[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 9 (Tuesday, January 14, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2153-2158]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-00416]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-293; NRC-2019-0244]
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC;
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC to
reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage insurance
from $1.06 billion to $50 million for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0244 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0244. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Wall, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2855, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of January, 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-293
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy
[[Page 2154]]
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) no later than
June 1, 2019. On May 31, 2019, ENOI permanently ceased power operations
at Pilgrim. By letter dated June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19161A033), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanenetly
removed from the Pilgrim reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel
pool (SFP) on June 9, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant to Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.82(a)(2), the Pilgrim
renewed facility operating license no longer authorizes operation of
the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
The facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the
Pilgrim facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19088A050),
as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19211B509), ENOI requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
concerning onsite liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for
Pilgrim.
By letter dated November 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18320A031), ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy Nuclear Generation
Company (ENGC) (to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC), Holtec
International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
(HDI, the licensee) (together, Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of control of Renewed Facility
Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim, as well as the general
license for the Pilgrim ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec; and
(2) the direct transfer of ENOI's operating authority (i.e., its
authority to conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to HDI. In
addition, the Applicants requested that the NRC approve a conforming
administrative amendment to the Licenses to reflect the proposed direct
transfer of the Licenses from ENOI to HDI; a planned name change for
ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and termination of all ENGC
obligations after the license transfer and equity sale.
By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and indirect transfers requested in
the November 16, 2018 application. Additionally, on August 22, 2019,
HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory
actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory
actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19235A050), the
NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect the license transfer.
Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for decommissioning operations at
Pilgrim.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident.
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no
longer authorized at Pilgrim, there are no events that would require
the stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly,
the risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite
contamination at Pilgrim is also much lower than the risk of such an
event at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the
reduced risk of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled
Pilgrim site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island accident out of concern that
licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs in
the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion
coverage amount requirement was developed based on an analysis of an
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at power resulting in a large
fission product release and requiring significant resource expenditures
to stabilize the reactor and ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the
site.
These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at Pilgrim
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessel, RCS,
and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related
to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting
systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption
request dated March 25, 2019, as supplemented by letter dated July 30,
2019, the licensee discussed both design-basis and beyond design-basis
events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The licensee
determined that there are no possible design-basis events at Pilgrim
that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the
limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1 roentgen equivalent
man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way to demonstrate that
any possible radiological releases would be minimal and would not
require precautionary protective actions (e.g., sheltering in place or
evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the radiological consequences
associated with various decommissioning activities and the design-basis
accidents at Pilgrim, in consideration of a permanently
[[Page 2155]]
shutdown and defueled condition. The possible design-basis accident
scenarios at Pilgrim have greatly reduced radiological consequences.
Based on its review, the NRC staff concluded that no reasonably
conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite
release greater than the EPA PAGs.
The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological
release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium
fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design-basis
accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP
resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in
substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat
of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a
zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time
since Pilgrim has been permanently shut down.
The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A483), the NRC staff recommended changes to the power reactor
financial protection regulations that would allow licensees to lower
onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel
stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC staff's recommendation
that, among other things, would allow permanently shut down power
reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance
coverage to $50 million when the licensee was able to demonstrate the
technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP
was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638);
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28,
2018 (83 FR 67365)). These prior exemptions were based on these
licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19211B509),
ENOI provided a supplement to its exemption request addressing air-
cooling of fuel in a drained pool. In the attachment to this letter,
the licensee compared Pilgrim fuel storage parameters with those used
in NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451,
``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water
Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML082260098). The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that
natural air circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for
7 months after operation in a typical BWR. The licensee compared the
post-shutdown fuel storage conditions with those assumed for the
analysis presented in NUREG/CR-6451. The licensee found that the
Pilgrim fuel storage configuration is nearly identical to the
representative configuration used in the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis with
respect to the fuel assembly size, the fuel storage pitch, the rack
material, and the rack orifice size being larger than the BWR fuel
assembly inlet nozzle size. Thus, the cooling air flow should be
comparable. However, although the Pilgrim final cycle fuel operated at
a lower power density, it achieved a higher total burnup than assumed
for the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis. The licensee determined that the higher
decay heat resulting from the increased burnup would be offset by the
longer decay time (i.e., 10 months) at the effective date of the
requested exemption as compared to the decay time used in the NUREG/CR-
6451 analysis (i.e., 7 months), which results in a lower total decay
heat rate. Therefore, at 10 months after permanent shutdown (i.e., the
effective date of the requested exemption), the NRC staff has
reasonable assurance that fuel stored in the Pilgrim SFP would be
adequately air-cooled in the unlikely event the SFP completely drained.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC
staff discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for
onsite property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the
spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure
that can be used to demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium
fire is exceedingly low. However, the NRC staff has more recently used
an additional analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP
water, or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of
the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is often referred to as an adiabatic
heatup.
The licensee's adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that there
would be at least 10 hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both
air and/or water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a
temperature where the potential for a significant offsite radiological
release could occur. The licensee states that for this loss of all
cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient time for personnel to respond
with additional resources, equipment, and capability to restore cooling
to the SFPs, even after a non-credible, catastrophic event.
In the analysis provided in Attachment 2, ``Calculation No. PNPS-
EC-81416-M1418, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel
Pool,'' to the letter dated February 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19056A260), the licensee compared the conditions for the hottest fuel
assembly stored in the SFP to a criterion proposed in SECY-99-168,
``Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12265A598), applicable to
offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning process.
This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly to heat up
from 30 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) to 900 [deg]C adiabatically. If the
heatup time is greater than 10 hours, then offsite emergency
preplanning involving the plant is not necessary. Based on the limiting
fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis presented in
Attachment 2 to the February 18, 2019 letter, at 10
[[Page 2156]]
months after permanent cessation of power operations (i.e., 10 months
of decay time), the time for the hottest fuel assembly to reach 900
[deg]C is 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered. As stated
in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an acceptable temperature to
use for assessing onset of fission product release under transient
conditions to establish the critical decay time for determining the
availability of 10 hours for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if
necessary, for offsite agencies to take appropriate action to protect
the health and safety of the public if fuel and cladding oxidation
occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and the
results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical
properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that 10
months after permanent cessation of power operations, more than 10
hours would be available before a significant offsite release could
begin. The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation
provided an acceptable method for determining the minimum time
available for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if necessary,
implementing measures under a comprehensive general emergency plan.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for Pilgrim being permanently defueled as part of SECY-19-0078,
``Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station,'' dated August 9, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18347A717).
Based on the evaluation in SECY-19-0078 and SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff determined $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property
damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in
the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. The NRC staff has
postulated that there is still a potential for other radiological
incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in significant
onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank
(~450,000 gallon) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater
contamination as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the Pilgrim site, should such an event
occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million
is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent insurance considerations
resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed in SECY-00-
0145 and SECY-01-0100. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar
exemptions have been granted to other permanently shut down and
defueled power reactors, upon demonstration that the criterion of the
zirconium fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of
negligible concern. As previously stated, the NRC staff concluded that
10 months after the permanent cessation of power operations on May 31,
2019, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have elapsed at
Pilgrim to decrease the probability of an onsite radiological release
from a postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels. In
addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level
of $50 million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs
for the recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radwaste storage
tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with the Pilgrim Post-
Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated November 16,
2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18320A040), all spent fuel will be removed
from the SFP and moved into dry storage at an onsite ISFSI by the end
of 2021, and the probability of an initiating event that would threaten
SFP integrity occurring before that time is extremely low, which
further supports the conclusion that the zirconium fire risk is
negligible.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow Holtec
Pilgrim and HDI to reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite
property damage insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC
to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the
exemptions are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256.
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 10 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time
will have elapsed at Pilgrim to decrease the probability of an onsite
and offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire
accident to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with
the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture
of a large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption
is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for
Pilgrim are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, Pilgrim permanently shut down on May 31, 2019, and defueled on
June 10, 2019. The permanently shutdown and defueled status of the
facility results in a significant reduction in the number and severity
of potential accidents and, correspondingly, a significant reduction in
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The proposed
reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does not impact
the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed
level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at Pilgrim. Therefore, the
NRC staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not
present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
[[Page 2157]]
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at Pilgrim are not
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption
is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological material. Since Pilgrim permanently
shut down on May 31, 2019, and defueled on June 10, 2019, it is no
longer possible for the radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents or other credible events at Pilgrim to exceed the limits of
the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The licensee has evaluated
the consequences of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions
involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show that 10
months after the permanent cessation of power operations on May 31,
2019, the likelihood of such an event leading to a large radiological
release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's
analyses confirm this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
Pilgrim site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the
permanently shutdown and defueled Pilgrim reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, I have determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because reducing the licensee's onsite
property damage insurance for Pilgrim does not: (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial
protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of Pilgrim or site
activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident) nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for onsite
property damage insurance involves surety, insurance, and indemnity
matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Holtec Pilgrim and HDI an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for Pilgrim.
Pilgrim permanently ceased power operations on May 31, 2019. The
exemption permits Pilgrim to lower the minimum required onsite
insurance to $50 million 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations.
[[Page 2158]]
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020-00416 Filed 1-13-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P