. Least Burdensome Option Explained

    The Department believes that it has chosen the least burdensome but 
still cost-effective methodology to revise its rule for determining 
joint employer status under the FLSA consistent with the Department's 
statutory obligation. Although the regulation would impose costs for 
regulatory familiarization, the Department believes that its revisions 
would reduce the overall burden on organizations by simplifying the 
standard for determining joint employer status. The Department believes 
that, after familiarization, this rule may reduce the time spent by 
organizations to determine whether they are joint employers. 
Additionally, revising the Department's guidance to provide more 
clarity could promote innovation and certainty in business 
relationships.

IX. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The Department has (1) reviewed this rule in accordance with 
Executive Order 13132 regarding federalism and (2) determined that it 
does not have federalism implications. The rule would not have 
substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

X. Executive Order 13175, Indian Tribal Governments

    This rule would not have substantial direct effects on one or more 
Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and 
Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities 
between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 791

    Wages.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 27th day of December, 2019.
Cheryl M. Stanton,
Administrator, Wage and Hour Division.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Department of Labor 
amends title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by revising part 791 
to read as follows:

PART 791--JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Sec.
791.1 Introductory statement.
791.2 Joint employment.
791.3 Severability.

    Authority:  52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201-219.


Sec.  791.1   Introductory statement.

    This part contains the Department of Labor's general 
interpretations of the text governing joint employer status under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. 201-19. The Administrator of 
the Wage and Hour Division will use these interpretations to guide the 
performance of his or her duties under the Act, and intends the 
interpretations to be used by employers, employees, and courts to 
understand employers' obligations and employees' rights under the Act. 
To the extent that prior administrative rulings, interpretations, 
practices, or enforcement policies relating to joint employer status 
under the Act are inconsistent or in conflict with the interpretations 
stated in this part, they are hereby rescinded. These interpretations 
stated in this part may be relied upon in accordance with section 10 of 
the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 251-262, notwithstanding that after 
any such act or omission in the course of such reliance, any such 
interpretation in revised part 791 ``is modified or rescinded or is 
determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.'' 
29 U.S.C. 259.


Sec.  791.2   Determining Joint Employer Status under the FLSA.

    There are two joint employer scenarios under the FLSA.
    (a)(1) In the first joint employer scenario, the employee has an 
employer who suffers, permits, or otherwise employs the employee to 
work, see 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), (g), but another person simultaneously 
benefits from that work. The other person is the employee's joint 
employer only if that person is acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of the employer in relation to the employee. See 29 U.S.C. 
203(d). In this situation, the following four factors are relevant to 
the determination. Those

[[Page 2859]]

four factors are whether the other person:
    (i) Hires or fires the employee;
    (ii) Supervises and controls the employee's work schedule or 
conditions of employment to a substantial degree;
    (iii) Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; and
    (iv) Maintains the employee's employment records.
    (2) As used in this section, ``employment records'' means records, 
such as payroll records, that reflect, relate to, or otherwise record 
information pertaining to the hiring or firing, supervision and control 
of the work schedules or conditions of employment, or determining the 
rate and method of payment of the employee. Except to the extent they 
reflect, relate to, or otherwise record that information, records 
maintained by the potential joint employer related to the employer's 
compliance with the contractual agreements identified in paragraphs 
(d)(3) and (4) of this section do not make joint employer status more 
or less likely under the Act and are not considered employment records 
under this section. Satisfaction of the maintenance of employment 
records factor alone will not lead to a finding of joint employer 
status.
    (3)(i) The potential joint employer must actually exercise--
directly or indirectly--one or more of these indicia of control to be 
jointly liable under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. 203(d). The potential joint 
employer's ability, power, or reserved right to act in relation to the 
employee may be relevant for determining joint employer status, but 
such ability, power, or right alone does not demonstrate joint employer 
status without some actual exercise of control. Standard contractual 
language reserving a right to act, for example, is alone insufficient 
for demonstrating joint employer status. No single factor is 
dispositive in determining joint employer status under the Act. Whether 
a person is a joint employer under the Act will depend on how all the 
facts in a particular case relate to these factors, and the appropriate 
weight to give each factor will vary depending on the circumstances of 
how that factor does or does not suggest control in the particular 
case.
    (ii) Indirect control is exercised by the potential joint employer 
through mandatory directions to another employer that directly controls 
the employee. But the direct employer's voluntary decision to grant the 
potential joint employer's request, recommendation, or suggestion does 
not constitute indirect control that can demonstrate joint employer 
status. Acts that incidentally impact the employee also do not indicate 
joint employer status.
    (b) Additional factors may be relevant for determining joint 
employer status in this scenario, but only if they are indicia of 
whether the potential joint employer exercises significant control over 
the terms and conditions of the employee's work.
    (c) Whether the employee is economically dependent on the potential 
joint employer is not relevant for determining the potential joint 
employer's liability under the Act. Accordingly, to determine joint 
employer status, no factors should be used to assess economic 
dependence. Examples of factors that are not relevant because they 
assess economic dependence include, but are not limited to:
    (1) Whether the employee is in a specialty job or a job that 
otherwise requires special skill, initiative, judgment, or foresight;
    (2) Whether the employee has the opportunity for profit or loss 
based on his or her managerial skill;
    (3) Whether the employee invests in equipment or materials required 
for work or the employment of helpers; and
    (4) The number of contractual relationships, other than with the 
employer, that the potential joint employer has entered into to receive 
similar services.
    (d)(1) A joint employer may be an individual, partnership, 
association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, public 
agency, or any organized group of persons, excluding any labor 
organization (other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting 
in the capacity of officer or agent of such a labor organization. See 
29 U.S.C. 203(a), (d).
    (2) Operating as a franchisor or entering into a brand and supply 
agreement, or using a similar business model does not make joint 
employer status more likely under the Act.
    (3) The potential joint employer's contractual agreements with the 
employer requiring the employer to comply with specific legal 
obligations or to meet certain standards to protect the health or 
safety of its employees or the public do not make joint employer status 
more or less likely under the Act. Similarly, the monitoring and 
enforcement of such contractual agreements against the employer does 
not make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act. Such 
contractual agreements include, but are not limited to, mandating that 
employers comply with their obligations under the FLSA or other similar 
laws; or institute sexual harassment policies; requiring background 
checks; or requiring employers to establish workplace safety practices 
and protocols or to provide workers training regarding matters such as 
health, safety, or legal compliance. Requiring the inclusion of such 
standards, policies, or procedures in an employee handbook does not 
make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act.
    (4) The potential joint employer's contractual agreements with the 
employer requiring quality control standards to ensure the consistent 
quality of the work product, brand, or business reputation do not make 
joint employer status more or less likely under the Act. Similarly, the 
monitoring and enforcement of such agreements against the employer does 
not make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act. Such 
contractual agreements include, but are not limited to, specifying the 
size or scope of the work project, requiring the employer to meet 
quantity and quality standards and deadlines, requiring morality 
clauses, or requiring the use of standardized products, services, or 
advertising to maintain brand standards.
    (5) The potential joint employer's practice of providing the 
employer a sample employee handbook, or other forms, to the employer; 
allowing the employer to operate a business on its premises (including 
``store within a store'' arrangements); offering an association health 
plan or association retirement plan to the employer or participating in 
such a plan with the employer; jointly participating in an 
apprenticeship program with the employer; or any other similar business 
practice, does not make joint employer status more or less likely under 
the Act.
    (e)(1) In the second joint employer scenario, one employer employs 
a worker for one set of hours in a workweek, and another employer 
employs the same worker for a separate set of hours in the same 
workweek. The jobs and the hours worked for each employer are separate, 
but if the employers are joint employers, both employers are jointly 
and severally liable for all of the hours the employee worked for them 
in the workweek.
    (2) In this second scenario, if the employers are acting 
independently of each other and are disassociated with respect to the 
employment of the employee, each employer may disregard all work 
performed by the employee for the other employer in determining its own 
responsibilities under the Act. However, if the employers are 
sufficiently associated with respect to the employment of the employee, 
they

[[Page 2860]]

are joint employers and must aggregate the hours worked for each for 
purposes of determining compliance with the Act. The employers will 
generally be sufficiently associated if:
    (i) There is an arrangement between them to share the employee's 
services;
    (ii) One employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest 
of the other employer in relation to the employee; or
    (iii) They share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, 
by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or 
is under common control with the other employer. Such a determination 
depends on all of the facts and circumstances. Certain business 
relationships, for example, which have little to do with the employment 
of specific workers--such as sharing a vendor or being franchisees of 
the same franchisor--are alone insufficient to establish that two 
employers are sufficiently associated to be joint employers.
    (f) For each workweek that a person is a joint employer of an 
employee, that joint employer is jointly and severally liable with the 
employer and any other joint employers for compliance with all of the 
applicable provisions of the Act, including the overtime provisions, 
for all of the hours worked by the employee in that workweek. In 
discharging this joint obligation in a particular workweek, the 
employer and joint employers may take credit toward minimum wage and 
overtime requirements for all payments made to the employee by the 
employer and any joint employers.
    (g) The following illustrative examples demonstrate the application 
of the principles described in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this 
section under the facts presented and are limited to substantially 
similar factual situations:
    (1)(i) Example. An individual works 30 hours per week as a cook at 
one restaurant establishment, and 15 hours per week as a cook at a 
different restaurant establishment affiliated with the same nationwide 
franchise. These establishments are locally owned and managed by 
different franchisees that do not coordinate in any way with respect to 
the employee. Are they joint employers of the cook?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the restaurant establishments 
are not joint employers of the cook because they are not associated in 
any meaningful way with respect to the cook's employment. The 
similarity of the cook's work at each restaurant, and the fact that 
both restaurants are part of the same nationwide franchise, are not 
relevant to the joint employer analysis, because those facts have no 
bearing on the question whether the restaurants are acting directly or 
indirectly in each other's interest in relation to the cook.
    (2)(i) Example. An individual works 30 hours per week as a cook at 
one restaurant establishment, and 15 hours per week as a cook at a 
different restaurant establishment owned by the same person. Each week, 
the restaurants coordinate and set the cook's schedule of hours at each 
location, and the cook works interchangeably at both restaurants. The 
restaurants decided together to pay the cook the same hourly rate. Are 
they joint employers of the cook?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the restaurant establishments 
are joint employers of the cook because they share common ownership, 
coordinate the cook's schedule of hours at the restaurants, and jointly 
decide the cook's terms and conditions of employment, such as the pay 
rate. Because the restaurants are sufficiently associated with respect 
to the cook's employment, they must aggregate the cook's hours worked 
across the two restaurants for purposes of complying with the Act.
    (3)(i) Example. An office park company hires a janitorial services 
company to clean the office park building after-hours. According to a 
contractual agreement between the office park and the janitorial 
company, the office park agrees to pay the janitorial company a fixed 
fee for these services and reserves the right to supervise the 
janitorial employees in their performance of those cleaning services. 
However, office park personnel do not set the janitorial employees' pay 
rates or individual schedules and do not in fact supervise the workers' 
performance of their work in any way. Is the office park a joint 
employer of the janitorial employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the office park is not a joint 
employer of the janitorial employees because it does not hire or fire 
the employees, determine their rate or method of payment, or exercise 
control over their conditions of employment. The office park's reserved 
contractual right to control the employee's conditions of employment is 
not enough to establish that it is a joint employer.
    (4)(i) Example. A restaurant contracts with a cleaning company to 
provide cleaning services. The contract does not give the restaurant 
authority to hire or fire the cleaning company's employees or to 
supervise their work on the restaurant's premises. A restaurant 
official provides general instructions to the team leader from the 
cleaning company regarding the tasks that need to be completed each 
workday, monitors the performance of the company's work, and keeps 
records tracking the cleaning company's completed assignments. The team 
leader from the cleaning company provides detailed supervision. At the 
restaurant's request, the cleaning company decides to terminate an 
individual worker for failure to follow the restaurant's instructions 
regarding customer safety. Is the restaurant a joint employer of the 
cleaning company's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the restaurant is not a joint 
employer of the cleaning company's employees because the restaurant 
does not exercise significant direct or indirect control over the terms 
and conditions of their employment. The restaurant's daily instructions 
and monitoring of the cleaning work is limited and does not demonstrate 
that the restaurant is a joint employer. Records of the cleaning team's 
work are not employment records under paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this 
section, and therefore, are not relevant in determining joint employer 
status. While the restaurant requested the termination of a cleaning 
company employee for not following safety instructions, the decision to 
terminate was made voluntarily by the cleaning company and therefore is 
not indicative of indirect control.
    (5)(i) Example. A restaurant contracts with a cleaning company to 
provide cleaning services. The contract does not give the restaurant 
authority to hire or fire the cleaning company's employees or to 
supervise their work on the restaurant's premises. However, in practice 
a restaurant official oversees the work of employees of the cleaning 
company by assigning them specific tasks throughout each day, providing 
them with hands-on instructions, and keeping records tracking the work 
hours of each employee. On several occasions, the restaurant requested 
that the cleaning company hire or terminate individual workers, and the 
cleaning company agreed without question each time. Is the restaurant a 
joint employer of the cleaning company's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the restaurant is a joint 
employer of the cleaning company's employees because the restaurant 
exercises sufficient control, both direct and indirect, over the terms 
and conditions of their employment. The restaurant directly supervises 
the cleaning company's employees' work on a regular basis and keeps 
employment records. And the cleaning company's repeated and 
unquestioned acquiescence to the restaurant's hiring and firing 
requests

[[Page 2861]]

indicates that the restaurant exercised indirect control over the 
cleaning company's hiring and firing decisions.
    (6)(i) Example. A packaging company requests workers on a daily 
basis from a staffing agency. Although the staffing agency determines 
each worker's hourly rate of pay, the packaging company closely 
supervises their work, providing hands-on instruction on a regular and 
routine basis. The packaging company also uses sophisticated analysis 
of expected customer demand to continuously adjust the number of 
workers it requests and the specific hours for each worker, sending 
workers home depending on workload. Is the packaging company a joint 
employer of the staffing agency's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the packaging company is a 
joint employer of the staffing agency's employees because it exercises 
sufficient control over their terms and conditions of employment by 
closely supervising their work and controlling their work schedules.
    (7)(i) Example. A packaging company has unfilled shifts and 
requests a staffing agency to identify and assign workers to fill those 
shifts. Like other clients, the packaging company pays the staffing 
agency a fixed fee to obtain each worker for an 8-hour shift. The 
staffing agency determines the hourly rate of pay for each worker, 
restricts all of its workers from performing more than five shifts in a 
week, and retains complete discretion over which workers to assign to 
fill a particular shift. Workers perform their shifts for the packaging 
company at the company's warehouse under limited supervision from the 
packaging company to ensure that minimal quantity, quality, and 
workplace safety standards are satisfied, and under more strict 
supervision from a staffing agency supervisor who is on site at the 
packaging company. Is the packaging company a joint employer?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the packaging company is not a 
joint employer of the staffing agency's employees because the staffing 
agency exclusively determines the pay and work schedule for each 
employee. Although the packaging company exercises some control over 
the workers by exercising limited supervision over their work, such 
supervision, especially considering the staffing agency's supervision, 
is alone insufficient to establish that the packaging company is a 
joint employer without additional facts to support such a conclusion.
    (8)(i) Example. An Association, whose membership is subject to 
certain criteria such as geography or type of business, provides 
optional group health coverage and an optional pension plan to its 
members to offer to their employees. Employer B and Employer C both 
meet the Association's specified criteria, become members, and provide 
the Association's optional group health coverage and pension plan to 
their respective employees. The employees of both B and C choose to opt 
in to the health and pension plans. Does the participation of B and C 
in the Association's health and pension plans make the Association a 
joint employer of B's and C's employees, or B and C joint employers of 
each other's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the Association is not a joint 
employer of B's or C's employees, and B and C are not joint employers 
of each other's employees. Participation in the Association's optional 
plans does not involve any control by the Association, direct or 
indirect, over B's or C's employees. And while B and C independently 
offer the same plans to their respective employees, there is no 
indication that B and C are coordinating, directly or indirectly, to 
control the other's employees. B and C are therefore not acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of the other in relation to any 
employee.
    (9)(i) Example. Entity A, a large national company, contracts with 
multiple other businesses in its supply chain. Entity A does not hire, 
fire, or supervise the employees of its suppliers, and the supply 
agreements do not grant Entity A the authority to do so. Entity A also 
does not maintain any employment records of suppliers' employees. As a 
precondition of doing business with A, all contracting businesses must 
agree to comply with a code of conduct, which includes a minimum hourly 
wage higher than the federal minimum wage, as well as a promise to 
comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. Employer B 
contracts with A and signs the code of conduct. Does A qualify as a 
joint employer of B's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, A is not a joint employer of 
B's employees. Entity A is not acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of B in relation to B's employees--hiring, firing, maintaining 
records, or supervising or controlling work schedules or conditions of 
employment. Nor is A exercising significant control over Employer B's 
rate or method of pay--although A requires B to maintain a wage floor, 
B retains control over how and how much to pay its employees, and the 
example does not indicate that the wage floor is accompanied by any 
other indicia of control. Finally, because there is no indication that 
A's requirement that B commit to comply with all applicable federal, 
state, and local law exerts any direct or indirect control over B's 
employees, this requirement has no bearing on the joint employer 
analysis.
    (10)(i) Example. Franchisor A is a global organization representing 
a hospitality brand with several thousand hotels under franchise 
agreements. Franchisee B owns one of these hotels and is a licensee of 
A's brand, which gives Franchisee B access to certain proprietary 
software for business operation or payroll processing. In addition, A 
provides B with a sample employment application, a sample employee 
handbook, and other forms and documents for use in operating the 
franchise, such as sample operational plans, business plans, and 
marketing materials. The licensing agreement is an industry-standard 
document explaining that B is solely responsible for all day-to-day 
operations, including hiring and firing of employees, setting the rate 
and method of pay, maintaining records, and supervising and controlling 
conditions of employment. Is A a joint employer of B's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, A is not a joint employer of 
B's employees. A does not exercise direct or indirect control over B's 
employees. Providing optional samples, forms, and documents that relate 
to staffing and employment does not amount to direct or indirect 
control over B's employees that would establish joint liability.
    (11)(i) Example. A retail company owns and operates a large store. 
The retail company contracts with a cell phone repair company, allowing 
the repair company to run its business operations inside the building 
in an open space near one of the building entrances. As part of the 
arrangement, the retail company requires the repair company to 
establish a policy of wearing specific shirts and to provide shirts to 
its employees that look substantially similar to the shirts worn by 
employees of the retail company. Additionally, the contract requires 
the repair company to institute a code of conduct for its employees 
stating that the employees must act professionally in their 
interactions with all customers on the premises. Is the retail company 
a joint employer of the repair company's employees?
    (ii) Application. Under these facts, the retail company is not a 
joint employer of the cell phone repair company's employees. The retail 
company's requirement that the repair company provide specific shirts 
to its employees and establish a policy that its employees

[[Page 2862]]

to wear those shirts does not, on its own, demonstrate substantial 
control over the repair company's employees' terms and conditions of 
employment. Moreover, requiring the repair company to institute a code 
of conduct or allowing the repair company to operate on its premises 
does not make joint employer status more or less likely under the Act. 
There is no indication that the retail company hires or fires the 
repair company's employees, controls any other terms and conditions of 
their employment, determines their rate and method of payment, or 
maintains their employment records.


Sec.  791.3   Severability.

    If any provision of this part is held to be invalid or 
unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or 
circumstance, or stayed pending further agency action, the provision 
shall be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to the 
provision permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter 
invalidity or unenforceability, in which event the provision shall be 
severable from part 791 and shall not affect the remainder thereof.

[FR Doc. 2019-28343 Filed 1-13-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-27-P