[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 8 (Monday, January 13, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1827-1832]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-00285]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-293; NRC-2019-0245]
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC;
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC to
reduce the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from
$450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry
secondary financial protection for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0245 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0245. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Wall, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2855, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-293
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) no later than June 1, 2019.
On May 31, 2019, ENOI permanently ceased power operations at Pilgrim.
By letter dated June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19161A033), ENOI
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the
Pilgrim reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) on June
9, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.82(a)(2), the Pilgrim renewed facility
operating license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is
still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the Pilgrim facility in
the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation
(ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19088A127),
as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19211B509), ENOI requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
concerning offsite primary and secondary liability insurance. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce
the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from $450
million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry
secondary financial protection for Pilgrim.
By letter dated November 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18320A031), ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy Nuclear Generation
Company (ENGC) (to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC), Holtec
International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
(HDI, the licensee) (together, Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of control of Renewed Facility
Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim, as well as the general
license for the Pilgrim ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec; and
(2) the direct transfer of ENOI's operating authority (i.e., its
authority to conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to HDI. In
addition, the Applicants requested that the NRC approve a conforming
administrative amendment to the Licenses to reflect the proposed direct
transfer of the Licenses from ENOI to HDI; a planned name change for
ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and termination of all ENGC
obligations after the license transfer and equity sale.
[[Page 1828]]
By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and indirect transfers requested in
the November 16, 2018 application. Additionally, on August 22, 2019,
HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory
actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory
actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19235A050), the
NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect the license transfer.
Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for decommissioning operations at
Pilgrim.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450
million. In addition, the licensee is required to participate in an
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection)
that commits each licensee to pay into an insurance pool to be used for
damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in
the industry retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to
deferred premium charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of
$131,056,000 with respect to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Pilgrim and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer
possible. Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages
that would require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower
for permanently shut down and defueled plants. Therefore, the licensee
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction
in primary offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor,
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary
retrospective insurance pool.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation,
as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a rated
capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that,
upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist after
permanent cessation of power operations (and the reactor having no
``rated capacity''), the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to
reduce the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing
decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shut down reactor,
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions and
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational and an
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA
[[Page 1829]]
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for
such permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at Pilgrim and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been eliminated.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for Pilgrim being permanently defueled as part of SECY-19-0078,
``Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station,'' dated August 9, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18347A717).
ENOI has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel
remains in the SFP, the only postulated design-basis accident that
would remain applicable to Pilgrim in the permanently defueled
condition that could contribute a significant dose is a fuel handling
accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building, where the SFP is located. For
completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of other
design-basis accidents documented in the Pilgrim Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16083A494) to ensure
that these accidents would not have consequences that could potentially
exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183,
``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis
Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria or
approach the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
protective action guides (PAGs).
In the Pilgrim UFSAR, the licensee has determined that within 46
days after shutdown, the FHA doses would decrease to a level that would
not warrant protective actions under the EPA early phase PAG framework,
notwithstanding meeting the dose limit requirements under 10 CFR 50.67
and dose acceptance criteria under Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC
staff notes that the doses from an FHA are dominated by the isotope
Iodine-131. Pilgrim permanently ceased power operations on May 31,
2019. With 10 months of decay, the thyroid dose from an FHA would be
negligible. After 10 months of decay, the only isotope remaining in
significant amounts, among those postulated to be released in a design-
basis FHA, would be Krypton-85. Since Krypton-85 primarily decays by
beta emission, the calculated skin dose from an FHA analysis would make
an insignificant contribution to the total effective dose equivalent
(TEDE), which is the parameter of interest in the determination of the
EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. The NRC staff
concludes that the dose consequence from an FHA for the permanently
shutdown Pilgrim would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological
release is highly unlikely and, thus, a significant amount of offsite
liability insurance coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that involves the
loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a significant heatup
of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding
oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario
is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to
decrease as a function of the time that Pilgrim has been permanently
shut down.
In the analysis provided in Attachment 2, ``Calculation No. PNPS-
EC-81416-M1418, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel
Pool,'' to the letter dated February 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19056A260), the licensee compared the conditions for the hottest fuel
assembly stored in the SFP to a criterion proposed in SECY-99-168,
``Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12265A598), applicable to
offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning process.
This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly to heat up
from 30 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) to 900 [deg]C adiabatically. If the
heatup time is greater than 10 hours, then offsite emergency
preplanning involving the plant is not necessary. Based on the limiting
fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis presented in
Attachment 2, at 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations (i.e., 10 months of decay time), the time for the hottest
fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is 10 hours after the assemblies have
been uncovered. As stated in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent
Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an
acceptable temperature to use for assessing onset of fission product
release under transient conditions to establish the critical decay time
for determining the availability of 10 hours for deployment of
mitigation equipment and, if necessary, for offsite agencies to take
appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public if
fuel and cladding oxidation occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and the
results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical
properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that 10
months after permanent cessation of power operations, more than 10
hours would be available before a significant offsite release could
begin. The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation
provided an acceptable method for determining the minimum
[[Page 1830]]
time available for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if
necessary, implementing measures under a comprehensive general
emergency plan.
In this regard, one technical criterion for relieving
decommissioning reactor licensees from the insurance obligations
applicable to an operating reactor is a finding that the heat generated
by the SFP has decayed to the point where the possibility of a
zirconium fire is highly unlikely.
This was addressed in SECY-93-127, where the NRC staff concluded
that there was a low likelihood and reduced short-term public health
consequences of a zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent
fuel has sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum,
``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power
Plants during Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML003760936), the Commission approved a policy that authorized,
through the exemption process, withdrawal from participation in the
secondary insurance layer and a reduction in commercial liability
insurance coverage to $100 million when a licensee is able to
demonstrate that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was
drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638);
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28,
2018 (83 FR 67365)).
Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor licensees
that have received exemptions to reduce their primary insurance level
to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes to the Financial
Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were based on
the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
The NRC staff has evaluated the issue of zirconium fires in SFPs
and presented an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe
earthquake in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling
Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365). This evaluation concluded that, for a representative
boiling-water reactor, fuel in a dispersed high-density configuration
would be adequately cooled by natural circulation air flow within
several months after discharge from a reactor if the pool was drained
of water.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19211B509),
ENOI provided a supplement to its exemption request addressing air-
cooling of fuel in a drained SFP. In the attachment to this letter, the
licensee compared Pilgrim fuel storage parameters with those used in
NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098). The
analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air
circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for 7 months
after operation in a typical BWR. The licensee compared the post-
shutdown fuel storage conditions with those assumed for the analysis
presented in NUREG/CR-6451. The licensee found that the Pilgrim fuel
storage configuration is nearly identical to the representative
configuration used in the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis with respect to the
fuel assembly size, the fuel storage pitch, the rack material, and the
rack orifice size being larger than the BWR fuel assembly inlet nozzle
size. Thus, the cooling air flow should be comparable. However,
although the Pilgrim final cycle fuel operated at a lower power
density, it achieved a higher total burnup than assumed for the NUREG/
CR-6451 analysis. The licensee determined that the higher decay heat
resulting from the increased burnup would be offset by the longer decay
time (i.e., 10 months) at the effective date of the requested exemption
as compared to the decay time used in the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis (i.e.,
7 months), which results in a lower total decay heat rate. Therefore,
at 10 months after permanent shutdown (i.e., the effective date of the
requested exemption), the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that fuel
stored in the Pilgrim SFP would be adequately air-cooled in the
unlikely event the SFP completely drained.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the
probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
In addition, the licensee performed adiabatic heatup analyses in
which a complete drainage of the SFP is combined with rearrangement of
spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP; this
type of analysis postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent
fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation would be impeded. The
licensee's adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that 10 months after
the permanent cessation of operations, there would be at least 10 hours
after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water) before
the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential
for a significant offsite radiological release could occur.
In the March 25, 2019, application, ENOI furnished the following
information: ``Based on the length of time it would take for the
adiabatic heat up to occur, there is ample time to respond to any
partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by
restoring SFP cooling or makeup, or providing SFP spray. As a result,
the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire
is deemed not credible.''
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-19-0078, the NRC
staff assessed the ENOI accident analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shut down and
defueled Pilgrim site. For the highly unlikely beyond design-basis
accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, the NRC staff found that there will be a minimum of
10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The NRC
staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment of
[[Page 1831]]
mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million and
the licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance pool for offsite financial protection are consistent with the
policy established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance
considerations resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in
SECY-00-0145 that the minimum offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that secondary insurance is not
required once it is determined that the spent fuel in the SFP is no
longer thermal-hydraulically capable of sustaining a zirconium fire
based on a plant-specific analysis. In addition, the NRC staff notes
that similar exemptions from these insurance requirements have been
granted to other permanently shut down and defueled power reactors upon
satisfactory demonstration that zirconium fire risk from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving Holtec Pilgrim and
HDI from their existing primary and secondary insurance obligations
have been met. As explained above, the NRC staff has concluded that no
reasonably conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an
offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any
offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological release is highly
unlikely and the need for a significant amount of offsite liability
insurance coverage is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff
determined that, after 10 months decay, the fuel stored in the Pilgrim
SFP will be capable of being adequately cooled by air in the highly
unlikely event of pool drainage. Moreover, in the highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff has determined that
at least 10 hours would be available and is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that the fuel stored in the
Pilgrim SFP will have decayed sufficiently by the requested effective
date for the exemption of 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations to support a reduction in the required insurance consistent
with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees
to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly, consistent with
the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under which
decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the requirements
to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to participate
in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient
technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at
operating reactors and the associated potential for offsite financial
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological risk are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$131,056,000. However, because Pilgrim is permanently shut down, it
cannot produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such
a liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by Pilgrim when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power plants
does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full operating
reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel cooling
period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The licensee's
proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level of liability
insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the public. These
changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as discussed in SECY-
00-0145 and exemptions approved for other decommissioning reactors.
Thus, the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be adversely
affected by the reductions in insurance coverage. Accordingly, an
exemption from participation in the secondary insurance pool and a
reduction in the primary insurance to $100 million, a value more in
line with the potential consequences of accidents, would be in
[[Page 1832]]
the public interest in that this ensures that there will be adequate
funds to address any of those consequences and helps to ensure the safe
and timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit Holtec Pilgrim and HDI to lower
the Pilgrim primary insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary
retrospective premium pool at the requested effective date of 10 months
after permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public
interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, I have determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because reducing a licensee's offsite
liability requirements at Pilgrim does not: (1) Involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial
protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of Pilgrim or site
activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident) nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for offsite
liability insurance involves surety, insurance, or indemnity matters
only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Holtec Pilgrim
and HDI an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for
Pilgrim. Pilgrim permanently ceased power operations on May 31, 2019.
The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits Pilgrim to reduce the
required level of primary financial protection from $450 million to
$100 million and to withdraw from participation in the secondary layer
of financial protection 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020-00285 Filed 1-10-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P